U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

94–390PDF 2015

MIGRATION CRISIS: OVERSIGHT OF THE

ADMINISTRATION’S PROPOSED $1 BILLION

REQUEST FOR CENTRAL AMERICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 30, 2015

Serial No. 114–43

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Scott Hamilton, Central America Director, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................... 7

The Honorable William R. Brownfield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State 13

Ms. Paloma Adams-Allen, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Latin America 

and the Caribbean Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development ....... 21

The Honorable Alan D. Bersin, Assistant Secretary and Chief Diplomatic 

Officer, Office of Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .................... 29

Lieutenant General Kenneth E. Tovo, USA, Military Deputy Commander, 

U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Department of Defense ................................... 42

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Scott Hamilton: Prepared statement .............................................................. 9

The Honorable William R. Brownfield: Prepared statement ............................... 15

Ms. Paloma Adams-Allen: Prepared statement .................................................... 23

The Honorable Alan D. Bersin: Prepared statement ............................................ 31

Lieutenant General Kenneth E. Tovo, USA: Prepared statement ...................... 44

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 114

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 115

(1)

MIGRATION CRISIS: OVERSIGHT OF THE 

ADMINISTRATION’S PROPOSED $1 BILLION 

REQUEST FOR CENTRAL AMERICA 

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The hearing will come to order. 

We will get through our opening statements and then we will 

begin the opening statements from the panelists, and when we get 

to a stopping point to go vote we will do that and we will come 

back and resume shortly after votes. 

So thank you, guys, for being here. I want to thank the general 

for a briefing recently with SOUTHCOM that was very, very helpful. 

And so today we meet to conduct oversight of the administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 $1 billion budget request for Central America, which would roughly triple the amount of funding for the region. 

According to the administration, this funding would support the 

U.S. strategy for engagement in Central America to promote prosperity, security, and good governance. 

It would also assist the Central American governments in implementing their Alliance for Prosperity plan. 

These efforts aim to address the massive influx of migrants we 

saw at our Southwest border last summer in which over 68,000 unaccompanied children sought admittance to the United States, 75 

percent who are from the Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, also known as the Northern Triangle area. 

As a result of this migration crisis, U.S. engaged in media campaigns to discourage migration, conducted law enforcement operations to dismantle human smuggling networks, and created a new 

in-country refugee parole processing pilot program to provide a 

safer way for children and their parents to migrate in the United 

States. 

Under this program, parents living in the United States do not 

need to be U.S. citizens or in lawful immigration status to qualify 

2

for their child and spouse living in Central America to gain admittance to the United States. 

Instead, lawful immigrants who have benefitted from the presence of executive overreach on immigration are now also allowed 

to unify their families through this program. 

This is appalling to me, and while I agree that we need to do all 

in our power to prevent another migration crisis, I am baffled as 

to how this program would achieve its goals since it is a welcome 

mat for a broader border surge and does nothing to deter Central 

America migration to the United States since it only furthers the 

narrative of family reunification—it is late in the afternoon, I 

guess—that many Central Americans seek. 

Nevertheless, I do want to commend the leadership that governments in the region have shown to address the migration crisis. 

Earlier this month, I led a congressional delegation to the seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama and our delegation met 

with the Presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to 

discuss their Alliance for Prosperity plan and how it will address 

the root causes of migration. 

It was a fruitful discussion and I told them that their plan is a 

good first step in the right direction. However, I also emphasized 

that money alone would not be sufficient to solving these problems. 

Similarly, I would like to—I want to commend the actions of 

Mexico on increasing its immigration enforcement efforts which are 

critical to U.S. border security. 

Last year, Mexico’s ministry of interior reported that it removed 

over 104,000 Central American migrants and Mexican agents conducted more than 150 raids on northbound trains that previously 

transported 500 to 700 migrants through Mexico to the U.S. border 

three times a week. 

This is a significant change from Mexico’s past practice but I also 

acknowledge that much more work needs to be done. Some believe 

that these efforts have been successful to the point that we will not 

see high levels of migration this year that we saw last year. 

I don’t share that optimism, given the increasing numbers of 

Central American migrants we are seeing at Mexico’s southern border on the way to the United States. 

According to Mexico’s National Institute of Migration, Mexico is 

catching the highest number of Central American migrants so far 

to date with numbers nearly double what they were last year compared to the same time frame. 

During the first half of 2015, Mexico has apprehended almost 

60,000 migrants. This month alone Mexico apprehended almost 

14,000 migrants as opposed to 8,000 in April of last year. 

Furthermore, according to polling by the State Department, it 

appears the desire to send children to the United States has actually increased in all three Northern Triangle countries since the 

peak of the crisis last year. 

Thus, the potential for another migration crisis this year at the 

U.S. southern border is real and we must have a secure U.S. border and strong relationships with the regional governments. 

Today, we have five witnesses from the administration here to 

testify to their proposed whole government approach to the $1-billion request and U.S. strategy for the region. According to the latVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:09 Jul 07, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\043015\94390 SHIRL
3

est available statistics, the U.S. has provided roughly $24 billion in 

2012 dollars to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras since 1946. 

Yet, the administration’s U.S. strategy for Central America clearly states that current U.S. and regional efforts to address the challenges in the region have been insufficient. So I ask, how will $1 billion more achieve different results from 

what we have seen so far? Will this be like Plan Colombia, which 

I fully support, which was originally a 6-year strategy but ended 

up requiring a stronger commitment and eventually almost $10 billion from Fiscal Year 2000 to 2014. And if so, is the administration 

strategy planning for that? 

In addition, the U.S. strategy also recognizes that success of the 

strategy depends on Central American governments themselves. 

We have seen some progress on this front with several public commitments and El Salvador’s adoption of an investment stability 

law, Guatemala’s extension of the mandate of international commission against impunity in Guatemala, or CSIG, and Honduras’ 

cooperation agreement with Transparency International to combat 

corruption. 

However, I believe that we must see more significant political 

will in these countries and greater involvement of local civil society, private sector and religious organizations in the implementation and monitoring of their Alliance for Prosperity plan if they are 

to achieve accountability and lasting sustainable results. 

For instance, all three governments could also take steps to require the completion of corruptions tests across the entire police 

force, share with the U.S. their concrete plans for addressing judicial reforms including completion of homicide investigations and 

successful prosecution of criminal offenders. 

Each sign an agreement with the Transparency International to 

combat corruption, each agreed to work with an independent organization similar to CSIG in Guatemala to address the impunity 

and each show a clear prioritization of using their own funds to address the communities experiencing the highest rate of out migration to the United States. 

So in conclusion, one issue I believe should be raised more often 

by the administration to countries that receive U.S. foreign assistance is their voting record with the United States and multilateral 

organizations such as the United Nations and OAS. 

Specific to today’s hearing, I am concerned that El Salvador, 

Guatemala, and Honduras do not vote with the United States at 

least 50 percent of the time in the United Nations. 

If these countries were going to receive more in U.S. taxpayer 

dollars, shouldn’t we ask that they support the United States position more frequently in multilateral organizations? 

So with that, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and 

I will now turn to Ranking Member Albio Sires for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon and thank you to our witnesses for being here 

today. This time last year we saw an unprecedented number of 

children fleeing to the U.S. from Central America, in particular, 

the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and 

Honduras. 

4

The cost in violence fueled by gangs, lack of security, weakened 

institutions, and poverty are creating such a sense of desperation 

that families and young children risk their lives on this treacherous journey with the small hope that they may be able to escape 

their realities. 

Congress must ensure that U.S. authorities manage the processing and treatment of detained children migrants as humanely 

and transparently as possible, respecting their human rights and 

legal protection—their basic human rights and legal protection. 

In turn, the Northern Triangle governments must acknowledge 

the factors driving these mothers and children from embarking on 

this dangerous journey. 

Over the past year, U.S., Mexico, and Northern Triangle countries have all put forth effort to deter desperate children and families from undertaking such a risk and began crafting plans to combat the root causes of migration. 

Messaging campaigns have taken place to inform families of the 

life-threatening dangers involved in the journey and dispel any 

misconception regarding U.S. migration policies. 

Northern Triangle countries have banded together to craft the 

Alliance of Prosperity, their regional approach focusing on longterm development in strengthening institution and reducing violence. 

Compared to this time last year, the rate of apprehensions at the 

U.S.-Mexico border has dropped. However, according to many reports, including the Pew Research Center analysis, this drop counts 

as a result of huge increase in Mexico deportation—the increased 

deportation of Central American children traveling alone by 56 percent during the first 5 months of the fiscal year. 

We must be careful not to consider a drop in U.S. apprehension 

as a drop in migration from the region. Furthermore, we must 

work together to make sure Mexican authorities are processing 

these children with the same respect for human rights that we 

would expect at our borders. 

Reports indicate that migrants are increasingly subject to widespread incidence of extortion, kidnapping and other abuses committed by both criminal groups and Mexican police officials. 

This crisis has not emerged halfway across the globe. It has unfolded at our own doorstep and underscores the need to pay attention to our own hemisphere. 

The U.S. should support a regional strategy that will increase 

economic opportunity, strengthen the rule of law, improve the integrity and effectiveness of police and security forces, and undermine the conditions that give way to gang and family-related violence. 

I call upon the region’s governments to work with the United 

States and do their parts to find the solution to this growing humanitarian crisis, provide a safe environment for these children, 

and address the underpinning of what is compelling these young 

children to abandon their homelands and risk their lives to come 

across to the United States. 

I look forward to hearing from our panelists on how we can address this unfortunate crisis and I thank the chairman for holding 

this hearing. 

5

Mr. DUNCAN. And I will thank the gentleman. It is an unfortunate crisis but we need to remember we are also a sovereign nation 

and we can determine a lot of things about our border. 

I would like to just turn to the former chairwoman of the full 

committee and the subcommittee chairman of the Middle East and 

North Africa for a brief opening statement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and 

Mr. Sires. Thank you for holding today’s important hearing, and as 

you had said, Mr. Chairman, from Fiscal Year 2008 to 2014 Congress has appropriated over $800 million for the countries of Central America but that did not prevent the incredible flood of migrants who came to our border last summer. So what is different about the President’s new proposal of $1 billion? I don’t believe that throwing money at the problem without 

a comprehensive strategy will help to fix the crisis. 

I have concerns about the capacity of our Embassies in Central 

America to oversee this money and whether the host countries can 

be prepared to receive such a large influx of assistance as well. And 

many of us have been advocating for such a long time that the 

hemisphere needs to be a higher priority. But we have got to be 

careful about how the money is spent. The President’s Central 

America strategy is lacking a strong security component. 

Drug trafficking in the region continues to undermine political 

stability in the area and we cannot successfully strengthen these 

government institutions and root out corruption unless drug trafficking is curtailed and the security environment is improved. 

We have had many successful interagency and international cooperative operations in the transit zone including Operations 

Martillo and Anvil. But drug interdiction efforts continue to be 

hampered by resource limitations. 

General Kelly has been clear in that SOUTHCOM, our great facility down south, lacks the assets and ISR support to really help 

our neighbors in Central America to have a larger security impact. 

And even when we do have assets in the region, such as JTF 

Bravo in Honduras, we are not allowed to use these assets for security purposes, only for humanitarian missions. That doesn’t seem 

to make much sense, Mr. Chairman. 

We should also provide more foreign military financing to help 

build the capacity of security in law enforcement sectors in Central 

America. And these are not new concepts. We have done them successfully in Colombia and in Mexico, and they are championed success stories. 

So why not imitate these initiatives for all of Central America? 

And as we look at the $1-billion request from the administration 

my concern is less, Mr. Chairman, about the amount of money but 

where the money will be put to use and what benchmarks we will 

use to gauge success. 

And with that, I would like to welcome to our subcommittee 

hearing Captain John Madril of the United States Forces Japan, 

Navy Reserve Headquarters Unit Commanding Officer. So we 

thank you, sir, for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

I will recognize the ranking member for a second. 

6

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Chairman, I see that Congresswoman Norma 

Torres has arrived. I ask unanimous consent that they be allowed 

to participate in this hearing after all committee members have 

had their opportunity to question the witnesses. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, without objection so ordered. 

The Chair will now recognize Mr. Castro from Texas for 1 

minute. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairman. 

And first, Chairman, let me say that I was very proud to join you 

and others, many from this subcommittee—Foreign Affairs Committee—who represented the United States at the Summit of the 

Americas. I think that you did a wonderful job and hopefully we 

represented our nation well down there. 

