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95–333 PDF 2015

WANTED: FOREIGN FIGHTERS—THE 

ESCALATING THREAT OF ISIL 

IN CENTRAL ASIA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 10, 2015 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

[CSCE 114–1–4] 

( 

Available via http://www.csce.gov 
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

HOUSE SENATE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Chairman 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, 

Co-Chairman 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Vacant, Department of State 

Vacant, Department of Commerce 

Vacant, Department of Defense 

[II] 
WANTED: FOREIGN FIGHTERS—THE 

ESCALATING THREAT OF ISIL 

IN CENTRAL ASIA 

JUNE 10, 2015 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 1 

Hon. Joe Pitts, Commissioner, Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe ............................................................ 2 

Hon. Steve Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 3 

Hon. Randy Hultgren, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 13 

WITNESSES 

Daniel N. Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Asia, U.S. Department of State ....................................... 4 

Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President and Director, 

Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, The George 

Washington University ........................................................... 18 

Jennifer Leonard, Deputy Director, International Crisis 

Group ........................................................................................ 20 

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith ................. 32 

Prepared statement of Hon. Roger F. Wicker ........................... 33 

Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin .................... 34 

Prepared statement of Daniel N. Rosenblum ........................... 35 

Prepared statement of Frank J. Cilluffo ................................... 40 

Prepared statement of Jennifer Leonard .................................. 47 

[III] 

(1) 

WANTED: FOREIGN FIGHTERS—THE 

ESCALATING THREAT OF ISIL 

IN CENTRAL ASIA 

June 10, 2015 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC 

The hearing was held at 2:33 p.m. in room 2175, Rayburn House 

Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Christopher H. Smith, 

Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 

presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Joe Pitts, 

Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; 

Hon. Steve Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. Randy Hultgren, Commissioner, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: Daniel N. Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Asia, U.S. Department of State; Frank J. 

Cilluffo, Associate Vice President and Director, Center for Cyber 

and Homeland Security, The George Washington University; and 

Jennifer Leonard, Deputy Director, International Crisis Group. 

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. SMITH. The Commission will come to order. And first of all, 

let me apologize for convening the Commission hearing late. We 

did have a series of votes, so again I apologize to our witnesses and 

to all of you for that lateness. 

I want to express a very hearty welcome to our witnesses and to 

everyone joining us this afternoon for this hearing on foreign fighters and the escalating threat of ISIS in Central Asia. A year ago 

today the city of Mosul fell to the Islamic State of Iraq in Syria, 

or ISIS, during a wave of violence that swept brutally through 

northern Iraq. Many of those who took part in the offensive were 

foreign fighters. 

In fact, the United Nations Security Council recently estimated 

that there are now at least 25,000 foreign terrorist fighters from 

more than 100 countries who have traveled internationally to join 

or fight for terrorist entities associated with ISIS and al-Qaida. According to the international crisis group, as many as 4,000 foreign 

fighters came from the five countries in Central Asia. Just last 

week, we learned that the chief of Tajikistan’s counterterrorism 
2 

program—someone highly trained by the United States government—abandoned his post to join ISIS. 

What does this say about the current efforts to stop terrorminded men and women from volunteering and traveling to the 

Middle East? Clearly our government, working with others and 

with organizations like the OSCE, must take stronger action to 

combat radicalization beyond our borders, as well as to ensure that 

returning foreign fighters do not bring jihad and murder back 

home. Central Asian governments face major challenges here. 

Many of these derive from their history as part of the Soviet Union, 

from wars in nearby Afghanistan, and from limited economic development which has led millions of their citizens to seek employment 

abroad, especially in Russia. 

The discrimination and exploitation to which these workers are 

subjected, as well as the decline in the Russian economy and 

changes in the Russian visa regime, have reduced the remittances 

these workers can send home to support their families, and may 

have contributed to creating conditions that ISIS uses to recruit 

foreign fighters from among different Central Asian nationalities. 

Some of the challenges the Central Asia governments face are of 

their own making, including widespread corruption, lack of the rule 

of law and their own human rights records. Turkmenistan and 

Uzbekistan have particularly terrible human rights records, among 

the worst in the world with respect to political prisoners and the 

use of torture. All of these factors are exploited by ISIS recruiters 

and other organizations promoting radicalization and violent extremism. 

It should be the particular role of the U.S. to promote to the Central Asian governments our conviction that fighting terrorism is no 

excuse for violating human rights or the rule of law. I look forward 

to hearing about many of the issues here, including counteracting 

radicalization of potential foreign fighters, inhibiting the travel of 

recruits and volunteers to the Middle East, disrupting financial 

support to fighters and their families and preventing their return 

to their home countries. 

This is in the first place the responsibility of the governments. 

And there is the question of what they are trying to do and how 

well they are doing it. There is a question of what our government 

and the OSCE is doing, and perhaps can do better, working with 

Central Asian governments. Here we need to talk about issues of 

document security, border security and law enforcement coordination. And I hope we can touch, during this hearing with our very 

distinguished witnesses, on all of these very pertinent issues and 

others. 

I’d like to yield to Mr. Pitts—Commissioner Pitts for any opening 

comments he has. 

HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this 

important hearing. 

And I’d also like to thank Mr. Rosenblum and the rest of our 

panelists for testifying here today. 
3 

The Islamic State, or ISIS, poses a direct and substantial threat 

to U.S. interest and security, as well as the security of the Middle 

East. Just a few months back, Islamic States spokespeople threatened to spread its brutality outward across the Mediterranean to 

Rome, one of the focal points of Western civilization. As the United 

States Government seeks to contain and even degrade and destroy 

the Islamic State, the contribution that foreign fighters offer inwardly to the terrorist organization is of vast significance. 

It has been estimated that more than 20,000 foreign fighters 

from possibly up to 90 countries have traveled to Syria to take up 

arms since the Arab Spring. And this includes approximately 180 

of our own citizens. The concern voiced by the State Department 

and other observers and analysts on this issue is very disturbing. 

One State Department official characterized it as formidable—an 

enormous threat. 

To put it simply, the United States Government and its allies, 

and indeed all of those combating the Islamic State, cannot hope 

to destroy the terrorist organization without substantially cutting 

off or mitigating the number of foreign fighters that fill its ranks. 

As noted by many observers, the amount of foreign fighters stemming from Central Asia amounts to only a small fraction of the 

thousands of foreign Islamic State fighters. However, the region’s 

significance in addressing the problem may prove to be pivotal. 

While we haven’t necessarily seen the amount of fighters originating from Central Asia as those from Europe, the potential for 

extremists to change this dynamic is great. I am encouraged by 

some of the actions from governments in the region, including attempts to punish participation with the terrorist group with penal 

codes. I believe the United States Government must do more, both 

in the short term and long term, to address this threat. 

I’ve been in discussion with officials from the Republic of 

Kazakhstan, for instance, on the need to increase economic opportunities in the region through greater leverage of the use of trade 

and power of American competitiveness and markets. As WE observe this issue, it is my hope that we can find policy tools that 

can obstruct the flow of foreign fighters, but also give the people 

of this region greater exposure to freedoms, prosperity and, ultimately, spiritual identities that don’t lead them to join the cult of 

death that the Islamic States represents. 

Again, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Commissioner Pitts. 

Commissioner Cohen. 

HON. STEVE COHEN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And I’m just looking forward to your testimony, although I think 

I’ve read it. I understand—you say recruiters employ a variety of 

narratives to attract adherents with the idea of a just war and defense of innocents, an Islamic caliphate as a utopia, and the opportunity to fight back against Western oppression. I think all those 

things are accurate and I can’t question what you’re saying here. 

But I was at a conference recently on Middle East. And a fellow 

from Middle East suggested that a lot of the attraction was young 
4 

people not having opportunities at home and not having opportunities to have—he got pretty basic in terms of relationships and no 

opportunity to have a job and to be able to afford to get married 

and not having too much of an opportunity to have partners of the 

opposite sex, and that they made him kind of like a football player 

in America, or a rock star, and gave him some kind of special panache. 

And I wondered what you thought about that theory. This was 

a Saudi who has been on boards X, Y and Z and pretty wired in. 

And this was his theory what attracted them, and that there’s not 

much other opportunity for young males in those countries to do 

much, because no jobs, no money, no wife, nothing else going on. 

They don’t have rock stars. They don’t have—I guess they got a few 

soccer players, but they don’t have LeBron and they don’t have 

Tom Brady and whatever. I’m just curious what you thought about 

that theory. 

And the other thing is social media, how we can use social media 

better to try to give them a different perspective of maybe what 

they should be doing with their lives, and to try to counterbalance 

the whole idea of jihadist suicide. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

I’d like to now welcome our very distinguished witness from the 

administration, Mr. Daniel Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for the Department of State’s Bureau of South and Central Asia. 

Before his appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary, Mr. 

Rosenblum served 17 years in the State Department’s Office of the 

Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe, Eurasia and Central 

Asia, including 6 as coordinator. 

He was instrumental in designing and implementing large packages of assistance for Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan following 

internal upheavals and for Kosovo, following its declaration of independence. Before coming to the State Department, Mr. Rosenblum 

spent six years as senior program coordinator at the Free Trade 

Union Institute, FTUI, of the AFL-CIO. And without objection, 

your full re ́sume ́ will be made a part of the record. 

But finally, Mr. Rosenblum has a B.A. in history from Yale and 

an M.A. in Soviet studies and international economics from Johns 

Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Welcome, the 

floor is yours. 

DANIEL N. ROSENBLUM, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 

CENTRAL ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

members of the Commission who are here. Thank you for inviting 

me to testify today. I’d like to give some brief remarks and I ask 

that my full written statement be entered into the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. Mr. Chairman, disrupting the flow of foreign 

fighters to Syria and Iraq is a top priority for the U.S. Government. 

The United States is working with governments in Central Asia 

and with multilateral organizations who are operating in the region—including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, which I know is of special interest to this Commission— 
5 

in ways that parallel the work we do with partners around the 

world. 

Together with our international partners, we’re committing significant resources to track and disrupt foreign terrorist fighter 

travel and recruitment. We’re working together on information 

sharing and border security, legal reform and criminal justice responses, and countering violent extremism to prevent recruitment 

and radicalization to violence. And we’re encouraging our key partners, including in Central Asia, to prioritize this threat. 

While there are no reliable statistics, research suggests that the 

vast majority of Central Asia fighters in Syria and Iraq are recruited while outside their own countries, mostly while in Russia, 

where millions of them live as migrant workers. They are without 

the family, community and religious leaders that back home would 

all work to mitigate recruitment and radicalization. Furthermore, 

many Central Asians working in Russia are marginalized and experience discrimination and harassment. 

This combination of factors creates fertile ground for extremist 

recruiters. The recruiters then employ a variety of narratives and 

methods, especially using social media, to attempt to attract adherents and radicalize recruits to violence. Similar tactics are used to 

attract the individuals who travel directly from Central Asia. The 

new recruits join not only ISIL, but other terrorist organizations as 

well, such as the al-Nusra Front. 

Given the complex interplay of factors, there is no one-size-fitsall approach to counter this phenomenon, but one key long-term effort we are engaged in is to improve economic prospects to allow 

Central Asians to find employment at home, where radicalization 

to violence is less likely to take place than among migrant worker 

communities in Russia. We’ve also begun to engage the governments and people of Central Asia on how they can disrupt recruiting, prevent radicalization, hinder financing, prevent travel of recruits and also engage civil society and counter false narratives. 

Let me turn for a moment from the conflict in Syria and Iraq to 

briefly address recent media reports on the presence of ISIL in Afghanistan, which borders three of the Central Asian countries. We 

have seen signs that ISIL is attempting to spread into Afghanistan, 

and that some Taliban groups have rebranded themselves as ISIL 

to attract funding and recruits. But ISIL’s presence in Afghanistan 

is still a relatively new phenomenon and it will take time to evaluate its long-term prospects. 

Let me now talk more specifically about some of the efforts we’re 

undertaking at the global, the regional, and the national levels. 

Through the global coalition to counter ISIL, which we’ve been encouraging our partners in Central Asia to join, our key efforts include disrupting the flow of foreign fighters and countering the 

messaging of violent extremists. Counter-messaging is a critical 

element because so much of the radicalization of recruiting happens through social media. 

Also, on the global level, President Obama chaired the U.N. Security Council session last fall that adopted Resolution 2178, which 

requires countries to take a range of steps to address the threat of 

foreign terrorist fighters and calls for improved international cooperation. This resolution resonated in Central Asia, and in August 
6 

the OSCE will hold a regional workshop in Kazakhstan on its implementation. Then in February of this year, the White House convened a summit on countering violent extremism that brought together governments, international organizations, civil society 

groups and the private sector to develop a comprehensive CVE action agenda—that’s countering violent extremism, CVE. 

Regionally, we’re supporting a CVE summit that the government 

of Kazakhstan will host in Astana at the end of this month to follow on the White House meeting. The Astana summit will focus on 

eight priority areas, ranging from assessing the drivers and threats 

of violent extremism to counter messaging, to how governments 

and communities can work together. And we’re also supporting this 

month a regional civil society CVE summit that will be held in 

Istanbul. And it will focus on nine priority areas ranging from the 

role of women and youth in the CVE efforts to rehabilitation and 

reintegration of violent extremists who return home. 

Such gatherings not only enhance information sharing, but they 

also generate action. For example, as a follow up to the White 

House CVE summit, the OSCE has now developed a multiyear program to build the capacity of civil society, including youth and 

women, to counter violent extremism. We’re also supporting the 

OSCE and other regional efforts. This past February, it organized 

a three-day workshop in Dushanbe on regional cooperation and response to foreign terrorist fighters, the first such meeting of its 

kind in Central Asia. 

At the national level, our diplomats regularly engage on these 

issues and we encourage a comprehensive approach that includes 

security improvements that are in line with international human 

rights obligations, as well as community-level programs to address 

the root causes that may be making some Central Asians vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups. 

We have bilateral programs in each country that not only build 

law enforcement capacity, but also train in community policing 

techniques and how to increase the role of religious leaders in conflict resolution. We’re working closely with the OSCE on several 

such programs and I’d refer you to my written testimony for more 

details on country-by-country. 

The nations of Central Asia are taking up this challenge, Mr. 

Chairman. And the U.S. will continue to work with global institutions, with regional groups and national governments to reduce the 

threat. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Rosenblum, thank you very much for your 

very comprehensive testimony and, again, in your written submission you do go into great depth with each of the countries, and this 

Commission certainly appreciates it. 

I have a couple of opening questions. You point out and you have 

listed in your bullets the topics that will be discussed at the CVEs, 

including at the Istanbul summit. Turkey has become a primary 

transit state for Central Asians traveling to Syria—low airfares, 

there’s a whole number of reasons, plus a 500-mile border with 

Syria. I’m wondering if that will be a major focus of that Istanbul 

summit when you convene it. 

Let me also ask you, Gulmurod Khalimov, the Tajik military officer who recently defected to ISIS, received extensive military train-
7 

ing in the U.S. Can you tell us what kind of safeguards are in place 

to prevent defection by Central Asian military members participating in U.S. training? 

Just a parallel, in a way, for years during the troubles in Northern Ireland, it was very disconcerting to me and a whole lot of 

other people that at the FBI academy some of the people involved 

with terrorism who were part of the Northern Irish police force 

there were actually terrorists. I actually wrote a law that said they 

all had to be vetted. I’m wondering if we’re properly vetting people 

who get that training to ensure that inadvertently we don’t train 

someone who’s doing such horrific things. 

Let me also ask you, as a Russia expert—as we all know, many 

of the recruiters very often can go into the migrant communities 

in Russia and play on the dissatisfaction and demoralization of 

those there. I know we’re at pretty much loggerheads with Russia 

over Ukraine and, you know, things are not the way they could 

be—hopefully someday will be in terms of our relationship with 

Russia. But let me ask you, how are they doing and are we assisting them in any way? Are they aware of this problem—of this massive recruitment that appears to be happening? 

And finally, in what ways do you think human rights violations 

by Central Asian states feed jihadist radicalization and ISIS recruitment? And how does that vary from state to state? Are the 

various Stans, different countries in the Central Asian region, are 

they receptive of that? This Commission has held multiple hearings, site visits, meetings with the presidents, prime ministers and 

parliamentarians for years. And human rights is always our first 

point of engagement with each of those countries. If you could, perhaps, address that. 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. OK. Thank you for those questions, Mr. Chairman. Hopefully I’ll cover all of them, but please remind me if I’ve 

left out something. 

So, first of all, you asked about the upcoming conference in 

Istanbul and Turkey’s role as a transit country. I don’t believe, actually, that the agenda of that conference will focus on that question because the conference is a civil society meeting. I believe the 

focus will be on what civil society groups can do in their communities and in their countries to contribute to preventing the root 

causes, essentially. It’s sort of local-level engagement to prevent 

the drivers of radicalization, as it’s often referred to. 

The issue of the transit through Turkey is something that comes 

up, for us, frequently in our dialogue with our Central Asian partners as well. And it is something that’s of concern and we’re working closely with Turkey on these issues, but I don’t believe that it’s 

going to be focused on in the conference. 

