U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

95–129PDF 2015

THE IRAN, NORTH KOREA, AND SYRIA

NONPROLIFERATION ACT: STATE

DEPARTMENT’S NON–COMPLIANCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 17, 2015

Serial No. 114–42

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

Mr. Thomas Melito, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 5

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Thomas Melito: Prepared statement ............................................................... 8

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 32

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 33

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 34

(1)

THE IRAN, NORTH KOREA, AND SYRIA 

NONPROLIFERATION ACT: STATE 

DEPARTMENT’S NON–COMPLIANCE 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and my good friend, the ranking member of our subcommittee, Ted Deutch of Florida, for 5 minutes each 

for our opening statements, we will then recognize any other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from our 

witness. And without objection, the witness’ prepared statements 

will be made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days 

to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the 

length limitation in the rules. 

And I would like to say, first of all, I apologize for not having 

a lot of members here. There is a lot of activity going on right now, 

and our GOP Caucus is having a big briefing on the pending Supreme Court decision on the subsidies for Obamacare. So I apologize, but you have the best right here. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. As part of this 

subcommittee’s continued efforts to perform our oversight functions 

of the State Department and of the Iranian nuclear negotiations, 

we are convening this hearing to take a look at State’s compliance 

with the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act, known 

by its acronym INKSNA. 

INKSNA, by State’s own admission, is an extremely important 

and effective tool to address the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, WMDs, and ballistic missiles. It could be 

even more effective if we pass an updated version, like the 

INKSNA Modernization Act that I authored in 2011, which passed 

the House overwhelmingly with a vote of 418 to 2. 

This law requires the President, who has delegated the authority 

of INKSNA to the State Department, to provide a report to our 

committee every 6 months identifying individuals who are believed 

to have sent or received certain items or technology from Iran, 

2

North Korea, or Syria. These individuals would then be subject to 

specific sanctions as detailed in the law. 

Well, the GAO (Government Accountability Office) was asked by 

Chairman Royce to examine the implementation of INKSNA by the 

State Department and to review its reporting process and identify 

the impact of that process on the imposition of sanctions against 

the Iranian regime. 

What the GAO found was that the State Department has been 

extremely delayed in providing the requisite reports to Congress. 

Of the 18 legislatively mandated reports that the Department was 

to issue to date, only six have been issued. The latest report we received was not only late, it took State almost 3 years to prepare 

the 2011 report that we received in December 2014—but this report sat awaiting approval on the Deputy Secretary of State’s desk 

for over a year. Can you follow that? 

So it took State almost 3 years to prepare the 2011 report. We 

received it in December 2014. But the report sat awaiting approval 

for over a year. State reportedly told the GAO that one of the major 

causes for delay is the vetting process of the individual cases. Each 

cycle, State has unilaterally made the decision to package cases together—that is the problem—and move them through the process 

at the same time. 

So what ends up happening is if we have one problematic case, 

well, that case can hold up the process for all of the other cases. 

Instead of pulling that case aside for processing in the next cycle, 

State holds up the entire package until all cases have been cleared, 

thus holding up indefinitely the sanctions on all of these individuals, because, remember, it is not just about the report, we want 

to know who is being sanctioned. 

So while we are waiting and waiting and waiting, no one is getting sanctioned. While we are waiting for an entire group to be 

processed because of one problematic case, we are allowing these 

other individuals to continue to help Iran, to continue to help 

North Korea, to continue to help Syria, and they will skirt sanctions and proliferate weapons of mass destruction. 

This is a huge blow to the intent of the sanctions and their effectiveness, as well as a huge blow to our national security. But let 

us look at the timeline of the last report for a moment. We received 

the report, as I said, in December 2014. It sat on the desk for over 

a year. In November 2013, President Obama announced that the 

P5+1 had reached an agreement with Iran, and we were ready to 

implement the joint plan of action while they continued to pursue 

a final agreement. 

If we connect the dots, the administration had actionable intelligence and a legal obligation—let us not forget that—to sign off on 

the report and sanction these individuals. But the administration 

sat on this. They did not file the report, and the administration did 

not sanction these individuals. 

This flies in the face of all of the times that the President and 

the folks that we know have said that the U.S. will continue to 

fully enforce all of the sanctions on Iran while the negotiations 

were ongoing. That is what the administration says. What they are 

doing is quite different. Each and every one of these times they 

knew that this was less than truthful. 

3

The reporting requirements of the law is clear. State is required 

to submit INKSNA reports to Congress every 6 months, yet the 

State Department took it upon itself to ignore this requirement. 

The requirement is not a suggestion; it is the law. 

And as the Iran nuclear negotiations continue we are also left to 

wonder, what other sanctions is the administration not enforcing 

that it should or that it must? We already had the recent report 

from the U.N. panel of experts that said that the U.S. and other 

nations were not reporting Iran’s sanctions violations to the Sanctions Committee. 

Ambassador Power was here in this very room yesterday and I 

asked her about that, and she, too, stated the administration has 

been above water and has been fully enforcing all of the sanctions. 

But when it comes to the nuclear negotiations and Iran, I am more 

inclined to believe that the administration is purposely misleading 

Congress and is in fact not following the intent and letter of the 

law. 

This GAO report should be just the tip of the iceberg, and I commend Director Melito and his team for their hard work in putting 

together this report. 

Thank you. 

And now I yield to the ranking member of the subcommittee, my 

good friend Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding today’s 

hearings. I want to thank the chairman for her continued legislative efforts to strengthen the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. You have been tireless in your efforts to keep 

focus on the nexus between these three regimes and their quest for 

weapons of mass destruction. 

