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SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS

BRIEFING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 18, 2011

Serial No. 112–1

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

VACANT 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

BRIEFERS 

The Honorable Princeton Lyman, special advisor for Sudan, U.S. Department 

of State .................................................................................................................. 10

The Honorable Richard S. Williamson, partner, Salisbury Strategies, LLC 

(former Special Envoy to Sudan and Ambassador to the U.N. Commission 

on Human Rights) ................................................................................................ 33

Mr. Omer Ismail, advisor, The Enough Project .................................................... 42

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE BRIEFING 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

The Honorable Princeton Lyman: Prepared statement ........................................ 15

The Honorable Richard S. Williamson: Prepared statement ............................... 35

Mr. Omer Ismail: Prepared statement ................................................................... 44

APPENDIX 

Briefing notice .......................................................................................................... 58

Briefing minutes ...................................................................................................... 59

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 61

(1)

SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 18, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:30 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The briefing will come to order. 

Good afternoon. After my opening remarks and those of my good 

friend, Mr. Berman, the ranking member of the committee, I will 

recognize the chairman-designate and the ranking member-designate of the Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights Subcommittee, Mr. Smith, on our side, and Mr. Payne, for 3 minutes 

each. 

We will then move to our panelists’ presentations, followed by 

questioning by the members-designate on the Committee on Foreign Affairs—and I use that phrase because we are not formally organized yet—for 5 minutes each, followed by 5 minutes each for 

any other member who would like to ask questions of our panelists. 

I appreciate the understanding and cooperation of our colleagues 

and look forward to today’s discussion. 

Before we begin, I would like to express what an honor is it to 

assume the responsibilities of chairman of the House Committee on 

Foreign Affairs. 

For the Members who will be joining the committee upon organization, please know that I do not take those responsibilities lightly. 

During the 112th Congress, this committee will be confronted with 

some of the most pressing national security and foreign policy challenges of our time, from ensuring rigorous enforcement of sanctions 

against Iran, to providing effective stewardship of American taxpayer dollars in foreign aid and State Department programs, to instituting systems for accountability at the United Nations. I fully 

intend to work with all members of the committee and the American people to confront these challenges directly, responsibly and 

effectively. 

It is therefore fitting that the first Members’ briefing hosted by 

this committee would be focused on Sudan. Today, Sudan is truly 

at the crossroads. Beginning on January 9th, millions of South Sudanese participated in a historic referendum to determine whether 

Africa’s largest country would remain united or split in two. Given 

the countless delays, manipulations and violent eruptions that 

have imperiled implementation of the Comprehensive Peace AgreeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:43 Feb 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\011811\64007 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ment for Sudan over these past 6 years, many doubted that this 

day would come. Yet the vote proceeded peacefully and credibly. 

After decades of repression by a genocidal regime in Khartoum 

and a war that left over 2 million people dead and 4 million people 

displaced, the people of South Sudan may at last have realized 

their right to self-determination. 

Unfortunately, the hardest work is yet to come. First, the results 

must be certified and accepted. Though Khartoum has pledged to 

accept the outcome, it has a long history of reneging on its commitments. The stakes are high, and both sides have spent the past 6 

years preparing for war. 

Second, outstanding issues relating to the implementation of the 

CPA must be resolved prior to conclusion of the transition period 

in July 2011, including the demarcation of the border; citizenship 

and nationality; wealth sharing and resource management, including for oil and water; division of assets and debt; currency; and security arrangements. 

Third, the future status of the oil-rich Abyei region must be resolved fairly and in a transparent manner. Abyei is a lit match in 

a pool of gasoline, and continued failure to resolve its status all but 

guarantees war. 

Likewise, the popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and 

Blue Nile must proceed in a manner that legitimately addresses 

longstanding grievances. These areas are awash with weapons, and 

tensions are high. A single security incident could set the entire region ablaze. 

Finally, we must not trade peace in Darfur for independence in 

the South. Regrettably, it appears the administration may have forgotten key lessons from the past. Prior U.S. efforts to reward the 

Sudanese regime for signing peace agreements and acceding to the 

deployment of peacekeepers while the regime simultaneously supported genocide in Darfur, blocked humanitarian access, and 

stalled implementation of the CPA were broadly condemned. 

In the words of then-Senator Barack Obama in April 2008, and 

I quote,

‘‘I am deeply concerned by reports that the Bush administration is negotiating a normalization of relations with the Government of Sudan. This reckless and cynical initiative would 

reward a regime in Khartoum that has a record of failing to 

live up to its commitments.’’

Yet the Obama administration is following the same misguided 

concessions-driven path. I do not intend to minimize what has been 

accomplished inside Sudan. Delivering a timely credible referendum was an incredibly hard task. But, again, the referendum 

is just the start. 

The true test of the regime’s commitment will extend far beyond 

the July 2011 date, and far beyond South Sudan. Thus, I am deeply troubled by the premature efforts to advance normalization, 

sanctions relief, and debt relief. The bulk of sanctions mandated by 

Congress are linked to peace in South Sudan and in Darfur. Given 

recent developments in Darfur, the certification requirements for 

easing sanctions cannot be met. 

3

I am particularly concerned by suggestions that the administration may remove Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List 

by July 2011. Removal from this list is not a ‘‘gold star’’ that can 

be offered to advance an unrelated political objective. This is a serious matter with repercussions that directly impact our most vital 

national security interests. 

Recall that the previous administration delisted North Korea in 

exchange for nominal concessions relating to one nuclear facility. 

Almost immediately upon winning this prize, North Korea reneged 

on its promise to implement a transparent verification regime, 

withdrew from the Six-Party Talks, and brazenly resumed its proliferation activities. Today, North Korea reportedly possesses one or 

more highly sophisticated uranium enrichment facilities and, according to the United Nations, is supplying Iran, Syria, and Burma 

with nuclear and ballistic missile related equipment. The U.S. 

must proceed with extreme caution in our dealings with the Sudanese regime. 

The potential birth of a new nation in South Sudan is truly momentous and will have significant ramifications beyond the region. 

The United States has played a major role in bringing the parties 

to this point, and it is in our national interest to see that the process advances peacefully. 

The risks are high. The challenges are daunting. But the 

achievement of peace in a region ravaged by war is an honorable 

endeavor. I welcome the opportunity to work with the administration and responsible partners for peace in Sudan toward this end. 

I now turn to our ranking member, Mr. Berman, for his opening 

remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

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Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you 

very much for calling this timely briefing. 

I want to begin by congratulating you on your new position as 

chairman. 

I would also like to congratulate the new subcommittee chairs. 

And I really do look forward to working with all of you in the 

112th Congress. 

And at the outset, I would also like to commend the Africa Subcommittee Ranking Member Donald Payne and other members on 

both sides of the aisle for their leadership on Sudan, especially 

their efforts to focus the world’s attention on the unspeakable 

atrocities committed by the Khartoum regime against the people of 

South Sudan and Darfur. 

Their work on these critical issues inspired two major pieces of 

legislation, the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 and the 

Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, along with a number 

of resolutions condemning the regime for crimes against humanity. 

Madam Chairman, this past week marked a historic moment for 

the people of South Sudan who fought a 22-year civil war to arrive 

at this moment of self-determination. While we do not know the official results of the referendum, it is clear that the vote will almost 

certainly result in independence for the South. 

And as we consider this milestone, it is important that we remember the late President John Garang Mabior, who led the 

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army through the long 

civil war, a terrible conflict that resulted in the deaths of over 2 

million South Sudanese and the displacement of millions more. Before his tragic death in a helicopter crash in July 2005, Garang negotiated the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with Khartoum. 

That agreement provided for the referendum and other events we 

will examine today. 

After his election in 2008, President Obama undertook a bolder 

view of U.S. policy toward Sudan and set out a new vision focused 

on intensive diplomacy. This new strategy required significant 

changes in behavior by the Khartoum government. It demanded 

verifiable progress toward a settlement between the North and 

South, as well as progress in Darfur. 


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The President’s new approach was met with great skepticism by 

many of us in Congress and the advocacy community in part because it required direct engagement with a Sudanese Government 

that had committed genocide and other gross violations of human 

rights. 

To carry out the new policy, President Obama appointed retired 

Air Force General Gration as special envoy to Sudan. Gration, the 

son of missionaries who was raised in Congo, assembled a team 

and developed a diplomatic strategy to realize the President’s vision. 

Our first witness today, Ambassador Princeton Lyman, also deserves great credit for his diplomatic efforts to complete the roadmap that helped deliver Khartoum’s final cooperation on the CPA 

and the referendum. 

Today we can see the results of the Obama administration’s hard 

work. The voting for the referendum has taken place peacefully, 

and a major goal of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has been 

achieved. 

There are, of course, many, as the chairman said earlier, many 

outstanding issues to resolve before independence is finalized in 

July. A referendum on the status of the oil producing Abyei region 

has yet to take place. An agreement needs to be reached on the 

sharing of oil revenue, the division of national debt, the delineation 

of borders. 

There is also the thorny issue of citizenship. Should the South 

vote to form a new independent state, there are fears that southerners in the North and northerners in the South could be left 

stateless and vulnerable to political violence. 

Finally, there is the crucial issue of peace in Darfur which still 

eludes us today. We must not forget the enumerable atrocities that 

have taken place in that region of Sudan. In 2004, Congress and 

the Bush administration declared that the events in Darfur constituted genocide. And in 2008, the International Criminal Court 

indicted Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir on three 

counts of genocide, five counts of crimes against humanity, and two 

counts of murder. 

I am encouraged that President Obama has remained focused on 

Darfur and intends to revive the stalled negotiations between 

Khartoum and the rebel groups in Darfur. 

The people of South Sudan have taken a major step toward selfdetermination, but there are many difficulties ahead. The new nation will face a large number of challenges, from building the basic 

institutions of statehood to economic development to the reintegration of the returnees. And by all accounts, there is very little capacity in South Sudan to meet these daunting challenges. If South 

Sudan is to flourish, then the United States, the United Nations 

and other members of the international community must continue 

to assist the people of that nation in their transition to independence and democratic rule. 

In this context, it is important to recognize the Herculean efforts 

of the United Nations Development Programme to help make the 

referendum a reality. The UNDP supported voter education, delivered ballots for more than 4 million voters on schedule and helped 

to establish and equip nearly 3,000 registration centers and trained 

8

over 8,000 staff to manage those centers. These efforts and the efforts of U.N. peacekeepers in South Sudan underscore the extent 

to which the U.N.’s work can support U.S. foreign policy interests 

and contribute to international peace and security. 

