alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Case No. 13,534.

#### STRIDER v. KING et al.

[3 Cranch, C. C. 67.] 1

Circuit Court, District of Columbia.

1826.

Vendor and Purchaser — Vendor’s Lien — Legal Estate — Separate Securitt.

A purchaser of land, who had paid a large part of the purchase-money, and had only a right to call for the legal estate upon payment of the balance, sold it to the first vendor for a *235less price, and took his bonds with surety for ■the amount due. The land was afterwards -sold by a trustee under a decree of this court -upon a bill filed by the creditors of the first ■vendor showing a deficiency of personal assets: *Held,*that the first vendee, who had thus resold -the land, had no lien upon it as against credit-ors, for the balance due to him upon such re-sale; because he never had the legal estate; and because he had taken a separate security.

[Disapproved in Johns v. Sewell, 33 Ind. 3.]

This was a bill in equity to charge the land, •or rather the proceeds of the sale of the land, in the hands of a trustee who had sold it under a decree of this court on a bill filed by creditors of the late George King, to charge the Teal estate, for the deficiency of personal assets for the payment of his debts. Mr. George King sold the land to Mr. Strider, the complainant, who paid $3,600 out of $5,000, which ■was the whole price of the land, and would Thave had a right to call for the legal estate upon payment of the balance. Mr. Strider, not Ibaving obtained the legal estate, resold the land to Mr. King at a less price, and took his honds with Mr. Boone as his surety, for the amount due upon this resale. Strider filed his "bill against Charles King, the administrator, -the heirs, and the creditors of George King, •who had obtained the decree for the sale of ■the land to pay the debts of George King, ■claiming a lien on the land, and priority of ■payment out of the proceeds of the sale made hy the trustee under the decree.

Mr. Marbury, for complainant

C. Cox and K. P. Dunlop, for defendants.

CRANCH, Chief Judge.

I think the complainant has no lien on the money in the hands -of the trustee, because, 1. The complainant uever had the legal estate; he had only a Tight to call for it upon payment of the bal-ranee of the purchase-money; and when he .agreed to rescind that contract he lost that Tight. 2. Because he took a separate security, namely, the bond of Mr. Boone.

The other judges concurred.
From: denise.kathryn@gmail.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 9:34:26 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Denise Felix

Alameda, CA 94501
From: ah64d1@charter.net

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 9:12:23 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Steven Johnson

Clarksville, TN 37042
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DETENTION ORDER 15.13

18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) Rev. 1/91

PAGE 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. 

JOHN TYRONE GUEST,

Defendant.

_____________________________________

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Case No. 05-462M

DETENTION ORDER 

Offenses charged: 

Count 1: Discharge of a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime in

violation of U.S.C. § 924(C)(1)(a)(iii).

Count 2. Felon in possession of a firearm, armed career criminal, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).

Date of Detention Hearing: October 5, 2005.

The Court, having conducted a detention hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), and

based upon the factual findings and statement of reasons for detention hereafter set forth, finds

the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DETENTION

(1) The Pretrial Services Report reflects that defendant has previous multiple assault

arrests.

(2) A criminal background records check shows that defendant has failed to appear

Case 2:05-mj-00462-MAT Document 11 Filed 10/05/05 Page 1 of 2
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DETENTION ORDER 15.13

18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) Rev. 1/91

PAGE 2

before a court as required on several occasions.

(3) Defendants contacts with the Western District of Washington are minimal.

(4) Defendant is facing a potential 25-year minimum sentence if convicted.

(5) Defendant is associated with one alias name, three dates of birth, and two social

security numbers.

(6) Because of defendant’s criminal history and nature of the current charge, there

appear to be no conditions or combination of conditions that will reasonably assure the

defendant’s appearance at future Court hearings and that will address the danger to other

persons or the community.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) Defendant shall be detained pending trial and committed to the custody of the

Attorney General for confinement in a correction facility separate, to the extent

practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody

pending appeal;

(2) Defendant shall be afforded reasonable opportunity for private consultation with

counsel;

(3) On order of a court of the United States or on request of an attorney for the

government, the person in charge of the corrections facility in which defendant

is confined shall deliver the defendant to a United States Marshal for the purpose

of an appearance in connection with a court proceeding; and

(4) The Clerk shall direct copies of this Order to counsel for the United States, to

counsel for the defendant, to the United States Marshal, and to the United States

Pretrial Services Officer.