I thank all of your for testimony and for being here today, and 

to the administration for putting forward a proposal to help the 

countries in the Northern Triangle do better by their children. 

I think each of us convey the message to the Presidents of these 

countries that many of us want to be helpful but, as others on this 

committee have said, we also want to make sure that the money 

is well spent, that it improves the lives of these children, and improves society in each of the countries. 

That said, I agree with my colleague, Albio Sires, that as we 

have asked Mexico to be better about making sure that they cut 

off the pipeline of children coming to the United States, there is a 

concern for human rights that comes up. 

Many folks have been cut off from riding what is known as the 

Beast—the train that ultimately leads them on the path toward the 

United States. And so I am going to have to leave a little bit early 

for a meeting at the White House on trade. 

But what I would like to see going back through the testimony 

that you all give is an understanding of how we are doing that with 

a respect for human rights or understanding the cost of human life 

because I have read several accounts now that describe the desperation and, quite frankly, the deaths of many people who have 

tried to get through Mexico who have been essentially shut off from 

riding that train and who have perished, and whether Mexico and 

the United States are cooperating to make sure that this is done 

in the most humane way possible. 

And so I hope that you all can shed some light on that subject. 

Thank you for being here. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman and thank him for his participation at the summit—a valuable member of the delegation. 

I remind other members that opening statements may be submitted for the record and I would like to explain the lighting system. 

I am going to give each of you 5 minutes for your opening statement. When we get close to 5 minutes if you could just recognize 

the lighting system will go from yellow. At red that means cut it 

off and we will move on. 

We are going to try to stay on time. Votes will be called so short 

of that I am going to go ahead and recognize Mr. Hamilton. I am 

not going to read your bios. They are provided for our members in 

the books. 

And so, Mr. Hamilton, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

7

STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT HAMILTON, CENTRAL AMERICA DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sires, members 

of the committee, thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, let me first of all thank you directly for your leadership in leading a delegation to Panama at the Summit of the 

Americas. 

I think it was the delegation that met the most Presidents in 24 

hours that we have ever seen and we appreciate that very, very 

much. And thank you, sir, for the opportunity to testify on U.S. 

strategy for engagement in Central America. 

This strategy, in our judgement, offers a compelling way to address the severe challenges facing this region, especially the Northern Triangle part of it. It prioritizes physical security for a good 

reason but it also includes governance and prosperity objectives because without all three, in our judgement, we cannot succeed in a 

sustainable way. 

It notes that security must be accompanied by what businesses 

call juridical security, or the rule of law. It notes the importance 

of vocational training and jobs, and it notes the importance of 

transparent and accountable government institutions. 

It concludes that only in this way together will we be able to ensure that the 1.7 million people in this region between 14 and 25 

who do not work and who do not study, and the 6 million of them 

who will enter the job market in the next 10 years will do so in 

their own countries trying to pursue the Honduran dream, the 

Guatemalan dream, and the Salvadoran dream instead of coming 

north. 

And Mr. Chairman, your comments and those of the other members indicated you want to know why it is different today—why are 

we investing or proposing that we do so. I would suggest, sir, that 

there are four principal reasons. 

The first is that political conditions in the Northern Triangle are 

substantially different today than they have ever been. Women and 

children fleeing a country send a very different message than 

young men fleeing for a right of passage to work. 

Women and children fleeing send a message of no confidence in 

the society. When that happened last year, it sent political shock 

waves through the region and was, frankly, humiliating for a number of leaders in the Northern Triangle. It is a wake-up call to 

them and they understand that. 

Second, those leaders are prepared to be held accountable for the 

first time by external entities. In Honduras, we are talking Transparency International in the Office of the High Commission of 

Human Rights from the United Nations. 

We are talking in Guatemala the Commission against Impunity, 

also from the United Nations. In El Salvador, we are talking about 

the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Partnership for 

Growth. 

These are strong indications for the first time that we have seen 

that they are prepared to be held publically accountable not just 

for what they say but for what they do. Going forward, that accountability is absolutely fundamental and we strongly endorse it. 

8

Third, for the first time in a generation, countries which are not 

necessarily always closely aligned have come together to prepare a 

collective plan for the region’s development. 

This collective plan, the Alliance for Prosperity, is one of the 

most impressive we have seen in the sense that it is combined and 

collective and represents the commitments and the goals of all 

three countries together. This is unusual and worthy of noting and, 

frankly, we have seen in the Colombia context that when a country 

comes together to take ownership of its situation and does not 

point fingers toward the United States, we have an opportunity to 

make a difference and that is what we see today. 

And finally, we have learned ourselves, as an Interagency, from 

experiences we have had in Colombia, Mexico, and Central America 

we know what works. We know how to scale it up and scale it out 

and we know what we need to invest in. 

In fact, we have spent so much time together that Assistant Secretary Brownfield almost speaks with a Scottish accent, which he 

will demonstrate, I am sure, when he speaks. 

Mr. Chairman, all investment necessarily involves calculated 

risk. We assess that conditions now exist for transformation. 

Our task, of course, is to ensure with you that political will is 

sustained in the region, that civil society is engaged and supported, 

and that the private sector is energized and, of course, that our 

partners are coordinated. 

Our inaction, I would suggest, invites far greater risks for the 

United States. The cost of investing in this region now is, frankly, 

going to pale in comparison with the cost of annually addressing 

migration surges to this country. 

We very much look forward to working with you on this committee and in other committees to assess the most effective way we 

can assist the region and protect the security and prosperity of the 

United States. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamilton follows:]

9


94390a-1.eps
10


94390a-2.eps
11


94390a-3.eps
12


94390a-4.eps
13

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, and I will now welcome back to the 

committee Ambassador Brownfield, who was in Colombia when 

Plan Colombia was being implemented. I hope you will touch on 

the successes of that at some point today. 

Ambassador, welcome back. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Mr. Hamilton, a mild Texas accent is sometimes confused for a Scottish accent but they are distinct accents. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sires, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you today 

our Central America engagement strategy. 

We meet to discuss the future of Central America but we filter 

our thinking through our experience last summer when tens of 

thousands of Central American migrants and children arrived at 

our southwest border. 

We learned then that the solution to the migration crisis is not 

at our border but, rather, in Central America itself and the root 

causes that drive migrants north. 

To address those root causes, we developed a three-prong strategy—prosperity, to give Central Americans a stake in their own futures; governance, to give them confidence in their own governments; and security to protect their families in their own communities. 

We do not start this exercise from scratch. Since 2009, my INL 

bureau has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support and 

assistance through CARSI, the Central America Regional Security 

Initiative. 

Some suggest there is little to show for this effort. I respectfully 

disagree. Operations Martillo and Anvil brought drug smuggling by 

air through Honduras down by as much as 50 percent since 2012. 

Maritime drug seizures—our best measure of drug flow—fell 40 

percent in Costa Rica and 60 percent in Panama. Seventy-two 

major traffickers now face justice in the United States. The homicide rate in Honduras dropped more than 20 percent between 2011 

and 2014. 

Migrant detentions at our southwest border are down as much 

as half from last year, thanks largely to Mexican and Central 

American law enforcement efforts. 

I do not apologize for CARSI, Mr. Chairman. I am proud of it. 

But if CARSI were completely successful we would not be here 

today. 

The President has requested $1 billion for Fiscal Year 2016 to 

support this strategy. The INL request is $205 million, which is 25 

percent more than last year. The committee—the subcommittee 

has a right to ask what more would it see for this 25 percent. 

First, a new bottom-up and top-down approach. Bottom-up, we 

will support local anti-gang, drug demand, and community policing 

programs that link communities with their own police. 

We will also support national police, prosecutor and judicial 

training, and capacity building programs to reform institutions 

14

from the top down and we will support specialized vetted units and 

task forces to produce immediate operational results. 

Second, we offer a new programming approach that links 

USAID’s community programs with INL’s model police precincts. 

We call it the place-based strategy. 

Jointly, we identify communities, age groups, security threats 

and root causes, and then design comprehensive statistics-driven 

programs to address them. 

And third, we expand those CARSI programs with a successful 

track record and draw down or modify those without. 

Members of the subcommittee, we knew when we started CARSI 

in 2009 that we were in this for the long haul. We knew we would 

learn from programs that worked well and from others that did 

not. 

We knew we would accomplish only as much as regional governments’ political will would survive and support. We have delivered 

results. Central America is a better place today and the United 

States is safer due to our efforts. But we surely have more to do. 

I look forward to working closely with the subcommittee to get 

it done. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your comments and your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brownfield follows:]

15


94390b-1.eps
16


94390b-2.eps
17


94390b-3.eps
18


94390b-4.eps
19


94390b-5.eps
20


94390b-6.eps
21

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

And the Chair will recognize Ms. Adams-Allen. 

STATEMENT OF MS. PALOMA ADAMS-ALLEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN BUREAU, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sires and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify today. 

I am grateful for your interest in Central America and am 

pleased to have this opportunity to update you on your plans to address the underlying causes of the region’s migration crisis. 

As you know, social development and economic growth in Central 

America have been stymied in recent years by dramatic rise in 

crime and violence, particularly in the Northern Triangle countries 

of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, one of the consequences 

being the migration of thousands of unaccompanied children to the 

United States last summer. 

To help Central American governments create an environment in 

which the smallest and most vulnerable citizens can survive and 

thrive, we must effectively address the root causes of this migration. 

As Vice President Biden said in January, the cost of investing 

now in a secure and prosperous Central America is modest compared with the cost of letting violence and poverty fester. 

The administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget request for Central 

America represents an investment now that we believe will save us 

money later. 

To ensure their investment pays off, the administration will implement the U.S. strategy for engagement in Central America, a coordinated whole of government effort that takes a comprehensive 

view of the region’s challenges and banks on a true partnership 

with the countries of the region, strong host country political will, 

and increased private sector investment. 

It directly addresses these root causes by advancing three interrelated objectives—improved prosperity, security, and governance. 

With additional funding we intend to spur greater prosperity with 

the North Triangle countries by supporting broad-based economic 

growth and anti-poverty programs. 

Our investments are intended to create jobs; expand the business, employment, and educational opportunities available to the 

groups most likely to migrate; and, ultimately, reduce poverty in 

their communities. 

In all three countries, we will invest in clean energy programs 

and trade facilitation measures that promote regional integration. 

Cheaper, more reliable energy will improve the competitiveness of 

the business sector while enhancing energy security. 

Reducing the time and cost to move goods across the region’s borders will make it easier for private businesses to capitalize on market opportunities. Expanding economic and educational opportunities for the poor is crucial to consolidating security. 

The heart of USAID’s security work continues to be youth-focused crime and violence prevention programs designed to keep 

22

youth safe, provide avenues to better education and job training, 

upgrade community infrastructure, and build trust between communities and police. 

We have been testing these approaches, many which have proven 

effective in U.S. cities in the region’s most dangerous communities. 

Last fall, a Vanderbilt University impact evaluation confirmed that 

these programs work. 

At the 3-year mark, the final results showed a 51-percent decline 

in reported murders and extortion, a 25-percent reduction in reported illegal drug sales, and a 19-percent drop in reported burglaries in neighborhoods benefiting from USAID programs as compared to the control group. 

With additional resources we will partner with national municipal governments to push for the reforms and investments needed 

to scale up and sustain successful programs. We will also implement in tandem with State INL a new place-based strategy in the 

region’s most dangerous communities with marries our youth and 

community development programs with INL’s programs to build 

trusted and accountable police. Ultimately, our success will depend 

on strong and effective governance in Central America. 

Prosperity and security gains are only sustainable in an environment where democratic values and institutions flourish, all people 

have access to basic social services, impunity is reduced, and civil 

society and the media can play their rightful roles. 

With additional resources, we will push for and help the countries implement reforms needed to enhance the effectiveness of 

their institutions. New programs will seek to increase their transparency and accountability by professionalizing the civil service 

empowering civil society to serve as watchdogs and strengthening 

the institutions charged with administering justice. 

To foster greater local revenue generation, we will strengthen 

their tax administration and financial management capability. We 

will only be successful in this endeavor if the region’s governments 

commit to making tough reforms. As such, we intend to calibrate 

our assistance in response to real reform efforts. We believe it is 

important to send the message at the outset of this process that resources will follow reform and not vice versa. 

