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i 

94–222 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–20] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

THE FISCAL YEAR 2016 NATIONAL 

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE MILITARY 

DEPARTMENTS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 17, 2015 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

SPENCER JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Committee on 

Armed Services ..................................................................................................... 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

James, Hon. Deborah Lee, Secretary of the Air Force, and Gen Mark A. 

Welsh, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force ..................................................... 7 

Maybus, Hon. Ray, Secretary of the Navy; ADM Michelle Howard, USN, 

Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen Joseph F. Dunford, USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps .............................................................................. 6 

McHugh, Hon. John M., Secretary of the Army, and GEN Raymond T. 

Odierno, USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ........................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Dunford, Gen Joseph F. ................................................................................... 198 

Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations .................. 160 

James, Hon. Deborah Lee, joint with Gen Mark A. Welsh ........................... 141 

Maybus, Hon. Ray ............................................................................................ 98 

McHugh, Hon. John M., joint with GEN Raymond T. Odierno .................... 68 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................... 67 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ ............................................................... 65 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 237 

Mr. Graves ........................................................................................................ 244 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 244 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 237 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 237 

Mr. Walz ............................................................................................................ 242 

(1) 

THE FISCAL YEAR 2016 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 17, 2015. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. 

Today, the full committee will examine the President’s budget request for the armed services of the United States. 

I am pleased to welcome each of the service secretaries and most 

of the service chiefs today. On behalf of the committee and the people we represent, I want to thank each of you for your service to 

the Nation. 

Since January, this committee has focused on understanding the 

strategic environment and many of the complex security challenges 

facing the United States. I believe that in order to fulfill our responsibilities under the Constitution, to raise and support, provide 

and maintain military forces that meet the President’s needs, it 

has been important for us to spend time understanding the specific 

challenges staring us in the face today as well as the longer term 

trends and where they are taking us. 

So over the last 2 months, the committee has had a variety of 

closed and open, classified and unclassified sessions with government and nongovernment witnesses as well as foreign leaders. 

We held the first-ever committee retreat with a number of distinguished speakers, including General Dempsey, and examined the 

past, the present, and the future. 

We have had sessions on the worldwide threats facing us, the 

status and trends of Islamic extremism, state-based security challenges, threats in various geographic regions, the status of conflicts 

in various geographic regions, and technological superiority and the 

pace of change. 

We have also received the recommendations of the compensation 

and retirement commission, heard from outside experts on the 

budget, and have studied ways to improve the Department’s acquisition of goods and services. 

All of that work, I think, puts us in a better position to consider 

the administration’s proposed budget. 
2 

I am sure that members are going to have questions on specific 

programs that were included or left out of the administration’s 

budget. I strongly believe that the job of the Congress under the 

Constitution and of this committee is to exercise independent judgment on how best to meet the Nation’s security needs, giving a 

great deal of weight, of course, to the judgment of our military 

leaders, but not being a rubber stamp for any administration. 

History has proven the wisdom of having a separate branch making independent decisions. But whatever the details of the individual programmatic decisions, I also believe we all need to look at 

the total resources we devote to defense, which is now about 15 

percent of the Federal budget, and we also have to consider the 

consequences if Congress approves significantly less defense spending than the President has asked for. 

And I would say to our distinguished witnesses, especially those 

in uniform, that this is the time to speak plainly. You know the 

dangers we face around the world. You know the damage that has 

already been done by a defense budget cut by one-fifth in real 

terms since 2010. And you know the difficult choices ahead of us 

even under the President’s budget request. 

Finally, as I have thanked each of our witnesses for their service, 

I want to express appreciation to all members of the committee on 

both sides of the aisle for all of your work so far this year. On both 

sides, members have asked—have done—have worked hard, asked 

very probing questions, trying to find the best answers for the security of the country, and I am proud to work with each of you. 

As most of you know, Ranking Member Smith is dealing with 

health issues and is not able to be with us this week. And ably sitting in his chair is the distinguished lady from California, Ms. 

Sanchez, who I recognize at this point for any opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 65.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And we do wish the 

quick return of Adam Smith. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for acknowledging that 

this has been a very tough year, already. And that we have some 

very severe budget constraints that may be coming out of the budget committee with respect to our resources here and how we allocate them for our military. 

And, you are right. It is in the purview of the Congress to make 

decisions about where we place the money. So this committee has 

a very difficult task ahead of it. 

I wanted to also thank our witnesses today. It is rare that we 

have service chiefs and our secretaries all in one room, so thank 

you so much. Today is, I hope, a hearing for some very constructive 

discussion about how we move forward. 

I also just want to acknowledge that it is also nice to see women 

on the panel. So, thank you for that. And we are thrilled to have 

you. 

Sequestration, I think that that has become such a distraction 

for the Congress. Certainly, I believe that we have to look at smart-
3 

er and more efficient ways in which we can invest and also save. 

We do not have the capacity as a country to hand anybody, even 

our military, a blank check. 

So I hope that the Department, along with the Congress can 

work together to invest in resources that will give us the best value 

for our money. We have to invest in R&D [research and development]. We have to make sure that we don’t have a hollow force. 

And we have to ensure that we can be an effective piece of what 

it takes to protect America and Americans. 

And I hope today’s hearing will not only focus on the threat of 

sequestration, but that we will have a discussion about our economic state, where we can invest, and where we must save. 

And, again, I thank all of you for being before us. And I look forward to having a good discussion. And I am glad so many members 

have shown to this hearing. 

I also request unanimous consent to place Mr. Smith’s opening 

comments into the record, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 67.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Again, let me welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses 

today. We have the Honorable John McHugh, the Secretary of the 

Army, a former member of this committee; General Ray Odierno, 

Chief of Staff of the Army; Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the 

Navy; the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], Admiral Greenert, had 

a family issue at the last minute, and so ably standing in for him 

is Admiral Michelle Howard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations; General Joseph Dunford, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Honorable 

Deborah Lee James, Secretary of the Air Force; and General Mark 

Welsh, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

Again, thank you all for being here. Without objection, your full 

written statements will be made part of the record. 

And the only other comment I would make is when we get to 

questions, with this many members and witnesses, I am going to 

have to be careful about the clock. So if you want to spend 3 minutes asking your question, you are going to get a very abbreviated 

answer. 

And I appreciate our witnesses as well as our members respecting the gavel as we try to give as many members as possible the 

chance to ask questions. 

Again, thank you all for being here. 

Secretary McHugh, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE 

ARMY, AND GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF 

STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

Secretary MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Ms. 

Sanchez, good to be with all of you. Please pass our best wishes on 

to Mr. Smith, and his speedy recovery. 

And to all of you, the distinguished members of the committee, 

I would say how much we appreciate the opportunity to be here 

today and to talk very frankly about the danger that lies ahead, 

should this budget not be enacted and sequestration allowed to return. 
4 

In short, it is amazing how much can change in a year. Over the 

last 12 months we have seen the geopolitical landscape morph at 

an astonishing pace, from renewed aggression by Russia and increased threats from North Korea to gains by radical terrorists in 

Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, not to mention the fight against Ebola, 

your Army has been managing to tackle contingencies around the 

world, even though they have grown at an alarming rate. 

Far from being foreseeable, our requirements have been more unexpected, our enemies more unpredictable, and our ability to handle multiple, simultaneous operations more uncertain. 

And yet, with such volatility, and instability around the world, 

America’s Army is faced yet again with an enemy here at home, 

the return of sequestration, unprepared units, unmaintained equipment, untrained soldiers. 

Ladies and gentlemen, our Army, your Army, faces a dark and 

dangerous future unless the Congress acts now to end these ill-conceived and inflexible budget cuts. Moreover—and I want to be very 

clear here—every installation, every component, and nearly every 

program will feel the brunt of these cuts. 

Under sequestration, by 2019, we will reduce our end strength 

to unconscionable levels, likely losing another six BCTs [brigade 

combat teams] and potentially a division headquarters, not to mention the impact to associated enablers, contracts, facilities, and civilian personnel. 

Let me share with you, if I may, some of the accomplishments 

of America’s Army this past year. As Russian-backed forces rolled 

into Ukraine, annexed Crimea, and threatened regional stability, 

our soldiers rapidly deployed to Eastern Europe in a demonstration 

of U.S. commitment and resolve. From Latvia and Lithuania to Poland and Estonia, soldiers from the 173rd Airborne and the 1st 

Cavalry showed the world that America would stand with our 

NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and respond to 

unbridled aggression. 

In West Africa, as thousands suffered from the scourge of Ebola, 

your Army acted. Elements of several units, led by the 101st Airborne, provided command and control, equipment, and expertise to 

support efforts to stop this deadly and destabilizing disease. 

In response to rapid gains by ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant], your soldiers quickly returned to Iraq to advise and assist 

security forces in turning the tide on this barbaric group of radical 

terrorists. In the Pacific, thousands of soldiers and civilians supported operations to strengthen our partnerships and increase our 

substantial presence. 

Today, the headquarters of nine Active Army and two Guard divisions are committed to combatant commands [COCOMs] and 

some 143,000 soldiers are deployed, forward-stationed or committed, including over 19,000 mobilized reservists. 

Moreover, we have done all of this while continuing to transform 

our formations to make them leaner, more agile, and far more lethal. 

As all of you know so well, such extraordinary success comes at 

a price. For in the end, the young lieutenant leading his or her platoon, the sergeants training and mentoring their soldiers, the invaluable civilian workforce laboring countless hours to support 
5 

them, and the young family waiting patiently at home are all 

human. 

The stress of war, multiple deployments, and unpredictable requirements doesn’t change in the face of indiscriminate funding 

cuts. Through it all, we have and will remain committed to supporting the needs of our warriors, from programs to increase resilience and improve behavioral health to the prevention of sexual assault and the protection of victims from retaliation, we will keep 

faith with our soldiers. 

But rest assured, the return of sequestration will directly impact 

critical installations and family programs, Army-wide. Simply put, 

we need the President’s budget. Our $126.5 billion request is, as 

you know, some $6.0 billion over the potential sequester level and 

is specifically designed to preserve our modest gains in readiness 

over the last year and take care of our soldiers. 

Moreover, this request seeks vital reform to compensation and 

force structure that will ensure the funding needed to support 

near-term readiness and help place the Army on a predictable path 

to balance. From modest changes to pay and allowances to our 

Aviation Restructuring Initiative, our reforms are both necessary 

and prudent to sustain the readiness of our forces and move the 

Army toward eventual balance. 

I cannot emphasize enough how critical these funds and reforms 

are to ensuring that your Army has sufficiently trained and ready 

soldiers to protect our Nation. This is an historic moment. We need 

to stop talking and start acting. We need wisdom, not words; we 

need results, not rhetoric. And, as I said to this very committee last 

year, we need predictability, not politics. 

As we face extreme instability around the world, we must have 

certainty here at home. I know you agree in what I am about to 

say: Your soldiers deserve no less. Their families deserve no less. 

We must have an end to sequestration this year, and we must have 

this budget. 

So thank you for all of the amazing support that I know personally each and every one of you provide to our men and women in 

uniform, their families, our civilians. Thank you for the work that 

this great committee has done time and time again on behalf of the 

nearly 1.3 million men and women of America’s Army, Active, 

Guard, Reserve, and civilian. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee’s 

questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary McHugh and General 

Odierno can be found in the Appendix on page 68.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

My understanding is that the opening statements are just going 

to be provided by the service secretaries. 

So, Secretary Mabus. 
6 

STATEMENT OF HON. RAY MAYBUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY; 

ADM MICHELLE HOWARD, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, USMC, COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

Secretary MABUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sanchez, members of the committee, thank you so much for this opportunity to discuss the Department of the Navy. 

With the Chief of Naval Operations, Jon Greenert, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Joe Dunford, I have the privilege of 

representing the sailors and marines who serve our Nation, the civilians who support them, and their families. 

Admiral Greenert cannot be here due to a death in his family. 

But I am joined by the very able vice chief, as you pointed out, Mr. 

Chairman, Admiral Michelle Howard. 

Uniquely, the Navy and Marine Corps provide presence around 

the globe, around the clock, the Nation’s first line of defense. Presence means we respond faster, we remain on station longer, we 

carry everything we need with us, and we do whatever missions 

are assigned by our Nation’s leaders without needing anyone else’s 

permission. 

We have always known America’s success depends on an exceptional Navy and Marine Corps. Article I of our Constitution, which 

you quoted, Mr. Chairman, and is enshrined in this committee 

room, authorizes Congress to raise an army when needed but directs it to provide and maintain a navy. 

From the first six frigates to our growing fleet of today, from 

Tripoli to Afghanistan, sailors and marines have proven the Founders’ wisdom. American leaders across the political spectrum have 

understood the vital significance of seapower. We deploy in peace 

just as much as in war. And our role in securing sea lanes has 

boosted our own and the world’s economy. 

That is why our national defense strategy is clearly focused on 

the maritime domain and why investing in maritime assets provides the best value for peace, for prosperity, and for security. 

And I want to join Secretary McHugh in thanking this committee, because you, through your actions, have shown that it 

shares the view of a strong defense and a strong Navy and Marine 

Corps. And thank you for your support for our sailors, our marines, 

and the things they need to get their job done. 

The presence that our Navy and Marine Corps so uniquely deliver is built on four foundations: people, platforms, power, and 

partnerships. Our sailors and marines are well-known for their 

ability to exercise independent judgment and the flexibility to face 

changing circumstances. We remain committed to providing our 

sailors, our marines, and our civilians with the training and support they need to maintain that naval presence. 

But our people, as good as they are, cannot do their job without 

platforms. Providing presence, being where we are needed when we 

are needed, requires those platforms. On September 11th, 2001, 

our fleet stood at 316 ships. By 2008, it had declined to 278 ships. 

Our focus on two ground wars only partly explains that decline. 

In the 5 years before I became Secretary, our Navy contracted for 

only 27 ships, not enough to stop the slide in the size of the fleet. 
7 

In my first 5 years, we have contracted for 70 ships and have reversed that decline. 

By the end of the decade, our fleet will once again be above 300 

ships. 

For the past few years, the Department of the Navy has attempted to minimize the impact of an uncertain budgetary environment, marked by numerous continuing resolutions, imposition of 

sequester-level funding, and the threat of the return of sequestration. 

In this environment, cutting ships is the most damaging and 

least reversible course of action. I am committed to preserving our 

shipbuilding, following the Navy’s watchword, ‘‘Don’t give up the 

ship.’’ 

Fueling the platforms of our Navy and Marine Corps is a vital 

operational concern that enables our global presence. That is why 

Navy has a long history of energy innovation. By employing alternative fuels and being more efficient in fuel usage, we are working 

to bring competition, lessen the incredible volatility in fuel prices, 

and decrease our adversaries’ ability to use fuel as a weapon. 

Our ability to maintain presence and advance global security will 

also be augmented through partnerships. Cooperation makes us 

more effective. 

Over all, the fiscal year 2016 President’s budget balances current 

readiness needed to execute the assigned missions of today while 

rebuilding our highly capable fleet. 

But it is the minimum that we must have to do that. Today’s 

tough fiscal climate demands our most rigorous examination of 

every dollar that we spend. And we have and will continue to do 

just that. 

But we are at the point where we can no longer do more or even 

the same with less. With less, we will be forced to do less. 

When America has called, the Navy and Marine Corps have always answered. In order to ensure that we continue to provide the 

naval force our Nation’s leaders and the American people expect. 

We look forward to answering your questions, and to working together with this committee and with Congress to maintain our 

great Navy and Marine Corps. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Mabus can be found in the 

Appendix on page 98.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

And now to a former staff member of this committee. We will 

take credit for all sorts of you folks. 

[Laughter.] 

Secretary James. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH LEE JAMES, SECRETARY OF 

THE AIR FORCE, AND GEN MARK A. WELSH, USAF, CHIEF OF 

STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE 

Secretary JAMES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez. It is a pleasure to come before all of you 

today, to come home, in effect, where my roots began. 
8 

Also an honor to sit here with my colleagues from sister services. 

And always a pleasure to be with my wingman, General Mark 

Welsh. 

Mr. Chairman, I am still the rookie among the service secretaries. I have now been in this seat for 15 months. And I would 

like to begin this morning by telling you all some of my key takeaways of the top things that I have learned in my 15 months as 

being the Secretary of the Air Force, the privilege of my professional lifetime. 

The first thing I have learned, which was a shock to me when 

I first got in the seat, is that today’s United States Air Force is the 

smallest Air Force that we have ever had since our inception as a 

separate service in the year 1947. We have literally been building 

down our Air Force for the better part of two decades. And today, 

we are the smallest we have even been in terms of people. 

Secondly, I have learned that our aircraft are the oldest that 

they have ever been, with an average age of 27 years, but, of 

course, average is average. And that means quite a few of the fleets 

are substantially older than that. 

Here is a shocking statistic, I think. More than half of our combat air forces are not sufficiently ready today for a high-end fight, 

meaning a fight where the enemy has the capacity to shoot back 

at you, to shoot you down, to interfere with you through integrated 

air defenses and the like. More than half of our forces are not sufficiently ready for such a fight. 

We all know budgets are extremely tight. And, of course, I think 

we also realize that demand for what we do in the United States 

Air Force is at an all-time high all around the world. And this is 

certainly the most dangerous and complex and constantly changing 

world scene that I can ever remember, certainly in the 34 years 

that I have been an observer on the scene in defense. 

Now, your Air Force is working very, very hard to meet the combatant commanders’ most urgent requirements and needs. But I 

have to join with my colleagues and say that a budgetary trajectory 

that results in sequestration is not going to allow us to sustain this 

pace. 

Let me now do my plain speaking. I believe sequestration is 

going to place American lives at greater risk, both at home and 

abroad, if we are forced to live with it. In fact, if sequestration remains the law of the land, we will not, in the United States Air 

Force, simultaneously be able to defeat an adversary in one part 

of the world, deny a second adversary the objectives they seek in 

a second part of the world, as well as defend the homeland. That, 

of course, is our national strategy. And I am telling you, we won’t 

be able to do it under sequestration. 

Mr. Chairman, you recently said at AEI [American Enterprise 

Institute] the problem with sequestration is whether we have the 

capability to do what the Nation needs and the times demand. It 

is also very much about the increased danger that comes to our 

people. And I couldn’t agree with you more. 

I think you are absolutely correct. And under sequestration, the 

Air Force cannot guarantee that we will meet the Nation’s demands. And our people will definitely be in more danger. And I just 

think this is not acceptable. Something has got to give. 
9 

And we thank you and we thank other members of this committee, because we know you are pushing hard to try to get sequestration lifted permanently. Please, please keep it up. 

Now, as you know, rather than living with this level of a budget, 

we are asking for a budget figure in fiscal year 2016 which is substantially closer to what we need in the United States Air Force. 

For us, the additional monies equate to about $10 billion more in 

fiscal year 2016 than what sequestration-level funding would provide to the Air Force. And this $10 billion more would provide both 

the forces that we need to do the most pressing combatant commander requirements, and it would also allow us to invest better, 

more appropriately in our top priorities. Which are, number one, 

taking care of people. And there is an awful lot in this budget related to people, but I want to call your attention to the number one 

priority that General Welsh and I have pinpointed. And that is, we 

have got to stop this downsizing. 

As I mentioned, we are the smallest that we have ever been. In 

my opinion, I think we have even gone too far. And that is why 

this budget proposes a modest uptick for both our Active Duty, our 

National Guard, and our Reserve elements. We want to go up very 

slightly. And if we are allowed to do so, this will alleviate some 

operational strain that we are feeling in a number of areas, to include our nuclear enterprise, the world of cyber, and the world of 

maintenance, particularly across the combat air forces. 

Turning to second priority, which is getting the right balance between our readiness of today and building a modern Air Force of 

tomorrow. 

Both General Welsh and I consulted very closely as we built our 

budget, not only with the folks at this table, but also with our combatant commanders. And as a result, our budget is going to ramp 

up support to the most urgent needs that the combatant commanders identified to us, which basically equate to one thing: ISR 

[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]. ISR, ISR, ISR— 

that is what they tell us. They need more Air Force as the top priority. 

So, as a result, we have got 60 steady-state ISR patrols in the 

budget, as well as we are extending the life of a U–2 and the 

AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] program in this 

budget. 

We also need to support space programs, strengthen the nuclear 

enterprise, fund flying hours to the maximum executable level, invest in weapons system sustainment, and ensure combat exercises 

like Red and Green Flag programs remain strong. All of that is the 

readiness of today, but we also have to modernize for tomorrow. 

And so, when it comes to modernization, again, we have got some 

decent funding that I want to share with you. 

The nuclear enterprise is our number one mission, and so we 

have redirected substantial resources towards that element. Moreover, we have our top three programs which will remain on track 

under this budget. The KC–46 tanker, the F–35, and the LongRange Strike Bomber. And we will also be making important investments in modernization for space, our science and technology 

budget, as well as other areas. 
10 

And our third priority, Mr. Chairman—our number three goal is 

what we call ‘‘make every dollar count.’’ And this is because we 

precisely understand—we get it that the taxpayer dollar is precious, and we can’t afford to waste any of it. And so, we are constantly looking for efficiencies and ways to do things differently, to 

free up resources, and to give back to our people some of their precious time. 

So, for example, we took an aggressive 20 percent reduction in 

our headquarters funding, which includes civilians and contractors 

and redirecting military personnel. We didn’t have to do it in 1 

year, but we did, because we thought it was the right thing to do. 

