IV 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 626 

Censuring the President and the Attorney General. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

AUGUST 4, 2007 

Mr. HINCHEY (for himself, Ms. BALDWIN, Mr. CAPUANO, Mr. COHEN, Mr. 

DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. FARR, Mr. FILNER, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. HALL of 

New York, Mr. HONDA, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. KUCINICH, Ms. LEE, Mrs. 

MALONEY of New York, Mr. MORAN of Virginia, Mr. PASTOR, Ms. 

SCHAKOWSKY, Ms. WATSON, Ms. SHEA-PORTER, and Mr. ROTHMAN) 

submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

RESOLUTION 

Censuring the President and the Attorney General. 

1 Resolved, 

2 SECTION 1. BASIS FOR CENSURE. 

3 (a) NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY WIRETAPPING.— 

4 The House of Representatives finds the following: 

5 (1) Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence 

6 Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), 

7 and in so doing provided the executive branch with 

8 clear authority to wiretap suspected terrorists inside 

9 the United States. 


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1 (2) Section 201 of the Foreign Intelligence Sur2 veillance Act of 1978 states that it and the criminal 

3 wiretap law are the ‘‘exclusive means by which elec4 tronic surveillance’’ may be conducted by the United 

5 States Government, and section 109 of that Act 

6 makes it a crime to wiretap individuals without com7 plying with this statutory authority. 

8 (3) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 

9 1978 both permits the Government to initiate wire10 tapping immediately in emergencies as long as the 

11 Government obtains approval from the court estab12 lished under section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence 

13 Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) within 

14 72 hours of initiating the wiretap, and authorizes 

15 wiretaps without a court order otherwise required by 

16 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for 

17 the first 15 days following a declaration of war by 

18 Congress. 

19 (4) The Authorization for Use of Military Force 

20 that became law on September 18, 2001 (Public 

21 Law 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), did not grant 

22 the President the power to authorize wiretaps of 

23 Americans within the United States without obtain24 ing the court orders required by the Foreign Intel25 ligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 


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1 (5) The President’s inherent constitutional au2 thority does not give him the power to violate the ex3 plicit statutory prohibition on warrantless wiretaps 

4 in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 

5 (6) George W. Bush, President of the United 

6 States, authorized the National Security Agency to 

7 wiretap Americans within the United States without 

8 obtaining the court orders required by the Foreign 

9 Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for more than 

10 5 years. 

11 (7) Alberto R. Gonzales, as Attorney General of 

12 the United States and as Counsel to the President, 

13 reviewed and defended the legality of the President’s 

14 authorization of wiretaps by the National Security 

15 Agency of Americans within the United States with16 out the court orders required by the Foreign Intel17 ligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 

18 (8) President George W. Bush repeatedly mis19 led the public prior to the public disclosure of the 

20 National Security Agency warrantless surveillance 

21 program by indicating his Administration was rely22 ing on court orders to wiretap suspected terrorists 

23 inside the United States. 

24 (9) Alberto R. Gonzales misled Congress in 

25 January 2005 during the hearing on his nomination 


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1 to be Attorney General of the United States by indi2 cating that a question about whether the President 

3 has the authority to authorize warrantless wiretaps 

4 in violation of statutory prohibitions presented a 

5 ‘‘hypothetical situation,’’ even though he was fully 

6 aware that a warrantless wiretapping program had 

7 been ongoing for several years. 

8 (10) In statements about the supposed need for 

9 the National Security Agency warrantless surveil10 lance program after the public disclosure of the pro11 gram, President George W. Bush falsely implied 

12 that the program was necessary because the execu13 tive branch did not otherwise have authority to wire14 tap suspected terrorists inside the United States. 

15 (11) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, de16 spite his admitted awareness that congressional crit17 ics of the program support wiretapping terrorists in 

18 accordance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveil19 lance Act of 1978, attempted to create the opposite 

20 impression by making public statements such as 

21 ‘‘[s]ome people will argue that nothing could justify 

22 the Government being able to intercept conversations 

23 like the ones the Program targets’’. 

