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Technical Paper 329

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AN EVAL UATION OF TWO SYSTEMS FOR

REDUCiNG DISCIPLINE FAILURE IN BCT

D. Bruce Bell Q ~~~~~~~~

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;• _j PERSONNEL ACCESSION AND UTILIZATION TECHNICAL AREA

U. S. Army

Research Institut e for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

September 1978

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U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCI ENC ES

A Field Operating A gency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

WILLIAM L. HAUSER

JOSEPH ZEIDNER Colonel , US Arm y Technic al Director Commander

NOTICES

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FINAL DISPOSITIQN This report may be destroyed when it is no longer need d. Pleage do not return It to the U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

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,Q.IL The l ndings in this report are not to be construed as an off iciil Department of the Army position, unI~s5 lo des ignated by othe, authori zed documents,
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EVALUATION OF~~~~O ,

~,YSTEMS FOR REDUCING ’ / -— ( tSt’IPI INE FAILU~~~ IN~BCT / _____________________________

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20. abstract (cont)

In the experiment , one—third of the trainees in each company were

treated by the AWOL syndrome approach; one-third by a similar strategy

using an ARI-developed instrument; and one-third were controls. Criteria

of effectiveness for both tests and the in terventions were discipline

records and research ratings obtained at the end of training .

Although both instrumen ts predic ted d iscipline failure, the ARI instrument was markedly superior. Identification of potential failures——and

the resulting interventions——had the effect of increasing rather than

decreasing discipline failure rates. The explanation for the finding

seems to lie in either a type of scapegoating or self—fulfilling prophecy

mechanism .

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(W h.n Data Entered)
Technical Paper 329

AN EVALUATION OF TWO SYSTEMS FOR

REDUCING DISCIPLINE FAILURE IN BCT

D. Bruce Bell

PERSONNEL ACCESSION AND UTILIZATION TECHNICAL AREA

SubmItted as complete and Approved By: technically accurate, by:

Ralph A. Canter E. Ralph Duselc, Director

Technical Area Chief INDIVIDUALTRAINING AND PERFORMANCE

RESEARCH LABORATORY

Joseph Zeidner

TECHNICAL DIRECTOR

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333

Office , Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

September 1978

Army Prolect Number Enlisted Accession 2076271 7A766 and Utilization

Appro~~d for public release ; distribution unlimited.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

ARI Research Reports and Technical Papers are intended for sponsors of

R&D tasks and other research and military agencies. Any findings ready for

implementation at the time of publication are presented in the latter part of

the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task, formal recommendations for official action normally are conveyed to appropriate military

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.
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FOREWORD

In the fall of 1971 , the Separations and Standards Branch of the Off ice of the Depu ty Ch ief of Staff for Personnel , Departmen t of the Army

(DCSPER, DA), requested an evaluation of the effectiveness of a new system

for reducing discipline problems in Basic Combat Training. Evaluation by

the Army Research Institute (ARI ) included not only a test of the system

then in use but also an alternative system based on work in military delinquency going back to the end of World War II.

Since this evaluation was completed and reported to the DCSPEP in

1973, ARI has continued to conduct research into the causes of and ways

to reduce military delinquency . An appendix lists major ARI publications in this field. Dr. S. F. Bolin, Mr. D. M . Kristiansen, and

Mr. T. J. Houston also worked on this project during 1972—73. This evaluation was accomplished under Army Project 2Q763731A769 (FY 74); the continuing research is done under Project 2Q762717A766 (FY 78), Enlisted

Accession and Utilization .