Madam Chairman, we would not be where we are today in South 

Sudan without hard-nosed American diplomacy, the active involvement of the United Nations, and targeted U.S. foreign assistance 

programs. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

I would like to recognize for 3 minutes the chairman-designate 

of the Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights Subcommittee, Mr. 

Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Madam Chair, thank you very much. 

And I want to begin by joining the ranking member, Mr. Berman, in congratulating you on assuming the chairmanship of this 

very important committee, particularly at this very difficult time 

around the world. 

There are crises everywhere, and we look forward to, all of us on 

this side of the aisle and I am sure on the other side of the aisle 

as well, in working with you and finding tangible solutions to the 

many vexing problems we face. 

So congratulations, Madam Chair. 

I also want to thank you for calling this extremely timely and 

important briefing to examine the historic events occurring in 

Sudan. I congratulate the Southern Sudanese people and join in in 

celebrating the completion of the referendum on the future status 

of their country. The U.N. monitoring panel of the referendum’s assessment that the process was well organized and credible is particularly commendable given the serious time and resource constraints that preceded it. 

However, the voting last week marked over the beginning of 

what promises to be a long process fraught with peril. It will take 

several weeks for the votes to be transmitted from the nearly 3,000 

referendum centers to county and state levels and on to Juba and 

Khartoum before the official results are announced. 

If the South has voted for secession, as is widely believed, then 

numerous complicated and potentially volatile issues remain to be 

resolved. Among the most prominent of these issues is the demarcation of the border, including the division of the Abyei region with 

its oil reserves and fertile land. The sharing of oil reserves as well 

as debt and the question of citizenship are some of the other major 

challenges still to be addressed. And the establishment of a permanent peace in Darfur remains a critical but elusive goal as violence 

intensifies despite the current talks in Doha. 

I personally am concerned about the return of reportedly large 

numbers of southerners residing in the North to the South. I was 

informed during a hearing in September that humanitarian agencies at that time were not prepared to handle mass movements in 

Sudan. Unless this assessment has changed, such movements could 

lead to a severe humanitarian crisis and have a destabilizing security impact on the South. 

Those southerners who remain in the North against their will is 

another deeply troubling concern. Beginning in the 1980s, Arab militias armed by the Khartoum regime conducted slave raids in the 

9

South, taking mostly women and children to the North to serve as 

labor and sex slaves. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

failed to address this issue, and an estimated 35,000 southerners 

remain in the North in a state of forced servitude. This grave 

human rights issue must be acknowledged as a priority and the 

freedom of all slaves immediately secured. 

Finally, I look forward to hearing the briefers’ views as to what 

the impact the referendum will have on the North, again assuming 

a vote for independence. The Government of Sudan, to its credit, 

allowed the referendum to proceed and has publicly stated that it 

will respect the outcome. But given its abysmal track record, it is 

not a basis for optimism. 

I thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

I would like to recognize for 3 minutes the ranking member-designate of the Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights Subcommittee, Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

And let me commend you for your ascension to the chair of this 

committee. 

Mr. Berman. 

And let me thank you for holding this very critical meeting on 

Sudan being the first hearing, and I think it is appropriate. 

Let me also express my deep appreciation to the witnesses, who 

are certainly among the most knowledgeable people on Sudan: Ambassador Lyman, who did a great job in Nigeria and South Africa 

during critical times; Special Envoy Williamson with the State Department and U.N. posts, who was a great envoy to Sudan; and 

Mr. Ismail, who fled from Darfur and has been a great advocate 

for justice. 

Let me thank all of you for your commitment and self-determination to make this day a reality. Today Sudan is indeed at the crossroads. A week-long referendum has just concluded. And by all accounts, the outcome is clear that the people of South Sudan have 

chosen independence. 

My friends on the ground during the voting process have relayed 

stories of remarkable moments that illustrate the hope and excitement that lies in the heart of the South Sudanese. A policeman, 

after voting, looked around and told people in line, ‘‘I crossed the 

river, come join me.’’ A pregnant woman while in line to vote gave 

birth and was later able to cast her vote for the sake of her new 

baby. 

As I reflect on the 20 years that I have been working with 

Sudan, I remember many pivotal moments, moments of my own 

and the Congress’ struggle to see the people of South Sudan exercise their right of self-determination. I recall my first visit in 1993 

to Nimule, a town near the Ugandan border, which was the frontline of the struggle back then, helped mediate negotiations between 

two factions of the SPLM. It was then that I first met Dr. John 

Garang in the bush, father of South Sudan’s quest for autonomy, 

as well as a young military commander, Salva Kiir, who was there 

at his side, who is now the President of the Government of South 

Sudan. Upon returning from that trip, I, along with other members, introduced a resolution in the House calling for the right of 

10

self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and it passed this 

body. 

I recall over a dozen visits to South Sudan and the Darfur refugee camps in Chad and with Representatives Lee and Wolf and 

Tancredo, along with Senator Feingold, Senator Frist, Senator 

Brownback, all dedicated members of this institution at the time. 

After one such visit in 2004, I sponsored a resolution to call the 

world’s attention to the atrocities in Darfur which passed the 

House overwhelmingly, the first time that the Congress recognized 

ongoing genocide while it was going on. 

I recall visits to Nairobi and Naivasha in 2004 and 2005 with 

IGAD and a negotiation that culminated in the signing of the CPA 

on January 9, 2005, in Nairobi where I witnessed that. 

I will ask that the rest of my statement be added to the record 

since the gavel has been hit. 

But I do agree that the Abyei, I believe, should be solved before 

sanctions are released. We see what has happened in India with 

Kashmir still a question. We don’t want Abyei to be a question 20 

years from now with fighting going on. Thank you, and I yield. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

As the new members will know, it is embarrassing to gavel down 

the gentlemen from New Jersey—and both gentlemen from New 

Jersey, because they are the leading experts when it comes to Africa. 

So we are well-served by having Chairman and Ranking Member 

Smith and Payne with us. 

I am sorry, gentlemen, for the time restraints. 

As Mr. Payne said, we are very privileged to have two distinguished panels before us today. I know everyone is anxious to hear 

what they have to say. They are the experts. So I will only offer 

brief introductions and encourage members to read their biographies in full in your packet. 

We will begin with Ambassador Princeton Lyman, who has just 

returned from observing the referendum process in Sudan. The 

Ambassador was appointed by Secretary Clinton in August 2010 to 

lead the U.S. Negotiation Support Unit in Sudan. Prior to his appointment, he was serving as an adjunct senior fellow for Africa 

Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and as an adjunct professor at Georgetown. He has a long, distinguished career 

in government service, including postings as deputy assistant secretary of state for Africa, U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria and South 

Africa, and assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs. 

The Ambassador has a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard 

University and has published numerous books and articles on foreign policy, African affairs, economic development, HIV/AIDS, U.N. 

reform and peacekeeping. 

Ambassador Lyman, the floor is yours. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PRINCETON LYMAN, 

SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR SUDAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador LYMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you and the members, ranking member, Congressman 

Berman, and all the members here for holding this hearing and 

11

making this one of the very first issues of your chairmanship and 

of the committee this year. 

As you said, this is a terribly important issue. I recall Prime 

Minister Meles at the U.N. meeting on Sudan in September saying—and here is a man who faces a lot of crises in his neighborhood—saying that the peace process in the Sudan was the most important in all of Africa. And it is an indication of how widespread 

the implications are of having peace in that area. 

Thank you also for the work that Congress has done on this 

issue, all the members, the legislation, et cetera. It has made an 

extraordinary difference to send a message to the people of Sudan 

how much the United States cares, not just about the politics and 

the strategic aspects of it, but the welfare of the people who have 

suffered from war during this long period of time. 

We had a good week, Madam Chairman. We had, as you described and Congressman Berman and others have, a referendum 

that even a month or 2 ago we doubted could come off this well. 

And it came off peacefully, and all the observer missions, whether 

the Arab League, the Africa Union, the U.N., the NDI or others, 

all saying this was a credible, fair, effective referendum. 

It took a lot of work, a lot of diplomatic work, a lot of wonderful 

work by the United Nations. And USAID assembled an extraordinary team of IFES, NDI, IRI, the Carter Center, all working together to give the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission the 

technical support it needed against all the odds to be ready on January 9th to pull this off. 

So there was a lot involved here, and a lot of people deserve credit. But as you said in your opening statement, this is just one step 

there is a lot of hard work left to go. 

One of the issues, and Congressman Payne emphasized this and 

others have as well, is Abyei. Abyei is a deeply difficult emotional 

issue in Sudanese politics and in its history. Even during the referendum, we had instances of violence in that area that was finally 

brought under control with the help of the U.N. and the meeting 

of the parties, and there was an agreement signed this past weekend that should permit the beginning of the migration security for 

it and other arrangements should contain the situation. But the 

underlying issue of the future of Abyei remains a very critical one. 

It is an issue that probably can only be solved at the level of the 

Presidents, of President Bashir and President Kiir, and we hope 

that action will resume on those negotiations very shortly after the 

referendum. There are other processes. There are the popular consultations that are very important in Blue Nile and South 

Kordofan. I am happy to say that the consultations have started in 

Blue Nile. I will be visiting that area next week to witness some 

of those consultations. And we hope South Kordofan will be able to 

start soon after the elections in that state. 

And as you have all said, there are a whole range of issues that 

the two parties now have to get down to work and solve by July. 

The relationships between what looks like now two independent 

countries, but who share so much interdependence. As you know, 

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der, some 30 percent of the population, and they go back and forth 

all the time. 

There needs to be a solution to the oil sector, to citizenship 

issues, to what those parties have called soft borders and how they 

will operate, security arrangements, currency, et cetera. A lot of 

work has been done. A lot of technical work has been done. But 

now the political work has to start on bringing these issues to a 

head. 

Now, you have mentioned the question of our relationship to 

Sudan and particularly to the Government of Northern Sudan, and 

it is a very important issue. Part of the discussions that have been 

going on for the last month is how the U.S. relationship with 

Northern Sudan played into the negotiations. There was a very 

strong feeling that until there was some sense of our own relationships with the Sudan and the future of Sudan, there would be an 

obstacle there to the negotiations themselves. 

But something equally important that I have discovered in my 

time there—I have met with leaders of the opposition in the North. 

I have met with women’s groups and youth groups, and what I find 

is that the people of Northern Sudan are terribly worried about the 

outcome of the CPA. They feel that they are going to be abandoned. 

