the amount is limited by the retainer agreement. Respondents argue that 

they were discharged and may assert a charging lien, and that discharged 

attorneys with contingency fee agreements may recover the reasonable 

value of their services in quantum meruit. We review the construction of 

NRS 18.015 de novo. Leventhal v. Black & LoBello, 129 Nev. , 305 

P.3d 907, 910 (2013). 

Regarding an attorney's withdrawal or discharge, NRS 18.015 

is silent, requiring only that there must be a "claim, demand or cause of 

action, . . . which has been placed in the attorney's hands by a client for 

suit or collection," or upon which a suit or other action has been instituted, 

before the attorney may assert a charging lien. NRS 18.015(1) (2012). 1 

We have previously determined that a charging lien asserted by a 

withdrawing or discharged attorney is enforceable. See Earl v. Las Vegas 

Auto Parts, Inc., 73 Nev. 58, 62, 307 P.2d 781, 783 (1957). Accordingly, in 

this case, respondents' right to assert a charging lien is not foreclosed by 

the fact that they either withdrew or were discharged by appellants. 

Although respondents' withdrawal or discharge does not 

prevent them from asserting a charging lien, the amount of the charging 

lien is limited to "the amount of any fee which has been agreed upon by 

the attorney and client," or, in the absence of an agreement, to "a 

reasonable fee for the services." NRS 18.015(1). Thus, the fee agreement 

controls the lien amount, subject to the district court's determination of 

the reasonableness of the charges under Brunzell v. Golden Gate National 

Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). NRS 18.015(1); Argentena 

'The 2013 Legislature amended NRS 18.015. 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 

79, § 1; S.B. 140, 77th Leg. (Nev. 2013). This appeal is governed by the 

pre-amendment version of NRS 18.015. See NRS 18.015 (2012). 

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1111 111171 

Consol. Mining Co. v. Jolley Urga Wirth Woodbury & Standish, 125 Nev. 

527, 540 n.2, 216 P.3d 779, 788 n.2 (2009). 

In this case, the retainer agreement provided for a $15,000 

retainer fee and a contingency fee of one-third of any amount recovered in 

excess of $2.565 million if the case proceeded past the NRCP 16.1 

conference. The retainer agreement did not specify what would occur if 

respondents were discharged or withdrew before the case concluded. 

Appellants had recovered only $50,000 when the charging lien was 

adjudicated, and did not recover any other amounts during the remainder 

of the litigation. In cases involving contingency fee agreements, attorneys 

are permitted to assert a charging lien upon the occurrence of the 

contingency and recover a reasonable amount in quantum meruit for 

services rendered before their withdrawal or discharge. Here, however, 

because the contingency did not occur, we conclude that respondents are 

not entitled to recover the reasonable value of their services in quantum 

meruit. NRS 18.015(1); see generally Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 

1972). Thus, the district court improperly adjudicated respondents' 

charging lien. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED. 2 

Pe.-4.0k 

Parraguirre 

2We have considered the parties' other arguments and conclude that 

they are either without merit or moot in light of this order. 
cc: Second Judicial District Court Dept. 10 

Margaret M. Crowley, Settlement Judge 

Laxalt & Nomura, Ltd./Reno 

Carl M. Hebert 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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