(JOkEPH ZE ER ‘

~~~~~nical Director

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AN EVALUATION 01” TWO SYSTEM S FOR REDUCING DISCIPLINE FAiLUR E IN BCT

BRIEF ______________________________ ____________ _____

Rt~

quirenent :

‘lb (a) determine the usefulness of two paper—and—pencil instruments

in predicting discipline failure among individuals undergoing basic combat training (BCT), and (b) evaluate the effectiveness of company—level

leaders in reducing discipline failure among those identified by the

tt~st...

Procedure:

In the experiment , one—third of the trainees were treated by the

AWOL syn~

1rome approach and one—third by a similar strategy using an ARI—

developed instrument ; the remainder were controls. Each group had over

1 ,600 cases. P.bout 10% of each group were selected for company comTnander

interview . In the experimental groups, selection was based on test scores ;

in the control group , ~e~~ ction was random . Criteria of both test and in—

terve.tt~ n .ffec t i’-~ IiLss were based on official discipline data and re—

sear’~h t~~t ngs obtained at the end of training.

Findings:

Although both instruments predicted discipline failure at a statistical level, the ARI instrument was markedly superior (the tetrachoric

correlations were .12 and .32, respectively). However , neither instrument possessed sufficient predictive validities to be used for operational

purposes.

Identification of potential discipline failures among trainees had

the effect of inireasing the chances that those identified would experience failure . The reason for the increased rates seems to lie in some

type of scapegoating or self—fulfilling prophecy mechanisms .

Utilizatton of Findings:

Results of this experiment formed the basis for the decision to

eliminate all ~

)rograms b.tsed on the AWOL syndrome approach. Prior to the

experiment, t~ at approach had been tried widely and was being considered

for Arrny- ’

~~. de implementotion. Valid questions from the ~RI instrument

were incorporated into the c ur;c’lt ARI instrUOe~~t t

~~r predicting early

~

ittrition .

78 ii ~

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AN EVALUATION OF TWO SYSTEM S FOR REDUCING DISCIPLINE FAILURE IN BCT

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

METHOD 2

Assignment of Individuals to Treatment Conditions 2

Conduct of Interviews and Follow—Up Actions 3

Gathering of Criterion Data 3

Further Processing of the Control Group 5

Analysis of the Data 5

RESULTS

How Predictive of Discipline Failure are the Two

Instruments? 7

How Effective is the Use of Instruments in the

Referral Process? 9

How Effective is Referral for Interview Alone? 11

DISCUSSION • . 14

Relationship of the TJTA and BOQ—72 to

Discipline Fa ilure . 14

The Bole of Identification and Referral Systems

in Reducing Discipl ine Failure 1 7

Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 19

REFERENCES 21

DISTRIBUTION . . . . 33

APPENDIX A: Recent Army Research Institute Publications

on Military Delinquency 23

B: Prediction of AWOL Using the TJTA 25

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Analyses of noninterview—control group for

prediction effects 8

2. Effect of TJTA referral on discipline failure

rates 10
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LIST OF TABLES (continued )

Table 3. Relationship between risk , outcome, and referral

for the TJTA . 11

4. Effect of BOQ referral on discipline failure rates . . . 12

5. Relationship between risk , outcome , and referral

for the BOQ 12

6. Effect of referral for interview in the absence

of instruments 13

B—i . Predictive validity of the TJTA for prisoners 26

8-2. TJTA prediction of AWOL for the control—

noninterview group 27

B-3. TJTA prediction of AWOL in the TJTA sample 27

8—4 . TJTA prediction of AWOL in BCT at Fort Polk 28

B-S. TJTA prediction of AWOL in BCT at Fort

Leonard Wood 30

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Testing, scoring, an d referral procedures

for BCT companies 4

2. Results of processing the control—

noninterview group 6

____
AN EVALUATION OF TWO SYSTEM S FOR REDUCING DISCIPLINE

FAILURE IN BCT

iI,TRODUCTION

The Army is always intereste i in new techniques f~ r reducing disciplinary problems , particularly amonq troops .i~ basic combat training

(BCT); in BCT, men form patterns of behavior that may remain throughout

their A~

.my careers. Therefore, a report by an Army chaplain suggesting

a way to reduce absence without leave (AWOL ) in BCT aroused considerable

interest (Berbiglia, 1971). This report evaluates Berbiglia ’s system in

comparison with a measure of discipline developed by the Army Research

Institute C ARl), as part of continuing ART research on military delinquency (see Appendix A).

Berbiglia ’s system had two parts: iuentification of “AWOL—prone”

soldiers and provision of services to them to prevent AWOL or other discipline problems . Such identification was based on a 180—item temperament profile test——the Taylor Johnson Temperament Analysis (TJTA ) (Taylor ,

~

.t rrison , Mo—risen, & Romoser , 196c3). Earlier research by Berbiglia

showed that the TJT!- could differentiate between men who were in the

stockade ~or AWOL offenses and other prisoners. AWOL soldiers described

themseives ~~ ~~rvous, depressed, quiet , inhibited , hostile , or impulsive .

Extreme scores on four or more of these six traits constituted the AWOL

syndrome .

Men identified as exhibiting the AWOL syndrome were referred to their

company commanders for interviews and to Berbiglia for counseling or other

appropriate follow-up services. Although Berbiglia reported highly promising results for this approach , the existence of an AWOL syndrome was

challenged (Fraas & Fox , 1972) (see also Appendix B).

The purpose of tne experiment reported here was to evaluate the effectiveness of identification and referral as a means of reducing discipline failure in BCT. A second identification instrument was included

to avoid conclusions based upon any TJTA idiosyncrasy——the Background and

Opinion Questio~ rtaire—72 (UCQ—72) (Bell, Bolin , & Houston , 1974). The

discipline problems examined included AWOL and all other offenses punishable under th~ provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

In addition t

~ ~he~;e official forms of disci pl inary infraction , the study

included behuv~.t,r rated by the platoon sergeants as insubordinate or

recalcitrant.

The fo~~ owing research questions were posed:

1 . What is the predictive validity of the identification instrwner4ts?

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2. Does use of instruments in the referral process reduce disci—

pline failure?

3. Does referral for interview reduce discipline failure?

METHOD

The experiment was conducted at an Army Training Center in companies

with new fills of men between 1 June and 30 November 1972. Among companies meeting the criterion, 5 , 333 men from 36 companies furnished sufficiently complete information for inclusion in the report. Because the

experimenta l procedures were identical for all companies , the data were

pooled into a single sample.

The research involved five pha ses:

1. ~~~si g r&ment of individuals to treatment conditions;

2. Conduct of interviews and other follow—up procedures;

3. Gathering of criterion data;

4. Further proce~ sin g of control group data ; and

5. r

~~~~. 

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. ~~~~iy~ i.

The first three phases occurred at the post , and the last two were corn—

pleted at the Army Research Institute (ARI).

Assignment of Individuals to Treatment Conditions

At the beginning of BCT, all participants completed both the TJTA

and the BOQ—72. Participants then were randomly divided into three samples: the TJTA sample, the BOQ sample , and the control sample. Within

the TJTA sample, the TJTA ’s alone were scored; this yielded two groups :

the TJTA high—risk group—-those who met the criteria for the AWOL syn—

drone——and the TJTA r

~ duced— risk group . The former group was referred

for interview ; the latter was not. Scoring of the BOQ—72, in the BOQ

sam ple, also resu lt~~l in the formation of two •~roups : a BOQ high—risk

group , referred for interview , and a BOQ reduced—risk group which was

not referred.

