NUMBER 13-23-00060-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

CITY OF MCALLEN, Appellant,

v.

ELYDA LORETTE DIAZ, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 206th District Court 

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

Appellant the City of McAllen appeals the trial court’s order denying its plea to the 

jurisdiction in favor of appellee Elyda Lorette Diaz.1 By its sole issue, the City argues that 

the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because Diaz failed to plead that 

1

In the order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, appellee’s name is spelled “Elyda Lorrett 

Diaz,” but her name is spelled “Lorette” throughout the rest of the proceedings.
2

the City’s alleged negligent operation of a motor-driven vehicle was the proximate cause 

of her injuries and therefore the City retains immunity from suit. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 19, 2020, Diaz filed suit against the City asserting a claim for negligence 

under § 101.021 of the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 

ANN. § 101.021(1)(A) (waiving sovereign immunity for a claim against a governmental unit 

which “arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle”). Diaz alleged that she 

was injured inside a patrol unit “with police owned objects.” Diaz claimed she suffered 

serious bodily injury, including a brain injury, due to the City’s “negligent transportation

she received while being handcuffed inside” a patrol unit.

On November 28, 2022, the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction. According to the 

City, “a bystander called 911 to report that” Diaz’s “then boyfriend . . . was captured on 

video physically attacking” Diaz. When a police officer responded to the 911 call, police 

“discovered [Diaz] and her boyfriend” were “involved in a minor car accident, and that 

[Diaz] was in a highly intoxicated state.” The City asserted that Diaz was booked into the 

City’s jail but was transferred to the hospital upon her request. The City further argued 

that Diaz “had not plead[ed] nor offered any facts to indicate there was negligent operation 

of a motor-driven vehicle.” Upon her release from the hospital, Diaz was charged with 

“public intoxication, plead[ed] no contest, and was convicted.” 

Diaz responded by stating that her injuries arose from the “use” of a patrol car 

while she was being transported by police. Diaz does not state in her petition how she 
3

sustained the injuries from the use of the patrol car, i.e., she does not allege that the 

patrol car crashed or how the car caused her injury while being transported in it.

On February 2, 2023, the trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. This 

interlocutory appeal followed. See id. § 51.014(a)(8).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

A unit of state government, such as the City, is immune from suit unless the state 

consents. Dall. Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003). 

“Governmental immunity defeats a court’s jurisdiction,” so “the plaintiff must affirmatively 

demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction by alleging a valid waiver of immunity.” Ryder 

Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. 2015) (internal 

citations omitted). A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction over a pleaded cause of action and may challenge either the sufficiency of 

jurisdictional allegations in the pleadings or the existence of jurisdictional facts. Tex. Dep’t 

of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27 (Tex. 2004). When, as in this 

case, a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings, we determine 

if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction 

to hear the cause. Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 927; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. We construe 

the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to the pleader’s intent. Ryder, 453 

S.W.3d at 927. We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. 

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.

The TTCA provides a limited waiver of immunity. See Alexander v. Walker, 435 

S.W.3d 789, 790 (Tex. 2014). As pertinent here, the TTCA provides that a governmental 
4

unit waives immunity and is liable for personal injury caused by the negligence of an 

employee acting within the scope of employment if personal injury arises from the 

operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 

§ 101.021(1)(A). Thus, the issue before us is whether Diaz has alleged harm arising from 

the operation or use of the officer’s patrol unit such that immunity may be waived under 

§ 101.021(1)(A). The “arising from” standard in the context of the TTCA only reaches 

injuries “proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of the 

employee.” Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 929; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 

§ 101.021(1)(A). “Arises from” is defined as a “nexus between the operation or use of the 

motor-driven vehicle or equipment and a plaintiff’s injuries.” Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 929. 

“To satisfy § 101.021(1)(A)’s nexus requirement, . . . plaintiffs must show that the 

governmental employee’s use or operation of the vehicle or equipment proximately 

caused the relevant injury.” Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 874 (Tex. 

2023).

