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63–020 PDF 2010

S. HRG. 111–763 

THE FUTURE OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL 

OPERATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS, 

HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, 

AND GLOBAL WOMEN’S ISSUES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 10, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND

ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY,

AND GLOBAL WOMEN’S ISSUES

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Glassman, Hon. James K., former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, executive director, George W. Bush Institute, Dallas, TX ..................... 17 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20 

Hughes, Hon. Karen P., former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, worldwide vice chair, Burson-Marsteller, Austin, TX ............................ 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15 

Kaufman, Hon. Edward E., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 1 

Lieberman, Hon. Evelyn S., former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, director of communications and public affairs, The Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC ....................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

McHale, Hon. Judith A., Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, 

Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................... 39 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators: 

John F. Kerry ............................................................................................ 51 

Richard G. Lugar ....................................................................................... 53 

Russell D. Feingold ................................................................................... 63 

Wicker, Hon. Roger F., U.S. Senator from Mississippi, opening statement ....... 3 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

List of Alumni of ECA Programs Who Are Current Chiefs of State of Heads 

of Government ...................................................................................................... 59 

(III)

(1) 

THE FUTURE OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPER- ATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOC- RACY, AND GLOBAL WOMEN’S ISSUES, COMMITTEE ON

FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:02 p.m., in room 

SD–430, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Edward E. Kaufman 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Kaufman, Barrasso, and Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator KAUFMAN. I assume Senator Wicker is on his way. I 

think we will go ahead and start. I’ll be making an opening statement. Thank you, Senator Barrasso, for being here. 

This is a day I’ve been looking forward to for a long time. Today 

we meet to examine the future of U.S. public diplomacy, one of the 

most important facets of foreign policy. As Secretary Clinton has 

said, we must use all the tools in our toolbox—diplomacy, development, and defense—to promote the U.S. interests globally, and soft 

power is an absolutely critical element of that strategy. 

Public diplomacy often takes the form of broadcasting, exchanges, and outreach with foreign populations, all of which help 

to promote greater understanding between the United States and 

the international community. By creating direct channels of communication between America and the world, U.S. public diplomacy 

contributes to global security and stability. 

Tools of public diplomacy can be grouped under three large umbrellas: education and cultural exchanges that promote cross-cultural dialogue and understanding; informational programming that 

explains U.S. policy; and international broadcasting that provides 

accurate, informative news and information, often to societies that 

do not have unfettered access to a free press. 

Those efforts, our broadcasting efforts serve two purposes: one, 

providing news to both open and closed society; and two, serving 

as a model for increasing the flow of news and information globally. 

Just like government-to-government diplomacy, public diplomacy 

efforts are only as effective as the quality of the leadership and 

personnel that shapes and implements them. This is why we will 

hear from three extraordinarily gifted and qualified individuals 

who have led these efforts in the State Department and learn from 

them about the lessons learned from their wide experience, and to 

2 

hear the current Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy about today’s strategy and policy and priorities. 

The goal of this hearing is to assess public diplomacy strategy of 

the past, the present, and with an eye toward the future. There is 

no question that many achievements have been made since the 

Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy was established in 1999 and 

it is important the State Department incorporate past successes 

into the future planning. This is why we must consider which tools 

have proven most effective and which have proven the most challenging. I love that word, ‘‘challenging.’’ 

I know our first panel of witnesses can shed light on valuable 

lessons learned based on their firsthand experience shaping public 

diplomacy strategy. The broader question to be explored today is 

how do we communicate our global message most effectively and 

how can achievements of the past be used as models for future public diplomacy activities? In addition, we must closely consider each 

tool of public diplomacy, including educational exchanges, American Centers, and international broadcasting efforts under the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors. 

The witnesses and many who have known me throughout my career know that I’m an unequivocal supporter of complete separation between programming in international broadcasting and the 

rest of the government. The firewall that exists between the BBG 

programming and the rest of the government is essential, and I 

look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their experiences, 

positive and negative, with this difficult issue, especially in wartime. 

Finally, we should consider how new technology changes our 

strategy and future vision for public diplomacy. I’m interested in 

hearing about the opportunities new technology creates and the 

way it forces us to reevaluate our old way of doing business. For 

example, how did mobile phone technology change our approach in 

regions such as Afghanistan and Pakistan? And what’s the future 

of the Smith-Mundt Act, part of which prohibits domestic dissemination of information produced for foreign audiences, when a quick 

search of the Internet will turn up all the information anyway. 

To answer these and other questions, we have two very distinguished panels. First we hear from three former Under Secretaries 

for Public Diplomacy, for whom I have great respect and admiration for their honorable service to this country. The first is Evelyn 

Lieberman, appointed by President Clinton as the first Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy. As a trailblazer who set the path for 

successes, Evelyn oversaw the difficult transition of shifting our 

public diplomacy structure to the State Department from the U.S. 

Information Agency. Evelyn was well equipped for this enormous 

challenge, having come from the Clinton White House, where she 

served as Assistant to the First Lady, Hillary Clinton, Deputy 

White House Press Secretary, and Deputy White House Chief of 

Staff; and later was Director of Voice of America, where she acquired valuable experience in international broadcasting. 

Since 2002, Evelyn has continued her career in the Federal Government, serving as the Director of Communications and Public 

Affairs for the Smithsonian. 

3 

Next we have former Under Secretary Karen Hughes, appointed 

by President Bush to this position after serving as counsel in the 

White House from 2000 to 2002. When she was appointed in 2005, 

Karen was given the rank of ambassador to underscore the importance of public diplomacy. While at State, Karen implemented important changes, including expanding English language training 

exchange programs, developing a strategic plan for public diplomacy, and creating a rapid response unit to respond to inaccurate 

press reports. 

Upon leaving State in 2007, Karen told the BBC that her greatest achievement was ‘‘transforming public diplomacy and making a 

national security priority central to everything we do in our government,’’ which is the goal I believe continues to this day. 

Since returning to Texas, Karen has been serving as the global 

vice chair of public relations firm Burson-Marsteller. 

Finally, we have former Under Secretary Jim Glassman, also appointed in the Bush administration. Jim brought with him to this 

position his previous experience as chairman of the Broadcasting 

Board of Governors. I worked frequently with Jim in that capacity 

and saw firsthand his commitment to promoting and developing a 

robust international broadcasting and public diplomacy strategy. 

While serving as Under Secretary, Jim focused on developing a 

strong interagency structure that allowed visibility into the strategic communications work being done in other parts of the government, especially the Department of Defense. He also created the 

Global Strategic Engagement Center with staff from State and the 

intelligence community to promote great coordination day to day. 

Since leaving office, Jim has been working in the nonprofit sector 

and was recently selected to lead the Public Policy Institute at the 

George W. Bush Presidential Library. 

We are also joined today by current Under Secretary for Public 

Diplomacy Judith McHale, a veteran of private sector media who 

will testify on our second panel. Most recently, Under Secretary 

McHale served as the president and CEO of Discovery Communications, parent company of Discovery Channel, TSL, Animal Planet, 

and a host of other networks. In her 11 years at Discovery, she 

oversaw worldwide expansion to 1.4 billion subscribers in 107 territories in countries. 

Since leaving Discovery for the State Department last year, she’s 

applied her wide experience in business to revamping our public 

diplomacy strategy. I look forward to her testimony and hearing 

about future plans and current policy. 

Finally, I thank Senator Wicker for his interest and commitment, 

and I want to thank Chair Boxer for generously allowing us to hold 

this subcommittee meeting. I’d also like to thank the HELP Committee for hosting us to this committee. 

Senator Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Kaufman, for convening 

this hearing to evaluate the future of U.S. public diplomacy. This 

should be a very good hearing. It’s my hope that this hearing will 

allow us to identify some of the challenges faced by previous under 

4 

secretaries, as well as understand the current direction of the 

administration and the direction they would like to take regarding 

these efforts. 

I would note that this is the second hearing Senator Kaufman 

has chaired and I appreciate you, Ted, for devoting your time and 

helping us examine in depth these important issues that impact 

U.S. foreign policy. 

Public diplomacy represents an indispensable component of any 

viable foreign policy. It is distinguished from the exclusive contact 

with foreign governments that has characterized traditional diplomacy. The importance of effective public diplomacy ought to be and 

has been embraced by both sides of the aisle. Believing is simple. 

Translating it into action is a bit more difficult. According to a 

May 2009 GAO report, the U.S. Government has spent more than 

$10 billion on international communication efforts since September 

11, 2001. Yet international public opinion polls highlight negative 

attitudes toward the United States. 

It is my hope that this hearing will shed light on this truth and 

identify steps that might reverse this trend. 

It is unquestionable that policy shapes public opinion. One need 

only look to the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, which provided 

aid to Pakistan, to see how damaging the lack of understanding of 

United States policy can be to foreign audiences. We worked here 

in Congress to pass a bill increasing aid to Pakistan by $7.5 billion 

over the next 5 years, focusing on addressing issues such as poverty, illiteracy, joblessness, and education. However, many Pakistanis viewed these efforts with suspicion and raised questions 

about United States interference into Pakistani sovereignty, forcing 

the authors of the bill to release an explanatory statement clarifying the legislation. 

I hope that during this hearing we can explore ways that these 

examples could be avoided through increased engagement and explanation in advance. 

It remains true that oftentimes because of U.S. national interests 

we have to adopt positions overseas that might become unpopular. 

We have seen this most recently in our increased focus on counterinsurgency. The leadership roles we often play come with the added 

consequence of international unpopularity. But this does not erase 

the need for an effective public diplomacy strategy. In fact, it reinforces that need. 

It is also true that the responsibility of public diplomacy does not 

lie with one department or agency. The State Department, the 

Defense Department, and USAID each have their own substantial 

public diplomacy responsibilities. We have witnessed the overlap of 

these responsibilities most recently in Haiti, where United States 

public diplomacy efforts will likely be needed for years to come. In 

the areas where our military is currently engaged, the need for coordinated public diplomacy efforts is immeasurable. As we continue 

to surge troops into Afghanistan, our ability to cohesively fight the 

battle of ideas is important there. 

As we hear from witnesses today, it is my hope that their experiences of the past will help shed light on how we approach our 

future outreach. As we use this time to focus on U.S. public diplomacy efforts, we should be mindful that other countries are also 

5 

working to define and improve their public image internationally. 

China and Russia continue to show increasing influence around the 

world. I would be interested to hear from our witnesses how they 

view this influence and how the United States can work to ensure 

we keep pace with other countries as we all strive to engage, inform, and influence key international audiences. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. I welcome 

both panels of witnesses and look forward to their testimony. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Roger. 

Let’s now hear from the witnesses, starting with Evelyn 

Lieberman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. EVELYN S. LIEBERMAN, FORMER UNDER 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, DIRECTOR 

OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee, for inviting me here today to discuss the future of 

American public diplomacy. Before I begin, however, I would like 

to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words on the floor of 

the Senate today about me. I could have done without the enormous blowup of a picture of me taken on a bad hair day, but that’s 

a discussion between my hairdresser and me. 

Today I’d like to look back briefly at the creation of the State 

Department Office of Public Diplomacy and what that experience 

might tell us as we work to support and better equip the foreign 

service professionals who represent our government, our culture, 

and our people to the world. I had the honor of serving as the first 

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 

during the final year of the Clinton administration. My tenure in 

that job was fairly brief and I have since observed the Department 

and public diplomacy from the outside vantage point as a private 

citizen. I do know that Secretary of State Clinton has a deep longstanding commitment to strengthening our public diplomacy and 

she has developed—she has assembled a superb public diplomacy 

team. My hope in appearing before you is that some of the things 

I learned as Under Secretary remain relevant today. 

Prior to becoming Under Secretary, as you said, Mr. Chairman, 

I had worked as Deputy White House Chief of Staff and had served 

as Director of the Voice of America. At VOA I learned firsthand the 

wisdom and power of diplomatic speech that is honest and respectful of its audience. Good news or bad news, VOA broadcasts the 

truth and because of that countless Americans listen, countless 

millions listen, and they listen with trust. 

So when Secretary Albright asked me to head the State Department’s new Public Diplomacy Office, she described its mission in 

words that hit home. ‘‘We are trying,’’ she said, ‘‘to build a diplomacy that listens more.’’ 

This was only a decade ago, but it was before 9/11 and it was 

medieval times in terms of where we are today with the Internet 

and global communications. Yet, although there was no Twitter or 

iPhones or YouTube, it was a pivotal time in American democracy. 

New forces of global communication, the Internet, cell phones, 24- 

hour cable news were pulling our Nation and the world together. 

6 

Our planet was shrinking fast as we crossed borders online and 

watched the world on TV and computer screens. 

It became tempting then to think that the unifying wonders of 

technology would give us a global village, a uniformity that might 

sweep away old divisions rooted in national, ethnic, and cultural 

identities. It was indeed a new world, but Secretary Albright cautioned us. ‘‘Globalization,’’ she said, ‘‘has blurred many national 

and cultural traditions, but it has by no means erased them.’’ That 

was true then and it is true today. 

We needed and still need to reshape our traditional diplomacy, 

to take it beyond the formal channels and often elite settings in 

which it has operated for so long. To strengthen our diplomacy in 

the new information age, President Clinton and Congress agreed to 

restructure the Foreign Service by merging the U.S. Information 

Agency and State Department Office of Public Affairs, creating the 

office that I served in. The reorganization aimed to give Foreign 

Service officers at USIA, the principal practitioners of public diplomacy, more equal status in the Department when it came to formulating and executing foreign policy. 

The Office of Public Diplomacy is still the only branch in the 

State Department that partners with independent nongovernmental organizations and programs, and its commitment to open 

debate and cross-cultural understanding is essential to advancing 

our diplomatic mission. 

As first Under Secretary, I did not myself get to practice much 

public diplomacy. My job was to rewire the structural circuitry, 

meld press operations with cultural outreach, and institute an 

organizational framework where public diplomacy could thrive. We 

were combining two distinct institutional cultures that had functioned separately in Washington and at our embassies for generations, one group of traditional diplomats, used to working in classified settings behind closed doors, the other, the cultural and public 

affairs people who engaged foreign publics, presenting American 

culture abroad and nurturing dialogue, largely through education 

and cultural programs and exchanges. This second group brought 

America to other countries and other cultures home to us. And, as 

with most big ideas, implementation meant organizational sausagemaking in the Department at all levels. 

To do this, I met with hundreds of staff and employees on both 

sides of the merger, visited embassies to learn how they operated 

and observe the cultural, educational, and exchange programs that 

were run now by the office I led. This process led me to believe 

even more in the goal of the merger, to infuse cultural and public 

diplomacy into the everyday conduct of foreign affairs. It meant including public diplomacy specialists in strategic planning. It meant 

adding a public diplomacy voice to internal policy debates, no matter what the issue, the myriad daunting issues that the State 

Department tackles every day. 

In launching this public diplomacy effort, we did not aim to end 

or alter too suddenly the practices and tenets of traditional diplomacy. We wanted to encourage and enable diplomats to work in a 

field where foreign relations were increasingly conducted in public, 

instantaneously through mass media, or, just as often, through 

local media or targeted Internet communications. People no longer 

7 

waited to hear what diplomats had hammered out in closed rooms. 

They could watch leaders shape public policy—shape policy live 

and in real time, witness the decision process, and by reacting help 

drive it. 

Indeed, the rise of interactive Internet-based communications 

has changed the interests and expectations of our global audience. 

People no longer only wanted to hear arguments. They wanted to 

argue back. Audiences still would listen, but they expected to be 

heard. Our mission as diplomatic communicators was not simply to 

make presentations, but to engage foreign publics in conversations, 

and conversations have to be two-way. Simply airing pro-American 

ads on Al Jazeera will not work because they are all push and no 

pull. They encourage attitudes toward our country that they seek 

to reverse. 

Simply put, we need communications strategies that listen more. 

We must stand firm against and defeat terrorism, true. But it is 

wrong and can be dangerously wrong to believe that simply listening shows weakness or that respect for other cultures naively invites exploitation. 

Seeing the results and impact of these public diplomacy programs in education and culture made it clear to me that, as one 

report stated, ‘‘Personal, active, direct engagement by diplomats is 

one of the best foreign policy tools we have.’’ At one point we polled 

our ambassadors, who unanimously attested to the value and import of education and cultural programs and charged us to do more 

to strengthen them. 

When I became Under Secretary, I was astonished to discover 

the extent to which these programs had to struggle for resources 

to survive, let alone grow. I know that my successors as Under Secretary continue to advocate as great as I do to strengthen these 

programs that have worked so powerfully for our country. 

When I was Under Secretary, the Fulbright Senior Scholars Program sent a thousand Americans to lecture and conduct research 

in 140 countries and the Fulbright Student Program supported 800 

Americans studying abroad and 3,000 foreign students studying 

here. These were respectable numbers and they have increased 

since, but Fulbright participants were chosen from among many 

thousands of gifted applicants who would have benefited the program immensely had we had the means to accept them. 

These programs should be viewed as smart investments in American security and international peace, not simply as a budget 

expense. As of today, more than 330 alumni of our education and 

cultural programs have gone on to become heads of state or government and more than 40 are Nobel laureates. These are leaders who 

know America, who have friends here, leaders to whom this country is a human place, not an abstraction or a piece of propaganda. 

We should be investing heavily in these programs. 

As I said, conducting effective public diplomacy is much more difficult now than it was prior to 9/11 when we launched the program. 

Of course we must ensure the safety and security of Foreign Service officers and we know that in some countries it takes exceptional 

fortitude and courage for a diplomat to work beyond embassy walls. 

Under Secretary Powell an ambitious program was begun to construct and modernize embassies that are safe, functional, and able 

8 

to advance our diplomatic mission. In some cases, however, these 

new embassies have been relocated outside major cities, where access to them and our programs is limited. Security and cost concerns require limitations, but we must do everything we can to see 

that our embassies are as open to the public as they can be and 

not remote from urban centers. 

I see that my time is about to expire. I just want to say that 

many of these programs—and I know, Senator, you talked, Mr. 

Chairman, you talked about American Corners and American Presence Posts, and I would say that these are effective tools to expand 

the reach of our public diplomacy even further, and I hope we can 

replicate them and other existing programs as much as possible. 

Our country needs to invest in these proven programs on a major 

scale and the American people need to understand the importance 

of strengthening our investment in public diplomacy. 

Thank you, and I’m happy to answer any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lieberman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EVELYN S. LIEBERMAN, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS

AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here to discuss the future of American public diplomacy. Today, I would like to look back briefly at the creation of the State Department office of public diplomacy and what that 

experience might tell us as we work to support and better equip the Foreign Service 

professionals who represent our government, our culture, and our people to the 

world. 

I had the honor of serving as the first Under Secretary of State for public diplomacy and public affairs during the final year of the Clinton administration. My tenure in that job was fairly brief and I have since observed the State Department and 

public diplomacy from the outside vantage point of a private citizen. I do know that 

Secretary of State Clinton has a deep, longstanding commitment to strengthening 

our public diplomacy and she has assembled a superb public diplomacy team. My 

hope, in appearing before you, is that some of the things I learned as Under Secretary remain relevant today. 

Prior to becoming Under Secretary, I had worked as deputy White House chief 

of staff and had served as director of the Voice of America. At VOA I learned firsthand the wisdom and power of diplomatic speech that is honest and respectful of 

its audience. Good news or bad news, VOA broadcasts the truth, and because of that 

countless millions listen, and they listen with trust. Over the years, VOA’s Office 

of Development and Training has conducted workshops for more than 5,000 foreign 

journalists in 140 countries. 

So when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asked me to head the State 

Department’s new public diplomacy office, she described its mission in words that 

hit home. ‘‘We are trying,’’ she said, ‘‘to build a new diplomacy that listens more.’’ 

This was only a decade ago, but it was before 9/11, and it was medieval times 

in terms of where we are today with Internet and global communications. Yet although there was no Twitter, no iPhones or YouTube, it was a pivotal time in American diplomacy. New forces of global communication—the Internet, cell phones, 24- 

hour cable news—were pulling our Nation and the world together. Our planet was 

shrinking fast, as we crossed borders online and watched the world on TV and computer screens. It became tempting to think that the unifying wonders of technology 

would give us a global village—a uniformity that might sweep away old divisions 

rooted in national, ethnic, and cultural identities. It was indeed a new world, but 

Secretary Albright cautioned us: ‘‘Globalization,’’ she said, ‘‘has blurred many national and cultural traditions, but it has by no means erased them.’’ That was true 

then and it is true today. 

We needed and still need to reshape our traditional diplomacy—to take it beyond 

the formal channels and often elite settings in which it has operated for so long. 

To strengthen our diplomacy in the new information age, President Clinton and 

Congress agreed to restructure the Foreign Service by merging the U.S. Information 

Agency and the State Department Office of Public Affairs, creating the Office of 

Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The reorganization aimed to give Foreign ServVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:22 Dec 15, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
9 

ice officers in USIA—the principle practitioners of public diplomacy—more equal 

status in the Department when it came to formulating and executing foreign policy. 

The Office of Public Diplomacy is the only branch of the State Department that 

partners with independent, nongovernmental organizations and programs, and its 

commitment to open debate and cross-cultural understanding is essential to advancing our diplomatic mission. 

As the first Under Secretary, I did not myself get to practice much public diplomacy—my job was to rewire the structural circuitry, meld press operations with cultural outreach, and institute an organizational framework where public diplomacy 

could thrive. We were combining two distinct, institutional cultures that had functioned separately in Washington and at our embassies for generations—traditional 

diplomats, used to working in classified settings behind closed doors and the cultural and public affairs people who engaged foreign publics, presenting American 

culture abroad and nurturing dialogue, largely through educational and cultural 

programs and exchanges. This second group brought America to other countries and 

other cultures home to us. As with most big ideas, implementation meant organizational sausagemaking at all levels of the Department—combining payroll functions, 

reconfiguring office space, safe-guarding the rights and aspirations of our Foreign 

Service professionals as we reorganized, and deciding what to cut and what to keep. 