24 (12) President George W. Bush inaccurately 

25 stated in his January 31, 2006, State of the Union 


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1 address that ‘‘[p]revious Presidents have used the 

2 same constitutional authority I have, and federal 

3 courts have approved the use of that authority.’’, 

4 even though the Administration has failed to identify 

5 a single instance since the Foreign Intelligence Sur6 veillance Act of 1978 became law in which another 

7 President has authorized wiretaps inside the United 

8 States without complying with the Foreign Intel9 ligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and no Federal 

10 court has evaluated whether the President has the 

11 inherent authority to authorize wiretaps inside the 

12 United States without complying with the Foreign 

13 Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 

14 (13) At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing 

15 on February 6, 2006, Attorney General Alberto R. 

16 Gonzales defended the President’s misleading state17 ments in the January 31, 2006, State of the Union 

18 address. 

19 (14) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales has 

20 misled Congress and the American people repeatedly 

21 by stating that there was no serious disagreement 

22 among Government officials ‘‘about’’ or ‘‘relate[d] 

23 to’’ the National Security Agency program con24 firmed by the President. 


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1 (15) According to testimony from former Dep2 uty Attorney General James Comey, Alberto R. 

3 Gonzales, while serving as Counsel to the President, 

4 participated in a visit to then-Attorney General John 

5 Ashcroft in the intensive care unit of the hospital in 

6 an attempt to convince Mr. Ashcroft to overturn the 

7 decision by Mr. Comey, then serving as Acting At8 torney General due to Mr. Ashcroft’s illness, not to 

9 certify the legality of a classified intelligence pro10 gram, in what Mr. Comey described as ‘‘an effort to 

11 take advantage of a very sick man’’. 

12 (b) DETAINEE AND TORTURE POLICY.—The House 

13 of Representatives finds the following: 

14 (1) The United States is a party to the Conven15 tion Against Torture, the Geneva Conventions, and 

16 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

17 Rights. 

18 (2) Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven19 tions requires that detainees in armed conflicts other 

20 than those between nations ‘‘shall in all cir21 cumstances be treated humanely,’’ and the Third 

22 Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of 

23 War provides additional protections for detainees 

24 who qualify as ‘‘prisoners of war’’. 


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1 (3) United States law criminalizes any ‘‘act spe2 cifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental 

3 pain or suffering’’ under sections 2340 and 2340A 

4 of title 18, United States Code, and the War Crimes 

5 Act (18 U.S.C. 2441) and recognizes the gravity of 

6 such offenses by further providing for civil liability 

7 under the Torture Victim Protection Act and the 

8 Alien Tort Claims Act. 

9 (4) In a draft memorandum dated January 25, 

10 2002, Alberto R. Gonzales, in his capacity as Coun11 sel to the President, argued that the protections of 

12 the Third Geneva Convention should not be afforded 

13 to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees, and described 

14 provisions of the Convention as ‘‘quaint’’ and ‘‘obso15 lete’’. 

16 (5) The January 25, 2002, memorandum by 

17 then-Counsel to the President Alberto R. Gonzales 

18 cited ‘‘reduc[ing] the threat of domestic criminal 

19 prosecution’’ as a ‘‘positive’’ consequence of dis20 avowing the Geneva Conventions’ applicability, as21 serting that such a disavowal ‘‘would provide a solid 

22 defense to any future prosecution’’ in the event a 

23 prosecutor brought charges under the domestic War 

24 Crimes Act. 


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1 (6) Secretary of State Colin Powell responded 

2 in a January 26, 2002, memorandum that such an 

3 attempt to evade the Geneva Conventions would ‘‘re4 verse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in 

5 supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine 

6 the protections of the rule of law for our troops’’. 

7 (7) Despite the warnings of the Secretary of 

8 State and in contravention of the language of the 

9 Third Geneva Convention, President George W. 

10 Bush announced on February 7, 2002, that— 

11 (A) he did not consider the Convention to 

12 apply to al Qaeda fighters; and 

13 (B) Taliban detainees would not be enti14 tled to ‘‘prisoner of war’’ status under the Con15 vention, despite the fact that Article 5 of the 

16 Convention and United States Army regulations 

17 expressly require such determinations to be 

18 made by a ‘‘competent tribunal’’. 

