THE NEW RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT 

WITH LATIN AMERICA: 

STRATEGIC POSITION, COMMERCE, 

AND DREAMS OF THE PAST

R. Evan Ellis

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

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PRESS
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i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

THE NEW RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT 

WITH LATIN AMERICA:

STRATEGIC POSITION, COMMERCE, 

AND DREAMS OF THE PAST

R. Evan Ellis

June 2015

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ISBN 1-58487-687-5
v

FOREWORD

In recent years, attention by the U.S. national security establishment to challenges in the Western 

Hemisphere has concentrated on issues of transnational organized crime, socialist populism, potential 

terrorist threats, and similar challenges arising from 

poverty, inequality, and weak governance in parts of 

the region. As Latin America and the Caribbean nations have expanded their economic and other forms 

of engagement with countries beyond the region, the 

majority of attention has gone to activities in the region by the People’s Republic of China, and to a lesser 

extent, by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The equally 

important re-engagement with the region by the Russian Federation during this period has received less 

attention, particularly among scholarly articles.

Russia’s re-engagement with the region, which began in earnest in 2008, coincided with an escalation in 

tension with the United States over the role of Russia 

in the civil war in Georgia and the related succession 

of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This led Russia to deploy nuclear-capable backfire bombers and warships 

to the Caribbean, as well as initiating a wave of presidential level diplomacy and heightened cooperation 

with regimes of the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA). In 2014, as tensions with the United States 

escalated over the conflict in the Ukraine, Russia renewed its attention to the Western Hemisphere with a 

new wave of diplomatic and military activity concentrating on the relatively anti-U.S. ALBA regimes, as 

well as Brazil and Argentina. In both 2008 and 2014, 

Russia’s initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean seemed designed to force the United States to respond to a challenge in its own hemisphere, expanding 
Russia’s freedom of action in its own near abroad. In 

the process, Russia’s actions sent an important message that U.S. security concerns in the Western Hemisphere are not only a function of dynamics occurring 

in the region itself, but also in the interconnected 

global security environment. Thus, U.S. decisionmakers responsible for Latin America and the Caribbean 

must also consider developments in other theaters.

The present monograph by Strategic Studies Institute professor Dr. R. Evan Ellis is one of the first 

in-depth treatments of contemporary Russian engagement with the countries of Latin America and its significance from a national security perspective. As such, 

it provides important insights into both the nature of 

the challenge posed by Russia, as well as the evolving role and persistent importance of Latin America 

and the Caribbean to the national security of the 

United States. 

This monograph is part of the ongoing effort by 

the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War 

College to provide analysis of contemporary issues 

impacting Latin America and the Carribbean and 

other regional security environments, in support of 

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, and other U.S. decisionmakers. We hope that 

readers find this work both useful and intellectually 

stimulating.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vi
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

R. EVAN ELLIS is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, with a research focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors. He has presented his work in a broad 

range of business and government forums in 25 countries on four continents. He has given testimony on 

Latin America and Carribbean Security Issues to the 

U.S. Congress, and has discussed his work regarding 

China and other external actors in Latin America on a 

broad range of radio and television programs, including CNN International, CNN En Español, The John 

Bachelor Show, Voice of America, and Radio Marti. 

Dr. Ellis is cited regularly in the print media in both 

the United States and Latin America for his work in 

this area, including The Washington Times, Bloomberg, 

América Economía, DEF, and InfoBAE. Dr. Ellis has 

published over 110 works, including China in Latin 

America: The Whats and Wherefores (2009), The Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Latin America

(2013), and China on the Ground in Latin America (2014). 

Dr. Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a 

specialization in comparative politics.

ix

SUMMARY

In many ways, Russia’s expanded engagement 

in Latin America as a response to escalating tension 

over the Ukraine was a repetition of its answer to U.S. 

involvement in the 2008 conflict in the former Soviet 

Republic of Georgia. In the 2008 conflict, as the U.S. 

deployed naval forces to the Black Sea in response to 

Russian support for the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia countered with a 

series of actions in Latin America, including sending 

nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, from 

where they conducted symbolically charged flights 

around the Caribbean. This was followed a month 

later by the deployment of a four-ship Russian naval 

flotilla to the area to conduct military exercises with 

the Venezuelan navy before making port calls in Cuba 

and Nicaragua. 

In addition to Russia’s military deployments, in 

November 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev traveled to Latin America to participate in the 

leadership summit of the Bolivarian Alliance for the 

Americas, then subsequently hosted both Venezuelan 

President Hugo Chavez and Nicaraguan President 

Daniel Ortega in Moscow. Three months later, Bolivian President Evo Morales also traveled to Russia, 

followed in November 2009 by Ecuadorian President 

Rafael Correa.

By comparison to the extensive literature on the 

activities of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere during the Cold War, and by contrast to the 

rapidly growing body of works on China’s activities 

in the region, very little beyond journalistic accounts 

have been written to examine contemporary Russian 

activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. As 
x

Russia’s reassertion of its global position and associated tensions with the United States proceed apace, 

a broad understanding of Russia in the Americas becomes evermore important, both as a question of U.S. 

national security and as an important dynamic shaping the global geopolitical environment. This monograph seeks to do so, focusing on the character of the 

ongoing Russian re-engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean and its implications for the 

United States.
1

THE NEW RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT 

WITH LATIN AMERICA:

STRATEGIC POSITION, COMMERCE, AND 

DREAMS OF THE PAST

OVERVIEW

In February 2015, Russian Defense Minister Sergei 

Shoigu traveled to Latin America to meet with leaders 

and defense officials in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The focus of meetings in all three countries was 

on access to ports and airfields in the region so as to 

support Russian military operations in the vicinity 

of the United States. In Nicaragua, Minister Shoigu 

signed an agreement to facilitate Russian access to the 

ports of Corinto and Bluefields, as well as strengthening counterdrug cooperation and discussing weapons 

sales. The trip advanced discussions and reinforced 

the message sent by Russian President Vladimir Putin when he had traveled to the region just 7 months 

previously, including Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina, 

and Brazil. As the Barack Obama administration increasingly pressured Russia regarding its activities in 

the Ukraine, Russia was equally capable of reasserting its presence and challenging the United States 

in Latin America, the region once considered the 

“U.S. backyard.” 

In many ways, Russia’s expanded engagement 

in Latin America as a response to escalating tension 

over the Ukraine was a repetition of its answer to U.S. 

involvement in the 2008 conflict in the former Soviet 

Republic of Georgia. In that conflict, as the U.S. deployed naval forces to the Black Sea in response to 

Russian support for the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia had countered with 

a series of actions in Latin America. These actions 
2

included sending nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to 

Venezuela, from where they conducted symbolically 

charged flights around the Caribbean. This was followed a month later by the deployment of a four-ship 

Russian naval flotilla to the area to conduct military 

exercises with the Venezuelan navy before making 

port calls in Cuba and Nicaragua. 

In addition to Russia’s military deployments, in 

November 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev traveled to Latin America to participate in the 

leadership summit of the Bolivarian Alliance for the 

Americas (ALBA), then subsequently hosted both 

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Nicaraguan 

President Daniel Ortega in Moscow. Three months 

later, Bolivian President Evo Morales also traveled 

to Russia, followed in November 2009 by Ecuadorian 

President Rafael Correa. 

Russia’s re-engagement with Latin America and 

the Caribbean has proceeded unevenly since its beginning in 2008. At that time, Russia concentrated on 

a limited number of countries, including the regimes 

of ALBA, as well as Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, even 

though it has engaged commercially, politically, and 

economically with other states of the region as well.

With respect to economic interactions, by contrast 

to expanding activities in the region by the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC), Russia’s economic activities there have been smaller and concentrated in a 

more limited number of sectors, including arms sales, 

petroleum, electricity production, and mining. Yet, 

however uneven, Russia’s re-engagement with the region since 2008 has produced significant cumulative 

results. When President Putin traveled to the region 

in 2014 on a four-nation tour to send a message to the 

United States over the conflict in the Ukraine, he was 

not doing so from the same low base from which his 
3

predecessor, Medvedev, had begun when Medvedev 

launched the prior diplomatic re-engagement with 

the region.

In another contrast to Chinese engagement with 

Latin America and the Caribbean, Russia has not shied 

away from acting in a way that overtly challenged the 

United States. As noted earlier, the 2014 round of Russian re-engagement with the region began with an 

announcement by Shoigu that his nation was talking 

with Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela about establishing bases in those nations for resupplying Russian 

warships, and potentially for refueling Russian long 

range bombers. One year later, as noted previously, 

the Defense Minister visited the three countries to 

conduct talks regarding such base access. This was 

complimented by an announcement during the same 

period that Russia, for the first time, might send its 

aircraft on long range patrols that would reach into 

the Gulf of Mexico. 

By comparison to the extensive literature on the 

activities of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere during the Cold War, and by contrast to the 

rapidly growing body of works on China’s activities 

in the region, very little beyond journalistic accounts 

have been written to examine contemporary Russian 

activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. As Russia’s reassertion of its global position and associated 

tensions with the United States proceed apace, a broad 

understanding of Russia in the Americas becomes 

evermore important, both as a question of U.S. national security and as an important dynamic shaping the 

global geopolitical environment.

This monograph seeks to fill that gap, focusing 

on the character of the ongoing Russian re-engage-
4

ment with Latin America and the Caribbean and its 

implications for the United States.

Background.

By comparison with some other extra-hemispheric 

actors such as China, India, and Iran, the political and 

economic relationships that Russia maintained with 

Latin America and the Caribbean during the Cold 

War arguably give it a substantial base of experience 

in dealing with the region. Yet, Russia’s engagement 

with Latin America and the Caribbean began well before the Cold War. In the 19th century, Russian officials and persons of influence affiliated with the Tsarist court recognized, in Latin American independence 

movements from Spain and Portugal, an opportunity 

to expand Russia’s economic and political influence 

through ties to the region.1 Both Brazil, which fought 

its war of independence from Portugal from February 

1822 to November 1823, and Mexico, which won its 

independence from Spain in 1821, sought ties with 

Russia as part of their maneuverings among other 

European powers.2 The Russian-American Company, 

with economic interests in commerce with the region 

(not unlike those of the British East India Company 

in Asia), also played an important role in advancing 

relations during this period.3

During the 20th century, the Russian revolution 

and the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) gave rise to a mixture of sentiments 

among Latin American leftists toward the new Soviet 

government. The Soviet Union, for its part, nurtured 

ties with leftist parties and revolutionary movements 

in Latin America and the Caribbean. Yet, not until the 

Cuban Revolution of 1959 did the region become a 
5

significant focus for Soviet initiatives to advance the 

communist cause and the strategic position of the 

USSR in its global struggle against the United States.

In many ways, the success of Fidel Castro’s revolutionary forces in seizing power in Cuba in January 

1959 showed the Soviet Union the potential for leftist movements and others supportive of the USSR 

to come to power by force in Latin America and the 

Caribbean.4 Driven in part by such new optimism regarding the possibilities for advancing communism 

and the Soviet strategic position in Latin America, 

the USSR began to develop important centers of Latin 

American studies during this time, such as the Latin 

American Studies Institute of the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs in Moscow.5

From the 1970s through the 1990s, the Soviet Union 

provided overt and covert support for, and maintained relationships with, numerous revolutionary 

movements throughout the region, including those in 

El Salvador, Guatemala, Grenada, and the Dominican 

Republic.6

Beyond such backing, the Soviet Union also pursued a second track of maintaining friendly ties with 

leaders who, while not communist, pursued a populist or independent orientation that disposed them to 

work with the USSR to varying degrees. Such figures 

included Salvador Allende in Chile (until he was deposed and killed in September 1973), Juan Peron in 

Argentina, Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, and General Jose 

Torres in Bolivia. Later examples with whom the Soviet Union collaborated to some degree included General Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru, as well as Mexican 

President Luis Echeverría.7

Beyond Cuba, several countries maintained an 

important military relationship with the Soviet Union 
6

during this period. The most prominent was Velasco, 

whose Peruvian government purchased substantial 

quantities of arms and received advisors from the 

Soviet Union. In addition, when the Frente Sandinista 

de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation 

Front or FSLN) came to power in Nicaragua in 1979, 

its newly triumphant revolutionary leader, Ortega, 

similarly brought Soviet advisors into the country, as 

well as receiving Soviet military and economic aid.8

The Soviet Union also maintained important economic relationships with more conservative regimes. 

Examples include Argentina, under the military rule 

of Jorge Rafael Videla, whose government became a 

major supplier of grain to the USSR after 1980 when 

the United States suspended its own sales of grain 

to the Soviet Union.9 In a similar fashion, the Brazilian military government of João Baptista de Oliveira 

Figueiredo sold feed corn to the Soviet Union.10

Beyond food sales, Soviet economic ties to the region during the Cold War included participation in 

the construction of hydroelectric power plants in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia; irrigation projects in Peru 

and Venezuela; and purchases of Cuban sugar, Brazilian cacao, and Colombian and Ecuadorian bananas.11

Although the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 

did not end engagement with Latin America and the 

Caribbean, economic aid from the successor Russian 

government to political allies such as Cuba12 and Nicaragua13 declined sharply, and diplomatic activity 

in the region was similarly scaled back. As Russia’s 

economy was transformed during the early post-Cold 

War years, the nature of its economic engagement 

with Latin America and the Caribbean shifted, focusing on a small number of industries in which the new 

Russia was building global ties. These included arms, 

petroleum, mining, and electricity generation.
7

During this period, the legacy of Latin America’s 

strategic value to the Soviet Union was not lost to the 

new generation of Russian thinkers, but rather redefined within the context of Russian global engagement. In 1997, for example, Foreign Minister Yevgeny 

Primakov made a trip to Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 

and Costa Rica where he spoke of Latin America as a 

major Russian ally in the construction of a multipolar 

world.14

Russia’s legacy of engagement with Latin America 

and the Caribbean during this period both contributes to, and creates challenges for its present activities 

there. Part of that legacy is a group of now high-ranking (or retired) military officers, diplomats, businessmen, and others in Russia familiar with the region and 

the Spanish language (as well as Portuguese to some 

degree). At the same time, however, Russia’s past engagement has also left a cadre of conservative political 

and business figures in influential positions in Latin 

America and the Caribbean, who are deeply suspicious of Russia’s intentions as it seeks to rebuild its 

ties in the region.

Fast-forwarding to the present, Russian companies 

and diplomats have sought to position themselves 

between a developed West and a rising Asia, with 

well-known products in niche sectors such as defense, 

and companies able to play by a more “flexible” set of 

rules than the U.S. and European firms that they are 

competing against. With the persistent and deepening hostility between Russia, the United States, and 

Europe, however, Russia’s ability to position itself 

between the West and Asia may be eroding.
8

Motivations. 

Russia’s re-engagement with Latin America arguably reflects a complex mix of often reinforcing, but occasionally conflicting, strategic, economic, and internal 

political considerations. For Russia, as suggested previously, the nation’s return to Latin America and the 

Caribbean is a reaction to an aggressive campaign by 

the United States following the collapse of the Soviet 

Union to not only bring the states of the former Warsaw Pact into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO),15 but building alliance relationships with the 

Baltic States16 and other nations once part of the Soviet 

Union itself. Russia believes this would bring the political and military power of its former adversary to 

the very doorstep of Russia.17

By creating a political and potential military challenge close to the United States, Russia’s projection in 

the hemisphere attempts to force the United States to 

focus part of its attention and resources on responding 

to the new vulnerability close to home, thus leaving it 

with less resources and attention to challenge Russia 

in its own neighborhood, or in other parts of the world. 

Beyond its strategic value, re-engagement with Latin 

America also arguably has benefitted Russia’s leaders 

in domestic politics. Under the regimes of both Russian Presidents Medvedev and Putin, Russian military 

activities in Latin America, high-level diplomacy with 

Latin American leaders, and the economic projects 

highlighted and facilitated by such diplomacy, demonstrate to the Russian people that the nation is overcoming the perceived tragedy of its withdrawal from 

the world stage following the collapse of the Soviet 

Union.18 It is now returning to a position of strength in 

which Russians can take pride.
9

For Medvedev in 2008, Russia’s return to Latin 

America was arguably important in helping to overcome perceptions of him as a weak leader, only “keeping the presidential chair warm” until his predecessor, Russian strongman Vladimir Putin, could reclaim 

power. For Putin, the latest deepening of Russia’s engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, including his July 2014 trip to the region, demonstrated 

to Russians that his policies in the Ukraine had not isolated the nation internationally, and indeed, that they 

were returning Russia to a position of international 

leadership in which they could take pride. Indeed, as 

Putin consolidates his power within the Russian political system and constructs a “cult of personality” 

in the Russian tradition, the return to Latin America 

which bears his imprimatur helps him to win his place 

among a long line of Russian leaders who have built 

or asserted the greatness of the Russian nation, such 

as Rurik, Alexander Nevsky, Ivan the Great, Ivan the 

Terrible, and Peter the Great.

Within the framework of strategic and domestic 

political considerations, Russia’s focus on particular 

industries, such as arms, petroleum, mining, and electricity infrastructure projects is a product of the structure of Russia’s economy and the tools available to the 

Russian state. In addition, it reflects the imperatives 

of leading industries in the Russian economy, and the 

influential figures connected to them.19

Country Focus of Re-Engagement.

As Russia has reconstructed its ties with Latin 

America and the Caribbean, its limited resources and 

the legacy of its activities in the region during the Cold 

War has led it to concentrate its activities on three 

groups of countries: 
10

1. former Soviet-era allies such as Cuba and 

Nicaragua, 

2. the broader group of states willing to assume 

the political risk of working with Russia against U.S. 

influence in the region, such as Venezuela, and to a 

lesser degree, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and 

3. states neither opposed to the United States 

or Russia, but in which Russia has a strategic 

commercial interest.

In the case of the first group, although Russia 

was able to leverage relationships and economic dependencies from the Cold War period, it also had to 

overcome the legacy of resentment for having “abandoned” those allies. This challenge was most visible 

in Cuba, where there was a widespread perception, at 

least among the leadership, that the economic hardship that the island had experienced in the 1990s was 

due, in part, to the Soviet Union having “stranded” it 

financially.

In Nicaragua, by contrast, the communist Sandinista government was voted out of power in 1990, the 

year after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 2007 return to 

power of Sandinista leader Ortega set the state for Nicaragua to reach out to Russia during the 2008 Georgia 

crisis in an unsolicited gesture to recognize the new 

breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

In the process, Nicaragua earned Russian gratitude 

and set the stage for the resumption of Russia-Nicaragua diplomatic interactions, as well as Russian aid.20

The difference between the group of Cold War era 

Soviet client states and new Russian allies such as Venezuela is not their willingness to work explicitly with 

Russia against the United States. Rather, newcomers 

such as Venezuela lack a cadre of military and politi-
11

cal leaders who openly collaborated with the Soviet 

Union against the United States during the earlier era. 

By contrast, the Cuban and Nicaraguan leaderships 

understand from personal experience that inviting a 

Russian military presence into the country threatens 

the United States and could precipitate a forcible intervention against the regime. When the current Venezuelan leadership similarly invites Russian warships 

and nuclear-capable aircraft to stage operations from 

the country, they arguably do so without a historical 

sense of the potential risks of such actions.

Such differences notwithstanding, the combination of both types of allies provide Russia with the opportunity to engage with the region in a sufficiently 

provocative way so as to send a message to the United 

States. As noted earlier, Russia’s open gambit in this 

exchange was to deploy Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, and from there, to conduct flights in Caribbean 

airspace to remind the United States that, with the 

help of partners in the region, it could put nuclearcapable offensive military assets able to strike the 

United States with little warning.21 The staging of Russian warships from Venezuela, and subsequently port 

calls to Cuba and Nicaragua, reinforced this message, 

while demonstrating the willingness of multiple nations of ALBA to participate in the implicit threat. For 

similar reasons, Russian President Medvedev chose a 

summit of ALBA leaders in Caracas, Venezuela, to receive him when he traveled to the region in November 

2008.22

With respect to the third group, the three countries 

with which Russia has had the most significant interactions have been Brazil, Peru, and Argentina. Although 

the response of these countries to Russian advances 

has not included explicit anti-U.S. political or military 
12

activity, the progress achieved is significant because 

of the political, military, and economic weight in the 

region of the countries involved.

Russian Engagement through Multilateral Forums. 

As during the Cold War period, Russia has used 

multilateral forums to compliment other vehicles for 

its political and economic engagement with Latin 

America. It has done so across a broad range of activities, from meetings of groups such as the G-7 (United 

States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom 

[UK], Italy, and Canada), G-20 (Argentina, Australia, 

Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 

South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the UK, the United 

States, and the European Union [EU]), and the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to anti-U.S. entities such as ALBA, and those exclusive of the United 

States, such as the Union of South American Nations 

(UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American 

and Caribbean States (CELAC). In general, Russia has 

used different types of forums in different ways. It has 

employed conventional forums such as the G-7, G-20, 

and APEC as tools to participate on an “equal footing” 

in the “club” of advanced nations, while it has used 

forums such as ALBA, UNASUR, and CELAC to send 

symbolic messages to the United States and strengthen its ties with the region in a way that excludes the 

United States.

In a similar fashion, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 

India, China, and South Africa) forum offered Russia an important opportunity to engage with not just 

members of the alliance itself,23 but also with other 

Latin American countries which came to the site of the 
13

summit. Forums such as the G-20 and APEC have afforded Russia multilateral engagement opportunities 

with Latin American countries on Russian soil. The 

September 2012 APEC summit, for example, was held 

in Vladivostok, Russia, and the September 2013 G-20 

meeting was held in St. Petersburg. Similarly, the next 

BRICS summit in 2015 is to be held in Ufa, Russia,24

and the 2018 World Cup will be held in Russia as well.

Beyond such engagements, Russia has also sought 

engagement with Latin American and Caribbean states 

through the framework of explicitly Latin American 

multilateral forums and sub-regional forums. Russia 

has used Latin American venues exclusive of the United States to spearhead its re-engagement with the region. These include not only ALBA, but also CELAC, 

whose foreign ministers met with their Russian counterpart in Havana, Cuba, in May 2013. At the end of 

the meeting, Putin expressed a strong interest in developing a relationship.25 Russia has similarly indicated 

interest in “substantive interactions” with UNASUR, 

the Pacific Alliance, the Central American Integration 

System (SICA) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), notably ignoring a demonstration of interest in 

the Organization of American States (OAS), in which 

the United States and Canada are members.26

Military Interactions. 

As during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, 

military engagement has been a cornerstone of Russia’s reassertion of its presence in Latin America and 

the Caribbean. Such engagement, although somewhat 

more low key than it was during the Cold War, has 

encompassed a full range of military activities, including expanded leadership visits, education and train-
14

ing interactions, arms sales, and deployments to the 

region. As noted earlier, Russia has reactivated and 

built upon relationships with Soviet-era client states 

of Nicaragua and Cuba, as well as leveraging countries which purchased Russian military goods during 

the Cold War and which have maintained some ties 

with the Russian armed forces. These countries include Peru, as mentioned previously, and to a lesser 

extent, Brazil and Mexico. 

With respect to arms sales and associated maintenance and training support, between 2001 and 2013, 

Russia sold Latin America $14.5 billion in arms, representing approximately 40 percent of the $35.5 billion in arms purchased by the region from external 

sources during the period.27 Of these purchases, approximately $11 billion went to Venezuela.28 Russian 

arms are well represented at Latin American defense 

expos such as FIDAE in Chile, Latin American Agribusiness Development (LAAD) Corporation in Brazil, 

and SitDef in Peru.29

Russia’s most successful product in engaging with 

the region has been its helicopters with over 400 Mi17 transport helicopters reportedly in service in the 

region, accounting for 42 percent of its military helicopter fleet.30 Virtually all of the major countries in the 

region have at least some Russian helicopters in their 

inventory, including Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Ecuador, 

Argentina, and Mexico. In many of these countries, 

Russia has used its earlier success selling arms to the 

region to win contracts in the contemporary period 

for maintaining and repairing them. The experience 

with Russian products and the simplification of maintenance, spare parts, and training by concentrating the 

weapons inventory on a single country,31 decreased 

the complexity of maintenance and training in prolif-
15

erating supplier countries. This experience and simplification, as well as the personal relationships built 

up over years of working with the Russian personnel, 

have each played a role in helping Russian companies 

secure such contracts.