As we heard in our hearing on Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities 

last week, the relationship between Iran and North Korea with respect to illicit procurement is vital to the Iranian regime’s efforts 

to circumvent international sanctions. We know that the Iranian 

regime has been unabated in its support for Assad over the past 

4 years, and the potential transfer of sensitive technologies or 

weapons to this murderous regime that has shown it is more willing to use and continue to use, despite its obligations under the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Agreement, chemical weapons that it is willing to use against its own people. 

INKSNA was enacted and subsequently amended to shut down 

illicit procurement and transfers. And, first, let me say that I appreciate the GAO’s work on this work, and I appreciate the State 

Department’s willingness to make comments on GAO’s findings 

and accept the GAO recommendation. We know that building and 

enforcing a sanctions regime is complex, and I commend the work 

that State has done to enact punishing sanctions on bad actors 

over the years. 

The ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran is a prime example 

of the effect sanctions can have, although I would respectfully note 

that the purpose of sanctions is to change behavior, not simply to 

come to a negotiation. 

However, it is clear from GAO’s investigation that there has been 

a failure to comply with the particular 6-month reporting requirement in INKSNA. And while I respect and appreciate the time that 

4

it takes to adequately verify sensitive intelligence and to work 

through the interagency process, I am concerned that State Department’s decision to issue annual reports instead of every 6 months 

is causing a lag time in the imposition of sanctions. 

Again, I know that it often takes quite a bit of time to meet the 

requirements for a sanctions determination, but I agree with the 

GAO that finding that one outstanding determination should not 

delay an entire report. Isn’t there a process in which State can 

issue its 6-month reports to Congress while denoting an unfinished 

investigation? 

Further, I would like to understanding more as to why GAO 

found that the longest delay in the issuance of a report seems to 

be at the Deputy Secretary level. How does this reporting requirement differ from those in other sanctions legislation, and are those 

requirements being met? 

Finally, and perhaps most concerning, is that the INKSNA process seems to differ from other sanctions determinations in which 

sanctions are not levied until a report is issued to Congress. I 

would be interested to hear if, in your interviews with the State 

Department, any discussions took place with respect to potential 

legislative changes to the underlying law. 

In cases where sanctions have been imposed, the majority of the 

sanctioned persons have been located in China, Sudan, Iran, and 

Syria. Strikingly, 17 of the 82 sanction entities have had sanctions 

imposed on them more than once. Understanding that INKSNA 

sanctions need to be renewed every 2 years, I would be interested 

to hear more from State as to why there are repeat offenders. Is 

the lag time between the issuance of reports, which then can trigger a sanctions designation, allowing these actors to continue to engage in sanctionable activity? 

Now, Mr. Melito, I appreciate you being here today to explain 

GAO’s findings, and it is my hope that we can work to implement 

whatever changes in process are necessary to ensure that we are 

acting as quickly as possible to impose sanctions on those who aid 

and abet the world’s most dangerous actors. 

And with that, Madam Chairman, I will yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, for that 

excellent statement. 

Mr. Trott, you are recognized. 

Mr. TROTT. Thank you. I want to thank the chairwoman and 

ranking member for calling this hearing to focus on the administration’s failure to comply with the reporting requirements of the Iran, 

North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. 

INKSNA is supposed to provide the United States Government 

with an important and flexible tool to achieve its nonproliferation 

objectives and a method by which to impose sanctions to accomplish this important goal. Unfortunately, due largely to political 

concerns with Iran, the administration has failed to comply with 

INKSNA, which has only heightened concerns in Congress with the 

ongoing nuclear negotiations. 

Continued reluctance to enforce these sanctions significantly 

compromises our credibility and nullifies INKSNA’s effectiveness 

5

as a tool in helping to curtail the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction. 

I urge the administration to comply with INKSNA, as failure in 

this regard will mostly certainly result in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Not only does non-compliance with this act 

put the United States at risk, but it also threatens our friend, 

Israel. 

I look forward to examining the reporting history with respect to 

INKSNA and trying to better understand why the delays—why 

there have been delays in the reporting and what impact the 

delays have had on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. Clawson of Florida is recognized. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

And now we are pleased to recognize our witness. We are so 

pleased to welcome Dr. Thomas Melito, Director of the International Affairs and Trade team at the Government Accountability 

Office. He is responsible for the GAO’s work on international sanctions and nonproliferation, and has recently completed a review of 

the implementation of the U.S. and U.N. sanctions on North Korea. 

Thank you, Dr. Melito, for being with us here this afternoon, and 

for the work of all of the folks on your team that helped put this 

very important document together. And, with that, your written 

statement will be made a part of the record. Please feel free to 

summarize and present your findings. 

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS MELITO, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. MELITO. Thank you. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here 

to discuss GAO’s work regarding State’s implementation of the 

Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2006, which 

is referred to as INKSNA. 

INKSNA targets the transfer of prohibited items related to weapons of mass destruction. INKSNA requires that State provide Congress with a report every 6 months, and State cannot impose sanctions until it has done so. My testimony is based on a report which 

is publicly released today. 

I will focus on four topics. First, State’s timeliness in providing 

Congress with INKSNA reports; second, State’s process for preparing these reports; third, the potential impact of State’s reporting 

timeliness on the imposition of sanctions; and, fourth, GAO’s recommendation and State’s response. 

