COVER: Marines unload sacks of rice from

CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter (Department of

Defense Photo (USAF) DF-ST-92-06112)
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF

OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH,. 1991

U S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

by

Charles R. Smith

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1995
PCN 19000316400

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents. Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0—16—048458—8
Foreword

The first half of 1991 was a demanding time for the armed forces of the

United States. In January, while elements of U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and

Marines were still deploying to the Persian Gulf, where they would join other

coalition forces in the liberation of Kuwait, a Marine special purpose force

conducted Operation Eastern Exit, a daring rescue of American citizens and

foreign nationals trapped in the American Embassy at Mogadishu, Somalia. Two

weeks later Operation Desert Storm began and coalition aircraft flew against Iraqi

targets in the Kuwaiti and Iraqi theaters of operation. In February, coalition

ground forces slashed through the vaunted Saddam Line to liberate Kuwait, while

their comrades afloat conducted one of the most successful strategic deceptions

in military history. Soon thereafter, American and other coalition forces were

involved in concurrent humanitarian operations, Provide Comfort in northern

Iraq and Sea Angel in Bangladesh. In June, Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines

erupted, causing massive damage. In response, American forces participated in

Operation Fiery Vigil, the evacuation of Clark Air Force and Subic Bay Naval

Bases, and Cubi Point Naval Air Station. With so much happening in so short

a period, some of these operations did not receive the same amount of attention

they would have, had they transpired during less tumultuous times. This

monograph provides a detailed look at Joint Task Force Sea Angel, the first joint

task force to be formed around a nucleus drawn from a Marine Air-Ground Task

Force, and the Marine-led humanitarian relief effort in Bangladesh.

The end of the Cold War begat a revolution in American military

strategy. Instead of a doomsday confrontation between superpowers, visionaries

of the new world order foresaw an emphasis on low intensity conflicts in the

third world and military "operations other than war." In addition, increasing

emphasis would be placed on teamwork or "jointness" within the armed services,

the formation of international coalitions not only for combined military

operations, but also for humanitarian relief activities, and close cooperation

among U.S. Government departments and agencies and international relief

organizations. Operation Sea Angel validated the effectiveness of each. Sea

Angel has served and can continue to serve as a model for future humanitarian

operations in littoral areas.

The author of this volume Charles R. Smith, has been with the History

and Museums Division since July 1971. He has written and edited several works

on the early history of the Marine Corps, among them Marines in the Revolution:

A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution, 1775-1783

(Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1975). In addition, he is the author of

U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969 (Washington:

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1988) in the official monographs of the Marine Corps

in the Vietnam War, and the co-author of the forthcoming volume on U.S.

Marine activities in Vietnam in 1968. He is a graduate of the University of

California, Santa Barbara, and received his master's degree in history from San

ill
Diego State University. He served in Vietnam with the 101st Airborne Division

(Airmobile) in 1968 and 1969, first as an artilleryman and then as a historian.

In the pursuit of accuracy and objectivity, the History and Museums

Division welcomes comments from interested individuals.

E. H. SIMMONS

Brigadier General

U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
Preface

Angels from the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991, relies on

primary source documents and oral history interviews for its main sources.

Originals or copies of these records are held at the Marine Corps Historical

Center. The documents include command chronologies, official messages,

journal files, after action and special action reports, operation orders, and

command briefs.

The author supplemented these sources with records provided by the

other services, Department of State, Agency for International Development,

international relief organizations, and pertinent published primary and secondary

sources. Although none of the information in this history is classified, some of

the documentation upon which it is based still carries a restricted or classified

designation.

A number of reviewers, all of whom were participants in the events

covered in the volume, read a comment edition of the manuscript. They were:

Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole III, USMC (Ret); Ambassador William

B. Milam; Dr. Mary C. Kilgour; Rear Admiral Stephen S. Clarey, USN (Ret);

Brigadier General Peter J. Rowe, USMC (Ret); Brigadier General Randall L.

West, USMC; Captain John R. Downs, MC, USNR; Colonel Gary W.

Anderson, USMC; Colonel Stephen E. Lindblom, USMC (Ret); and Mr. Jon F.

Danilowicz. Their comments, where applicable, have been incorporated into the

text.

This history, like its subject, has been a cooperative effort. Lieutenant

Colonel Ronald J. Brown, USMCR (Ret), former deputy command historian,

then later, command historian, I Marine Expeditionary Force, aided the project

by providing materials on the activities of the 5th Marine Expeditonary Brigade.

Members of the Historical Branch, History and Museums Division, have

reviewed the draft manuscript. Miss Evelyn A. Englander, head librarian, was

very helpful in obtaining needed reference materials. Mr. Robert E. Struder,

head of the Editing and Design Section, guided the manuscript through the

various production phases. Mrs. Catherine A. Kerns contributed significantly to

the publication effort, completing the design and layout, and Mr. William S.

Hill, the division's visual information specialist, expertly produced the maps and

assisted with the photo illustrations to the volume.

The author gives special thanks to Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons,

USMC (Ret), Director of Marine Corps History and Museums, whose policies

guided the preparation of this history; to former Deputy Director, Marine Corps

History and Museums, Colonel William J. Davis, USMC (Ret), who provided

support and guidance; to Mr. Benis M. Frank, Chief Historian, who aided the

author by giving him the benefit of his considerable experience in writing Marine

Corps history; and to Dr. Jack Shulimson, Head, History Writing Unit, for

providing advice and for editing the draft manuscript.

The author also is indebted to those individuals within the Marine Corps,

V
Department of Defense, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies

who freely exchanged information and made pertinent documents and

photographs available for examination. Among them were: Colonel Eugene L.

Gobeli, USMC; Colonel Kevin M. Kennedy, USMC (Ret); Lieutenant Colonel

Steven A. Slade, USA; Lieutenant Colonel Larry A. Johnson, USMC; Major V.

M. Bentinck, RM; Dr. Richard W. Stewart; Captain Len Palaschak, USA; Chief

Warrant Officer Larson P. Wilkison, USMC; Mr. Robert B. Hilton; and Mr.

Dennis J. King. To these individuals and all others connected with this project,

the author is indebted and truly grateful. In the end, however, it is the author

alone who is responsible for the content of the text, including all opinions

expressed and any errors of fact.

Charles R. Smith

vi
Table of Contents

Foreword . jjj

Preface v

The Winds of Death 1

The American Relief Effort . 9

Marshalling the Forces . . . 28

Angels from the Sea . . . . 52

Epilogue 85

Notes 88

Appendix:

A. Chronology 97

B. Command and Staff List 101

C. Task Organization . . . . 103

D. United States Assistance

Provided Cyclone Disaster Effort 106

E. Joint Meritorious Unit Award . . . 108

Index 109

vii

U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

Angels from the Sea: Relief Operations

in Bangladesh, 1991

The Winds of Death

On night of 29 April 1991 howling winds of death roared up the Bay of

Bengal, signaling the arrival of a killer cyclone. For eight hours the densely

populated coastal lowlands and offshore islands of the nation of Bangladesh on

the Indian subcontinent were battered by 235 kilometer-per-hour (140-mile) galeforce winds and swamped by a six- to eight-meter tidal wave. The first rays of

sunshine the next morning revealed almost unimaginable devastation. The entire

southeast countryside was under water. Trees had been uprooted or stripped of

their leaves and villages had been leveled. What had been a lush, verdant

landscape was now muddy brown. The bodies of an estimated 139,000 people

and more than a million livestock floated in turbid water. The affected area was

completely isolated. There was no electricity, every phone line was down, and

roads had been washed away. There was no way accurately to assess, let alone

repair, the damage. A greater danger, however, was that the situation could get

worse before it got better. Famine and disease threatened Bangladesh and without

immediate action this fast-unfolding tragedy could become a humanitarian disaster

of monumental proportions. The disaster would be averted as the Bangladesh

government, with the assistance of a Marine-led, American military joint task

force, turned back the threat.

The People's Republic of Bangladesh, formerly the east wing of Pakistan, is

the world's most densely populated agrarian nation. This troubled land is no

stranger to natural disasters. Located between India and Burma on the stunningly

beautiful, fertile, deltaic plain formed by the confluence of three Asian river

systems, the Brahmaputra, Ganges, and Meghna, Bangladesh is situated at the

head of a natural funnel formed by the shallow Bay of Bengal. Ravaged by

floods and tornadoes, the country has been subjected to seven of this century's

deadliest cyclones. Between 1960 and 1971 alone, five cyclones killed more than

540,000 people. As one American newspaper reported: 'These are seminal

disasters, interspersed among scores of other ghastly events that seem almost

minor by comparison--300 die in a train fire, 400 perish when a ferry boat goes

under,' or Bengal tigers kill 50 people in a forest along the coast.' During the

annual monsoon season, from May to October, it is not unusual for the welcome

floods which are the lifeblood of this country to exceed the norm and cause

extensive crop loss and cholera, and gastrointestinal epidemics.
2 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 3

While the hurricanes of the Atlantic and Eastern Pacific and the typhoons in

the Western Pacific are frequently more intense, the cyclones spawned in the Bay

of Bengal often cause catastrophic loss of life and property due to Bangladesh's

topography and population density. Since most of the country lies less than nine

meters above sea level, a high tidal wave can sweep over most of the low-lying

islands and immediate coastal areas. People, buildings, and crops surviving the

initial onslaught are therefore at great risk of death and further damage until the

waters recede, a process which can take weeks.

With about 116 million people occupying a nation the size of Wisconsin,

overpopulation has forced large numbers of Bangladeshi to inhabit remote

islands, silt islands or chars, and the coastal floodplain. The areas most

vulnerable to the severe effects of cyclones are occupied by the poor and

landless. They settle in the islands and coastal regions where they eke out a

living without paying rent or sharecrop on land perennially at risk of inundation

by salt water. Thus, it is the poor and landless who most often lose what little

they have built and accumulated, and even a few days without food or income

following a cyclone is a devastating experience from which they may never

recover.

On 23 April 1991, the Bangladesh Space Research and Remote Sensing

Organization detected a tropical depression just beyond the southern edge of the

Bay of Bengal. As it moved northwest over the warm waters of the bay, the

depression slowly evolved into a tropical storm and eventually became a cyclone.

Meteorologists designated it Tropical Cyclone 02B.2

As early as the 24th, the Government of Bangladesh and international relief

agencies issued storm warnings to alert the country's citizens, especially those

living on off-shore islands and in coastal districts, of potential danger.

Authorities urged the inhabitants of these vulnerable regions to move their

families, domestic animals, and belongings into the relative safety of cyclone

shelters, higher ground, or to areas at least 10 kilometers inland. The warning

cautioned the people to bury food, drinking water, and medicine in sealed packets

and cans. The containers, buried at least one meter underground, could be

retrieved after the expected tidal surge had receded .

As Tropical Cyclone 02B, now named Marian, moved slowly up the Bay of

Bengal, thousands took refuge in cyclone shelters. Due to the lack of shelter

space thousands more had to remain outside, seeking safety atop multistoried

buildings and even intall trees. Many people, however, stayed in their homes.

They were skeptical of the warnings and weather forecasts, because for every

actual cyclone there had been countless warnings. The fact that Marian had

formed in the premonsoon season led many to believe that as previous early

cyclones had it would pass by harmlessly. Others refused to leave their homes

and the land they cultivated, fearing that since they possessed no title to the land

they occupied, they could lose everything if someone else moved in while they

were away. The government appeared to make little effort to evacuate those on

vulnerable offshore islands.4
4 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Photograph courtesy of Mary C. Kilgour

The barograph on board the Bangladeshi naval ship Umar Farooq, which rode out the

storm in the port of Chittagong. At 0145 on 30 April the drop in barometric pressure to

below 930 millibars could no longer be recorded by the ship's instruments.

On the 28th, Cyclone Marian assumed a more northeasterly direction. The

Bangladesh government then activated its alert system, warning coastal and island

residents of imminent danger from hurricane-force winds and the threat of a

storm surge. Heavy winds and torrential rains began to buffet the country's

southeast coast the following day. More than 320,000 Bangladeshi sought the

protection of cyclone shelters and official buildings. The storm's death-blow

came about midnight. Marian's center crossed the coast near the Meghna

Estuary, located between the country's second largest city, Chittagong, and North

and South Hatia Islands. A six- to eight-meter high tidal wave rolled over the

low-lying off-shore islands, swept across the tidal plain, and then moved several

kilometers inland. Plunged into darkness, the fortunate who had taken refuge in

shelters watched in horror as their simply built homes, cattle, neighbors, and

crops were swept away. Even substantial buildings trembled as if shaken by an

earthquake before being hit by the tidal surge. "There was," as one observer

noted, "an uncanny roaring sound of the whirlwind and on-rushing water

grasping people and domestic animals into the jaws of death."5

On the morning of 30 April, all that was known in Dhaka, the capital, was

that a cyclone causing uncertain damage had hit the islands and southeastern

coastal areas. Telephone, FAX, and telegraph with the affected areas, as well

as international communications, were down. While precise, verifiable
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 5

Photograph courtesy of Shahidul Alam

Cattle corpses lay infields inundated by salt water on Sandwip Island. An estimated one

million head of cattle perished during the storm.

information was unavailable, initial reports from the media, the government, and

several voluntary agencies indicated that there was an unknown number of deaths

and widespread property damage.6

Later that day, Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia flew to the affected areas

and upon her return to Dhaka that evening called her cabinet into session.

Following the cabinet meeting, she issued an appeal for international assistance,

noting that while it would take some time before the full 'extent of the damage

[is] clearly known and the requirement of the affected people fully realized, it is,

however, evident that the damage has been both colossal and extensive." The

government, she continued, "has mobilized all its manpower and resources, and

already launched a massive relief operation, but the magnitude of the damage

appears to be such that it might prove impossible for the government of

Bangladesh alone to meet the challenge and mitigate the sufferings of the helpless

Begum Khaleda Zia was the widow of former army general and President, Ziaur Rahman

(Zia), who was assassinated by dissident elements of the military while visiting Chittagong in 1981.

The killing of Zia was followed by nearly 10 years of rule by another general who became

President, Hussain Muhammad Ershad. Ershad was forced to resign in December 1990 following

a period of strikes, protests, and a general disintegration of law and order. In February 1991, an

interim government oversaw new elections. As the country's new and first woman prime minister,

Begum Khaleda Zia promised to restore parliamentary democracy to Bangladesh after taking power

in March, just six weeks before the cyclone.
6 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

people." It was under these circumstances that she appealed to the international

community "to come forward in aid of the humanity in distress in Bangladesh

and help the people affected by the cyclone.' Food, shelter, pure drinking

water, medicine, and clothing were of immediate need.7

The government, which less than five months before had ended more than

15 years of military dictatorship, was unprepared to respond quickly and

effectively to a disaster of this magnitude. Within days instead of hours, the

young democratic government activated coordinating committees and mobilized

its armed forces to restore access to clean drinking water, reestablish

communications, and distribute relief supplies from its own stockpiles. Although

the effort eventually would involve all elements of Bangladesh society, the armed

forces were the key players initially. Constantly prepared for disaster operations,

they could mobilize trained human resources with an effective chain of command,

and operate on a decentralized basis when communications were inevitably

knocked out. The army soon established temporary camps and began feeding

refugees, while the Bangladesh air force, using the remaining dozen undamaged

helicopters, began food and medicine drops to isolated communities.8

The international community responded more quickly. Neighboring India

immediately sent aid supplies and three helicopters. Saudi Arabia, Canada, and

the United Kingdom each pledged millions of dollars. China and Japan promised

humanitarian aid. The European Economic Community undertook to send food,

tents, clothing, medicine, and other essentials. Private relief agencies and nongovernment organizations, such as the Red Crescent Society, International Red

Cross, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), World Health

Organization, Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), and Caritas

Bangladesh, activated volunteers and supplies already in Bangladesh and agreed

to provide additional assistance.

In Dhaka, United States Ambassador William B. Milam, a career diplomat

and an expert on international economic, environmental, and energy issues,

rapidly moved to coordinate the American response. After receiving

unconfirmed reports of widespread devastation on the 30th, he, at the request of

the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission

Director Mary C. Kilgour, a former Marine Corps officer candidate with more

than 25 years of service with the agency, declared a disaster and authorized the

immediate release of $25,000 to the Bangladesh government for relief activities.

In addition, an estimated $2 million worth of just-arrived medical supplies

previously donated through the Department of Defense's Humanitarian Assistance

Program, but not delivered, were turned over to the Ministry of Health. The

5,500 pounds of medical supplies included prepackaged kits containing surgical

and first-aid equipment and intravenous fluids, which the Government of

Bangladesh had requested the previous year. The American mission also took

steps to obtain a comprehensive assessment of the situation by dispatching trained

staff members from four USAID-funded non-government organizations to the

affected areas with a standardized rapid assessment program developed by the

mission.9
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 7

The following day, at the invitation of the Bangladesh government,

Ambassador Milam and other heads of foreign missions toured the most

devastated areas. In their discussions with local officials, they were told that the

critical need was pure drinking water. "The tidal surge, river flooding and heavy

rainfall," the embassy reported, "caused considerable damage to water

distribution systems in built-up areas and flooded many of the shallow and deep

'tube wells' that the majority of the rural citizens use for fresh water." This lack

of pure drinking water "will result in possible loss of life due to dysentery and

other water related diseases."°

The mission's initial assessment was confirmed on 2 May. Prime Minister

Zia, after meeting with representatives of non-government relief agencies, issued

a fresh international appeal. She asked for an immediate $56 million in

assistance, noting that the "threat to the cyclone survivors was from death due

to dehydration, starvation and disease." The government also requested the

donation of a number of items which could be procured locally such as food and

medicine, and items such as helicopters, tents, water purification tablets, and

bleaching powder which were in short supply or could not be obtained in

Bangladesh. These items were needed to supplement the government's on-going,

yet uncoordinated, relief efforts.'2

As a result of Prime Minister Zia's appeal and Ambassador Milam's visit,

the mission, which saw the "supply of first and foremost fresh water and,

secondly, potable water" as the greatest need, immediately donated more than

727,000 water purification tablets to the Bangladesh government and nongovernment organizations for distribution. Its supply depleted, the mission then

sent an urgent request for funds to the Department of State's Office of Foreign

Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to purchase additional purification agents and oral

rehydration salts. The embassy also queried the Department of Defense (DOD)

concerning the possibility of obtaining 2 million chlorine-based tablets from DOD

stocks. "We realize that the number is large," noted the defense attache,

Lieutenant Colonel James A. Dunn, Jr., USA, "and that Operation Provide

Comfort may have drawn down stocks." But, as he pointed out, "there are as

many as one million plus families who will need fresh water each day until

normal systems are restored. "

With the deployment of an ever-increasing number of Bangladesh military

personnel and non-government relief workers to the affected areas, the extent of

the devastation gradually emerged. Ten districts, home to approximately 11.2

Chlorine-based water purification tablets were preferred over the standard military canteentype, iodine-based tablets as the latter posed problems if taken by pregnant women. ** A graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and an Army tank officer, Lieutenant Colonel

James A. Dunn attended the Bangladesh Staff College before being assigned as defense attache in

1989.
8 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Photograph courtesy of USCinCPac

Housing was destroyed in Khankanabad, Banskhali, south of Chittagong.

Photograph courtesy of Shahidul Alam

This devastated patch on Sandwip Island was once home to 26 families.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 9

million people, were affected by the cyclone. Of those ten, the four coastal

districts of Bhola, Noakhali, Chittagong, and Cox's Bazar bore the brunt of the

storm and storm surge. Within the four coastal districts the greatest concern was

for the 5.2 million people living in 13 upazilas or administrative subdistricts, and

the city of Chittagong, the historic city that served as a primary entry point for

supplies destined for the China-Burma-India theater during World War II. By

2 May, the government confirmed more than 37,000 dead and reported tens of

thousands missing. The death toll was expected to exceed 100,000, since the offshore islands of Kutubdia, Sandwip, and Maheshkali, with a population of more

than 600,000, virtually were submerged. Chittagong, the only port in the stormravaged region capable of receiving relief supplies, was blocked by sunken ships

and its air facilities severely damaged.

Tragic stories equalled the number of bodies that washed ashore with the

tide. One such was that of a desperate man in the village of Kutubdia who

"reaches out for a floating banana tree on which to rest his baby boy. But a

poisonous snake bites the man's arm and he drops silently into the turbid

floodwaters. The tree floats away. The baby drowns." In the same village

"another man blacked out at the sight of waves 'as high as mountains'. Hours

later, when he came to, he realized that his wife, son and three daughters had

been swept out to sea . . . . 'I have lost everything. I have lost everything,' the

man said. 'God, why has it happened to me?"4 For those who survived the

cyclone, they had to contend with cholera, shortages of food and water, and

everyday bouts with malnutrition, dysentery, diarrhea, and malaria.

The American Relief Effort

On 3 May, President George Bush sent a message to Prime Minister Zia

expressing his condolences and those of the American people over the devastation

caused by the cyclone. "Our hearts go out . . . to the families of the numerous

victims of this terrible tragedy," Presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said.

The United States stands ready, the President assured the Bangladesh

government, to assist in the varied tasks of relief and reconstruction. In addition

to the more than $2 million already provided, the United States, Fitzwater

reported, was "looking into other means to help Bangladesh obtain its highest

priority needs for clean water, dry food, helicopter transport, clothing, and

temporary shelter."5

In Bangladesh, on the 3d, Agency for International Development Director

Mary Kilgour, accompanied by Defense Attache Lieutenant Colonel James Dunn

and First Lieutenant David Silverman, commanding officer of the U. S. Army's

2d Platoon, Company B, 84th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy), flew to
10 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Photograph courtesy of Mary C. Kilgour

USAID Director Mary C. Kilgour hands over water purification tablets to Oh Ahmed,

Civilian Relief Coordinator, at the Chittagong Circuit House Civilian Relief Center.

Chittagong to view the damage to the city and port. The USAID director met

with the Minister of Communications, Oh Ahmed, a native of Chittagong, who

was coordinating the relief effort, and turned over 450,000 water purification

tablets. Lieutenant Colonel Dunn and Lieutenant Silverman toured the heavily

damaged port facilities and airfield with senior Bangladeshi military officials.

Lieutenant Silverman determined that the repair of the airfield's terminal and

tower was within the engineer detachment's capabilities. The following day

Director Kilgour returned to Dhaka and Lieutenant Colonel Dunn flew to the

offshore islands where he viewed the devastation.'6

The four USAID-funded, non-government assessment teams made their first

report, based on field trips to the affected areas, to the mission's staff on the 4th,

the proclaimed national day of mourning for the flood victims. By then the

country's confirmed death toll stood at 92,000, but the teams estimated that it

would soon exceed 150,000. The total population in the moderate to severely

affected areas they estimated at 5 million, half of whom were homeless. The offWhen the cyclone struck, the 15 soldiers from 2d Platoon, Company B, were deployed to

Mymensingh, north of Dhaka, constructing schools on training Exercise Baker Carriage II. The

Pacific Command authorized the American Embassy to coordinate all United States military

disaster assistance, including the diversion of the platoon from school construction to the relief

effort. (USCinCPac msg to AmEmbassy, Dhaka, OlOO45ZMay9l)
ANGELS FROM ThE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 11

shore islands had no source of fresh water and it was unlikely that a fresh water

supply would be reestablished for at least several weeks. The survivors, they

reported, lacked water, food, shelter and had lost all of their possessions; the

dead lacked adequate burial.

Of those inhabiting the rural coastal areas, 70 to 80 percent were homeless

and more than a third of these were in overcrowded, dirty, unorganized shelters

without sanitation or water supply. Many had not eaten in the last 24 to 48

hours. The teams noted that half the cattle and most of the fowl were lost. The

dry season or boro rice crop was lost and they surmised that it could not be

replanted for six months due to the inundation of salt water. In urban areas,

such as Chittagong and Cox's Bazar, the poor suffered a near total loss of

shelter, food supplies, fuel, and cooking utensils. The middle and upper classes

lost less and had access to some food, however, with dry, unspoiled food in short

supply, the teams reported that its price was beginning to climb sharply.'7

The cyclone also ruined the affected area's infrastructure; by this time the

reported damage was far worse than that inflicted by past cyclones. The large,

just-completed bridge spanning the Karnaphuli River in Chittagong had been

knocked down by an errant crane, making communications with the south more

difficult. Hundreds of kilometers of embankments, used for flood protection and

to prevent the inundation of crop lands by salt water, had been breached or tally

destroyed by the storm surge. Major thoroughfares and sections of the Dhaka

Department of Defense Photo (USAF) DF-ST-92-02643

Salt water inundated the rice fields of Sandwip Island destroying much of the boro, or dry

season rice crop.
12 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Photograph courtesy of Shahidul Alam

People of Chowkatalli on Sandwip Island collect water from a tubewell just meters away

from a pond containing both human and cattle remains.

to Chittagong railway were cut, as were telecommunications between the area

and the capital. The area's only ground satellite station at Betbunia, northeast

of Chittagong, was wrecked. It was estimated that it would take several weeks

before satellite communications could be restored.'8

Access to fresh water, the non-government teams reported, should remain the

first priority. If fresh water could not be procured, then water purification

materials, such as tablets, or locally purchased alum or bleaching powder, needed

to be distributed, followed by oral rehydration salts, and dry food which children

could consume. The import and distribution of other items such as milk powder

had to be discouraged. To assist with the distribution effort, the teams echoed

the mission's conclusions and the request made by the Bangladesh government

that the United States and several other bilateral donors provide flatbottomed,

inflatable boats; helicopters; water containers; rations; and communications

equipment. '

The mission relayed a brief outline of the teams' assessments,

recommendations, and requests to the Department of State, which had established

a working group on the American government's relief effort. In addition to the

Department of State, the group was made up of representatives from AID's

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, other units within AID, the Office of the

Because international telephone and FAX were down, all communications between the

embassy and Washington had to be by cumbersome cable.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 13

Secretary of Defense, and appropriate sections of the Joint Staff. During the

group's first meeting, its members detennined that assuring an adequate supply

of oral rehydration salts and water purification tablets was the highest immediate

priority, and the item which the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance would

focus on even though its funding authority virtually was exhausted.

The problems of aid organization and distribution, however, dominated the

working group's discussions. While the supply of food stockpiled in government

warehouses, or "Go Downs,'1 and non-government storehouses was considered

adequate to deal with the disaster, the means of delivering the food to those in

need was not. Department of Defense representatives, noting that they were still

gathering information on the availability and exact cost of providing helicopters,

most probably from the Philippines, estimated that it would cost in excess of $3

million to transport eight helicopters to Dhaka and that it would take a minimum

of five days. With cost in mind, the group agreed that it might be more practical

to charter helicopters or provide funds for helicopters from a third country, and

that the money saved then be used for water and land transportation. Before any

specific action could be taken, the group, in addition to passing on its thoughts,

asked that the embassy provide "well-defined action recommendations both for

immediate relief and for near-term reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts."20

While members of the working group continued their efforts in Washington,

American Embassy personnel moved ahead in Dhaka. Agency for International

Development representatives met with officials of the Bangladesh government and

non-government relief agencies daily, constantly updating their assessment of the

damage and need for assistance. They also began to make cash grants to several

prequalified, non-government organizations to address immediate health needs,

and requested an Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance allotment of an additional

$4.25 million in grant funds to support the proposed relief efforts of other nongovernment organizations.2' On the military side, Defense Attache Lieutenant

Colonel Dunn queried Admiral Charles R. Larson, USN, United States

Commander in Chief, Pacific (USCinCPac) on the availability of water containers

and rations, and on the possibility of using satellite coverage for damage

assessment. Informed by the Department of State and USAID that helicopters

might have to be rented if needed, he also sent messages to nearby defense

attaches inquiring if helicopters could be obtained and their rental rates •22

By 6 May, the confirmed death toll had risen to more than 125,000. The

Bangladesh government reported that 77,800 confirmed dead were from

Chittagong District, 39,700 from Cox's Bazar, and smaller numbers from the

remaining hard-hit districts. Within Chittagong District, 35,000 of the dead were

residents of Sandwip Island, more than 10 percent of the island's precyclone

population; 30,000 from the subdistrict of Banshkhali, 10,000 from Anwara

subdistrict; and 1,900 from the city itself. Even greater damage had occurred

in the areas surrounding Cox's Bazar, where as much as 25 percent of the

population of Kutubdia Island was reported killed. Women and children

constituted more than 60 percent of all dead. The estimated number of homeless

was placed between two and one half and three million people.
14 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Photograph courtesy of Shahidul Alam

An urban bustee or village in Chittagong, totally destroyed by the cyclone, was rebuilt

temporarily on a roadside with salvaged bamboo and matting.

That day, despite strong rains and heavy seas which had thwarted earlier

attempts, several ships of the Bangladesh navy reached the offshore islands of

Sandwip, Manpura, and Kutubdia, and began the task of setting up relief camps.

Although hampering to the relief effort, the rains did provide the only fresh

water the islanders, most of whom were marooned and hungry, had received

since the cyclone struck a week before. As had the navy, the Bangladesh army

deployed additional communications teams and troops to the affected areas to

reestablish communications and assist with the daily airlift of more the 30 metric

tons of bread. The government also sent additional companies of the Bangladesh

Rifles, one of the country's two paramilitary forces, to assist local officials in

maintaining order.u The efforts of the government, both civilian and military,

were, as the American Embassy pointed out, heroic and involved numerous

personal sacrifices, but the task was overwhelming.24

A week after the cyclone struck, relief workers had made little headway in

reaching and aiding those in the greatest need of help. Dependent upon a few

ships, a dozen of their own helicopters and three sent from India, the

government's efforts moved ahead slowly. Although relief supplies poured in

from around the world, the lack of adequate transportation hindered timely

distribution of much-needed relief supplies. This prompted Ambassador Milam

to request that Lieutenant Colonel Dunn ask CinCPac if U.S. Marine Corps or

U.S. Navy assets that may be transiting the Indian Ocean, southern Bay of

Bengal or near Singapore might be diverted to assist in relief operations." Most

important assets would include helicopters for the delivery of relief supplies and

personnel and landing craft which would be able to reach nearby offshore
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 15

islands. It was vital to land relief supplies, especially potable water,

immediately. Lieutenant Colonel Dunn envisioned "that the ships could anchor

off Chittagong for coordination with local government/military relief operators

and then conduct operations under their control." While it was not clear at that

time how long relief operations would continue, the Ambassador, Dunn noted,

believed that the Navy or Marine Corps assets would be needed for at least two

to three weeks. Should that long a stay prove a problem, their help for less time,

he said, would still be extremely useful. Dunn also inquired whether units then

deployed to Thailand on the Cobra Gold series of training exercises might be

diverted to Bangladesh.

In a separate request, Lieutenant Colonel Dunn reported that Ambassador

Milam had been approached by Bangladesh officials and asked if the United

States could assist by providing long-range communications and a "mini-air

traffic control" unit to restore control of airspace in the disaster area. This was

crucial because Bangladesh, Indian, and Pakistani helicopters were operating with

no air traffic control.26 Lieutenant Colonel Dunn also requested the use of a

small, twin-engine Beechcraft support aircraft, to assist the staff of the embassy

and defense attache's office in damage assessment.27

The use of American military aircraft, ships, and communications teams was

being considered in Washington. In discussing the range of options available to

assist the Bangladesh government's relief efforts, Defense Department

representatives assigned to the Department of State working group reported that

the nearest embarked helicopter assets, those of the 5th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade (MEB), were in the Persian Gulf, but could not be diverted to

Bangladesh as they were earmarked to support a possible evacuation of American

Photograph courtesy of Shahidul Alam

Hundreds of people line up near one of the first temporary emergency relief centers

established by the Bangladesh government on Sandwip Island.
16 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

citizens from Ethiopia. The 5th MEB's redeployment also was tied to the safe

withdrawal of U.S. Army forces from southern Iraq, the termination of Navy

combat air patrols, and the movement of more than 30,000 Iraqi refugees to

havens in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.28 The only other helicopter support options

were to deploy a number of Marine Boeing CH-46 Sea Knight and Sikorsky CH53 Sea Stallion helicopters attached to Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task

Force 4-90 from the Philippines using Air Force Lockheed C-5A Galaxy

transports or to airlift helicopters from Okinawa or the West Coast.

Expenditures to support the latter options, defense representatives noted, would

be prohibitive. The cost of each one-way C-5A sortie would approach $400,000,

excluding fuel, maintenance, and associated charges. As to other forms of

disaster assistance, such as food, water purification tablets, flatbottomed,

inflatable or shallow-draft aluminum or fiberglass-hulled boats, and plastic water

containers, the defense staffers reported the items could be procured if the

Department of State provided the funds. The bottom line was that unless the

President said "do it," or the Department of State found funds to pay the bill,

there was little the Department of Defense could do.

The State Department informed the American Embassy in Dhaka of the

problems and exorbitant costs of leasing commercial heavy-lift helicopters or

transporting Department of Defense air assets. As the department noted: "we

have conflicting information on the need for helicopters and need to sort out the

requirements before we make a final decision on whether to proceed." The

department also reported funding then under consideration would not authorize

the use of commercial or Department of Defense helicopters. It concluded by

asking the embassy to confirm its requirement for heavy-lift helicopters in view

of the fact that the then-current level of funding did not include funds for

helicopters: "We need urgently therefore your best needs assessment so that we

can determine whether we should go ahead with our search for sources of

funding."29

In reply to the department's request, Ambassador Milam noted that the

"mission understands that OFDA and perhaps others think a substantial sum for

helicopters could be better spent chartering or hiring boats. Initially [the] mission also [was] inclined toward that view." But, he continued, "we have

lately become convinced . . . that U.S. -provided helicopters are essential to [the]

relief efforts." In support of his position, Ambassador Milam noted that the most

devastated areas where people were starving could only be reached by helicopter.

Although the Government of Bangladesh possessed nearly 300 shallow-draft

boats, donated by Japan in 1988, they could not, he reported, navigate open

ocean in order to supply or resupply the hard-hit, offshore islands. Peripheral

to the issue of disaster relief, but of extreme political importance, was that the

Bangladesh government's first relief request made of the United States was for

helicopters. A number of government officials, he noted, had speculated that the

reason Bangladesh had not been supplied with helicopters was that the United

States had no confidence in the "newly and fairly elected government." "While

our calculations about the need for helicopters is not based on this factor," he
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 17

Photograph courtesy of Col Eugene L. Gobeli, USMC

A local ferry sits abandoned in the midst of rice fields covered with salt water. Devastated

areas such as this could only be reached by helicopter.

continued, "it is important that we be visibly responsive to this democratic

government's urgently expressed needs." "If cost effectiveness and numbers of

tons per blade hOurs is to be the guide for deciding whether helicopters should

be sent to Bangladesh, then perhaps they should not be sent. If filling a

desperate need, as stated by the BDG [Bangladesh government} and delivering

food/supplies that will save lives is the primary consideration, then helicopters

should be sent." Ambassador Milam strongly urged that $2 million be found to

fund three heavy lift, Department of Defense CH-46 helicopters for a period of

two weeks. Military aircraft, he concluded, would be administratively easier to

support than commercially leased aircraft.3°

While the Department of State tried to resolve diplomatic and financial

difficulties, events in Ethiopia made U.S. military assistance to Bangladesh much

more likely. At that time, the 5th MEB was embarked on board the ships of

Amphibious Group 3 (PhibGru 3) in the Persian Gulf. This force had not been

previously available because it was standing by to evacuate more than 600

American citizens caught up in a civil war in Ethiopia. In early May, even

though rebel factions had gained ground against government forces, the threat

subsided and the 5th MEB was no longer needed.

The 5th MEB and PhibGru 3 were reorganized in preparation for their

redeployment in the wake of Operation Desert Storm and lost about one-third of

their combat capability. The 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations

Capable) (MEU [SOC]) and five amphibious ships of Amphibious Squadron 1
18 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

were detached from the 5th MEB and PhibGru 3, respectively. They were to

stay in the Persian Gulf as a strategic reserve, covering Central Command's pullout and ready to provide air and ground forces should an Ethiopian evacuation

become necessary. Two Military Sealift Command ships assigned to PhibGru

3, the crane ship Flickertail State (T-ACS 5) and the cargo ship Cape Girardeau

(T-AK 2039), also stayed behind to support Central Command's retrograde.

After the breakout of the 11th MEU (SOC), the remaining ships of PhibGru 3,

led by the amphibious assault ship Tarawa (LHA 1), conducted routine

maintenance in various Arabian Gulf ports and prepared for their redeployment.

On 7 May, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, released PhibGru 3 and

ordered it to return to the United States by way of the Indian Ocean and the

Philippine Islands. PhibGru 3 was scheduled to come under the operational

control of the Seventh Fleet on 10 May and could, if so ordered, be off the coast

of Bangladesh seven days later.3'

With the release of PhibGru 3 and the 5th MEB, the Pacific Command,

which concurrently was considering and planning for a number of relief options,

became convinced that using the task group's assets was the "best way to go"

should the Department of Defense be directed to assist. Because of its inherent

flexibility and capacity to react quickly, an amphibious task force was well-suited

for relief operations in Bangladesh. The areas most in need of help were the

offshore islands and the coastal lowlands, both of which were well within the

reach of a landing force. It could easily provide needed transportation using

landing craft, small boats, helicopters, and amphibious vehicles. Operations

could be sea-based, hence, would require only minimal American forces on the

shore, reducing the logistic demands on the fragile Bangladesh infrastructure.

As a result of the defense attache's query on the 6th, and subsequent

discussions held between representatives of the command and Pacific Fleet, the

Commander, Seventh Fleet requested the amphibious task group forward a "plan

to provide immediate assistance including units to be diverted, proposed

command structure, logistics support required, and ETA [estimated time of

arrival] Chittagong area." Since the task group would be needed, according to

embassy estimates, for two to three weeks, Seventh Fleet notified commanders

of Naval Task Forces 76 and 73 that the potential existed that elements of

Amphibious Ready Group Bravo, the amphibious cargo ship St. Louis (LKA

116), tank landing ship San Bernardino (LST 1189), or the Maritime

Prepositioning Ship First Lieutenant Jack Lummus (TAK 3011), would be

directed to relieve the amphibious task group on station. The task force

commanders, like PhibGru 3, were to provide a coordinated plan of action, the

The 2,000-man 11th MEU (SOC), composed of Battalion Landing Team 3/1, Marine Medium

Helicopter Squadron 268, and Marine Service Support Group 11, had been embedded into the 5th

MEB for Operation Desert Storm and was embarked on the New Orleans (LPH 11), Denver (LPD

9), Mobile (LKA 115), Germantown (LSD 42), and Peoria (LST 1183). Another PhibGru 3 ship,

the Tripoli (LPH 10), struck a mine and was seriously damaged in January 1991.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 19

earliest possible departure date for each ship, and estimated time of arrival off

Chittagong •32

Responding to Seventh Fleet's request, PhibGru 3 reported that it could

arrive the morning of 16 May, assuming a speed of 16 knots. Its planned

concept of operations encompassed four main phases: a liaison visit between

PhibGru 3 and 5th MEB personnel and relief officials at Chittagong; the airlift

and surface movement of relief supplies and water-making facilities to predesignated landing zones; the turnover of the relief mission to international

agencies or follow-on relief organizations; and, finally, the return of personnel

and equipment to their respective amphibious ships. Should the group be tasked

with the relief mission, it requested appropriate radio frequencies, landing zone

and distribution site. locations, aeronautical and topographical charts, additional

medical supplies and vaccines, especially against rabies, and the designation of

specific liaison personnel from the Bangladesh navy and government or from a

non-government relief organization.33

Task Force 76 reported that while a number of options were considered, it

would recommend that the St. Louis proceed from Subic Bay in the Philippines

to Okinawa where it would load a number of Marine Corps items best suited for

relief operations such as reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs),

generators, and bulldozers. * From Okinawa, the St. Louis would steam to

Chittagong, arriving about 23 May. The San Bernardino and Lummus would

continue with their scheduled operations and not be deployed. This option, it

noted, precluded any reliance on Military Airlift Command support and allowed

adequate time to prestage the best humanitarian relief package from equipment

available on Okinawa.34 Seventh Fleet passed both the proposed

recommendations of Task Force 76 and the concept of operations submitted by

PhibGru 3 to CinCPac for consideration.

On the morning of 9 May, CinCPac informed Lieutenant Colonel Dunn that

the command was closely monitoring the situation in Bangladesh and was taking

a number of specific actions on his requests for assistance. The quantity and cost

of chlorine-based water purification tablets and water cans were being identified.

Thirteen pallets of relief and medical supplies, singled out by the Pacific

Command's Humanitarian Assistance Office, were readied for shipment on

Okinawa and would be airlifted by an Air Force Lockheed C- 141 Starlifter to

The Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit is a frame-mounted, portable water purification

system capable of purifying water from almost any deep or shallow well or surface water source.

The ROWPU is able to remove nuclear, biological, and chemical contaminants as well as minerals

and biological impurities. The single greatest benefit of the reverse osmosis process is the ability

to desalinate salt water. Powered by a 30-kilowatt generator, the ROWPU is capable of producing

potable water at a rate of 600 gallons per hour.

The ROWPU's end product, drinkable water, posed a problem for many Bangladeshi.

They could not comprehend how a machine, or a water purification tablet, could produce safe

drinking water from water taken from poluted tube wells, and ponds or irrigation canals that had

once contained the corpses of their livestock and countrymen.
20 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Photograph courtesy of ShaIidu1 Alam

A section of the damaged port of Chittagong illustrates the numerous wrecks which

clogged the port, preventing ocean-going relief ships from delivering needed supplies.

Bangladesh on 10 May. Although the command informed Dunn that the closest

helicopter assets were on board ships of the amphibious group and their use was

'operationally preferred and logistically much more supportable" than drawing

on air assets on Okinawa or in the Philippines, CinCPac noted that it could do

nothing unless the group's diversion was requested and authorized. The same

was true for Pacific Ocean Division Corps of Engineer personnel to be used in

a damage assessment of Chittagong harbor and the use of communication

personnel and equipment. Any CinCPac assistance was dependent upon the

receipt of a specific American Embassy request and subsequent approval by the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.35

In Bangladesh, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance notified the embassy

that the Department of State had approved the requested allotment of an

additional $4.25 million for disaster relief. USAID quickly obligated grants

totalling more than $3.6 million with CARE, Save the Children Fund (USA),

The Asia Foundation, World Vision, and a number of other non-government

relief organizations. After receiving approval from the Bangladesh army, the

embassy deployed the 15 soldiers from the U.S. Army's 84th Engineer Battalion

to Chittagong to assist with the repair of the city's airport terminal and

tower.36* Following the receipt of a request from the Bangladesh air force for

additional parachutes to facilitate aerial delivery of relief supplies which

The Army engineers did little in the terms of major reconstruction because construction

materials were in very short supply and the availability of heavy engineer equipment was limited.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 21

Lieutenant Colonel Dunn promptly forwarded to the Pacific Command for action,

the defense attache, accompanied by several USAID officials, flew to Chittagong

to continue damage reconnaissance.37

Upon their return to Dhaka and after subsequent discussions at the embassy,

the mission's country team agreed that helicopters would be needed to perform

relief operations. Accordingly, Ambassador Milam informed the Department of

State of the recommendation on the 9th. Of the more than 5 million people

severely affected by the cyclone, he reported, approximately half lived on islands

or in coastal areas not served by main roads. The few feeder roads that existed

were impassable and the island population was hard to reach due to rough seas

and the shortage of large boats. The Bangladesh military, he noted, "has been

able to reach these areas with relief goods intermittently by helicopter and

occasional air drops . . . . You know better than I what an inexact science

disaster assessment and assistance are." The ambassador concluded by noting

that: "Our best judgement at this time, given humanitarian need, logistical

difficulties of reaching island and remote mainland coastal areas, loss of BDG

[Bangladesh government] helicopters and overuse of remaining ones, and need

for newly elected government to perform well quickly is that U.S. supply of a

few helicopters would be money well spent."38

At Ambassador Milam's request, Lieutenant Colonel Dunn advised CinCPac

of the mission's "high interest in possible diversion" of the amphibious task

group and asked "if earlier arrival was possible."39 In response, CinCPac noted

Photograph courtesy of Mary C. Kilgour

The cyclone's fierce winds brought down several of the port's cranes, which hindered the

relief efforts and placed a greater emphasis on the need for helicopter support.
22 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

that the task group could possibly arrive earlier if an increased speed of advance

was authorized. The original 17 May arrival date off Chittagong was based on

an assumed speed of 14 knots, but an increase to 16 knots, as suggested by

PhibGru 3, was feasible. Any increase in speed, however, would increase "fuel

costs dramatically and will not be ordered until [the group was] committed by

CJCS [Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff]."4°

At Camp Courtney on Okinawa, on the 9th, III Marine Expeditionary Force

(III MEF) staff received indications from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac),

in Hawaii that the MEF was one of several candidates being considered as the

nucleus around which a joint task force would be formed and deployed within the

next 24 hours. At the time, the MEF commanding general, Major General

Henry C. Stackpole III, and his Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (0-3),

Colonel Stephen E. Lindblom, were in the Philippines attending a Seventh Fleet

planning conference. Colonel Warren R. McPherson, III MEF Chief of Staff,

informed Colonel Lindblom of the situation. They agreed that a planning cell

should be formed to follow events as they unfolded and that Major General

Stackpole should be apprised of any developments.

As all voice communications with Bangladesh were disrupted and the only

communications available was by teletype through the American Embassy in

Dhaka, little was known about the situation on the ground other than that

provided by the mission's country team. Assuming a near total destruction of the

affected area's infrastructure and an inability on the part of the Bangladesh

government to support an American military effort, the MEF planning cell

developed a "worst case" relief package that included a survey and

reconnaissance party, command and control, satellite communications capability,

limited transportation assets, and a reverse osmosis water purification component.

This flexible relief package could be expanded or reduced as the situation

demanded.

Late on the 9th, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, notified III MEF that there

were indications that the Commander, Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Stanley R.

Arthur, would be designated the joint task force commander. The planning had

been done, so all that remained was to wait until the situation clarified as the

staff expected that deployable elements of the MEF would be involved in the

relief effort if the staff was not.4' This on-again, off-again process was not

helpful. "The affected commands," as Colonel Lindblom later noted, "should

have been given advance word and kept in the loop as decisions were being

made."42

The American relief effort in Bangladesh received a boost on the 10th with

the arrival of the C-141 from Okinawa and a Air Force C-5A transport from

Southwest Asia. With an estimated value of $25 million, the Department of

Defense-donated provisions included medical supplies, blankets, tents, foodstuffs,
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 23

and other relief commodities. These supplies were unloaded with the assistance

of embassy staff and Bangladesh military personnel. They were then turned over

to representatives of the Bangladesh army's Supreme Command on behalf of the

Ministry of Relief and were taken to government warehouses for later

distribution. This donation supplemented on-going embassy relief endeavors.

The relief priorities of providing water, food, diarrheal disease control, and

emergency shelter remained unchanged. The overriding need, however, was to

'establish effective transportation and logistics systems to the severely affected

islands and inaccessible coastal areas."43

The embassy again asked for help in alleviating the problem. American

Defense Attache Lieutenant Colonel Dunn forwarded Ambassador Milam's

personal appeal for helicopter support to the Commander in Chief, Pacific,

Admiral Charles R. Larson, with a copy going to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff:

Admiral, I ask to take a few moments of your time to pass

on a request from the American Ambassador to Bangladesh, Mr.

William B. Milam. As your staff is aware, through

messages on the same subject, the AmEmbassy in Dhaka is

attempting to obtain the services of the USS Tarawa and her 16

CH46 helicopters to assist in life saving measures in Bangladesh.

Colossal damage has been sustained in the coastal regions of

southeastern Bangladesh in a 30 April 91 cyclone and DOD

assistance has led the way in U.S. relief. Your staff, and that of

your subordinates and the Joint Staff, have provided spectacular

support to the U.S. defense attache office and the AmEmbassy

in this crisis.

Mr. Milam and the country team strongly believe that the

aircraft on the Tarawa are the closest and best organized force

to now bring aid and save lives of the millions of affected

Bangladeshis. Funding by USAID and State Department does

not now seem to be available to finance the deployment of the

Tarawa.

If funding for the deployment of the Tarawa and her aircraft

could be made available, either through operational or exercise

funds, lives of our Desert Shield ally could be saved.

* The donation did not contain food items as the Bangladesh government had advised the

embassy that even though 26 sea containers of excess meals ready to eat (MREs) were available

from Desert Storm, the government did not want MREs or other rations that contained or might

contain pork. (USDAO, Dhaka msg to USCinCPac, llO7O4ZMay9l)
24 U.S. MARINESIN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel Dunn concluded his appeal on behalf of the ambassador by

requesting that "all attempts be made to make the Tarawa available for this noble

mission. "

The Bangladesh government and American Embassy appeals were echoed by

the United Nations. After meeting with private aid agencies in Dhaka,

representatives of the world body declared "that foreign nations had failed to

mount an effort sufficient to help the survivors of the cyclone." They concluded

that "Bangladesh urgently needed helicopters, water purification tablets, tents,

medical kits, plastic sheets, powdered milk and drugs, particularly anti-diarrhea

medicine." The United Nations representatives considered the means of

transporting these and other supplies to the cyclone victims essential

The repeated entreaties by Ambassador Milam and his staff for helicopter

support had not gone unnoticed in Washington and Hawaii. On the 9th,

following discussions between Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S.

Eagleburger, and Deputy and Acting Secretary of Defense Donald J. Atwood,

the Department of State formally requested that the Department of Defense

provide relief assistance in the form of heavy-lift helicopters, specifically those

attached to the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The helicopters were to be

used "to deliver relief supplies to low-lying coastal areas, flooded areas and areas

not accessible by roads" for a period of approximately 14 days. Shortly after

1700 on the 10th, Secretary Atwood forwarded a memorandum to the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cohn L. Powell, directing "the commander

in chief of the appropriate unified command or specified command to order

appropriate elements of the Fifth Marine Expeditionary Brigade to make best

speed to international waters adjacent to Bangladesh." The brigade's mission was

to provide "transportation support to humanitarian relief efforts in Bangladesh."

In a note appended to the memorandum, Secretary Atwood directed Major

General Stackpole to Bangladesh to "assess and set up" communications and

authorized a "speed up" of Amphibious Group 347

Late that evening, a warning order, prepared by the Joint Staff and approved

by the Chairman, was sent to CinCPac requesting that Admiral Larson provide

a "commander's estimate with alternative courses of action" for the President's

consideration by noon on the 11th. The command was to be prepared, when

directed by the President, to "provide support for relief operations to assist the

Government of Bangladesh in recovering from tropical cyclone damage for a

period of approximately 2 weeks." Authorized courses of action included--but

were not limited to--providing helicopter lift of relief supplies, relief of

Bangladesh government and U.S. Embassy personnel, search and rescue

assistance, and communications help until the Bangladesh government could

reestablish communications in the disaster area. Other commands, such as the

Strategic Air and Special Operations Commands, were to provide appropriate

support as required.48

Upon receipt of the warning order, CinCPac activated a crisis action team

to address immediate and long-term assistance concerns. Working throughout

the night, the team communicated its assessment and proposed concept of
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 25

operations to the American Embassy in Dhaka and the Joint Staff in Washington

early on the 11th. The established overriding priority was to assist in minimizing

the death of additional Bangladeshi citizens in the postdisaster period. To that

end, CinCPac proposed, when directed by the President, to execute a three-phase

operation designed to provide command, control, and communications capability,

"immediate short term disaster relief, and longer term sustainable humanitarian

assistance to designated areas in Bangladesh."49

During phase one, a joint task force, codenamed Productive Effort, would

be formed and the designated commander, Major General Stackpole, would

deploy to Dhaka. He and his staff would establish liaison with the embassy's

country team, officials of the Bangladesh government, private volunteer and

international relief organizations, and would furnish CinCPac with an on-site

mission assessment. To provide a means of assessment during phase two,

CinCPac would deploy the first American rotary wing assets, consisting of five

U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawks, an environmental preventive medicine

assessment capability, and a command, control, and communications

augmentation cell. Following the assessment phases, the final phase would

encompass an "organized, sustained effort to provide protracted humanitarian

assistance." The Joint Task Force (JTF) commander would "direct and

coordinate the relief efforts provided by light-, medium-, and heavy-lift

Department of Defense Photo (USAF) DF-ST-92-06107

MajGen Henry C. Stackpole III, commanding the III Marine Expeditionary Force

headquartered on Okinawa, was given command of the joint American effort to provide

disaster relief to the victims of the Bangladesh cyclone.
26 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

helicopters, surface and shallow draft craft and personnel" from Amphibious

Group 3 and embarked 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. All activities would

be limited to those permitted by the Department of State through the American

ambassador to Bangladesh. In addition, CinCPac set a spending ceiling of

$500,000, noting that service-incurred costs would be born by each obligating

service.50 "Rest assured," the Pacific Command informed the American

Embassy, "USCinCPac is capable and prepared to respond with significant assets

and speed to render appropriate assistance to our regional neighbors in

Bangladesh. "51

Moving rapidly, CinCPac activated Joint Task Force Productive Effort and

formally designated Major General Henry C. Stackpole III, its commander. A

Connecticut native, General Stackpole was commissioned a Marine second

lieutenant in 1958 after his graduation from Princeton University. He served two

tours in Vietnam and held command, staff, and school assignments before being

appointed commanding general of the III Marine Expeditionary Force, 3d Marine

Division, and Marine Corps Bases, Japan. He concurrently held the posts of

Okinawa Area Coordinator under U.S. Forces, Japan, and Commander, Landing

Force, Seventh Fleet. General Stackpole, as the Joint Task Force commander,

was given operational control of all U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine

forces ashore or entering Bangladesh "to assist the Government of Bangladesh in

recovering from tropical storm damage."52 Deployment of the task force,

however, would have to await an order from the President.

The Presidential order came early on 11 May. Based on the assessments and

recommendations of the Departments of State and Defense and discussions

between Deputy Secretary Eagleburger and National Security Advisor Brent

Scowcroft, President Bush formally issued the order to dispatch the proposed

joint task force to Bangladesh. In making the announcement, a White House

spokesman noted that while the humanitarian effort would be "a significant

contribution--in people and cost involved, . . . it is not unprecedented." Several

recent examples were cited to support the use of American military personnel in

humanitarian relief projects, such as aiding Kurdish refugees, and providing

relief to victims of the San Francisco-area, Armenian, and Mexican earthquakes.

"We have a long history of coming to the aid of people who need it," the

spokesman said.53

Once the President approved the proposed disaster relief effort, the Secretary

of Defense instructed CinCPac through the JCS to initiate Operation Productive

Effort.54 In the Philippines, General Stackpole received a call from the

CinCPac J-3 (Operations) informing him that the President had decided to assist

Bangladesh and inquired how soon he could be in Dhaka. Twenty-four hours,

responded Stackpole.55 General Stackpole and Colonel Lindblom immediately

left Subic Bay and flew to Okinawa where he met with his staff, which had

formed a crisis action team, at Camp Courtney. Already in contact with their

counterparts at CinCPac and airlift traffic managers at Kadena Air Base on the

island, the staff reported one C-141 Starlifter would be ready at 1800 that same

evening, and that there would be limited ground and helicopter transport
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 27

available for the survey and reconnaissance party upon its arrival in Dhaka. In

addition, the staff had contacted the American defense attache about the current

situation in Dhaka regarding water, food, transportation, shelter, electrical

power, and security.56 Lieutenant Colonel Dunn informed them that the

situation in the capital was "normal," that a variety of accommodations were

available, and that preliminary briefings by appropriate embassy staff and

Bangladesh officials had been scheduled.57 Given this information, Stackpole

decided to go with a very small advance party, limited to no more than 30

Marine and Navy personnel, until the actual situation in Bangladesh could be

ascertained. The remaining III MEF staff members would follow within 24

hours. Due to the absence of a military threat, few intelligence personnel would

accompany the advance party or follow-on staff to Bangladesh. As CinCPac had

directed the deployment of additional forces to augment the initial party and

ordered PhibGru 3 to increase speed to 16 knots and proceed to a location in

international waters off Chittagong, General Stackpole decided to wait and create

a staff in Bangladesh that had a true joint character.58

Prior to their departure from Kadena, the 28-man advance party checked and

adjusted mount-out boxes and field chests which held critical supplies and office

equipment for operating in an expeditionary environment, updated their

vaccinations, and made numerous other preparations necessitated by the short

notice deployment. In addition, they "quickly ascertained that very little in the

way of joint doctrine existed concerning humanitarian relief operations," noted

Lieutenant Colonel Gary W. Anderson, so they "took an extensive file on

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT."59 The team carried enough food,

water, and shelter to be self-supporting for the first 72 hours in-country, and

included satellite communications equipment.6° By 1800 on the 11th, the

advance survey and reconnaissance party staged at Kadena Air Base.

At 2100, General Stackpole and the advance party left Kadena enroute to

Dhaka with a scheduled stop at Utapao, Thailand. While refueling at Utapao,

a problem of overflight rights for Burma and India arose. Due to the short

notice, emergency nature of the mission and the fact that the flight was taking

place on a weekend, both countries refused to grant permission for the aircraft

to proceed. "I had to make a hard decision leaving Utapao, Thailand as to

whether we were going to have fighters scrambled to come after us from India

or not," Stackpole later recounted. Despite the lack of clearance, Stackpole

decided to press on, informing both countries that the mission was "for

humanitarian purposes." Skirting their air defense network "to the extent we

could," the flight proceeded on to Dhaka without incident.6

*Burma required diplomatic clearance for Stackpole's aircraft and all follow-on Military Airlift

Command (MAC) aircraft prior to granting flight clearance through the Yangon flight information

region. Since the proposed route did not come within 12 nautical miles of Burmese territory, no

diplomatic clearances were requested by the U.S. Because of the lack of clearances, MAC aircraft

experienced numerous delays. To avoid the delays, aircrews filed flight plans that skirted the

Yangon flight information region.
28 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Marshalling the Forces

Early on the morning of 12 May, the Air Force C-141 Starlifter carrying

Major General Stackpole and the advance party broke through a heavy layer of

clouds and began its final approach into Zia International Airport outside Dhaka.

The aircraft touched down shortly before 0700 and taxied to the airport's main

terminal. General Stackpole was greeted by Ambassador Milam, Lieutenant

Colonel Dunn, and members of the country team, as well as a delegation of

Bangladesh officials that included State Minister of Relief and Rehabilitation,

Luftur Rahman Khan; Chief of the General Staff, Major General Abdus Salam;

and other general officers from the government's Supreme Command

Headquarters. Following their arrival, General Stackpole and the primary members of his staff drove into Dhaka, dropped off their gear at the

government's guest house in the Dhaka Cantonment, adjacent to Army

Headquarters, and then moved on to a breakfast meeting with the ambassador,

the defense attache, and senior embassy and USAID officials. The remainder of

the advance party was billeted temporarily in an embassy-leased house on the

outskirts of the capital not far from the American Club.62

Stackpole and the senior members of his team spent the morning being

briefed by the ambassador and embassy personnel and the afternoon receiving an

update of the situation and ongoing relief efforts from Bangladesh military and

civilian officials and representatives of several non-government relief

organizations. Despite the gallant efforts of the Bangladesh government and

military, all reported that the situation was bleak and required immediate action.

"My initial impression," General Stackpole told Admiral Larson that evening, "is

that although the situation is grave, the immediate threat posed by the situation,

such as dehydration, starvation, and injury, can be dealt with in the stipulated 14-

day time frame. However, estimate consIderable assistance needed to stabilize

health crisis will be required for an additional 14 days. The Bangladesh military

is providing heroic support within capabilities, but desperately needs help to do

so successfully." The "Ambassador and staff," he concluded, "have rendered

superb support and briefings in helping us get our feet on the ground."63

Stackpole and his staff met to review a number of common observations and

to work on a preliminary assessment of the situation which would be relayed to

CinCPac. By the time of the meeting, Stackpole had assumed operational control

of the U.S. Army's 84th Engineer Battalion detachment, and combat camera,

public affairs, and maintenance personnel from the on-going Cobra Gold exercise

in Thailand who were also assigned to augment the Joint Task Force. A Disaster

Assessment and Relief Team (DART) from the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces

Group A (Airborne), which was flown from Okinawa via the Philippines on

board two Air Force Lockheed HC-130 Hercules aircraft belonging to the 17th
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 29

Photograph courtesy of American Embassy, Bangladesh

American Ambassador William B. Milan, left, MajGen Henry C. Stackpole III, and LtGen

Muhammad Noor Uddin Khan, chi ef of staff of the Bangladeshi army, were briefed during

the preparatory stage of the relief operation.

Special Operations Squadron, 353d Special Operations Wing, was also chopped

to the Joint Task Force. The Special Operations Force commander, Lieutenant

Colonel George W. Norwood, USAF, was designated the Special Operations

component commander and attended the late evening meeting.TM

Briefings by Bangladesh, embassy, and non-government relief agency

representatives provided Stackpole and the Joint Task Force staff with an

accurate picture of the situation. The most pressing relief effort problem was the

prioritization of existing aid supplies and their distribution. The task force staff

agreed that neither the massive use of ground forces, nor a large influx of relief

supplies would be needed. The quantity of food, especially grain, stored in

government and non-government relief organizations' warehouses was considered

adequate to meet the emergency. With the road network virtually destroyed and

the affected area covered by shallow water, only helicopters, air-cushion landing

The DART was task organized from 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group with the

command and control element and an advanced operational base composed of a Special Forces

Operational Detachment Bravo and two Special Forces Operational Detachment Aiphas. The team

was composed of 36 Special Operations personnel, including command and control, operations,

intelligence, logistics, communications, medical, and weather personnel.

A third aircraft, a C-130 from the 1st Special Operations Squadron, carrying additional

Joint Task Force command and special tactics team personnel was forced to remain in Thailand

when the aircraft developed a main landing gear malfunction.
30 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

craft (LCAC), air drops, and the limited use of conventional landing craft could

be used. As General Stackpole stated to CinCPac: "We will deliver food, water

and supplies to GOB [Government of Bangladesh] Forces in place for immediate

distribution to [the] population to preserve life."65

General Stackpole, in his preliminary assessment, reported two major

concerns. The first, shared by Ambassador Milam, was "to avoid the appearance

of stepping in to relieve the government." The newly elected democratic

government, Stackpole noted, was trying hard to cope with the unprecedented

disaster and its sovereign right to lead the relief effort had to be respected.

America's operational control rather than command would be emphasized.66

"Believe it important," he continued, "that we be visibly working hand in hand

with the GOB [Government of Bangladesh] and Bangladesh military as a team."

Stackpole's philosophy from the outset "was to 'backbone' the gallant Bangladesh

efforts rather than be intrusive or overwhelming in demands on the fragile

infrastructure of this third world nation."67 He considered it vital that the

government be in charge of the relief effort and that a coordinating mechanism

be created which would bring all agencies involved together and to work toward

a common end. The arrival of the amphibious task group, he noted, would be

"invaluable due to their ability to operate in a sea-based mode. This sea-based

presence will also help us avoid further stressing an already strained national

infra-structure."68

Stackpole's second concern was for needed medical support. Abysmal

sanitary conditions and the resultant contamination of the affected area's water

supply would produce, he surmised, more deaths from disease than from

starvation or dehydration. Although follow-on medical teams would be needed,

he stressed that the distribution of food and water was the primary focus of the

effort. "Overall," he concluded, "[I] am confident that forces currently planned

can alleviate immediate crisis as it exists in next 14 days." However, an "end

state" eventually would need to be defined in coordination with the American

ambassador, CinCPac, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to ensure that we do not

appear to be an 'occupying force' in the long run. Currently envision providing

immediate lifesaving response for 14 days and follow on support as required for

a further 14 if NCA [National Command Authorities] requires. Currently do not

envision presence beyond that."69

Stackpole's preliminary distribution plan involved transport of food and

supplies by fixed-wing aircraft from Dhaka to Chittagong, about 190 kilometers

south of the capital. Relief supplies would then be delivered from Chittagong to

the outlying coastal areas and islands by helicopter and surface craft. Until

regular Air Force C-130s capable of carrying larger payloads arrived, General

Stackpole proposed using the two Special Operations HC-130 aircraft for the

initial runs between Dhaka and Chittagong. The five UH-60 Blackhawk

helicopters and crews from the 4th Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment of the U.S.

Army Pacific's 25th Infantry Division, accompanying the Joint Task Force

augmentation cell from Hawaii, where to be designated the initial primary rotary

wing delivery platforms. Upon the arrival of Amphibious Group 3 with Marine
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 31

Aircraft Group 50's 26 medium- and heavy-lift helicopters on 15 May, the 5th

MEB would assume the main burden of distributing relief supplies to inaccessible

areas within the disaster zone.

Before submitting a formal assessment and detailed campaign plan to

CinCPac for approval, General Stackpole wanted to make a visual reconnaissance

of the disaster area.* The visit was scheduled for early the following morning

so as to be completed by midday, before the eruption of daily afternoon

thunderstorms which could make flying difficult. Stackpole's initial survey

would stress the requirements needed to reopen Chittagong airport for routine

flight operations, in addition to looking for unflooded landing zones, landing

craft ramp sites, and secure areas where reverse osmosis water purification units

could be set up.7°

At 0800 on 13 May, Stackpole and the senior members of his staff met with

Lieutenant General Muhammad Noor Uddin Khan, Chief of Staff of the

Bangladesh Army, Ambassador Milam, Director Kilgour, and key members of

the Bangladesh Supreme Command staff. Following a short meeting they

boarded two Bangladesh air force UN-i Huey helicopters for an extensive tour

of the disaster area. Stops included Chittagong city and airport, Sandwip, South

Hatia, Kutubdia, and Maheshkali Islands. "The devastation was extremely

sobering," noted the Joint Task Force commander.7' "I have seen combat," but

"I have never seen greater carnage." As he later recalled:

It dwarfed anything that happened in Desert Storm. And

because the total infrastructure was destroyed in these outlying

islands and up to five kilometers inland along this 110 mile

coastline, there was no way to bury [the deadj in mass graves or

even be able to get out into the area and get control of the

situation. All communications were knocked out. Water

supplies . . . were completely polluted by this point in time.

The toxicity of the bodies, now bloated, was a serious problem

for us. People were dying of cholera. They were dying of a

variety of other diseases. Simple scratches had become infected;

amputations were legion. We had many, many problems which

to solve.72

The devastation, Stackpole reported, "imbued all concerned with [a] renewed

sense of purpose concerning the absolutely vital need for relief operations." The

tour also confirmed his belief that the distribution of water, food, and supplies

would be the main focus of the Joint Task Force's relief effort. With adequate

* On 12 May, the embassy sent a liaison team to Chittagong in order to coordinate the effort

and to prepare for Stackpole's visit. The presence of embassy personnel in Chittagong proved to

be "extraordinarily useful and essential" as the operation progressed. (Jon F. Danilowicz,

Comments on draft ms, 18Feb95)
32 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Photograph courtesy of USC1nCPac

One of five U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopters from the 4th Battalion, 25th Aviation

Regiment, based in Hawaii, is unloaded at Zia International Airport. The helicopters

were part of the Joint Task Force augmentation cell.

food supplies available, the problem would be getting it to the areas where it was

needed due to the destroyed infrastructure.73

Shortly after General Stackpole's return to Dhaka, the Air Force C-5A

Galaxy transport carrying five U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopters, support

equipment, and the 56-man augmentation cell arrived from Hawaii.74 The cell

was composed of helicopter support, communications, and public affairs

personnel, and the initial elements of the Navy's Environmental and Preventive

Medicine Unit 6 (NEPMU 6). In addition, it included the Joint Task Force's

deputy commander, Colonel Edward G. Hoffman, USAF. He also was

designated the JTF Air Force component commander. Lieutenant Colonel

Thomas F. Elzey, USA, in command of the Blackhawk detachment, was named

the JTF Army component commander. While welcome, the cell lacked standing

operating procedures and competent personnel to deal with administrative,

automated data processing, contracting, purchasing, and comptroller matters.

While separate elements of the cell had trained for such deployments, the cell as

a whole was not prepared.

'The Pacific Command eventually deployed professional personnel from Hawaii and Okinawa,

but in the interim the embassy lent a number of staff members to assist the JTF in the areas of

public affairs, legal, public health, and contracting.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 33

As the staff continued to grow, a tentative headquarters site was identified

at Tezgaon, the old international airport midway between Dhaka and Zia

International. The unused Bangladesh air force barracks at Tezgaon was

selected, as it was not far from the Presidential Secretariat building which housed

the civil-military team formed by the Bangladesh government to manage the relief

effort. The barracks soon proved unsuitable as a JTF Operations Center due to

its small, compartmented rooms which separated principal staff sections,

hindering the flow of information within the staff and to higher headquarters and

component commanders.

The embassy and the American International School provided

accommodations at no cost for the staff. "Our living situation is much better that

we had anticipated," wrote Lieutenant Colonel James L. White, USAF,

commander of a contingent of the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing from Yokota Air

Base, Japan. "We live on the second floor of the embassy Storage and Furniture

Warehouse. It is air conditioned and we have used our [own] cots and their

mattresses. We have outdoor showers and a small embassy commissary, which

JOINT TASK FORCE SEA ANGEL

BANGLADESH

NAVFOR RADM LAREY

USN

I I I I MARFOR AIRFOR ARFOR SOF BGEN ROWE COL HOFFMAN LTCOL ELZEY LTCOL NORW000 USMC USAF USA USAF
34 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

helps a lot. We eat MREs [Meals Ready to Eat] except for dinner, which is a

hot meal provided by the American Club."75 In addition, the embassy loaned

support equipment such as copying machines and air conditioners, allowed the

JTF to requisition office supplies and other items from the General Service Office

store, and provided local transportation and laundry service on a reimbursable

basis.76

Late in the day, General Stackpole again met with Ambassador Milam and

senior Ministry of Relief officials and military officers in charge of relief

operations. A number of Bangladeshis present expressed concern as to the JTF's

resources and how they would be used. Following an explanation by General

Stackpole of the task force's mission, resources, and proposed role in the relief

effort, and Ambassador Milam's reassurances, apprehension slowly gave way to

guarded support

Based on his personal observations, discussions with Bangladesh officials and

members of the embassy's country team, and political and geographical realities,

Stackpole decided to split the JTF staff between Chittagong and Dhaka. Colonel

Stephen Lindblom, III MEF operations officer, would remain in Dhaka as the

Joint Task Force's Chief of Staff with Marine Lieutenant Colonel Gary W.

Anderson as his operations officer. Located in the capital near government

ministries and the country's only major airport, the Dhaka center would function

primarily as a planning and liaison headquarters. In addition it would coordinate--in consultation with representatives of the Bangladesh government,

American embassy, other foreign military contingents and embassies, and nongovernment relief agencies--incoming aid, the staging of relief materials, and the

setting of priorities for flights to forward areas. With few exceptions, all air and

sea assets contributed to the relief effort by other foreign governments were

placed under the JTF's operational control. The Chittagong center, situated at

the city's Patenga Airport, would schedule helicopter flights and landing craft

operations to move the relief supplies to outlying islands and coastal areas within

the disaster zone. The center would not only act as a transshipment point, but

also as the local coordination center for civilian, Bangladeshi, and foreign

military forces engaged in the relief effort. Air Force Colonel Mike Ferguson

was designated the chief of staff for Joint Task Force (Forward) (JTF Forward)

headquarters at Chittagong. Navy Captain Edward P. Anglim from Amphibious

Group 1 became his operations officer. General Stackpole and Colonel Hoffman

planned to rotate between the two centers, providing constant command

presence.

78

After his inspection tour, General Stackpole forwarded an update of the

situation to CinCPac and requested additional communications and airlift support.

At that time, the only voice communications among Dhaka, Okinawa, and

Hawaii was the portable, single-channel, ultra-high-frequency PSC-3 satellite

communications terminal carried by the advance party. The lack of a high-gain

tactical satellite antenna, unstable local power, and harsh environmental

conditions initially limited the system's effectiveness. Although Army Special

Forces brought long-range communications equipment and quickly established a
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 35

functioning net, it rapidly was overburdened. Hard-copy (non-voice) message

traffic had to be relayed through the embassy's message center. Although the

JTF had access to the host country's limited civilian and military telephone

service between Dhaka and Chittagong, the establishment of reliable command,

disaster relief, and air traffic control nets, in addition to "Autodin" and

"Autovon" support for the disaster control centers, was "critical to operations,"

Stackpole reported. He also requested four more Air Force C-130 transports

and the necessary command and support packages to provide adequate intratheater lift. His immediate priorities were: to establish the forward headquarters

at Chittagong; place Special Operations assessment teams at six Bangladesh

military relief sites; position water purification units at about a dozen secure

locations; and begin relief and reconnaissance flights as soon as possible. "Every

* The Automatic Voice Network (Autovon) and Automatic Digital Network (Autodin) are the

principal long-haul voice and digital communications networks within the Defense Communications

System.

JOINT TASK FORCE SEA ANGEL

DITAKA
36 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

effort," he emphasized, "is being made to conduct assessment and follow-on

op[eration]s in conjunction with Bangladesh civil and military authorities.

Believe JTF can make real and immediate impact on efforts to reduce mortality

and stabilize the situation almost immediately."79

General Stackpole followed up his assessment with a more detailed concept

of operations for Phase I of the campaign plan developed by the CinCPac crisis

action team. The goal of the on-going first phase was to take immediate action

to minimize mortality and stabilize the situation by overcoming the recurring

problem of distribution. "In doing so," Stackpole said, "we must maximize cross

support until we reach a point where the whole effort is greater than the sum of

[its parts]." Beginning on 15 May, the forward operations center would be

activated at Chittagong airport and begin relief operations in the hardest-hit areas.

In addition, communications teams and water purification units would be located

at key Bangladesh army relief centers. To facilitate the aid effort, each service

component of the joint command would be assigned an individual sector based

on its available assets, for the distribution of food and relief supplies. The

northern sector, encompassing the coastal region north of the Karnaphuli River,

was assigned to the Army component; the Marine component was given the

southern sector, the coastal area south of the Karnaphuli River, centered on

Cox's Bazar and Kutubdia Island; and the island sector, which incorporated

Sandwip, North and South Hatia, and Manpura Islands, as well as the smaller

surrounding mud flats, was allotted to the Navy component. The Special

Operations and Air Force components were to provide assessment and airlift

support as required.8°

Taking Stackpole's assessment, the operational concept, Task Force 76's

recommendation, and the amphibious task group's projected 14-day commitment

into consideration, CinCPac suggested that the St. Louis, instead of the Maritime

Prepositioning Ship Lummus, relieve the Navy task group and embarked Marine

brigade. Pacific Command's recommendation was based upon the size and

nature of the cargo and the existing harbor conditions at Chittagong. On the

13th, Seventh Fleet ordered the St. Louis, under the command of Captain John

W. Peterson, to proceed from Subic Bay in the Philippines to Naha, Okinawa.

At Naha, the St. Louis would load 28 reverse osmosis water purification units

(ROWPUs), each weighing more than five tons, for use in the relief effort.

Another eight units would be airlifted to Bangladesh. The amphibious cargo ship

was scheduled to depart Okinawa on the 19th and arrive off Chittagong 10 days

later. There she would replace the amphibious task group, which then would

resume its return voyage to the West Coast. The Lummus was placed on alert

status should the ship be needed.8'

To support the deployment and use of the water purification units and assist

with the humanitarian effort, III MEF activated Contingency Marine Air-Ground

Task Force 2-91 (CMAGTF 291).82 Drawn from 26 different MEF units, the

contingency air-ground task force was composed of a command element from the

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, a ground element drawn from Company F,

2d Battalion, 23d Marines, and a combat service support element consisting of
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 37
38 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Department of Defense Photo (USAF) DF-ST-92-06142

U.S. Air Force TSgt K. L. Jones, a member of a Mobile Area Assessment Team,

coordinates Joint Task Force relief efforts with CARE personnel on Kutubdia Island.

medical, engineer, motor transport, supply, and maintenance detachments from

the 3d Force Service Support Group. The Marine task force included no

aviation combat element. Within 96 hours of activation, 44 Marines and Navy

corpsmen, with the eight ROWPUs, generators, floodlights, and associated

equipment, had been airlifted to Bangladesh, moved to their designated locations,

and were producing potable water. On the 19th, the remaining 190 Marines, in

addition to medical and repair parts packages worth more than $1 million,

embarked on board the St. Louis and departed Okinawa for Bangladesh.83

On 14 May, as Major General Stackpole, Ambassador Milam, Lieutenant

General Noor Uddin Khan, and others continued their reconnaissance of the

affected area, the vanguard of JTF Forward headquarters deployed to Chittagong.

Units included Special Operations Force personnel organized as Mobile Area

Assessment Teams. These teams were positioned at key Bangladesh relief sites

throughout the mainland and offshore islands. The small, three- to four-man

teams were composed of a communications specialist, medical technician,

engineer, and at times a team leader, and were accompanied by two Bangladesh

soldiers. The teams: conducted an area assessment; selected and, to a limited

degree, secured helicopter landing zones; established long-range communications;

2d Battalion, 23d Marines, was a Selected Marine Reserve unit headquartered at Encino,

California. The battalion was mobilized in December 1990 and deployed to Okinawa to fill the

depleted ranks of the 9th Marines.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 39

administered limited medical and disaster assistance; and coordinated follow-on

or supporting relief efforts, noting any specific medical, food, water, or

equipment needs. It was only after the deployment and subsequent debriefing of

these teams, as General Stackpole later noted, "that the Bangladeshi had the full

impact and magnitude of what had occurred. " In addition to the Special

Forces teams, Air Force specialists from the 1723d Special Tactics Squadron

were tasked to do assessments of the airfields at Chittagong, Cox's Bazar, and

Dhaka to determine their load-bearing capabilities.

As the day wore on, the remaining elements of the CinCPac augmentation

cell arrived in Dhaka and were quickly integrated into the JTF staff or supporting

component units. The forces included additional Army Blackhawk aviators and

support personnel, a six-man reserve civil affairs team from the 351st Civil

Affairs Command, a Corps of Engineers harbor assessment team, and

communications, public affairs, and medical staff. Among the later group was

Captain John R. Downs, MC, USNR, who was designated the JTF surgeon.

The following day, preparations for the expanded international relief effort

moved into high gear. In Dhaka, as the Agency for International Development

continued to expedite the relief effort by extending additional grants to several

non-government agencies, the JTF staff continued to work on the campaign plan,

which would be forwarded to CinCPac once it received planning input from the

amphibious task force. In addition, the staff collaborated with members of the

Bangladesh government's civil and military relief team and representatives of

major non-government organizations to build a national-level coordinating

committee to establish priorities. The first meeting of the national committee

took place on the 15th to set the priorities for the following day as to the type

and quantity of relief supplies airlifted to Chittagong. Chaired by Bangladesh

army Brigadier Shafaat Ahmed, charged by Prime Minister Zia with

responsibility for the relief effort, the committee included representatives from

the JTF, U.S. Agency for International Development, Bangladesh military,

government civil agencies, and several non-government relief organizations such

as the Red Crescent Society and CARE. The national coordinating committee

met daily until 28 May when it was determined that an adequate amount of relief

supplies had been delivered to Chittagong. Future meetings would only be called

when needed.

Also on the 15th, JTF Forward headquarters was formally established at

Chittagong with the arrival of additional American military and embassy

The civil affairs team was to assist in coordination efforts among the Government of

Bangladesh, non-government relief organizations, American Embassy, and U.S. military forces.

As a member of the team, native-born Sergeant First Class Faruque U. Ahmed returned to

Bangladesh a hero. However, he did not view himself as such. 'I'm just a soldier doing my job,"

he said. "I'm just happy to get an opportunity to do something good for my homeland." (Maj John

R. Spotts, USAR, "Operation Sea Angel: USCINCPAC Responds," Asia-PacWc Defense Forum,

Fall 1991, p. 44.)
40 US. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

personnel and the first relief supplies on board a Special Forces HC-130 from

Dhaka. Organized on short notice and consisting primarily of senior officers, the

forward headquarters had few clerks, little in the way of administrative supplies

and equipment, and no cots, water cans, or other "camp" supplies. Although

initially "small in number and shallow in density," as the 5th MEB's

commanding officer later noted, the Chittagong forward headquarters would

become the major player in the relief effort.

With the establishment of the headquarters, the first meeting between

government civilian, military, and non-government organization representatives

and members of the JTF took place. As a result of the meeting, the Chittagong

Coordination Cell was formed, co-chaired by government secretary and zonal

relief coordinator M. Mokammel Haque and Marine Colonel Russell F. Bailes,

Jr 86

Prior to the arrival of the JTF, distribution of relief supplies within

Chittagong and Cox's Bazar districts had been coordinated separately by each of

the agencies involved, without an agreed focus of effort. The joint coordination

cell would provide the needed focus and ensure optimum use of the task force's

transportation assets in the distribution of relief supplies. The cell was located

at the Patenga Airport recruit training school facility and was composed of

representatives of the JTF, Bangladesh government, 24th Bangladesh Army

Division, and several non-government organizations. The cell established a

prioritized list of relief supplies to be transported: (1) food, water, and medical

supplies; (2) clothing; (3) shelter and building supplies; and (4) tube well

supplies, power pumps, and piping. Based on this list of priorities, the cell

planned and scheduled the movement of supplies by helicopter or surface craft.

Requests for emergency supply or personnel lift had to involve a life-threatening

situation, and if validated, would be scheduled for immediate movement. In

addition, the cell established relief supply delivery sites within each of the

districts included inside the Chittagong Disaster Zone. Initially, these sites would

be under government control in order to provide crowd control and protection

for the surface craft and helicopters.87

As the forward headquarters became operational, it assumed control of the

two squads of Army engineers and the five Army Blackhawk helicopters,

deployed to Chittagong to support the positioning of the first of several Special

Forces Mobile Area Assessment Teams to the outlying islands. The forward

headquarters tasked these assessment and communications teams with providing

assistance to the Chittagong cell in determining relief effort requirements. The

teams took with them the first relief supplies transported to a designated disaster

site. In addition to distributing the first relief supplies, JTF Forward attempted

to provide emergency medical care, but found that it was beyond the capabilities

of its limited aid station.88 A majority of the first day's activities, however,

was directed toward preparing for the arrival and subsequent deployment of the

amphibious task force composed of Amphibious Group 3 and the 5th Marine

Expeditionary Brigade.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 41

PhibGru3 was composed of seven amphibious ships and one support ship: the

general purpose amphibious assault ship Tarawa (LHA 1); the amphibious

transport docks Vancouver (LPD 2) and Juneau (LPD 10); the dock landing ships

Anchorage (LSD 36) and Mount Vernon (LSD 39); the tank landing ships

Frederick (LST 1184) and Barbour County (LST 1195); and the fleet oiler

Passumpsic (T-AO 107). The amphibious group's landing craft included four air

cushioned landing craft, utility and mechanized landing craft, and both inflatable

and rigid raiding craft.89

Rear Admiral Stephen S. Clarey commanded the eight-ship, 3,000-man

amphibious group. A native of Hawaii, Admiral Clarey graduated from Williams

College before attending Naval Officer Candidate School in 1962. Trained at

various Navy schools and a veteran of Vietnam service, Clarey previously had

commanded the tank landing ship Suffolk County (LST 1173), destroyer Elliot

(DD 967), and Destroyer Squadron 21. In addition to his shipboard assignments,

Clarey had held a number of service and joint staff positions before assuming

command of PhibGru3 in March 1990. He also commanded the Maritime

Prepositioning Force in Southwest Asia during Operation Desert Shield.

JOINT TASK FORCE SEA ANGEL

FORWARD OPERATING BASE

CIIITTAGONG
42 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Department of Defense Photo (USAF) DO-307-SPT-91-7071

When the first U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopters arrive at landing zones on Sandwip

island they are rapidly unloaded and the relief supplies quickly distributed.

The 4,000-man 5th MEB, as all Marine air-ground task forces, had four

elements: a command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat

element, and a combat service support element. The brigade headquarters,

reinforced with reconnaissance, intelligence, communications, and military police

personnel, was the command element. The ground combat element was

Regimental Landing Team 5 (RLT 5), commanded by Colonel Randolph A.

Gangle. Marine Aircraft Group 50 (MAG-50), commanded by Colonel Randall

L. West, was the aviation combat element. Brigade Service Support Group 5

(BSSG 5), commanded by Major Robert G. Johnson, provided logistic

support.9°

The 5th MEB 's commanding general was Brigadier General Peter J. Rowe.

Born in Connecticut, General Rowe graduated from Xavier University in

Cincinnati, Ohio, and received a master's degree from San Diego State

University. During 30 years' service, he had commanded almost every sized

infantry unit, and had been assistant division commander of the 1st Marine

Division prior to assuming command of the 5th MEB. In May 1990, he was

Formed at Camp Pendleton in October 1990, the 5th MEB sailed for the Persian Gulf where

it was assigned to the Marine Forces Afloat, later became I Marine Expeditionary Force reserve

ashore, participated in combat actions at the Ice Cube and Ice Tray and the Al Wafrah Forest in

Kuwait, and then backloaded to sail for home. The 'embedded' 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit

(SOC), which comprised about one-third of the brigade's strength, was detached on 16 March 1991

and remained in the Arabian Gulf until July 1991.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 43

dual-hatted" as the commanding general of both the Landing Force Training

Command, Pacific, and the 5th MEB.

The 5th MEB could muster a solid nucleus for humanitarian operations. The

brigade command element possessed a staff well-versed in rapid planning and had

good communications assets. RLT 5 was ready to send headquarters staff,

liaison officers, volunteer laborers, transportation assets, and supplies ashore.

MAG-50's inventory included medium-lift transport helicopters, heavy-lift cargo

helicopters, and light utility helicopters. BSSG 5, although stripped of a majority

of its assets with the departure of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU),

could provide water-production units, portable electric generators, trucks,

forklifts, and other engineer resources.9'

Brigade headquarters included 400 personnel and was composed of

Headquarters and Service Company and the 5th Surveillance, Reconnaissance,

and Intelligence Support Group (5th SRISG). The 5th SRJSG was specifically organized to provide intelligence support for the 5th MEB and included

detachments from 1st Radio Battalion, 4th Force Reconnaissance Company, 9th

Communications Battalion, and a military police detachment.

RLT 5 was built around two battalions of the 5th Marines and an artillery

battalion from Camp Pendleton, reinforced by combat support units composed

of both active duty Marines and Reserve. The landing team included:

Headquarters Company, 5th Marines; 2d Battalion, 5th Marines; 3d Battalion,

5th Marines; 2d Battalion, 11th Marines; Company B, 1st Reconnaissance

Department of Defense Photo (USN) DN-ST-90-05672

The Tarawa-led seven-ship Amphibious Group 3, with the embarked 5th Marine

Expeditionary Brigade, which deployed from the Persian Gulf to the Bay of Bengal to

assist with the relief effort.
44 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Battalion; Company A, 4th Tank Battalion, a Reserve unit from Miramar,

California; Company A, 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion, a Reserve unit from

Norfolk, Virginia; Company A, 4th Combat Engineer Battalion, a Reserve unit

from Charleston, West Virginia; and Company B, 1st Combat Engineer

Battalion.

The aviation combat element was MAG-50, which was composed of Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265) from Kaneohe, Hawaii; Marine

Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 (HMLA-169) from Camp Pendleton;

Detachment B, Marine Attack Squadron 513 (VMA-513) from Yuma, Arizona;

Detachment A, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 772 (HMH-772), a Reserve

unit from Alameda Naval Air Station, California; 3d Low Altitude Air Defense

Battalion (3d LAAD) from Camp Pendleton; a detachment from Marine Wing

Support Squadron 372 (MWSS-372) from Camp Pendleton; and a detachment

from Marine Air Support Squadron 6 (MASS-6), South Weymouth,

Massachusetts.* The aircraft available included 12 Boeing CH-46E Sea Knights

(HMM-265), 4 Sikorsky RH-53D Sea Stallions (HMH-772), 10 Bell UH-lNs

(HMLA-169), 7 Bell AH-1W Sea Cobras (HMLA-169), and 6 McDonnell

Douglas AV-8B Harriers (VMA513).** PhibGru3 carried two Sikorsky SH-3H

Sea King night-capable, search and rescue (SAR) helicopters."

According to Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Kohl, who commanded Marine

Service Support Group 24 during Operation Provide Comfort, the international

humanitarian relief operation in northern Iraq, Marine combat service support

elements were perfectly suited for humanitarian operations because of their

special equipment and expeditionary nature. This was especially true for BSSG

5. BSSG 5 was formed at Camp Pendleton, California. Its nucleus was

composed of stay-behind cadre when the 1st Force Service Support Group (1st

FSSG) left for the Persian Gulf to support I Marine Expeditionary Force. These

cadres merged with recently activated units of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve

in late November. BSSG S's muster rolls comprised engineers, mechanics,

Four aircraft from HMH-772 joined MAO-SO on board the Tarawa from the Naval Air

Facility, Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, in anticipation of being needed for the Ethiopian evacuation. Due

to heavy ship loading conditions, the unit was authorized to bring only those personnel necessary

for minimum flight operations. The shortage of maintenance personnel to service the four RH53Ds subsequently strained the supply and maintenance support for these Sea Stallions during the

relief effort in Bangladesh.

The Sikorsky RH-53Ds were similar in appearance to CH-53Ds, but had twin T64-GE-415

engines and automatic flight controls for sustained low-level flight. Four of the UH-lNs were

grounded due to structural weaknesses that required depot repair work.

The SH-3H is an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter. The ASW systems had been

removed from these aircraft and they were deployed specifically as night SAR helicopters, the first

such deployment in the Navy, and a precursor to removing the ill-suited, organic Navy UN-iNs

and subsequent deployment of HH-46 SAR helicopter detachments on board amphibious assault

ships. (RAdm Stephen S. Clarey, Comments on draft ms, 23Feb95)
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN HANGLADESH, 1991 45

drivers, forklift operators, communicators, medics, fuel handlers, and other

specialists. Its equipment included 14 forklifts, 10 water purification units, 10

portable generators, 8 motorcycles, 7 bulldozers, and 16 five-ton trucks.

Major Robert G. Johnson commanded BSSG 5. Its elements included

detachments from Headquarters and Service Battalions, 1st and 4th FSSGs; 1st

Landing Support Battalion; 6th Motor Transport Battalion (Lubbock, Texas); 6th

Engineer Support Battalion (Battle Creek, Michigan); 1st and 4th Supply

Battalions; 1st and 4th Maintenance Battalions; 1st Medical Battalion; 1st Dental

Battalion; and 6th and 7th Communications Battalions. The main drawback was

that the brigade service support group was short of personnel. It originally sailed

from San Diego with only about one-fourth of its theoretical strength; this

number was further reduced to 313 when the 11th MEU was detached.

One day after leaving the Persian Gulf, the amphibious task force received

an order instructing it to prepare for possible participation in relief operations in

Bangladesh. On 11 May, the Seventh Fleet ordered the ships of the amphibious

task group to the Bay of Bengal to support humanitarian operations with the

mission of delivering relief supplies and providing other assistance as needed.

The amphibious task force was not deploying to establish a foothold, so Admiral

Clarey and General Rowe expected to be in-country only a short time. The plan

of action, as described by one 5th MEB staff officer, was to "hurry up, hurry in,

and hurry out."92

Of major concern to both Admiral Clarey and General Rowe was how the

weather, terrain, and hydrography of the affected region might impact operations.

Additional issues were the threat of infectious diseases, the status of the refugees,

the condition of lines of communication, and the ability of the Bangladesh

government to cope with these problems. Both felt that relief operations were

going to make heavy demands on their available communications, transportation,

and medical assets.93

The four-day period from 11 May, when the execute order was received, to

15 May, when the amphibious task force made landfall, was devoted to planning,

although the exact concept of support was unknown pending a reconnaissance of

the area and coordination with the JTF staff. Despite the lack of hard

information, preparations continued. The 5th MEB intelligence section prepared

map studies and gave orientation lectures. The operations section worked out

task organizations and prepared contingency operations plans. The logistics

section reconfigured landing craft loads to carry engineer equipment and relief

supplies instead of combat equipment. Helicopter crews labored to prepare

desert operations-configured aircraft for the vastly different Bangladesh

environment. Embarkation teams unloaded tactical equipment and supplies and

reloaded engineer equipment, rations, medical supplies, and relief aid.94

Planning by medical personnel encompassed an analysis of medical civic

action program (MedCAP) capabilities. Fifteen authorized medical allowance

A Marine brigade service support group's normal strength was approximately 2,900.
46 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

blocks--five battalion aid station equipment blocks, five blocks consisting of

battalion aid station consumables, and five military sick call blocks--were on

hand. These supply blocks were configured for combat operations and designed

to treat combat casualties, and were not intended to support disaster relief

operations involving a large number of women and children. If medical civic

action teams were to be deployed, it was apparent that most of their medical

supplies would have to come from the Government of Bangladesh or nongovernment relief agencies.

Of immediate concern to amphibious task force medical personnel were the

preventive measures that needed to be taken prior to beginning operations ashore.

Important among these were malaria prophylaxis and immunizations for hepatitis

A and typhoid. The task force possessed an outdated disease risk assessment that

simply advised that the country suffered from poor sanitation and sanitary

practices, so a new assessment was requested from Navy Environmental and

Preventive Medicine Unit 6 outlining the malaria chemo-prophylaxis

recommendations for Chittagong and outlying islands. In its response, NEMPU

6 suggested that personnel going ashore take Doxycycline for two days prior to

exposure through the 28th day following the exposure. Bed and head nets,

insecticides, and gamma globulin inoculations were considered essential. The

unit also advised typhoid vaccinations be updated, but recommended that Marines

and sailors not be immunized against cholera. Based on the unit's suggestions,

all personnel going ashore were immunized against hepatitis A, typhoid, yellow

fever, and started on a malaria chemo-prophylaxis. To avoid contracting

cholera, they were instructed to steer clear of the local food and water supplies.

As the task group neared the Bay of Bengal, PhibGru 3 and 5th MEB

planners recommended the early launch of the Marine Aircraft Group's four RH53D Sea Stallions across Indian territory to Bangladesh so that they could be

available early in the relief effort. Task force planners soon scrapped the

proposal because of the distance involved and the lack of maintenance support

facilities along the proposed route.95** Steaming around the tip of India and

into position in the Bay of Bengal, one of the Tarawa's embarked AV-8B

* Arrival off Bangladesh revealed that the updated disease risk assessment was based on

generalizations about the country and overstated the threat of disease in and around Chittagong.

Fortunately, the cyclone initially had reduced the mosquito vector population. Had the operation

continued much longer, the forces ashore would have encountered a greater risk of contracting

malaria.

It was noted at the time and later that had the MV-22 tilt-rotor medium lift aircraft been

available, "relief aircraft could have arrived on scene and begun relief operations some five days

before the amphibious task force was in position to launch conventional helicopters." In addition,

the transit time between the central distribution point at Chittagong and delivery landing zones

could have been reduced resulting in the delivery of more relief supplies in less time. (BGen

Randall L. West, Comments on draft ms, 10Apr95; MAG-50 MCLLS Report 60534-18689

(05631))
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 47

Harriers was lost while conducting deck landing qualifications on the

Vancouver.96

Shortly after the amphibious task group arrived off the Bangladesh coast on

the afternoon of the 15th, Admiral Clarey, General Rowe, Colonels Gangle and

West, and key staff members flew to Chittagong to meet with General Stackpole.

In his briefing, Stackpole outlined the situation as he saw it. There were plenty

of relief supplies on shore and more were on the way. A dedicated, but

inexperienced, democratic government was struggling to take control of the

situation. Non-government relief agencies lacked adequate communications and

transportation. During the storm, he explained, Bangladesh had lost eight ships,

more than 60 percent of its helicopters, most of its fixed-wing air transport, and

almost all of its communications resources. The airfield at Chittagong, at first

under three feet of water, was just now being placed into operation. Most of the

port's docks and piers had been carried away by the high winds and heavy surf.

Inland, the major lines of communication, consisting mostly of unpaved roads

and trails, had been either destroyed or rendered impassible. The massive loss

of the area's livestock, a primary form of transit, seriously degraded the ability

to move heavy and large items. As a result of the devastation, the most critical

immediate issue was the distribution of prestaged relief supplies. Helicopters,

landing craft, small boats, and ground transportation assets were needed to move

food, water, medicine, and relief personnel to the remote areas devastated by the

cyclone With these issues in mind, General Stackpole told Clarey and Rowe that the

Photograph courtesy of 5th MEB

Marine BGen Peter J. Rowe, left, and RAdm Stephen S. Clarey, USN, welcome a

Bangladeshi delegation on board the Tarawa.
48 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

role of PhibGru 3 and the 5th MEB was going to be delivery of the food,

medicine, and expertise. The commander of the JTF assumed operational control

of the amphibious task force, rather than it being placed "in support of" the JTF.

General Stackpole's intent was that the Marines and sailors would be the

providers, while the Bangladeshi were the implementers.

Since the amphibious task force possessed more than 90 percent of the

available helicopter transport, General Stackpole assigned it the largest segment

of the disaster zone. Encompassing 23,000 square kilometers, this sector

included more than 240 kilometers of coastline from Chittagong in the north to

Cox's Bazar in the south and the off-shore islands of South Hatia, Sandwip,

Kutubdia, Manpura, and Maheshkali. Stackpole's initial plan had called for the

Marine forces to be assigned to the southern sector and naval forces to the island

sector. This division of labor was discussed and debated at the meeting. Both

Brigadier General Rowe and Admiral Clarey, noting that a synergistic

relationship had developed among the units under their command as they had

been operating together for some time, recommended to General Stackpole that

the JTF "capitalize on what we brought as a combined Navy/Marine Corps

team."98 Agreeing with Rowe and Clarey, Stackpole decided that the

amphibious task force should continue to operate as a single unit, thus exploiting

its unique combined capabilities.

The mission assigned the amphibious task force was to provide support for

relief operations to assist the government of Bangladesh; to be prepared to lift

relief supplies using its landing craft and helicopter assets; and to provide

medical assistance, water production, engineer and material handling equipment,

security, rations, communications, and other support on short notice. General

Stackpole's intent was that the mission be accomplished within two weeks, that

the forces ashore, except for those guarding cryptographic materials, carry no

weapons as they would not be working in a hostile environment, and that a

minimum "footprint" be created by using as few Americans on shore as possible.

Naval logistics support, therefore, would be sea-based throughout the operation.

Helicopters would distribute relief supplies from Chittagong to the outlying areas

and be refueled at sea. Marine aircraft group representatives stationed ashore

would monitor, control, and dispatch aircraft for mission assignments. RLT 5

would provide material handling teams to help load, unload, and distribute relief

supplies. BSSG 5 would furnish engineer support, including water production,

heavy equipment and operators, and medical assistance. The ships of PhibGru

3 were to provide surface landing craft and air traffic control personnel.

The requirement for a small "footprint" ashore necessitated that there would

never be more than 500 Marines, sailors, airmen, or soldiers on shore during

daylight hours. Maintaining a larger force ashore would have placed an undue

burden on the already beleaguered local infrastructure by increasing the demand

for berthing space, sanitation facilities, and waste disposal. Logistically,

requirements for food, water, and living supplies would likewise rise. Increasing

the forces ashore also would mean that more Marines and sailors would risk

being exposed to disease. While not a primary consideration, General Stackpole
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 49

Department of Defense Photo (USA) DA-SC-88-00434

The Tarawa was forced to remain more than 80 kilometers off the Bangladesh coast

because of strong tidal currents and contrary wind conditions.

was aware of criticism leveled against the government by opposition parties and

politicians in both Bangladesh and India. He felt that by adding more troops to

the relief effort he might have added credence to their charges that American

forces had been sent to Bangladesh to establish a foreign military presence in the

area.99*

The hydrography of the Bay of Bengal dictated that the amphibious task

group should be divided to support operational plans. The flagship Tarawa with

MAG-50 embarked remained in navigable waters in a modified offshore

deployment location more than 80 kilometers from Chittagong. Strong tidal

currents that were generally out of phase with the prevailing winds making flight

operations at anchor impossible, forced the Tarawa to remain underway

throughout the operation.'°° The landing and transport ships moved closer to

shore to facilitate material offloading by landing craft and helicopter and served

as forward refueling and replenishment stations. Choppy water, tricky currents,

underwater hazards, and high winds obviated operations after dark.

Since the 5th MEB would carry the major burden of the amphibious task

force's relief effort, General Rowe and his staff developed a six-phase concept

of operations: (1) a forward command element would be collocated with JTF

Forward headquarters at Chittagong; (2) helicopter insertion of communications

personnel and liaison teams into designated landing zones to coordinate

operations with the JTF and relief agencies on the scene and positioning

amphibious task force ships in the northern Bay of Bengal to provide sea-based

logistics support; (3) lifting supplies ashore employing the brigade's helicopters

and the task group's landing craft, including the movement of water-making

India's West Bengal's ruling Communist Party expressed surprise over the arrival of

"thousands of American" soldiers and implied that the Government of Bangladesh had handed

direct responsibility for the relief effort to the Americans and suggested that U.S. forces had no

intention of leaving the country "very soon." It linked the arrival of American forces to imperialist

activities in west and south Asia, including alleged assistance to separatist forces in India.
50 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

facilities and potable water; (4) provide additional support as directed; (5) turn

over the relief mission to international agencies or follow-on relief organizations

within two weeks; and (6) backload equipment and personnel to the ships of the

amphibious task force.'°'

Admiral Clarey and General Rowe, while retaining their respective posts in

the amphibious task force, were designated the operation's Naval Forces and

Marine Forces component commanders. As both officers now held two

commands, it was necessary to appoint a mission commander to direct operations

ashore personally. In making his choice, General Rowe weighed a number of

competing factors. Since the mission essentially was logistical in nature, the

logical choice was the commanding officer of the BSSG 5,but it was commanded

by a major and General Rowe felt his rank relative to the other members of the

JTF staff "could prove a hindrance, notwithstanding Major Johnson's exemplary

competence." The mission commander would have to educate a joint staff that

had been only recently created from diverse organizations and as yet possessed

no clear understanding of command relationships or the capabilities of the

amphibious task force. He would also have to secure mission orders and obtain

enough latitude to accomplish the assigned tasks.

Because a major contribution to the relief effort would be helicopter

transport, General Rowe's next logical choice was MAG-50's commanding

officer. While Colonel West was sufficiently senior to operate within the JTF

command structure, the intensity of air operations would require his undivided

attention. If he was saddled with overall command of the operation ashore,

MAG-50's assets might be spread too thin. Colonel Randolph Gangle was

experienced in commanding a regimental landing team composed of three

infantry battalions and attached artillery, tank, light armored infantry, engineer,

and reconnaissance units. "Senior and savvy," he and his regimental landing

team staff "were a sound base around which to form an integrated mission

command. "2 "There were no book solutions to the situation," Brigadier

General Rowe later noted, "it was the decision I agonized over most and it went

the right way."°3

Early on the morning of 16 May, Colonel Gangle established a mission

liaison detachment in the JTF Forward headquarters at Chittagong. This

detachment contained Marine and Navy personnel, including the mission

commander, a Navy commander to supervise surface craft operations, the

regimental landing team's operations and intelligence officers to coordinate

operations, and aviation officers to create air tasking orders and coordinate

aircraft control. Administrative supplies and equipment, camp provisions,

communications gear, limited rolling stock, material handling equipment,

ROWPUs, and other essential items also were landed at Chittagong.

Colonel Gangle's integrated staff streamlined coordination among the

aviation, seaborne, and ground elements, ensuring the efficient exploitation of the

amphibious task force's capabilities. Middlemen were eliminated. Gangle could,

for example, speak directly with Navy Commander Thomas J. Hirsch regarding

surface craft operations or to Navy air traffic control personnel without going
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 51

Photograph courtesy of Col Kevin M. Kennedy, USMC (Ret)

Mission commander, Col Randolph A. Gangle, USMC, center, coordinates relief efforts

with Bangladeshi navy Capt Anwar Haque, left, and LtCol Kevin M. Kennedy, USMC,

commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, at the Chittagong forward

headquarters.

through a multi-tiered chain of command. The MAG-50 representative reported

directly to the mission commander as did representatives of the service support

group and regimental landing team. Colonel West, who served as air mission

commander, provided Gangle with technical advice in addition to tutoring

members of the JTF staff as to the most effective ways of employing scarce

helicopter resources.

By 1400, Colonel Gangle's staff was established and working within the

JTF's operations center. The group's functions included manning the center

around the clock, coordinating with host-country personnel and civilian workers,

acting as a clearing house for information, tracking operations and evaluating

their effectiveness, planning future operations, networking administrative and

tactical radio traffic, handling public affairs, and escorting a myriad of important

visitors. While these were typical command functions, they had to be adapted

for non-combat humanitarian relief operations.

In addition to Colonel Gangle's staff, the Chittagong operations center

included members of the JTF Forward detachment, Bangladesh government and

military personnel, American embassy staff, and representatives of several nongovernment relief organizations. Although this centralized location provided for

enhanced coordination and cooperation, smooth working relationships among the

various participants took time to develop. Disagreements arose over the number

of relief centers to be established, the use and location of ROWPUs, and

movement of inappropriate relief supplies. Many of the non-government
52 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

organizations, such as CARE and the Red Crescent Society, had provided relief

in Bangladesh for years and were accustomed to operating in their own ways,

and all vied for a "piece of the action." Initially, American military and embassy

personnel spent a considerable amount of time achieving a consensus among the

competing organizations, training them in how to plan and organize a massive

relief effort, and at the same time educating them as to the capabilities of the

JTF.°4 In addition, because their logistical resources were more limited than

those available to the JTF, task force and Marine brigade staff members found

they needed to prod the non-government organizations to think on a grander

scale--moving hundreds of tons of supplies per day instead of only 20 or 30.

Mutual trust in each participant's competence and integrity, critical to the relief

effort's success, developed among the various parties in the Chittagong center as

all discovered a common goal.

Angels from the Sea

The amphibious task force's tactical-logistical group was in full operation on

the 16th. Initial relief efforts began when MAG-50's helicopters moved 259

passengers and delivered more than 89,000 pounds of relief supplies. The

operational pattern established that first day remained in effect throughout the

remainder of the task force's stay.

The movement and distribution chain began with non-government

organizations submitting their distribution requirements to the Bangladesh

government to ensure that the requirements were compatible with the

government's overall relief plan. Each morning representatives from various

government ministries and non-government organizations passed a list of the

following day's relief requirements and the projected needs for the next 48 hours

to the JTF in Dhaka. By early afternoon, the JTF staff would publish the

following day's distribution schedule, enabling suppliers time to position their

cargoes at the designated loading sites for airlift from Dhaka to Chittagong and

elsewhere.

The following morning, local workmen stacked relief supplies, which in turn

were loaded on board Special Forces and Air Force C-130 Hercules transports.

The working conditions were primitive, wrote Air Force Lieutenant Colonel

White. "We didn't have any forklifts, K-loaders, pallets, nets--you name it! We

floor-loaded 150-pound sacks of rice, 200-pound bags of potatoes, medical

supplies, tents, etc. We managed to fly six sorties per day with only the

aircrews to upload and download 40,000 pounds of cargo per sortie." Aircrews

and support personnel from the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing worked from 0400

to 2000 each day until additional help in the form of loadmasters arrived from

the 8th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron stationed at Clark Air Base)°5

At Chittagong, each day began with a similar "requirements meeting." At

0730 representatives from the brigade liaison team, regimental landing team,

aircraft group, amphibious task group, and Army and Air Force components met

with members of the JTF staff, Bangladesh government, and the various non-
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 53

CHITTAGONGMODEL

GOB SIk

CRESCENT CARE RELIEF

AGENCIES

SUBMIT LIFT REQUESTS

BANGLADESH MILIJTF

SET PRIORITIES

AIR TASKING ORDER

DEVELOPED FOR LCAC/

AVIATION/LCU

FINAL COORDINATION

OF AIR TASKING ORDER

MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO

AVIATIONILCACILCU

Photograph courtesy of 5th MEB

An Air Force C-130 Hercules off-loads relief supplies from Dhaka at Chitragong for

further transport by air, sea, and ground to the cyclone victims.
54 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

government relief organizations to review the surface and air movement schedule

for the day and determine whether there was a requirement for emergency lifts.

When necessary, appropriate changes were made to the day's schedule.

The Chittagong coordinating cell scrutinized and then validated lift

requirements for the following three days. Each government or non-government

agency submitted its transport requirements for relief supplies, building materials,

or personnel to the cell for validation. Once approved, the cell forwarded

requests to the JTF operations section. This data was used to develop the daily

air and surface movement schedule. The operations section would then match

transportation requirements against available assets, either surface or air, based

on the priority of the items, bulk, and destination. By 1600 each day, the JTF

Forward staff provided each agency an air and surface schedule indicating arrival

time, ramp location, quantity and type, and destination of the relief supplies. As

happens in all disaster relief operations, the Marine and Army air contingents

experienced a substantial number of rapid response requirements, schedule

changes, and aircraft diversions during the first few days of the operation. These

complications, however, diminished with time as each of the various parties

gained experience in working together.'°6

As mission commander, Colonel Gangle was responsible for the air and sea

movement of relief supplies, carefully balancing centralized control and

decentralized effectiveness. Centralized control of mission assignments normally

allowed for the efficient and orderly execution of a mission, but the Bangladesh

relief effort was not a normal mission. Employing air and sea assets in support

of the JTF, Bangladesh government, and non-government organizations--three

sometimes competing entities--required adaptability. On the other hand, the

potential for confusion and disarray existed if any one of the three organizations

or staff agencies within the Chittagong operations center was given tasking

control. With this in mind, Gangle based the allocation of distribution missions

among helicopters and boats on load size, delivery location, and time available.

Boats could serve only Sandwip, Kutubdia, and Maheshkali Islands; large, heavy

loads were suited to surface lift, an optimum LCAC load was 40 to 50 tons, and

an LCU could carry up to 170 tons; and time-sensitive items, such as food and

medical supplies, would be sent by helicopter. He also took into consideration

the relative availability of the two different means of transport.

Colonel West coordinated movement of Marine aircraft in accord with the

wishes of the JTF staff and the mission commander. To do this, MAG-50 sent

a forward control element ashore. The element was composed of an operations

and a logistics section and a team from Navy Tactical Air Control Squadron 11

(TACRON-il). Colonel Gangle wisely allowed the Marine aircraft group staff

maximum latitude to accomplish its tasks, and Colonel West felt this was a key

ingredient in successfully accomplishing the mission assigned to the group.'°7

The operations section, located in the JTF operations center at the north end

of Chittagong Airport, coordinated assigned aircraft to accomplish the day's

missions. Each afternoon, the JTF announced its taskings for the following day.

Using a dedicated satellite communications link with the flagship, the operations
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 55

Photograph courtesy of 5th MEB

The 5th MEB maintained a small command group ashore to control the flow of relief

supplies.

section obtained from the tactical air control center afloat what aircraft would be

available the next day. The tactical air control center on board the Tarawa

scheduled, controlled, and monitored flights from ship to shore each morning and

from shore to ship each evening. The fluid situation required maximum

flexibility, so specific missions were not assigned until aircraft were actually

airborne and on their way to the airfield at Chittagong. Aircraft were given new

missions each time they returned to the airfield, instead of using scarce heliôopter.

assets on multiple missions for prolonged periods that might require lengthy

loiter time. In addition, missions were numbered and scheduled in order of

priority, then assigned depending upon what aircraft were available during the

day, therefore minimizing the disruptive impact of cancellations, change of

priorities, bad weather, and mechanical problems. Flight paths and refueling

times and places were left to the discretion of flight leaders and individual pilots.

Frederick and Barbour County, the two amphibious tank landing ships anchored

in shallow water 16 kilometers off Chittagong, served as refueling platforms.

The two ships freed the aircraft from any dependence upon shore-based supplies

while maintaining rapid turnaround times. A major responsibility of the

operations section was to ensure all helicopters were released from their taskings

in time to return to the Tarawa by their appointed recovery time.

The logistics section oversaw the activities of the arrival and departure

airfield control groups which occupied the southern portion of the airfield from

which the Marine helicopters operated. Effective communications between the

operations and logistics sections kept the control groups, staffed by aircraft group

logistics personnel, apprised of each inbound aircraft's assigned mission. This

link also served as a backup communications system. The arrival and departure

control groups also tightly managed the inventory of relief supplies, informing

the JTF through the operations section of the need for replenishment. The two
56 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

groups had to maintain sufficient quantities of relief supplies on hand to load all

aircraft, while ensuring that no supplies remained in the groups' areas when

flight operations ended each day. Any supplies left behind would be lost, either

to rain damage or pilferage.

A detachment from Tactical Air Control Squadron 11 augmented the Marine

aviation element. The TACRON staff provided several key functions. After

initial difficulties communicating with the tower, the squadron supplied a

qualified air traffic controller equipped with a ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio

to Chittagong airfield. This was critical because MAG-50's UH-1N helicopters

were not equipped with very-high frequency, amplitude modulation, VHF (AM)

radios, the only type of radio used by the tower.' It was also reassuring to have

an English-speaking controller to work out language difficulties. He recorded 11

"saves" in an equal number of days standing tower watch)°8 The control

group also passed on important weather, tasking, safety, flight, and navigational

information. Initially, navigation proved a problem due to the unreliability of

non-directional beacons, the absence of a shore-based tactical air navigation

system, and the lack of long-range navigation chain coverage. Few local maps

were available, but aircrews and relief parties improvised tactical pilotage charts

by photocopying and taping together the 8-1/2 by 11-inch sheets to form useful

mosaics." Although originally intended for use by ground units, helicopter

aircrews made use of the few available small, lightweight global positioning

system receivers.

One of the 5th MEB's major contributions to the JTF was to augment it with

the brigade's command element and service support group. Although equipment

and logistics expertise was important, the most important support provided was

communications. Neither the Bangladesh government nor the relief agencies had

sufficient communications resources, due either to a lack of equipment or because

existing equipment had been damaged or destroyed. As a result, Bangladesh

government officials and military officers were unable to communicate with each

other or with their units and offices in the disaster zone. Fifteen hundred nongovernment volunteer workers had come to Bangladesh, but their agencies could

not transport them to the field or communicate with representatives already there.

• Prior to the arrival of the air traffic controller, HMLA-169 made an attempt to assign discrete

ultra-high frequencies for the Chittagong tower, but the attempt proved futile as tower workers

refused to monitor the UHF net. The refusal resulted in the squadron's UH-lNs using the UHF

guard normally assigned to aircraft with emergency problems. In addition, the squadron attempted

to fly multi-plane formations with the lead aircraft equipped with one of two available ARC-182s,

a radio providing VHF (AM), VHF (FM), and UHF (AM) capabilities within the same unit. This

solution worked well until the squadron's aircraft were forced to operate separately for most

missions.

While enroute, the amphibious task group requested the appropriate support maps through

CinCPacFlt and CinCPac from the Defense Mapping Agency. A partial fill of the order was

received on 25 May, four days before the amphibious task force was to cease operations.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 57

The Joint Task Force also experienced similar problems as promised

supplemental communications personnel and equipment had not arrived.

The JTF's primary concern was a central command net tying together the

JTF, CinCPac, and III MEF. It fell to the brigade's communications officer,

Lieutenant Colonel William V. Cantu, and a detachment from the 5th SRISG to

develop a communications plan and establish a communications net covering all

aspects of air, ground, and seaborne operations. The net consisted of 10 to 12

communications sites using assets from the JTF, the 5th MEB, and flown-in

equipment of the 7th Communications Battalion. Small detachments, each

consisting of only two or three Marines, manned high-frequency radios at key

government buildings, relief storehouses, and distribution points. These sites

supported Bangladesh government and non-government relief agencies. Although

only a temporary measure, the communications detachments doubled the amount

of supplies reaching the Chittagong distribution center. Relying on Marine

communications, the government was able to coordinate relief efforts and

simultaneously rebuild its damaged commercial communications links to the

disaster zone. Despite the very austere living conditions, reported Lieutenant

Colonel Kevin M. Kennedy, commanding officer of Battalion Landing Team 2/5,

"the teams really enjoyed the assignment."109

Full-scale relief operations began on the morning of 17 May. The first day

of operations set a pattern that remained in place throughout the operation. At

first light, helicopters and landing craft carried personnel and equipment ashore.

After unloading, personnel and transportation assets were directed to one of the

five distribution points. As Air Force and Special Forces C-130s arrived at the

designated C- 130 ramp at Chittagong's Patenga Airport, regimental landing team

forklifts off-loaded the cargo. The cargo and the considerable amount of relief

supplies stockpiled at the airport by government and non-government agencies

then were moved to the initial loading points: the northern ramp, from which the

five Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters operated; the south ramp, where Marine

RH-53 Sea Stallions and CH-46 Sea Knights were stationed; or the "V ramp used

by two Aerospatiale AS 365N Dauphin emergency medical service helicopters

and a 50-man Japanese relief team. The amphibious task group located its

LCAC ramp at the fuel jetty off the Karnaphuli River. The LCU ramp, located

at the port's ferry landing, was used by utility landing craft. A ramp director

controlled each loading site and organized the activities of the ramp in

accordance with the daily mission schedule. At the end of the day, each director

reported to the JTF the amount of relief supplies moved.

Once the relief supplies had been moved to their designated ramp, brigade

material handling teams took over, loading the aircraft and unloading them at

landing zones scattered throughout southeastern Bangladesh. Bangladesh civilian

laborers loaded and unloaded the surface craft. The Americans provided muscle

and lift assets, but they did not interfere with delivery priority or selection of

distribution locations. When these missions were completed or as darkness fell,

the handling teams on shore were picked up and returned to their respective

ships.
58 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Department of Defense Photo (USAF) DF-ST-92-06 120

A Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter lands as an Air Force 3 74th Tractical Air Wing

C-130 Hercules prepares for take-off at Chittagong airfield.

Tracking the wide variety of missions spread across a 23,000-square

kilometer area of operations was difficult. Close liaison between JTF,

government representatives, and non-government relief workers was crucial if

supplies were to reach those who most needed them. Careful planning was

reqUired to ensure the proper tools were being used, that supplies were being

delivered where they were most needed, and to avoid redundant or useless

missions. For aircraft this was accomplished by creating an air tasking order that

matched available aircraft and their capabilities with mission needs. Navy

representatives used similar schedules to plan landing craft missions.

The mission control centers resembled combat operations centers familiar to

all Marines. Busy watch officers manned a bank of phones, scribbled messages,

and answered questions. Area maps were dotted with colored pins and colored

markers that showed unit locations. Constant updating of this information was

imperative to keep decision makers abreast of the fluid situation and everchanging requirements. Charts detailed air and surface craft missions, noting the

scheduled time, date, location, delivery area, and load configuration--passengers,

weight, or items. Other charts and maps indicated current status of assets,

delivery priorities, planned routes, call signs and radio frequencies, alternate

plans, escape and evasion routes, and rally points. The distribution teams were manned primarily by the 5th Marines

Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon, officers from the ground combat

element, and other specialists as needed. These small detachments moved into

the disaster area to replace or reinforce Special Forces disaster relief teams

already in place. By doing this, the 5th MEB was able to triple the number of
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 59

Department of Defense Photo (USAF) DF-ST-92-02634

Air Force, Marine and Army personnel coordinate supply deliveries from a

communications site at Chittagong airfield.

receiving points in the hardest-hit areas. Once in place, they coordinated

resupply efforts, radioed situation reports to the command center, and provided

terminal guidance at the landing zones. Distribution points usually were manned

by American or Bangladesh military personnel, a few relief workers, and at least

one government representative. Marine engineers often set up water purification

units at these sites, which also soon became favorite places to establish medical

treatment centers.

Surface craft carried a large portion of the relief aid that was moved during

the operation. They included LCACs, LCUs, rigid raiding craft, and inflatable

boats. * The nature of the operations area made these craft ideal for distribution

missions, however, the forces of nature put excellent seamanship at a premium.

Winds reached velocities of up to 50 knots, there was a 12-foot tidal rise, and

ever-shifting 12-knot currents swirled between the islands and the mainland)'0

The Chittagong headquarters established landing beaches on Sandwip,

Manpura, Kutubdia, Matabari, and Maheshkali Islands. Air-cushion landing craft

soon became the stars of the show. The image of LCACs rushing over the

water, kicking up a silvery spray as they made their runs to the shore while

* Commander Thomas J. Hirsch quickly determined that the amphibious task group's LCM-8s

were unsuitable for the relief effort as they were not self-sustaining for personnel. They remained

on board the Tarawa well to seaward throughout Sea Angel and did not participate in the relief

operation.
60 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Photograph courtesy of 5th MEB

An air-cushion landing craft being loaded with relief supplies for transport to one of the

the offshore islands.

carrying 30 to 40 tons at speeds up to 50 knots, became synonymous with the

operation. Unfortunately, the LCACs were designed to carry rolling stock, not

bulk cargo, so loading and unloading was less efficient than when carrying

vehicles. Local delivery trucks were not transported because they lacked

appropriate tie downs and were often loaded beyond axle capacity. The

Bangladesh government hired laborers to load and unload the four LCACs.

Military and police personnel provided security around the off-load ramps to

restrain curiosity seekers who often numbered up to 10,000. The air-cushion

landing craft returned to their ships each night, often carrying a load to be

delivered the following morning.

Other craft provided yeoman service as well. Unlike the LCACs, the three

LCUs required most of a day to load, depending upon the arrival time of the

relief supplies. These boats remained overnight when loaded, delivered their

cargo the next morning, and returned to their assigned ship that evening. Small

rigid raiding craft manned by Navy SEALs and reconnaissance Marines proved

ideal for moving supplies through the numerous waterways that crisscrossed the

islands and coastal lowlands. These boats proved very useful for short hauls and

their small loads were manageable for local laborers working without forldifts or

motor transport.

Marine amphibious assault vehicles were launched but quickly encountered

difficulties. Their top water speed was only about eight knots, so they could not

be used in the face of 8- to 12-knot currents. In addition, the silt-ladened water

soon fouled their propulsion systems, leaving them to drift at the mercy of the
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 61

Photograph courtesy of 5th MEB

Local laborers unload food and construction materials from one of the three LCUs used

during the relief operation.

prevailing currents and tides. The vehicles were recovered and did not assist

in the relief operation. Had the AAVs made it to shore, the treads of these 25-

ton monsters would have damaged the fragile infrastructure and most probably

ruptured the packed-dirt embankments that held the tides at bay.

The ships of PhibGru 3 provided splendid support throughout the operation.

The "blue-green" Navy-Marine team had been improving sea-based logistics

since the Vietnam War. This concept relied on ships of the fleet for combat

service support rather than building logistics bases ashore. Sea-basing the 5th

MEB had been pioneered by General Rowe's predecessor, Brigadier General

William P. Eshelman. General Rowe refined the concept and used it to the

fullest during the recent deployment to the Persian Gulf. The result was that

PhibGru 3 and the 5th MEB were very familiar with the concept and

implemented it easily in the Bay of Bengal.

One visible example of sea-basing was the use of the LSTs Barbour County

and Frederick for aviation support. Both ships broke away from the task group

and moved close to shore in order to facilitate the unloading of supplies. During

the operation, they remained at anchor in less than 10 meters of water where they

could act as forward replenishment platforms. A friendly rivalry between the

two ships soon emerged when they vied to see which could service the most

The three LCUs encountered similar problems with the silt-laden water, but with constant

maintenance remained able to perform their assigned relief missions.
62 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

aircraft. Arriving helicopters were quickly refueled and their crews were given

box lunches and cold sodas. Using the acronym "BoB" for Bay of Bengal, the

Barbour County was soon tabbed "BoB's Service Station." The deck crew

outfitted a cork mannequin with a cranial helmet, goggles, flotation vest, steeltoed boots, and work suit to play the role of friendly "Bob," the station manager.

"Bob's arm was raised in a constant gesture of warm welcome or fond farewell,

depending on whether your were landing or taking off." The Barbour County

even offered free ship's baseball caps to the 100th customer in a spoof of

American service station marketing strategies.'1'

The general daily aviation plan was to use the Blackhawks, Sea Knights, and

Sea Stallions, and the two Japanese Dauphin helicopters, to deliver working

parties and move bulk cargo, such as large bags of rice, potatoes, lentils, dry

molasses, flour, and wheat. They also carried Bangladesh officials, nongovernment relief workers, medical teams, water purification units, livestock,

VIPs, and members of the media."2' The preferred delivery method was to

sling-load cargo whereby an entire load could be hooked up or dropped off in

minutes, instead of the hours it might take to load and unload using stevedore

labor. The main drawback to this method was that safe operating procedures

dictated slings could not be used when helicopters were carrying passengers.

Colonel West used the aircraft group's light helicopters to deliver small loads

directly to the disaster area, notably to the islets just off the north coast of

Sandwip Island. Hueys, flown by skilled pilots, set down at minuscule landing

zones such as roof tops or paddy dikes to deliver loads of up to 1,500 pounds.

Bags of rice and lentils were emptied in minutes by hungry Bangladeshis who

quickly got in line for their cup or double handful. Colonel West reported that

on one such mission he saw the village chief clasping his hands together and

nodding with tears in his eyes to acknowledge the first food and fresh water

delivery since the cyclone struck. In a note later passed to West, the grateful

village chief explained that a baby born that day had been named Faresta. It was

done, he said, to serve as a reminder to the village of the faresta, or angels, sent

by their American friends in their time of great need."3 "The words 'faresta,

faresta, . . .' became frequently heard shouts from smiling and waving villagers

as helos came in and out of landing zones, delivering badly needed food, water,

and medical supplies."4

Ironically, the major supply problem was that there was too much on hand.

Humanitarian relief was flooding into Bangladesh, but it could not be moved to

the forward areas. This was particularly true for items too big or too delicate to

be manhandled by Bangladeshi workers. Non-government relief workers and

'Early in the operation, CinCPac authorized the Joint Task Force to transport foreign nationals

and members of the news media on American military aircraft. Initially, flight requests from the

media came with little or no warning, and inadequate consolidation. However, with careful

management, maximum use was made of every helicopter. When transporting the press or VIPs,

any extra space was filled with rice or other relief supplies.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 63

Photograph courtesy of 5th MEB

A Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter is besieged by starving villagers as it delivers food

and medical supplies to an outlying village.

government officials understood the problem, but were helpless to do much

because they lacked the proper equipment; therefore, the assets the amphibious

task force brought to Bangladesh became crucial to the operation's success.

Almost every Marine volunteered to go ashore, but not all could be sent at

one time, so General Rowe instituted a rotation system to allow as many Marines

as possible to get ashore and see what Operation Productive Effort was all about.

Working parties of 50 to 100 Marines were organized every day to help move

relief materials. The Americans and Bangladeshis soon were working side by

side and from all outward signs, they worked together with efficiency, team

spirit, and camaraderie. The sight of a robust Marine throwing a 50-pound sack

of rice around with ease quickly awed the Bangladeshis. The ultimate status

symbol for a Bangladeshi was to be invited on board one of the helicopters, and

they soon began mirroring the American "bucket brigade" method of passing

bags of food, building materials, and medical supplies from person to person.

Within a few days it was common practice for the Bangladeshis to give the

Marines a broad smile and a distinctive "thumbs up" sign when the work day

ended .* As the relief effort moved into high gear on the 17th, General Stackpole and

his planning section in Dhaka made a number of final refinements and then

* For many Bangladeshis, the "thumbs up' sign is an obscene gesture. Obviously, this cultural

prejudice temporarily faded with Operation Sea Angel.
64 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Department of Defense Photo (USAF) DF-ST-92-02649

A common sight at numerous villages throughout southeastern Bangladesh was a Marine

hurrying to unload sacks of rice and potatoes.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 65

submitted the task force's completed campaign plan to CinCPac for approval.

The plan was based on four assumptions: first, duration of the operation was

approximately 30 days; second, the Government of Bangladesh would want the

JTF to remain for the duration; third, the amphibious task group was to depart

on 29 May; and fourth, the St. Louis and Marine Contingency Air-Group Task

Force 2-91 would arrive on 29 May. The goal was to stabilize the situation in

Bangladesh, allowing the government to assume full responsibility for long-term

recovery, assisted by normal American foreign aid. The restoration of the

infrastructure within the disaster region was to be the government's main focus,

while the JTF would concentrate on assisting Bangladesh in stabilizing the

situation until the country could recover from the initial effects of the cyclone

and begin its own rebuilding program.

The campaign plan, as envisioned, encompassed three phases. The first was

to "conduct humanitarian operations designed to immediately reduce mortality

and stabilize the situation to begin recovery operations." The primary focus of

the first phase would be on distribution. This phase was scheduled to last

approximately 14 days. During phase two, the efforts of the JTF would be

directed toward the delivery of supplies and equipment that would allow the

residents of the affected areas to begin self-help recovery projects. General

Stackpole estimated that phase two would require approximately 10 days to

complete. In the final phase, which he estimated would take five days, the

Bangladesh government would assume full control of the relief effort. The JTF

would continue to provide technical advice and humanitarian assistance, and then

withdraw. Pacific Command quickly approved the plan)'5

General Stackpole realized that the transition from one phase to another

would not be clear-cut and would vary from one area to another. To avoid

offending local sensitivities, American forces would not be involved in the

disposal of human or animal remains. Likewise, American and subordinate

commanders were not to engage in open-ended activities or long-term projects

that would go beyond the JTF's original charter of conducting life-sustaining

operations. "We could not do that," Stackpole later noted, "nor did we have the

heavy equipment" to rebuild embankments, clear more than 20 wrecks from the

Karnaphuli River, restore power, or repair microwave communications towers.

"We were not staying there forever," a point which General Stackpole

continually stressed and which permeated all planning from the very

beginning)'6

At first, relief efforts were limited to the vicinity of Chittagong, however,

operations rapidly expanded and soon included many outlying areas and offshore

islands. On 19 May, Colonel Gangle ordered Lieutenant Colonel Donald R.

Selvage, commanding officer of Battalion Landing Team 3/5, to move ashore

from the Vancouver and to establish a second control center at Cox's Bazar, a

small resort city located at the southern tip of the area of operations. Its 6,000-

foot airfield and small boat harbor became the focal points for relief efforts on

Kutubdia, Maheshkali, and several of the smaller islands in the vicinity.
66 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Department of Defense Photo (USN) DN-ST-90-05402

The Vancouver transported LtCol Donald R. Selvage 's 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, south

to Cox 's Bazar, where a second control center was established on 19 May.

Lieutenant Colonel Selvage followed the Chittagong model in organizing and

conducting the relief activities at Cox's Bazar. The Deputy Zonal Relief

Coordinator for Cox's Bazar and Deputy Commissioners for both Cox's Bazar

and Naokhali districts provided Selvage's staff, located at the city's airport, with

daily lift requirements. Based upon those requirements, the staff developed daily

mission schedules.

Battalion Landing Team 3/5's efforts at Cox's Bazar received a welcome

boost when Britain's Royal Navy and Royal Marines reported for duty with the

JTF. Royal Fleet Auxiliary replenishment ship Fort Grange (A 385) arrived off

the port city on 20 May after a short passage from Colombo in Sri Lanka. The

Fort Grange carried a 200-man crew and 20 Royal Marines from 539 Assault

Squadron, four 846 Naval Air Squadron Westland HAS .5 Sea King commando

medium-lift transport helicopters, six rigid raiding craft, and assorted inflatable

boats.*

Following an air reconnaissance of the area to locate a secure operations base

from which boats could operate at all tidal levels, the Royal Marines launched

their relief effort on 22 May. A daily routine was established consisting of boat

runs between Cox's Bazar and Dhalghata and Matabari Villages on the island of

Matabari and Gorakghata Pier on Maheshkali Island. At last light, the Royal

Marines flew back to the Fort Grange, leaving two behind to secure the base.

While they enjoyed an "outstanding" working relationship with their American

counterparts, they also shared a common problem--navigating an area choked

* The Royal Fleet Auxiliary is similar to the United States Military Sealift Command; both

feature Navy-owned, civilian-manned, non-amphibious, combat support ships. ** The Westland HC.4 Sea King helicopter was the British commando assault version of the

Sikorsky SH-3 Sea King helicopter used by the U.S. Navy; it could carry 28 personnel or 8,000

pounds of cargo.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 67

with floating debris and fish traps and shifting channels and sand bars. The

British soon found out that local navigational charts and maps were outdated."7

As Operation Productive Effort advanced it evolved from a joint, denoting

inter-Service, into a combined or international, military humanitarian operation.

British, Pakistani, and Japanese troops were integrated into the JTF and provided

liaison personnel at Dhaka, Chittagong, and Cox's Bazar who accepted missions

as assigned by the coordination cells. While the British concentrated on two

major islands off Chittagong, the Japanese generally flew utility missions suited

to their two small helicopters, as did the two Pakistani helicopters. The Indians

and Chinese did not subordinate their helicopters to the joint effort, but did

establish informal agreements with the JTF by which they would cover certain

areas when allied assets could not assist or were otherwise employed.

By the second week of the massive relief operation, the effort had settled into

an efficient routine. Military Airlift Command Galaxies and Starlifters arrived

at Zia International bringing in water purification units from Okinawa,

communications packages and personnel from the Air Force's 4th Combat

Communications Group on Guam, and C- 130 aircraft maintenance packages from

Yokota Air Base in Japan. Air Force C-130s, Marine and Army helicopters, and

Navy surface craft hauled food and medical supplies. On the ground, Marine

engineers set-up water purification units and Army Special Forces relief teams

provided on-site assessment.

The relief effort soon was expanded to include the Sylhet region of northDepartment of Defense Photo (USN) DF-ST-90-06106

Mrs. Marilyn T. Quayle, wife of the Vice President, greets Marines upon her arrival at

Chittagong.
68 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 69

eastern Bangladesh, hard hit by monsoonal flooding. Hercules C-i 30 transports

flew three or four daily sorties between Dhaka and the city of Sylhet, carrying

more than 25 tons of supplies each day. Chinese and Indian helicopters assisted

with the local distribution of these supplies. In addition, Mrs. Marilyn T.

Quayle, Chairman of the American Advisory Committee for Foreign Disaster

Assistance and wife of Vice President J. Danforth Quayle, visited American

forces and toured the disaster area. She and her small official party remained

overnight on board the flagship Tarawa, where security, medical, and

communications facilities were available. Among other visitors were

ambassadors representing the nations involved and senior members of the

Bangladesh government, including President Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed and

Prime Minister Zia. The week also witnessed the signing of a formal status of

forces agreement between Bangladesh and the United States which accorded JTF

personnel status equivalent to that provided to members of the administrative and

technical staff of the American Embassy in Bangladesh. American military personel were also granted freedom of movement, exemption from local taxation and

tariff charges, and immunity from the jurisdiction of local courts h18

During the second week, the operation and the JTF were renamed. "Well

done to all involved in ongoing relief operations for the people of Bangladesh,"

read the message from the Chairman of th Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cohn

L. Powell. He then quoted a recent news story describing U.S. relief forces as

"angels from the sea." According to Powell, the quote "carries the true spirit of

our work and inspired a change to the name of our operations. Effective

immediately, Operation 'Productive Effort' will be called 'Sea Angel."9 As

General Stackpole later commented: "it worked out extremely well because that

indeed encapsulized and described the functions that we were carrying out."2°

One of the greatest threats to the success of Operation Sea Angel was the toll

taken by infectious disease. Providing food and shelter was not enough. If

proper medical care and clean water were not forthcoming, more people would

perish from disease than would die from starvation or as a direct result of the

cyclone. A medical management team headed by Captain John R. Downs, MC,

USNR, and supported by Lieutenant Colonel Craig S. Matsuda, MC, USAF, and

Lieutenant Commander Pete L. Godbey, MC, USN, oversaw the Joint Task

Force's medical relief effort.

Arriving in Dhaka on 14 May, the team met with the appropriate government

ministers and their secretaries who had jurisdiction over health care, water, and

sanitation, as well as physicians at the International Center for Diarrheal Disease

Research, Bangladesh; USAID personnel; and representatives of several nongovernment relief organizations. All agencies involved agreed that the primary

concern was to ensure an adequate supply of safe drinking water. This would

require the repair of existing tubewehls, the placement of additional wells, the

distribution of water purifying agents, and an engineering study of tubewells,

water collection ponds, and embankments by Navy Mobile Construction Battalion

personnel. The second priority was to ensure an adequate food supply and then

the prompt treatment of diarrheal diseases. As oral rehydration solutions were
70 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Photograph courtesy of PhibGru 3

Col Mike Ferguson, USAF, right, chi ef of staff of the forward headquarters, displays the

new Combined Joint Task Force banner with draftsman Regaul Karim.

in short supply, one of the JTF's major efforts would be to provide the capability

for treating diarrheal outbreaks with intravenous rehydration solutions and

antibiotics. Mobile medical civic action program (MedCAP) teams would be

deployed throughout the affected area to provide care, and lastly, the JTF would

attempt to provide temporary shelter materials, such as plastic sheeting, and then

building materials to repair destroyed homes.

With the establishment of the forward headquarters at Chittagong, Captain

Downs and Lieutenant Commander Godbey, who was responsible for

coordinating medical operations within the disaster area, supervised the opening

of a small aid station. They also met with local medical officials. At the

meeting, the district's chief surgeon told the JTF medical representatives that

Sandwip Island and the hard-hit subdistrict of Banshkhali, south of the city, had

the highest priorities. As a result, NEPMtJ 6 was tasked with surveying

Sandwip and Banshkhali for a team site. Sandwip Island was finally chosen by

the unit as the location for its quasi-health department. From this base, the unit

carried out an epidemiology, entomology, preventive medicine, and

microbiological assessment of the island. While not quantifiable, the findings

would assist the inhabitants of Sandwip Island prepare for disease control during

and after future disasters. In addition, the unit initiated a program of disease

surveillance throughout the area's remaining subdistricts. A computer database

was constructed and the data collected from all affected regions was analyzed to

identify areas of greatest need.'2'
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 71

Following the arrival of the amphibious task group, Captain Downs flew out

to the Tarawa where he met PhibGru 3 and 5th MEB medical staffs. He

identified a reservoir of approximately eight medical• civic action program teams

formed from the brigade.* Practical and political considerations weighed toward

using MedCAP teams to augment and work with local medical professionals. In

addition to providing assistance and education, the teams could initiate programs

and procedures that could be carried on by those who permanently served the

population. Treatment without continuity was of little long-term value.

The JTF surgeon designated the Tarawa as the primary casualty receiving

and treatment ship for American forces in the Chittagong area. A small ward

and a seven-bed intensive care unit were also set aside at the combined military

hospital in Dhaka. A similar arrangement was made with the Chittagong

Comprehensive Military Hospital. These hospitals provided sufficient emergency

care to treat and stabilize any injury or disease suffered by American personnel

prior to being evacuated by air.

The JTF medical management team conducted an overland assessment of

Patiya, Anwara, Banshkhali, Chakaria, and Maheskhali subdistricts. They ended

their tour in Cox's Bazar. Medical civic action program sites were identified and

assessed by Special Operations Forces disaster relief teams which, working in

concert with local Bangladeshi Special Forces units, provided medical intelligence

and other support information to Captain Downs and his staff. The subdistrict

survey, and meetings with local medical personnel, resulted in the definition of

district priorities--the highest being Sandwip and Hatia Islands and the coastal

areas of Anwara and Banshkhali. In addition, the management team established

a protocol for inserting the MedCAP teams. No team would be deployed without

the presence of translators and local authorities. Coordination between local

authorities, the Special Forces team, and the MedCAP team at each site was

stressed. And initially, the teams would work at local subdistrict hospitals.'22

The first MedCAP team deployed to Kutubdia Island on the morning of 19

May. Later, additional teams were sent to Anwara and Patiya subdistricts and

Matabari Island. By the 20th, six teams were rotating throughout the affected

area. Each team consisted of a Navy doctor and four or five corpsmen. They

were briefed at the Chittagong headquarters, given medical supplies, water,

prepackaged meals, and background information on the selected site and

surrounding area before deploying forward.

The experiences of the Kutubdia Island team typified MedCAP operations

throughout the disaster area. Navy Reserve Lieutenant John E. Koella, battalion

surgeon for the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines; four corpsmen; and a Reserve

Marine sergeant from TOW Platoon, 23d Marines, who was a civilian nurse,

arrived at the Kutubdia Health Complex from the Anchorage early on the 19th.

'The MedCAP teams were formed exclusively from 5th MEBpersonnel, as PhibGru 3 medical

personnel had shipboard responsibilities that precluded them from going ashore.
72 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

The team was accompanied by a Bangladeshi medical researcher; a nurse and

public health specialist from USAID, who was seconded full-time from Dhaka

to assist the JTF public health effort; and a public health nurse with Project

Concern. Funded by Bangladesh, American, and other non-government

agencies, the Health Complex encompassed a small outpatient clinic, a 50-bed

inpatient hospital, and a regional medical administration office. The sole

permanent medical facility on the island, it served a population of more than

120,000 prior to the cyclone.Iu

The complex was surrounded by standing water, mud, and sewage. The

interior of the hospital, which held more than 80 patients, was worse, as

Lieutenant Koella reported:

There was no electricity or running water. Potable water

was obtained from a nearby tubewell. There were no hand-held

urinals, bed pans, or bedside commodes, and few actual beds for

inpatients. Most inpatients were either too weak or too illinformed to try and use hospital toilets, and they defecated,

vomited, and urinated onto the hospital floor. In the inpatient

facility the majority of patients had no bed or mattress and they

rested on the floor, which was awash in diarrhea, urine, and

vomitus. There was a cloud of flies covering each patient. Ants

covered IV bags as they infused fluids, and at night mosquitoes

swarmed)24

Lieutenant Koella's team assumed responsibility for all inpatient care from

0600 to 1800 each day, local staff managed care from 1800 to 0600. Local

physicians staffed the outpatient clinic and referred the most serious cases to the

team for screening and treatment. A constant stream of outpatients, regulated by

a Bangladesh army disaster relief unit, sought the team's care after normal

working hours.

The team initially augmented the local staff and Bangladesh army and navy

medical relief teams. The arrival of additional civilian medical workers from the

country's Postgraduate Medical Training Hospital in Dhaka relieved the local

physicians and staff of their outpatient duties, allowing them to concentrate

temporarily on administrative matters and remedying the facility's sanitation

problems. Running water was restored, albeit intermittently, floors were cleaned

and bleached, new mattresses obtained, and flies and ants controlled.

Inpatient admissions averaged 50 per day, with an average stay of 36 hours.

Approximately 70 percent of those admitted suffered moderate to severe

dehydration with watery diarrhea, assumed to be cholera, and 20 percent had

abdominal cramps accompanied by bloody diarrhea, caused by the Shigella

bacteria. A majority of the remaining 10 percent had infected soft tissue injuries

directly attributable to the cyclone. The rest suffered from severe malnutrition,

oral fungus infections, advanced bony and soft tissue tumors, bowel obstructions,
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 73

Department of Defense Photo (USAF) DF-ST-92-06131

Lt John Koella, a doctor with the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, examines a patient at the

Kutubdia Health Complex as Hospital Corpsman 1st Class Robert Andrews stands by.

persistent and intractable asthma, and eye infections. Outpatients numbered

about 120 per day and generally suffered from minor or chronic orthopedic and

dermatological problems.

After a five-day stay, during which the Health Complex staff was reinforced

substantially by civilian physicians, Koella's team returned to the Anchorage.
74 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Unfortunately, as the battalion surgeon later noted, the newly arrived physicians

were not accompanied by a sufficient number of nurses or other health workers.

"We did not need more doctors, we needed nurses," he reported. "Never before

in my career has the importance of good nursing care been so vividly displayed."

Koella continued: "Patients went unfed, uncleaned, uneducated, and uncared for;

IVs ran out; meds were not passed reliably; and records were lost or mixed up.

We cannot change ingrained Bengali attitudes overnight, but we must impress

upon Bengali officials the need for more appreciation of the benefits of adequate

nursing care."

By 21 May, reports from the six medical civic action teams indicated that the

patient load of diarrheal diseases was stabilized in all areas. As the amount of

medical supplies and the number of non-government health professionals airlifted

into the area increased, so did the volume of evacuated patients. Based on the

recommendations of the MedCAP teams, patients with tetanus, abdominal

obstructions caused by worms, infected traumatic wounds, and all pediatric and

infected multiple fracture cases, were flown to Chittagong. The patients were

then transferred to the medical school of the city's hospital where they received

appropriate care. One ethnic group was excluded--Muslim Burmese who had

immigrated to Bangladesh. Because they were Burmese and not Bangladeshi,

government officials did not designate this hard-hit group as a priority for relief

aid. To avoid a political confrontation or inflaming ethnic sensitivities, Captain

Downs arranged for the Fort Grange to provide food, medical supplies, and care

to the Burmese.

On 25 May, with the medical conditions of most areas stabilized, the

MedCAP teams were withdrawn and replaced by government and nongovernment medical personnel. While ashore, 5th MEB corpsmen and

physicians saw and treated more than 15,000 patients, and supervised the

distribution of 38 metric tons of medical supplies. "Their exposure to the

disease, sanitation and population problems present in Bangladesh will have an

impact on [all doctors and corpsmenl for the rest of their lives," reported General

Stackpole, "they will be far better health practitioners because of their exposure."

In addition, "many thousands of Bangladesh citizens were directly impacted

because of the health care given by our MedCAP teams."26 The contributions

of the 5th MEB and JTF medical teams were not short-lived. The impact of

educational programs, such as instruction provided to local health authorities in

pediatric care, and the sharing of knowledge between health and medical

professionals would outlast the short-term emergency assistance provided by the

MedCAP teams.

To cover the cost of medical support and the numerous other types of

assistance provided by the JTF, on 26 May President Bush, with the advice of

the Departments of State and Defense, authorized "the furnishing of up to $20

million of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense and

defense services of the Department of Defense," for Bangladesh disaster

assistance.'27 This presidential determination, based on section 506 (a) (2) of

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, would later cause some
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 75

Photograph courtesy of 5th MED

A Marine RH-53, two CH-46s, and a UH-1N belonging to MAG-SO, stage to receive

relief supplies at Chittagong airfield.

confusion. Initially, it was assumed that it would cover the total cost of all JTFprovided goods such as food, medical supplies, and shelter materials, and

services such as transportation, water purification, and basic engineering work.

However, State Department and CinCPac legal staffs subsequently determined

that it only applied to assistance provided for 120 days after the presidential

determination was issued)28* Following the termination of Operation Sea

Angel, the American Embassy, through the defense attache's office, would use

this presidential determination to upgrade the Bangladesh government's disaster

relief network by providing Department of Defense-declared excess equipment,

such as radios and other communications gear.

As the month of May came to a close, General Stackpole realized that the

three phases of the campaign were culminating at different times in different

regions. It was not possible to characterize the operation as entirely into any

given phase at any given time. By 27 May, however, there was a consensus that

* The costs associated with Operation Sea Angel eventually were funded, with the assurance

of later reimbursement, by each service component from its operations and maintenance budget,

with the explanation that the operation offered a "tremendous training opportunity." The costs per

service were: Marine Corps, $514,000; Navy, $2,968,000; Army, $500,000; Air Force,

$2,241,000; and other defense agencies, $127,000. Originally, the Department of Defense

anticipated that the Department of State would reimburse the department for its disaster assistance

efforts. However, it later was determined that each of the services' operations and maintenance

budgets would be reimbursed with money drawn from the Defense Emergency Response Fund,

established by Congress in 1990. (LtGen Henry C. Stackpole ifi, statement before House Armed

Services Subcommittee on Readiness, 31Mar92). For a list of forms of assistance provided by the

United States, see Appendix D.
76 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

all areas were stabilized and were ready for the transition back to a primarily

Bangladeshi effort. Despite a decrease in donor and government relief supplies,

the JTF's air and sealift campaign continued, lifting everything available and

ensuring that the outlying storage and distribution facilities were stocked with the

needed 129

As the allotted two-week deployment period of the amphibious task group

came to an end on the 28th, Marine Aircraft Group 50 ended helicopter

operations and closed its forward air centers at Chittagong and Dhaka. In

addition, Battalion Landing Team 3/5 turned over coordination of the relief effort

at the Cox's Bazar distribution center to a British liaison cell from the Fort

Grange. At about 1900, with the retrograde of personnel and equipment to the

ships of the amphibious task group complete, Colonel Gangle and his liaison

team departed. That evening, American officers and their Bangladeshi military

counterparts got together for a small farewell party. The Bangladeshis presented

each American with the appropriate military rank insignia in Bangladesh forces.

'As we stood beside you in Desert Storm," they said in thanks, "now you stand

beside us in our nation's time of need."3° The following day, the JTF released

PhibGru 3 and the 5th MEB.'3'

In less than two weeks ashore, the amphibious task force delivered 2,148

short tons of food, emergency medical supplies, water, clothing, and building

materials. Marine aircraft flew 1,167 helicopter sorties in 1,114 flight hours to

deliver 5,485 passengers and more than 695 tons of relief supplies. The average

flight time per aircraft was 50.5 hours, about four times the normal operating

tempo. The amphibious group's surface craft delivered 1,450 tons of relief

aid.132

Much of what the amphibious task force accomplished ashore during

Operation Sea Angel, however, was intangible. General Rowe felt that the

Bangladesh relief effort was a visible demonstration of the effectiveness of

democracy in action. Prime Minister Zia's government had been anxious to

prove that a freely elected, responsible government could act swiftly and

effectively in times of crisis. Sea Angel proved the ability of the Bangladesh

government to take action, and showed how other world democracies were

willing to provide immediate assistance in times of trouble. General Rowe also

noted that the morning meetings and plenary sessions conducted by the command

elements of the amphibious and joint task forces with civilian and military

officials offered good role models and practical experience in democratic

decision-making.'33

In addition, both General Rowe and Admiral Clarey viewed Operation Sea

Angel as a testament to the flexibility and capabilities of a forward-deployed

amphibious force. Seldom in history have warriors been called upon to turn their

swords into plowshares so quickly. Rapid planning, sea-based logistics, and

over-the-horizon movement to shore were among the latest innovations in

amphibious doctrine. Each of these capabilities was demonstrated in the Bay of

Bengal.134 The amphibious task force, General Stackpole remarked, was "the

living embodiment of the true meaning of the 'Navy-Marine Corps Team.'
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 77

Coming from the sea you didn't intrude or overwhelm . . . . You supported and

aided under the coordination of the Bangladesh fledgling democracy."35 When

combined with traditional Navy and Marine Corps devotion to duty and the

individual skills of both Regular and Reserve Marines and sailors, the result was

a hard-earned "well done" from Bangladesh and American officials alike. As

Ambassador Milam noted: "There is no way to calculate how many scores of

thousands of lives have been saved by your selfless labor. Be assured that the

people of Bangladesh will never forget you, and nor will we Americans here,

whom you have made so proud."136

Although the amphibious task force had been delayed on its return journey

home, it appeared that not a single sailor or Marine resented this unexpected

sojourn. Those who served on the shore were impressed by the tremendous

resilience of the people of Bangladesh and the depth of the suffering they

endured. None of these combat veterans remained unmoved by the forlorn look

of starving and sick children, the plaintive cries of Bangladeshis who had lost

family members, or the compassion of their comrades. General Rowe reported

that all hands were visibly moved when poor Bangladeshis, most of whom had

only two or three meager possessions, attempted to give one of them to the

Americans as a gesture of gratitude.137 Although the people of Bangladesh

were unaware of it, the departing Marines had already been given the reward

they wanted when they heard healthy children laughing or gazed at the smiles of

thankful elders.'38 The sailors and Marines of the amphibious task force

returned home with the self-satisfaction of knowing that when an unexpected call

for help came, they were "good to go" and "made it happen."39

On 29 May, the amphibious cargo ship St. Louis, with the embarked

Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 2-91, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Larry A. Johnson, rendezvoused with the departing amphibious task

group. During the 10-day voyage, CMAGTF 2-91 Marines and corpsmen

participated in a wide variety of training. They held classes on field hygiene,

heat stress and first aid, and ROWPU operations, in addition to normal shipboard

drills. Upon arrival they were provided with a detailed brief by members of the

JTF Forward headquarters and the Bangladesh area military coordinator. The

initial mooring off Cox's Bazar, however, proved fruitless, as the sailors and

Marines sent ashore could not locate suitable LCM-8 landing sites due to an

insufficient shore gradient and surf conditions. The St. Louis then steamed up

the coast toward Chittagong.

During its two-week stay, the amphibious task group had operated more than

11 kilometers off the coast because of shallow water and numerous uncharted

wrecks and shoals. Operating from such a great distance was impractical for the

St. Louis and her LCM-8 landing craft. To function efficiently and safely, the

amphibious cargo ship needed to be as close to the mouth of the Karnaphuli

River as possible. To accomplish this, anchor buoys and drag lines were

fabricated and a channel was swept through the line of 10 wrecks by two LCM-8

boats, clearing the way for the ship to anchor less than two kilometers from the

port of Chittagong. This close-in anchorage, however, was not ideal. Fine, silt-
78 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Department of Defense Photo (USN) DN-SC-85-06060

With the departure of the Amphibious Task Force, Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task

Force 2-91, embarked on board the St. Louis assumed the task of continuing the relief

effort.

laden water eventually permeated the ship's salt water systems, forcing the ship's

engineers to work overtime, often in blistering heat, to keep the systems

Shortly after arriving off Chittagong, a CMAGTF 2-91 communications team

and a small security element were sent ashore to support JTF operations.

Offloading of the 28 reverse osmosis water purification units, Marine support

teams, and their dispersal throughout the affected area began. As additional

equipment and supplies were moved ashore to assist with the later retrograde of

non-essential water purification units, floodlights, and generators, the ship's

landing craft proceeded upriver to Chittagong where they delivered medical

supplies, consisting of more than 600 cases of intravenous fluid, and 200 hot

meals. Lieutenant Colonel Johnson, former operations officer of the 3d Force

Service Support Group on Okinawa, also saw to it that members of CMAGTF

2-91 were rotated among the five water purification sites established by the task

force's lead elements on Sandwip and Kutubdia Islands and at Chittagong.'4'

Despite a late start, "every Sailor and Marine aboard is happy to be here and

they are ready for any tasking," reported Captain John W. Peterson, the St.

Louis's commanding officer. * However, replacing the eight-ship amphibious

task group with one ship would be no easy task.'42 While some sailors

performed routine duties on board the St. Louis, others shuttled medical supplies,

Following the departure of the amphibious task group, Major General Stackpole designated

Captain Peterson as the Naval Forces component commander and Lieutenant Colonel Johnson the

Marine Forces component commander.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 79

food, and equipment ashore and then returned with unneeded stores. The

Marines and corpsmen of CMAGTF 2-91 were likewise tested. The Marines,

in addition to delivering large amounts of food and medical supplies and

producing and distributing thousands of gallons of potable water a day, provided

satellite communications support, assuring the JTF a reliable form of

communications when distance, topography, and weather affected all other means

of communication. Officers and staff non-commissioned officers assisted with

the basic support functions of the forward headquarters and U.S. Army and Air

Force components, including the preparation of hot meals, routine health care,

administrative support, insect control, and embarkation assistance. The attached

corpsmen participated in a comprehensive assistance program, traveling to

several impoverished villages and aiding those that were in need of medical

attention. The contingency task force also established and operated arrival and

departure airfield control groups at Zia International in Dhaka, which assured

proper control of inbound supplies during the remaining days of the operation

and coordination during the redeployment of JTF personnel and equipment.143

With the arrival of the St. Louis and her "willing Sailors and the Marines of

MAGTF 2-91, it gave us a balanced JTF as we ramp down and the Bangladeshi

ramp up to take control of their destiny for the long haul."

Relief operations proceeded smoothly as the month of May came to a close.

The first phase of the campaign plan was completed in all but a few isolated

Photography courtesy of PhibGru 3

Operating the remaining water purifi cation units was the primary job of contingency task

force Marines. Each unit could produce more than 600 gallons of potable water an hour.
80 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

areas, while the second and third phases were well underway. The available

aircraft, Air Force C-130s, Army Blackhawks, Japanese Dauphins, British Sea

Kings, and recently integrated Bangladesh air force helicopters, were considered

adequate to meet the demands. As outside donations slowly declined, the JTF's

lift capability soon exceeded the amount of supplies on hand.

With the Government of Bangladesh beginning to assume an increasing share

of the control and coordination of the relief effort, the gradual drawdown of

personnel and equipment began. Among the first to be redeployed was the Joint

Special Operations Task Force, followed by Army's 84th Engineer Detachment,

elements of the Navy's Environmental and Preventative Medicine Unit, and a

portion of Joint Task Force staff. The two Japanese Dauphin helicopters and an

accompanying relief team departed on the 31st. In 76 missions, the two small

Japanese helicopters had transported more than 21 tons of relief supplies. The

Fort Grange, with its four Sea King helicopters and small boats, was scheduled

to leave on 3 June.

Remaining elements of the Joint Task Force concentrated on providing

assistance in three areas: the movement of food stocks from Dhaka to

Chittagong; the distribution of relief supplies from central collection points and

former LCAC ramps to outlying areas on Sandwip Island; and providing

sustainment to the hardest-hit regions along the coast south of Chittagong.

Although daily thunderstorms previously had caused slight delays, the relief

effort had to be halted on the morning of 2 June. Located less than 200 nautical

miles south southwest of Chittagong with winds of 110 kilometers per hour

gusting to 130, Tropical Cyclone 03B was forecast to make landfall near or just

north of the southern port city the following day. As a precaution, the St. Louis

recovered ROWPU crews from all remote sites and then she and the Fort Grange

moved out to sea." The 374th Tactical Airlift Wing canceled all C-130 flights

to Chittagong, stockpiles of food and water were secured, the Blackhawks were

flown to Dhaka, the communications liaison team at Cox's Bazar was withdrawn,

and the Chittagong Autovon/Autodin service was terminated. While underway,

personnel on board the St. Louis took time to clean the ship and flush the

engineering systems with clear water.'45

The storm crossed the Patuakhali-Chittagong coast, northwest of the city, late

on the 2d. Its measured wind speed of 100 kilometers per hour damaged crops

and property along the coastal belt and off-shore islands. Low-lying areas again

were inundated by a tidal surge measuring more than one meter. There were,

however, no reported casualties.'46 'The Lord smiled on us today," noted

General Stackpole, "as the anticipated new cyclone weakened on approach to

While preparing to move to safer waters, the Fort Grange lost one of her four helicopters.

All five crewmen were recovered safely, but several attempts by Bangladesh army and navy divers

and the ship's mobile crane to salvage the aircraft were unsuccessful. (JTF-SA msg to USCinCPac,

02I043ZJun9I; The New Nation, Dhaka, 4Jun91).
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 81

landfall and had no significant impact on the already hard hit coastal and island

area of southeast Bangladesh."47

On the morning of the 3d, the JTF reactivated relief operations, but at a

slower pace. The St. Louis anchored off Chittagong at 0630, then returned key

Marine personnel to the remote ROWPU sites to begin preparing the equipment

for transport back to the ship. In addition to conducting boat operations, a 25-

man joint Navy-Marine Corps working party moved ashore to help with the

distribution of relief supplies and assisted the Air Force's 4th Combat

Communications Group to strike its base camp at Chittagong. As C-130 flight

operations between Dhaka and Chittagong resumed, four of the five UH-60

Blackhawks returned to Chittagong and began the process of backloading

ROWPUs, redistributing rice on Sandwip Island, and delivering medical supplies

as needed. However, helicopter flight operations were limited to four hours per

aircraft per day in order to keep all four aircraft functioning. Shortly before

noon, the Fort Grange and her contingent of Royal Marines departed the waters

off Chittagong enroute to Colombo. In 10 days, the British sailors and Marines

had "shifted a total of 99 metric tonnes of food, medical and building

supplies. "148

With conditions in the affected area gradually returning to normal and the

Government of Bangladesh assuming an ever-greater role in the relief effort, the

JTF continued to draw down. General Stackpole's redeployment plan called for

the withdrawal of personnel and equipment from all outlying areas to Dhaka or

the St. Louis, the departure of non-essential personnel and equipment by daily

Military Airlift Command C-141 sustainment flights, and the termination of

operations at Chittagong by 7 June. Between the 7th and the 13th all remaining

JTF personnel and equipment would be withdrawn)49

By 4 June, the remaining ROWPUs and their supporting equipment and

personnel, except for one which supplied water to the forward headquarters at

Chittagong, were extracted from Sandwip and Kutubdia Islands and transported

by helicopter and then landing craft to the St. Louis. During more than three

weeks of operation, the water purification units had produced and distributed

more than 266,000 gallons of potable water. The retrograde of personnel and

equipment, interspersed with a number of relief missions, continued the following

day, despite strong isolated showers and thunderstorms.

On the 6th, all air relief operations came to an end when Army helicopters

flew from Chittagong to Dhaka, and the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing completed

its last C-130 mission, delivering more than 74 tons of rice for the Red Crescent

Society to Chittagong. Both C-130s, along with the first increment of the 4th

Combat Communications Group, departed on 8 June. They were followed two

days later by the 25th Infantry Division's five UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters.'50

During three weeks of flying, the Army Blackhawks logged 805 sorties and

carried more than 885 tons of relief supplies. Air Force HC-130 and C-130

aircraft flew 194 sorties, and transported 2,430 tons of supplies to Chittagong

and the flood-ravaged Sylhet region of northeastern Bangladesh.'5'
82 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

On 7 June, with the withdrawal of personnel and equipment to Dhaka

complete, the forward headquarters at Chittagong was closed. Later in the day,

the JTF released the St. Louis and CMAGTF 2-91 from their duties as Naval and

Marine Force components.'52 However, because of monsoon rains, reduced

visibility, and heavy traffic, the St. Louis was unable to get underway on the

evening tide.

In his final report to General Stackpole the following morning, Lieutenant

Colonel Johnson noted that "during the past two days I have had ample

opportunity to reflect back on the past three weeks and to have considered our

contributions. Without a doubt, each and every member of CMAGTF 2-91 is

most pleased that he had an opportunity to participate in the relief operation and

to have helped the citizens of Bangladesh. However," he continued, "we wish

we could have provided even more support. I suppose this is natural given the

average American's penchant for generosity. As we depart the AOR, and

speaking for all of my Marines and Corpsmen, we leave behind new-found

friends, many memories, and, most importantly, our prayers for the Bangladesh

people. It was an honor to serve."53

Early on the 8th, the St. Louis weighed anchor and steamed for Phuket,

Thailand, where her crew was granted its first liberty in weeks. Four days later

as the ship left Phuket, her tasking again was changed. On orders from Seventh

Fleet, the St. Louis was to make the best possible speed to Subic Bay in the

Philippines. There she and her embarked Marines would provide humanitarian

assistance to the naval base and nearby Cubi Point Naval Air Station after the

volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo, followed by several days of torrential rains

and severe earthquakes.'54

With the departure of the St. Louis, General Stackpole declared the second

phase of the campaign plan complete. It was, he reported to Pacific Command,

a "superb effort by all involved [which] produced unprecedented relief. Safety

was paramount; mission accomplished without any injury to U.S. personnel or

loss of equipment."55 During the next five days, the remaining 190 members

of the JTF and their equipment were flown by Air Force C-141s and C-5As to

their home stations on Hawaii, Okinawa, and Guam. Following a news

conference at which Ambassador Milam and General Stackpole presided, the

commander of the JTF boarded the last C-5A for the flight home to Okinawa.

On 14 June, Pacific Command terminated Operation Sea Angel and formally

deactivated the Joint Task Force.'56

"Words really can't convey the depth of our feeling here," noted Ambassador

William Milam in his message to Admiral Charles Larson, "our gratitude and

fond wishes to Major General Henry C. Stackpole, III, and all the officers and

enlisted personnel comprising JTF Operation Sea Angel. All deserve the highest,

strongest commendation for their superlative relief operation in Bangladesh."

The Joint Task Force, he continued, "admirably fulfilled its mission of bringing

food to the starving, medicine to the sick, and hope to the hopeless. But

coincident to its mission, JTFSA also served the foreign interests of the United

States by very visibly enabling a fledgling democracy to meet the most critical
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 83

Photograph courtesy of American Embassy, Dhaka

MajGen Stackpole and American Ambassador Milam brief reporters at the Dhaka

embassy on the accomplishments of the relief effort.

needs of a distressed population." While General Stackpole had become a legend

in Bangladesh for his "leadership, sensitivity, and high intelligence," it was "the

superior organization and efficiency of JTFSA, the unusual professional

competence of its members, as well as their unfailingly sympathetic and benign

behavior on foreign soil [that] brought great credit to their services, to

themselves, to this mission, and to our country."57 General Cohn Powell

echoed Ambassador Milam's words: "The magnificent performance of every

Sailor, Marine, Soldier, Airman left an indelible mark on nearly two million

people who will never forget 'The Angels From the Sea.' The end results of
84 US. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

'Sea Angel' are lives saved, the enhanced faith of a people in its democratic

government, and 'a view of America as truly a friend in time of need."58

Praise also came from Bangladeshi officials, both civilian and military.

Among the many tributes, the one written by Muhammad Omar Farooq, zonal

relief coordinator for Cox 's Bazar, expressed the sentiments of all:

Today, democracy in our country is reborn. It is young,

hardly a few months old. But within these few months it has

had its baptism of fire, with the fateful and devastating Cyclone

and Tidal surge of 29 April 1991, which rocked our people to

their roots and caused devastation on a scale hitherto unknown,

and left them in a state of complete shock and bewilderment.

But our people are resilient, they are born in cyclones and

tidal bores, and they grow and live with them. For them,

cyclones and tidal bores are almost so to say a natural habitat.

With fortitude, and indomitable courage our people withstood the

scourge of the cyclone which was like a holocaust. Inspiration

and unshakable assistance from friends like you helped to get us

back on our feet sooner than later, and move boldly ahead. You

and your sea angels, helped, facilitated and expedited the process

of our recovery. For this, we will remain indebted. We have

no words adequate to express our gratitude.'59

Photograph courtesy of RAdm Stephen S. Clarey, USN (Ret)

The smiling faces of young Bangladeshi villagers near Cox 's Bazar was, as RAdm

Stephen S. Clarey later said, a testament to the efforts of American Marines, seamen,

airmen, and soldiers.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 85

Operation Sea Angel, Stackpole later noted, "was a significant chapter in

U.S. history because . . . it was the forerunner of what caused us to go to

Somalia." If the Bangladesh relief operation had been a failure, "you would not

see anywhere near the interested effort going on for these other rescue

operations. But it became," he continued, "a model in the sense of how we

construct the task force; a model in the sense of not having an . . . intrusive

element with a large footprint because we come from the sea; a model in respect

for sovereignty; and a model in campaign planning." A goal was set and "we

achieved the goal," he concluded, "and we created the conditions in each phase

necessary to move to the next phase."°

Epilogue

At its peak, more than 7,500 American military personnel were involved in

the relief effort. In slightly more than four weeks of operations almost 2,000

helicopter and C-130 sorties were flown, carrying 4,000 tons of supplies--more

than 1,500 tons were delivered by surface craft. More than 1.7 million people

were reached and aided in the affected area and thousands of lives were saved

from the ravages of disease and starvation. "When we left Bangladesh," General

Stackpole later noted, "the crops were growing and the trees had sprouted leaves,

• and there was life in the area."6'

Joint Task Force Sea Angel's legacy was more than healed bodies and full

stomachs, it also left behind a reservoir of knowledge and recommendations.

Elements of the task force produced harbor assessment and embankment

engineering studies and updated local physicians in disease treatment and patient

care. "The salutary effect of the Task Force effort," Stackpole reported, "has

been a study by the Government of Bangladesh of our organization, structure,

equipment and methodologies for adoption where possible for their own

civil/military disaster plan." However, more needed to be done. In his last

situation report to Pacific Command, Major General Stackpole noted that while

much remained to be done in Bangladesh, he believed that the United States had

a future training opportunity. He recommended that disaster relief ties be

maintained with Bangladesh and that "technical help from [the United States]

military in form of MTT's [mobile training teams] and medical expertise appears

to be the way to go."62

Disaster relief ties were maintained and would be tested in November 1992

as Tropical Cyclone Forest moved up the Bay of Bengal toward the offshore

islands and coastal lowlands of southeastern Bangladesh, the same area devastated

more than a year earlier. While the Bangladesh government alerted its citizenry

and mobilized its armed forces, the American government also took action.

Pacific Command was alerted that it, when directed by the President, would

provide "support for relief operations to assist the Government of Bangladesh in

recovering from tropical cyclone damage for a period of approximately 2 weeks."63 -
86 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Early on the morning of 20 November, CinCPac activated a crisis planning

group and subsequently designated Major General Donald R. Gardner, General

Stackpole's successor at III Marine Expeditionary Force, to be Commander, Joint

Task Force Bangladesh Relief.IM During the next 24 hours, III MEF activated

a crisis action center and provided the Pacific Command estimates of the situation

and of forces that would be needed)65 As planning moved ahead and operation

orders were written, Joint Task Force Bangladesh Relief was redesignated Joint

Task Force Sea Angel II and Navy, Marine, Army, and Air Force units were

assigned and alerted.'66 Despite the extensive planning and preparations, Joint

Task Force Sea Angel II did not deploy because Tropical Cyclone Forest made

landfall approximately 230 kilometers southeast of Chittagong in Burma. The

damage in Bangladesh was much less than had been anticipated, so Ambassador

William Milam did not expect any request for disaster relief because the

Bangladesh government was better prepared this time around)67 The seeds of

Sea Angel bore fruit within the first year.

The disaster relief ties between Bangladesh and the United States did not end

with Sea Angel II. In May 1992, CinCPac inaugurated the Joint/Combined

Exchange Training Program and designated the Pacific Special Operations

Command to be the executive agency for planning, coordinating, and conducting

exercises and training for active and Reserve Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force,

and Special Operations personnel throughout the Pacific. Two months after

Tropical Cyclone Forest struck, American soldiers, sailors, and airmen were

deployed to Bangladesh to share and improve upon combined American and

Bangladesh disaster relief techniques. The Bangladesh Defense Forces handled

most of the nation's disaster relief efforts, so the American teams were to train

with Bangladeshi forces and provide instruction in aerial delivery, pathfinder

operations, piloting techniques, underwater search and salvage, hydrographic

survey, and underwater demolitions.'68

The "Balance Buffalo" series of exercises, two of which were conducted in

1993, continued. The training deployment of one Special Forces detachment

from the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), one C-130 from the

374th Air Wing, and a four-man civil affairs direct support team from the 426th

Civil Affairs Battalion in April 1994 proved fortuitous. Shortly after they arrived

in Bangladesh, a major cyclone began moving toward the coast. The American

Embassy indicated that if the devastation was similar to that of the April 1991

storm, they might again ask CinCPac for assistance. Without hesitation the

American forces moved into action, dispatching the C-130 from the training site

to Dhaka where a special forces team prepared to provide a secure

communications link to the embassy, if required, for the coordination of the

disaster relief effort. However, like Cyclone Forest, the 1994 storm veered

south and crossed the coast near the border with Burma. The 374th Air Wing's

C-130 provided overflight and reconnaissance to the ambassador and country

team, assisting with the damage assessment. The devastation was relatively light,

consisting primarily of property damage, and the embassy determined that no

additional support would be required.'69
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 87

With ongoing training exercises like Balance Buffalo, the response of

Bangladesh civilian agencies and armed forces will improve and combined relief

efforts, in the event of a future disaster, will be easier. In addition, the USAID

mission resident in Dhaka along with United Nations and other bilateral agencies

have a continuous program with Bangladesh civilian agencies to strengthen both

disaster preparedness and relief programs. Although Bangladesh, with its unique

geography and climate, will continue to be battered by natural disasters, future

disaster relief operations should result in less loss of life, livestock, and property

than in the past as a result of the lessons learned during Operation Sea Angel.
Notes

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this monograph was derived from: 5th MEB After Action

Report "The 5th MEB Deployment to SWA, 2 August 1990-29 May 1991," hereafter 5th MEB AAR;

5th MEB Staff interview by LtCol Ronald J. Brown conducted at 5th MEB HQ, Camp Pendleton,

California, 25Jul91, hereafter 5th MEB intvw; 5th MEB Operations Brief, hereafter 5th MEB Ops Brief;

MAG-50 ComdC, Mar-Jun9l; MAG-50 Special Action Report, "Sea Angel: Case Study," hereafter

MAG-50 SAR; LtGen Henry C. Stackpole III, "Angels from the Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,

May92, pp. 110-16, hereafter Stackpole, "Angels from the Sea"; BGen Peter J. Rowe, "Interview," U.S.

Naval Institute Proceedings, May92, pp. 128-132; LtCol Donald R. Selvage, "Operation Sea Angel:

Bangladesh Disaster Relief," Marine Corps Gazette, Nov91, pp. 89-97; and "Bangladesh--Cyclone,"

OFDA Annual Report FY 1991, pp. 18-24. Source materials used in the preparation of this volume are

located in the "Sea Angel Files," Archives Section, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

1. Vernon Loeb, "Again, calamity, familiar guest in an unlucky land," Philadelphia Inquirer, 5May91,

hereafter Loeb, "Again, calamity."

2. Capt Shafiq-ur-Rahman, Bangladesh Navy, "Disaster in Bangladesh: A Multinational Relief Effort,"

Naval War College Review, Winter93, pp. 59-62.

3. Caritas Bangladesh, Cyclone 1991, 5May91, p. 3, in MajGen Henry C. Stackpole III, Final Report

of Operation Sea Angel, 20Jun91, hereafter Stackpole, "Final Report," 20Jun91.

4. 5th MEB, "Angels From the Sea: A Case Study of 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade's Humanitarian

Assistance to Bangladesh, May 1991," undated, p. 1, hereafter 5th MEB, "Case Study."

5. Caritas Bangladesh, Cyclone 1991: An Appeal, 11May91, p. 5, in Stackpole, "Final Report," 20Jun91.

6. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, 301216ZApr91.

7. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, 010737ZMay91; SecState msg to AmEmbassy, Dhaka,

030503ZMay91.

8. Brig Ibrahim Ahmed and Col A. Md. Moazzem, "Disaster Preparedness In Bangladesh and Role of

Bangladesh Army in Disaster Management," (Paper given at Military Operations and Law Conference,

Honolulu, Hawaii, 16-l9Sept9l), pp. 18-19.

9. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, 030752ZMay91; AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState,

030948ZMay9 1.

10. USDAO, Dhaka msg to JCS/SecDef, 020736ZMay91.

11. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, 030948ZMay91.

12. Ibid.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 89

13. USDAO, Dhaka msg to JCS/SecDef, O20736ZMay91.

14. Loeb, "Again, calamity."

15. U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington: Office of the

Federal Register, National Archives, 1992), George Bush, 1991, v. 1, p. 463.

16. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, 041212ZMay91.

17. Ibid.

18. Caritas Bangladesh, Cyclone 1991, 5May91, p. 6, in Stackpole, "Final Report," 20Jun91.

19. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, 041212ZMay91.

20. SecState msg to AmEmbassy, Dhaka 040420ZMay91.

21. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, 041212ZMay91; AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState,

061 l23ZMay9l.

22. USDAO, Dhaka msg to DIA, 220852ZJu191.

23. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, O6l2OlZMay9l.

24. Ibid.; AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, 05 l2O8ZMay9l.

25. USDAO, Dhaka msg to USCinCPac, 060445ZMay91.

26. USDAO, Dhaka msg to USCinCPac, 060507ZMay91.

27. USDAO, Dhaka msg to DIA, 220852ZMay91.

28. 5th MEB, ComdC, l8Mar-3OJun9l.

29. SecState msg to AmEmbassy, Dhaka, 080357ZMay91.

30. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, 081238ZMay91.

31. 5th MEB, AAR.

32. ComSeventhFlt msg to ComPhibGru 3, 5th MEB, and CTF 76, 080513ZMay91.

33. ComPhibGru 3 msg to ComSeventhFlt, O8200lZMay9l.

34. CTF 76 msg to ComSeventhFlt, O8l600ZMay9l.

35. USCinCPac msg to USDAO, Dhaka, O900l5ZMay9l.
90 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

36. USDAO, Dhaka msg to USCinCPac, 060657ZMay91.

37. CJTF Sea Angel, "Final Report on Operation Sea Angel, 20Jun91; tJSDAO, Dhaka msg to

USCinCPac, 080731ZMay91; USDAO, Dhaka msg to DIA, 22Jul91.

38. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, O9lll3ZMay9l.

39. USDAO, Dhaka msg to USCinCPac, O9lll7ZMay9l.

40. USCinCPac msg to AmEmbassy, Dhaka, 092345ZMay91.

41. LtCol Gary W. Anderson, USMC, "Operation Sea Angel; A Retrospective on the 1991 Humanitarian

Relief Operation in Bangladesh," (Naval War College), Rpt 1-92, 15Jan92, pp. 5-6, hereafter Anderson,

"Sea Angel."

42. Col Stephen E. Lindblom, Comments on draft ms, 20Apr95, hereafter Lindblom Comments.

43. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, 11 l22OZMay9l.

44. USDAO, Dhaka msg to USCinCPac, lOl34OZMay9l.

45. New York Times, 12May91, p. 6.

46. Joint Staff memo to CJCS, 10May91.

47. DepSec memo to CJCS, 10May91.

48. Joint Staff msg to USCinCPac, 102323ZMay91.

49. USCinCPac msg to AmEmbassy, Dhaka, llO3l5ZMay9l.

50. Stackpole, "Final Report," 20Jun91.

51. USCinCPac msg to AmEmbassy, Dhaka, llO3l5ZMay9l; USCinCPac msg to Joint Staff,

1 10325ZMay91.

52. USCinCPac msg to USCinCPacFIt, 1103 l5ZMay9l.

53. New York Times, 12May91, pp. 1, 6.

54. CJCS msg to USCinCPac, lll3l5ZMay9l.

55. Stackpole, "Angels from the Sea," p. 112; LtGen Henry C. Stackpole III, "Operation Sea Angel:

Marine Corps Relief Operations in Bangladesh," MCHC Seminar, 30Jan92, hereafter Stackpole, "MCHC

Sea Angel Seminar," 30Jan92.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 91

56. JTF-PE msg to USDAO, Dhaka, 110724ZMay91.

57. USDAO, Dhaka msg to JTF-PE, lll2llZMay9l.

58. Anderson, "Sea Angel," pp. 6-8; USCinCPac msg to CinCPacFlt, 111734ZMay91; ComSeventhFlt

msg to CTG 76.6, 110930ZMay91.

59. Anderson, "Sea Angel," p. 8.

60. JTF-PE msg to USDAO, Dhaka, 1 10724ZMay91.

61. Anderson, "Sea Angel," p. 9; Stackpole, "Mdc Sea Angel Seminar," 30Jan92.

62. USDAO msg to JTF-PE, lll2llZMay9l; JTF-PE msg to USCinCPac, 121739ZMay91.

63. Ibid.

64. USCinCPac msg to CdrUSAPac, lll2O4ZMay9l; 353Sow msg to COMSocPac, 121247ZMay91;

JTF-PE msg to USCinCPac, 130814ZMay91; Anderson, "Sea Angel," pp. 11-12; Cdr 1/1SFGA msg to

Cdr 4thSOSC, llO65OZJun9l.

65. JTF-PE msg to USCinCPac, 130814ZMay91.

66. Stackpole, "MCHC Sea Angel Seminar," 30Jan92.

67. Stackpole, "Final Report," 20Jun91.

68. JTF-PE msg to USCinCPac, 130814ZMay91.

69. JTF-PE msg to USCinCPac, 130814ZMay91.

70. Ibid.

71. JTF-PE msg to USCinCPac, 141629ZMay91.

72. Stackpole, "Mdc Sea Angel Seminar," 30Jan92.

73. JTF-PE msg to USCinCPac, 141629ZMay91.

74. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to SecState, 131245ZMay91.

75. 374 AW Hist, Jan-Jun9l, p. 44.

76. MOA, JTFSA and American Embassy, Dhaka, undated.

77. Amb William B. Milam, Comments on draft ms, 18Feb95.
92 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

78. JTF-PE msg to USCinCPac, 141629ZMay91; USDAO, Dhaka msg to DIA, 220852ZJu191; and

LtCol Anderson, 'Sea Angel," pp. 13-14.

79. JTF-PE msg to USCinCPac, 141629ZMay91.

80. JTF-PE msg to USCinCPac, 141640ZMay91.

81. USCinCPac msg to USCinCPacF1t, 130904ZMay91; USCinCPac msg to USCinCPacFIt,

140534ZMay91; USS St Louis (LKA 116) 1991 Command History, 23Mar91.

82. CG III MEF msg to CG 3d MarDiv, l6002lZMay9l.

83. CMAGTF 2-91, ComdC l6May-8Jul9l, dtd 3Jul91.

84. Stackpole, "MCHC Sea Angel Seminar," 30Jan92.

85. BGen Peter J. Rowe, Comments on draft ms, 23Feb95, hereafter Rowe Comments; Col Stephen E.

Lindblom, Comments on draft ms, 20Apr95.

86. JTF-PE msg to USCinCPac, 152326ZMay91.

87. Stackpole, "Final Report," 20Jun91.

88. Ibid.

89. USCinCPac msg to USCinCPacF1t, 161 l52ZMay9l.

90. 5th MEB Ops Brief.

91. Ibid.

92. Col Drake F. Trumpe, 5th MEB intvw.

93. 5th MEB intvw.

94. 5th MED AAR.

95. MAG-50 SAR.

96. USS Tarawa, 1991 Command History, 3Apr92.

97. 5th MEB intvw.

98. Rowe Comments.

99. Stackpole, "MCHC Sea Angel Seminar," 30Jan92.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 93

100. USS Tarawa, 1991 Command History, 3Apr92.

101. 5th MEB Ops Brief.

102. 5th MEB, "Case Study"; 5th MEB intvw.

103. Rowe Comments.

104. Rowe Comments.

105. 374 AW Hist, Jan-Jun9l, p. 44.

106. Stackpole, "Final Report," 20Jun91.

107. MAG-50 SAR.

108. Ibid.

109. LtCol Kevin M. Kennedy ltr to authors, 4Aug93.

110. Stackpole, "MCHC Sea Angel Seminar," 30Jan92.

111. J03 J. Vincent Dickens, USN, "Relief Helicopters Fill Up at 'Bob's," Leatherneck, Sep91, p. 17.

112. USCinCPac msg to AmEmbassy, Dhaka, 130804ZMay91.

113. CU, 5th MEB msg to ComSeventhFlt, 301535ZMay91; 2dLt J. W. Disney, "Sea Angels Dropped

Food and Supplies," Leatherneck, Sep91, pp. 15-16.

114. BGen Randall L. West, Comments on draft ms, 10Apr95, hereafter West Comments.

115. JTF-SA msg to JTF-SA (FWD), 220353ZMay91.

116. Stackpole, "MCHC Sea Angel Seminar," 30Jan92.

117. 539 AS, Operation Manna, Post Operation Report, 10Jun91.

118. "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh

and the United States of America to Specify the Legal Status of the United States Pacific Command

Disaster Relief Task Force," 20May91.

119. Joint Staff msg to USCinCPac, 17May91.

120. Stackpole, "MCHC Sea Angel Seminar," 30Jan92.

121. NEPMU 6, 1991 Command History, 26Feb92.
94 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

122. Dr. John R. Downs, "Historical Medical Perspective: Operation Sea Angel, Bangladesh Relief

Effort," undated.

123. 2/11, ComdC, 1 8Mar-3OJun9l.

124. 5th MEB, "Case Study."

125. Ibid.

126. Stackpole, "Final Report," 20Jun91.

127. U. S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington: Office of the

Federal Register, National Archives, 1992), George Bush, 1991, v. 1, p. 574.

128. SecState msg to AmEmbassy, 1302217ZJun91; USCinCPac msg to SecDef, 180255ZJun91.

129. JTF-SA msg to USCinCPac, 281613ZMay91.

130. West Comments.

131. CG, 5thMEB msg to ComSeventhFlt, 301535ZMay91.

132. MAG-50, ComdC, l8Mar-3OJun9l; Phibron 3, Command History, 1991, dtd Mar92.

133. 5th MEB intvw.

134. 5th MEB, ComdC, l8Mar-3OJun9l.

135. JTF-SA msg to ComPhibGru 3, 281422ZMay91.

136. CG, 5thMEB msg to ComSeventhFlt, 301535ZMay91.

137. Rowe intvw, p. 131.

138. 2dLt James W. Disney, "MAG-50 Marines Finish the Rescue Missions," Okinawa Marine,

21Jun91, p. 8.

139. 5th MEB, ComdC, l8Mar-3OJun9l.

140. USS St Louis, 1991 Command History, 23Mar91.

141. CTG 76.4 msg to JTF-SA, 3Ol7lOZMay9l; CMAGTF 2-91 msg to JTF-SA, 010930Jun91.

142. CTG 76.4 msg to JTF-SA, 3Ol7lOZMay9l.

143. CMAGTF 2-91, ComdC, 3Jul91.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 95

144. JTF-SA msg to USCinCPac, O3233OZJun91.

145. USS St Louis msg to JTF-SA, O2l7lOZJun9l.

146. USCinCPac msg to Joint Staff, O3O154ZJun91.

147. JTF-SA msg to USCinCPac, 022215ZJun91.

148. Sgt P. J. Webb, "Operation Manna," The Globe & Laurel: The Journal of the Royal Marines,

Jul/Aug9l, p. 237.

149. USCinCPac msg to Joint Staff, O4O134ZJun91.

150. JTF-SA msg to USCinCPac, 080843ZJun91.

151. JTF-SA msg to USCinCPac, 090903ZJun91.

152. JTF-SA msg to USS St Louis, O7O800ZJun9l.

153. CMAGTF 2-91 msg to JTF-SA, 081525ZJun91.

154. USS St Louis, 1991 Command History, 23Mar92; CMAGTF 2-91, ComdC, 3Jul91.

155. JTF-SA msg to USCinCPac, 080450ZJun91.

156. USCinCPac msg to CinCPacFlt, 140734ZJun91.

157. AmEmbassy, Dhaka msg to USCinCPac, 161158ZJun91.

158. CJCS msg to USCinCPac, l3lOO5ZJun9l.

159. Muhammad Omar Farooq ltr to MajGen Stackpole, 6Jun91.

160. LtGen Henry C. Stackpole, intvw, 29Apr93.

161. Stackpole, "MCHC Sea Angel Seminar," 30Jan92.

162. JTF-SA msg to USCinCPac, 131157ZMay91.

163. CJCS msg to USCinCPac, 192345ZNov92.

164. USCinCPac msg to CG, III MEF, 200430ZNov92.

165. CG, III MEF msg to USCinCPac, 200320ZNov92; CG, III MEF msg to USCinCPac,

2011 lOZNov92.

166. USCinCPac msg to COMMarForPac, 210610ZNov92.
96 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

167. USCinCPac msg to Joint Staff, 21 173OZNov92.

168. ComSocPac msg to USCinCPac, O8O113ZApr93; ComSocPac msg to USCinCPac, O8O2O1ZJu193;

Sgt Weston Ochse, USA, and Sgt Andrew Gudgel, USA, "Disaster Relief Crosstraining: Bangladesh

1993," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, 5um93, pp. 37-41.

169. ComSocPac, "Background--Balance Buffalo 94-2," 4May94.
Appendix A

Chronology

29-30 April 1991--Tropical Cyclone 02B, Marian, devastates coastal region of

Bangladesh. The port of Chittagong and the city of Cox's Bazar severely damaged and

the islands of South Hatia, Sandwip, Kutubdia, and Manpura submerged. Water and

power distribution systems, tubewells, housing, and transportation infrastructure badly

damaged.

30 April--Bangladeshi Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, after visiting the affected

area, appeals to international community "to come forward in aid of humanity in

distress." Thirty-two countries respond with some form of assistance.

U.S. Ambassador William B. Milam declares disaster in Bangladesh and

provides $25,000 for disaster relief and releases 5,500 pounds of Department of Defense

(DOD) donated medical supplies.

1 May--Ambassador Milam visits affected area with other chiefs of mission.

2 May--Bangladeshi armed forces and military medical units deployed to affected

districts.

U.S. Agency for International Development donates 727,000 water purification

tablets to Bangladesh government and non-government agencies for distribution.

3 May--President George Bush informs Prime Minister Zia that the United States stands

ready to assist. USAID Director and U.S. Defense Attache and military staff visit

affected areas.

5 May--Bangladeshi naval vessels reach Sandwip, Manpura, and Kutubdia Islands after

earlier attempts were thwarted by heavy seas.

6 May--Additional Bangladeshi military assets deployed to area.

Ambassador Milam queries Commander in Chief, Pacific (CinCPac) about the

possible use of Navy and Marine Corps air and surface assets to assist in the relief effort.

8 May--Deployment of 15 U.s. Corps of Engineer personnel already in-country to

Chittagong to assist in rehabilitation of airport.

9 May--Ill Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) receives indications from Fleet Marine

Force, Pacific (FMFPac) that the MEF was one candidate being considered as the

nucleus for a proposed joint task force to assist in relief efforts. CG, III MEF, MajGen

Henry C. Stackpole III, in Philippines attending Seventh Fleet planning conference. III

MEF planning cell formed to follow situation and develop a series of options.

10 May--Air Force C-141 from Okinawa and C-5A from Southwest Asia arrive at Dhaka

with DOD-donated relief supplies.
98 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

11 May--President George Bush announces decision to go beyond the financial support

rendered by the U.S. Embassy and to dispatch a joint task force to Bangladesh.

Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Charles R. Larson, would exercise overall

responsibility for the operation, codenamed Productive Effort, while MajGen Stackpole

was designated Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. The relief effort was to be phased:

Phase I: Form and deploy JTF to assess situation and recommend concept of

operations.

Phase II: Deploy command, control, and communications equipment and

personnel, civil affairs and disaster assessment teams, medical personnel, and helicopters

to facilitate assessment and provide immediate assistance.

Phase III: Employ Amphibious Group 3 (PhibGru 3) and embarked 5th Marine

Expeditionaiy Brigade (MEB) to provide additional helicopters, water transport,

communications, and support personnel and equipment.

PhibGru 3, enroute from Persian Gulf to West Coast, diverted to support relief

operations.

2100, the 28-man Survey and Reconnaissance (Advance) Party, headed by

MajGen Stackpole, departs Kadena AFB, Okinawa, on board a C-141 for Dhaka.

12 May--0700, JTF Advance Party arrives in Dhaka, is briefed by Ambassador Milam

and staff, and sets up housekeeping in a rented house on the outskirts of the capital.

Satellite communications established with CinCPac in Hawaii and III MEF on Okinawa.

Initial assessment was that distribution was the primary problem facing the relief

effort. Food and supplies would have to be moved to Chittagong and then to outlying

areas; water, food, and medical needs could be met within two weeks, but an additional

two weeks would be needed to stabilize overall health crisis.

Elements of 1st Battalion, First Special Forces Group (Airborne), arrives from

Okinawa on board two C-130s. The aircraft are committed to airlifting bulk supplies

from Dhaka to Chittagong.

13 May--MajGen Stackpole and staff visit disaster area on board two Bangladeshi air

force UH-l helicopters, accompanied by several host country military officers,

Ambassador Milam, the USAID Director, and the embassy pubic affairs officer.

Assessment was that food supplies were adequate and that a combination of helicopters,

landing craft, and air drops should be effective in distributing the food. Focus was on

identifying and moving personnel and equipment into the area as quickly as possible.

JTF augmentation cell arrives from Hawaii. Cell included designated deputy,

Col Edward G. Hoffman, USAF, who was also designated the Air Force Component

Commander. Also included were five U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, along

with Seabee assets and an environmental medicine unit.
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 99

Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) decides to split staff between Dhaka and

Chittagong. Col Stephen E. Lindbolm, III MEF G-3, would remain in Dhaka as JTF

Chief of Staff. Col Mike Ferguson, USAF, designated Chief of Staff at JTF (Forward)

in Chittagong. Headquarters at Dhaka moved to unused Bangladeshi air force barracks

at old airfield outside capital; initial building retained as press headquarters.

St. Louis ordered to Okinawa to load 28 ROWPUs (water purification units) and

support personnel and to proceed to Bangladesh.

14 May--CJTF visits disaster sites with Ambassador, USAID Director, embassy PAO,

and senior members of Bangladesh command staff.

15 May--JTF establishes forward headquarters and air detachment at Chittagong to

coordinate relief efforts in the hardest hit areas.

First formal meeting of the Combined Relief Tasking Cell. Representatives from

the JTF, U.S. Embassy, AID, CARE, Red Crescent, and Bangladeshi military, civil, and

non-governmental assistance agencies attend. Daily meeting of Cell continued until 28

May when it was determined that adequate supplies had been delivered to Chittagong and

that further meetings would be conducted as needed.

Disaster relief and communications teams and first relief supplies delivered to

remote disaster sites.

PhibGru 3, composed of eight ships, commanded by RAdm Stephen S. Clarey,

and 5th MEB under the command of BGen Peter J. Rowe, arrives off coast of

Bangladesh.

16 May--PhibGru 3 and 5th MEB, augmented by a Japanese contingent, began full-scale

relief efforts. Twenty-eight helicopters, in conjunction with four LCACs and three

LCUs, handled the bulk of local distribution of food and medical supplies in the area of

Chittagong, Sandwip, Kutubdia, and Moheshkheli.

17 May--Campaign plan approved and implemented:

Phase I: Immediate efforts to stabilize life-threatening situations (14 days).

Phase II: Delivery of supplies and equipment that would allow government and

people to assume control of relief efforts (10 days).

Phase III: Preparation for U.S. withdrawal and the assumption of full control

of relief efforts by the Government of Bangladesh (5 days).

18 May--Eight of a total of 36 ROWPUs arrive and are located at Chittagong. Two units

became operational on Kutubdia Island on 20 May, while two units are shipped to

Sandwip Island and are placed in service on the 24th.

19 May--First of six 5th MEB MedCap teams deployed.
100 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Second control center established at Cox's Bazar by Marine Battalion Landing

Team 3/5.

20 May--RFA Fort Grange arrives off Cox's Bazar with elements of 539 Assault

Squadron, Royal Marines, on board.

21 May--Operations under campaign plan proceeding; phase one essentially complete

despite daily thunderstorms and occasional tornadoes.

Mrs. Marilyn Quayle, wife of U.S. Vice President, arrives for three-day visit.

During visit operational codename redesignated Sea Angel.

29 May--Phase II nears completion, transition back to a primarily Bangladeshi effort

underway, and PhibGru 3 and 5th MEB depart.

St. Louis, with 28 ROWPUs embarked, arrives to act as interim platform during

completion of Phase II. Marine Air-Ground Task Force 2-91, commanded by LtCol

Larry A. Johnson, configured as a humanitarian relief unit on board to act as a partial

replacement for the amphibious task force.

30 May--In-country force drawdown begins; all personnel to be out of country by 13

June.

2 June--Tropical Cyclone 03B comes ashore northwest of Chittagong, but causes no loss

of life or serious damage.

4 June--All forces returned to forward locations and continue operations.

7 June--Emphasis changes to retrograde. Helicopter relief operations completed. All

available government and non-government supplies delivered. Situation returning to

normal with road networks, ferry boats, and local infrastructure being returned to precyclone conditions.

St. Louis departs for Thailand. Last day of operations at Chittagong.

13 June--Redeployment of all personnel and equipment completed.

15 June--Operation Sea Angel terminated.
Appendix B

Command and Staff List

Joint Task Force Sea Angel, Bangladesh

Cdr: MajGen Hemy C. Stackpole III, USMC

DepCdr: Col Edward 0. Hoffman, USAF

CS: Col Stephen E. Lindblom, USMC

SgtMaj: SgtMaj Patrick W. McLane, USMC

J-1: LtCol James R. Morris, USMC

J-2: Cdr Joseph C. Levi, USN

J-3: LtCol Gary W. Anderson, USMC

J-4A: LtCol Christopher R. Mohr, USMC

J-6: LtCol Dan P. Houston, USMC

Surgeon: Capt John R. Downs MC, USNR

SJA: Maj Manuel E. Supervielle, USA

PA: LtCol James L. Vance, USMC

Joint Task Force Sea Angel (Forward), Chittagong

CS(Fwd): Col Mike Ferguson, USAF

J-l(Fwd): Maj D. C. Ward, USAF

J-2(Fwd): LtCol Alan H. Dank, USMC

J-3(Fwd): Capt Edward P. Anglim, USN

J-4: Col Russell F. Bailes, Jr., USMC

J-6(Fwd): Maj Charles E. Cooke, USMC

5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

CG: BGen Peter J. Rowe

CS: Col Drake F. Trumpe

G-l: Maj Leslie E. Garrett

G-2: LtCol Malcolm Arnot

G-3: LtCol Thorys J. Stensrud

G-4: Col Eugene L. Gobeli

G-6: LtCol William J. Cantu

Regimental Landing Team 5

CO: Col Randolph A. Gangle

2d Bn, 5th Mar: LtCol Kevin M. Kennedy

3d Bn, 5th Mar: LtCol Donald R. Selvage

2d Ba, 11th Mar: LtCol Paul A. Gido

Marine Aircraft Group 50

CO: Col Randall L. West

HMLA-169: LtCol Theron D. Rogers

HMH-772: LtCol Thomas J. Miller

HMM-265: LtCol John D. Holdstein
102 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

VMA-513: Maj Eddie L. Holcomb

3d LAAD: Maj Gerald L. Troupe

Brigade Service Support Group 5

CO: Maj Robert G. Johnson
Appendix C

Task Organization

Command Element MajGen Henry C. Stackpole, ifi, USMC

flet III MEF

Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell

C-12 Det MCAS Iwakuni and MCAS Futenma

4th Combat Communications Group (-)

Contingency Operations Base 3

Contingency Operations Base 5

PAO Det

PAO Det, MCB Camp S. D. Butler

PAO Det, COMNAVFORJAPAN

PAO Det, COMUSFOR, Subic Bay, RP

Det 834th Air Logistics Division (ALD)

Det 364th Civil Affairs Brigade

Det 322d Civil Affairs Group

Det 35 1st Civil Affairs Command

Marine Forces (MARFOR)

5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade BGen Peter J. Rowe, USMC

Command Element

Headquarters Company

5th SRISG

Det 1st Radio Bn

Det Company A, 9th Comm Bn

Det 4th Force Recon Company

Det 4th Military Police Company

Det 31st ITT

Det 14th CIT

Det 4th SCAMP

Ground Combat Element

Regimental Landing Team 5

Headquarters, 5th Marines

TOW Platoon, HQ Company, 23d Marines

2d Bn, 5th Marines

3d Bn, 5th Marines

3dBn, 11th Marines

Company B, 1St Reconnaissance Bn

Company A (Rein), 4th Tank Bn

Company A (Rein), 4th Assault Amphibian Bn

Company A (Rein), 4th Light Armored Infantry Bn

Company A, 4th Combat Engineer Bn

Company B, 1st Combat Engineer Bn

Company F, 2nd Bn, 25th Marines

Aviation Combat Element
Marine Aircraft Group 50

Det MASS-6

Det MWSS-372

HMM-265

HMLA-169

HMH-772, Det A

VMA-513, Det B

3d LAAD Bn

Combat Service Support Element

Brigade Service Support Group 5

Headquarters

Det 1st Landing Support Bn

Det 7th Motor Transport Bn

Det 1st Medical Bn

Det 1st Dental Bn

Det 7th Engineer Support Bn

Det 1st Supply Bn

Det 1st Maintenance Bn

Det 7th Communications Bn

Contingency Marine Air-Ground

Task Force 2-91

Task Group 76.6

USS Tarawa (LHA 1)

USS Vancouver (LPD 2)

USS Juneau (LPD 10)

USS Mount Vernon (LSD 39)

USS Frederick (LST 1184)

USS Barbour County

(LST 1195)

USS Anchorage (LSD 36)

USS St. Louis (LKA 116)

Environmental and Preventive Medicine

Unit-6

Air Forces (AFFOR)

Det 374th Tactical Airlift Wing

21st Tactical Airlift Squadron (-)

345th Tactical Airlift Squadron (-)

Det 603d Airlift Control Squadron

Det 8th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron (MAPS)

104 US. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Navy Forces (NAVFOR)

LtCol Larry A. Johnson, USMC

RAdm Stephen S. Clarey, USN

Capt Wirt R. Fladd, USN

Capt Clarence W. Burck, USN

Capt Tom A. Fitzgibbons, USN

Cdr David E. Myers, USN

Cdr Thomas W. Thiesse, USN

Cdr Joseph B. Wilkinson, USN

Capt Terence P. Labrecque, USN

Capt John W. Peterson, USN

Cdr Kenneth R. Ockermann, MC, USN

Col Edward G. Hoffman, USAF
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 105

Army Forces (ARFOR) LtCol Thomas F. Elzey, USA

4-25 Aviation Battalion (-)

Det 84th Engineer Battalion

Special Operations Forces (SOI') LtCol George W. Norwood, USAF

Joint Special Operations Task Force

1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) (USA)

17th Special Operations Squadron (USAF)

Det 2, 1723d Special Tactics Squadron (USAF)
Appendix D

United States Assistance

Provided Cyclone Disaster Effort

OFDA Funding Amount Description

Grants to NGOs

CARE $2,326,850 24 Relief Centers

Save the Children 9,000 families in urban Fund

(USA) $280,739 Chittagong and Sitakunda

The Asia 24,200 families in urban

Foundation $366,000 Chittagong and Sitakunda

Pathfinder Fund $294,000 7,000 families in urban

Chittagong, Rawzan, and

Fatikchari

World Vision $250,000 Relief in urban Chittagong

and Bandarban

International Center Technical assistance to

for Diarrheal Disease NGOs and BDG on water,

Control, Bangladesh $75,000 sanitation, and diarrheal

disease control

Helen Keller Distress monitoring

International $91,000 in affected areas

Other OFDA-Funded Assistance

Ambassador's Fund $25,000 Contributed to Prime

Minister's Relief Fund

Disaster Relief

Staff Support $12,850 Personal Service Contractor

ORS Production!

Supply Assessment $7,150 Consultant

4 Million Water

Purification Tablets $512,000 Distributed to seven NGOs

ORS sachets and For local production and

inputs $184,000 distribution of ORS
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 107

Infrastructure Assessment of damage to

Damage Assessment roads, bridges, schools,

(with World Bank) $295,000 BDG clinics, and utilities

Local Support Costs $15,000

Additional NGO Grants $390,411

OFDA Total $5,125,000

Other USAID Funding

Water Purification

Tablets $14,000 Donated to BDG and NGOs

Up to 55,000 MT Replenish stocks used for

of Title II wheat $11,000,000 emergency feeding

Rehabilitate Reprogramming USAID

Rural Electricity Development Assistance

Board equipment $2,000,000 funds

Department of Defense

Medical Supplies $2,000,000 From pre-positioned stocks

Corps of Engineer

Personnel 15 persons Repair Chittagong Airport

Relief Commodities $26,000,000 Delivered by C-5s, C-141s,

and C-130s

Joint Task Force Helicopters, amphibious

Sea Angel $6,350,000 craft, personnel, water

purification units, medical

supplies, food, etc.

Non-OFDA Contributions

$47,364,000

Total Assistance $52,489,000
Appendix E

Joint Meritorious Unit Award

Citation

to accompany the award of the

Joint Meritorious Unit Award

to the

Joint Task Force SEA ANGEL

Joint Task Force SEA ANGEL distinguished itself by exceptional meritorious service

from 10 May 1991 to 13 June 1991. During this period, as one of the largest military

disaster relief forces ever assembled, Joint Task Force SEA ANGEL established a record

of accomplishments that also made it one of the most successful. In response to the

Bangladesh Government's request for humanitarian disaster relief assistance, in the wake

of a tropical cyclone and tidal surge that claimed in excess of 139,000 lives and left

millions homeless, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines were notified and within hours

deployed and rapidly formed into a cohesive, dedicated team. Displaying exceptional

airmanship in all kinds of weather extremes, the Air Force component flew 194 missions

moving 2,430 tons of relief materials. Concurrently, the Army's 'Blackhawks' flew 805

sorties for distribution of 886 tons, while the Navy and Marine aviation assets from the

7th Fleet's Amphibious Ready Group flew 969 sorties, distributing 700 tons of food,

medicine, and construction materials. Equally monumental was the surface lift effort of

the Navy and Marine Team in the Bay of Bengal's treacherous currents and debris-filled,

unmarked river channels, which resulted in remote areas receiving 1,487 tons of lifesustaining medicines and supplies and 266,000 gallons of potable water produced by the

Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Crews. Simultaneously, 6 Medical Contact Teams

provided a host of medical analyses, treated over 15,000 patients and orchestrated the

distribution [of] 38 metric tons of medical supplies. As a result of these efforts,

representatives of the United States Agency for International Development estimated that

critical supplies and medicines reached in excess of one million people and likely saved

from starvation and serious illness over 100,000 others. In addition, appraisals compiled

by engineers and the Special Forces Disaster Assessment Teams will be invaluable to the

future self-directed restoration and development of the Bangladesh coastal infrastructure.

Furthermore, despite the hundreds of hours flown, the ever-changing weather extremes,

the seaborne lift mission through some of the world's most treacherous waters, and

thousand of individual efforts in every conceivable environment, Joint Task Force SEA

ANGEL accomplished the mission without a single death, serious injury, accident, or

incident. By their exemplary performance of duty, the members of Joint Task Force

SEA ANGEL brought great credit upon themselves and to the Department of Defense.

Given under my hand this 15th day of January 1992

I/Cohn L. Powell

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Index

Ahmed, Brig Shafaat, 39

Ahmed, President Justice Shahabuddin, 69

Ahmed, Oh, 10

Ahmed, SFC Farugue U., USA, 39

aircraft types

Aerospatiale AS 365N Dauphin, 31, 57, 62, 75

Bell AH-1W Sea Cobra, 44

Bell UH-1N Huey, 44, 56, 62

Boeing CH-46E Sea Knight, 16-17, 23, 44, 57-58, 62-63, 75

Lockheed C-130 Hercules, 29-30, 35, 40, 52-53, 57-58, 67, 69, 80-81, 85-86

Lockheed C-5A Galaxy, 16, 22, 32, 82

Lockheed C-141 Starlifter, 19, 22, 26, 28, 81-82

Lockheed HC-130 Hercules, 28

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier, 44, 46-47

Boeing MV-22, 46

Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion, 16

Sikorsky RH-53D Sea Stallion, 44, 46, 57, 62, 75

Sikorsky SH-3H Sea King, 44

Sikorsky SH-3 Sea King, 66

Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk, 25, 30, 32, 39-40, 42, 57, 62, 80-81

Westland HAS.5 Sea King, 66, 80

Westland HC.4 Sea King, 66

Alameda Naval Air Station, 44

Al Wafrah Forest, 42

American Club, 28, 34

American International School, 33

Amphibious assault vehicles (AAV), 60-61

Anchorage (LSD 36), 41, 71, 73

Anderson, LtCol Gary W., 27, 34

Andrew, HC 1st Class Robert, USN, 73

Anghim, Capt Edward P., USN, 34

Anwara District, 71

Anwara Subdistrict, 13

Armed Forces Staff College, 7

Arthur, VAdm Stanley R., USN, 22

Atwood, Donald J., 24

Autodin, 35, 80

Autovon, 35, 80

Bailes, Col Russell F., Jr., 40

Baker Carriage II, 10

Balance Buffalo, 86-87

Bangladesh Armed Forces

Bangladesh Air Force, 6

Bangladesh Army, 6-7, 10, 23, 30, 38-40, 56, 59, 72, 76

24th Bangladesh Army, 40

Bangladeshi naval ship Umar Farooq, 4
110 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Bangladeshi Special Forces, 71

Bangladesh Rifles, 14

Bangladesh Ministry of Health, 6

Bangladesh Ministry of Relief, 23

Bangladesh Space Research and Remote Sensing Organization, 3

Bangladesh Staff College, 7

Banshkhali Subdistrict, 13, 70-71

Barbour County (LST 1195), 41, 55, 61-62

Bay of Bengal, 1,2, 14,45-46,49,61-62,76,85

Betbunia, 12

Bhola District, 9

Bob's Service Station, 62

Brahmaputra River, 1

British Commands and Units

539 Assault Squadron, 66, 81

846 Naval Air Squadron, 66, 81

Royal Fleet Auxiliary, 66

Burma, 1, 27, 86

Bush, President George W., 9, 26, 74

Camp Courtney, 22, 26

Camp Pendleton, 42-44

Canada, 6

Cantu, LtCol William V., 57

Cape Girardeau (T-AK 2039), 18

CARE (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere), 6, 20, 39, 52

Caritas Bangladesh, 6

Chakaria District, 71

Chars, 3

China, 6

China-Burma-India Theater, 9

Chittagong, 4, 9-12, 15, 18-22, 27, 30-31, 34-36, 38-39, 46-50, 55, 65-67, 70-71, 74,

76-78, 80-81, 82, 86

Chittagong Comprehensive Military Hospital, 71

Chittagong coordinating cell, 40, 54

Chittagong District, 9, 13

Chittagong forward headquarters, 34, 39, 51, 54, 59, 77

Chowkatalli Village, 12

CinCPac, 13-14, 18-21, 24-28, 30-32, 34, 36, 39, 57, 62, 65, 75, 82, 85-86

Clarey, RAdm Stephen S., USN, 41, 45, 47-48, 50, 76, 84

Clark Air Force Base, 52

Cobra Gold, 15, 28

Colombo, 66

Cox's Bazar, 11, 13, 36, 40, 48, 65-67, 71, 76-77, 80, 84

Cox's Bazar Airfield, 39

Cox's Bazar District, 9, 13, 66

Cubi Point Naval Air Station, 82

Cyclone Marian, 3-4
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 111

Denver (LPH 9), 18

Department of Defense, 7, 13, 15-18, 22, 24, 74, 75

Humanitarian Assistance Program, 6

Department of State, 12-13, 15-17, 20-21, 24, 26, 74-75

Desert Shield, 23

Desert Storm, 23, 31

Dhaka, 4-6, 10-11, 13, 16, 21-22, 24-28, 30, 32-35, 40, 52, 63, 67, 71, 76, 79-82, 87

Dhalghata Village, 66

Downs, Capt John R., MC, USNR, 39, 69-71, 74

Dunn, LtCol James A., Jr., USA, 7, 9-10, 13-15, 19-21, 23-24, 27-28

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., 24, 26

Elliott (DD 967), 41

Elzy, LtCol Thomas F., USA, 32

Emergency Response Fund, 75

Ershad, President Hussain Muhammad, 5

Eshelman, BGen William P., 61

Ethiopia, 16-18, 44

European Economic Community, 6

Faresta, 62

Farooq, Muhammad Omar, 84

Ferguson, Col Mike, USAF, 34, 70

First Lieutenant Jack Lummus (TAK 3011), 18-19, 36

Fitzwater, Marlin, 9

Flickertail State (T-ACS 5), 18

Foreign Assistance Act, 1961, 74

Fort Grange (A 385), 66, 74, 76, 80-81

Frederick (LST 1184), 41, 55, 61

Ganges River, 1

Gangle, Col Randolph A., 42, 47, 50-5 1, 54, 65, 76

Gardner, MajGen Donald R., 86

Germantown (LSD 42), 18

Godbey, LCdr Pete L., MC, USN, 69-70

Guam, 67, 82

Haque, Capt Anwar, 51

Haque, M. Mokammel, 40

Hawaii, 22, 24, 30, 34, 82

Hirsch, Cdr Thomas J., USN, 50, 59

Hoffman, Col Edward G., USAF, 32, 34

Ice Cube, 42

Ice Tray, 42

India, 1, 6, 14-15, 49

Indian Ocean, 14, 18

International Center for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh, 69

International Red Cross, 6
112 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Iraq, 16, 44

Japan, 6, 16

Japanese relief team, 57

Johnson, LtCol Larry A., 77-78, 82

Johnson, Maj Robert G., 45, 50

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20, 22-23, 26, 30

Joint Staff, 13, 23-25

Joint Task Force Bangladesh Relief, 86

Jones, TSgt K. L., USAF, 38

Juneau (LPD 10), 41

Kadena Air Force Base, 26-27

Karnaphuli River, 11, 36, 57, 65, 77

Kennedy, LtCol Kevin M., 51, 57

Khan, LtGen Muhammad Noor Uddin, 29, 31, 38

Khan, Luftur Rahman, 28

Kilgour, Mary C., 6, 9-10, 31

Koella, Lt John E., USNR, 71-74

Kohl, LtCol Richard T., 44

Kutubdia Health Complex, 71-74

Kutubdia Island, 9, 13-14, 31, 36, 48, 54, 59, 65, 71, 78, 81

Kutubdia Village, 9

Kuwait, 16, 42

Larson, Adm Charles R., USN, 13, 23-24, 28, 82

LCAC (air-cushion landing craft), 29-30, 54, 57-60, 80

LCM-8, 59, 77

LCU, 54, 57, 59-61

Lindblom, Col Stephen E., 22, 26, 34

Maheshkali District, 71

Maheshkali Island, 9, 31, 48, 54, 59, 65-66

Manpura Island, 14, 36, 48, 59

Marine Corps Commands and Units

Battalion Landing Team 2/5, 57

Battalion Landing Team 3/1, 18

Battalion Landing Team 3/5, 65-66, 76

Brigade Service Support Group 5, 42-45, 48, 50

Company A, 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion, 44

Company A, 4th Tank Battalion, 44

Company B, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, 44

Company B, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 43-44

Company F, 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, 36, 38

Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 2-91, 36, 65, 77, 78, 79, 82

Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 4-90, 16

2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 43

3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 43

2d Battalion, 11th Marines, 43, 71
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 113

Detachment A, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 772, 44

Detachment B, Marine Attack Squadron 513, 44

3d Force Service Support Group, 38, 78

3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion, 44

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 22

Headquarters and Service Battalion

1st Force Service Support Group, 44-45

4th Force Service Support Group, 45

Headquarters and Service Company, 5th MEB, 43

Headquarters Company, 5th Marines, 43

III Marine Expeditionary Force, 22, 25, 27, 36, 57, 86

I Marine Expeditionary Force, 42, 44

Landing Force Training Command, Pacific, 43

Marine Aircraft Group 50, 31, 42-44, 49-52, 54, 59, 76

Marine Air Support Squadron 6, 44

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169, 44

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265, 44

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268, 18

Marine Service Support Group 11, 18

Marine Service Support Group 24, 44

Marine Wing Support Squadron 372, 44

Regimental Landing Team 5, 42-43, 48

TOW Platoon, 23d Marines, 71

1st Dental Battalion, 45

1st Force Service Support Group, 44

1st Landing Support Battalion, 45

1st Maintenance Battalion, 45

1st Marine Division, 42

1st Medical Battalion, 45

1st Radio Battalion, 43

1st Supply Battalion, 45

4th Force Reconnaissance Company, 43

4th Maintenance Battalion, 45

4th Supply Battalion, 45

5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 15-19, 24, 26, 31, 40, 42-43, 45-46, 48-49, 56-57,

58, 61, 71, 74, 76

5th Marines, 43

5th Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Support Group, 43, 57-58

6th Communications Battalion, 45

6th Engineer Support Battalion, 45

6th Motor Transport Battalion, 45

7th Communications Battalion, 45

9th Communications Battalion, 43

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 36

9th Marines, 38

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 17-18, 42, 43, 45

Maritime Prepositioning Force, 41

Matabari Island, 59, 66, 71

Matabari Village, 66
114 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Matsuda, LtCol Craig S., MC, USAF, 69

McPherson, Col Warren R., 22

Meals Ready to Eat (MREs), 23, 34

Medical Civic Action Program, 45-46, 70-71, 74

Meghna Estuaiy, 4

Meghna River, 1

Milam, Ambassador William B., 6-7, 14-17, 21, 23-24, 28-3 1, 34, 38, 77, 82-83, 86

Mobile Area Assessment Teams, 38, 40

Mobile (LKA 115), 18

Mount Pinatubo, 82

Mount Vernon (LSD 39), 41

Mymensingh, 10

Naha, Okinawa, 36

Naokhali District, 9, 66

Naval Air Facility, Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 44

Naval Officer Candidate School, 41

New Orleans (LPH 11), 18

North Hatia Island, 4, 36

Norwood, LtCol George W., USAF, 29

Office of Secretary of Defense, 13

Okinawa, 16, 19-20, 22, 26, 28, 34, 38, 67, 78, 82

Operation Desert Shield, 41

Operation Desert Storm, 17, 18

Operation Productive Effort, 25-69

Operation Provide Comfort, 27, 44

Operation Sea Angel, 69-85

Operation Sea Angel II, 86-87

oral rehydration salts, 7, 12, 13

OXFAM (Oxford Committee for Famine Relief), 6

Pacific Ocean Division, Corps of Engineers, 20

Pakistan, 1, 15, 67

Passumpsic (T-AO 107), 41

Patenga Airport, 34, 36, 39-40, 47, 54, 55-57

Patiya District, 71

Peoria (LST 1183), 18

Persian Gulf, 15, 17, 18, 42, 44, 45, 61

Peterson, Capt Johii W., USN, 36, 78

Philippines, 13, 16, 18-19, 20, 22, 26, 28

Phuket, Thailand, 82

Powell, Gen Cohn L., USA, 24, 69, 83

Princeton University, 26

Project Concern, 72

Quayle, Marilyn T., 67, 69

Quayle, Vice President J. Danforth, 69
ANGELS FROM THE SEA: RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH, 1991 115

Red Crescent Society, 6, 39, 52, 81

Regaul Karim, 70

Rowe, BGen Peter J., 42, 45, 47-50, 61, 63, 76-77

ROWPU (reverse osmosis water purification unit), 19, 31, 36, 38, 50, 51, 77, 78, 79,

80, 81

Salam, MajGen Abdus, 28

San Bernardino (LST 1189), 18, 19

San Diego State University, 42

Sandwip Island, 9, 13, 14, 31, 36, 48, 54, 59, 62, 70, 78, 80-81

Saudi Arabia, 6, 16

Save the Children (USA), 20

Scowcroft, Brent, 26

Selvage, LtCol Donald R., 65-66

Silverman, lstLt David, 9-10

Singapore, 14

Somalia, 85

South Hatia Island, 4, 31, 36, 48

St. Louis (LKA 116), 18-19, 36, 38, 65, 77-82

Stackpole, MajGen Henry C. III, 22, 24-32, 34-36, 38-39, 47-48, 63, 65, 69, 74-76,

78, 81-83, 85-86

Subic Bay, 19, 26, 36

Suffolk County (LST 1173), 41

Sylhet, 67-69, 81

Tarawa (LilA 1), 18, 23-24, 41, 44, 46, 49, 55, 59, 69, 71

Tezgaon Airport, 33

Thailand, 15, 28-29

The Asia Foundation, 20

Tripoli (LPH 10), 18

Tropical Cyclone Forest, 85-86

Tropical Cyclone 02B, 3

Tropical Cyclone 03B, 80

United Kingdom, 6

United Nations, 87

U.S. Air Force Commands and Units

Military Airlift Command, 19, 27, 81

Stategic Air Command, 24

1st Special Operations Squadron, 29

4th Combat Communications Group, 67, 81

8th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron, 52

17th Special Operations Squadron, 353d Special Operations Wing, 29

374th Tactical Airlift Wing, 33, 52, 80-81, 86

426th Civil Affairs Battalion, 86

1723d Special Tactics Squadron, 39

U.S. Army Commands and Units

Corps of Engineers, 39

Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha, 29
116 U.S. MARINES IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Special Forces Operational Detachment Bravo, 29

Special Operations Command, 24

1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), 28-29, 34-35, 39, 58-59, 71, 86

2d Platoon, Company B, 84th Engineer Battalion, 9, 10, 20, 28, 80

4th Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment, 30, 81

35 1st Civil Affairs Command, 39

U.S. Navy Commands and Units

Amphibious Group 1, 17, 34

Amphibious Ready Group Bravo, 18

Amphibious Squadron 3 (PhibGru 3), 17-19, 22, 24, 26-27, 30, 40-41, 46, 48, 61, 71,

76

Destroyer Squadron 21, 41

Military Sealift Command, 18, 66, 67

Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit 6, 32, 46, 70, 80

Navy Mobile Construction Battalion, 69

Navy Seals, 60

Seventh Fleet, 18-19, 22, 36, 45, 82

Tactical Air Control Squadron 11, 54, 56

Task Force 73, 18

Task Force 76, 18-19, 36

U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, 18

USAID (United States Agency for International Development), 6-7, 9-10, 12-13, 16, 20-

21, 23, 28, 39, 69, 72, 87

OFDA (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance), 7, 12-13, 16, 20

Utapao, Thailand, 27

Vancouver (LPD 2), 41, 47, 66

Vietnam, 26, 41

water purification tablets, 7, 12-13, 16, 19, 24

West, Col Randall L., 42, 47, 50-5 1, 54, 62

West Bengal Communist Party, 49

White, LtCol James L., USAF, 33, 52

Williams College, 41

Wisconsin, 3

World Health Organization, 6

World Vision, 20

World War II, 9

Xavier University, 42

Yangon flight information region, 27

Yokota Air Base, Japan, 33, 67

Yuma, Arizona, 44

Zia International Airport, 28, 33, 39, 67, 79

Zia, President Ziaur Rahman, 5

Zia, Prime Minister Begum Khaleda, 5, 7, 9, 39, 69, 76
The device reproduced on the back cover is

the oldest military insignia in continuous use

in the United States. It first appeared, as

shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. W/ith the stars changed to five

points this device has continued on Marine

Corps buttons to the present day.