We would be able to free up those resources more quickly to plow 

back into important things that we need to do. Not only that, but 

over the last 3 years, we have reduced our service contract workforce by $7 billion. 

So, we have reduced contractors substantially. And we are going 

to continue to scrub this as time goes by, both on the contractor 

workforce, the civilian workforce over the next several years. 

We also are striving to institute service-wide efficiencies in our 

acquisition systems. We call it ‘‘bend the cost curve,’’ trying to keep 

weapons on track, building affordability into new systems right 

from the beginning. We are driving toward auditability of our 

books and we are looking to maximize energy savings. So all of 

this, I would submit, falls very much in line with your acquisition 

reform thrust, Mr. Chairman. And I want you to know we are on 

it. We are on this line as well. 

Now there are plenty of tough choices in this budget as well. I 

don’t want to pick an overly—paint an overly rosy picture. We had 

hard choices to make because we couldn’t do everything. So for example, we are proposing, once again, to retire the A–10 fleet gradually over time and also to slow the growth in military compensation. 

And we know these are not popular decisions, popular choices, 

but would ask you to keep in mind that if you don’t like these 

choices, hold on to your hats, because under sequestration, it gets 

uglier and uglier and uglier. 

So for example, under sequestration, our Air Force would not 

only have to retire the A–10, as well as slow the growth in military 

compensation, but in addition, we would be facing the following actions. Divest the U–2, and the Global Hawk Block 40, and the KC– 

10 fleets. 

We would have to reduce our combat air patrols, our Reapers, 

and our Predators, up to 10 orbits. We would defer 14 F–35s, 

which, of course, would drive up unit costs. 

We would cancel the adaptive engine program and then we 

would have to, in some sort of not across-the-board equal percentage way, but in some fashion, we would also have to reduce our investments in space and cyber and nuclear and science and technology and readiness and people. 

In other words, I think, everything is threatened, Mr. Chairman, 

under sequestration. And most of all, I fear that American lives 

would be at risk. So I ask you again, please continue your leadership to get sequestration lifted permanently. Please keep on pushing. 
11 

Thank you very much. And we all look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary James and General 

Welsh can be found in the Appendix on page 141.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I am going to ask the staff to put me 

on the clock, because I have, really, one question directed to each 

of the service chiefs. At our retreat, General Dempsey said, and he 

said we could quote him, that ‘‘the budget request was the lower 

ragged edge of what it takes to defend the country.’’ 

So if you were talking to my constituents or some of our colleagues who don’t deal in this area every day and had 1 minute 

to describe what the consequences to the country would be for not 

approving the amount that the President or the administration has 

asked for, for Department of Defense [DOD] or for your service, 

how would you do that? Again, in 1 minute, in plain language. 

General. 

General ODIERNO. Chairman, I would say unpreparedness, inability to react to the unknown, contingencies, and stress on the 

force would be increased significantly. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral. 

Admiral HOWARD. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I am 

more of a rookie than Secretary James. Strategic deterrence remains our number-one priority, so we would focus on that, but then 

the impact on the rest of the conventional force, our ships and submarines, would be tremendous. You are talking about impact on 

readiness, our ability to train people and our ability to forward deploy and be where we need to be. All of that would shrink. Our 

ability to respond to the Nation’s needs would be greatly diminished. It is—it would be devastating. 

The CHAIRMAN. General. 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, I think I would use an anecdote. 

What you would expect out of the Marine Corps is that we are forward deployed, forward engaged, and ready to respond to crises in 

a moment’s notice. And I think there are two models for that. 

There is the model that we have seen over the past year where 

marines have immediately responded to evacuation operations in 

South Sudan, in Libya, in Yemen. And in those cases, we haven’t 

heard much. It was in the news for about a day and then it moved 

on. 

There was a case a few years ago in Benghazi when marines 

weren’t forward postured, forward engaged, and ready to respond 

on a moment’s notice and we heard about that particular incident 

now for years. I think that is the difference between funding the 

budget in support of marines and having us be forward deployed, 

forward engaged, and not be engaged. There are two models of crisis response and I would outline those for your constituents, Chairman, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. General. 

General WELSH. Chairman, I would agree with what the Commandant said and I would tell you that I believe the fundamental 

issue is going to be that the American people cannot expect their 

military to do what we have been asked to do in the past, if we 

stay at these funding levels. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. As you all were talking, I was thinking, too, some comments that were made by one of our committee 
12 

members earlier today that basically it means that lives are at 

greater risk and more lives are lost because that is what the bottom line to what we ask you and those who serve under you to do. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually have two 

questions. The first is for General Odierno and for the Admiral— 

Admiral Howard. Please feel free to answer the best you can. So 

I have a letter here both from General Odierno and Admiral 

Greenert sent to Secretary Hagel November of last year, indicating 

your concerns with essentially how much we are investing in missile defense and the growing challenges both that you see in terms 

of our capacity to continue to invest in missile defense at the current rate, considering the fiscal environment that we are in. The 

letter states ‘‘our present acquisition-based strategy is unsustainable in the current fiscal environment and favors forward deployment of assets in lieu of deterrence-based options to meet contingency demands. 

‘‘Now is the opportunity to develop a long-term approach that addresses homeland missile defense and regional missile defense priorities, a holistic approach that is more sustainable and cost effective, incorporating ‘‘left of launch’’ and other non-kinetic means of 

defense.’’ That is from your letter, General Odierno. 

Can you expand on this letter, because I believe it is very important as we look at how we can get the best value for the taxpayers’ 

money. I have always argued that missile defense is only one approach to addressing the various threats that face us. And as indicated in your letter, could you expand on that, please? 

General ODIERNO. So the basis of the letter was that we cannot 

sustain the rate of deployments of the current missile defense capability that we have. We simply are overstressing the force. We don’t 

have enough. We are not meeting all the requirements. So in our 

mind, we have to come up with a new concept that allows us to 

use an integrated air and missile defense capability that is shared 

among the services that allows us to deal with this growing threat, 

because the threat is growing. 

So what we want is a study that enables us to come up with new 

techniques, new procedures, new capabilities that are able for us 

to provide proper defense for this Nation, using a variety of capabilities to include current missile defense assets, but other capabilities. You can—cyber and other things that have to be integrated 

into this that enables us to deal with these problems. We are on 

a path that we can’t sustain. And the threat, missile defense 

threat, is growing, so we have got to come up with a most costeffective means of dealing with this issue and I think that was the 

basis of the letter. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you would like a study? General, can we wait 

to put that in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] and 

go through the whole funding process for a year or would you prefer that we try to get a study up on that as soon as possible? 

General ODIERNO. I think we need to do it as soon as possible, 

ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. My second question is in regards to where 

each service is in fully integrating women into the military. You 

know this has been a big deal from my standpoint for a long time. 
13 

There is about 15 percent of the military comprised of women. 

Over 200,000 women have dedicated their lives to serve our country, and have died while serving on the front lines. So, it is women’s history month, and equality of women extends to the military. 

By September of this year, all gender-neutral occupation standards 

are to be set. And by next year, all positions should be open unless 

an exception to the policy is requested. 

Are all the services on track to meeting those deadlines? And if 

not, why? And from what I can see on the current schedule, many 

occupations and units won’t be open by January 1st, 2016, deadline. So, what is OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] doing to 

ensure service, and so, compliance with the original directive? And 

why are women in open specialties like communications, intelligence, and logistics still barred from serving in Marine Corps infantry battalions in any capacity, even though, for example, a male 

public affairs officer assigned to an infantry unit requires no infantry training beyond what all officers receive at the basic school, and 

women in these open specialties are not allowed in any capacity in 

infantry battalions? 

So, can you please address where we are, where we are going? 

Are we going to meet what we need to do? 

General ODIERNO. Ma’am, if I could, we are on track. We have— 

to make our recommendation to the Secretary. This year, we are 

on the—we are continuing to finish up the testing for all our MOSs 

[military occupational specialties]. Currently, we have infantry engineer, field artillery, and armor that are currently not yet open. 

We are running tests with women in these positions now. We have 

actually sent a note forward to Congress recommending the opening of combat engineers already. So, we have finished that. 

We expect artillery to be done within the next month or so. And 

we expect armor and infantry—we will have—we will be prepared 

to provide a recommendation September, October timeframe. And 

that is the timeline we are on. We are comfortable with where we 

are in assessing. And I think you are aware that we are also doing 

a test right now in Ranger school, where, for the first time, females 

will participate in Ranger school. 

The CHAIRMAN. If you all could just have—I—in fairness to her, 

I did not alert Ms. Sanchez that I was going to put us under the 

clock, too. But if the other services just have a really brief answer. 

And then I am sure we can expand. 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy and the Marine Corps are absolutely 

on track to meet the deadlines. In the Navy, we have opened every 

single occupation and billet to women, including submarines, 

riverine. And the only one that remains closed today are the trigger 

pullers for the SEALs [Sea, Air, Land teams]. All the support 

things like intel and communications for the SEALs are open. 

I will let General Dunford give you an update on exactly where 

the Marines are. But the one thing I would ask this committee— 

we don’t have enough women in our service. And one of the reasons 

that we are having problems is, we do not have enough flexibility 

in how we manage our force. And more women leave than men. 

And we have some legislative proposals in to address that. 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, thank you. And the Secretary outlines where we are. But I would just go back to your ex-
14 

ample of public affairs officer. In fact, due to the Secretary of Defense lifting the co-location policy, there is no difference today in 

how we would assign a male and a female public affairs officer, to 

include in support of an infantry unit. 

So, today, there are no restrictions. A commander can, due to lifting of the co-location policy, assign women anywhere in the battlefield where he or she believes it is necessary. And that has been 

in effect since Secretary Panetta signed his letter. 

Secretary JAMES. And the vast majority of our positions in the 

Air Force are open. We have seven closed AFSCs [Air Force specialty codes] at present. We are on track to meet the deadlines. 

And I personally have received kind of an interim update about 

how it is all going. And I feel pretty good about it. 

As you pointed out, Ms. Sanchez, we do need to work closely with 

the Special Operations Command. Our seven AFSCs pretty much 

relate to the world of special operations. And so, we are trying to 

work through that coordination now. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence. I 

think it is an incredibly important issue. And I hope that our personnel committee, in particular, will continue to be on top of this. 

I just think it is so important. 

The CHAIRMAN. They are on top of everything. They are good. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. They have done good jobs—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Dunford, if I 

could go back to the chairman’s line of questioning about the impact of these budgets—you stated about as articulately as I have 

heard it stated a few weeks ago. As I understood you to state, you 

said this. That even if we were to get the full amount in the President’s budget, that the best that could do for us would be to reset 

us to where the military was a decade ago. That it still would not 

enable us to begin to reconstitute to where we need to be to fight 

tomorrow’s wars. And that if we did not get the amount in the 

President’s budget, we couldn’t even reset to where we were a decade ago—fighting wars a decade ago. 

Is that an accurate statement? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, it is in many functional areas. 

And very briefly, why I say that is because we have learned that 

today, we must operate in a greatly distributed manner. That is 

both at sea and at shore. And that has implications for command 

and control systems. It has implications for fliers. It has implications for our organizational construct and our equipment strategy 

as a whole. 

And currently, even at the President’s budget, we are not making 

the kind of changes that facilitate and optimize distributed operations in a manner that I think is necessary for the current fight, 

as well as the future fight. 

And I would just—you know, if you just look at the examples of 

our special-purpose Marine air-ground task forces today, the one 

that is in the Central Command is spread across six different countries. That is an organization now spread across six different countries. And when I was a lieutenant, I was trained in a unit of that 
15 

size. We would defend on about a 3,000-meter frontage and attack 

on about a 600-meter frontage. 

So, you can get a sense of how time and space has changed over 

time, and the implications, again, for both organization and equipping. And I don’t think we are making the kinds of changes to facilitate that as quickly as necessary. 

And so, fundamentally, we really are building capabilities that 

are more applicable to yesterday than tomorrow right now as a result of the budgetary constraints. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral Howard, I won’t ask you to comment on 

what the CNO would say, but I can say for the record that I heard 

him a few days after General Dunford made that statement. He 

quoted that statement, and said that he did agree with it, as well. 

General Odierno, I asked you the same question. And I think 

your comment was that you agreed, as well. But I would just like 

for your thoughts on that. 

General ODIERNO. I agree. I would say for the Army, actually, we 

don’t even get reset for 5 more years. And so, it takes us to 2020 

even to reset, as we are still trying to move to the future. And so, 

for us, the next 4 or 5 years, we have some significant issues in 

terms of readiness. 

Mr. FORBES. Yes. General Welsh, I haven’t had an opportunity 

to ask you that question, but what would you feel about the statement that General Dunford had made? 

General WELSH. Congressman, the problem we have is if we 

don’t invest in readiness today, we risk losing the fight today. If 

we don’t invest in readiness and capability for the future, we risk 

losing the fight 10 to 20 years from now. That is the balance we 

are trying to walk. 

It will take the Air Force 8 to 10 years to recover full-spectrum 

readiness. We haven’t been investing in the infrastructure over the 

last 10 to 15 years. It gives us mission capability, training ranges, 

space launch capabilities, simulation infrastructure, black and 

white world test infrastructure, those kind of things. The entire nuclear infrastructure issue that you are familiar with, those things 

must be persistent, consistent investment for us or we will fail 

down the road. That is what we are lacking right now. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. And Secretary James, you gave a very good 

statement of where the Air Force is and your comments. As you 

know, the budget that the President sent over, however, even if we 

pass that budget, would not become law unless we also have legislation doing away with sequestration. 

Are you aware of any proposal the President has sent over here 

that would do away with sequestration for national defense? And 

if not, if we were to pass such a piece of legislation that would do 

away with sequestration for national defense, do you have any indication that the White House would sign that legislation? 

Secretary JAMES. Mr. Chairman, it has at least been my impression, but I want to go back and double-check what I am about to 

say here, is that the overall plan that the President set forth would 

involve the lifting of sequestration not only for defense, but for the 

whole of government. So my belief was that the President’s plan 

did include the lifting of sequestration for all of us—— 

Mr. FORBES. And what I ask—— 
16 

Secretary JAMES [continuing]. But please allow me to check that. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. I would ask for all three of our secretaries, if you could give us any indication that the President would 

be willing to sign a piece of legislation that would do away with 

sequestration at least related to national defense because, as I take 

your statement that we can’t defend against an adversary in one 

part of the world and hold another one at bay and defend the 

homeland, unless we do that. I would hope the President wouldn’t 

hold that hostage to money that he might want for the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], IRS [Internal Revenue Service], or 

something else. 

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Appreciate it. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all very much 

for being here, of course, for your service. Secretary Mabus, you 

mentioned just briefly—and you don’t have to respond right now— 

that there are some authorities that you need in order to do a better job hiring women into the Navy, particularly? And if you 

could—I would look forward to seeing that, so that we can work on 

that in the upcoming NDAA. 

I wanted to ask you, Secretary Mabus, and certainly to General 

Dunford, we know that sequestration will decrease readiness and 

place our personnel at risk. I wonder if you could speak more directly, though, to the fact that for the Marines, 60 percent are first 

enlistments. 

And as we move forward with the environment that we have, the 

OPTEMPO [operations tempo] environment, the changes to future 

benefits, perhaps, what are we doing to ensure the quality and the 

high standards of the Marine Corps? Do you see that that could be 

affected by the way that we move forward today? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, thank you. Today, 60 percent, as you pointed out, of our forces, is first-termers. In terms of 

quality, we are absolutely recruiting and retaining high-quality 

marines today and I am confident of that. 

However, something that we have spoken about is that I also believe that the demographics in the Marine Corps need to change to 

account for the increasingly complex security environment. So 

today we may have a 60 percent first-term force. But I don’t believe 

that it should be that case in the future. 

And we are in the process now of actually increasing the numbers of sergeants, staff sergeants, gunnery sergeants—those are the 

middle-grade enlisted ranks—and reducing the numbers of lance 

corporals, PFCs [privates first class], and privates, those are the 

bottom three enlisted grades. And that is in recognition, again, of 

technological developments with the F–35 cyber capabilities, as 

well as our infantry squad leaders who today have the responsibility, frankly, that were probably more in line with what a lieutenant was doing 15 or 20 years ago is now on the shoulders of a sergeant and I think that also requires some changes again in the demographics and the construct of the Marine Corps. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. So, the skill sets are all obviously important, in 

terms of how you do that. I think part of my question, and it has 

been raised—and the last few questions is, you know, it is maybe 
17 

not in your area of responsibility to look at non-defense impacts of 

sequestration. But when we talk about the young people that we 

are recruiting today, certainly, our domestic budget has an impact 

on that as well. And I know that, in the past, Admiral Mullen specifically comes to mind, but others have really spoken to the needs 

of whether it is in education, whether it is in fitness, whether it 

is in health, all those areas. So do you feel comfortable saying that, 

in fact, it does matter what we do in terms of sequestration and 

the non-defense budget, as well? Does that impact on our military? 

Does it impact on the young people who were going to be recruited? 

Secretary MABUS. Congresswoman, I will give you a very specific 

example of how it has a tremendous impact on us. Seventy-five percent of young Americans 18–24 years old do not qualify to join the 

American military. It is either for—they lack the educational requirements that we have, they have a health problem, usually obesity, or they have a criminal record. So if you want to help us continue to recruit the very best that, that we believe we are the recruiting today, but we are drawing from a very small pool of Americans. You have to pay attention to education, you have to pay attention to health. You have to pay attention to the domestic side. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Anybody else want to comment briefly? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I would be happy to, Mrs. Davis. 

Obviously, the Army, all the services are laboring under the 

same one-in-four constraint that Secretary Mabus mentioned. 

I can tell you both in talking to new recruits, but also those who 

have served some time in the United States Army that they are 

very mindful of the discussion on sequestration. 

They are also very aware of the cuts that we in the Army have 

already had to take, of the loss of training opportunities that they 

have had to endure in other programs. And while they want to 

stick with us, it becomes more and more challenging for them to 

do that. They want to secure a future for their families and they 

are very worried about how this may turn out. 

As for recruiting, similarly, recruits and their influencers, particularly parents, are mindful of these discussions and are questioning whether or not they want to send their child, number one, 

into a military service, where there is obviously great danger involved. But coupled with the fact of a totally uncertain fiscal future. So it is a very large challenge we are all dealing with right 

at the moment. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being 

here today. I want to go a little bit further out than the budget 

that we are discussing today, but talk a little bit about the audit. 

One of the things that absolutely shocked me was that when we 

started talking about auditing DOD a few years ago, we were told 

it would take years to get the agency into a posture that we, in 

fact, could audit them. So we have got a couple deadlines that are 

approaching. I think, 2017 is the first one to get ready, and then 

2019, when the results have to be given to Congress. 
18 

But I want to talk a little about risk allocation, or hear from you, 

that may come from the DOD audit. 

Two quick questions. 

One is, I understand that the leadership is supporting the audit, 

but I am a little concerned about the SES [Senior Executive Service] levels and commitment to making this happen. So I want to 

know your feeling on the commitment from the senior level. And 

then any tweaks that you may have done since the November report that Congress received on the financial improvement and 

audit readiness plan. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I can start, Mr. Miller. As to the larger question of the Army’s posture in achieving the milestones that you described, I feel we are on track. We have gone through a series of 

both mock audits and outside examinations that have proven very, 

very positive unqualified findings in a number of areas. But equally, if not more important, they have shown us where we have 

weaknesses and need to do better. 

As to your specific question on the SES’s, I think we have buyin. What we are challenged with is helping people operate under 

the new paradigm and getting away from business as usual. So, 

what we have done in response to that, where we witnessed it 

through our mock audits and our other examinations, is to go back 

in and to reemphasize training. And to the extent we have been 

able to measure that to this point, we think we are on the right 

path. 

But this is an incredibly complex endeavor, as you noted, particularly for the United States Army, but we have made great progress 

and we feel we are moving forward as you would want us to. 

General ODIERNO. If I could just add one comment to that it 

would be, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Under Secretary of the Army quarterly are doing VTCs [video teleconferences] with all subordinate MACOMs [major commands] of the 

Army specifically on this issue so they all understand the importance they play in moving forward with this. And that is starting— 

that is really helping us to move this along. 

Secretary MABUS. As a former State auditor, I don’t take anything more seriously. As you know, the Marine Corps got a clean 

audit on their statement of budgetary accounts for fiscal year 2012. 

They are almost finished with the fiscal year 2013 audit. Navy has 

its first statement of budgetary account audit under contract now, 

and moving forward. 

I believe in particular SES is understanding the importance of it 

and of moving forward. The concern that I have, very frankly, is 

that there is at least one area that we don’t control that could have 

an impact on whether we get the audit. The Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service [DFAS] that writes our checks, that we pay, the 

Navy and the Marine Corps, $300 million to last year to write 

those checks, 9 out of their 10 internal controls have been found 

to be inadequate. 

The numbers that we receive from them that we are dependent 

on cannot be validated. And so the Navy and Marine Corps are absolutely on track to do it. Again, I am concerned about that that 

is outside of our control. 
19 

Secretary JAMES. And Congressman Miller, I first of all want to 

agree with my colleague, Ray Mabus, on that last point about 

DFAS. But on behalf of the Air Force, I would say again we are 

fully committed to the audit. In fact, I mentioned that in my opening statement. I come out of the business world and so I personally 

am devoting time to this as well. 

I do monthly meetings just to keep my finger on the pulse of how 

we are doing. We are underway with the schedule of budgetary activity, which of course is the precursor to doing the audit. And we 

have a new accounting environment, which we call DEAMS [Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System] in the Air 

Force, which a year or two ago was quite messy and not going well. 