Mr. SMITH. I understand going after systemic causes, but it 

would seem to me that if since it is a large transit area, country— 

has Ankara been responsive? Or are they really toeing the line to 

try to mitigate this transit? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. Yeah. Turkey co-chairs with the Netherlands 

the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Group of this counter-ISIL 

coalition that the U.S. has helped put together. We consult very 

frequently and with high intensity with Turkey on these issues, on 

the foreign terrorist fighter flow. 
8 

Turkey signed a letter of intent on March 12th to improve information sharing on foreign terrorist fighters and known and suspected terrorists. We also co-chaired the Global Counterterrorism 

Forum with Turkey. So there’s a lot of engagement with Turkey on 

this issue now. And Turkey itself acknowledges the scope of the 

problem and that they need to do more. So we’re encouraging that 

line. 

Let me talk for a minute about Mr. Khalimov, the head of the 

interior ministry special forces who defected recently and has 

claimed in a video that he had joined ISIL. He was an important 

leader in the security forces in Tajikistan who came up through the 

ranks over about a 10-year period, during which he participated in 

five Department of State-sponsored antiterrorism assistance program trainings between 2003 and 2010. 

The process for selecting for training, which goes to your question, involves first selection by the government—so in each case it 

was the government of Tajikistan that selected and recommended 

him to participate in training. And to be honest, it was appropriate 

given the positions that he held. And then we do vetting ourselves. 

We vet all participants in this training course through processes we 

have under the so-called Leahy amendment, to determine that 

there’s no record of gross human rights violations. 

Mr. Khalimov was vetted in each case and passed our standard 

vetting procedures. So I should emphasize here that we offer the 

training and the other government that we’re working with identifies the students for training. The vetting is an additional measure 

after the students are identified for the program. 

Now, your specific question, I think, at the end was whether 

there’s some technique that could be used to sort of screen or identify people who are potentially recruits, so to speak. And I don’t 

know the answer to that, to be honest with you, Mr. Chairman, 

today. It is something that we have to think long and hard about. 

Something tells me that it would be very difficult, because the motivations are so complex. 

And that’s something that I think Mr. Cohen actually referred to 

in the question he asked in the opening. We can talk more about 

that later. But the interplay of factors that go into someone ending 

up doing what Khalimov did are so complex that it might be difficult. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t look at whether there 

are things that could be done to screen out people. 

Mr. SMITH. Now, was he a lone wolf? Or he’s not part of a trend, 

as far as we know. Have there been others? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. We’re following it closely. We’re talking to the 

government of Tajikistan about it. We—— 

Mr. SMITH. Or any of the other countries, too. 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. Yeah, we don’t have any evidence that he’s 

part of some larger network yet. 

So that—— 

Mr. SMITH. But again, in terms of people we’ve trained, we have 

no evidence that there are other people who have followed the 

course of going into ISIS or al-Qaida? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. Right, no evidence that other people who are 

involved in the same training are going the same way. 
9 

You asked about Russia. And on Russia, I think it’s fair to say 

that the Russian Government has acknowledged the problem. And 

there have been statements—public statements by senior officials 

both about the growth of foreign terrorist fighters in Syria and 

Iraq, and also about the fact that some of them are being recruited 

from within the territory of the Russian Federation. That concern 

has been expressed and also acted on through support, for example, 

for the U.N. Security Council resolution that I referred to earlier. 

Russia did participate—they were invited and they participated 

in the summit in February on countering violent extremism that 

was held here. They sent a high-level delegation. Russia is also a 

founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, this 

group, and has been invited to participate in this Astana meeting— 

regional meeting that will be held in Kazakhstan later this month. 

So we work together where possible to find ways of disrupting 

the travel of foreign fighters, and we’ll continue to do so. I think 

it is fair to say, as you characterized it too, that the level of our 

engagement on a lot of issues with Russia these days is not as robust as it has been in the past. But nonetheless, this is an issue 

where we clearly have shared concerns. 

And then I think your last question was about human rights and 

in what ways do human rights violations and so on fuel recruitment. I’d start out by saying that we are concerned that lack of respect for human rights, limitations on freedom of religion specifically could potentially be used by extremist groups in their efforts 

to recruit individuals and to radicalize them to commit acts of violence. And these things could also contribute to what people refer 

to as self-radicalization, where people through social media and 

other means become inspired. 

But at the same time, the recruitment process and this 

radicalization process are complex phenomena. And we don’t have 

evidence of a direct causal link between restrictions on rights and 

radicalization. The lack of evidence of a direct link doesn’t mean 

that we don’t take the issues of human rights and religious freedom and other related issues less seriously, and we engage regularly with the governments in Central Asia on these issues and 

raise them in many fora and many opportunities. But I guess I 

would just come back to the main point that there’s a potential 

there, but we have not seen the evidence—no one has brought to 

us the evidence of a direct causal link. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

You mentioned some of the questions I asked earlier, and I 

guess—I presume you were referring to the incentives or the reasons why. I mean, I know you’re not—because he’s passed—Dr. 

Freud, but can you help us with the 2015 Freud analysis of the 

ISIS fighter and their desires? Easy question right? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. So, Congressman, it is a complex issue, as I 

said before, and the motivations are complicated. Often the people 

who study this—and I had to talk to the experts because I confess 

I’m not an expert on radicalization and the recruitment issue. But 

they talk about there being three types of motivation, and sort of 

divide them into three categories: the ideological motivations, 

which could be political or could be religious. So for example, we 
10 

have to get rid of Assad, so I want to go to Syria to fight to overthrow the Assad regime. 

Then you have the psychological motivations, which will vary 

from individual to individual, even to the level of somebody being 

a sociopath being inclined to violence and being drawn to it, not 

necessarily for ideological reasons. 

And then there’s the situational category of motivations—which 

is a big basket, a broad range of things. But it could be anything 

from my community that says it’s OK to go fight and to commit 

acts of terrorism, or lack of opportunities, economic opportunities, 

a feeling of hopelessness, a feeling of drifting. 

So all of those things could be possible explanations in any given 

case. And they’re probably not all going to play the same role in 

any country. So as we’re focused here on Central Asia, it’s hard to 

say what’s the primary driver to those Central Asians who are joining, except that the one interesting piece of evidence we have, that 

I presented in my testimony, is that it does seem that the majority—even some say the vast majority—of those Central Asians 

going to fight in these conflicts are coming from outside of Central 

Asia. So that’s suggestive of something, and I presented some possible explanations related to the situation faced by migrant workers in Russia. But a lot of it is conjecture at this point. 

Mr. COHEN. You probably can’t answer my question, and you 

haven’t, and maybe it can’t be answered and it was just a suggestion this man made and is fairly simplistic and I don’t have any 

answer, but part of it’s the disparity in wealth in all those nations. 

And then we have a terrible disparity here, but compared to what 

it is in the Middle East, we’re Nirvana. And they have very little 

hope. And it seems like these nations—a lot of people at the top 

making—or taking, I don’t know if they make it, they take it—lots 

of money. And they’re living beyond the Kardashians. 

And then the rest of the people have got nothing. And so the idea 

of going off and fighting and putting a Kalashnikov over your 

shoulder and having some women that think you’re great that 

come over there to be your bride is a pretty attractive life for somebody who has no life whatsoever where they are. Now, maybe the 

migrant workers in Russia, but I don’t know how we’re going to 

stop that until there’s more of a democratization in those nations 

and throughout the Middle East. 

And it’s part of the whole problem, I think, that we’re seeing in 

terms of revolution and failed states and chaos, which we have in 

the Middle East, is the disparity in wealth that’s gone on. And the 

Saudis, you see it there. It’s all throughout. I guess USAID can 

help, other opportunities like that. Social media can help. And from 

what I understand, this conference I went to recently with quite a 

few folks from the United States and from around the world, everybody was in agreement that our social media campaign is inadequate. 

And we don’t do a very good job of reaching the young or influencing the young, and that we could do it better with some 

cultural-type icons and trying to find ways that we can reach them. 

I don’t know who’s doing our social media programs, but we got the 

best social media people in the world in the United States. And 

why our State Department or government isn’t trying to incor-
11 

porate some of the ideas they can get and help us is beyond me, 

because we don’t seem to be doing it. Do you know if we’ve reached 

out to any of these companies in Silicon Valley or wherever? Have 

we? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. Yes, we have collaborated with some companies. I will defer to colleagues who know more about this, and we 

can get back to you with a more detailed answer to your question 

on social media specifically. But I know that there’s been exchange 

with private companies in the past and collaboration on this issue. 

There is also an interagency body housed at the State Department, the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, 

which was established specifically to counter recruitment online 

through counter-messaging. And it is engaged now in a sustained 

campaign against the ISIL and other groups online messaging to 

combat their ability to recruit new fighters. So there is an effort 

being made. It can always be better. 

Mr. COHEN. Is Russia doing anything in the same capacity? I 

mean, I know they’ve got problems in Chechnya and Dagestan and 

all the Stans. But they’re very concerned about radical Islam. Are 

they—if you say that most of these foreign fighters are—I think 

that’s what you said—they’re coming from being migrant workers 

in Russia. Are they not concerned that they’re going to return to 

Russia? I mean, we seem to be concerned that some of these folks 

are going to return to the United States. Isn’t Russia concerned? 

And are they doing anything about it? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. They are concerned. And the details of what 

they’re doing about it, to be honest, I don’t know. We can get back 

to you about what we do know. I know that they have supported 

the international efforts that I referred to earlier—the U.N. Security Council, participating in our CVE summit. But what they’re 

doing domestically to address the root causes and so on, I’ll have 

to come back to you with a more detailed answer on that. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. 

Commissioner Pitts. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony and for coming 

today. 

Let me explore a little bit more—you’re talking about root causes 

and the economic aspect of this attraction. Could you explore or explain a little bit about the religious dimension of this attraction? 

Is it true that this brand of Islamic—radical Islam that believes in 

this caliphate being established—if they’re of that brand, they are 

compelled to go and defend the caliphate, just like others in Islam 

believe they have to take a trip to Mecca once in a lifetime? Can 

you explore a little bit of the religious dimension or motivation that 

you understand here? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. Sir, as I understand it, that religious message—the message of establishing the caliphate does have appeal 

for some, but it’s a minority. It’s not something that is part of the 

religious traditions of Central Asia, of the mainstream Islam that’s 

established in Central Asia. 

And one often hears that those who are attracted to the messaging and the ideal picture of this caliphate that they will join are 
12 

those who are probably not well-educated in their religion, that 

they may be ignorant of it. And so actually one of the efforts that 

we’ve been making in some countries in Central Asia is working 

with local governments, working with community groups to get religious leaders more involved in community education, both about 

the dangers of the messages that are coming out and also trying 

to fill in some of the gaps that exist. 

So in fact I just learned yesterday of a program that we’re doing 

in Kyrgyzstan which involves the religious establishment—that is 

the deputy mufti who’s the head of the religious council there— 

local law enforcement in communities in Kyrgyzstan and community groups talking about how religious leaders can play a more active role in seeing the danger signs that some of this messaging is 

resonating and providing information that might help to counter it, 

they hope. And so we actually supported this through a grant from 

our U.S. embassy in Kyrgyzstan, this program. 

And OSCE in addition is doing programming like this, working 

at the community level. So it’s about not having information, not 

having multiple sources of information. It’s also—I think also about 

not really understanding their own religious traditions completely, 

and therefore being more prone to believe what they’re reading online. 

Mr. PITTS. If I can shift to another issue, due to the relatively 

cheap flights, ease of visa restrictions and a growing market aimed 

at aiding foreign fighters along their journey, Turkey has become 

a primary transit state from—for Central Asians traveling to Syria. 

Are the Turkish authorities currently doing enough to prevent foreign extremist entry into Turkey and departure to Syria? And what 

can the United States do to help our NATO ally more effectively 

clamp down on their 500-mile border with Syria? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. Congressman, as I said in my earlier answer 

to the Chairman, there is a major problem of the transit through 

Turkey. It’s something that comes up frequently in our dialogue 

with our Central Asian partners as well, because everyone’s aware 

that that’s the route that people take. And it is something that the 

government of Turkey recognizes and is taking seriously. The 

President just a couple days ago at the G7 summit referred to this 

as one of a number of elements of combating ISIL and said that 

Turkey can do more. And we’re working with them to help to take 

stronger action. 

Mr. PITTS. The five Central Asian states that we’re talking about 

here have fragile governance structures and lack the ability to adequately provide jobs and education and health care to the citizens. 

And some reports argue that this lack of social stability and structure tempts individuals to turn to ISIL/ISIS, in the belief that it 

can provide better opportunity, perhaps a better future for their 

families. How have we, or can we or might we, encourage the Central Asian governments to address these issues in order to create 

more inclusive and appealing societies? What aid can the U.S. provide in order to help build government institutions and strengthen 

the rule of law? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. So that’s a very good question, Congressman. 

And the answer is a complicated one, as it often is on this issue. 

First of all, we always stress in our dialogue with our Central 
13 

Asian partners that in the long term stability and security is best 

ensured in countries where the citizens can provide for themselves 

economically and where government is responsive and accountable. 

And so that is definitely part of our message about the long term. 

And that’s something that we say all over the world when we’re engaging with other countries on these issues of internal governance. 

At the same time, on the specific issue of recruitment by ISIL 

and foreign fighters going to Syria and Iraq, as I said earlier, the 

motivations for those individuals to go are very complex and it’s 

hard to untangle the multiple possibilities of why they’re going. 

There may be cases where the economic circumstances or frustration that somebody’s feeling in their local community toward local 

authorities or whatever it is could be a factor, but it may be one 

among many. And we just don’t have evidence of that causal link. 

The question is, though, what can we do to help address some of 

these issues, which are important even if they’re not a cause of foreign fighter recruitment? 

And the answer is that we’ve been working for the past 20 to 25 

years in all these countries to try to improve economic systems, to 

try to improve the performance by, for example, helping small business buildup, improving government policies, investment climate 

and all those sorts of issues, and also by working with governments 

and with civil society to improve how government delivers for its 

citizens. Part of that is fighting corruption. That’s a major issue in 

the region, and in many countries, of course, around the world. And 

part of it is also just how to deliver services to citizens in a way 

that they deserve. 

And we have a number of programs—USAID, which I think the 

congressman referred to earlier, our State Department itself works 

in many of these areas. So I guess I would characterize that almost 

as a generational effort to make a difference. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Commissioner Hultgren. 

HON. RANDY HULTGREN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you so much. Thank you for being here 

today and your work. 

Couple questions, I know recently the U.S. has been pulling 

troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq. I wonder what does this mean 

for foreign fighters coming to or from this region. With the lessening U.S. military presence, can the number of foreign fighters be 

expected to increase in these areas? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. So I had a fairly brief reference in my testimony to Afghanistan and the appearance of ISIL there. And I 

would say, first of all, that to the extent that we understand what’s 

happening there now is that former Taliban forces are essentially 

rebranding themselves as ISIL, whether in order to get more funding or in order to get support from outside. And the estimates of 

the numbers vary quite a bit. It’s not clear how big of a phenomenon it is. 

But we also—what we don’t see, in the case of ISIL appearing 

in Afghanistan, is it being a foreign fighter issue. That is, it’s not 

coming about because of an influx of people coming from outside. 
14 

Very frankly, the magnet for the foreign fighters today is Syria and 

Iraq. It’s not Afghanistan. So it’s sort of a homegrown issue within 

Afghanistan. There’s a broader issue of security in Afghanistan, 

which I’m not the expert on and can’t really speak to in detail 

today, but I don’t think that we’ve been able to draw a connection 

between the appearance of ISIL in Afghanistan and our drawdown. 

So—— 

Mr. HULTGREN. Let me go back to this idea of the magnet of 

Syria drawing these people and get more focused on Central Asia. 

With the Central Asian countries, are they effective in preventing 

Syria-bound violent extremists from exiting their borders? If not, 

how can the United States be helpful to assist or exert pressure on 

them in a way that will diminish the flow of foreign fighters into 

these regions? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. So it’s a good question. I think that the countries themselves are making efforts and trying to deal with a relatively new challenge. And I think they would acknowledge themselves—although they should really speak for themselves—that 

they can be more effective, that they need to improve. And that’s 

why, for example, they’re participating in these global meetings 

that we’re helping to convene to learn from others, to learn how it’s 

done and also to improve information sharing. 

So there’s a number of things that we are doing and can do more 

of that relate to helping them to be more effective. One thing that 

we encourage all the governments of Central Asia to do is to approach the issue in a comprehensive way that doesn’t just involve 

law enforcement, as important as that is, but also involves civil society, religious groups, private organizations. The response needs to 

deal with issues that belong to law enforcement and security, like 

sharing information about passengers who are traveling, traveler 

screening, border security, things like that, but that it also needs 

to address the root causes, the stuff we were talking about a 

minute ago, the local, community-level issues. 

And so we’ve offered our support. Ultimately they recognize that 

they need—they’re going to need to step up themselves. But there 

are a number of ways in which our assistance programs, through 

these conferences where people can exchange information and 

ideas, and through belonging to a more global network, that they 

can become more effective. 

