2014 IL 114271

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 114271)

EVANSTON INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, v. GEORGE E.

RISEBOROUGH et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed February 21, 2014.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, and Karmeier concurred in 

the judgment and opinion.

Justice Kilbride dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Theis.

OPINION

¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is whether section 13-214.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 2008)), which sets forth a six-year statute of 

repose for “action[s] for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise *** against an 

attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services,” 

applies to plaintiff’s second amended complaint for breach of implied warranty of 

authority, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. The circuit 

court of Cook County found that the statute of repose barred plaintiff’s claims against 

the defendant attorneys and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed and 

remanded for further proceedings, finding that the statute of repose did not apply to an 

action brought by a nonclient of the defendant for a cause of action other than legal 

malpractice. 2011 IL App (1st) 102660-U, ¶ 28. We reverse the appellate court’s 

judgment and affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint.
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¶ 2 Background

¶ 3 In 1996, Kiferbaum Construction Corporation (Kiferbaum) was the general 

contractor for the construction of a warehouse. Two employees of a subcontractor on 

the project were injured at the construction site, resulting in a personal injury action 

filed against Kiferbaum by one of the injured workers. Kiferbaum was represented in 

the personal injury lawsuit by the law firm of Jacobson & Riseborough. 

¶ 4 At the time of the accident, Kiferbaum was the named insured under primary and 

excess liability policies issued by Statewide Insurance Company (Statewide). 

Kiferbaum was listed as an additional insured on each of its subcontractors’ insurance 

policies, including a $1 million excess liability policy issued by Evanston Insurance 

Company (Evanston), and policies issued by Steadfast Insurance Company (Steadfast) 

and Transportation Insurance Company (Transportation).

¶ 5 In 1997, Statewide filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court seeking a 

declaration that it owed no coverage under its policies. That action was pending when, 

in 2000, the parties reached a settlement in the personal injury case in the amount of 

$4,887,500. On October 23, 2000, Evanston, Steadfast, and CNA Insurance Company 

(as owner of Transportation) entered into an agreement, referred to by the parties as the 

“Fund and Fight Agreement,” in which they agreed to contribute their respective policy 

limits to fund the settlement. In accord with the agreement, Evanston contributed $1 

million, Steadfast contributed $1 million, and CNA funded the remainder of the 

settlement. Statewide signed the Fund and Fight Agreement but did not contribute any 

funds. The agreement provided, in part, that the insurers reserved the right to litigate 

policy and coverage defenses among themselves. Statewide and Kiferbaum also agreed 

to reimburse the contributing insurers “if defenses to coverage on behalf of any or all of 

these insurers are judicially found to be valid and/or that the position taken by 

Kiferbaum and/or Statewide, as set forth above, is invalid.” George Riseborough, an 

attorney from Jacobson & Riseborough, signed the agreement as the “duly authorized 

agent and representative of Kiferbaum.”

¶ 6 Pursuant to the Fund and Fight Agreement, Evanston intervened in Statewide’s 

declaratory judgment action and filed a separate complaint against Statewide and 

Kiferbaum with respect to coverage issues.1 These actions were consolidated 

(hereinafter referred to as the “coverage action”). Evanston alleged that Kiferbaum 

 1

Steadfast and Transportation (CNA) settled their claims and were dismissed from the litigation.
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should have exhausted its coverage under its primary policy issued by Statewide before 

turning to excess insurance carriers. Evanston alleged further that, under the terms of 

the Fund and Fight Agreement, Kiferbaum was required to reimburse Evanston for the 

$1 million it contributed to the personal injury settlement. Kiferbaum asserted as a 

defense to Evanston’s claims that it was not bound by the Fund and Fight Agreement. 

In support of that defense, on December 22, 2003, Kiferbaum’s president, Jacob 

Kiferbaum, filed an affidavit stating that he had no knowledge of the agreement at the 

time of its creation, and that George Riseborough lacked authorization to sign the 

agreement on Kiferbaum’s behalf.

¶ 7 Evanston reached an agreement with Statewide to settle the coverage action, 

whereby Statewide agreed to pay Evanston $612,500 in exchange for Evanston’s 

release of Statewide and Kiferbaum. On December 23, 2003, the circuit court entered 

an agreed order of dismissal pursuant to settlement. Statewide later went into 

liquidation, however, and the settlement check was not honored. Evanston filed a 

petition to vacate the agreed order of dismissal pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code 

of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2008)), which the circuit court granted. 

Evanston continued to pursue its claims against Kiferbaum, and the parties engaged in 

discovery and motion practice. On April 29, 2009, the circuit court granted 

Kiferbaum’s motion for summary judgment, in part, finding that Kiferbaum did not 

give authority to Riseborough to sign the Fund and Fight Agreement on its behalf. On 

December 2, 2009, following a bench trial on the remaining issue of Kiferbaum’s 

ratification of the Fund and Fight Agreement, the circuit court entered judgment in 

favor of Kiferbaum and against Evanston. Evanston did not appeal the judgment in the 

coverage action.