They feel that it will lead to war. They feel that it will lead to economic deprivation, and they want to know what the future is for 

them once the South is gone. And that is an important concern, because instability in the North or chaos in the North is not going 

to be any more in our interest than chaos in the South. 

There also has to be political transformation of the North. That 

is part of the dream, if you will, the objective of the CPA, and it 

hasn’t really happened. So we want to be engaged in the North. We 

want it to be successful and strategically stable, and we want to 

see prosperity for the people there. 

We have put down a roadmap for normalization with Northern 

Sudan after the CPA. And I can assure you that it is based on actions; it is not based on promises. The first step only comes after 

the government accepts the results of the referendum. And the step 

there, as the President said in his letter to Senator Kerry, which 

Kerry—Senator Kerry presented to the Sudanese, was that the 

President would begin the process of withdrawing Sudan from the 

list of States Sponsoring Terrorism. But they would have to meet 

all of the conditions under that law, and they would also have to 

complete the negotiations which you have all well described for the 

remaining balance of the CPA. And there has to be progress toward 

peace in Darfur. 

So before we can even complete that process and certainly before 

we would come to Congress and discuss the possible lifting of sanctions, steps would have to be taken, concrete steps by the North. 

In the meanwhile, a great deal has to be done on helping Southern 

Sudan. It is an area, as all of you know, devastated by war, extraordinarily poor with almost no infrastructure to speak of. You 

fly over Southern Sudan, you see very little agricultural activity. 

You see almost no roads. You have a very low educational base and 

a thin administrative structure. 

A lot of donors are working on that problem. We are the major 

donor. Our technical assistance this past year to the Government 

13

of Southern Sudan is about $430 million. Other donors are contributing just under $700 million to developing the capacity of the 

South. A lot of countries are involved. Kenya is the biggest trainer 

of technical personnel. The U.K., the European Union, Norway and 

others and China has begun a development program in the South. 

It is going to be a long, hard struggle for the South to meet the 

expectations of its people. 

We have done a lot and we will continue to do a lot to build up 

their capacity, their ability for conflict resolution within the South, 

their ability to deliver in education, health and the other areas of 

which their people expect. 

Now, Darfur is not my brief. General Gration, and he apologizes 

for not being able to within you today. He was just in Darfur this 

past week and he is joined now by another colleague of mine, Dane 

Smith, who will be working on Darfur in the same way that I have 

been working on the North-South. But I don’t want anybody to get 

the impression that the administration is either forgetting Darfur 

or sacrificing Darfur to the CPA. In fact, there is a good deal of 

interaction in Sudan between the two. There has to be peace in 

both places for Sudan, North and South, to succeed. 

I am not the expert on Darfur, but I know that work is underway 

to try and bring peace to strengthen UNAMID, to increase access 

for the humanitarian organizations and, above all, to get a credible 

peace process. And I am sure General Gration would be happy to 

brief you on all of that. 

Let me just conclude on one issue raised by Congressman Smith, 

a very important one about which we were very concerned, and 

that is the condition and the future for the southerners living in 

Northern Sudan. There are quite a few, as you know, estimates of 

as many as 1.5 million. Since the beginning of the CPA in 2005, 

330,000 people have returned to South Sudan. Just since last August, 150,000 have returned and more are returning all of the time. 

What we found was that the process was erratic, not very well 

planned and the states in the southern part of Sudan not prepared 

to receive them or get them to places where they could earn a livelihood. So we have worked now, we and the U.N., to try and regularize that process. We went to Government of Sudan, and we said, 

we need access to all the places where the southerners live in the 

North. We didn’t have that access before. We have it now. We and 

the U.N. and international agencies can now go visit the southern 

population in the North, find out what they are planning. UNHCR 

is going to begin a registration process and try to make more orderly the process of departure. 

Second, we are working with the government in the South to 

come up with more realistic timetables and plans for absorbing 

that many people in what is a very poor area. So I just wanted to 

assure you that this is an issue high on our list. And we have been 

given assurances, but we will monitor it very closely, that there 

will be no reprisals against those people. 

But it does raise one final issue that you all have mentioned, and 

that is the citizenship issue. Because the question is what happens 

when the South becomes independent to southerners living in the 

North or northerners living in the South. The Government of 

Sudan, the Northern government, the NCP, has said they will not 

14

support dual citizenship for everyone, and that is a right of a government to say that. But what we and others have argued is—and 

both sides have agreed in principle—that you cannot create a situation of statelessness for anyone. 

Therefore, there has to be a period of transition during which 

Southern Sudan develops its own rules, regulations and procedures 

for citizenship and then southerners who so wish can access that 

citizenship if they choose. This is a very important issue both for 

the stability of the country and in terms of basic human rights. 

And it is one of the critical issues still to be negotiated. 

I will stop there, Madam Chairman. I am happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lyman follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so very much. 

Excellent testimony. We will begin our question and answers 

now. 

But I just want to remind our members, pursuant to longstanding committee practice, I will be recognizing you by seniority 

for those who are here when I make the sound of the gavel, and 

then by order of arrival for those who arrive after the gavel. So 

there is an incentive to get here on time, boys and girls. 

And I am pleased as punch to have so many members of our 

freshman class on our committee. To make a public declaration of 

how pleased I am, I randomly chose among the wonderful freshmen 

members of our committee Mr. Duncan’s name. So I will yield my 

time, my question-and-answer time, to Mr. Duncan from South 

Carolina. 

Mr. Duncan is recognized. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ambassador Lyman, thank you for coming to address the committee today about Sudan, and I just have a few questions because 

we are concerned about terrorism in the world. We are concerned 

about national security. And can the administration credibly certify 

to Congress that Sudan has permanently ceased support for fellow 

State Sponsors of Terrorism, including Iran and Syria, and designated foreign terrorist organizations, including Hamas? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Excuse me. First, Madam Chairman, I forgot. I submitted a fuller statement for the record if that is okay. 

Congressman, that will be part——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. Thank you. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Thank you very much. 

That will be a part of this process that would begin, and it is a 

process whereby the relevant agencies and the United States Government would be examining that. 

I think the requirement is to look at it over a 6-month period to 

make sure that Sudan would meet all of the criteria under the law 

regarding counterterrorism. 


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That process hasn’t yet begun because the President hasn’t announced it, because it is conditional to even begin that process 

based on the acceptance of the results of the referendum. 

But I assure you that that will be done and that the administration will then consult with Congress on the results of that review. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Just a follow-up. What do you make of the independent or open-sourced reports that Iranian arms transited Sudan 

en route to Hamas and the Gaza strip? Can you help with that? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I cannot comment on that, Congressman. 

But I can assure you that those are the kinds of issues that will 

be looked at in this review process. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Are open-source reports of Bashir’s strong relationship with Hamas leadership inaccurate? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I am afraid I am not in a position to comment on that. I, again, say that the agencies in the U.S. Government are going to examine all of that as a part of this process. I 

apologize that I am not in a position to comment on that information which our agencies will have to determine and verify. 

Mr. DUNCAN. We look forward to the time that you can comment 

on that. Thank you. 

I yield back my time, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you for 

that maiden voyage. 

Welcome to all of our wonderful freshmen. 

I would like to yield 5 minutes to our wonderful ranking member, Mr. Berman. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I will follow 

your lead, and I am going to yield my 5 minutes to the tentative 

and I think soon-to-be ranking member of the Africa Subcommittee, 

the long-time chair of that subcommittee and, to a great extent, 

one of my key mentors on the issue of Sudan, Mr. Payne. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Payne is recognized. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for yielding. 

Ambassador Lyman, the AU was very involved in this IGAD, 

which is, as most of us know, the East African Intergovernmental 

Authority on Development, which has several East African countries, about six or seven, Kenya, Uganda, et cetera. And they were 

very involved, as you know, actually in the negotiations in 

Naivasha. How strong do you believe that the AU and IGAD will 

remain in Sudan as they move forward to the more difficult times? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I think the roles are going to be different. 

The Africa Union is now charged with overseeing the post-referendum negotiations over the issues we talked about. And the 

high-level panel that the AU has created to do this is headed by 

former South African President Thabo Mbeki and then with former 

Burundian President Buyoya and former Nigerian President 

Abubakar. And they have a staff and have overseen the structure 

of the negotiations. I am happy to say that we in the U.N. worked 

very, very closely with them. We are official observers in those discussions and worked very closely with them on the negotiations. 

IGAD now plays I think a different and more political role. The 

IGAD summit some weeks ago was a very important step in confirming assurances from the Government of Sudan about the referendum and proceeding with the CPA. They are not as active as 

21

they used to be in Naivasha and elsewhere in the actual negotiations. 

Mr. PAYNE. How do you see the—as we know, Abyei is certainly 

a very difficult issue to confront. But also, as you know, the Blue 

Nile and the Southern Kordofan states have also some question 

about where they really belong. What is your take on those two 

states? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, the CPA did not see the popular consultations as the same as for Abyei. Abyei was accorded the right 

of self-determination to see whether they wanted to be part of the 

North or the South. That is not included in the terms of reference 

for the popular consultations. What the popular consultations are 

supposed to do for those two states is to determine how the CPA 

has affected them and how their relationships, both internally in 

the state and with Khartoum, should take place. They are more 

like if—if I can describe it, good governance consultations, rather 

than self-determination consultations. 

And what we are pleased about with Blue Nile is the tremendous 

amount of interest taking place as those consultations get underway. People are coming forward. Civil society is coming forward, 

and they will look very carefully at both the governance of the 

state and the way the central government impacts on their lives. 

As you know, elements in those states fought on the side of the 

SPLM, but they live in the North. And they are part of the North. 

So the question really that is being posed is, what kind of political 

structure will we be seeing in the North that accommodates their 

interests and the interests of everyone else in the North? 

Mr. PAYNE. And the final question about Egypt and the Nile, 

Egypt can be very, very constructive, or they can be very destructive. And they have changed roles during this whole conflict. The 

Nile is something that Egypt feels concerned about. How do you 

think the negotiations regarding Egypt and the North and other 

countries will go on the Nile? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I think it is not a secret that Egypt was 

very concerned about the whole self-determination vote and the implications of it. But toward the latter part of the year, Egypt became very supportive. And just prior to the referendum, President 

Mubarak, along with President Gaddafi, came and urged the government to go ahead and go through with the referendum and follow the dictates of the CPA. And I think the attitude of Egypt is 

that they are going to work with the new Government of Southern 

Sudan. 