Mr. HULTGREN. One last question, and I apologize if you’ve already covered this, I’ve got a couple different meetings going on at 

the same time so I missed a good part of your testimony and I 

apologize for that—but I know according to a report the lure of the 

Islamic State for Central Asians—there was a report by Radio Free 

Europe, Radio Liberty—that said marginalized people, especially 

entire families in the Central Asia area, are joining ISIL because 

they believe it to be a better option for their families than the dismal economic prospects, restrictive governments and oppressive social circumstances of their home countries. 

I wonder, do you agree with that assessment of the reason why— 

for ISIL’s allure, especially for entire families? And if so, what kind 

of approach, comprehensive or otherwise, that the U.S. and its allies and partners and organizations such as OSCE offer to help di-
15 

minish the sort of allure towards ISIL from Central Asian countries? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. Congressman, this goes back to the discussion 

about the motivations and what makes people join. And as I said 

earlier, there’s a complex mix of motivations or potential motivations that people look at. Because of the nature of the conflict in 

Syria, and because the recruitment obviously happens in a sort of 

clandestine way, it’s very hard for us—it’s rare to get the chance, 

for example, to interview someone and ask them the question. 

There are some returnees, and so there’s a handful of people— 

I mean, returnees—who have gotten disillusioned with their membership in these extremist groups. But there aren’t many opportunities to ask people why they join these groups. So clearly the economic circumstances or other frustrations people feel could be a 

factor in some cases. And in terms of what we can do to address 

it, or the governments of the region can do to address it, it’s really 

about providing economic opportunity. But again, even if we did 

that, it’s not clear that that’s going address the problem. 

And just one last data point to throw on the table as we think 

about these matters: If you look at the numbers—and as you know, 

my focus is only Central Asia, not the whole world—but if you look 

around the world at where the foreign fighters are coming from to 

join ISIL, I’ve been told that probably about 20 percent are coming 

from Western countries—from Europe, the United States and other 

places. So it becomes harder to say that economic circumstances 

must be the main cause, when you look at the origin of other people. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Right. I’ve talked with some other European 

countries, like Sweden, and very concerned of what’s happening 

there. And again, these are very affluent communities with strong 

social structures. And yet, people are still choosing to leave to go 

fight. So this is complex and deep. 

Mr. Chairman, can I ask one last question, is that all right? I’m 

sorry. You just sparked another question I had where you mentioned some are returning because they’re disillusioned and going 

back to their home country because it wasn’t what they expected 

it to be. My guess is some are returning and haven’t been disillusioned yet. They’re returning maybe because they were injured or 

they’re just coming back home for a while. What kind of potential 

instability in those countries might we see or are we already seeing? Or is there a threat to some of these existing countries and 

governments as fighters come back who still are committed to the 

cause? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. Well, the issue of returning fighters from Syria 

is definitely of great concern to the countries of the region. And 

they are watching very closely when these people come back. We 

don’t know of any cases or evidence yet of attacks originating from 

those returned people. But it’s something that obviously the countries of the region first and foremost will look at very closely. And 

we, to the extent that we can be helpful to them in that, we stand 

ready to do so. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Well, thank you very much for your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 
16 

Mr. SMITH. Just if I could ask one final question, Mr. Secretary. 

Again, paralleling with what Mr. Pitts was talking about with regard to the radical Islamic allure, the magnet, if you will. When 

Boko Haram was emerging as a clear and compelling threat, I held 

four hearings in my Subcommittee on Human Rights, Africa and 

Global Health. Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson testified and 

said that they’re just unhappy with the infrastructure in the northern counties that were under assault, not enough roads and 

bridges. And to which I said, well, so they can blow them up? 

There seemed to have been a Boko Haram misperception about 

what the core radical Islamic belief really was causing these individuals to do. And again, we’re now at the 14th month of the 

Chibok girls having been kidnapped, and so many others since. I’ve 

actually met some of the ones who escaped when I was in Jos and 

Abuja on two trips to Nigeria. My question really goes to do we 

really understand the importance that the imams play? 

In Bosnia, we’ve had a great grand mufti, and I’m good personal 

friends with him—Reis Ceric, and we’re coming up to the 20th anniversary of the slaughter—the genocide in Srebrenica. And he has 

been eloquent in his defense of human rights, but also strictly adhering to his deeply held convictions about his faith, but rejects 

radical Islam. General al-Sisi—President al-Sisi in Egypt gave a 

powerful statement on January 1st to a group of clerics about the 

need for a reformation. 

And I’m wondering in the Central Asian countries, you did mention that religious believers—leaders are included—how much emphasis are we putting on bringing the imams in to speak out, to 

talk to those who attend their mosque? Sometimes it makes them 

a target. I’ll never forget in Jos I met with the Archbishop Kaigama 

and the grand imam there. He said that when certain clerics speak 

out, the next day they’re murdered by Boko Haram. 

So there’s a huge risk. But it would seem to me that in the Central Asian countries that risk would be far less and could have a 

preventive effect if they were to be very robust in their stressing 

of the importance of the tenets of their faith, but it doesn’t include 

radical Islamic and murder and mass atrocities. Are they really 

being brought into the fold in Central Asia? 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. Mr. Chairman, it’s a very good point. And it is 

something that we emphasize strongly in our engagement. We also 

talk about civil society organizations and private organizations. But 

I think there’s an especial emphasis in our recommendations and 

also events that we organize, on religious leaders being involved, 

for exactly the reason that you cited. I mentioned earlier in passing, and I’ll just repeat it again because I thought it was such an 

interesting example of how this can work, that our embassy grants 

program in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan is supporting workshops for 

imams on conflict resolution. 

And there was an event that was just held two days ago where 

the deputy mufti of Kyrgyzstan, together with the head of the 

counterterrorism department under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, led a training that was organized by an NGO, actually, called 

The Foundation for Tolerance International. The focus of this was 

on giving imams training in mediation and negotiation in factors 
17 

conducive to the spread of violent extremism. So, sensitizing them, 

but also getting them involved in the preventive aspect. 

Mr. SMITH. That’s great. Thank you. 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. That’s the sort of thing, I think, that’s a good 

initiative— 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. We look forward to working with you. 

Thank you so very, very much for your testimony, for your expertise and for your leadership. We deeply appreciate it. 

Sec. ROSENBLUM. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. I’d like to now welcome our second panel to the witness table, beginning first with Frank Cilluffo, who is the vice 

president of the George Washington University. Mr. Cilluffo directs 

the Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, is co-director of the 

George Washington University Cyber Center for National and Economic Security. Before his university appointment he served as 

special assistant to George W. Bush’s Department of Homeland Security. As a matter of fact, he was principle adviser to Governor 

Tom Ridge and directed the president’s advisory council for homeland security. 

He is routinely called upon to advise senior officials in the executive branch, U.S. armed services, state and local governments on 

an array of national homeland security and strategy policy matters. 

He frequently briefs congressional committees and their staffs. And 

he has testified before Congress over 25 times at high-profile hearings on counterterrorism, cyber threats, security—I guess this is 

26—and deterrence, weapons proliferation, organized crime, intelligence and threat assessment, border and transportation security 

and emergency management. 

Similarly, he works with U.S. allies and organizations such as 

NATO and Europol. He has presented at a number of bilateral and 

multilateral summits on cyber security and countering Islamic terrorism, including the U.N. Security Council. Without objection, 

your full resume will be made part of the record. 

And then secondly we’ll hear from Jennifer Leonard, who joined 

the Crisis Group’s Washington office in June of 2002. As Washington advocacy director, she works across the spectrum of Washington’s foreign policy actors, including the administration, Congress, media, think tanks and NGOs to design and implement 

strategies that impact the process of policy. She’s also the primary 

responsibility in advocacy for the Crisis Group’s Central Asia, 

Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and the Caucasus projects. 

Jen came to the Crisis Group after three years with the U.S. Department of Energy, where she worked for the assistant secretary 

for nuclear nonproliferation, then a special assistant to the administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. At the 

Department of Energy, she oversaw aspects of a new nonproliferation initiative, helped establish the Russia task force, international 

organizations and foreign governments on national security matters. She received her M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and 

Diplomacy and B.A. from Connecticut College. 

Two very highly credentialed experts and we welcome you to the 

Commission. Please begin if you would, Frank. 
18 

FRANK J. CILLUFFO, ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR CYBER AND HOMELAND SECURITY, THE 

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Chairman Smith, Commissioner Pitts, thank you 

for the opportunity to testify before you today. As you can probably 

already surmise, I’ve never had an unspoken thought, but I will try 

to be brief and summarize my comments and hopefully submit the 

complete testimony. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection your full statement and anything 

you want to attach to it will be made a part of the record. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Terrific, thank you. And I also thank you for your 

leadership in examining this challenge. It is an important issue because the threat not only affects U.S. interests at home and abroad, 

but also to our allies and it is pressing. At the same time, we can’t 

go it alone, and I think that’s emblematic of the Helsinki Commission’s overall mission. This threat spans borders, to include cyberspace in some of the discussions that were brought up earlier, and 

will demand international cooperation and transnational solutions. 

The foreign fighter challenge is a matter of serious concern for 

the U.S. and our allies. While the foreign fighter phenomena is 

nothing new, its present scale and scope is unprecedented. By comparison—and Mr. Pitts, I think you brought this up in one of your 

questions—questions earlier, whether or not it’s a religious duty. 

That was first popularized during the first Afghan-Soviet war in 

the 1970s, when Abdullah Azzam made that argument in that case. 

At that time, which was a very significant yet, you had about 5,000 

Muslims from around the world join up the banner to fight the Soviets. You’ve had similar scenarios in terms of Chechnya, in terms 

of their war in the Balkans and in Bosnia, and then again of course 

in the FATA region more recently. But those numbers are dwarfed 

compared to what we’re seeing today. 

So during the Soviet-Afghan war, you had 5,000 foreign fighters. 

That was over a decade of fighting. Here you’ve seen over 20,000, 

up to 25,000, and we’re still early, unfortunately, in the situation 

in terms of what we’re addressing here. So scale and scope you 

really can’t compare. When you look at the foreign fighter phenomena today in Syria and Iraq, you’re talking 90 different countries. You’re talking thousands of Westerners, including up to 150 

Americans who have either attempted to travel or successfully did 

travel to fight alongside ISIL. 

It’s also worth noting that just this past April there was a big 

arrest in the United States: four Brooklyn men, including an Uzbek 

American who radicalized three other Americans from Central Asia 

to go fight alongside ISIS or ISIL. The good news is obviously we 

were able to prevent that before they were successful. But I think 

it’s a harbinger and an indicator of what we’re dealing with here. 

And I think it’s also worth noting that terrorism is a small numbers business. You don’t need big numbers from a national security 

standpoint. This is why I think these numbers are so significant. 

It’s not just that you can put X number of thousands behind it, but 

unfortunately it only takes small numbers to cause mass harm. 

And I’ve been meeting with the security services of all our allied 

countries recently, and quite honestly they’re overwhelmed. They 

can’t keep up with the flow, both in terms of people attempting to 
19 

travel and also returnees. There have been quite a few returnees. 

And actually, I would disagree with the previous witness in one little incident. There have been some incidents, including in France, 

an attack on a synagogue, in terms of someone who had fought 

overseas in Syria and Iraq. So I think that there’s enough there to 

be aware of in terms of what we need to be worrying about. 

The phenomena itself I think is becoming difficult to detect. Obviously you want to get there left of boom, before an incident occurs, and that requires enhanced law enforcement capabilities as 

well as intelligence cooperation. That’s where transnational solutions come in and are so important. And I think from a U.S. perspective, and the same for the Stans or for the region in Central 

Asia, all real solutions here are going to be local at the end of the 

day. They’re the ones closest to the action, they’re the ones who 

know their communities, and they’re the ones who are ultimately 

going to either detect and/or prevent or respond to an incident. So 

I think that has to be part of our solution set. 

There’s been some discussion in terms of Afghanistan, and I 

think this is a dilemma and I think it’s a significant challenge to 

U.S. interest. This conflict zone, as well as others such as the 

Maghreb and the Sahel—you’ve had a number of Americans fight 

alongside Al-Shabaab in Somalia and alongside al-Qaida in the 

Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. You’ve had French fighters fighting 

alongside Ansar al-Dine in Mali. So the Maghreb and the Sahel 

have been front and center for a while. 

Afghanistan was not only as we discussed earlier the first major 

situation in terms of foreign fighters, but you are starting to see 

that undergoverned space be filled and that vacuum be filled, 

whether it’s for fundraising purposes or whether it’s for training in 

terms of conflating different organizations. So in addition to the 

ISIL direct threat, another concern is they’re interacting with other 

foreign terrorist organizations. Some of those organizations have 

stronger international reach and capability, which obviously from 

a homeland perspective poses a high threat perspective. So that is 

a concern when they come back to Afghanistan, and I think the 

reason you saw the numbers drop in recent years in terms of foreign fighters going into Afghanistan was because of the pressure 

we were asserting then. I’d rather them look over their shoulder 

than have the time and space to maneuver, to plan, train, and ultimately execute attacks. And when our presence is diminished, that 

vacuum will be filled. And nature abhors a vacuum, and unfortunately I think a lot of bad actors will do that. 

In terms of Central Asia itself, you heard the numbers: 2,000 to 

4,000. I think that’s, again, early stages. I am quite concerned 

about Colonel Khalimov’s defection. I think that one of the key indicators, if you look at any foreign fighter flow historically, is what 

I refer to as bridge figures. These are people who have feet in both 

communities. Think Anwar al-Awlaki in terms of the role that he 

played to get Americans to fight alongside AQAP; or Eric 

Breininger, who was a German who brought over thousands of people to fight alongside the IJU in the FATA region. These bridge figures are important, and I do think that his role in terms of serving 

as a communicator to spread propaganda should not be underesti-
20 

mated. Not only does he have operational capability, he’s got street 

creds with the folks he’s trying to influence. 

It also recognizes the fact that, unfortunately, to paraphrase Bill 

Clinton, in this case it’s not ‘‘the economy, stupid,’’ but it is the ideology. And we need to do more to expose, unpack, undermine and 

hit back at the Islamist ideology. I think that’s been our greatest 

missing tool in our counterterrorism toolkit and statecraft since 

9/11, and something we ought to be doing an awful lot more to be 

able to combat their lifeblood, to be blunt. 

Operationally, obviously we’re doing a lot with our Five Eyes 

partners, and that should still be the number one relationship the 

U.S. has in terms of counterterrorism. But we’re seeing that expand to our transatlantic partners in Europe, and obviously we 

need to expand that even beyond into the region. 

In terms of working directly with the countries of Central Asia, 

I really do feel there’s more that can be done in terms of border 

security. It had come up in the previous panel, questioning whether 

or not Turkey’s doing all that they can do. The reality is, is bluntly 

speaking, they’re not. And there’s an awful lot more we should be 

able to do, which will in turn help the countries in the region of 

Central Asia get their arms around this issue. And there’s no travel restrictions between Central Asian countries and Turkey, so 

maybe we ought to be looking to that as well. 

So a long-winded way of saying that the threat that we’re facing 

today obviously has implications to the region, but that’s one part 

of a much broader set of issues that I think does directly impact 

U.S. national security. So thank you, sir. 

Mr. PITTS. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

Ms. Leonard, you’re recognized for your statement. 

JENNIFER LEONARD, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL 

CRISIS GROUP 

Ms. LEONARD. Well, thank you very much, Congressman Pitts, 

for inviting us to present our findings and research before the Helsinki Commission. We appreciate the Commission’s sustained attention to the region over these long years. It’s been going on for 

a while. We have appeared before the Commission before, and we 

appreciate today’s opportunity. 

International Crisis Group is an international conflict prevention 

organization, and our approach is grounded in field research that 

we conduct. We’ve got teams of political analysts who are based in 

or near countries vulnerable to violent conflict, and based on that 

research and analysis we try to come up with prescriptions to prevent and resolve it. And we’ve covered Central Asia for over 15 

years. Right now, our current base is in Bishkek, and we conduct 

frequent visits throughout the region exploring the challenges and 

opportunities facing Central Asia, with a particular focus on the 

interplay of democratic repression, the threat of radicalization, and 

the decay and decline of the economy as well as infrastructure over 

the years. 

And in January of this year, we published ‘‘Syria Calling: 

Radicalisation in Central Asia,’’ a copy of which I’d like to submit 
21 

1 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/b072-syria-calling-radicalisation-incentral-asia.aspx 

for the record. 1 But it addresses the very topic that we’re here to 

discuss. And over the course of the research that we conducted over 

last fall and preserved in the report, indeed we see—and I don’t 

think anyone here debates—that Islamic State is attracting a coalition of Central Asian jihadis and sympathizers, and it’s fostering 

a network of links within the region. Now, it’s prompted in part by 

the political marginalization and the bleak economic prospects that 

my fellow panelists have addressed, and it’s beckoned roughly 

2,000 to 4,000 Central Asian citizens so far. 

And while the phenomenon has a disproportionate impact on security perceptions at home, the region supplies only a small fraction of the IS fighters in Syria. But if enough of them return, it 

does present a serious risk to regional security and stability, 

which—yes—presents a complex problem to each of the five Central Asian governments, which each suffer from their own brand of 

political repression, poverty, corruption, and all of them have really 

struggled over the years to accommodate space for expression of 

conscience, religious freedom, and the religious organizations that 

would be involved in that expression. Meantime, the belief that 

Syrian-trained jihadis plan to establish a caliphate in the region 

has shaped the security debate and the response in each. That’s 

created an increased use of surveillance, harassment and detentions, and provided additional justification for ever-stricter laws on 

religious practice and expression that, in fact, may be counterproductive. 