To do this job, I met with hundreds of staff and employees on both sides of the 

merger, visited embassies to learn how they operated and observed the cultural, 

educational and exchange programs that now were run by the office I led. This process led me to believe even more in the goal of the merger—to infuse cultural and 

public diplomacy into the every day conduct of foreign affairs. It meant including 

public diplomacy specialists in strategic planning. It meant adding a public diplomacy voice to internal policy debates, no matter what the issue—combating terrorists, promoting the rule of law, stopping the trafficking in human beings, fighting 

disease, strengthening civil institutions, addressing weapons proliferation—the myriad, daunting issues that the State Department tackles every day. 

In launching Public Diplomacy at the Department, we did not aim to end—or to 

alter too suddenly—the practices and tenets of traditional diplomacy. We wanted to 

encourage and enable diplomats to work in a world where foreign relations were increasingly conducted in public, instantaneously, through mass media or, just as 

often, through local media or targeted Internet communications. We realized that 

in the new world of global information, millions of people could access and observe 

policymaking and instantly register their opinions, ideas and objections. People no 

longer waited to hear what diplomats had hammered out in closed rooms; they could 

watch leaders shape policy live and in real time, witness the decision process and, 

by reacting, help drive it. 

Indeed, the rise of interactive, Internet-based communications had changed the 

interests and expectations of our global audience. People no longer only wanted to 

hear arguments—they wanted to argue back. Audiences still would listen but they 

also expected to be heard. Our mission as diplomatic communicators was not simply 

to make presentations but to engage foreign publics in conversations, and conversations have to be two-way. Simply airing pro-American ads on Al Jazeera will not 

work because they are all push and no pull—they encourage attitudes toward our 

country that they seek to reverse. Simply put, we need communication strategies 

that ‘‘listen more.’’ We must stand firm against and defeat terrorists, but it is 

wrong—and can be dangerously wrong—to believe that simply listening shows 

weakness, or that respect for other cultures naively invites exploitation. 

A 2007 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, entitled, ‘‘The 

Embassy of the Future,’’ put matters succinctly. ‘‘America’s diplomats,’’ it said, ‘‘are 

struggling to break free from the bureaucratic practices that keep them inside U.S. 

embassy buildings and that emphasize the processing of information over the personal, active, direct engagement that wins friends and supporters for America—the 

kind of diplomacy that inspired Foreign Service officers to serve their country in the 

first place.’’ 

Seeing the results and impact of public diplomacy programs in education and culture made it clear to me that ‘‘personal, active, direct engagement’’ by diplomats is 

one of the best foreign policy tools that we have. At one point we polled our ambassadors, who unanimously attested to the value and import of educational and cultural programs and charged us to do more to strengthen them. 

When I became Under Secretary I was astonished to discover the extent to which 

these programs had to struggle for resources to survive, let alone grow. We all know 

that throwing money at issues does not necessarily improve things, but these programs work so powerfully for our country that I continue to advocate a great surge 

in their growth whenever I get the chance, just as I did as Under Secretary and 

10 

as—I am sure—my successors have done. And with, I would bet, unfortunately consistent results. 

When I was Under Secretary, the Fulbright Senior Scholars program sent 1,000 

Americans to lecture and conduct research in 140 countries, and the Fulbright Student Program supported 800 Americans studying abroad and 3,000 foreign students 

studying here. These were respectable numbers, I suppose, but Fulbright participants were chosen from among many thousands more gifted applicants who would 

have benefited the program immensely had we had the means to accept them. 

Fulbright students and scholars should be viewed as a smart investment in American security and international peace, not simply as a budget expense. Similarly, the 

Citizens Exchange Program in fiscal year 2000 engaged 1,000 Americans and 3,000 

foreign citizens in professional and cultural exchanges, and our International Visitors Program enabled about 5,000 emerging foreign leaders to visit the United 

States. At the time, alumni of the Visitors program included more than 200 current 

or former heads of state of foreign governments—leaders who knew America, who 

had friends here—leaders to whom this country was a human place, not an abstraction or a piece of propaganda. As of today, more than 330 alumni of our educational 

and cultural programs have gone on to become heads of state or government and 

more than 40 are Nobel laureates. We should be investing heavily in these programs. 

A singular project that we undertook in November 2000 was the White House 

Conference on Culture and Diplomacy, a colloquy hosted by President and Mrs. 

Clinton and Secretary Albright that assembled 200 cultural leaders, artists, and diplomatic leaders from around the world, as well as congressional leaders. Organized 

in partnership with the Office of the First Lady, the National Security Council and 

the White House Millennium Council, the conference focused attention on the role 

of culture in U.S. foreign policy and produced recommendations for future development of American cultural diplomacy. 

The event was high profile, involving a major Islamic leader, an African Nobel 

Laureate in Literature, two former American Poets Laureate, and some of the 

world’s most recognized actors, artists, and musicians, not to mention the President, 

First Lady, Secretary of State, ministers of culture from around the world and leaders of private foundations, NGO’s, and multinational companies. The conference received global media coverage, and large numbers of Americans heard about the connections between culture and public policy around the world—about the powerful 

force that public diplomacy can be in a dangerous and threatening world. Opening 

the conference in the East Room of The White House, Mrs. Clinton said, ‘‘It is the 

arts and humanities that give us roots, that foster our civil society and democracy 

and create a universal language so that we can understand each other better as nations and human beings.’’ 

In her remarks, Secretary Albright declared that we were assembled ‘‘for the 

first—but I hope not the last’’ such conference. As it turns out, it was the first and 

last, and I would hope that similar, cultural diplomacy summits be held at the highest level—events involving international leaders in culture, government and the arts 

that can reach millions though global media and the World Wide Web. Too few 

Americans know about the importance of public diplomacy; we need to tell its story. 

Conducting effective public diplomacy is more difficult today than it was prior to 

9/11, when we launched the State Department program. We must, of course, ensure 

the safety and security of Foreign Service officers. In some countries, it takes exceptional fortitude and courage for a diplomat to work beyond embassy walls. An ambitious program to construct and modernize embassies, begun, I believe, under Secretary of State Powell, aims to build embassies that are safe, functional, and able 

to advance our diplomatic mission. In some cases, however, new embassies have 

been relocated outside major cities, where access to them is limited. Security and 

cost concerns require limitations, but we must do everything we can to see that our 

embassies are as open to the public as they can be, and not remote from urban centers. 

In some countries, our diplomatic missions have set up small, unclassified posts 

that consist of a single Foreign Service officer, who wears many hats, assisted by 

one or two host national staff. These American Presence Posts, or APPs, operate in 

cities distant from the embassy and engage in a full range of person-to-person diplomacy—public relations, trade and commercial affairs, liaisons with local government, and so on. Security is always an issue; APPs cannot operate everywhere. But 

they are a strong public diplomacy asset. Similarly, some embassies are establishing 

‘‘American Corners,’’ spaces that offer the public access to American books, DVDs, 

CDs, informational materials and the Internet. Operating in institutions such libraries or universities and staffed by a person from the host institution, American 

Corners are another good way to engage and serve foreign publics. Virtual Presence 

11 

Posts, which offer Internet connectivity to the public, also are being used increasingly as a diplomatic tool. 

These programs and others like them should be replicated as much as possible, 

just as the cultural, educational and exchange programs sponsored by the Office of 

Public Diplomacy should be allowed to grow significantly. Our country needs to invest in these proven, public diplomacy programs on a major scale, and our government and its leaders should do a better job of informing the American people about 

the need to strengthen public diplomacy and its role in our foreign affairs. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Hughes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KAREN P. HUGHES, FORMER UNDER 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, WORLDWIDE VICE CHAIR, BURSON-MARSTELLER, AUSTIN, TX 

Ms. HUGHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also for honoring us on the floor also. Thank you for your many, many years 

of service and passionate advocacy for public diplomacy and especially our international broadcasting. You’ve been a real champion 

for our efforts. 

Thank you. 

Let me start by saying that the 21⁄2 years that I spent as Under 

Secretary were among the most challenging and difficult, yet in the 

end among the most rewarding, of my entire career. Working with 

an outstanding team of foreign and civil service officers and public 

diplomats across the world, we were able to make a number of significant changes and put in place new programs, most of which are 

being carried on by the current administration. Much more needs 

to be done and I thank you for the opportunity to share some 

thoughts about that today. 

People often talk about public diplomacy in the context of opinion 

polls and, while we all want to be liked, I believe to view public 

diplomacy only in the context of an international popularity contest 

is a fundamental misunderstanding. America’s engagement with 

foreign publics is actually a vital foreign policy and national security priority that seeks to promote our national ideals and interests, to undermine those of our enemies, and to foster understanding by engaging in dialogue and listening with respect to the 

views and opinions of others. 

When I took office, a strategic plan for U.S. public diplomacy did 

not exist. We worked through an interagency process to develop 

one and put in place three strategic imperatives which I believe remain vital today: First, that America must offer a positive vision 

of hope and opportunity rooted in our most basic values, which are 

not merely American, but are universal human rights—liberty, justice, the rule of law, rights for women and other minorities, a fundamental belief in the dignity and worth of every person. 

Second, public diplomacy should work to isolate and discredit 

al-Qaeda and other violent extremists and undermine their attempt 

to appropriate religion to their cause. 

And third, to nurture—public diplomacy should work to nurture 

common interests between Americans and people of different cultures and countries across the world. 

I believe you can put most U.S. public diplomacy activities into 

four broad categories: our communications efforts; our education 

and exchange programs, which are the heart of public diplomacy; 

12 

what I call the deeds of diplomacy, and these are the concrete 

things that our country does in the areas of education and health 

and economic development to improve people’s lives; and finally, 

our international broadcasting, which now reaches 171 million 

people across the world with accurate and objective news and 

information. 

I’ll talk a little about each of those areas. In the area of communications, with the explosion of media channels across the world today’s ambassadors and diplomats must be trained and empowered 

to speak on behalf of our country and represent us on those foreign 

media channels. I found the bilateral setup of the State Department was often counterproductive to our communications efforts, 

particularly when dealing with regional networks like Al Jazeera 

that reach broad audiences across an entire region. 

I remember meeting with an ambassador. He told me Al Jazeera 

was by far the No. 1 source of news and information influencing 

people in his country, yet they weren’t headquartered there, so he 

had no personnel or strategy to deal with them, really no capability 

to push back. We set up regional media hubs as a result and put 

language-qualified communicators in them whose daily job it was 

to go out and communicate and advocate for our U.S. Government 

policies. I believe we need more of this as we now have more and 

more journalists who increasingly are viewing us on a regional 

basis, our policies toward a certain region of the world, rather than 

individual countries. 

We also need better language training. Most of State’s training 

teaches officers to be able to engage in conversation in a foreign 

language, but to be able to conduct an interview on television 

under often hostile questioning you need far greater language 

skills, and we need many more effective spokespeople to be able to 

communicate on television. 

I believe the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy also has to 

be more involved in the assignment of State Department personnel. 

I needed Arabic speakers and I found that Arabic speakers were 

often in non-Arabic speaking countries and I had no ability to move 

them to the locations where I needed them. The Under Secretary 

also needs flexibility to move people in order to respond to urgent 

world events, such as what happened in the aftermath of 9/11. 

Our communications also have to be two-way. We need to do 

more listening, and to help us do that I started a new broadcast 

center to monitor the international media and produce a daily summary of what they were saying about our policies, to inform our 

policymakers, and then also provide our U.S. Government position 

in response, to help our ambassadors and military commanders and 

others around the world know what our country’s position was on 

those issues that were driving news. 

We engaged on the Internet in a preliminary fashion. We 

assigned several officers to start blogging and get on the blogs and 

begin to correct misunderstandings and misrepresentations and 

accurately present our policies. We made a concerted effort to communicate that al-Qaeda’s attacks most often killed fellow Muslims. 

It’s vitally important, I think, that our communications strategies 

counter the extensive communications being carried out by extremists, largely on the Internet. 

13 

On education and exchange programs, during my tenure I dramatically expanded English language training. I found it was a 

skill that young people across the world want because it improves their opportunities in life, plus it allows us to reach a much 

younger demographic of 8-to-14-year-olds. We started programs 

teaching English language. It also exposes them to a wider body of 

knowledge and of course put them in contact face to face with 

Americans. Many of them had never met a real-life American before, and I found that the reaction was almost universally positive. 

We almost doubled participation in our education and exchange 

programs and worked to make them more strategic, focused on 

those who have a wide circle of influence, such as clerics and journalists and others who are influential in shaping the opinions of a 

wider audience. 

A survey of our ambassadors rated the international visitor program No. 1 among all public diplomacy programs because of its 

ability to influence the future leaders of the world. Bringing them 

here, letting them see America for themselves, is enormous intellectual capital for our country. 

We also worked with university leaders to reverse the trend of 

decline in student visas that had occurred after 9/11 and the number of students after we reversed that decline has now been growing and setting records, I believe, for the last several years. 

We began using technology to expand the impact of our exchanges, encouraging participants to blog about their experiences, 

giving them a camera to make YouTube videos. I believe much 

more needs to be done in this area to maximize the impact of our 

exchanges, perhaps through documentaries, other ways of broadcasting them to a wider universe. 

I also worked to each out through areas of mutual interest such 

as sports and music that transcend any political or policy differences. 

Now, most of these programs build relationships in understanding over the long term, so I understand, with a lot of competing interests, it’s often difficult to fund them. But I also believe they’re 

vital and they must be expanded in a world that is increasingly 

global and interconnected. 

Collaborative programs such as the breast cancer initiative that 

we started with women in the Middle East I believe have a lot of 

potential, because they do more than just share expertise on a 

health issue. They also teach women to network, to begin to stand 

up for themselves, to more fully participate in their societies. I 

think we should actively seek ways to partner with people in other 

countries on areas of mutual interest that both improve people’s 

lives and show the great compassion of America. Teacher training, 

hospital ships, the AIDS initiative in Africa, these are not just development programs; they are also powerful public diplomacy tools 

that communicate who we are, and we must view them that way. 

In international broadcasting, we worked to improve our television offerings. As you know, Voice of America and many of our 

other broadcasts started as radio programs. Yet now most of the 

world gets its news on television. Members of the BBG, including 

you, Senator Kaufman, had the foresight to start a new Arabic television and radio station before I arrived. I worked with you to get 

14 

additional funding for a new midday show for women’s programs. 

Those two channels, Alhurra and Sawa, now have a weekly combined audience of 35 million people—a channel where we had none 

before. 

I just returned from Dubai, where I announced the results of the 

most comprehensive survey ever done of Arab youth—2,000 inperson interviews conducted by my company and its partner polling 

firm. It highlighted the crucial importance of television. I know the 

Internet—a lot is happening on the Internet, but television is also 

a dramatic and powerful tool. Seventy-eight percent of the Arab 

youth we surveyed said they get their news and information from 

television, and overwhelmingly they listed it as their No. 1 leisure 

pastime. Sixty-six percent said television was their first choice for 

leisure activities. 

Let me tell you why I worry about that for our national interest. 

If you see something on television, you tend to give it more credibility. You’ve seen it with your own eyes. Yet the view is often 

quite misleading. I heard people around the world talk about the 

sex and violence that they saw on American movies and the soap 

operas and shows. 

I’ll close with a story from a young man I met in China who had 

just returned from his first trip to America. I asked him what surprised him. He said he was surprised by how friendly Americans 

were, by how much they cared about their families, and by how 

many of them went to church or synagogue or mosque. I told him: 

I don’t get that, because if you take a survey of my fellow Americans most of them, not all of them but most of them, will say their 

family and their faith are what’s most important to them. So 

what’s the disconnect? 

His reply has haunted me ever since. He said: America is not the 

way it looks on television. A lot of people are getting their views 

of our country—one of the biggest changes in communications in 

the world is that mass audiences are now seeing television in ways 

they never did before, and the view is often not a pretty picture. 

I believe it calls for continued investment in international broadcasting, a lot more private sector partnerships to produce documentaries, perhaps reality shows, something to offer a more accurate 

picture of what our country is truly like. 

Let me just quickly state—I see I’m out of time—a few recommendations. We do need more accessible spaces with diplomats occupying them. We cannot conduct public diplomacy while walled off 

in embassy fortresses. We have to encourage more conversations 

and recognize that’s going to mean less control. When you have a 

call-in show or an Internet chat, you may not like everything that’s 

being said, but we have to support the conversation. 

I urge you to confirm board members of the BBG so that they 

can continue to improve our international broadcasting. 

Finally, public diplomacy needs an advocate at the White House. 

I regularly met with President Bush. I sat in on all the Secretary 

of State’s policy meetings. It was important, but it wasn’t enough. 

It’s very hard from someplace besides the White House to get the 

resources, the personnel, the authority that you need. I believe 

there has to be someone there who comes to work thinking about 

foreign audiences and coordinating with the Under Secretary, 

15 

because we have to do a lot more thinking and planning about our 

conversations around the world. 

So thank you so much for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hughes follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KAREN HUGHES, WORLDWIDE VICE CHAIR, BURSONMARSTELLER, AUSTIN, TX 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Senator Kaufman—with whom I had 

the great pleasure of working on the Broadcasting Board of Governors and who is 

a great champion of public diplomacy and particularly international broadcasting— 

thank you for inviting me here today. 

Let me start by saying the 21⁄2 years I spent as Under Secretary were among the 

most challenging and difficult, yet in the end some of the most rewarding, of my 

entire career. 

Working with an outstanding team of career foreign and civil service officers and 

public diplomats around the world, we were able to make a number of significant 

changes. Much more needs to be done and I want to outline some thoughts about 

that today. 

People often talk about public diplomacy in the context of the most recent opinion 

poll but to view public diplomacy as an international popularity contest is a fundamental misunderstanding. 

America’s engagement with foreign publics is actually a vital foreign policy and 

national security priority that seeks to promote our national ideals and interests 

and to undermine our enemies. 

When I took office, a strategic plan for U.S. public diplomacy did not exist. We 

worked in an interagency process to develop one and put in place three strategic 

imperative, which I believe remain vital today. 

First, that America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity rooted 

in our most basic values, values which are not merely American, but universal 

human rights—liberty, justice, the rule of law, rights for women and other minorities, a fundamental belief in the dignity of every individual. 

Second, to isolate and discredit al-Qaeda, and other violent extremists, and undermine their attempt to appropriate religion to their cause. 

Third, to nurture common interests between Americans and people of different 

countries across the world. 

You can put most U.S. public diplomacy activities into four broad categories: 

(1) Communications; 

(2) Education and exchange programs (the heart of public diplomacy); 

(3) The Deeds of Diplomacy (concrete things we do in areas such as education, 

health and economic development that make such an impact on people’s lives); 

and 

(4) International broadcasting (which now reaches 171 million people across 

the world). 

COMMUNICATIONS

With the explosion of media channels across the world, today’s ambassadors and 

public diplomats have to be trained and effective communicators and empowered to 

speak on behalf of our country. 

I found the bilateral setup of the State Department is often counterproductive, 

particularly when dealing with regional networks like Al Jazeera that reach broad 

audiences across an entire region. I remember meeting with an ambassador; 

Al Jazeera was by far the No. 1 source of news and information in his county yet 

they weren’t headquartered in his country so he had no strategy or personnel to 

deal with them. We set up hubs and put language qualified communicators there. 

The daily job of those communicators was to get out and explain and advocate our 

policies. 

We need better language training of our personnel. Most of State’s training teaches officers to be able to engage in conversations, but not television interviews. We 

need effective spokespeople who are able to communicate on television in key 

languages. 

Public diplomacy has to be more involved in assigning State Department personnel and have the flexibility to move people to respond to urgent needs or world 

events. 

Communications have to be two-way. It’s imperative to put in place a unit to monitor international media, listen to what they are saying about U.S. policies, provide 

16 

U.S. Government’s position in response, etc. Secretary Clinton’s team has kept up 

with that practice and I believe it’s vitally important. 

And I’d like to mention two other areas. One, we were more engaged on Internet 

and put in place a program blogging in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu to correct misrepresentations and undermine the work of extremists. Two, there was a concerted effort to 

communicate that al-Qaeda’s attacks often killed fellow Muslims. These are vitally 

important communications strategies that undermine extensive communications of 

extremists. 

EDUCATION AND EXCHANGE

Education and exchange programs are the heart of public diplomacy. During my 

tenure we dramatically expanded English language training; it’s a skill young people across the world want because it gives them opportunities, and also gives them 

access to a wider body of knowledge and brings them in contact with an American. 

We are also allowed to reach much younger demographics (8–4 year olds) with incountry programs to learn English. 

Doubled participation in exchange programs worked to make more strategic and 

focused on those who have a wide circle of audience and influence such as clerics 

and journalists, and also women who have a rippling impact on societies. 

We worked with university leaders and reversed the trend of decline in student 

visas, that had occurred after 9/11, and the number of students has been growing 

and setting new records ever since. 

We began using technology to expand the impact of exchanges, encouraging them 

to blog about their experience, giving them a camera and asking to make YouTube 

videos. However, much more needs to be done in this area to maximize the impact 

of exchanges. 

Also, the act of citizen dialogue: We sent Muslim Americans overseas to engage 

with Muslim communities through sports diplomacy, music, and culture. These are 

spaces where Americans can come in contact with foreign publics. 

Most of these programs that build relationships and understanding over the long 

term are hard to fund, but they are vital and must be expanded in a world that 

is increasingly interconnected. 