Diaz was required to address each element of negligence in her pleading, including 

proximate cause. Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 927–928. Proximate cause has two elements: 

cause in fact and foreseeability. Rattray, 662 S.W.3d at 874. Id. at 929. “Cause in fact is 

essentially but-for causation.” Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 929. In other words, a tortious act is 

a cause in fact if serves as “a substantial factor in causing the injury and without which 

the injury would not have occurred.” Id. Foreseeability requires only “that the injury be of 

such a general character as might reasonably have been anticipated; and that the injured 

party should be so situated with relation to the wrongful act that injury to him or to one 
5

similarly situated might reasonably have been foreseen.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

We construe Diaz’s pleading liberally to determine whether Diaz pleaded an injury arising 

from the City’s operation or use of a motor vehicle. See id. at 927.

III. DISCUSSION

By its sole issue, the City argues that Diaz failed to plead that the City’s alleged 

negligent operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle was the proximate cause of her 

injuries; therefore, Diaz did not allege a valid waiver of immunity under the TTCA. See

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(1)(A); Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 927. In Ryder, 

the supreme court reviewed a pleading sufficiency challenge to determine whether the 

plaintiff pleaded a waiver of immunity for damages arising out of the use of a motor vehicle 

under the TTCA, and in La Joya Independent School District v. Gonzalez and Harlingen

Consolidated Independent School District v. Miranda, this court did the same. See Ryder, 

453 S.W.3d at 927; La Joya Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gonzalez, 532 S.W.3d 892, 903 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, pet. denied); Harlingen Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. 

v. Miranda, No. 13-18-00391-CV, 2019 WL 1187151, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Mar. 14, 2019, no pet.). Because Diaz was required to provide allegations 

supporting that the City waived immunity, we must analyze the facts in this case for 

components of proximate cause: cause in fact and foreseeability. Rattray, 662 S.W.3d at 

874; Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 927.

A. Facts in Ryder

In Ryder, the plaintiff alleged that he had been injured after being involved in a 

collision caused by the City. 453 S.W.3d at 926. The City responded that it had immunity 
6

because the petition failed to allege the accident arose from the use of the vehicle. Id. In 

his petition, the plaintiff had made the following allegations: 

(1) the county was operating a county vehicle at the time of the alleged injury;

(2) the county vehicle was approaching eastbound traffic as two trucks 

collided; 

(3) the county officer was in the process of “relocating” the county vehicle;

(4) the county breached a legal duty when it failed to follow proper protocols 

and procedures in moving its county vehicle;

(5) the county officer blinded and distracted another driver;

(6) the county officer caused a driver to strike an 18-wheeler;

(7) by directing the county vehicle’s lights toward eastbound traffic, the county 

officer caused erratic driving;

(8) the subsequent collision—and any associated harm from the collision—

would not have occurred absent the county officer’s decision to drive his car 

toward oncoming traffic;

(9) “a reasonable peace officer could have foreseen that driving westbound 

near an eastbound shoulder at night—with headlights and emergency lights 

illuminated—might confuse drivers, disrupt traffic, and lead to a collision 

much like the one that ultimately occurred”; and

(10) the alleged harm is of the very character that might reasonably have been 

anticipated.

Id. at 927–931. The supreme court analyzed each of these facts to determine whether 

the plaintiff “has alleged an injury arising from the use of a vehicle” for the purposes of 

the TTCA. Id. at 931. It concluded that the allegations were sufficient. Id.

B. Facts in La Joya

In La Joya, the plaintiff pleaded the following facts: 
7

(1) the bus driver turned the bus into a crossover between the 

expressway’s main lanes;

(2) when the bus driver saw the decedent approaching the bus on foot, 

the bus driver stopped the bus and activated its flashing warning 

lights;

(3) the flashing lights signaled to the decedent that it was safe to cross 

the expressway;

(4) as the decedent crossed the expressway, he was struck by another 

vehicle;

(5) the decedent died at the scene;

(6) the bus driver acted negligently by failing to follow protocols and 

procedures for the safe loading of students;

(7) the bus driver created a “non-designated stop” by activating the 

flashing lights;

(8) the decedent’s death was proximately caused by the bus driver’s 

wrongful acts and omissions;

(9) the district was vicariously liable. 

532 S.W.3d at 896. The defendant city in that case argued that the plaintiff had not 

pleaded sufficient facts that the accident arose out of the operation of the district’s vehicle.