Regarding the first topic, State has not provided reports to congressional committees in accordance with INKSNA’s 6-month reporting requirements. Since 2006, it has provided only six reports 

covering 2006 through 2011, instead of the 18 reports that 

INKSNA required. State provided these reports at irregular intervals averaging 16 months. It provided its most recent report in December 2014, 22 months after its prior report. 

6

Regarding the second topic, State’s process does not allow it to 

comply with INKSNA’s 6-month reporting cycle. The process is 

complex and lengthy, involving multiple interagency and internal 

reviews regarding each group of reportable transfers that first 

came to its attention in a single calendar year. It then determines 

whether to impose sanctions on foreign persons associated with 

those transfers. 

Under this process, State does not provide a report to the committee until it has resolved concerns it may have regarding any of 

the transfers in a particular annual group. As a result, a single 

problematic case can delay State’s provision of a report which may 

include other transfers that State may be otherwise ready to report. 

Moreover, State’s process requires officials to begin preparing a 

new report every December, regardless of whether they have completed and provided all previous reports. As a result, they must 

manage the preparation of a backlog of multiple draft reports, each 

addressing a different year. 

For example, State data indicate that in the last 6 months of 

2014 State officials were simultaneously managing the preparation 

of three draft reports covering calendar years 2011, 2012, and 

2013. State’s delays in reporting on transfers have also recently increased, growing from 26 months for the 2010 report to 36 months 

for the 2011 report. 

Regarding the third topic, State’s process limits its ability to 

minimize the time required to impose INKSNA sanctions. INKSNA 

requires State to identify foreign persons in a report before it can 

impose sanctions on them. Under INKSNA, State is expected to decide on sanctions between 6 and 12 months after it first obtains 

credible information of a foreign person’s involvement in a reportable transfer. 

However, under State’s process, the actual interval between the 

transfer and the opportunity to impose a sanction has been considerably longer. For example, State did not impose sanctions on 23 

foreign persons for transfers it first learned of in calendar year 

2011 until December 2014, between 36 and 48 months after the 

fact. 

Regarding our fourth topic, GAO recommended that State should 

reconsider its INKSNA reporting process to ensure that it, one, 

complies with INKSNA’s 6-month reporting cycle; and, two minimizes delays in its ability to impose sanctions. 

State officials concurred with our recommendation. However, in 

commenting on our findings, they raised some concerns. State officials commented that our report does not take into account the inherent difficulties of meeting what they characterize as the law’s 

tight deadlines and a substantial increase in scope of reportable activity. 

In response, we note that INKSNA’s scope has not changed since 

2006, and that the time required by State to provide the reports 

to the committee has increased since 2006. 

State officials also commented that our report does not place sufficient priority on the need for careful preparation and thorough 

vetting. We recognize that State must thoroughly vet each 

INKSNA transfer, and that some transfers may require several 

7

years to investigate. However, our report demonstrates that State 

should consider a more efficient process for meeting INKSNA’s 

deadlines. 

Under its current process, State’s practice of reporting transfers 

in annual groups could allow a single, problematic transfer to delay 

the reporting of other transfers that State may have already investigated. 

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, and members of 

the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would 

be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Melito follows:]

8


95129a-1.eps
9


95129a-2.eps
10


95129a-3.eps
11


95129a-4.eps
12


95129a-5.eps
13


95129a-6.eps
14


95129a-7.eps
15


95129a-8.eps
16


95129a-9.eps
17


95129a-10.eps
18

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, and thank you, again 

to your whole team for the great and difficult work that you do all 

the time. 

Mr. MELITO. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The findings in this report are very troubling, not only from an oversight perspective for us as Members of 

Congress but for anyone who believes that the laws of the land are 

indeed meant to be followed, and that no one is above these laws. 

And they are also disturbing because of what they tell us about 

the length that the administration will go to to appease the Iranian 

regime in its misguided and dangerous quest to reach a nuclear 

deal with Iran and forge some sort of legacy for President Obama. 

Those are my words, not yours. I realize that. 

But in your report you mention that State officials said political 

concerns, including international negotiations and foreign relations, 

can delay the reporting process. Did the negotiations between Iran 

and the P5+1 factor in the decision to delay the latest report? What 

were you told? 

Mr. MELITO. We can’t actually comment in a public setting on 

that. We are able to talk about the process in a public setting. But 

when you get into discussions of countries in individual cases, it actually goes to a very high level of classification very quickly. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. No worries. The GAO found that 

State actually ignores the 6-month requirement and focuses on 

yearly reports, as I said and you verified. Does State decide on its 

own to submit yearly sanctions reports rather than adhering to the 

legally required 6-month schedule? Do they do that on their own? 

Mr. MELITO. State has created a process that envisions annual 

reports. And when we asked them why, they thought that was the 

most efficient way to do it. So it does not envision two reports a 

year; it only envisions one report a year. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Did anyone at State acknowledge that they 

are violating the law with this practice, that until it is changed 

that is the requirement? 

Mr. MELITO. We asked that question several times, and I don’t 

think we ever got a clearly definitive answer on that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. In response to your report, State assumed 

that the committees were okay with the reporting process. However, it is extremely odd since in the year 2011 I authored, and the 

House passed, the INKSNA Reform and Modernization Act and 

State’s failure to meet the requirements of this law, particularly 

with respect to the reporting cycle, was a part of that effort and 

has been raised with the Department in multiple instances. 

Which specific offices within the State Department did you have 

access to? Did you ever engage or have sufficient access to the Deputy Secretary’s office or those in the State Department who dealt 

with Iran sanctions generally, such as the Deputy Coordinator for 

Sanctions? 