But it is doing much better now, and that is going to help us get 

there from here. 

So on balance, I am cautiously optimistic, but with several of 

these caveats that you heard, that we are on track to meet the 

goals that are laid out in the law now, of September of 2017 specifically, to reach the full financial statement audit. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today, for your 

testimony, and of course, your enduring service to our Nation. 

Secretary Mabus, if I could start with you. First of all, I want 

to thank you. Recently, you were in Rhode Island for the keel-laying ceremony for the USS Colorado, along with your daughter, the 

ship sponsor, and your family. You honored our State, as well as 

the State of Colorado and the workforce, the men and women of 

Quonset Point Electric Boat, for your presence there, and I thank 

you for that. 

On the Virginia-class program, along with the Virginia Payload 

Module and then the Ohio replacement, as we face significant 

budget challenges, Secretary, can you tell us how is your ability to 

keep those programs on track at the President’s budget level, or if 

we have to drop back to BCA [Budget Control Act] levels or even 

worse, how is the impact if sequestration goes into effect to keep 

those programs on track, especially given the challenges that we 

face as our submarine force is declining if we don’t keep those programs on track at just at the same time our adversaries, in particular China, are increasing the size of their submarine fleet? 

Secretary MABUS. Thank you, Congressman. 

The Virginia-class program is a model program. We, as you 

know, signed a 10-year—a 10-boat, multiyear where we got 10 submarines for the price of 9 because of this committee’s support in 

allowing us to do the multiyear. 

To break a multiyear because of lack of funds, that is possible 

with sequestration, means you would pay more money and get 

fewer ships, which is just a bizarre outcome. 

On the Virginia Payload Module, the first one of those is scheduled to go into one boat in 2019. We are looking to see if we can 

move that up because of the need we have for that strike capability 

that will go away when our SSGNs, our guided missile submarines, 

retire in the mid-2020s. 
20 

And finally, the Ohio-class replacement program, the first boat 

will have to begin in 2021. This is the most survivable leg of the— 

of our deterrence triad. We cannot extend the life of the Ohio class 

any longer. And this is a program that if Navy shipbuilding is 

asked to bear the entire burden of it, would take more than half 

of our shipbuilding budget for 12 years, which would have serious 

implications to our submarine fleet and all the rest of our fleet, and 

to the entire Navy. 

So, I appreciate Congress setting up the fund for the Ohio-class 

replacement, and I think that this debate has to continue as to how 

we fund this because it is a national program and needs national 

support for it. 

And there is history behind it in the first time we did deterrent 

submarines, ‘‘41 for Freedom’’ in the late 1950s, early 1960s, and 

in the Ohio class, both times significant amounts were added to 

Navy shipbuilding to allow that deterrent to be met. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

And Secretary, I would like to point out a sentence in your statement that resonated with me. And that was the mention of the 

Navy and Marine Corps being those services that perform most 

often far from home, in addition to the Army. What are the current 

dwell ratios? And would a reduced budget negatively affect the current ratios in a way that might threaten the morale and efficiency 

of our Army, Navy, and Marine Corps? 

Secretary MABUS. Our Marine Corps right now is a little bit less 

than 1:2, dwell to deployment. We today have more than 30,000 

marines on deployment around the world. And 1:2 is, to use the 

chairman’s term, the ‘‘ragged edge’’ of how much you can ask someone to deploy without their effectiveness being—suffering. 

On the Navy side, our deployments are getting longer. They are 

getting less predictable. And we are trying to get into a thing called 

the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, which will make deployments 

more predictable, which will make maintenance more predictable, 

which will make training more predictable. All that would be seriously jeopardized and scuttled by sequestration. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank each of you for being here today. I know 

first-hand your commitment, how military families, service members, veterans truly appreciate your service. 

In fact, our family’s joint service cover each of you. Thanks to my 

wife, I give her all the credit, we have had three sons in the Army 

National Guard; have a son in the Navy. We have a nephew in the 

Air Force. My late brother-in-law and father-in-law were proud marines. So first-hand, I know of your commitment and how military 

families are putting so much trust in you. 

I also want to point out the context to where we are today. Somebody that we all respect, I believe it is universal, bipartisan, Dr. 

Henry Kissinger, testified recently, ‘‘the United States has not 

faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of 

the Second World War.’’ 
21 

And Secretary James, I appreciate in particular you pointed out 

how the reduction of our air capability is putting the American people at risk and we want to work with you. 

Additionally, though, we need to recognize according to Bob 

Woodward in his book, ‘‘The Price of Politics,’’ that it was the President who came up with defense sequestration. I am very grateful 

that House Republicans have voted twice to replace defense sequestration. Sadly, neither one of our initiatives were taken up by the 

former Senate, but hope springs eternal that this can be addressed. 

In regard to a question, General Odierno, I will always be very 

grateful visiting you in Baghdad. I have had two sons serve in Iraq, 

so I know again of your insight. And I would like your insight into 

what milestones we will be looking at in Afghanistan before there 

is a further drawdown. 

General ODIERNO. Congressman, I would say that the important 

thing in Afghanistan is twofold. One is we have to make sure that 

the Afghan security forces continue to improve, they continue to be 

able to do the institutional things that are necessary for a longterm sustainment of their military. And I think that is critical. 

And so in order for that to happen, I believe we have to stay the 

course with them and we have to continue to help them as they 

continue to fight the challenges that they face. And they are doing 

an incredible job doing that, but it is important we stay with them 

and that we have a conditions-based capability with a commander 

over there that allows him to make judgments in order to make 

sure we continue the support that is necessary for them to have 

sustained—sustainable outcomes that will last a long time. 

Mr. WILSON. And I share the concern of the President. One of my 

sons served also in Afghanistan. And that is that the stability of 

Afghanistan is very important for the stability of nuclear-equipped 

Pakistan. And so I appreciate the President recognizing that. And 

every step should be made for stability so that they are not safe 

havens to attack the United States. 

An issue that really has come before us, cyber threat to our country. And in particular, I am keenly interested, Secretary McHugh, 

in regard to Cyber Command. What is the latest on how we are 

going to be facing it? And if other branches would like to address, 

this is such a key issue to the American people. 

Secretary MCHUGH. It is. And as many far smarter than I have 

declared, it is clearly the critical challenge of the future, and a 

threat to not just the military, but to the homeland writ large. Like 

all of the services, we are working through Cyber Command as a 

joint commander to ensure that we are coordinated across all of the 

military departments in a way that provides the most robust and 

most effective cyber team. 

In the Army, in the Active Component, we are in the process of 

standing up 41 cyber protection teams; 24 of those are currently at 

initial operation capability. And by the end of 2016, we expect all 

41 to be up and operating. We are very mindful of the fact that, 

particularly in the Guard and Reserve, there is a wealth of experience. Many of these individuals have employment outside of their 

military jobs that have much to do with cyber systems. 

As such, the Guard is setting up 11 cyber protection teams. The 

Reserve Component will have 10. And as I said, we are working 
22 

very hard to coordinate that writ large. We have instituted a series 

of benefits, of programs and bonuses to try to compete for these 

highly technical individuals. And through the Army Center of Excellence, Cyber Center of Excellence at Fort Gordon, which we have 

announced, I think we are making progress. But as I think any expert would readily admit, there are challenges that remain and a 

ways to go. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to all of our service secretaries and chiefs. I want 

to commend all of you for sharing with this committee the dangers 

of sequestration and the devastating impact it can have on our 

military readiness. And I hope that Congress will have the political 

will to eliminate sequestration entirely. I urge you to continue your 

efforts. 

General Dunford, in 2012, the U.S. and Japanese governments 

agreed to de-link the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam, 

from progress on the Futenma replacement facility. General, last 

week during your testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, you stated, ‘‘We have to have the Futenma replacement facility in order for us to leave our current Futenma Air Station, and 

then back the redeployment to Guam as well and properly support 

the marines that are in the area.’’ 

I am concerned, General, that we may have given the impression 

that Futenma and Guam relocation are again linked. So can you 

clarify this point? And also quickly, can you comment on the 

progress of implementing the distributed laydown in the AsiaPacific region? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks very much for giving 

me the chance to clarify. I was speaking in response to a question 

that said what are the issues that Congress should pay attention 

to with regard to the implementation of DPRI [Defense Policy Review Initiative]. And so, I did not link the Futenma replacement 

facility to the move to Guam. In fact, in the President’s budget for 

2016, we have funds for training ranges and we are proceeding 

apace for the move to Guam in 2021, 2022. So, that is absolutely 

on track. 

And so I would just say overall, our progress for DPRI is on path. 

However, one of the second-order effects of sequestration would certainly be to have an impact on DPRI. And I find it hard to imagine 

it would be able to sustain the plan we have right now were we 

to go below the President’s budget. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much for clarifying that. 

Admiral Howard, I have a three-part question here, so if you 

could be brief in your answers. Pacific Fleet has stated, ‘‘the restoration of a dry-docking capability on Guam remains a strategic 

requirement and operational necessity.’’ Last year, a submarine 

tender was sent from Guam back to the West Coast for the overhaul which was costly. What are the costs and the impacts on fleet 

readiness imposed by sending ships from their Western Pacific area 

of responsibilities back to the U.S. mainland for dry-docking? 

And further, 2 years ago, MSC [Military Sealift Command] indicated in a letter to the Governor of Guam that it would pursue dry- 
23 

docking availabilities as a follow-on contracting action. I reluctantly agreed to this strategy, but expected the Navy to follow 

through on its commitment. To date, that has not occurred. So can 

you get an update on this situation and when will a request for information be released for chartering a dry-dock on Guam? 

Admiral HOWARD. Congresswoman, thank you for that question. 

And obviously, the repair and maintenance of our ships in Guam 

is a strategic priority for us, and our ability to be forward-deployed 

particularly with the Pacific rebalance. 

In regards to the specific cost of sending ships back, I would have 

to get to you the dollar cost. Clearly, sending ships back stateside 

has a responsiveness cost for our forces. We are still looking at the 

economic feasibility of getting a dry dock into Guam and we owe 

you an answer shortly on that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. WILSON [presiding]. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo of 

Guam. 

We now proceed to Congressman Frank LoBiondo of New Jersey. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I join with my colleagues in thanking all of you 

for being here and your service to our country. 

General Welsh, I have a question. What are the—actually two— 

what are the Air Force’s plans to address the urgent operational 

need for radar upgrades for F–16 Block 30 aircraft currently conducting their aerospace control alert mission? 

General WELSH. Congressman, we need to develop an AESA [active electronically scanned array] radar plan for our F–16s who are 

conducting the homeland defense mission in particular. Our entire 

fleet—Active, Guard, and Reserve—none of them have been upgraded with that radar. 

The RDT&E [research, development, test, and evaluation] money 

we have in the budget for this year, hopefully we can move forward 

with this effort. It is about $25 million to do RDT&E on a radar 

that just is integrated with the air-to-air mission for those F–16s. 

We would prefer to spend about $75 million if we can find the 

funding, to do the RDT&E to build a fully integrated AESA radar. 

The cost of one versus the other to actually procure for the airplanes is relatively close. It is about $2.8 million for the nonintegrated radar and about $3.2 million for aircraft for the integrated radar. So we think that is the way to go. We are looking 

now at how we can do that as we move forward. 

Part of the problem is that the CAPES [combat avionics programmed extension suite] program to develop F–16 upgrades was 

part of the BCA cuts to modernization that we were forced to take 

when we cut about 50 percent of our modernization programs. So 

we have got to solve this problem for a lot of reasons operationally. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Do you have any plans to revisit the CAPES program? 

General WELSH. Certainly not at this time, Congressman. We 

just simply don’t have the money to fund CAPES for all our entire 

F–16 fleet. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Yes, I am sure you know the arguments that are 

laid out with the tight budget constraints that you are working 

under, that all of us are working under. What the Air Guard pro-
24 

vides in terms of bang for the buck is really incredible. The statistics are staggering in a positive way. 

And not to have these F–16 Air Guard units be able to fully integrate I think would be a terrible tragedy. And I appreciate all you 

are doing to try to make that happen. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman LoBiondo. 

We now proceed to Congressman Courtney of Connecticut. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all the witnesses for being here and the important messages. This is a critical week in terms of the budget resolution being put together, and frankly, you know, we are forewarned by you all being here, and that is really important. 

Secretary Mabus, I want to again acknowledge the fact that your 

testimony on page 16 points out that during your tenure, the shipbuilding trajectory is on an upward angle, contrary to some of the 

noise that is out there. And also want to make sure, you know, to 

note that you are doing this with every public forum you have that 

opportunity. 

This morning’s Wall Street Journal article, which I just had a 

chance to read through, again points out the fact that compared to 

2009, we have actually turned the direction in terms of shipbuilding—military shipbuilding under your leadership. And it is 

going to have a benefit for decades to come. 

The question of the day, though, of course, is sequestration and 

the budget control caps, which I actually think is a better way to 

make sure people understand this. And just if you could briefly talk 

about if the Department is sort of left with the BCA caps, you 

know, what does that mean in terms of trying to, again, grow the 

size of the fleet? 

Secretary MABUS. Thank you, Congressman. If we go back to 

BCA, sequester, however you want to phrase it, I have said that 

I am going to protect shipbuilding as much as humanly possible. 

I believe the phrase I used, which evidently nobody outside Mississippi understood much, was I will protect shipbuilding until the 

last dog dies. 

But if we do that, something else is going to break because our 

maintenance—we are already behind on our maintenance because 

of sequestration in 2013. It is going to take us until 2018 to catch 

up on our maintenance on our ships. It will take us until 2020 to 

catch up on our maintenance on our aircraft; that is at the President’s budget level. 

Our bases—we are already falling below the sustainment rate 

that we believe we need. Our training—the last sequestration, we 

had air wings that had to go down to a hard deck, which meant 

the very minimum training. Our marines—training at home station, the ones next to deploy and the ones after that, all have suffered under the first sequestration. And it would be a—I think a 

fair word is devastating in terms of the Navy’s ability to respond 

to crisis, to surge, to meet a near-peer adversary. To do the things 

that America has come to expect, and should expect from its Navy 

and Marine Corps. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

And we now proceed to Congressman Mike Turner of Ohio. 
25 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, thank you for your articulation of the issue of the threat of sequestration. As you are all aware 

today, the House Budget Committee will unveil its budget, and it 

will be funding the Department of Defense at the sequestration 

number, which I oppose, and I think most people in this room oppose. And I appreciate your articulation of what happens. 

But I have had this conversation with most of you of—that—you 

know, the more we talk in this room about the effects of sequestration, the less we win, right? Because we are all on the same page, 

but we have got to get the message outside of this room. And unfortunately, in this room, when we talk about sequestration, we use 

words like ‘‘readiness,’’ ‘‘risk,’’ ‘‘capability,’’ ‘‘mission.’’ 

General Odierno, I am going to ask you to help give us some clarity beyond words of ‘‘readiness,’’ ‘‘risk,’’ ‘‘capability,’’ and ‘‘mission.’’ 

You testified last week that only 33 percent of our brigades are 

ready, when our sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 

percent. This number is disturbing, both because its significance to 

our military, but the effects of it. 

When a brigade combat team, or BCT—which is the essential 

building block of the Army’s combat power—isn’t ready, and the 

Army isn’t ready to fight, but they go to fight, General Odierno, 

could you describe to us—and doesn’t this mean that more people 

will get injured or killed? It is not just an issue of readiness, risk, 

capability, or mission. It is that more people will get injured or 

killed. Is that correct? 

General ODIERNO. That is absolutely right, Congressman. It 

means it will take us longer to do our mission. It will cost us in 

lives. It will cost us in injuries. And it potentially could cost us in 

achieving the goals that we are attempting to achieve, as well. 

Mr. TURNER. All right. So, the translation we need is, we can 

lose, people will die, and people will be injured? 

General ODIERNO. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Now, General, if we go to the full sequestration for 

fiscal year 2016—and that is an issue that—it is beyond just what 

the budget is—your goal of taking our brigades to 70 percent of 

readiness—how do you accomplish that? 

General ODIERNO. We will not. What we will do is, as you mentioned, we are 33 percent ready now. That will go down with sequestration probably to somewhere around 25 percent to 20 percent. We will have to focus all our resources on a small part of the 

force just to meet everyday requirements that we have in the 

Army. The rest of the force will go untrained. And that means that 

if they are needed, they will not be able to do the job that we expect them to do. And our sons and daughters will be asked to do 

things without the proper training or readiness of their equipment. 

Mr. TURNER. Which again means that more people will be injured or killed? 

General ODIERNO. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. General, you also testified that the number of Active Duty soldiers in the Army has fallen by 80,000 over the past 

3 years. And it will fall another 70,000 if full sequestration comes 

into effect. With only 420,000 troops remaining, the Army would be 
26 

substantially smaller than it was on 9/11. And we all know how it 

is—the world is not a safer place today than it was then. 

Secretary McHugh, could you please describe how that loss of 

manpower translates into risk to our troops, of injury and people 

being killed? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, it means, as the chief said, that with 

fewer soldiers to go out to do missions, we continue to run the risk, 

as we say, of sending an unprepared soldier into a very dangerous 

environment. We are doing everything we can to try to minimize 

that. But at 420,000, our judgment is very clearly that we would 

not be able to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance. That that 

would leave us absolutely no room to respond to the kinds of unforeseen contingencies that we have seen just in the past 18 

months, whether it is Russia and Ukraine or whether it is Ebola 

in West Africa, or ISIL in Syria and Iraq. And I don’t think that 

the American people are really postured to accept a United States 

military that can’t answer the bell wherever the challenge may 

rise. 

But, again, it comes back to risk means people dying. Risk means 

greater injuries. Risk means people don’t come home. 

Mr. TURNER. Secretary James, if sequestration-level funding goes 

into effect, what is the most difficult strategic decision you are 

going to have to make? 

Secretary JAMES. I worry about the very things that you said— 

that we will have airmen who will needlessly die and become injured. I worry that we will be slower to respond. Right now, our 

hallmark is, we are ready to fight tonight. Sequestration could endanger that. 

As you have heard my colleagues say, ultimately, we could lose 

in trying to reach our objective. Our national security strategy requires that we be able to do three very important things in a near 

simultaneous fashion. We cannot do them in that sort of fashion 

under sequestration. That is our best military advice. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Sequestration assumes that the Nation’s debt is out of control, 

and so, therefore, we must cut spending. We cannot increase tax 

revenues. We must cut spending. And if that is true, then I am 

glad that both defense and non-defense spending are included in 

sequestration. 

I myself do not accept that premise. But if I am wrong and if it 

is true, then I am glad defense and non-defense spending are covered by sequestration. That is one point I want to make. 

The other point I want to make is sequestration is the wrong 

way to cut spending, both in the defense and in the non-defense 

sectors of our budget. Why? It is because sequestration is just a 

blunt force instrument cutting across the board regardless of 

whether or not it is sensible enough to do so. 

It is true that fraud, waste, and abuse exists in both the defense 

and non-defense sectors. It is true. But it is also true that there 

are some sectors that we are doing some excellent cutting-edge necessary spending that does not need to be cut. And that is why se-
27 

questration needs to go away. It needs to go away for both defense 

and non-defense. 

Moreover, I think we need to come up off of this attitude that 

we can never increase taxes because we know that some folks— 

some corporations don’t pay any taxes. We know that the middle 

class—middle-income and working people pay taxes. We know that 

the tax code is riddled with tax loopholes that enable others who 

should be paying and can afford to pay, not to pay. 

And so, they are riding—they are getting a free ride. Talking 

about entitled—entitlement—talking about an entitlement mentality, we got so many folks that can afford to pay that are not paying. And I think it is obscene that they would create the conditions 

under which we are here today, which is a hollowing out of our defense spending. Providing and protecting and promoting the common defense of this country is something that we must do. And we 

have had a lot of unforeseen incidents or unforeseen developments 

that have occurred. And you all have related to them. ISIL, Russian aggression. 

Just if each one of you—well, I will ask anyone who wants to respond—describe the key security environment challenges and 

threats that you are most concerned about, and the ability of your 

service to address them. What challenges have emerged in the last 

year that the defense strategy of your service’s budget request does 

not adequately address? And similarly, in what areas have you recommended reduced—a reduced funding level? And for the secretaries, I will ask that question. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Congressman Johnson, I guess I can start. 

As I mentioned just previously, we can’t pick and choose the 

things we worry about most. We have to be equally prepared to respond to wherever our national command authorities send us. 

Wherever the commanders believe there is a need, whether it is 

ISIL, where we have Army forces in Iraq, or whether it was in 

West Africa with Ebola, special operations—Army special operation 

forces throughout Africa, responding to a variety of emerging terrorist threats there. 

We have—again, as I mentioned in my opening comment—forces 

in Estonia, Lithuania, forces in Poland, teaming with those nations. And they are a very important part of our new posture on 

the European Continent. 

We have some 20,000 soldiers, which we have used a longstanding mission on the Korean Peninsula. Certainly, with the 

threat of nuclear weapons there, that is a critical challenge. And 

I could go on and on, as I am sure the other services could, as well. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

My time is expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, ladies and 

gentlemen, for being here and for your service. 

I think we have picked up the thread here that all of you and 

the witnesses would like to see us spend more than the sequestration level—the President’s budget or greater. And I think all of us 

know that we are trying to find a way here in Congress to make 

sure that we get to a number like that. 
28 

I share your concerns about readiness. General Odierno, you are 

very clear about it. I have, obviously, some personal concerns about 

the Army readiness with my family. And we should all be concerned. But sometimes, we have issues that really aren’t about 

money. And I know that the Commandant and I had a discussion 

on the phone the other day. And, General, I am sorry, I am going 

to go back there to that issue. 

