IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2017-CA-01166-COA CHRISTOPHER BAILEY KEETON, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS NATURAL GUARDIAN AND NEX T FRIEND, ALISON GRAY APPELLANT

v. OCEAN SPRINGS SCHOOL BOARD APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/18/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT P. KREBS COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: G. CHARLES BORDIS IV ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: ALW YN H. LUCKEY NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 01/31/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, C.J., BARNES AND CARLTON, P.JJ. GRIFFIS, C.J., FOR THE COURT : ¶1. Christopher Bailey Keeton was suspended f rom Ocean S prings High School f or a violation of the school district’s alcohol policy

. The decision was a ppealed t o the circui t court, and a m otion f

or injunctive relief w as f

iled. T he circuit court dism issed the appeal and denied the m otion f

or injunctive relief

. W e f i nd no error and af

f irm

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. In 2016, Keeton was an eleventh grader at Ocean Springs High School. In April of 2016, he attended t he high school’s prom in Bilox i. Keeton and several other students traveled to the prom in a “ party bus.” Alcohol was consum e d o n the party bus. A f ter Keetonreturned hom e, he was contacted by the high school’s adm i nistrator and told to r eturn to the

prom . Keeton was then questioned by the adm inistrator and the Biloxi Police D epartm ent about suspected alcohol use. ¶3. Keeton adm i tted that h e s a w o t her students with alcohol in Gatorade b ottles on the party bus. In his s igned statem ent, Keeton adm itted t hat he “drank less than t hree sips” and that h e “just rode here didn’t drink here at a l l , o r on the bus at all except f or three sips.”
Keeton stated that several people drank m ore than the “legal am ount.” Several other students of f ered accounts of

the evening that were sim ilar to Keeton’s account. ¶4. The school district has a policy that prohibits alcohol, and it reads: Any pupil who phy sically possesses, actually possesses, constructively possesses, u s es, consum es, . . . alcohol, beer, or any other intoxicant or liquor

. . . while in school,

. . . during pa r t i c i p a t i o n i n or attendance a t

. . . extracurricular activities,

. . . events,

. . . or other school activities, during travel by the student to and f rom . . . extracurricular a ctivities . . . events, . . . or other school activ i t i e s s hall be disciplined in accordance herewith as f ollows: 1. Any pupi l who shall actually and/or phy sically possess alcohol, beer, liquor or a ny other intoxicant shall be suspended f or up to ten (10) d ay s OSS - Out of S chool Suspens i o n , a nd shall be r ecom m e nded f or expulsion to th e Alternative Education Center f o r a period of not l ess than 45 d ay s of school, with consideration being g iven to the circum stances surroundi n g e ach use, including but not lim ited to the class schedule of

the student. 2. A n y p u p i l who s h all constructively p ossess beer, liquor, or any ot h e r intoxicant shall be suspended f or u p to ten (10) day s and consideration shall be given to the circum s tances surrounding eac h c a s e , including but not lim ited to t he class schedule of the student and the extent of the student' s awareness of the presence of alcohol, beer, liquor or any other intox i c a n t

. Theref

ore, a student m a y be recom m ended f or e xpulsion based upon f

indings of

the school adm inistrators.

2¶5. The school district h as a sim ilar policy f or the use or possession of drugs. However, the punishm ent f

o r the drug p o l i c y is m ore s evere—punishm ent through s u spension f or a period of not less than thirty -six weeks and expulsion. ¶6. The school distric t also has a policy f or “Due Process” and the “ Appeals of Suspensions and Expulsions.” This policy s eparates a student’s due process rights into two categories. ¶7. Class I involves students who are accused of a violation of the drug policy , weapon policy , or who a re accused of violence on school property