And, related to that, which offices did you request meetings 

with? And which offices failed to either get back to you or turn 

down your request for a meeting? 

Mr. MELITO. So we had what I would characterize as highly functional access to the working level, which was the ISN, the InterVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:06 Jul 06, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\061715\95129 SHIRL
19

national Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, which is the bureau responsible for preparing the annual reports. 

We did realize, given the nature of what we were finding, that 

there was a need to engage higher level officials. And we did request a meeting with the Deputy’s office, as well as the coordinator’s office, and we were not granted that meeting. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And, finally, the GAO provided State with 

the opportunity to comment on the report and submit those comments for the record. Department officials, according to your report 

and the comments, repeatedly cite the difficulties of meeting the 

tight deadline, and even went through the trouble of boldfacing and 

underlining the fact that they need time to identify every foreign 

person in each group. 

The GAO also noted that this practice of reporting individuals in 

entire groups could allow a single problematic case, as we talked 

about, to delay the reporting of an entire group. Why wouldn’t 

State simply remove the problematic cases allowing the other ones 

to be processed through, and did you suggest this as a workaround 

for the State Department? And, if so, what was their response? 

Mr. MELITO. We went through our understanding of how it was 

working with them on multiple occasions. And at what is called the 

exit conference where we go through our findings, we went through 

exactly that scenario, where we were seeing single cases holding up 

the process. And we explored with them their opportunity to maybe 

revisit the process and change it, and they were quite resistant. 

They have had this process for probably 10 years, and they seem 

to think it works and it is very efficient. But I think the ‘‘why’’ is 

probably better asked of State Department. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Director Melito. 

I now recognize Mr. Deutch, the ranking member. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And, Madam Chairman, I apologize, but after my line of questioning I have another 

committee meeting that I have to run off to. 

Mr. Melito, in the course of your discussions with State Department, did they indicate that meeting the 6-month reporting requirement is too difficult and that they needed changes made to 

the law? 

Mr. MELITO. They recognize they have a backlog. They recognize 

they need to clear that backlog. They also say that once they clear 

the backlog that they are going to go back to a 6-month reporting 

cycle. I don’t know exactly what changes they have in mind. 

So we did ask them whether they thought that 6 months was not 

reasonable, would you want to explore changing the law, and they 

said, actually, they wanted to leave the law as it was, because they 

thought it was working as intended. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, what did they think the impact on the law 

was of the 36- to 48-month delay that you referenced? 

Mr. MELITO. Well, we bring up that the threat of a sanction may 

loosen credibility when there is such a long time between the actual observation of a problematic transfer and the actual sanction 

decision. 

They disagreed, and they thought that the—what is going on 

during this period of time, there is a lot of behind-the-scenes discussions with other governments and trying to forestall other 

20

transfers. And I am confident that that is actually happening, but 

the actual ultimate result, if you can’t succeed, is a sanction. The 

credibility of the sanction does require some timeliness. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And did State give your team any justification as 

to why they choose to look at potential violations only on an annual 

basis? 

Mr. MELITO. So one tangible thing they have is they have to look 

at lists of technologies that are possibly not—are controlled. They 

have international lists, and they have their own internal list. 

If they decide in 2010 to add a new item, it can’t be retroactive 

to 2010. It can only move forward. So they are saying that by keeping cohorts together they won’t create any confusion on that. But 

that does seem like something that could be managed. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Because you suggested in your testimony that there 

is a more efficient way to do it. 

Mr. MELITO. The most efficient way is to release the cases as 

they are finished. We agree that some cases are very difficult and 

should take as long as they are taking. But they acknowledge that 

when the report comes out some cases have been finished for a long 

time. 

Mr. DEUTCH. All right. So what is the response as to why they 

shouldn’t be reported as they are finished? 

Mr. MELITO. If they gave you the answer they gave us, if it is 

not satisfying it is because it wasn’t satisfied. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. Did State indicate that the process that it 

uses to investigate and make determinations for these sanctions 

differs in any way from the process they use for other sanctions regimes? 

Mr. MELITO. So the biggest difference is that the requirement to 

sanction has to first follow a report to Congress. We have looked 

at quite a number of Iran and North Korea and other sanction regimes, and there is a very similar deliberative process, both within 

State and across multiple agencies. Some of the same working 

groups are involved in other sanction regimes. 

All of those, though, culminate with an internal decision by either State or Treasury to sanction. INKSNA seems unique, from 

my perspective, in that it first requires a report to Congress. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So, in all, just to refer back to my friend’s comment 

earlier, in all of the other Iranian sanctions programs, they reach 

a determination saying if they make a designation sanctions are 

applied. It doesn’t appear that the goal, then, is to appease the Iranian regime. 

Mr. MELITO. I really couldn’t comment on that one way or the 

other. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. Did the Department acknowledge that it 

could issue reports that acknowledge in some way that at least that 

there were investigations that were still pending? 

Mr. MELITO. We know that they currently, at the end of 2014, 

were simultaneously preparing the results of 2012, 2013, and we 

now—I am sure they are beginning to think about a 2014 report. 

So there are—we know they are doing what they need to do. They 

are monitoring activity, and they are preparing case files, and they 

are discussing this internally in the State Department and across. 

21

It is reaching the final decision. That seems to be what is taking 

so long. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And just getting back to the first question I asked, 

so they believe that once the backlog is cleared up—the law doesn’t 

need to change, because once the backlog is cleared up, then they 

can get back to the requirements, meeting the requirements that 

are set forth. Did they tell you when they anticipate that happening? 