Random assiqnm~ nt I rather than scoring of protocols) led to the

.irniation ) 1~ W(~ -i roups ron tii~~ control sample. The 10% referred for

nterview ~

n~~titute~ t

~~~ cr)ntr ol—irlt e rview group ; the remaining 90%

const.L r~ itr~~ the cn~~trnl—non i n t e r view -

~roup.

2

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In summary , the TJTA , BOQ, and corit- rol samples were divided into

six groups by the scoring and referral procedures. The TJTA high—risk ,

BOQ high—risk , and control—interview groups were referred for interview.

The remaining three groups ( the reduced—risk TJTA , reduced—risk BOQ, and

the cor,trol—noninterview groups) were not referred. A pictorial representation of the process and its results is shown in Figure 1.

Conduct of Interviews and Follow—Up Actions

After the testing, assignment , and scor~~ oq procedures were cornplet& ’i,

each company commander was given a list of inaividuals to interview a:~u

the protocols of these men. The list contained the names of soldiers to

interview and their group designations, i.e., high—risk TJTA, high—risk

BOQ, or control—interview . Although both prot~ coks were available to a

commander for each man, only the appropriate one was scored , i.e., the

TJTA for the TJTA high-risk group ; the BuQ-72 for the BOQ high—risK group;

and neither for the control—interview group .

To aid the commanders , a special manual (PT 4887) on the art of conducting interviews was prepared . In addition , an effort was made to teach

some commanders now to conduct interviews ; however , it was not possible

to provi~ie this training to many commanders. When the help was provided ,

it consisted of ind i~’idual and group discussions and live demonstrations

of interviewing techniques.

Throug hout this report , the phrase “referred for interview’s is used

to describe what happened to the men who appeared on the commanders ’ lists .

It is difficult to determine from the data whether , in fact, the men were

interviewed, what types of interviews they received , and what types of

follow—up actions occurred . This subject is treated more fully in the

discussion section .

Gathering of Criterion Data

The criterion data consisted of disciplinary infractions recorded on

each participant at the end of BCT. The data came from records available

at company, battalion, brigade , and post levels , and also from a special

end—of—cycle rating form administered as part of the research. (The form

is called “the Training Performance Rating,” PT 4878; instructions are

provided for its use in PT 4880.)

For the present report , this information was used to reduce the sam—

pl.~ to three cli ~~ses of men :

1 • Theuc -4h~ were AWOL OL whose actions resulted in a recorded pun—

~‘~ r.’r 1f iader tar tJCMJ. Thi a punishment could he “ Article 15’ a ”

conviction iy ~~~~~ tal or qencral court ;tartial , or separa tion

fr~ nt: ~~ errvice undor oil -er than honorable conditions.

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or recalcitrant but who had no otficial record.

3. Those who had no such punishment or rating.

These three classes were “official ,” “marginal ,” and “clean ,” respectively.

Fur ther Processing of the Control Group

Once data from the post had been returned , the TJTA’ s and BOQ—72 ’ s

for each man in the control—noninterview group were scored. The independent scoring of the prediction instruments by the researchers resulte d

1

~~ four subsamples: a hi gh—risk and a reduced—risk group for each of

V the two instruments . However , because both instruments were scored for

the same persons , the TJTA and BOQ groups were not independent from one

The four subsamples or groups were called , respectively,

1. TJTA high—risk ,

2. TJTA reduced—risk ,

3. POQ high-risk , and

4. BOQ reduce,—risk noninterview groups.

Figure 2 is a pictorial representation of the process that produced them.

Analysis of the Data

The data were considered nominal in level with an underlying continuous distribution . Analytic techniques were chosen accordingly. CM—

square was used to test for differences in discipline outcomes for different groups. Tetrachoric correla tion was used to show the strength of

relationships .

The typical data di splay used to answer research questions was a

2 x 3 table. F’~r example , to answer the question of how predictive of

discipline failure the TJTA was , the discipline outcomes (official, marginal , and clean) for the ‘rJTA high—risk and the TJTA reduced—risk nonin—

cerview groups wer e displayed and analyzed.

1 tn fact , tao -

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with o-t at-rc her in the contr-o]—r4oninterview group (r tet = .26).

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“The Control Sample ”

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Action : None

“Th e Control—Interview Group” “The Control—Non—

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score

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Action : None Action: None

“The BOQ Control “Th e BOQ Control

High—Risk Group” Reduced—Risk Group”1

Figure 2. Results of processing the control—noninterview group .
To maximize the information available in these 2 x 3 tables, the

chi—square analyses were divided into orthogonal partitions (Castellan ,

1965). Two separate chi—squares were computed : one comparing the two

groups in terms of clean versus mar ginal outcomes , and a separate corn—

parison of these two outcomes combined and contrasted with the official

outcome. An overall chi—square for each analysis was also obtained by

combining the two partitions and comparing the obtained value with th~ t

expected for an analysis with 2 degrees of freedom .

The use of tetrachoric correlations also depended on r~ duciny the

2 x 3 tables to 2 x 2 displays before computing the correlations, because the discipline criterion was considered continuous , the method oc

collapsing was arbitrary . Collapsing the marginal and official categories yielded the most stable estimates and was therefore used. Computations were based on Thurstone’s tables (Cheshire, Saffir , & Thurstone,

1933).

For some analyses , three dimensions were present: scores on a predictor instrument , referral status, and discipline outcome. Fbr these

analyses , the resulting 2 x 2 x 3 tables were partitioned into two 2 x

2 x 2 tables and analyzed using Snedecor ’s (1946) procedure .

RESULTS

Thero ~

s C V r - thr& e research questions:

1. What is the predictive validity of the identification

instruments?

2. Does use of instruments in the referral process reduce discipline failure?

3. Does referral for interview , in the absence of any instruments ,

reduce discipline failure?

For two of the questions , separate analyses are provided for each of the

-wo instruments involved.

How Predictive of Uiscipline Failure Are the Two Instruments?

The first - research question——what is the predictive validity of the

I dentification instruments——required separate analyses for each of the

two instruments . These analyses , using the control—noninterview group ,

appear itt Tabl’~ 1.

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How Predictive Is the TJTA? AWOL syndrome scoring of the TJTA was

related to whether a man got into trouble (the marginal and clean versus

official comparison) but not to how he was rated (the marginal versus

clean comparison ). However , the size of the relationship between TJTA

scores and discipline failure in BCT was small (rtet ~ .12).

How Pred ictive Is the BOQ-72? The BOQ—72 was related to all aspects

of discipline. Both partitions of chi—aquare and the tetrachoric correlation for the data in Table 1 (rtet = .32) were significantly different

from chance.

How Effective Is the Use of Instruments in the Referral Process?

Because the answer to the question may depend upon the instrument

being used, separate analyses are provided for the TJTA and SOQ identif i—

cation—referral systems.

The Effect of TJTA Referral Upon Discipline Rates. The soldiers referred for interview using the TJTA were different from other men in two

ways : they scored in the high—risk group and they received special atten—

tion. Table 2 shows the degree of relationship that occurs when these

two conditions are compounded. Subsequent analyses show what occurs when

the two conditions are unraveled.

Scores on the TJTA were related to discipline failure for one partition of chi— square (official versus other) but not the other (marg inal ver—

su.s clean) . The tetrachoric correlation was also significant (r tet The degree of relationship between scores and discipline failure appears

stronger here than when scores did not lead to referral (Table 1).

To sort out the effects of risk and referral , it was necessary to

compare the data in Table 1 (where risk alone was operative) with the

data in Table 2 (where both risk and referral were operative). To make

this comparison , Snedecor ’s (1946) procedures for computing 2 x 2 x 2

chi—squares were applied to orthogonally partitioned data from each table .

Table 3 presents the results of these analyses for different levels of

risk (high- versus reduced—risk), referral status (referred versus not

referred), and discipline outcomes (marginal versus clean , and official

versus other).

Referral based upon TJTA scores had no effect on platoon sergeants’

ratings (the clean versus marginal comparison). However, it did affect

the official punishment rate (the official versus other comparison) . Use

of the TJTA to refer men for interview is counterproductive , i.e., the

numbe r of high—risk men punished increased from 7% (Table 1) to 12%

(Table 2).

9 

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Table 3

Relationship Between Risk , Outcome, and Referral

for the TJTA

(n 3,309)

Analysis Chi-square Degrees of freedom Probability

Marginal vs. clean .67 1 n.s.

Official vs. other 4.35 1 .05

The Effect of BOQ Referral upon Discipline Rates. As in the case

of the TJTA identification—referral system, this portion of the research

question can be analyzed only by comparing the discipline experience of

two groups: one where risk alone is operative (the control—noninterview

group) and one where both risk and referral are operative (the BOQ sample). Table 4 shows what occurred in the BOQ sample.

Table 4 indicates that in the BOQ sample (as in the control—nonin—

terview sample in Table 1), BOQ—72 scores were related to all aspects of

discipline in BCT. That is, both partitions of chi—square and the tet—

rachoric correlation for these data (r t5t = .37) were significantly different from chance. This is in contrast to the findings for the TJTA

where significant differences were not always present (Table 2).

Table 5, like Table 3, shows the effects of using an instrument in

the referral process. Again, the table presents the analyses for two

types of risk, two types of treatment, and three discipline outcomes .

Use of the BOQ—72 to refer men for interview had no effect upon

discipline failure.

How Effective Is Referral for Interview Alone?

The final research question——does referral for interview (without

instruments) decrease discipline failure?——can be answered by contrasting

the disciplinary outcomes for men randomly referred for interview (the

control—i nterview group) with those who were not referred (the control

noninterview group). Table 6 shows this comparison.

11

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--~~~~~—-