. W ith a Cl a s s I v i o l a t i o n, the student has a right to appeal to the school b o a r d, and t he v iolator rem ains expelled or suspended during the appellate process. ¶8. Class II involves students who are “suspended and/or expelled f or any reason other than a violation of the district’s drug policy , weapon’s policy or f or com m itting a violent act

on educational property .” W ith a Class II violation, the student has a right t o appeal f irst to the “ District Discipline C om m ittee” and then t o the s c hool board. Unlike a Class I violator, a Class II violator is allowed to return to school during the appeal. ¶9. Here, the assistant p rincipal recom m ended that Keeton receive a t en-day s uspension and a f o r ty -f ive day expulsion t o the Alternative E ducation Center. Keeton and his parents
p rovided notice of t heir intent to appeal the recom m endation. A lthough Keeton w a s classif ied as a Class I I v iolator, t he school district treated Keeton as a Class I violator during the appellate process. As a result, Keeton was unable to f irst appeal to the “ D i strict Discipline Com m ittee” and was prohibited f r om returning to his norm al classroom setting.

3¶10. On May 13, 2016, the s chool district’s Board o f Trustees heard Keeton’s a ppeal and accepted the assistant principal’s recom m endation. Keeton then appealed the d ecision to the circuit court. Keeton also f iled a m otion f

or injunctive relief and requested t hat his e xpulsion b e p o s tponed during the a ppellate process in accordance with the school district’s policy

. The circuit court d enied the m otion and dism issed Keeton’s appeal as m o ot because Keeton had already graduated f

rom high school. The circuit court determ ined t hat no existing case

or c ontroversy was pending and f o und that “[ s]ince then[ ,] Ke[ e]ton s erved his punishm ent
at the start of the 2016-2017 school y e ar and h as since graduated f rom Ocean S prings High School, m aking the issue m oot.

. . . [ E]ven if the i ssue w ere n ot m oot, the [ c]ourt would have f ound in f avor of the Ocean Springs School District.” It is f rom this judgm ent that Keeton now appeals. S TANDARD OF REVIEW ¶11. “W hen this Court reviews a decision by a chancery or ci r c u i t c o u r t c o n cerning an
agency decision, it a

pplies the sam e standard of r eview t hat the lower courts are bound to f ollow.” Hinds Cty. Sch. D ist. Bd. of Trs. v. R.B. , 10 So. 3d 3 8 7 , 3 9 4 ( ¶ 1 7 ) ( Miss. 2008). “This Court reviews an adm inistrative agency d ecision to determ i ne w hether the decision (1)

was u nsupported by substantial evidence, (2) was arbitrary or capricious, (3) was bey ond the
power of t he adm inistrative agency to m a ke, o r ( 4) v iolated som e statutory or constitutional right of the com plaining party .” Id . at 394-95 (¶17).

ANALYSIS 1. Wh e t her the Ocean Springs S chool District failed to comply w i t h requirements regarding the need to maintain a record o f the h earing

4conducted before the school board.

¶12. In t he f

irst issue, Keeton argues that t he school district f ailed to m ake a r ecord of

the school board hearing. Mississippi R u l e o f A p pellate Procedure 28(c)(7) provides that the appellant’s brief “shall contain t he contention s o f a p p e llant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons f or those contentions, with citations to the a u t h o r ities, s tatutes, and parts of the r ecord relied on.” “[ I]f an appellant f ails to support h[ is] allegation of error with
argum ent or authority , this Court need not consider the i ssue.” Jordan v
. State , 995 So. 2d 94, 103 (¶14) ( M i s s. 2008). Because Keeton f ailed to cite any a

uthority to support this allegation of

error, we decline to consider this issue. 2. W hether Keeton’s d

u e p rocess rights were violated b y t he school district’s f

ailure to follow its own policy in affording Keeton two separate hearings. 3. W hether the circuit court e r r e d a nd applied an erroneous legal standard in finding that Keeton’s due process r ights w ere not violated and that the school district followed its policy. ¶13. W e consolidate issues 2 and 3 because they a d dress sim ilar issues. ¶14. U n der the school board’s policy , K eeton’s v iolation was a Class II viola t i o n . F o r Class II violations, t he student has a right to appeal f irst to the “District D iscipline Com m i t t e e . ” Then, t he student has another right to appeal to the school board. Keeton claim s t he school district’s f ailure to p rovide two separate hearings violated his right to due
process. The school district, however, claim s that Keeton w as af f orded the required m inim al due process. ¶15. In the f

inal judgm ent dated July

18, 2017, the circuit court f ound as f o llows:

