COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

ELSIE NAOMI BOYD (McKINNEY) HORN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2654-97-3 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 DECEMBER 22, 1998 

CLYDE J. HORN 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY 

Donald R. Mullins, Judge 

 Susan E.F. Henderson (Henderson & Fuda, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Robert M. Galumbeck (Dudley, Galumbeck & 

Simmons, on brief), for appellee. 

 Elsie Naomi Boyd (McKinney) Horn (wife) appeals the trial 

court's divorce and equitable distribution decree. Because this 

order is interlocutory in nature and thus not appealable, we 

dismiss the appeal.1

 I. 

 In its decree entered October 9, 1997, the trial court 

granted the parties a divorce. On the issue of the equitable 

distribution of the parties' business property, the court found 

as follows: 

 Dana Coal Company, Inc., although the 

stock in same was solely owned by [wife] at 

 

 1On appeal, wife argues that the court erred: (1) in 

classifying a corporation solely owned by wife as marital 

property; (2) in finding that wife committed waste with regard to 

the parties' marital property; and (3) in setting the valuation 

date for the marital estate as of the time of separation. 

Because of the procedural posture of the case, we do not reach 

the merits of these claims. 
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the time of the marriage of the parties, and 

remains solely owned by [wife] at this time, 

has been transmuted into marital property by 

the investment of marital funds, marital 

property and the personal efforts of the 

parties in the said company during the 

marriage. The Court finds that there remains 

no identifiable portion of the asset which 

may continue to be classified as separate 

property, as a result of the investment of 

marital funds, marital property and the 

personal efforts of the parties in the 

operation of the business since the marriage 

of the parties. 

Accordingly, the trial court classified Dana Coal and the 

remaining businesses as marital property subject to equitable 

distribution and set the valuation date of the marital estate as 

the time of the parties' separation. 

 Although the trial court granted the divorce and determined 

the classification of property owned by the parties, it retained 

jurisdiction to value and distribute the various property.2 The 

 

 2We initially note that the trial court did not retain 

jurisdiction pursuant to Code § 20-107.3(K), which grants a trial 

court continuing jurisdiction in various enumerated situations, 

none of which apply here. Code § 20-107.3(K) provides: 

 The court shall have the continuing authority and 

jurisdiction to make any additional orders necessary to 

effectuate and enforce any order entered pursuant to 

this section, including the authority to: 

 1. Order a date certain for transfer or 

division of any jointly owned property under 

subsection C or payment of any monetary award 

under subsection D; 

 2. Punish as contempt of court any 

willful failure of a party to comply with the 

provisions of any order made by the court 

under this section; 

 3. Appoint a special commissioner to 
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court found that: 

 [a]dditional evidence must be taken with 

regard to the value of the marital estate; 

and, further, this Court finds that matters 

currently pending before the United States 

Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 

Virginia, Abingdon Division, may affect the 

valuation of, individual ownership and 

distribution of such property, specifically 

as same relates to McHorn Construction 

Company, Inc. and Dana Coal Company, Inc.; 

and, that as a result of same, and upon 

motion of [husband], further matters 

concerning the equitable distribution of the 

marital estate, including valuation thereof 

and the manner in which the distribution of 

the estate shall be made, must be continued 

upon the docket of this Court because such 

action is clearly necessary and the Court 

will, therefore, retain jurisdiction 

concerning same. 

Accordingly, the court ordered that the equitable distribution, 

value and manner of distribution "shall be determined at a later 

date for the reasons previously set forth, herein." The matter 

was continued on the docket of the trial court. No final 

valuation of the property or monetary award was entered. 

transfer any property under subsection C 

where a party refuses to comply with the 

order of the court to transfer such property; 

and 

 4. Modify any order entered in a case 

filed on or after July 1, 1982, intended to 

affect or divide any pension, profit-sharing 

or deferred compensation plan or retirement 

benefits pursuant to the United States 

Internal Revenue Code or other applicable 

federal laws, only for the purpose of 

establishing or maintaining the order as a 

qualified domestic relations order or to 

revise or conform its terms so as to 

effectuate the expressed intent of the order. 
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 II. 

 This Court has appellate jurisdiction over final decrees of 

a circuit court in domestic relations matters arising under 

Titles 16.1 or 20, and any interlocutory decree or order 

involving the granting, dissolving, or denying of an injunction 

or "adjudicating the principles of a cause." Code 

§ 17.1-405(3)(f) and (4), recodifying § 17-116.05(3)(f) and (4). 

 A final decree is one "which disposes of the whole subject, 

gives all the relief that is contemplated, and leaves nothing to 

be done by the court." Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 390, 

451 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1994) (quotations omitted). 

 In the instant case, the decree is far from final. Only the 

first step in the equitable distribution scheme has been 

completed. The parties' property has been classified but has not 

been valued or divided and no monetary award has been made. The 

trial court specifically retained jurisdiction to consider 

further valuation and distribution of the marital property. The 

court acknowledged that the valuation of Dana Coal and McHorn 

Construction, two of the included assets, was dependent upon the 

outcome of a bankruptcy proceeding. 

 Unless the trial court's decree constituted an interlocutory 

decree that "adjudicates the principles of the cause," we do not 

have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of the equitable 

distribution of property. 

 An interlocutory decree adjudicates the 

principles of a cause where "`the rules or 

methods by which the rights of the parties 
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are to be finally worked out have been so far 

determined that it is only necessary to apply 

those rules or methods to the facts of the 

case in order to ascertain the relative 

rights of the parties, with regard to the 

subject matter of the suit.'" 

Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 227, 231, 481 S.E.2d 482, 485 

(1997) (quoting Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 848, 851, 407 

S.E.2d 339, 341 (1991) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 142 Va. 244, 252-53, 

128 S.E. 524, 527 (1925))). 

 An interlocutory decree that adjudicates the principles of a 

cause is one which must "determine the rights of the parties" and 

"would of necessity affect the final order in the case." 

Erikson, 19 Va. App. at 391, 451 S.E.2d at 713. An interlocutory 

order that adjudicates the principles "must respond to the chief 

object of the suit," id., which, in an equitable distribution 

proceeding is to classify the property, value the marital estate, 

and distribute the estate accordingly. "[T]he mere possibility 

that an interlocutory decree may affect the final decision in the 

trial does not necessitate an immediate appeal." Id. (quotations 

omitted). 

 The trial court's decree, while classifying the marital 

property, did not value the property and did not actually 

determine the manner in which the distribution of marital assets 

would be accomplished. Although the court's ruling may affect 

the ultimate decision as to the distribution of Dana Coal and 

McHorn Construction, the valuation of this property also 

significantly affects the parties' property rights. See Webb v. 
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Webb, 13 Va. App. 681, 682-83, 414 S.E.2d 612, 613 (1992) 

(dismissing an appeal because the parties' rights may still be 

determined through equitable distribution proceedings). We hold 

the decree is interlocutory and does not adjudicate the 

principles of the cause. Accordingly, we are without 

jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 

 Dismissed.