Now, water, as the chairwoman said, is one of the issues to be 

negotiated, how the water is managed, the Nile, which cuts 

through both Southern and Northern Sudan, are going to be managed, access to water, amounts of water. Those negotiations have 

not gotten very far, and they will be important, and clearly Egypt 

will be watching them very closely. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The chairman-designate of the Africa, 

Global Health, and Human Rights Subcommittee, Mr. Smith from 

New Jersey, is recognized. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you. 

22

And, Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your extraordinary service 

and your leadership. Let me ask a couple of questions. 

First, you mentioned the first step beginning the process of removing Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List. Ambassador Williamson and I—we were serving with him at the U.N. 

Human Rights Commission when it was a commission in Geneva. 

And he led the effort on getting the focus on genocide being committed in Darfur, did an outstanding job doing it. He makes a point 

in his testimony that the—you must make that determination 

purely on the merits, not tilted to some other political considerations. And based on what you said, it sounds like that is the process you are going to pursue, but I would just like to hear you say 

it in your own words or further elaboration. 

Secondly, churches play a key role, perhaps even a central role 

in the provision of humanitarian and development aid and in promoting dialogue and mediating crises. Will the faith-based sector in 

the new Republic of Southern Sudan, if that is what emerges here, 

receive a significant amount of money to immediately have a high 

impact on health care delivery and the like? 

Thirdly, the ICC chief prosecutor said that Bashir may have skimmed upwards of $9 billion. Is that true? What do we know 

about that? 

And finally, I mentioned in my opening about the 35,000 southerners who remain in the North in forced servitude. In the mid1990s, I held a hearing on slavery in Sudan, was roundly criticized 

when I had it. And I can tell you by whom if you ask. Roundly 

criticized. But we brought out the point—and I even had a woman, 

a mother who told the harrowing story of how they broke into her 

home, stole her son, kidnapped her son, gave him an Islamic name, 

and then he became part of a slavery regime. What are we doing 

about that? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Thank you very much, Congressman. On 

the first question, with regard to the State Sponsors of Terrorism, 

first and foremost, they have to meet all of the conditions under 

that law. So it has to be on the merits of that. 

But secondarily, we have also said that the final step has to be 

in the context of they are also meeting the conditions of the CPA. 

So it is, first and foremost, they have to meet those criteria. And 

then, second, when we would take the step would be when they 

have also—if they meet all those criteria, that they would also have 

to meet the criteria under the CPA. 

On churches, I don’t know of the exact plans on USAID, but I 

will say this, they play an extraordinarily important role in Southern Sudan, as you know. And they have been very important in 

conflict resolution, and I think they will play a major role in the 

development side. There is no question it is one of the elements of 

society. 

I will just take a second to say something that has bothered me 

about the peace process; it has not been terribly transparent. That 

is, it has been carried on—and we are part of this, too—between 

two parties, but civil society hasn’t been brought in very much. I 

think now, as we move forward, there must be much broader transparency and involvement of civil society in what comes next, and 

that very much includes the churches. 

23

On the $9 billion, I have seen the accusation. I haven’t seen the 

proof, so I cannot say. 

On slavery, it is a very, very bitter memory for people who suffered that. That includes some people in the Abyei area. 

Clearly, the independence of the Southern Sudan, if that is what 

the vote will show, may alleviate that problem and other security 

steps, but clearly, that has to go if it exists anymore. But the memory is there, and I know people who have spoken to me about the 

bitterness that they feel about it. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Finally, let me ask one final question 

with my time. Are there sufficient resources available at the 

UNHCR, as well as within our own Government as well as other 

contributors, to assist the southerners in the North to register 

them, as you said, to mitigate the incidents of retaliation? And 

what kind of numbers are we talking about in terms of funds? 

Ambassador LYMAN. The Southern Sudan Government talks 

about another—or up to 500,000 people coming. So that would be 

another 350,000. We have made it a very, very strong part of our 

diplomacy with the North that no retaliation or violence takes 

place against the southerners in the North. We have been back to 

them on this over and over and over again. And so far, that has 

been—they have respected that. And they claim they will respect 

it. 

But the future of those people in terms of citizenship and economics, et cetera, is still an important consideration. Now, UNHCR 

is just beginning, really, now that it has access to start to register 

people, et cetera. There is sufficient international stocks of emergency supplies to handle people when they come south, let’s say to 

get 3-month supply of food, et cetera. 

The problem is how well these people can be integrated for longterm development because some of them aren’t farmers; they 

haven’t been farmers, et cetera. And this is something we have 

under discussion now with the Government of Southern Sudan and 

how our development programs can help in that regard. That, to 

me, is becoming the most serious challenge. So far, we have been 

able to work in the North without any retaliation against those 

people. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey, my good 

friend, Congressman Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Madam Chair, and congratulations. 

Ambassador Lyman, as I listen to you, I sense hope in your voice 

that this is going to succeed. 

But as I listen carefully to what you say to me—excuse me, to 

the committee, I am not as optimistic. I mean, there is no infrastructure, no help, no way of feeding. There is a referendum governing one end of the country. What can we—what steps can we 

take to continue to encourage the peace? 

And I worry, when you split these countries—we don’t have a 

good experience in Korea still. The tensions are still there. And I 

worry when all this money comes in to try to help, I look at Haiti 

and the lack of infrastructure. Sorry, but you sound optimistic, but 

I am not as optimistic as you are, and I do hope that we can conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:43 Feb 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\011811\64007 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tinue—we have so many years of war, that I do hope that this 

leads to a peaceful future. Can you just tell us what we can do? 

Ambassador LYMAN. You caught me on a good week. A couple of 

months ago, I was much less optimistic, and I am very encouraged 

that this referendum has come off and what I think it signifies for 

the future. 

But I wouldn’t underestimate the problems ahead. Look, there 

are several different peace problems. One is peace in the South 

itself, where there have been clashes in the past, proxies supported 

by the North, et cetera. Now, we are working hard to build up their 

security capability. By that I mean their ability to manage conflict, 

to manage local issues, communicate better, coordinate better, et 

cetera. 

Lots of people—lots of countries along with us are training people, et cetera. President Kiir has promised a very inclusive political 

process in the future for a new constitution in the South. He must 

follow that path. Otherwise, there will be dissension, and there will 

be trouble. 

I am reasonably optimistic that they will rise to the challenge. 

But I think it is going to be a good long struggle. 

The other danger is in the continuing tensions that will exist 

from time to time between the North and the South. One of the 

points we have emphasized so much to both sides in the last few 

months is, don’t support proxies; that is, that the North doesn’t 

support proxies in the South and vice versa, that the South doesn’t 

support proxies in Darfur or someplace else. It is a very important 

part of keeping peace, and they have got to resolve their tensions 

in other ways. 

I think that the hope for peace in the area comes from their inevitable interdependence, whether it is in the oil sector, it is the 

trade sector, et cetera. Both sides need each other right now, and 

both sides now are not interested in going back to war. And we can 

build on that, and they can build on that. It is not going to be perfect, and there are going to be crises, and there are going to be 

threats. But I guess I am more optimistic now than I was a few 

months ago. 

Mr. SIRES. And the other issue that I have a concern of is, you 

talked about the oil. Obviously, the oil is in the South, and the 

North is going to feel that they have been excluded of its wealth. 

I just don’t see them sitting back and saying, well, you had this referendum; you keep the oil, and I will stop the water from going 

South. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Actually, their leverage is greater because 

all the pipelines to export the oil are in the North. So what they 

have had to do—and the Norwegians have been extremely helpful 

in this regard, in laying out all of the complexities of how two countries with shared resources can work out a fair compensation. During the CPA, they split the oil revenues 50/50. But that was temporary. Now there is a question of whether the South will keep 

that ratio, whether they will pay a fee for the use of the pipelines, 

et cetera. Those are the details they have got to work out now. But 

they kind of need each other on the oil. 

And the other thing which is very important—and, again, we are 

grateful to the Norwegians for this analysis—that oil isn’t that 

25

great. Over the next 5 years, it will decline substantially in output. 

Both sides have to develop an economy that is less dependent on 

oil. And that is an important reason for them to turn their attention away from war. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The chairman-designate of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And, Mr. Ambassador, what is the population of Sudan, both 

North and South? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Oh, I was afraid you were going to ask me 

that. It is about 8 million in the South. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And what is it in the North? 

Mr. LYMAN. 38 million overall, thanks to Rich. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I see. 

Ambassador LYMAN. 38 million overall, about less than a third 

in the South. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I will tell you, when I worked in the 

White House, he had all the answers, as well. I just want you to 

know that. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Yeah. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So 38 million all together. And how much 

have we spent in Sudan? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Since the CPA, overall, for all expenditures, 

peacekeeping and everything else, we have spent $10 billion. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How much? 

Ambassador LYMAN. $10 billion. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have spent $10 billion. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Much of that for peacekeeping and relief because of the wars and the displacement, et cetera. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ambassador LYMAN. But that is the figure over——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now, is that just us or is that the overall 

spending? We have spent $10 billion or——

Ambassador LYMAN. No, we, the U.S. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We. And how much has been spent then? We 

have spent $10 billion. How much have the other philanthropists 

of the world spent? 

Ambassador LYMAN. They have contributed—of course, the 

peacekeeping, they contribute toward a formula in the U.N. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ambassador LYMAN. There is a formula that they always contribute to. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ambassador LYMAN. On the economic side, I know, for example, 

that other donors have been doing about $700 million a year in the 

South. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Uh-huh. 

Ambassador LYMAN. I don’t have the figures for what they are 

doing in Darfur. I can try and get those for you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. But your guesstimate would be that 

we are the biggest contributor and almost 50 percent, maybe, of 

what has been spent has been from us? 

26

Ambassador LYMAN. We are clearly the largest donor, and I will 

try to get you more accurate percentages. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Now, what a fortuitous day for you to 

be testifying because President Hu from China has just arrived. 

And I was wondering how much the Chinese have actually contributed to this effort. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, the Chinese, of course, as members of 

the Security Council, pay whatever their share is of peacekeeping 

costs as permanent members of the Security Council. They also 

have begun a development program in the South. They also contribute a fair number of peacekeepers to the U.N. peacekeeping 

force. We don’t contribute soldiers; they do. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ambassador LYMAN. They have some engineering companies, et 

cetera, in the peacekeeping operation. 

They are, of course, as you know, big investors in the oil industry 

in Sudan. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. But you don’t know what they have 

spent. And I think that is significant because it is my understanding that the Chinese perhaps are benefiting greatly by their 

association with the government in the North and et cetera. 