5[ Keeton]’s argum ents of due p rocess violation centers around a n O c e a n

Springs S chool District policy that lay s o ut the pr o c e s s f o r a ppealing suspensions and expulsion. This policy separates appeals and suspension into two classes: Class I governs the procedure f or students who a re suspended or expelled f

or violating the d i s trict' s drug p olicies, weapon policies, or com m itting v iolent a cts on education property and C lass II governs any reason that is not governed under Class I. Appellant contends that he should have been classif

ied under Class II and w ould have theref ore b e e n e n t i t led to a hearing bef

ore the District Discipline Com m ittee and that the OSSD’s f ailure to place him in this category and its f ailure to let Keeton have a h earing bef ore the District Discipline Com m ittee is a v iolation of his d ue process rights. This argum ent does not h a ve any m erit as t he consum ption of alcohol would be a violation of Ocean Spring Schoo l District’s d rug policy placing him within Class I. Ocean S prings School District f ollowed a ll of its policies pursuant to Class I, theref

ore, there was no due process violation. ¶16. The circuit court is sim ply incorrect as a m a tter of law in t his f inding. The sch o ol district has a separate “drug” policy and “alcohol” policy

. A Class I violation only involves students t hat are accused of a violation o f the drug policy , w eapon policy , or who are accused of violence on s chool property

. A violation of the “alcohol” policy is not included in Class
I violations. Accordingly , the circuit court erred a s a m atter of l aw w hen it stated that Keeton

was a Class I violator. Despit e t h i s f i nding, the school b oard correctly argues that Keeton received m inim al due process and was not deprived of any substantive right. ¶17. “The f

undam e ntal requi rem ent of due process is the opportunity to be heard a t a

m eaningf ul tim e and in a m eaningf ul m anner.” W

arnick v. Natchez Community Hosp. Inc. , 904 S o. 2d 1019, 1022 (¶14) (Miss. 2004) (internal quotation m ark om itted). “Courts have

never required

. . . that particular procedures b e a dopted in o rder t o satisf y constitutional due process requirem ents.” Miss. Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Geotes , 770 So. 2d 940, 943 (¶13) (Miss. 2 000). “[ D ]ue pr o c e s s i s not a f ixed content unrelated to t im e, place and

6circum stances.” Id. “ [ D]ue process is f lexible and calls f

or such procedural protections as the particular situation d em ands.” Id

. M oreover, “the f orm alities of practice, p rocedure, and evidence are relaxed in all adm i nistrative proceedings . . . .” Id . at (¶14). ¶18. The s uprem e c ourt has clarif ied t he process that is d

u e i n s c h o o l discipline cases. “The standards of procedural due process are n ot wooden absolutes.” R.B. , 1 0 So. 3d at 398 (¶28) (quoting Keough v. T ate Cty. Bd. of

Educ. , 7 48 F.2d 1077, 1 081 (5th Cir.1984)). “The suf f i ciency of procedures e m

ploy ed in any particular situation m ust b e judged in the light of the parties, t he subject m atter and the c ircum stances involved.” R.B. , 10 So. 3d at 398 (¶28)

. “[ N]otice and o p portunity to be heard are m inim a l r equirem e nts of the Due Process Clause.” Id

. a t ( ¶ 2 9 )

. D ue process requires “nothing m ore” than giving the appellant a h earing “to
p r e s ent all relevant evidence” and to a llow the appellant’s claim s t o b e h eard “at a

m eaningf ul tim e and in a m e aningf ul m anner.” W

arnick , 904 So. 2d at 1023 (¶19). ¶19. In R .B. , the a

ppellant argued that “where a s c hool district’s own policy has created a right to m ore than a m inim al am ount of process, f ailure by the school district to provide such additional procedures r esults i n a due process violation.” R .B. , 10 So. 3d at 3 99 (¶32). Yet,

t h e s u p rem e court f

o und that “the procedures im plem ented by t he School Board [ we r e ] suf f i cient where R.B. (1) was apprised of the n ature of the c ha r g e s ; ( 2 ) was g iven a list of potential witnesses; (3) w as inf orm ed of his right to counsel; and (4) was given notice and opportunity to speak on his own behalf and to call any others with relevant inf orm a tion.” Id. at 401 (¶38). ¶20. Here, we f

ind the c ircuit c o u r t e r r e d in its c onclusion that Keeton was a Class I