Id. at 902. This Court stated that these “facts pleaded by [the plaintiff] taken as true, 

establish cause-in-fact.” Id. at 903.2

2 We note that in Miranda, the supreme court analyzed jurisdiction based solely on the plaintiff’s 

pleadings: (1) the plaintiffs asked the department for a recommendation for a safe camping ground; (2) at 

the campsite the plaintiff was struck by a falling tree branch that severely injured her; (3) the unpruned, 

uninspected tree branches created a dangerous, defective condition on the premises that the department 

was aware of; (4) the department knew of the dangers of falling tree branches but failed to inspect, prune, 

alleviate the dangers or otherwise make the conditions safe; (5) the department consciously and 

deliberately failed to warn the plaintiffs of the extremely dangerous condition; and (6) the department’s 

conduct was willful, wanton, or grossly negligent. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 

217, 230 (Tex. 2004). Based on those facts, the supreme court concluded “the Mirandas alleged sufficient 

facts to survive a plea to the jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings.” Id.
8

C. Harlingen’s Facts

In Harlingen, we reviewed the pleadings for cause in fact and foreseeability 

requirements. The plaintiff pleaded the following facts:

(1) the plaintiff, who was located in the rear of the bus, “fell, or was pushed, out 

of the emergency exit door” while the bus was travelling sixty-five miles per 

hour;

(2) “although having the responsibility for the operation and use of Bus # 118, 

[the bus driver] exceeded the posted speed limit of Bus # 118 on the day of 

[plaintiff’s] Fall”;

(3) “although having the responsibility for the operation and use of Bus # 118, 

[the bus driver] exceeded the proper speed limit of Bus # 118 when taking 

into consideration the condition of the roadway traveled on the day of 

[plaintiff’s] Fall”;

(4) “Immediately prior to [plaintiff’s] Fall, Bus # 118 was seen bouncing up and 

down as though [it] had run over something or was traveling over uneven 

pavement, with such bouncing being attributable to the excessive rate of 

speed and the road conditions”;

(5) there were “marks” on the emergency exit door “that could be consistent 

with damage to the interior side of the [door] . . . which could be attributed 

to the described bouncing of [the bus]”;

(6) although having the responsibility for the operation and use of Bus # 118, 

[the bus driver] failed to prevent Bus # 188 from bouncing up and down, 

thereby allowing someone, or something, to be thrown against the 

[emergency exit door] resulting in [plaintiff’s] Fall”;

(7) witnesses described the plaintiff falling, as opposed to jumping, from the 

bus;

(8) the bus driver allowed students to stand on the bus, allowed two monitors 

to sit in the front of the bus, failed to slow the bus down after the emergency 

door indicated it opened, and operated the bus at an unsafe speed.

Harlingen, 2019 WL 1187151, at *1. The District argued that “the pleadings do not 

demonstrate” that the plaintiff’s death “arose from the use or operation of the [the District’s 
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vehicle]” or “show a nexus between the use or operation” and the plaintiff’s death. Id. at 

*3. We held “the foregoing allegations identify affirmative actions or omissions of the bus 

driver in operating the school bus.” Id. at *4. We further held that the allegations were 

sufficient to establish the proximate cause elements of cause-in-fact and foreseeability. 

Id. at *5.

D. Diaz’s Facts

Diaz pleaded the following facts: (1) “Diaz was injured while she was being 

transported to the police station in a police car”; (2) “while the police was using the car to 

transport her, she was injured with police owned objects”; (3) “she suffered serious bodily 

injuries, including a brain injury, as a result of the negligent transportation she received 

while being handcuffed inside” the City’s car; and (4) the officer who had custody of Diaz 

“negligently operated the car & its security instrumentalities and injured” her.

E. Analysis

1. Cause in Fact

Comparing the facts in Ryder, La Joya, and Harlingen to the allegations herein,

Diaz’s pleading falls short. “[T]he statute ‘requires a nexus between the injury negligently 

caused by a governmental employee and the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle.’” 

PHI, Inc. v. Tex. Juv. Just. Dep’t, 593 S.W.3d 296, 302 (Tex. 2019) (citing LeLeaux v. 