Mr. MELITO. They did not. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Excellent questions. Thank you, 

Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. Trott is recognized. 

Mr. TROTT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

You said a minute ago, sir, that reaching a final decision seems 

to be the problem. Can you explain why reaching a final decision 

is so difficult? 

Mr. MELITO. I can only tell you in a general sense and what is 

publicly available. They have to—first, the intelligence community 

has to determine whether it is publicly possible to report the information, the names of individuals, and they also want to go through 

the deliberative process of working with other governments, and 

making sure that they have got a sufficient case file. 

So when you are dealing with, you know, overseas entities and 

trying to make sure you have the right person and you have 

enough evidence, this can take some time. 

Mr. TROTT. So is there any evidence, or do you have any sense 

that the administration’s general indifference and insouciance toward taking action on the world stage is a contributing factor? 

Mr. MELITO. I cannot comment on that. 

Mr. TROTT. Okay. Is there anything in INKSNA that requires 

that the State Department review and vet individuals as a group? 

Could they do it individually? 

Mr. MELITO. The law does not state how that should be done. It 

just says it has to be done every 6 months. 

Mr. TROTT. Has anyone suggested maybe that, since they are so 

backlogged that they develop a different process, or are weapons of 

mass destruction not a big deal? 

Mr. MELITO. I think if they were to implement GAO’s recommendation, they would create a new process. 

Mr. TROTT. Okay. So the State Department officials told you that 

they believe that the threat of imposing sanctions can be as effective as the imposition of sanctions in achieving the behavioral 

changes that sanctions are intended to motivate. Do they provide 

any information or analysis to support the idea that the threat of 

sanctions against these three countries could be as effective as actual sanctions? 

Mr. MELITO. To get into specifics on that assertion on their part 

would actually not be possible at a public hearing. 

Mr. TROTT. I apologize. Not be possible because of? 

Mr. MELITO. In a public hearing. 

Mr. TROTT. I see. Okay. So basically they are treating these three 

countries like we treat England, France, and Australia. Would that 

be a fair summary? 

22

Mr. MELITO. I——

Mr. TROTT. Okay. I apologize. I will move on. 

Actually, that is the extent of my questions. I yield back. Thank 

you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair. I just wanted to 

focus on the North Korean agreement that was signed back in 

1994. And, you know, it seems as though that agreement was fundamentally flawed in the first instance, because of its brevity, because of the lack of inspections, and just a lack of detail in terms 

of both infrastructure and nuclear material. 

What was the stated objective in 2004 in signing that agreement 

with North Korea? 

Mr. MELITO. That is outside the scope of what GAO did. I can 

talk to you a little bit about how State is implementing sanctions 

on North Korea, but actually what the State Department was 

thinking when it signed that agreement I could only—I can only 

speculate on that. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Well, was it to keep North Korea from obtaining 

nuclear weapons? 

Mr. MELITO. I am—that seems like a reasonable expectation. 

Mr. HIGGINS. And how many nuclear weapons does North Korea 

have today? 

Mr. MELITO. I know they have more than one. 

Mr. HIGGINS. And they have a pretty considerable atomic program? What inspections are in place relative to the North Korean 

nuclear program? 

Mr. MELITO. We reported last month that the U.S. Government’s 

imposition of sanctions on North Korea had been hampered by the 

need to identify specifically North Korean individuals. And given 

their closed regime—and we don’t have good access—following the 

Sony hack late in 2014, the President signed a new Executive 

Order which changed the way sanctions against North Korea are 

implemented. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Right. 

Mr. MELITO. Now, if we are confident that an individual is either 

a member of the Worker’s Party or a member of the Government 

of North Korea, we can sanction. They don’t necessarily want to do 

that just because of those things, but it allows them to have a 

lower level of evidence before they can actually implement a sanction. So they think that is going to actually help in the months 

ahead. 

Mr. HIGGINS. And how is that going? 

Mr. MELITO. Well, it just got implemented. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I see. Well, you know, it seems like—I mean, there 

are some fundamental differences here between North Korea and 

Iran. I mean, you know, the domestic policies of Iran, or politics of 

Iran, are that a vast majority of that population is very young and 

wants to normalize relations with the rest of the world. And that 

is, you know, fundamental I think to America’s leverage in negotiating a deal with Iran, where North Korea, it is almost—they kind 

of pride theirselves on being isolated from everybody. 

23

It just seems to me that, you know, there is a pride in North 

Korea boasting that its atomic arsenal is enshrined in its constitution. And so it just seems like, you know, this is a weak agreement 

to begin with, and more cosmetic than it is substantial, which I 

suppose the good thing is maybe it has influenced or informed the 

negotiations with Iran, that this has to be a lot more serious than 

the one with North Korea, because it is almost like we don’t have 

an agreement with North Korea. 

Mr. MELITO. There is nothing equivalent to the TPOA with 

North Korea. That is correct. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, yes. Okay. 

All right. I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. Issa of California. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Melito, I am trying to go back to some basics and understand 

this a little. President Clinton signed a law requiring this report. 

President Bush twice signed laws requiring this report. Before we 

get to President Obama, either one of those Presidents make 

progress on delivering reports in a timely fashion from your looking 

at history? 

Mr. MELITO. We identified some delays in the past, but we focus 

on INKSNA, so we really focus heavily from 2006 forward. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So previous Presidents were not perfect. We are 

not going to give either one a pass. But since 2009 when President 

Obama came in, you have seen this problem of essentially almost 

non-compliance, going through the motions, but 3 years seems like 

not even a close to a semi-annual report. Is that right? 