7violator and was af f orded proper due p rocess. Although the school district f ailed to provide
Keeton his right to an appeal f irst to the “District Discipline C om m ittee,” we f i nd that Keeton

was af f orded m inim al due process through his appeal to t he school board. Thus, we f ind no

m erit to these issues.
4. W hether the circuit court committed manifest error i n d enying the requested injunctive relief. ¶21. On May 18, 2016, the assistant superintendent of t he school d istrict advised Keeton’s

m other that the school board had upheld t he s u spension and f orty

- f ive day expulsion to the Alternative Education Center. Keeton c om m enced the appeal to the circuit court on May 24, 2016. The 2015-2016 academ ic y ear ended on or about May 24, 2016. ¶22. Keeton f

iled a m o t ion f

or injunctive r e l i e f a n d asked the circuit c ourt to stay the school board’s decision to suspend and expel Keeton. The m ovant also asked t h e c ircuit

court to order Keeton’s return to t h e norm a l academ ic curriculum and classroom setting during t he pendency of the appeal. Shortly b ef ore the start o f t he 2016-2017 academ ic y ear, the circuit court denied the m otion f or injunctive r elief

. T he circuit court’s order was dated August 12, 2016, and gave no reason f or the denial of

injunctive relief

. ¶23. As we have discussed a b o v e , t h e circuit court was in error t o d eny the m otion f or injunctive relief

. As a Class II violat o r , based on the school district’s policy , Keeton was entitled to have his suspension and expul s i o n s tay ed d uring the p endency of h is appeal, which included his appeal bef ore the circuit court and bef ore other appellate courts. ¶24. Keeton tim ely f

iled a m otion to alter or a m end the ord e r d e n y i n g the m otion f or i n j u n c t i v e relief

, f o r r econsideration, or f

or a new trial. The circuit court entered an or d e r ,
8dated April 4, 2017, that denied this m otion. Because K eeton’s suspens i o n a n d e x p ulsion

were based upon an alleged Class II violation, Keeton should have b een allowed to return to
t he classroom setting pending the outcom e o f his appeal. The circuit court was in err o r t o classif y K eeton as a Class I violator. Accordingly , Ke e t o n s h ould have been granted injunctive relief

to return to the classroom setting pending the appeal.
5. W hether the circuit court committed manifest error in dismissing the appeal as moot

. ¶25. Ultim ately , the circuit court entered a f i nal judgm ent and f

ound: Since then[ ,] Keeton s erved his p unishm ent at the start of the 2016-20 1 7 school y ear and h as since graduated f rom O cean Springs High School, m aking the issue m oot. Furtherm ore, even if

the issue were not m oot the Court would have f ound in f avor of the Ocean S prings School D istrict. The standard of review f or an adm inistrative agency decision is “ whether the decision (1) was unsupported by substant i a l evidence, (2) was arbitrary or capricious, ( 3) was bey ond the power of the a dm inistrative agency to m ake, or (4) violated som e statutory or constitutional right of the c om p laining party .” [ R.B. , 10 So. 3d a t 395 (¶17)]. The decision of the Ocean Springs School District was supported by the f act school of f icials observed alcohol on the “party bus”, other students[ ’] written statem ents s ay ing t hat Keeton drank t hree s ips, and Keeton adm i tting to drinking o u t of a bottle that contained alcohol. The decision was not a rbitrary or c apricious. It was w ithin the agency ’ s power to m ake and it did not v iolate any statutory or constitutional rights of the com plaint party

. . . . ¶26. The circuit court determ ined that the issue was m oot. In addition , the circuit court

exam ined the school board’s decision and c o ncluded it was s upported by substant ial evidence, was not arbitrary or c apricious, was within the s chool district’s power, and did not violate a statutory

or constitutional right of Keeton. R.B. , 10 So. 3d at 395 (¶17). ¶27. This Court will exam ine the circuit court’s substantive decision and not the decision