DATED this 6th day of October, 2005.AJAMES P. DONOHUE

United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 2:05-mj-00462-MAT Document 11 Filed 10/05/05 Page 2 of 2
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP - 1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 

AT SEATTLE 

RICHARD ROY SCOTT, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

JOHN HAMILL, 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 3:05-mc-5029-RSM 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP 

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Richard Roy Scott’s Application to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Dkt. #157. Plaintiff has been previously declared a “vexatious

litigant” and is “prohibited from proceeding in forma pauperis in any future action in the 

United States District Court for the Western District of Washington... unless the Court 

determines that he is in imminent danger of death or serious injury.” Scott v. Weinberg, Case 

No. 3:06-cv-05172-FDB, Dkt. #95. 

Upon review of Plaintiff’s current proposed complaint, the Court determines that he is 

not in imminent danger of death or serious injury and will deny his request for IFP status. 

Plaintiff’s attached proposed complaint raises a variety of issues related to the medical 

care he has received from Dr. John Hamill, the Director of Medical Services at the Special 

Commitment Center where Plaintiff is housed. Dkt. #157-2 at 2. Each issue presents some 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP - 2

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grievance or potential injury incurred by Plaintiff, but none indicate an imminent danger of 

death or serious injury. For example, Plaintiff pleads that Dr. Hamill “indicated a need for a cat 

scan” due to “shortest [sic] of breath,” in 2016, but no cat scan has occurred. Id. Even if true, 

this is insufficient to conclude that Plaintiff is facing an imminent danger of death or serious 

injury because shortness of breath can be a symptom of non-serious injuries and because a year 

has passed without apparent incident. Plaintiff complains that an “off island trip” has not 

occurred due to his medical condition. Id. at 3. Not being able to make an off island trip is not 

a life and death situation. Plaintiff further complains of having his diet changed and not having 

medical tests rescheduled. These may be inconveniences to Plaintiff, but they do not indicate 

imminent risk of death or serious injury. 

Pursuant to the bar order above, Plaintiff is not entitled to IFP status to prosecute his 

claims. If he wishes to proceed, he must pay the required filing fee for his complaint. 

Accordingly, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS that Plaintiff Richard Roy Scott’s 

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Dkt. #157, is DENIED. The clerk is directed to 

provide a copy of this order to Plaintiff. 

DATED this 4 day of October, 2017. 

A 

RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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ORDER

PAGE - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

NATHAN LORING,

Petitioner, 

v.

ALICE PAYNE,

Respondent.

____________________________________

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Case No. C05-1599-JLR-JPD

ORDER

Petitioner Nathan Loring, an inmate at the McNeil Island Corrections Center in

Steilacoom, Washington, has filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

Dkt. No. 4. By orders dated May 15, 2006 (Dkt. No. 17) and October 30, 2006 (Dkt. No. 20),

this Court stayed petitioner’s § 2254 petition and ordered that it be held in abeyance, enabling

petitioner to make every effort to properly exhaust his claims in state court. The present matter

comes before the Court on petitioner’s “Motion for Supplemental Response and Memorandum

of Law by Petitioner to Respondent’s Answer.” Dkt. No. 22. It appears that petitioner has

presented his previously unexhausted claims to the Washington Supreme Court. See Dkt. No.

22 at 3-10. However, because the Washington appellate courts have yet to rule on the matter,

this Court ORDERS as follows:

(1) The Court does not rule on petitioner’s “Motion for Supplemental Response and

Memorandum of Law by Petitioner to Respondent’s Answer” (Dkt. No. 22). While the Court

Case 2:05-cv-01599-RAJ Document 24 Filed 01/19/07 Page 1 of 2
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ORDER

PAGE - 2

intends to provide petitioner with the opportunity to file the response he speaks of, it is

premature to do so at this time. Instead, petitioner is ORDERED to advise the Court of the

Washington Supreme Court’s ruling on his motion for discretionary review within fifteen (15)

days of that ruling. At such time, the Court will set a expedited briefing schedule in this matter. 

(2) The Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the parties and to the

Honorable James L. Robart.

DATED this 19th day of January, 2007.

AJAMES P. DONOHUE

United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 2:05-cv-01599-RAJ Document 24 Filed 01/19/07 Page 2 of 2
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Osteotech, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Mark H. Burroughs,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
to my knowledge:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.