Mr. MELITO. That is correct. 

Mr. ISSA. And their statement to you is, ‘‘We are going to do better.’’ That is kind of like the guy that owes you money saying he 

will pay you when his brother straightens out, but then you find 

out his brother is a hunchback. Okay. You know, he will not 

straighten out. 

This does—I know that is so insensitive. The fact is, this is a 

problem that is not going to straighten out in the last 18 months 

of this administration. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. MELITO. I think——

Mr. ISSA. I know you believe in the redemption of souls, I am 

sure, but excluding that kind of an event, do you see it happening? 

Mr. MELITO. We have given State a possible new process, demonstrated that there is a process that could make this go quicker. 

And State has sort of acknowledged that they need to do something, so I guess my perspective, I just need to see what happens 

now. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So we are back to hope. Okay. Excluding hope 

for a moment, you earlier said that you were given access, sort of 

very broad but not very high, that you—up to a point you were 

given good access, and then after that some of the details, that 

higher level that would have helped you understand the problem 

and maybe suggest more, you were denied. Is that correct? 

Mr. MELITO. Well, from our perspective, we got the access we 

needed to complete the work, so that is important to note. And the 

24

focus was on the process. So we spoke with all of the key parts of 

State that was dealing with the actual creating of the report. 

When we recognized, though, that this process and how it is run 

is probably above the people who are doing it, and the decisions on 

changing it are not up to them, we thought it would be a good idea 

to actually seek out some views of the higher level officials. And 

we did request those meetings, but we didn’t get them. 

Mr. ISSA. So one thing that Congress could do in appropriation 

or other appropriate areas is insist that you have that access so 

that perhaps beyond hope you could also have participation. Is that 

correct? You are not lobbying; we are asking. 

Mr. MELITO. From our perspective, we got the access we needed, 

because I thought it was actually in State—it would have been to 

their advantage to have had a meeting. If it actually—if I needed 

that meeting to complete the work, then I probably would have 

gone through a more legalistic process. But I did not need that 

meeting to finish my work, but I thought it would have been helpful if State had had that conversation. 

Mr. ISSA. Let me just close—and I know, Madam Chair, this has 

been said many, many times. But since I alluded to, you know, we 

are not going to get where we want to be in the next 18 months, 

you, at GAO, are great at giving corrective action and then advising Congress in your role in our branch on what to do in the future. 

If you could take the remaining time, to the extent that you can, 

and tell us, how could we better write and oversee requirements 

like this so that we could get and expect compliance? Is it that we 

need to pre-negotiate? It sounds like they have said 6 months was 

enough; they are just behind. What is it we could do different? Because I know the chair would like to do better next time, so that 

we wouldn’t be at fault for these reports. 

Mr. MELITO. I think the law is quite clear, so I don’t know if the 

law needs to be clearer. So I——

Mr. ISSA. So you are just saying that you need people who will 

obey the law? 

Mr. MELITO. I think there probably would have needed to have 

been a dialogue between the Congress and State earlier. I mean, 

these laws—these reports have been delayed for a long time now. 

So it is possible that they didn’t think that they needed to meet the 

law. I don’t know. It is a question they have never really answered, 

but I think Congress’ concerns were not necessarily being received. 

Mr. ISSA. Well, you know, the interesting thing is State, in another committee, told us that the reason that Ambassador Stevens 

didn’t get more security is he didn’t ask enough. He didn’t insist 

enough. That after asking for and saying things, including on the 

day he died, that it wasn’t a question of if, but when, there would 

be an attack, he didn’t ask enough. I appreciate it, Director, and 

we will try to figure out how to ask more. 

I thank the gentlelady and yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Issa. 

Mr. Clawson of Florida. 

Mr. CLAWSON. So thank you for coming today. Appreciate it. The 

process slows almost to a halt. It takes a long time to get the final 

decision. Then, it takes even longer to get a final decision. 

25

In the meantime, that creates space, time for the State Department to renegotiate deals they don’t like anymore, slow down on 

details, redo—you know, use the threat of the sanction that is out 

there that we haven’t really applied yet because our process is so 

low—or so slow. 

So you kind of have this—you know, and then we blame it on bureaucracy. But if it really is bureaucracy, it kind of helps the State 

Department and the administration around the intent of the original process, so that they can retrade the deal and do what they 

really want to do with these folks. 

And so it doesn’t sound like a bureaucracy problem at all. It 

sounds like somebody playing on the margins of the law in order 

to create space, to retrade a deal they don’t like anymore, or never 

did like, and then we are in a position where we have no recourse, 

unless we want to change the law, which is hard to do because 

there is a Democrat in the White House that likes retrading these 

deals. 

Did I summarize that correct? 

Mr. MELITO. I think GAO provided you the ‘‘what.’’ You are asking me for the ‘‘why,’’ and I can’t really give you the ‘‘why.’’ But 

your narrative is as reasonable as any others I have heard. 

Mr. CLAWSON. But I am saying that the focus on procedural 

delays, when those procedural delays coincidentally help the State 

Department retrade the deal, I mean, we are—we have got a mishmash of incentives here that we are not being—you know, the 

American people deserve clarity. If I am going to sit up on this 

committee, I am going to speak clear about what is really going on 

as opposed to yakking around the edges about bureaucracy and 

steps in the process. 

Mr. MELITO. And I understand perfectly. GAO, though, can only 

really talk about what we can observe, and you are asking about 

things we could not observe. 

Mr. CLAWSON. I have nothing, then, I can add to that. You know, 

we need to figure out, you know, how to use the power of the purse 

or the power of change in the law, so that what we do, you know, 

the process actually reflects reality on what the original intent was. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Clawson. 