9to deny

the appeal on the grounds that it was m oot. ¶28. The school board’s d e c i s i o n was based on substantial evidence. A school of f icial observed alcoholic beverage containers on the party bus that K eeton adm itte d h e u sed to travel to t he prom . Further, Keeton adm itted that he consum e d three sips f r om the alcoholic beverage c ont a i n e r s o n the party bus on the way to t he prom . Keeton said “I w ill adm it I drank l ess than three sips

. . . . People t hat w ere on there drank m ore than the l egal am ount. I

. . . didn’t drink

. . . except f or 3 sips.” There was substantial evidence that Keeton ref erred to the consum

ption of alcoholic beverages in his adm i ssion. ¶29. In R .B. , the student was suspended f or p ossession of a knif

e and drugs. I

d. a t 390-91 (¶2). There was a dispute about whether the instrum ent was a knif e or nail f ile. Id

. at 396 (¶21). The suprem e court reversed this Court and ruled: The Court of Appeals judges

. . . viewed the a ctual instrum ent and determ i ned that the device w as not a knif e, but an unaltered nail f

ile

. . . . However, f

rom the record and the applicable law, it is obvious that the plurality , contrary to the f a ctual f indings of t he School Board, substituted its o wn judgm ent f or t hat of the S chool B oard. This Court respectf u lly disagrees with t he plurality ' s f indings as to the s e i z e d weapon. The r ecord r eveals that there exists a rea s o n a b l e basis to conclude that the object i n question was a knif e, as categorized by

Principal Cam

pbell and the school resource of f icer present at the tim e the instrum e nt was conf iscated. Id

. The suprem e c ourt concluded that the s chool board’s decision was based o n s u bstantial evidence consisting of

“the Appeals Com m ittee’s r ecom m endation; the descriptions of the object by the p r i n c i p a l , school resource of f icer, and s uperintendent; a photocopy of the object; D.L.B.’s o ral argum ents and written statem ent on behalf of R

. B .; a nd the instrum ent that D.L.B. presented t o the Scho ol Board during the hearing and d escribed as identical to

1 0the one conf iscated f rom R.B.” Id. at (¶22). ¶30. In a ddition, the student “ adm itted that h e considered this device a ‘knif e’—describing it as his ‘slicer’ t hat he used f or cutting boxe s.” Id. at 396-97 (¶23). In u pholding the discipline, the suprem e court concluded that: the role of this Court is lim i t e d t o determ ining whether there exists a reasonable basis f

o r school of

f icials to f ind that it could potentially cause harm to other students. T h e dissent would have us ignore our r ole and substitute the judgm ent of t his Court f or that of the Schoo l B o a r d; however, where a reasonable f

a ctual basis f

or the charge exists, the S chool Board was within its discretion to strictly apply a nd construe its own policies as to what constituted a weapon and what punishm ent was appropriate. Id. at 397 (¶24). The s uprem e court ultim ately held that “[ w]hile it is true that t here are m any punishm ents that would seem less harsh or m o re appropriate in t his case, we m ust r ecognize that the law com m its this entire m atter to the discretion of the school board.” Id. ¶31. Here, Keeton’s o wn adm i ssion coupled with t he assistant principal f inding th e a l c ohol containers on the bus and f ellow students’ statem ents t hat every one was drinking provides f ar m ore evidence. W hen we consider t he ultim ate decision of the c ircuit court, we f ind that there was substantial evidence t o support the s chool board’s decision, the decision was not arbitrary or c a pricious, it was within the s c hool district’s power, and it did not violate Keeton’s statutory

or constitutional rights. ¶32. AFFIRMED.
B A R N E S A N D C A R L T O N, P.JJ., G REENLEE, TINDELL A ND LAWRENCE, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, J., C O N C U R S IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED B Y GREENLEE, J.; TINDELL, J., JOINS IN PART. WESTBROOKS, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McCARTY, J., C ONCURS IN P A R T A N D D I S S E N T S I N P A R T WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, J OINED

1 1BY WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ.