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the conditions in the region are 

ripe for us to successfully tackle poverty, insecurity, and weak governance that compels children to migrate and help our partners in 

Central America create the secure, peaceful, and prosperous region 

we all desire. 

Thank you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Adams-Allen follows:]

23


94390c-1.eps
24


94390c-2.eps
25


94390c-3.eps
26


94390c-4.eps
27


94390c-5.eps
28


94390c-6.eps
29

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you so much. I apologize. We got tickled 

during your comments but I want to thank the United States Army 

for stepping in and dispatching a pesky fly that was flying around 

the table down there. 

Mr. Bersin for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALAN D. BERSIN, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY AND CHIEF DIPLOMATIC OFFICER, OFFICE OF 

POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BERSIN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, in light of the 

opening statements of my distinguished colleagues, let me be brief 

and summarize. 

As Barry Gordy, the founder and chief owner of Motown Records 

was asked to sit in a university hearing of a Ph.D. candidate’s thesis and before the candidate could launch into an hour-long discussion, Mr. Gordy looked at her and said, ‘‘I just need the answer to 

three questions—what is your conclusion, how did you reach it, and 

why does it matter.’’

So let me try to provide brief summary answers to each of those. 

The causes of the migration surge of the summer of 2014 are clear. 

We know the push factors out of the Northern Triangle—poverty, 

violence, educational concerns, the need for family reunification, 

the role of smuggling networks. 

These are not disputed by anyone. Why do we think that this 

time around this investment will yield a different result? The fact 

is that we did not address the pull factors that pulled people out 

of those countries, and Congress was given an opportunity to do 

that and declined to do so. 

We ask that you accept the conclusion that we need to deal with 

the push factors, otherwise we should not expect a different result. 

The reason we can expect a different result is that, as my colleagues have indicated, there is a strength of will in Central America that has not before existed on which we can build on the successes that Ambassador Brownfield has outlined that we have seen 

over the last 5 to 7 years. 

We have administrations there with political will, with a plan of 

their own developed in connection with the Inter-American Development Bank, the Alliance for Prosperity that shows a difference 

in the domestic context that is new and different. 

Equally important, there is a strategy in the United States Government that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Brownfield and Ms. AdamsAllen have outlined. There is a coherent strategy to address security issues and economic development concerns. 

How do we know this? What is the method we use? With regard 

to the push factors there is no dispute. We hear this from the migrants themselves. We hear it from the general—the GAO. We 

hear it from the leaders of Central American countries. 

Why do we think that we would see a different result with this 

investment? We see a different result because we have seen it happen in Colombia, we have seen it happen in Mexico in terms of 

dealing with the security situation until the economic conditions 

and the economic investments that are there are able to take root 

and we begin to see the push factors diminished. 

30

What happened in Colombia and what happened in Mexico is 

unique to the circumstances in those countries but the key principles of governments’ will and the United States Government with 

an assistance strategy that holds together, I think, the determining 

factors. 

The third question of Mr. Gordy—why does it matter. It matters 

because in fact this is an issue that if we do not deal with it at 

the site we will deal with it on our own border. If we do not deal 

with it in the context of the investment that has been requested, 

we will pay three times as much in dealing with the consequences 

of it without affecting at all the factors that have led to the crisis 

in the first place. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, that is my answer to the these 

questions on behalf of Secretary Johnson. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bersin follows:]

31


94390d-1.eps
32


94390d-2.eps
33


94390d-3.eps
34


94390d-4.eps
35


94390d-5.eps
36


94390d-6.eps
37


94390d-7.eps
38


94390d-8.eps
39


94390d-9.eps
40


94390d-10.eps
41


94390d-11.eps
42

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you so much. 

Votes have been called so we are going to go ahead and let General Tovo have his opening statement and then we will break after 

that. 

General, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNETH E. TOVO, 

USA, MILITARY DEPUTY COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General TOVO. Thank you. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member 

Sires, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify here today. 

Instability and insecurity in Central America are a direct threat 

to our national security. The criminality, violence, corruption, and 

weakening of institutions that accompany drug trafficking have 

created an atmosphere of hopelessness. 

We experienced some of the impact of that with last year’s migration crisis. The illicit pathways that allow the movement of 

drugs, people, weapons, and bulk cash can also provide opportunity 

to those with more nefarious intent. 

Therefore, it is in our nation’s interest to help our partners in 

the region develop the capacity to disrupt these pathways. I also 

believe we have an obligation to support our partners as they seek 

to address the root causes of insecurity and instability that threaten their nations. 

After all, it is our nation’s demand for drugs that at the very 

least has exacerbated Central America’s many challenges. Combatting these challenges will not be easy. It requires a comprehensive 

and coordinated approach that advances security, good governance, 

and economic development in equal measure. This balance is critical. 

Security gains will not be maintained if institutions are weak. 

Migration flows will not be stemmed if economic opportunity is 

non-existent and democracy will not flourish when the rule of law 

is fragile. 

From the SOUTHCOM perspective, we are working closely with 

our partners across the U.S. Government, especially with State, 

INL, DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security, as well as 

our partners in Central America. 

Our goals are to disrupt the flow of illicit trafficking, dismantle 

the networks, and improve border security. Our primary focus right 

now is on the Northern Triangle—countries that have been dealing 

with citizen security crises in recent years—and we have seen some 

remarkable progress there. 

But we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that challenges like illicit 

trafficking, violence, and poverty are regional issues—they affect 

all of Central America. Many countries are understandably concerned about the balloon effect that may come with improvements 

in security in the Northern Triangle. 

We need to make sure that the success we have in the Northern 

Triangle doesn’t come at the expense of the rest of the Caribbean—

the rest of Central America or the Caribbean. 

Mr. Chairman, these challenges are significant. It will take resources, hard work, and a long-term commitment to see a Plan 

43

Central America become a reality in the region. The good news is 

that we have a window of opportunity. Our Northern Triangle partners have developed their own plan to work collectively toward 

their shared objectives. 

They are investing in their own security and economic prosperity. 

Organizations like the IADB and the Millennium Challenge Account Corporation are lending their support. 

In short, we are seeing real political will in the region. This is 

perhaps the most promising sign of all. We only have to look to Colombia to see the payoffs that come from a committed partner and 

sustained U.S. engagement. With our support, I am optimistic we 

can see the same sort of turnaround in Central America. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Tovo follows:]

44


94390e-1.eps
45


94390e-2.eps
46


94390e-3.eps
47


94390e-4.eps
48


94390e-5.eps
49


94390e-6.eps
50


94390e-7.eps
51


94390e-8.eps
52


94390e-9.eps
53


94390e-10.eps
54


94390e-11.eps
55


94390e-12.eps
56


94390e-13.eps
57


94390e-14.eps
58


94390e-15.eps
59


94390e-16.eps
60


94390e-17.eps
61


94390e-18.eps
62


94390e-19.eps
63


94390e-20.eps
64


94390e-21.eps
65


94390e-22.eps
66


94390e-23.eps
67


94390e-24.eps
68


94390e-25.eps
69


94390e-26.eps
70


94390e-27.eps
71


94390e-28.eps
72


94390e-29.eps
73


94390e-30.eps
74


94390e-31.eps
75


94390e-32.eps
76


94390e-33.eps
77


94390e-34.eps
78


94390e-35.eps
79


94390e-36.eps
80


94390e-37.eps
81


94390e-38.eps
82


94390e-39.eps
83


94390e-40.eps
84

Mr. DUNCAN. General, thank you, and let me just take the opportunity on behalf of the committee to thank you for your service to 

the United States military in defense of our great nation. 

We are going to pause and recess until after votes. I ask the committee members to come back 10 minutes after the beginning of the 

last vote. That will give us 10 minutes to vote and come on across 

after the last vote. 

So with that, we will stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. DUNCAN. We will go ahead and reconvene the hearing and 

I appreciate y’all’s patience as we worked through votes. We do 

have some other members coming but I am going to recognize myself first for some opening questions. 

First off, I am glad we are getting out ahead of this. In anticipation of a repeat from last year at some level I am glad we are having this hearing now so that we can start addressing some of the 

issues and I think that opening statements were great and provided a lot of information to us. 

One thing that concerns me is how the unaccompanied children 

tax the resources not only of the Federal Government with manpower that has to be used to secure the border or deal with the 

number of children and watching over those but also the Federal 

resources, but at the state level. 

We are seeing state resources being taxed as well in Texas and 

the border states. And even right now we are talking about relocation of some of these children to interior states like South Carolina 

and others. And so you are going to end up seeing those states recognize the taxing of their resources. 

When I was in Panama at the Summit of the Americas, I had 

a chance meeting with President Obama after the opening ceremony, and at that meeting he and I had a chance to talk and one 

of the things that we talked about was the fact that I am probably 

one on my side of the aisle that support the financial assistance request of $1 billion. 

But I told him and I said, Mr. President, there has got to be accountability, and he agreed. He said, absolutely there has to be accountability. And I think what we were both talking about when 

we talk about accountability is making sure the money gets to 

where the rubber meets the road—that it is not taken off in some 

amount at the top and with the governments there—that it is actually getting to where it is going to be the most—do the most good. 

And that is why I think, Ambassador, that the Plan Colombia 

model is a great one when we talk judicial assistance and rule of 

law and addressing confidence in the population in those countries 

with their judicial system and that, you know, they are not going 

to have to pay a bribe to get out of jail, that there is actually going 

to be rule of law enforcement. I think that is so important. So I 

think accountability is important. 

What I would like to address first off is potential vulnerabilities 

with what we are seeing as the Central America-4 Border Control 

Agreement originally signed in 2006, but implemented between 

Guatemala and Honduras just recently. 

So open borders—open borders between those countries and what 

that may mean for law enforcement—and so I am going to address 

85

my first question to General Tovo about—I get open border and the 

free flow of goods and commerce and people among those countries, 

but I think it creates some impediments to law enforcement and I 

want to see how we are—how we are thinking about those impediments if you have got those open borders for illicit drugs and smuggling of all kinds and what that may or may not do to our law enforcement and to our national security. 

So if you could address that and then I may come over to another 

gentleman. But General? 

General TOVO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Certainly, the more open borders the risk is that you can ease 

the flow for all, not just trade and commerce. One of the things 

that we have been doing in conjunction with others on the team 

here, particularly with the Guatemalans and Hondurans, is getting 

them together in what we call IATF’s—Interagency Task Force—

on either side of that border to get them to cooperate more closely 

on intel sharing, procedures and that is coming along. 

It is part of the recent agreement between the two Presidents 

that they would have a shared mechanism. So IATF Chorti in Guatemala and then a similar JTF across the border in Honduras are 

now doing cooperative security work to open the border, yet control 

the border. 

And so I think while we are at the nascent stages of that, I think 

that is a good sign that they recognize the potential vulnerability, 

they are taking steps to control the border in a proper manner, and 

then, of course, we are supporting their efforts through advice and 

assistance. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So do you think that potential enemies such as 

ISIS would try to exploit any of that open border across the whole 

Latin America, Central America region to some degree? 

General TOVO. Chairman, I can’t speak specifically to ISIS. You 

know, at this point I don’t think we have any information that says 

that they specifically want to exploit these pathways. 

But it is our position at SOUTHCOM that, given the pathways 

that exist—the illicit pathways that move people, drugs, money, 

guns, et cetera, in multiple directions that it is certainly a vulnerability that we ought to figure out how address and that we are 

addressing. 

That is part of what we do with our partners is help them develop their capacity to monitor and improve their ability to maintain domain awareness and then disrupt the networks with appropriate capabilities. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. Okay. While I have got you, a different topic. 

Mr. Bersin, I am coming to you in just a second. But General, the 

250 Marines that are going to be stationed that I have read about, 

are they going to be under SOCOM’s control? 

General TOVO. Under SOUTHCOM. 

Mr. DUNCAN. In SOUTHCOM? 

General TOVO. They are under the command and control of our 

Marine component MARFORSOUTH and they will working closely 

with JTF Bravo in Honduras. 

Mr. DUNCAN. How are they going to be used? 

General TOVO. Well, they have got several different elements. 

The ground element is going to be providing training to our partVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:09 Jul 07, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\043015\94390 SHIRL
86

ners in the region, things such as rivering operations, marksmanship, small unit training. The air element will provide general support and then the logistics element will be doing a series of humanitarian assistance projects—working with our partners to repair 

schools and other facilities. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Bersin, let us go back to the open border issue and the question is what efforts DHS has taken to mitigate any exploitation of 

Central America’s loose border security measures and so I would 

love to hear your take on that. 