Ambassador LYMAN. There is no question that oil has been a successful investment for them. But now that the oil lies largely in the 

South, they understand that they have to develop relationships in 

the South, as well. And they are beginning development programs, 

road programs, health programs, et cetera, in the South. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just note that—now, first of all, do 

you believe that the Chinese have played a positive role in Sudan? 

Is that what you would tell us today, that, by and large, the Chinese have played a positive role there over the years? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I think they are playing a more positive role 

now than they played before, to be perfectly candid. I think they 

were very resistant, as you well know, in the U.N. to sanctions on 

Sudan. And so there is a history there. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And they were opposed to the sanctions——

Ambassador LYMAN. They don’t participate——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excuse me one moment, but they were opposed to those sanctions because they had a direct relationship 

with the tough guys who were running the country. Isn’t that 

right? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Yeah. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And the guys who signed contracts for who 

gets to benefit from the oil. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Right. There is no question about that. Now, 

more recently—and they do most of their diplomacy behind the 

scenes. They don’t work in concert with the rest of us envoys who 

meet all the time. 

They have done some facilitation on the peacekeeping side. They 

contributed peacekeepers. And they have been supportive now of 

the referendum process. They have been openly supportive of that 

and, as I said, starting to do more in the South. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. I only have about 30 seconds left, and 

let me just note that we are entering a new era in government. We 

can no longer afford to have a trillion-and-a-half-dollar deficit. We 

27

figured that will destroy our country. And especially if we are going 

to be investing $10 billion in a country with 38 million people—$10 

billion for 38 million people—and then see that another country, 

perhaps our economic adversary, like China, is benefiting greatly 

from our investment. Those are the things we need to pay attention 

to, and we will be. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

And because the ranking member had given his time to Mr. 

Payne, now Mr. Payne is recognized, as the ranking member-designate of the Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights Subcommittee, for his questions. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I am doing better under this 

new setup than I did under my own. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let’s discuss that later. 

Mr. PAYNE. Let me continue, I think, on the China discussion. As 

you indicated, China was very, very noninvolved, as you know. And 

there were several meetings that were held with the Chinese. The 

Congressional Black Caucus actually met with the Ambassador 

and, kind of, had a pretty tough meeting with them, and they 

asked for a second meeting. They had never been to Darfur. They 

were still selling weapons. They just had no interest in the problems of Sudan. 

I had the opportunity to go to Beijing, and the second-in-command of the Government of China asked the question in the Great 

Hall, once again, about what were they going to do. Since then, as 

you have mentioned, they have sent people to Darfur, they have 

started participating in U.N. peacekeeping. 

How do you think China will react and do you think they will 

be a true neutral party as this process moves forward? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I think the Chinese will have—you know, I 

don’t want to speak for them really, but they have a stake in the 

oil sector. They have a stake that those are Chinese companies that 

own a good deal of the infrastructure, as well as their share in the 

oil industry. They are very concerned about that. They want to 

make sure that whatever is worked out between the two entities 

on oil protects those interests. And, of course, they import oil from 

Sudan, so they want the stability of supply. 

I am pleased that they have begun development programs in the 

South. I think that is very important. I think we need every donor 

we can to help in the South. 

How they will progress in their relationship between the two it 

is a little hard for me to predict. Obviously, they will want to have 

relations in both countries to pursue their interests. 

Mr. PAYNE. Now, in the South, the South has the potential of a 

great agricultural program if they get going. At one time, Sudan 

was the breadbasket of all of Africa—and with the oil. Are we looking at developing, helping them develop that agricultural sector as 

we move forward? 

And, secondly, what does Khartoum have left? What will their 

major resources be? Are they industrializing and manufacturing? 

Ambassador LYMAN. There was a conference in Nairobi some 

months ago in which the U.S. was a major participant—General 

28

Gration was there and others—just on agricultural development in 

the South. 

It will have to be a major focus of their development efforts. They 

have this potential, but it is just not being realized at all. So that 

has to be a major part of their economic development, no question 

about it. You go to Juba now, and all the fruits and vegetables are 

coming from Uganda. You know that the potential isn’t being realized. 

In the North, they, too, have to develop the agriculture sector. 

They import a lot of food, which they shouldn’t. And they are now 

turning more attention and investment to the food sector, knowing 

their oil revenues are going to go down, that they have extraordinary economic potential. They are getting investment from Arab 

countries in the agriculture sector. And I think that is going to be 

one of the major areas they look to, as well. 

Mr. PAYNE. Yeah. There is a lot of new technology on getting 

water out of the desert now. 

I have agreed to yield the balance of my time back to the ranking 

member, who I think has a question he would like to ask, Mr. Berman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The ranking member is recognized. 

Mr. BERMAN. I thank you, Mr. Payne, and you, Madam Chairman. 

And I just wanted to thank you, Ambassador. I was sitting here, 

thinking. I came to Congress 28 years ago. You were a key figure 

in the Africa Bureau at that time, during some incredible times—

the fight against apartheid, the other conflicts in Africa going on—

the role you played there; and, later on, Ambassador to South Africa and the new South Africa; the leader of our refugee programs 

during some of the most—I am sure Mr. Smith remembers those 

years in Southeast Asia and in Africa, former Soviet Union, the 

places—you worked there; your role before that at USAID, assistant secretary for IO, serving both Republican and Democratic 

Presidents. 

You really do give the term ‘‘diplomat’’ a great name with your 

stellar service. That you would come out of the academic world—

I don’t know if that is retirement—but to take this on is a great 

tribute to you. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Berman. 

Ambassador LYMAN. You are very kind, Congressman. Thank 

you so much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Now I am pleased to yield to the chairman-designate of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, Mr. Royce of 

California. 

Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador Lyman, you have a long association 

with these problems on the continent of Africa. And we have many 

NGOs who are here today, as well. 

One of the things that comes with that experience of long being 

engaged with these types of regimes is that it gives you an important historical check on your assumptions going forward and, in 

particular, in dealing with Khartoum, which has broken promise 

after promise. 

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When dealing with somebody like Bashir, who is in power not because he is a peacemaker, but because he is the most ruthless; 

when looking at that situation—and I have seen firsthand the result of that ruthlessness in Sudan, in Darfur, Sudan. I remember 

we had a ‘‘Nightline’’ camera crew we took in to interview some of 

the survivors of an attack. And I remember a town, Tina, that had 

been bombed from the air. That was not an attack by the 

Janjaweed. Those were Antonovs that bombed that town. I remember interviewing a young man who had lost his hand. He had lost 

his hand to the Janjaweed, but with his other hand he was able 

to draw pictures, as other kids did, of these Antonovs that had 

bombed their village, and of mechanized armor that was from the 

Khartoum government there to support the Janjaweed in the attack. 

So, in looking at this, the NGO community, I think, is very hesitant to reach assumptions that all is going to end well. And, in one 

particular regard, there is an issue that all of us are concerned 

about, and it has to do with that issue of the state sponsor of terrorism list. Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army could not 

have abducted 10,000 children and abused so many over the last 

20 years and made child soldiers out of them without the armaments he got from Khartoum, and without being able to send his 

fighters up to Khartoum to be patched up without the support that 

he had. And they didn’t allow people to go into South Sudan to 

take him out when we had the opportunity to do it. 

So the question I have is, have you made it very clear to Khartoum that any support for the LRA would prevent them from being 

taken off the terrorism list and, basically, that for you, this is a red 

line? That is my question. 

Ambassador LYMAN. I would say categorically we have said that. 

Any support of them by proxies or other such entities would preclude our following through on that. 

Mr. ROYCE. Very good. 

Ambassador LYMAN. And, in general, I would say, in dealing 

with the regime, the way forward is for them to understand that 

this is the way for them to go forward because it is worse for them 

if they don’t, in terms of peace, in terms of any thoughts of prosperity. 

Mr. ROYCE. And that is logical. But then we have the historical 

record, and we have the fact that, for 10 years, between 1994 and 

2005, Sudan is the only documented supporter for the LRA. And 

we have a U.N. report last November that LRA commanders 

reached out to Sudan’s military in Darfur for support. Now, we 

don’t know much more than that, other than that that happened. 

Would the State Department certify to Congress that there are 

no links between the government in Khartoum and the LRA before 

taking them off the terrorism list? I guess that is a little harder 

question. 

Ambassador LYMAN. It is a harder question, and I will get you 

a definitive answer because I have to talk to the people who do 

that kind of analysis. 

But I can tell you this. I have discussed personally—and I know 

General Gration has—the LRA with the government and made it 

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malization of relations with us. That is a terrible group. That is a 

horrific group. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yeah, it is the most horrific group, probably, on the 

planet. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Right. 

Mr. ROYCE. And the fact that the Khartoum government would 

support—Ambassador Lyman, thank you for your service. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

The gentleman from Florida, my good friend, Mr. Rivera. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Ambassador, in our administration’s enthusiasm to engage local 

authorities and roll out basic materials and services as a conflictmitigation strategy, have appropriate safeguards to prevent waste, 

fraud, and abuse been implemented? 

Ambassador LYMAN. One of the things we are working on most 

intensely with the government in the South, which is where most 

of our development assistance is going, is exactly that—that is, to 

get good financial controls, good budget controls, et cetera. And we 

don’t put money through the government without those kinds of assurances. So we are watching that very closely. This is a young 

government in the South, and getting better controls, better financial controls is one of the top priorities. 

We are also doing that at the state level, because resources have 

to be sent down to the state level. So we are working with the state 

governments in the South to make sure they have those controls 

in place. And we will continue to do that. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

A couple of other questions. What is the status of the S/CRS 

flyaway teams that have been deployed to South Sudan? And what 

are they doing exactly? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Those teams are out visiting and staying in 

areas throughout the South to be able to get an understanding of 

whether there are conflicts developing in the South, whether the 

state governments are capable of dealing with them, so that proper 

assistance and responses can be made. 

It is kind of an extended outreach for the United States to know 

what is happening out there, to make sure that the potentials for 

conflict in the South, which are serious, are being addressed, that 

we know what is happening, that we have good information. And 

they have been effective over these last couple months. 

Mr. RIVERA. If you could drill down on that just a little bit further, what types of program funds are they administering? To what 

end? Are they implementing directly? Are they employing contractors or providing budget support to local institutions? 

Ambassador LYMAN. They are only providing information. It is 

up to USAID and other programs to then help with those states 

and help in their security. The flyaway teams are information-gathering teams. 