Hamshire–Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. 1992)). From Diaz’s sparse 

allegations, it is entirely unclear what Diaz alleges is the causal nexus between her 

alleged injuries and the officer’s operation of the vehicle. See id. In Ryder, the plaintiff 

alleged that the officer directed patrol headlights towards eastbound traffic, caused erratic 
10

driving, caused a collision, and absent his conduct, no injuries would have occurred. 453 

S.W.3d at 929. The plaintiff pleaded: “the collision—and any associated harm—would not 

have occurred absent [the officer’s] decision to drive his car toward oncoming traffic.” 

From these facts, the supreme court concluded that a reasonable juror might find the 

requisite nexus between the use of the county vehicle and the injuries suffered. Id.

In this case, Diaz alleges the City “negligently operated the car” and “negligently 

transported her,” but there are no facts supporting “the requisite nexus between the use 

of” the City vehicle and the injuries Diaz allegedly suffered. See Harlingen, 2019 WL 

1187151, at *4. While an allegation of “negligent transportation” may suffice outside of 

the TTCA realm, in the context of the TTCA, where the plaintiff must demonstrate 

proximate cause to overcome governmental immunity, a bare allegation of being 

“negligently transported,” will not suffice to support waiver of immunity. In this regard, a 

plaintiff may not overcome the TTCA’s limited waiver of immunity with a general assertion 

of negligence and therefore meet the nexus requirement. Here, Diaz did not allege any 

facts regarding the City’s conduct, that if taken as true, would satisfy the cause in fact 

requirement of proximate cause.

In Harlingen, the plaintiff pleaded: “had the District bus driver not driven at an 

unsafe speed over poor road conditions, [the decedent] would not have been thrown 

against the emergency exit door in such a manner to cause him to fall to the roadway.” 

We held such pleadings established cause in fact. 2019 WL 1187151, at *5. Thus, merely

accusing the City of negligence is not a substitute for the required facts necessary to find 

the requisite nexus between the use of the vehicle and the injuries suffered. See id. From 
11

her pleadings, it is unclear whether absent the officer’s negligent operation of the patrol 

unit, any and all associated injuries would not have occurred. See id.

Diaz attempts to overcome her omission of facts by asserting: “As a direct and 

proximate result of [the City’s] conduct,” she “experienced severe trauma, personal bodily 

injuries, physical pain, head injuries[,] and mental anguish,” “suffered physical 

impairment . . . for a long time into the future, if not for the balance of her natural life.” 

However, mere reference to the TTCA by incorporating the words “proximate cause”

“does not establish consent to be sued and is therefore insufficient to confer jurisdiction 

on the trial court.” See Los Fresnos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Southworth, 156 S.W.3d 

910, 915 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet. denied).

In La Joya, the plaintiff pleaded that the decedent’s death was “proximately 

caused” by the bus driver’s wrong acts and omissions, but we did not end our analysis 

there. 532 S.W.3d at 896. Instead, we analyzed the facts in the plaintiff’s pleadings to 

determine whether the plaintiff alleged facts establishing that the government employee’s 

acts were the cause in fact of the injuries sustained and whether those injuries were 

foreseeable. Id. at 903. Specifically, we found the following allegation relevant to establish 

cause in fact: “Uranga would not have attempted to cross the expressway to board the 

bus, and would not have been struck by Venecia’s vehicle, if Rodriguez had not stopped 

the bus in the middle of the crossover lane and activated the bus’s warning lights.” Id.

Likewise, in Ryder, the supreme court did not end its analysis when the plaintiff 

alleged the county officer was “negligent”; the court analyzed the factual allegations for 

the components of proximate cause—cause in fact and foreseeability. 453 S.W.3d at 929.
12

Diaz’s general allegation that she suffered an injury “[a]s a direct and proximate result of 

[the City’s] conduct”—without more—does not establish “but-for causation” regarding the 

causal relationship between the City’s operation of the vehicle and her alleged injuries. 