~~~~ - -—- ~~~—--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ---‘~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

-

~~~~~~~~~
Random selection for interview had no effect upon discipline failure

in BCT. Neither partition of chi—square (clean versus marginal , or off i—

cial versus other), nor the tetrachoric correlation for this analysis

(r tet = .08) reached significant levels.

Although not related directly to this research question , the dis—

cipline rates for the control—noninterview group were important because

they were the base rates for the post as a whole. That is, they represented the expected rate of trouble experienced by a random sample of

men not affected directly by either the scoring or referral procedures.

DISCUSSION

The findings can be summarized as follows . First, both AWOL syn—

drome scoring of the TJTA and scores on the BOQ—72 were related to dis—

cipli~ e failure in BCT, but the degree of relationship for the BOQ—72

was mt~ch stronger. Second , although the use of the BOQ—72 to refer men

for interview yielded more men who actually became delinquent, the use

of either instrument was ineffective. ~~reover , use of the TJTA for this

purpose was even counterproductive . Finally , referral for interview

(using no test) had no measurable effect. Each of these findings is

discussed further.

Relationship of the TJTA and BOQ—72 to Discipline Failure

Limitations of the Experiment. Several factors in the experiment

probably limited predictive validity of the instruments. As the experi—

ment was conducted only during BCT, the opportunity for the men to get

into some form of trouble was limited. BCT is only 8 weeks long; the

time between administration of the predictor instruments and the gathering of criterion data was 8 weeks or less. t’breover, BCT is atypical of

time in the Army . Men who might experience discipline failure later in

their Army careers or under different circumstances were not identified

unless they also experienced discipline failure in BCT.

A second factor was the rather diffuse nature of the criterion——

any behavior that evoked punishment or adverse ratings from the cadre.

Either instrument could predict some types of behavior (e.g., AWOL) that

were part of the criterion , but not others (e.g., Article 1~- ’s for non—

AWOL offenses). If this were the case, the presence of unpredictable behavior(s) in the criterion would lower the predictive validity of the instrument(s). (The test of prediction of AWOL is reported in Appendix B.)

The method of gathering the criterion data presented a third problem . Much of the data (e.g. , platoon sergeants’ evaluations) depended

upon rating scales, which are known to be rather unreliable. t-breover,

ratings were often missing for the very persons most likely to have expe—

rienced discipline failures. The ratings were completed at group meetings at or near the end of BCT. If a man were absent from such a

14
meetiny because he was AWOL , in the stockade awaiting punishment , or re—

cyclec due to AWOL, his rating might have been omitted. Data drawn from

brigade or post records (e.g., cour ts mar tial and discharges under less

thai-i honorable conditions) were more complete.

Finally, instruments like the TJTA and BOQ, which focus upon characteristics of the man only, probably can never attain high validity . The

Instruments simply do not measure important variables such as characteristics of company leaders , atmosphere of the company (e.g., racial tensions ,

pre~ sures to use drugs, etc), Army policies, and opportunities to engage

in ~ieviant behaviors. All these considerations affect the probability

triat punishable acts will occur and that such acts will result in punish—

ment or adverse ratings. Also several studies have shown that unit delinquency rates are related to characteristics of units and their leaders

(McCubbin et al., 1971; Hart, in press).

.)iscussion of the TJTA. It is not surprising that AWOL syndrome

scor 1

~

ng of the TJTA was only weakly related to discipline failure in BCT.

k~

t1.~ scoring system was designed to differentiate between two groups of

stockade prisoners: those who were incarcerated for AWOL offenses and

those who were there for other reasons. It would be remarkable if the

same scoring system also differentiated between basic trainees who got

into trouble in BCT and those who did not , because this would mean that

the same characteristics were common to these quite different groups.

Berbi glia ’s use of the TJTA strongly implies that he believed the instru—

r~

lent could differentiate ; however , he does not present supporting data .

In stead , Berbiglia offers some indirect proof of the validity of the in—

strument. Discipline failure rates dropped in those battalions where

Berbiglia~ s program was in effect. Because the TJTA was part of that

program , one could argue that the instrument has some validity. This

reasoning is not cOmpelling .

Several subsequent research projects (reviewe d in Appendix B) show

that the TJTA does not (a) effectively differentiate between AWOL and

non—AWOL prisoners (Fraas & Fox , 1972); (b) effectively predict discipline failure in BCT (Bell , Bolin , Houston , & Kristiansen , 1973); or

(c) effectively predict AWOrJ in BCT (see Appendix B).

Although by no means the onl y problem , part of the difficulty of

predicting AWOL using the AWOL syndrome approach is that the scoring sys—

tern selects more men for the hi gh—risk group (13% of the sample) than

actually get into trouble. Only about 4% of the men were in any form of

official trouble , and only about 2% of the men went AWOL. Thus there is

a bui lt—in inflation in the number of false positives, i.e., men who are

predicted to go AWOL but who , in fact, do not. Changing the cutting

scores—-and thus reducing the proportion of false positives——on the TJ’rA

might result in a better instrument , but sever al fundamental problems

would still remain. First , there Is no research guide to help determine

which scale scores to alter . Second , serious questions exist concerning

whether or not the scoring system has intrinsic validity . Finally, a

better instrument already exists : the BOQ—72.

15

-.4
— --

~~~~~~~~~

- .