Despite such successes, the Russian record in the 

Latin American arms market has not been without 

problems. Despite the previously mentioned success 

of Rosoboronexport in selling $11 billion in arms to 

Venezuela, 32 it saw those sales stall when Venezuela’s 

Bolivarian Socialist government ran out of money in 

a growing financial and political crisis. This allowed 

Chinese arms companies to make significant inroads 

in a market that had once been almost completely 

dominated by the Russians.33

Although Russia has sold the country attack helicopters and air defense systems, the Brazilian market 

has not lived up to the importance that Russia has put 

on the country as a partner.34 Indeed, Russian arms 

manufacturers have suffered multiple disappointments in Brazil, including the failure to sell the country the Russian Su-35 fighter or the Tigr light armored 

vehicle, as well as the inability to win follow-on work 

from the 2008 contract for Mi-35 attack helicopters beyond the 12 units in the original contract. On the other 

hand, the BrahMos missile, one of the most significant 

new weapons that could be introduced into the region 

through sales to Brazil, is not entirely Russian, but 

rather a collaborative effort with India.35

With respect to military activities beyond arms 

sales, Russian deployments, institutional visits, and 

other forms of military engagement with Latin America have increased and tapered off with the two previously mentioned cycles of heightened tensions with 

the United States, in 2008 with the crisis in Georgia, 

and in 2014 with escalating tensions in the Ukraine. 
16

During the Georgia crisis, as a short-term response 

to the U.S. naval presence in the Black Sea, Russia 

sent two supersonic, nuclear-capable Tu-160 backfire 

bombers to Venezuela, and from there, to conduct 

exercises in the Caribbean.36 Approximately 1 month 

later (reflecting the time required to plan and execute 

a trans-Atlantic naval movement), Russia sent a 4-ship 

naval flotilla to Venezuela, including the cruiser Peter 

the Great, the destroyer Admiral Chabanenko, a minesweeper, and a supply ship. These ships conducted 

a naval exercise with their Venezuelan counterparts 

before making port calls in Cuba and Nicaragua.37

In a manner parallel to its actions during the 2008 

Georgia conflict, as U.S.-Russia tensions escalated 

over the Ukraine in 2014, Russia bolstered a flurry of 

diplomatic activity to the region by Foreign Minister 

Sergei Lavrov and President Putin with declarations 

regarding the establishment or reactivation of bases in 

Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua.38 During the same 

months, a Russian signals collection ship visited Cuba 

multiple times.39

Despite the correlation between U.S.-Russian tensions and Russian military activity in Latin America, 

a portion of expanding Russian military engagement 

with the West has been independent from tensions 

elsewhere. In March 2013, for example, following a 

visit to Nicaragua by Russian Armed Forces Chief 

of Staff Valery Gerasimov, Russia announced that it 

was constructing a major new counterdrug center in 

Managua, Nicaragua. The facility, officially addressing the very real problem of drug production in, and 

shipment across, the region, would be used to train 

not only Nicaraguans, but also law enforcement personnel from an array of other countries in the region, 

giving Russia important security engagement opportunities with those nations.40
17

Similarly, a three-ship Russian flotilla traveled to 

the region in August 2013, making port calls in both 

Cuba and Nicaragua.41 In February 2014, as the crisis 

in the Ukraine escalated, Commander in Chief of U.S. 

Southern Command General John Kelly commented 

that Russia’s new military presence in the region was 

greater than anything seen in 3 decades.42

Commercial Focus of Re-Engagement. 

By comparison with other extra-hemispheric actors 

in the region such as the PRC, Russia’s commercial engagement has been more limited in its overall volume 

and in its concentration on a number of countries and 

sectors. In 2013, Russia’s bilateral trade with Latin 

America and the Caribbean was $18.8 billion, representing less than 1 percent of the $2.35 trillion in trade 

between the states of the region and the rest of the 

world. This was 14 times less than China’s $257.9 billion in trade with Latin America and the Caribbean.43

Even as Russia expands its bilateral trade with the 

region, it continues to fall further behind China, the 

current star in interregional trade. Although Russia’s 

trade with the region has expanded almost six-fold 

from the $3.3 billion that it traded with the region in 

2003, China’s trade with the region increased almost 

10-fold during the same period.44

Russia’s commercial relationship with Latin America is dominated by its engagement with Brazil and 

Mexico, which together represent 50 percent of Russian trade with the region. Other significant partners 

there, in declining order, include Argentina, Ecuador, 

Panama, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Chile, and 

Nicaragua. The composition of trade between Russia and each of its partners also varies significantly. 
18

For example, Russia both imports products from and 

exports products to Brazil, by contrast to Venezuela, 

for which only $10 million (less than .3 percent) of its 

$3.42 billion in trade was from exports to Russia. Similarly, Mexico and Peru run significant trade deficits 

with Russia, while for most of the rest, Russia imports 

more from these countries than it exports to them.45

With respect to the sectorial composition of Russian trade with Latin America, the latter has been 

particularly concentrated in petroleum, mining, arms 

sales, and niche technologies such as nuclear energy. 

In the petroleum and mining sectors, Russian firms 

have made investments in a number of Latin American countries, including oilfields in Venezuela and 

bauxite mines in Jamaica and Guyana, among others. 

Russian firms such as Inter Rao and Power Machines 

have bid for, and supplied, components for the construction of hydroelectric and thermoelectric facilities, 

while Rosatom has positioned itself to build civilian 

nuclear reactors in Brazil and Argentina, and less realistically, Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay. Russia has 

also been a significant buyer of Latin American agricultural goods, and in recent years, the country has 

demonstrated an expanded interest in Latin America 

as a tourist destination, with a focus on Cuba, Jamaica, 

and other islands of the Caribbean.

In general, Russian banks have not played as significant a role in advancing its projects in Latin America 

in the way that Chinese financing has underwritten its 

construction and infrastructure projects in the ALBA 

states and the Caribbean, with Chinese policy banks 

loaning more than $100 billion to the region between 

2005 and 2013.46 Nonetheless, Russia has provided 

money to select Latin American countries, including 

$4 billion through the Russia-Venezuela joint bank 
19

in 2012 and 2013 to make possible Venezuela’s purchase of Russian arms.47 Similarly, the Russian policy 

bank Vnesheconombank has offered financial backing for Russian hydroelectric projects in Ecuador and 

Argentina. 

With respect to multilateral lending, in July 2014 

at the BRICS summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, Russia, like 

other BRICS members, offered to put up $10 billion 

in seed capital for the establishment of a new “BRICS 

bank.”48 Russia has also indicated an interest in joining the Inter-American Development Bank, and has 

signed cooperation agreements with the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) and the Latin American 

Association of Development Financing Institutions,49

yet to date, such proposals have not borne fruit. 

With respect to Russia as a market and source of 

investment for Latin America and the Caribbean, the 

mediocre performance of the Russian economy and 

the nation’s limited commercial interactions with the 

region have not inspired the same level of enthusiasm 

among the region’s political leaders and businessmen 

that China has inspired there. Although Russia has 

a reservoir of goodwill with certain Latin American 

and Caribbean countries, particularly among its Cold 

War allies and the members of ALBA, Latin American 

students are not clamoring to learn Russian, nor are 

businessmen hurrying to establish themselves in the 

Russian domestic market.

Ethnic Russians in Latin America. 

In interacting with the states of Latin America and 

the Caribbean, Russia has a relatively limited diaspora of its ethnic nationals living there. Most of Latin 

America’s Russian population immigrated from the 
20

end of the 19th century through the early-20th century, fleeing economic hardship and later the violence 

and chaos of the 1917 Russian Revolution.

Between the formation of the Soviet Union and its 

collapse in 1989, a smaller group of Russians migrated 

to the region, including some who came to countries 

such as Cuba to fight for the revolutionary cause. 

The largest Russian immigrant population in Latin 

America and the Caribbean is found today in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil,50 although small numbers 

of Russians are found throughout the region.51 They 

have not, however, played a highly visible role in contemporary Russian re-engagement with the region, 

either in economic or political terms.

Intellectual Infrastructure. 

By contrast to the PRC, Russia’s re-engagement 

with Latin America that started in 2008 was able to 

leverage a relatively well-developed pool of academic 

knowledge regarding the region, as well as a substantial group of persons with the language skills to operate there, thanks to the legacy of Soviet engagement 

there during the Cold War. This includes the previously noted sending of advisors and others to Cuba 

and Nicaragua, the nurturing of relationships with 

guerilla movements in states such as El Salvador and 

Guatemala, and ongoing ties to the states of the region, as well as out-of-power leftist parties and movements. As Sovietologist Cole Blasier put it in 1987, the 

Soviet Union established a presence in the Western 

Hemisphere “unique in history.”52

As noted earlier, the intellectual infrastructure in 

Russia for understanding Latin America began to increase in 1959 with the Cuban revolution and the op-
21

portunities that it highlighted for the Soviet Union to 

expand its political and military position in the region. 

While Russian engagement itself fell off somewhat 

with the retrenchment of Russia at the end of the Cold 

War, the nation’s key Latin America centers today are 

able to leverage to some degree the body of knowledge built up by Latin Americanists from that era: 

1. the Institute of Latin America, Moscow, 

2. the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow, 

3. the Latin America research center at Moscow 

State University, and 

4. the Center for the Study of Latin America, part 

of St. Petersburg State University. 

Of these, the oldest, largest, and most prestigious is 

arguably the Institute of Latin America, established by 

the Soviet government in 1961. At its height in the late1980s, this institute included 100 full-time researchers 

and provided support for others in other institutions 

throughout the country.53

Interactions with Other Extra-regional Actors. 

Another important consideration for Russia as 

it has expanded its engagement in Latin America is 

competition from, and complementarity with, the 

commercial and governmental entities of other extrahemispheric actors also operating in the region. In 

political, military, commercial, and other affairs, those 

interactions have featured a complex mixture of competition and complementarity. In forums such as the 

BRICS, for example, Russia has presented a united 

front with states from outside the hemisphere such 

as China and India against established “developed 
22

nations” in the region. In military affairs, as noted 

previously, Russia has cooperated with India to develop the hypersonic BrahMos missile,54 marketed to 

Latin American countries including Brazil, Chile, and 

Venezuela.55

At the same time, Russia also competes with other 

extra-hemispheric actors for the Latin America defense market. Examples include a 2012 bid for an air 

defense systems contract in Peru, in which Russian 

and Chinese companies went head-to-head. In Venezuela, Russian arms sales have been to some degree 

displaced by sales to Chinese companies, beginning 

with a $500 million contract in July 2012 to the Chinese 

arms company NORINCO. The contract included purchase of armored vehicles, fighter aircraft, and other 

advanced equipment once supplied almost solely by 

Russian companies to the Venezuelan market.56

With respect to commerce, Russian, Chinese, and 

Indian companies have competed for oil blocks and 

mining concessions in Venezuela, Ecuador, and other 

countries of the region. In Argentina, for example, 

Russian and Chinese companies have been rivals in 

the energy sector for hydroelectric projects such as the 

Nestor Kirchner and Jorge Copernic facilities on Argentina’s Santa Cruz River, as well as for the construction of new nuclear facilities.57

RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN 

AMERICA COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY

The following section of this monograph analyzes 

Russian activities in Latin America and the Caribbean 

on a country-by-country basis, with an emphasis on 

political and military engagement, as well as Russian 

commercial projects in the region in sectors such as 
23

petroleum, mining, energy infrastructure, and to 

a lesser extent, trade. While this section attempts to 

cover the most significant country relationships, 

commercial ventures, and interactions, it does not attempt to provide an exhaustive list of all countries or 

Russian activities in the region.

Mexico. 

The current Mexico-Russia relationship is relatively modest, although during the Cold War, the Soviet Union courted left-of-center Mexican Presidents 

like Luis Echeverría, who, in 1973, became the first 

Latin American leader to visit the Soviet Union. Reciprocally in 2004, Russian President Putin traveled to 

Mexico for a state visit, meeting with his counterpart, 

Vicente Fox. In 2005, Fox reciprocated by making a 

state visit to Russia, and the two met again in the G-8 

(United States, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Italy, 

Canada, and Russia) + G-5 (United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the UK) meeting in St. Petersburg 

in 2006.58 As a legacy of Mexico’s independent posture 

in the Americas, that country has traditionally maintained some military interactions with Russia. 

In the domain of arms sales, the Mexican navy has 

purchased Russian BTR-60 and Ural-4320 armored 

vehicles, 52 of which remain in service,59 as well as 

9K38 Igla anti-aircraft missiles. Russia has also sold to 

Mexico 24 Mi-17 Hip-H helicopters, acquired between 

1996 and 1999, as well as 12 Mi-8T Hip-C transport 

helicopters and two Antonov An-124 heavy transport 

aircraft.60 As with Russian military engagements in 

other Latin American countries, such sales have created opportunities for interactions for the maintenance 

of, and modifications to, the equipment. Beginning in 
24

May 2014, Mexico begun to send its aging Mi-17s and 

Mi-8Ts helicopters to Russia for upgrades, even as it 

replaced another part of the same military transport 

fleet with European Airbus Super Puma helicopters.61

Security interactions have also extended beyond arms 

sales to Russian assistance in the struggle against organized crime, with an agreement signed between the 

two governments on the topic in 2010.62

In addition to military actions, Russia also engages 

with Mexico in the commercial sphere to a greater degree than is commonly recognized. In 2013, Mexico 

was Russia’s 6th largest trading partner in the region, 

although almost the entire relationship ($827 million 

out of $849 billion in bilateral trade) was Mexican purchases of Russian products.63 Mexico’s exports to Russia also include a relatively large quantity of manufactured goods. Indeed, 55 percent of Mexican exports to 

Russia in 2013 were motorized vehicles (cars, trucks, 

motorcycles, etc.), although another 12 percent was 

alcohol and other beverages. For Russia, half of the 

nation’s exports to Mexico in 2013 were iron and steel, 

with another 21 percent being fertilizers, and another 

18 percent being mineral fuels and oils.64

With respect to specific Russian investments in 

Mexico, Russian oil companies have expressed interest in the nation’s petroleum sector, seeking to capitalize on opportunities for participation for foreign nationals created by reforms to the sector. The first major 

foray by a Russian firm into the sector was the Russian firm Lukoil, which signed an agreement with the 

Mexican state oil company Pemex in February 2014 to 

cooperate in oil exploration and the supply of oil technology.65 As in other Latin American countries, the 

Russian atomic energy agency Rosatom has signed an 

agreement with the Mexican government to assist in 
25

the development of civilian nuclear power,66 although 

the agreement has not yet produced a significant 

commercial initiative.

In aviation, the Mexican commercial airline Interjet has purchased $650 million in Superjet-100 planes 

from Russia’s Sukhoi.67 Russia has also sought to facilitate tourism and other travel with Mexico, with 

the two countries establishing direct flights between 

Moscow and Cancun.68 In general, the focus of Russian tourism in Mexico has been the state of Quintana 

Roo, the location of Cancun and the Caribbean beach 

resorts of Riviera Maya, with an estimated 30,000 

Russians visiting the state in 2011 alone.69

Despite its close relations to the United States, 

Mexico’s interest in exporting goods to Russia has positioned it to benefit from Russia’s dispute with the 

United States and Europe over the Ukraine. As with 

other countries such as Argentina and Brazil, when 

Russia suspended purchases of agricultural goods 

from the United States and Europe,70 the Mexican 

government repeatedly sought to facilitate opportunities for Mexican companies to increase agricultural exports to Russia,71 but found little interest among them 

in doing so.72

Nicaragua. 

During the Cold War, Russian and Cuban assistance helped bring the FSLN and its leader Ortega to 

power,73 and help the government to survive the challenge posed by the contra insurgency. Nonetheless, 

the relationship atrophied following Russia’s withdraw from the region in 1989 and the loss of power 

by the Sandinistas in the February 1990 Nicaraguan 

national election.
26

The renovation of close relations between Russia 

and Nicaragua that began in 2008 was triggered by 

a coincidence of imperatives and enabling conditions 

on both the Nicaraguan and Russian sides. In January 

2007, former Nicaraguan President and revolutionary 

Ortega returned to power after prevailing in a complex presidential election in which both his Sandinista movement and the more conservative opposition 

were split. If Ortega was looking for an opportunity to 

show his Russian allies that Nicaragua could still be 

useful to Moscow in the post-Cold War era, such an 

opportunity presented itself in September 2008 during the civil war in Georgia, when Ortega’s government became the first in Latin America to recognize 

diplomatically the pro-Russian breakaway republics 

of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 

In the context of the same conflict, in the final 

months of 2008, Russia reached out to receptive states 

in Latin America and the Caribbean in order to conduct political and military activities in close proximity to the United States. This action was intended to 

send a symbolic warning to the United States that 

Russia was capable of acting in the U.S. “backyard,” 

in response to what it interpreted as U.S. meddling 

in its own sphere of interest. Nicaragua was one of 

the states, along with Venezuela and Cuba, which 

agreed to host some of the most provocative aspects 

of the Russian demonstration. Specifically, Nicaragua 

received two Russian nuclear-capable, supersonic 

Tu-160 bombers sent by Russia to conduct flights in 

the Caribbean. A month later, in December, it similarly hosted a visiting flotilla of Russian warships led

by the cruiser Peter the Great.

74

Following the incidents of 2008, Nicaragua continued to play a key role in Russian military engage-
27

ment with the region. In April 2013, Chief of Staff of 

the Russian Armed Forces General Valery Gerasimov 

traveled to Nicaragua to preside over the opening of a 

munitions disposal facility in the country, and to discuss military cooperation between the two countries.75

While there, he also showcased a new military training center which Moscow was constructing in Managua, the “Marshall Zukhov” military counternarcotics 

training center, also in Managua,76 building upon a 

counternarcotics cooperation agreement signed between the two nations in March 2013.77 Through the 

new center, Russia is potentially able to interact not 

only with Nicaraguan law enforcement officers, but 

also those from other Central American countries, 

as well as Ecuador and the Dominican Republic, 

among others.

In September 2013, two Russian warships made 

a port call in the Nicaraguan Pacific-Coast port of 

Corinto, after visiting Cuba and passing through the 

Panama Canal.78 At the end of October of 2013, Nicaragua was visited by a Russian delegation headed 

by the Secretary of the Russian Federation Security 

Council (and former head of the Russian intelligence 

service) Nikolai Patrushev,79 resulting in the signing 

of an agreement for Russian support in the modernization of Nicaragua’s armed forces.80 Also emerging 

from the Patrushev visit was an agreement facilitating 

high-level consultations between the High Command 

of Nicaragua and Russia’s Security Council, advancing the level of strategic cooperation between the two 

countries.81

In conjunction with the Patrushev visit, in a manner paralleling events of September 2008, two Russian 

Tu-160s, made a trip to the region, first flying from 

Russia to Venezuela, before conducting aerial maneu-
28

vers in the Caribbean and landing in Nicaragua. While 

on return from Nicaragua to Venezuela, the bombers 

caused an international incident when they made unauthorized incursions into Colombian airspace in the 

proximity of the Colombian island of San Andres and 

the surrounding cays.82 This act that was seen by some 

in Colombia as a message of Russia’s support to Nicaragua’s claim to the waters surrounding the islands, 

and perhaps the islands and cays themselves.83 The 

coincidence of the incursion with the visit of Patrushev (considered a hard-liner), raised the possibility 

that the incursion was a signal sent to Colombia following coordination between Patrushev and Ortega, 

although no concrete evidence substantiating such a 

connection has emerged. 

Later in October (possibly also linked to the Patrushev visit), President Ortega requested, and the 

Sandinista-dominated Nicaraguan parliament passed, 

a resolution authorizing visits to Nicaragua by Russian warships, military aircraft and ground forces, as 

well as authorizing Russian forces to conduct patrols 

off of Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast near the Colombian island of San Andres and surrounding cays,84 although as of the date of this writing, the Russians had 

not done so. Russia-Nicaragua military interactions 

and announcements of future cooperation continued 

to expand throughout 2014 as tensions between the 

United States and Russia increased over the conflict 

in the Ukraine. In February 2014, as noted previously, 

Nicaragua was one of three Latin American countries 

mentioned by Russian Defense Minister Shoigu as 

candidates for establishing new Russian maintenance 

bases in the Caribbean.85 In June 2014, Russia opened 

a maintenance facility for military vehicles in Nicaragua in support of that nation’s mechanized brigade, 
29

further allowing Russia to expand its military 

presence there.86

In general, Russia-Nicaragua military cooperation 

has paralleled other aspects of the re-engagement between the two countries that began in 2008. In 2013, 

the two countries signed an agreement regarding Russian support for the modernization of the Nicaraguan 

armed forces.87 Pursuant to that agreement, new Russian military equipment has begun to appear in Nicaragua, including two Mi-17 aircraft,88 BMP-1 armored 

personnel carriers, BM-21 mobile rocket launchers, 

PT-76 light armored vehicles, and announced negotiations for Mig-29 fighter aircraft.89 Russia has further donated equipment to the Nicaraguan military, 

including $500,000 in first aid equipment donated 

in January 2014,90 and has discussed selling Nicaragua Russian patrol boats and the Tigr light armored 

vehicle.91

Russia military-to-military engagement also has 

included sending Nicaraguan personnel to Russian 

institutions for training,92 as well as conducting joint 

counternarcotics operations on Nicaraguan soil. In 

March 2013, for example, a joint Russia-Nicaragua 

operation against a local drug gang resulted in the arrest of 41 persons and the seizure of 10 “containers” of 

cocaine.93

With respect to Russia-Nicaragua commercial activities, by contrast to the significant amount of military cooperation between the two countries since 2008, 

trade between the two has been a modest $522 million, 

with all but $18 million of that Nicaraguan imports of 

Russian products.94 Of Nicaraguan exports to Russia 

in 2013, 95 percent were comprised of three products: 

oilseeds, coffee, and meat, in that order. Similarly, 80 

percent of Russia’s exports to Nicaragua during the 
30

period were cereals, with an additional 9 percent being 

fertilizers.95 Specific commercial transactions between 

Russia-Nicaragua are dominated by the donation of 

goods, or their purchase by the Nicaraguan state with 

concessional loans, followed by their resale within the 

country. Key examples of such transactions since 2008 

include Russia’s gift of 520 buses, 500 Lada-brand cars 

and trucks,96 and 100,000 tons of wheat, as well as the 

construction of a $41 million hospital.97

The largest project in which Russia has considered 

participating in Nicaragua is the canal connecting the 

Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the country. Possible Russian support for the canal, long desired in Nicaragua, 

was a key discussion topic in Ortega’s trip to Moscow 

in 2008,98 although the countries did not proceed forward with the project at that time.99 In 2012, the initiative shifted to an even more ambitious $40-$80 billion 

canal project spearheaded by Chinese businessman 

Wang Jing and his company Hong Kong Nicaragua 

Development (HKND). Yet, despite the media attention given to the possibility of a leading role by the 

Chinese government and banks in the project, Russia 

also continues to pursue an interest in participating in 

some fashion. When Russian President Putin made an 

unscheduled stop in Managua as part of his July 2014 

trip to Latin America, analysts speculated that Russian participation in the canal project was part of the 

agenda.100 In a follow-up visit by a Russian delegation 

in September 2014, the Nicaraguan civil defense authority announced that Russia would provide equipment to be used in the construction of the canal.101

Guatemala. 

Within Central America, Guatemala is an outlier as 

a Central American state which has maintained some 
31

economic and diplomatic ties with Russia despite a 

legacy of unsuccessful attempts by Marxist guerillas to 

overthrow its conservative government.102 Although 

Guatemala technically established relations with the 

Soviet Union in 1945, political and other engagement 

between the two countries remained limited during 

Guatemala’s 30-year long civil war from 1960 through 

1990, in which Russia was seen to back the insurgents 

seeking to overthrow the Guatemalan government.103

Even after the peace accords of 1996, which put an end 

to the Guatemalan civil war, the country conducted 

diplomatic relations with Russia through Costa Rica 

until 2007, when Russia established an embassy in 

Guatemala City. In March 2010, Alvaro Colom became the first Guatemalan president to visit Russia.104

The trip, however, occurred near the end of his term, 

and Colom’s successor, General Otto Perez Molina, 

has not shown a similar interest in diplomatic engagement with the country.