DEEDS OF DIPLOMACY

Collaborative programs such as a breast cancer initiative with women in Middle 

East does more than share expertise in a way that improves women’s health—it also 

teaches them to learn to network, to stand up for themselves, to more fully participate in their societies. 

I believe there are many such ways to partner on issues of mutual interest in 

ways that improves people’s lives and shows the heart and compassion of our country. 

The USNS Comfort and the AIDS initiative in Africa are examples of things that 

are not just development, they are also public diplomacy that communicate who we 

are and we must view them that way. 

INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

Improved television offerings: Members of the Broadcasting Board of Governors 

had had the foresight to start new Arabic television and radio stations before I arrived. We worked to get additional funding and provide relevant programming such 

as a new midday show, women’s programs and others that build value. They now 

have a weekly audience of 35 million. 

I just returned from Dubai where I announced the results of the most comprehensive survey every done with Arab youth. The survey compiled 2,000 in person interviews and was conducted by my company Burson-Marsteller. Findings from the survey showed Arab youth are increasingly connected: Three out of four have mobile 

phones, three in five use the Internet at least once a day. The survey also highlighted the crucial importance of television in the lives of Arab youth. 

Seventy-eight percent said they get their news and information from television. 

Overwhelmingly 66 percent said their favorite leisure pastime is watching television. 

Let me tell you why I worry about that for our national interests; if you see something on television, you tend to give it more credibility because you’ve seen it with 

your own eyes. Yet the view is often quite misleading. I’ll close with a story from 

a young man I met in China, who had just returned from his first trip to America. 

I asked him what surprised him. He said he was surprised by how friendly Americans were, how much they cared about their families and how many of them went 

to church or synagogue or mosque. 

17 

I told him that if you take a survey of Americans and ask what’s most important 

to them, not all of them, but most will say family and faith—yet he just told me 

that surprised him, so I asked: What’s the disconnect. His reply has haunted me 

ever since: America, he said, is NOT the way it looks on television. 

There should be calls for continued investment in international broadcasting, and 

additionally a lot more private sector partnerships (documentaries, etc.) 

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

We need changes in personnel training and deployment at State, more in-depth 

language training of spokesmen in key languages and maybe we need to keep those 

people in one region of the world, rather than transferring them around. This will 

strengthen public diplomacy within the regional bureaus, which is the power structure at State, and give the Under Secretary greater authority to assign personnel 

and allocate resources. 

We need more accessible spaces and expanded American corners. We need Americans staffing them; we cannot conduct public diplomacy while walled off in embassies. 

We have to encourage more conversations and recognize that’s going to mean less 

control. Internet chat means someone may not like what is said, a call-in show 

means someone may not agree with all the opinions expressed. Al-Qaeda is a oneway communicator; we have to be a two-way facilitator. 

We need to confirm board members at the Broadcasting Board of Governors and 

continue to improve international broadcasting. 

Public diplomacy needs an advocate at the White House. I regularly met with, and 

saw, President Bush and he put me in the lead of interagency. I was in all of Secretary Rice’s highest level policy meetings and all that was important but it was 

still very hard to get it done. We need someone at White House who cares and 

comes to work every day thinking about this and coordinating with the Under Secretary and that’s hard because the White House tends to focus on the domestic audience—after all, that’s who elects the President. But for our national interests we 

have to do a lot more thinking and planning about our conversations and interactions with publics across the world. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. I’d just like to say, because it’s interesting in terms of the complexity of this problem, and that is I 

was in Guinea right before I left the Broadcasting Board of Governors 3 years ago. The No. 1 syndicated TV show in Guinea was 

‘‘Baywatch,’’ the No. 2 show was ‘‘Jerry Seinfeld’’—not ‘‘Jerry 

Seinfeld’’; ‘‘Jerry Springer.’’ 

Jim. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES K. GLASSMAN, FORMER UNDER 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, GEORGE W. BUSH INSTITUTE, DALLAS, TX 

Mr. GLASSMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. 

Senator Kaufman, you and Vice President Biden, more than any 

other individuals in recent years, have advanced the cause of public 

diplomacy as champions of international broadcasting. Thank you 

for your long service to your country. 

Thank you also for your kind words on the floor about the three 

of us. I benefited enormously from the work of the four women who 

preceded me, and especially my immediate predecessor, Ambassador Hughes. You can tell from her remarks she accomplished a 

great deal in 21⁄2 years. 

The hearing asks us to address the future of public diplomacy. 

That future in my view is in doubt. Why? Because public diplomacy 

today is not being taken seriously enough as a tool of national security. Public diplomacy needs to focus on key foreign policy problems, not merely on more vague improvements in the far-off future. 

It needs to be primarily an activity of national security, not of pubVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:22 Dec 15, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
18 

lic relations. It needs to be mobilized and sent into battle to win 

the ideological conflicts of our time. 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has said: ‘‘Over the long term, 

we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Nonmilitary efforts, 

tools of persuasion and inspiration were indispensable to the outcomes of the defining struggle of the 20th century. They are just 

as indispensable in the 21st century and perhaps even more so.’’ 

The Secretary is right, and one would expect his words to be 

heeded at a time when so many have lauded soft or smart power. 

But in fact, tools of persuasion and inspiration are not being considered indispensable. Far from it. 

Here then are some recommendations for a more effective public 

diplomacy. First, make public diplomacy a top priority. The entire 

government should know that the President views public diplomacy 

as a critical part of America’s overall national security strategy. 

Second, make a distinction between what I call strategic public 

diplomacy, that is public diplomacy with clear objectives that can 

be achieved in a definable period, such as goals in a war of ideas 

against violent extremists like al-Qaeda, and long-term ongoing 

public diplomacy, which may be shaped strategically, with emphasis on exchanges with Muslim-majority nations, for example, but 

which is more general in its effects. 

Third, public diplomacy needs to be more about the rest of the 

world and less about us. As President Obama has said several 

times, we should stress mutual interests and mutual understanding. We should find mutual interests even among those who don’t 

like us at present. The default position in U.S. public diplomacy, 

getting people to like us better, has irresistible inertia. Certainly 

some public diplomacy activities can over the long run improve foreigners’ understanding of the United States, our people, our values, 

and our policies, and we should vigorously pursue those activities, 

such as exchanges. But in addition to such activities, the tools of 

strategic public diplomacy must be applied toward urging goals for 

which likability means very little. 

For example, in Pakistan United States favorability has dropped 

in the past year and is in the teens. But according to Pew, by a 

margin of 47 percent to 24 percent Pakistanis support United 

States missile strikes against leaders of extremist groups. What 

can public diplomacy do in Pakistan? Working quietly, it can help 

the Pakistani Government reinforce the notion that the violent extremist threat is real and that this is Pakistan’s war. 

Fourth, institute a strong interagency structure and process led 

by an official with a close connection to the President. During the 

Bush administration that official was the Under Secretary of State 

for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. But other structures are 

possible. 

Fifth, launch an interagency program quickly to show that public 

diplomacy can achieve national security goals. Iran should be the 

immediate focus. Here we are squandering a great opportunity. 

Our objective is an Iran free of nuclear weapons. Two routes to 

achieving that objective appear in my view unlikely: armed conflict 

or successful official diplomacy. But public diplomacy can work, 

mainly because of the brave opposition movement that developed 

after the June elections. 

19 

We could help by providing substantial moral, intellectual, and 

material support for the Green Movement. The great fear of the 

Iranian regime is that a nonviolent civil resistance in the form of 

a color movement, like those in the states of the former Soviet 

Union, will gain authority and legitimacy and ultimately power 

through democratic means. The regime is right to be afraid, but we 

are wrong to ignore this opportunity. 

Sixth, promote the successes and enhance the understanding of 

the function and purpose of the Broadcasting Board of Governors 

and the entities it oversees, such as Voice of America, Radio Free 

Europe-Radio Liberty, and Alhurra. Between 2001 and 2009 the 

weekly audience of the BBG increased by approximately threefourths. Nearly the entire increase occurred in languages of strategic importance, such as Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu. Particularly 

remarkable is the Arabic Service. Before its launch just 7 years 

ago, the Arabic audience for the BBG through Voice of America 

radio was only 2 or 3 million. Today the total audience, that is listeners and viewers who tune in at least once a week on radio or 

TV, is 35 million. Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa have a weekly audience of 71 percent of Iraqis and 61 percent of Syrians. VOA and 

Radio Farda are reaching more than one-fourth of Iranians each 

week, and BBG networks have large audiences in Pakistan and 

Afghanistan. 

Senator Kaufman, in reference to your question earlier about the 

firewall, my experience has been that the firewall between State 

and other government agencies on the one hand and the journalists 

of the BBG on the other has worked very well. You have been the 

great guardian of that firewall. 

Seventh, expand what I call Public Diplomacy 2.0, using technology to facilitate and convene a broad and deep global conversation in which we can more effectively influence and inform. At the 

same time, put teeth into Secretary Clinton’s affirmation that the 

United States supports open global communications. One step 

would be to challenge outrageous Iranian jamming of satellite 

broadcasts by VOA and BBC. As the head of BBC’s Farsi Service 

put it, ‘‘This is a rogue government jamming international signals. 

How will the West stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons if we 

can’t deal with this?’’ And we are not dealing with it right now. 

Eighth, create a new narrative to counter the pervasive one that 

holds that the United States is out to destroy Islam and replace it 

with Christianity. The counternarrative would accurately portray 

conflicts within Muslim societies that are working toward resolution: the attempt of a radical, violent group to hijack a religion, the 

struggle for democracy and the rights of women, the conflict between the Iranian regime and Arab societies. These are real conflicts. They are intra-Muslim conflicts, and I think that the right 

side is going to win and it will be a glorious victory. But we need 

to recognize that that is the most important narrative that faces 

Muslim societies today. 

Ninth, establish a pervasive culture of measurable results. All 

public diplomacy programs must be assessed and evaluated to see 

how well they move the needle. Measuring can be difficult and 

expensive, but without it we can’t tell whether work is succeeding 

or failing. 

20 

1 ‘‘Changing Minds, Winning Peace,’’ report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the 

Arab and Muslim World, submitted to the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Oct. 1, 2003, p. 8. 

Finally, although it occurred in June 2007, almost 3 years ago, 

my own confirmation was the last one voted by the Senate for a 

BBG governor. Natural attrition has left the BBG with only four 

governors plus the Secretary of State, a total of five, which is the 

minimum for a quorum. The BBG is no ordinary board, as you 

know, Senator Kaufman. 

Its governors serve as a collective chief executive office for this 

critical organization. The lack of action over the past few years on 

confirmations of governors is a sad manifestation of the overall 

standing of public diplomacy among too many policymakers. We 

can’t wait. 

I ended my testimony before this committee in January 2008 

with the following sentence, which I believe bears repeating: ‘‘The 

task ahead is to tell the world the story of a good and compassionate nation and at the same time to engage in the most important ideological contest of our time, a contest that we will win.’’ 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Glassman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES K. GLASSMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, GEORGE W. 

BUSH INSTITUTE, DALLAS, TX 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Senator Kaufmann, you and Vice 

President Biden, more than any other individuals in recent years, have advanced 

the cause of public diplomacy as champions of international broadcasting. Thank 

you for your long service to your country. 

I had the unique honor myself of serving, far more briefly, in two public diplomacy 

positions: First, as chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, where I was 

a colleague of the future Senator Kaufmann. The BBG oversees all nonmilitary taxpayer-funded U.S. international broadcasting, including radio, television, and Internet in 60 languages across more than 100 countries. Then, as Under Secretary of 

State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, in charge of engagement with foreign 

publics. 

This hearing asks four of us who have served or are serving in the latter post 

to address the future of public diplomacy. That future, in my view, is in doubt. 

While the men and women who practice public diplomacy are working diligently 

and courageously, they lack what the Djerejian Group, a 2003 commission, called 

the proper ‘‘strategic direction’’ 1 to contribute effectively toward the achievement of 

the American interest. 

In short, here is the problem with public diplomacy: It is not today being taken 

seriously as a tool of national security by policymakers. Will it be in the future? Perhaps only in a desperate response to a terrible crisis. Such delay is unacceptable. 

In my testimony today, I will describe what a serious public diplomacy—what I 

call ‘‘Strategic Public Diplomacy’’—looks like. In the second half of the last administration, President Bush and the leadership of the State Department, the Pentagon, 

the National Security Council, the BBG, and the intelligence community—with support from a handful of Members of Congress and staffers—were succeeding in developing this new vision of public diplomacy and putting it into practice, especially to 

counter violent extremism. 

Today, that effort needs to be sustained, renewed, and invigorated. There are 

areas in the world where Strategic Public Diplomacy is not merely one tool, but, in 

fact, the best tool, for achieving America’s interests. One of those areas is Iran, 

which I will address today. 

Public diplomacy needs to be sharp, not flaccid. It needs to focus on key foreign 

policy problems, not merely on vague, feel-good improvements in the far-off future. 

It needs to be primarily an activity of national security, not of public relations. It 

needs to be mobilized and sent into battle to win the ideological conflicts of our time. 

During the cold war, with institutions like Radio Free Europe, the Congress of 

Cultural Freedom, the publication Problems of Communism, educational and cultural exchanges, and the U.S. Information Agency, the United States became very 

21 

2See many examples, including this speech last year by Yale Richmond, a retired Foreign 

Service officer: http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview/2009/12/cultural-exchange-and-thecold-war-how-the-west-won.html. 3 ‘‘Changing Minds, Winning Peace,’’ pp. 8 and 13. I served on this panel, created by Congress 

and chaired by Ambassador Edward Djerejian. 4http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1262. 

effective at public diplomacy. Public diplomacy played an essential role in defeating 

communism.2 But after the Berlin Wall came down, our arsenal of persuasion was 

dismantled. 

‘‘At a critical time in our Nation’s history,’’ said the report of the Advisory Group 

on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, ‘‘the apparatus of public diplomacy has proven inadequate . . . First and foremost, public diplomacy requires a 

new strategic direction, informed by a seriousness and commitment that matches 

the gravity of our approach to national defense and traditional state-to-state diplomacy.’’ 3 True in 2003; still true today. 

‘‘WE CANNOT KILL OR CAPTURE OUR WAY TO VICTORY’’ 

Here is the best definition of public diplomacy: understanding, engaging, informing and influencing foreign publics with the goal of achieving the national interest 

of the United States of America. Of the four activities, the most important is ‘‘influencing.’’ Public diplomacy is a means, not an end. It is a particular set of tools and 

approaches that help us influence foreigners in order to achieve goals that the 

United States desires. 

During the Bush administration, the relevant ends were keeping the United 

States safe and promoting freedom—ends that are linked. 

Today, the greatest threats to safety and freedom come from violent extremists 

and their supporters, mainly using terrorism to try to achieve their aims. 

As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, ‘‘Over the long term, we cannot kill 

or capture our way to victory. Nonmilitary efforts—tools of persuasion and inspiration—were indispensable to the outcome of the defining struggle of the 20th century. 

They are just as indispensable in the 21st century—and perhaps even more so.’’ 4

In keeping with that belief, President Bush in 2006 designated the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy as the lead official across government in strategic communications—which is a rubric that includes public diplomacy as well as 

other activities, including covert and kinetc ones, that attempt to communicate a 

specific, intentional message to the rest of the world. The Secretary of State and 

I believed that, given my own background and the nature of the threats, this role 

should be my primary one. Our focus was countering violent extremism by engaging 

in a ‘‘war of ideas,’’ or what we also termed ‘‘global strategic engagement.’’ 

Drawing on the work of my predecessor, Karen Hughes, I built an interagency 

structure that allowed visibility into the strategic communications work being done 

in other parts of government, including the military, the intelligence community, the 

foreign assistance apparatus, Treasury, and elsewhere. 

Beyond visibility, we were able, working with the National Security Council, to 

assign specific agencies to perform specific duties in pursuit of clear strategic goals. 

I also created a small interagency group called the Global Strategic Engagement 

Center, or GSEC, with a State Department director and members from the Department of State and the intelligence community, to handle day-to-day operations. 

By the time I left government, this structure was working well, with State at the 

top of it, as it should be. We received superb cooperation, both from the military 

and from the intelligence community. Yes, the Department of Defense had more resources for strategic communications activities, but DOD worked in concert with us 

and looked to us for leadership. 

We tried to achieve our war-of-ideas goals in two ways: First, by pushing back 

and undermining the ideology behind the violent extremism while at the same time 

explaining and advocating free alternatives and, second, by diverting young people 

from following a path that leads to violent extremism. What all terrorist groups 

have in common, in fact, is the exploitation of vulnerable young people, who are isolated and indoctrinated and become the shock troops. 

In both of these endeavors—undermining and diverting—Americans themselves 

are rarely the most credible actors and voices. Much of what we did was encourage 

others. For example, we supported a global organization of female family members 

of victims of violent extremism and supported another network, based in Europe, 

of Muslim entrepreneurs. 

In Afghanistan, with the most meager resources, we helped stand up an Afghanled media center in Kabul. In October 2008, the Taliban stopped a bus at Maiwand, 

22 

5http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/world/asia/19iht-19afghan.17083733.html. 

6http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2892.htm. 

7 ‘‘Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,’’ as updated Feb. 2010, Office of 

the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State. 8http://www.icrd.org/. 

9http://www.layalina.tv/productions/lifeafterdeath.html. 

10http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/. 11www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address. 12For a more complete exposition of this subject, see my article, ‘‘It’s Not About Us,’’ on ForeignPolicy.com: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/01/itslnotlaboutlus?page=0,0. 

pulled off 50 passengers and beheaded 30 of them.5 The media center’s leaders immediately brought together 300 Afghan religious leaders who issued a statement 

condemning the action and calling it anti-Islamic. The effort led to widespread antiTaliban protests.6

(I am happy to note that the new Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy calls for an expansion of the Afghan Government Media and Information Center and the establishment of 16 provincial satellite offices.7) 

We often worked in partnership with private-sector organizations, deploying small 

amounts of money, in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars. A good example was 

providing funds to the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, a group 

that has been working for years to enhance education (to include academic subjects, 

plus the teaching of universal values such as tolerance and critical thinking) in 

Pakistan’s madrassas, often breeding grounds of terrorists.8 The ICRD has so far 

trained over 2,000 madrassa leaders. 

We also funded ‘‘Life After Death,’’ a documentary by Layalina Productions, a 

U.S.-based nonprofit, on the journey of families of 9/11 victims as they commiserate 

with families of terrorism victims in Spain, Jordan, and Egypt.9 The documentary 

was first aired last fall on Al Arabiya News Channel throughout Arab-speaking 

nations. 

All of these efforts were aimed at specific goals. We wanted, for example, to show 

the widespread and senseless suffering caused by violent extremists, especially in 

their attacks against fellow Muslims. We also wanted to find ways—such as through 

encouraging entrepreneurship, improving madrassas, or expanding an excellent 

English-teaching program that teaches values as well—to divert young people from 

a path to terrorism. 

‘‘MUTUAL INTEREST AND MUTUAL RESPECT’’ 

We took our direction from the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism of 

2006, which stated: ‘‘In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning 

the battle of ideas.’’ 10 So our mission then and, it is my hope, today is to use the 

tools of ideological engagement—words, deeds, and images—to create an environment hostile to violent extremism. 

What do these efforts in strategic public diplomacy have to do with improving 

America’s image abroad? Very little, in an immediate sense. The United States itself 

is not at the center of the war of ideas. Rather, as I will explain a bit later, the 

United States is being affected by conflicts within Muslim societies, which themselves are ground zero for this enormous struggle, which involves both ideology and 

violence. 

In his inaugural address, President Obama stated, ‘‘To the Muslim world, we seek 

a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.’’ 11 He repeated 

this powerful phrase in speeches in Istanbul and Cairo last year. We do indeed have 

mutual interest, even with people who may disagree with us on such policy matters 

as Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. 

On the threat of violent extremism, we are absolutely on the same page as Muslim societies. As a result, even in countries where vast majorities say, even today, 

that they view the United States unfavorably—Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, to 

name a few—our mutual interest in defeating the terrorist threat (and, I should 

add, in constraining the Iranian threat)—the United States can work cooperatively, 

using public diplomacy methods, to reach mutual strategic goals. 

Americans, for example, have a clear mutual interest with the Pakistanis, who, 

according to recent Pew Research surveys, view us more unfavorably than practically any other people (in fact, favorability dropped, to just 16 percent, between 

2008 and 2009).12 We both want to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda for the sake 

of a stable, free Pakistan and a safer America. That interest can be achieved even 

if Pakistanis harbor animus toward Americans. 

The latest Pew data reinforce this notion. By a margin of 63 percent to 12 percent, 

Pakistanis support America’s ‘‘providing intelligence and logistical support to PakiVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:22 Dec 15, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
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13President Zardari of Pakistan has made this statement many times, for example: http:// 

www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2892.htm. 14Secretary Clinton immediately supported the Alliance of Youth Movements and in January 

gave a speech on Internet freedom and met with high-tech executives on improving the use 

of social media in public diplomacy: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/01/secl 

clintonldineslhigh-techlti.html?wprss=posttech. 15 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘‘Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,’’ PublicAffairs, 

2004, p. 7. 16http://connect.state.gov/. 

stani troops fighting extremist groups. By 47 percent to 24 percent, Pakistanis even 

support U.S. ‘‘missile strikes against leaders of extremist groups.’’ What can public 

diplomacy do in Pakistan? Working quietly, it can help the Pakistani Government 

reinforce the notion that the violent extremist threat is real and that ‘‘this is Pakistan’s war.’’ 13

Still, the default position in U.S. public diplomacy—getting people to like us better—has irresistible inertia. When in doubt, policymakers and practitioners turn to 

brand-burnishing. But the unresolved question is whether a better-liked America is 

one that can more easily achieve its national security goals. Certainly, some public 

diplomacy activities can, over the long run, improve foreigners’ understanding of the 

United States, our people, our values, and our policies—and we should vigorously 

pursue those activities. But, in addition to such activities, the tools of Strategic Public Diplomacy must be applied toward urgent goals for which likeability means little. 