Mr. BERSIN. Mr. Chairman, the way in which we used to look at 

borders in the past were strictly the lines on the map, the lines 

that separate one country from another and the notion was that 

you do inspections at the line where the sovereignty shifts. 

I think what we understand about borders today, and we apply 

in a lot of our actions and we expect the Central Americans to do 

the same in the context of the Guatemalan and Honduran agreement, is to secure the flows of goods and people that are going back 

and forth. 

And it is not so much the inspection point at the sovereignty line 

but it is the ability to exchange information and, in a layered security fashion, to be able to intercept high-risk or malefactors who 

are crossing. 

So this is not about a free pass but it is about recognizing that 

the Maya Chorti, of example, has a zone from 20 miles south of the 

sovereignty line, 20 miles north into Guatemala and the idea is to 

exchange information and coordinate, and with the work that DHS 

is doing with the support of INL in Honduras, for example, with 

the Goetz Group which is training border patrol agents, in effect—

our border patrol agents training Guatemalan border—Honduran 

border patrol agents, we expect to be doing the same in Guatemala, 

and we think that this notion of securing the flow of people and 

the flow of goods in a layered security is going to be as effective 

as having an incomplete inspection point right at the line of sovereignty. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right, and I appreciate those efforts. I don’t mean 

to come across as negative for what Honduras and Guatemala are 

doing. I am exactly opposite of that. I appreciate them working together in a bilateral agreement to facilitate trade and all that. 

I think that will benefit both countries. Just to follow up, though, 

Mexico has increased their border security on that Guatemalan 

border. Are you all involved in that and how do you see that? I 

think it is effective, from what I have read. How do you see it? 

Mr. BERSIN. So in effect then, just to carry the point further on 

the Guatemalan-Honduran border using Mexico as an example, actually Mexico’s efforts on its southern border—Guatemala’s northern border—involves giving a pass to Central Americans to go up 

into the—into Mexico for a certain period of time under a border 

crossing card arrangement. Where there is a line drawn and the 

checkpoint and the security is that the Isthmus of Tehuantepec—

there are other checkpoints—but at the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, 

the narrow part of Mexico, is where people are not being permitted 

to go further north. 

87

We have been working very closely with our Mexican colleagues 

in a whole variety of methods with regard to our southern border—

Mexico’s northern border. Many of those techniques in terms of 

technology, in terms of layered security, in terms of training and 

capacity building actually have been adopted by the Mexicans in 

their efforts that have, I think, shown great results on the Guatemalan border. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right, and I think it has been effective. I want to 

applaud the Mexicans for recognizing that and stepping it up. I 

think the layered approach of Guatemala on their side, Mexico on 

their side to stop it before it ever gets to that Texas-U.S. borders 

is very vital. 

I want to ask the State Department will any of the billion dollars 

for Central America be targeted to addressing this issue and preventing exploitation of the loose border security measures by bad 

actors? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We are collaborating very closely in the interagency on exactly 

those questions. We spent about—about 18 months ago we started 

talking about this subject and we determined with DHS, with INL, 

with Justice, with others, how we might seek to address border security and also achieve the goals that we set for ourselves. And 

with Mr. Bersin and his team, we are working very closely to try 

to identify exactly what those programs will be. So it is very much 

an integral part of what we are doing. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. I appreciate that. 

You know, last year at the peak we witnessed a GuatemalanMexican river crossing. People were paying 80 cents to hop on a 

pallet on top of inner tubes and be paddled across into Mexico and 

there were Guatemalan police that were right there. I mean, the videos were very, very clear, and it was less than $1. 

It was a very nominal fee. You saw people exploiting that situation 

to make money but the porousness of that was very alarming to 

folks in my district. And so I hope we—I hope we see a very active 

effort on behalf of—on the part of Guatemalans and Hondurans 

and El Salvadorans and Mexico, which I think we are seeing. 

So I am over my time but we are going to come back for a second 

round. I am going to recognize the ranking member. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, I have been on this committee now 9 years and I have 

always been an advocate for this region of the world ever since I 

was not even a congressman. 

But, you know, it is very frustrating to me when people come before this committee and they tell me how well things are working 

and what improvement we are making in this part of the Western 

Hemisphere. 

You know, from my view, you know, I look at Venezuela as a 

mess. Brazil is embroiled in probably the biggest corruption scandal of history. You have Bolivia, who is acting like a rogue nation, 

and you have Ecuador. Then you have, obviously, Nicaragua now—

Ortega wants to perpetuate himself. He has found capitalism now. 

You know, I look at—we were in Argentina, the former chairman 

and I. I mean, I just don’t see, you know, this improvement, and 

I look at Guatemala, El Salvador and I see where they have their 

88

society problems with these children, and to me they look at these 

children going to America as a pressure releasing valve that they 

have within their own country. 

And I really don’t know what their full commitment is to really stop this. You know, the Presidents ask for $1 billion. We are never 

going to get $1 billion. That is just a figure that they threw out 

there. We will get some, you know—you know, an amount that we 

will get. 

But where are we headed with some of this stuff? I mean, Ambassador, I know you have been before me half a dozen times and 

you are always going to say the same thing. But go ahead, say it 

again. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. I would never, ever argue or disagree with the 

distinguished gentleman from New Jersey. May I—may I—may I 

start by agreeing with you and actually laying out my own personal experience? 

Mr. SIRES. I guess I am frustrated. That is my——

Mr. BROWNFIELD. I am with you, and let me share that frustration at the start and then give you some more positive stuff at the 

end. 

I am one of the most kind of experienced Latin America hands, 

I guess, that has ever had the job that I currently hold as assistant 

secretary for INL. 

I came in actually committed big time to plussing up what we 

were doing because when I arrived in this job less than 25 percent 

of my entire budget was focussed on Latin America. 

That was a function of Iraq and Afghanistan but it was also a 

function of concentration elsewhere. To my intense frustration, I 

spent much of my first 2 years shutting down INL sections. 

I shut down the INL section in Bolivia. I shut down the INL section in Ecuador. I shut down small INL programs in Argentina, 

Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Venezuela we had shut down even 

before I got to the job, for rather obvious reasons. 

I was quite frustrated. I was then and I am now. In South America I have exactly two INL sections in place—Peru and Colombia. 

So I start with the same frustration you had, which is to say due 

to circumstances that, in my opinion, were beyond any of our controls, we did not have these programs. 

Central America I did say to you, and I said it somewhat defensively but I do say it again, CARSI has not solved all these problems but I do emphatically assert that both Paloma from the 

USAID side and me from the INL side have spent 5 years putting 

infrastructure in place. 

We have got people on the ground now that can actually do these 

programs, learning lessons between stupid programs that obviously 

did not work and programs that did work, and figuring how we can 

go from here. 

And finally, reminding everyone—and you hear it from me every 

time I come and appear before this committee—we have got to 

think long term. This is not a problem—a problem that has been 

created over decades is not going to be solved in a matter of days. 

But let me go back to the chairman’s question. For example, border stuff—what are we doing on border stuff? First, don’t forget 

that on the other side of Central America is Mexico. 

89

This year I am going to put $90 million of INL programs into the 

Mexican southern border. Now, is this going to have an impact on 

Central America? Of course, it is going to have an impact on Central America for all the reasons that Mr. Bersin just laid out. 

Second, we are supporting these joint interagency task forces, police and military, that are to work the borders themselves. They 

are tied into the open border concept, Ranking Member and Mr. 

Chairman, the theory being if you open the border basically for the 

regular crossing points people will no longer—who are doing legitimate business will no longer avoid the highways because they will 

move more rapidly along the regular places and the criminals will 

be the ones who are trying to cross at the non-authorized crossing 

points for which you have the Joint Interagency Task Forces to 

identify and grab them. 

Will it work? I guess I would say it cannot possibly work any 

worse than we have had for the last 5 years. Sorry, Dr. Sires, I got 

carried away. 

Mr. SIRES. Well, thank you for making me a doctor. I didn’t realize that. You know, I think part of all this refocus on the Western 

Hemisphere—last year was a wake-up call but also, I think, China 

is scaring a lot of people in this country with the influence that 

they are having in all these countries. So all of a sudden we have 

to refocus on the Western Hemisphere. And I am looking for signs 

that there really is a commitment by these countries that they are 

going to do what they need to do to stop this flow of people coming 

over because, really, at the end of this those children are the ones 

that suffer. 

I mean, they are abused. They get taken advantage of and, you 

know, just from the humanitarian point of view somebody has got 

to make a real commitment. 

If we are going to give them money—and I would like to see 

some money go there—but I also like to see transparency. You 

know, I think those days where we just gave them money and forgot about it are over. 

So Mr. Hamilton, can you talk a little bit about that? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Certainly. Thank you, Mr. Sires. 

Two things I would say about. First, last summer when the unaccompanied children started to arrive, the countries took it very seriously. Their public commitment was matched by their actions and 

the numbers slowed down significantly. 

They also took the very difficult political decisions for them to 

take back flights of women and children in addition to the, in the 

last fiscal year, over 100,000 young men who were deported from 

the United States to those three countries. 

So this was a challenging time for them but they did it. They did 

what we asked, and they did it for their own reasons because those 

kids belong in those countries and they understand that. 

In November, following up on that type of decision, they worked 

with the Inter-American Development Bank to create a plan that 

essentially said to the rest of us we own this problem—it is our 

problem and we want to address it with your assistance. That, 

again, is new and worthy of attention and respect. 

And third, in March of this year they came up with an elaboration of the plan which is very, very programmatic and very 

90

strong clear detailed goals and commitments that they have entered into. 

Now, what are those commitments that they have achieved so 

far? In Honduras, where we have seen significant action, they have 

invited in Transparency International, and those of you who know 

that entity know that it is not an entity easily bullied by politicians. 

It is independent, it is credible and very serious and they are 

going to be auditing the countries’ government departments. That 

is something that is creative and new and worthy, I think, of attention and respect. 

They increased their tax revenues by 21 percent in the past year 

in part by being more efficient and trying to invest in their own 

society, knowing very well that that is the only way they can make 

genuine progress. 

They negotiated a new agreement with International Monetary 

Fund in order to get their budget house in order so they can do this 

over the long term as well—again, quite serious. 

Only a few days ago, they passed a new law to protect human 

rights defenders and journalists, something that has been a continuing concern in Honduras for some time. And as Secretary 

Bersin said, they have inaugurated the two task forces on the border that we consider to be very serious and effective. 

So in general, Honduras has done a lot. They even invited in the 

Office of the High Commission for Human Rights—again, an organization that is independent in every respect and will help them 

achieve progress in that area, too. 

Guatemala’s decision a few days ago to renew the mandate of the 

Commission Against Impunity was absolutely fundamental to that 

country’s future. 

Without an independent investigative body like that, without the 

ability to investigate, indict, arrest, and hopefully allow the system 

to convict bad actors, the country simply cannot progress. 

And only a week ago they indicted 22 members of the tax administration who had committed fraud, one of whom is a fugitive—the 

personal secretary of the Vice President, in fact. Again, a very serious effort by the CSIG entity to move forward on correcting impunity in that country. 

Guatemala also has extradited to the United States over ten 

major criminals in the past year, Honduras over seven—taking, 

again, very seriously their obligation. 

In El Salvador, they have launched an anti-extortion task force 

designed to crack down on gangs who are intimidating young 

small-business owners. They also passed a law to ensure that legal 

stability of investments. 

So a number of things have happened in the past 12 months that 

represent, in our judgment collectively, a serious effort to address 

these impunity and accountability issues that you quite properly 

raise and we will absolutely intend to ensure that they follow 

through on those and many other commitments that they have 

made. 

Mr. SIRES. Is Salvador the biggest recipient of money from us 

with the Millennium Challenge money and everything? 

91

Mr. HAMILTON. I think if you add the Millennium Challenge account it is very close. But Guatemala also receives significant Feed 

the Future assistance from USAID. But I think Paloma might 

know more than I do about that. 

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Am I on? Yes. 

Yes, Guatemala receives significant assistance from us for their 

food security and agricultural development efforts in the western——

Mr. SIRES. And they have been receiving this money prior to the 

children coming across? 