Secretary McHugh, you talked about we send our young men and 

women into, ‘‘a very dangerous environment.’’ Well, some couple of 

weeks ago, we had apparently a very dangerous environment in 

Yemen. It was so dangerous that we sent extra marines in there. 

And then it was so dangerous that we evacuated all the Americans—closed the embassy, took the ambassador out, evacuated all 

the Americans. And in that process, even though we had an MEU 

[Marine expeditionary unit] on standby not far offshore, somebody 

made a decision—I want to work to that here on the record—somebody made a decision to destroy all of the crew-served weapons and 

have the marines, who were there to provide protection in this very 

dangerous environment, turn over their weapons, their individual 

weapons. 

And it is my opinion that that is an intolerable position for our 

Americans, particularly our men and women in uniform, whether 

marines or soldiers or sailors or airmen, to be in a very dangerous 

situation and depend upon trusting the very people who have put 

us in that very dangerous situation to not do us any harm while 

we turn over all our weapons. 

So, General Dunford, we just need to get for the record, that is 

my account of that—roughly what happened. 

And the marines, when they got on that civilian aircraft, contract 

aircraft, were totally unarmed. Is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. That is correct, Congressman. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. 

Now, somebody made—who—let me, for the record—who gave 

the senior marine there the order to do that? 

General DUNFORD. The senior marine was under the United 

States Central Command [CENTCOM] chain of command, Congressman. 

Mr. KLINE. So the commander of CENTCOM gave the order to 

the senior marine on the ground in Yemen to disarm? 

General DUNFORD. The senior CENTCOM officer on the ground 

gave that order, Congressman. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. 

And the decision, as well as you can relay it here for the record— 

the decision to do that was made where by whom? 

General DUNFORD. The ambassador and the commander of 

CENTCOM approved the plan, and my understanding is that went 

back to Washington, DC, at the policy level. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. 

And then also for the record, I think it is not classified that there 

were Navy-Marine Corps assets not far offshore. Is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. There were, Congressman. 

Mr. KLINE. Well, I know General Dunford, he already knows how 

I feel about this, but I think that is intolerable. 
29 

If that can happen to marines, General Odierno, it can happen 

to soldiers, it can anybody to be in a very dangerous place and be 

ordered to turn in their weapons while they are still in a very dangerous place when they are there to be part of the Armed Forces. 

I would hope that senior leaders sitting at this table, we would do 

everything—you would do everything in your power to see that 

that does not happen again. That is an outrageous situation. 

So thank you very much, General. I just wanted to get that on 

the record. We had the assets, we had the trained people where 

they were on the ground in a very dangerous place, and they were 

disarmed, put on a civilian airplane and sent home. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to just get some more clarification on the type of role 

that sequestration is playing in terms of us wanting to, you know, 

I guess, sustain our superiority that we have when it comes to 

areas like readiness, technology, combat gear, you know, versus 

other powers that are also trying to stay ahead when it comes to 

the cutting edge in these areas. 

Secretary MABUS. I will speak for the Navy and Marine Corps. 

We have to stay ahead in terms of platforms, in terms of weapons, in terms of ordnance, in terms of systems, in terms of surveillance, in terms of any number of things. 

The danger that sequestration poses is that we will not be able 

to surge Navy ships, because they won’t be maintained and we 

won’t have the trained—we will not have done the training to get 

them ready to go. 

Same thing with the Marines. We will have Navy ships forward. 

We will have marines forward. It is the next to go. It is the ability 

to surge. 

Looking further out into the future, our technological edge is one 

of the crucial things that we have. 

Maintaining the money for research and development, for science 

and technology, and bringing those scientific advances to the 

warfighter in the field, those things are at risk, particularly on 

anti-access/area denial, that adversaries may try to force us out, to 

push us further and further afield. 

The weapons that we need, the ordnance that we need, the numbers that we need to do that will be at risk. 

The new technologies to meet some of the threats that we are 

facing now and that we are going to be facing in the not-too-distant 

future, they go—that research goes down, that science and technology goes down. As much as we try to protect it, we simply cannot do that. So to use the language that other service secretaries 

and the service chiefs have used, the risks that we take is that we 

will get there later than we should, more Americans will die or be 

wounded, and we take a chance of losing. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Congressman, if I might add, for the Army— 

and I am sure the Marine Corps feels the very same way, but the 

reason we have been so superior on the battlefield is that young 

man or woman who picks up a rifle and goes into very dangerous 

situations. 
30 

But it is because of that young warrior that we need to do everything we can to ensure that the weaponry we provide them, the 

platforms that support them have a superiority edge over whomever is our competitor at the moment. 

And as Secretary Mabus just very accurately noted, for all the 

services, certainly for the Army, that research and development, 

the R&D that is so critical to develop the weapons, the systems, 

the protection programs of the future, has been cut, just since 

2012, by a third. 

We are fencing off S&T [science and technology], because we feel 

that is the core of tomorrow’s technology. But overall, our ability 

to look into the future and ensure that over 10 years it generally 

takes to develop some of these next-generation platforms, we have 

it available. 

And with this funding level, we will not. The Army will not have 

a major developmental modernization program until the next decade. 

So sequestration only makes that worse. 

General WELSH. Congressman, we wrote the blueprint for how 

you build the world’s greatest Air Force. We have other countries 

who have seen it, and they are now pursuing the same blueprint. 

And the capability gap is clearly closing. There is no question 

about that. And the trick over time, as budgets are more constrained, is how you manage that gap. 

I use a NASCAR analogy a lot when I talk to airmen. If the car 

trailing you has been behind for a couple of laps but is consistently 

slowing, eventually, they are going to get to a point where although 

they are still behind you, you cannot keep them from passing. And 

that is what we worry about in trying to manage this balance. 

When you hear terms like ‘‘high-risk’’ or ‘‘significant risk’’ come 

from a military leader, you should translate that as ‘‘not guaranteed success,’’ because that is what it means to us. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you for 

being here and for your service to our country. 

Secretary McHugh, good to have you back in the old stomping 

grounds. 

I wanted to ask you again—I am going to stay on sequestration 

and its impact to our military—the members of this committee understand its implications and how adversely it is affecting our readiness and our ability to meet our challenges that Secretary James 

made reference to in our three objectives as a military. 

And in fact, I can talk about specific parochial examples of its 

impact on my district, as any member up here can. 

I have got Anniston Army Depot laying off 190 workers right 

now. I got part of Maxwell Air Force Base. They could talk about 

specific examples. I have got part of Fort Benning. They could talk 

about specific examples. 

And that is just parochial. We hear from y’all regularly about its 

impact on our readiness and our capabilities. 
31 

Our colleagues don’t understand, and you uniquely have been 

here, and you understand how difficult it is for us to convey to 

members who are focused on tax policy or Medicare or telecommunications what we are concerned about. 

So we really count on y’all—that is a Southern term, by the 

way—we count on you to help us communicate that message. 

And I have shared it with Chairman Dempsey that is—we have 

this need for members to understand. In fact, some in our leadership think this is working out pretty well for the military, because 

they are not hearing squealing or they are not hearing, ‘‘the sky 

is falling,’’ from some of y’all. 

So I am curious. Why do you think it has been difficult for those 

of you in the leadership in the military to convey specific examples 

of how this is very detrimental to our ability to protect this country? 

Secretary MCHUGH. You are asking me? 

Mr. ROGERS. We will start with you, please. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Okay. 

Well, part of the reason why I think this opportunity, this moment is important is we tend to talk in code—‘‘risk’’ and other such 

words that don’t convey to the average citizen, understandably, 

what that really means, loss of life, et cetera. 

The other is, frankly, one of opportunity. All of us go out and 

give speeches, talk to think tanks, try to engage in a way that gets 

the word out as to the reality of the challenges we are facing. But 

obviously, we have to do a lot more. 

The last point I would make before I turn over to my colleagues, 

I have said before that in part, we are victims of our own success. 

We came to this Congress before sequestration passed and predicted the effects. And thereafter, most of those effects weren’t seen 

or felt, because I think, against the odds, all the services managed 

the unmanageable. 

We have been moving money. We have been putting off necessary programs. We have been delaying modernization. But those 

cuts, those delays, those ‘‘we will do it next year’’ have run out. 

And why the return of sequestration added already to the cuts we 

have taken will be such a backbreaker for this United States Army, 

certainly—and I would argue the military writ large. 

General ODIERNO. If I could just add, you know, I define it as, 

we are mortgaging the future to barely meet today’s needs. 

And that is really my concern, is we are doing everything we can 

just to meet the commitments we have today, which are not overwhelming commitments. They are just basic commitments that we 

have to sustain normal security. 

Yes, we have an operation in Iraq. Yes, we have a small operation in Afghanistan. Yes, we have presence in Korea. Yes, we are 

doing some small things. But those aren’t big operations; that is 

just day-to-day commitments, and we are struggling to meet those 

commitments. 

We are mortgaging our modernization. We are mortgaging our 

readiness just to meet these commitments that we have now. So if 

something bigger happens, we will not be able to respond in the 

way people are used to us responding. 

And that is the problem. 
32 

Mr. ROGERS. The thing that I am after is to get you all to help 

us by giving some specific examples. That is a very good example, 

but also some specific—sometimes parochial examples of platforms 

that you may have to give up; troop end strength you may have 

to reduce; installations you may have to close. Whatever, so that 

we can help them understand. 

Because it is difficult. I mean, generally, we have got 30 to 45 

seconds of a member’s attention on the floor before they have 

moved on and are thinking about something different; that is a 

challenge. 

Briefly, Secretary James, before my time runs out. 

Secretary JAMES. So, Congressman Rogers, we do have a list of 

specific things to include. In addition to the retirements in the 

President’s budget, we would have to retire the U–2, the Global 

Hawk Block 40. We would reduce our combat air patrols. We would 

divest seven AWACs; KC–10 fleet, gone. 

So all of these things would go away. Plus, we would have to 

touch literally every part of our Air Force to come up with that differential in money. It would be enormous. 

And we would be willing to go anywhere, talk to anybody. Maybe 

you could help us set something up with leadership so that we 

could give some of these threat briefings, things that you know and 

that we know, but perhaps they don’t know as well. And I just 

hope and pray it doesn’t take a catastrophe in this country to wake 

up. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. So do we all. 

Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would like to begin by thanking each of you for your service, and through each of you, I would like to thank the men and 

women who serve under you for their service to our country. 

I would like to begin with General Odierno, and ask you the following series of questions. As I understand it today in Iraq and 

Syria, the ground forces arrayed against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq 

and Syria] are the Iraqi national army, the Kurdish Peshmerga, 

Iranian-sponsored Shiite militias, and to the degree that they exist, 

the moderate Syrian opposition forces, which we are helping to 

train and equip. 

Will those ground forces be sufficient to meet the President’s objective of degrading, defeating, and destroying ISIS? 

General ODIERNO. It is yet to be understood. What I would say 

is depending on how well the Iraqi security forces do; Kurdish 

Peshmerga are performing incredibly well. Iraqi security forces are 

still being trained; not sure. I have great concern about Shia militias. I don’t know who they work for. I am not sure who they are 

loyal to. I am not sure what they are trying to accomplish, so I 

have some concerns about their participation. 

We are working to train the moderate Syrian opposition. And so 

I think it is still time will tell. I think we have halted the movement of ISIL. I think we have had some initial, with the great 

work of the Air Force and the Navy and the Marine Corps Air, but 

I think we also have to wait and see how well these ground forces 

do. And we simply don’t know yet. 
33 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Has any other country anywhere in the world, 

but especially in the Middle East, pledged ground forces to this effort? 

General ODIERNO. There are special operations forces from other 

countries that are participating in supporting and training the 

Iraqi security force and the Kurdish Peshmerga, as well as we 

begin to train the Sunni moderates. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. And including those forces both on the ground 

and pledged for the future, does your assessment still stand that 

too soon to tell whether those—— 

General ODIERNO. That is correct. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Okay. And so I would assume that if we are 

going to achieve the President’s stated objective of defeating and 

destroying ISIS, it is very possible that we will need additional 

ground forces. And it is very possible that we as a Congress will 

have to make a decision about funding and supporting our ground 

forces in that country—in those two countries. 

And I guess my question for you and for Secretary McHugh is: 

Does the budget that you are proposing today, the President’s 

budget, have sufficient resources to ensure that we are training our 

soldiers, that their readiness is at the level that is necessary, and 

that we can support them through the following budget year to the 

degree that we need to to ensure that they can prevail? And that 

we don’t unnecessarily put them in harm’s way due to lack of training, readiness or equipment? 

General ODIERNO. If we had to—the President’s budget allows us 

to sustain where we are at in readiness, maybe increase it a little 

bit. If we get into a sustained conflict, that is years, we would need 

more dollars in order to develop the proper readiness for us to repeatedly redeploy our soldiers into harm’s way. We do not have 

that level in the budget today. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. In this budget? 

General ODIERNO. In this budget. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Okay. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I would fully agree. I would note, of course, 

there is always an option to ask us to stop doing the things we are 

doing right now. Given the missions that all the services are 

arrayed against, I can’t imagine what that would be. But short of 

a very dramatic, probably unpalatable decision point such as that, 

we would not be able to meet that. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Let me ask you a related question. Secretary 

James talked about even more difficult choices if we continue with 

the budget caps and the sequester. And I think that should extend 

to political choices, diplomatic choices, and choices that our allies 

make. 

You mentioned that in response to Russian aggression in 

Ukraine, we have deployed additional forces to Estonia, to Latvia, 

to Lithuania, to Poland. But when you look at those countries’ defense budgets, what they spend as a percentage of their GDP [gross 

domestic product] compared to what we spend is insufficient. What 

more do we need to do to force other countries to make the difficult 

decisions to get their taxpayers to support these missions that are 

arguably more in their national interest than they are in ours? 
34 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, that is a—it is a big challenge and a 

moving target, and one that Secretaries of Defense, certainly going 

back in my time to Secretary Gates, have tried to press upon largely our European allies. Only 4 of the 28 NATO nations currently 

meet the 2 percent requirement. I might add, Estonia is one of 

them. 

But as you noted, when it comes to Russia and the concerns that 

we see driving out of Ukraine, all of us would like to work more 

closely with our European allies. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway—Chairman Conaway? 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Chairman. 

And I thank the folks for being here today. 

I am encouraged that whenever it has been my experience, and 

Secretary McHugh knows this too, that when a question rises to 

the top level of the committee up there, that it is—we are gaining 

some traction. And so I want to follow up on Mr. Miller’s comments 

about auditing. That probably doesn’t shock anybody. 

One quick anecdote. I shared this with Secretary Mabus the 

other day. I was touring the USS Texas, a submarine, and we were 

having an impromptu town hall meeting in the galley with some 

young sailors. And one of the kids asked me during the questionand-answer period: How is that audit thing coming, with auditing 

the Department of Defense? 

So, I don’t know if that was a plant, Secretary Mabus, or—— 

Secretary MABUS. How about those sailors? 

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. A really smart, really smart—or just 

sucking up to a member of the House Armed Services Committee. 

Does—and taking off the chairman’s kind of model, each of you 

respond. Does the President’s budget fully fund or properly fund 

the continued efforts at reaching the goal that all of us want to get 

to, and that is audited financial statements for the Department of 

Defense? 

Secretary MCHUGH. We assess the funding available to the Army 

initiative within the President’s budget as sufficient to carry us forward and meet those milestones. 

Secretary MABUS. Mr. Chairman, the President’s budget is sufficient for the Navy and Marine Corps to meet the milestones. I 

would like to circle back around, though. There are some things 

that we don’t control that worry me a lot about whether we are 

going to meet this audit. And not in terms of funding, but in terms 

of assurance of numbers. 

Secretary JAMES. And yes, for the Air Force, but with that same 

caveat. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I think for a second, I did brag on the Marine 

Corps. You guys led the way on auditing. We have moved from getting ready to audit, to auditing. And all the services are now doing 

that, and it is a better learning experience, so the Marine Corps 

led the way again. 

General Dunford, a little bit before your time when that got 

started, but you are keeping it forward. 

So, Secretary Mabus and others, I think you are making reference to other agencies that are an integral part to your financial 
35 

statements, they themselves are not audited. Do you sense that the 

commitment at the—whoever is in charge of that effort, rivals your 

own? Or do we need to harass them more? 

Secretary MABUS. Well, our sense is that we are sharing our concerns, and to use a military term, in a robust way, with those— 

particularly with Defense Finance and Accounting Service. That is 

the one that concerns us. That is the one that does not have the 

internal controls that we need to have some assurance about the 

numbers that they give us. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. The other secretaries? Ms. James, same to 

you. 

Secretary JAMES. Likewise. We have communicated our concerns. 

Certainly the top leaders of the Department of Defense, they are 

aware that we are concerned about this; the comptroller, to whom 

the DFAS reports. So I think everybody is working collaboratively 

to try to get there from here. 

Secretary MCHUGH. As I believe DFAS’s largest customer, the 

Army has equally extended our concerns to the appropriate departmental authorities. Part of the problem I think DFAS faces, quite 

frankly, is that like the rest of us, their customer base is coming 

down. They are going to write fewer checks as end strength decreases. Their business flow will decrease. And I know, Mr. 

Conaway, you understand the realities of that kind of trend line 

more than anyone else perhaps in this room. 

But I haven’t yet seen a commensurate amount of response from 

DFAS to accommodate what seems to most of us to be an inescapable reality. I don’t want to ascribe motivation to that, but as my 

colleagues have said, it will affect our ability to receive a clean 

audit, given the relationship amongst all of us with that organization. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, let me just finish up by telling you—thanking you for your service across the—all of your responsibilities, but 

also thanking each of you for what I perceive to be full-throated 

commitment to getting this important deal done. We are talking 

about budgeting and spending, and the American taxpayer obviously would love to have audited financial statements as kind of 

the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval that is out there. And I 

appreciate each of your commitments to doing that in the face of 

sequestration and budget cuts and all the other things that are 

going on. I thank you for your efforts on getting that done. 

And I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to have the comptroller here with 

us tomorrow. And it will be another opportunity to raise this issue. 

Because I do agree with the gentleman. This is really important. 

If we are going to make the case to increase defense spending, 

there has to be accountability that goes with it. And so this carries 

big implications. 

Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This question is directed at Secretary James. I am a beneficiary of close air support 

[CAS] from the A–10, so I am disturbed to hear that it is back on 

the chopping block. 

So one, I would just like to, you know, point out, and maybe you 

could comment on this, too, that in the era where we seem to be 
36 

more engaged in the type of combat where an A–10 close air support would actually be more useful, is it really wise to be putting 

it on the chopping block? 

And two, if it is on the chopping block, then what is the weapon 

system platform that is going to be replacing it, that is going to be 

able to provide the same type of close air support to your infantrymen? 

Secretary JAMES. So Congressman, please let me start and then 

I want of course General Welsh to chip in—— 

Mr. GALLEGO. Sure. 

Secretary JAMES [continuing]. Because he is a former A–10 pilot 

actually, so he is extremely knowledgeable. 

I will tell you that the A–10 ended up on this list to reduce with 

the greatest of reluctance. It was a budgetary matter, and it literally after reviewing all of the different alternatives about how we 

could come up with the budgetary savings this one, because of the 

single-purpose nature, and because we do have other aircraft in the 

inventory that can do close air support. So that is how we got to 

where we are today. 

In terms of what are the next aircraft that will bridge the gap, 

so to speak, of course we do have our other aircraft that are currently flying some of these missions to include the F–15Es, the F– 

16s, and so forth, so they will be with us for years to come, as will 

eventually come into play the F–35. So that one is of course on the 

horizon. It is not with us yet, but will be coming online in the next 

few years. 

Mr. GALLEGO. To that point, before we move on, the platforms 

you just mentioned, what type of rotary gun do they have, and are 

they 30-millimeter mortar—I am sorry, 30-millimeter guns, and are 

they going to be capable—just as capable as the A–10 Warthog in 

terms of support? 

General WELSH. Well, Congressman, it depends on the scenario. 

No, none of them carry a 30-millimeter gun. They carry 25 in the 

case of the F–35 and 20-millimeter guns in the F–15E and the F– 

16. 

The issue isn’t the A–10, Congressman; the issue is the Budget 

Control Act caused us to make some really tough prioritization decisions. And when we talked to the combatant commanders and 

asked them where they preferred that we take the cuts and where 

they preferred we prioritize our funding they gave us real clear answers, and the A–10 was not one of them. 

We have done the operational analysis on this. We would love to 

show you the impact on the battlespace, low threat through high 

threat. This is just the front edge of a lot of very ugly decisions 

that are going to have to be made if we stay at BCA-level funding. 

The workhorse of our CAS fleet has been the F–16, not the A– 

10, for the last 8 years. It has flown thousands more CAS sorties 

than the A–10. 

Are there scenarios where you would prefer an A–10 to be there? 

Absolutely. And there are some you would prefer a B–1 with 32 

JDAMs [Joint Direct Attack Munitions] at night, above the weather. And there are some you would prefer an AC–130. 

And my Marine infantry officer son would prefer a Marine Corps 

F/A–18. The scenarios change that requirement. 
37 

But the issue here is not any particular platform. CAS is a mission priority for us. It is part of our fabric. We are going to be doing 

CAS 10, 20, 50 years from now. And the A–10 is not going to be 

doing it then. 