~~

--

~~~~~

Discussion of the BOQ—72. Previous research shows that the BOQ—72

items can predict disciplinary failure in BCT,/AIT (Larson & Kristiansen ,

1969) arid that the items are even more predictive if separate cutting

scores are used for young dropouts (Bell et al., 1974). Thus, it should

come as no surprise to find that the BOQ—72 is predictive of discipline

failure in BCT. What is surprising is the range of disciplinary events

to which the BOQ—72 is related. For example, Table 1 shows that the

BOQ— 72 is related to platoon sergeants’ ratings and to official discipline. Subsequent analyses of data from the control—noniriterview group

show that the BOQ—72 is also predictive of AWOL, Article 1 5’ s, Article

iS’s for AWOL, and Article 15’s for noxi—AWOL offenses. Although all these

relationships are statistically significant, the magnitude of the obtained

statistics places very definite limitations upon the number of administrative decisions that can be made on the basis of BOQ—72 scores.

For example, the BOQ—72 might be useful in an early referral program

because the costs of interviewing are low and there is ample opportunity

to interview or take other appropriate actions with men not identified by

the instrument. It is doubtful, however, that the instrument could be

justified in a more costly program (e.g., using professionally trained

counselors), because the majority of men referred to such a progr am would

not actually need the services (see Table 1). t-bre importantly, the

BOQ—72 could not be the ultimate screen to eliminate men from service at

the point of entry. The BOQ—72 would eliminate many more “good” men than

“bad” ones and would leave more “bad” men in the Army than would be

eliminated.

Although additional research might refine the BOQ—72, it would probably remain insufficiently predictive for practical purposes. The instrument focuses only upon characteristics of individuals and ignores the

situational variables. These, in turn, are probably subject to a great

deal of chance variation . If discipline failures are to be identified

and reduced, additional research to determine the relevant situational

variables is needed.

General Discussion and Conclusions. The BOQ—72 is clearly superior

to the TJTA as a predictor of disciplinary failure in BCT. - The BOQ—72

is also superior in other respects. First, it is shorter (i.e., 25 versus

180 items) and , consequently, easier and faster to administer. Second ,

the BOQ—72 has a simpler scoring system (i.e., one scoring key rather than

Six). Third, the BOQ—72 is a good interview guide , because the answer

sheet contains the questions as well as the responses , and the items On — the BOQ—72 are arranged in topical areas. (In contrast , the TJTA has a

separate , machine—scorable answer sheet. On return to the commanders,

the sheet has only the pencil marks made by the respondents and a red

check for each scale within the range required by the P~

WOL syndrome system.) Finally , there is the matter of cost——no small factor in the use

of an instrument for any post—wide or Army—wide experiment or program .

The Army owns the BOQ—72 but must pay royalties for each T

~

3TA it uses.

All these justifications support the conclusion that the BOQ—72 is at

present the instrument of choice for discipline research.

16
The Role of Identification and Referral Systems in Reducing Discipline

Failure

Several assumptions are made in adopting any identification—referral

system :

1. That what is needed is a quick means of differentiating soldiers

who need help from those who do not,

2. That the differentiation is valid , and

3. That effective help can and will be provided to the identified

men.

The TJTA and BOQ systems met the first assumption. The tests were

adniinistered shortly after trainees were assigned to their units . The

SyS~ ~ms weLe scored and entered into the commanders’ referral lists within another 24 hours. But neither system met the crucial second assumption. In both systems, most of the men referred were unlikely to have

experienced discipline failure (Table 1) or to have needed special attention. Also, neither system met the third assumption. The referred men

were not less likely to experience discipline failure. In fact, ther e

was a slight increase in the probability that men referred by the TJTA

would get into more trouble than if no intervention had occurredt

Why the systems did not work——and why the TJTA system proved counterproductive——is not entirely clear. But some data are suggestive , and

some speculation is possible.

Why the Systems Did not Work. When (a) a soldier engages in some

form of deviant behavior , (b) the behavior is observed by, or reported to,

someone in authority , and ( C) the act then leads to a reaction by someone in authority (i.e., a punishment or an adverse rating), a discipline

failure is recorded.

Successful intervention should be directed toward decreasing the

probability that soldiers will behave in a deviant manner. Although

there is ample evidence that effective psychotherapy can accomplish this

goal , it has not been proved that the type of interviewing suggested in

the manual , PT 4887 , will yield similar results. In this experiment , interviewing might also have decreased discipline failure by decreasing the

probability that a man would be observed or punished; however , this was

not likely. Persons largely unaffected by the interviews——the platoon

sergeants-—did most of the observing ar.-1 all of the rating . Although

company commanders have some flexibility in deciding whether or not to

punish men , the policies of the Army and the battalion commanders largely

dntermine what will occur. Thus, it could be argued that any increases

in diwipline failure following referral for interview occurred because

the commanders did not reduce the probability that men would engage in

deviant behavior , or because the commanders did not change the probabil-

.ity tat such behavior would be observed anti punished. Both are probably

17
true1 the question still arises, "WOuld successful use of the procedures 

outlined in PT 4887 have decreased the di scipline failure?" We do not 

know, as the bulk of the evi dence available shows that these procedures 

were not applied consistently. 

The administrative and experimental controls were not sufficiently 

formaliz i for us to be certain about events after men were referred. 

However, considerable evidence suggests that often no i nterviews occurred, 

and that when they did occur, the int erviews did not follow procedures 

suggested in the interview manual. 

For example, the instructions state that protocol should be divided 

into sections by having lines drawn between certain questions. The instructions also state that the commander should summarj - e the trainees' 

feelings toward the events represented by those questions by writing notes 

in the margin. Although these instructions are clearly part of the procedures for conducting interviews with men in the BOQ and control-interview groups, only 10 of the 326 protocols in the two groups had any such 

aarkings. Furthermore, the researchers seldom encountered commanders who 

were aware that any "special" style of interview was required for this 

research program, despite the efforts of the researchers to keep commanders informed about what was expected. 

several factors may have contributed to the commanders' low utilization of interview procedures. First, it was difficult for the small research staff, which was located some distance from the post, to orient 

and tr in all the commanders. This problem was further compounded by the 

turnover of commanders, which occurred througho11t the research. Second, 

comaanders are busy people who often work 10-16 hours a day, 6-7 days a 

week, .during the time~· is being conducted. Therefore, the commanders 

might not read manuals and might provide pro forma interviews, or no interviews at all. Finally, the commanders might not have followed the procedures because they did not believe that they would work. Commanders 

generally have their own ideas about how troops should be interviewed' 

these ideas do not always coincide with the methods suggested in this 

research. 

The labels TJTA and BOQ "high risk" may have conditioned the interviews that soldiers received and the additional treatment offered. Pbr 

example, the researchers noticed that the officers and NCO's tended to 

think of the TJTA and BOQ-72 as tests the men passed or failed. 

The terms "T*ylor-Johnson failure" and "BOQ failure" appeared often 

in the vocabulary of the company leaders and \>lere even used as epithets 

hurled at the unlucky trainees whose names appeared under appropriate 

headings on the referral lists. Some commanders stated that, although 

they tried to be. objective in dealing with trainees, the labels did influence the type and severity of "punishment. It is unclear whether the 

labeling was responsible for differences in discipline failure rates for 

men referred under the TJTA or BOQ systems. In other situations, labeling has produced adverse effects through the mechanism of scapegoating. 

18 
Those in authority are more likely to observe and punish those identified

by an adverse label. Labeling may also produce self—fulfilling prophecy

effects. Both those in authority and those who are labeled come to accept and act on the presumed validity of the labels.

The most likely explanation of the TJTA ’s counterproductive effect

is its wider degree of acceptance among the men and leaders. It would

probably have been more subject to a self—fulfilling prophecy or scapegoating effect. Personnel at Fort Polk, La., where the AWOL syndrome

approach was f irst used, were convinced of the value of the instrument

as a tool for reducing AWOL. The TJTA was the cornerstone of the ongoing, post—wide program; its labels were thus guaranteed an impact.

The BOQ—72 was received only as an experimental instrument being tried

by an outside agency.

Random Selection for Interview Had no Effect. Why random selection

did not reduce discipline fa ilure ra tes is not immediately apparent from

tL~ data . Probably two opposing forces operated to produce these results.

Improvements failed to occur because commanders were not properly trained

and often did not apply the interview procedures. But also, the rates

did not increase because the label control was relatively neutral and did

not lead to scapegoating or self—fulfilling prophecy. Further research

could test the validity of this speculation.

Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

The AWOL syndrome scoring system is not a good predictor of disciplinary failure in BCT. The BOQ—72 is predictive of all of the dis—

ciplinary criteria. Thus, the BOQ—72 is the instrument of choice for

future research efforts in the field of discipline. However, its presen t

level of validity severely limits its use as an administrative tool.

Further research could refine the BOQ—72, but it is doubtful that any

instrument focusing exclusively upon individual characteristics would be

administratively practical or useful . Further efforts should be directed

toward (a) learning more about situational variables that impact on discipline failure , and (b) improving treatment systems .

Plans are underway to conduct just such a demonstratiou study . Researchers would be placed in training companies over an extended period

of time to teach commanders how to conduct better interviews , and to

learn more about the noninteryjew events that affect discipline fa ilure

in BCT. In order to overcome the labeling problem, no protocols would

be scored , Instead , commanders would be asked to interview a random

portion of the ir men , using the BOQ—72 as an interview guide. It is

hoped that the commanders would demonstrate to the entire company as a

whole that they are approachable and concerned about personnel probl ems ,

and that their attitudes would lead to a decrease in discipline problems.

If personnel become less fear ful of the command , they might be more willing to refer themselves for interview and appropriate follow—up services

before they get Into trouble. Self—referrals are probably better than

19
,v, ~r-