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Yes. They have been for about 3 years now 

and we are seeing——

Mr. SIRES. And El Salvador also? 

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN [continuing]. We are seeing great results with 

it. 

Mr. SIRES. We are seeing great results? I mean——

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Yes, we are seeing the results in the western 

highlands in linking farmers to markets, moving people out of extreme poverty, getting nutrition intervention to youth under five. 

These are the big pieces that we have seen in the western highlands of Guatemala. 

We would like to and are working with the government to expand those investments through their Pacto Hambre—their national food security plan. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, I thank the gentleman. 

I want to go now to the chairman of the Asia Pacific Subcommittee, former chairman of this committee, someone who followed this issue, worked very diligently on it last year and I commend him for that—Mr. Salmon from Arizona. 

Mr. SALMON. Well, thank you, and first of all, Mr. Chairman, 

thanks for holding this incredibly important hearing. 

I am very apologetic that I wasn’t here for the testimony, but I 

am chairing an Asia Pacific Subcommittee on Bangladesh on an 

upper floor and somebody is relieving me because this issue is so 

important to me. 

I wanted to come and be able to ask some questions. I do want 

to make a couple of observations both about the hearing and the 

subcommittee. 

First observation is I have a really hard time masking my affinity for Ambassador Brownfield. I wish there were 1,000 like you. 

I think that this country would be in a lot better shape. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. My wife disagrees intensely with that statement, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. I might be able to talk her into something. And 

then my other observation is that if every subcommittee in this 

Congress had a ranking member like Mr. Sires, who is so darn cooperative to work for and just cares about doing the right thing, 

we would solve a lot of problems in this country. And I really appreciate—I really—you are just a gem to work with and mean that. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I second that, by the way. 

Mr. SALMON. Yes. So my question would be to Mr. Bersin, and 

because I spoke so fondly of one of your members doesn’t mean I 

92

don’t like the rest of you. I just really have such a strong affinity 

for Ambassador Brownfield and I think he knows that. 

But to date, Mr. Bersin, how many individuals, both adults and 

children, have been brought to the U.S. under the new in-country 

refugee/parole processing program? That is my first question. How 

are they arriving in the U.S. is my second question. 

Third, once in the U.S., how many of the program participants 

are minors and how many are adults? And if you don’t have any 

of those answers you can get them to me. I would really appreciate 

it. 

Fourth, how many of the—well, why don’t you start with that because I have some other questions I would like to follow on with 

that. 

Mr. BERSIN. After observing that I am in accord with your assessment of Brownfield—to know him is to love him—I will——

Mr. SALMON. You just rose in my estimation so that is good. 

Mr. BERSIN [continuing]. To answer your question, which is that 

in fact none to date have been admitted to the United States because the applications—approximately 500 have been received, but 

the interviews with regard to in-country processing of refugees status has not begun. 

Mr. SALMON. Okay. Then my—so we really don’t have any that 

have qualified under the terms of this new—or this arrangement, 

this agreement? 

Mr. BERSIN. To date, that is correct, sir. 

Mr. SALMON. How—but they are actually coming to the States, 

we are understanding. How are they getting here? 

Mr. BERSIN. There is a—there is a—as you know, there is a refugee admissions process that covers the entire world——

Mr. SALMON. Right. 

Mr. BERSIN [continuing]. And there are protocols that pertain to 

how refugees are brought to the United States after it has been 

ascertained that they are refugees. 

Mr. SALMON. Right. 

Mr. BERSIN. That has not yet applied in the Central American 

context. 

Mr. SALMON. What do we know about the applicants? Or do we 

have any information? 

Mr. BERSIN. I know, sir, there are 500 of them. I have not looked 

at any of the files. 

Mr. SALMON. You don’t know a breakdown yet of whether they 

are adults or children? 

Mr. BERSIN. That is—I will get—if you leave the record open we 

will supply that. 

Mr. SALMON. That would be very helpful, and how many have, 

you know, applied for parole status. Here is my next question. Out 

of that 500 that we know of, how many of the individuals who applied on behalf of their relative for refugee or parolee status are in 

the U.S. on a deferred action? 

That would be my next question. Can an applicant here in the 

U.S. petition to bring in a parent or another relative under the program? Let us say that they are granted asylum status or parolee 

status. 

93

Can they apply then for chain migration? Can they bring a parent? Can they bring another relative, and if—do we know whether 

they have done that yet? Do you know anything about that? 

Mr. BERSIN. So with regard to the latter case, I can state, consistent with previous responses, that it has not yet begun. Therefore, you would not have those results. 

With regard to the two questions on legal eligibility, we will provide that. I, myself, am not an expert on the refugee——

Mr. SALMON. Okay. I would just like to know if they are here 

under deferred status whether they can then be the sponsor or 

whether—yes. 

Mr. BERSIN. I understand the inquiry. 

Mr. SALMON. Okay. And then are any of those who are applying 

on behalf of the relative in the U.S. under deferred action as put 

in place by the President’s November 2014 action—that is my other 

question. 

One other question that I have is more in regards to I witnessed 

what you talked about. I was with General Kelly about a year ago 

on the Guatemala-Mexican border. I personally witnessed those 

people coming over on those barges or rafts or whatever you want 

to call them. 

I saw it happening. I saw the law enforcement people turning the 

other way, not doing anything about it, and I would note that one 

of my perceptions about this whole diminishment this year—the 

numbers have gone dramatically down of those who have come to 

the border, surrendered themselves, both unaccompanied minors as 

well as accompanied minors—but I think a lot of that is in part to 

Mexico’s stepped up participation. They are interdicting either at 

the Mexican border or in Mexico. 

And, I mean, it is not that we are catching these people. At least, 

that is my understanding, because many of them are surrendering. 

It is not like we are apprehending them. They get to the border 

and they surrender themselves and so I don’t know that we have 

really stepped up anything, have we? 

Mr. BERSIN. So, first, with regard to the situation and all of us—

many of us have seen the situation on the Mexican-Guatemalan 

border on the river—let me—if I can put that in context. 

Until 2 years ago, there was absolutely nothing going on on the 

U.S.-Guatemalan border. Zero. So what you are seeing is actually 

not so much—there are cases where people are crossing with the 

intention of going to the United States. But actually most of the 

activity there is the intercommunity border economic activity that 

goes back and forth. The difference is that that is not where Guatemalans or Hondurans or Salvadorans are being stopped anyway by 

the Mexicans. They are being stopped further up——

Mr. SALMON. Right. 

Mr. BERSIN [continuing]. Into Mexico. 

Mr. SALMON. Into Mexico. 

Mr. BERSIN. And what we see in terms of the ziplines and tubes 

is actually a intra——

Mr. SALMON. Commerce. 

Mr. BERSIN. It is a commerce. It is a commercial relationship 

that has existed for decades and decades. But that isn’t what is 

94

leading to the change you notice, which is the enforcement effort 

ten miles, 20 miles and then 50 miles——

Mr. SALMON. By the Mexico—yes. 

Mr. BERSIN [continuing]. By Mexico and there is significant activity going on. 

Mr. SALMON. They are doing an amazing job. I think they have 

really stepped it up. As to, you know, what we are doing on our 

borders I think that when they come and they claim credible fear 

or whatever, you know, the line de jour is that they are then 

brought into the country and taken through the process. 

So I don’t know that we are doing anything to thwart it. I know 

we did some public service announcements and things like that in 

country about how difficult the journey is and how dangerous it is 

and those kinds of things. 

But, ultimately, one of my hopes and desires was that, you know, 

we would get them back in country as quickly as possible to show 

that that $5,000 or $8,000 they paid to the coyotes was wasted 

money and that you do it again it is going to be wasted money. 

Mr. BERSIN. Congressman, again, you know, with all due respect, 

that was the point of the request for the appropriations to deal 

with the pull factors. Until we have an enforcement mechanism 

and an immigration court that is properly resourced here, we will 

not see the turnaround that you suggest. 

When there is the ability to do so, we are actually returning people in short order. But as you note, when you claim asylum there 

is a process which our country has recognized and I think we 

should be proud that it does recognize it. 

But we don’t have the ability to actually conduct that process 

with the—with the speed and rapidity that a properly resourced 

immigration court would permit us to do. 

Mr. SALMON. The asylum statues are valid. I mean, they are—

I think asylum is a worthy policy for legitimate folks that qualify 

for asylum. 

I think there are a lot of people that are maybe not so honest 

about why they are really crossing the border, and they have figured out that by claiming that your chances are a lot better. 

But with the Mexican minors we had a lot more flexibility in the 

past than we do with Central American kids because of legislation, 

and our hope was to try to streamline that process through a series 

of questioning that maybe some of these adjudication processes 

might be averted. And is that happening or can it not? 

Mr. BERSIN. So with regard to the Guatemalan, Honduran, Salvadoran councils, on those cases where we can get cooperation, get 

travel documents——

Mr. SALMON. Where they will voluntarily deport, they can still do 

that? 

Mr. BERSIN [continuing]. That is actually—yes, yes, and we are 

getting significant cooperation from the Northern Triangle countries with their in U.S. country-based personnel. 

But again, sir, the problem is we respect the asylum process as 

you do and—but there is not adequate machinery to make this 

function in a way that gets rapid hearings which would permit 

them a disposition of the case, one way or the other, and then a 

95

return to the country of origin for those who don’t qualify for asylum. 

The problem is that decision is not being made in real time. 

Mr. SALMON. I just—my final comment, Mr. Chairman, but we 

passed a bill—we in the House passed a bill last summer that 

would have addressed this and would have sped up the asylum 

process and would have provided judges and courts, and Senate 

never took it up. 

Mr. DUNCAN. It is time to pass it again and I thank the gentleman for his efforts on this. And perception is reality. 

We talked about the rafts and people being across, but the fact 

is people in New Jersey and people in South Carolina saw that 

newscast or saw that YouTube video or whatever it was—saw the 

Guatemalan law enforcement standing right there, saw the interview with the people that were actually trying to migrate to this 

country weren’t just normal commerce across that river, and they 

believe that is the reality there—that law enforcement is looking 

the other way. 

Guatemala can change that perception and ultimately change the 

reality in the minds of the American people, who are looking at the 

request for an extra billion dollars to be spent. And so we have got 

to change that perception in order to justify that expenditure to our 

constituents. 

So with that, I will yield to the gentlelady from California, Ms. 

Torres, who has joined our committee for the day. Thank you. 

Ms. TORRES. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 

Member, and also to the rest of the committee members for giving 

me an opportunity to participate. 

I absolutely agree that we must do everything that we can to stabilize Central America. I think it is a critical partner for the Americas and for our country. 

I do want to commend you, Mr. Hamilton, your comments and 

what you said earlier regarding the outreach that has been made 

to the Northern Triangle countries about the difficulties and the 

dangers of travelling to the U.S. 

I was—had the opportunity to travel to El Salvador and Honduras recently. Spoke to civil society groups and many, many, 

many youth groups. 

What they said was that they got the message that it is very 

dangerous and that the effort for the U.S. to provide that community outreach to them about the dangers that they are facing walking 1,000 miles to the U.S. is real. 

I wonder if you know anything about the—what appear to me 

that it was somewhat a coordinated effort of two for one smugglers. 

That was what they were offering last year, and I recognize that 

it was a political year—an election year. But the fact that, you 

know, they were sort of going out there and pushing people to come 

to the U.S. seems almost surreal to me. 

I want to ask three specific questions. I know I have limited 

time. Number one, you said that the Northern Triangle countries 

are prepared and want to see change. I saw—I saw that in El Salvador. They are working with civil society groups. I did not quite 

see that in Honduras. 

96

I wonder will this money, this aid—will it include technical assistance to ensure that there is transparency on how this money 

is going to be spent, that my community is going to be able to go 

on some website and be able to see where our tax dollars are going, 

who is receiving them and how are they being—are they being effectively directed to where it is needed. 

The other thing is what are your views on establishing CSIG-like 

commissions in El Salvador and in Honduras and how much of or 

what percentage of law enforcement funding will be directed to 

support institutional reforms? 

We heard it over and over and over again in these two countries—corruption within the ranks of the police department, corruption within the ranks of the military. They are not trustworthy organizations. 

The community can’t go to them to report a crime. Oftentimes, 

they are victims of these two organizations. And, frankly, they are 

starving their police forces. You have to look at their wages and 

their salaries and you have to bring them to par with the rest of 

the Central American communities. 