So we have got to look at how we transition to a future capability 

that will work on both a low threat and a high threat battlefield, 

and that is what we are trying to do, and we are doing this collaboratively with the Marine Corps, with the Navy, with the Army, and 

we are working this in terms of weapon systems. We are working 

at weapons themselves that we could put on different platforms. 

There is no question about our commitment to this mission, and 

we have got about 140,000 data points from the last 7 years to 

prove it. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Chair—I apologize. I lost track of your name, 

sir. What was your name again? 

General WELSH. Mark Welsh, sir. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you. 

I would love to see the studies, just because at least from what— 

my understanding the past efforts to replace the A–10 back in the 

1980s and 1990s were pretty much duds and didn’t end up doing 

the same kind of effectiveness that the A–10 did. 

So if you could share any of those studies to—you know, especially just to put me at ease, I mean, it really did save me in the 

pinch, and I think a lot of us infantrymen—former, current, and in 

the future—would love to still have that assurance that that kind 

of close air support would be available. 

General WELSH. Yes, sir. So would us former pilots. Unfortunately, money precludes that. 

We would love to come talk to you about this and give you the 

whole story. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen 

of the panel, thank you so much for your service to our Nation. We 

deeply appreciate that, especially your commitment during these 

challenging times. 

I want to follow up from some comments that were made earlier. 

We all know the devastating effects of sequestration. But there are 

some that look at efficiencies within the Pentagon, and you have 

heard the chairman speak about it. 

Some of the questions are about the acquisition and procurement 

process, and the chairman, as well as others of us, have looked at 

how we can fix that to actually empower decision making within 

the Pentagon to make sure we are indeed as efficient as possible 

in spending those precious dollars that get to the Pentagon. 

I think the question is this, is give us your perspective on where 

the current obstacles are in the acquisition process. Is there a need 

for additional acquisition authorities, and what can we do to fix 

and reform the acquisition and procurement process to make sure 

that it is indeed as efficient as possible and that we can demonstrate that every penny that goes to the Pentagon is getting to 

the right place and that we are doing the best job possible in making those decisions? 
38 

Secretary MABUS. I will start very briefly. 

Here is a chart of what we have to do to buy anything but particularly a major weapon system. It takes forever. It is costly. 

The thing you could do for us is cut out a lot of this. 

And we will be happy to give you details. I know that we have 

been over here doing that, but I think all of the services agree that 

the current system of just requirement after requirement after requirement after requirement, which—many of which don’t add anything to the end value of the weapon, just needs to be pruned back 

pretty dramatically. 

General ODIERNO. If I could just add, I would like to see an increased role of the service chiefs, which was significantly reduced 

in 1986 with Goldwater-Nichols. I think it is important to have 

their experience, as we are going through this, with some authority. 

I would also tell you, I think there are—I agree with the bureaucracy—the number of people who can say no to our systems is 

significant. That increases the time sometimes it takes. 

In the Army specifically, I would tell you—the Army has a lot of small programs, and I would like to see the limit raise from $1 billion to $10 billion those that require specific DOD oversight. And 

a program under $10 billion, I would like to see the Army have the 

responsibility and have the accountability to ensure that those programs are capable. 

And I think that would enable to speed up the processes that we 

have, and I think there are many others that we could give. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Mr. Wittman, if I could just add a little 

math to my good friend Ray Mabus’s chartology, I will give you one 

example of the complex bureaucracy. 

PIM [Paladin Integrated Management], our new artillery system, 

the Milestone C decision was reached by the Army in October of 

2013. That one milestone required 3,185 pages of primary documentation and took 1,742 calendar days just to develop the documents and to get through the process—1,800 days to approve it. 

Not all of that is bad. All of that is, in part, I think, necessary. 

But there is overlap, and as Chairman Thornberry and I know 

Chairman McCain in the other House and many of all of you are 

focused upon, I think we could save a lot of time, which in acquisition means money, without giving up the kinds of assurances that 

all of us, I think, believe are really, really important. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Secretary James. 

Secretary JAMES. And I don’t have a cool prop. That was pretty 

slick, Mr. Secretary Mabus. Yeah, I like that. 

[Laughter.] 

But I certainly agree with trying to, as best as you can, streamline some of the reporting requirements, some of the processes. 

I know the tendency, when things go wrong, is put more process 

and more oversight. But actually, again, from a business perspective, the less in this case, the better. Trust people and hold them 

accountable when things go wrong. 

In terms of the service chief involvement, I am not exactly sure 

how everybody else handles it across the board, but my service 

chief and I, we do pretty much everything together, so we are al-
39 

ready heavily doing program reviews and watching over our programs as best as we can. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

General Dunford, your perspective? 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Congressman. 

I don’t really have anything to add. I would associate myself with 

General Odierno’s comment about the service chiefs, though. 

Today, we are actually responsible for requirements and resources and not outcome, and I think that is where I would zero 

in on, is the service chiefs’ responsibilities for outcome as well. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral Howard. 

Admiral HOWARD. Besides the simplification, there is also a 

sense of agility to all of this. So as time unfolds and programs 

change and requirements change in terms of cost and scheduling 

and then what is appropriate to keep, what is appropriate to enhance, I think the service chiefs would appreciate an opportunity 

to have a voice in that process. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

And Admiral, I think that agility point is a key one that we don’t 

spend enough time talking about. In a volatile world that we live 

in, being able to be agile in response is just essential. 

Ms. Graham. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks 

to each of you for your service to our country. 

First, I would like to offer my condolences to the families of the 

seven marines and the four soldiers who lost their lives in a training exercise in the Gulf of Mexico last week. Anything that I can 

do in the Second Congressional District to help you all, please do 

not hesitate to call upon me or anyone on my team. 

My first question is for Secretary McHugh, Secretary Mabus, and 

Secretary James. 

As the Congress debates a new authorization for use of military 

force, one of my priorities is knowing that should we engage militarily in current or future conflicts, our service members go into 

the fight with confidence that this country will take care of them 

when they return home. 

In 2007, the Dole-Shalala Commission recommended the establishment of recovery-care coordinators at both DOD and the VA 

[Department of Veterans Affairs] to care for wounded warriors. 

If, God forbid, service members should become severely injured 

or ill while serving our country, I want to make sure that they 

know we will do everything in our power to get them the care they 

need when they return home. 

So I would like to learn what are your service branches doing to 

ensure the transition from active service to the VA for our most 

wounded, injured, and ill service members, and what more can we 

do to make sure that we identify every discharged service member 

who qualifies for VA’s Federal recovery care? 

And I have one more question following this one. I appreciate 

your answers. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, if I may start, it is a critically important question and one that I tried to at least allude to in my opening comments. We have, I think, a legal responsibility but even 
40 

more importantly, a moral responsibility to ensure that those who 

return home in the first instance get the medical care that they deserve. 

And all of us that set up wounded warrior care facilities, where 

we are reconfiguring ours now, both to respond to the realities of 

the diminishing budgets but also the phasing out of wartime activities that we have endured for the last 13 years, but also to ensure 

that we are providing care in the most effective, efficient manner 

possible. 

The story of transitioning from active service over to VA care has 

been one of challenges and successes. And thanks, in no small 

measure, to the Congress and their focus on that, all of us have 

come a long way toward ensuring through the, what is known as 

the IDES [Integrated Disability Evaluation System] process, the 

process by which the medically retired are moved over to the VA 

has improved. 

For the Army, a much different story than it was in recent years 

where we are meeting all the current timeframes as to the development of the case file, the scheduling of the—of physicals and such. 

And I have provided a dashboard whereby all soldiers can go up 

and see exactly where they are in that process. 

The source of frustration in the past was they didn’t know where 

they were, didn’t know what their next appointment was. We have 

provided that visibility. 

We are meeting, as I said, all the standards that DOD has. There 

are still challenges between the VA and the United States military, 

DOD, and we are supporting the VA to help them meet those objectives as well. It has been something of a moving target, but I understand the VA now thinks they will be in compliance with the 

processing, hopefully—I believe, it is by the start of next year. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Secretary McHugh. 

Secretary MABUS. What Secretary McHugh said, we have no 

higher, greater responsibility than to care for those who have borne 

the battle. And through the experience that we have had—Secretary McHugh very well described some of these things that—the 

Marines have the Wounded Warrior battalions. Navy has a program called Safe Harbor, and it is to aid in the medical care, the 

reintegration, either back into the military or into civilian life, of 

those who have been wounded and to give each of them an advocate to help them through the process, to make appointments for 

them, to tell them what benefits are available, and to do it for 

them and for their caregivers, for their family members or friends 

who have assumed the burden of caring for them. 

And we are also meeting and exceeding the requirements in 

terms of time. But I would say that even though we are doing that, 

we can do better. 

The CHAIRMAN. If the gentlelady—if the other witnesses want to 

add, if you would please do so in writing—— 

Ms. GRAHAM. That is fine. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. So we can move along. 

Ms. GRAHAM. I am sorry. 

The CHAIRMAN. Appreciate it. 

Ms. GRAHAM. I look forward to reading whatever you have to 

add. 
41 

Secretary JAMES. Will do. Thank you. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. GRAHAM. One more question? Is that—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Sorry. Gentlelady’s time has expired, although 

you are certainly welcome to submit additional questions in writing 

to the witnesses. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank and congratulate our panel of service chiefs 

and secretaries today. Thank you for your service at this critical 

time in history and all the great work that you are doing. 

I want to particularly cite Secretary James and General—Chairman Walsh as well, because—Welsh, I am sorry—because that you 

have put our nuclear triad and our nuclear enterprise at such a 

high priority level. That is so important. And I am very concerned 

about our bombers, our B–52s, and the fact that you have the 

Long-Range Strike Bomber in your sights. I really appreciate that. 

That is so important. 

I am going to ask a general question, and I am not sure who is 

best qualified to answer this, and this really may more be a chairman question for the Budget Committee. But we are talking about 

OCO [overseas contingency operations] used to supplement and get 

us beyond those caps. 

The question many of us have is how much of that, or in what 

way can that be used in useful ways beyond just the underlying 

purpose of OCO? 

Secretary McHugh. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I don’t claim any particular expertise, but I 

can provide a response at least from the Army perspective. Based 

on some of the articles I have read and discussions that I have 

been in, I believe for the Army, the committees are looking at placing the cost of our end strength above 450 [thousand] into OCO, 

which by most standards would be an allowable OCO utilization. 

That would provide the Army, a rough estimate here, about $4.2 

billion in relief of the $6 billion that the President’s budget would 

provide over sequestration. That is a far better outcome than sequestration. There is no argument about that. I do think we have 

to be mindful—for the Army right now, we have about $5.5 billion 

in our current OCO accounts that really should be in the base. And 

that is a factor of many things that happened in recent years in 

theater. 

So, we have got to move that money over at some point. That is 

a challenge. To add to that, it is just I think important for everyone 

to understand, will add to the challenge of getting into the base 

budget at some point in the future those unsupportable funds that 

are currently residing in OCO. 

Dr. FLEMING. So, I appreciate your answer. So you are saying 

that in terms of end strength, that it is useful for that purpose. 

And I am very concerned. Fort Polk is in my district. There have 

been huge amounts of investments. We have grown the training 

area by 40,000 acres. There have been huge investments in mili-
42 

tary construction. And yet we could see the strength go from 10,000 

down to as low as 2,000 troops. That would be a huge waste of 

money going forward. And you know just how key that base is for 

training for overseas operations. 

Now, for the Air Force, how does that using OCO money plusingup with that, how does that affect what you do? Are there some 

limitations in how you can use that usefully? 

Secretary JAMES. Well, I would say that under the rules of what 

is allowable to go into OCO, we, too, have constraints similar to 

what you heard Secretary McHugh talk about. And I don’t pretend 

to be an absolute expert in all of this, but the basic rule is that 

the overseas operations are what are funded through OCO. 

And I am sure that we—I couldn’t quote you the figures—but we 

also have at present certain things in OCO which probably more 

specifically belong—rightfully belong in the base budget. 

My plea to you would simply be I don’t exactly know how to fix 

this, but if the use of OCO, if it is allowable or if you can find a 

way to make it allowable, and if that gets over this hump, I am 

all in favor of getting over this hump because we are all very much 

needing it. 

General WELSH. Congressman, I would just add that the real 

issue for us, because we are really in a dire place as far as needing 

to recapitalize and modernize the Air Force. Secretary James 

talked about fleet ages, et cetera. The problem with OCO funding 

is that you can’t count on it over time for a long-term investment 

in modernization, which is one of the problems we have. So anything is better than nothing, however. 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. Well, and I appreciate that fact. The problem, as you well know, is if we take those caps off, the other caps 

come off, and then, you know, we begin a downward spiral in our 

budget. So this is being creative by using OCO funds to plus-up our 

military. But considering all the parties involved, that seems the 

best approach to take. 

So with that, I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One of the things that comes up in the midst of these challenging 

budget discussions, when we all have to make tradeoffs, are some 

of the political obstacles that members of this committee or even 

the larger of the Congress put in front of you. 

And I would like to just take a minute to try to bring some of 

those to the surface. I mean, we have heard talk about cuts you 

want to make that are painful, like cutting the A–10 or making 

changes in the compensation system. But if each of you could explicate for us a few—in greater detail—a few of these challenges that 

you see from us when you are trying to make sure that you do your 

jobs under, you know, the constraints that we put before you. 

General ODIERNO. So, if you want specific examples, so the specific example for us is end strength. So, you know, we have taken 

80,000 out of the Active Component. Even under the President’s 

budget, we are going to take 100—it will be a total of 120,000 out 

of the Active Component; 20,000 out of the National Guard; and 
43 

about 10,000 out of the U.S. Army Reserve. So that—we have significantly reduced our size and ability to respond. 

But in addition to that, we still have about a 4- to 5-year readiness problem because we still don’t have enough money, even as we 

go down to those levels, to sustain a level of readiness until about 

2020. So we have about a 5-year significant risk window. We have 

already canceled our infantry fighting vehicle, which we desperately need. 

Mr. MOULTON. Right. But General Odierno, I am not asking for 

examples of cuts you don’t want to make. I am asking for examples 

of cuts you do want to make, but for political reasons in the Congress, you are not able to make them. 

General ODIERNO. Yes, so I think, okay. Thank you. What I 

would say is, first, first and foremost, is BRAC [Base Realignment 

and Closure]. We have a billion dollars, half-a-billion dollars a year 

of excess infrastructure in the Army as we downsize. We have to 

address that issue. If we don’t, we are going to have to pay for that. 

Pay and compensation and Army Aviation Restructuring Initiative is—both of those combine to be $6 billion. So if we don’t get 

those reforms, we are going to have to find $6 billion and we are 

going to have to find another half-billion for BRAC, because that 

is what it costs every year of our excess infrastructure. So if we 

don’t get those things, we are going to have to find that money 

somewhere. 

Mr. MOULTON. Great. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary MABUS. For Navy and Marine Corps, it is slowing 

down the growth of pay and compensation. We simply have to do 

that. We are at the point where we are choosing between keeping 

people or getting them the tools that they need to do their job. And 

I think the proposals that have been put forward are reasonable. 

They are sound. 

And from talking to sailors and marines around the world, they 

are—the thing that concerns them the most is certainty, and the 

concern about sequester and whether they will have the tools to do 

the job that they joined the Navy and Marine Corps to do. 

Secretary JAMES. And Congressman, in addition, you heard me 

of course say the A–10 and the compensation reforms. I certainly 

agree with BRAC. I would add just a couple of other examples. 

Over the last year or two, we have a series of aging platforms 

where we have proposed retiring some of them in order to free up 

money to modernize the rest of them and to go to the next generation. And those sorts of actions have tended to be blocked. So I am 

thinking of the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System] last year. And there is a series of them in that regard. 

One other that I will give you, which, you know, it is difficult to 

work through, and I am an alumni of this committee, so I understand this. But nonetheless, these are tough choices. We have too 

many overall C–130s in our fleet. For all the shortages we have, 

that is the one platform that leaps to mind that we probably have 

too many of them. So we are trying to reduce the overall numbers. 

We are trying to modernize. We are trying to upgrade some of the 

older ones we are going to keep. 
44 

So we have got all of this going on at once, and we are trying 

also to shift them around the country to get better efficiencies and 

also to provide certain coverage of certain areas because we don’t 

have the authority to do a BRAC. 

Well, that whole movement, that entire plan has been put on 

hold. And so we can’t do it until, you know, we provide additional 

information, more reports and the like. So those would be some additional examples I would offer up. 

Admiral HOWARD. Congressman, if I may, we appreciate the 

work with the Congress on our cruiser modernization program, the 

original sustainment, modernization, and operational fund. If we 

could get back to the original intent of that fund and remove those 

restraints, that would be helpful. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you very much. I think the key point here 

is that sometimes when we are protecting jobs back here at home, 

we are putting lives at risk overseas. And it is really your decision 

to make those tradeoffs. If you have anything to add in writing, I 

would appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

And I appreciate the panelists. And I, for one, have been listening very carefully these many months, indeed years. And I think 

that the services have provided great detail about the impacts— 

negative impacts of sequester. 

In 2012, I voted for a bipartisan budget that would have completely replaced the sequester. Unfortunately, it only got 38 votes 

that day. And then I voted for Ryan-Murray that at least gave us 

reprieve for 2 years. 

So I hope that in the Congress we have the wisdom and the will, 

we summon it up to replace hopefully in total the sequester, but 

at least for a period of time to give some stability for the services 

going forward. 

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned agility just a few moments ago. 

That is where I want to go with this. Two different types of 

threats—we deal with nation-states, we deal with transnational actors. Focus on the former in this question. With nation-states, so 

much of the world’s actions can be explained by this concept of deterrence. And deterrence roughly assembled through capability and 

will. 

And particularly, I am interested in delving into strategic maneuver and our ability to strengthen the hands of diplomats by restoring the Global Response Force capability. So I am interested 

from each of the services, starting with the Air Force, your commitment to the Global Response Force with budgetary detail. And you 

can also include modeling and simulation and exercises towards 

that end. 

To the Air Force first. 

General WELSH. Congressman, I believe I will be the same as the 

other service chiefs. We are committed to the Global Response 

Force. The problem we have is filling the Global Response Force 

when all our assets are being used in operations everywhere else. 
45 

We are—the Air Force’s issue with force structure is that we have 

a limited capacity now in certain key areas. 

We have got ISR, mobility, air refueling, and command and control in demand on all parts of the globe. And as a result, we cannot 

meet the combatant commanders’ requirements today in those 

areas. We just don’t have enough of it anymore. 

And as you have heard us discuss already today, BCA levels of 

funding will make us decrease more—take more capacity out of 

those areas. The problem is going to get worse. 

So while we are committed to the Global Response Force, the 

problem is the assets required to fill it are already doing something. 

Mr. GIBSON. And before we go on to the other services, Mr. 

Chairman, I would just say that one of the things I think our committee should be doing is documenting this risk and just how critical I think it is in terms of—to what degree we talk about everyday about Russia, we talk about Iran, we talk about North Korea, 

but we haven’t really talked about our role in restoring this capability. 

Let me go to the other services. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks. 

And our situation is much like General Welsh. I mean, we are 

committed to the Global Response Force. We are meeting our requirements in the Global Response Force right now, which is a fairly small commitment. 

But more broadly, it is the forces that are back at home station, 

currently about 50 percent of them that have training, personnel, 

and equipment shortfalls that really are the concern, and so it is 

our ability to deal with the unexpected that really is the issue more 

broadly than the Global Response Force. 

Admiral HOWARD. Thank you, Congressman. 

So, in fact, I was at Fleet Forces Command when we sequestered 

in 2013, and the first thing that happened is we ended up eliminating some deployments, and we ended up reducing flying hours 

and steaming hours and getting that next set of deployers ready to 

go, and we ended up delaying the deployment of a carrier. 

And so when you talk about the Global Response Force, our ability to train our folks and our ability to have that next set ready 

is very much tied to the budgetary topline. 

Right now, we are—we have two carriers ready to go. We always 

have two ARGs [amphibious ready groups] ready to go. We are 

building back up to a larger surge capacity. But clearly, with sequestration, our ability to maintain that projection force generation 

is significantly challenged. 

General ODIERNO. Sir, we have a designated Global Response 

Force under the 82nd Airborne Division with enablers that is ready 

to go and prepared to go. 

What I would say, though, is because of the fact that we have 

less forward-stationed capability out of the Army now, the importance of Global Response Force has increased significantly. 

And unfortunately, I think it goes beyond now just the ability of 

the 82nd Airborne Division to do forced-entry operations anywhere 

in the world. 
46 

I go back to—I agree with General Dunford. It really is about the 

total force being able to respond very quickly in a variety of different directions, both medium and heavy, and I worry about the 

readiness levels, as we have stated earlier, of units having the ability and capability to do that at the level we expect them to be able 

to do that. 

Mr. GIBSON. I appreciate those responses. 

And then putting the joint DOD piece on this is modeling, simulating—and then how we work together as a team. And I think we 

have a long way to go. Chairman, thank you very much for the responses. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ashford. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you. 

You know, from a parochial perspective, my district is Omaha 

and Sarpy County, Nebraska, STRATCOM [Strategic Command], 

and the 55th Air Wing. And as a sort of historic tweak, my father 

flew B–26 bombers in World War II, and the plane was actually 

built at the Martin Bomber Plant, which is, I guess, now scheduled 

to be eventually now demolished, finally, after all these years— 

1943, it was built. 

Obviously, we are very proud of Offut [Air Force Base] and its 

history and STRATCOM, and thank you for all your support there. 