Mr. RIVERA. A few governance questions. Is the administration 

planning to certify that an elected government has taken office to 

justify removing restrictions on U.S. assistance to Sudan under section 7008 of the State Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Appropriations Act of 2010 as carried forward? 

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Ambassador LYMAN. Assuming that they voted for secession, they 

will not become fully independent under the CPA until July. And 

then, of course, we would have to have legislation with the Congress that would authorize assistance to that entity. We don’t have 

to do it right away because independence becomes official at the 

end of the CPA. 

Mr. RIVERA. Will the Secretary of the Treasury also be moving 

to make such a certification to provide debt relief to the regime? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Debt relief is—there are sanctions against 

our supporting debt relief. And it depends on how the debt is divided, also, between the North and the South. If some of the debt 

is assumed by the South and they become an independent entity—

and I would want to consult with the Congress closely on this—we 

could support the South in doing that. 

But any general debt relief, assuming that the North carries 

much of that debt—there are sanctions. And they would have to be 

removed for us to support action on debt relief for the North. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

And now I would like to yield for our last—no, we still have one 

more—the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, who is the chairmandesignate of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. 

And thanks for subbing for me this weekend, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Happy to do it, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate 

the opportunity to do that. And you are loved down there, there is 

no question about that. So we appreciated filling in for you. 

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your time here this afternoon. 

And I know you have answered a lot of questions, so just a couple 

that I have. 

Relative to the referendum, and assuming that it goes the way 

that virtually everyone believes that it will and that the vote in the 

South is to essentially secede, could you—and I know you have already talked about this to some degree, but could you discuss again 

what mechanisms are expected to take place relative to the oil revenues and wealth sharing and that sort of thing in the disputed 

areas? 

Ambassador LYMAN. The two entities face some choices on how 

to handle the management of the oil sector. One is to create a joint 

management of the sector. I don’t think that is going to happen, 

but that is one option out there. 

Another is to have the South take an equity position in the infrastructure in the North so they are part owner, as well, and the economics works out that way. 

A third option is simply for the South to pay a fee for transporting the oil through the pipelines. And there are a number of 

variations on this, all of which—I owe what limited knowledge I 

have of this to the Norwegians, who have laid this out in great detail for the two parties. 

So they will choose among these potential ways of cooperating, 

and then the political decision is, how much does the South pay to 

the North? Is there a premium for peace, to put it bluntly, in what 

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they pay? And that is going to be the political side of the negotiation. 

On the other issues, there are working groups on all the other 

issues looking at them technically. For example, on currency, if 

both countries move to a new currency, how do they do it very carefully, not to destabilize the other? Because you could do that. And 

they have agreed in principle that they won’t destabilize each 

other, but then the question is, what is the timing? How do they 

do it in the proper way? So there is a working group on that. 

And similarly on borders, there is a working group, although, 

again, the decisions there are very political, because there are five 

disputed border areas. Most of the border is agreed, but five areas 

are disputed, and they haven’t agreed on how to solve the dispute. 

And that is now a major issue to be resolved. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

And then on another area, Mr. Ambassador, I was here for 14 

years and then gone the last 2, and so I have gotten a little behind 

in some of these things over the last 2 years. But I have been to 

the Darfur region on two different trips, one to the refugee camps 

in Sudan and then to the refugee camps in Chad. And, at the time, 

things seemed to be simmering down somewhat, to the extent that 

the Janjaweed attacks had been, shall we say, limited compared to 

the way they had been previously, although many people were still 

in the camps. 

Has there been any progress in the people moving out of the 

camps and back to their villages, or is it too dangerous in most 

places for that to occur? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Again, I have to apologize because Darfur 

isn’t in my brief. I don’t have the up-to-date details. 

I don’t think there has been a lot of movement in that regard. 

There was some violence very recently between the South African—Sudan Armed Forces and one of the rebel groups that displaced a lot of people additionally. 

But I would defer to General Gration when he is here and my 

colleague Dane Smith to give you a more accurate up-to-date. I 

apologize that Darfur I am not as sharp on. 

Mr. CHABOT. That is quite all right, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you 

very much for your time. 

I yield back the balance of my time, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. 

And the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, which is a 

much revered name in Miami, yields his time. And we thank you 

so much because we are so short of time. 

So we are going to say, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, 

for your time. Get back to work. We are going to shoo you out of 

there. 

I am going to welcome Ambassador Richard Williamson and 

Omer Ismail to our panelist table. And I am going to give you the 

briefest of introduction. Gentlemen, I am going to be ruthless with 

my gavel because we want to get to the question-and-answer period. So, as you settle in, let me introduce you. 

Ambassador Williamson has served as the President’s special 

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tion of a resolution condemning the atrocities in Darfur, in conjunction with the United Nations commemorations of the 10th anniversary of genocide in Rwanda. 

Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. And I know that your book is here 

floating about. 

And Omer Ismail—thank you so much, Omer. You are so loved. 

A humanitarian, human rights activist, working with numerous organizations to stop genocide and mass atrocities. Mr. Ismail was 

born in Darfur but was forced to flee Sudan in 1989. 

Thank you gentlemen both for being here. I will gavel you down 

in 5 minutes so we can get to our question-and-answers because we 

have votes on the floor in a little bit. Thank you. 

Ambassador Williamson, if you could start. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON, 

PARTNER, SALISBURY STRATEGIES, LLC (FORMER SPECIAL 

ENVOY TO SUDAN AND AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS) 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson, and congratulations on that. Good to see Ranking Member 

Berman again. And I have to note, Don Payne has spent more time 

working on Sudan than any other American leader, and we are all 

in his debt. And, as Congressman Smith said, we have worked together in the past. It is good to be good with you again. 

I think in Sudan you have to first start with the fact that there 

has been marginalization for 200 years that has resulted in discrimination—discrimination economically, educationally, health, 

politically, injustice. And that permeates the country, and that creates instability. And the South is only a small part of the story. 

Second, we have to recognize that, unfortunately, in Sudan, it is 

too common that the political leaders feel comfortable resorting to 

violence as a legitimate way to pursue their political objectives and 

engage in their atrocities. 

And, thirdly, we have to recognize the nature of the regime. The 

vote is a shining moment. The Sudan people deserve most of the 

credit. The international community—U.S. brokered the CPA, 

President Bush. And while I have criticized President Obama and 

his administration, they deserve credit for their initiative over the 

last 4 months, the diplomatic surge, which was extremely helpful. 

But the vote is not the end of the story. It may not even be the 

beginning of the end of the story. The contested border areas, 

Abyei, oil revenue sharing, and citizenship are not just the headlines of issues. It is the fundamental dispute which, over 6 years, 

have been known. For 6 years, Khartoum has blocked progress on 

those issues. And for the last 6 months, 4 months notwithstanding, 

the initiative, little substantive, particularized progress has been 

made. 

Fourth, my experiences of the CPA, the regime in Khartoum 

breaches commitments. Look at just the CPA. They agreed to abide 

by the Abyei Border Commission. It made its determination. The 

South accepted it; the North refused. They agreed to abide by the 

permanent arbitration court in The Hague in its determination of 

the border. That process went forward. The South accepted it; the 

North refused. In the CPA, the North agreed to disarm and deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:43 Feb 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\011811\64007 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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mobilize their militias; they did not. They committed to transparency in oil revenue sharing and accounting; they did not. 

It is important to recognize that incentives alone are inadequate, 

promises are illusory, and incentives without steel, without some 

threat of coercion, have proven a failure in the past, and they will 

let down the Sudanese people again. 

Underlying all this, what is the U.S. goal? In 2005, it was in part 

the separation, and we paid for that. It would be overpaying now 

to say that because haltingly, imperfectly, in a delayed manner and 

having cost many lives, that we should now be overly generous for 

the performance of commitments made. The marginalization continues, the injustices continue, atrocities continue. 

The week before the vote began in the referendum, 18 bombs 

dropped in the South. The U.N. certified that they were from the 

Sudan Armed Forces. And the South is not the only area subjected 

to this. Darfur and the Nuba Mountains cannot be separated. We 

should not rush to give benefits. 

The nine neighbors and China have not been helpful, but we 

have reached a tipping point where they see that separation is 

going to happen, so they have been, on the margins, helpful. They 

can do more. The administration has tried to encourage it. They 

should. There is an enormous development challenge, but it has to 

have burden sharing, and the European Union and others have to 

increase their participation. 

I am concerned about a process that begins in a litany of incentives before performance, before specific agreements, before 

verification mechanisms are put in place, before there is monitored 

results. As Ronald Reagan used to say, ‘‘Trust but verify.’’ I am 

concerned about it, and I fear, once again, the Sudanese people will 

be denied what they need. 

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williamson follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you. 

Mr. Ismail? 

STATEMENT OF MR. OMER ISMAIL, ADVISOR, THE ENOUGH 

PROJECT 

Mr. ISMAIL. Congratulations and thank you, Madam Chair. And 

thanks to the esteemed members of your committee. I will get 

down to it. 

The United States has a crucial role to play in laying the groundwork for peace and stability in Sudan from this moment forward. 

The Southerners have come out. They cast their vote. They are 

going to decide their destiny, which is going to be the separation 

from the mother country of Sudan. But, as everybody agrees, including President Obama in his op-ed in the New York Times, that 

the work is just beginning. 

So the United States should capitalize on this current momentum in Sudan to address three crucial issues that will establish 

peace and stability in all of Sudan and the neighboring countries 

in the region. 

First, the relationship between North and South Sudan must be 

clarified before secession formally takes place in July. This involves 

detailing the economic arrangements between North and South 

after separation, the legal status of populations in both the North 

and the South, as well as resolving the status of contentious border 

areas. Without agreement on these issues, anxieties on the ground 

and among the leadership of both governments have the potential 

to spark violence. 

Second, the conflict in Darfur must be reprioritized. An inadequate peace process has trickled along for years while violence has 

intensified in recent weeks. Now is the time to revitalize the 

Darfur peace process, one that has inched along for years with very 

limited effect on the ground in Darfur. 

Number three, at a time when political changes will be underfoot 

in both the North and the South, the U.S. should press both governments toward inclusive governance and pluralism to ensure 

that peace endures in Sudan, both in the North and the South. 

Sharing oil revenues, the currency, citizenship, border, and the 

issue of Abyei are very crucial, but until now, the international 

community has been content to let the Sudanese parties delay 

making the difficult and necessary decisions to ensure a peaceful 

transition. In place of this unassertive mediation, the U.S. should 

jump-start a far more proactive international mediation, modeled 

upon the Naivasha peace process that produced the CPA. 