WILSON, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND IN THE RESULT: ¶33. I concur in the result reached by the m ajority

but f or som ewhat dif

f erent reasons. ¶34. An appeal f

rom a school b oard’s disciplinary d e c i s ion “ shall be taken in the sam e

m anner as appeals are taken f rom judgm ents or decisions of t he board o f supervisors as provided in Section 11-51-75” o f the Mississippi C ode. Miss. Code Ann. § 37-7-115 (Rev. 2014); see M.L.R. v. Pontotoc City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. , 46 So. 3 d 874, 877 ( ¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). Wh e n K e e t o n f iled his appeal in this case, section 11-51-75 p rovided f or an appeal by “a bill of exceptions.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-75 ( Rev. 2012). 1 I n such an

a p p e al, “the aggrieved party ”—i.e., the appellant—has t he “duty to prepare the b i l l o f exceptions,” Pruitt v. Zoning Bd. of Laurel , 5 So. 3d 464, 469 (¶15) (Miss. C t. App. 2008), and “the responsibility to ensure that all relevant m aterial [ i s] included i n the bill of exceptions.” Brinsmade v. City of Biloxi , 70 So. 3d 1159, 1165 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). ¶35. The aggrieved party ’ s duty to prepare a s u f f i c i e n t b i l l o f exceptions is im portant because “[ i]t is well settled that the bill of exceptions constitutes the record o n appeal . . . , and the c i rcuit c ourt m

ust not consider m atters that are not a part of that record.” Id. Theref ore, it is equally “clear that f ailing to em

body a s u f

f i c i ent record in the bill of exceptions c an be f

atal to the attem

pted appeal.” Allen , 242 So. 3d at 21 (¶49). “[ S]uch has been the case since the f

irst d ay s o f our State.” Id. “If the bill of exceptions is not com plete

1 S ectio n 1 1 -5 1 -7 5 w as a m en d e d af ter K eeto n f

iled h i s ap p eal. S

ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 1 1

- 5 1 -7 5 ( S u p p . 2 0 1 8 ); 2 0 1 8 M iss. L aw s ch

. 4 4 8

. T h o se am en d m en ts h av e n o ef f ect o n K e eto n ’s ap p eal. 2 0 1 8 M iss. L aw s ch

. 4 4 8 , § 2

. F o r a h i sto ry an d d iscu ssio n o f ap p eals b y b ill o f ex cep tio n s, see C ity o f Ja ckso n v. A llen , 2 4 2 S o . 3 d 8 , 1 4

- 2 6 (¶¶2 4 -6 6 ) (M iss. 2 0 1 8 ).

1 2and i s f

atally def e ctive in that pertinent a nd im portant f acts and docum ents are om itted theref rom , then the [ c ircuit] c ourt does not have a record upon w hich it can intelligently act.”
Pruit t , 5 So. 3d at 469 (¶14) (qu o t i n g Hollywood Cemetery Ass’n v. Bd. of Mayor & Selectmen of McComb , 7 60 So. 2d 715, 719 (¶16) ( M i s s . 2 0 0 0)). If the bill of e xceptions does not set our f

acts suf f i cient to support the aggrieved party ’ s claim s o f error, then the board’s decision m

u st be af f irm ed. Id. at (¶¶15-16). ¶36. The b ill of exceptions f iled in this case provides a l mo s t n o i n f o rm ation about the hearing bef

ore the school board o r t h e e v i dence presented to the board. Thus, the bill of exceptions “could not possibly provide a ll of the f acts n ecessary t o establish [ Keeton’s] claim of error.” Id. at (¶16). This f ailure is “f

atal to the attem

pted appeal.” Allen , 242 So. 3d at 21 (¶49). Theref

o re, I agree that the school board’s decision should be af f irm ed. GREENLEE, J., J OINS THIS OPINIO N . T I NDELL, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART. McCARTY, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: ¶37. W h ile he w as in 11th grade, a teenager adm i tted h e d r a n k t h r e e s i p s o f s p i k e d Gatorade on a b us heading to prom . The m a j o r i t y concludes the circuit c ourt erred as a

m atter of law when it ruled that the child was a Class I violator. The m ajority also concludes that the child should have been granted injunctive relief to return to class during the pendency of his appeal. I concur with both conclusions. Yet because these conclusions do not lead to reversal, I m

ust respectf

ully dissent in part. ¶38. U n d e r o u r s t a n d a r d o f review, when a decision “was bey ond the pow e r o f t h e adm inistrative agency to m ake,” it m ust be reversed. H

inds Cty. Sch. D ist. Bd. of T rs. v. R.B.