With respect to economic interactions, Russian 

companies have had a small presence in Guatemala’s 

mining and petroleum sectors. In 2011, for example, 

the Russian firm Solway purchased the Fenix ferronickel mine near the town of El Estor.105 The resulting entity Compania Guatemalteca de Niquel has subsequently invested $450 million dollars in the sector.106

In petroleum, in July 2013, the Russian-backed Panamanian company Zacapa was granted a concession 

by the Guatemalan Ministry of Energy and Mines to 

explore for gas and oil.107

Venezuela. 

Venezuela, alongside Nicaragua and Cuba, has 

arguably been one of Russia’s cornerstones for the 
32

re-engagement that it has pursued with the region 

since 2008. Although Venezuela lacks the legacy of 

intergovernmental collaboration with Russia during 

the Cold War that mark Cuba and Nicaragua’s relationship with Russia, Venezuela has partially compensated for that through its willingness to support 

Russian initiatives in the region, the magnitude of its 

arms purchases from Russia, and the significance of 

its oil reserves, in which Russian firms have shown a 

strong interest.

The story of Venezuela’s contemporary engagement with Russia began in 2006, with a focus on arms 

purchases. The Venezuelan regime of former military 

officer Hugo Chavez turned to Russia to buy arms 

when the U.S. refused to sell the nation spare parts for 

its F-16s fighter aircraft. Venezuela was motivated to 

turn away from Western arms suppliers almost entirely when the United States successfully prevented European arms manufacturers from selling their product 

to the country, based on agreements that those manufacturers had signed in order to incorporate U.S. technology in their own weapons. These sales108 became 

the initial lynchpin of Venezuela-Russia cooperation, 

allowing Venezuelan leader Chavez to simultaneously defy U.S. attempts to deny him arms, while keeping 

his supporters within the Venezuelan military happy.

Against this backdrop, when U.S.-Russia tensions 

escalated in 2008 over the crisis in Georgia, Chavez 

was willing to make Venezuela available to Russia 

as a platform through which the latter could engage 

diplomatically with, and project, military forces to the 

region in order to send the United States a warning 

and potentially distract it from engaging in Georgia 

by putting the United States strategically at risk in its 

own “backyard.”
33

As noted previously, Nicaragua recognized the 

pro-Russian breakaway republics of Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia, and Venezuela was the lead actor to 

receive Russia’s nuclear-capable Tu-160 supersonic 

bombers when they deployed to the Western Hemisphere in September 2008 amidst the escalating conflict. Similarly, 2 1/2 months later, Venezuela was the 

first country in the region to receive the four-ship flotilla of Russian warships led by the cruiser Peter the 

Great. Naval exercises were conducted with the ships 

before they moved on to visit Nicaragua and Cuba. In 

each case, the Chavez regime showed that it was willing to go beyond provocative anti-Western rhetoric 

to host Russian military forces that the United States 

might have perceived as menacing, with the risk of 

provoking military action from the United States.

Despite Venezuela’s enthusiasm to receive Russian 

military assets, the Russians, for their part, were careful to ensure that, in sending a message to the United 

States through their actions, they were not perceived 

as excessively provocative. Prior to the arrival of the 

Tu-160s, for example, Russia publicly announced that 

they were not carrying nuclear weapons.109 Moreover, 

when the naval flotilla arrived in Venezuela, Russia 

cut short the scheduled 3-day exercise between the 

ships and the Venezuelan navy, and denied a request 

by Venezuelan President Chavez to visit the lead 

Russian ship.110

Following the departure of the Russian naval flotilla, the Chavez regime continued to remind the United States of its willingness to offer itself as a host for 

Russian military and other activities in the Americas. 

In March 2009, for example, Chavez announced that 

he would allow Russia to use Venezuelan terrain to 

base strategic bombers, presumably for use against 

the United States. Yet, the island that he publicly men-
34

tioned for basing the aircraft, La Orchilla,111 was far 

too small to permit the take-off of the Russian aircraft 

in question, even if a runway was built from one tip 

of the island to the other. This suggested that the announcement had been more a message to provoke the 

United States than a serious initiative.

Such Venezuelan openness to military collaboration with Russia has continued to the present day. 

When Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu announced 

in February 2014 that Russia would establish permanent facilities in the region to receive and resupply its 

military forces, it included Venezuela as one of the 

three Latin American regimes to serve as a possible 

host, along with Cuba and Nicaragua.112

Venezuela’s purchases of Russian arms, mentioned 

previously as the launch point of the contemporary 

close Venezuela-Russia relationship, has served as a 

compliment to its willingness to host Russian military 

forces. From 2001 through 2013, Russia sold Venezuela over $11 billion in military goods,113 making the 

country by far the principal purchaser of Russian 

arms in the Western Hemisphere, accounting for over 

two-thirds of the $14.5 billion in sales to the region by 

the Russian arms supplier Rosoboronexport.114 Russia’s arms sales between 2006 and 2014 may be loosely divided into three groups of purchases. The first 

group of sales, with a value of approximately $4 billion, was focused on helicopters, fighter aircraft, and 

small arms. Venezuela purchased 53 helicopters from 

Russia, including 38 Mi-17V-5s, 10 Mi-35M2 attack 

helicopters, and three Mi-26T2 heavy transports.115 Indeed, the quantity of Russian helicopters sold to Venezuela was so great that in 2011, the Russian company 

Transas announced that it was setting up a regional 

center for helicopter instruction there.116 In addition to 
35

helicopters, the first group of Venezuelan purchases 

also included 24 Su-30 fighter aircraft and 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, as well as Russian assistance in building a factory in the country to assemble them.117

The second group of Russian arms sales to Venezuela, whose negotiation and delivery spanned the 

period from roughly 2008 through 2011, included 12 

Tor-M1 self-propelled air defense systems, Zu-23 antiaircraft guns, 12 9K58 Smerch multiple rocket systems, 

2S23 120 millimeter (mm) self-propelled mortars, IglaS man-portable surface-to-air missiles,118 and T-72B1V 

tanks, of which Venezuela eventually purchased 

192.119 Other Russian systems acquired by Venezuela 

during this period also included BMP-3 and BTR-8A 

armored personnel carriers,120 Bal-E mobile coastal 

defense missile systems, Buk-2ME and S-300VM Antey-2500 mobile anti-aircraft missile systems.121

The third group of sales, which were negotiated 

as Chavez’ health deteriorated in 2012, was only partially realized due to deepening economic problems 

in Venezuela. This group included Russian fast attack 

boats, submarines, and Yak-130 fighters to replace 

Venezuela’s aging F-5s,122 as well as 10 Mi-28 NG 

Night Hunter attack helicopters.123 Agreements for 

even more arms purchases were signed in May 2014, 

between the commander in chief of the Venezuelan 

armed forces Carmen Meléndez Rivas, and the Vicepresident of the Russian Federal Military Technical 

Cooperation Service, Andrei Boltsov, on the occasion 

of the 10th Ruso-Venezuelan High-Level Intergovernmental Commission.124

With respect to the Russia-Venezuela commercial 

engagement, Venezuela is Russia’s second largest 

trade partner in the region behind Brazil, yet the relationship is extremely imbalanced. In 2013, for example, 
36

all but $10 million of the $3.42 billion in Russia-Venezuela bilateral trade was Venezuelan purchases from 

Russia.125 With respect to the composition of Russian 

exports to Venezuela, according to the United Nations (UN) COMTRADE database, in 2013, 92 percent 

of those exports were accounted for by three types of 

goods: 59 percent of the total were arms, 26 percent 

were vehicles (cars, trucks, and motorcycles), and 7 

percent were electrical and electronic equipment.126

With respect to specific nonmilitary projects in 

Venezuela, Russian companies have leveraged the 

favorable political relationship between the two countries to build a significant presence in Venezuela’s oil 

sector, although Russian companies operating there 

have experienced numerous difficulties. In 2009, a 

five-company Russian consortium committed to an 

investment of $16.2 billion to develop the Junin-6 oil 

block in the newly nationalized Orinoco tar sands, 

with the resulting Russia-PdVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., the Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company) venture operation named “Petromiranda.”127 The deal included payment of a $600 million 

signing bonus to PdVSA.128 In addition, the Russian 

oil company Rosneft (part of the Junin-6 consortium) 

subsequently contracted with PdVSA for rights to the 

Carabobo 2 block, making a royalty payment of $1 billion for those rights,129 while the Russian firm Lukoil 

contracted for the Junin-3 block.130

As with other multinational firms, the Russian 

companies in the Venezuelan oil sector experienced 

delays in working with their Venezuelan partners to 

invest and bring production on line.131 Due to such 

frustrations, in January 2013, the Russian firm Surgutneftegaz pulled out of the Junin-6 consortium, 

selling its stake to Rosneft.132 In October 2013, Lukoil 

similarly announced that it was withdrawing from the 
37

country.133 As other Russian companies have pulled 

out of oil operations in the Orinoco tar belt, Russian 

petroleum activities in Venezuela have become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the Russian 

firm Rosneft, headed by Igor Sechin, a former Soviet-era intelligence operative close to Putin. Sechin’s 

long-term interest and expanding stake in the Venezuela petroleum sector was illustrated in 2014 when 

he sponsored the construction of a statue dedicated 

to Chavez, in the late Venezuelan leader’s home town 

of Sabaneta, and traveled to the town to dedicate it 

personally.134 Indeed, in July 2014, the consolidation 

of Russian oil activities in Venezuela in the hands of 

Rosneft continued with the company’s purchase of the 

Venezuelan assets of Weatherford International.135

In addition to petroleum, Russia also has a modest presence in Venezuela’s mining sector, although, 

there, as in the petroleum sector, its companies have 

experienced difficulties. In January 2009, the Russian 

mining company Rusoro formed joint venture concessions with the Venezuelan government to develop the 

Las Cristinas and Brisas minerals fields. The award 

took by surprise the Canadian firm Crystallex, which 

had applied for permits to develop the properties.136

Yet Rusoro did not fare much better in dealing with 

the Chavez regime than had Crystallex, and by August 

2012, Rusoro had become embroiled in a legal dispute 

with the regime over its Venezuela operations.137

Nor have Russian projects in Venezuela been limited to arms, petroleum, and mining. Russia has reportedly discussed a joint venture with the Venezuelan 

government to construct a shipyard.138

In the financial sector, in 2009, Russia and Venezuela announced a joint-capital bank to fund projects 

in the country,139 with $4 billion in initial funds.140 Its 
38

principal focus, to date, has been underwriting the 

sale of Russian arms to the country,141 with loans of $2 

billion in 2012 and $2 billion in 2013 to support such 

transactions.142

Cuba. 

From 1959, when Fidel Castro and his supporters 

overthrew the Batista government and took power in 

Havana, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 

Cuba served as Russia’s principal partner for engaging with, and advancing, its strategic position in the 

region. When Moscow sought to rebuild its relationships with Latin America and the Caribbean prior to 

its high-profile political and military moves in 2008, 

it began with a low-key attempt to repair its relations 

with Cuba.

During the Cold War period, Russia was Cuba’s 

principal patron and ally, as well as its main collaborator for advancing anti-U.S. revolutionary movements in the third world, including Latin America, the 

Caribbean, and Africa. For Russia, in the form of the 

Soviet Union, post-Revolution Cuba was the principal 

gateway in Latin America and the Caribbean for activities with state partners, insurgents, and other groups 

to advance global communism and the strategic position of the Soviet Union.143 Russia reciprocated the 

favor, providing not only billions of dollars in arms, 

loans, and aid to Cuba, but also hosting tens of thousands of Cubans to travel to Russia for education in its 

universities.144

During the Cold War period, the Soviet Union 

also maintained its most important overseas signals 

collection facility at Lourdes, Cuba,145 housing an 

estimated 3,000 Soviet intelligence specialists. With 
39

respect to military support, between 1961 and 1991, 

Russia provided Cuba with an estimated $16 billion 

in arms, including T-55 and T-62 tanks; anti-aircraft 

defenses; MiG-29, MiG-23, and MiG-21 fighters; Mi24, Mi-17, Mi-8, and Mi-14 helicopters, among other 

equipment.146

Russia’s withdrawal from the region in 1989 created significant financial hardship for Cuba for which 

it was able to compensate only partly through help 

from the PRC. Nonetheless, Russia’s withdraw left 

lingering resentment within the Cuban leadership.147

With the election of Putin to the Russian Presidency, 

the country began cautiously to rebuild its ties with 

Cuba. Putin visited the country in December 2000, and 

in September 2004, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov 

made a visit to the country.148 Reciprocally, in December 2006, Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque 

visited Russia.149

When Russia began the current stage of its reengagement with Latin America in 2008, it featured 

Cuba prominently in its outreach, alongside of Nicaragua and Venezuela, as noted previously. Russian President Medvedev made a point to visit Cuba, 

although only for 1 day, during his November 2008 

Latin America trip and met with both President Raul 

Castro and his brother, Fidel.150 Raul Castro reciprocated with a trip to Russia 2 months later, in January 

2009, 22 years after the last visit by a Cuban president 

to the country, that of his brother, Fidel.151

Despite such activity, Cuba’s embrace of Russia’s 

re-engagement with the region in 2008 was subtly 

less enthusiastic than that by Venezuela and Nicaragua, arguably reflecting lingering resentment over 

the economic hardship caused by Russia’s precipitous withdraw from the region in 1991. By contrast to 
40

Venezuela and Nicaragua, Cuba did not follow Russia 

and diplomatically recognize the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008 when they broke 

away from Georgia.152 Similarly, it was Venezuela, 

rather than Cuba, that initially hosted the two Russian 

Tu-160 bombers when they deployed to the region in 

September 2008. Nor did Cuba participate in the naval exercise which Venezuela and Russia conducted 

in the Caribbean, although the flotilla did make a port 

call in the Port of Havana, Cuba, following conclusion 

of the exercise.153

As Russian re-engagement with the region continued in the years which followed, Cuba continued to 

play an important role. Following his departure from 

the Russian presidency in May 2012, Medvedev paid a 

new visit to Cuba in February 2013, this time as Prime 

Minister. When Putin traveled to the region in 2014 in 

the context of the escalating crisis in the Ukraine, he 

made Cuba the first stop on his trip.154

With respect to military cooperation, since 2008, 

Cuba has consistently been included in virtually all 

Russian deployments to the region, although typically 

with Venezuela playing the leading role. Because of its 

proximity to the United States, Cuba has also repeatedly played a role as host for the real and proposed 

positioning of Russian military assets in the region, as 

well as being the recipient of modest quantities of new 

Russian arms and military-to-military personnel and 

training interactions.

Beyond such temporary deployments and with 

Cuba’s proximity to the United States, the nation may 

be resuming its Cold War role as host for Russian collection of signals intelligence (SIGINT) against the 

United States. In February 2014, as the crisis in the 

Ukraine escalated, the Vishnya-class Russian SIGINT 
41

ship Viktor Leonov (SSV-175) conducted operations in 

the Caribbean, then made a port call in Havana harbor.155 With respect to land-based SIGINT facilities, in 

July 2014, Russia indicated that it would re-activate 

and send personnel to the facility at Lourdes, Cuba, 

just 155 miles from the United States, which it used to 

monitor the United States during the Cold War.156

Beyond intelligence collection, Cuba has also been 

mentioned by Russia as a candidate for the servicing, 

or even basing, of offensive military assets. In March 

2009, Chief of Staff of Russia’s long range aviation Major General Anatoly Zhikharev captured the attention 

of the international press when he spoke publicly of 

the possibility of using Cuba (in addition to Venezuela), as a base for Russian military aircraft. Russian 

defense officials quickly qualified his remarks, saying 

that the General had been speaking only hypothetically.157 Although Zhikharev’s comments were not followed up by concrete action, the theme re-emerged in 

February 2014, when Shoigu indicated that Cuba was 

one of three Latin American countries (the other two 

being Venezuela and Nicaragua) in which Russia was 

considering facilities to receive and resupply its warships and other military assets.158

With respect to post-2008 arms sales, Moscow is 

helping Cuba to maintain and upgrade its legacy Cold 

War era Russian military equipment. In 2011, for example, Russia built an assembly line for the production of 7.62-mm rounds for Kalashnikov rifles at the 

Che Guevara weapons factory in the eastern part of 

the country, after having constructed a similar facility in Venezuela.159 The nation has also resumed gifts 

and sales of arms on credit to Cuba. In April 2013, 

for example, Gerasimov visited the country and announced that Russia would give Cuba a $650 million 
42

credit for the purchase of eight military aircraft: two 

Tupolev Tu-204s, three Antonov An-158s, and three 

Ilushyn-96-400 aircraft.160 In December 2013, Russia 

announced that it was restructuring Cuba’s $35 billion 

Cold War debt,161 with Russian President Putin finalizing the write-off of all but $3.5 billion during his July 

2014 visit to Havana.162

Russia and Cuba are also collaborating in various 

strategic technology areas. For a number of years, Russia and Cuba have collaborated in the area of medical 

research,163 including biotechnology.164 During Putin’s 

July 2014 visit to the region, Cuba also agreed to host 

ground facilities for the Russian GLONASS (Global 

Navigation Satellite System), which competes with 

the U.S.-based global positioning system (GPS).165

With respect to other types of commercial cooperation, Cuba-Russia ties have been more modest than 

suggested by the history of close military and political 

cooperation between the two countries. Russia-Cuba 

trade was almost $179 million in 2013, ranking it 15th 

among Russia’s trading partners in Latin America, 

and less than a 10th of Cuba’s $1.88 billion in trade 

with China.166 Of the Russia-Cuba trade, all but $32 

billion were Cuban imports of products from Russia.167 According to the UN COMTRADE database, 

27 percent of those Russian exports to Cuba in 2013 

was equipment for nuclear reactors, 24 percent was 

vehicles (cars, trucks, buses, and motorcycles), and 11 

percent was railway equipment, followed by rubber 

goods and electrical machinery.168 At the individual 

firm level, Russian companies are present in the Cuban gas and oil sector, the electricity sector, logistics 

and construction, the Cuban nickel industry, sugar 

refining, and tourism among others. Cuba also hosts 

Russian-Cuban and Cuban-Russian business councils. 
43

During 2008 to 2014, Russia expanded its presence 

in the Cuban petroleum sector, with the Russian firms 

Gazprom and Rosneft drilling for oil in the Gulf of 

Mexico.169 The Russian firm Zarubezhneft is also present, drilling in the Boca de Jaruco oilfield in cooperation with Cuba’s state oil company Cupet.170

With respect to other infrastructure projects, Russia has also agreed to fund the construction of four 

200 megawatt power stations to boost capability at 

the Cuban Maximo Gomez and East Havana thermoelectric power plants, with the work to be done by 

the Russian firm Inter Rao.171 Russian companies are 

also participating in the construction of a new international airport at San Antonio de los Baños.172 They 

are also reportedly involved in upgrading the port of 

Mariel, 173 which Cuba hopes to turn into a major logistics hub, with potential investment from Russian 

and other companies in the special economic zone 

associated with the port.174

For years, going back to the Soviet period, Russian purchases of Cuban sugar have also been an 

important part of the relationship between the two 

countries.175 Nonetheless, although the Cuban government has sought foreign investment in its sugar industry, to date, Russian companies have not sought to 

participate in the sector.176

With respect to tourism, Cuba has long been a favored destination for Russians seeking to escape their 

nation’s cold climate, with an estimated 70,000 Russian tourists visiting Cuba in 2013.177 Yet, in recent 

years, Russia has been engaged in negotiating visafree access to other countries in the Caribbean and 

Latin America, to facilitate travel by its citizens to a 

broader array of tourist destinations.
44

Guyana. 

Russian activities in Guyana have principally concentrated on the bauxite mining, although the RussiaGuyana relationship also reflects the political legacy 

of Russian courtship of Guyanese leftists during the 

Cold War. The People’s Progressive Party (PPP), under which Guyana achieved independence from Great 

Britain, was significantly left-of-center, and Cheddi 

Jagan, one of its two founding fathers, was openly 

Marxist, defying the United States to maintain relations with Cuba after that country’s revolution in 1959. 

Afro-Guyanese independence leader Forbes Burnham, who came to power after Jagan, openly courted 

the Soviet Union for loans and fostered ties between 

his People’s National Congress (PNC) and the Soviet 

Communist Party.178

The continuity of the Russia-Guyana relationship from the Cold War period to today can be seen 

in Guyana’s most recently retired President, Bharat 

Jagdeo. Jagdeo, who still is believed to exercise considerable influence in his country, also has personal 

ties to Russia, having studied economics there, receiving a degree from the People’s Friendship University 

of Russia in 1990.179 In February 2010, Jagdeo made a 

politically charged, albeit little recognized, state visit 

to Russia in which he spoke warmly of his host and 

openly invited Russia to expand its presence in the 

Caribbean.180

In terms of Russia’s commercial relationship with 

Guyana, the International Monetary Fund lists trade 

between the two countries as negligible, with less than 

$1 million in imports to, and exports from, the two 

countries in 2013.181 Bauxite dominates the RussiaGuyana trade relationship, with 95 percent of Guya-
45

nese exports to Russia in 2013 categorized as mineral 

ores, followed by a small quantity of animal products 

and textiles. Reciprocally, 60 percent of Russian exports to Guyana were rubber products; 18 percent, 

iron and steel; and 8 percent, vehicles (cars, trucks, 

buses, and motorcycles).182

Since the 1970s, the Soviet Union, and now Russia 

as its successor, have purchased Guyanese bauxite.183

The physical presence of Russian companies in Guyana’s bauxite sector, however, dates to 2004, when the 

mining company Russia Aluminum (RusAl) signed a 

joint venture agreement with the Guyanese government to conduct mining operations in the country, 

creating the Bauxite Corporation of Guyana (BCGI). In 

2006, RusAl acquired Guyana’s state-owned Aroaima 

Mining Company,184 transforming BCGI into a subsidiary of RusAl. Following RusAl’s consolidation of 

control over Guyana’s bauxite assets and a 2007 visit 

to Russia by President Jagdeo, Russia also sent a team 

to evaluate possible construction of a hydroelectric facility to support the processing of the bauxite ore,185

although the plans did not result in a concrete project. 

RusAl’s relationship with the Guyanese community 

since establishing itself in the country have been difficult, with multiple strikes and a decision by BCGI 

to “de-recognize” the Guyana Bauxite & General 

Workers Union (GB&GWU), with whom it had been 

negotiating.186

Although Russia has not highlighted its relationship with Guyana as part of its relationship with 

Latin America, it has continued to focus attention 

on Guyana in recent years. This includes the writeoff of $56.7 million in Guyanese debt to Russia in 

February 2013.187
46

Jamaica. 