~~~ F ~~~~~~~~~ -~~~~- - - - -

instr~ nent—r eferraj s for two reasons. First, given the low accuracy of

the instruments, self—referred men are more likely than instrumen t—

referred men to actually need assistance. Second , and more important, self—referrals probably see problems with which they want assistance and

are more motivated to improve and less likely to get into trouble. That , after all, is the point of having these systems in the first place .

20 

-~~---— A
___ -_ 

__

REFE~ ENCE~

J

Bell , D. B ., Bolin , S. F., & Houston , T. 3. i)evelopnent of the Background

and Opinion Qu~~stionn~ ir e — 72. ARI besearch t

~~morandum 74—13, 1974 .

Bel l1 D. B., Boliri , S. F., Houston , T. J., & Xristiansen , D. M. ~~e~~

i c—

tions and Self—Fulfilling Prophecis:~ of Army Discipline. P -oceedinj n

of the 81st. Ann ual Convent~.on of the American Psychological Association , 1973.

Berbidlia , J. C. The AWOL Syr.drc:ne Supplenent 3: Tay lor—Johnson Tenc.ex~

-

ment Analysis Manual. Los Angeles: Psychologicai Publications , 1971 .

Castellan , N. J., Jr. On the Partitioning of ~or.tingency Tables. Psych.

Bull. 1965, 54(E~), 320—328.

Cheshire . L., Saffir, M ., & Thurstone , L. L. Computing Diagrams for the

Tetrachoric Correlation Coefficient. chicago : The Un iversity of

Ch icago Bookstore, 1933.

Fort Polk 1972 Post—Wide AWOL Seminar : Examination of the Past, Evaluation of the Present , and Recommendations for the Future. Fort Pol~’.,

La.: 1972.

Fraas, L. A., ~

. Fox , L. J. The Taylor—Johnson Temperament Analysis ‘AWOL

Syndrome ” : i. Further Evaluation. Fort Riley, Xans.: U.S. Army

Correctional Training Facility , 1972.

Hart , R. ‘3. Crime and Punishment in the Army . Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, in press.

Larson , E. E., & Kristiansen, D. M. Prediction of Di sciplinary Offenses

Early in Army Service. ARI Technical Research Report 2 10 , 1969.

McCubbin , H. I., et al. Leadership and situational factors related to

AWOL: A research report. Fort Riley, Kans.: U.S. Army Correctional

Training Facility, 1971.