19 (8) The Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rums20 feld, confirmed that Common Article 3 of the Gene21 va Conventions applies to Taliban forces and al 

22 Qaeda forces, and characterized a central legal 

23 premise by which the President sought to avoid the 

24 obligations of international law as ‘‘erroneous’’. 


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1 (9) Alberto R. Gonzales, acting as Counsel to 

2 the President, solicited and accepted the August 1, 

3 2002, Office of Legal Counsel memorandum entitled 

4 ‘‘Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 

5 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A’’, which took the untenable 

6 position that ‘‘mere infliction of pain’’ is not ‘‘tor7 ture’’ unless ‘‘the victim . . . experiences intense pain 

8 or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the 

9 pain that would be associated with serious physical 

10 injury so severe that death, organ failure, or perma11 nent damage resulting in a loss of significant body 

12 function will likely result.’’. 

13 (10) According to the ‘‘Review of Department 

14 of Defense Detention Operations and Detainee In15 terrogation Techniques’’ (the ‘‘Church Report’’), 

16 issued on March 7, 2005, then-Secretary of Defense 

17 Donald Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002, authorized 

18 the use on Guantanamo Bay detainees of harsh in19 terrogation techniques not listed in the Army Field 

20 Manual, including stress positions, hooding, the use 

21 of military dogs to exploit phobias, prolonged isola22 tion, sensory deprivation, and forcing Muslim men to 

23 shave their beards. 

24 (11) According to the ‘‘Article 15–6 Investiga25 tion of CJSOTF–AP [Combined Joint Special OperVerDate Aug 31 2005 21:30 Aug 07, 2007 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\HR626.IH HR626

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1 ations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula] and 5th SF 

2 [Special Forces] Group Detention Operation (For3 mica Report)’’ and Department of Defense docu4 ments released under the Freedom of Information 

5 Act, Guantanamo Bay detainees were chained to the 

6 floor, subjected to loud music, fed only bread and 

7 water, and kept for some period of time in cells 

8 measuring 4 feet by 4 feet by 20 inches. 

9 (12) The March 2004 investigative report of 

10 Major General Antonio Taguba documented ‘‘sadis11 tic, blatant and wanton criminal abuses’’ against de12 tainees at the Abu Ghraib detention facility, includ13 ing sexual and physical abuse, the threat of torture, 

14 the forcing of detainees to perform degrading acts 

15 designed to assault their religious identity, and the 

16 use of dogs to frighten detainees. 

17 (13) According to Department of Defense docu18 ments released under the Freedom of Information 

19 Act, the United States Armed Forces held certain 

20 Iraqis as ‘‘ghost detainees,’’ who were ‘‘not ac21 counted for’’ and were hidden from the observation 

22 of the International Committee of the Red Cross 

23 (ICRC). 

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1 tion Act revealed that at least 39 deaths, and prob2 ably more, have occurred among detainees in United 

3 States custody overseas, approximately half of which 

4 were homicides and 7 of which appear to have been 

5 caused by ‘‘strangulation,’’ ‘‘asphyxiation’’ or fatal 

6 ‘‘blunt force injuries’’. 

7 (15) On September 6, 2006, President George 

8 W. Bush stated that he had authorized the incom9 municado detention of certain suspected terrorist 

10 leaders and operatives at secret sites outside the 

11 United States under a ‘‘separate program’’ operated 

12 by the Central Intelligence Agency. 

13 (16) President George W. Bush has authorized 

14 the indefinite detention, without charge or trial, of 

15 more than 700 individuals at Guantanamo Bay 

16 Naval Base on the ground that they are ‘‘enemy 

17 combatants’’ and therefore may be held until the 

18 cessation of hostilities under the laws of war. 