And lastly, it alarms me that 500 people have requested an asylum and we have not been able to process those applications. 

I would like to see, you know, what process do we have, or 

should we be investing some of this money in ensuring that these 

three countries have some type of victim assistance programs and 

relocation within their countries? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Congressman Torres. Excellent questions, and we agree, of course, completely with you that criminal 

smuggling networks should not be allowed to determine the immigration policy of the United States, and we were very active in 

seeking to make sure that did not happen last year and will not 

happen in the future. 

With respect to your question on transparency and accountability, we could not agree more. If we do not ensure accountability 

and transparency and, frankly, crack down on impunity, we will 

never succeed in the region. 

We know that. The strategy is designed exactly around those 

principal factors. We are trying to ensure that all of the principal 

government institutions—the tax system, the justice sector, the 

public procurement departments—are transparent and accountable 

in every way. 

The governments themselves have committed to do that and, as 

I mentioned earlier, have brought in external actors to assess and 

to monitor themselves. That is, frankly, quite unusual and suggests 

to us that they are serious. 

They can’t hide from those institutions. They can perhaps pull 

the wool over people’s eyes in past administrations by doing it 

themselves, but outside actors are unlikely to allow that to happen. 

So we are quite confident they are serious and we intend to move 

forward on that. 

We have a very, very serious monitoring and evaluation program 

built into what we propose here, three different levels. One is a political level—the political requests or asks that we will make of 

those governments and they have publically committed to any 

97

March 3rd statement or jointly authored with the Vice President 

of the United States. 

Second, there is a programmatic evaluation effort, which will be 

U.S. programs—how we seek to achieve certain goals and how we 

measure benchmarks along the way. 

And third will be national level trajectory benchmarks—how, 

with a lag over time, do we see success. Those benchmarks will be 

shared and discussed with the Members of Congress on a regular 

basis because that is the only way we can move forward together—

by being open and transparent and honest about this process. 

With respect to CSIG in Guatemala, we are very strong supporters of it, as you know. We would very much welcome consideration by other countries of a similar entity in their societies. 

CSIG succeeds because it is independent. It is not susceptible to 

manipulation by anyone, and to the extent that Guatemala can 

help persuade Salvador and Honduras that these are valuable 

interventions we would very much support them in doing so. 

Institutional reforms in the police and military are critical. Ambassador Brownfield will talk about that in more detail. But fundamentally, we agree completely with you that police forces have 

been under resourced and misused for a long period of time and all 

three governments are committed to changing those processes. 

In Honduras, in particular, they propose to train and hire 6,000 

new police officers in the next 3 years precisely in order to create 

a credible police force that people do not fear, and that can then 

replace the current military police who are patrolling the streets in 

the absence of a credible national police force. So we very strongly 

agree with you on all of those factors. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. And Congresswoman, let me flesh out in detail 

a little bit in terms of police institutional reform in terms of how 

we are trying to attack this problems set. 

Because you are, obviously, absolutely correct—that until the law 

enforcement institutions are in fact reformed, purified, improved 

they will never be able to perform the function that we are—that 

we are asking as their commitment to this Central America strategy. 

As I said during my opening statement, we have a bottom-up and 

a top-down approach. Bottom-up, in a sense, means linking the 

communities with their local law enforcement. But that is not reform per se. Top-down is exactly that and that is what we can do 

to professionalize and reform the law enforcement community. 

In no particular order, we are supporting, and in fact providing, 

a great deal of assistance monitoring and participation into police 

academies and police training in each of the three Northern Triangle countries, in addition to a regional police academy that we 

are operating and working in Panama for the entire region. 

Second, we are establishing—trying to establish, encouraging 

them to establish with us an IAD—internal affairs division or inspector general sort of office or function in each of the police communities. 

In other words, duh, somebody who will police the police. Until 

you have that, you know that you will not be able to control the 

problem within the institution. 

98

Third, we are working with the three governments in terms of 

establishing and passing the legislation—the statutory basis that 

allows the removal of individuals legally for abusive or corrupt behavior. 

Fourth, we are working in what in Mexico we have come to call 

los controles de confianza, which is to say the system, the structure, by which you can vet and remove, at least if not from the entire institution from individual units, those people who for whatever reason are found to have been penetrated or corrupted. 

And finally, as our requirement from each of the three governments, we will insist that they themselves meet salary—minimum 

salary requirements. 

You know as well as I do that a big part of the problem is if a 

police officer is paid so little that he or she cannot support his or 

her family, that police officer will supplement the income in other 

ways and that becomes part of the problem. 

Ms. TORRES. Can I—can I ask a follow-up on that? Can you go 

more into detail as to what are those requirements, and does that 

include background checks on the current officers that are there? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. That is where we are headed. But I am going 

to break this out into—briefly, Mr. Chairman, into a couple of different areas. 

One is for specific units, what we call the vetted units that are 

designed to do specific functions. They are intensely vetted and 

when I say background checks I mean not only do they—is there 

an assessment of where they are from and what has been their 

track record while in the police, but also they are then polygraphed 

on a systematic basis and asked, quite frankly and bluntly, have 

you engage in activity that is corrupt or illegal and the polygraph 

will produce an outcome. 

Obviously, that is a time-intensive approach that cannot be applied to the entire police force and, quite frankly, in many countries 

part of the statutory or legal problem you cannot compel a police 

officer to submit to a polygraph. 

You can say you may not join this particular unit if you do not 

agree to a polygraph—you will not receive the salary stipend and 

the additional equipment. That you can do but you cannot necessarily compel them to do polygraphing. 

So on a more nationwide and national basis, the principle of vetting, which has been worked through, by the way, both in the Plan 

Colombia experience in Colombia and the—and the Merida Initiative experience in Mexico is to have an office and professionals who 

will do basic vetting—where did the human come from, talk to the 

community in terms of what he or she has done in the past, go 

through the actual personnel and official records of those individuals after they have joined the police force, and, to the extent that 

there is something there that does not work, you have the extreme 

option to separate them from the police force. 

A less extreme option: Move them into other areas in the police 

that do not necessarily make them as attractive to those who wish 

to purchase their services because they are not in an area where 

they can influence. In other words, put them in some place where 

they are not in direct engagement with the community. 

99

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentlelady. Her time is expired. And 

the Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Yoho, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panelists, for 

being here. 

Lieutenant General Tovo, I appreciate the service to your country 

and everything you guys are doing in the Southern Command. 

I know people personally that are in the Coast Guard in the 

south Florida area and I hear stories of what they go through and 

I commend you for what you guys are doing. 

And I hear a resounding theme over and over again from everybody that has been up there—talking about the corruption in countries in Central and South America, and I think sometimes we can 

maybe even look at our own Government—not to point fingers at 

anybody without pointing at us. 

Saying that, with so much corruption in Latin American governments and the police forces, what is your recommendation in working effectively through the corruption in order to get the results we 

want? Because what I am hearing from you, Ambassador 

Brownfield, is that we need to ask for a minimum pay for the police 

officers in their country. 

But I am looking here in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras 

that we have given—not we, the American taxpayers, has given the 

equivalent of $23.6 billion—$23.6 billion and we have to tell them 

how much to pay their police officer? 

What in the heck have we been doing since 1946, and why do not 

the governments of those countries want the desire to fix that problem? And again, I shared this story—my mom wanted me to play 

the piano. I didn’t want to play the piano and I sat down there to 

take lessons, and I still don’t know how to play the piano. 

At what point and what do you do to make them want to do that 

or we walk away and get stronger on our border security? And I 

want to talk to all of you about border security. 

I would just like to hear what else do we need to do to get the 

message across that we are not playing? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Let me start with that, Congressman. 

Mr. YOHO. And I apologize for my tone. I am generally calm. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Not to worry. There is nothing that excites me 

more than an appropriately warm conversation. First, I would suggest to you that we are—as I have said a couple of times before, 

we are dealing with an issue that is now embedded in culture, society and——

Mr. YOHO. Exactly. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD [continuing]. Communities for decades. We are 

not talking about a problem that started last year or the year before last. We are talking about a situation that has endured probably for more than 100 years. 

Mr. YOHO. Let me interject here, because since 1971 when the 

infamous War on Drugs was announced by President Nixon we 

have spent about $2 trillion, again, of the American taxpayers’ 

money. I want results. You know, I want—go ahead. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. And I will—I will suggest to you two quick 

thoughts and then I will let other jump into this as well. You are 

absolutely correct that if we cannot get something as fundamental 

100

agreed to by governments such as paying a basic salary that is sufficient so that the individual member of the police does not need 

to go into corruption and accept bribes in order to survive, then we 

should not be walking down this road for enhanced expenditures. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. But what I believe this means is this is one of 

the—I won’t even call it an ask—one of the requirements that we 

will impose before we would expect you all, the United States Congress, to respond positively to a substantially enhanced or increased support for Central America. 

That is a given. And by the way, I have heard this from several 

other people as well. It is an absolutely fair point. 

That said, ladies and gentlemen, may I suggest to you as well 

that we are dealing with the following situation. We have a world 

that we want to get to and we call can define that. Call it nirvana, 

call it whatever you wish. We know, roughly, what we want in 

Central America. 

We have the world that we currently live in, which is today’s 

world on the 30th of April, 2015. Our challenge—mine from the executive branch, yours from the legislative branch—is to figure what 

we can do, what programs, what resources, what policies, what 

strategies that will deal with the world in which we currently are 

that will move us into the direction of the world that we want. 

Because if you are telling me we should not do any of this until 

we have reached that more perfect world, I am afraid you are condemning us to get nothing accomplished. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, you know, saying that I am going to revert to 

a story my daughter told me when she wanted to go jogging. She 

was 10 years old and I wanted to jog with her. We got up at 6 

o’clock—well, she got up at 6 o’clock and I didn’t. 

And after about 5 days of she had to come and wake me up she 

went out on her own one day. And I said, Katie, how come you 

didn’t wake me up. She said, Dad, if you really wanted to jog you 

would have been ready. 

And I think it is the same thing—that philosophy—and I would 

like for us to be who we are as a country to go to those countries 

and say, if you really want our help you will do these things. 

And then I don’t know at what point you walk away and, certainly, we don’t want to walk away and leave a vacuum because 

when you leave a vacuum somebody will fill that. 

I want to switch over to the Southern Command. With our—the 

announcement of the policy change December 2014 with our policies toward Cuba, have you seen a ramp-up of illegal immigration 

in the Caribbean Basin when we said we were going to relax our 

Cuban policy? 

General TOVO. Congressman, I would prefer to hand that one 

over to Secretary Bersin. I think they track the actual numbers, I 

believe, on——

Mr. YOHO. All right. That will be fine. And again, I wanted to 

ask you, I know you guys need more cutters and fast response 

boats, right? 

General TOVO. We could certainly put more resources——

Mr. YOHO. About 17 of them, I think, was what I read. 

101

Mr. BERSIN. You are referring to assets of the Coast Guard in the 

Caribbean? 

Mr. YOHO. Right, but I want to know about the increase in immigration—illegal immigration in the Caribbean Basin since President Obama and this administration relaxed—the narrative of relaxing policies to Cuba. 

Mr. BERSIN. With respect to migration from Cuba, we have seen 

an increase. I am not in a position but will supply the actual number in terms of Cuban migrants leaving Cuba on their way to Ecuador and to places in South America. 

What we have seen in terms of the Caribbean itself is, since we 

have the same policy in effect, we will return those that are encountered at sea and, as you know, not do so with those who make 

it to land. 

I cannot give you the specific number that have been encountered since December but we will——

Mr. YOHO. I will help you out here, because I checked, and the 

increase is 265 percent from December 2014 to the middle of 

March, and that was tracked through the U.S. Coast Guard and 

the people I talked to up here. 

Mr. BERSIN. The absolute number would also be of help, Congressman, in that respect, because I recognize two and a half times 

is great but the number, as you know, had fallen to historically low 

numbers in the preceding years. So I think it would be helpful to 

get the——

Mr. YOHO. But we saw an uptick is from what I saw. Let me 

move on. Do I have more time, Mr. Chairman? Yes. 

Mr. Bersin, I read a report that said—stated America is known 

around the world as a country with a global immigration policy of 

unenforcement. Do you feel this is accurate? 