So against that backdrop, you’ve got the call of IS, which says 

not only does it want fighters but it wants facilitators. They want 

nurses, engineers, teachers to support the effort. And that can appear to offer an attractive alternative for those who are feeling 

alienated, discriminated, marginalized, et cetera, and who find 

some inspiration in the belief that the Islamic State is a meaningful alternative to the challenges of their post-Soviet life. 

I’d like to talk about the profile because I think our take on this 

differs a little bit from what we’ve heard. I think Commissioner 

Cohen alluded to the sort of young, disenfranchised male. In fact, 

there is no single one-size-fits-all profile for IS supporters in Central Asia. We’re seeing rich, poor, young, old, men, women, educated, non-educated. We’ve talked to 17-year-old hairdressers, established businessmen, women who’ve been basically abandoned by 

husbands who, yes, have pursued migrant opportunities in Russia, 

and they’ve started another family and left their first one behind. 

There are families who believe their children have better prospects 

in a caliphate. 

The largest single group are Uzbeks, both citizens of Uzbekistan 

and ethnic Uzbeks from the region—notably, the Fergana Valley 

and the city of Osh, which is in Kyrgyzstan. And the risk has amplified since violence claimed the lives of about 400 ethnic Uzbeks 

back in 2010. That has gone unaccounted for. Meanwhile, Tashkent 

puts their number at about 500. We think that’s conservative. The 

number may go up to about 2,500 of their citizens. 
22 

In northern Kyrgyzstan, there may be up to 300 cases unreported of recruitment. 

In Kazakhstan, IS supporters tend to come from the west and 

south, but that’s not exclusive. And about 150 made headlines in 

fall of 2013 when they appeared in a YouTube video that surfaced. 

And then, of course, there’s Tajikistan and the alarming revelations of this recent defection, which has rattled the regime and the 

region. Clearly, you can hear from our own discussion that the U.S. 

government is seized with it and wondering how did somebody who 

darkened West Point’s doorstep end up where he is today. 

In terms of how the recruitment of these individuals occurs, it’s 

happening at local levels. It’s happening by word of mouth. Some 

are recruited at home in mosques and prayer groups, others 

abroad. We discussed the vulnerability of migrant workers. And the 

Internet and social media do play a critical role, but it’s not a decisive or definitive one. 

Groups that the Commission is familiar with, and in particular 

Hizb ut-Tahrir, play a peripheral role insofar as they—the folks 

who gravitate towards them could be radicalized to a degree, but 

these groups don’t yet appear to be directly involved in recruiting 

to Syria. But they may be an unwitting waystation on the way to 

that fight. 

More worrying for the regional security climate is where IMU— 

the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan—and its offshoots fit into this 

picture. Up until earlier this year they’d sort of kept a respective 

distance, but in March IMU released a sort of IS-style beheading 

video shot in Afghanistan in which they declared their allegiance 

and support to IS. 

So in terms of the motivations, we talked about the economic disenfranchisement and the lack of opportunities. Indeed, economic reward is not a motivation here. Rather, it’s the idea of a holy struggle to advance Islam. And people who are frustrated, excluded, who 

would not have considered fighting with the longer-established 

IMU, some of these outfits that have been around in the area 

longer, they’re perceiving IS as the creator of a novel political 

order, something—the call of the IS caliphate is more compelling. 

And an imam from southern Kyrgyzstan told us in an interview, 

in comparing Syria to Afghanistan, that Syria is about principles, 

Afghanistan was about colonialism. So there’s something that’s resonating now along those lines. 

One group that we haven’t talked about here is women, and indeed we are concerned about the radicalization of women. The traditional and state-approved Muslim community’s sort of disinterest 

in the role of women in society allows underground groups to fill 

a need. Radical Islam gives them some framework to distance—for 

women to distance themselves from marital or family frameworks 

that they feel frustrated by. For other women, it’s the call of a devout life for them, perhaps for their children. And still others are 

following fighters or family members that have already sort of 

tread the path and have a network of contacts in Turkey and IS 

territory. 

Now, while the numbers of Central Asians who’ve received active 

combat training and might yet be rising through the ranks is increasing, so far the danger is something to be prepared for rather 
23 

than presenting some immediate threat. But for the time being, 

then, Central Asia is fortunate that Syria is a long way away, the 

problem’s in its infancy, no major attacks have yet occurred back 

in their neighborhood—well, actually I should also say that a point 

that hasn’t yet been made is that many, in fact, may not return 

because they may very well perish in Syria. 

But in the meantime, and keenly aware of the dangers that the 

return of these fighters could pose, beyond criminalizing their participation abroad, the Central Asian governments have done very 

little to address the reasons why the draw exists in the first place 

for their citizens, nor have they contemplated how that dynamic 

might relate to broader unmet societal demands. The prevention of 

extremism and the rehabilitation of jihadis are just not high on the 

agenda, and female radicalization in particular is not at all discussed. 

These dynamics risk gathering pace and purpose. They risk 

blindsiding the governments that are ill-prepared to respond to 

such a complex security threat. ‘‘Complex’’ is a term that we keep 

throwing around, but indeed it is. And these are governments that 

may well, in the current day, be tempted to exploit the situation 

to crack down further on dissent—not just dissent expressed 

through a more radical religious means, but generally speaking. 

These governments need to assess accurately the long-term danger 

that jihadism poses to the region and take effective preventive action now. That doesn’t mean labeling everyone who is interested in 

an unfamiliar interpretation of Islam as an extremist, adopting increasingly severe laws to limit freedom of conscience and association, or promoting intrusive security practices. Rather, effective 

prevention means responding to an unmet demand for increased 

democratic space, revising discriminatory laws and practices, implementing outreach programs—we talked about creating jobs, ensuring better coordination between security services and tackling 

police reform. And on the most basic level tackling police reform 

needs to start with the basic matter of how they’re perceived by the 

communities that they serve. 

For its part, the U.S. and regional partners should recognize that 

Central Asia is a growing source of foreign fighters, and we need 

to be prioritizing police reform and a more tolerant attitude towards religion in our bilateral engagements and programming in 

the region. We heard some promising references from Secretary 

Rosenblum, but clearly more can be done. There are lessons to be 

gleaned from other countries—from Denmark, from Indonesia— 

about how they’ve addressed some of these issues. But the capacity 

of the Central Asian governments to absorb and implement these 

lessons are undermined by not only weak state institutions, but a 

profound lack of political will. 

And with that, I’ll stop. Thank you. 

Mr. PITTS. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. Thank you both for 

excellent testimony. 

I’ll begin the questioning, and like to start where I ask the secretary about the idea of motivation, not economic but religious. And 

you mentioned Islamic ideology. You mentioned religious duty and 

the caliphate. Could you drill down a little bit? Are there Islamic 

scholars who teach that, since there is a caliphate, they have a 
24 

duty to go there and defend the caliphate? Explain how serious 

that religious motivation, you think, is. We’ll start with you, Mr. 

Cilluffo. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, that’s a 

complex question, but—and I’m not going to zero right in on Central Asia specifically, but looking more broadly. 

I touched on what I referred to as bridge figures. These are individuals who have played a significant role in radicalizing and ultimately recruiting individuals to fight alongside foreign terrorist organizations. You cannot underestimate the significant role that 

Anwar al-Awlaki played, for example, in recruiting Americans to 

join up with AQAP in Yemen or to stay at home, given the fact that 

they had recognized that the authorities may be on to them, and 

they become a homegrown violent Islamist extremist threat. So the 

bridge figure role. 

And that’s why I think the colonel’s defection is so significant 

here. This is someone kids would look up to. This is someone who, 

if you think back to even gangs, think back to the role that Tookie 

Williams played, for example, a big gang-banger. Ultimately, he 

had more effect in renouncing the gang lifestyle to others than anyone else could. So this is a big coup in terms of defector if you think 

from intelligence perspectives. 

And I think his message is important, and if it’s OK I’ll quote 

quickly what he said because it was dressed in religious garb, but 

at the end of the day his message was also trying to resonate from 

an economic perspective. And his note was this: ‘‘Going out to work 

every morning, look at yourself in the mirror and ask yourself: Are 

you ready to die for the state or not?’’ He was clearly speaking directly to his colleagues in the Tajik services and others who could 

be potentially susceptible to this message. He went on to say ‘‘I am 

ready to die for the caliphate. Are you?’’ So there’s clearly a religious underpinning, but it’s also tapping into obviously a much 

broader message as well. 

There are imams who have spoken out against, obviously, jihad 

and violent jihad and terrorist activity. But there are also many 

that have not. And at the end of the day, there are people turning 

to the Internet—I don’t mean to be pejorative here, but Sheikh 

Google, call it that. Anyone who’s got the loudest voice is going to 

get a lot of the followers, and these videos are resonating with a 

number of folks. 

Now, I think the role social media plays with Western foreign 

fighters is absolutely critical. I think it probably has less of a significant impact in terms of Central Asia. But don’t underestimate 

that particular set of issues. 

Everyone’s going to disagree with me on this point in this room. 

It’s not only about what we’re doing good in the world. We need 

to think of it as negative political campaigning. We’ve got to tear 

down the enemy. We have to expose the hypocrisy, expose the lies, 

and facilitate it falling under its own weight. Why? Because it’s 

ideologically bankrupt. And ideally, that wouldn’t be with our fingerprints on it. Obviously, it should come from the communities 

themselves. But we’ve had a hard time recognizing this as a principal tenet of our response, and until we do we’re always going to 

be playing defense. We’re always going to be reacting because it’s 
25 

the ideology, it’s the underpinning of the overall message. So I’m 

sure that there are very different views on that in this room, including possibly on this panel, but those are my thoughts. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. Ms. Leonard, if you could respond to that. 

And you mentioned principles versus colonization, if you can drill 

down a little bit more. 

Ms. LEONARD. Well, maybe before I do I wanted to make a point 

that we’re talking about push versus pull, to a certain degree. So 

are these individuals who feel so marginalized, disenfranchised, 

discriminated against that they have no options or feel their options are so little where they currently reside that they’re pushed 

from their home country towards something grand? Or is the pull 

of the caliphate what’s bringing them? I think in most cases it’s not 

an either/or, it’s a combination. And so we need to work to address 

both of those dynamics. 

Now, in terms of sort of bringing it more local and understanding 

what the religious dynamics or the religious base that currently exists in each country—and each country is different—and we have 

to be truthful, and for a variety of reasons known very well by the 

panel varying degrees of access to each of these countries too. But 

historically the state-sanctioned imams are not as versed and as 

educated, and therefore as capable of countering that narrative, 

that lure. And to the degree that programs can enhance their understanding and their capacity and their ability to counter that 

narrative, it’s a good thing. But they’re operating in a space, too, 

where they are state-sanctioned. So the state itself needs to arrive 

at a level of comfort where that space can be provided and take 

some of the pressure off of the situation, and that in nearly every 

case runs counter to how these regimes approach governance. 

Mr. PITTS. You mentioned the profiling. We’ve had a large discussion about fighters from Central Asia, but can you possibly 

highlight distinctions between fighters from this region and those 

coming from Europe or elsewhere? Are there differences in motivations? Are there differences in lethalness or, in combat experience? 

Ms. LEONARD. My comparative frame of reference—this isn’t my 

expertise; we’re sort of based in or near conflict zones, and we’ve 

done a lot of work historically in the Balkans but haven’t taken a 

really close look at this. So I’m really not in a position to speak 

with any expertise on this. 

Mr. PITTS. OK. Mr. Cilluffo, you want to speak to that? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Unfortunately, there’s not a single, easy answer, 

a profile that comes in different shapes, sizes and forms, and different people are being—whether actively or susceptible to that 

message. So when you look at the U.S., for example, one of the 

things we saw that was very interesting when we were following 

some of the foreign fighter flows to Yemen and Somalia, the Brits 

were, in particular, they always had a significant foreign fighter 

issue vis-a`-vis Pakistan, given the strong community in the U.K. 

Overnight, they were seeing, though, that a lot of these first/second 

generation of Southeast Asian origin fighters moving to Somalia 

and Yemen. And the answer that the security service would give 

you is they were coming back with the same street creds; in other 

words, they knew that the likelihood of them getting picked up was 

a lot higher traveling to Pakistan, but less so when traveling to 
26 

North Africa. So I think we are seeing a different pattern and demographic. 

And the one thing I would note here is, we first did our first 

major study on foreign fighters about five years ago, and I get back 

to the fact that terrorism is a small numbers business. In this case, 

it was an individual by the name of Najibullah Zazi. This was a 

naturalized citizen who was traveling to Afghanistan. His his intent was to join up with the Taliban. He was intercepted by alQaida, turned back around, and said you are of much greater value 

to attack the homeland. He had the ability to travel. He understood 

the region. And this was one of those cases since 

9/11 where our system was really blinking red. Luckily, we got 

there before the bombs went off, and his attempt was multiple suicide/homicide bombings in the New York subway. We were able to 

prevent that, but that was pretty far along in the planning phase. 

And then if you look at another case in the United States, Faisal 

Shahzad, the so-called Times Square bomber, he too initially had 

intentions to go overseas and was turned back around. 

So I just caution that you don’t need huge numbers. And that’s 

what makes this so difficult, because we can’t—and when you’re 

talking 25,000, when you’re hearing some of the security services 

in Europe saying they are absolutely overwhelmed, they don’t have 

the bodies, they don’t have the capability, that’s why transnational 

solutions I think right now are so important. And I think anything 

the Commission can do to keep Turkey’s feet to the fire in terms 

of policing the border would be well-received because that’s where 

most of these guys are still slipping through. 

If you look back to the FATA region and foreign fighters in the 

past, it was pretty hard to get to the FATA. To get to Syria, it’s 

a bus ticket, a train ticket, or a plane ticket away, and you can easily slip across the border. And there were probably about 18 

months there where all security services were not aware of the significant growth of this phenomenon, so those numbers, who knows 

where they are and whether or not they’ve come back. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. Recognize the Chairman, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Pitts. 

Let me thank you for your testimony. I did read it. I was on the 

floor, regrettably, and missed most of the oral presentations. But 

let me just ask you a couple of questions. 

In the Middle East, we know that anti-Semitism is used very effectively to radicalize communities in country after country. More 

moderate Muslims are ostracized/marginalized if they don’t toe the 

line on being virulently anti-Semitic. And I’m wondering what impact anti-Semitism in an overarching way is having on the Central 

Asian countries. If you could—and maybe you don’t want to, but if 

you could, how would you rate each country? What might be the 

best: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 

Uzbekistan? How would you say—who’s doing the most? Which 

country is the laggard, or countries? 

Your comments, Ms. Leonard, on motivations—I couldn’t agree 

more. And I sometimes think that is missed, which is why I asked 

Secretary Rosenblum about that, whether or not there is an appreciation for how that motivation is what drives this, because they 

missed it on Boko Haram. I’ll give you an example. For almost 
27 

three years I tried to get the administration to designate Boko 

Haram an FTO, a foreign terrorist organization—number of hearings, dialogue after dialogue, finally put in a bill to do so. The day 

we were going to mark up the bill, they announced it was an FTO. 

We had missed two and a half, almost three years in not so designating it because it was just a bunch of ruffians who were blowing 

up bridges and killing people rather than driven by an ideology. So 

I think your point about the idea of holy struggle to advance Islam, 

the novel political order, universal purpose, creation of a caliphate, 

I think those words need to be said over and over again. So you 

got to understand the nature of, in this case, a metastasizing of 

cancer in order to combat it. And so I thank you for bringing focus 

to that. 

Because we do have to—and I did ask Secretary Rosenblum; if 

you could maybe, perhaps both of you, answer this—are we engaging the Islamic leadership well enough? I waited with bated breath 

to hear comments when al-Sisi made those famous comments on 

January 1st, and then a week later—I mean, that was bold. He 

was Sadat-like. And yet, it was like a dead silence here in the Capitol. We should have been embracing that in calling for that reformation and for Islam to heal itself from within. If you could 

speak to that. 

Human rights—Secretary Rosenblum thought there was not a 

nexus between what’s happening in human rights—what your view 

is on that. 

With regards to Chechnya, the dictator there, Kadyrov, and 

Chechen authorities in general, as you know, have become increasingly aggressive and tinged with Salafist notions. I remember we 

held hearings, did resolutions, traveled to Moscow. We even had 

Elena Bonner twice testify at hearings that I chaired—Sakharov’s 

wife—when the Chechen wars broke out. And now we’re seeing this 

renewed—maybe it never went away—radicalization occurring 

there. How does that figure into all of this? Because, as you all 

know, those fighters were absolutely bizarre in their extremism. 

And finally, if you could—let’s see—again, whether or not the administration understands the core reasons why, I would note parenthetically that—and I held hearings on this as well—for half of 

President Obama’s presidency, he did not have an ambassador-atlarge for international religious freedom, did not name countries of 

particular concern. To me—and I held hearings on it and asked 

them why, never got a good answer—it was revelation of priorities. 