Rollier , R. L. Fort Leonard ~~od AWOL and Desertion Study (FI~ ADS)

Phase I. Fort Leonard Wood, Ho.: Headquarters , 3d Basic Training

Brigade , U.S. Arn,y Training Center Engineer , 1972.

Snedecor , (;. W . St.a~~

istica l Methods Applied to Experiments in Ay ricul—

turf’ and Biolo ry. Ames , Iowa : Iowa State College Press, 1946.

Taylor , M., ? ‘brrison, L. P., M~ rrisori , W. L., & Pomoser, R. C. Taylor—

•Johnson Tnmper~ ment Analvsis Manual. Los Angelen : Psychological

Publications , 1 ’68.

21

~

.-- -- ~~~~~~~~- -~~~~~ -—--- ~~~~--

~ ~~~~ . - -~~~~ -~ - --- -~ 
APPENDIX A

RECENT ARMY RESEA&~H IN STITUTE PUBLICATIONS

ON MILITARY DELINQUENCY

Bauer , R. C., Stout , R. L., & Holz , R. F. Predicting Military Delinquency . ARI Research Problem Review 76—4 , August 1976 .

Bauer, R. G., Stout, R. L.,, & Hols, R. F. Developing a Conceptual and

Predictive Hodel of Discipline in the U.S. Army . ARI Research Prob—

1cm Review 76—5, September 1976.

Bell, D. B., Bol in , S. F., Houston , T. J., & Kristiansen , D. M. Predictions and Self—Fulfilling Prophecies of Army Discipline. Proceedings

of the Blat Annual. Conv ention of the American Psychological Association , 1973 , 743—744.

Bell , D., B., Kr istiansen , D. M. , & Seeley, L. C. Initial considerations

in the developuent of the Early Experience Questionnair e (EEQ). ARI

Research Memorandum 74—1 0, July 1974.

Bell , D. B., Kristiansen, D. M., & Houston , T. J. Predictions and SelfFulfilling Prophecies of Army Discipline : A Follow—Up Evaluation.

Paper presented at American Psychological Association Annual Convention , New Orleans, August 1974.

Bell , D. B., Holin, S. F., & Houston , T. J. Developuent of the Ba ckg ro un d

and C~ inion Questionnaire 72. ARI Research Memorandum 74—13, December

1974.

Bell , D. B., & Holz , R. F. Summary of ARI Research on Military Delinquency . ARI Research Report 1185 , June 1975. ( Abstracted in APA

Journal Su~

pplement Abstract Service, 1976 , 6 , 16)

Bell , D. B., & Houston , T. J. The Vietnam ~~ a Deserter : Characteristics

of Unconv icted Army Deserters Participating in the Presidential Clemency Progr am . ARI Research Problem Review 76—6 , July 1976.

Bell , D. B., & Bell., B. W. Desertion and Antiwa r Protest : Findings from

the Ford Clemency Progr am , Armed Forces and Society, 1977 , 3(3),

433—443.

Bell, D. B. character istics of Participants in the DoD Special Discharge

Review Program. ARI Research Problem Review 78—2 , March 1978.

Bell, D. B. The Vietnam Era Deserter as Exile : The Canadian Experience.

Paper presented at America n Psychological Association Ann ua l Convention , Thronto , Augus t 1978. 

23
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Cook , R. F., & Morton , A. S. Art Assessment of Drug Education—Prevention

Programs in the U.S. Army . ARI Technical Pape r 261 , January 1975.

Eckerman , W . C., ,iilliams, 3. R., & Ramsay, D. A. Observations of Inter—

rank Conflicts at the Company Level: Drug and Alcohol Abuse . ARI

Research Meinoranaum 75—15 , December 1975.

Har t, R. 1. The Relationship Between Perceived Offense and Actual Discipline Rates in the Military. ARI Research Memorandum 77—30 ,

February 1978.

Hart , R. ‘3. Crime and Purishment in the Army. Journal of Personality

and Social Psychology, in press .

Hurst, P., Cook, R. F., & Ramsay, D. A. Assessing the Prevalence of Illicit

Drug Use in the Army. ARI Technical Paper 264, July 1975.

Ramsay, D. A. Summary of ARI Research on Dr ug and Alcohol Abuse . ARI

Research Report 1186 , May 1975.

24
APPENDIX B

PREDICTI ON OF AWOL USING THE TJTA

In its original form, the AWOL syndro me scoring system for the Taylor

Jo hnson Tempe r ament Analysis or TJTA (Ta ylor , M~rrison, ?brrison , &

Romoser , 1968) was used to identify AWOL—prone soldiers. Several studies

have addressed the question of the TJT A ’s efficiency as an AWOL predic—

tor; they are reviewed in this appendix .

The Fraas and Fox Study

Fraas and FOx (1972) attempted to cross—validate Berbi glia ’s stockade

research using 381 “trainees ” at the U.S. Army Correctional Training Facility ( CTF) , Fort Ri ley, Kans. TJ TA’ s administered to the men were scored

according to Berbi glia ’s directions. The protocols were divided into

three gro ups according to the offense s committed by the men :

1. AWOL offense s only ( “ AWOL”),

2. AWOL plus other offenses ( “ mixed”), and

3. Non—AWO L offenses only (“ other ”).

Analysis of the Fraas and Fox data using partitioned chi—squares app ears

in Table B — i .

The TJTA failed to differentiate AWOL or mixed prisoners from men

incarcerated for non—AWOL offenses.

The ARI Experiment

The ARI experiment rep orted in this pa per indicated tha t the TJTA

wag not a good predictor of broad categories of discipline failure. But

the name of the scoring system suggests a more specialized use . Table

B—2 presents an ana lysis of the predictive validity of the TJTA in this

experimen t for AWOL offense s only. Because of the email prop ortion of

men rep orted AWOL, the phi coefficient has been substit uted for the tet—

rachoric correlation as the measur e of association.

AWOL syndrom e scoring of the TJTA was related to AWOL offenses in

BCT, but the degree of relationship was extremely weak. Apparently the

TJ’rA is no better at predicting AWOL . than discipline failure in general.

(The beneficial effect of Berbiglia’s program may not have been related

to the identification process at alli)

— 25
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26

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~~- - - - -~~~ -~~~ -~~~~~~~~ -. -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --~~~~~-
____________________ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Table B-2

TJTA Prediction of AWOL for the ControlNoninterview Group

(n = 1 ,689 )

Discipline offense

Analysis percentages

AWOL No AWOL Tota l Chi-square Phi

TJTA high—risk group 3.1 96.9 100

(13.5% of the sample)

TJTA reduced—risk

group 1.3 98.7 100 4.08* .05

(86.5% of the samp le)

< .05.

