IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 50592-4-II

Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

v.

LEVAR DEMETRIUS COUCH,

Appellant.

BJORGEN, J. — Levar Demetrius Couch appeals his convictions based on guilty pleas for

attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, driving while under the influence of alcohol, and 

second degree driving on a suspended license.

Couch’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw on the ground 

that there is no basis for a good faith argument on appeal. She presents three potential issues that 

she claims would be frivolous: (1) whether Couch made a knowing and intelligent guilty plea, 

(2) whether Couch was afforded his right to allocution, and (3) whether the trial court properly 

imposed discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs).

We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw and direct her to pursue Couch’s appeal on the 

issue of whether the trial court inadequately inquired into his ability to pay discretionary LFOs 

under State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). 

FACTS

A. Substantive Facts

Couch pled guilty to attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, driving while under 

the influence of alcohol (DUI), and second degree driving on a suspended license. Couch signed 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

December 27, 2018
No. 50592-4-II

2

a statement of defendant on a plea of guilty. Counsel assisted Couch through his guilty plea and 

at his subsequent sentencing hearing. 

The State recommended consecutive sentences for the negotiated plea, and the court 

informed Couch that it alone had the discretion to decide whether the sentences would be 

concurrent or consecutive. Couch affirmed that he understood it was within the court’s authority 

to make this decision. The parties agreed that Couch’s offender score on the eluding charge was 

2 based on a prior DUI conviction plus the current DUI conviction. The court agreed to the plea 

recommendation and imposed consecutive sentences. 

Before imposing discretionary LFOs, the court discussed with Couch his work history 

and education, establishing that at the time of his arrest Couch had been working at Nordstrom 

and that he had gone through the 12th grade in school. Based on this discussion, the court

determined that Couch had the present and future ability to pay discretionary LFOs. The court 

then imposed two discretionary LFOs: a $500.00 court-appointed attorney fee and, for count II 

only, a $2,895.50 assessment. The court also ordered Couch to have an alcohol evaluation and 

placed him on bench probation. 

Couch appeals his judgment and sentence.

B. Motion to Withdraw

Couch’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw, which includes a 

discussion of issues that potentially could be raised on appeal. The State filed a response 

agreeing that there are no nonfrivolous issues on appeal. Couch was served with both his 

counsel’s motion to withdraw and the State’s response. Couch did not file a statement of 

additional grounds.
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ANALYSIS

I. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

Couch’s court-appointed appellate counsel moves to withdraw on the grounds that there 

is no basis for a good faith argument on appeal. We disagree.

A. Legal Principles

Under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), 

appellate counsel for a criminal defendant is authorized to file a motion to withdraw if there are 

no nonfrivolous grounds that can be raised on appeal.

“[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination 

of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That 

request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the 

record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be 

furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the 

court—not counsel—then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, 

to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.”

State v. Hairston, 133 Wn.2d 534, 537-38, 946 P.2d 397 (1997) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). If we agree that the appeal is wholly frivolous, we will grant the 

motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. See State v. Theobald, 78 Wn.2d 184, 187, 470 P.2d 

188 (1970).

RAP 18.3(a)(2) outlines the procedure for filing an Anders motion. The motion filed by 

the defendant’s attorney must “identify the issues that could be argued if they had merit” with 

references to the record, and the motion and answer from the adverse party must be served on the 

person represented by counsel seeking to withdraw. RAP 18.3(a)(2).
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B. Motion Procedure

Couch’s counsel followed the procedure required under Anders and under RAP

18.3(a)(2). She filed a motion to withdraw with our court, which included a discussion of issues 

that potentially could be raised on appeal. The State filed a response agreeing that there are no 

nonfrivolous issues on appeal. Couch was served with his counsel’s motion to withdraw and the 

State’s response. Couch did not file a statement of additional grounds.

With the procedural requirements being met, we next consider whether there are any 

nonfrivolous claims Couch could make on appeal. 

C. Analysis of Potential Appellate Issues

The material facts are accurately set forth in counsel’s motion to withdraw. Counsel 

identified the following potential issues on appeal:

1. Whether Couch made a knowing and intelligent guilty plea;

2. Whether the trial court afforded Couch his right to allocution;

3. Whether the trial court adequately inquired into Couch’s ability to pay 

discretionary LFOs before imposing them.

Br. of Appellant at 2-5.

In considering these issues, we have reviewed counsel’s motion and the State’s response. 

In addition, as required under Anders, we have independently reviewed the record to determine if 

there are other nonfrivolous issues that could be raised on appeal.

1. Knowing and Intelligent Guilty Plea

Counsel argues that Couch could potentially argue that he did not make a knowing and 

intelligent guilty plea. We agree that doing so would be frivolous.

“Due process requires an affirmative showing that a defendant entered a guilty plea 

intelligently and voluntarily,” with knowledge that certain rights will be waived. State v. Ross, 
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129 Wn.2d 279, 284, 916 P.2d 405 (1996); State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d 635, 642, 919 P.2d 1228 

(1996). The trial court “shall not accept a plea of guilty, without first determining that it is made 

voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the 

consequences of the plea.” CrR 4.2(d). Whether a plea is knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily made is determined from a totality of the circumstances. Branch, 129 Wn.2d at 642. 

A defendant’s signature on a plea statement is strong evidence of a plea’s voluntariness. Id.

Couch told the court he understood the consequences of the guilty plea and signed the 

plea form. The trial court discussed with him the rights he was giving up, answered his 

questions, and confirmed that he understood what was happening and what the implications of 

his sentence would be, including confirming that he was making his plea knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily. He has not moved to withdraw his plea. 

We agree with Couch’s counsel and the State that the facts of this case did not support an 

argument that Couch did not make a knowing and intelligent guilty plea. We accordingly hold 

that arguing to the contrary would be frivolous on appeal. 