Congressman O’Rourke—there have been a number of questions 

asked regarding this question, but I really still don’t have an answer. It is not because of you; it just seems so dynamic. 

Congressman O’Rourke asked the question about what—the situation in the Mideast, where we were—obviously, we have talked 

about that, is dynamic. 

And it seems to me that if the—we don’t do something about sequestration, those problems are going to continue to exist, and they 

are, in some sense, imponderable. I mean, we don’t know what is 

coming next. 

So I hate to be redundant, but I would just ask one more time, 

what do you see in the next year to two years, maybe, through 

2016, possibly, with the possibility of this situation in the Middle 

East becoming more difficult or even just the level it is at now? 

General ODIERNO. Well, I think we understand for sure, as a 

minimum, we know we are going to have to continue to train Iraqi 

security forces, advise them, as well as the Syrian moderate resistance. We know that for sure. 

We know that we are going to have to have the air support necessary to support us as we do that. That is the minimum. 

But we also—that requires response forces in case our troops get 

into trouble that are there advising. So we have to have forces that 

are readily available in Kuwait and other places. That is the minimum. 

It we decide that is not working and the President makes a decision that we have to do reassessment and we decide to use more 

forces, then we will have to be prepared to do that. And that is the 

concern. Are we prepared to do that, and do we have the readiness 

to accomplish that mission if necessary. 

Mr. ASHFORD. If you would, just get from your perspectives, I 

know—— 
47 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, you know, I guess the only 

thing I would add is—I mean, there are two trends that really— 

when you talk about dynamic, is the Shia-Sunni issue and then 

violent extremism in the region. So this is—it is a dynamic environment, and we do know what we are trying to do in Iraq and 

Syria specifically. What we don’t is what is going to happen even 

into 2016, which makes our readiness to deal with the unexpected 

all the more important. 

General WELSH. Congressman, I think the—as you mentioned, 

the problems are dynamic, and I think that is what we expect: 

more instability, more uncertainty, new groups arising, just like 

ISIS kind of surprised most Americans as it appeared. 

I think that will lead to frustration here in the U.S. It will lead 

to frustration on the ground and with the folks doing the air campaign. And I think that will lead to more debate on the best approach to take as the situation changes again. 

And so I think this will be an ongoing discussion. I think that 

Ray was exactly right in saying that we are going to have to continue the operations we are executing now, we have to continue to 

execute them well, and they have to be done in a manner that allows us options as this dynamic situation develops. 

Mr. ASHFORD. It is just to see—to observe what is going on, and 

the exceptionalism of the team over there is beyond anything. So 

thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thirty minutes before this hearing began, the embargo on Congressman Price’s proposed House budget was lifted. It was embargoed until 9:30 a.m. this morning. 

And I have got some preliminary questions, and Secretary 

McHugh, I hope you can assist me with those. 

First, what does the President request as his base budget for national defense? 

Secretary MCHUGH. How about I give you the Army number? 

Mr. BROOKS. Does someone here have the total number for national defense from the President, his budget? 

Secretary MCHUGH. It is $571 billion—$561 billion. 

Mr. BROOKS. $561 billion is the base. And then how much for 

overseas contingency operations? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, again, for the Army, it is $20 billion. 

General ODIERNO. I think it is very close to $50 billion. 

Secretary MCHUGH. $50 billion. 

General ODIERNO. About $48 billion, I believe, is the number. 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay, I have got it as $51 billion. Does that sound 

about right? 

General ODIERNO. Sounds about right. 

Mr. BROOKS. And that would give us a total, then, of $612 billion. 

Does that sound about right for OCO and President’s base budget 

request? 

Now, the Budget Control Act has a limitation on base of $523 billion, so the President’s proposing a budget that is, if my math in 

my head is correct, about $38 billion more than what the Budget 

Control Act says is permissible. 
48 

Does anyone have any explanation for how he can do that, how 

he can just disregard the Budget Control Act of 2011 and throw out 

a budget that is $38 billion more than its limitation? 

No one? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I won’t speak to the law. You directed—you 

asked if I could perhaps help on this. 

I can tell you in discussions at OSD level, the President believes 

the sequestration level is so irresponsible that it cannot—— 

Mr. BROOKS. Secretary McHugh, if I could interject, because I 

have very limited time. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Sure. 

Mr. BROOKS. I am looking for the legal explanation, not the policy explanation. 

No—I didn’t hear anyone come up with a legal explanation. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well. I am a title 10 authority, I don’t have 

legal responsibility from the Department of Defense. 

Mr. BROOKS. All right. Let me move on then to Congressman 

Price’s proposed House budget. 

He starts, according to page 40 of his news release, graph S5. I 

don’t know if you have had a chance to review it. He has got the 

basic $523 billion, but then he has $94 billion for OCO in order to 

go beyond what the President has requested for national defense 

and that OCO is defined as ‘‘global war on terrorism.’’ 

Of that $94 billion for OCO, $20.5 billion is some amorphous 

thing called Reserve, which we may or may not ever see. So it 

might actually be $70-some odd billion that is in OCO as opposed 

to the $94 billion that is in these graphs for a rough total of around 

$617 billion. 

Now, my question is kind of akin to what Congressman Fleming 

was asking. Does it make any difference to the Department of Defense if the money comes to the Department of Defense via the 

base versus overseas contingency operations? 

How does that affect your ability to do what needs to be done? 

Would anyone like to respond to that? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I think I addressed that earlier when I said 

that for the Army receiving relief through our end-strength provisions above 450 [thousand] provides us $4.2 billion in 1-year relief. 

Mr. BROOKS. Can you do—— 

Secretary MCHUGH. I am trying to explain—— 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. Well, I have got only a minute and 10 seconds left, so let me move onto something more specific. 

Littoral Combat Ships that are being built in the State of Alabama, Secretary Mabus, can that be built out of OCO funds? 

Secretary MABUS. Under the current rules, I don’t believe that 

any new construction can be. We can do repair. 

Mr. BROOKS. So we can’t use them for that purpose. Not as good 

as base money in that instance then? Is that a fair statement. 

Secretary MABUS. I believe that is correct. 

Mr. BROOKS. Let’s look at Redstone Arsenal. We do a lot of missile defense. Can you do missile defense out of OCO moneys? 

General Odierno, do you know? 

General ODIERNO. As far as I know, we are not able to do that. 

It depends, but right now, we do not have the flexibility. 
49 

It is about flexibility in the OCO budget. We would have to have 

enough flexibility to do that, and we don’t know how it is defined, 

so it would be difficult to give an answer. 

Mr. BROOKS. Is it fair, then, for me to conclude that, as I am 

looking at the proposed House budget, that it is a whole lot better 

for the money to be in base as opposed to OCO. And to the extent 

it is in OCO, it does have some adverse effect on our national security capabilities. 

Would you agree with that, Secretary McHugh? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Yes, sir. I did earlier. It presents some challenges. 

Mr. BROOKS. Secretary Mabus, would you agree with that? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, I would. It would be better to be in base. 

Mr. BROOKS. And Secretary James, would you agree with that? 

Secretary JAMES. Yes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Does anyone have a judgment as to how much 

worse our national security would be if it is in OCO as opposed to 

base? 

Secretary JAMES. The worst of all is if we don’t get this fixed 

through some mechanism. 

Mr. BROOKS. Right. Thank you, ma’am. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mabus, I was really happily surprised to see you devote so much time to power and energy initiatives in your written 

testimony. Your comment about fuel being used as a weapon particularly struck out to me. I have always felt that there is a strategic imperative to energy use in the Department of Defense. 

In fact, in 2003 and 2007, DOD put out numbers that said that 

80 percent of all supply trucks on the road in Iraq and Afghanistan 

were conveying fuel. In that same time period, over 3,000 Americans, troops and contractors, were killed in fuel supply convoys. 

Every time we talk about energy initiatives within DOD, somehow what gets lost in the conversation are the national security implications of what you and other services are trying to do. 

It is not about—just about going green or trying to achieve some 

larger environmental goal. It is actually about developing technologies that will lighten the loads of our soldiers and marines. It 

is about developing technologies that will allow a platoon of soldiers and marines to push further to bring the fight into the enemy 

territory because they are not dependent on huge logistical tails. 

It is also about enabling greater persistence range, endurance, 

and time on station for vehicles shipped in airplanes. It is about 

being able to project greater and more lethal power. Anything that 

enables us to do that, I am all for, and I think it should be embraced. 

Mr. Secretary, could you outline some of the innovative energy 

initiatives the Navy is undertaking specifically touching on what 

they will enable the Navy to do in tactical and strategic terms? 

Secretary MABUS. Thank you so much. And I couldn’t be more articulate than you just were on that. But some of the specific things 

that we are doing in energy efficiency, we are doing everything 

from hull coatings to changing the light bulbs to doing voyage plan-
50 

ning, to putting electric drives on some of our larger ships for slower speeds, to building an all-electric ship. 

The Marines, as always, are leading the way here. And your statistic about we were losing a marine killed or wounded in Afghanistan for every 50 fuel trucks that were brought in. That is just too 

high a price to pay. 

We have got SEAL teams now in the field that are pretty much 

net-zero in terms of energy. They make their energy where they 

are and they make their water where they are. For a Marine company, by using solar power to power radios, GPSs [Global Positioning Systems], they save 700 pounds of batteries per company. 

And they don’t have to be resupplied with that. 

In a larger, more strategic scale, the ability to use fuel as a 

weapon and the volatility of fuel prices that go up dramatically and 

down dramatically, creates immense problems for us in terms of 

being able to pay for that fuel and being able to plan for how much 

that fuel is. 

And we are moving to non-fossil fuel sources to provide some 

competition in the fuel market, but also to smooth out that volatility and to create American jobs, and to have a home-grown 

source of fuel. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

Secretary McHugh, can you talk a little bit about some of the 

Army initiatives? I would think that if you could have an LSA [Logistics Support Area] that could produce some of its own fuel on 

base and keep, you know, a convoy or two of soldiers out there running fuel for the generators to run air conditioners at Balad or 

someplace, that would be a good thing. Is there—can you talk 

about some of the Army initiatives? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, thank you very much, Congresswoman. As we have discussed before this committee in the past, it 

really is, as you so accurately put, a matter of soldiers’ lives. And 

that is particularly true with respect to our operational energy programs. 

We have constricted our energy utilization by about 17 percent 

in recent years. The frustrating thing is the cost of that energy 

nevertheless continues to rise. But having said that, we think we 

have a responsibility to our soldiers, as again you noted, to lighten 

their load. 

Like our friends in the Marine Corps, we have reduced weights 

in necessary equipment for battery usage. We have solar blankets 

that can be used in just about any climate, to charge various radios, to charge our battery supplies, significantly lessening the 

load. 

And we have also, through the use of more efficient engines, 

caused our need to resupply for fuel while forward much less demanding, much fewer occasions. 

Again, to the strategic aspects of this, as Secretary Mabus said, 

this is a matter of, yes, the environment, but it is also of saving 

dollars. And I would be happy to provide you additional information on how we have done that back home. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I would appreciate that. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
51 

Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate this panel being here today. Obviously, it is always 

good to see all of you. I appreciate your service. 

But this question is directed to Secretary James. It is in reference to the CHAMP [Counter-electronics High Power Microwave 

Advanced Missile Project] system. Congress directed the Air Force 

to develop CHAMP system on a cruise missile in the fiscal year 

2014 NDAA, and added $10 million to the fiscal year 2015 Omnibus Appropriations for the Air Force to build the system. 

The capability the COCOMs have asked for—asked this committee for and right now it is a cost-effective way, and you talked 

about affordability, obviously, and we are looking to save money in 

areas that we can. But it is very cost-effective for us and very expensive for our adversaries to try to defeat. 

America is leading the world in technology at the moment, but 

near-peer nations are catching up, you know, at a time when we 

really don’t need that, and we certainly shouldn’t deploy or delay 

deployment of this particular weapon system. 

Despite the obvious benefits and the low-cost timeliness of the 

closing of the technology gap and authorization, appropriation, and 

outright encouragement by this Congress, and I was briefed earlier 

this year that the Air Force is not fully committed to building 

CHAMP by 2016. 

And this is not a limitation on technology, authority, or funding. 

So please tell this committee, myself, if there is any reason the Air 

Force can’t deliver CHAMP in 2016. 

Secretary JAMES. So Mr. Nugent, I am going to yield to the chief 

because I am going to admit I do not know a great deal about this 

program, but it is one that I am going to look into more, you know, 

based on your bringing this to our attention. But I will yield to the 

chief on this. 

General WELSH. [inaudible]—in fiscal year 2015 NDAA to look at 

a new way of moving this thing on a—of moving this—of using this 

weapon on a platform that is actually going to be survivable and 

operational beyond the COCOM. 

The second thing we wanted to do is do more tech maturation 

on the technology. We want it to have a longer range. We want it 

to be more efficient. We want it to be more effective and more survivable. 

So that is the near-term focus. We want to produce a family of 

electromagnetic weapons. So the idea of walking away from this 

concept is just simply not true. 

One of the problems we have had that has made us inefficient 

in getting started on this program, and this is Mark offering an 

opinion to you now, sir, is that we have built weapons and electronic warfare capabilities in two separate capability portfolios. 

So, what our A5/8 on the Air Staff has done, recognizing this 

problem several months ago, he directed a cross-functional study to 

bring our electronic warfare folks and our weapons producers together, which is where CHAMPs has to work, and tasked them to 

give him a study on the future of this weapons approach. And it 

is due this summer. 
52 

So we will be informed this summer on this, but to your specific 

question: Do we plan to produce this weapon by fiscal year 2016? 

No, sir, we can’t get there from here. 

Mr. NUGENT. What is amazing to me, General, with all due respect, is that this system has been tested and works on a current 

system that we have—the cruise missile. And we have some in inventory because we had to—because of the INF [IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces] Treaty, you know, and it works. 

Now, they have also increased the capability of the system. And 

obviously, we are not in a classified setting to talk about that increase to it, but the COCOMs have indicated that to get it out in 

the field today is better than, you know, while yes, it would be 

great to have a reusable platform in the future, and I think the Air 

Force should continue on that venture, but to get it out into the 

field in a relatively short period of time, at a relatively low cost by 

using existing platforms, it is a stop-gap. 

I mean, it is something that you fit in knowing full well that the 

long-term is you need to have a long-term approach, but today it 

would give the warfighters, the Navy and the Army and those that 

will need that capability right now. And right now, I mean in terms 

of within a year or two versus 10 years out kind of development. 

General WELSH. Congressman, munitions in general are a major 

issue for us right now. The funding that we have put against munitions is prioritized with precision weapons that we have been using 

for the last 15 years on the battlefield. And our stocks are depleted 

markedly. 

So that is where the priority has been. I would love to have the 

folks on my staff who are working this issue come sit and talk to 

you and get your view of this problem and how you see the future 

for it. And then sit and tell you exactly where we are in this study 

effort. Would that be fair? 

Mr. NUGENT. That would be fair. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My questions today are directed to Secretary Mabus and Admiral 

Howard. I appreciate the time both of you have spent in my district. Admiral Howard, your remarks at the christening of the 

Montgomery were just fabulous. Thank you. 

Secretary Mabus, what are the likely impacts to the Littoral 

Combat Ship [LCS] program of slowing or breaking production in 

fiscal year 2016, 2017, and 2018, as we move toward implementing 

the design upgrades in fiscal year 2019? 

Secretary MABUS. We have a block buy, as you know, on the Littoral Combat Ships, and they are in full serial production now. We 

have driven the cost down because of that, from a beginning cost 

per hull of about $800 million, now to the ones coming off the line 

of about $350 million. If you break that serial production, if you 

break that block buy, you, number one, lose some very skilled 

craftsmen that it is very hard to get that back. The industrial base 

impacts are enormous. 

Number two, you end the economies of scale that we have now, 

and the ability to do these ships one after the other. 
53 

Number three, after the small surface combatant task force 

looked at how to make these ships more lethal, more survivable, 

they have come up with a package after an exhaustive look at 

every possible type ship, every possible type upgrade, that for 

about $75 million a ship, it is going to be far more lethal, far more 

survivable, and you can fit it onto this hull. 

But to keep that—those dollars, both for the hull costs and for 

the upgrade costs in those bounds at all, you have to keep this serial production going. You have a production break, you are going 

to be looking again at a first of a ship class, far more expensive. 

You are going to be looking at job training that you will have to 

do because you will have lost so many of these tradesmen. It would 

be not only for the LCS and its follow-on, the frigate, that will be 

the same ship, just upgraded. 

I cannot overemphasize how devastating it would be to break 

production for economic reasons, because you are going to end up 

getting fewer ships at a much higher cost, so any economies that 

you might think you were getting would just disappear. 

It is—I think I used the term, it is a bizarre way to approach 

shipbuilding. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you. 

Admiral HOWARD. There is also warfighting and operational aspect. When you slow down the build rate of the ships, we are producing these ships to replace our aging mine countermeasure capability. They will replace the frigates, and the last of our frigates are 

being decommissioned this year. 

That ship right now coupled with the Fire Scout, tremendous, 

you know, ISR capability potential. She is going to bring flexibility 

and agility to some of our mission sets, and the longer we stretch 

out that gap as the frigates go away, the less we can offer up to 

the COCOMs’ needs. 

Secretary MABUS. Finally, Congressman, we have a need, a demonstrated need for 52 of these small surface combatants. We will 

not get there under the current budget, under the current bill plan 

until 2028. So to Admiral Howard’s point, we will be low in terms 

of these for the next more than a decade. 

Mr. BYRNE. There has been some comment about the fact that 

it had this redesign coming from the task force that looked at it. 

Isn’t it par for the course that we change ships as we understand 

new circumstances, Admiral, that—for example, on both our DDGs 

[guided-missile destroyers] and Virginia-class submarine we have 

had to make some redesigns and changes, because we have learned 

new things and there are new circumstances out there. So is it any 

different with regard to the redesign of the LCS to become a frigate? Is it just our responding to the new circumstances we have 

discovered? 

Admiral HOWARD. So you are quite right, that is the very essence 

of modernization for all of our services. And then for capital ships 

that certainly takes an amount of time. 

The genius of LCS was to create the mission packages, the weapons systems, separate from the platform, so that we could more 

quickly adjust to emerging threats. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I just want to thank you both, because I know 

how hard you have worked for the fleet in general, but my par-
54 

ticular concern has been the LCS, and I appreciate your leadership 

on that, and you will have the continued support of this Congressman as you do so. 

And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Stefanik. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all 

of the witnesses here today. I want to direct my question to Secretary McHugh. Today and recently at a Senate hearing, you said 

‘‘Because of sequestration, the Army will reduce its end strength to 

unconscionable levels by 2019, likely losing another six brigade 

combat teams and potentially a division headquarters along with 

associated effects to support infrastructure.’’ 

As you know very well, Fort Drum is home to the 10th Mountain 

Division which I am privileged to represent, and you for so many 

years represented with great honor and an exceptional record. It is 

extremely unique in terms of its training capabilities, power projection, and regional location in order to support our Armed Forces. 

This installation has already experienced these devastating cuts 

first-hand, with the deactivation of one of its brigades, dilapidated 

World War II-era buildings still being used, and the potential loss 

of 16,000 soldier and civilian jobs due to another round of sequestration in the BCA. These cuts, as you know, would have a huge 

economic impact on New York and the Northeast as a whole. 

Fort Drum is a training hub for all service branches and houses 

the Army’s most deployed division since 1990. 

Because of the potential cuts to training facilities and troop count 

due to sequestration, would you be able to give us your thoughts 

on how these cuts to Fort Drum and other installations like it 

would impact the Army’s current and future missions overseas? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Thank you, Congresswoman, and best wishes representing a place I obviously think is pretty special. 

As I said in my opening comments, the reality of sequestration 

is simply this. Virtually every post, every camp, every station, 

every program that the Army conducts will see significant reductions. Mathematically it is inescapable. And that includes Fort 

Drum. 

We are blessed as an Army to have a great plethora, if you will, 

of amazing bases that in places like the north country, in your district, support and provide an incredibly effective training ground 

and a very welcoming home. 

But what we are faced with as all of us have said here today are 

the realities of the numbers that the budget would provide. And at 

420,000, as you know, we are currently looking at possible reductions for our major military installations of up to 16,000. So that 

is in play. 

I think there is an irony here. I went through three base closure 

rounds, and I understand how painful they are. And I lost a base 

in Plattsburgh, New York. Thanks to the great efforts of the community, that part of the world came back, but it wasn’t easy and 

it took a lot of hard work. So I recognize and fully understand the 

hesitancy of many members. 

But here is the reality: without the support of a base closure 

round we are forced, rather than to take excess infrastructure 

where we believe it exists, and spread these cuts almost in a pea-
55 

nut butter kind of fashion, across all bases, across all installations, 

and it is not just a matter of end strength, it is to the point that 

you made our ability, or inability really, to keep up the facilities 

that our soldiers and their families rely upon and call home. 

So this is a very dangerous spiral in which we find ourselves, 

and while ultimately as a military, we are most concerned with 

meeting the Nation’s defense needs, where at sequestration, as the 

chief and I have both testified, we feel we can’t meet the Defense 

Strategic Guidance, but it is also a question of the inability at sequestration levels of providing a good home and adequate training 

facilities, like we currently enjoy in places such as Fort Drum. 

Ms. STEFANIK. I agree with your concerns about sequestration. I 

have been a strong voice against the sequester in terms of the longterm impact on our readiness. And frankly, I believe it puts our 

troops’ lives at risk. 