19 (17) Department of Justice lawyers, rep20 resenting President George W. Bush and the De21 partment of Defense in a Federal lawsuit brought on 

22 behalf of Guantanamo detainees, took the unprece23 dented position that the term ‘‘enemy combatant’’ 

24 could in theory justify the indefinite detention of a 

25 ‘‘little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to 


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1 what she thinks is [a] charity that helps orphans in 

2 Afghanistan but is really a front to finance al-Qaeda 

3 activities’’ and ‘‘a person who teaches English to the 

4 son of an al Qaeda member’’. 

5 (18) After the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. 

6 Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush rejected the claim that 

7 an alleged ‘‘enemy combatant’’ could be detained in8 definitely without any meaningful opportunity to 

9 challenge the designation, the Deputy Secretary of 

10 Defense issued an order on July 7, 2004, creating 

11 ‘‘Combatant Status Review Tribunals’’ (CSRTs) for 

12 the stated purpose of ‘‘review[ing] the detainee’s sta13 tus as an enemy combatant’’. 

14 (19) Such Order— 

15 (A) did not allow detainees to be rep16 resented by counsel in Combatant Status Re17 view Tribunal proceedings, but instead specified 

18 that a ‘‘military officer’’ would be assigned to 

19 ‘‘assist[ ]’’ each detainee and required such 

20 military officers to inform the detainees that ‘‘I 

21 am neither a lawyer nor your advocate,’’ and 

22 that ‘‘[n]one of the information you provide me 

23 shall be held in confidence’’; 

24 (B) allowed the detainee to be excluded 

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1 volving ‘‘testimony or other matters that would 

2 compromise national security if held in the 

3 presence of the detainee’’; 

4 (C) allowed the decision-maker to rely on 

5 hearsay evidence and specified that ‘‘[t]he Tri6 bunal is not bound by the rules of evidence such 

7 as would apply in a court of law’’; and 

8 (D) specified that ‘‘there shall be a rebut9 table presumption in favor of the Government’s 

10 evidence’’. 

11 (20) The Government has relied on the above 

12 procedures to deprive individuals of their liberty for 

13 an indefinite period of time without a meaningful 

14 opportunity to confront and rebut the evidence on 

15 which that detention is predicated. 

16 (21) President George W. Bush and the De17 partment of Defense designated at least 2 United 

18 States citizens as ‘‘enemy combatants,’’ claimed the 

19 right to detain them indefinitely on United States 

20 soil without charge and without access to counsel, 

21 and argued that allowing meaningful judicial review 

22 of their detention would be ‘‘constitutionally intoler23 able’’. 

24 (22) The Supreme Court established in Hamdi 

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1 cisionmaker of the detention of United States citi2 zens is constitutionally required, that ‘‘the risk of an 

3 erroneous deprivation of a citizen’s liberty . . . is very 

4 real,’’ and that the Constitution mandates that a 

5 United States citizen be given a fair opportunity to 

6 rebut the Government’s ‘‘enemy combatant’’ des7 ignation. 

8 (23) The administration, having consistently 

9 claimed that according United States citizens des10 ignated as ‘‘enemy combatants’’ the due process pro11 tections accorded to criminal defendants in civilian 

12 courts would jeopardize national security interests of 

13 the utmost importance, elected to pursue criminal 

14 charges against alleged ‘‘enemy combatant’’ Jose 

15 Padilla in a civilian court after holding him in mili16 tary custody for 3 years. 

17 (24) The administration, having contended that 

18 alleged ‘‘enemy combatant’’ and United States cit19 izen Yaser Esam Hamdi was so dangerous that 

20 merely allowing him to meet with counsel ‘‘jeopard21 izes compelling national security interests’’ because 

22 he might ‘‘pass concealed messages through unwit23 ting intermediaries,’’ released Mr. Hamdi from cus24 tody after 3 years and allowed him to return to 

25 Saudi Arabia. 


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1 (25) President George W. Bush issued ‘‘Mili2 tary Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treat3 ment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 

4 Against Terrorism,’’ which authorized the creation 

5 of military tribunals to try suspected al Qaeda mem6 bers and other international terrorist suspects for 

7 violations of the law of war. 

