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Filed 7/18/23 In re R.L. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Shasta)

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In re R.L. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C096835

SHASTA COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. S.L., Defendant and Appellant. (Super. Ct. Nos. JVSQ112884201, JVSQ112884301)

Appellant S.L., mother of minors R.L. and A.L., appeals from the juvenile court’s
orders on her petition for modif ication, permitting visitation with R.L. but not with A.L. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 395.) 1 As highlighted by respondent , the parties, including

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.2

mother, stipulated to the orders from which mother now appeals. Accordingly, w e shall dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND Shasta County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) instituted these dependency proceedings in March 2011 with the filing of a section 300, subdivision (b) petition on behalf of minors R.L. (then age five years) and A.L. (then age one month) as a result of parents ’ substance abuse, anger control , and domestic violence issues. The minors were placed with the maternal grandparents. Parents were provided reunification services, but they failed to reunify and reunification services were terminated in May 2012. In September 2012, the juvenile court ordered a permanent plan of legal guardianship with the maternal grandparents for the minors. In July 2016, mother filed a JV

- 180 petition to modif y pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 388 (hereafter JV

- 180) requesting the guardianship be
dissolved

. In January 2017, after a hearing, the juvenile court dissolved the guardianship, reinstated the dependency, and placed the minors with mot her with family maintenance
services. Mother relapsed and began testing positive for methamphetamine on April 7 , 2017. Mother did not comply with substance abuse treatment , and in November 2017, law enforcement began getting repeated reports of domestic violence between mother and
her live

- in partner (who is not the minors’ father). 2 In January 2018, the Agency filed a section 387 supplemental petition , and the juvenile court ordered the minors detained . In May 2018, the juvenile court terminated
fam ily maintenance services for mother and, in October 2018, ordered a permanent plan of legal guardianship for the minors

. In April 2019, t he dependency as to minor R.L. was

2 The minors’ father did not maintain contact with the Agency after the minors’ initial guardianship orders and is not a party to this appeal.3

again terminated an d he was placed with his legal guardians. A.L. remained placed with her legal guardians but dependency was not terminated at that time

. A.L.’s dependency
was terminated in November 2019. In December 2020, the maternal grandparents resumed legal guardianship of A.L.
On February 8, 2022, mother filed a JV

- 180 petition requesting visitation as to both minors. The juvenile court reinstated the dependency, appointed counsel for mother

an d the minors , and set a hearing on the petition for March 22, 2022. Minors’ counsel opposed mother’s request. The Agency noted concerns about mother’s mental health and
delusio n s

. Minor A. L

. ( then age 13 years) did not wish to visit with mother. Minor R.L. (then age 16 years) said he did not mind seeing mother but noted that he lived four hours
away and did not want to mak e a special trip to visit. Mother told the social work er that the minors were old enough to make their own decision about visiting. The Agency
recommended mother’s petition be denied as to A.L. and granted supervised visits as to R.L., but that R.L.’s dependency remain open to allow for monitoring of the visits and to assess safety

. On March 22, 2022, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for mother and
the matter was continued. Thereafter, the Agency clarified that it was concerned that mother’s mental illness would result in emotional or physic al injury to R.L. but it
understood R.L. may want to see mother, even though the Agency did not think visits
were in his best interests. The court set the matter for a contested hearing on June 17 , 2022

. On June 15, 2022, the Agency filed an addendum rec ommending visits between mother and A.L. be found detrimental due to mother’s mental health and A.L.’s unwillingness to participate in visits. It recommended R.L. be offered visits with mother,
with the proviso that the visits o ccur at an agreed upon publ ic place and mother be responsible for travel to the visit.4

On June 17, 2022, the parties entered into a stipulation on the disposition of mother’s JV

- 180 petition. The parties agreed to the court’s denial of the petition as to
minor A.L. as not in the m inor’s best interest ; grant of the petition as to minor R.L., with orders that R.L. may visit mother at his discretion ; and termination of the minors’ dependency cases with the continued plan s of guardianship. The stipulation was signed by mother, mother’s counsel, mother’s GAL , father, father’s counsel, minors’ counsel, and counsel for the Agency. The court entered t he orders as stipulated to by the parties. On August 15, 2022, mother filed a notice of appe al, identifying the June 17, 2022

“ [section] 362.1 visitation under JV 180 order” as well as section “16507 all orders under reunification, visitation” and “all previous to visitation, communication.” She did not
requ est appointed appellate counsel and ap pears in pro pria per sona in this appeal.
DISCUSSION
M other raises no coherent arguments in her opening brief. A civil litigant must abide by the same procedures