Much of the public diplomacy effort in the past has focused on our own image, 

on how we are seen by others. But today, in the war of ideas, our core task is not 

how to fix foreigners’ perceptions of the United States but how to isolate and reduce 

the threat of violent extremism. In other words, it’s not about us. 

‘‘AN OBSERVABLE BUT INTANGIBLE ATTRACTION’’ 

In all aspects of public diplomacy—both traditional and strategic—we require a 

new approach to communications, to the engaging and informing that lead to the 

influencing. We began to develop such an approach during my brief tenure, calling 

it Public Diplomacy 2.0. It is an approach that Secretary Clinton has embraced.14

The approach begins with research on America’s image. We found three reasons 

for low favorability—differences with our policies, a lack of understanding of those 

policies and beliefs, and a perception that the United States does not respect the 

views of others, does not listen to them, or take them seriously. These last two subjects—lack of understanding by foreigners and lack of respect by us—cannot be addressed by preaching or by telling the world how wonderful we are. In fact, the technique of standing in one place and spraying a message widely to others is not very 

effective in today’s world. 

A better way to communicate is through the generation of a wide and deep conversation. Our role in that conversation is as facilitator and convener. We generate 

this conversation in the belief that our views will be heard—even if U.S. Government actors are not always the authors of those views. 

This new approach takes advantage of new social networking technologies like 

Facebook and YouTube and Second Life, whose essence is multiple, simultaneous 

conversations, in words and pictures. And, in fact, the method of communication is 

itself a reflection of American values. The medium, as Marshall McLuhan said, is 

the message. We, as Americans, do not dictate. Rather, we believe that, in a free 

and open discussion, the best ideas will prevail, and we want to encourage the free 

expression of views, rather than drowning out words that disturb us. 

Joseph Nye, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, has 

written: ‘‘If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit 

threat or exchange taking place—in short, if my behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction—soft power is at work. Soft power uses a different 

type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation—an attraction to 

shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those 

values.’’ 15

Public Diplomacy 2.0, endorsed at the highest levels of government during my 

tenure at the State Department, embodies Nye’s description of soft power. Specifically, in 2008, our Education and Cultural Affairs Bureau, under the direction of 

Goli Ameri, an Iranian-American with experience as a technology executive, 

launched the first U.S. Government social-networking Web site. The site, 

ExchangesConnect,16 on the Ning platform, provides a forum around the topic of 

international exchanges. 

The U.S. Government cannot control everything that goes on within this forum 

(indeed, during the fighting in Gaza, much of the comment on the site was in oppoVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:22 Dec 15, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
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17http://connectcontest.state.gov/contests/change-your-climate-change-our-world/entries/topl 

entries. 18Oscar Morales in February became a Visiting Fellow of the George W. Bush Institute in 

Dallas. 19http://youthmovements.howcast.com/. 

sition to U.S. policy), and the lack of control naturally produces some anxiety. But 

we live in a world in which we have two choices: preach and be ignored, or convene 

a conversation and be heard—and, if our views are persuasive, have influence. 

ExchangesConnect is now running its second annual video contest, this one with the 

theme, ‘‘Change Your Climate, Change Our World.’’ Among the top 40 entries are 

videos from Egypt, Turmenistan, Cuba, and Vietnam.17

In 2008, the Bureau of International Information Programs—with such private 

sector partners as YouTube, the Tisch School at New York University, and NBC 

Universal—initiated a video contest called the Democracy Video Challenge, with the 

theme ‘‘Democracy Is . . .’’ We wanted contestants, most of them young Internet 

users, to define democracy for themselves in 3-minute films. There were 900 entries 

from around the world, with the winner chosen by a vote on the Web—which, again, 

we did not control. 

Perhaps the best example of PD 2.0 in action is the Alliance of Youth Movements. 

In the fall of 2008, a young State Department official named Jared Cohen suggested 

that I travel to Colombia to see what that government, with U.S. help, had done 

to encourage young fighters to leave the FARC, the terrorist group (which started 

in the 1960s as the military wing of Colombia’s Communist Party) that had been 

killing and kidnapping innocents. Were there lessons here for the demobilization 

and reintegration of violent extremists in the Middle East? 

Also at Cohen’s suggestion, I met with the leaders of a spontaneous civilian movement that used Facebook to bring 12 million people into the streets of cities around 

the world in early 2008 to oppose the FARC. That movement, One Million Voices 

Against the FARC, had real-life effects, demoralizing FARC fighters and causing 

them to demobilize. As a result of this and other efforts, the size of the FARC was 

cut in half and its effectiveness significantly reduced. 

The dynamic young founder of the anti-FARC group, Oscar Morales,18 worked 

without the support—or, even, at first, the knowledge—of the Colombian Government. Morales, a young computer technician, was simply a citizen, angry at what 

terrorists were doing in his country. This was a model we wanted to replicate. So 

we decided to bring Morales together with young representatives of similar 

antiviolence and pro-social-change organizations using the Internet from countries 

like Egypt, Mexico, and the U.K., as well as officials of technology companies such 

as Facebook, Google, Howcast, and AT&T. 

The State Department provided only a small amount of seed money. We were conveners and facilitators. At a New York conference in late 2008, the young people 

decided to create their own network—which is now called the Alliance of Youth 

Movements (AYM), with a social networking site, including how-to hub, and a professional executive director.19 With backing from Secretary Clinton, the group held 

a conference in Mexico in October, in part with the purpose of pushing back against 

narcoterrorism, and will hold another meeting next month in London. 

Unfortunately, not all PD 2.0 ideas have become reality. We were on the brink 

of launching the contemporary analogue of ‘‘Problems of Communism,’’ the USIA 

journal that confronted the Soviet ideology for 40 years during the cold war. Our 

version, tentatively called ‘‘Problems of Extremism’’ (POE), was planned as a journal, a Web site, and a platform for conferences. We wanted it to become the locus 

of liberal thought, promoting freedom, tolerance, and women’s rights, with emphasis 

on the conflicts (which I will explain below) that are occurring in Muslim societies. 

The POE venture, like AYM, would be a nonprofit foundation, with a small amount 

of seed money provided by the U.S. Government and other funding from foreign governments and private institutions. 

Finally, a good example of PD 2.0 even before such a rubric existed is the Digital 

Outreach Team, begun under Ambassador Hughes. Team members go into chat 

rooms and on interactive Web sites, in Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu (and, we had 

planned, Russian), to explain U.S. policy and refute lies and distortions. They identify themselves as working for the U.S. Government and provide links to easily 

accessible facts on the Internet. 

Public Diplomacy 2.0 would be an unfulfilled idea if it were not for Web 2.0, the 

interactive tools now available on the Internet. Yes, al-Qaeda and other violent 

extremist organizations have exploited the Internet to their advantage, but that 

edge has diminished—and not just because the jihadist message has worn thin with 

al-Qaeda’s penchant for slaughtering fellow Muslims. 

25 

20www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/opinion/26kimmage.html. 21The source of these data is the BBG itself, which contracts with a firm which independently 

engages such respected survey organizations. Most of the Middle East research was done by 

ACNielsen. The BBG uses the standard audience measurement for international broadcasters, 

asking whether the respondent watched or listened in the past week. 

Why? One reason, says analyst Daniel Kimmage in the New York Times, is that 

‘‘the Qaeda media nexus . . . is old hat. If Web 1.0 was about creating the snazziest 

official Web resources and Web 2.0 is about letting users run wild with self-created 

content and interactivity, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are stuck in 1.0.’’ 20

The Internet world of al-Qaeda is one of direction: believe this, do that. The Internet world of today is one of interactivity and conversation: I think this, your ideas 

are unconvincing, I need more information to make up my mind, let’s meet at 3 p.m. 

Thursday for a peaceful protest. In fact, the Internet itself is becoming the locus of 

Civil Society 2.0. 

This new virtual world is democratic. It is an agora. It is not a place for a death 

cult that counts on keeping its ideology sealed off from criticism. The new world is 

a marketplace of ideas, and it is no coincidence that al-Qaeda blows up marketplaces. 

U.S. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

While taxpayer-funded, nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting is almost 70 

years old, the fundamental principle that underlies it is the same as that of Public 

Diplomacy 2.0: rather than preaching, the BBG’s entities seek to inform and to generate a conversation, also with the ultimate objective of securing American interests. 

The BBG’s broadcasters embody President Obama’s notion of mutual interest and 

mutual respect. 

Along with the Fulbright educational exchanges, U.S. international broadcasting 

is almost certainly the most successful public diplomacy program. It is also the largest. The BBG budget rose from $440 million in 2001 to $758 million in fiscal 2010. 

The BBG’s success may be attributed in part to its clear mandate. It does one 

thing and does it well: as a reliable source of news, it presents an accurate, objective 

and comprehensive view of America and its policies and, through surrogate broadcasters like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), the BBG serves as a free, 

mature communications medium in nations lacking in such institutions. 

Between 2001 and 2009, the weekly audience of the BBG increased by approximately three-fourths, to 171 million, and nearly the entire increase occurred in languages of strategic importance, such as Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu. Particularly remarkable is the Arabic service, Middle East Broadcasting Network. 

Before MBN’s launch, just 7 years ago, the Arabic audience for BBG—through 

Voice of America (VOA) radio, was only 2 to 3 million. Today, the total audience— 

that is, listeners and viewers who tune in at least once a week on radio or TV— 

is 35 million. In the 14 countries where the BBG has done research (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 

Syria, Tunisia, and UAE), 92 million adults have access to satellite TV. Alhurra’s 

weekly audience in these 14 countries, as measured consistent with international 

broadcasting standard, is 27.5 million—almost a third of the potential audience.21

While Alhurra’s weekly audience is less than the weekly audiences for Al Jazeera 

and Al Arabiya, it is greater than all other non-Arab broadcasters combined (including BBC Arabic). Alhurra and the BBG’s Arabic radio network, Radio Sawa, have 

a weekly audience of 71 percent of Iraqis and 61 percent of Syrians. Together, Sawa 

and Alhurra reach an upduplicated audience of more than 35 million. In each of the 

14 researched markets, Alhurra figures among the top 20 TV channels of all kinds 

(entertainment as well as news), except in Saudi Arabia, where it is 21st. Surveys 

find that Alhurra is considered ‘‘trustworthy’’ by at least 90 percent of its viewers 

in such countries as Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait. In the past few weeks, 

Alhurra, with a larger audience in Iraq than Al Jazeera, has provided vigorous, objective coverage of that country’s elections. 

Meanwhile, two other BBG entities, RFE/RL and VOA are together broadcasting 

a stream in Pashto and Dari 24/7 into Afghanistan, where RFE/RL is the No. 1 

news station in the country. Separately, last December, RFE/RL began broadcasting 

in local Pashto dialects to Pakistan and the border regions with Afghanistan over 

a new station called Radio Mashaal, offering an alternative to extremist stations in 

the region. Radio Deewa, a product of VOA, is now broadcasting 9 hours a day in 

Pashto to federally administered tribal areas of Pakistan, reaching 14 percent of 

Pashtuns in this critical area. 

VOA has the largest combined radio and television audience in Iran of all international broadcasters, with one in four adult Iranians tuning in to a VOA program 

26 

22www.fulbright.org/conference/2009/.../Marianne%20CravenlRemarks.doc. Marianne Craven 

is Managing Director for Academic Programs at the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State. 

once a week. PNN broadcasts 7 hours of television daily, repeated in a 24-hour format, and 5 hours of radio. Programming is also available around the clock on the 

Internet. 

At the end of December, VOA launched a new Web application that allows users 

in Iran to download and send content to VOA’s Persian News Network with their 

iPhones. The application enables users of Apple iPhones and Android phones to get 

the latest news from PNN and, with a single click, to send links to VOA stories via 

Facebook and Twitter pages and e-mail accounts. The application will be available 

shortly in Apple’s online store, PNN’s Web site (http://www1.voanews.com/persian/ 

news/) and on PNN’s Facebook and Twitter accounts. 

The application also gives Iran’s ‘‘citizen journalists’’ the opportunity to use their 

iPhones and Android phones to send video and still pictures taken on their devices 

to a secure Web site where VOA’s PNN editors can download the images and review 

them for possible broadcast use and Web posting. 

RFE/RL’s Radio Farda continues to provide hard-hitting news and information in 

a 24/7 format that gets stories to the Iranian people that their government denies 

them on domestic media outlets. Radio Farda has reported the harsh crackdown in 

the aftermath of the flawed June election. 

The BBG is focused not only on areas of conflict. It has a major presence in Africa, 

where it has gained a reputation for broadcasting useful information about health; 

in Cuba, Russia, and in parts of Asia where freedom of the press is constrained, 

such as China and Burma. BBG budgets rose significantly in the 7 years following 

the 9/11 attacks. 

Because of evolving audience tastes, as well as legal, political, and technical obstacles to radio and TV in countries such as Russia, the BBG has moved more and 

more toward reaching audiences through the Internet. 

But all is not well. The BBG’s purpose and achievements need to gain greater understanding and support among policymakers. 

The BBG is an independent agency of the Federal Government, with eight governors, four from each party, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, plus the Secretary of State, who typically appoints as representative the Under 

Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. 

Unfortunately, in recent years, the confirmation process has become fraught with 

difficulty. As a result, although it occurred in June 2007—more than 21⁄2 years 

ago—my confirmation was the last voted by the Senate for a BBG governor. Natural 

attrition has left the BBG with only four governors plus the Secretary of State— 

a total of five, which is the minimum for a quorum. 

The BBG is no ordinary board; its governors serve as a collective chief executive 

officer for this critical organization. Imagine a CEO who serves with barely half of 

his or her intellectual and physical strength, and you’ll get an idea of the status 

of the BBG today. I urge the Senate to confirm a full slate of governors immediately. 

The lack of action over the past few years on confirmations of governors is a sad 

manifestation of the overall standing of public diplomacy among too many policymakers. We can’t wait. 

TRADITIONAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

My predecessor, Ambassador Hughes, gave me two excellent pieces of advice, and 

I passed them on to my successor: First, the best thing we can do for the long run 

in traditional public diplomacy is put Americans face to face with foreigners, and, 

second, we can’t do enough English teaching. 

We put people face to face mainly through exchanges. Ambassador Hughes’ great 

accomplishment was expanding these programs that had been languishing. The 

United States now brings about 50,000 people from other countries to the United 

States on programs like Fulbright and YES (for high school students, mainly from 

Muslim-majority nations) and International Visitor Programs, whose graduates 

have included such figures as Hamid Karzai and Margaret Thatchter, when they 

were rising stars. 

Education is America’s greatest brand, and we have bounced back dramatically 

from 9/11. Today, despite tougher visa requirements, more than 600,000 foreign students are matriculating in the United States—an all-time record. 

Fulbright is the largest single public diplomacy program of the State Department, 

with federal support that has been increasing consistently for the past 6 years,22

thanks to the efforts of President Bush and the U.S. Congress. In fiscal 2004, 

27 

23See sources that I cited in my confirmation testimony in January 2008: 

WorldPublicOpinion.org, Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, 

‘‘Muslim Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al-Qaeda,’’ April 24, 2007. A press 

release summarizing the study began, ‘‘An in-depth poll of four major Muslim countries has 

found that in all of them large majorities believe that undermining Islam is a key goal of U.S. 

foreign policy.’’ See http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/346.php? 

lb=brme&pnt=346&nid=&id=. Also, ‘‘America’s Image in The World: Findings From the Pew 

Global Attitudes Project,’’ Testimony of Andrew Kohut, Pew Research Center, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, March 14, 2007. 24 ‘‘Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S. Engagement With the World,’’ Office of the Under 

Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, 2010, pp. 8–11. 

federal spending on Fulbright was $150 million; in 2010, it will be $254 million. 

Fulbright too has become more strategic. Exchanges for university students and 

scholars in both directions have increased substantially in Muslim-majority countries, including Afghanistan, Indonesia, Turkey, and Iraq. The Fulbright program in 

Pakistan is the largest in the world. Globally, applications are at their highest level 

in history. 

While the U.S. Government is the top funder of Fulbright scholarships, there are 

substantial contributions coming now from 100 countries, including major investments from India, China, Turkey, Chile, and Indonesia. And as an example of the 

public-private partnerships that are so critical to the success of public diplomacy, 

U.S. universities contribute $30 million a year in cost-sharing. 

The problem with exchanges, however, is that they are expensive. To succeed in 

the future, public diplomacy will need to find ways to use technology to reach a 

wider audience with each individual exchange—through video, for example, or sophisticated use of social networking media—and to find ways to engage more private-sector partners. 

As for English, the United States teaches it because the world wants to learn it— 

because governments and people in practically every country in the world see 

English as a way to move up economically. Everywhere, including difficult neighborhoods like Yemen, the West Bank and Gaza. In teaching English, we teach a language and tell America’s story. Spending on English-teaching programs by the State 

Department has risen from $6.8 million in fiscal 2004 to $46.6 million this year. 

Educational and cultural (including sports) exchanges, plus the outreach activities 

(such as sending speakers aboard and operating America.gov Web sites in seven different languages) of the Bureau of International Information Programs, comprise 

what I term ‘‘traditional public diplomacy.’’ These programs are important. They 

work, as recent assessments and evaluations have shown. The challenge is to improve efficiency and flexibility. 

TWO URGENT TASKS

But, to return to Strategic Public Diplomacy and the war of ideas: What are the 

urgent tasks today? Here are two . 

A New Narrative: The most pernicious idea in Muslim societies is that the United 

States wants to destroy Islam and replace it with Christianity. Vast majorities in 

many countries believe this narrative, and it is the prism through which they view 

almost all U.S. activities.23

But to try to refute this narrative head on is not easy. A better approach is to 

promote a different narrative—one that reflects the truth. The State Department’s 

new strategic plan for public diplomacy lists ‘‘Shape the narrative’’ as one of five 

strategic objectives. That’s encouraging, but the narrative that the plan has in mind 

appears, from the document, to be U.S.-centric and difficult to convey and sustain. 

The objective appears to be to explain American policies better and to ‘‘counter misinformation and disinformation.’’ 24 Certainly, those activities must be part of any 

public diplomacy strategy, but the more valuable narrative to spread is not about 

the United States at all. 

The indispensable narrative is the real story of what is happening in Muslim societies. It is a narrative of three conflicts that are within Muslim societies. Yes, the 

United States is deeply affected by them, but they are intra-Muslim conflicts and 

need to be understood that way. They are: 

• Religion and terror. A small group of violent reactionaries—led by al-Qaeda, the 

Taliban, and allied groups—is trying, through horrifying brutality, to bring 

more than 1 billion Muslims into line with a sweeping totalitarian doctrine, inconsistent with the tenets of Islam. 

Growing numbers of Muslims are waking up to threat and are opposing and 

ostracizing the violent extremists in their midst—even in Pakistan, where a terrible threat had been widely ignored. Even as U.S. favorability has slipped, 

28 

25http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1148/pakistan-little-support-for-terrorists-most-favor-educationfor-girls. 26See ‘‘What Obama Should Tell Muslims,’’ my op-ed from the Boston Globe, with Juan 

Zarate: http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial—opinion/oped/articles/2009/05/27/whatl 

obamalshouldltelllmuslims/. 

support for al-Qaeda and the Taliban has plummeted. In spring 2008, some 25 

percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of al-Qaeda, with 34 percent unfavorable—a disturbingly close split. Today, just 9 percent have a favorable opinion, with 61 percent unfavorable. So, too, with the Taliban: The ratings shifted 

from 27 percent favorable and 33 percent unfavorable in 2008 to 10 percent 

favorable and 70 percent unfavorable today.25 Our job in public diplomacy 

should be to help spread information about these reactionary groups trying to 

destroy Islam. 

• Iran and proxies. Along with its proxies Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas, Iran is 

confronting the vast majority of Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 

and Egypt. This Iran vs. Arab conflict is also part of the Sunni-Shia conflict 

that is playing out elsewhere, including Iraq, but Iran’s threat transcends religion. Regardless of sectarian bent, Muslim communities are rising to oppose the 

attempts by Iran and its intelligence services—in particular the Quds Force— 

to extend Shia extremism and influence throughout the world. Here, public diplomacy can support those who are struggling to change the policies of the Iranian regime. 

• Democracy and human rights, especially the rights of women. Many Arab governments have denied their citizens what Egyptian activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim 

has called ‘‘the infrastructure of democracy’’: rule of law, independent judiciary, 

free media, gender equality, and autonomous civil society. These necessities of 

liberty are more important than ballots dropped in a box, as we have seen by 

the actions of the terrorist Hamas regime in Gaza. 

A widespread criticism among Muslims is that the United States has not 

pressed authoritarian allies to democratize. For both moral and strategic reasons, we have a stake in supporting free societies with accountable governments. The reality of democracies thriving in Muslim societies—like Turkey and 

Indonesia—is a powerful counterweight to the canard that Islam and political 

freedom can’t coexist. Here, public diplomacy can remind those advancing freedom and democracy that they aren’t alone and that history, including our own, 

is replete with examples of brave advocates. 

For the immediate future, our job in public diplomacy is to promote this accurate narrative in everything we do. We can do it while at the same time emphasizing America’s values—concepts of pluralism, freedom, and opportunity that 

run counter to the extremists’ ideology. We should emphasize that the United 

States won’t be a passive bystander in these struggles. We will advance our own 

ideals and interests—which include promoting a comprehensive two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. 