Table 8—3 indicates the predictive validity of the TJTA when both

the cadre and the trainees know which men scored in the high—risk group.

Table B—3

TJTA Prediction of AWOL in the TJTA sample

(n = 1 ,62 0)

Discipline offense

Analysis percentages

AWOL No AWOL Total Chi-square Phi

TJTA high—risk group 4.9 95.1 100.0 15.70* .10

(8.9% of samp le)

TJTA reduced—risk

q roup 0.9 99.1 100.0

(91.1% of sample)

< .001.

27 

-—- -- - -

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~~~~~~~~~-- - ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~ .- -- —

Scores on the TJTA are again significantly related to future AWOL

behavior. Although it is true that the relationship between the scores

and the behav ior is small (phi = .10), the direction of the findings is

somewhat alarming. Attempts by the cadre to prevent AWOL actually increase the probability that men identified as high—risk soldiers will

go AWOL (4.9% versus 3.1%). The most probable explanation for this find—

ing is that some form of scapegoating or self-fulfilling prophecy effect

is present.

The Early TJTA Program at Fort Polk

Following the suggestion of Herbiglia (1971), Fort Polk initiated an

AWOL-prevention program based upon TJTA differentiation. The program was

virtually identical with the treatment received by men in the TJTA group

in the ARI experiment. High—risk soldiers were referred to their company

commanders for interview and possible referral services. Results can be

seen in Table 8—4 .

Table B—4

TJTA Prediction of AWOL in BCT at Fort Polk 1

(n = 18,139)

Discipline offense

Analysis percentages

AWOL No AWOL Total Chi-square Phi

TJTA high—risk group 3.6 95.4 100 16.41* .03

(13.0% of sample)

TJTA reduced—risk

group 2.3 97.7 100

(97.0% of sample)

1Prior to present experiment.

Source : Fort Polk , 197 2 post—wide AWOL seminar : Examination of the

past, evaluation of the present , and recommendations for the

future , Fort Polk , La.: (mimeographed). Undated.

a p < .001.

28 

-~~~~~~~~---- ---- -— ~~~ --

~~~~~~ - -~~~~~~~ - -~~-- --------
__ 

There was a small (phi = .03) but statistically significant relationship between TJTA scores and AWO L offenses. Again , compared with

results from the AR1 control sample, the effect of the Fort Polk program

appears to have been counterproductive ; more high—risk men went AWOL than

had been expected to (3.6% versus 3.1%).

The Fort Leonard Wood Program

In 1972 an independent investigation of the relation between AWOL

syndrome scoring of the TJTA and AWOL offenses was undertaken at Fort

Leonard Wood , Mo. (Rollier, 1972). Table B—5 shows the predictive validity of the TJTA for two BCT brigades: the 3d brigade, which was commanded

by COL Rollier, and the 2d, which was not.

The presence of a small, but statistically significant, relationship

between AWOL syndrome scoring and AWOL offenses occurred throughout the

8CT units. However, the relationship was strongest in the 3rd BCT brigade

(COL Rollier ’s Brigade), which was the unit with the most active program.

Since an effective program should have lessened the degree of relationship

(i.e.. those identified and helped would have been less likely to go AWOL ),

this findinq again suggests a counterproductive force at work. However ,

the absence of a control group makes any further interpretation difficult.

The absence of a control group at Fort Leonard Wood also makes it

difficult to compare the results at the two posts. The Fort Leonard Wood

rates are lower than those for either of the programs at Fort Polk . But

it is not clear from the Rollier report whether the figures in Table B—S

refer to trainees or to all personnel. This is an important omission ,

since the rates for permanent soldiers are usually much lower than for

trainees and would tend to reduce overall rates. Tables separating

trainees and permanent party personnel for the two installations show

Fort Wood’s rates as higher than Fort Polk’s for both types of men ( Fort

Polk , 1972).

Discussion

Fraas and Fox’s (1972) research casts doubt upon the existence of an

AWOL syndrome within prison populations. The weak relationship between

AWOL offenses and AWOL syndrome scores in the control group at Fort Polk

(Table fl—2) casts similar doubt upon the existence of such a syndrome

amonq troops in RCT. That relationship is stren gthened when scores are

known sugqests criterion contamination. Probably, either some action by

the cadre or fellow trainees (scapegoating) or some action by the high—

risk soldier (self—fulfilling prophecy) increases the likelihood that men

identified as AWOL—prone will , in fact, become AWOL statistics.

29

.---- 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
---- —------ - - - -

~~~ -~~~~~----—-~~~~ - -

Table B—5

TJTA Prediction of AWOL in BCT at Fbrt Leonard Wood

Percentages

Analysis

AWOL No AWOL Total Chi-square Phi

2d BCT Bde (n = 6,254)

TJTA high—risk group 2.8 97.2 100

(13.0% of the sample) 5,37* .03

TJTA reduced—risk

group 1.6 98.4 100

(87.0% of the sample)

3d BCT Bde (n = 10,231)

TJTA high—risk group 2.3 97.7 100

(16.6% of the sample 12.89** .04

TJTA reduced—risk

group 1.2 98.8 100

(83.4% of the sample)

Tota l (n = 16,485)

TJTA high—risk group 2.5 97.5 100

(15.3% of the sample) 12.08** .03

TJTA reduced-risk

group 1.3 98.7 100

(84.7% of the sample)

Source : Adapted from Wll ier , 1972, md 2, Part 2, Annex 01.

*Significant beyond the .05 level .

**Signifjcant beyond the .001 level.

30
The lack of information about historical differences between Fort 

Wood and FOrt Polk (e.g., do the personnel differ? were there any unusual circumstances at either post?) make it difficult to tell what is 

happening at Fort Wood. Making comparisons between posts is particularly difficult in the absence of a control group at Fort Wood. 

Ibwever, it does seem clear that the TJTA is n t strongly related 

to AWOL when the scores are not known by the cadre (Fort Polk). Even 

when the scores are known (FOrt Wood and the experimental group at Fort 

Polk), the magni~ude of the relationship is too small to be of any practical utility. 

31 
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‘.

~

t,-i’

34

~

— —----— ~- - - - - ---‘-- —-- -,

~~~~~ -.~~~~~~~ -—‘---- ~~~~~~ - -- - -

~~~~-