8 (26) Alberto R. Gonzales, as Counsel to the 

9 President, in a November 30, 2001, newspaper edi10 torial, defended these military tribunals and 

11 misleadingly represented that they would have ade12 quate procedural safeguards, by stating: ‘‘Everyone 

13 tried before a military commission will know the 

14 charges against him, be represented by qualified 

15 counsel and be allowed to present a defense.’’. 

16 (27) The military tribunals’ procedural rules as 

17 outlined in Military Commission Order No. 1, issued 

18 on March 21, 2002, and as subsequently amended— 

19 (A) permitted the accused and his civilian 

20 counsel to be excluded from any part of the 

21 proceeding that the presiding officer decided to 

22 close, and never learn what was presented dur23 ing that portion of the proceeding; 

24 (B) permitted the introduction of any evi25 dence that the presiding officer determined 


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1 would have probative value to a reasonable per2 son, thereby permitting the admission of hear3 say and evidence obtained through undue coer4 cion; and 

5 (C) restricted appellate review of the com6 missions to a panel appointed by the Secretary 

7 of Defense, followed by review by the Secretary 

8 of Defense and a final decision by the Presi9 dent, with no provision for direct appeal to the 

10 Federal courts for review by civilian judges. 

11 (28) Nearly 5 years after the military order was 

12 signed, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 

13 struck down the military commissions as unlawful, 

14 finding that— 

15 (A) the military commissions as con16 stituted were not expressly authorized by any 

17 congressional act, including the Authorization 

18 for Use of Military Force, the Uniform Code of 

19 Military Justice (UCMJ), and the Detainee 

20 Treatment Act; 

21 (B) the military commission procedures 

22 violated the UCMJ, which mandates that rules 

23 governing military commissions be as similar to 

24 those governing courts-martial ‘‘as practicable,’’ 


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1 and which affords the accused the right to be 

2 present; 

3 (C) the military commission procedures 

4 violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Con5 ventions, which is part of the ‘‘law of war’’ 

6 under UCMJ Article 21 and requires trial in ‘‘a 

7 regularly constituted court affording all the ju8 dicial guarantees which are recognized as indis9 pensable by civilized peoples’’. 

10 (29) President George W. Bush sought to pre11 vent the Guantanamo detainees from obtaining judi12 cial review of their indefinite confinement by claim13 ing that the writ of habeas corpus was categorically 

14 unavailable to non-citizens held at Guantanamo Bay. 

15 (30) The Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush 

16 squarely rejected this claim, holding that the legal 

17 precedent on which the President relied ‘‘plainly 

18 does not preclude the exercise of [statutory habeas] 

19 jurisdiction’’ over the detainees’ claims, and that the 

20 general presumption against extraterritorial applica21 tion of a statute, cited by the President, ‘‘certainly 

22 has no application’’ with respect to detainees at 

23 Guantanamo Bay where the United States exercises 

24 ‘‘complete jurisdiction and control’’. 


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1 (c) UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FIRINGS AND EXEC2 UTIVE PRIVILEGE.—The House of Representatives finds 

3 the following: 

4 (1) At least 9 United States Attorneys were 

5 told in 2006 that they must step down under the au6 thority of President George W. Bush, who had the 

7 final decision-making power in terminating the em8 ployment of United States Attorneys. 

9 (2) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales and 

10 subordinates under his supervision repeatedly misled 

11 Congress and attempted to block legitimate congres12 sional oversight efforts concerning the firing of at 

13 least nine United States Attorneys. 

14 (3) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales re15 peatedly obscured the true scope of the firings, origi16 nally declining to cite a specific number of individ17 uals fired in his testimony on January 18, 2007, ac18 knowledging only seven in his USA Today op-ed 

19 published on March 6, 2007, acknowledging eight 

20 firings in his testimony on April 19, 2007, tacitly 

21 conceding there had been nine individuals fired in 

22 his testimony on May 10, 2007, and testifying on 

23 July 24, 2007, that ‘‘there may have been others’’ 

24 but he did not know the exact number. 