But it is challenging and empowering Muslim communities to take on the 

three great struggles themselves, with the United States as a constructive partner, that is an approach that will overturn the extremists’ narrative and help 

shape a new, honest, and positive storyline—in which Muslims see themselves 

not as victims but as central protagonists in global struggles for justice.26

Strategic Public Diplomacy in Iran: The second example is one I laid out in a recent article with Mike Doran, a former colleague who now teaches at NYU. It concerns Iran. 

Here we are squandering a great opportunity. Our objective is an Iran free of nuclear weapons. Two routes to achieving the objective appear highly unlikely: armed 

conflict or successful official diplomacy. But public diplomacy can work—mainly because of the brave opposition movement that developed after the June elections. 

What are we doing to help? It’s hard to see. Doran and I urge: 

• Providing moral and educational support for the Green Movement in Iran by 

publicizing what worked in Ukraine or Georgia, dubbing into Farsi documentaries on the fall of Ceausescu, Milosevic, and Pinochet; the transitions in South 

Africa and Poland; and the achievements of the U.S. civil-rights movement. The 

great fear of the Iranian regime is that a nonviolent civil resistance in the form 

of a color movement, like those in states of the former Soviet Union, will gain 

authority and legitimacy and, ultimately, power through democratic means. The 

regime is right to be afraid. 

• Tightening sanctions on the Iranian economy and publicizing the connection between regime belligerence and economic malaise. The slogans of the protesters 

29 

27http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC14.php?CID=512. Testimony before the House 

Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. Both Khalaji, 

who was trained in the seminars of Qom before moving to the United States, and Carpenter, 

a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, are fellows of the Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy. 28http://www.bbg.gov/pressroom/printerfr.cfm?articleID=443. VOA and BBC transmissions 

were both jammed, leading a European satellite operator to take down Persian TV (PTV), the 

BBC Farsi network. VOA’s Persian News Network is also sporadically removed. ‘‘Iranians keep 

asking me why the west is so powerless,’’ Sadeq Saba, head of PTV, wrote on his blog. ‘‘They 

say: ‘This is a rogue government jamming international signals. How will the west stop Iran 

getting nuclear weapons if they can’t deal with this?’ ’’ (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/ 

jan/14/bbc-joins-iran-tv-protest). 

demonstrate that they are connecting the dots between the regime’s foreign policy and economic privation. • Doing all we can to increase communications within Iran, as well as between 

Iran and the outside world, including boosting broadcasting by Radio Farda and 

Voice of America satellite TV and spreading tools to facilitate mobile-phone 

messaging and social networking—and helping Iranians get the technology to 

overcome regime attempts to block and censor. In testimony in February in the 

House, Mehdi Khalaji and J. Scott Carpenter urged this approach as well. They 

state that Ayatollah ‘‘Khamenei often expresses his belief that he is in a soft 

war with the West. For him, all new telecommunication, Internet, and satellite 

technology are Western tools to defeat him in this war.’’ 27 We should be furnishing that technology. We should also be vigorously opposing Iranian interference with satellite transmissions, in violation of international agreements.28

• Finally, aggressively refuting, in campaign style, the key propositions of Iranian 

propaganda, such as that the Green Movement is marginal and lacks support 

and that the West wants Iran to be a technological backwater. A serious strategic communications program for Iran could have dozens, even hundreds, of 

programs. They might range from a campaign, including posters and TV commercials featuring Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, to encourage Iranians to come 

to California to be trained as high-tech experts; to an aggressive effort to expose 

the Iranian agents who beat and seize demonstrators; to support for an interactive satellite TV station that appeals to young people and urges them to express free choice in cultural and social, as well as political matters; to financial 

aid to the families of victims of the crackdown on demonstrators. 

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Here, then are seven recommendations for a more effective public diplomacy: 

1. Make public diplomacy a top priority. The entire government should know that 

the President sees public diplomacy as a critical part of America’s overall national 

security strategy. 

2. Make a distinction between what I call Strategic Public Diplomacy—that is, PD 

with clear objectives that can be achieved in a definable period, such as war-of-ideas 

goals—and long-term ongoing public diplomacy, which may be shaped strategically 

(with emphasis on exchanges with Muslim-majority nations, for example) but which 

is more general in its effects. 

3. Institute a strong interagency structure and process led by an official with a 

close connection to the President. During the Bush administration, that official was 

the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, but other 

structures are possible. 

4. Launch an interagency program quickly to show that public diplomacy can 

achieve national security goals. Iran should be the immediate focus. 

5. Promote the successes and enhance the understanding of the function and purpose of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Confirm the new slate of governors. 

The BBG is a precious asset that must not be ignored or denigrated. 

6. Expand Public Diplomacy 2.0, using technology to facilitate and convene a 

broad and deep global conversation in which we can more effectively influence and 

inform. At the same time, put teeth into Secretary Clinton’s affirmation that the 

United States supports open global communications. One step would be to challenge 

Iranian jamming of satellite broadcasts. 

7. Establish a culture of measurable results. All public diplomacy programs must 

be assessed and evaluated to see how well they ‘‘move the needle.’’ Measuring can 

be difficult and expensive, but, without it, we can’t tell whether work is succeeding 

or failing. 

Finally, remember that public diplomacy performs its mission of achieving the national interest in a particular way: by understanding, informing, engaging, and influencing foreign publics. While the ‘‘influencing’’ part may be the most important, 

30 

29www.fulbright.org/ifad/manual/quotes.pdf. 

the ‘‘understanding’’ part comes first. You can’t persuade if you don’t truly understand the people you are trying to persuade. 

Senator J. William Fulbright, who created the Fulbright exchanges in 1946, put 

it well: The ‘‘essence of intercultural education,’’ he said, referring to what would 

become one of our most effective public diplomacy programs, is ‘‘empathy, the ability 

to see the world as others see it, and to allow for the possibility that others may 

see something we have failed to see.’’ 29

Another key word in public diplomacy is compassion. At the Bush Institute, we 

base our programs on four key principles of the former President: freedom, responsibility, opportunity, and compassion. Americans are compassionate people, and that 

trait needs to be reflected in all that we do in public diplomacy. It is the foundation 

of Public Diplomacy 2.0, and, in the goals we seek, it is the driving force behind 

Strategic Public Diplomacy. 

I ended my testimony before this committee in January 2008 with the following 

sentence, which I believe bears repeating: The task ahead is to tell the world the 

story of a good and compassionate nation and, at the same time, to engage in the 

most important ideological contest of our time—a contest that we will win. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you very much. Thanks for all three. 

I’d like to start with Jim and then go down the panel on this one 

question. That is, we get so tied up in the budgets and where we 

are and the rest of it, I think the point that Jim made about this 

has got to be taken seriously. If you came back 10 years from now, 

what were the things that, if we’d done them, they would have 

been the most effective? Not thinking about present budgets or 

what’s happening right away, but trying to view it from a longer 

range, what are the things that would have been the most effective 

if we had done them now so that 10 years from now we’d take seriously a strategic—public diplomacy was taken seriously? Start with 

Jim. 

Mr. GLASSMAN. Senator, first let me just comment on budgets. I 

really did not in my way too extensive written testimony say that 

we ought to expand budgets. I understand what’s going on. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Oh, no, I—— 

Mr. GLASSMAN. I know you agree with that. So I don’t think 

that’s the solution, to increase resources. Increasing resources 

would be fine, but we have to be realistic. 

I think there’s a lot that can be done. First of all, I completely 

agree with Ambassador Hughes that increasing exchanges is enormously important. There’s nothing more important. Karen told me 

the two most important things that we do are putting foreigners 

face to face with Americans and teaching English. That’s what she 

told me when I took the job. She was absolutely right. 

But I do believe that there are certain things we can do in this 

more strategic realm of public diplomacy, and it begins with the 

President taking seriously, and other policymakers, public diplomacy as a tool of national security. That’s what it is. I think what 

I would feel very good about 10 years from now is that there is a 

structure in place led by the Under Secretary or possibly by somebody else, that brings the interagency together, and that actually 

sends people out to do specific tasks. 

Now, we were doing that at the end of the last administration. 

I’m not clear about how that’s being done now. I’m not going to 

criticize what’s being done now. But I think that’s the most important thing. If you ask me one specific thing, it would be this: I 

believe we are on the brink of a foreign policy success in Iran if 

31 

we would use public diplomacy the way it should be used. That 

would be a great thing to look back on 10 years from now. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Now, you know we passed the Voice Act, 

which was a bipartisan bill passed the Senate, that shows that this 

is a bipartisan issue in terms of the Congress, in terms of the Senate, that we really want to do this thing and what we have to do 

on Internet freedom. It has funds in there for Internet freedom and 

the rest of it. 

So Iran is very much on people’s minds and public diplomacy’s 

role is key. Obviously, we have a good broadcasting effort in that 

area. 

Karen. 

Ms. HUGHES. Same question? 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, same question. 

Ms. HUGHES. Let me share with you what I saw being done in 

one country that I thought was extremely effective, and it touches 

on what Ambassador Glassman just said. That is that all the tools 

were brought together and applied to a problem in a coordinated 

way. So for example, the Ambassador in the Philippines at the 

time, Kristie Kenney, took me to Holo Island, where I, as the U.S. 

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, opened a road that we had 

opened to help the villagers bring their products to market. 

It was very much a battle for hearts and minds, where they were 

competing with a very violent strain of extremism that was connected with al-Qaeda. The war of ideas was going on on that little 

island, where they were trying to—the terrorists were attacking 

the local population, were trying to intimidate and terrorize the 

local population. We were trying to win them over. 

The Defense Department was providing strategic help to the 

Philippines Armed Forces. The USAID was working with State to 

help provide the funds to help the villagers bring their goods to 

market. 

That’s the type of thing that I think needs to happen more 

broadly in key countries where we’re facing this ideological struggle. We had identified, as Jim said, key countries. The list was 

classified, but we were working on very country-specific plans to 

bring all the resources of the U.S. Government together and try to 

coordinate better to make a difference in those countries. So I think 

that’s probably the single thing. 

I do think we need more resources devoted to public diplomacy. 

I don’t think that means an expansion of spending overall. I think 

there are resources that are misallocated. For example, Defense 

has—and Secretary Gates has said this himself, that they have a 

lot of funds for public diplomacy that probably should more 

normally be used by the State Department in conducting public 

diplomacy. 

One of the problems that I found was not much flexibility. Most 

of my funding was tied up in salaries around the world with Foreign Service nationals, career Foreign Service officers. There was 

no pot of money to apply to a problem. So if I had found the magic 

bullet program, it would have been very hard to find the money to 

fund it. 

I did get funding, thanks to the Congress, through the supplemental on the war on terror, that allowed us to start this new 

32 

English language teaching program for 8-to-14-year-olds in about 

30 different countries. I think that was very important. But that 

illustrated that those types of funds are not available. 

The first week that I was at the State Department, the Defense 

Department signed a contract with a public relations agency, the 

Lincoln Group, for almost as much as my overall budget. So I think 

that sort of illustrated very clearly that there may be some 

misallocation of existing resources and we need better coordination 

among the agencies. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Of course, Secretary Gates is a big supporter 

of that. 

Ms. HUGHES. He is. 

Senator KAUFMAN. He always points out that there are more people in the Army bands than there are in the entire Foreign Service. 

Ms. HUGHES. Exactly. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Evelyn. 

Ms. LIEBERMAN. I agree with my colleagues. Mine is a little bit 

more of a—my first is a little bit more of a parochial request, and 

that is I still do not believe that the public diplomacy practitioners 

in the State Department are considered equal to the people who 

are the Foreign Service officers. I think that has not happened yet. 

I think it’s been a merger, successful in some places. I think the 

fact that some ambassadors have been former public affairs officers 

or cultural officers, have been very few and far between, but that 

symbolically makes a difference as well. So I don’t think the 

merger has worked as well in terms of the personnel. 

The second, I agree that exchanges, exchanges, exchanges, let 

Americans see people from other places. Let people from other 

places see and interact with Americans. I think the radios should 

be strengthened. I think they’re very often underestimated, underrated, the radios and TV. I think that’s worked very well. I’d like 

to see that work even better. I was reading some statistics from 

one of my former colleagues at VOA. He told me that VOA has 

trained 5,000 journalists in 140 countries. 

I also find that Voice of America’s special English program with 

a vocabulary of 1,500 words has taught thousands. Thousands of 

people, who we’ve all met, I’m sure, have said that that’s how they 

learned to speak English and have learned to like this country, love 

this country. 

I agree about interagency, but I would also like to see—there was 

a point I was just going to make. I would also like to see more 

interagency activity. I think the point about the Defense Department being very rich and in many cases they just don’t know how 

to practice public diplomacy. They try to be more generous with 

some funds, but it’s usually for programs that they themselves 

want to encourage, not necessarily programs that the State Department wants to encourage. 

I also think that we have got to get rid of having editorials in 

our radio broadcasts. The BBC and Deutsche Welle and Radio 

France International and one other that I’m missing used to meet 

quarterly, all the international broadcasters. And I would say why 

do people look at the BBC or Deutsche Welle with more seriousness 

in some cases than they look at us? And they said: Because you 

have these required editorials. People do not make a distinction 

33 

between what is an editorial, considered American propaganda, 

and what is real news; and because the broadcasts on—because I 

was at Voice of America, I use that as an example, of course. Because ‘‘The news shall be good, the news shall be bad, we’ll tell you 

the truth,’’ and the broadcasts themselves are so excellent, but they 

lose—they lose their power when they are juxtaposed with American policy editorials. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much, and thanks to all three 

of our witnesses. They certainly have been there and we can benefit from their testimony. 

Ambassador Hughes, let me begin with you. In the House and 

Senate I’ve tried to be a strong advocate of languages at the university level, strengthening language training in ROTC with our 

military. But you said something that caught my attention. You 

said we not only need people who are conversational, but we need 

to go beyond that to people who can be actually articulate in an 

interview, even with a hostile questioner. You know, that’s hard for 

a lot of American politicians, so it’s a tall order. [Laughter.] 

And it got me thinking. I was in Afghanistan at the police academy in Kabul and the general who was talking to us had a translator who it turns out was an Afghan-American who had gone to 

the United States, had married an American citizen, and who was 

persuaded to join the military to serve his new country. Well, I’ll 

tell you what. I don’t speak the language that he was speaking, but 

he certainly appeared to be very comfortable in the native language, obviously. 

How are we going to find these people that can go beyond conversational, which is really an achievement for an American citizen? 

How do we do that? 

Ms. HUGHES. That’s a great question. 

Senator WICKER. Have I stumbled upon something that we need 

to be looking at. 

Ms. HUGHES. I think we need to be more focused on it. President 

Bush started a national security language initiative to encourage 

scholarships for young Americans in key languages vital to our 

national security, such as Arabic, Chinese, Russian. There’s a list 

of six or seven as I recall. I do think we need to reach out. 

The State Department trains—reach out to people, maybe, as you 

say, Afghan-Americans, people from—maybe native speakers, and 

recruit them. There are problems, however. One of the things I’m 

concerned about is the State Department personnel system makes 

it difficult, even if you can find those people, to get them on board 

and deployed quickly. 

Right now you have to take the Foreign Service exam. That’s a 

lengthy process. Once you go to work at the State Department, you 

have to do a tour on consular duty. All required—new officers have 

to do that. It’s several years, I believe. Two years, is that right, 

Jim? 

Mr. GLASSMAN. Frequently it’s 5. 

Ms. HUGHES. Frequently it’s longer. So from start to finish, if you 

had a young American who was a great speaker that you wanted 

to send to Afghanistan to speak on, do television interviews on 

34 

behalf of the Foreign Service, it would probably take you at least 

5 to 6, 7 years to get them there, because of the current system. 

The State Department has language training that is very good. 

They rate it on different categories and I think there’s a 3–3 that 

is trained to be able to be very conversational, to be able to engage 

with foreign publics and work. The 4–4 is what is required to be 

able to conduct an interview, and we don’t train very many people 

to that 4–4 level. 

There’s another concern that I have. We’ve gone away from a 

system of encouraging people to specialize in certain regions or language. There was apparently some concern, described as ‘‘going 

native,’’ that they worried that people were going native because 

they served in certain regions so long that they started to have the 

perspective of that region rather than the perspective of America. 

The problem is—and so now the State Department rewards people for serving in different geographical regions rather than staying 

on one throughout their career. The problem with that again is it 

becomes very hard to train enough spokespeople who are able to 

communicate and understand the nuances of language and culture 

that make them really effective communicators. 

So I do think for the type of people that we’re expecting to communicate in foreign languages on behalf of our country, we might 

need to look at their career path a little differently. 

Senator WICKER. Ambassador Glassman, you may want to comment about that. But let me shift and first ask you about Iran. I 

think the information that we have is that the government there 

doesn’t like America very much, but the Iranian people really do. 

The population of Iran, I guess approximately half of it is below the 

age of 25, 26, something like that. What accounts for that? 

And then—I’ll pile my questions up and let you answer as you 

choose. You stated we need to provide moral support for the protesters. Could you be specific about how we might do that without 

raising expectations? I don’t want the protesters to think that it’s 

at all likely that the American military is going to come in and intervene on their behalf. In previous decades—Hungary comes to 

mind. I think the freedom fighters thought that America would 

show up. We didn’t. We shouldn’t have given them reason to 

believe we would. 

So how do you balance that out? And then if you want to comment on languages I’d be happy for you to. 

Mr. GLASSMAN. Senator, on the question of why the Iranian people like us, but the regime doesn’t, you’re absolutely right. The 

Iranian people have a long and rich history, deep. It’s a great civilization and it is a freedom-loving people, and I don’t think it should 

be unusual, we should be surprised, that the Iranian people have 

a good deal of admiration for the United States. 

Senator WICKER. Where does that young person that’s 25 years 

of age or under, where do they get their information? 

Mr. GLASSMAN. Well, I think that—— 

Senator WICKER. Is this a success of public diplomacy or is it 

just—— 

Mr. GLASSMAN. Let me say, and I have talked to many Iranians 

in this country, Iranian-Americans, and the role that’s played by 

the VOA and Radio Farda should not be underestimated. It’s really 

35 

important. It is really important. That’s why I did mention the 

jamming by the Iranians of international satellite broadcasts, 

which is absolutely outrageous. 

But the answer to your question is that the Iranians are very 

much, especially the young people, are very much exposed to what’s 

going on in the rest of the world through the Internet and through 

other means. There is travel outside of Iran. And they feel an affinity with Americans. There are a lot of Iranian-Americans that talk 

to people in Iran as well. 

So it’s a great relationship, and Iran is a rich, a rich civilization 

that is now under the thumb of a despotic regime that more and 

more Iranians feel that something can be done about. And I’m not 

talking about the United States giving material support to overthrow the Iranian Government. I’m not saying that. What I’m saying is that there is, first of all, moral support. I don’t think moral 

support—to give moral support to Iranians in the Green Movement 

is not to say that we’re sending in the tanks. It is to say that what 

you’re doing is brave, it is admirable, and it is in keeping with the 

values of this country and I think the values of freedom-loving people everywhere. I think that’s something we need to say, and we 

can reinforce it. There are many ways to reinforce it. 

One very simple way to reinforce it is to remind Iranians of the 

people who’ve gone before them, both those in the Orange Movement in Ukraine, people in the civil rights movement in the United 

States. There is a rich history of dissidents and freedom and advancing freedom around the world. The idea is they’re part of it. 

Now, there are other things that can be done in a material sense 

and certainly in an educational sense. But there’s lots and lots that 

can be done. I mentioned in an op-ed that I wrote with Mike 

Doran, former Defense Department official, that there are— 

literally we could be doing hundreds of programs aimed at Iran 

today, and we’re lucky that events have transpired in the way that 

they have in a country in which, as you say, the population is predisposed to like us. There couldn’t be a more fertile field for the use 

of public diplomacy to achieve national security ends than Iran. 

Senator WICKER. OK. And then finally, you’ve mentioned measuring results. You also mentioned strategic goals versus long-term 

and ongoing goals. I guess it’s hard to measure success in the long 

term ongoing. But to the extent that you have a strategic goal that 

doesn’t last for decades, could you elaborate on how best to measure our success? 

Mr. GLASSMAN. Well, let me just say, Senator, that it is not easy 

to do this. 

Senator WICKER. No, it sure isn’t. 

Mr. GLASSMAN. Right. When I was on the Djerejian group in 

2003 looking at public diplomacy in Arab and Muslim societies, 

that was one of our major recommendations. I have to say that 

Ambassador Hughes and others of my predecessors really stepped 

up to the plate and put into effect in the Under Secretary’s Office 

some very good tools for measuring, for example, how well we’re 

doing with exchanges, how well we’re doing with Access Microscholarships, the English teaching programs she’s talking about. 

It is much harder to do, and I’m not the expert on exactly how 

you do it. All I can say is it has to be part of everything that you 

36 

do in public diplomacy. Is this working or not? It requires people 

who are experts sitting down, trying to figure out what the metrics 

should be, and then trying to take out the other elements that may 

be influencing final outcomes. 

As I say, it’s not easy. We devoted a fair amount of resources 

during my time to trying to do this, and I know that the current 

Under Secretary is doing the same thing. I think it just needs to 

continue. It’s too easy to say, as I heard many people say in 2003, 

gee, we can’t do this, it’s way too hard. You’ve got to know whether 

it’s working or not. 

Senator WICKER. Well, I’m way over on this segment. If you 

could supplement your answer with thinking back during your 

term to specific ways that you measured. 

Mr. GLASSMAN. I’d be happy to. 

Senator WICKER. Now, Mr. Chairman, it’s your turn. I have a 

question—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Go ahead. 