It was no priority. We passed legislation last year to establish a 

special envoy for Middle Eastern minority religions. That would include the Islamic groups—faiths that are marginalized themselves, 

including Coptic Christians and others. There’s still nobody named 

as special envoy. We do have, thankfully, right now an excellent 

ambassador-at-large, David Saperstein, Rabbi Saperstein, but he 

came on late. He’s trying to do his level best. But you know, if you 

miss the reason why these things are happening, your remedy’s 

going to be far less effective and efficacious. 

So if you could speak to those things. 

Ms. LEONARD. That’s a long list. 

You had asked for a ranking. I’m going to sidestep the ranking, 

but I’m going to address it a different way and talk about the acute 
28 

problem for Uzbeks. Now, we talk about Uzbek citizens and ethnic 

Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, and that’s what we’ve seen as the ripest 

group. 

In Uzbekistan, it’s a very repressive regime. There are all kinds 

of challenges, and those citizens have long demanded increased 

democratic space. We’re no longer operating in Uzbekistan because 

of those same reasons. We were forced to leave the country, along 

with a lot of other NGOs, and that is a symptom of a very large 

and significant problem. 

In the meantime, right across the border, you’ve got the ethnic 

Uzbek minorities, a minority that has really suffered in Kyrgyzstan 

as a disenfranchised minority. I referred to the death of 400 of 

them in 2010. That’s totally unresolved. These are completely 

marginalized. They don’t feel safe. Even if there are whiffs of radical activity and you’re a moderate ethnic Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan, the 

level of trust with the security services, you’re not going to go because it invites increased surveillance, harassment, potential detention. And so we’re flirting with it becoming a self-fulfilling 

prophecy. And so, for that reason, I sort of single out the plight of 

Uzbeks in particular. 

But that’s not to say—I mean, as the alarming example of late 

in Tajikistan—that the problems aren’t going to crop up. And if I 

use my colleague’s term, this is a small numbers game. There are 

some really real threats. So I’ll shift gears a bit on your request 

for a ranking and say as much. 

Now, in terms of the threat of return of foreign fighters, a point 

that I didn’t make in my shorter comments is the criminalization 

that’s happening—this is laws that have been introduced in each 

of the countries, et cetera, in various stages—Uzbekistan is actually one that has said—contained in the legislation is basically an 

amnesty in terms of, as long as you haven’t actually done anything, 

we’ll forgive you, just come to us. And there’s an effort to rehabilitate. If you are that individual making that choice, the track record 

of that government doesn’t sort of infuse any degree of trust in taking that leap toward ‘‘I’m sorry, I’ve changed my mind, I want to 

walk back from it.’’ And so the Uzbek government and the rest of 

them need to really think hard about how do we prevent that. 

Now, if you’re a foreign fighter that wants to return home for 

whatever reason, our assessment is that you’d be more likely to 

probably find your way to Kyrgyzstan because Kazakhstan and 

Uzbekistan are going to treat you probably, on the relative scale of 

how you’ll be treated in the neighborhood, more harshly. A zerotolerance policy is what’s likely to be anticipated. Kyrgyzstan, although there may be severe consequences and not a lot of faith in 

what the rehabilitation opportunities would look like, it might be 

a safer bet if you really feel compelled to return home. 

You asked about human rights and the causal relationship. It’s 

a symptom of a larger problem. While there may not be absolute 

sort of research illustrating the direct relationship between human 

rights violations and radicalization, I think we can all agree that 

we’re here today suggesting that it’s a worrying trend. These are 

repressive regimes, with varying degrees of repression in each. But 

human rights is symptomatic of a larger problem and a lack of 
29 

space. So, causal or not, definitively, I don’t think it’s a false road. 

I mean, it’s a problem. 

Chechens, I think I’ll take a pass on that. 

And whether or not the administration understands the core reason why. We’ve talked about Afghanistan. For about a decade, 

we’ve all talked about and—we’ve worked in Central Asia for over 

15 years. The Commission has paid a lot of attention to the area. 

While the war was going on in Afghanistan and active, frankly, 

those national security priorities trumped the conversation that 

we’re having today about the dynamics that have created this particular problem. So while we might have wanted to promote rule 

of law, governance, open democratic space, take some of the pressure off, attend to the very issues that we have identified as creating the environment where radicalization is happening, those 

were trumped by strategic and tactical priorities that flowed out of 

the operations in Afghanistan, and it was really hard to find some 

bandwidth. So here we are today having that conversation. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Chairman, I’ll try to pick up and briefly touch 

on some of the excellent questions. By the way, that should be your 

Commission staff, if they could put together the answers to those 

questions I think they’ll be very well focused for a year because 

those are excellent questions. 

Firstly, let me just make reference on your comment on antiSemitism and all minority religious rights—Christian groups and 

others. They are oppressed. And you had mentioned Boko Haram 

examples in Nigeria, but you’ve seen the same play out in Iraq, obviously, as well as minority Muslim—Sufis in particular have a 

pretty hard time operating in the area. 

I’m also concerned about anti-Semitism, by the way, in Europe. 

If you notice the communications that are trying to resonate to the 

Islamists in the region, they do use that as part of that narrative. 

But I might try to tie a point that my colleague said eloquently, 

and that ties to some of the human rights issues. Whether it’s 

causal or not I think misses some of the point. The reality is it is 

part of the message, the story. That story is resonating, and it really is about storytelling with a certain group of individuals. So real 

or perceived grievances is almost irrelevant. It’s how it’s packaged 

in that broader story, and the storyboard has different components 

along the way. And human rights will always be one of those 

issues, real or perceived, raised in that storyboard. 

One thing I’d note, especially as pertains to Western foreign 

fighters, it’s not the message as much as it’s the packaging around 

the message. It’s an emotional call as much as it is a religious call. 

So it’s in the trappings of religion, but it really is an emotional call. 

And we’ve been very uncomfortable unpacking that particular set 

of issues. So I think that is an area we can and should do more. 

So a long-winded way of saying anti-Semitism is a concern. So 

are the rights of Christians in the area and other Muslims. 

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank both of you for your extraordinary 

insights, your leadership. And we benefit greatly from that, as does 

the, by extension, Congress, and I hope the executive branch as 

well. 

I do have to run to the floor. I have a speech I have to give, a 

colloquy. I might have missed it. I hope I haven’t. 
30 

But I want to thank you so very, very much. The hearing’s adjourned. 

Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 
(31) 

A P P E N D I X 
32 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Welcome to our witnesses and to everyone joining us this afternoon for this hearing on foreign fighters and the escalating threat of ISIS in Central Asia. 

A year ago today, the city of Mosul fell to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, 

during a wave of violence that swept brutally through Northern Iraq. Many of those 

who took part in the offensive were foreign fighters—in fact, the UN Security Council recently estimated that there are now at least 25,000 foreign terrorist fighters 

from more than 100 countries who have travelled internationally to join or fight for 

terrorist entities associated with ISIS and Al-Qaida. 

According to the International Crisis Group, as many as 4,000 foreign fighters 

come from the five countries of central Asia. Just last week, we learned that the 

chief of Tajikistan’s counter-terrorism program—someone highly trained by our own 

government—abandoned his post to join ISIS. 

What does this say about the current efforts to stop terror-minded men and 

women from volunteering and traveling to the Middle East? Clearly, our government—working with others and with organizations like the OSCE—must take 

stronger action to combat radicalization beyond our borders, as well as to ensure 

that returning foreign fighters do not bring jihad and murder back home. 

Central Asian governments face major challenges here. Many of these derive from 

their history as part of the Soviet Union, from wars in nearby Afghanistan and from 

limited economic development, which has led millions of their citizens to seek employment abroad, especially in Russia. The discrimination and exploitation to which 

those workers are subjected, as well as the decline of the Russian economy and 

changes in the Russian visa regime, have reduced the remittances these workers 

can send home to support their families and may have contributed to creating the 

conditions that ISIS uses to recruit foreign fighters from among different Central 

Asian nationalities. 

Some of the challenges the central Asia governments face are of their own making—including widespread corruption, lack of rule of law, and their own human 

rights records. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have particularly terrible human 

rights records, among the worst in the world in respect of political prisoners and 

torture. All of these factors are exploited by ISIS recruiters and other organizations 

promoting radicalization and violent extremism. 

It should be the particular role of the United States to promote, to the central 

Asian governments, our conviction that ‘‘fighting terrorism’’ is no excuse for violating human rights or the rule of law. 

I look forward to hearing about the many issues here, including counteracting 

radicalization of potential foreign fighters, inhibiting the travel of recruits and volunteers to the Middle East, disrupting financial support to fighters and their families, and preventing their return to their home countries. This is in the first place 

the responsibility of the governments, and there is the question of what they are 

trying to do and how well they are doing it. There is the question of what our government and the OSCE is doing and can do better, working with the central Asian 

governments—here we need to talk about issues of document security, border security and law enforcement coordination. I hope we can touch on all of these aspects. 
33 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership and for calling a hearing on an 

incredibly important aspect of security for our country and for our partners in Central Asia and all across the entire OSCE region. I also want to welcome our witnesses, and I look forward to hearing their insights on how we can better address 

this threat. 

I am pleased to note that the United States has a strong record of promoting multilateral, multidimensional approaches to combatting the diverse challenges associated with the recruitment of terrorists, as outlined by Chairman Smith, stretching 

back over 10 years. Since 2003, following a proposal by the United States, OSCE 

countries have been focused on improving security standards for international travel 

documents as a means of thwarting easy cross-border movement of terrorists. Constraining terrorists’ mobility continues to be a major security concern in the region, 

particularly regarding flows of foreign fighters from Central Asia. Over the past several years, the establishment and increased efficiency of migration networks has 

played a major role in ISIL’s ability to recruit terrorists from abroad. 

Additionally, since 2004, OSCE participating States, again at the urging of the 

United States, have concentrated on the implementation of Financial Action Task 

Force recommendations regarding terrorist financing. Access to capital not only empowers military capacity of organizations such as ISIL, but also affords them the 

opportunity to finance travel expenses for foreign fighters. For many Central Asians, 

ISIL’s appeal further rests on its supposed ability to offer greater access to educational opportunities, religious cohesion, and more stable social structures. If the 

United States and its partners wish to successfully extinguish the growing threat 

of these extremist organizations, then deliberate steps must be taken to dismantle 

its organizational structures. 

In addition to monitoring the dangers posed in Central Asia by the continued recruitment of foreign fighters to Afghanistan, Syria and other areas of the Middle 

East, the United States must remain vigilant in safeguarding its own security. Each 

individual recruited from Central Asia and other regions contributes to the growing 

influence of ISIL and the prevalence of violent extremism around the world. 

Over the past several years, thousands of men and women have abandoned their 

countries to join the ranks of ISIL. As Chairman Smith noted, on May 30 it was 

announced that a top military official from Tajikistan defected in favor of fighting 

for the terrorist group. The official had received formal military training in the 

United States. This troubling incident is indicative of the increased influence ISIL 

is continuing to build in Central Asia, even among powerful individuals. We must 

focus our efforts on nullifying the pretexts ISIL uses for recruitment and on destroying the framework of ISIL at the source, while simultaneously encouraging respect 

for human rights and bolstering institutions and rule of law in Central Asia and 

elsewhere. During the past decade, this Commission and the Congress have been 

staunch advocates of the counter-terrorism work of the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), OSCE field missions, especially those in Central 

Asia, and the extraordinary efforts of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. This work 

must continue into the future and must remain a priority for the United States and 

OSCE member States. 
34 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION

ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

I want to commend the Chairman for convening today’s hearing. Developments 

related to the recruitment of foreign fighters throughout the OSCE space have been 

of deep and ongoing concern to me, and I want to see continued progress in addressing this matter. The cooperative bonds between the peoples of the United States and 

Central Asian countries, I believe, are a solid foundation for us to cooperate on the 

crucial issues of combatting violent extremism and of preventing radicalization of 

individuals to the point that the become foreign terrorist fighters. 

As Chairman Smith noted, the Helsinki Commission has strongly supported the 

efforts of the U.S. government over many years to build cross-border, comprehensive 

security based on the shared commitments made by all OSCE states—including 

Central Asians—to respect fundamental freedoms. Human beings, whether they live 

in Washington or Paris or Tashkent, should expect of their governments reasonable 

steps to protect them from those who would do them harm, but also that their governments not impose repressive security measures that inhibit the exercise of freedoms of speech, assembly, media or religion. 

Unfortunately, we have seen such steps taken by governments in Russia and Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. These restrictions fuel resentment on the part of law-abiding citizens and give the propaganda 

arms of organizations like ISIL ammunition with which to attempt to lure individuals into their international terrorist networks. While I look forward to hearing 

from witnesses about the scale of the threat we are confronting and the measures 

we are, or should be taking to counter it, I want to note the important multi-dimensional approach to security that is the hallmark of the OSCE. As the OSCE’s firstdimension, or security dimension, response to threats to security and stability in the 

21st Century has grown to focus on border security, policing and counter-terrorism, 

we have never lost site of the interdependence of such measures with economic cooperation and respect for human rights. 

If one looks at the Helsinki Commission’s record over time, we have advocated for 

keeping the focus on human rights, democracy and the rule-of-law in U.S. policy as 

even handed as possible, toward allies and partners alike. We seek nothing but 

friendship and cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. But friends can—and 

need to—be honest with one another when they see mistakes being made. I take 

very seriously the grave concerns about ISIL and the threat that the recruitment 

of Central Asian fighters—from Russia and their home countries—represents to 

those countries and to the U.S. itself. As we listen to the views and suggestions of 

friends on our own shortcomings, I hope that others will be willing to consider our 

suggestions on how they can deal with security challenges like ISIL while respecting 

their OSCE human rights commitments. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and thanks in advance to our witnesses. 
35 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL N. ROSENBLUM, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY

FOR CENTRAL ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Introduction 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission: I welcome your invitation to review 

U.S. efforts to address the issue of foreign fighters from Central Asia joining the 

ranks of ISIL (Daesh) and other terrorist organizations. The United States is working with governments in Central Asia and with multilateral organizations in the region—including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)— 

in ways that parallel our work with partners around the world. Together with our 

international partners, we are committing significant resources to track and disrupt 

foreign terrorist fighter travel and recruitment. We are working together on information sharing and border security, legal reform and criminal justice responses, and 

countering violent extremism to prevent recruitment and radicalization to violence. 

And we marshal our resources to encourage key partners in Europe, North Africa, 

the Middle East, and Asia—including in Central Asia—to prioritize the threat, address vulnerabilities, and adopt preventive measures. 

Central Asians and the Conflict in Syria and Iraq 

For the overwhelming majority of Central Asians, the conflict in Syria and Iraq 

is a distant phenomenon; it is not something they think about day-to-day. But a 

small minority of Central Asians have been successfully recruited by violent extremists to join the conflict. Violent extremists have attempted to recruit Central Asians, 

millions of whom live and work in Russia as migrant workers, into the conflict in 

Syria and Iraq. In fact, while the nature of the conflict in Syria and Iraq and the 

clandestine nature of foreign terrorist fighter recruitment make reliable statistics 

nearly impossible to obtain, a variety of research suggests the vast majority of Central Asian recruits are being recruited from outside the borders of Central Asia, and 

many come from the Russian Federation. 

Why are these Central Asians leaving Russia to fight in Iraq and Syria? Motivations vary widely throughout the world, and even on a country-by-country basis 

within Central Asia. One key factor for migrant workers in Russia can be the lack 

of a positive presence of family, community, and religious leaders that, back home, 

would all work to prevent recruitment and radicalization to violence. Furthermore, 

once in Russia, Central Asian migrant workers are often subject to ghettoization. 

Many regularly experience discrimination, harassment, and humiliation from both 

the public and the authorities. The absence of mitigating factors such as social, familial and spiritual bonds together with the presence of aggravating factors such as 

marginalization and disenfranchisement create fertile ground for extremist recruiters. Recruiters are able to traverse migrant-labor heavy neighborhoods in Russia’s 

cities and use social media to find and target their quarry—isolated and lonely individuals who want to feel connected to something empowering and larger than themselves, often including individuals who were not previously religiously observant or 

educated. Recruiters employ a variety of narratives to attract adherents, including 

the idea of a ‘‘just war’’ in defense of innocents, an Islamic caliphate as a utopian 

paradise, and the opportunity to fight back against alleged ‘‘Western oppression.’’ 

When one or more of these narratives resonate with vulnerable individuals, they are 

encouraged to travel to the conflict zone to take up arms, either by recruiters faceto-face or through mechanisms such as social media. The new recruits are not only 

joining ISIL but also a range of other terrorist organizations, such as al Nusrah 

Front, some of which in fact are in conflict with ISIL. Recruiters also use similar 

tactics to attract the smaller numbers of individuals who travel directly from Central Asia to the conflict zone. 

What can be done to disrupt the flow of Central Asian fighters to Syria and Iraq? 