¶ 8 While the insurance coverage proceedings were still pending, on December 22, 

2005, Evanston filed a complaint in Cook County Circuit Court against defendants 

Jacobson & Riseborough, and individual attorneys George E. Riseborough and Reid 

Jacobson. Evanston alleged breach of implied warranty of authority, fraudulent 

misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, based on defendants’ execution of 

the Fund and Fight Agreement on Kiferbaum’s behalf without Kiferbaum’s express 

authority. Evanston alleged that defendants’ actions caused Evanston to lose the 

anticipated benefits of the agreement and sustain damages. Evanston later filed an 

amended complaint setting forth substantially the same allegations. The relief sought 

by Evanston included the $1,000,000 which Evanston had contributed to the personal 

injury settlement, as well as attorney fees and costs incurred in its efforts to obtain 

relief from Kiferbaum. The circuit court dismissed both complaints without prejudice 
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pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2008)). The court 

found that Evanston’s claims were premature because, at the time of filing the 

complaints, Evanston had not established its entitlement to collect reimbursement from 

Kiferbaum under the terms of the Fund and Fight Agreement.

¶ 9 On December 23, 2009, after the final judgment order had been entered in the 

coverage action, Evanston filed its second amended complaint reasserting its claims 

against the Riseborough defendants. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 

section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2008)). The circuit court of Cook 

County granted the motion to dismiss, finding the six-year statute of repose in section 

13-214.3(c) (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(6) (West 2008)) barred Evanston’s claims. 

Evanston’s motion to reconsider and to vacate the order of dismissal was denied. The 

appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 2011 IL App (1st) 

102660-U. We allowed defendants’ petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. 

Feb. 26, 2010).

¶ 10 Analysis

¶ 11 On appeal to this court, defendants argue that the appellate court failed to apply the 

plain language of section 13-214.3 and, instead, improperly limited the application of 

the statute solely to claims brought by a client against an attorney for legal malpractice. 

Evanston, however, asks that we affirm the appellate court and find that section 

13-214.3 is inapplicable to claims by non-clients of the defendant. In the alternative, 

Evanston argues that, even if the statute of repose applies to its second amended 

complaint, its claims are not barred because (1) its original complaint was filed before 

the repose period and remained “pending on the docket” of the circuit court; (2) the 

second amended complaint related back to the original timely filed complaint; and (3) 

the trial court erred in dismissing the original and first amended complaints as 

premature. 

¶ 12 I. Statute of Repose

¶ 13 Evanston’s second amended complaint was dismissed pursuant to section 2-619 of 

the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2008)). A motion to dismiss under section 2-619 

“admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ complaint, but asserts an affirmative 

defense or other matter that avoids or defeats the plaintiffs’ claim.” DeLuna v. 
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Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006). The circuit court’s dismissal of a complaint 

pursuant to section 2-619 is reviewed de novo. Id. Both the interpretation of a statute 

and the applicability of a statute of repose to a cause of action are questions of law 

subject to de novo review. Uldrych v. VHS of Illinois, Inc., 239 Ill. 2d 532, 540 (2011); 

Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541, 553 (2006).

¶ 14 The statute of repose at issue is contained in section 13-214.3 of the Code, which is 

titled “Attorneys.” Section 13-214.3 provides, in part:

“(b) An action for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise (i) against 

an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional 

services *** must be commenced within 2 years from the time the person 

bringing the action knew or reasonably should have known of the injury for 

which damages are sought.

(c) An action described in subsection (b) may not be commenced in any 

event more than 6 years after the date on which the act or omission occurred.” 

735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b), (c) (West 2008).

¶ 15 This court’s primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the 

intent of the legislature. DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d at 59. The most reliable indication of the 

legislative intent is the plain language of the statute itself. Id. The statutory language 

must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. 

County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). “[W]here an enactment is clear and 

unambiguous a court is not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of 

the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature 

did not express.” Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). 

¶ 16 In contrast to a statute of limitations, which determines the time within which a 

lawsuit may be commenced after a cause of action has accrued, a statute of repose 

extinguishes the action after a defined period of time, regardless of when the action 

accrued. DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d at 61 (citing Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill. 2d 304, 311 

(2001)). A statute of repose is not tolled by the discovery rule. Mega v. Holy Cross 

Hospital, 111 Ill. 2d 416, 422-23 (1986). After the expiration of the repose period, 

“[t]he injured party no longer has a recognized right of action.” Goodman v. Harbor 

Market, Ltd., 278 Ill. App. 3d 684, 691 (1995) (citing Rosenberg v. Town of North 

Bergen, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (N.J. 1972)). A plaintiff’s right to bring an action is 

terminated when the event giving rise to the cause of action does not transpire within 

the period of time specified in the statute of repose. Id.
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¶ 17 Under section 13-214.3, an action for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise 

against an attorney “arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional 

services *** may not be commenced *** more than 6 years after the date on which the 

act or omission occurred.” 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b), (c) (West 2008). There is no 

dispute that the act or omission which formed the basis for Evanston’s second amended 

complaint was defendants’ execution of the Fund and Fight Agreement, allegedly on 

Kiferbaum’s behalf, on October 23, 2000. Evanston filed its second amended 

complaint on December 23, 2009. Thus, if the repose provision in section 13-214.3 

applies to the complaint, it was properly dismissed as having been filed more than three 

years after the expiration of the six-year repose period.