As a fellow part of the Caribbean basin, the history 

and nature of Jamaica’s relations with Russia resemble 

those of Guyana, as described earlier. Although the Jamaican socialist government of Michael Manley, who 

came to power in 1972, developed friendly relations 

with Cuba and, to some degree, the Soviet Union,188 a 

relatively deeply rooted and widespread spirit of antiCommunism inhibited closer USSR-Jamaica relations 

during the Cold War, and left Russia with a very limited base upon which to build relations today.189

The contemporary Russia-Jamaica commercial relationship is dominated by bauxite. The International 

Monetary Fund recorded only $93 million in trade between the two countries in 2013, of which almost all 

was Jamaican exports to Russia.190 Correspondingly, 

99 percent of these exports were categorized as inorganic chemicals, presumably bauxite.191 The physical 

presence of Russian companies in the Jamaican bauxite sector began in 2007 when RusAl merged with its 

smaller rival, the Siberian Urals Aluminum Company 

(SUAL), as well as the aluminum assets of the multinational Glencore, to form a new company United RusAl 

with a 65 percent stake in the Jamaican company Aluminum Partners (Alpart), as well as a 93 percent stake 

in the West Indies Alumina Company (Windalco).192

Russian bauxite operations in Jamaica experienced 

difficulties almost from the beginning. With the fall 

in global aluminum prices in the late-1990s, United 

RusAl was force to scale back its Jamaica operations, 

shutting down its Kirkvine and Alvine facilities in 

March 2009,193 and closing Windalco in March 2010.194

Nonetheless, the company also took advantage of the 

depressed market to expand its position in the sector, 
47

buying out the 35 percent stake that its Norwegian 

partner, Norsk Hydro, had in the Alpart project,195

while also acquiring the Jamaican government’s 7 

percent stake in Windalco in 2014,196 forgiving debts 

owed to RusAl by Jamaica, in exchange its equity in 

Windalco.197

As in Guyana, RusAl’s perceived heavy-handed 

style in managing its bauxite operations in Jamaica 

gave rise to some political tensions in the country. In 

June 2014, the government threatened to strip RusAl 

of its concession in the Kirkvine and Alvine refineries if they did not resume operations.198 Nonetheless, 

beyond the issue of its plant closures, RusAl’s relationship with Jamaican society has generally been 

positive. Following practices common among other 

multinational companies operating in the country, the 

company employed Jamaicans in management positions, and built up goodwill with its workers and the 

surrounding community by providing public works 

and social benefits.199

Beyond mining, Russia’s relationship with Jamaica 

has also focused on tourism. In 2012, the two countries 

agreed to establish nonstop flights.200 An estimated 

10,000 Russian tourists traveled to Jamaica in the first 

8 months following the start of the flights in 2013, a 644 

percent increase over the same period during the prior 

year.201 Nonetheless, the number of Russian tourists 

traveling to the country continues to be low.202

Ecuador. 

Although Russia’s relationship with Ecuador has 

not been as high-profile as that with other ALBA 

countries such as Venezuela and Nicaragua, it has 

maintained a modest but important relationship with 
48

Ecuador across a range of activities and sectors including military cooperation, petroleum, infrastructure construction, banking, and even nuclear power. 

As with other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, Russia began to expand its relationship with 

Ecuador in November 2008, the wake of tension with 

the United States over the crisis with Georgia. During that month, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa 

met in Caracas with his Russian counterpart, Medvedev, who had traveled to Venezuela to participate in 

a summit of ALBA countries. In October 2009, Correa 

followed up by traveling to Moscow (the first time an 

Ecuadorian leader had ever done so),203 and returned 

for a second time in October 2013.204 To date, however, 

neither Russian President Putin, nor his predecessor, 

Medvedev have visited Ecuador.

With respect to military interactions, Russian arms 

sales to Ecuador begun later than those to neighboring 

Peru and Colombia. One of Russia’s first major end 

item sales to Ecuador was a $22 million transaction, 

selling 2 Mi-17Es to the Ecuadorian air force,205 with 

the contract signed during Ecuadorian President Correa’s October 2009 trip to Moscow, and delivered in 

January 2011.206 During Correa’s second trip to Moscow in October 2013, Russia sought to expand military cooperation, offering a $200 million loan for the 

purchase of additional Mi-17s and other equipment.207

With respect to Russia-Ecuador commercial relations, the two countries registered $1.28 billion in 

trade in 2013. Indeed, Ecuador was also one of the few 

Latin American countries to enjoy a significant trade 

surplus with Russia, with $1.13 billion in exports to 

the country, vice $150 million in imports from it that 

year.208 According to the UN COMTRADE database, 

99 percent of Ecuador’s exports to Russia were concen-
49

trated in four categories: fruit (68 percent of the total), 

live trees and plants (23 percent), seafood (4 percent), 

and miscellaneous edible items (4 percent). Similarly, 

90 percent of Russian exports to Ecuador fell into four 

categories: mineral fuels and oils (49 percent), fertilizers (23 percent), iron and steel (11 percent), and 

cereals (7 percent).209

With respect to specific projects, the Russian company Gazprom is present in the oil sector, with a contract to operate in Block 6 in the Gulf of Guayaquil, 

including a commitment to invest a total of $1.5 billion to develop it.210 Russian energy firms and banks 

currently play a role in the renovation of Ecuador’s 

electricity production and transmission infrastructure 

(although Chinese banks and companies dominate 

the 10 projects currently underway). Two ongoing 

initiatives, are partially financed by Russia’s Ex-Im 

bank and include the supply of components by the 

Russian firm Inter Rao: (1) the $1 billion Cardenillo 

power plant in the province of Azuay (with a contract 

signed in 2014, and work on the $528 million facility 

begun in 2011); 211 and (2) a $195 million thermoelectric 

power plant.212 The Ecuadorian government has also 

publicly expressed on multiple occasions its interest 

in developing a nuclear power capability with Russian support, including a 2009 agreement between the 

two countries,213 as well as a visit to Ecuador by the 

Russian atomic energy agency, Rosatom.214

Nor has Russia-Ecuador cooperation been limited 

to energy and military cooperation. When Ecuadorian 

President Correa and Russian President Putin met in 

October 2013, they discussed an estimated $1.5 billion in collaborative projects, including a 1,800-mile 

rail link from the capital city of Quito in the Andes 

Mountains, to the Pacific Ocean. As with Russia and 
50

Venezuela, there has also been financial cooperation 

between Russia and Ecuador in support of commercial projects, with Ecuador’s central bank and Russia’s 

Vnesheconombank signing a cooperation agreement 

in June 2012.215

As with Mexico and other countries, when Russia suspended agricultural purchases from the United States and the EU, Ecuador was one of the Latin 

American countries which expanded its own exports 

to Russia to make up the difference.216

Colombia. 

The close U.S.-Colombian relationship under Columbian President Alvaro Uribe has arguably inhibited Russia’s cautious engagement with the country, yet 

Russia, nonetheless, continues to maintain low-level 

military and economic interactions with Colombia, 

while its current President, Juan Manuel Santos, has 

indicated some desire to expand the Russia-Colombia 

relationship.217

At the political level, Russia and Colombia’s mutual lack of emphasis on their relationship is illustrated by the fact that in recent years, no Colombian 

president has traveled to Russia, nor has a Russian 

president visited Colombia. Yet, Russia has indirectly 

indicated its interest in the country. According to a 

Colombian source, between approximately 2012 and 

2014, the Russian embassy in that country doubled 

its size to approximately 25 persons. In the context of 

Colombia’s close relationship with the United States 

in the post-Cold War era, Colombia has generally perceived Russia as a threat, due to its association with 

leftist governments surrounding the country (including Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, and Nicaragua), as 
51

well as for its presumed support during the Cold War 

era to groups fighting against the Colombian government, such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de 

Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

or FARC).218

On the other hand, Russia has, at times, also been 

a vehicle through which Colombia has sought to offset its dependence on the United States. The country’s 

first major military acquisition from Russia, for example, dates to 1996, when the government of Columbian President Samper became angry with the United 

States for decertifying his government on the issue of 

counterdrug cooperation (and for having blocked him 

from entering the United States because of his alleged 

drug ties). Samper turned to Russia to acquire Mi-17 

military transport helicopters.219 In 1997, Colombia 

signed a $42 million contract for 10 Mi-17s,220 eventually acquiring a total of 24 of the helicopters, as well 

as Antonov-32 high-wing transport aircraft. Although 

the acquisition created an opening for sending Colombian pilots and other personnel to Russia for training 

on the new systems. Although the Russians initially 

established a presence in Colombian bases such as 

Tolemaida for the maintenance of Russian-made helicopters and aircraft, in recent years such activities 

have been outsourced to the Colombian company, 

Vertical de Aviación.

221

In a similar fashion, the Colombian air force does 

not own the Russian Antonov-32 aircraft that it uses, 

but rather leases them. Although Russian aircraft are 

generally well regarded by Colombian officers for the 

simplicity of their maintenance under harsh field conditions, the Colombian military has reportedly been 

reluctant to acquire more Russian equipment. One 

reason, according to Colombian defense experts, is to 
52

avoid complicating the logistics system, since acquiring Russian equipment would introduce more complexity into the nation’s logistics system. Arguably, 

this would create difficulties in interoperability with 

the United States and other allies, a consideration that 

is becoming increasingly important to Colombia as it 

expands its role in multilateral international missions 

such as UN peacekeeping.222

Besides aircraft, Colombia is reportedly also producing Russian BTR-80 armored vehicles under license. However, the role of Russian companies and 

personnel in this activity is not clear.223

With respect to Colombia-Russia military-to-military personnel interactions and leadership interactions, the most significant event in recent years was 

the 2008 trip by then-Columbian Defense Minister 

Juan Manuel Santos to Moscow to attend an Interpol 

conference. Indeed, the visit was the first time that a 

Colombian defense minister had traveled to Russia.224

Beyond the Santos visit, a small number of Colombian 

officers have traveled to Russia for special forces and 

other training, yet by contrast to the number who are 

regularly sent to the PRC National Defense University 

in Changping, China, no Colombians in recent years 

have been sent to Russia’s senior staff academy. 

In general, Russia has cautiously explored opportunities to improve its relationship with Colombia 

when they have presented themselves. According to a 

Colombian source, during the 2013 U.S. budget crisis, 

the U.S. Government informed Colombia that it might 

have to cut approximately $50 million in security assistance programs from the country, prompting Russia, and later the PRC, to offer to fill the deficiency if 

the Colombian government wished.225 According to 

the same source, the Colombian government did not 

pursue the offer.
53

Russia’s sales of a significant quantity of arms to 

neighboring Venezuela is viewed with concern, more 

because of Venezuelan instability than because of a 

perceived credible offensive capability by the Venezuelan military against its Colombian neighbors. Similarly, Colombians are concerned by the previously

mentioned plans announced in February 2014 by 

Shoigu to re-establish military facilities in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua,226 as well as Russia’s reoccupation of the electronic surveillance facility at Lourdes.227

These actions are collectively perceived as a strategic 

encirclement of pro-U.S. Colombia by Russia through 

its allies Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Ecuador. 

Indeed, the November 2013 invasion of Colombian 

airspace by two Russian bombers was seen in Colombia as signs of Russian hostile intent, reinforcing the 

message sent by Russia’s deployment of nuclear-capable bombers and warships to the region in 2008.228

Beyond military affairs, Russia-Colombia nongovernmental narcotics and other criminal ties are a 

growing concern. The current presence of the Russian 

mafia in Colombia is believed to be less than during 

the 1990s at the high-point of power of the Cali and 

Medellin cartels. Incidents suggesting ongoing activity by Russian criminal groups in Colombia include 

the 2013 murder of a Russian businessman under 

mysterious conditions in Barrio Kennedy locality of 

Bogota, as well as the implication of Russians in the 

supply of components for an operation constructing narco-submarines near Buenaventura. Colombia is also believed to be the principal source of cocaine for the Russian market, which is believed to be 

expanding.229

In terms of trade and investment, Russia’s ties with 

Colombia are very modest. In 2013, Russia-Colombia bilateral trade was a mere $382 million, making 
54

Colombia Russia’s 12th largest trading partner in the 

region. This volume was also insignificant in comparison to Colombia’s $10.5 million in bilateral trade with 

the PRC that year, or even its $5.2 million in 2013 trade 

with India.230 With respect to the composition of the 

trade, according to the UN COMTRADE database, in 

2013, 64 percent of Colombian exports to Russia were 

“live trees and plants” (presumably flowers), followed 

by 11 percent “miscellaneous edible preparations,” 7 

percent coffee, and 5 percent “edible fruit.” In a pattern seen in Russian engagement with other countries 

in the region, Russian exports to Colombia were dominated by fertilizers (46 percent), mineral fuels and 

oils (12 percent), iron and steel (11 percent).231 There 

have been attempts at the official level to strengthen 

such interactions, including the Colombian-Russian 

Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Trade, 

Scientific and Technological Cooperation,232 but thus 

far with minimal impacts.

With respect to specific projects, one Russian company in the petroleum sector, Lukoil, had a significant 

presence in Colombia, but withdrew from the country in 2012. While the official reason given was that it 

needed funds to develop a new oil find in the Middle 

East,233 another contributing factor may have been extortion demands and other difficulties that Lukoil experienced in its area of operation.234 In 2012, the Russian energy company TNK, also considered investing 

in Colombia,235 but did not pursue its interest.

In the mining sector, as in petroleum, Russian interests are reportedly conducting exploratory operations in the east of the country near the Venezuelan 

border, but without a major formal presence to date.236

For the Russians, one of the minerals of interest is 

coltan, used in modern smartphones, and believed to 

be mined and sold in small quantities by the FARC.
55

Russia also had hopes of marketing a number of energy projects in Colombia, including the construction 

of hydroelectric power facilities by companies such as 

Inter Rao, as well as the sale of nuclear reactors. To 

date, such major projects have not gone forward.

On the other hand, because of the crisis, Russia 

reportedly engaged in conversations with Colombian 

agriculture producers about purchasing meats and 

other products to compensate for European sources of 

supply lost because of sanctions and increasing tensions over the Ukraine. Nonetheless, as of the time of 

this writing, no major expansion of Colombian food 

exports to Russia had occurred.

Peru. 

Peru today is one of Russia’s most important arms 

buyers and military partners in Latin America. It has 

also maintained a significant political relationship 

with Russia in the contemporary period, although one 

which has received less scrutiny than Russia’s relationships with the ALBA regimes. 

With respect to political interactions, Russian President Medvedev included Peru as one of four stops 

in his November 2008 trip to Latin America, designed 

to highlight Russia’s re-engagement with the region. 

Almost 4 years later, in September 2012, Peruvian 

President Ollanta Humala met with his Russian counterpart, Putin, during the APEC leaders’ summit in 

Vladivostok, Russia.237 The two met again in July 2014 

in Brazil, when Putin’s presence there for the BRICS 

summit coincided with Humala’s visit to the country 

for the CELAC forum.238 Four months later, in November 2014, Humala made a state visit to Russia en route 

to the APEC summit in China, meeting with his coun-
56

terpart, Putin. In doing so, Humala made history as 

the first Peruvian president ever to visit Russia.239

One of the cornerstones of the Peru-Russia relationship for more than 40 years has been military ties. 

The legacy of Russia’s presence in Peru dates to the 

populist military regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75), who pursued a quasi-socialist policy 

during his time in power, nationalizing many key industries, and turning to Russia as the principal supplier of Peruvian military hardware. Much of the now 

aging equipment in Peru’s military inventory dates 

to this period, including 280 T-55 tanks (of which 50 

remain in service), as well as an Mi-8 helicopter, 30 

BRDM-2 armored cars, 12 BTR-60 armored personnel 

carriers, 24 BM-21 GRAD, and two BM-13 multiple 

launch rocket vehicles. Nonetheless, purchases of Russian equipment continued after the end of the Velasco 

regime, including the acquisition of 24 MiG-29 fighter 

aircraft in 1996 by the government of Alberto Fujimori,240 as well as Su-25 ground support aircraft and 

Mi-25 attack helicopters,241 among other systems. The 

legacy of collaborating with Russia remains particularly strong today among senior officers in the Peruvian Army, many of whom studied in the country as 

part of military exchange programs. 

As Russia began re-engaging with Peru in the 

post-2008 period, it leveraged the abundance of Cold 

War era Russian military hardware in the Peruvian 

inventory, as well as the goodwill within the senior 

Peruvian Army leadership toward Russia, to win new 

military contracts and rebuild relations. The new acquisitions included a $106 million contract signed in 

August 2008 for the upgrade of Peru’s aging fleet of 

Mig-29s,242 of which 19 are still in service,243 with subsequent commitments for up to $400 million more in 
57

aircraft upgrades.244 The country also won a contract 

to maintain and restore aging Russian helicopters. In 

October 2012, four aging Mi-25 attack helicopters were 

restored to service by Russian maintenance personnel 

as part of this program.245

In 2010, following the Peruvian government’s difficulties with the acquisition of Chinese-made MBT2000 tanks,246 its army decided to acquire six Mi-171 

and two Mi-35 P helicopters in support of operations 

in Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE), site of operations by the terrorist group, Sendero Luminoso. In 

December 2013, the Peruvian military signed a contract to acquire an additional 24 Mi-171 helicopters in 

a contract valued at $528 million, in support of increasing the mobility of its forces operating in the region.247

The contract also included $180 million in offsets in 

support of Peru’s economy and defense sector, including the co-production of parts,248 and the construction 

of a base to maintain the helicopters near the Peruvian 

Air Force Base in the La Joya district of Arequipa.249

By 2013, Russian military sales to Peru were advancing on all fronts. Highlighting the importance of 

the relationship for Russia, Shoigu made Peru one of 

two stops in his October 2013 visit to the region, with 

the other being Brazil.250 During the visit, there were 

discussions of the sale of 110 T-90S tanks to Peru to 

replace the country’s aging stock of Russian T-55s, 

as well as a possible factory for the manufacture of 

military and civilian trucks by Russian manufacturer 

Kamaz, although both transactions were subsequently postponed until after the 2016 Peruvian national 

elections.251 In October 2013, Peru was also evaluating 

the purchase of the Russian BTR-80 armored personnel carrier, although as of the time of this writing, the 

sale had not gone forward.252 Similarly, the Peruvian 
58

army entered discussions concerning the acquisition 

of Russian man-portable Igla air defense munitions 

to replace their aging stock of Pechora missiles.253 Beyond military sales, Russia has also begun to expand 

significantly its military education cooperation with 

Peru, offering in 2012 to sponsor 200 Peruvian military 

officers who would study in Russian universities.254

Paralleling initiatives in Nicaragua, in May 2012 

Russia also announced a new counterdrug cooperation initiative with Peru.255 In March 2013, as part of 

that effort, director of the Russian Antinarcotics State 

Committee Victor Ivanov presented a counternarcotics action plan to Peruvian President Ollanta Humala, 

including not only the training by Russians of Peruvian police antinarcotics units, but also the planning 

and execution of “joint strategic operations.”256

By contrast to the substantial level of Peru-Russia 

political and military engagement, economic ties between the nations are relatively modest. As of 2013, 

Peru was Russia’s 11th largest trading partner in the 

region, with a mere $403 million in bilateral trade. 

With respect to Russian exports to Peru, mineral fertilizers comprise over 50 percent. Reciprocally, approximately 54 percent of Peruvian exports to Russia were 

agricultural products, while 41 percent were mining 

products.257

Peru and Russia have also collaborated in the space 

arena. In November 2013, Russia launched two Peruvian microsatellites into low earth orbit, PUCP-Sat 1 

and Pocket PUCP, from the Russian Yasny cosmodrome.258 In addition, as with a number of other Latin 

American states, Peru is reportedly investigating the 

use of the Russian GLONASS satellite navigation system (a rival to the Western system GPS).259
59

In the energy sector, Russian companies have 

played a modest role in Peru, with the Russian petroleum company Gazprom reportedly interested in 

participating in the construction of a new gas pipeline, 

as well as a possible liquid natural gas compression 

plant in the country.260 Beyond petroleum, Russia and 

Peru have also had some discussions regarding nuclear power, including a visit to Peru by representatives 

of Rosatom in March 2013, as well as the inclusion of 

the topic during a state visit by Humala to Russia in 

November 2014.261

In the energy and construction sectors more 

broadly, the Russian companies Inter Rao and Power Machines have reportedly been pursuing work in 

Peru, 262 but to date, no major projects have emerged. 

During his November 2014 trip to Moscow, Russian 

President Putin met with the head of Russia’s staterun company Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin, to 

discuss Russian participation in a planned transcontinental railroad link across Brazil and Peru,263 although 

to date the Chinese have been the principal drivers of 

the project.

In May 2014, Peru and Russia also launched talks 

for a free trade accord,264 with negotiations still in 

progress at the time of this writing.

Brazil. 

Both economically and more broadly, Brazil is arguably Russia’s most important partner in the region, 

although in specific areas, Russia’s partnerships with 

countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and 

Peru may overshadow the relationship with Brazil. 

With respect to Russia-Brazil political engagement, 

the two nations have a special partnership which, by 
60

contrast to Russia’s other relationships in Latin America and the Caribbean, goes beyond the region in both 

its political and economic scope. Indeed, the “global” 

nature of the partnership was manifested in the “Strategic Alliance Agreement” signed between those two 

states in October 2005,265 as well as the membership of 

both in the BRIC forum (established in 2006 and later 

renamed “BRICS” to include South Africa). 

Interactions between Russian and Brazilian leaders 

in recent years has been regular, both as part of, and 

independent from, the BRICS forum. Russian President Medvedev included Brazil in his four-nation trip 

to Latin America in November 2008, then returned to 

Brazil in April 2010 when the BRIC forum was hosted 

in the country, then returned again in March 2013 as 

Prime Minister.266 More recently, Russian President 

Putin traveled to Brazil in July 2014 to attend the 

BRICS summit in Fortaleza, making it the cornerstone 

of his own four-nation Latin America trip. Brazilian 

President Dilma Rousseff interacted with her Russian counterpart, President Putin, during her attendance at the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, in 

December 2012.267

The political nature of the interaction between 

Russia and Brazil was further highlighted in March 

2014, when Brazil abstained from its criticism of Russia in a key UN vote over the activities of the latter in 

Crimea.268 By contrast to fellow BRICS partner China, 

Russia explicitly supports Brazil’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.269

With respect to military interactions, Russia has 

placed great emphasis on Brazil as an arms market, 

with $306.7 million in arms sales to Brazil between 

2008 and 2012. Russian arms sales to Brazil include 

a $150 million270 contract in 2008 for 12 Mi-35 attack 
61

helicopters, the last of which were delivered at the 

end of 2014,271 as well as an agreement in 2012 to sell 

Brazil seven Ka-62 medium transport helicopters.272 In 

support of Brazil’s purchase of the Russian helicopters, Russian Helicopters, Inc. and the Brazilian firm 

Odebrecht signed an agreement in 2013 to establish 

a maintenance facility in Brazil to perform assembly, 

maintenance, repair, and overhaul operations on such 

helicopters.273 Beyond these deals, Brazil’s arms purchases from Russia also include negotiations for three 

batteries of the Pantsir-S1 truck-mounted air defense 

system, in a contract that could be worth $1 billion.274

In addition, Brazil has acquired other weapons from 

Russia, including the Igla-S man-portable antiaircraft 

missile, many of which were delivered to Brazil in 

March 2010.275

In addition to such sales, Brazil is rumored to be 

interested in acquiring the new supersonic BrahMos 

missile, co-developed by Russia and India.276 While 

such an acquisition would have a dramatic strategic 

impact on the region, it has not yet gone beyond the 

phase of general interest. In addition, Russian companies have been active participants in the annual LAAD 

defense expo which occurred in April 2015 in Rio de 

Janeiro, Brazil, as well as other military expositions in 

the region. In March 2014, the Brazilian firm Odebrecht 

and Russian firm Rostec signed an agreement on the 

sidelines of the FIDAE military air show in Chile.277

Despite such successes, Russia’s advances in its 

defense relationship with Brazil have arguably been 

much less than hoped. Russia lost its bid, for example, 

to sell Brazil the Sukhoi-35 fighter as part of the country’s FX-2 fighter modernization effort,278 with Brazil 

ultimately choosing the Swedish Gripen NG.279 Similarly, Brazil’s acquisition of Mi-35 attack helicopters 
62

was terminated in 2014 after the delivery of only the 

original 12 units. Russian difficulties in selling arms 

to Brazil have occurred in part, because the country 

has its own domestic arms industry which, in some 

sectors, competes with equipment that Russia would 

like to sell. As an example, in 2010, the Brazilian 

federal police entered into conversations with Rosoboronexport over the possible purchase of the GAZ2975 Tigr light armored vehicle for use in riot control 

missions.280 However, the sale was vetoed because it 

competed with a similar Brazilian-made vehicle, the 

Guarani. In a similar fashion, Russian interest in selling Brazil a nuclear submarine was also unsuccessful, 

reportedly because Russia was unwilling to transfer 

a sufficient amount of technology to the Brazilian 

defense industry.281

With respect to military-to-military personnel interactions and leadership visits, senior Russian officials periodically travel to Brazil, such as the October 

2013 trip by Defense Minister Shoigu. Such contacts 

also include lower-level interaction, including training provided by Russian instructors in May 2010 in 

Brazil on the use of the then recently acquired Igla-S 

man-portable antiaircraft missiles.282

With respect to the economic relationship between 

the two countries, as noted previously, Brazil is by 

far Russia’s most important trading partner in the region, with its $5.9 billion in bilateral trade with Russia in 2013, accounting for 31 percent of all Russian 

trade with the region for that year. The relationship 

is a trade surplus in Brazil’s favor, with $3.3 billion 

in Brazilian exports to Russia, and $2.6 billion of Brazilian imports. A substantial portion of this trade on 

both sides is agricultural goods, with 94 percent of 

Brazilian exports to Russia comprised of agricultural 
63

products, including beef and wheat,283 and 65 percent 

of Russian exports to Brazil comprised by fertilizer, 

although Russia also exports significant quantities of 

metals and high tech machinery to Brazil as well.284

In the petroleum sector, Russian firms have very 

little presence in Brazil’s newly developed offshore oil 

fields. One exception is Russian firm Rosneft285 whose 

subsidiary TNK is involved in a joint venture the Brazilian firm HRT Participacoes em Petróleo in the Solimoes river basin.286 In addition, Gazprom reportedly 

has opened up a representative office in the country, 

with plans in investing in Brazilian offshore oil.287 In 

mining, Russian companies such as RusAl and Rusoro are also relatively absent in Brazil. One of the few 

examples occurred in 2011, when the Russian mining 

and coal company OAO Mechel entered an $800 million joint venture with Brazilian iron company Usina 

Sidurigica do Para.288

In energy, in Brazil, as in Argentina, Russia has 

sought to participate in the possible expansion of the 

nation’s nuclear power generation capacity,289 with 

the Russian commercial nuclear agency Rosatom signing a memorandum of understanding with the Brazilian private energy and construction firm Comarga 

Correa in July 2014 regarding the construction of a 

nuclear waste storage facility in Brazil and possible 

Russian participation in a future Brazilian nuclear reactor.290 Reflecting the structural similarities between 

Russia and Brazil in select sectors, Russian construction companies have been unable to penetrate Brazil’s 

electricity infrastructure market, where they have had 

to compete directly with capable, well-financed and 

well-connected Brazilian competitors such as Odebrecht. Nevertheless, undeterred, Russian companies 

have expressed hopes of playing a role in the con-
64

struction of hydroelectric and thermoelectric power 

facilities in the country.291

In the commercial aircraft sector, competition exists between Russian and Brazilian companies. Russia 

reportedly blocked the Brazilian company Embraer 

from access to the Russian private jet market because 

the commercial side of the Russian aircraft manager Sukhoi was afraid that Brazilian aircraft would 

compete with Sukhoi’s candidate for the regional jet 

market, the “Interjet Superjet.”292 On the other hand, 

there are a number of Brazil-Russia partnerships in 

the manufacturing and technology sectors, including 

joint ventures by the companies Kaspersky Laboratories, Biocad, and Qiwi.293

Russian firms are venturing into Brazil’s financial 

market, albeit in a limited fashion. In June 2012, for 

example, the Russian investment firm VTB Capital 

announced that it was cooperating with the Brazilian 

firm BTG Pactual to establish an investment presence 

in the Brazilian market.294 Finally, as with other countries in the region, Brazil has positioned itself to benefit from Russia’s suspension of agricultural purchases 

from European suppliers as tensions expanded over 

events in the Ukraine in the summer of 2014.295

Bolivia. 