No one-size-fits-all approach could succeed, since radicalization involves a complex 

interplay of personal, group, community, sociopolitical, and ideological factors. Key 

to countering violent extremism is to mitigate causes of radicalization, such as economic distress and hopelessness; as such, one key effort is to improve economic prospects and job opportunities in the Central Asian countries themselves, where 

radicalization is less likely to take place than among migrant worker communities 

in Russia. Of course, improving economic opportunities in Central Asia is a longterm effort, and one that the United States and other donor countries have tried 

for years to address through various development aid efforts. There are also lessons 

to be learned about promoting safer labor migration as in the countries of South 

Asia. But there are also plenty of actions that can be taken in the short-to-medium 

term to address the threat of recruitment. And so, we have begun to engage the governments of Central Asia—and their peoples—about steps they can take to identify 
36 

and disrupt recruiting networks, prevent radicalization to violence, hinder financing, 

monitor and prevent travel and transit of recruits, engage civil society to develop 

resilient communities, build migrant support networks, and counter the false narratives spread by violent extremists. Additionally, we encourage Central Asian governments to identify and act upon credible domestic and transnational security 

threats, and to avoid conflating violent extremism with political opposition, the activities of civil society organizations, and peaceful religious practice. To prevent 

radicalization to violence, governments need to distinguish peaceful expressions of 

conscience from genuine threats of violence. 

Let me also turn for a moment from the conflict in Syria and Iraq to briefly address recent media reports on the presence of ISIL in Afghanistan. We have seen 

signs that ISIL is attempting to spread into Afghanistan, and that some Taliban 

groups have rebranded themselves as ISIL to attract funding and recruits. ISIL’s 

presence in Afghanistan is a relatively new phenomenon and it will take time to 

evaluate its long-term prospects. 

It is clearly a complicated situation, and one that requires a complex response. 

Let me turn to some of the efforts we are undertaking globally, regionally, and at 

the national level through both bilateral and multilateral engagement. 

Global Efforts 

Under the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, which we have been encouraging our 

partners in Central Asia to join, our key efforts include disrupting the flow of foreign fighters and countering the messaging of violent extremists. On the former, efforts range from legal reform and criminal justice responses, to border control, to 

information sharing, to interdicting the travel of known and suspected terrorists, 

and more. On counter-messaging, the United States, along with the United Arab 

Emirates and the United Kingdom, lead the Coalition Working Group on that subject, which directs coalition efforts on counter-ISIL messaging across platforms and 

languages. The UAE has established a messaging center in the UAE and may examine prospects for other regional messaging centers. This is a critical element because, as I mentioned earlier, so much of the violent radicalization and recruitment 

begins on social media, on people’s smartphones, where our enemies are employing 

sophisticated and effective techniques, and we have to counter them. 

Another global effort regarding foreign fighters is through the United Nations. In 

September 2014, President Obama chaired a session of the United Nations Security 

Council (UNSC) that adopted Resolution 2178, which requires countries to take several steps to address the threat of foreign terrorist fighters, including preventing 

them from entering or transiting their territories and to adopt and implement appropriate legislation to prosecute them. Resolution 2178 also called for improved 

international cooperation through sharing information on criminal investigations, 

interdictions, and prosecutions. The resolution marked the first time that the UNSC 

named countering violent extremism as a priority for Member States. The UNSC 

directed UN counter-terrorism organizations to assist countries in enforcing the resolution. The resolution resonated in Central Asia, as shown by Kazakhstan’s statement accompanying the resolution, in which Deputy Foreign Minister Yerzhan 

Ashikbaev said cooperation between neighboring States and regional organizations 

plays a key role in preventing terrorism and highlighted specific concerns about 

young people travelling to join ‘‘terrorist-driven conflicts.’’ 

Third, in February the White House convened the Summit on Countering Violent 

Extremism that brought together ministers from more than 60 countries, the United 

Nations Secretary-General and other international organizations—including the 

OSCE Secretary General—and representatives from civil society and the private 

sector to develop a comprehensive action agenda against violent extremism. It 

charted a path for progress that includes a leaders-level summit on the margins of 

the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2015. Kazakhstan and 

Kyrgyzstan took part in the event in Washington and have continued to engage as 

the participants have built on the Summit’s action agenda. 

So that covers some of our global efforts, but what are we specifically doing in 

the region? 

Regional Efforts 

At the end of this month, the Government of Kazakhstan will host a ministeriallevel Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Summit in Astana. The Astana event follows up on the White House CVE Summit and aims to bring together government 

authorities, multilateral representatives, and civil society leaders to exchange perspectives and share information, and propose programs that will address violent extremism at its roots. The Summit’s sessions plan to focus on eight priority areas: 
37 

• Assessing the Drivers and Threats of Violent Extremism in South & Central 

Asia • Innovative Approaches in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism • Violent Extremist Propaganda: Countering the Message and Offering Alternatives • Developing National Strategies/Action Plans to Counter Violent Extremism • Promoting Local Research on the Drivers and Spread of Violent Extremism • Building Relationships and Success Stories—Government and Community Collaboration • Empowering youth, women, and religious leaders and civil society to prevent 

violent extremism • The Role of the Private Sector in Helping to Prevent Violent Extremism 

Later this month, and complementing the Astana event, we are supporting a Civil 

Society CVE Summit in Istanbul. That summit plans to focus on nine priority areas: 

• Promoting Local Research and Information-Sharing on the Drivers of Violent 

Extremism • The Role of Civil Society, including Women and Youth in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism • Strengthening Community-Police and Community-Security Force Relations as 

Ingredients for Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism • Promoting Positive Narratives and Weakening the Legitimacy of Violent Extremist Messaging • Interactive Technology Training for Addressing CVE • Promoting Educational Approaches to Build Resilience to Violent Extremism • Enhancing Access to Mainstream Religious Knowledge • Preventing Radicalization in Prisons and Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Violent Extremists • Identifying Political and Economic Opportunities for Communities Vulnerable to 

Radicalization and Recruitment to Violent Extremism 

So our regional approach is to bring together governments and civil society across 

Central Asia to identify the drivers of radicalization and find the solutions.We are 

also helping to support the OSCE as it leads several regional efforts on the issue 

in Central Asia. This past February, the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department 

and its Tajikistan office organized a regional three-day workshop on promoting regional cooperation and response to foreign terrorist fighters. This workshop was the 

first of its kind in Central Asia and brought together participants from government 

and civil society to discuss the requirements of the UNSC and OSCE resolutions on 

countering foreign fighters. From Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Tajikistan all sent representatives. The OSCE also plans an August regional workshop on preventive obligations regarding foreign terrorist fighters under UNSCR 

2178 in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in addition to a June OSCE-wide Conference in Vienna on countering the incitement of foreign terrorist fighters and preventing their 

recruitment and departure. And as a follow-up to the White House CVE Summit, 

the OSCE has developed a multi-year program that aims to build the capacity of 

civil society leaders, including youth, women, and religious figures, to contribute to 

CVE efforts. 

National Efforts 

Central Asian governments are deeply concerned about the spread of violent extremism, and they want to engage with the United States and like-minded partners. 

Our diplomats regularly discuss these issues with their counterparts, and we encourage the countries of Central Asia to take a comprehensive approach to CVE and 

countering foreign fighter recruitment and radicalization to violence that includes 

improving security and law enforcement capacities consistent with international 

human rights obligations, as well as broadening engagement with civic groups, religious organizations, private businesses, and other groups to counter the spread of 

violent extremism through grassroots programs. Our bilateral programs also encourage this kind of comprehensive approach. These efforts include security-focused programs such as building law enforcement capacity and enhanced investigative skills, 

but also broader programs such as those aimed at training law enforcement in community policing techniques, or increasing the role of religious leaders in conflict resolution at the local level. 

Kazakhstan 

As shown by their hosting of the upcoming CVE Summit and co-sponsorship of 

UNSC 2178, Kazakhstan is a leader on these issues in the region. At the highest 

levels, Kazakhstan’s leadership has stressed the importance of joint efforts to dis-
38 

credit ISIL and counter its propaganda. We could not agree more, and we look forward to working with Kazakhstan and other countries in the region on counter-ISIL 

messaging. We are already working with the Kazakhstanis, through our assistance 

efforts, to help increase access to civically-relevant information; and to support increased communication among communities, civil society organizations, the private 

sector and government officials. The Department of Defense is also using counternarcotics funding to build the capacity of Kazakhstan’s border guards with border 

outposts and training. 

Kyrgyz Republic 

The Kyrgyz Republic has followed up on the White House CVE Summit with programming and policies based on the Summit’s recommendations, and our Embassy 

reports very positive engagement on this issue. U.S. development assistance provides economic growth programs designed to improve people’s lives, promote jobs, 

and enhance business and trade, as well as to support the development of a more 

collaborative relationship between government and civil society. NGOs like Foundation for Tolerance International have partnered with the Ministry of Internal Affairs 

(MVD) to conduct preventative training exercises in areas that are especially susceptible to recruitment. Our Embassy funds programs on increasing the role of religious leaders in peacekeeping in volatile areas, as well as English language and vocational skills training for madrassah students. And the OSCE, through its Community Security Initiative, is embedding police advisors in at-risk neighborhoods in the 

south of Kyrgyzstan to promote community policing approaches, encourage ethnic 

reconciliation, and mitigate tensions. 

Tajikistan 

In Tajikistan, we are working to address some of the drivers of radicalization by 

increasing economic opportunities within the country in an effort to reduce migration and potential exposure to extremist ideologies. USAID’s Feed the Future initiative, for example, seeks to improve food security, and reduce poverty and hunger. 

Its programs work with local communities to improve irrigation water management 

and help local families to improve the quality and quantity of their crops, thereby 

increasing family incomes. USAID is also helping to strengthen citizen participation 

in local government decision making and to improve local governments’ abilities to 

support its communities. The Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) operates a Border Guard Infrastructure program 

that, in addition to training and equipping border guards, focuses on district-level 

community policing efforts that work to counter violent extremism in remote areas. 

This program runs in parallel to an OSCE project that focuses on regional-level 

community-policing coordination. INL and OSCE are working to dovetail their efforts to create direct communication, coordination, and community input on policing 

efforts at district, regional, and national levels. The OSCE has also partnered with 

international and local NGOs on initiatives focused on encouraging family members, 

particularly mothers, to identify and address early signs of violent extremism in 

their local communities. For example, we supported a pilot OSCE CVE program in 

Tajikistan aimed at supporting women’s roles in security, working with mothers 

groups in rural villages to train them to recognize and respond to early warning 

signs of potential radicalization in their children. We are also in the planning stages 

of a community-based cultural program designed to counter extremist messaging in 

Tajikistan. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Defense provides counter-narcotics 

funding in Tajikistan to build the capacity of border guards with border outposts, 

training, and communications gear. 

Turkmenistan 

We support an ongoing OSCE project to train officers from Turkmenistan’s State 

Border Service on border management that enhances that country’s ability to patrol 

and conduct searches, surveillance, and counter threats at the border—a key component in the effort to identify credible security threats in the region and addressing 

them accordingly. Additionally, in March, we sent representatives to a regional 

workshop on border security management for countering terrorism hosted by 

Turkmenistan and organized jointly by the United Nations Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, and the OSCE’s Center in Ashgabat and its Transnational 

Threats Department/Action against Terrorism Unit. The workshop focused on countering the flow of foreign fighters through enhanced transnational cooperation by 

law enforcement agencies. 
39 

Uzbekistan 

For the first time in ten years, two Uzbekistani officials participated in training 

this past April by the Department of Defense on the law of armed conflict. The 

training dealt in part with the nexus between terrorism and human rights. In 2014 

Uzbek security forces also participated in border security training through a resumption of the Department of State’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. In 

addition to anti-terrorism training, our Embassy’s social media and programming in 

Uzbekistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, focuses on education, family, and peace— 

topics that, at their heart, are the surest ways to counter the appeal of violent extremism over time. Furthermore, anti-trafficking activities in Uzbekistan promote safe 

migration and minimize the risk of labor exploitation that can exacerbate 

radicalization. 

Conclusion: A Generational Challenge 

To conclude, I could not do better than to quote from the recent speech in Doha 

by General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to 

Counter ISIL: ‘‘From the point of radicalization and recruitment to the process of 

rehabilitation, we as a Coalition and a community of nations must work together 

to confront this generational challenge.’’The nations of Central Asia, and the nations 

of the world, are waking up to the challenge of foreign terrorist fighters in Syria 

and Iraq. The United States plans to continue to work with global institutions, regional groups, and national governments to confront the challenge of foreign fighters 

and reduce the threat to our partners, allies, and to our own country. And the Department of State is eager to work closely with this Commission and others in Congress to address this generational challenge. Thank you and I look forward to your 

questions. 

Daniel Rosenblum is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Asia at the U.S. Department of State. Working within the State Department’s Bureau for South and 

Central Asian Affairs, Mr. Rosenblum oversees U.S. policy towards and diplomatic 

relations with the five Central Asian states. 

During 2008–2014, Mr. Rosenblum was Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe, 

Eurasia, and Central Asia. His office provided strategic guidance and oversight for 

all U.S. foreign assistance to more than 30 countries in the former Soviet Union, 

the Western Balkans, and Central Europe. He and his team coordinated the efforts 

of more than a dozen U.S. government agencies supporting economic reform, the development of democratic institutions and rule of law, building the capacity of lawenforcement and other security-sector institutions, and relieving human suffering 

through humanitarian aid. He also served as the primary U.S. government liaison 

with other international donors, including the European Union and multilateral development banks. 

During 1997–2008, Mr. Rosenblum held a variety of other positions in the Assistance Coordinator’s office, including Deputy Coordinator, Director of the Eurasia Division, and Special Advisor for Economic Programs. He played the lead role in developing economic initiatives for several regions of Russia; served as the State Department liaison to 10 U.S.-backed investment funds operating in the region; and was 

instrumental in designing and implementing large packages of assistance for 

Ukraine, Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic following internal upheavals, and for 

Kosovo following its declaration of independence. 

Before coming to the State Department, Mr. Rosenblum spent six years as Senior 

Program Coordinator at the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) of the AFL-CIO. 

FTUI conducted educational programs and provided technical assistance to labor 

unions in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Mr. Rosenblum managed 

the operation of field offices in Moscow, Kyiv, and Warsaw. While working for FTUI, 

Mr. Rosenblum also served as a public spokesman for the AFL-CIO on the labor 

movement in the former Soviet Union, and social problems associated with the transition to a market economy.Mr. Rosenblum has a BA in History from Yale University and an MA in Soviet Studies and International Economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. 
40 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO, ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT AND DI- RECTOR, CENTER FOR CYBER AND HOMELAND SECURITY, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON

UNIVERSITY

Chairman Smith, Co-Chairman Wicker and distinguished Members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the issue of 

foreign terrorist fighters. Your leadership in examining this challenge is important 

because the threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad, and to U.S. allies, is both 

real and pressing. At the same time, we cannot go it alone: the threat spans national borders, which means that international cooperation and transnational solutions are required. 

Allow me to begin with a word about how these remarks are organized. This testimony is structured with the bottom line up-front: a thumbnail sketch of the problem 

accompanied by key recommendations for action. This executive summary is then 

followed by additional details which serve as context and background for the crucial 

topline material. The latter is intended to serve as a resource for those with the 

time and inclination for a deep dive into the subject at hand. 

The foreign fighter challenge is a matter of serious concern for the United States 

and its allies. While the foreign fighter phenomenon is not new, its present scale 

and scope is unprecedented. As individuals from the West travel to conflict zones 

around the world, they are forming new networks with discrete skills and they are 

amassing battle experience that may be turned around and redirected at their countries of origin. So-called returnees are a particular challenge for domestic law enforcement officials and intelligence agencies of the United States and its allies because such individuals possess cultural fluency and are able to walk amongst us. 

While tripwires such as exit and entry measures and controls are increasingly being 

adopted by the U.S. and Europe, it remains a challenge to identify and intervene 

before they cause actual harm, given the volume of individuals of concern. Communities and local authorities are at the tip of the spear in this regard because they 

are closest to the problem and are best placed to identify and prevent it before it 

fully materializes. 

This problem is all the more complex as the U.S. draws down its engagement in 

Afghanistan. This conflict zone and others (such as the Maghreb and Sahel) are 

under-governed spaces where nefarious forces can thrive; and with respect to Syria 

and Iraq, ISIL actually controls territory. As the official U.S. presence tapers off in 

Afghanistan, particularly in the context of indigenous forces being either unable or 

unwilling to ramp up commensurately, our adversaries are afforded space and time 

in which to train, plan, plot and recruit. 

Of course the problem is not confined to Afghanistan. To the contrary, a variation 

of the problem extends throughout Central Asia: as the Commission has pointed 

out, the so-called Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) has attracted hundreds if not 

thousands of fighters from ‘‘the ‘stans’’. These numbers demonstrate that the ideology and narrative of violent Islamist extremist movements and groups continues 

to resonate with and successfully recruit individuals who are susceptible to such 

propaganda. 

In short, foreign fighters pose a threat to innocents within the conflict zones, to 

countries in the surrounding region, and to the broader international community. 

The crucial question, therefore, is: what can and should we do to combat this problem? Allow me to offer several suggestions. 

First, we need to combat the root of the problem which is the ideology upon which 

ISIL feeds and recruits. Pushing back on this narrative in order to expose its inherent inconsistencies and falsehoods must therefore be a crucial plank in both national 

and transnational strategy. Unless and until we combat the lifeblood of the jihadists 

in this way, their pool of recruits will continue to grow. 