So thank you very much for your service, both to the north country, but to this country. Thanks. 

Secretary MCHUGH. And thank you for yours. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks all of you 

for your testimony. I think it has been a long day, but I appreciate 

your patience. 

General Odierno, I would like to ask you, you have said in the 

past, ‘‘Our soldiers are very confident in the A–10.’’ Is that still 

true? Just yes or no, I have got a lot of questions if you don’t mind. 

General ODIERNO. They are confident in the A–10, yes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. And you have also said, ‘‘that your soldiers prefer 

the A–10.’’ Is that still true, yes or no? 

General ODIERNO. It depends on the environment. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay, thank you, sir. 

And you have also said that, ‘‘the A–10 is the best close air-support platform we have today.’’ Do you still believe that to be true? 

General ODIERNO. In Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay, thank you, sir. 

And I just want to do a shoutout to the A–10 units right now 

that are deployed in the fight against ISIS, and also the 354th 

Fighter Squadron which I commanded is deployed over to the 

EUCOM [European Command] theater right now to ensure and 

train our allies with Russia’s increased aggression. 

So, Secretary James, you know, just given General Odierno’s 

statements that he just reaffirmed, is the decision to mothball the 

A–10 a budget-based decision only? 

Secretary JAMES. It is driven by the budget, Yes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Just by the budget. 

So if you had more money, you would keep the A–10 in the inventory? 

Secretary JAMES. I would, yes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay, great. So I think you think your budget request is about, what, $10 billion over the sequester number? Or 

what is—— 

Secretary JAMES. Ten billion, and I have to add that we would 

need dollars above the President’s budget level. 
56 

Ms. MCSALLY. That is what I am getting at. So how much more 

money would you need above the President’s budget request in 

order to not mothball any A–10s. 

Secretary JAMES. I think the 1-year cost would be on the order of between $400 and $500 million, but please let me check that to 

be sure. But if you look over the 5-year period of time, it is closer 

to $4 billion. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Got it. I have heard you say $4.2 billion, but just 

for next year, would you guys get back to me what that cost would 

be? And I am assuming there may be—are there other unfunded 

mandates, or other unfunded requests above that, or if we were 

able to get you another $400 million, $500 million, would you keep 

the A–10 in the inventory? 

Secretary JAMES. I would like to yield to the chief on that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. How much more money do you need to keep the 

A–10? 

General WELSH. We would have to go look at it, because it is beyond the A–10. We have to look at where we develop manpower 

now, for new maintenance for new airplanes that are being fielded. 

So it is beyond just the cost of the A–10. But the A–10 cost is $4.2 

billion for the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program]. It $520 million or so this year. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yes, great. Thank you. 

And I noticed in the discussion last year, and this is a very important one, because we are talking men and women on the ground 

under fire in harm’s way, and making sure they have the best capability overhead, especially when they are in close proximity with 

enemies and friendlies where they need long loiter time and firepower and survivability in that environment, and that is where the 

A–10 brings the best capability overhead. So this is really important. 

I know in the past there has been a discussion, it has been said 

the A–10 is old, the A–10 is aging, and we need new capabilities. 

But I noticed in your testimony you highlighted that your youngest 

B–52 is 53 years old, and you would like to keep it in the inventory 

until 2040, which by my math, that would mean your youngest B– 

52 would be 78 years old in 2040, and so you are keeping an aging 

airplane that certainly can’t survive in a high air-defense environment, like the B–52, but we have heard the argument in the past 

that the A–10 is old. We have invested over a billion dollars in it 

to rebuild its wings, in the A–10C, and its avionics and the capabilities. 

So those two things seem to be sort of contradictory. So I just 

want a comment on that. 

General WELSH. We don’t have the B–52 in the inventory by 

choice. If you will recall, the B–2 was supposed to replace a large 

part of that fleet, but that buy was stopped at 20 aircraft. 

So that is why we are building the Long-Range Strike Bomber 

now, because we need 80 to 100 bombers. 

The same thing is true with the A–10. We don’t want the A–10 

to be flying this mission when it is 50, 60, 70 years old. That is 

not fair to the sons and daughters of America. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. So, okay, the B–52 is still flying because we 

don’t yet have a capability to replace it. But the A–10 is being 
57 

asked to be mothballed but we don’t have a capability yet to replace it, even though it can fly until at least 2028 and 2030. So how 

does that—— 

General WELSH. The A–10 is being retired because of the Budget 

Control Act. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay, got it. So right now—— 

Secretary JAMES. Of course we do have the other aircraft that 

can cover the mission of close air support. That is the other reason—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Not under those circumstances that I mentioned, 

having flown the A–10 in combat. There are unique circumstances 

where only the A–10 can save lives. Would you not agree with that, 

Secretary James? 

General WELSH. I do not agree with that. I think there are circumstances where you would prefer to have an A–10. We have 

priced ourself out of that game. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay, so it is a budget issue. 

General WELSH [continuing]. Every option available—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. If we had the funds and with the current wings 

rebuilding the A–10C, is it 2028 still where it could fly until before 

it needs to be retired? 

General WELSH. 2028. 

Ms. MCSALLY. 2028? Okay, great. And right now, the plan is to 

replace the A–10 eventually with the F–35, is that true? 

General WELSH. The F–35 will be the high-threat CAS platform 

of the future. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay, so the A–10 will be replaced by the F–35? 

General WELSH. The F–35 will take the place of the A–10 and 

the F–16 eventually. But in the CAS arena, we will replace the A– 

10 capability more near term with F–16s and F–15Es, and we will 

augment that with the B–1 when the scenario allows us to, even 

the B–52, the AC–130, et cetera, but we will eventually have the 

F–35 as the high-end CAS platform. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yes, sir. Got it. My time has expired. I know we 

have talked about this before, but I don’t believe the F–35 replaces 

the A–10 and the capabilities it brings to the fight for General 

Odierno’s troops to make sure that they live to fight another day 

and get home to their troops. 

I love the F–35. It is a great airplane, but it doesn’t replace those 

capabilities. 

General WELSH. I love your pin. 

But the A–10 also cannot operate in a high-threat environment 

and provide close air support. He might need an—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Absolutely, we need all of those capabilities. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, you all aren’t going to decide this now, but 

I appreciate the discussion. 

Ms. MCSALLY. We are going to do this outside, and—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all for your patience. I think maybe 

we just have a couple more. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And really appreciate your service, your leadership, and both the appointees by 

the administration, as well as the service chiefs here today. 
58 

And I think if nothing else comes from your financial stress, the 

stress to our military, is the fact that we are going to have to start 

having different debates on the foreign policy that you have nothing directly to do with. 

I looked at this week—and I heard Mr. Rogers, and I want to 

bring this up very quickly, and I want to ask a very simple question that you might or might not be able to answer. 

These are articles this past week: ‘‘between casualties and desertions, Afghan military is shrinking fast’’; ‘‘Afghan officials sanction 

murder, torture, rape, says report.’’ This past week in the New 

York Times, ‘‘CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] cash ended up in 

coffers of Al Qaeda.’’ That is what is the problem for Congress to 

help you get the proper funding for your military. That is not your 

doing or your fault. That is the fault of the administration and of 

Congress itself. Because you follow orders in uniform, and you are 

there because the President selected you to be the service chief, 

and he has confidence in you. 

That is the problem, is that we continue to find absolute millions 

and billions of dollars to spend in Afghanistan. And yet we get 

these articles. You didn’t write the articles—you can’t help it. But 

this is the problem that the American people have, because they 

do read the articles. That does not take away from their respect of 

you and your services. Not one—not at all. 

But when you cannot sell them—I heard General Welsh—and I 

agree with you, sir, you said, we haven’t done much to help with 

the infrastructure—to build the infrastructure of the Air Force. We 

can’t build the infrastructure of America, but yet we are spending 

billions of dollars so Afghanistan can build its infrastructure. That 

is the contradiction that is presenting the problem with this debate 

about whether we have sequestration or we don’t have sequestration. 

I asked General Campbell last week, a very impressive Army 

general who now oversees the military action, I guess, in Afghanistan. And I was a little bit taken back by his answer when I asked 

him this question—and I am going to get to you in just 1 second. 

Do you ever get a chance to tell whomever you answer to that 

9 more years in Afghanistan of spending roughly $25 to $50 billion 

a year is worthwhile? Do you get a chance to say, well, I think 

maybe in 3 years, we give them benchmarks, and if they can’t 

reach those benchmarks, then we say, we are out. And his answer 

was fine. In fact, I got copies of it. He said that he is—his hope 

is, and that he believes that this would be the star of Central Asia. 

Well, every history book I ever read said, you ain’t going to change 

it no matter what you do. 

I want to know, in informal settings, do you, in the military, who 

are here today, in uniform, get a chance once a month or once a 

week to sit down with General Dempsey, take off your ties, relax, 

have a beer or a glass of wine or whiskey, and talk about where 

we are going in this country and how it is impacting our military? 

To the service chiefs—and I have got 1 minute. The service 

chiefs, do you get the same thing with Secretary Carter, of whether 

you get together in a relaxed session and talk about the foreign policy of America and how our military is falling apart because they 

are overworked, they are tired, and the equipment is overworked 
59 

and tired? Do you all ever get that opportunity? Whoever with the 

military will go first, and then one of the service chiefs, please. 

General ODIERNO. Mr. Jones, we meet with the chairman 

schedually twice a week, Monday or Friday, usually at least once 

every week. We have formal briefings, but at the end we have executive session; we discuss all of these issues in detail. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

One of the service chiefs—— 

General WELSH. Sir I would offer that Secretary Carter is bringing together all of the service chiefs, all the combatant commanders, and all of the service secretaries, along with his Department of Defense senior leadership this Friday, to have exactly the 

discussion you are talking about—how do we best inform the debates on what is best for national security in this country. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your service to our country and thank you for 

your patience today in handling all these questions. And I guess I 

will be finishing up or helping to finish up, and I would like to ask 

about directed energy and missile defense. 

Now the Navy has operationally deployed the LaWS system 

[Laser Weapon System], I think on the Ponce, a directed energy 

weapon which can be used against a variety of threats. I believe 

that directed energy has turned a corner, and is one of the keys 

to our asymmetrical advantage using our technology for future security, but I am not sure the other branches are as up to date on 

this as the Navy is. Is anyone other than the Navy leaning forward 

on directed energy? 

General ODIERNO. We just put $5 million out to—specifically on 

laser technology in order to have a competition that will allow us 

to downsize the laser in such a way that we can use it against 

UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], mortars, rockets. We think there 

is a great application there and we are into that process. Plus for 

us it is about getting it small enough and enough directed energy 

in order to meet our needs and it is absolutely essential, we think, 

to our future and we just recently invested in that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. That is great to hear. And Air Force? 

Secretary JAMES. We too have a program. I can’t quote you the 

dollar figures. We could get you that for the record. But for example, I was just out at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico. Air 

Force Research Laboratory is doing work out there with lasers and 

directed energy. 

Furthermore we are testing an aircraft defensive system which 

would have lasers involved and a laser communication system. So 

we have quite an active program as well. 

Mr. LAMBORN. That is really good to hear. And I have been to 

the Air Force lab also, and they are doing wonderful work. 

Now on missile defense, I am concerned that some of the services 

may not be taking missile defense capability as seriously as I think 

we have to. For example, the Navy is cutting—you thought I was 

going to let you off the hook there, the Navy—is cutting missile defense capable ships from its budget. Are each of you—starting with 

the Navy—are each of you committed to missile defense? 
60 

Secretary MABUS. Absolutely, Congressman. And we cut the modernization of some of our Aegis destroyers to make them ballistic 

missile defense capable, and we did it purely as a budgetary thing. 

It was one of the hard choices you had to make. We need a certain 

number of ballistic missile defense capable ships. And we can meet 

most of the requirements today. We have 4 that will be permanently homeported in Rota, Spain, that take the place of about 16 

back here because they are permanently homeported. 

We are continuing to modernize the Aegis system on our cruisers 

and our destroyers, but not as fast as we would like to, and it is 

all because of the, of the budget situation. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Would anyone else like to jump in on that? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I can add. Obviously the Army with that and 

Patriot is all in with respect to missile defense. It is one of, if not 

the most high-demand low-density assets we have. The chief spoke 

earlier today about the incredible amount of deployments we have, 

and even at that we are still not meeting combatant commanders’ 

requirements. 

We would be less than honest if we said that we haven’t already, 

through the budget cuts we have experienced in recent years, particularly in our S&T programs, not had challenges to date. Our Patriot modernization program, our PAC–3 MSE [Missile Segment 

Enhancement] initiative, although continuous progress, is not going 

forward as quickly as we like. We had funds in 2014 to receive 92 

missiles. We will begin to take delivery on those later this year. 

But as we look across the broad range of threats, again, as the 

chief mentioned earlier, we see that demand only increasing. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. And Air Force? 

General WELSH. Congressman, I would add that the Air Force is 

heavily involved in command and control for both theater ballistic 

missile defense, national missile defense, missile warning architecture, obviously is something we have been responsible for, for quite 

some time. 

We have an awful lot of people who are involved in the collection, 

analysis, and distribution against indications and warning, collection targets for missile defense, and then one of the four pillars of 

missile defense of course is offensive operations. And our precision 

global strike capability is fundamental to that ability when we get 

tired of being a catcher’s mitt. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you all very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all for today, for your responsiveness 

to this committee every day, and, again, for your service to the 

country. With that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 17, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 17, 2015 

(237) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. How will the fiscal year 2016 budget request assist the Air Force 

in supporting the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region? How will funding for the 

Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS–B) support the rebalance? What are we doing to 

enhance our resiliency in the region? 

General WELSH. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 budget will help the Air Force support 

the Asia-Pacific rebalance by strengthening our power projection capabilities and resiliency efforts. FY16 funding for LRS–B will help the Air Force recapitalize our legacy bomber fleet and improve our future power projection capability. LRS–B’s long 

range, significant payload, and survivability will provide operational flexibility for 

the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, while increasing our ability to operate in 

Anti-Access/Area Denial environments. The FY16 budget request includes various 

initiatives designed to enhance our resiliency in this theater. These include funding 

for hardened infrastructure to protect key nodes, enhanced airfield damage repair 

capabilities, and expanded locations for future use. Additional details can be provided at the classified level to give a fuller picture. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, as you know the Army’s 

Capstone Concept emphasizes human performance. Can you tell me how the Army 

research community is working to improve the physical, psychological and cognitive 

performance of its soldiers? 

Secretary MCHUGH. One of our challenges today is how we manage the increasingly heavy physical and cognitive loads our Soldiers are asked to bear. The Army 

is developing innovative solutions through systematic study of the complex human 

system to unburden our Soldiers. We are focused on understanding the cognitive, 

psychological, and physiological stressors associated with preparation, response, and 

recovery from operational and training environments. 

One major effort for Army Science and Technology is the development of a Soldier 

Systems Engineering Architecture, which will use analytical models of cognitive, 

physical, and psychological performance to create linkages among the Soldier, the 

tasks a Soldier must be able to perform, and the technical performance requirements of equipment used to execute specific missions/functions. These models will 

allow the Army to design better human system interfaces of equipment used during 

dismounted operations, reducing the physical and cognitive burden for the Soldier. 

Research in areas such as medical sciences, behavioral and social science, neuroscience, biomechanics, learning sciences, and human/systems integration allows the 

Army to discover, understand, and predict human behaviors in a range of settings 

from individuals and teams to organizations and societies. In addition to advancing 

equipment design, the results of this research will inform Institutional and Operational Army processes such as training, human resources, and medical care. 

The data from behavioral and social science research provides effective non-materiel solutions that provide the Army with improved predictability of potential performance, behaviors, attitudes, and resilience of Soldiers. The Army believes understanding and applying fundamental human/systems science are critical to optimizing the physical, psychological, and cognitive performance of our Soldiers. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. What is the impact to depot workload at Budget Control Act funding levels? Are you concerned about weapons, missile and vehicle inventories? If so, 

how will sequestration raise your level of concern? The Department of Defense base 

budget is growing while the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget is decreasing. What costs, if any, have been moved into the base budget that were historically funded through OCO? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army’s Industrial Base consists of Government-owned 

(organic) and commercial industrial capability and capacity that must be readily 
238 

available to manufacture and repair items during both peacetime and national 

emergencies. Due to BCA funding levels, we are concerned that we will not be able 

to retain an Army Industrial Base that provides unique capabilities, sustains the 

capacity for reversibility, and meets the manufacturing and repair materiel demands of the Joint Force. 

The Army will not have the required resources to overhaul or modernize: 358 

Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 534 Stryker Combat Vehicles, 192 howitzers, 8 Patriot 

Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 Launcher Stations, 20 Patriot Missile Battery Command Posts, 140 High Mobility Artillery Rocket and M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, over 200,000 small arms, and tens of thousands of other combat and 

tactical systems to meet Combatant Commander requirements. 

BCA funding levels, absent the receipt of any required Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, will set conditions that could force the Army to idle or adversely impact up to 40% of the current on-board workforce in the next few years. 

Impacts would be felt by up to 1,875 permanent career professionals and 3,372 temporary/term government employees and contractors. Regrettably, we could once 

again see the permanent loss of skilled artisans like we did at Corpus Christi Army 

Depot under sequester in FY13. 

The current budget caps and any follow-on imposition of sequestration will further 

challenge our ability to balance readiness across the force. Depots will be challenged 

to retain an effective and cost efficient operation, which will cause workload backlogs that can take multiple years to complete. As a result, commanders will need 

to expend more resources to maintain a ready fleet. 

Since FY11, the Army has experienced sizeable reductions to both its base and 

OCO budgets. The Army’s portion of the DoD FY16 OCO budget request represents 

40.6% of the DoD total—primarily due to the Army providing the majority of the 

Joint Force engaged in OCO operations and its significant executive agent responsibilities for resourcing in-theater support operations. 

The primary reason for the downward trend in the OCO budgets over the last several years is the decreased scale of OCO operations. Our withdrawal from Iraq and 

the changing role and size of the force in Afghanistan have significantly reduced demand for OCO funds. As our troops return from theater, we must continue to build 

readiness, conduct shaping exercises, and execute home station training, which is 

funded with base dollars. These costs increase our base requirements as we work 

to ensure success in decisive action operations. 

I’m concerned that a number of our OCO missions are evolving and becoming 

more enduring in nature. Operation Spartan Shield and our Patriot batteries deployed in the Middle East are examples of missions that are currently funded with 

OCO, but if we were forced to fund them in the base, without a topline increase, 

we would see severe impact to our other accounts. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Recently, the Deputy Commander of the 32nd Air and Missile Defense Command stated ‘‘we are rapidly approaching an inflection point where we 

face the risk of breaking our AMD [Air and Missile Defense] force.’’ There is an 

acute need for upgrades to our PATRIOT units, particularly the radar, many of 

which still use vacuum tubes. How do you believe we can best upgrade this critical 

component of our AMD system? 

General ODIERNO. I remain concerned about the stress on the Patriot force, both 

our people and equipment, due to the repetitive, long deployments around the world. 

Combatant Commanders’ demand for Patriot missile battalions and Terminal High 

Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) batteries exceeds our capacity, significantly limiting 

options in emerging crises, and exceeding the Army’s ability to meet Department 

of Defense (DoD) deployment-to-dwell rotation goals for these units. 

In a non-sequestration, stable budget environment, it would take us more than 

a decade to begin fielding a new Patriot-class AMD radar and another decade or 

so to complete fielding throughout the force. The current uncertain budget environment impedes our ability to fully execute our modernization efforts. As a Nation, 

we must find a resolution of this foundational issue. Until a new significantly upgraded radar capability can be fielded (a program planned for initiation in Fiscal 

Year 2017 (FY17)), we must continue to improve the current Patriot system through 

a series of modernization and modification efforts that are reflected in the FY16 

President’s Budget (PB) Request. 

The FY16 PB request describes the best path to continue to improve the Patriot’s 

capability as a critical component of the AMD force. Specifically, the Patriot improvements that must continue to be funded as requested in the PB are both hardware upgrades to the major components (radar, launcher, interceptor, and battle 

management) and software advancements that tie the components together and provide a system engagement capability. 
239 

The Army must continue to make improvements in radar capabilities to detect 

and discriminate air and missile threats. To do this, the Army is introducing a more 

capable interceptor and has begun the process to transition Patriot components to 

the Integrated AMD Battle Command System networked battle command and integrated fire control architecture. It is critical that we continue developing Patriot 

component improvements to counter threats from Tactical Ballistic Missiles. Another major radar upgrade, Combat Identification, allows the system to identify targets as friend or foe and is part of the next increment of Congressionally mandated 

electronic protection improvements. 

Therefore, full funding of the FY16 PB remains critical to ensuring the Patriot 

Weapon System remains modernized and capable to continue to protect U.S. and allied forces and their key assets worldwide against the current and evolving threat. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Do you believe that sequestration harms the ability for our organic 

industrial base to meet the needs of the warfighter? 

General ODIERNO. Yes. The Army’s Industrial Base consists of Government-owned 

(organic) and commercial industrial capability and capacity that must be readily 

available to manufacture and repair items during both peacetime and national 

emergencies. We are concerned that we will not be able to retain an Army Industrial Base that provides unique capabilities, sustains the capacity for reversibility, 

and meets the manufacturing and repair materiel demands of the Joint Force. Already, modernization accounts have been reduced by 25% and every program affected; maintenance has been deferred; and the defense industrial base is increasingly skeptical about investing in future innovative systems needed to make the 

force more agile and adaptive. 