As with the other countries of ALBA, Russia has 

enjoyed a close relationship with Bolivia in the post2008 era, although arguably not as close as its relationships with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, or 

even as close as its relationships with key non-ALBA 

partners such as Brazil and Peru. At the political level, 

Bolivian President Evo Morales traveled to Moscow 

in July 2013 for a forum of gas exporting countries, 
65

where he met with his Russian counterpart, Putin.296

Morales also met with Putin as part of a special dinner for visiting heads of state in July 2014.297 Significant presidential level diplomacy also includes a 

2009 trip to Russia by Morales to meet with President 

Putin’s predecessor, Medvedev,298 as well as a meeting 

between Morales and Putin in Caracas, Venezuela, in 

April 2011. Such interactions have also included ongoing lower-level visits such as the trip by Bolivian 

Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca to Moscow in 

May 2011.

On the other hand, unlike fellow ALBA nations 

such as Venezuela, it is of note that Bolivia did not 

diplomatically recognize the breakaway republics of 

South Ossetia and Abkhazia during the 2008 Georgia 

civil war. The country is also one of the few nations in 

the region to continue to require a visa for Russians to 

enter the country, although the procedure by which 

they request the visa upon arrival at a port of entry 

makes the requirement only pro forma. Russia-Bolivia 

engagement includes both military and commercial 

activities, yet to date, few major projects contemplated 

between Russia and Bolivia have gone forward on either front. 

With respect to arms sales, from 2009, the Bolivian 

military was in discussions with Russia for the possible purchase of 10 Mi-17 transport helicopters,299 as 

well as the acquisition from Russia of a $30 million 

Antonov Business Jet (Antonov BJ)300 to serve as the 

President’s executive aircraft, (announced in September 2009) and a credit of $250 million to cover the 

purchases.301 As part of the deal, the two countries 

also discussed establishing a region-wide center for 

aircraft maintenance at Airbase 92, near the Bolivian 

city of Cochabamba,302 although the plan never went 
66

forward. In the end, neither the helicopter purchase 

nor the purchase of the Antonov business jet were 

realized. The Bolivian military reportedly decided 

that it did not have sufficient resources for the helicopters, while President Morales decided to purchase 

a Falcon 900EX (the type used by one of his favorite 

soccer teams, Manchester United) as his presidential 

aircraft.303 Despite these setbacks, the foreign sales 

organization for Russian arms, Rosoboronexport, has 

had some successes in Bolivia. In March 2014, for example, a commission from the Bolivian government 

traveled to Russia to evaluate a more modest Russian 

offer to sell Bolivia two Mi-17s.304 As with other nations in the region, Bolivia has maintained a regular 

interchange with senior Russian military officials, 

including an August 2013 trip to Bolivia by Deputy 

Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Major General Oleg Leonidovich Salukov.305

With respect to commercial interactions more 

broadly, Bolivia and Russia registered only a token 

$17 million in trade in 2013.306 Of Bolivian exports to 

Russia in 2013, 73 percent were inorganic chemicals, 

with almost the entire remainder composed of fruit 

and nuts. Reciprocally, 71 percent of Russian exports 

to Bolivia similarly were in the category of inorganic 

chemicals, with most of the remainder composed of 

paper products.307

As with other Latin American countries, Russia has also expressed interest in launching satellites 

for Bolivia as well as selling the country nuclear reactors.308 To date, however, such projects have not 

gone forward.

In the petroleum sector, both Russian firms Rosneft and Gazprom have been active in the country. 

The relationship began to improve greatly in Decem-
67

ber 2008 when Gazprom signed a $4.5 billion exploration agreement with the Bolivian government.309 Also 

in December, Russia spent $4 million on a study of the 

Bolivian gas industry, and later indicated its intention 

to open a joint Russia-Bolivia center for gas exploration.310 Gazprom today has a joint venture in Bolivia 

with Total Oil to explore the Azero block, with a total 

pledged investment of $130 million. Rosneft, for its 

part, committed to explore for petroleum in Bolivia in 

November 2013,311 and in July 2014, during a meeting 

with Bolivian President Evo Morales in Brazil, Russian 

President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed that the company 

was still considering an investment in the country.312

In mining sector, Russian firms are reportedly interested in exploiting Bolivia’s lithium deposits, concentrated in the Uyuni salt flats,313 believed to be the 

largest in the world. To date, as with numerous other 

interested international actors, the Russians have not 

been successful in securing a concession from the 

Bolivian government to do so.

Argentina. 

Argentina historically has maintained a strong relationship with Russia as an economic, and, at times, a 

security partner, despite the country’s history of tensions with Russia over its perceived support for leftist groups regarded as threats by the nation’s military 

government.314

In the 1980s, when the United States suspended 

grain sales to the former Soviet Union, Argentina was 

one of the countries which significantly expanded the 

export of foodstuffs to the country to compensate for 

the loss.315 Indeed, much of the export-oriented cereals 

sector in Argentina today is a product of the demand 
68

for exports to the Soviet Union during that period. 

U.S. support for the British position in the 1982 war 

for control of the Falklands/Malvinas islands also 

reportedly strengthened ties between the Argentine 

military government and the Soviet Union.316

Argentina today is also the host of Latin America’s 

largest population of ethnic Russians who immigrated to the country during the late-19th and early-20th 

centuries.317

The continuing importance of Argentina to Russia 

in the contemporary context was highlighted by then 

President Medvedev’s stop in the country in April 

2010 en route to attend the second BRIC summit in 

Brazil,318 as well as inclusion of the country in Russian President Putin’s July 2014 trip to the region.319

The relationship has also included some political cooperation, in addition to military and economic ties. 

Argentina abstained, for example, on a 2014 UN vote 

condemning Russian activities in the Crimea. Reciprocally, President Putin indicated, during multiple visits 

on multiple occasions, support for Argentina’s claim 

against Britain over the Falkland Islands.320

With respect to military cooperation, Russia has 

long sought to sell a broad array of arms to Argentina, 

including Mi-17 and Mi-35M helicopters, Igla manportable missiles, high-speed missile boats and patrol 

craft, Buk-M1-2 and Tunguska air defense systems, 

military vehicles, and rifles.321 Argentina’s defense 

budget has been very limited in recent years, however. 

One of the few major purchases actually to occur was 

a 20 billion euro deal for five Mi-171 E-model helicopters with an associated package for maintenance and 

pilot training.322 In 2012, Rosoboronexport announced 

Argentine interest in the follow-on purchase of three 

Kamov Ka-226T helicopters.323 In the same year, Ar-
69

gentina also announced construction of a new ship 

with Russia for transportation to the South Pole.324

In December 2014, the Argentine defense ministry 

signed an agreement to buy four Neftegaz-class supply vessels from the Russian state-owned enterprise 

Zarubezhneft in a deal valued at $8.1 million.325

With respect to commercial interactions, Argentina 

was Russia’s third most important trade partner in the 

region after Brazil and Venezuela, registering $1.54 

billion in bilateral trade in 2013. Of this amount, only 

$334 million was Russian exports to Argentina, while 

$1.21 billion was Russian imports from the country,326

due to the importance of Argentina as a provider of 

foodstuffs to Russia. In 2013, 88 percent of Argentine 

exports to Russia were agricultural goods, with meat 

the leading category. Reciprocally, 65 percent of Russian exports to Argentina that year were mineral fuels; with another 22 percent, fertilizers; and 4 percent, 

components for the nuclear industry.327

With respect to specific nondefense projects, notable activity between the two countries have occurred 

in the space sector, nuclear and hydroelectric power, 

and petroleum, among others. In the field of space, in 

2010, Argentina signed an accord that committed it to 

participation in Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation system.328 In the nuclear power domain, Russian 

atomic energy agency Rosatom has expressed interest 

for a number of years in participating in helping Argentina to expand and modernize its nuclear power 

generation facilities.329 In July 2014, during his visit 

to Argentina, Russian President Putin indicated that 

his country was participating in the bidding process 

for Argentina’s next nuclear reactor, Atucha III,330 although Argentina signed a $2 billion agreement with 

China to finance the long delayed reactor just weeks 

after the Russian declaration.331
70

In the petroleum sector, Russian company Gazprom is working with Argentine state oil company 

Enarsa on the production of liquefied natural gas 

(LNG).332 With respect to oil exploration and drilling 

operations, when the Argentine government nationalized the assets of Spanish company Repsol YPF, 

Russia was one of the countries that it approached to 

potentially take over the property.333 In the end, however, the Argentine government contracted with the 

U.S. energy company Chevron, rather than Russian 

companies, to develop the concession.334 In addition, 

Russian companies Gazprom, Rosneft, and Lukoil, 

along with other international players, have been invited by Argentine authorities to invest in the development of the Vaca Muerte shale oil fields, believed to 

be one of the largest in the region.335 Although Russian 

activities in Argentina’s petroleum sector was not a 

focus of Russian President Putin’s July 2014 visit to 

Argentina,336 Gazprom chairman Alexander Medvedev reportedly discussed the matter with a visiting 

Argentine trade delegation just 2 months later.337

Russian companies are also competing for a number of energy industry infrastructure projects in the 

country. Gazprom, for example, has expressed interest in participating in the construction of a $1.5 billion 

gas pipeline between Argentina and Bolivia.338 Separately, Russian firm Inter Rao is competing to build 

the Chihuido I and II hydroelectric facilities in the 

Argentine province of Neuquén with the backing of 

the Russian financial institution Gazprombank.339 Inter Rao has already won a contract for the preliminary 

design phase of the $2 billion Chihuido I facility.340

The Russian firm Power Machines similarly played a 

role in the construction of the Caracoles hydroelectric 

plant, which opened in 2008, and in 2011, signed a con-
71

tract for the supply of equipment to the Punta Negara 

power plant.341 Power Machines was further part of a 

consortium which sought a role in the construction of 

the Jorge Copernic and Nestor Kirchner hydroelectric 

facilities on the Santa Cruz River. The firm ultimately 

lost the bid to the Chinese Gezouba group.342

In agriculture, as with Brazil and other South 

American nations, Argentina has also sought to take 

advantage of Russia’s suspension of agricultural purchases from Europe due to the escalating crisis in the 

Ukraine. In September 2014, Argentina sent a delegation to negotiate expanded meat exports to Russia.343

Other Russian commercial interests in Argentina reportedly include interest by Russian truck producer 

Kamaz in the Argentine market,344 as well as Energomashexport,345 RusHydro,346 and Russian financial firms including Sberinvest Russian Bank, Aterra 

Capital, and the Russian Direct Investment Fund.347

Russia-Argentina commercial engagement even 

involves the media. In October 2014, in a public ceremony, the Argentine President Cristina Fernández de 

Kirchner announced that Russia TV would be broadcast in Argentina as a free public channel.348

Paraguay. 

The Paraguay-Russia relationship traditionally has 

been dominated by Paraguayan food exports to Russia, and traditionally has not been overtly political. 

Although the nation has considered the purchase of 

Russian arms, including a 2011 Russian offer to sell six 

combat aircraft for its air force349 and transport aircraft 

for its national police,350 Paraguay has not yet bought 

Russian end items. Nor has there been a significant 

Russia-Paraguay military relationship.
72

With respect to commercial interactions, bilateral 

trade between Paraguay and Russia in 2013 was a 

modest $269 million, making the nation Russia’s 13th 

largest trading partner in the region. Virtually all Paraguayan exports to Russia during the year were agricultural products, with 57 percent of the total value 

being the export of meat.351 Indeed, Russia has been 

the major purchaser of Paraguayan beef, accounting 

for 77 percent of the country’s exports.352 Reflecting 

the importance of the relationship, Russia even helped 

Paraguay to repair and modernize one of its meat processing facilities in 2012 to support Paraguayan beef 

exports to Russia.353 Paraguay was one of the countries hoping to benefit from the suspension of Russian 

beef purchases from the United States and Europe in 

2014.354 Reciprocally, 95 percent of Russian exports to 

Paraguay in 2013 was fertilizer.355

Beyond agricultural trade, Russian nuclear energy 

agency Rosatom reportedly has visited the country 

multiple times, including an attempt to interest Paraguay in purchasing technology to develop its uranium 

into the refined material yellowcake, usable for nuclear reactors. To date, no public project has emerged 

from the talks.356

Uruguay. 

As with Paraguay, the most significant dimension 

of Uruguay’s relationship with Russia has been exports 

of meat to Russia, although in 2013, the PRC replaced 

Russia as Uruguay’s most significant extra-regional 

purchaser of beef.357 In political terms, the UruguayRussia relationship has not included the amount of 

high-level contacts as other relationships mentioned 

in this monograph, although Russian President Pu-
73

tin did meet his Uruguayan counterpart, Jose Mujica, 

in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in July 2014, along with 

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and Bolivian 

President Morales, in a special dinner sponsored by 

Argentine President de Kirchner.358

With respect to arms purchases, although Uruguay 

has limited resources to buy military hardware, Russia 

has sold some military items to the country. Uruguay 

was, for example, one of the first nations in the region 

to purchase the Russian Tigr light armored vehicle, 

with the Uruguayan national police acquiring three of 

the vehicles in 2011 as part of a force modernization 

program.359 Uruguay also uses Russian Ural heavyduty trucks in its military inventory, acquiring eight of 

these vehicles in August 2012.360 In addition, in 2012, 

the Uruguayan police bought $1.2 million in Russian 

small arms as part of that force modernization.361

In addition to the Uruguayan police, as of late-2014, 

the nation’s military was reportedly considering the 

acquisition of Russian Yak-130 training aircraft, and 

possibly Russian Saburov or Steregushchy class naval 

patrol vessels in a deal that would have included Uruguayan meat in barter as part of the transaction.362

With respect to the broader economic relationship, in 2013, Uruguay registered only $166 million in 

bilateral trade with Russia in 2013, all but $1 million 

were exports, the vast majority of them agricultural 

goods.363 In 2013, 51 percent of Uruguay’s exports to 

Russia were meat products, with dairy goods accounting for an additional 33 percent.364

With respect to nuclear energy, Uruguay has expressed interest in cooperating with Russia to develop 

a reactor for electricity generation.365 To date, nothing 

has come of the initiative. In petroleum, Russian firm 

Gazprom has expressed interest exploring for oil and 
74

gas off of the coast.366 Lukoil has expressed a similar 

interest, but to date, nothing has come of these initiatives.367 In the domain of agriculture, as with other 

countries in the region, Uruguay indicated in July 2014 

its intention to expand such exports in lieu of Russia’s 

suspension of food purchases from Europe.368

Chile. 

As one of the closest allies of the United States in 

the Southern Cone, Chile’s interactions with Russia 

have been minimal.369 Like many other nations in the 

region, during the Cold War, conservative Chilean 

military governments looked at Russia with suspicion due to its presumed support for leftist groups in 

their country.370 Nonetheless, the return of Michelle 

Bachelet to the Chilean presidency in March 2014 with 

the backing of a far more left-of-center coalition has 

opened the door for a significant expansion of ChileRussia engagement.

Prior to 2014, the most recent visit by a Russian 

president to Chile was Putin’s trip to Santiago in November 2004 to meet with then-Chilean President Ricardo Lagos. With Bachelet’s return to the Presidency 

enabled by left-of-center parties such as the Chilean 

Communist Party, however, the level and tempo of 

diplomatic interactions have increased markedly. Two 

months after Bachelet’s March 2014 inauguration, 

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov made an official visit 

to Chile.371 Six months later, President Bachelet met 

with Putin on the sidelines of the APEC leaders’ summit in Beijing, in a dialogue that Putin subsequently 

described as “intense.”372 The Bachelet-Putin meeting also produced a commitment for Chilean Foreign 

Minister Heraldo Muñoz to travel to Russia to follow-
75

up on issues raised by the presidential discourse.373

Moreover, Bachelet has also reportedly invited Putin 

to visit Chile.374

With respect to military affairs, Chile’s interaction 

with Russia historically has been minimal. In the domain of arms sales and associated training and maintenance contracts, Chile has consistently relied on U.S. 

and European military equipment. Indeed, one of the 

few Chilean purchases of Russian arms occurred during the Cold War era, when Chile’s Marxist president 

Salvador Allende purchased DShK machine guns 

from the Soviet Union. Ironically, the weapons were 

used by the Chilean military in deposing Allende on 

September 11, 1973, including in the attack on the 

presidential palace, La Moneda.375 More recently, in 

2009, Chile announced its intention to acquire five Mi17 helicopters from Russia in a contract valued at $80 

million, prompting the U.S. Secretary of Commerce 

to express his disillusionment in uncharacteristically 

negative terms.376 Although Chile, like Brazil and Venezuela, reportedly has also been interested since 2008 

in the BrahMos missile, jointly developed by India and 

Russia, there have been no specific announcement in 

the public domain about doing so.

With respect to military-to-military contacts, there 

have been almost no recent, high-level visits between 

Chilean and Russia defense officials. Nor have there 

been significant academic interchanges or joint exercises between the countries.377 Nonetheless, the warming of relations under the second Bachelet administration in Chile has also carried over to the defense 

sector, with the previously noted April 2014 visit to 

Chile by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, including 

a meeting with Chilean Defense Minister Jorge Burgos 

in which the “potential for military exchanges” was 

discussed.378
76

With respect to trade, Chile was only Russia’s 

ninth largest partner in the region, with $752 million 

in bilateral trade recorded in 2013. While not insignificant, such a level of commercial interchange contrasts 

unfavorably with Chile’s $33.9 billion in trade with 

the PRC the same year, or its $3.90 billion in 2013 trade 

with India.379 With respect to the composition of the 

trade, 45 percent of Chilean exports to Russia during 

this period was seafood, while another 33 percent was 

fruit and nuts. Of Russian exports to Chile, 87 percent 

were comprised of rubber products, fertilizer, and 

mineral fuels, in that order.380

In the space sector, Russia has collaborated with 

Chile to reactivate the Pulkovo astronomical observatory located at the El Roble mountaintop in Chile.381

In energy, the firm RusHydro has been involved in 

minor projects in the country, such as one for electricity generation from wave action in 2011.382 Chile has 

discussed interest in a Free Trade Agreement with 

Russia,383 but to date, the initiative has not borne fruit.

IMPACTS ON THE REGION AND ON 

THE UNITED STATES

As an economic phenomenon, Russia’s re-engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean is modest 

by comparison to the size, scope, and rate of expansion of China’s commercial and military presence during the same period. Moreover, Russia’s future ability 

to finance arms purchases, construction projects, petroleum, and mining activities in the region is likely 

to be seriously limited by long-term downward pressures on the price of petroleum, the export of which 

is a key source of revenues for the Russian state, as 

well as a source of resources for firms such as Ros-
77

neft, Lukoil, and Gazprom as they pursue projects in 

Latin America and the Caribbean. It is probable that 

the resources available to Russia will also continue to 

be limited by the adverse effect of economic sanctions 

from the United States and Europe.

Such limitations notwithstanding, since 2008, Russia has demonstrated a clear and persistent willingness to expand its political, military, and economic 

footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean, and to 

do so in a manner that does not shy away from projecting military force close to U.S. borders, or engaging in 

political and security cooperation in the region in a 

fashion that explicitly challenges the United States.384

While Russia’s activity may be on a small scale and 

limited to a handful of states and sectors, its presence will likely be a persistent facet of the new globally-interconnected strategic environment currently 

reshaping the region.

Economic Impacts. 

In commercial terms, the impact of Russia’s re-engagement with Latin America is concentrated on a relatively small group of countries, including the ALBA 

regimes, plus Peru, Brazil, and Argentina. Those impacts are also concentrated on a limited number of 

economic sectors, including military sales, petroleum, 

atomic and hydroelectric energy generation, mining, 

and agriculture. By contrast to Chinese trade with 

the region, Russia’s manufactured products, such as 

Lada cars and buses and Kamaz trucks, have not significantly penetrated Latin American and Caribbean 

markets except in those special cases such as Cuba or 

Nicaragua, where they have been given as gifts, or access has been granted on politically favorable terms. 
78

Even in sectors such as petroleum and mining, 

in which Russia has some presence in the region, its 

companies have proven to be as vulnerable to the risks 

of Latin American markets as their Western counterparts. In some countries, including Venezuela and 

Nicaragua, select Russian companies such as Rosneft 

may have received special access because of the country’s political relationship with the host government. 

Yet even so, such activities, including oil investment 

in Venezuela’s Orinoco tar belt, arms sales, and participation in the Nicaragua Canal, each depend on Russian financing, the availability of which is limited by 

Russia’s mediocre economic circumstances,385 made 

worse by the effects of persistently low oil prices and 

expanding international sanctions.386

By contrast to the expanding presence of Chinese 

companies in the region387 and the associated growth 

of Chinese soft power through the hope of commercial benefit,388 Russia does not appear to be on the path 

to displace U.S. companies from commercial markets 

in the near future, nor to exert significant influence 

over Latin American and Caribbean states through 

their hopes for access to Russian markets, investments 

and loans. 

Strategic Impacts. 

Despite the aforementioned limitations, Russia’s 

presence in Latin America nonetheless significantly 

impacts the strategic U.S. position in Latin America. 

Such impacts do not, however, come from Russia 

alone, but the way in which Russian re-engagement 

with the region interacts with the activities of other 

extra-hemispheric actors in Latin America and the 

Caribbean to alter the dynamics of the region. 
79

Such impacts may be divided into three categories:

1. Undermining the disposition of key actors in the 

region to work with the United States on trade, security, and other initiatives, both within the region, and 

beyond it. 

2. Isolating strongly pro-U.S. regimes such as 

Colombia and Chile. 

3. Arming, contributing to the survival of, and 

politically emboldening anti-U.S. regimes in the region currently represented by the states of ALBA 

and Argentina, including collaboration of these regimes in hosting Russian military forces, and activities in the region that present strategic threats to the 

United States.

Through commercial and security collaboration, 

Russia gives states such as Brazil and Peru options 

other than working with the United States or the EU as 

their principal security partner, as well as giving them 

alternatives to U.S.-led initiatives to address problems 

of importance to the region from trade and development, to narcotrafficking and organized crime, to 

standards for democracy and human rights. 

Engagement with Russia, in conjunction with other 

actors such as China, has also undermined, in subtle 

ways, U.S.-led concepts for multilateral organization 

in the Americas such as the OAS and the Inter-American system. While Russia has not explicitly promoted 

alternative forms of sub-regional organization that 

exclude the United States such as UNASUR, CELAC, 

and ALBA, it has been more receptive to engaging 

with these multilateral organizations, than it has to 

working with the OAS, and that has contributed to 

the perceived functionality and importance of these 

organizations.
80

Beyond the region itself, the increasing independence of such actors in the Americas makes it difficult for the United States to mobilize coalitions to act 

with authority outside the region, from votes in the 

UN to the imposition of international sanctions. While 

difficulties such as Mexico and Chile’s opposition 

to a UN-sanctioned role that Iraq cannot be blamed 

on Russia,389 the interest of Latin American states in 

working with Russia undermines the U.S. position in 

more subtle ways. In the summer of 2014, for example, 

Russia’s ability to turn to Latin America as a food supplier allowed it to defy U.S. and European sanctions 

over its actions in the Ukraine, and reciprocate by 

cutting off Russian imports of European agricultural 

products.390

Beyond such impacts on coalition formation, Russian engagement with the region on the United States 

also adversely impacts pro-U.S. states such as Colombia, Chile, and even Honduras, which arguably perceive themselves as increasingly surrounded by proRussian states, and threatened by Russia’s activities 

in the region. In the case of Colombia, Russia’s close 

political, military, and economic relations with the 

three ALBA states that surround it (Venezuela, Ecuador, and Cuba), and perceived historic Russian ties to 

groups that fight against the Colombia government 

internally, such as the FARC and the ELN, increase 

the Colombian government’s sense of encirclement 

by hostile forces, and its interest in informal security 

guarantees from its traditional ally, the United States. 

For some in Honduras, the prospect of renewed Russian engagement with neighboring El Salvador, in 

combination with the strong Russian position in Nicaragua and Cuba, raises similar fears of “encirclement.”

With respect to the ALBA states, the economic viability of regimes such as the Bolivarian government 
81

of Venezuela arguably is enabled more by loans and 

support from the PRC than from Russia. Nonetheless, 

Russian activities reinforces, and sometimes compliments, the impacts of Chinese engagement in select 

sectors such as petroleum, arms, and construction, and 

provides political support for the anti-Western projects of these countries in a way that the PRC, to date, 

has been reluctant to do. As suggested earlier, Russian 

arms and investment thus make these regimes somewhat more viable, and potentially more dangerous to 

their neighbors. 

In turn, the viability of these regimes, and their 

willingness to host Russian military and irregular activities, creates an opportunity for Russia to operate 

in the region in a manner that threatens the United 

States in the hemisphere when it wishes to do so. During a conflict involving Russia in another theater, for 

example, such allies present Russia with options to act 

in Latin America and the Caribbean so as to force the 

United States to divert attention and resources away 

from its activities in other parts of the globe. Examples 

of such possible actions include basing or resupplying 

nuclear-capable military assets in countries in close 

proximity to the United States, such as Venezuela, 

Cuba, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. Other possibilities include supporting military action against a U.S. ally, 

such as a Venezuelan occupation of historically contested Colombian territory on its border, or a Nicaraguan incursion against Costa Rica.

As noted previously, sending such a message was 

arguably one of the principal motives behind Russian 

deployments of its Tu-160 bombers, and later warships, to the Caribbean in 2008, as well as the more 

recent proposals for base access and to conduct long 

range patrols in the Caribbean.391
82

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP

In general terms, Russian re-engagement in Latin 

America and the Caribbean demonstrates the importance of considering not only the challenges to U.S. 

national security that emerge from Latin America 

itself, but how extra-regional actors with objectives 

adverse to the United States, such as Russia, may directly or indirectly impact U.S. national security, and 

hemispheric security, by acting there.

In broad terms, this analysis reinforces the need 

for U.S. decisionmakers to consider Latin America in 

strategic terms, rather than focusing on its individual 

challenges, such as drugs, crime, and immigration, as 

law enforcement or developmental issues to be managed. With the end of the Cold War, the United States 

has arguably ceased to seriously consider Latin America as a source of potential challenges beyond issues 

of crime and migration. The United States has fallen 

into the illusion that Latin America and the Caribbean 

are isolated from the global strategic landscape, rather 

than a fundamental part of it. Even if the endogenous 

threats to U.S. national security may be minimal, the 

ideological orientations of governments of the region, 

and their relationships with extra-hemispheric powers such as Russia, may take on new relevance for 

U.S. national security as a product of what happens in 

other parts of the world.

At a policy level, and within the Department of 

Defense (DoD), the U.S. response to the new engagement in the hemisphere by Russia and other extraregional actors should begin with a detailed analysis 

of how the latter might attempt to build upon and employ its presence in the region under a broad range of 
83

scenarios. Such scenarios should include how Russia, 

in conjunction with (or in opposition to), other global 

actors, might act in the region in the near-term, as well 

as what it could do in a future in which it is engaged in 

a major conflict with the United States (including the 

use of military force in, or from the region).

Ideally, analysis of such scenarios should include 

consideration of variants with a range of assumptions 

about how other major global actors may be oriented 

toward both Russia and the United States, such as 

whether or not China would collaborate with Russia in the region in the context of global hostilities 

with the United States. The analysis should include 

an evaluation of both the likelihood and gravity of 

the consequences contemplated, as well as indicators 

for detecting the course of action, leveraging associated opportunities, and countering or mitigating its 

adverse effects. 

In a conflict scenario, in evaluating whether Latin 

American states would risk openly assisting a competitor such as Russia against the United States, analysts 

should also consider conditions under which such an 

anti-U.S. regime in the region might calculate that the 

United States might not prevail in the broader conflict, 

or might not be able or willing to impose consequences for such behavior. Beyond assessing the possibility 

of Latin American states providing direct assistance to 

Russia during a global conflict, such as access to bases 

or intelligence support, analysts should also consider 

ways in which states of the region could impact the 

outcome of the global conflict by withholding cooperation, such as not supporting the U.S. position on 

the crisis in international forums such as the UN, not 

contributing personnel or resources to an international coalition deployed to the conflict zone, not provid-
84

ing intelligence support to the United States, or not 

allowing the United States to use its territorial waters 

or airspace. 

Finally, using the specific scenarios generated, the 

United States should consider strategies that it could 

use to counter Russian actions in the Western Hemisphere during a conflict, in shaping the conflict in the 

lead-up to it, and in shaping the strategic environment 

in the present day to mitigate or reduce the probability of undesirable outcomes. In developing strategies 

to manage the identified risks and pursue associated 

opportunities, the United States should consider collaboration with like-minded extra-hemispheric actors, 

whose values and interests in resisting the Russian 

advance in Latin America coincide with that of the 

United States. Japan, South Korea, and India each are 

arguably candidates to collaborate with the United 

States in select areas. Each has commercial interests 

in the region, each is adversely impacted by the expansion of Russia’s presence globally, and each has an 

interest in strengthening its own ties with the United 

States in the face of the expansion of rivals in its own 

region, which include not only Russia, but also others 

such as the PRC.

At the level of combatant commands, U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command, and 

their respective Army components, U.S. Army North, 

and U.S. Army South, decisionmakers should be particularly attentive to the risks and opportunities presented by individual countries. In Peru, for example, 

the United States should build upon its strong support 

to the nation as a provider of intelligence and training in counterterrorist and counterdrug operations 

to strengthen its relationship as partner of choice, by 

contrast to Russia, whose relationship arguably has 
85

focused principally on equipment, which may not be 

dedicated to those areas of the country, such as the 

VRAE-M, which need it most. 

In Cuba, the United States should be attentive to 

the current regime’s interest in securing the lifting of 

economic sanctions, particularly as the economy of 

its Venezuelan patron crumbles. Such interest may be 

leveraged to help persuade Cuba not to cooperate with 

Russia in ways which would create strategic threats 

to the United States, on the grounds that such cooperation might create problems for the political case 

in the United States for the lifting of sanctions. Such 

politically sensitive Cuban actions might include permitting Russia to have renewed access to the signals 

intelligence collection facility at Lourdes, or signing 

agreements for Russian military aircraft and warships 

to have regular access to Cuban facilities.

In Nicaragua, which similarly seeks to balance 

its relationship with the United States with that of 

Russia, the United States might emphasize that continued Nicaraguan access to U.S. markets under the 

provisions of the Central American Free Trade Agreement could be jeopardized by providing base access 

to Russian warships, permitting Russian warships to 

conduct large-scale “counternarcotics” patrols from 

Nicaraguan ports, or expanding Russian intelligence 

operations in the country, even if in the name of counterdrug patrols. At the same time, the United States 

should also consider increasing the presence of U.S. 

military forces in the Caribbean, providing implicit 

security guarantees to, and increasing the level of, 

operational coordination with those nations in the region most intimidated by growing Russian presence 

in the region, including Colombia, Costa Rica, and 

Honduras.
86

The paradox of contemporary Russian re-engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean is that the 

Russian political and military initiatives, which coincided with the 2008 conflict in Georgia and the current 

conflict in the Ukraine, were most likely intended, in 

part, to provide the nation with increased latitude 

to maneuver in Eurasia by forcing the United States 

to divert some of its attention away from the area in 

order to address risks in the Western Hemisphere 

“backyard.” Yet in the process, through its dramatic 

actions, Russia has done the United States a favor, 

highlighting the risks to the United States stemming 

from potential Russian activities in the region, and in 

the process giving the United States the opportunity 

to address such vulnerabilities before a global crisis in 

which Russia or another U.S. geopolitical rival might 

seek to exploit them.

Yet the favor that Russia has done the United 

States by highlighting the potential national security 

risks to the United States through such engagement is 

only an opportunity if the United States responds by 

taking meaningful action to address them. Doing so 

will require significant resources, yet the price of not 

acting is potentially far greater than the nation is in a 

position to pay.

ENDNOTES 

1. For a detailed account of this period, see Russell H. Bartley, Imperial Russia and the Struggle for Latin American Independence, 

1808-1828, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978.

2. A. Sizonenko, “Latin America and Russia,” International 

Affairs, No. 6, Vol. 50, 2004, pp. 52-60.

3. Ibid.
87

4.Nonetheless, as Latin American scholar David Mares notes, 

Russia’s relationship with the region remained complicated insofar as many Latin American communist parties viewed Marxist 

guerilla movements with suspicion, or as adventurists. Written 

correspondence from David Mares, December 11, 2014.

5. Sizonenko, p. 58.

6. For a good academic discussion of Soviet support for such 

movements, see Cole Blasier, The Giant’s Rival, Rev. Ed., Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987.

7. Sizonenko.

8. See, for example, Eduard A. Lynch, The Cold War’s Last Battlefield: Regan, the Soviets and Central America, Albany, NY: SUNY 

Press, 2011.

9. Sizonenko.

10. Yevgeniy Trifonov, “Las Dash to the Pampas,” Gazeta, 

November 21, 2008, available from www.gazeta.ru. 

11. Ibid.

12. Sizonenko, p. 58.

13. See, for example, Michael R. Gordon, “East-Bloc Is Said to 

Cut Managua Aid,” The New York Times, October 5, 1989, available 

from www.nytimes.com. 

14. Vicky Pelaez, “Winds of change alter Latin America’s relationship with Russia,” The Moscow News, May 18, 2012, available 

from themoscownews.com. 

15. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO 

in 1999; Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in 2004; 

and Albania and Croatia joined in 2009.

16. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined NATO in 2004.
88

17. In 1997, for example, NATO signed an agreement with 

Russia agreeing not to station large numbers of troops permanently in Eastern Europe. See “Russia warns NATO against military presence in Eastern Europe,” Deutsche Welle, August 2, 2014, 

available from www.dw.de. 

18. See, for example, Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the 

Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” Presidency of Russia, Official Website, April 25, 2005, available from archive.kremlin.

ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml. 

19. Russian interactions with Venezuela and Cuba, for example, arguably have been shaped by Igor Sechin, current head 

of the Russian petroleum company Rosneft, and close colleague 

of Vladimir Putin. See “The Tango is Fashionable Once Again,” 

Vedomosti, April 16, 2010.

20. Such benefits ranged from the donation of Russian buses 

to Russian interest in helping Nicaragua build a transcontinental canal. See “Russia Set to Donate 250 Buses to Nicaragua,” Ria 

Novosti, August 18, 2010, available from en.ria.ru. See also “Russia, Nicaragua Sign Deals after Presidents’ Meeting,” Ria Novosti,

December 18, 2008, available from en.ria.ru. 

21. In advance of the deployment, however, Russia announced that the Tu-160s were not carrying nuclear weapons, 

neutralizing the concerns of Latin American countries such as 

Mexico and Brazil regarding the “nuclearization” of the region, 

while still symbolically demonstrating to the United States that it 

could introduce such forces into the region if it wished to do so. 

See “Russia Maintains that Tu-160 Bombers Do Not Carry Nuclear Weapons,” El Universal, September 11, 2008, available from 

www.eluniversal.com. 

22. “Dmitry Medvedev Took Part in a Meeting of the Leaders 

of the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America,” Presidency of 

Russia, Official Website, November 27, 2008, available from eng.

news.kremlin.ru. 

23. While in Fortaleza, Brazil, for the summit, Russian President Putin was able to share the final game of the World Cup 

with his Brazilian counterpart, Dilma Rousseff. See “From Brazil 
89

to Russia: Symbolic Hand-Over at the Maracana,” Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), Official Website, July 

13, 2014, available from www.fifa.com. 

24. “BRICS Summit 2015 to be held in Russia,” Business Standard, July 16, 2014, available from wap.business-standard.com. 

25. “Russia Ready to Collaborate with All Latin American 

Countries—Putin,” Voice of Russia, July 11, 2014, available from 

sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia.

26. Vladimir Putin, “Interview to Prensa Latina and ITARTASS,” RU Facts, July 11, 2014, available from ru-facts.com. 

27. Estimate of total arms imports by Latin America derived 

from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 

figures, adjusting for inflation.

28. “Russia Seeks New Arms Deals on Growing Latin 

American Market,” Ria Novosti, May 18, 2013, available from 

www.ria.ru.

29. “Venezuela Contracts Worth USD 11 Billion to Russia,” 

Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 15, 2013.

30. “Russian Helicopters Outlines Latin American Plans,” 

Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 31, 2014.

31. As the weapon systems of a country come from a greater number of foreign countries, it becomes more difficult and 

costly to repair, train on, and maintain spare parts for all of the 

different systems.

32. “Venezuela Contracts Worth USD 11 Billion to Russia.”

33. In general, the Chinese arms were cheaper than comparable Russian equipment. Moreover, China had a greater capacity 

to finance large arms purchases than did Russia, a factor which 

became increasingly important in Venezuela as the deepening 

financial crisis in that country undercut the ability of its government to pay up-front for arms.
90

34. Stephen Blank, “Moscow Rediscovers the South American 

Arms Market,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue 89, May 9, 2011, 

available from www.jamestown.org.

35. “India, Russia Plans Pact for New BrahMos Missile Version,” The Times of India, August 1, 2014, available from timesof

india.indiatimes.com. 

36. “Russian Tu-160 Strategic Bombers Land in Venezuela,” 

Ria Novosti, October 29, 2008, available from en.ria.ru. 

37. “US to Keep a Close Watch on Russian-Venezuelan Naval 

Exercise,” El Universal, November 24, 2008, available from www.

eluniversal.com. 

38. “Rusia reabrirá su centro de inteligencia electrónica 

en Cuba” (“Russia Re-Opens Its Electronic Intelligence Center in Cuba”), Infodefensa, July 18, 2014, available from www.

infodefensa.com. 

39. Rosa Tania Valdés, “Russian Spy Ship Makes Surprise 

Visit to Havana,” Reuters, February 27, 2014, available from 

www.reuters.com. 

40. “Russia to Open Police Anti-Drug Training Centre in Nicaragua,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, March 25, 2013, https://janes.

ihs.com. 

41. “Russian Warships to Arrive in Cuba on Official Visit,” 

Ria Novosti, August 3, 2013, available from en.ria.ru/. 

42. Kristina Wong, “Putin’s Quiet Latin America Play,” 

The Hill, March 21, 2014, available from thehill.com/policy/

defense/201305-putins-quiet-play-for-latin-america. 

43. Direction of Trade Statistics, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2014. 

44. Compiled from the Ibid.; and Yearbook, Direction of Trade 

Statistics, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2007.

45. Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014.
91

46. Based on the China-Latin America Finance Database, as 

presented by Amos Irwin and Kevin Gallagher, “Chinese Finance 

to Latin America Tops $100 Billion since 2005,” InterAmerican 

Dialogue, April 2, 2014, available from thedialogue.org. 

47. Matthew Bell, “Russia Set to Issue $4BN Defense Loan to 

Venezuela,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 19, 2011.

48. See John J. Metzler, “Putin’s Latin American Charm Offensive,” Korea Times, July 31, 2014, available from www.koreatimes.co.kr. 

49. “Russian Businesses Keen on Boosting Presence in Latin 

America,” Interfax, August 24, 2011.

50. Sizonenko.

51. “Moscow Forges Relationships with Compatriots in Latin America,” The Voice of Russia, June 12, 2010, available from 

voiceofrussia.com. 

52. Blasier, p. 3.

53. Ibid., p. 195.

54. “India, Russia Plans Pact for New BrahMos Missile 

Version.”

55. “India to Export BrahMos Missile to Latin America,” 

Chennai, India: Indo-South American Chamber of Commerce, 

August 18, 2014, available from www.indosouthamericanchamber.

com/india-export-brahmos-missile-latin-america/.

56. This equipment included Chinese VN-18 amphibious assault vehicles, VN-16 light tanks, and VN-1 armored amphibious 

vehicles. See “Exclusiva: El Nuevo Vehículo Anfibio VN-18 Para 

La Infantería de Marina Venezolana” (“Exclusive: The New VN18 Amphibious Vehicle for the Venezuelan Marines”), FAV Club, 

July 18, 2014, available from www.fav.club.com. It also included 

SR-5 multiple rocket launch vehicles and SM-4 self-propelled 

mortars, and continued with Venezuela’s 2014 order of L-15 

supersonic fighters from Hongdu Aviation, among others. See 
92

“Venezuela; FAV Orders L-15 Jet Trainer from China,” Defence 

Market Intelligence, April 15, 2014, available from dmilt.com. 

57. Fernando Krakowiak, “El interés ruso por el sector energético” (“Russia’s Interest in the Energy Sector”), Página 12, July 

14, 2014. available from www.pagina12.com.ar. 

58. “Relación Bilateral” (“Bilateral Relations”), Mexico City, 

Mexico: Ministry of Foreign Relations Official Website, available 

from embamex.sre.gob.mx/rusia/index.php/es/relacion-bilateral, accessed on December 1, 2014.

59. “Infantería de Marina. La élite de las Fuerzas Armadas 

Mexicanas” (“Naval Infantry: The Elite of the Mexican Armed 

Forces”), Defensa, available from www.defensa.com, accessed November 3, 2014. 

60. “México envía a Rusia sus helicópteros Mi-17 y Mi-8 para 

someterlos a modernización” (“Mexico to Send its Mi-17 and Mi-8 

Helicopters to Russia to be Modernized”), Defensa, July 15, 2014, 

available from www.defensa.com. 

61. Ibid.

62. “U.S. Okays Russia’s Intention to Help Mexico Fight 

Drug Criminality,” Ria Novosti, February 18, 2010, available from 

en.rian.ru. 

63. Direction of Trade Statistics, June 2014.

64. UN COMTRADE database for 2013, available from comtrade.un.org/data, accessed November 12, 2014. 

65. “Lukoil Makes Move on Mexico Oil,” Petro Global News, 

February 12, 2014, available from petroglobalnews.com. 

66. Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe (Economic System for Latin America and the Caribbean), “Recent 

developments in Economic Relations between the Russian Federation and Latin America and the Caribbean: Institutional and 

Cooperation Mechanisms for Strengthening Relations,” Caracas, 

Venezuela, August 2011.
93

67. Marvin Astrada and Félix Martín, Russia and Latin America: From Nation-State to Society of States, New York: Palgrave 

Pivot, 2013.

68. Ibid.

69. Anna Protsenko, “Cada vez hay más turistas rusos en 

México” (“There Are More and More Russian Tourists in Mexico”), Russia Beyond the Headlines, April 3, 2012, available from 

es.rbth.com.

70. Eyder Peralta, “In Retaliation, Russia Bans Some Food Imports from U.S., Europe,” National Public Radio, August 7, 2014, 

available from www.npr.org.

71. “Mexico’s Exporters Interested in Russian Market—Ambassador,” TASS, August 13, 2014, available from en.itar-tass.com. 

72. Anonymous interview with former senior Mexican 

official, October 2014.

73. Mark Falcoff, “Cuba: First Among Equals,” Dennis L. 

Bark, ed., The Red Orchestra, Vol. 1, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, pp. 78-79.

74. “Navío Ruso llega a Nicaragua” (“Russian Ship Arrives in 

Nicaragua”), El Nuevo Diario, December 11, 2008, available from 

www.elnuevodiario.com.ni. 

75. “General Gerasimov Opens Nicaraguan Munitions Disposal Plant,” Voice of Russia, April 22, 2013, available from voiceofrussia.com.

76. “Russia-Nicaragua: Multifaceted Cooperation,” The Voice 

of Russia, April 22, 2013, available from voiceofrussia.com. 

77. “Rusia y Nicaragua desmantelan red de narcotraficantes 

en Centroamérica” (“Russia and Nicaragua Dismantle Narcotrafficking Network in Central America”), Ria Novosti, March 11, 

2013, available from sp.ria.ru. 
94

78. “Dos buques de la marina de guerra de Rusia llegan a Nicaragua” (“Two Russian Navy Warships Arrive in Nicaragua”), 

La Prensa, September 12, 2013, available from www.laprensa.com.ni. 

79. “Nicaragua, Russia Sign Memorandum of International 

Security Cooperation,” TASS, October 31, 2013, available from 

en.itar-tass.com.

80. “Russia and Nicaragua Sign Cooperation Memorandum,” 

Interfax, October 31, 2013, available from www.interfax.com. 

81. “SCRF Secretary Patrushev Leads Delegation to Nicaragua,” The Voice of Russia, November 11, 2013, available from 

voiceofrussia.com. 

82. Caitlin Lee, “Colombia Rebukes Russia for Airspace Incursion,” IHS Jane’s 360, November 5, 2013, available from www.

janes.com. 

83. Observers in Colombia noted that Russia could be further 

called upon to play a role in patrolling the waters off of the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua in the future, if the trans-Nicaragua canal 

currently in process is successfully completed. The logical route 

between the Caribbean entrance of such a canal and destinations 

in Europe would pass in close proximity to the Colombian island of San Andres and the surrounding cays, with an associated 

need to protect the new shipping lanes and conduct counterpiracy, counternarcotics, and search and rescue operations in the 

zone. Each are areas in which Nicaragua could call upon Russia 

for assistance. Based on subject matter expert interviews, Bogota, 

Colombia, October 2014.

84. “Nicaragua’s Parliament Votes for Russian Military Presence,” The Voice of Russia, November 27, 2013, available from 

voiceofrussia.com. 

85. “Russia with Plans for Military Bases in Nicaragua, Cuba, 

and Venezuela,” Mercopress. February 27, 2014, available from 

www.mercopress.com. See also “Rusia negocia la apertura de bases 

militares en el Caribe” (“Russia Negotiates the Opening of Military Bases in the Caribbean”), Infodefensa, March 1, 2014, available 

from www.infodefensa.com. 
95

86. “Nicaragua Modernizes Military Fleet with Russia’s 

Help,” Xinhua, June 13, 2014, available from news.xinhuanet.com. 

87. “Russia and Nicaragua Sign Cooperation Memorandum.”

88. “Rusia confirma el suministro a Nicaragua de dos helicópteros civiles Mi-17” (“Russia Confirms Supplying Civilian 

Variant of Two Mi-17 Helicopters to Nicaragua”), Infodefensa. 

July 29, 2009, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

89. “Nicaragua recibe asistencia Rusia” (“Nicaragua Receives 

Russian Assistance”), Defensa, September 2, 2014, available from 

www.defensa.com.

90. “Rusia dona al Ejército de Nicaragua equipos de socorro 

y alerta para desastres” (“Russia Donates Rescue and Warning 

Equipment to Nicaragua for Natural Disasters”), Infodefensa, January 10, 2014, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

91. “Nicaragua compró vehículos militares rusos para lucha 

contra el narcotráfico” (“Nicaragua Bought Russian Miitary Vehicles for the Fight against Narcotrafficking”), El Nacional, October 

16, 2012, available from www.el-nacional.com. 

92. “Rusia presentará asistencia a Nicaragua en instrucción 

de efectivos de personal militar” (“Russia Will Offer Assistance to 

Nicaragua in Teaching of Military Personnel”), Infodefensa, September 4, 2012, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

93. “Russia-Nicaragua: Multifaceted Cooperation.”

94. Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014.

95. UN COMTRADE database.

96. “Russia-Nicaragua: Multifaceted Cooperation.”

97. “Nicaragua compró vehículos militares rusos para lucha 

contra el narcotráfico.”

98. The Ortega regime reportedly also requested Russian 

assistance in rebuilding the Punte Huete airport (“Panchito”), a 
96

Cold War era military airfield built by the Soviet Union during 

the 1980s. See Wilfredo Mirando Aburto and Octavio Enriquez, 

“¿Una base militar rusa?” (“A Russian Military Base?”), Confidencial, February 27, 2014, available from www.confidencial.com.

ni/articulo/16319/rusia-negocia-base-militar-en-nicaragua. See also 

“‘Panchito’ es un aeropuerto para Centroamérica” (“’Panchito’ Is 

an Airport for Central America”), El Nuevo Diario, June 11, 2011, 

available from www.elnuevodiario.com.ni. 

99. Luis Galeano and Mauricio Miranda, “Aquí sería megacanal” (“There Will be a Mega-Canal Here”), El Nuevo Diario, December 23, 2008, available from elnuevodiario.com.ni. 

100. See, for example, Rigoberto Díaz, “Russia’s Putin in 

Cuba, Nicaragua to Rekindle Latin America Ties,” Tico Times, July 

12, 2014, available from www.ticotimes.net. 

101. “Russia to Provide Nicaragua with Equipment for Construction of New Interoceanic Canal,” Ria Novosti, September 10, 

2014, available from en.ria.ru. 

102. See, for example, Blasier, pp. 91-92.

103. Ibid., p. 154.

104. “Colom de visita en Rusia” (“Colom on a Visit to 

Russia”), Prensa Libre, March 23, 2010, available from www.

prensalibre.com. 

105. Samuel Williams, “Mina Fénix de Solway producirá 

25.000t/a de ferroníquel” (“Solway’s Fenix Mine Will Produce 

25,000 Tons of Nickel per Year”), Business News Americas, June 2, 

2014, available from www.bnamericas.com. 

106. “Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,” 

Russian Foreign Ministry, Official Website, November 29, 2013, 

available from www.mid.ru. 

107. “Guatemala autoriza a empresas extranjeras a explotar petróleo en el norte del país” (“Guatemala Authorizes Foreign Companies to Explore for Petroleum in the North of the 

Country”), America Economia, June 7, 2013, available from www.

americaeconomia.com. 
97

108. “Venezuela se convertirá en un centro regional de instrucción de helicópteros rusos” (“Venezuela Will Become a Regional Training Center for Russian Helicopters”), Infodefensa, September 13, 2011, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

109. See, for example, “Russia’s Strategic Tu-160 Bombers Set 

Two World Records,” Pravda, September 19, 2008, available from 

english.pravda.ru.

110. “Russian Fleet Leaves Venezuelan Waters,” Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report, December 4, 2008, available from https://

janes.ihs.com. 

111. “Chavez Offers Bases for Russian Long-Range Bombers,” Mercopress. March 15, 2009, available from en.mercopress.com. 

See also “Report: Russia May Base Bombers in Cuba,” NBC News, 

March 14, 2009, available from www.nbcnews.com. 

112. “Rusia negocia la apertura de bases militares en el 

Caribe.”

113. “Venezuela Contracts Worth USD 11 Billion to Russia.”

114. “Russia Seeks New Arms Deals on Growing Latin 

American Market.”

115. “Venezuela se convertirá en un centro regional de 

instrucción de helicópteros rusos.”

116. Ibid.

117. “Construction of Kalashnikov Factories in Venezuela 

Behind Schedule,” The Moscow Times, October 23, 2013, available 

from www.themoscowtimes.com.

118. Guy Anderson and Inigo Guevara, “Russia Extends Venezuela’s Defence Systems Credit Facility,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 

December 1, 2010, available from https://janes.ihs.com. 

119. “Venezuela compra en Rusia 100 tanques T-72B1V 

adicionales” (“Venezuela Purchases 100 More Russian T72B1V Tanks”), Infodefensa, June 28, 2012, available from www.

infodefensa.com. 
98

120. “Venezuela es el cuarto cliente mundial de la industria 

militar rusa” (“Venezuela is the Fourth Largest Client Globally 

for the Russian Military Industry”), Infodefensa, December 21, 

2012, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

121. “El Comando de Defensa Aeroespacial de Venezuela comienza a recibir el sistema misilistico Buk-2ME” (“The Venezuelan Aerospace Defense Command Begins Receiving the Buk-2ME 

Missile System”), Infodefensa, April 17, 2013, available from www.

infodefensa.com. 

122. “Venezuela interesada en adquirir aviones Yak-130” 

(“Venezuela Interested in Acquiring Yak-130 Aircraft”), El Universal, October 15, 2012, available from www.eluniversal.com.

123. “Chavez anuncia que Venezuela recibirá próximamente 

nuevos lotes de armamento ruso” (“Chavez Announces that Venezuela Will Soon Receive New Consignments of Russian Arms”), 

Infodefensa, May 24, 2012, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

124. “Rusia y Venezuela rubrican un acuerdo de cooperación 

técnico-militar” (“Russia and Venezuela Frame a Military Technical Cooperation Agreement”), Infodefensa, May 10, 2014, available 

from www.infodefensa.com. 

125. Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014.

126. UN COMTRADE database.

127. Daniel Cancel, “Venezuela, Russia Sign Joint Venture to 

Develop Junin 6 Block,” Bloomberg, September 12, 2009, available 

from www.bloomberg.com. 

128. “Junin 6 Oilfield to Become a Russian-Venezuelan Joint 

Venture,” Russia Today, February 2, 2010, available from rt.com. 

129. “Rosneft pagará $1.000 millones por acceso a Bloque 

Carabobo 2” (“Rosneft Will Pay $1 Billion for Access to the Carabobo 2 Block”), El Universal, October 8, 2011, available from www.

eluniversal.com. 
99

130. “Venezuelan Politics May Blow Cold on Russian Contracts,” The Moscow News, March 6, 2013, available from themoscownews.com. 

131. Andrés Rojas Jiménez, “Empresas rusas advierten retrasos en planes Petroleros” (“Russian Businesses Advise of Delays 

in Oil Plans”), El Nacional, November 20, 2013, available from 

www.el-nacional.com.

132. “Venezuelan Politics May Blow Cold on Russian 

Contracts.”

133. “Russian Lukoil Seeks to Pull Out of Venezuelan Oil 

Project,” El Universal, October 2, 2013, available from www.

eluniversal.com. 

134. “Igor Sechin Took Part in Celebrations Devoted to 60th 

Anniversary of President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez,” Rosneft, 

Official Website, July 29, 2014, available from www.rosneft.com. 

Sechin was also sent as Moscow’s emissary to Chavez’ funeral.

135. Stephen Bierman and David Wethe, “Weatherford to 

Sell Russia, Venezuela Units for $500 Million,” Bloomberg, July 14, 

2014, available from www.bloomberg.com. 

136. Brian Ellsworth, “Chavez Increases Mining Control,” The 

Vancouver Province, p. A40. 

137. “Rusoro sues Venezuela at the Icsid,” El Universal, April 

2, 2013, available from www.eluniversal.com.

138. Reyes Theis, “Rusia impulsara construccion de armas en 

Venezuela” (“Russia Driving Building of Arms in Venezuela”), El 

Universal, April 11, 2010, available from www.eluniversal.com. 

139. “Venezuela acuerda con Rusia crear un banco para 

PdVSA” (“Venezuela Agrees with Russia to Create a Bank 

for PdVSA”), El Universal, July 29, 2009, available from www.

eluniversal.com. 

140. “Fonden adquirirá acciones de banco ruso-venezolano” 

(“Fonden Will Acquire Shares in the Russia-Venezuela Bank”), El 

Universal, October 14, 2010, available from www.eluniversal.com. 
100

141. Jose Orozco, “Venezuela Getting $4 Billion in Russian Financing for Weapons,” Bloomberg, November 27, 2010, available 

from www.bloomberg.com. 

142. Bell.

143. See, for example, Blasier, pp. 103-132. See also Wolfgang 

W. Berner, “The Place of Cuba in Soviet Latin American Strategy,” J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover, eds., The Soviet 

Union and Latin America, 2nd Ed., London, UK: The Pall Mall Press 

Limited, 1970, pp. 91-99. See also Falcoff.

144. Putin.

145. Juan O. Tamayo, “Report: Russia Will Reopen Spy Base 

in Cuba,” Miami Herald, July 16, 2014, available from www.miamiherald.com. 

146. “Rusia entregó a Cuba maquinaria para fabricar municiones del Kalashnikov” (“Russia Delivers Machinery to Manufacture Ammunition for Kalashnikovs to Cuba”), Fuerzas Militares, September 19, 2012, available from www.fuerzasmilitares.org. 

147. See, for example, Kevin Sullivan, “Cuba Upset by Closure of Russian Spy Base,” The Washington Post, October 19, 2001, 

p. A26. See also Mervyn Bain, “A New Era in Russia-Cuban Relations,” International Journal of Cuban Studies, Vol. 2. No. 1, Spring/

Summer 2010, pp. 39-49.

148. “Transcript of Remarks and Replies to Media Questions 

by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Official Website, 

September 29, 2004, www.mid.ru.

149. “Recibe Canciller Cubano Felipe Perez Roque a Viceminister Ruso de Relaciones Exteriores” (“Cuban Foreign Minister 

Felipe Perez Roque Hosts Russia’s Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations”), Ria Novosti, December 13, 2006, available from sp.ria.ru. 

150. Rory Carroll, “Medvedev and Castro Meet to Rebuild 

Russia-Cuba Relations,” The Guardian, November 28, 2008, available from www.theguardian.com. 
101

151. Yuri Pushkin, “Cuban Leader Visits Russia in a First since 

Cold War,” CNN, January 29, 2009, available from www.cnn.com. 

152. “Chavez to Aid Abkhazia, S Ossetia Seek Recognition,” 

Fox News, July 23, 2010, available from www.foxnews.com. 

153. “Rusia y Venezuela fortalecen relaciones con el Caribe” 

(“Russia and Venezuela Strengthen Their Relationships with the 

Caribbean”), El Universal, November 7, 2008, available from www.

eluniversal.com. 

154. Lucy Westcott and Bill Powell, “Why Russia and Cuba 

Are Partying Like Its 1962,” Newsweek, August 22, 2014, available 

from www.newsweek.com. 

155. Valdés.

156. “Rusia reabrirá su centro de inteligencia electrónica en 

Cuba.”

157. “Report: Russia May Base Bombers in Cuba.”

158. “Rusia negocia la apertura de bases militares en el 

Caribe.”

159. “Rusia entregó a Cuba maquinaria para fabricar municiones del Kalashnikov.”

160. “Cuba Will Acquire Russian Aircraft to the Amount of 

$650 Million,” Engineering Russia, February 2013, available from 

engineeringrussia.wordpress.com. 

161. “Russia to Cancel Cuba’s $29 Billion of Soviet Debt,” 

Russia Today, December 10, 2013, available from www.rt.com. 

162. “Russia Cuts Cuba’s Debt to US $3.5 Billion,” Havana 

Times, July 4, 2014, available from www.havanatimes.com. Indeed, 

to some degree, Mexico’s ability to balance its security relationship with the United States and that with Russia argues against 

those who suggest that Russian engagement with countries of the 

region inherently undercuts that of the United States.
102

163. See, for example, “Rusia quiere fomentar cooperación 

con Cuba en ámbito de innovaciones farmacológicas” (“Russia Wants to Strengthen Its Cooperation with Cuba in the Area 

of Farmacological Innovation”), Ria Novosti, October 21, 2010, 

available from sp.ria.ru. 

164. “Rusia fortalecerá la cooperación con Cuba en la esfera 

farmacológica” (“Russia Will Strengthen Its Cooperation with 

Cuba in the Farmacological Sphere”), Russia Today, October 21, 

2010, available from actualidad.rt.com. 

165. Metzler.

166. Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014.

167. Ibid.

168. UN COMTRADE database.

169. “Gazprom Takes Stake in Petronas’s Cuba Project,” 

Reuters, November 6, 2010, available from www.reuters.com. 

170. Putin.

171. “Russia, Cuba Sign 10 Agreements during Putin Visit,” 

The Brics Post, July 12, 2014, available from www.thebricspost.com. 

172. Putin.

173. Ibid.

174. “Más de 30 países interesados en invertir en Zona de 

Mariel” (“More than 30 Countries Interested in Investing in the 

Mariel Trade Zone”), Periodico, No. 26, November 5, 2014, available from www.periodico26.cu. See also “Empresarios Rusos Interesados En Zona De Desarrollo Cubana” (“Russian Businesses 

Interested in the Cuban Development Zone”), Prensa Latina, 

October 26, 2013, available from news.caribseek.com.

175. Jose F. Alonso and Ralph J. Galliano, “Russian Oil-ForSugar Barter Deals 1989-1999,” Cuba in Transition, ASCE 1999, 

pp. 335-341. See also “Russia Forgives Whopping $29 Billion of 
103

Cuban Debt with Commentary,” Havana Journal, December 10, 

2013, available from havanajournal.com.

176. “Cuba Focuses on Sugar Industry in New Investment 

Program,” Xinhua, September 21, 2014, available from news.xinhuanet.com.

177. Putin.

178. Blasier, pp. 46-47.

179. “Jagdeo Lands in Russia,” Kaieteur News, February 2, 

2010, available from www.kaieteurnewsonline.com. 

180. “Jagdeo Urges Greater Russian Presence in Caribbean,” Stabroek News, February 4, 2010, available from www.

stabroeknews.com. 

181. Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014.

182. UN COMTRADE database.

183. Blasier, p. 46.

184. “Bauxite Mining in Guyana,” Mbendi, available from 

www.mbendi.com, accessed October 29, 2014. 

185. “Russian Team Here To Do Pre-Feasibility Study for Hydropower Plant,” Stabroek News, March 24, 2007, available from 

www.stabroeknews.com. 

186. “It is Now 17 Months since BCGI Has Refused to Engage 

the BAUXITE UNION,” Stabroek News, March 19, 2011, available 

from www.stabroeknews.com. See also “Bauxite Workers Protest at 

Linden,” Stabroek News, December 4, 2009, available from www.

stabroeknews.com. 

187. “Guyana’s $56.7M Debt to Russia Cancelled,” Stabroek 

News, February 2, 2013, available from www.stabroeknews.com.

188. See Blasier, p. 47.
104

189. Anonymous interview with a senior Jamaican 

economist, November 2014.

190. Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014.

191. UN COMTRADE database.

192. “Paulwell to Outline Solutions for Bauxite Plants,” Jamaica Gleaner, April 16, 2013, available from jamaica-gleaner.com. 

193. Patrick Foster, “ALPART Closes May 15,” Jamaica Observer, March 19, 2009, available from www.jamaicaobserver.com. 

194. Horace Helps, “RPT-Jamaica’s Windalco Shuts Down 

Permanently—Union,” Reuters, March 31, 2010, available from 

www.reuters.com. 

195. Camilo Thame, “Russians Gobble Up Last Slice of Alpart,” Jamaica Observer, September 21, 2011, available from www.

jamaicaobserver.com. 

196. “Govt’s Sale of Windalco Shares Costs Country Over 

US$7m—Bauxite Official,” Jamaica Observer, June 11, 2014, 

available from www.jamaicaobserver.com. 

197. In 2011, RusAl also expressed an interest in acquiring a 

45 percent stake in Jamaica Aluminum Corporation (Jamalco). See 

“Russians Take Up Last Slice of Jamaica’s Alpart,” Stabroek News, 

September 21, 2011, available from www.stabroeknews.com. 

198. “Gov’t Gives Six-Month Notice to UC Rusal to Resume 

Mining,” Jamaica Observer, July 11, 2014, available from www.

jamaicaobserver.com. 

199. Anonymous interview with senior Jamaican economist, 

November 2014.

200. “Direct Flights to Jamaica from Russia Next Year,” 

Jamaica Observer, November 15, 2012, available from www.

jamaicaobserver.com. 
105

201. “10,000 Russian Tourists Visit Jamaica,” Jamaica Observer, 

December 12, 2013, available from www.jamaicaobserver.com. 

202. Anonymous interview with a senior Jamaican 

economist, November 2014.

203. “Russia, Ecuador Ink Strategic Partnership Declaration,” 

Ria Novosti, October 29, 2009, available from en.ria.ru. 

204. “President Correa of Ecuador Arrives in Russia on Official Visit,” Voice of Russia, August 29, 2013, available from 

voiceofrussia.com.

205. “Ecuador compra dos helicópteros Mi-17 a Rusia por 22 

millones de dólares y estudia adquirir siete UAVs” (“Ecuador 

Purchases 2 Mi-17 Helicopters from Russia for 22 Million Dollars 

and Studies Purchasing 7 UAVs”), Infodefensa, October 30, 2009, 

available from www.infodefensa.com. 

206. “El Ejército ecuatoriano recibe dos Mi-171 E de fabricación rusa” (“The Ecuadorian Army Takes Delivery on Two Mi171Es of Russian Manufacture”), Infodefensa.com, January 22, 2011, 

available from www.infodefensa.com. 

207. “Ponce: Ecuador negocia contrato para comprar armas a 

Rusia” (“Ponce: Ecuador Negotiates a Contract for the Purchase 

of Arms from Russia”), La Republica. October 31, 2011, available 

from www.larepublica.ec. 

208. Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014.

209. UN COMTRADE database.

210. “Russia to Invest $1.5bn in Ecuador Energy,” Russia 

Today, October 30, 2013, available from rt.com. 

211. Cardenillo is due to be completed in July 2016. “Building 

up Ecuador,” LATAM Confidential, November 2014.

212. “Russia to Invest $1.5bn in Ecuador Energy.”

213. Astrada and Martín, pp. 94-95.
106

214. “Ecuador y Rusia firman acuerdo para uso de energía 

nuclear” (“Ecuador and Russia Sign Agreement for the Use of 

Nuclear Energy”), El Universo, August 20, 2009, available from 

www.eluniverso.com.

215. “Vnesheconombank and Ecuador’s Central Bank Agree 

to Cooperate,” Vnesheconombank, Official Website, June 7, 2012, 

available from www.veb.ru. 

216. “Ecuador May Export Food to Russia without EU Permission—Ecuadorian President,” Ria Novosti, August 13, 2014, 

available from en.ria.ru. 

217. “New Colombian Leadership Wants to Build Up Relations with Russia,” ITAR-TASS, August 8, 2010, available from 

en.itar-tass.com.

218. See Astrada and Martin, p. 82.

219. Samper also reportedly had a commitment from then 

Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov that Samper would 

be invited to Russia as part of the deal. He became angry when 

the Russians did not fulfill their side of the bargain.

220. Ralph Boulton, “Russia Strives to Be Tops in Guns,” The 

Moscow Times, February 4, 1997, available from www.themoscowtimes.com. 

221. Beyond routine maintenance, in 2004, the Colombian 

government reportedly signed a contract for the repair of 9 Mi17Es damaged in combat operations. See “Rusos Vienen a Reparar Helicópteros” (“Russians Come to Repair Helicopters”), El 

Tiempo, July 10, 2004, available from www.eltiempo.com. 

222. See, for example, “Colombia participará en misiones de 

paz de la Unión Europea” (“Colombia to Participate in European 

Union Peace Missions”), Defensa, August 8, 2014, available from 

www.defensa.com. 

223. “Colombia to locally produce BTR-80,” Invision Free, July 

28, 2006, available from z14.invisionfree.com. 
107

224. “Tal y como lo hizo Chávez, Juan Manuel Santos estará 

de visita oficial en Rusia” (“Following in the Footsteps of Chavez, 

Juan Manuel Santos Will Make an Official Visit to Russia”), El Espectador, October 3, 2008, available from www.espectador.com. 

225. Anonymous interview with Colombian security official, 

Bogota, Colombia, October 2014.

226. Zachary Keck, “Russia Says It’s Building Naval Bases in 

Asia, Latin America,” The Diplomat, February 28, 2014, available 

from thediplomat.com. 

227. Alec Luhn, “Russia to Reopen Spy Base in Cuba as Relations with US Continue to Sour,” The Guardian, July 16, 2014, 

available from www.theguardian.com. 

228. “Rusia negocia la apertura de bases militares en el 

Caribe.”

229. Anonymous interview with Colombian security expert, 

Bogota, Colombia, October 2014.

230. Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014.

231. UN COMTRADE database.

232. Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe. 

233. Anonymous interview with Colombia energy industry 

expert, Bogota, Colombia, October 2014.

234. Anonymous interview with Colombian scholar, Bogota, 

Colombia, October 2014.

235. “TNK-BP Interested in Hydrocarbon Tenders in Colombia But Still Has Not Entered the Country—Senior VP,” Interfax,

September 27, 2012, available from www.interfax.com. 

236. Anonymous interview with Colombian scholar, Bogota, 

Colombia, October 2014.
108

237. “Meeting with President of Peru Ollanta Humala,” Russian Presidency, Official Website, September 8, 2012, available 

from eng.kremlin.ru. 

238. Elizabeth Alvarez Velásquez, “Peruvian President Focuses on Economic Ties in Visit to Russia,” Prensa Latina, November 6, 2014, available from www.plenglish.com. 

239. Ibid.

240. Calvin Simms, “Peru’s Cut-Rate Fighter Jets Were Too 

Good to Be True,” The New York Times, May 31, 1997, available 

from www.nytimes.com. 

241. “Peru Gets Upgraded Mi-25 Gunships to Boost Drug 

Fight,” Ria Novosti, October 20, 2012, available from en.ria.ru. 

242. “Fuerza Aérea Del Perú Firma Contrato Para Reparar 

MIG29” (“Peruvian Air Force Signs Contract to Repair Mig-29s”), 

Zona Militar, August 12, 2008, available from www.zona-militar.

com. See also “RAC MiG Upgraded MiG-29 Fighters of Peruvian 

Air Forces,” Russia Aviation, August 22, 2012, available from www.

ruaviation.com. 

