IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Inthe Matterofthe Marriage of ) JILL S. CALABRESE, ) Appellant, ) and ) JACKA. CALABRESE, ) Respondent. ) No. 73439-3-1 DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: March 7, 2016 ISO O $*9 r* 3*. rn~<? 1 "^1 33b
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• * Cyt* CO TM~ftJ KO ®M: Trickey, J. — JillCalabrese appeals a trial court ordergranting herformer husband's petition for modification ofspousal maintenance. She contends Jack Calabrese's reduction of income was voluntary and not taken in good faith. Because substantial evidence supports the court's finding that the reduction in income was involuntary and constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification, we affirm.
FACTS In 2010, Jill and Jack Calabrese1 divorced after 27 years of marriage. 

### Under their settlement agreement, Jill received just over 54 percent of the net 

### community assets, which totaled approximately $3 million. The agreement also required Jack to pay Jill $10,000 a month in spousal maintenance. The decree provided that this maintenance would continue for approximately eight years, until Jack turned 65. And if Jack's income remained at its current level of $300,000 annually, maintenance would continueforone additional year.

1For clarity, we referto the parties bytheirfirst names.No. 73439-3-1 / 2 At the time of the divorce, Jack had operated his own business, NAPA Insurance Center (NIC), for many years. As the endorsed provider of insurance for NAPAAuto Parts, NIC markets business insurance programs to NAPA stores nationwide. Because the sole focus of NIC is marketing insurance to NAPA stores, the corporate leadership of NAPA Auto Parts has allowed NIC to use the NAPAbranding and logo. However, NIChas never had an ownership interest in

or contractual relationship with any NAPA stores or NAPA corporate management. NIC functions as a "middleman" between NAPA stores and the insurance companies that sell policies to the NAPA dealers. NIC generates income from the commissions itreceives from the insurance companies. From 1991 to 2012, Federated Insurance was the only provider of business insurance that NIC marketed to NAPA dealers. Over 90 percent of NIC's income from commissions came from Federated. For many years, this 

### was a consistently lucrative arrangement; at the time of the divorce, Jack's income exceeded $25,000 a month. 

### At some point, Federated began losing NAPA policyholders because its rates were no longer competitive. Around June 2011, NAPA corporate management met with Jack and Federated representatives to discuss ways to 

### improve NAPA participation in Federated programs. After "many weeks of no 

### improvements on the program," NAPA authorized Jack to "go a different direction."2 In September 2012, NAPA severed its relationship with Federated, which stopped paying commissions to Jack.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1805.No. 73439-3-1 / 3 

### Jack's first attempt to replace Federated and secure a new source of income for NIC was an asset purchase agreementwith a different provider, GMI, Inc. Under this agreement, Jack and GMI formed a new limited liability 

### corporation, Newco, which would be known as NAPA Insurance Center, LLC. GMI owned 67 percentof this new entity, and Jackowned 33 percent. As part of 

### the agreement, Jack also sold hisgoodwill in NIC toGMI for $800,000, to bepaid in monthly installments over two years. Jack and GMI executed the contract as 

### an asset purchase agreement in order for Jack to be able to declare capital 

### gains, notordinary income, and thusgain a taxbenefit in 2012 and2013. The agreementincluded an endorsementfrom NAPA. The agreementprovided that aftertwo years, Jack would receive an annual base salary of$200,000 plus a 

### percentageof netprofits. The parties projectedthathis annual incomewould be approximately $400,000 under these terms. NAPA reserved the right to terminate its relationship withGMI at anytime. 

### The business plan with GMI was not successful. There was a low 

### program adoption rate and NAPA corporate had received poor feedback from customers. GMI wanted to end the agreement to avoid further losses, and Jack wanted to maintain hisrelationship with NAPA. In October2013, Jack agreed to 

### pay GMI $200,000 to repurchase his membership interest and noncompetition agreement. He agreed to forgive the $100,000 GMI still owed him of the $800,000 in goodwill and to pay$100,000 in cashintwo $50,000 installments. 

### In January 2014, Jackexecuted anagreementwith LocktonAffinity, LLC. 

### Underthis agreement, Jackwould receive amonthlyfee of$10,000 during 2014,No. 73439-3-1/4 along with a percentage of premiums over $1.8 million. After 2014, Jack would receive a percentage of collected premiums, but no monthly fee. The president of Lockton projected that Jack's income from commissions would total $24,948 for 2014, $89,892 for 2015, $60,984 for 2016, and $73,656 for 2017. During 2014, Jack used savings to compensate for the reduction in income and remained current in his maintenance payments to Jill. 

### On August 21, 2014, Jack filed a petition for modification of spousal support on the basis of a substantial change in circumstances, requesting that the court reduce his monthly maintenance payments to $2,000. Jack proposed that Jill also receive 30 percent of "net business revenue from NAPA Insurance 

### Center,"with payments not to exceed $120,000ayear.3 On January 9, 2015, following a contested hearing, the superior court 

### commissioner entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and an order 

### granting Jack's petition. The commissioner found that Jack's loss ofincome following NAPA's severance of its relationship with Federated constituted a substantial and involuntary change of circumstances. The commissionerfound that the exclusive endorsement and business relationship with Federated "was 

### expected to continue because it had been longstanding," but that Federated's loss of market share caused the end of the relationship and consequent reduction in Jack's income.4 The commissioner found that Jack's agreement with GMI, subsequent 

### purchase of hisnoncompete, and his agreementwith Lockton were "good faith

3 CP at 4. 4CP at 1898.No. 73439-3-1 / 5

efforts to maintain his income and to find a new insurance carrier for NAPA to 

### endorse."5 The commissioner noted that Jack paid his maintenance throughout 2012 and 2013 in part by means of his capital gains from the original agreement with GMI. And the commissionerfound that Jack's 10 monthly bank deposits of $14,679.88 in2014 included Lockton's guaranteed payment of$10,000 a month forthatyear, which would not continue in2015. The commissioner ordered that maintenance payments be reduced to $2,500, to begin inJanuary 2015. In addition, the commissionerordered Jackto 

### pay 15 percent of all gross commission compensation above $100,000 a year. The commissioner ordered Jack to deposit all income to one bank account, with quarterly disclosures ofbank statements. Jill moved for revision ofthe commissioner's order. On March 20, 2015, 

### the trial court adopted the commissioner's findings and conclusions, revising the orderto include, "Should Mr. Calabrese's income be restored to historic levels to 

### $300,000 annually, Ms. Calabrese may petition the court to reinstate the maintenance amounts and schedule inthe Decree."6 Jill appeals. ANALYSIS On a motion for revision, the superior court reviews the commissioner's 

### findings of fact and conclusions oflaw de novo, examining onlythe evidence and issues before the commissioner. State v. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106, 113, 86 P.3d 

### 132(2004). Once the superior court rules on the revision motion, "the appeal is

5 CP at 1898. 6 CP at 1917-18.No. 73439-3-1 / 6 

### from the superior court's decision, not the commissioner's." State v. Hoffman, 

### 115 Wn.App. 91, 101.60P.3d 1261. rev'd on other grounds. 150 Wn.2d 536, 78 P.3d 1289 (2003). 

### Modification of spousal maintenance is appropriate where the moving 

### party presents evidenceestablishing that there has been a substantial change in circumstances notwithin the parties' contemplation at the time the maintenance 

### was ordered. RCW26.09.170(1)(b); Waaner v. Wagner, 95 Wn.2d 94, 98, 621 

### P.2d 1279 (1980); In re Marriage ofOchsner. 47Wn. App. 520, 524, 736P.2d 

### 292 (1987). A changein circumstances occurs upon a changein thefinancial ability of the obligor spouse to pay in comparison with the need of the other 

### spouse. Ochsner. 47Wn. App. at524. Avoluntary reduction in incomewill not constitute a change in circumstances warranting modification absent a 

### "substantial showing ofgoodfaith." Lambertv. Lambert. 66Wn.2d 503, 510, 403 P.2d 664 (1965). We will not disturb the trial court's determination regarding substantial 

### change in circumstances absent an abuseofdiscretion. Lambert, 66Wn.2d at 508. A court abuses it discretion when itsdecision is manifestly unreasonable or 

### is based on untenable grounds or reasons. In re Marriage ofKovacs. 121 Wn.2d 795, 801, 854 P.2d 629 (1993). "A court's decision is manifestly unreasonable ifit is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and 

### theapplicable legal standard." In re Marriage ofFiorito. 112Wn. App. 657, 664, 50 P.3d 298 (2002). Adecision is based on untenable grounds if "the factual 

### findings areunsupported by therecord; it is based on untenable reasons ifit isNo. 73439-3-1 / 7 based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements ofthe correct standard." Fiorito, 112 Wn. App. at 664. Substantial evidence supports a factual determination ifthe record contains sufficient evidence to persuade a fair minded, rational person ofthe truth ofthat determination. Bering v. SHARE. 106 Wn.2d 212, 220, 721 P.2d 918 (1986). Jill argues that Jack's reduction in income was part of a retirement strategy. She analogizes to two cases, Fox v. Fox. 87 Wn. App. 782, 942 P.2d 1084 (1997), and Lambert v. Lambert. 66 Wn.2d 503, 403 P.2d 664 (1965), to 

### argue thatthe reduction of income was voluntary and thatJackfailed to carry his burden to showgood faith. These cases do not supporther argument. In Fox, the husband, a surgeon, paid spousal support after his divorce 

### from his wife of 37 years, who was disabled. 87 Wn. App. at 783. After the divorce, Fox sold his medical practice to a company whose registered agentwas 

### his new wife. Following the sale, the company hired Fox on a part-time basis and also hired his wifeas the practice manager, at a substantial salary. Fox, 87 

### Wn. App. at 783-84. In affirming the trial court's rejection of the husband's 

### petition for modification of spousal support, this court noted that while Fox's former wife's situation had worsened due to her increasingly debilitating multiple 

### sclerosis, Fox had "suffered no significant reduction ofthe income to which he has access." Fox, 87 Wn. App. at 785-86. This court concluded, "Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that [Fox's] reduction in individual income was part of a plan designed to create the 

### appearance of a worsened financial condition, while at the same time ensuringNo. 73439-3-1 / 8 that his household income and lifestyle remained unchanged." Fox, 87 Wn. App.

at 786.Here, the record establishes that at the time of the divorce, the parties reasonably expected the lucrative relationship with Federated to continue. Following NAPA's severance of its relationship with Federated, Jack made voluntary decisions to sell his interest to GMI, repurchase his interest when the business plan did not succeed, and execute an agreement with Lockton. These decisions were efforts to secure a replacement for the relationship with Federated, which had accounted for 90 percent of Jack's income. Jack 

### presented evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the loss of income from Federated was involuntary, resulting from decisions made not by Jack but by the corporate managementofFederated and NAPA. 

### Jill argues that Jack, like the husband in Fox, voluntarily reduced his incomein order to implementa retirement strategy. Jill points to a declarationin the record, in which Jack explained the sale of his goodwill in NIC to GMI investors: "At the time, itseemed like a good business proposition, as Iam 61 

### and was trying tofigure out a retirement strategy thatwould enable me to exit the business."7 But this single general statementinone declaration does notsupport 

### a finding that the sale to GMI was a voluntary retirement decision not made in 

### good faith, analogous to Fox's plan "designed to create the appearance of a worsened financial condition." Fox, 87 Wn. App. at 786. The trial court rejected

CP at 326.

8No. 73439-3-1 / 9 

### this argument, as do we. Norare we persuaded by Jill's arguments that Jack's 

### lifestyle has "even improved" sincethe divorce.8 Lambert involved a husband whose optometry practice declined due to 

### the notoriety surrounding his divorce proceedings. 66 Wn.2d at 505. While the divorce was pending, he began working as an employee at another optometry 

### practice in a nearby city. Lambert. 66 Wn.2d at 505. After only one month of employment, however, the employerfired Lambert for notdiscontinuing his own 

### optometry practice but essentially competing with his employer. Lambert. 66 Wn.2d at 505. Our Supreme Court noted that Lambert's employment "could 

### have continued and probably prospered." Lambert. 66Wn.2d at 505. Butin his ill-fated efforts to revive his practice, Lambert incurred monthly expenses 

### exceeding his employee salary and remained delinquent in his support 

### obligations. Lambert. 66Wn.2d at505. Thecourt held that such a "[vjoluntary reduction in income or self-imposed curtailment of earning capacity, absent a 

### substantial showing of good faith, will not constitute such a change of circumstances as to warrant a modification." Lambert. 66Wn.2d at510. 

### Here, by contrast, the record shows noanalogous voluntary reduction in income or self-imposed curtailment ofemployment. And unlike Lambert, Jack
neverbecamedelinquentin his supportobligations, despite his reducedincome. 

### Similarly, In re Marriage ofBucklin. 70 Wn. App. 837, 855 P.2d 1197 

### (1993), whichJill citestoarguethatinsufficientevidence supportsthetrial court's findings, doesnotsupportherposition. In Bucklin. thehusband's evidenceofhis allegedly reduced income came only from his own testimony and handwritten 8Reply Br. ofAppellant at 20.No. 73439-3-1/10

notes. 70 Wn. App. at 839. He provided no independent records of his income, despite "protracted discovery attempts." Bucklin. 70 Wn. App. at 839. Division Three of this court concluded that the trial court "exercised its discretion in an untenable and manifestly unreasonable way by essentially guessing at his income. Without any clear idea of Mr. Bucklin's gross income, there was no way to determine whether his circumstances had substantially changed." Bucklin. 70 Wn. App. at 841. Here, Jack provided tax returns, bank statements, deposit summaries, projections, interrogatory answers, business agreements including compensation clauses, and a declaration from NAPA corporate leadership. These documents support the court's finding of an involuntary reduction in income constituting a substantial change incircumstances. 

### Finally, Jill asserts that the trial court's remedy is inadequate, given that underthe terms ofthe order on modification, monthly maintenance payments will not increase to $10,000 even if Jack's income reaches its former level of 

### $300,000 a year. But the trial court revised the commissioner's order, providing that in the event Jack's income again reaches $300,000, Jill may petition the courtto reinstate the maintenance levels ofthe original decree. 

### The trial court properly considered the change in circumstances of the 

### obligor spouse relative to the necessities of the spouse receiving support and both parties' financial situations. See Ochsner. 47 Wn. App. at 524; Lambert. 66 Wn.2d at 508; In re Marriage of Glass. 67 Wn. App. 378, 391, 835 P.2d 1054 

### (1992). Here, Jill's assertion that she is "virtually dependent on [spousal

10No. 73439-3-1 /11 

### maintenance] for her survival"9 is undermined bythe court's observation that her net worth now exceeds $2 million. In light of the evidence and both parties' situations, itwas reasonable for the trial courtto conclude that Jack's reduction in income was involuntary and constituted a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification. The courtdid not abuse its discretion. Both Jill and Jack request an award of attorney fees on appeal. Jill includes one sentence in her brief, purporting to "reserve[ ] the right to an award 

### of attorneys fees and costs."10 Jack argues that RCW 26.09.140 supports an award on the basis that Jill's briefing includes erroneous citations to the record and that he has paid more in legal fees. RCW 26.09.140 gives this court 

### discretion to award attorney fees to either party based on the parties' financial 

### resources, balancing the financial need of the requesting partyagainstthe other 

### party'sability to pay. In re Marriage ofPennamen. 135Wn. App. 790, 807-08, 146 P.3d 466 (2006). The trial court made no award of attorney fees below. Under all the circumstances here, we decline to award fees and costs to either party on appeal. CONCLUSION 

### Substantial evidence supports the trialcourt's findings, and those findings 

### support the court'sconclusions oflaw. Thetrial courtdid not abuse itsdiscretion in finding that Jack met his burden to prove a substantial change in circumstances warranting a modification ofspousal support.

9Br. ofAppellant at 32. 10 Br. ofAppellant at 34.

11No. 73439-3-1/12
We affirm the trial court's order on revision. We decline to award appellate attorney fees and costs to eitherparty. 

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WE CONCUR:



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