NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANDREW KWASI DONKOR, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-55705 

D.C. No. 5:15-cv-01712-GW-DTB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 16, 2018**

Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. 

Andrew Kwasi Donkor appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from 

a wage garnishment. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to 

state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doe v. Abbott Labs., 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 23 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-55705 

571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Donkor’s Fifth Amendment claims 

because defendants are not federal government actors and because defendants did 

not impose any criminal punishments on Donkor. See Hudson v. United States, 

522 U.S. 93, 98-99 (1997) (Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 

prohibits only the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same 

offense); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The Due 

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the equal protection component 

thereof apply only to actions of the federal government—not to those of state or 

local governments.” (citation omitted)). 

The district court properly dismissed Donkor’s Fourteenth Amendment 

substantive and procedural due process claims because Donkor failed to allege 

facts sufficient to show that defendants’ conduct was egregious and shocks the 

conscience, or that Donkor did not receive an adequate opportunity to be heard. 

See Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2006) (substantive due process 

claim requires allegation of “egregious” official conduct that “shocks the 

conscience” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Raditch v. United 

States, 929 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991) (procedural due process requires “notice 

and an opportunity to respond in some manner”).

The district court properly dismissed Donkor’s Fourteenth Amendment 
3 17-55705 

equal protection claim because Donkor failed to allege facts sufficient to show that 

he was intentionally treated differently from similarly situated individuals, or 

discriminated against based on his membership in a protected class. See Village of 

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (setting forth elements of an equal 

protection “class of one” claim); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 

(9th Cir. 1998) (setting forth elements of an equal protection claim based on 

membership in a protected class).

The district court properly dismissed Donkor’s Sixth and Eighth 

Amendment claims because Donkor failed to allege facts sufficient to state any

plausible claims for relief. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 

2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must 

present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also 

Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440 n.16 (1960) (the Sixth Amendment “is 

specifically limited to criminal prosecutions” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (an Eighth

Amendment claim requires punishment which is “offensive to human dignity” 

(citation omitted)). 

The district court properly dismissed Donkor’s claims against the County of 

Riverside and the individual defendants in their official capacities because Donkor

failed to allege facts sufficient to show any constitutional violation. See Dougherty 
4 17-55705 

v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements for 

municipal liability). 

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.