Dr. Yoho, also of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. Appreciate you being here, 

sir. In their response to the GAO’s studies, they stated that ‘‘Further challenging the ability of the Department to deliver INKSNA 

reports within the statutory timeframe, the law has subsequently 

expanded its scope along its evolution.’’

The last time the law was amended was in 2006, adding North 

Korea. What was State’s response to the fact that despite no 

changes in the scope of the law since ’06, the time that State requires to produce a report for Congress has increased? I mean, 

what was their reasoning? 

Mr. MELITO. State mentioned that they thought because of scope 

changes that that was contributing to it. But we don’t think the 

scope has changed. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, they have had since 2006 to get their act in 

order. 

26

Mr. MELITO. And that is the period of time we are looking at, 

and we also observed that the time between reports is getting 

longer, not shorter. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. And you have offered, you know, the suggestion 

of, do we need to expand it to a year, but yet they said no. 

Mr. MELITO. They did not think the law needed to be changed. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. What do you believe would be the most efficient method for eliminating the current backlog, and also keeping 

up with the future deadlines? 

Mr. MELITO. I think State could implement a 6-month reporting 

cycle. They could. 

Mr. YOHO. Is it a shortage of help? Funds? 

Mr. MELITO. They did not say they needed resources, but I think 

if State—State may want to actually have a conversation with Congress about that, because they—it was at the bureau level. I think 

that should really be at the deputy level to really decide that. 

Mr. YOHO. Who is the person at State, the individual, that is responsible for that study? 

Mr. MELITO. It is an individual in the International Security and 

Nonproliferation Bureau. I would rather not name the name, because——

Mr. YOHO. You don’t have to, but there is one person that is held 

accountable for this. 

Mr. MELITO. There is one person, although ultimately it is the 

Deputy Secretary, because ultimately the Deputy Secretary is the 

deciding official. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. So somebody can be held accountable. 

Mr. MELITO. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO. And somebody, if they are held accountable and they 

are not performing their job, in the private sector would be removed from that job. That could happen here, correct? 

Mr. MELITO. I assume so. 

Mr. YOHO. I would hope so. 

And I think that is something, Madam Chair, for another meeting would be wonderful. 

Let me ask you this. What is the impact of—what impact has 

State’s delay in reporting had on sanction decisions? 

Mr. MELITO. The way the INKSNA law is written, you can’t 

make an INKSNA sanction decision until you first report to Congress. So in December 2014, we get the—we got the decision on 23 

cases that were observed in 2011. So between the time the State 

Department became aware of a problematic transfer and actually 

sanctioning was between 36 and 48 months later. 

Mr. YOHO. And with the critical negotiations where they are at 

with Iran right now, a period of time delay like that is unacceptable. I mean, it is—you are reporting on something that happened 

24 to 30 months ago on today’s decisions. And I just—would you 

feel that would weaken our hand at the negotiating table? 

Mr. MELITO. We observe, separate from any of the negotiations. 

We are concerned about the credibility of the sanctioning process. 

Mr. YOHO. I was going to get into that here. 

Mr. MELITO. To my mind, the sanctioning process requires relatively timely action. 

27

Mr. YOHO. Yes. I mean, you want it timely. It is like disciplining 

a child when they are wrong. You don’t want to wait until they are 

18. 

According to your report, State Department officials told GAO 

that they believe that the threat of imposing sanctions can be effective with what you just brought up as imposing sanctions in 

achieving the behavior changes sanctions are intended to motivate. 

However, did they quantify this claim? And if they believe that, 

they would be reporting quicker, wouldn’t you think so? 

Mr. MELITO. As to the first part, I think they may have a couple 

of examples, but any example cannot be done publicly. So I would 

think that you would benefit from a briefing from them in a classified setting, where they would give you some of those examples. 

Mr. YOHO. I have got an example here. Seventeen of the 18 foreign persons that have had sanctions imposed on them have actually had the INKSNA sanctions imposed on them for more than—

actually, more than once. That is correct, isn’t it? 

Mr. MELITO. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO. In your opinion, would that undermine State’s suggestion that the mere threat of a sanction is just as effective as the 

imposition? 

Mr. MELITO. That is a very fair question. 

Mr. YOHO. And, again, you know, you can only threaten so long 

before you act. 

Mr. MELITO. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO. Let us see. What is the effect of the administration’s 

failure to implement these nonproliferation sanctions, particularly 

against Iran? And I think I kind of covered that and you kind of 

answered that. But in this——

Mr. MELITO. I cannot talk about individual countries. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. I understand. 

Mr. MELITO. Yes. So——

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, sir, for your time. And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. Weber of Texas. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. Director Melito, forgive me if some of 

this is redundant, because I came late so I didn’t hear your remarks. I am looking at your testimony here. According to your testimony, you talk about from 2006 to May 2015 that State imposed 

sanctions on 82 foreign persons located in 10 nations, including 

China, Iran, Syria, North Korea, Sudan, and Russia. 

Once imposed, INKSNA sanctions are in effect for 2 years at 

State’s discretion. Okay. So there was 82 foreign people in those 9 

years that you have identified. 

Mr. MELITO. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. So you go in and you look at the process. Is that 

number, that percentage of people who are identified and sanctioned, is it rising? Is it raising or lowering? 

Mr. MELITO. It goes up and down, but their most recent report 

covering 2011 has the most in any of the years, which is from 2006 

to 2011. And 23 was the single largest year. 