— including appellate procedures

— regardless of whether she chooses to employ an attorney. ( B istawros v. Greenberg (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 189, 193.) Mother , as the party who brought this appeal, bears the burden to show reversible

error. ( Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115

- 1116.) Yet, her

o pening brief is incomprehensible, fails to provide a coherent factual and procedural background , and fails to provide coherent legal arguments. (See Cal. Ru l es of Court,
rule s 8.204 and 8.412(a)(2) .) An appellate court is not required, on its own motion, to develop argu ments for an appellant. ( Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994)
28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1.) An appellant must prove that a trial court ’ s rulings are incorrect “by presenting legal authority on each point made and factual analysis, supported by ap propriate citations to the material facts in the record; otherwise, the argument may be deemed forfeited.” ( Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655.) Mother has failed to do so and, as such, has forfeited any argument s she may have

. Moreover, “ f

ailure of an appellant in a civil action to articulate any pertinent or5

intelligible legal argument in an opening brief may, in the discretion of the court, be deemed an abandonment of the appeal justifying dismissal.” ( Berger v. Godden (1985)
163 Cal.App .3d 1113, 1119.) Notwithstanding the defects in mother’s briefing, dismissal of the appeal is
nonetheless compelled in this case for additional reasons

. As a general rule, a stipulated judgment or order is not appealable. ( Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 400.) This rule is based upon “ ‘the theory that by consenting to the judgment or order the party expressly waives all objection to it, and cannot be allowed afterwards, on appeal, to question its propriety, because by consenting to it [she] has abandoned all opposition or exception to it.’ ” ( Ibid. ) Indeed, “ ‘ “ [i] t is an elementary and fundamental rule of appellate procedure that a judgment or order will not be disturbed on an appeal prosecuted by a party who consented to it.”

. . . A stipulation is a consent within the meaning of this rule. ’ ” ( Zinke v. Zinke Rebottoming Shoe Co. (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 690, 694

- 695, italics added, quoting Brooms v. Brooms (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 351, 352.) There are several exceptions to the rule that no appeal may be taken from a stipulated judgment or order. First, where a judgment or order is void on its face due to a lack of fundamental jurisdictional power to hear or determine the case, an appeal may be
heard. ( Reed v. Murphy (1925) 196 Cal. 395, 399

- 400 [“a decree or judgment which is void upon its face is open to attack by anyone, including the parties thereto, even though they consented to its rendition”].) Second, an appeal may be taken from a stipulated judgment or order where the p arty agreed to the judgment or order for the express purpose of facilitating an appeal. ( Norgart v. Upjohn Co. , supra , 21 Cal.4th at pp. 400

- 401.) Here, mother stipulated to the JV

- 180 orders, with the consent of counsel and her
GAL. T here is no suggesti on that the juvenile court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to enter the stipulated JV

- 180 order s . Nor does the record show that mother agreed to the6

stipulated order s merely to facilitate an appeal. Accordingly , mother has failed to
demonstrate that she can appeal from the stipulated order s on these or any other grounds. Finally, mother assert s that she is “[ a ] ppealing not just the last filing of the JV180 but the case entirely,” and she request s that we review previous reunification and
visitation order s , entered earlier in the case, and “consider all actions and orders , ” and “the case entirely .” Yet mother’s notice of appeal is not effective as to the juvenile
court’s earlier orders and th is court does not have jurisdiction to review them in this appeal. Dependency proceedings are proceedings of an ongoing nature and appellate jurisdiction to review an appealable order is dependent upon a timely notice of appeal. ( In re Elizabeth G. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1327, 1329, reh g. den. & op n. mod

. (Dec. 13 , 1988) .) The time for appeal of an order made in a dependency case is 60 days from the date of the order’s pronouncement in open court. ( In re Alyssa H. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1253

- 1254.) An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependenc y matter may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed. ( In re Elizabeth G. , at p. 1331 ; In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553,
563 .) If no timely appeal is taken from a dependency order, the order is final and binding ; the issues determined by the order are res judicata and not subject to attack on appeal from a later appealable order. ( In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532; In re
Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 393.) This appeal is simply n ot timely as to any earlier orders.7 DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed. 3

/s/ HORST, J. 

We concur:

/s/ RENNER, Acting P. J.

/s/ BOULWARE EURIE, J.

3 In light of our disposition, appellant’s request to abandon the appeal, filed May 30, 2023, is denied as moot.

 Judge of the Placer County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution