AFFIRM; Opinion Filed April 26, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-20-00566-CV 

SUSAN ELIZABETH WRIGHT, Appellant 

V. 

JAMES TURNER WRIGHT, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 254th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DF-18-24919 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Schenck, Osborne, and Partida-Kipness 

Opinion by Justice Schenck 

Susan Elizabeth Wright appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding a life 

insurance policy (“the policy”) to appellee James Turner Wright. In three issues, 

Ms. Wright argues the trial court abused its discretion by finding the policy was 

community property and awarding the policy to Dr. Wright. We affirm. Because 

all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 

47.4. 

BACKGROUND

The parties were married in 1985. During their marriage, they acquired a life 

insurance policy insuring the life of Dr. Wright (“the policy”) with Ms. Wright 
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named the beneficiary. The parties divorced in 2009, but the final divorce decree 

did not award the policy to either party. Thereafter, Dr. Wright filed a bill of review,1

and the parties attended mediation in 2014, during which they agreed to be coowners of the policy. According to the agreement, Ms. Wright would receive half 

of the proceeds, and the remaining half would be placed into a trust for the benefit 

of the parties’ children with Ms. Wright acting as trustee. The trial court then signed 

a Final Order dated March 10, 2017 (“March 10 Order”), which purported to order 

the parties to divide the policy into two separate policies. However, the insurer of 

the policy The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company (“Penn”) advised that it could 

not convert the policy into two separate policies. 

In December 2018, Dr. Wright filed an action for declaratory judgment 

seeking to be declared the sole owner of the policy, an application for a temporary 

restraining order against Ms. Wright and Penn, and alternative suit to divide 

undivided property. In January 2019, Ms. Wright filed a counter-petition seeking a 

declaratory judgment that the policy is her separate property and to divide undivided 

assets. After conducting a bench trial, the trial court issued a memorandum ruling, 

finding the policy was an undivided asset of the parties’ community estate and 

awarding the policy to Dr. Wright while also ordering him to maintain the policy for 

1

 That instrument is not in the record, nor is it clear when it was filed, and although the parties referenced 

the bill of review in the reporter’s record, the relief sought is not described. Ms. Wright’s brief indicates 

the bill of review challenged the entire divorce decree and did not reference the policy, and Dr. Wright does 

not dispute that statement in his own brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g) (providing in civil cases, appellate 

courts will accept as true facts stated unless other party contradicts them). 
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the benefit of the parties’ children. The trial court later reduced the memorandum 

ruling to a final judgment. This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

I. The Policy Was Ms. Wright’s Separate Property from Inception

In her first issue, Ms. Wright argues the evidence at trial on the bill of review 

established the policy was her separate property such that the trial court abused its 

discretion by finding otherwise. Dr. Wright responds by citing the presumption a 

trial court properly exercises its discretion in dividing property in a divorce 

proceeding. And indeed we review the trial court’s rulings dividing the parties’ 

property for an abuse of discretion. See In re D.V.D., No. 05-17-00268-CV, 2018 

WL 2316014, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 22, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also

TEX. FAM. CODE § 9.203(a) (providing in post-divorce-decree proceedings, court 

dividing undivided assets shall do so “in a manner that the court deems just and 

right”). 

At the bench trial, Ms. Wright testified the policy was obtained during the 

marriage between herself and Dr. Wright. According to Ms. Wright, she was 

designated the beneficiary because she was “insecure for the first time [in their 

marriage] not being the breadwinner.” She testified the policy was not divided by 

the 2009 divorce decree. According to Ms. Wright, she and Dr. Wright later attended 

mediation where they agreed to be co-owners of the policy and that half of the 
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proceeds would go to herself and the remaining half would go into a trust for the 

benefit of their children with herself acting as trustee. 

Dr. Wright also testified at the bench trial, stating his belief that, at the time 

he and Ms. Wright divorced, the policy was awarded to him as the sole owner based 

on his understanding of the terms of the divorce decree. He denied making a gift of 

the policy to Ms. Wright, ever agreeing she would be the sole owner of the policy, 

or redesignating her as the beneficiary of the policy after the divorce decree was 

entered. According to Dr. Wright, he asked that at the conclusion of the bench trial 

the judge award him sole ownership of the policy. He testified that the reason Ms. 

Wright was named as the beneficiary was “in case I got sued someone couldn’t take 

the policy from me.” He also admitted that when the policy was purchased, Ms. 

Wright was the owner of the policy. He further testified that his intention at the time 

of trial was for “the money to go to the kids.” 

We conclude the trial court did not err by not finding the policy to be Ms. 

Wright’s separate property. Although Ms. Wright testified her belief that the policy 

was her separate property “from the get-go” and Dr. Wright also admitted that the 

policy was issued to Ms. Wright when it was purchased, Dr. Wright also testified his 

initial belief that the divorce decree awarded him the policy, he never agreed at the 

time of the divorce that she would own the policy, and that he never made a gift of 

the policy to Ms. Wright. See Reisler v. Reisler, 439 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2014, no pet.) (“In a bench trial, the trial court acts as the fact finder and is 
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the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses.”). Importantly, the trial court could 

have taken into consideration the text of section 9.301(a): 

If a decree of divorce or annulment is rendered after an insured has 

designated the insured’s spouse as a beneficiary under a life insurance 

policy in force at the time of rendition, a provision in the policy in favor 

of the insured’s former spouse is not effective unless: 

(1) the decree designates the insured’s former spouse as the beneficiary; 

(2) the insured redesignates the former spouse as the beneficiary after 

rendition of the decree; or 

(3) the former spouse is designated to receive the proceeds in trust for, 

on behalf of, or for the benefit of a child or a dependent of either former 

spouse. 

FAM. § 9.301. Dr. Wright testified that since the divorce, he did not designate or 

otherwise change the beneficiary of the policy. See id. And both parties agree the 

divorce decree did not designate Ms. Wright as the beneficiary. See id. In all events, 

we conclude the trial court did not err by failing to find the policy to be Ms. Wright’s 

separate property. 

Accordingly, we overrule Ms. Wright’s first issue. 

II. Laches and Limitations 

In her second issue, Ms. Wright asserts laches bars Dr. Wright’s claim to the 

policy, urging that by waiting until 2018 to file the instant suit, he unreasonably 

delayed in asserting his rights to the policy, such that he waived any rights to it. 

However, her argument does not account for the fact that the parties agree Dr. Wright 

filed a petition for bill of review, which led to mediation in 2014 between the parties, 

and a mediated settlement agreement that was reduced to the March 10 Order in 
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2017, which ordered the policy to be split into two separate policies, one to be owned 

by each party. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court erred by failing to 

conclude Ms. Wright established this affirmative defense. 

Ms. Wright argues limitations applies to Dr. Wright’s suit because section 

9.202 of the family code limits post-decree divisions of property to two years after 

former spouse repudiates ownership interest of other former spouse and 

communicates the same to the former spouse. Even assuming Ms. Wright is correct, 

Dr. Wright’s suit appears to be a declaratory action to declare the parties’ respective 

rights under the March 10 Order and pursuant to section 9.301 of the family code, 

which provides for the post-divorce-decree disposition of a life insurance policy 

designating insured’s former spouse as the beneficiary. See TEX. FAM. CODE 

§ 9.301(a). The plain text of section 9.202 limits only actions asserted under that 

subchapter containing sections 9.201 through 9.205, and not those asserted under the 

subchapter containing section 9.301 or to actions to declare rights and obligations 

established by an order entered pursuant to a mediated settlement agreement, such 

as the March 10 Order. Accordingly, to the extent Ms. Wright urges the policy 

became her separate property through the operation of the statute of limitations as 

set forth in section 9.202, we disagree. 

We overrule Ms. Wright’s second issue. 
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III. Intentions of the Parties 

In her final issue, Ms. Wright urges the trial court’s order awarding the policy 

to Dr. Wright was erroneous because the mediated settlement agreement and the 

March 10 Order demonstrated the parties’ intentions that Ms. Wright own, at least 

in part, the policy and receive in whole or in part the proceeds of the policy. She 

also argues the trial court abused its discretion by finding the policy was community 

property. Dr. Wright responds that, because the policy was obtained during the 

marriage and nothing in the record establishes anything but community funds were 

used to purchase the policy, the policy is presumed to be community property. 

In resolving her first issue, we note that have already rejected Ms. Wright’s 

arguments that the trial court erred by concluding it was her separate property. 

Additionally, both parties agree the policy was obtained during the marriage and 

existed at the time of divorce. See FAM. § 3.003 (presumption that property 

possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is community 

property). And the record indicates the trial court could not award the policy to both 

parties. Therefore, we conclude this record does not support a conclusion that the 

trial court erred in awarding the policy to Dr. Wright or by ordering the children to 

be named the beneficiaries. See In re D.V.D., 2018 WL 2316014, at *8 (party 

complaining of division of community estate has burden of showing from evidence 

in record that trial court’s division was so unjust and unfair as to constitute abuse of 

discretion); see also Branch v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 422 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. 
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App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing FAM. § 9.301(a)) (holding predivorce designation of spouse as life-insurance beneficiary is ineffective after 

divorce unless former spouse designated beneficiary in divorce decree, insured 

redesignates former spouse after divorce, or former spouse designated to receive 

proceeds for benefit of dependent of either former spouses). We overrule Ms. 

Wright’s third issue. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm. 

200566F.P05 

 

/David J. Schenck/

DAVID J. SCHENCK 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

SUSAN ELIZABETH WRIGHT, 

Appellant 

No. 05-20-00566-CV V. 

JAMES TURNER WRIGHT, 

Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 254th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DF-18-24919. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Schenck. Justices Osborne and 

Partida-Kipness participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee JAMES TURNER WRIGHT recover his 

costs of this appeal from appellant SUSAN ELIZABETH WRIGHT. 

Judgment entered this 26th day of April 2022.