243. Of these, eight were upgraded to the “SMP” configuration under a 2012 contract, while an additional eight were to be 

upgraded under a 2013 contract that had yet to be implemented 

at the time of this writing. Beyond the upgrades, the Peruvian 

Air Force was reportedly considering buying up to 10 Mig-35s. 

See “Rusia quiere vender el Mig-35 en Perú” (“Russia Wants to 

Sell the Mig-35 in Peru”), Defensa, October 3, 2014, available from 

www.defensa.com.

244. “Spain Offers Eurofighters to Peru,” Free Republic,

February 4, 2013, available from www.freerepublic.com.

245. “La Fuerza Aérea del Perú recibe cuatro helicópteros de 

ataque MI-25 reparados en Rusia” (“The Peruvian Air Force Takes 

Delivery on Four Mi-25 Attack Helicopters Repaired in Russia”), 

Infodefensa, October 23, 2012, available from www.infodefensa.com. 
109

246. “Ejército desmiente información publicada en medio de 

comunicación local” (“Army Refutes Information Published in 

Local Media”), Agencia Peruana de Noticias, June 25, 2011, available from www.andina.com.pe.

247. The first eight helicopters were to be delivered in November 2014, with the rest to be delivered in 2015. See “El ministro de Defensa de Perú revisa en Moscú con su homólogo ruso los 

avances del contrato para el suministro de 24 Mi-171Sh-P Hip H” 

(“The Peruvian Minister of Defense, with His Russian Counterpart, Reviews Progress in the Contract for the Supply of 24 Mi-171 

Sh-P Hip H”), Defensa, September 4, 2014, available from www.

defensa.com. 

248. “El Ministerio de Defensa de Perú expone los logros del 

programa Offset en sus compras de equipamiento militar” (“The 

Peruvian Minister of Defense Expounds on the Accomplishments 

of the Offset Program in Its Purchases of Military Equipment”), 

Defensa, October 2, 2014, available from www.defensa.com. 

249. “El ministro de Defensa de Perú revisa en Moscú con 

su homólogo ruso los avances del contrato para el suministro de 

24 Mi-171Sh-P Hip H” (“The Peruvian Minister of Defense, with 

His Russian Counterpart, Reviews Progress in the Contract for 

the Supply of 24 Mi-171 Sh-P Hip H”). In addition, the Russians 

also worked with Peru to create a secondary maintenance center 

for Russian equipment in the VRAE-M region itself, managed by 

Peruvians with Russian assistance.

250. “Russian Defense Minister Due in Brazil for Talks,” Defense News, October 15, 2013, available from www.defensenews.com. 

251. “Rosoboronexport espera cerrar tras las elecciones 

presidenciales de Perú, en 2016, la venta de 140 carros de combate T-90S” (“Rosoboronexport Hopes to Close the Deal for 140 

T-90S Armored Vehicles after the Peruvian Presidential Elections in 2016”), Defensa, September 22, 2014, available from 

www.defensa.com. 

252. “El ministro de Defensa de Rusia promueve en persona 

ventas militares en Brasil y Perú” (“The Russian Minister of Defense Promotes Military Sales in Person in Brazil and Peru”), Infodefensa, October 10, 2013, available from www.infodefensa.com. 
110

253. “Defense Minister Shoigu to Push Russian Arms Sales in 

Brazil, Peru,” Ria Novosti, October 9, 2013, available from en.ria.ru. 

254. “Putin a Humala: “Más de 200 oficiales peruanos se formarán en Rusia” (“Putin to Humala: More than 200 Peruvian Officers to be Educated in Russia”), Russia Today. September 8, 2012, 

available from actualidad.rt.com. 

255. “Perú y Rusia Suscriben Convenio De Cooperación En 

Lucha Contra Las Drogas” (“Peru and Russia Sign Cooperation 

Agreement in the Fight against Drugs”), DEVIDA, Official Website, June 25, 2012, available from www.devida.gob.pe. Although 

Colombia is the major source of cocaine destined for Russia, important quantities are also reportedly exported from Peru, mostly 

from the VRAE-M region, through the Brazilian amazon, often 

via caqmpesinos (peasants) carrying the drugs in backpacks, then 

through Africa, Europe, and eventually Russia.

256. “Rusia, Cabeza De La Lucha Contra Las Drogas” (“Russia, at the Head of the Fight against Drugs”), Los Tiempos, March 

21, 2013, available from www.lostiempos.com. 

257. UN COMTRADE database.

258. The small “Cubesat” was reportedly wholly developed 

in Peru by scientists at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru 

(PUPC). “La PUCP lanza al espacio primeros satélites hechos 

íntegramente en el Perú” (“PUCP University Launches Its First 

Satellites Built Entirely in Peru”), Gestion, November 21, 2013, 

available from gestion.pe. For technical specifications, see “PUCPSat-1,” Instituto Radioastronomia Inras-PUCP, available from

inras.pucp.edu.pe.

259. “Russia and Peru Agree to Boost Food Imports, May 

Share GLONASS,” Russia Today, November 7, 2014, available 

from rt.com. 

260. Lucien Chauvin, “As Russia Pivots to Asia, Some Ask 

How Far East It’s Willing to Look,” The Christian Science Monitor, 

May 21, 2014, available from www.csmonitor.com. 
111

261. “Russia and Peru Agree to Boost Food Imports, May 

Share GLONASS.”

262. Ibid.

263. “Peru’s President Humala Meets with Russian Officials 

in Moscow,” Andina, November 7, 2014, available from www.

andina.com.pe. 

264. “Peru, Russia Eye to Kick Off FTA Talks to Boost Trade,” 

Andina, May 6, 2014, available from www.andina.com.pe. 

265. Matthew Michaelides, “The New Face of Russia’s Relations with Brazil,” Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No. 5, May 2014, 

available from www.jpolrisk.com. 

266. Ibid.

267. “Putin Talks with Dilma Rousseff in Brazilian Capital,” 

The Voice of Russia, July 22, 2014, available from voiceofrussia.com. 

268. Michaelides.

269. Putin.

270. Michaelides.

271. “Brasil va a recibir sus últimos MI-35 en los próximos 90 

días” (“Brazil Will Receive Its Last Mi-35 in the Next 90 Days”), 

Defensa, September 23, 2014, available from www.defensa.com. 

272. Michaelides.

273. “Russian Helicopters Outlines Latin American Plans.”

274. “Militares brasileños evalúan en Rusia el Pantsir-S1” 

(“Brazilian Military Officers in Russia Evaluate the Pantsir-S1”), 

Defensa, September 1, 2014, available from www.defensa.com. See 

also “El contrato ruso- brasileño por los ‘Pantsir’ y la futura planta 

de producción en Brasil superaría los 1.000 millones de dólares” 

(“The Russia-Brazilian Contract for the ‘Pantsir’s’ and the Future 

Production Plant in Brazil Will Exceed $1 Billion”), Defensa, July 

22, 2014, available from www.defensa.com. 
112

275. “Soldados del Ejército de Brasil reciben capacitación para 

operar los misiles antiaéreos rusos Igla-S” (“Soldiers of the Brailian Army Receive Training for the Operation of Russian Igla-S 

Antiaircraft Missiles”), Infodefensa, May 12, 2010, available from 

www.infodefensa.com. 

276. “India Plans to Supply Vietnam BrahMos Missiles,” Indian Defence, September 14, 2014, available from indiandefence.com. 

277. “Brasil y Rusia afianzan en Chile su colaboración en tecnología militar” (“Brazil and Russia in Chile Refine Their Collaboration in Military-Technical Collaboration”), Infodefensa, March 

28, 2014, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

278. “Rusia ofrece a Brasil aviones de caza Sukhoi Su-35” 

(“Russia Offers Brazil Sukhoi Su-35 Fighters”), Infodefensa.com, 

May 24, 2013, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

279. “La Fuerza Aérea Brasileña estudia nuevas opciones para 

disponer de aviones de transición hasta la llegada del Gripen NG” 

(“The Braziian Air Force Studies New Options to Make Available Transitional Aircraft until the Gripen NG Arrives”), Defensa, 

September 15, 2014, available from www.defensa.com. 

280. “La policía de Río de Janeiro probará un vehículo blindado ruso para luchar contra el crimen organizado” (“The Police 

of Rio de Janeiro State Will Test a Russian Armored Vehicle for 

the Fight against Organized Crime”), Infodefensa, May 25, 2010, 

available from www.infodefensa.com. 

281. John K. C. Daly, “Moscow Looses Brazil Submarine Deal 

to Paris,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2008, pp. 5-27.

282. “Soldados del Ejército de Brasil reciben capacitación para 

operar los misiles antiaéreos rusos Igla-S.”

283. Alexandra Koval, “Contemporary Perspectives and 

Trends in Russian-Brazilian Relations,” Russian Analytical Digest, 

February 14, 2011.

284. Michaelides.
113

285. “Putin Talks with Dilma Rousseff in Brazilian Capital.”

286. Ibid.

287. “Gazprom Eyeing Opportunities in Brazil Oil, Gas,” Reuters, October 9, 2009, available from www.reuters.com. 

288. Michaelides.

289. “Rosatom in Brazil by 2015,” Brazil Energy, February 

14, 2014.

290. Nick Cunningham, “In Latin America, Putin Wheels, 

Deals on Energy,” The Christian Science Monitor, July 16, 2014, 

available from www.csmonitor.com. 

291. Guy Anderson, “Russia Targets Brazilian Market as Part 

of Global Expansion Strategy,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 17, 

2010, available from https://janes.ihs.com. 

292. See, for example, Aleksey Ekimovsky, “Brazil’s Embraer 

to Rival the Superjet,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, December 27, 

2012, available from in.rbth.com. 

293. “Putin Talks with Dilma Rousseff in Brazilian Capital.”

294. Elliot Wilson, “Russia: Hand in Hand,” LatinFinance, 

May 1, 2013, available from www.latinfinance.com.

295. “Putin Talks with Dilma Rousseff in Brazilian Capital.”

296. “Bolivia Says Morales’ Plane Diverted, Apparently over 

Snowden,” Reuters, July 2, 2013, available from www.reuters.com. 

297. “Presidentes Evo Morales y Vladimir Putin se reunirán 

en Brasil” (“Evo Morales and Vladimir Putin Will Meet in 

Brazil”), Cambio, July 11, 2014, available from www.cambio.bo. 

298. “Bolivia pide a Rusia créditos a largo plazo y bajo interés” (“Bolivia Asks Russia for Long Term Credit at Low Interest 

Rates”), Infodefensa, January 10, 2011, available from www.infodefensa.com. 
114

299. “Russian Helicopters Outlines Latin American Plans.”

300. “Morales confirma compra de avión presidencial a Rusia” (“Morales Confirms the Purchase of a Presidential Aircraft 

from Russia”), La Patria, September 13, 2009, available from www.

lapatriaenlinea.com. 

301. “Bolivia pide a Rusia créditos a largo plazo y bajo 

interés.”

302. “Rusia establecerá un centro de mantenimiento de aviones en Bolivia” (“Russia to Establish an Aviation Maintenance 

Center in Bolivia”), Infodefensa, September 16, 2009, available from 

www.infodefensa.com. 

303. “Bolivia ha decidido adquirir un Dassault Falcon 900EX 

como avión presidencial” (“Bolivia Has Decided to Acquire a 

Dassault Falcon 900EX as its Presidential Aircraft”), Aviacion

Argentina, April 12, 2010, available from www.aviacionargentina.

net. 

304. “Bolivia evalúa la compra de dos helicópteros rusos 

Mi-17” (“Bolivia Evaluates the Purchase of Two Russian Mi-17 

Helicopters”), Infodefensa, March 21, 2014, available from www.

infodefensa.com.

305. “Bolivia negocia con Rusia compras de helicópteros y armamento” (“Bolivia Negotiates with Russia for the Purchase of 

Helicopters and Arms”), Infodefensa, August 28, 2013, available 

from www.infodefensa.com. 

306. Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014.

307. UN COMTRADE database.

308. “Rusia destaca que en Bolivia puede construirse una estación para lanzar satélites” (“Russia Emphasizes that in Bolivia, 

It Could Construct a Facility for Launching Satellites”), Infodefensa, April 29, 2010, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

309. Astrada and Martin, p. 90.
115

310. “Bolivia proyecta comprar armammento ruso por varios 

millions de dólares” (“Bolivia Anticipates Purchasing Millions of 

Dollars of Russian Arms”), El Pais, May 22, 2009, available from 

www.elpais.com. 

311. “Russian Oil Giant Rosneft Inks Bolivia Energy Deal,” 

AFP, November 9, 2013, available from https://uk.news.yahoo.com.

312. “Bolivia’s Morales to Anticipate Rosneft Investment 

Despite Sanctions,” Reuters, July 16, 2014, available from www.

reuters.com. 

313. “Rusia interesada en litio boliviano” (“Russia Interested 

in Bolivian Lithium”), Vanguardia, June 22, 2009, available from 

www.vanguardia.com.mx. 

314. See, for example, Blasier, p. 159.

315. Ibid., p. 163.

316. Ibid., p. 163.

317. “Moscow Forges Relationships with Compatriots in Latin America.”

318. While it was the only other country that Medvedev visited on that trip beside Brazil, it is of note that he did not make 

a stop in Argentina during his four-nation visit to the region 

in 2008.

319. Putin was received warmly by Argentine president Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner when the two leaders signed an agreement for cooperation in a broad array of sectors, from energy to 

telecommunications. 

320. Alexei Anishchuk and Richard Lough, “Putin Signs 

Nuclear Energy Deal with Argentina,” Reuters, July 12, 2014, 

available from www.reuters.com. 

321. Anna Smolchenko, “Russia, Argentina in Talks on Arms 

Deal,” The Moscow Times, August 10, 2006, available from www.

themoscowtimes.com. 
116

322. “Arriban a Buenos Aires los dos primeros helicópteros 

MI-171E adquiridos a Rusia” (“The First Mi-171E Helicopters 

Purchased from Russia Touch Down in Buenos Aires”), Infodefensa, November 29, 2011, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

323. “Argentina adquirirá nueva partida de helicópteros Mi171E de fabricación rusa” (“Argentina Will Acquire a New Squadron of Mi-171E Helicopters of Russian Manufacture”), Infodefensa, 

April 16, 2012, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

324. “Argentina construirá un nuevo buque polar en cooperación con Rusia” (“Argentina Will Build a New Polar Ship in Cooperation with Russia”), Infodefensa, February 16, 2012, available 

from www.infodefensa.com. 

325. “Compran barcos a Rusia para patrullaje” (“Russian 

Boats Purchased for Patrolling”), Nacion, December 5, 2014, 

available from www.lanacion.com.ar.

326. Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014.

327. UN COMTRADE database.

328. “Argentina compra a Rusia helicópteros Mi-17 y firman 

acuerdos en energía nuclear y tecnología de satélites” (“Argentina Purchases Mi-17 Helicopters from Russia and Signs Agreements for Nuclear Energy and Satellite Technology”), Infodefensa, 

April 15, 2010, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

329. Argentina is one of the few countries in the region to 

have an installed nuclear capability (the others being Mexico 

and Brazil). 

330. Anishchuk and Lough.

331. “Argentina and China Sign Nuclear Cooperation Deal 

for Atucha III,” Buenos Aires Herald, September 3, 2014, available 

from buenosairesherald.com. 

332. “Russian Companies Display Interest in Making 

Agreements with Argentina,” Telam, September 19, 2014. 
117

333. “Nationalized YPF Draws Russian Investor,” UPI, 

September 7, 2012, available from www.upi.com. 

334. Pablo Gonzalez and Camila Russo, “Chevron $1.24 Billion Deal Leads YPF Post-Repsol Shale Hunt,” Bloomberg, July 17, 

2013, available from www.bloomberg.com. 

335. “Russian Companies Invited to Develop World’s Second Largest Shale Field in Argentina,” TASS, September 22, 2014, 

available from en.itar-tass.com. 

336. Jonathan Gilbert, “Russia Signs Nuclear Deal in 

Argentina,” The New York Times, July 14, 2014, p. 8.

337. “Russian Companies Display Interest in Making 

Agreements with Argentina.” 

338. “Argentina and Russia Agree to Strategic Association,” 

Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report, December 11, 2008, available from 

https://janes.ihs.com. 

339. “Russian Companies Invited to Develop World’s Second 

Largest Shale Field in Argentina.”

340. “Inter Rao Plans to Help Hydropower Plants Construction in Argentina,” Energy Business Review, July 14, 2014, available 

from hydro.energy-business-review.com. 

341. Krakowiak.

342. Ibid.

343. “Argentina to Discuss Increasing Exports to Russia,” The Moscow Times, August 17, 2014, available from www.

themoscowtimes.com. 

344. “Russian Companies Display Interest in Making 

Agreements with Argentina.” 

345. See, for example, “Inter RAO Could Help Build Turnkey 

Hydropower Plants in Argentina,” Russia Beyond the Headlines,

Interfax, July 10, 2014, available from m.rbth.com. 
118

346. “RusHydro Signs Memorandum of Understanding with 

ENERGIA ARGENTINA S.A.,” RusHydro, Official Website, May 

27, 2011, available from www.eng.RusHydro.ru. 

347. Krakowiak.

348. “Russian, Argentinian Presidents Launch Broadcasting 

of RT in Argentina,” Ria Novosti, October 10, 2014, available from

en.ria.ru. 

349. “Paraguay confirma que Rusia le ofreció seis aviones de 

combate” (“Paraguay Confirms that Russia Offered It Six Combat 

Aircraft”), InfoDefensa, January 2, 2011, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

350. “Paraguay quiere comprar de Rusia aeronaves y no 

armas, dice Filizzola” (“Paraguay Wants to Buy Russian Aircraft, and Not Arms, Filizzola Says”), ABC Color, June 14, 2010, 

available from www.abc.com.py. 

351. UN COMTRADE database.

352. “Russia and Brazil Main Buyers of Paraguayan Beef 

in Spite of FMD,” Mercopress, April 26, 2012, available from 

en.mercopress.com. 

353. “Rusia rehabilita dos frigoríficos para exportar carne 

paraguaya” (“Russia Refurbishes Two Meat-Processing Facilities 

for Exporting Paraguayan Meat”), AmericaEconomia, January 27, 

2012, available from www.americaeconomia.com. 

354. “Surge oportunidad para enviar más carne a Rusia” 

(“The Opportunity to Send More Meat to Russia Arises”), ABC 

Color, May 1, 2014, available from www.abc.com.py. 

355. UN COMTRADE database.

356. Anonymous interview with Paraguayan scholar, 

October 2014.

357. “Crecieron las exportaciones de carne a Rusia” (“Meat 

Exports to Russia Grow”), El Observador, April 12, 2013, available 

from www.elobservador.com.uy. 
119

358. “Morales, Fernández, Mujica, Putin y Maduro se reunirán 

en Argentina” (“Morales, Fernandez, Mujica, Putin, and Maduro 

Meet in Argentina”), Cambio, July 11, 2014, available from www.

cambio.bo. 

359. “La Policía Nacional de Uruguay recibe el viernes los 

blindados Tigr adquiridos a Rusia” (“The Uruguayan National 

Police Friday Will Take Delivery on the Tigr Armored Vehicles 

Acquired from Russia”), Infodefensa, October 14, 2011, available 

from www.infodefensa.com. 

360. “El Ministerio de Defensa del Uruguay adquiere camiones tácticos rusos Ural” (“The Uruguayan Ministry of Defense 

Acquires Ural Russian Tactical Trucks”), Infodefensa, August 21, 

2012, available from www.infodefensa.com. 

361. “El pedido de armamento de la Policía de Uruguay a Rusia ascendió a más de 1,2 millones de dólares” (“The Order by the 

Uruguayan Police to Russia for Arms Rises to More than $1.2 Million Dollars”), InfoDefensa, February 3, 2012, available from www.

infodefensa.com. 

362. “La FAU no participa en la ronda negociatoria por el Yak 

130. Los problemas de pagar a Rusia armamento con carne” (“The 

Uruguayan Air Force Will Not Participate in the Round of Negotiations for the Yak-130. The Problems of Paying for Arms with 

Meat”), Defensa, July 16, 2014, available from www.defensa.com. 

363. Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014.

364. UN COMTRADE database.

365. “Russia Looks to Nuclear Cooperation with Uruguay,” 

Mercopress, January 2, 2008, available from en.mercopress.com.

366. “Gazprom International Talks in Uruguay,” Gazprom, 

Official Website, September 16, 2014, available from gazprom-international.com.

367. “Uruguay Says Gazprom, LUKOIL Eye Its Energy Sector,” Reuters, April 14, 2011, available from www.reuters.com.
120

368. “Uruguay aumentará sus exportaciones agrícolas a Rusia” (“Uruguay Will Increase Its Agricultural Exports to Russia”), 

Ria Novosti, October 6, 2014, available from sp.ria.ru. 

369. For Russia, the perceived closeness of Chile to the United 

States implies that Russian courtship of the country would be a 

“waste of time.” See Chauvin.

370. Blasier, p. 161.

371. “Lavrov Hopes Chile Officials Will Attend St. Petersburg International Economic Forum,” Voice of Russia, May 1, 2014, 

available from voiceofrussia.com. 

372. “Putin constata un ‘diálogo intense político’ entre Rusia 

y Chile en material económica” (“Putin Verifies That There Is an 

‘Intense Political Dialogue’ between Russia and Chile on Economic Matters”), El Mercurio, November 9, 2014, available from www.

emol.com. 

373. “Canciller Muñoz visitará Moscú para concretar acuerdos entre Chile y Rusia” (“Foreign Minister Muñoz Will Visit 

Moscow to Cement Agreements between Chile and Russia”), El 

Mercurio, November 10, 2014, available from www.emol.com. 

374. “Bachelet Invites Putin to Visit Chile,” Fox News, April 

30, 2014, available from www.foxnews.com. 

375. Trifonov.

376. “EEUU muestra su malestar por la intención de Chile de 

adquirir helicópteros militares rusos” (“The U.S. Demonstrates 

Its Displeasure over Chile’s Intention to Acquire Russian Military Helicopters”), Infodefensa, July 8, 2009, available from www.

infodefensa.com. 

377. Anonymous interview with Chilean security expert, 

November 2014.

378. Guy Anderson, “Russia and Chile Explore Military Cooperation Again,” IHS Janes 360, May 1, 2014, available from www.

janes.com.
121

379. Direction of Trade Statistics, 2014.

380. UN COMTRADE database.

381. “Observatorio astronómico ruso “abre los ojos” en Chile 

tras 41 años” (“The Russian Astronomical Observatory ‘Opens Its 

Eyes’ in Chile after 41 Years”), Efektonoticias, May 8, 2014, available from efektonoticias.com. 

382. “Firma rusa desarrolla proyecto piloto undimotriz en la 

VI Región” (“Russian Firm Develops an Automotive Pilot Project 

in the 6th Region”), Business News Americas. June 1, 2011, available 

from www.bnamericas.com. 

383. Chauvin.

384. Still, Russia’s commercial ventures with countries such 

as Mexico and Peru also illustrate that challenging the United 

States is not the sole reason for its activities in the region.

385. Indeed, one indication of just how grave the Russian financial situation is becoming is recent Russian indications that it 

may need to reduce the budget for a number of projects contemplated for the 2018 World Cup. See “Russia’s World Cup Budget 

Feeling Squeeze,” Yahoo News, October 15, 2014, available from 

news.yahoo.com. 

386. See, for example, Laurence Norman, “EU Projects Impact 

of Sanctions on Russian Economy,” The Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2014, available from online.wsj.com. See also Anna Andrianova, “Russian GDP Growth Slows Less Than Forecast on 

Harvest,” Bloomberg, November 13, 2014, available from www.

bloomberg.com. 

387. See, for example, R. Evan Ellis, China on the Ground in 

Latin America, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014.

388. R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 60, 1st Quarter 

2011, pp. 85-91.
122

389. Written correspondence from David Mares, December 

11, 2014.

390. “Russian Food Embargo Smells Like Opportunity for 

LatAm,” The Global Post, August 17, 2014, available from www.

globalpost.com. 

391. Even beyond purely military actions, Russia’s commercial presence in Latin America in sectors such as gas and oil and 

construction creates opportunities for Russia to introduce forces 

into the region in time of conflict.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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