Second, there are many more operational activities, both within and across borders that can be deepened and broadened to achieve more robust (counterterrorist) 

outcomes. Specifically, the United States must continue to work in tandem with its 

allies within the ‘‘Five Eyes’’ intelligence alliance, and expand its cooperation in this 

area to other countries in Europe and beyond. Information is the crucial component 

that underlies virtually all counterterrorism efforts, both domestic and cross-border; 

hence we must maximize the intelligence that US officials and their counterparts 

in allied nations possess in order to best formulate and execute the measures that 

will keep foreign fighters’ plans left of boom. 

Third, the United States should work with the countries of Central Asia to assist 

them in building the capacities that are necessary for them to be their own best 

guardians. For instance, more could be done in the area of border security (including 

sharing best practices in this field) in order to clamp down on the freedom of travel 

currently experienced by foreign fighter aspirants and returnees. 
41 

1 ‘‘Bridge figures’’ are defined as primary actors in the radicalization process and serve as 

a major catalyst for recruitment. Frank J. Cilluffo, Jeffrey B. Cozzens, and Magnus Ranstorp, 

Foreign Fighters Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones (Washington D.C.: The George Washington Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2010). 2Peter Neumann, ‘‘Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s,’’ International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, January 26, 

2015, http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/ 3 ‘‘Fourth Brooklyn, New York, Resident Charged With Attempt and Conspiracy to Provide 

Material Support to ISIL’’, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, April 6, 2015, http:// 

www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fourth-brooklyn-new-york-resident-charged-attempt-and-conspiracy-provide-material-support 

The measures recommended above are intended to complement, deepen and extend ongoing OSCE work which leverages the Organization’s unique strengths and 

abilities. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to trying 

to answer any questions that you may have. And I hope that you find the detailed 

explanatory material below useful. 

Context 

The current terrorist threat climate is reminiscent of that prior to 9/11, marked by 

budget cuts and the rollback of hard-earned gains. The emergence of ISIL, along 

with active terrorist groups in Nigeria, Mali, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia, pose a set 

of unprecedented challenges. The most notable: foreign fighters. These individuals 

constitute a critical threat to the security of the United States and our allies. Foreign fighters and bridge figures—the latter equipped with the cross-cultural fluency 

to punch up and spread the radicalizing message across a broader pool of recruits— 

come from a myriad of backgrounds, but share a common ability to move across borders, extend conflict zones, bolster insurgent factions both operationally and 

motivationally, and threaten the territorial integrity of their home countries upon 

return. 1 ISIL has attracted well over 20,000 foreign fighters (at least 4,000 of whom 

Western, including 150 Americans) from nearly 90 nationalities. 2 Bridge figures 

play a key role in radicalizing and recruiting Westerners, as was the case when an 

Uzbek-American from Brooklyn was charged with radicalizing three other Central 

Asian-Americans and funding their transit to join ISIL in Syria. 3 Countering the 

extremist threat—abroad and at home—will require robust international and domestic partnerships emboldened by a clear-cut foreign policy and strategy. 

Foreign fighters and bridge figures internationalize local conflicts, drawing the attention of Western media, promoting the jihadist cause, and recreating recruits 

among populations. Moreover, these conflicts became extended through time and 

space; forming networks and cells through which ideology, manpower, and expertise 

are exchanged across borders. The first conflict that involved mobilized Islamic foreign fighters for the sake of jihad was the Afghan-Soviet War from 1979 to 1992. 

The modern notion of individual obligation as a religious duty was popularized by 

founding member of al-Qaeda Abdullah Azzam. Throughout the 1990s, similar reasoning was used by foreign fighters during the Bosnian War, First Chechen War, 

and Somali conflict. 

Many foreign fighters end up returning to their home countries, radicalized, jobless, and well-trained. Such was the case after the Soviet-Afghan war, as thousands 

of Arab foreign fighters leveraged personal contacts with former comrades and 

bridge figures to form decentralized cells and networks across the Middle East and 

North Africa. This nascent, but growing jihadist scene produced a spate of violent 

attacks against the U.S. and its allies, Arab governments, and Israel. Led by Osama 

bin Laden, al-Qaeda emerged as the ideological and operational vanguard of 

jihadism, inspiring the 1993 attempting bombing of the World Trade Center, orchestrating the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa, funding local militias in 

Bosnia and Somalia, and staging the 9/11 attacks in 2001. 

At the same time, Afghanistan—thrown onto the back burner by both foreign 

jihadists and American policy-makers—continued to collapse under the weight of 

civil war. Central Asian fighters; the peoples from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, long oppressed by their own authoritarian, 

secular governments, flocked to the new dominant force in the region— the Taliban. 

The Taliban provided Central Asian combatants with a clear banner to mobilize and 

fight under and shielded bin Laden after 9/11. Despite being toppled by the U.S.- 

led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2002, the Taliban resurged in 

2006 with the help of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), other Central 

Asians, Chechens, and Caucasians. The U.S. military operations in Iraq in 2003 

forced a shift in administrative energy, resources, and troops away from the Afghan 
42 

4 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-state-a-videointroduction 5 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-state-a-videointroduction 6 http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/reports-analysis/report/isis-centralasia-growing-threat 

theater, allowing both the Taliban to re-emerge under the regime of Hamid Karzai 

and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) led by Abu Musab az-Zarqawi, to expand in the Levant. 

It is significant to note AQI is ISIL’s predecessor. Up until this time period, the 

international jihadist network consisted of al-Qaeda ‘‘core’’—bin Laden and his 

small cadre of commanders—and its various affiliates. Islamic insurgencies and localized, homegrown cells sprouted up through these overlapping logistical, financial, 

and personal networks. 

The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and eruption of region wide uprisings in 2011 

provided a set of completely unique circumstances under which jihadists could 

threaten Western interests. As opposed al-Qaeda core’s priority of hitting the ‘‘far 

enemy’’, or the U.S. and the West, the Islamic State or ISIL emphasized and was 

successful at consolidating and governing territory. It has done so in Syria, Iraq, 

and Libya; supported by cells across the region and world. ISIL’s declaration of the 

‘‘Caliphate’’ in June 2014 bolstered by a sophisticated, savvy media campaign—two 

things al-Qaeda never fully achieved—has given it unprecedented legitimacy and 

appeal in the eyes of foreign fighters. ISIL has attracted well over 20,000 foreign 

fighters (at least 4,000 of whom Western) from nearly 90 nationalities. 4 To provide 

a sense of scale, these numbers are unprecedented compared to the Soviet-Afghan 

War, which attracted 5,000 Muslims from around the world, the Chechnya conflict 

1,000 fighters, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 1,000, and Operation 

Iraqi Freedom 4,000. 5

With most of the international community’s attention on Syria and Iraq, a loss 

of focus on Afghanistan can lead to the rollback of hard-earned gains that had been 

achieved through the investment of $686 billion and, most importantly, the lives of 

over 2,000 of our men and women in uniform. If the U.S. ends military operations 

in Afghanistan by the scheduled January 20 2016 deadline, we run the risk of allowing the Taliban, both al-Qaeda and ISIL-backed elements, to carve out safe havens. 

Given the freedom to operate in such havens, there is a greater likelihood foreign 

terrorist organizations will be better positioned to plan and conduct attacks against 

the U.S. and Europe. The key to the Taliban’s survival and success: Central Asian 

fighters. If the U.S. can cooperate with regional and international allies to not only 

stem the growth of Western jihadism, but also the free flow of Central Asian militants to and from Afghanistan—some pro-ISIL and some not—then the security of 

the American homeland and our allies will be better addressed. 

ISIL and Central Asia 

While most of the international community is focused on Syria and Iraq, a regional 

crisis is brewing in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The activation and growth of 

Central Asian foreign fighter networks pose three acute threats to U.S. security. 

First, these individuals provide direct support to ISIL’s foothold in the Levant and 

stand to protract the conflict found there. Second, when these fighters return to 

their home countries, many will use the financial, logistical, and military skills acquired in the Levant and Afghanistan to form cells and groups in Central Asia. 

Third, the entrance of ISIL-branded elements in the Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas (FATA) internationalizes the fight against a Taliban rejuvenated by Central 

Asian foreign fighters. 

Direct Support 

ISIL has made clear that it intends to engage heavily with Central Asian 

Islamists. In January, its leadership began a charm offensive and leveraged their 

position as an anti-establishment, Islamic alternative to the region’s secular regimes. ISIL’s leadership has been able to claim some level of religious authority, as 

it has effectively exposed the (fairly naked) ties that moderating voices have to the 

government. This political positioning has been bolstered by promises of economic 

opportunity, with advertised salaries ranging as high as $5,000 per month. In contrast to the glossy tactics used to attract Western fighters, social media plays a 

more limited role. The ‘old pulls’ of economic opportunity and an outlet of political 

expression foster a deeper support and will require a corresponding countering violent extremism strategy. 

The approach has been quite successful to date—some estimates hold that 

4,000 6 Central Asian foreign fighters have begun to fight in the Levant. According 
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7 http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/ 8 http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=contentrecords.viewdetail&contentrecordid=1199&contentrecordtype=p&contenttype=p 9 http://jihadology.net/2014/07/22/al-%E1%B8%A5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-join-the-ranks/http://www.rferl.org/content/under-black-flag-centralasia-militants-allegiance/26666098.html 10 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32917311 

to the International Center for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), there are an estimated 500 Uzbeks, 360 Turkmen, 250 Kazaks, 190 Tajiks, and 100 Kyrgyzs, bolstered by 1,500 Caucasians and 800–1,500 Russians fighting in Syria. 7 According to 

the U.S. Counter-Terrorism Center, there are more than 1,000 Kazakhs fighting for 

ISIL. 8 Like Western foreign fighters, Central Asians provide propaganda and language services for recruitment abroad. In Syria and Iraq, Central Asians are divided 

along ethnic and linguistic lines into jamaats, or factions. Some of the most prominent ones like the Uzbek factions Katibat al-Imam Bukhari and Sabri’s Jamaat— 

both of which operate in northern Syria alongside 1,500 veteran Caucasian fighters—have pledged allegiance to ISIS. 9 These factions mostly operate out of northern Syria, contributing to ISIL’s dominance in Raqqa and never-ending attempts to 

take Aleppo, Idlib, and Latakia. In the absence of U.S. Special Forces and human 

assets on the ground to guide air strikes, these fighters enjoy more time to train, 

plot, and execute attacks against moderate Syrian rebels. 

Cell Formation 

Central Asians and Caucasians not only fill the rank-and-file, but also important 

leadership positions. ISIL’s Central Asian commanders with previous military experience—for example, ISIL’s northern Syria Emir Umar al-Shishani, a former Special 

Reconnaissance soldier in the Georgian Army and Tajikistan’s former Special Forces 

chief Gulmurod Khalimov—are particularly dangerous for several reasons. 10 These 

fighters, through mosques, prayer rooms, and personal connections, have been able 

to recruit and radicalize hundreds of Central Asian youth alongside ISIL. The combination of a committed leadership pool and a broadened domestic base imbues the 

region with the necessary raw materials for violent Islamist organizations to form 

domestically. As leaders begin to convert their operational and administrative 

knowledge into active terror cells, Central Asian governments may be forced to contend with new threats. 

These fronts will be further enhanced by returning foreign fighters. Central Asian 

Islamist groups—driven by the desire to establish a transnational Caliphate across 

the region since the 1990s—have a long history of armed opposition to both pre- and 

post-Soviet regimes. The success of these groups spawned a plethora of decentralized Islamist extremist groups. Some engaged American and Pakistani troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan and others remained at home to conduct bomb attacks and 

assassination of regime targets. In essence, Islamist militancy in Central Asia—long 

cultivated by a history of social and economic oppression by secular police states— 

spawned a cadre of battle-hardened jihadis bent on transiting from one conflict zone 

to another to establish an Islamic state. It is no accident that the IMU experienced 

a pronounced period of resurgence, immediately following the return of Talibanaffiliated foreign fighters from Afghanistan. The result in Central Asia could prove 

to be an existential threat for some of the region’s governments. 

Conflict Convergence 

Foreign fighter recruitment has served as a platform from which ISIL has grown 

its physical presence. In September, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan—one of 

the region’s most active terror organizations—effectively severed its ties to the 

Taliban and pledged allegiance to ISIL’s leadership. The move represented a large 

swing of momentum in ISIL’s favor and was accompanied by the emergence of ISILaffiliated fighters in Northern Afghanistan’s Kunduz Province. From here, operations have expanded into parts even less easily governed. The Fergana Valley— 

a remote region that is incorporated into parts of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Tajikistan—has the beginnings of a promising haven for returning ISIS fighters. 

And—as we saw in the April attacks in Eastern Afghanista—ISIL will challenge 

Taliban territories in and around the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 

The most pressing concern lies in the FATA, however. Here, ISIL and the Taliban 

are poised to battle one another for regional supremacy. Syria’s own civil war has 

shown that national militaries are ill-suited to maintain territorial integrity, while 

combatting two rival adversaries. In particular, an unproven Afghan National Army 

(ANA) stands particularly vulnerable to these challenges. Geographically challenging borders stand to exacerbate the problem and will likely be exploited by 
44 

11 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/b072-syria-calling-radicalisation-incentral-asia.aspx 12 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- 

CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/slresl2178.pdf 13 http://www.crisisgroup.org//media/Files/asia/central-asia/b072-syria-calling-radicalisation-incentral-asia.pdf 14 http://www.undp.org/content/brussels/en/home/partnershipslinitiatives/results/bomca.html 

transnational groups who can more easily move materiel across national borders. 

Ultimately, decisive action will be required if countries around the world are to deny 

ISIL a stronghold that has lent its occupier the ability to stage more destructive attacks. 

Remedies 

In order to stem ISIL’s further expansion into Central Asia and Afghanistan, the 

United States needs to work with domestic and international partners to ensure 

both short and long-term security. The instability in Afghanistan is largely attributed to the conflating violence in Syria and Iraq, as it is reported that 2,000–4,000 

Central Asians are fighting on behalf of ISIL. 11 These individuals are leveraging 

the political and economic marginalization of Muslim communities to recruit and 

radicalize others. The police states of Central Asia view ISIL not only as a security 

threat, but also an excuse to crack down on political dissent—further crushing prospects of political and social change. Circumstances warrant a security-oriented strategy that reunites and enhances our relationship with the ‘‘Five Eyes’’ (U.S., United 

Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), the world’s strongest and most valuable counter-terrorism partnership. We can take various lessons from this dynamic 

and expand it to our European Union, transatlantic, and then, Central Asian partners to fully curtail the foreign fighter and homegrown threat. On the other hand, 

to prevent the opening up of terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan and possible collapse of the nascent Kabul government and Afghan National Army (ANA), the 

United States should not make the same mistake as it did when disengaging from 

Afghanistan in 2003 and Iraq in 2011. Foreign fighter pipelines have intensified, requiring even more determination, focus, and willpower to sustain our counterterrorism and military efforts in the FATA. 

First, the U.S. needs to take on a clear yet broad-based stand against foreign 

fighters. This may include a more concerted effort to enforce U.N. Security Resolution 2178 (2014), which lays out appropriate measures on preventing inter-state 

travel of foreign fighters, enforcing proper information-sharing practices within national security systems, and criminalizing terrorist activity. 12 In terms of counteracting Western foreign fighters, the Five Eyes may consider expanding intelligence 

cooperation to include other European nations that suffer from radicalization and 

extremism, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, France, Norway, 

Spain, Italy, and to a controlled degree Turkey, the Balkan states, and Central Asia. 

Integrating European and Central Asian intelligence can provide the necessary 

framework for broader, more global law enforcement information-sharing equipped 

with secure communications networks, databases, and a system of notices, plus 

measures to track illicit money transfers, stolen, forged identity papers and travel 

documents. 