Senator WICKER. OK. Secretary Lieberman, I want to ask you 

about American Centers, which we now call Information Resource 

Centers. You mentioned, you and Ambassador Hughes both mentioned, not being walled in within the security of our compounds. 

After the bombing of our Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, we 

pulled back on what some people consider a very valuable diplomacy platform, the American Centers. They housed libraries, reading rooms, taught English, conducted countless outreach programs, 

book groups, film series, and on and on. 

The decision was made around 1998, 1999, to move those within 

the Embassy and, as you might expect, the attendance at these 

centers dropped considerably. Our ranking member on the full committee, Senator Lugar, has championed reversing this retrenchment of the American Centers. S. Res. 49 has passed the full 

Senate and Senator Kaufman and I were cosponsors. It urges the 

Secretary of State to review the status of American Centers globally and, to the extent that security considerations allow, increase 

access to them. 

Did we make a mistake by changing the focus and accessibility 

of American Centers and what is the future there? 

Ms. LIEBERMAN. The answer is we made a mistake, but in some 

places it was a matter of necessity. When I first became Under Secretary, as I had traveled around many of the libraries were beginning to close, and it was as these libraries that were staffed by the 

former USIA public affairs officers began to close down, I think not 

so much because of safety reasons at that time, but because everything was becoming more electronic and they were trying to get 

more efficient. 

I think after 9/11—and the complaint about the closure was that 

this was the one place, this was the one place in the Embassy that 

people were allowed to come in, find information, read books, find 

out about the United States, a chance for us to meet people face 

to face, and that was considered a hardship when they closed 

because people didn’t have any contact with the Embassy, with the 

Embassy informally, let’s put it that way. 

I remember Ambassador Rohatyn around the time of 1999 or 

2000 began to talk about these American Presence posts, where 

37 

people—one officer would go to, not a remote area, but away from 

the Embassy, to a city or a smaller area, and he and a couple of 

foreign host national staff would have a mini-embassy where they 

would deal with local governments, do trade, do commerce. So they 

would function as mini-embassies, and at least there were places 

where people could interact with local people. 

I think the safety and security became an issue. In some places, 

as I said before, you’re very brave to go out of the embassy in some 

countries, as you know, and deal with the people on the street, but 

where American Centers spaces that offer public access to information about us—books, CDs, DVDs, Internet use—have been tremendously popular and tremendously successful, and it’s the one place 

where informally there can be interaction with people in a particular country and our public affairs officers. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I’d just make one comment. The importance 

of these things—I was really struck. I was in Johannesburg when 

they closed down the library there in the Embassy. That’s where 

Mandela and Slovo and Mbeke came together to figure out what 

they were going to do, and that’s what happened all over the world. 

The second thing was, I was in Jerusalem in April. There’s an 

American Center right in downtown Jerusalem in a mall. So I 

think we really have to—and I know Senator Wicker agrees with 

me—we really have to take a hard look at the security, because 

clearly this is what the terrorists want us to do. I mean, the whole 

objective, if you listen to what they’re saying, is they want us to 

retreat. 

Jim, could you just talk me a little bit more? I thought your example on measurement on Pakistan was extremely good in terms 

of laying out the complexity of the problem. How would you do 

something like that kind of a complex problem, where you’re not 

trying to change public opinion, but where you’re trying to change 

opinions in the country? And I’d like everybody’s comment. 

Mr. GLASSMAN. Well, it’s not public opinion about the United 

States necessarily. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. GLASSMAN. I think we’re way too fixated on that. For example, if your objective in Pakistan would be to convince more Pakistanis that this is our war—that, by the way, is a phrase that 

comes from President Zardari, and I think that as a mission for 

American public diplomacy it’s a good one. That’s actually quite 

easy to measure. Maybe our own participation in changing attitudes in Pakistan so that more people would agree with the statement, that may be kind of difficult to separate out from what 

others are doing. 

And then there’s the question of what we would do. Some of what 

we would do might be covert and classified, but a lot of it might 

be simply giving help to the Pakistanis, helping to build capacity, 

for example, for their own effort to change public opinion. I think 

that would do a world of good. 

Now, public opinion in Pakistan is changing and it’s mainly—it 

may be changing partly because of what we’re doing, but it may be 

mainly changing because of what they’re doing, what the terrorists 

are doing. But I think that’s something we could measure. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Good. Karen, Evelyn? 

38 

Ms. LIEBERMAN. Karen, go ahead. 

Ms. HUGHES. Well, I do think there are a lot of things we could 

do to help. We can provide forums where Pakistanis have a chance 

to talk about these issues, to debate. We can help with communications tools and tactics. I found that often very good things would 

happen, someone would speak out and condemn violence and terrorism in the name of Islam, for example, but it wouldn’t be publicized, it wouldn’t be picked up by the media. So we can help them 

with communications tactics to make sure that it’s publicized and 

that they’re booked on radio and television and have an opportunity to share those views. 

So I think there are a lot of opportunities to do things like that. 

And I very much agree with Jim that we need to look at it, not 

as if—we need to look at our strategic priority in the country. Obviously, we have a shared priority with Pakistan in defeating extremism there, and look at with Pakistani partners how can we best 

help you to do that, because it’s in our interest and in your interests. 

Ms. LIEBERMAN. It’s very difficult to measure, obviously, as my 

colleagues have said. But one vastly underutilized resource is the 

thousands of alumni who have participated in our programs, then 

have gone back to their own countries. There is no system for 

reaching these people with regular communications, and I think 

that that is a vast untapped resource that we can use. 

Ms. HUGHES. I agree with that, and we worked—Senator, if I 

may address that, we did work to begin to establish an alumni 

database. We also put in place some programs to begin to evaluate. 

We do a good job of evaluating our exchange programs. We often 

weren’t doing a good job on our other public diplomacy programs. 

So we put in place something called the Mission Activity Tracker, 

where we now have a survey: What was the result? Did this 

speaker help shape your views or increase your understanding of 

America? Did we achieve the goal in this program? How would you 

evaluate the impact of this program? 

So we are trying to get that culture. I actually cancelled the publication of a magazine, Hi Magazine, which had been created to try 

to reach out to Arab young people, but we found after we did a survey of our embassies it wasn’t successful. People weren’t looking at 

it. It wasn’t being used. It was expensive and not achieving the 

goal. So we suspended publication of it. 

So I think we are doing a better job and our public diplomats are 

committed to doing that. The thing that’s harder to measure is 

what is the impact of having an American who speaks good Arabic 

going on Al Jazeera? Well, at least you’re taking time that somebody else might be spending to criticize you, so at least you’re getting—and you’re getting your views out there. It’s hard to measure 

what impact does that have, but over time—take the analogy here. 

It’s as if someone in a campaign for Senate decided not to go on 

television. Well, you would never do that because your opponent 

would get all the air time. 

So we need to be out there advocating. It is difficult to measure 

the impact of that. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Great. I want to thank you very much. We 

could stay. I’ve got another 20 questions. But we have a very imVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:22 Dec 15, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
39 

portant second panel and the Ambassador is here. So I want to 

thank you very much, and if Ambassador McHale will come up 

here we’ll get started with the second panel. 

Ms. HUGHES. Thank you for the opportunity for inviting us. 

Thank you. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you very much. 

[Pause.] 

Senator KAUFMAN. Under Secretary McHale, thank you very 

much for coming here today. I think we can move right into your 

opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JUDITH A. MCHALE, UNDER SECRETARY 

OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. MCHALE. Thank you. Thank you very much. It’s a bit lonely 

by myself. Can I invite them back? 

Chairman Kaufman, Senator Wicker, thank you for your invitation to appear before you this afternoon. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the state of America’s public diplomacy, 

the framework that we are developing to more closely align our 

activities with the Nation’s foreign policy objectives, and the challenges we continue to face. 

Before I begin, I want to acknowledge the legacies of my predecessors who just testified. In a span of just a few years, they put 

our Nation’s public diplomacy on a trajectory that laid the foundation for a new approach to public diplomacy for the 21st century. 

As I noticed when I listened to them—in fact, I was saying to 

them, you guys have stolen all my lines—my predecessors and I 

agree on many issues, including the central importance of public 

diplomacy to our Nation’s foreign policy and our obligation to ensure public diplomacy is strategic and coordinated at the interagency level. We also agree in many ways on how we should 

approach public diplomacy, including by assertively shaping the 

public narrative, expanding our engagement beyond elite audiences, and getting more innovative in our programming while not 

walking away from programs that work. 

Throughout the past year we have witnessed the strong, energetic, and consistent commitment of President Obama and Secretary Clinton to public diplomacy. Both understand that engagement with global publics must be an essential part of our foreign 

policy apparatus. The communications revolution that has rocketed 

around the world has had an impact on the attitudes, behaviors, 

and aspirations of people everywhere. Public opinion is influencing 

foreign governments and shaping world affairs to an unprecedented 

degree. 

In this environment, our efforts to engage foreign publics 

through public diplomacy are more important than ever. We must 

act boldly and decisively to develop a clear, consistent, and comprehensive approach. Over the past months 8 months we have 

undertaken a focused and disciplined review of the current state of 

public diplomacy and public affairs at the Department of State. 

This process showed that in significant ways our public diplomacy 

was working well to advance America’s interests, but it also reVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:22 Dec 15, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
40 

vealed a great deal of consensus about what needs to be changed 

to align it to current priorities and guide our efforts going forward. 

Last month we began rolling out the results of our review, a new 

global strategic framework that I believe will give us the focus and 

capabilities we need in the complex environment of the 21st century. The new framework rests on the core mission of public diplomacy to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and 

objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding 

and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world. 

As part of our review, we identified five strategic imperatives. 

First, in this information-saturated age we must do a better job of 

framing global narratives in order to reinforce our foreign policy 

goals. We must become more proactive and less reactive. We are 

bolstering our communications outreach locally, nationally, regionally, and globally to inform, inspire, and persuade our target audiences and to counter misinformation. 

In support of these efforts, among other things, we are creating 

the new position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Media Support within State’s Bureau of Public Affairs, to 

facilitate coordinated and high-level attention to foreign media. 

Second, we are expanding and strengthening people-to-people 

relationships, relationships based on mutual trust and respect, 

through our public diplomacy programs and platforms. In addition 

to growing our highly successful exchange programs, we are broadening the demographic base of those with whom we engage beyond 

traditional elites, and we will continue to support programs that 

simultaneously advance U.S. national interests and offer desired 

skills to targeted audiences, including expanded language training 

and teacher training, collaboration in skill-building in science, technology, and entrepreneurship, and programs designed to provide 

women with the skills they need to advance within their societies. 

We are evaluating the opportunities to revitalize and establish 

American Centers and Corners as spaces for public engagement 

and we are working with organizations across the country to expand our cultural programs to showcase the breadth and depth of 

America’s cultural heritage. 

Third, we are expanding our efforts to respond rapidly to terrorist and violent extremist messages and proactively counter the 

narrative that has allowed them to disseminate misinformation 

and recruit new followers. In Washington and at our embassies and 

consulates overseas, we will aggressively harness new and traditional media to counter misinformation and disinformation. In 

doing so, we will not simply communicate U.S. perspectives. We 

will also empower local, credible voices and build host government 

capacity to counter the extremist narratives. 

Fourth, we are taking steps to ensure that our policies and programs are informed up front by a clear understanding of attitudes 

and opinions of foreign publics. We are establishing the position of 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy in each 

of our regional bureaus. These officers will be responsible for ensuring that a public diplomacy perspective is incorporated as part 

41 

of senior policy formulations and for coordinating all our public 

diplomacy initiatives throughout the respective regions. 

Finally, we are taking steps to ensure a strategic allocation of resources in support of today’s foreign policy priorities. We are 

strengthening the policy, planning, and resource function within 

my office and we are reestablishing multiyear public diplomacy 

plans for all posts. These plans will set forth our public diplomacy 

mission in host countries, analyze target audiences, inventory continuing and innovative tactics to achieve our goals, identify the resources necessary for success, and integrate realistic measurements 

of effectiveness. 

As we implement the new global strategic framework for public 

diplomacy, we have placed renewed emphasis on coordination both 

in Washington and overseas to ensure that our efforts complement 

and, where possible, reinforce the activities of other departments 

and agencies. We participate in the weekly NSC-led interagency 

policy coordination process and take part in a variety of other stafflevel coordination bodies, including the biweekly small table group 

at the National Counterterrorism Center. We also enjoy a close and 

productive working relationship with our partners at the Department of Defense. I talk and meet regularly with my counterparts 

there on both specific programs and on broader strategic issues, 

such as potential rebalancing of the respective roles, responsibilities, and resources of State and Defense in the public diplomacy 

and strategic communications arenas. 

Mr. Chairman, let me say in closing that I believe this is a moment of great opportunity to redefine our relationship with people 

around the world and to build bridges of knowledge and understanding with people everywhere. In doing so, I believe we will improve lives and support our national interests, and I look forward 

to working with you as we seek to achieve these goals. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. McHale follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JUDITH MCHALE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC

DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Kaufman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for your invitation 

to appear before you this morning. 

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the state of America’s public 

diplomacy, the framework that we are developing to more closely align our activities 

with the Nation’s foreign policy objectives, and the challenges we continue to face. 

Before I begin, I want to acknowledge the legacies of my predecessors, several of 

whom testified before you this morning. In a span of just a few years, they put our 

Nation’s public diplomacy on a trajectory that laid the foundation for a new 

approach to public diplomacy for the 21st century. 

Throughout the past year we have witnessed the strong, energetic, and consistent 

commitment of President Obama and Secretary Clinton to public diplomacy. From 

the President’s speeches in Cairo and Accra, to the many events that the Secretary 

has held directly with international audiences around the world, they have made 

public diplomacy an integral part of their approach to foreign policy. Both understand that engagement with global publics must be an essential part of our foreign 

policy apparatus as we pursue our policy objectives, seek to advance our national 

interests, and strive to ensure our national security. 

THE WORLD WE FACE

The communications revolution that has rocketed around the world has had an 

impact on the attitudes, behaviors, and aspirations of people everywhere. Public 

opinion is influencing foreign governments and shaping world affairs to an unpreceVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:22 Dec 15, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
42 

dented degree. In the past 25 years 40 new electoral democracies have emerged. 

This is a great triumph for our belief in the democratic form of government. As citizens in these countries exercise their rights, their decisions affect not only the 

future of their own countries but also the future of the United States and that of 

the rest of the world. In this context, our efforts to engage foreign publics through 

public diplomacy are more important than ever before. 

Today, 45 percent of the world’s population is under the age of 25. These young 

people—many of whom face enormous social and economic challenges—have come 

of age during a period of limited direct engagement with the United States. They 

communicate in new ways and with tools which are constantly evolving. As we 

reach out to this new generation we must develop strategies to engage and inspire 

them. Increasingly our opponents and adversaries are developing sophisticated 

media strategies to spread disinformation and rumors which ignite hatred and spur 

acts of terror and destruction. We must be ever vigilant and respond rapidly to their 

attacks against us. 

Women account for over 50 percent of the world’s population and yet in too many 

parts of the world they lack access to education and fundamental rights. Countless 

reports and studies demonstrate that increased participation by women in the social, economic, and political lives of their countries results in more stable productive 

societies. We must continue to develop and deploy new programs to support and empower women as they seek to improve their lives and communities. 

The global challenges we face today require a complex, multidimensional 

approach to public diplomacy. Our Government must develop new ways to communicate and engage with foreign publics at all levels of society. In doing so, we must 

do a better job of listening; learn how people in other countries and cultures listen 

to us; understand their desires and aspirations; and provide them with information 

and services of value to them. In essence, we must develop ways to become woven 

into the fabric of the daily lives of people around the world as we seek to create 

strong and lasting relationships with them. 

A STRATEGIC APPROACH FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

We must act boldly and decisively to develop a clear, consistent, and comprehensive approach to public diplomacy. Over the past 8 months we have undertaken a 

focused and disciplined review of the current state of public diplomacy and public 

affairs at the Department of State. As part of that review, we have consulted with 

individuals involved in public diplomacy here on Capitol Hill, at the National Security Council and the Department of Defense, and at all levels within the Department of State. We have also met with representatives of academia, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector. I have traveled to embassies and 

consulates in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. And in October 

we hosted a global conference attended by all our Public Affairs Officers to ensure 

that we understood the needs of our posts around the world. 

This process showed that in significant ways our public diplomacy was working 

well to advance America’s interests. But it also revealed a great degree of consensus 

about what needs to be changed to align it to current priorities and guide our efforts 

going forward. Last month, we began rolling out the results of our review: a new 

global strategic framework for public diplomacy that I believe will give us the focus 

and capabilities we need in the complex environment of the 21st century. 

The new framework rests on the core mission of public diplomacy to support the 

achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, 

and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by 

expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government 

of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world. 

As part of our review we identified five strategic imperatives: to proactively shape 

global narratives; expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships; counter violent extremism; better inform policymaking; and, redeploy resources in strategic 

alignment with shifting priorities. Moving forward, we are taking steps to ensure 

that all our activities support these requirements. 

First, in this information saturated age we must do a better job of framing our 

national narrative. We must become more proactive and less reactive. We are bolstering our communications outreach—locally, nationally, regionally, and globally— 

to inform, inspire, and persuade our target audiences and to counter misinformation. We are working with our posts around the world to develop and implement 

targeted media engagement plans to both push positive stories and to respond rapidly to negative attacks against us. We will expand the role of our regional Media 

Hubs, and enhance their capabilities as digital engagement centers to ensure that 

43 

we are fully represented in dialogues in both traditional and new venues for information and debate. 

In December , I sent a cable to our Public Affairs Officers worldwide directing 

them to be more aggressive and strategic in their communications efforts. As an example of our new forward-leaning stance across the range of issues, our embassies 

successfully changed the global narrative about our rescue and relief efforts following the tragic earthquake in Haiti. In support of these efforts, we are creating 

the new position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Media 

Support within State’s Bureau of Public Affairs to facilitate coordinated and highlevel attention to foreign media. 

Second, we are expanding and strengthening people-to-people relationships—relationships based on mutual trust and respect—through our public diplomacy programs and platforms. In addition to growing our highly successful exchange 

programs, we are broadening the demographic base of those with whom we engage 

beyond traditional elites. We are using social networking and connective technologies such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter to expand our reach and ensure 

that we are represented in new media and conversation spaces. Last year, in connection with the President’s speech in Ghana, we used a combination of traditional 

and new media to actively engage with millions of individuals across Africa. And 

in January, I participated in a Skype-enabled video conference which allowed high 

school students in Boston to talk to their peers in Jalalabad. 

We will continue to support programs that simultaneously advance U.S. national 

interests and offer desired skills to targeted audiences. These programs include expanded English language teaching and teacher training, collaboration and skillbuilding in science, technology, and entrepreneurship, programs designed to provide 

women with the skills they need to advance within their societies, and, educational 

advising that promotes the broad array of education opportunities offered by U.S. 

academic institutions. 

We are evaluating opportunities to revitalize and establish American Centers and 

Corners as spaces for public engagement. And we are working with organizations 

across the country to expand our cultural programs to showcase the breadth and 

depth of America’s cultural heritage. Recognizing that participants in our programs 

are among our best ambassadors, we are investing new resources both to enable us 

to remain better connected to alumni of our exchange programs and to enable them 

to better connect with each other so that they can build upon their shared experiences. 

Third, we are expanding our efforts to respond rapidly to terrorist and violent extremist messages and proactively counter the narrative that has allowed them to 

disseminate misinformation and recruit new followers. In Washington and at our 

embassies and consulates overseas, we will aggressively harness new and traditional media to communicate U.S. perspectives and counter misinformation and 

disinformation. We will redouble our efforts to empower credible voices within societies. To do so, we will continue to provide tools and platforms for independent 

voices to expand their reach, and leverage partnerships to train religious and secular leaders with local influence in issues of development, health, and education. 

Fourth, we are taking steps to ensure that our policies and programs are informed 

upfront by a clear understanding of attitudes and opinions of foreign publics. We 

are establishing the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy in each of the regional bureaus. These officers will be responsible for ensuring 

that a public diplomacy perspective is incorporated as part of senior policy deliberations and for coordinating all our public diplomacy initiatives throughout their respective regions. We are also strengthening our research and planning capacity. In 

doing so we will draw on the resources of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 

at the State Department , the Broadcasting Board of Governors, media reporting 

from the Open Source Center, and others to provide us with the information and 

data we need for this critical task. 

Finally, we are taking steps to ensure a strategic allocation of resources in support of today’s foreign policy priorities. We are strengthening the Policy, Planning 

and Resource function within my office and we are reestablishing multiyear public 

diplomacy plans for all posts. These plans will set forth our public diplomacy mission in the host country, analyze target audiences, inventory continuing and innovative tactics to achieve our goals, identify the resources necessary for success, and 

integrate realistic measurements of effectiveness. In Washington we will examine 

each plan to ensure congruence with our global objectives and allocation of public 

diplomacy resources in line with current priorities. 

44 

COORDINATION AT ALL LEVELS

As we implement the new global strategic framework for public diplomacy, we 

have placed renewed emphasis on coordination both in Washington and overseas to 

ensure that our efforts complement and, where possible, reinforce the activities of 

other departments and agencies. 

We participate in the National Security Council (NSC)-led Interagency Policy 

Coordination (IPC) process. The NSC brings together senior working-level stakeholders from across the interagency for a Strategic Communications IPC meeting on 

a weekly basis. These meetings address a wide range of issues including global, regional, and country-specific matters. They are designed to coordinate, develop, and 

deconflict communications programs and activities across U.S. Government agencies. My staff also takes part in a variety of other staff-level coordination bodies, 

including the biweekly Small Table Group at the National Counterterrorism Center. 

The Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC), which is part of my office, is 

specifically chartered to support the NSC’s Global Engagement Directorate. We are 

expanding and upgrading GSEC to strengthen its ability to contribute across a 

broad range of U.S. Government strategic communications and global engagement 

activities. To head the new GSEC, I have recruited Ambassador Richard LeBaron, 

formerly our Ambassador to Kuwait and one of our senior-most Foreign Service officers. He will arrive on the job this summer. 

We also enjoy a close and productive working relationship with our partners at 

the Department of Defense. I talk and meet regularly with my counterparts there 

on both specific programs and on broader strategic issues, such as potential rebalancing of the respective roles, responsibilities, and resources of State and Defense 

in the public diplomacy and strategic communications arenas. I recently visited General Petraeus in Tampa to discuss challenges and opportunities in his region of responsibility and how we can work more effectively with CENTCOM. I have also met 

several times with Admiral Olson of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to 

put our heads together on ways to improve current cooperation between State and 

SOCOM. 

THE NEW APPROACH: A CASE STUDY—PAKISTAN

Last summer, my office worked closely with our Embassy in Islamabad, Special 

Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, USAID, and DOD 

to draft the Pakistan Communications Plan, a copy of which has been provided to 

the committee. 

The Pakistan Plan has four broad goals: expand media outreach, counter extremist propaganda, build communications capacity, and strengthen people-to-people 

ties. Our plan links elements of traditional public diplomacy with innovative new 

tools. For instance, recognizing that extremist voices dominate in some of Pakistan’s 

media markets, we instituted a rapid response unit and a 24-hour multilingual hotline for the Embassy to respond to attacks, threats, and propaganda from the 

Taliban, al-Qaeda, and their sympathizers. This approach reversed a previous approach of not actively countering such propaganda. It has been an uphill battle but, 

as our voice gets more frequent play, the impact on the discourse in Pakistan’s 

media has been noticeable. 

As we strengthen our people-to-people ties with Pakistanis, our aim has been to 

increase positive American presence on the ground in Pakistan. To do this we are 

focusing on more exchanges, more presence, more Lincoln Centers, more face-to-face 

meetings with engaged citizens in Pakistan, and more nonofficial contacts between 

Pakistanis and Americans in Pakistan. 

Secretary Clinton’s October 2009 visit to Pakistan was planned and executed in 

coordination with the themes of our strategic plan. Her focus on issues of education, 

jobs, and reliable electric power responded to what we had identified as central concerns of Pakistanis. Her extensive series of public engagement activities carried out 

the plan’s emphasis on rejuvenating our personal, face-to-face diplomacy. Her visits 

to historical and cultural venues underscored American respect for and desire for 

partnership with the people of Pakistan. Perhaps the most telling moment came 

during a press conference during which Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi stated 

that the Secretary’s visit had been a success precisely because it had manifested a 

‘‘policy shift’’ toward a focus on ‘‘people centric’’ relations. This was and is precisely 

our message. 

While very few countries will require plans on the order of Pakistan, henceforth 

we will ensure that our public diplomacy strategic plans for each mission incorporate rigorous strategic analysis to drive focus and coordination at the post level. 

Mr. Chairman, let me say in closing that I believe this is a moment of great opportunity to redefine our relationship with people around the world and to build 

45 

bridges of knowledge and understanding with people everywhere. In doing so, I believe we will improve lives and support our national interests. I look forward to 

working with you as we seek to achieve these goals. 

The Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you very much. 

I was really pleased to see that the fiscal year 2011 State 

Department’s budget’s gone from—you requested $568 million, 

which is almost a $48 million increase. Why don’t you spend a couple minutes and tell us what that $48 million is going to go for? 

Ms. MCHALE. First, I think it is one of the sort of good news stories of public diplomacy. If you look at 2009, 2010, 2011, there has 

been a robust increase in the resources allocated to it. I think 

that’s a reflection across the government of an understanding of 

the importance of its critical nature. 

I don’t have the exact specifics as to where it is, but some of the 

things that we’re looking at are American Centers. We believe that 

this is a critical area, that we actually have to find ways of going 

back and connecting with people and being where they are. So a 

certain amount of that, of those funds, will be going there. We’re 

also looking to expand some of our very successful exchange programs as well. 

Again, my predecessors, we all agree that—if I could sort of wave 

my magic wand and bring everyone here and send everyone there, 

we would be able to do it. We can’t do that. But we want to do it, 

because we see and understand the importance and the power of 

those programs. 

[Additional written information supplied by Ms. McHale follows:] 

The requested FY 2011 increase of approximately $48 million is composed of the 

following: 

• $14.5 million for statutory pay raises and inflation to maintain the current FY 

2010 level of personnel activity. 

• $14.4 million for the establishment of new American Centers as pilot projects 

around the world varying in size and function reflecting different local conditions and priorities. Funding requested would cover make-ready, staffing, equipment and maintenance of the new Centers as well as training and development 

of IIP’s Information Resource Officer Corps. 

• $7.4 million for the establishment of 28 new American Officer positions (8 

domestic and 20 overseas) in accordance with the Secretary’s Diplomacy 3.0 initiative. 

• $11.5 million for the extension and expansion of public diplomacy programs in 

Pakistan above the $30.9 million originally funded by the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009. The goals of this program are to reduce support for 

al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist groups and ideologies; build confidence in the capabilities of the Pakistan Government to serve its people; improve and expand the professionalism of Pakistani media; and strengthen the 

U.S. relationship with Pakistani people at all levels of society. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Can you talk a little bit about what Evelyn 

Lieberman talked about in terms of making sure that the public 

diplomacy people throughout the embassies and in the State 

Department are on equal footing with the Foreign Service officers? 

Ms. MCHALE. I think I agree, and I’ve spoken to Ambassador 

Lieberman about this issue before coming in, and obviously I had 

read about it. I think, first off, that there’s a growing recognition 

within the Department itself of the importance of public diplomacy. 

Part of our establishment of a new role of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in each of the regional bureaus is one way of doing 

that. It provides a career path. I was recently in India and I was 

46 

talking to our PAO there and when he heard that he basically said: 

You know, that’s something for me to shoot for. 

Evelyn again mentioned the fact that there had not been a lot 

of PAOs who have progressed up through the structure to become 

ambassador, and we are looking to address that. So I think part 

of it is to look how to provide career paths for people; to provide 

them the opportunities. We have increased the number of PAO 

positions around the world, so we’re actually creating more positions. 

I don’t have the exact statistic, but I think the initial recruits 

into the PD Cone are actually either the top or the second, that’s 

where people go, but when they get in there haven’t been sufficient 

posts for them to advance their careers. So we’re addressing it at 

multiple levels and we’ve made this a top priority to see how we 

can continue to do it. 

But I do believe that there’s sort of throughout the building an 

acknowledgment and an understanding that we have simply got to 

do some different things here. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much, Secretary McHale. When 

a representative of the State Department appears on Al Jazeera, 

can that representative speak Arabic to the extent that he or she 

can handle a sometimes hostile interview? 

Ms. MCHALE. Well, in Dubai we have a media hub. And we have 

specifically staffed it with Arabic speakers who are at the 4–4 level 

because we knew that it was absolutely critical for them to be able 

to do that. So we have that. We have a number of our senior officers who can respond in Arabic, because I absolutely agree that the 

more that we can do that the better off we are going to be. 

So we specifically recruit officers who can do that. Do we have 

enough people who can speak Arabic to do that? Probably not. 

Senator WICKER. What strategy would we have to find some 

more? 

Ms. MCHALE. You know, it’s one of the things which is quite difficult to do, to get to that level where you’re confident enough to 

take those kinds of interviews and handle that in a very rapid-fire 

environment. I think we have a renewed focus and emphasis on 

training people. Unfortunately, you can’t train someone in it overnight. But we’re trying to encourage people to do it as best we can. 

Senator WICKER. Some of my colleagues have been interviewed 

on Al Jazeera. When they submit to an interview in English, what 

sort of penetration do we get? How many listeners are able to 

understand that interview in English? 

Ms. MCHALE. Well, we encourage people to go on Al Jazeera 

when we can, because if you look at the reach that that network 

actually has throughout the Arab world, it has an audience of 

about 250 million people. So we encourage people, under the appropriate circumstances, to go on there because it is a great opportunity to connect with them. 

In terms of how many of those 250 million would understand the 

English, I can get back to you on that. I can’t give you a specific 

answer on it. I would expect that the majority of the 250 million 

probably cannot understand it in English and you would be relying 

on the translation. 

47 

[Additional written information supplied by Ms. McHale follows:] 

Al Jazeera Arabic estimates that it has an average weekly audience of 50–60 million viewers. They routinely interview English speakers, including U.S. officials, via 

interpreters in order to ensure that all their viewers are able to understand the answers clearly. We have consistently found their interpreters to be of high quality. 

Al Jazeera English, on the other hand, conducts interviews in English for their 

English-speaking audiences in Africa, South Asia, North America, and elsewhere. As 

of now, we have seen no complete data on audience penetration rates for Al Jazeera 

English. 

Senator WICKER. What did you think about the question about 

measuring results? Let me preface it by saying this. I understand 

what Senator Kaufman and you are saying about expanding the 

budget. I also worry about the national debt and I think Americans 

are worried about $12 trillion. If we’re going to view this as an 

essential part of national security, therefore justifying an exception 

to the President’s freeze, which is apparently his view, then we 

need to be able to get back to the American people at a point and 

say we got this, this, and this for your dollars. 

Ms. MCHALE. I couldn’t agree more, and I have made this a big 

area of focus. I obviously come from the private sector, where 

everything I did was measured, literally. So I’m very familiar with 

that. 

One of the things that we have done now as sort of a new approach to this is we will not undertake a program unless we build 

into it up front some performance metrics against which we can 

measure. It is, as Ambassador Glassman said, it is very difficult to 

do that. How do you measure? When you put someone through— 

you have a Fulbright scholar who comes here; 30 years later they 

may end up being the President of their country. I know now that 

that’s a great investment. We have 40 heads of state or senior government ministers who have been there. However, the fact that it’s 

not impossible; that it’s very difficult—we still have to do it. 

And frankly, whether there was a budget challenge or not, I 

would think that we should do that. I think that that’s a prudent 

way of knowing what you’re doing. 

So what are some of the things that we’re actually doing? As 

Ambassador Hughes said, we pretty successfully measure our exchanges. It’s relatively easy to do that. You invite people, they’re 

here, you survey them, and you send them back. Some of our other 

programs are more difficult. We have a new office of—we’ve expanded the Office of Measurement and Evaluation. I’d be happy to 

have them come up and give you a full briefing on it. But to give 

you some sense of what we’re doing, we do some post-program experience. We go back to a sort of sound research basis; we follow 

participants in those programs over a defined period of time—2 to 

3 years—so that we can see what was the benefit of it, measuring 

it. So that’s one way that we’re doing it. We know from our initial 

reports of that, which just came out earlier this year, that they 

have a positive impact on people’s perception of the United States. 

I think we are also trying to establish a process of trend analysis, 

so that we can see over time and filter out some of the sort of intervening effects, and you should be able to over a period of time discern some trends. You have to have a relatively short period of 

time. You don’t want to be 5 years into a program and go, well, 

that doesn’t work. So there are a variety of different mechanisms 

48 

and levers that we’re pulling. But I’d be happy to have the head 

of the evaluation team come up and brief your staff if you’d like 

to hear more details. 

But to me it’s absolutely essential. One of the things we do is, 

as we’re rolling out new programs, we build in some measures of 

effectiveness, so that we’re trying to embed in the culture the sense 

that you have to do this on a going forward basis. 

Senator WICKER. Who is that Fulbright scholar that’s now President of his country? 

Ms. MCHALE. I knew you were probably going to ask that. I’ll get 

back to you with a full list. 

[The written information submitted by Ms. McHale follows:] 

There are three Fulbright Alumni who are current Heads of State: 

• John Mills, President of Ghana (2009-present); 

• Sebastian Pinera, President of Chile (2010-present); and 

• Colvert Young, Governor General of Belize (1993-Present). 

Fulbright Alumni who are former Heads of State (with their terms in office) 

include: 

• Giuliano Amato, Prime Minister of Italy (1992–1993, 2000–2001); 

• Marek Belka, Prime Minister of Poland (2004–2005); 

• Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil (1995–2003); 

• Ingvar Carlsson, Prime Minister of Sweden (1986–1991, 1994–1996); 

• Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Prime Minister of Poland (1996–1997); 

• Lamberto Dini, Prime Minister of Italy (1995–1996); 

• Ivy Dumont, Governor General of the Bahamas (2001–2005); 

• Zlatko Lagumdzija, Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001–2002); 

• Hyun Jae Lee, Prime Minister of South Korea (1988); 

• Jamil Mahuad, President of Ecuador (1998–2000); 

• Beatriz Merino, Prime Minister of Peru (2003); 

• Moeen Qureshi, Prime Minister of Pakistan (1993); 

• Wallace Rowling, Prime Minister of New Zealand (1974–1975); 

• Alejandro Toledo, President of Peru (2001–2006). 

Attached please find a list of the 55 alumni of all ECA programs who are current 

Chiefs of State of Heads of Government. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The above attached list can be found on page 59 in ‘‘Additional 

Material Submitted for the Record.’’] 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I’d just like to make—and Senator Wicker 

and I are in exactly the same place in terms of the deficit and the 

rest of it. But I must tell you, every time—— 

Senator WICKER. Not exactly. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Well, no, I think we are, in terms of being 

concerned about them and making sure that whatever money we 

spend—we may be a little different about how to get there. 

But it does offend me every time people start talking about us 

on Al Jazeera and us having gone on Al Jazeera and Al Jazeera 

having this and Al Jazeera having that. We’re the most powerful 

military, economic, and strategic political organization, diplomatic 

organization, in the world, in the history of mankind, and the idea 

that we spend $100 million on our TV station and we allow a small 

Arab country to spend $400 million on their TV station and therefore one of the reasons why we have 35 million combined and they 

have the big numbers they have is the fact that we don’t spend 

money. 

In terms of long-term effectiveness, I don’t think anybody would 

argue that if we could do something, especially now that we have 

49 

a counterinsurgency strategy, if we could do something to change 

the hearts and minds of people around the world—let me tell you, 

Al Jazeera is doing a hell of a job. I don’t have to measure it. I 

know. They’re out there in the street constantly stirring things up, 

constantly presenting things. 

So I think that I’m concerned about the deficits, but I’m also concerned that we don’t get outdone by a third-rate country. 

Ms. MCHALE. I think that we live in an age, again, of the 24- 

hour news cycle. We all know that. You know that. We have to do 

that. It is very, very difficult to do that. We have to get better at 

responding across the board. We have to get better at telling sort 

of our side of the story and being very proactive. 

I’ll give you a quick example recently as a result of the Haiti crisis, for example, where, frankly, I thought our response was America at its best. Our military went in; they reestablished the airport. 

Americans opened their hearts and their pocketbooks to the Haitian people. And the headlines and the stories around the world, 

including, may I say, Al Jazeera, were horrifying. It was ‘‘the 

American invasion.’’ 

So what we did was very proactive. We responded to that. We 

very specifically had our chiefs of mission around the world respond to that. I personally called Al Jazeera and said: What you’re 

doing is not only inaccurate, it’s unprofessional; how can you do 

that? And frankly, I got a letter of apology from them in terms of 

their coverage because it was inaccurate. 

But more importantly, around the world our ambassadors were 

able to change that story. So you literally could see it. I think it 

demonstrated the importance of our responding very quickly and 

not allowing things like that to develop. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Can you talk a little bit about—everybody 

talked about the importance of TV and I think that’s absolutely 

essential. The advantage we have in the Arabic world is we have 

satellite TV, so we can actually broadcast into countries. Can you 

talk about how you get into countries or how we should be dealing 

with countries that clearly won’t let us do anything on TV, will 

fight everything we do on the radio, countries like China and Russia, the Stans primarily, nations in Africa? 

And I’m not just talking about broadcasting. I’m talking about 

the whole public diplomacy effort. How do we make that more 

effective? 

Ms. MCHALE. Well, obviously it’s a very challenging environment 

in countries like that. But we can’t allow the challenges to deter 

us. I think what we’re doing is trying to understand, how can we 

get our message in. Clearly, the Internet is one way to do it, and 

I think the Secretary has been very strong on her position and her 

support for freedom of the Internet. We see that that is a way of 

going in. 

Frankly, I believe that the regimes that try to sort of keep out 

information are fighting a losing game. They cannot continue to do 

that. I think what we try to do is look at all the tools that are 

available to us and try to find the best way to get in, because 

frankly at the end of the day they can’t win—this is a zero sum 

game for them and they will lose it. You can’t suppress information. I think you see that all over the world. Even in countries 

50 

which 5 or 10 years ago did not have access to information, like 

many parts of Africa, they’re using mobile phones which have become a very effective communication tool. We are adapting our programs and strategies to be able to reach people wherever they are, 

even in very difficult circumstances. 

A lot of it will be Internet-based. BBG’s going to continue to do 

the great work that they do, which is essential for everything that 

we’re trying to achieve. But at the end of the day I do believe we 

will prevail in this environment. There is simply no way for them 

to keep the information out, and we see so many examples of that. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Can you talk a little bit—I didn’t realize this. 

There are 14 Cabinet-level departments and 48 independent agencies in the government participating in at least one or another form 

of official public diplomacy. Can you talk about—the former Under 

Secretaries talked about how challenging it is to coordinate everything that’s going on throughout the government. Can you talk 

about where we are and the state of play on that? 

Ms. MCHALE. Yes, I think it is complicated. Yet I think it’s critically important for any number of reasons. I think it’s important 

for us to be consistent in how we communicate, but I also think— 

I think Evelyn used the word—let’s leverage all the resources we 

have. So we participate in the IPC process—the NSC takes the lead 

in this and brings in agencies and departments to work together. 

I have been struck by, to be honest, the degree of collaboration 

that I’ve actually encountered. So I work very closely—the agencies 

that I work most closely with would be Department of Defense and 

USAID. Those three agencies together really have a lot in common. 

So we’re trying to figure out what’s the best way of leveraging it. 

But there is a change in the IPCs that are there. What we are 

all trying to do is, because I think everyone here understands the 

importance of collaboration, is to work ahead of the game and figure out ways that we can do it. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Without getting into anything classified, can 

you give me an example off the top of your head of a program 

you’re doing with the Department of Defense that you really think 

is working well? 

Ms. MCHALE. I would probably rather talk to you about that 

separately. 

Senator KAUFMAN. OK. Can you talk a little bit about surge? 

What happens with these—so many times, all of a sudden we have 

a problem. There isn’t much ability from a budget standpoint to 

put things on the shelf to bring out. But can you talk a little bit 

about—Haiti is a very good example, but also what we’re doing in 

Afghanistan? In other words, here we are faced with an extraordinary situation, it’s not business as usual. Many of those things 

are incredibly important. Just give me some feel for how you—— 

Ms. MCHALE. Sure. I’ll approach it two ways. First, Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. I’ll start with the easy one. Basically, frankly, what 

we’ve done in Pakistan and Afghanistan, we have supplemental 

budgets focused on communications; strategic communications. I’ve 

worked very closely with Ambassador Holbrooke and his team to 

put together a comprehensive strategic communications plan for 

Pakistan and for Afghanistan. I think I provided copies to the committee of that plan. 

51 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, you did. 

Ms. MCHALE. There you actually see the sort of interagency cooperation and collaboration and how we’ve done it. In cases like 

Haiti, what we try to do, because you have to anticipate that there 

will be crises like this—one of the things that we’re trying to do 

with our new focus on the budgets and how they’re actually being 

administered is to be sure that we have sufficient unallocated 

funds that would enable us to deal with crises like that. 

The other thing that happens is that at the moment of a crisis 

you look to what you have in your existing budgets that you could 

repurpose. Obviously, circumstances changed pretty dramatically 

in Haiti. There were existing funds there that we looked at to repurpose, and then we supplemented those with additional funds 

that I have within my office. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you very much. 

I just want to recognize Tom Dine here. Talk about public diplomacy, someone who has been a leader in public diplomacy as the 

president of Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty. 

I want to thank everybody for coming today. This is an important 

issue and I really think we’ve had a lot of light on it. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF UNDER SECRETARY JUDITH MCHALE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. The President’s FY 2011 State Department budget request shows an increase of $47.7 million above the FY 2010 appropriated level for public diplomacy. 

What percentage of these funds will go into expanding educational and professional 

exchange programs that target Muslim-majority and developing countries? 

Answer. The increase of $47.7 million illustrated in the FY 2011 President’s 

budget request supports public diplomacy programs funded within the Diplomatic 

and Consular Programs (D&CP) appropriation and excludes funding to expand educational and professional exchanges. Educational and professional exchanges are 

funded through the Educational and Cultural Exchanges (ECE) appropriation which 

includes within the request approximately $83.2 million that will support programs 

in Muslim-majority countries. 

Question. The domestic dissemination restrictions of the Smith-Mundt Act have 

been criticized as anachronistic given the global reach of the Internet, and as 

unduly limiting the ability of the State Department to conduct public diplomacy in 

a timely and effective fashion. Do you support amendment to or repeal of the act’s 

domestic dissemination restrictions? 

Answer. The Smith-Mundt and Zorinsky restrictions were enacted years ago and 

designed to ensure that public diplomacy funds and materials not be used to propagandize the American people or influence U.S. public opinion. With the consolidation 

of the United States Information Agency and the State Department and the widespread use of the Internet, these restrictions pose challenges to advancing the core 

public diplomacy mission of informing and influencing foreign audiences. These restrictions also place limitations on our ability to inform the American people about 

our efforts overseas and, on occasion, engender duplication of effort. 