2. Right to Allocution

Counsel asserts that Couch could potentially argue that he was not afforded his right to 

allocution. We agree that doing so would be frivolous.

Allocution is the right of a criminal defendant to make a personal argument or statement 

to the court before the pronouncement of sentence. State v. Canfield, 154 Wn.2d 698, 701, 116 

P.3d 391 (2005). At sentencing, the trial court must allow argument from the defendant on the 

sentence to be imposed. RCW 9.94A.500(1).
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At sentencing, before imposing the sentence, the trial court asked Couch if he had 

anything to say. Couch apologized for his actions, expressed his wishes to get alcohol treatment 

to do right by his family, and discussed his work and education history with the court.

Because the court gave Couch the opportunity to speak on his own behalf prior to 

sentencing, he was afforded his right to allocution. We hold that any argument to the contrary 

would be frivolous on appeal. 

3. Discretionary LFOs 

Counsel claims that Couch could potentially argue that the trial court did not adequately 

inquire into his ability to pay discretionary LFOs before imposing them. We think there is a 

legitimate, good faith argument to support this claim. Therefore, we deny counsel’s request to 

withdraw with respect to this issue. 

In sentencing, courts must impose mandatory LFOs, and may impose discretionary costs. 

RCW 9.94A.760; former RCW 10.01.160(1) (2011). In determining the amount and method of 

payment of costs, the sentencing court is required to take account of the financial resources of 

the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. Former RCW 

10.01.160(3). The sentencing court must conduct on the record an individualized inquiry into

the defendant’s present and future ability to pay before imposing discretionary costs. State v. 

Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 838, 344 P.3d 680 (2015). This inquiry requires the court to consider 

factors such as incarceration and a defendant’s other debts, including restitution, when 

determining his ability to pay. Id. Trial courts should seek additional guidance from court rule 

GR 34, which lists the ways a person may prove indigent status for the purpose of seeking a 
No. 50592-4-II

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waiver of filing fees and surcharges. Id. If a defendant is indigent under GR 34, “courts should 

seriously question that person’s ability to pay LFOs.” Id. at 839.

After counsel filed her motion to withdraw, our Supreme Court clarified a heightened 

standard for Blazina inquiries. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732. Ramirez noted that the financial 

statement section of a motion for indigency asks defendants questions relating to five categories:

(1) employment history, (2) income, (3) assets and other financial resources, (4) monthly living 

expenses, and (5) other debts. Id. at 744. The court held that “[t]o satisfy Blazina and RCW 

10.01.160(3)’s mandate that the State cannot collect costs from defendants who are unable to 

pay, the record must reflect that the trial court inquired into all five of these categories before 

deciding to impose discretionary costs.” Id. The court also held that de novo review applies to 

an alleged failure by the trial court to make an adequate inquiry under Blazina. Id. at 742.

The trial court inquired into Couch’s employment and education history, establishing that 

until his arrest he had worked for one and a half years in the women’s shoes department at 

Nordstrom and that he had attended school through the 12th grade. It then made the following 

on-the-record assessment of Couch’s ability to pay discretionary LFOs:

At this point, since you’re not doing a lot of time and since you do have 

work history and since you can make this up, I’m going to impose $200 court costs, 

$500 dollar crime victim penalty assessment, the DNA [(deoxyribonucleic acid)]

sample, $500 reimbursement to DAC [(Department of Assigned Counsel)], the 

$2895.50 assessment, and the $124 for DUI recovery.

Verbatim Report of Proceedings (June 15, 2017) at 7.1

 

1 The record is unclear as to whether the $2,895.50 assessment is a mandatory DUI fine or a 

discretionary assessment. However, it is clear that the DAC $500.00 court-appointed attorney 

fee was a discretionary LFO. Hence, regardless of whether the $2,895.50 assessment is a 

mandatory or discretionary LFO, there remains a nonfrivolous argument that the discretionary 

$500.00 fee was improperly imposed. Further, the lack of clarity in the nature of the $2,895.50 
No. 50592-4-II

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Although the trial court inquired into Couch’s employment and education history, it made 

no inquiry into his debts or other “‘important factors’” relating to his current and future ability to 

pay discretionary LFOs, such as his income, assets and other financial resources, and monthly 

living expenses. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d at 735 (quoting Blazina, 182 Wn.2d at 838). Nor does the 

record reflect that the court inquired into whether Couch was indigent under GR 34, though 

Couch made no argument or showing that he is indigent.

Under Ramirez, Couch has a legitimate argument that the trial court did not adequately 

inquire into his ability to pay discretionary LFOs before imposing them. We hold that this 

argument would not be frivolous on appeal. 

“If an appellate court ‘concludes that there are nonfrivolous issues to be raised, it must 

appoint counsel to pursue the appeal and direct that counsel to prepare an advocate’s brief before 

deciding the merits.’” State v. Nichols, 136 Wn.2d 859, 861, 968 P.2d 411 (1998) (quoting 

McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 444, 108 S. Ct. 1895, 100 L. Ed. 

2d 440 (1988). Having identified a nonfrivolous issue, we direct counsel to pursue Couch’s 

appeal.

4. Other Nonfrivolous Issues

We have independently reviewed the record and could not identify any other 

nonfrivolous issues that could be raised on appeal.

 

assessment may serve as additional grounds for an argument that the court may have improperly 

imposed discretionary LFOs. 
No. 50592-4-II

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CONCLUSION

We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw and direct her to pursue Couch’s appeal on the 

issue of whether the trial court adequately inquired into his ability to pay discretionary LFOs

under Ramirez.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Bjorgen, J.

We concur:

Johanson, P.J.

Sutton, J.