The Sudanese Government in August unveiled its own Darfur 

strategy that would nationalize or domesticate the political forces, 

and focus on the return of IDPs, development and implementation 

of justice locally. We believe that this plan is not only problematic 

but that it hides the government’s true intention of seeking a military solution in Darfur. 

We believe the way forward is for the U.S. to have a decisive 

roadmap to secure peace in Darfur based on a sound diagnosis on 

why efforts to date have fallen short of the mark. This will require 

robust engagement with the mediation team, significant diplomatic 

43

and technical support, and securing constructive participation by 

the Europeans, China, and the regional actors. 

Finally, the U.S. should capitalize on the opportunity for political 

reform that South Sudan’s secession presents for both the North 

and South. 

In the North, several of the processes that the United States 

should strongly support are specifically mandated under the CPA, 

including a constitutional review that involves public participation 

as well as popular consultation in the border states of Southern 

Kordofan and Blue Nile. Investing in civil society groups, independent voices, political party development, and other building 

blocks to a more democratic future are fundamentally steps that 

the U.S. can take toward preventing future conflict in Sudan. 

In the South, we see a fragile new state that is filled with potential. It is in the interest of the United States to help lay the foundation for good governance and invest in real institution and capacity building. The development of a strong Parliament and judiciary, 

as well as executive institutions that deliver services, share power, 

and transparently administer tax on oil revenue will be key to the 

peace in Southern Sudan. 

As the United States moves forward to urgently ensure that the 

two Sudans separate amicably but find the common ground necessary to sustain peace in a tumultuous corner of the world, we 

must do what we can to help deliver on the promises to all Sudanese. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ismail follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, gentlemen. You have proven that you can be brilliant and succinct. Thank you. 

I will yield my time to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Rivera. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Ambassador Williamson, thank you very much for being here. By 

the way, what years were you at the United Nations Human 

Rights Commission? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Oh, it was 2004, I think it was. 

Mr. RIVERA. I was there in the late 1980s and early 1990s, working for one of your predecessors, U.S. Ambassador Armando 

Valladares. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I was assistant secretary for IO at the 

time, and Armando was working for me. He did a great job, pushed 

an important issue, and we should continue to put pressure on the 

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Mr. RIVERA. Thank you. And thank you not only for those words, 

thank you for your service. 

With respect to the roadmap, Ambassador, pursuant to the roadmap presented, the administration is poised to remove Sudan from 

the state sponsors of terrorism list, facilitate high-level visits, exchange ambassadors, ease sanctions, and advance negotiations for 

debt relief in exchange for Khartoum meeting its own obligations 

under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 

United States leverage with regard to Darfur would be reserved 

to lifting sanctions that cannot be removed without legislative relief. In your opinion, does Khartoum care about the remaining 

sanctions? And, realistically, what leverage would the United 

States have, with regard to Darfur, if the United States pursues 

this course? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. First, a generic observation, Congressman: The less a regime deserves the mantle of legitimacy, the more 

they desire it. And those actions all raise into question the legitimacy of the government of Khartoum. So it is beyond whatever 

economic benefit or other benefits; it goes to their legitimacy within 

Sudan and outside. 

Second, as I noted earlier, I am concerned about being too anxious to provide incentives. Remember, the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement was agreed to 6 years ago. When I was special envoy, 

it was my view, after meeting with the leaders often in Khartoum, 

meetings that drew the criticism from Senators Obama, Biden, and 

Clinton, that they had already made a decision at the time they 

signed CPA that they may be having to give up the South. 

I have noted that all the difficult issues that matter have not 

been resolved. We have a long way to go beyond the 6-month period when separation will become official before we know if those 

commitments will be made. And I also know, from my various positions in government, there is a bureaucratic momentum once you 

start the process. Again, to cite President Reagan, ‘‘Trust but 

verify.’’ We have to see more. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Ambassador. 

In November 2008, Ambassador Lyman participated in a conference hosted by the Embassy of Sweden and the United Nations 

Association on the ‘‘responsibility to protect.’’ And according to a 

meeting summary, he suggested that Darfur would be excluded 

from obligations inferred from the responsibility to protect because 

the crimes were committed prior to adoption of the world summit 

outcome document in 2005. 

What is your position on this? And does the United Nations have 

a responsibility to protect marginalized populations in Sudan in the 

event that the regime in Khartoum decides to crush all remaining 

opposition following a vote for independence in Southern Sudan? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I think the general responsibility to 

protect preceded the millennium summit outcomes document 

adopted in September 2005. Furthermore, I think when you look at 

the genocide in slow motion that continued after the adoption of 

that document, it is important for the United States and the international community to step up to its responsibility. 

Let me note, I am loathe to ever disagree with Ambassador 

Princeton Lyman, who I have the greatest respect for. But, in this 

49

case, I do think we have a responsibility. I have noted that as recently as 2 weeks ago Khartoum was involved in bombings in the 

South. They have been involved in bombings in Darfur. They continue to engage in coordinated attacks. It is less intense only because there are fewer targets of opportunity. This should be a concern. It is not delinked from the North/South nor the difficulties in 

the Nuba Mountains. We have to be more robust. 

And one of the disappointments has been that those violations of 

past agreements have occurred, innocent lives have died, and there 

has been a reluctance from the administration to hold to account 

and publicly criticize the perpetrators of these atrocities. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much. Appreciate your service, 

again. Nice seeing you after 20 years. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

I am pleased to yield to the ranking member-designate of Africa, 

Global Health, and Human Rights, Mr. Payne of New Jersey. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Ismail, what do you think of the prospects 

of a right to return for the people of Darfur? Has the government 

thought of any plan? Is it safe for some areas to have a right to 

return? 

For people to live in refugee camps for now until the next generation is wrong. So I would even like to see sanctions held until the 

government comes up with a plan of the right of people to return 

to their properties. 

Mr. ISMAIL. I am in agreement, Mr. Payne, because the Government of Sudan has put every obstacle in the way of peace in 

Darfur, and the refugees and the IDPs cannot return today to their 

regions, to their place of origin because, A, there is nothing there, 

after they have been burned and all the infrastructure that were 

there support to life was destroyed during the attacks. And, again, 

there is another reason, because most of these areas were occupied 

by people who, in some reports, we have seen that they don’t even 

belong to Sudan, let alone belonging to Darfur and being citizens 

of Darfur. 

Number three, the violence still continues. And until today, contrary to the SOFA agreement, the agreement of the deployment of 

the U.N. troops, the Government of Sudan is still putting the obstacles in front of UNAMID and the U.N. troops that are supposed 

to protect those people and supposed to provide safe havens for 

those people who are willing to voluntarily return to the areas. 

Yes, the sanctions should remain until that issue is addressed in 

Darfur. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Williamson, I remember meeting you in Abyei. The 

flames were still smoldering. 

What is your take on the East? We heard very little about the 

East, and, as we know, there are problems there. How do you see 

the government in Khartoum moving forward with the problem in 

the East, with the separation from the South? Will there be panicking? Will the East decide that they should have some protest 

against the government and do something perhaps that happened 

in Darfur when that began? What do you think about that part? 

50

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Congressman Payne. 

I think relevant to that is what has been the U.S. policy goal, 

a bipartisan policy goal in Sudan. And it is to bring sustainable 

peace, stability, and justice—justice that has been denied due to 

marginalization. 

And you are correct, in the East, in the Nuba Mountains, as well 

as Darfur, as well as in the South, they have been victims of those 

injustices. And if there is dismemberment of Sudan and the South 

is independent next July, you still have the root cause of injustices 

that will not be addressed. And I am loathe to be too generous 

until those issues are dealt with for those who have been subjected 

to violence as well as the injustice. And I think the instability and 

traumas will continue both in the East as well as in the West. 

Secondly, Congressman, there is a lot of talk about the stress 

that is going to be on the North after separation if it comes. And 

I acknowledge that that is true. There will be people that say the 

government has lost its legitimacy. The opposition will try to unite. 

The rebel movements may move more aggressively in Darfur or 

overreach. But there also will be stress in the South. 

Political competition has been suppressed because of a unity to 

try to move to CPA implementation. And I would suggest to you 

that the competition that will be unleashed in the next 6 months, 

in the next 12 months, also will be severe in Juba, that it will be 

difficult for the Government of Southern Sudan to be excessive in 

its concessions, especially those that are aren’t meritorious, and 

that the negotiators have to be mindful of that, as well. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. In the seconds I have, Luis Ocampo said that Bashir 

should still be indicted. Where do you think that is going? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I am very concerned. It is ironic that 

President George Bush, who opposed the ICC, was a stronger supporter for international accountability of the regime in Khartoum 

than this administration has been. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Chairman-Designate Smith of the Africa, Global Health, and 

Human Rights Subcommittee. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Gentlemen, thank you very much for 

your testimony and for your leadership. 

New York Times reporter Jeffrey Gettleman wrote a piece, 

‘‘Roots of Bitterness in a Region Threaten Sudan’s Future.’’ It was 

in the New York Times on January 15th. And he talks about how 

most people in Abyei are armed to the teeth. 

My question, first, is, where have all those AK–47s gone that we 

believe the Chinese Government helped to facilitate, well in excess 

of 100,000? Are they there? Are we perhaps being a little too optimistic about the prospects of a peaceful transition here or what? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I think, Congressman, if you are dealing with Sudan, you have to have a fault of optimism to be able 

to deal with such a difficult issue. So I have no fault there. 

But, as you know, if it is Human Rights First, if it is the smallarms commission of the U.N., the documentation of Chinese small 

arms has been irrefutable. And we can assume—there have been 

credible reports of the flow of those arms down into regions near 

the border, directed by Khartoum. It is a matter of great concern. 

51

I think, as Congressman Payne said, we were together in Abyei 

when the smoke was still coming up where the charred bed remains, where there were no homes as far as you can see. And then 

in the Gok, where 50,000 people were living under torn sheets during the rainy season when you couldn’t walk without mud up to 

your ankles. 

The tragedy of Abyei goes on. It goes on because of the oil. The 

vote was good, but the tough issues lie ahead. 

Mr. ISMAIL. May I add, there is information that is coming from 

Abyei that the weapons are there and the violence can spark at 

any moment. You might have heard of this project that The 

Enough Project, with Harvard University and others, have 

launched. And these are the eyes in the sky that are going to show 

us what is happening in Abyei, so stay tuned. 