In light of this and changes in technology in recent years, it would make sense 

to review the law to ensure that it still expresses the will of Congress, and allows 

us to accomplish our multiple missions as efficiently and effectively as possible. I 

am not in a position to prejudge the results of such a review. 

Question. The independent U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy can review U.S. public diplomacy activities and report on its findings. Do you support increasing the Commission’s role in assessing U.S. public diplomacy efforts, and could 

52 

the Commission serve in the place of a proposed independent support organization 

for public diplomacy? 

Answer. I welcome support for U.S. public diplomacy from a variety of sources, 

not only from within the government but also from the private sector. The U.S. 

Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy has for years supported the public diplomacy function by offering independent assessments of U.S. Government activities 

intended to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics. However, I believe 

public diplomacy is best served by dialogue with a variety of organizations outside 

of the Department of State which are interested in international outreach and engagement and not one single independent organization. 

I have read the many reports on public diplomacy, some of which call for a separate independent organization. I do not believe that such an organization is needed 

at this time. As I lay out in the public diplomacy framework, what public diplomacy 

needs is a more strategic focus, structural changes, improved processes which help 

ensure the link between policy and public diplomacy, and adequate resources. The 

real work is to ensure that public diplomacy has a seat at the policymaking table, 

and that resources are deployed in accordance with policy priorities. Toward this 

end, for example, we are moving ahead to create public diplomacy deputy assistant 

secretary (PD DAS) positions in each regional bureau. 

Question. You stated that interagency coordination has not been problematic, and 

that you are part of ongoing interagency discussions on public diplomacy and strategic communications. Given your seat at the table, how should the Congress 

approach the disparity of resources between DOD and the State Department for 

strategic communication and other kinds of public diplomacy? Should we accept the 

status quo, or should funding levels be modified? 

Answer. The State Department is developing well-reasoned and strategically justified requests for appropriate levels of funding for public diplomacy (PD) and strategic communication (SC) to present to Congress, through the annual State Department appropriations process. 

PD coordination across the U.S. Government is improving but still needs to get 

better. As part of the effort to improve coordination, I and members of my office regularly participate in the Interagency Policy Coordination (IPC) meetings led by the 

National Security Council (NSC) staff. This enables us to address a wide range of 

issues, including global, regional, and country-specific matters; and it enables us to 

coordinate, develop, and de-conflict communications programs and activities across 

U.S. Government agencies. My staff also take part in a variety of other interagency 

coordination bodies. 

The Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC), which is part of my office, is 

specifically chartered to support the NSC’s Global Engagement Directorate; and we 

are expanding and upgrading GSEC to strengthen its ability to support the interagency coordination of a broad range of U.S. Government SC and global engagement 

activities. 

I am also focused on institutionalizing the already close and enthusiastic dialogue 

and coordination between DOD and State about SC and PD. We have launched a 

joint DOD-State working group to review existing DOD programs in order to recommend an appropriate rebalancing of SC programs, authorities, and resources. 

This effort, under the purview of the National Security Council, will focus on current DOD strategic communication with civilian populations outside zones of active 

combat. 

As we implement the new Global Strategic Framework for public diplomacy about 

which I spoke at the subcommittee hearing , we will place renewed emphasis on PD 

coordination not only in Washington but also overseas to ensure that our efforts 

complement and, where possible, reinforce the activities of other departments and 

agencies. 

There is no question that American PD is suffering today the effects of years of 

underfunding. PD is more important than ever to accomplishing our foreign policy 

priorities, and we passed the point long ago where we could reasonably be expected 

to do more with less. But before we seek increased resources, I am committed to 

ensuring that we wisely spend every penny of what we already have. With the new 

framework for PD in place, we will be able to ensure a strategic allocation of resources in support of current foreign policy priorities. 

Among other steps, we are reestablishing multiyear PD plans for all posts that 

will specify our PD mission in each host country, analyze target audiences, inventory continuing programs and propose innovative tactics to achieve our goals, integrate realistic measurements of effectiveness, and identify the necessary resources. 

As we enumerate through those multiyear PD plans the resources necessary for success, and as we take into account the recommendations that will emerge from the 

53 

DOD-State working group on rebalancing, I will be able to present a strategically 

justified rationale for an appropriate level of resources for PD worldwide. 

RESPONSES OF UNDER SECRETARY JUDITH MCHALE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. In your discussion with the committee today, you mentioned it was vital 

to have language-qualified Public Diplomacy officers capable of speaking with the 

press in the local language. With that in mind, please provide for the committee the 

designated language requirement level for the PD positions in the Near East Asia 

Bureau. Please indicate the language proficiency of the incumbent and of the officer 

slated to replace him/her with a pending arrival date and the departure of the incumbent, if known. 

Answer. The NEA Bureau has 70 language-designated public diplomacy positions, 

of which 34 are specifically designated to work with the media. Of the NEA language-designated public diplomacy positions, 46 require a General Professional Proficiency (3/3) in Arabic, and 18 require a Limited Working Proficiency (2/2) or lower 

in Arabic. There is also one regional media position that requires Advanced Professional Proficiency (4/4). In addition, there are also 5 Hebrew-designated positions 

(General Professional Proficiency or lower) and 1 position requires a General Professional Proficiency in French. 

Of the incumbents in these 70 language-designated positions, 58 meet or exceed 

the language requirement. 

During the upcoming summer transfer season, 24 Public Diplomacy languagedesignated positions will rotate. Eighteen of the incoming Public Diplomacy officers 

meet or exceed the language requirements of the positions they will fill. In an effort 

to increase the number of language-qualified Public Diplomacy officers, the NEA 

Bureau often fills its language-designated public diplomacy positions far enough in 

advance to allow time for language training. Depending on the language and the 

level required, language training can sometimes take 1 to 2 years. The challenge 

so far has been having enough officers to fill existing positions as well as having 

officers in this ‘‘language float.’’ 

Question. As per H.R. 489, and the policy of the Bush administration to convert 

the head of the International Information Programs Bureau from a Coordinator to 

an Assistant Secretary in order to highlight the importance of IIP activities, is there 

an available Assistant Secretary slot unencumbered to use for this position (given 

that the number of such positions is capped by statute)? If such a slot is available, 

will it be used for IIP? If not, what are the perceived advantages of keeping the 

position as a Coordinator? 

Answer. There is an available Assistant Secretary slot unencumbered which could 

be used for the head of IIP. Deliberations are ongoing among the Department’s senior leaders as to whether the IIP Coordinator should be designated an Assistant 

Secretary, or whether that slot should be used elsewhere. 

Question. The recent OIG inspection of the Public Affairs Bureau noted that four 

of the eight offices in the Bureau’s USAID Press Office are vacant. OIG recommends 

filling the vacant Director of that office with someone selected by USAID. Please 

provide a staffing pattern for the Office showing grade levels and brief job descriptions. Please note which positions are currently vacant and for how long they have 

been so. Additionally, the OIG has called the arrangement of this office ‘‘institutionally awkward.’’ Please provide an organizational chart showing the location of the 

Office within the PA structure and provide other possible alternative arrangements. 

Answer. The duties of the Public Relations Officers in USAID are basically similar 

and the duties follow: 

Public Affairs Specialists/Press Relations Officer 

Serves as senior advisor to assigned USAID senior staff on all press matters. 

Meets regularly with assigned senior staff to formulate press guidance and official 

response to media inquiries. Reviews media requests and determines appropriate responses to queries. Arranges and conducts media interviews in response to requests 

and proactively generates media interest on USAID issues. Provides confidential 

briefings to USAID senior staff regarding on-going programs and developments. 

Briefs USAID senior staff on possible interview questions and provides guidance on 

appropriate responses. Prepares briefings materials and talking points for senior 

USAID officials in preparation for news media events. Prepares press releases, fact 

sheets, and other background materials for use with the news media. Prepares, reviews, and edits speeches, testimony, talking points and other written materials for 

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USAID officials attending public events. Arranges and coordinates major public 

events, which involve heads of state and other high-level visits with USAID Administrator and other senior officials. Arranges for media coverage and works with 

White House and other government agencies. Provides press materials and serves 

as officer-in-charge of events. Covers congressional hearings affecting USAID to assist with background information for media. Travels to assigned countries to provide 

assistance with media events, media training, and other media-related events at the 

USAID missions. 

Attached is an organizational chart for the USAID Press Office as well as the updated organizational chart for the entire Bureau of Public Affairs. Some structural 

changes have been made to both the press office and the Bureau to address the 

shortcomings identified by the office of the Inspector General, including moving the 

USAID press office to report directly to the Spokesman. 

While staffing shortages have plagued this office for far too long, we are optimistic 

that they will soon be addressed. We have identified candidates for the Director position and now titled Deputy Director position, both traditionally filled by Schedule 

C appointees, which have been vacant since January 20, 2008. Both individuals are 

scheduled to begin work in early April. The Public Affairs Assistant position that 

has been vacant since March 24, 2008, and has not been filled due to a variety of 

reasons. The long vacancy in this position will be one of the first issues we will ask 

the new Director of the office to tackle. 

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Question. The committee was recently briefed by S/SRAP officials on a $50 million 

dollar congressional Notification for PD activities to Build Afghan Communication 

Capacity and Counter Extremist Voices in Afghanistan. Please provide a breakdown 

of the personnel currently at post and in Washington who will implement these activities (by grade, position, cone and office)—particularly in light of the OIG’s recent 

inspection of Embassy Kabul which found that ‘‘most of the Public Affairs Section 

had only limited PD experience.’’ The OIG report also notes that the Embassy requested some 27 new FS and LE PD positions—what is the status of those requested positions? 

Answer. Kabul Public Affairs Section (PAS) staff members are fully engaged on 

a range of public outreach programs, including building communications capacity, 

countering extremist voices, strengthening people-to-people ties and expanding 

media engagement. PAS is currently staffed with 22 American and 18 Locally EmVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:22 Dec 15, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARI diplo3.eps

N
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ployed Staff (LES). Twenty additional American positions and 20 additional LES positions were requested and approved, and are in the process of being filled. 

PAS Kabul is comprised of a Director of Communications and Public Diplomacy, 

who is a 3161 limited appointment, a Public Affairs officer (a Senior Foreign Service 

Public Diplomacy officer), two deputy Public Affairs officers (Foreign Service (FS) 

grade 01 PD officer and Civil Service (GS) grade 15 PAO), three Information officers 

(an FS grade 02 Management officer, and FS grades 03 and 04 PD officers), four 

Cultural Affairs officers (one FS 02, three FS 03), and seven 3161 PD-experienced 

employees equivalent to mid-level FS officers. New positions will build on existing 

staffing of information officers, cultural affairs officers, and also include the addition 

of grants management and contracting officers to help develop and track grants and 

contracts. Some of these new positions have been filled temporarily during the summer months in the leadup to the end of fiscal year. There are also seven Department 

of Defense personnel and USAID communications specialists working on these 

issues within PAS and who report to the Director of Communications and Public 

Diplomacy. 

Five Public Diplomacy Officers presently operate in the field outside of Kabul. The 

PAOs for consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif are in place in Kabul until the 

consulates open. Two immediately available positions are open for Public Diplomacy 

officers in Helmand and Kandahar and are in the process of being filled. Eventually, 

the Department intends to place Public Diplomacy officers on at least 26 Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The current field positions are occupied by two FS 

grade 02 officers and three 3161s at the equivalent level. 

In Washington, the public affairs arm of the Bureau of South and Central Asian 

Affairs has the following employees supporting Strategic Communication activities: 

Director (GS15); Deputy Director (FS02 PD Cone); Program Coordinator (WAE), 

Public Diplomacy Desk officer (FS03 PD cone), Social Media officer (FS04 PD cone); 

Grants Program Specialist (3161); Program Specialist (contractor). 

Question. The Bureau’s Strategic Approach for the 21st century calls for clear dissemination and coordinated guidance to posts for the use of digital tools such as 

Facebook and YouTube and to ‘‘address confusion and inconsistency’’ in their utilization. Given the prominence new media is playing in current PD strategies, what 

have been the Department’s attempts to address such problems and what more 

needs to be done? 

Answer. The Department’s Internet Steering Committee, chaired by the Bureau 

of International Information Programs (IIP), has for 10 years developed policies 

guiding the Department’s presence on the Internet. Over the past year, this committee coordinated a Department-wide effort with key experts from the Office of Privacy, Records Management, the Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM) 

and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) to create clear policy specifically addressing the Department’s sue of social media. Publication in the Foreign Affairs 

Manual (FAM) is expected within a month. That policy will formalize guidance that 

has been in place as social media tools became rapidly employed for Department use 

within the last 2 years. Approximately a year ago, IRM issued a worldwide notice 

on the subject of social media usage as a precursor to the formal and more detailed 

FAM Chapter. 

IIP coordinates the development of social media products and services with all relevant stakeholders. The Bureau’s pilot initiative on innovative engagement is the 

Department’s central resource for tool-specific social media guides; e.g., how to establish a Facebook presence, or how to incorporate video and Twitter into targeted 

information campaigns for use abroad. This pilot initiative publishes guides on its 

Social Media Hub, available worldwide on the Department’s Intranet, and to the 

wider interagency community via Intelink. 

IIP support is designed to empower American embassy officers and locally employed staff to use social media for engaging foreign publics. Guidance includes: 

• Social Media Field Guides provide policy-based step-by-step instruction for most 

commonly used tools and platforms; 

• Discussion forums for specific and current social media topics; 

• Best Practices showcase innovation in social media throughout the Department; 

• Research assists Posts with analysis and engagement opportunities; 

• ‘‘Ask the Expert’’ is a new webinar series with outside experts; 

• Community Managers Group is a virtual location for department online managers to meet; 

• Training enables participants to engage in hands-on discussions at the Foreign 

Service Institute with both public affairs professionals and embassy information 

technology managers. 

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Guidance and resources related to digital tools are also available on 

INFOCENTRAL, a USG-only internal Web site that provides guidance and instruction for public diplomacy and strategic communication practitioners, includes comprehensive material on the use of USG new media tools such as government 

Facebook pages, YouTube videos, Twitter feeds, blogs, Web chats, and Flickr photos, 

so that officers in the field can quickly and easily access them to engage foreign 

audiences. 

IIP continually adapts its policies, tools, and resources to meet the challenges of 

a constantly changing communication landscape and audience. More needs to be 

done to increase both formal and informal training for overseas posts so resources 

are available to develop and teach the most productive uses of social media. IIP 

critically needs around the clock expert support so overseas posts can avail them 

of these services in real time. Limited resources need to be targeted better through 

more in-depth audience analysis and market focused testing. The Department needs 

more band-width, and storage, to support the burgeoning use of video and related 

social media. This requires extensive investment in global communication infrastructure. 

Question. The Bureau’s Strategic Approach for the 21st century calls for greater 

outreach to alumni of USG exchanges. What have been the current budgets for such 

programs and what increases have been proposed to keep alumni engaged in USG 

programming? 

Answer. For both FY 2010 and FY 2011, funding for alumni outreach is 

$4,135,000 per year. This amount reflects a substantial increase over the $1,000,000 

budgets of the past several years for alumni activities. Expanding opportunities for 

the USG to stay connected with exchange program alumni and for them to better 

connect with each other is a top priority under the Public Diplomacy Strategic 

Framework. 

Question. By when do you hope the PD regional bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary positions will be created and filled? Since each regional bureau already has 

an Office of Public Diplomacy, staffed by an Office Director, what other issues will 

the DAS cover or offices supervise, to prevent him/her from becoming what is, in 

essence, a glorified office director? 

Answer. We hope that the new Public Diplomacy Deputy Assistant Secretary positions will be established and filled by this summer. 

By establishing a PD DAS position in each regional bureau, we hope to institutionalize PD’s role in ensuring that Bureau policy discussions are informed upfront 

by a research-based understanding of foreign opinions and attitudes. While we recognize that Public Diplomacy Office Directors are generally included in bureau policy and resource discussions, this has not been the case universally. 

As DASes, these individuals will be the regional Assistant Secretary’s primary adviser on all Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs matters. The PD DAS will also be 

responsible for seeing that Public Diplomacy operations and resources in the region 

are tied to policy objectives and align with the Department’s priorities and standards. The PD DAS will be expected to nurture strong working relationships with 

the leaders of all three R bureaus (i.e., ECA, IIP, and PA) to enlist their consistent 

support for regional information and outreach requirements. They will oversee Public Diplomacy assignments process for the bureau, recruiting and mentoring officers 

for regional positions, and participating with other leaders in the decisionmaking 

process to ensure the most qualified officers are assigned appropriately. The PD 

DAS will serve as the rating officer for the bureau Public Diplomacy Office Director 

and the reviewing officer for any deputy(-ies) in that office; some bureaus may elect 

to have the PD DAS also have some role in reviewing the performance of PAOs in 

the field. Finally, the PD DAS may also represent the Assistant Secretary or the 

Principal DAS when necessary. 

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LIST OF ALUMNI OF ECA PROGRAMS WHO ARE CURRENT CHIEFS OF STATE OF HEADS

OF GOVERNMENT

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RESPONSES OF UNDER SECRETARY JUDITH MCHALE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. Former Under Secretary Glassman testified that international broadcasting is currently one of the most successful public diplomacy programs run by 

the U.S. Government, and that the BBG’s success in building ‘‘mutual interest and 

mutual respect’’ comes from providing an ‘‘accurate, objective, and comprehensive 

view of America and its policies.’’ However, a 2009 GAO report cited questionable 

journalistic standards and biased editorialization at the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and at a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee hearing in June 2009, an expert witness testified that Cubans ‘‘are going to look for more credible sources of 

information and entertainment [than Marti].’’ Do you agree that if broadcasts are 

perceived as unreliable, inaccurate, or biased, they may actually be counterproductive and undermine both the stated goals of the BBG and the broader public 

diplomacy goals of the U.S. Government? 

Answer. The United States is a strong supporter of freedom of expression and 

high journalistic standards around the world. We agree that unbiased and objective 

reporting should be the cornerstone of all broadcasting supported by the United 

States Government. 

The State Department appreciates the collaborative partnership that we have 

with the BBG, as well as the role that the Department’s seat on the BBG Board 

of Governors serves in advising the Board on U.S. foreign policy goals. 

For additional information on how the BBG ensures high journalistic standards 

for its broadcasting, including its office of Cuba Broadcasting, we suggest you reach 

out to the BBG directly. 

Question. Mr. Glassman testified that we need to focus on ‘‘Strategic Public Diplomacy’’ geared to addressing our national security priorities, and in your testimony 

you identified strategic imperatives that included countering violent extremism and 

‘‘redeploying resources in strategic alignment with shifting priorities.’’ Please describe the unique strategic importance of Cuba Broadcasting as part of our public 

diplomacy and national security strategies. Despite extensive and expensive efforts 

by the OCB, numerous reports have found that very few Cubans are interested in 

tuning in to Radio or TV Marti or able to do so, and I remain concerned that we 

will spend over $30 million in FY10 ineffectively promoting human rights through 

jammed radio and TV broadcasts to Cuba. 

Answer. An important component of the administration’s policy toward Cuba includes promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms. President Obama has 

made promoting freedom of expression and the free flow of information to, from, and 

within the island one of the cornerstones of this policy. 

Some examples of steps that we have taken to support this policy include the 

President’s April 2009 announcements easing restrictions on family travel and regulatory and policy changes permitting increased telecommunication between the 

United States and Cuba which enable Cubans access to additional sources of information. Most recently, the administration established a general license category for 

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personal Internet communications services to reinstate services that were temporarily cut off by companies that feared that they were in violation of U.S. sanctions. 

Live Messenger, Facebook, and Twitter, among others, are free personal Internet 

communication tools that can be accessed by people all around the world. 

We believe that Radio Marti continues to serve a critical function in providing uncensored news and information to the people of Cuba. We agree that its programming should be of the highest caliber. It is very difficult to accurately account for 

the percentage of people in Cuba who listen to Radio Marti, for a variety of reasons 

related to the closed nature of the state and the challenges involved with conducting 

survey research on the island. We defer to the Broadcasting Board of Governors for 

more detailed information about their audience reach and their approaches to assessment of impact. Limited survey research indicates, however, that Cubans do listen to and appreciate having access to Radio Marti. 

Question. In your testimony, you said that the U.S. Government must ‘‘develop 

new ways to communicate and engage with foreign publics,’’ and highlighted the use 

of new technologies and new media to expand our global reach. In the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 2010, Congress requested a report on the efficacy of Cuba 

Broadcasting and on possible alternative means of reaching a larger audience in 

Cuba. In light of the aforementioned problems that plague Radio and TV Marti, 

would you consider advocating for the suspension of continued operation of the OCB 

and Radio/TV Marti broadcasting in favor of such new media alternatives? 

Answer. We do not support suspending broadcasting to Cuba because it provides 

the Cuban people with uncensored news and information. Nor do we think this is 

the only appropriate media with which to interact with the Cuban people. Throughout the world, and certainly including Cuba, we must make sure that we are communicating with the public in innovative ways that allow different audiences to access information through their preferred media outlet. For example, the Web site 

of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana already includes a Facebook link in Spanish. 

We will continue to reach out to the island through new, as well as traditional, 

media in a multifaceted campaign; the continued emphasis on traditional media is 

particularly important in a country where Internet access remains largely out of 

reach for the majority of Cubans. 

We also note that new technologies and the country’s important youth demographic are natural allies in the pursuit of greater freedom of expression and the 

free flow of information. Emerging online tools have the potential to allow young 

activists to collaborate virtually and physically with counterparts throughout the 

country and around the world to empower citizens and advance democratic processes. 

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