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1 (4) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales ini2 tially characterized the firings as ‘‘an overblown per3 sonnel matter,’’ claiming that the United States At4 torneys had lost his confidence and were fired for 

5 ‘‘performance reasons’’ when many of those same in6 dividuals had received only the highest performance 

7 reviews prior to their dismissal. 

8 (5) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testi9 fied before the Senate on January 18, 2007, that he 

10 would ‘‘never, ever make a change in a United 

11 States attorney for political reasons,’’ but in later 

12 testimony on April 19, 2007, and July 24, 2007, ad13 mitted that he does not know who selected each indi14 vidual United States Attorney for firing or why they 

15 were included on the list of United States Attorneys 

16 to be fired. 

17 (6) Prior to their selection for firing, both 

18 former New Mexico United States Attorney David 

19 Iglesias and former Washington United States At20 torney John McKay received inappropriate phone 

21 calls from Members of Congress or their staffs re22 garding ongoing, politically sensitive investigations 

23 and the White House received complaints about the 

24 manner in which they were conducting those inves25 tigations. 


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1 (7) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testi2 fied before the Senate on January 18, 2007, that he 

3 would not fire a United States Attorney ‘‘if it would 

4 in any way jeopardize an ongoing serious investiga5 tion,’’ but later testified, as did his subordinates, 

6 that concerns about whether ongoing investigations 

7 would be jeopardized were not explored prior to the 

8 firings and were specifically ignored when some fired 

9 United States Attorneys asked for a delay in their 

10 departure dates to allow them to wrap up ongoing 

11 investigations. 

12 (8) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales pub13 licly stated on March 13, 2007, that he was ‘‘not in14 volved in seeing any memos, was not involved in any 

15 discussions about what was going on’’ regarding the 

16 process leading up to the firing of the United States 

17 Attorneys, but later testimony from his subordinates 

18 and documents released by the Department of Jus19 tice indicate that the Attorney General was, in fact, 

20 regularly briefed on the process and did receive at 

21 least one memo in November 2005 regarding the 

22 planned firings. 

23 (9) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales pub24 licly stated on May 15, 2007, that Deputy Attorney 

25 General Paul McNulty’s participation in the firing of 


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1 the United States Attorneys was of central impor2 tance to the validity of the process and to the Attor3 ney General’s decision to fire the specific individuals, 

4 but he had previously testified on April 19, 2007, 

5 that he did not discuss the process with Mr. McNul6 ty prior to firing the United States Attorneys, and 

7 that ‘‘looking back . . . I would have had the deputy 

8 attorney general more involved, directly involved’’. 

9 (10) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales tes10 tified on May 10, 2007, that, after the start of the 

11 congressional investigation into the firings, he had 

12 refrained from discussing the firings with anyone in13 volved because he did not want to interfere with the 

14 ongoing investigations, but former White House Li15 aison for the Department of Justice, Monica Good16 ling, testified on May 23, 2007, that the Attorney 

17 General spoke with her in late March of 2007 and 

18 ‘‘laid out . . . his general recollection . . . of some of 

19 the process regarding the replacement of the United 

20 States Attorneys.’’ 

21 (11) Former White House Liaison for the De22 partment of Justice, Monica Goodling, also testified 

23 on May 23, 2007, that she did not respond to what 

24 Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales said about his 

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1 priate for us to both be discussing our recollections 

2 of what had happened, and I just thought maybe we 

3 shouldn’t have that conversation.’’ 

4 (12) President George W. Bush has consistently 

5 stonewalled congressional attempts at oversight by 

6 refusing to turn over White House documents relat7 ing to the firing of at least 9 United States Attor8 neys and refusing to allow current or former White 

9 House officials to testify before Congress on this 

10 matter, based on an excessively broad and legally in11 sufficient assertion of executive privilege. 

12 (13) President George W. Bush has asserted 

13 executive privilege in refusing even to turn over cor14 respondence between non-Executive Branch officials 

15 and White House officials concerning the firings of 

16 at least 9 United States Attorneys, even though such 

17 communications could not reasonably be classified as 

18 falling within the privilege. 