1 3ex rel. D.L.B. , 10 So. 3 d 387, 3 95 (¶17) (M i s s . 2 008). If the school cannot be t rusted to

f o l l o w t he rules, i t seem s perverse to not only f orce a child to observe them , b ut to p u n i s h him f or a rule he did not break. T h e s c h o o l did that which it could n ot do u nder its own rules, and this requires reversal. ¶39. I likewise agree the issue is not m o ot. The child and his f am ily still s uf f er the harm of t he expulsion, which cannot b e cured a t this point, as it has already been s erved. Counsel f or the f am ily points out that it rem ains upon the records of the school. Theref

o re the case
cannot be m oot because it could v isit a “ practical benef it to the p laintif

f o r detrim ent to the def endant.” In re Validation of Tax Anticipation Note, Series 2014 , 1 87 So. 3d 1025, 1032 (¶17) (Miss. 2016) (internal quotation m ark om itted). ¶40. A s t o t h e f

i r s t i s s u e raised by the child and his f am ily

– that t he school f ailed t o produce a record of the proceedings – the m ajority concludes t hat t he issue w as waived f or f ailure to p rovide argum ent o f authority in support. From t he f ace of t he f

am ily ’s b rief

, this is sim ply incorrect. Our Rules require t h a t a n “ a r gum ent shall contain the contentions of appellant with respect to t he issues presented, and the reasons f o r t hose c ontentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts o f the record r elied upon .” M.R.A.P. 28(a)(7) (em phasis added). ¶41. In its brief

, the f am ily argues that “[ t]he district, by and through its p resident, executed

a B i l l o f Exceptions a nd f iled the sam e in this cause,” a nd “represented in the Bi l l o f Exceptions that a c om

plete record of the p roceedings bef ore the Board of Trustees would be presented to the [ circuit] court.” The f am ily then cites to two sections of the record bef ore

1 4t h i s C o u r t

. Although the Bill was d raf ted by counsel f

or t he f a m ily , it does carry t h e signature of

the President of

the Board of

Trustees. This argum ent satisf ies Rule 28. ¶42. The f

am ily ’s argum ent can be f urther d istinguished f

r om t he case relied upon by the

m ajority , where a def

endant’s “appellate counsel cites no authority , n o r d o es he d irect the Court to any objection by def ense c ounsel at trial or ruling of the t rial c ou r t t h at would constitute reversible error,” a nd the Court r u led that “[ t]he issue i s com pletely devoid of any

s p ecif ic a llegation o f e rror by [ the def endant].” J

ordan v. State , 995 So. 2d 9 4 , 1 0 3 ( ¶ 1 4 ) (Miss. 2 008). In this case, the f am ily repeatedly urged that the f ailure to tender a record of the proceedings dam aged the ability o f a n y reviewing court to d eterm ine what happened below. I would f

ind the issue was not waived. ¶43. Further, we know that the record is critical since this is the review of an a dm inistrative decision, which m

u st be b a sed solely upon t he record. See R.B. , 10 So. 3d at 394 (“where the Suprem e C o u r t cautioned that “appellate review of this a d m inistrative decision should

not h a v e g one bey ond the record”). A record i s a lway s im portant in an a

ppeal, but is the lif eblood of an a d mi n i s trative a ppeal. Many a

ppeals, such as R .B. , turn on whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious. I d

. at 394-96. W ithout a record , such an appeal is im p ossible. Again, I would not f ind this issue waived beca u s e s i n c e i t i s so critical to reviewing an appeal of

this nature. ¶44. For these reasons, I concur in part and respectf ully dissent in part. WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

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