Mr. WEBER. So that was the largest year. So that kind of answers the doctor’s question about, does the statement—even the 

28

threat of sanctions seems to work. If you looked at the numbers, 

that would kind of be antithetical, wouldn’t it? 

Mr. MELITO. It seems the activity may be increasing, but I actually don’t know that, and that would actually be——

Mr. WEBER. Well, you don’t think they just chose those people 

out of a hat. 

Mr. MELITO. We don’t know——

Mr. WEBER. I mean, the activity is obviously increasing. 

Mr. MELITO. Part of this is actually becoming aware of activity. 

So some of it may have occurred before 2011. But, again, any of 

this kind of conversation requires information that cannot be discussed publicly. 

Mr. WEBER. So how far—did you go back to 2006? 

Mr. MELITO. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So did you identify, in 2006, what the first report due—where the problem was? Where did—who was responsible? Where did the buck stop? 

Mr. MELITO. We have a table in the statement for the hearing, 

not for the report, which gives you how long, in months, each of 

the six steps take, and we——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Okay. 

Mr. MELITO [continuing]. Our general summary is the steps that 

are inside State’s control take the longest. And in the most recent 

report, the actual final approval by the Deputy Secretary took the 

longest. 

Mr. WEBER. But identifying 2006, that first person, that first 

step, that never got the ball rolling. I mean, you can do it by a position; you don’t have to do it by person’s name. Can you do that by 

position? 

Mr. MELITO. So for the—so the report that covers 2007, because 

we——

Mr. WEBER. Let me restate it this way. Does State have a process whereby they start to put this report together? Have they built 

that outline? 

Mr. MELITO. I guess, and we did review the statements of——

Mr. WEBER. All right. Now we are getting somewhere. In that 

outline, what is the first office it goes to? 

Mr. MELITO. We have a flowchart in the report. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. MELITO. In the actual report itself, on page 9, which goes 

through the 12 steps. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. MELITO. It starts—so there are these expert groups——

Mr. WEBER. I don’t want to turn to page 9. 

Mr. MELITO. But I am going to just say one thing quickly. Their 

expert groups, which are responsible for missile proliferation, biological/chemical/nuclear, they are meeting every 2 to 4 weeks. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. MELITO. They are not meeting just for——

Mr. WEBER. So somebody compiles the report of these expert 

groups. 

Mr. MELITO. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Help me. Who is that office? What position is that? 

29

Mr. MELITO. That is the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau of State Department. They are the ones who are responsible for——

Mr. WEBER. Is that same person there now that was there in 

2006? 

Mr. MELITO. We actually do not know. 

Mr. WEBER. You actually do not know. 

Mr. MELITO. We didn’t ask that question. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So——

Mr. MELITO. My staff just told me that they think he was. 

Mr. WEBER. They think he wasn’t there, but now he is there. 

Mr. MELITO. They actually—they are telling me that the person 

who——

Mr. WEBER. He is there. 

Mr. MELITO [continuing]. Is running the office now is the same 

one who was there then, yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Do you know the reason why? 

Mr. MELITO. I do not know. 

Mr. WEBER. Could it be he or she wasn’t held accountable? 

Mr. MELITO. That is a question for State. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. But you are the GAO. You come in and you 

weigh in on these things, the process, right? 

Mr. MELITO. We actually do not think that that Bureau itself 

was where the problem was. That Bureau was following the process it was told to follow. We would like the question to go to the 

Deputy Secretary. 

Mr. WEBER. In your testimony, you state, ‘‘State’s delays in reporting on transfers and acquisitions have recently increased.’’ 

Why? 

Mr. MELITO. The ‘‘why’’ is hard to answer. We can show you 

which parts of the process it is taking, and it is taking much longer 

for the Deputy Secretary to approve it. Why it is taking him longer, 

I cannot tell you. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So let me ask you this question. I have got 

22 seconds left. You don’t know—well, you do know who is responsible, and there is—first, you didn’t think that person was still 

there, and now you think that person is still there. So we have a 

backlog. 

So is it a good premise to say, ‘‘To fix this problem, let us let the 

backlog sit for a minute, and let us start today now and get somebody accountable in that process that has got to, say, report in less 

than 6 months.’’ Is that feasible? 

Mr. MELITO. I think it is possible for State to decide this year 

to start reporting every 6 months, and they would release whatever 

decisions have already been completed. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. MELITO. And those decisions would cover multiple years. And 

they could do that and I think—and still continue to fully vet the 

cases that take too long, that take a long time. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. That doesn’t make me happy, but, Madam 

Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Those were excellent 

questions, Mr. Weber. 

30

And if I could just ask one question. Is the State Department 

taking longer to make these reports and implement the sanctions? 

If that is what is happening, does this diminish or bolster the 

credibility of the threatened sanctions? Because if sanctions are not 

being effectively implemented, and the delays in reporting are hindering their application, how credible is the threat to impose 

INKSNA sanctions? And did you raise this issue with State? And, 

if so——

Mr. MELITO. Yes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. How did they respond? 

Mr. MELITO. GAO observes in the report that a long period of 

time between observing a sanctionable action and sanctions probably undermines the credibility of the sanctions. State disagreed 

with that, but, to my mind, 3 or 4 years after you observe something is too long. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is too long. Thank you very much. Director, please give your thanks to your team for excellent work. 

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. 

And with that, our subcommittee is adjourned, but we look forward to working with you and making sure that they follow the 

law. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 2:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(31)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

32

f


95129n.eps
33

f


95129m.eps
34

Æ


95129b.eps