19 (14) President George W. Bush has directed at 

20 least two staff members, former and current, to ig21 nore congressional subpoenas altogether, ordering 

22 former Counsel to the President Harriet Miers and 

23 current Deputy Chief of Staff and Senior Adviser to 

24 the President Karl Rove not to appear at Congres25 sional oversight hearings based on the assertion that 


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1 immediate presidential advisors are ‘‘immune from 

2 compelled Congressional testimony about matters 

3 that arose during [their] tenure,’’ rather than simply 

4 instructing them to refrain from answering questions 

5 that might be covered by a proper assertion of exec6 utive privilege. 

7 (15) President George W. Bush has refused to 

8 work to find a compromise with Congress or other9 wise accommodate legitimate congressional oversight 

10 efforts, disregarding the proper relationship between 

11 the executive and legislative branches and dem12 onstrating a belief that he and his Administration 

13 are above oversight and the rule of law. 

14 (d) MISLEADING STATEMENTS ON THE USA PA15 TRIOT ACT.—The House of Representatives finds the fol16 lowing: 

17 (1) President George W. Bush made misleading 

18 claims during the course of the Administration’s 

19 2005 campaign to reauthorize the USA PATRIOT 

20 Act of 2001, by suggesting that Federal officials did 

21 not have access to the same tools to investigate ter22 rorism as they did to investigate other crimes. 

23 (2) In 2005 the Federal Bureau of Investiga24 tion transmitted to Attorney General Alberto R. 

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1 nection with provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act 

2 and related authorities, including unauthorized sur3 veillance and improper collection of communications 

4 data that were serious enough to require notification 

5 of the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board. 

6 (3) Despite these reports, Attorney General 

7 Alberto R. Gonzales told Congress and the American 

8 people in the course of the Administration’s 2005 

9 campaign to reauthorize the USA PATRIOT Act of 

10 2001 that ‘‘[t]he track record established over the 

11 past three years has demonstrated the effectiveness 

12 of the safeguards of civil liberties put in place when 

13 the Act was passed,’’ that ‘‘[t]here has not been one 

14 verified case of civil liberties abuse,’’ and that ‘‘no 

15 one has provided me with evidence that the Patriot 

16 Act is being abused or misused’’. 

17 (4) The United States Department of Justice 

18 sent a 10-page letter to Congress dated November 

19 23, 2005— 

20 (A) stating that a November 6, 2005, 

21 Washington Post story detailing the Federal 

22 Bureau of Investigation’s use of National Secu23 rity Letters was a ‘‘materially misleading por24 trayal’’ full of ‘‘distortions and factual errors’’; 


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1 (B) defending its use of National Security 

2 Letters by pointing to the Department’s ‘‘ro3 bust mechanisms for checking misuse,’’ ‘‘signifi4 cant internal oversight and checks,’’ and re5 ports to Congress regarding the number of Na6 tional Security Letters issued; and 

7 (C) stating that the November 6, 2005, 

8 Washington Post story was inaccurate in stat9 ing that ‘‘The FBI now issues more than 

10 30,000 National Security Letters a year, . . . a 

11 hundredfold increase over historic norms.’’. 

12 (5) On March 9, 2007, the Inspector General 

13 for the United States Department of Justice issued 

14 a report on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

15 use of National Security Letters from 2003 through 

16 2005— 

17 (A) that the Inspector General said found 

18 ‘‘widespread and serious misuse of the FBI’s 

19 national security letter authorities’’ that ‘‘in 

20 many instances . . . violated NSL statutes, At21 torney General Guidelines, or the FBI’s own in22 ternal policies,’’ and found that ‘‘the FBI did 

23 not provide adequate guidance, adequate con24 trols, or adequate training on the use of these 

25 sensitive authorities’’; and 


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1 (B) that indicated the Federal Bureau of 

2 Investigation issued approximately 39,000 Na3 tional Security Letter requests in 2003, 56,000 

4 National Security Letter requests in 2004, and 

5 47,000 National Security Letter requests in 

6 2005. 