Mr. BERSIN. No, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. The report went on to say that if you get 

to the Southwest border or any border you get in, and if you get 

in you might get picked up but they are not going to deport you 

and that you can—the narrative is that you get—that you may get 

a work permit, you will get free education, free food, and we are 

seeing that with the people I have talked to. 

Mr. BERSIN. No, sir. If you apply for asylum and you are given 

asylum, then you get those benefits. But you do not walk up to the 

border and have the right to enter legally and work in the United 

States. No, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. With the President’s policy—his policy of the executive amnesty, I will reserve my question and will submit it to you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. I now recognize the other 

gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been bouncing 

around in different hearings so I apologize for not being able to 

hear your answers to the previous questions. 

I was—earlier this week I attended a summit down in Miami 

with representatives from Latin American countries, people who 

are also serving in those parliaments and congresses, and we were 

discussing the Middle East and unifying in support of Israel’s secuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:09 Jul 07, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\043015\94390 SHIRL
102

rity and with the situation that is going on there and the discussion, obviously, turned toward the role of Iran. 

Of course, in the Middle East they are pursuing a nuclear weapon. They are fomenting jihad in the Gaza Strip. They are fomenting 

jihad in Yemen, Iraq, in Damascus, and whether they pursue the 

nuclear weapon it is, obviously, a critical issue. 

But we discuss the extent to which Iran is seeking influence in 

Latin America and I think this is something that is a concern to, 

I know, the chairman and, certainly, to me. 

So General, what can you say about Iran’s influence in Latin 

America? 

General TOVO. In an open forum, Congressman, I think we can 

say that the Iranians have some number of cultural centers——

Mr. DESANTIS. General, is your microphone on? 

General TOVO. It indicates that it is on. We can say at this level 

of classification that the Iranians have some level of cultural centers. They have seen an increase over the last decade in number 

of Embassies and outreach. 

As far as their level of political or diplomatic influence, I defer 

to the State Department to evaluate, and as far as their intentions 

in what I would call network development, I think we would have 

to do that in a classified setting. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. And the same question, again, what you 

can say, if anything, in an open forum about Sunni Islamists in the 

Western Hemisphere—in Latin America. 

General TOVO. I think we can, in this forum, safely say we have 

seen—you have probably seen reported in open source that some 

number of personnel from this region have gone to fight jihad—

have been radicalized largely through Internet and other means 

much like we have seen out of our own country and out of Western 

Europe. 

It is certainly not near the numbers that we have seen out of 

other parts of the world, certainly out of Europe and North Africa. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank God. So, I—and I have—I know you have 

discussed this in closed forums that I have been at and I appreciate 

that. 

But I—and we obviously want to respect that, what is open 

source. I think it is important to educate the American people on 

that because I know a lot of people are concerned. 

The child exploitation issue, and this may be for the State Department—last year, when they had the border crisis, I mean, you 

had a situation where minors were being sent with these human 

smugglers, with the drug cartels. 

You had a situation where many of them were being abused, and 

it was just a really awful situation that some of these kids were 

put through, that I know there was a lot of concern that the incentives that they were seeing out of our own Government was that 

hey, as long as you are under 18 if you get here you are never 

going to be sent back. 

And, obviously, I think, to see that policy outcome where you 

have people being—paying these criminal groups to smuggle people 

in that, clearly, is not something that we wanted to do. So what 

is the status of the cartels and the smugglers right now and, you 

know, have we seen a significant decline from last summer? 

103

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Congressman. Of course, we completely agree that the level of sexual and gender violence in the region itself is appalling and needs to change. 

The level of sexual violence on the dangerous journey was equally appalling. In fact, we had numerous stories of young girls using 

birth control in order to get through the journey, knowing very well 

or anticipating what they might face on the way. Those stories 

were shocking to every normal person. 

The criminal networks had, obviously, misled a vast number of 

children that they would be allowed to stay in this country, and 

that is something that they did repeatedly and successfully for a 

short period of time. 

It was our determination that criminal networks do not control 

U.S. immigration policy that led us to crack down in the way that 

we did. The messages that we went were not just about dangerous 

journeys which, frankly, the people in the region know very well, 

as their precautions would suggest. 

But, frankly, they were being misled by people who were just 

wanting to steal their money. This is a process that involves legal 

immigration and only legal emigration. So we are very, very aware 

of this. 

The strategy that we are imposing includes significant elements 

that are designed to protect women and children in the region both 

in their own countries and in any other—any other way. 

The desire that we have is that people in those countries build 

for themselves what they consider to be the Salvadoran dream or 

the Guatemalan dream or the Honduran dream and not seek to 

take advantage of their impression of the American dream, and I 

think USAID and other entities have specific programs that address gender and sexual violence against girls which, again, is a 

critical issue. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Great. Yes. No, look, I think that this is something that is really heartbreaking when you really start to study 

it and, you know, some of these poor kids are just put through terrible, terrible circumstances and I think that we have to be foursquare our policy 100 percent—has got to disincentivize anyone 

from putting themselves in that position but, obviously, also be 

very hard about people who would—who would take advantage of 

them. 

I mean, some of these groups are just the worst of the worst. So 

I thank you for that and I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the gentleman for bringing up the 

Iranian threat in the Western Hemisphere, something that I have 

been following. 

We did have a classified briefing last week, wasn’t it, General? 

And I apologize that you weren’t able to make that. I would ask 

the committee to try to facilitate maybe something in a little more 

intimate setting than what we had, even if General Kelly can’t 

come to brief some of the members, because I think the threat is 

worth it. 

I am going to skip myself for just a minute. The ranking member 

has a meeting in his office so I am going to recognize him for a last 

question. 

104

Mr. SIRES. I just want to thank you for being here and I also 

want to thank the former chairman for his kind words, and the 

current chairman. It is a pleasure to work with people like I have 

on my right and my left. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman—a great ranking member 

and I am glad for the working relationship we have. 

Just want to get into another round, and if the members want 

to stay—the gentleman from Florida, if you want to change out I 

am going to come back around if you would like to continue. I 

apologize for cutting you off. 

But I will recognize myself for another round of questions and I 

will direct this to the State Department. What we saw out of Plan 

Colombia was the original time frame and then an extension of 

that, because it was working, right? 

How many years of elevated levels of U.S. assistance will be necessary to sufficiently improve the socioeconomic and security conditions in Central America? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Look into your crystal ball and tell—no. 

Mr. HAMILTON. A terrific question. This situation did not arise 

overnight, clearly—two decades or even longer to fester in the way 

that it has and we need to understand that, too. 

The Alliance for Prosperity plan that the Northern Triangle has 

developed has a 5-year horizon and a $20-billion price tag which—

70 to 80 percent of which they intend to invest themselves either 

directly or through the private sector. 

So they have a 5-year horizon. That, frankly, may be slightly optimistic. 

I understand that in our strategy process we are looking at, I anticipate, a 3-year plan to try to help them and leverage U.S. assistance to achieve the results we are all seeking. 

You are quite right. Plan Colombia started in a certain way and 

expanded. It was heavily focused on security, for obvious reasons, 

in that country. 

But it, clearly, also included economic development assistance 

pretty much immediately after the FARC had been cleared out of 

areas. 

The FARC had often been cleared out but come back again and 

local people were very unclear as to who they should support our 

ally with because the state was never present. It was only when 

the state came in behind the military with doctors and clinics and 

teachers and presence of the state——

Mr. DUNCAN. But it was broader than just the FARC. It was the 

cartels and drug trafficking and all of that, pushing everything to 

the border, dropping down their percentages of drug production 

and what not. 

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right. One of Colombia’s tremendous advantages was they already had a tremendously deep institutional 

quality. 

They had politicians, attorney general’s office, Congress, Supreme Court—all of which were very mature, very democratic and 

very well organized. Those are things that Central America does 

not currently have and need to be built in order for them to take 

advantage of the types of things that we are talking about. 

105

So there are some similarities with Plan Colombia but some significant differences. You have functionally state weakness in the 

Northern Triangle that Colombia did not suffer from. 

Colombia also had a very much larger economy, able to invest 

much more much more quickly and a large territory where the 

economy could continue even while the war was being fought with 

the cartels and with the FARC. 

So they have many more advantages and, frankly, as well united 

political leadership over two consecutive terms of President Uribe. 

In the Northern Triangle, it is much harder because each of 

those countries has a divided legislature and it is harder to cobble 

together agreement to move forward. But they are doing a much, 

much better job than they have ever done. 

Mr. DUNCAN. But wouldn’t you agree they have got a geographical advantage because the countries are a lot smaller? 

Mr. HAMILTON. They do. El Salvador and Honduras are—well, 

Salvador is small. Honduras is quite large and Guatemala is very 

large as well. They also have a lot of——

Mr. DUNCAN. I guess compared to Colombia, I guess. Yes. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, absolutely yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Mr. Chairman, may I? Because I have probably 

delivered 20 speeches. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And I am coming to you with the next question. Go 

ahead. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. I will wait patiently because I do have some 

Plan Colombia observations which, in fact, would be applicable, I 

believe, to Central America. But let us see if——

Mr. DUNCAN. I am coming right now. So I would like you to answer that, Mr. Ambassador, but I would also like you to answer 

what would be the likely outcome if Congress failed to appropriate 

this money for the region? 

If we didn’t give them $1 billion, what—so incorporate in your 

comments what would the likely outcome be? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. In fact, let me—it is a smooth conclusion to 

what I want to suggest to you. You and I have both been involved 

in Colombia—in Plan Colombia for a number of years, in my case 

since 1999. 

Some quick lessons learned—one was you are going to have to 

adjust along the way. As you correctly noted, we started out in 

Plan Colombia as a 5-year plan and we basically stretched it out 

for about 12 to 14 years before we declared that we were done. 

Second, sequencing—as Scott has mentioned, we started security 

heavy with the expectation that we would eventually move from security into economic development. We did, although it ended up 

taking longer to do it than we had originally thought. 

Third, political will and buy-in by the host government—as Scott 

points out, we got either three or six or seven governments that we 

need to work with in Central America, more complicated than just 

one in Colombia. 

Third, fourth—fourth, holistic, meaning you are trying to address 

all of the issues, not just security, and you are trying to bring in 

all the parts of the United States Government to work the issue. 

106

Sixth, connections to the United States—if we cannot convince 

the American people that there is a direct impact on them in terms 

of what is happening in this country, you, the representatives of 

the American people and the controllers of the purse strings, are 

not going to move the money down there. 

Monitoring and evaluation—as you have correctly noted, we have 

to be able to report on what is actually happening in these programs and in these countries. 

Finally, end gage and shut down—you almost never have a good 

plan. You know you are going to say we are going to end it when 

we have accomplished the mission. That doesn’t work. 

At some point—at the 5-year mark, the 7-year mark, the 10-year 

mark, you have to be in a position to say to you, the members of 

this committee, here is when we are going to conclude this exercise 

and go to some sort of sustainable program. 

Now, what is the impact? If, previously in Colombia, now in Central America, we don’t, in a sense, perform these programs, implement these programs, and implement this strategy—we kind of 

have seen the impact. 

I would argue that is what we were watching last July, August, 

September on our Southwest border. But you will see others as 

well. The cartels that do not just move drugs—they also move people, firearms, counterfeit goods and basically anything that will 

produce income—will have a better base from which they can operate. 

We will see more gang activity in Central America that is tied, 

literally and directly, to gangs in the United States of America. The 

truth of the matter is what the impact is is a very easy argument 

for me to make. 

The question that you legitimately ask is so how much—how 

much is the right amount of money, what are the commitments we 

have received from these governments in advance and can I give 

you a reasonable time line in which you are going to see the results. That is what we are correctly discussing today and will continue, I suspect, for months to come. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for that. 

The last thing I will say, and I will go to the new ranking member, but in response to something Mr. Yoho said, when I was in 

Panama we met with President Varela and he said that they have 

an issue of police officers who are making $300 a month. 

It is very difficult to stop the corruption when that same officer 

could either look the other way and be involved in taking a bribe 

or whatever of an extraordinary amount of money to be able to provide for his family and what not. That is a dynamic that we can’t 

overcome. 

I don’t think we can provide enough money to pay those officers. 

I don’t know that the countries can. It is a—those officers have to 

come to the mind-set that they are doing what is right for their 

country and ultimately for their family and their children by ending this corruption and not taking the bribe to provide financially 

but understanding a broader picture that they are improving their 

country for all Hondurans or all Guatemalans by not taking that 

bribe and actually enforcing the rule of law and providing stability 

and that is a cultural mind-set. 