See id.; La Joya, 532 S.W.3d at 903 (“This nexus requires more than mere involvement 

of the property; rather, the vehicle’s use must have actually caused the injury.”); see also 

City of Weslaco v. Trejo, No. 13-18-00024-CV, 2018 WL 3062575, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 21, 2018, no pet.) (“This causal nexus is not satisfied by 

the mere involvement of vehicles.”). Because proximate cause is not shown by merely 

uttering the words “proximate cause,” we cannot conclude that Diaz “has alleged an injury 

arising from the use of a vehicle” based on her assertion that the City was negligent. See 

Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 929, Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 230; La Joya, 532 S.W.3d at 903; see 

also County of Hidalgo v. Perez, No. 13-22-00312-CV, 2023 WL 2807216, at *5 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A]ppellees have 

satisfied the cause in fact prong by alleging that Garcia’s failure to secure his load resulted 

in debris flying from the trailer of his vehicle, which in turn caused appellees, who were 

traveling behind Garcia’s vehicle at the time of the incident, to suffer property damage 

and personal injuries.”); Salinas v. City of Brownsville, No. 13-08-00146-CV, 2010 WL 

672885, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 25, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(holding that although the plaintiff pleaded that the city’s use of equipment was the 

proximate cause of her injuries, the plaintiff’s pleadings did not satisfy the cause in fact 

requirement of proximate cause).
13

Without additional facts criticizing the City’s conduct like those pleaded in Ryder,

La Joya, and Harlingen, it is entirely unclear how the City’s use of the vehicle caused Diaz

to experience “severe trauma, personal bodily injuries, physical pain, head injuries[,] and 

mental anguish.” See Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 929; La Joya, 532 S.W.3d at 903. To be 

sufficient, Diaz’s pleadings must have alleged facts that established a “nexus between 

the operation or use of the motor-driven vehicle” and her injuries. See Ryder, 453 S.W.3d 

at 929; La Joya, 532 S.W.3d at 903; see also PHI, 593 S.W.3d at 302 (providing that the 

vehicle’s “use must have actually caused the injury”). We conclude she failed to do so.

2. Foreseeability

In Ryder, although the plaintiff stated that the city was negligent and the city’s use 

of its vehicle was the cause in fact of the collision, the court also found that the plaintiff’s 

allegations satisfied the foreseeability component of proximate cause: “According to 

Ryder, a reasonable peace officer could have foreseen that driving westbound near an 

eastbound shoulder at night—with headlights and emergency lights illuminated—might 

confuse drivers, disrupt traffic, and lead to a collision much like the one that ultimately 

occurred.” 453 S.W.3d at 929. Thus, “the alleged harm is of the very character that might 

reasonably have been anticipated.” Id. at 903. In La Joya, this Court held that the plaintiff’s 

allegations were also sufficient to establish foreseeability. 532 S.W.3d at 903. We 

explained that: “When, as alleged here, a bus driver stops at an undesignated location in 

the middle of an expressway in order to pick up a student, it is reasonable to anticipate 

that the student would attempt to cross the expressway, thereby risking injury or death to 

the student.” Id. at 904. In Harlingen, we reasoned: “it is reasonable to anticipate that a 
14

student might be thrown against an emergency exit door causing it to open when, as 

alleged here, a bus is travelling at speeds exceeding sixty-five miles-per-hour over 

uneven pavement.” 2019 WL 1187151, at *5. Thus, we too must determine whether 

Diaz’s pleadings sufficiently alleged that her injuries were foreseeable. See id.

In this case, Diaz did not allege that the type of injuries she allegedly sustained 

were foreseeable. See id. Here, the alleged harm is not of the very character that might 

reasonably have been anticipated because it is not reasonable to anticipate that

transporting a person to the local jail in a patrol vehicle—without more—may cause

severe trauma, personal bodily injuries, physical pain, head injuries, mental anguish, and 

physical impairment for the balance of her natural life, especially when a collision is not 

alleged. The injury here is not of such a general character as might reasonably have been 

anticipated to one similarly situated. Whereas it is reasonable to anticipate erratic driving 

where a vehicle is driving toward oncoming traffic with its high beams, reasonable to 

anticipate injury to student crossing the expressway at an area that is not a designated 

bus stop, see id., and reasonable to anticipate a student might be thrown against an exit 

door causing it to open when the bus is traveling in excess of the speed limit on uneven

pavement, it is not reasonable to anticipate Diaz’s alleged extensive injuries from being 

transported in the back of patrol vehicle without any additional facts, such as accusing 

the City of causing a collision.