7 (6) The United States Department of Justice 

8 sent a letter on March 9, 2007, to Congress, admit9 ting that it had ‘‘determined that certain statements 

10 in our November 23, 2005 letter need clarification’’ 

11 in light of the Inspector General’s findings and that 

12 ‘‘the reports [The Department of Justice] provided 

13 Congress in response to statutory reporting require14 ments did not accurately reflect the FBI’s use of 

15 NSLs’’. 

16 (e) SIGNING STATEMENTS.—The House of Rep17 resentatives finds the following: 

18 (1) President George W. Bush has lodged more 

19 than 800 challenges to duly enacted provisions of 

20 law by issuing signing statements that indicate that 

21 the President does not believe he must comply with 

22 such provisions of law. 

23 (2) Such signing statements effectively assign 

24 to the executive branch alone the decision whether to 

25 fully comply with the laws that Congress has passed. 


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1 (3) On December 30, 2005, President George 

2 W. Bush signed the Department of Defense Emer3 gency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hur4 ricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influ5 enza Act, 2006, title X of which prohibits the Gov6 ernment from subjecting any individual ‘‘in the cus7 tody or under the physical control of the United 

8 States Government, regardless of nationality or 

9 physical location’’ to ‘‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading 

10 treatment or punishment’’. 

11 (4) President George W. Bush issued a signing 

12 statement to such Act that suggested he believed he 

13 did not have to comply with the prohibition on tor14 ture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, 

15 stating: ‘‘The executive branch shall construe Title 

16 X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in 

17 a manner consistent with the constitutional author18 ity of the President to supervise the unitary execu19 tive branch and as Commander in Chief and con20 sistent with the constitutional limitations on the ju21 dicial power, which will assist in achieving the 

22 shared objective of the Congress and the President, 

23 evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American 

24 people from further terrorist attacks.’’. 


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1 (5) On March 9, 2006, President George W. 

2 Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 

3 Reauthorization Act of 2005, which requires that 

4 the executive branch furnish reports to Congress on 

5 certain surveillance activities. 

6 (6) President George W. Bush issued a signing 

7 statement to such Act that suggested he believed he 

8 did not have to comply fully with these reporting re9 quirements, stating: ‘‘The executive branch shall 

10 construe the provisions of H.R. 3199 that call for 

11 furnishing information to entities outside the execu12 tive branch, such as sections 106A and 119, in a 

13 manner consistent with the President’s constitu14 tional authority to supervise the unitary executive 

15 branch and to withhold information the disclosure of 

16 which could impair foreign relations, national secu17 rity, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or 

18 the performance of the Executive’s constitutional du19 ties.’’. 

20 (7) On December 20, 2006, President George 

21 W. Bush signed the Postal Accountability and En22 hancement Act, which protects certain classes of 

23 sealed domestic mail from being opened except in 

24 specifically defined circumstances. 


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1 (8) President George W. Bush issued a signing 

2 statement to such Act that suggested he believed he 

3 did not have to comply with this provision, stating: 

4 ‘‘The executive branch shall construe subsection 

5 404(c) of title 39, as enacted by subsection 1010(e) 

6 of the Act, which provides for opening of an item of 

7 a class of mail otherwise sealed against inspection, 

8 in a manner consistent, to the maximum extent per9 missible, with the need to conduct searches in exi10 gent circumstances, such as to protect human life 

11 and safety against hazardous materials, and the 

12 need for physical searches specifically authorized by 

13 law for foreign intelligence collection.’’ 

14 (9) The American Bar Association Task Force 

15 on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separa16 tion of Powers Doctrine concluded that President 

17 George W. Bush’s misuse of signing statements 

18 ‘‘weaken[s] our cherished system of checks and bal19 ances and separation of powers’’. 

20 SEC. 2. CENSURE BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 

21 The House of Representatives censures George W. 

22 Bush, President of the United States, and Alberto R. 

23 Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, and con24 demns their lengthy record of— 


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1 (1) undermining the rule of law and the separa2 tion of powers; 

3 (2) disregarding statutes, treaties ratified by 

4 the United States, and the Constitution; and 

5 (3) repeatedly misleading the American people. 

Æ 


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