An example of the present lack of critical information sharing is the relative ease 

in transferring personnel and resources from the Levant, either through Turkey and 

the Caucasus and across the Caspian Sea or overland through northern Iran, into 

Afghanistan. Travel to Turkey is visa-free for citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, while Uzbeks can get a 30-day visa upon arrival. 13

Intelligence sharing between Turkish authorities and Central Asian security services is lackluster. As one of its NATO allies, the U.S. should encourage Turkey to 

re-evaluate its liberal travel controls and cooperate more with Central Asian nations. In order for this to occur, there needs to be greater efforts to identify and investigate potential foreign fighters. There are several mechanisms designed to maintain and improve border management in Central Asia, including the Organization 

for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA). BOMCA is a European Union-U.N. Development 

Programme joint venture meant to promote stability and security of Central Asian 

nation-states through integrated, modernized border management. 14 Originally conceived to combat the illicit transit of goods and personnel across Central Asia, 

BOMCA should be develop the capacity—through U.S. and European assistance— 

to combat foreign fighter migrations. This means more intelligence sharing to help 

border security officials identify, apprehend, and ultimately prosecute violent extremists. The OSCE has two lines of programming that can assist the BOMCA in 
45 

15 http://www.osce.org/secretariat/110768 16 Law, David. ‘‘Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform’’ 17 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/26/counter-terrorism-incentral-asia-requires-international-cooperation/ 18 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/26/counter-terrorism-incentral-asia-requires-international-cooperation/ 19 http://www.stripes.com/us-advisers-hope-realistic-training-scenarios-help-iraqi-troops-faceislamic-state-fighters-1.343931 20 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf 

beefing up border practices: border management and combating terrorism. 15 However OSCE and BOMCA activities are not streamlined and they lack information 

sharing amongst themselves, let alone between the nation-states they are attempting to help. 16

To make border management more geared towards counter-terrorism, it is worth 

considering creating a liaison office that integrates the OSCE and BOMCA offices 

with the Joint Plan for Action for Central Asian States under the U.N. Global 

Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Istanbul Process. The former enables all states to 

agree on a broad strategy to combat terrorism. A major issue is the sluggish process 

of implementation across national contexts and regional relationships. 17 The 

Istanbul Process, focused on security and development, also faces issues of integration and implementation. Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asian nation, is not formally a member in the Process’s counter-terrorism section. 18

Better border management with an orientation towards counter-terrorism and 

transnational security will reduce the spillover of violence into northern Afghanistan, where the Taliban and ISIL-affiliated groups are not only fighting each other, 

but also the ANA. ISIL’s goal is to one day merge its Wilayat al-Khorasan, or 

‘‘Khorasan Province’’ with its territory in Syria and Iraq. This prospect is unlikely, 

but constitutes a direct threat to Afghanistan. President Obama’s rapid withdrawal 

of American troops from Iraq in 2011 should serve as a valuable lesson in maintaining our political, economic, and humanitarian commitment to Afghanistan. In Iraq, 

our lack of presence in the post-withdrawal period afforded then-Prime Minister 

Nouri al-Maliki a complete mandate to fill political and military ranks with Shiite 

loyalists, dilapidating an Iraqi military that the United States had spent $25 billion 

to train and equip. 19 The Sunni population was marginalized and pushed into the 

arms of a rejuvenated ISIL. To avoid a similar situation in Afghanistan—where the 

United States has spent $686 billion since 2001—American military officials, in tandem with Kabul, should continue to pressure Taliban and ISIL-affiliated elements 

with counter-terrorism and military operations led by Special Forces and covert elements to earmark airstrikes. 20 The continued presence of U.S. troops will help the 

ANA prevent the Taliban or ISIL from taking over and consolidating territory and 

forming potential safe havens. 

A consistent ANA campaign backed by U.S. airstrikes will subsequently strengthen the Afghan government’s position in negotiations with the Taliban. The best option is to leave the U.S. troop withdrawal deadline unknown to the international 

community and U.S. public. Once the Taliban and ISIL know the definite date, they 

will hunker down, wait out the drone strikes, and re-emerge to feast on the ANA. 

Air strikes and presence of American operatives dramatically increases the costs for 

the Taliban to operate in the open, maintain pipelines to other parts of the region, 

facilitate transit, and build training camps. This gives our enemies less time to 

train, plot, and execute terrorist attacks while giving our allies more time to train, 

obtain experience, and become a more competent fighting force. Plus, If Ghani 

reaches a tentative deal with the Taliban, ISIL’s position will be significantly weakened. ISIL, which already clashes with the Taliban over territory and ideological legitimacy, risks opening up a second front with its Pashto rivals. 

Frank J. Cilluffo is an Associate Vice President at The George Washington University where he leads a number of national security and cyber security policy and research initiatives. Cilluffo directs the Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, is 

co-director of GW’s Cyber Center for National and Economic Security and along with 

the School of Business, launched the university’s World Executive MBA in 

Cybersecurity program. 

Cilluffo is routinely called upon to advise senior officials in the Executive Branch, 

US Armed Services, and State and Local governments on an array of national and 

homeland security strategy and policy matters. He also frequently briefs Congressional committees and their staffs and has testified before Congress over 25 times 
46 

at high profile hearings on counterterrorism, cyber threats, security and deterrence, 

weapons proliferation, organized crime, intelligence and threat assessment, as well 

as emergency management, border and transportation security. Similarly, he works 

with US allies and organizations such as NATO and Europol. He has presented at 

a number of bi-lateral and multi-lateral summits on cybersecurity and countering 

Islamist terrorism, including the UN Security Council. 

Cilluffo serves or has served on various national security-related committees sponsored by the US government and non-profit organizations, including the Homeland 

Security Advisory Council, where he served as the Vice Chairman of the Future of 

Terrorism Task Force. Cilluffo also served as a member of the Secure Borders and 

Open Doors Advisory Committee, Defense Science Board committees and summer 

studies, and along with Norm Augustine, chaired the first Quadrennial Homeland 

Security Review Advisory Council. 

Cilluffo joined GW in 2003, establishing CCHS as a prominent nonpartisan ‘‘think 

and do tank’’ dedicated to the building bridges between theory and practice to advance US security. CCHS has hosted numerous Cabinet Members and agency directors, military and law enforcement officers, Members of Congress, diplomats, business executives and academics and has issued dozens of reports that are widely 

cited by media, research institutions, think tanks and governments. 

Prior to joining GW, Cilluffo served as Special Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Immediately following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 

Cilluffo was appointed by President George W. Bush to the newly created Office of 

Homeland Security. During his tenure at The White House, he was involved in a 

wide range of counterterrorism and homeland security strategy and policy initiatives, served as a principal advisor to Governor Tom Ridge, and directed the President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council. 
47 

1 Official Central Asian governments’ estimates of several hundred are conservative. Western 

officials suggest the number is 2,000, and it may be as many as 4,000. Western officials estimate 

that about 400 fighters from each of the five Central Asian countries have travelled to join the 

Islamic State. A Russian official put the total regional figure at 4,000. Crisis Group interviews, 

Bishkek, October 2014; Astana, November 2014. 2 Many ethnic Uzbeks have retreated from engaging with the Kyrgyz authorities for fear of 

harassment and extortion. Many men have migrated to Russia to find work and escape discrimination. Unlike ethnic Kyrgyz elsewhere in the country, Uzbek families are unlikely to report 

or seek help regarding the radicalisation of relatives since it invites at best state surveillance, 

at worst detentions, beatings or demands for cash. Inter-ethnic tensions in southern Kyrgyzstan 

have gone unresolved, and the political and economic marginalisation of the Uzbek community 

contributes to the appeal of radical groups, particularly Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the jihadi cause in 

general. 3 Crisis Group interview, Russian official, September 2014, who also said there were 2,500 

Russian citizens fighting in Syria. 4 Crisis Group interviews, senior Kyrgyz official, Bishkek, July 2014; senior police officer, 

southern Kyrgystan, August 2014; Uzbek opposition activist, Turkey, September 2014. 5 20 former residents from just one medium-sized town are reported to have travelled to Turkey in 2013 with the intention of going on to Syria; Crisis Group interview, Kyrgyz security official, Chui province, Kyrgyzstan, May 2014. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JENNIFER LEONARD, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL

CRISIS GROUP

Thank you for the opportunity to speak before the Helsinki Commission today. My 

organization, the International Crisis Group, values the Commission’s sustained 

focus on Central Asia. 

As an international conflict prevention organization, our approach is grounded in 

field-based research. We have teams of political analysts located within or near 

countries vulnerable to violent conflict and based on our research and analysis, we 

develop policy recommendations to prevent and resolve it. 

We have covered Central Asia for over 15 years. From our current base in 

Bishkek, we conduct frequent visits throughout the region exploring the challenges 

and opportunities facing it, with particular focus on the interplay of democratic repression, threat of radicalization, and the decay of the economy and infrastructure. 

In January 2015 we published, Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia, 

which addresses the very topic of today’s discussion. 

INTRODUCTION: The Islamic State (IS) is attracting a coalition of Central Asian 

jihadis and sympathisers and fostering a network of links within the region. 

Prompted in part by political marginalisation and bleak economic prospects, in the 

past three years IS has beckoned roughly 2K–4K Central Asian citizens. 1 While the 

phenomenon has a disproportionate impact on security perceptions at home, the region supplies only a small fraction of IS fighters in Syria, however, if enough return, 

they could present a risk to regional security and stability. 

This presents a complex problem to the five CA governments, each of whom suffers from its own brand of poor governance, poverty, and corruption and has struggled to accommodate the growth of religion and religious organisations. The belief 

that Syrian-trained jihadis plan to establish a caliphate in the region has shaped 

the security debate and response in each—including increased surveillance, harassment and detentions—and provides additional justification for ever-stricter laws on 

religious practice and expression that may be counterproductive. 

Meanwhile, the call of IS—which says it wants not just fighters but also 

facilitators, e.g. teachers, nurses, engineers—can appear to offer an attractive alternative for those alienated, marginalized, or discriminated against, who are inspired 

by the belief that an Islamic state is a meaningful alternative to post-Soviet life. 

PROFILE. There is no single profile of an IS supporter from Central Asia: rich/ 

poor, young/old, men/women, educated or not. There are seventeen-year-old hairdressers, established businessmen, women abandoned by husbands who have taken 

second wives in Russia, families who believe their children will have better prospects in a caliphate, young men, school dropouts and university students. 

The largest single group is reportedly Uzbek, both citizens of Uzbekistan and 

ethnic Uzbeks from the Ferghana Valley, including Osh, Kyrgyzstan’s southern 

city, where risks have amplified since the violence in 2010 that killed over 400 ethnic Uzbeks. 2 While Tashkent estimates 500 of its citizens are in Syria, they could 

exceed 2,500. 3 With the exodus that began in the Valley in 2011, perhaps 1,000 

men and women [including 500 ethnic Kyrgyz and others from Osh] have left to 

fight for or provide humanitarian assistance to IS. 4 In northern Kyrgyzstan there 

could be another 300 unreported cases. 5
48 

6 Crisis Group telephone interview, Kazakh security expert, Astana, October 2014. 7 ‘‘Astana probes video allegedly showing Kazakh ‘jihad’ family in Syria’’, Radio Free Europe/ 

Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 21 October 2013. 8 Masum Mukhammadradjab, ‘‘Chorqishloq: Birthplace of 20 participants in the Syrian war’’, 

Radio Ozodi, 25 September 2014. 9 Col. Khalimov was an intimate of the elite—the head of Tajikistan’s Special Assignment 

Police Unit (OMON), a key element in the security apparatus, he has trained in Russia and 

the US. His defection is a blow to Rahman’s regime on many levels, as he speaks to the parts 

of the elite not yet bought off and to the alienation of a substantial segment of society. 10 Its Federal Migration Service estimates there are some 3.95 million Kyrgyz, Tajik and 

Uzbek citizens working in Russia. See [‘‘There are more than 550 thousand Kyrgyz citizens in 

Russia’’], Radio Azattyk, 20 November 2014. 11 Tablighi Jamaat, a non-violent organisation founded in 1926 in India, is banned in every 

Central Asian state but Kyrgyzstan. Hizb ut-Tahrir, a non-violent organisation that seeks to establish a caliphate, is banned in all five Central Asian states. 12 Alleged plots included bomb attacks in Bishkek and Dushanbe and on strategic road tunnels through the Tajik mountains. 

In Kazakhstan, IS supporters tend to come from the west and south of the country, but not exclusively. 6 Some 150 people made headlines when a video showing 

them in Syria appeared on YouTube in October 2013. 7

In Tajikistan, recruitment is nationwide but appears strongest in two particular 

provinces. At least twenty people left from just one village in September 2014 8 and 

recent revelations that a senior Tajik security official, who disappeared only to resurface in an IS propaganda video calling for violent jihad, has rattled 

the region. 9

[It is worth noting that estimates vary among local, national, Russian and Western 

security sources, underlining significant information gaps which in turn complicate 

efforts to create prevention and rehabilitation policies.] 

RECRUITMENT: Recruitment of these individuals is happening at local levels, by 

word-of-mouth. Some are recruited at home— in mosques and prayer rooms. Others 

are radicalised abroad, often as migrant workers [where dislocation can lead them 

into the arms of jihadi recruiters]. 10 The internet and social media play a critical 

but not definitive role. 

While groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat play a peripheral role 

in so far as both men and women may be radicalised as they gravitate toward their 

teachings, these groups do not appear to be directly involved with recruiting to 

Syria, though they are sometimes unwittingly staging posts in the journey [to extremist violence]. 11

More worrying for the regional security climate is the way Syria appears to have 

provided the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its offshoots with a renewed sense of purpose. While the IMU and Afghan Taliban have long-established 

links, for a while the IMU and IS kept a polite but admiring distance from one another. However, in March 2015 the IMU released an IS style-beheading video [shot 

in northern Afghanistan] to declare their allegiance to the organisation. 

MOTIVATIONS: Socio-economic factors play a role but economic reward is not a 

motivation. Rather it is the idea of holy struggle to advance Islam. Frustrated and 

excluded, people who would not have considered fighting with the longer-established 

IMU or Taliban perceive IS as the creator of a novel political order, a more universal purpose: the creation of a caliphate. An imam from southern Kyrgyzstan compared it to Afghanistan, told us that ‘‘Syria is about principles, not colonialism’’. And 

not all who go to Syria want to engage in violence, but accept that others will do 

it for them in pursuit of the ordained cause. 

For women, the traditional and state-approved Muslim community’s relative disinterest in their role allows underground groups to fill a need. Radical Islam also 

gives some a framework to distance themselves from marital and family circumstances. For other women, it is the call of a devout life, or an Islamic environment for their children. Still others follow fighters or family members who have established contacts in Turkey or IS-controlled territory. 

RISK OF RETURN: While the numbers of Central Asians receiving combat training and progressing through IS command structures is increasing, so far, returning 

jihadis are a danger to be prepared for rather than an immediate threat. For the 

time being, Central Asia is fortunate that Syria is relatively distant, no major attacks have yet occurred, 12 and the risks posed by returning jihadis are still in relative infancy. In fact, many will not return because they will die in Syria. 
49 

13 Tajikistan and Kazakhstan have introduced laws criminalizing fighting abroad, the former 

coming into effect in July 2014, the latter on 1 January 2015. Uzbekistan banned terrorism 

training without reference to location in January 2014, but the law was widely interpreted as 

directed against foreign-trained fighters. The law states that persons with no previous convictions who turn themselves in will not be held criminally liable (no such provision in the legislation of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,) but doubt surrounds Uzbekistan’s actual willingness to rehabilitate returning fighters. Kyrgyz parliament approved criminal code amendments suggesting sentences of eight to fifteen years for taking part in conflicts, military operations or terrorist- or extremist-training in a foreign state in September 2014, but these have 

yet to be signed into law. 14 In Denmark, effective rehabilitation programs are based on trust built up between the authorities and the families of fighters. In Indonesia, police forces develop responses to 

radicalisation in terms of improved intelligence-gathering techniques and building community 

relations, as well as rehabilitation. 

In the meantime and though keenly aware of the dangers returning fighters could 

pose, beyond instituting measures criminalizing fighting abroad, 13 Central Asian 

governments have done little to address the reasons why such a diverse crosssection of their citizens seek to participate in IS, nor have they contemplated how 

the dynamic might relate to broader unmet societal demands. Prevention of extremism and rehabilitation of jihadis are not high on the agenda and female 

radicalisation, in particular, is largely ignored [by religious leaders]. 

CONCLUSION: These dynamics risk gathering pace and purpose, blindsiding governments ill-prepared to respond to such a complex security threat and tempted to 

exploit it to crack down on dissent. These governments must assess accurately the 

long-term danger jihadism poses to the region and take effective preventive action 

now. This does not mean: labeling unfamiliar interpretations of Islam as extremist, 

adopting increasingly severe laws to limit freedom of conscience and association, or 

promoting intrusive security practices, etc. 

Rather, effective prevention means responding to an unmet demand for increased 

democratic space, revising discriminatory laws and policies, implementing outreach 

programs, creating jobs at home for disadvantaged youth, ensuring better coordination between security services, and tackling police reform, starting with the most 

basic matter of how they are perceived by the communities they serve. 

For its part, the U.S. and other regional partners should recognise that Central 

Asia is a growing source of foreign fighters and consider prioritising police reform 

and a more tolerant attitude to religion, in its bilateral engagements and programming. Indeed, there are lessons to be gleaned [from places like Denmark and Indonesia], 14 but the capacity of Central Asian governments to absorb and implement 

these lessons are undermined by weak state structures and lack of political will. 

Jennifer Leonard joined Crisis Group’s Washington office in June 2002. As Washington Advocacy Director, she works across the spectrum of Washington’s foreign 

policy actor—including the Administration, Congress, media, think-tanks, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—to design and implement strategies that impact the policy process. She also has primary responsibility for advocacy and research in Crisis Group’s Central Asia, South East Asia, North East Asia and 

Caucasus projects. 

Jen came to Crisis Group after three years with the U.S. Department of Energy 

where she worked for the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation, then as 

special assistant to the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. At the Department of Energy she oversaw aspects of a new non-proliferation 

initiative, helped establish the Russia Task Force, worked at the U.S. Embassy Moscow, and liaised with other U.S. government entities, international organizations, 

and foreign governments on national security matters. Before joining the government, she worked with variety of NGOs, including Conflict Management Group, a 

non-profit consulting company dedicated to promoting peacebuilding through engagement, training and research. 

She has been an Associate at Harvard Law School’s Program on Negotiation, a 

Graduate Fellow at the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan, Armenia, and a regular contributor to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s election-related 

activities in the Balkans and Caucasus. She earned her MA from the Fletcher 

School of Law and Diplomacy and a B.A. from Connecticut College. 

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