                                        /s/ Mark H. Burroughs
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Mark H. Burroughs
                                        Chief Financial Officer
                                        May 10, 2006
**Exhibit 13.2**

** **

** **

** **

** **

**Certification of Principal Executive Officer and Principal FinancialOfficer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, I, Kevin Barnes, the Chief Financial Officer of POET Technologies Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certify,that, to my knowledge:

 

1.The Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended 2015 (the "Report") ofthe Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

The foregoing certification is provided solely for purposes of complying with the provisionsof Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is not intended to be used or relied upon for any other purpose.

 

 

Date: March 18, 2016

 

 

 

 

/s/ Kevin Barnes

_____________________

 

Name: Kevin Barnes

 

Title: Chief Financial Officer
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26 ORDER - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

GEORGE C. SWINYER, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

BALINDA COLE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. C05-5610FDB

ORDER DENYING OBJECTIONS

A Report and Recommendation [Dkt. # 28] in this case was filed on April 25, 2006 to which

Plaintiff filed a timely objection [Dkt. # 31] on May 2, 2006. The Court adopted the R&R on June

8, 2006 [Dkt. # 33]. Plaintiff filed another objection to The R&R on June 14, 2006 [Dkt. # 40]. 

Plaintiff’s objection to the Report and Recommendation [Dkt. # 28] are unavailing, and the Order

adopting the Report and Recommendation [Dkt. # 33] stands. 

IT IS ORDERED: Plaintiff’s objections [Dkt. # 40] are out of order and are overruled. 

DATED this 18th day of July, 2006.

AFRANKLIN D. BURGESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-05610-FDB Document 43 Filed 07/19/06 Page 1 of 1
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ORDER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

_________________________________ )

RICHARD ROY SCOTT, ) No. MC05-5029

)

Plaintiff, ) 

v. ) ORDER

)

KELLY CUNNINGHAM, et al., )

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Defendant. )

_________________________________ )

This matter comes before the Court on Richard Roy Scott’s “Motion for Some

Clarification Dk # 68 Order” (Dkt. # 73) and “Motion for Clarification Dk # 68” (Dkt. # 77). 

As stated in this Court’s “Order” (Dkt. # 54) and “Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration

and Directing Clerk to Provide Copy of Complaint” (Dkt. # 68), plaintiff is unable to verify

“under penalty of perjury that none of the issues raised in the proposed complaint have been

litigated in the past by the plaintiff” (April 5, 2005 Order Adopting Report and Recommendation

at 24). Plaintiff has already filed a complaint asserting constitutional and tort claims arising out

of the February 2006 confiscation of his computer. The proposed complaint (Dkt. # 50), which

seeks to litigation those same claims against a different group of defendants, has therefore been

rejected. 

Case 3:05-mc-05029-MJP Document 83 Filed 07/25/06 Page 1 of 2
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ORDER -2-

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order, along with a copy of

Dkt. # 50, 54, 68, 73, and 77, to plaintiff.

DATED this 25th day of July, 2006.

A

Robert S. Lasnik,

Chief Judge, United States District Court 

Case 3:05-mc-05029-MJP Document 83 Filed 07/25/06 Page 2 of 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
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<CASH>                                             182
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   19,775
<ALLOWANCES>                                       655
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                19,700
<PP&E>                                          17,374
<DEPRECIATION>                                  10,930
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  27,826
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</TABLE>
----

|   | 1. | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | To      my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in      all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations      of the Corporation as of and for the period covered by the      Report. |
|--------|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:  | March 24, 2010 | By:    | /s/  Scott      E. Lied  |
|--------|----------------|--------|-----------------------------------------|
|   |           |   | Scott      E. Lied, CPA                 |
|   |           |   | Treasurer                               |
|   |           |   | (Principal      Financial Officer)      |

----
#### Enrico & Sons Contracting, Inc., Respondent, v Bridgemarket Associates et al., Appellants.

[633 NYS2d 134]

—Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Louis York, J.), entered March 9,1995 and March 20,1995, respectively, which granted defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s complaint unless plaintiff served answers to certain interrogatories within 20 days and granted plaintiff’s motion to restore the action to the trial calendar on condition that plaintiff pay defendant $750 within 10 days, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The evidence of the communications between the parties’ attorneys approximately four months before the case was automatically dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404, and of efforts by both sides to complete disclosure both before and after the automatic dismissal, satisfactorily demonstrates that plaintiff did not intend to abandon the action. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Kupferman and Williams, JJ.