3. Tangible Property

In its plea to the jurisdiction, the City argued its immunity was not waived pursuant 

to § 101.062(b) because the claim arose from an action taken in response to a 911 
15

emergency call but Diaz did not plead that the City’s action violated any applicable statute 

or ordinance. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.062(b) (“This chapter applies 

to a claim against a public agency that arises from an action of an employee of the public 

agency . . . that involves . . . responding to a 9-1-1 emergency call only if the action 

violates a statute or ordinance applicable to the action.”). In its plea, the City asserted that 

Diaz did not allege that the City’s use of the handcuffs violated any statute or ordinance, 

and she did not identify any injury caused by the alleged negligent use of the handcuffs. 

The City further asserted that Diaz failed to assert a claim under the TTCA involving the 

tangible use of personal property because she failed to show how the handcuffs were the 

instrumentality of the harm, failed to allege facts that would establish the handcuffs were 

misused, and failed to identify any alleged injury proximately caused by the handcuffs. 

Thus, the City asserted immunity was not waived. See id. § 101.021(2) (waiving immunity 

for a claim for “personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible 

personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable 

to the claimant according to Texas law”.).

In her response to the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, Diaz did not address the City’s 

arguments regarding the use of tangible personal property, and specifically limited her 

response to allegations of the City’s use of a motor-driven vehicle. Nonetheless, we agree 

with the City that Diaz’s statement that she was injured “as a result of the negligent

transportation while being handcuffed” is insufficient to establish proximate cause. See 

Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 929. Accordingly, the trial court should not have denied the plea to 

the jurisdiction on this basis.
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4. Response to Dissent

In La Joya, this Court expressly stated that “a plaintiff can satisfy the ‘arising from’ 

standard by demonstrating the more exacting standard of proximate cause.” 532 S.W.3d 

at 903. We reaffirmed the same in Harlingen. See 2019 WL 1187151, at *5. Now, the 

dissent states this more exacting standard of proximate cause is met with a general 

assertion of negligence where only one vehicle is involved in causing the alleged injuries. 

The dissent states that in Ryder and La Joya, more factually detailed pleadings were 

necessary otherwise “it would be unclear how the negligence of the first driver could 

proximately cause injuries which directly stemmed from a collision from the second 

vehicle.” And here, because only one car was involved the “causal relationship is direct 

and obvious.” The dissent suggests that because only one vehicle was involved here, 

detailed factual allegations to overcome immunity are unnecessary—that is, Diaz need 

only allege she was negligently transported to overcome immunity.

However, pleading “negligence,” which is a cause of action for which immunity is 

waived under the TTCA, is not the equivalent of pleading facts supporting the cause of 

action. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 101.021(1)(A). “[T]he trial court’s 

jurisdiction is ultimately determined by the facts alleged.” County of Hidalgo, 2023 WL 

2807216, at *3 (emphasis added). Thus, a plaintiff makes no effort to establish a waiver 

of immunity based on a recitation of the TTCA’s cause of action without providing facts to 

perform a pleading sufficiency analysis. The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly 

instructed courts to review the pleadings for facts concerning cause in fact and 

foreseeability—not for an allegation of negligence—regardless of how many vehicles 
17

were involved. Rattray, 662 S.W.3d at 867 (providing that a plaintiff discharges the 

“burden of showing immunity under the TTCA by alleging facts that bring a claim within 

the waiver”); Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 927 (reviewing a pleading sufficiency challenge for 

facts); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 (same); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 

852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993) (“That standard requires the pleader to allege facts that 

affirmatively demonstrate” jurisdiction.); La Joya, 532 S.W.3d at 896 (“The plaintiff has 

the initial burden to plead facts affirmatively showing that the trial court has jurisdiction.”); 

see also County of Hidalgo, 2023 WL 2807216, at *3 (“A plaintiff is required to plead facts

invoking a waiver of immunity.”); Nueces County v. Sundial Owner’s Ass’n, Inc., No. 13-

18-00074-CV, 2019 WL 1285301, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 21, 

2019, no pet.) (same). A plaintiff does not meet its burden of pleading facts affirmatively 

demonstrating the trial court’s jurisdiction by merely alleging the cause of action. See Tex. 

Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.