Under sequestration, the Army will not have the resources to perform major repairs or recapitalize worn, obsolete or damaged combat and tactical systems in our 

formations. This means fewer systems will be available for unit training, or that 

units will find OPTEMPO funding inadequate as they are forced to spend an increasing portion of their training funds just to keep their systems operationally 

ready. 

Sequestration invariably sets conditions for uncertainty in the workforce, forcing 

our industrial facilities to consider employee furloughs and hiring freezes. This uncertainty could drive our industrial base professionals to seek employment elsewhere, as we saw at Corpus Christi Army Depot in FY13. The departure of these 

skilled artisans erodes depot capabilities and takes years to replace. 

Funding reductions, with corresponding workload reductions, degrade the depot’s 

ability to maintain an effective and cost efficient production operation, increases the 

average per unit cost of their products and creates workload backlogs that can take 

years to complete. These conditions will degrade unit and program manager buying 

power as we endure and come out of the sequester. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Does the Army still have the capacity to support U.S. action in a 

major, large-scale conflict? 

General ODIERNO. Last year, we testified before Congress that the minimum end 

strength the Army requires to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance is 

980,000 Soldiers—450,000 in the Regular Army, 335,000 in the Army National 

Guard, and 195,000 in the Army Reserve. 

Although we still believe we can meet the fundamental requirements of the DSG 

at 980,000 Regular, Guard and Reserve Soldiers, it is a tenuous balance. The risk 

to our national security and our force itself continues to increase with rising instability and uncertainty across Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific, along 

with a growing threat to the homeland. Any force reductions below 980,000 Soldiers 

will render our Army unable to meet all elements of the DSG, and we will not be 

able to meet the multiple challenges to U.S. national interests without incurring an 

imprudent level of risk to our Nation’s security. 

If sequestration returns, it will challenge us to meet even our current level of 

commitments to our allies and partners around the world. It will eliminate our capability, on any scale, to conduct simultaneous operations, specifically deterring in 

one region while defeating in another. Essentially, for ground forces, sequestration 

even puts into question our ability to conduct even one prolonged multiphase, combined arms, campaign against a determined enemy. We would significantly degrade 

our capability to shape the security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. 

It puts into question our ability to deter and compel multiple adversaries simultaneously. Ultimately, sequestration limits strategic flexibility and requires us to hope 

we are able to predict the future with great accuracy. Something we have never 

been able to do. 

It is imperative we maintain strategic and operational flexibility to deter and operate in multiple regions simultaneously—in all phases of military operations—to 

prevent conflicts, shape the security environment and, when necessary, win in sup-
240 

port of U.S. policy objectives. The Army is and will continue to be the backbone of 

the Joint Force, providing fundamental capabilities to each of the Combatant Commanders such as command and control, logistics, intelligence and communications 

support to set the theater, as well as providing ground combat forces, Special Operations Forces and Joint Task Force headquarters. Demand for Army capabilities and 

presence continues to increase across Combatant Commands in response to emerging contingencies. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Do you feel that the sequester hurts the ability for our depots and 

industrial base installations to remain ‘‘warm’’ by maintaining a consistent workload? 

General ODIERNO. The Army’s Industrial Base consists of Government-owned (organic) and commercial industrial capability and capacity that must be readily available to manufacture and repair items during both peacetime and national emergencies. We are concerned that we will not be able to retain an Army Industrial 

Base that provides unique capabilities, sustains the capacity for reversibility, and 

meets the manufacturing and repair materiel demands of the Joint Force. Already, 

modernization accounts have been reduced by 25% and every program affected; 

maintenance has been deferred; and the defense industrial base is increasingly 

skeptical about investing in future innovative systems needed to make the force 

more agile and adaptive. 

Sequestration hurts the ability of our depots and industrial base installations to 

remain ‘‘warm.’’ Funding reductions, with corresponding workload reductions, degrade the depots’ ability to maintain an effective and cost efficient production operation, increases the average per unit cost of their products, and creates workload 

backlogs that can take years to complete. 

The current Budget Control Act budget caps and any resulting sequester will set 

conditions for uncertainty in the workforce and industrial facilities will be forced to 

consider employee furloughs and hiring freezes. This uncertainty could drive our industrial base professionals to seek employment elsewhere, as we saw at Corpus 

Christi Army Depot in FY13. The departure of these skilled artisans erodes depot 

capabilities and takes years to replace. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Our military men and women have maintained a high operations 

tempo for more than a decade. To complicate matters, they have endured a myriad 

of force reduction initiatives amid growing security threats globally. How have these 

factors impacted your service’s capability to ‘‘surge’’ forces in response to a major 

contingency, both in terms of response times and overall capacity? 

General ODIERNO. The Army has fewer fully ready and available units to source 

major contingency surge requirements. 

And the number one thing that keeps me up at night is that if we are asked to 

respond to an unknown contingency, I will send Soldiers to that contingency not 

properly trained and ready. We simply cannot afford to do that. The American people expect our Soldiers to be prepared—that they have had the ability to train, that 

they understand their equipment, and that they have been able to integrate and 

synchronize their activities so they are successful on the ground. I worry that we 

may receive a request from a combatant commander that we just aren’t trained for. 

Non-relenting budget impasse has compelled us to degrade readiness to historically low levels. Today, only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when we believe 

our sustained readiness rates should be closer to 70 percent. Under our current 

budget, Army readiness will at best flat line over the next three to four years. 

The compromises we have made to modernization and readiness, combined with 

reductions to our force size and capabilities translates into increased strategic risk. 

We are generating just enough readiness for immediate consumption. We are not 

able to generate residual readiness to respond to unknown contingency, or to even 

reinforce ongoing operations. 

This is a dangerous balancing act. We have fewer soldiers, the majority of whom 

are in units that are not ready. And they are manning aging equipment at a time 

when demand for Army forces is much higher than anticipated. 

The burden of miscalculation and under-investment will directly fall on the shoulders of our men and women of the U.S. Army who have so ably served this Nation. 

We simply cannot allow this to happen. 

Mr. SHUSTER. What is the impact to depot workload at Budget Control Act funding levels? 

Admiral HOWARD. We have not yet recovered from the readiness impact of over 

a decade of combat operations, exacerbated by the imposition of a lengthy Continuing Resolution and followed by budget sequestration in FY13. These circumstances created maintenance backlogs that have prevented us from getting ships 

back to the Fleet on time and aircraft back on the flight line. 
241 

Furthermore, ship depot maintenance backlogs result in increased funding needs 

to cover uncompleted maintenance and more material casualties. For aviation depot 

maintenance, the growing backlog will result in more aircraft awaiting maintenance 

and fewer operational aircraft on the flight line available for squadron training. This 

will lead to less proficient aircrews, decreased combat effectiveness of naval air 

forces, and increased potential for flight and ground mishaps. 

We continue our efforts to reduce the number of lost operational days, but it will 

take years to dig out of a readiness hole. The FY16 Navy budget submission is designed to continue our readiness recovery, restoring our required contingency operations capacity by 2018–2020 while continuing to provide a sustainable forward 

presence. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Are you concerned about weapons, missile and vehicle inventories? 

If so, how will sequestration raise your of concern? 

Admiral HOWARD. I am concerned about our national security and our ability to 

execute the Defense Strategic Guidance. As we look to the future, the Navy will continue to be globally deployed to provide a credible and survivable strategic deterrent 

and to support the mission requirements of the regional Combatant Commanders. 

Global operations continue to assume an increasingly maritime focus, and our Navy 

will sustain its forward presence, warfighting focus, and readiness preparations to 

continue operating where it matters, when it matters. We see no future reduction 

of these requirements and we have focused the FY16 Navy budget submission to 

address the challenges to achieving the necessary readiness to execute our missions. 

In other words, if we return to a sequestered budget, we will not be able to execute 

the defense strategic guidance. 

Sequestration also brings negative impacts to our workforce. Sequestration in 

FY13 created an environment of decreased productivity and low morale. In the 

midst of growing workloads, shipyards and aviation depots were faced with hiring 

freezes, furloughs and overtime restrictions. These conditions coupled with an uncertain future contributed to an early departure of skilled workers and artisans. 

These workforce challenges directly resulted in costly maintenance delays at shipyards and aviation depots. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The Department of Defense base budget is growing while the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget is decreasing. What costs, if any, have 

been moved into the base budgets that were historically funded through OCO? 

Admiral HOWARD. We have made progress in transitioning OCO-funded enduring 

activities to the baseline over the last few years. The below table shows Navy programs that have transitioned from OCO to baseline. 

Program Start Description 

Flying Hours FY11 Funded enduring flying hour operations in 

baseline vice OCO; fund baseline flying hour 

operations to 80 percent of training and readiness matrix 

Air Depot Maintenance FY11 Funded enduring air depot maintenance activities in baseline vice OCO; fund 80 percent of 

total air depot maintenance requirement in 

baseline 

Ship Depot Maintenance FY12 Funded enduring ship depot maintenance activities in baseline vice OCO; fund 80 percent of 

total ship depot maintenance requirements in 

baseline 

Djibouti Base Support FY13 Funded enduring base operating support costs 

for Djibouti in baseline vice OCO 

Navy Expeditionary 

Combat Command 

FY16 Fund baseline operations to 80% of the enduring requirement 

Increased operating tempo required of aircraft and ships in the Middle East is 

funded through OCO. The Combatant Command and the Joint Staff expect in-
242 

creased flying and ship operations above baseline levels when deployed to the Middle East. 

The Navy continues to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to 

identify and plan the possible transition of OCO funds to the baseline. 

Mr. SHUSTER. What is the impact to depot workload at Budget Control Act funding levels? 

General DUNFORD. Past Congressional support for the depot maintenance program has allowed the Marine Corps to continue war-related reset and sustain home 

station depot maintenance without taking significant risk in the program. However, 

the Budget Control Act would impact OEF equipment reset and home station repair 

requirements, increase out-year depot maintenance costs, and potentially reduce the 

depot workforce to accommodate a lower workload level. 

General DUNFORD. Are you concerned about weapons, missile and vehicle inventories? If so, how will sequestration raise your level of concern? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. The long conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have impacted 

the Marine Corps’ weapon system inventory. The Marine Corps’ weapons and vehicles have been used extensively and sequestration would force difficult decisions regarding modernization and maintenance. We are currently investing in several critical procurement programs, including the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, the Joint 

Light Tactical Vehicle, and the Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar while maintaining 

our current legacy fleet of Amphibious Assault Vehicles and Light Armored Vehicles. Funding at the Budget Control Act levels would delay the procurement of our 

investment priorities and require additional resources devoted to maintaining our 

current inventory. This will degrade our ability to maintain technical superiority 

over our adversaries. Our legacy tactical mobility, combat aviation, and ground systems require significant maintenance to keep them operational and only through 

modernization will we be able to maintain our technological edge and field the most 

capable Marine Corps. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The Department of Defense base budget is growing while the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget is decreasing. What costs, if any, have 

been moved into the base budget that were historically funded through OCO? 

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps has executed and continues to execute its 

ground equipment reset strategy through Congressional support of the OCO budget. 

Combined with the baseline budget for depot maintenance, the Marine Corps is on 

track to complete its OEF reset by 2017. We will address future depot maintenance 

needs in subsequent budget requests. 

Mr. SHUSTER. What is the impact to depot workload at Budget Control Act funding levels? Are you concerned about weapons, missile and vehicle inventories? If so, 

how will sequestration raise your level of concern? The Department of Defense base 

budget is growing while the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget is decreasing. What costs, if any, have been moved into the base budget that were historically funded through OCO? 

Secretary JAMES and General WELSH. The Budget Control Act reduces total Active Duty Weapon Systems Sustainment depot funding by ∼ $600 million (includes 

OCO). The primary commodities impacted by this limitation are aircraft, software, 

and engines. If sequestration lowers customer orders beyond our current planning 

amounts, our depots could face reduced workloads of up to 1.8 million hours and 

place at risk 2,000 positions in our depots. 

Yes, there is concern about weapons, missile, and vehicle inventories. 

Sustainment activities underpin readiness. Our weapons, missiles, and vehicles continue to remain high Air Force readiness priorities. Sequestration will only exacerbate the existing challenges we face in our ongoing efforts to restore full-spectrum 

Air Force readiness by 2023. 

The Fiscal Year 2016 Presidential Budget submission maintains the delicate balance between capability, readiness, and capacity by funding our most critical aircraft depot/engine overhauls, but does not represent a move from OCO to the base 

budget. Our OCO submission also represents our careful consideration of a widerange of weapon systems sustainment costs associated with platforms engaged in 

direct OCO operations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALZ 

Mr. WALZ. General Odierno, I know you are a fervent believer in the ‘‘One Army’’ 

concept. During my 24 years in the National Guard (and during the careers of most 

TAGs [The Adjutant General] out there), we have seen the Guard go from what it 

once was to the force that it is today. Without nurturing and funding, the National 

Guard is at risk to return to the force that it was, an underfunded and disrespected 
243 

entity not capable of achieve the high standards of the Army and Air Force because 

the money for training and equipment won’t be there. I think the reason the TAGs 

and NGAUS are so vocal these days is because they don’t want to return to the days 

of crew drills with toilet paper rolls, as useful for Sergeants’ Time Training as that 

was. I know the Army has to make the decisions it has to because the budget is 

tight these days, and that’s on us. We in Congress must fix that. However, this is 

also why we created the Army Commission to study the issue of the proper force 

structure balance within the Army during these tough budget years. Why is the 

Army moving forward with many cost saving measures that involve the National 

Guard without receiving the results of the Army Commission, scheduled for delivery 

in fiscal year 2016? 

General ODIERNO. The Army is planning and implementing end strength reductions and force structure adjustments in accordance with the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. Although we disagree with the need for a Commission on the Future of the Army, as directed in the FY15 NDAA, we will fully 

support the Commission as it examines and assesses the force structure and force 

mix decisions the Army has proposed for Active and Reserve Components. 

Mr. WALZ. General Odierno, after the last few years of reduced defense budgets, 

we have consistently heard testimony regarding lower readiness levels; could you 

please explain in layman’s terms, and give some examples of decreased readiness 

and what that actually means? How much of your service’s capacity is consumed 

by day-to-day, steady-state operations? Can you discuss your service’s capacity to 

provide additional ‘‘surge’’ forces to respond to a major contingency? 

General ODIERNO. The number one thing that keeps me up at night is that if we 

are asked to respond to an unknown contingency, I will send Soldiers to that contingency not properly trained and ready. We simply cannot afford to do that. The 

American people expect our Soldiers to be prepared—that they have had the ability 

to train, that they understand their equipment, and that they have been able to integrate and synchronize their activities so they are successful on the ground. I 

worry that we may receive a request from a combatant commander that we just 

aren’t trained for. 

Non-relenting budget impasse has compelled us to degrade readiness to historically low levels. Today, only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when we believe 

our sustained readiness rates should be closer to 70 percent. Under our current 

budget, Army readiness will at best flat line over the next three to four years. 

The compromises we have made to modernization and readiness, combined with 

reductions to our force size and capabilities translates into increased strategic risk. 

We are generating just enough readiness for immediate consumption. We are not 

able to generate residual readiness to respond to unknown contingency, or to even 

reinforce ongoing operations. 

This is a dangerous balancing act. We have fewer soldiers, the majority of whom 

are in units that are not ready. And they are manning aging equipment at a time 

when demand for Army forces is much higher than anticipated. 

The burden of miscalculation and under-investment will directly fall on the shoulders of our men and women of the U.S. Army who have so ably served this Nation. 

We simply cannot allow this to happen. 

Mr. WALZ. General Odierno, I can greatly appreciate and understand the ‘‘can do’’ 

attitude of our soldiers. However, with the planned reduction to an end-strength of 

475,000 in fiscal year 2016, and perhaps lower numbers in subsequent years, and 

the steady state high operational tempo, are we not putting the same stress and 

circumstances on our soldiers and families that they experienced during the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq? Are there any units in the Total Army Force that 

are achieving the stated dwell time goals? Do you believe that the current Army 

drawdown plan leaves sufficient end-strength to successfully execute your operational missions while maintaining the Department’s goal of a 1:3 dwell time for Active Duty and 1:5 dwell time for Reserve Component service members? 

General ODIERNO. Force reductions, increasing global demand for forces, and the 

Army’s current commitments will place stress on our Soldiers and Families. 

The Army has over 5,000 operating force units, and many of them do meet stated 

dwell time goals. However, some major force elements within the Active Component 

are not achieving the department’s goal of 1:3 dwell time. 

Brigade Combat Teams are at 1:1.59 

Patriot Battalions are at 1:1.52 

Component Combat Aviation Brigades are at 1:1.4 

Division Headquarters are at less than 1:1 

The current rate of demand, including un-forecasted requirements, and limitations on mobilization authorities’ access to the reserve component has strained the 

Army’s capacity to meet Combatant Commander requirements today, and achieve 
244 

the Department’s dwell time goals. As we draw down even further, we will be more 

challenged to meet dwell time goals if demand does not decrease. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GRAVES 

Mr. GRAVES. It is my understanding that the Reserve Component, specifically the 

National Guard, including in my State of Missouri, will soon have all the oldest C– 

130s in the Air Force’s inventory. What is the impact if the Air Guard’s C–130 fleet 

is not modernized and becomes incompatible with new air traffic requirements? 

Secretary JAMES. While all non-compliant aircraft face potential altitude restrictions, limiting them to below 10,000 feet mean sea level, those aircraft operating 

from/near major airports, like Rosecrans Air National Guard Base in your home 

state of Missouri, face potential takeoff and landing restrictions at those fields. This 

has the potential to significantly impact aircrew training and mission readiness. As 

we continue to pursue mitigation contingencies, such as waivers, or letters of agreement, etc., the Air Force is committed to making every effort to meet the January 

1, 2020 mandate, while remaining compliant with prior year legal constraints and 

within the bounds of acquisition laws and regulations. 

Mr. GRAVES. We face an increasingly dangerous world at a time of unprecedented 

fiscal uncertainty. You’ve said the Air National Guard (ANG) is an operation force, 

yet the Air National Guard operates the oldest F–16s and C–130s in the U.S. Air 

Force. What impact does the declining budget have on keeping the ANG fleet capable of meeting overseas and domestic requirements? 

Secretary JAMES. As an operational component of the Air Force, it is critically important to modernize the Air National Guard legacy weapons systems, to include the 

F–16 and the C–130. A declining budget limits our ability to recapitalize legacy 

fleets with newer aircraft, which in turn forces us to prioritize our modernization 

efforts. It also affects the allocation of Weapons System Sustainment funds and critical Flying Hours, which can negatively impact the overall readiness of our Airmen. 

Cost effective modernization coupled with a viable Operations and Maintenance program ensures the Air National Guard remains a professional, ready, and reliable 

force. 

Mr. GRAVES. It is my understanding that the Air National Guard (ANG) C–130 

fleet will be unusable beginning in 2020 unless there is a program to fix various 

avionics issues to fly in both domestic and international airspace. I also understand 

the U.S. Air Force has a program which will get only about 10–15 percent of the 

ANG C–130 fleet minimally compliant by 2020. Do you have any ideas on how to 

fix this program and how this committee can be helpful in ensuring all ANG C– 

130s are fully capable and compliant and able to accomplish both their critical domestic and overseas missions? 

Secretary JAMES. The European Commission and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have mandated the use of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B) Out, for aircraft flying in their airspace. The European guidance requires ADS–B Out compliance by June 7, 2020 and the FAA deadline is January 

1, 2020. These mandates will severely limit airspace the C–130 can use without 

ADS–B Out. All of the capabilities required for the C–130H to be compliant are included in Increment 1 of the C–130H Avionics Modernization Program, or C–130H 

AMP. Due to the large C–130H fleet size and the relatively short timeframe remaining until compliance deadlines, equipping the entire C–130H fleet with the ADS– 

B Out capability before the January 2020 mandate will be extremely challenging. 

However, the U.S. Air Force is committed to accelerating airspace compliance upgrades as much as the acquisition process and industry will allow. 

We are working with industry to explore all possibilities for reducing the timeline 

for compliance. The continued support of the committee toward removing barriers 

and accelerating C–130H AMP Increment 1 are welcomed and appreciated. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Mr. JOHNSON. Are you aware of the increasing threat, due to rising instability, 

to U.S. personnel serving in Bahrain? How does the budget request ensure that our 

service members are protected while serving in Bahrain and elsewhere? Has the 

U.S. Navy developed a plan to relocate the 5th fleet should instability in the country 

necessitate? If not, will this budget request allow for the U.S. Navy to develop a 

plan to relocate the 5th fleet should instability in the country necessitate? If not, 

why, and when will the U.S. Navy develop a plan? 
245 

Secretary MABUS. Considering the recent developments in the Middle East—specifically in Bahrain—what is the current risk to the long-term viability of the 5th 

Fleet stationed in Bahrain? 

There has been no change in the status of the relationship between 

COMUSNAVCENT/C5F and the Government of Bahrain. The Government of Bahrain continues to fully support hosting Naval Support Activity-Bahrain (NSA-Bahrain) and its tenant commands. The King and Crown Prince have stated their continuing support to the U.S. Navy presence in the Kingdom of Bahrain. We do not 

expect a change in the Bahraini government’s attitude toward hosting NSA-Bahrain. To date, there are no known credible threats to U.S./Coalition forces or bases. 

There have been incidents of direct anti-Western/anti-U.S. (but not specifically 

against U.S. Navy) sentiment. 

Æ