And, also, the small arms are there, and other open sources that 

are saying 55,000 of the 105,000 standing army of Sudan are in or 

around the area of Abyei. If that is not a spark that is going to 

start something, I don’t know what it is. So we have to be vigilant, 

we have to work hard to avoid that clash from happening. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Let me ask about the Sudanese 

slaves. I mentioned earlier about the 35,000. Do you have any recommendations on how to liberate them from the bondage that they 

live in in the North? 

Also, on debt, $35 billion to $40 billion of indebtedness, mostly 

to other countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but also, if my 

understanding is correct, about $2 billion to the U.S. 

When the administration talks about the roadmap, could you 

again say whether or not you believe—because debt is certainly a 

part of that—lifting the designation as a state sponsor of terror—

and other issues, obviously, are in there, as well—could you speak 

to that roadmap, if you would, how comfortable you are with it, either of you. 

And finally—I will run out of time. Why don’t you go on those 

issues? 

Mr. ISMAIL. I will start with the roadmap in Darfur, as well in 

the South, because, as you know, all these issues that we are talking about are real issues, the border and the Abyei issue, as far as 

the South is concerned, the debt and currency and the citizenship. 

If you listen to the rhetoric coming out of Khartoum, that the 

Southern Sudanese are going to be stripped of their citizenship the 

day after announcing the secession—and I don’t know how they are 

going to define a Southern Sudanese from another Sudanese that 

are living in the North today. And how about dual citizenship, 

something that the government gives to itself. Some ministers in 

the Government of Sudan today, they hold other passports from 

different countries, including this country. And they are not going 

to allow the Southerners who were born and raised in Sudan as 

such to have dual citizenship. I don’t understand that. We have to 

work hard on these issues. 

And the roadmap for Darfur, we have to revitalize the peace 

process. We have to support the mediation. And we have to have 

to some high-level people who are involved in this, because the alternative of that is going to be violence in Darfur. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you. 

52

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Quickly, Congressman, the most important thing with the slave tragedy is being very vigorous to push 

the rule of law, which doesn’t exist. It is still the rule of position 

and power. And, second, shining light on it. That is the best disinfectant to human rights abuses. The United States and others 

should both engage in speaking out more aggressively. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Carnahan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And let me first 

just say congratulations again. We are looking forward to working 

with you in this new Congress and with your leadership. And 

thank you for holding this timely and important hearing. 

I really wanted to focus my time and again acknowledge this referendum. I think it is cause for hope. The international community, 

especially the African Union, the U.N., have played important roles 

in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and were 

key facilitators of the referendum. 

I guess, with multilateral engagement, these efforts have been 

met with some criticism. But I would like to ask our two panelists 

here why it is important for the U.S. to continue to engage in these 

international organizations to leverage the work in Sudan. What 

have been some of the tangible benefits so far? And how might we, 

going forward, maximize these collaborative efforts? 

And if we could start with Ambassador Williamson, please. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Congressman. 

I think if we look at Sudan, we see a long history of various multilateral mechanisms making a contribution. The IGAD process 

itself, where it has seven Eastern African countries, the troika of 

the United States, Britain, and Norway, were instrumental in 

being the midwife of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 

Since then, there has been significant multilateral efforts with 

respect to peacekeeping, first, the African Union forces, then the 

U.N. forces, both in the South and in the West. They have not 

stopped violence. They can’t. They don’t have the capacity. The 

areas are too big. But they have crowded out the space for violence, 

and they have given some window for peace negotiations and discussions. 

I think you can also look at the assistance where it has been an 

international effort through the Sudan Consortium. I think that 

Congressman Rohrabacher—and he will probably raise it, about 

the burden sharing. The U.S. clearly has made a disproportionate 

contribution. Nonetheless, the Sudan Consortium has involved 

other countries, many other countries. Norway has taken the lead 

in coordination of the consortium, and there has been that assistance. 

But, finally, sir, if I could, let me note that, to the degree there 

has been humanitarian success in Sudan, whether it is in Darfur 

or in the South, the unsung heroes are the humanitarian NGO organizations, their workers, who are Sudanese as well as from countries all over the world, and the Sudanese nationals who also participated in that, some risking their own lives. 

So it has been a collective effort. I do think the U.S. deserves 

note not only for its lead on the humanitarian assistance and its 

pivotal role in the political process, but this is a victory for the SuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:43 Feb 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\011811\64007 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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danese people. But there have many who have helped it along 

through international organizations and other mechanisms. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. Ismail? 

Mr. ISMAIL. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

And I think the United States is standing to benefit a lot from 

the subject in Sudan. It is a huge country, as it stands today, 1 million square miles, bordering nine countries. If you just consider the 

western country of Chad there and its natural extension of Sudan 

in the Sahel and you put Nigeria into the equation, you will find 

about 520 million people living in and around Sudan. If Sudan 

unravels, then this whole population is going to be thrown in a tailspin. 

We have seen the spillover of the LRA into Sudan and the spillover of Darfur into Chad and the destabilization that has created. 

This is very important. Besides the $10 billion that we just talked 

about here that the United States is spending in the South, there 

are today over $1 billion that the United States is spending in 

Darfur to keep about 31⁄2 million displaced alive. That is a huge 

burden. 

If the Sudan was left to its own devices—and we have seen violence of the scale that we have seen before in Darfur and the 

South—only God knows how much we are going to spend to keep 

some of these people alive in refugee camps, not in their homes. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Carnahan. 

Mr. Rohrabacher? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And Ambassador Williamson was right. I would like to focus a 

little bit on the disproportionate contribution that the United 

States is making, not only in Sudan, but this, I think, exemplifies 

many of the crises, humanitarian crises, that we find around the 

world. 

If there is anything the last election should have told the rest of 

the world, it is that the United States can no longer afford to do 

this. We are going broke. And once our economy is broken by this 

irresponsibility that we have had, then we will be able to help no 

one—not our own people, not other people in crisis. The world 

needs to take that into consideration, notice it, and plan their futures proportionally. 

I would suggest that we—that is not to say that in Sudan and 

other places that we have seen these horrible tragedies take place, 

the heartrending murder of innocent people—we care about that. 

But we can no longer afford to carry as big a burden as we have. 

And what makes it worse, perhaps—and, Ambassador 

Williamson, you seem a bit pessimistic that, after this $10 billion 

of investment that we have made, that we will actually succeed. It 

is a rough road to go. 

Let me ask you, is the roadmap that has been set down—do you 

consider that to be adequate? And if it is adequate, has it been enforced and followed? Or the roadmap will not succeed because it 

does not address the issues that need to be addressed? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Congressman Rohrabacher, if I could 

make a few points that I think are relevant. 

54

First, it is noteworthy that when the regime came to power in 1989, total exports were $500 million. They grew to $9.5 billion by 

2008, almost all from oil, which is why the oil revenue sharing is 

crucial. 

Second, with that sort of money coming in, the Government of 

Sudan, who designed the genocide in Darfur, as of the end of 2008 

their total contribution to the humanitarian needs of the people in 

Darfur was $30 million. I think that is not irrelevant to the considerations of how much faith we should have. 

Secondly, China gets 6 percent of its imported oil from Sudan. 

They have now tipped, where they understand it is in their interest 

to have stability. They should step up more for humanitarian assistance. 

The larger question you raised on humanitarian assistance is beyond my purview. It is up to the 435 of you and the hundred across 

the way to make those decisions, ultimately. 

But I do think there is an impulse in America that is worthy, 

that is part of our mission, that recognizes whether it is human 

rights, humanitarian assistance, we have an obligation to step up. 

But we should be tough-minded about it, get others to step up too, 

especially in these times of economic peril. 

And, finally, let me just say on the roadmap, on good days I am 

optimistic, but my experience teaches me to maybe be a little skeptical and cynical. And I think the talk of incentives without the 

talk of coercion, without the talk of steel, without the talk of being 

tough, is a matter of great concern. As Bismarck said, diplomacy 

without coercion is like sheets of music without instruments. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And no amount of humanitarian, you know, 

assistance is going to increase the standard of living of anybody for 

any length of time unless it is accompanied by a democratization 

and a change in character of a regime that is capable of the type 

of violence that you have just described. Isn’t that correct? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes, Congressman. I think it is important to note, in the South, not only do they have 80 percent of this 

oil revenue, but they have other mineral resources, and they have 

among the richest agricultural land anywhere, outside of Illinois, 

which of course has the best. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me note before my time runs out, which 

is one moment, and that is, Madam Chairman, if we are going to 

help people in the future and they have this potential wealth that 

exists, it is not wrong for us to suggest we are going to help you 

in this crisis but we expect to be paid back one way or the other. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Just a couple of questions briefly. 

Could you discuss the roles of both the African Union and the 

Arab League in all of the things that we are talking about here this 

afternoon, and what do you anticipate it will be in the near future? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Quickly, my experience is it has been 

uneven. The African Union, understandably, is worried about countries being split. There are only two African countries that have 

just two ethnic groups. Most of them have multiple ethnic groups. 

They are concerned about a contagion, as are the nine neighbors. 

55

But I think, now that they have understood the inevitability of 

this, they have played a more constructive role. The Arab League 

was unhelpful, as was the African Union, on questions of accountability, but they have been helpful on some of the development 

issues. 

And Qatar, in particular, should be singled out and the minister 

of state for foreign affairs, Al Mahmoud, for their extraordinary 

leadership in trying to get constructive discussions going on 

Darfur. 

So, could they have done more? Yes. Should they have done 

more? In my opinion, yes. Do we wish they had done more? Absolutely. But they have made contributions and more lately than they 

did a few years ago. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

And then, finally, what can we do to ensure that the corruption, 

which is endemic in much of Africa, doesn’t take root—although, 

certainly, there is already corruption in Southern Sudan—but 

doesn’t thrive in what may soon be Africa’s newest country. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Transparency, transparency, transparency are your first three priorities. Second, good governance will 

require helping train a larger coterie of people to run the agencies 

and departments of a newly independent Southern Sudan. And, 

third, some good green eyeshades from outside donors and others 

to try to monitor it. 

And, ultimately, as Congressman Rohrabacher indicated, if there 

is, in fact, a democratic process of accountability, that is a useful 

and often determinative aspect in corruption fighting. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairwoman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you to the presenters. Thank you to our panelists, and 

great members. 

Tomorrow, at 10:30, in this room, we will be having a briefing 

on China. 

And, with that, this briefing is adjourned. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

[Whereupon, at 6:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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