In Harlingen, we did not hold that the plaintiff was not required to provide facts 

demonstrating of proximate cause because the “causal relationship is direct and obvious” 

although only one vehicle was involved, See id. To contrary, this Court, including the 

dissent, performed a detailed analysis of all of the plaintiff’s numerous and detailed 

allegations for cause in fact and foreseeability. See id. We did not waive the TTCA’s

proximate cause requirements because only one vehicle was involved. See id. There is 

no case law holding that “detailed factual pleadings are not necessary” to establish how 

the plaintiff’s injuries arose from the use of the vehicle where only one vehicle is involved 

because in such a case the relationship is direct and obvious. We have found no case 
18

law that holds that a plaintiff may circumvent the cause in fact and foreseeability 

requirements of the TTCA with a general assertion of negligence. 

If Diaz’s general allegation that the City was negligent without more were to suffice, 

then the actual provisions of the TTCA would be meaningless: every pleading merely 

alleging “negligence” would overcome a governmental entity’s waiver of immunity, 

regardless of the lack of other facts, and we would never have a pleading sufficiency case 

before us to review. See PHI, 593 S.W.3d at 303 (providing that the “arises from” 

“causation element requires that Webb’s negligent failure to engage the emergency brake 

“actually caused” the collision between van and helicopter”). Surely, the legislature did 

not intend for the sovereign to waive immunity on such meager pleadings, such as these, 

without facts when only one vehicle was involved in allegedly causing a plethora of 

injuries. See id. (The Supreme Court of Texas has “repeatedly affirmed that any purported 

statutory waiver of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed in favor of retention of 

immunity.”).

5. Summary

Given the Legislature’s preference for a limited immunity waiver in the context of 

the TTCA, we conclude Diaz’s pleadings failed to demonstrate “the more exacting 

standard of proximate cause,” which includes cause in fact and foreseeability.3 La Joya, 

532 S.W.3d at 903. To the extent that Diaz continues to complain of the City’s negligent 

use of handcuffs, that pleading also fails. PHI, 593 S.W.3d at 303. Because Diaz’s 

3 For example, Diaz did not allege a collision occurred; Diaz did not accuse the City of driving 

erratically or suddenly or improperly slamming the brakes; Diaz did not complain she was ejected from the 

vehicle; Diaz did not allege she was shifting in the backseat, causing her injuries. Instead, the City is left to 

guess what affirmative acts caused Diaz’s injuries.
19

pleadings did not demonstrate the critical nexus between the City’s alleged negligent use 

of the vehicle and Diaz’s injuries, they are insufficient to support a waiver of the City’s 

immunity. La Joya, 532 S.W.3d at 903. Accordingly, the trial court should have granted 

the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. Id. We sustain the City’s sole issue.

D. Remand

The City requests that we dismiss Diaz’s case with prejudice because it claims that 

Diaz has had ample time to amend her pleadings. However, if a plaintiff “fails to plead 

facts that establish jurisdiction, but the petition does not affirmatively demonstrate 

incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff 

should be afforded the opportunity to amend.” County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 

549, 555 (Tex. 2002).

Here, Diaz’s pleadings do not affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction as 

a matter of law. That is, when Diaz’s allegations are taken as true, her pleadings do not 

demonstrate an incurable defect. If Diaz were to plead sufficient allegations satisfying the 

cause in fact and foreseeability components of proximate cause, she may perhaps cure

the pleading insufficiency. See Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 555. Whether Diaz can ultimately

prove cause in fact or foreseeability is irrelevant at this stage of the litigation where the 

City failed to attach evidence to its plea to the jurisdiction. Because the City merely 

challenged the sufficiency of Diaz’s pleadings and Diaz may amend her pleadings to 

allege cause in fact and foreseeability—regardless of whether those allegations are 

supported by evidence—we must afford her the opportunity to replead. See Miranda, 133 

S.W.3d at 226–27 (providing that if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of 
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jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff the 

opportunity to replead). Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court with instructions 

to afford Diaz the opportunity to replead. Id. 

IV. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, and we 

remand the case to the trial for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum 

opinion.

JAIME TIJERINA

Justice

Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by Chief Contreras.

Delivered and filed on the

7th day of March, 2024.