107

And I hope that the programs that we are talking about are programs that will do that. I also heard that understanding from 

President Hernandez and that understanding from President 

Molina. 

So at the top that understanding is there. It has got to get down 

to the police officers and it has got to get down to the judges. Because we see it in Mexico as well. 

When we visit with the foreign ministers there and we visit with 

the civil society there, bribery and other things, and understanding 

that you are not going to have to pay a bribe to get out of jail—

that the judge is actually going to look at the facts of the case and 

make a decision to either rule you guilty or innocent and get you 

out of jail in a timely manner. 

So, you know, it is much broader than just money, and I said 

that to the President at the trilateral meeting with the Northern 

Triangle countries. So we need to continue that. 

I want to applaud you for this hearing and the information you 

provided. This isn’t the last one we are going to have, unfortunately. I will turn to Ms. Torres. 

Ms. TORRES. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and just a 

quick comment on this salary issue because it is—I think it is such 

an important issue that we need to address to professionalize these 

police departments. 

Just quick math—in El Salvador, it is $5 million investment to 

bring them to that $600 median income level. I don’t think that is, 

you know, a big, big number and what we could get out of that is 

so important. 

While we were in El Salvador and Honduras, we had an opportunity to visit with the Ambassadors there in El Salvador. She is 

wonderful. You know, she—I don’t think we could have chosen a 

better person. She is in the trenches visiting and talking to civil 

society, to community groups, and I was—I was very happy to hear 

about the work that she is doing there. 

But from your perspective, are they prepared—do they have the 

personnel that it will take to ensure that we are able to process 

these resources and that we are able to follow the money? 

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Thank you, Congresswoman, for that question 

and statement. We believe that we are prepared. We are not looking necessarily to put additional funding through any governments 

and so we will be working with the partners that we currently have 

who are delivering the kinds of results that we need and building 

up our stable of partners in the region. 

It is really a matter of scaling out the numbers of partners that 

we have and we have the mechanisms in place and the systems in 

place to do that. So we believe we have the capacity to absorb this 

and to do that well. 

Ms. TORRES. So does that mean scaling up current programs that 

have proven to be successful? 

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Yes. We would start with current programs 

that have proven to be successful in the security realm, in the governance realm and in the prosperity realm, and in the interim design new programs. 

108

But we know the partners out there who would run those kinds 

of programs. So we believe we have enough partners to run current 

programs and to scale those but also to manage our new programs. 

Ms. TORRES. Okay. So the Embassies are staffed to that level? 

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. We are staffing up our missions as USAID to 

do that—to be required to do that. 

Ms. TORRES. Going back to a question I asked earlier, I don’t 

know if I heard the answer to it, and do—are there resources to 

help victims of crime, to help them relocate victims of crime within 

these three countries? 

I am talking about shelters that are secured. So if a victim of domestic violence or a child victim of, you know, sexual abuse is 

needing to have—to be protected from their abusers, where do 

they—right now, I don’t know where they go and right now they 

can’t go to their government and say, you know, this is a crime 

that I am reporting—can you help me relocate to another place 

where I am safe other than the U.S.? 

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Currently, USAID does support centers specifically for women and children in Guatemala, Honduras and El 

Salvador. We can get you details on how many and how many victims we believe they reach. 

Ms. TORRES. I would like to have some information on that because we heard just the opposite in these two countries. 

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Will do. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentlelady. I will turn to Mr. Yoho from 

Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And just for Ms. Torres and you, Mr. Chairman, you were talking 

about the money and you said $5 million in El Salvador would 

solve that problem. 

Think of the money we have spent—$2 trillion since ’71, $23 billion in equivalence that we have spent. I mean, that would pay a 

lot of military and law enforcement, and that may be a better way 

to solve this problem. 

I want to direct this question to Mr. Hamilton. Since this hearing 

is on the billion-dollar request proposed for Central America, where 

is that $1 billion coming from? What pot of money is that coming 

from? Do you know? 

Mr. HAMILTON. About half of the funding request is for development assistance and economic support. 

Mr. YOHO. No. But where is it coming from? Is it coming out of 

USAID or maybe one of the Embassies is getting shorted or—do 

you know where the money is coming from that the President requested? Is it allocated? I mean, has it been authorized? 

Mr. DUNCAN. That is a great question. We haven’t appropriated 

the money yet and if the—I would say—I think that is a great 

question for State. Where is this money coming from? 

Mr. YOHO. I would like if we can get them to submit where—because it says here are there Embassies or USAID missions in the 

regions that will experience budget cuts so that the money can be 

redirected to fund the $1-billion extra increase. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. I think I can answer that question for you. 

Mr. YOHO. Yes, sir. 

109

Mr. BROWNFIELD. It is—it is the President’s budget request for 

Fiscal Year 2016. It has gone up to the United States Congress. 

The breakout is roughly the way Mr. Hamilton was describing it. 

The INCL money, which would be that which would be—we would 

reallocate it or appropriate it to INL that is $205 million. I believe 

there is some FMF, which is—which is foreign military funds and 

assistance. But the overwhelming majority and I believe it is somewhere in the vicinity of $600 million, would be ESF and development assistance. It is not taken from anywhere. At the end of the 

day, it will be the United States Congress’ determination, a plus 

up or not plus up. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. YOHO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I guess what he is asking are any programs—existing programs now going to suffer——

Mr. YOHO. Right. That is what——

Mr. DUNCAN [continuing]. From a shifting of resources or is this 

going to be a new appropriation where status quo for all the existing programs an additional amount of money. 

Mr. YOHO. That is kind of—is somebody going to be shorted in 

the end and if you don’t have time to—you know, if you have to 

check into that, that is fine. 

I want to kind of redirect to Lieutenant General Tovo. To what 

extent was the Department of Defense involved in developing the 

new Central America strategy? 

General TOVO. The initial strategy we were provided input 

through the OSD and then since that time we have been very actively involved in the sub-IPC process ongoing that really has focused on how do we execute—how do we, you know, kind of take 

the broad strategy that has been developed and get into the 

programmatics. So we have been involved in all of the various 

meetings and conferences. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

General TOVO. And then down on—additionally, of course, we are 

down with our partners helping them develop and implement their 

strategies and so we, you know, I think are involved kind of both 

sides of this process. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Thank you. And that $1 billion—the extra request is from the administration, how much of that is marked for 

the Department of Defense? 

You know, I read a report and I think you guys are short 17 

rapid response boats plus you are looking at decommissioning the 

50-year-old boats from the Navy. I don’t know if that is a wise investment. 

General TOVO. Congressman, at this point my understanding of 

the $1-billion proposal is that that is primarily going to State for 

the programs as discussed with the idea that we have already got 

money going against—sufficient money going against the security 

line of effort, and that most of the money would go into governance 

and prosperity lines of effort. 

But I think I will turn it back to State. They have got the—I 

think that Mr. Hamilton is on the money. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Hamilton. 

110

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, sir. There is a significant amount going to 

foreign military finance and IMET programs, which we consider to 

be especially effective in ensuring the integrity and 

professionalization of the regional militaries and that is very much 

part of—DoD manages that, of course, on behalf of the State Department. The strategy also includes the very significant plus-up 

on security lines of action which are consistent with a lot of the 

things that General Tovo and SOUTHCOM have been doing. 

In addition, it includes the governance and prosperity angles 

that, in our judgement, sustain the security gains and, again, very 

consistent with General Kelly’s recent posture statement on the importance of those factors in ensuring that any gains we make are 

sustainable over time. We talk a lot to business men and women 

as well and we ask them what do you need. 

Their answer to us is, we can buy physical security—we do that 

all the time. It is a cost of doing business for us. What we cannot 

buy is the rule of law and juridical security and that is what we 

implore you to try to ensure. 

Mr. YOHO. And that is what I think we really need to work on 

because we can throw as much money at this problem as you want, 

but if we don’t get to the basic problem we are treating symptoms 

when we need to get to the underlying diagnosis and cause of that. 

Mr. Chairman, I had one quick—one other question. With the 

problem we have in our country with drug use, do we need to 

refocus attention on our drug laws, maybe decriminalizing some 

things and look at reducing the threat or the penalty on these 

things? Say, marijuana, for one—it keeps coming up in meetings I 

go to. People say if you decriminalize it it gets rid of the foreign 

trade of marijuana coming into our country. And I am certainly not 

advocating that. I am looking to gather information. 

And the other thing—instead of having the War on Drugs, 

refocus on the war on gangs, both the domestic and foreign, in this 

country, and maybe it is time for an Eliot Ness moment from the 

old days and put more emphasis on running these people out of 

this country, and if you are going to do that you are not doing it 

here in our country. Just thoughts? If I have time, sir. Anybody 

want to weigh in on that? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Would the chairman like to have a response? 

I don’t see anyone else leaping for the microphone at this particular point in time. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I would remind 

you that we all have kind of the international or outward looking 

responsibility. 

We are not those that are responsible for domestic law and domestic policy. So therefore, in a sense, we don’t have a right to give 

you a formal position on domestic drug law modifications. 

That said, I will offer you 361⁄2 years of experience in this business in terms of the argument that legalization somehow is going 

to solve this problem. And not to use too diplomatic an expression, 

I think that is just so much horse manure to suggest that one single step is going to make the entire problem go away. 

That has not been our experience overseas. That has not been 

our experience here. It is quite clear that in this country as well 

as in the entire world there is a debate, a discussion going on in 

111

terms of how we should modify, adjust, change our drug control 

policies and strategies. 

That is fine. I think everyone on this side of the table agrees 

with that. But we should perhaps avoid these simplistic suggestions that if we just arrest everyone who uses it—that is one extreme—or legalize the entire process—that is the other extreme—

that will solve the problem. 

The solution must be found somewhere in between those two extremes and I would like to think that at some point in time we will 

move in the direction of those solutions. Internationally, we have 

a U.N. General Assembly special session scheduled for April of next 

year where the entire world is going to address these issues. 

We have laid out our own position which leaves open possibilities 

to discuss public health as an issue, criminal justice reform as an 

issue, legitimate issues to discuss, but perhaps veering away from 

the more simple solutions to this problem. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, I know there is not a simple solution but I think 

a redirection of where we are going. And have you seen an increase 

of drugs into the Caribbean from, say, South America, of all types? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Yes, but with the following caveat. First, dating it and I would date it from about 2007, 2008, Congress, and 

second, the direction in which the stuff is moving, and this is to 

a certain extent a little noticed but fairly important point. 

The product that is moving from South America is decreasingly 

coming to the United States of America. Cocaine consumption in 

the United States of America since 2007 has dropped nearly 50—

that is 5–0 percent. 

So what we are seeing in terms of increased movement through 

the Caribbean is actually movement that is headed east and it is 

on its way to new markets either directly in western Europe or via 

western Africa on its way to western Europe. 

Now, this isn’t particularly good news for the Caribbean. They 

are still victims of criminal drug trafficking through the region. 

But it actually is not bad news for us. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And I agree with you. The gentleman’s time has expired. We heard that when we were in Peru. We heard that when 

we were in Colombia. The gentleman from Florida was on the 

CODEL Royce with us where we heard some of that as well. 

I want to remind the gentleman from Florida some of the things 

we heard in Mexico and Colombia and Peru about the rule of law 

and the need for getting that graft and corruption and bribery 

issue out and why civil society down in Mexico is so important. 

So we have put the witnesses through an extraordinary amount 

of time today due to votes and all that. 

Mr. YOHO. We did. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank you guys for—and ladies for being 

here. This is probably the first of several hearings we are going to 

have on this issue because we anticipate, as we heard today, an increase in unaccompanied children. 

This problem isn’t going away overnight. I agree with Ambassador Brownfield that this is a long-term issue—that it needs a 

decade-old mind-set on Members of Congress but also those on the 

ground that are working on this. So I agree with you on that as 

well. 

112

I want to thank, again, the general for your service to the country and our staff—committee staff—will be in touch with 

SOUTHCOM about the classified briefing maybe. But I am going 

to get commitments from members to be there. I am not going to 

waste your time. 

I am going to make sure that they have a commitment to come 

because the briefing is so important because it is something that 

I have been following, as you know, for a very long time. 

So I want to thank the panelists, all of you, and with that we 

will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(113)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

114

f


94390n.eps
115

Æ


94390m.eps