¶ 18 The appellate court below determined that Evanston’s claims did not arise out of 

professional services performed by defendants because those professional services 

were not performed on behalf of Evanston as defendants’ client. 2011 IL App (1st) 

102660-U, ¶ 28. The court first rejected Evanston’s contention that the complaint set 

forth a claim for legal malpractice, finding that the causes of action for breach of 

implied warranty of authority, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent 

misrepresentation were distinct from legal malpractice. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. The court then 

held:

“In the case at bar, following [Bova v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 446 F. Supp. 2d 926 

(S.D. Ill. 2006)] and [Ganci v. Blauvelt, 294 Ill. App. 3d 508 (1998)], we find 

that section 13-214.3(b) contemplates an attorney-client relationship. 

Defendants, as legal counsel for [Kiferbaum], did not provide legal 

representation to Evanston. In the absence of an attorney-client relationship, 

there is no duty owed to plaintiff by the defendant attorneys. Kopka v. 

K[a]mensky & Rubenstein, 354 Ill. App. 3d 930, 934-35 (2004). As such, a 

plaintiff cannot bring suit against an attorney in the ‘performance of their 

professional services’ unless there was a [sic] attorney-client relationship in 

which the defendants owed a duty to the complaining party. We hold that 

section 13-214.3(b) is unambiguous. We conclude that ‘professional services’ 

contemplates an action where a client brings suit against his or her attorney 

arising out of an attorney-client relationship.” Id. ¶ 28.

¶ 19 The appellate court’s conclusion that section 13-214.3 applies only to a claim 

asserted by a client of the attorney is contrary to the plain language expressed in the 

statute. There is nothing in section 13-214.3 that requires the plaintiff to be a client of 

the attorney who rendered the professional services. The statute does not refer to a 
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“client” nor does it place any restrictions on who may bring an action against an 

attorney. The statute simply provides that an action for damages against an attorney 

“arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services” is 

subject to the six-year repose period. Thus, under the express language of the statute, it 

is the nature of the act or omission, rather than the identity of the plaintiff, that 

determines whether the statute of repose applies to a claim brought against an attorney. 

¶ 20 As justification for reading into the statute an additional requirement that the 

plaintiff and defendant must have an attorney-client relationship, the appellate court 

cited the general rule in Illinois that an attorney owes a duty of care only to his or her 

client and not to third parties. Id. ¶ 28 (citing Kopka v. Kamensky & Rubenstein, 354 Ill. 

App. 3d 930, 934-35 (2004)). The general rule that attorneys do not owe professional 

duties to non-clients also was the basis for the court’s decision in Ganci v. Blauvelt, 294 

Ill. App. 3d 508, 515 (1998). The Ganci court held that the two-year statute of 

limitations in section 13-214.3(b) did not apply to a third-party contribution action 

against an attorney where the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant owed a 

professional duty to him, and the action was not for legal malpractice. Id. The court 

held that an action “arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional 

services” necessarily implied that the defendant attorney owed a professional duty to 

the plaintiff. Where no professional duty was owed because the defendant had not 

performed professional services for the plaintiff, the statute of limitations did not bar an 

action filed by a non-client. Id.

¶ 21 Several federal district court opinions have followed Ganci in concluding that the 

statute of limitations in section 13-214.3(b) applies solely to claims of legal 

malpractice brought by a client of the attorney. See Wilbourn v. Advantage Financial 

Partners, LLC, No. 09-CV-2068, 2010 WL 1194950, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2010) 

(section 13-214.3(b) did not bar fraud claim where the defendant never served as the 

plaintiff’s attorney and owed no fiduciary duty to the plaintiff); Bova v. U.S. Bank, 

N.A., 446 F. Supp. 2d 926, 934 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (section 13-214.3(b) did not bar fraud 

claim brought against the defendant law firm where the firm did not render legal 

services to the plaintiffs and the claim was not for legal malpractice); Cotton v. Private 

Bank & Trust Co., No. 01 C 1099, 2004 WL 526739, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2004) 

(section 13-214.3(b) did not bar tortious interference, inducement, and conversion 

claims brought by a non-client against a law firm where the firm owed no fiduciary 

duty to the plaintiff and, thus, was not engaged in providing “professional services” to 

the plaintiff).
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¶ 22 Another panel of the appellate court declined to follow Ganci and held, instead, that 

the statute of limitations in section 13-214.3(b) applied to a third-party complaint 

brought by the plaintiff against an attorney who represented the plaintiff’s lessor. 800 

South Wells Commercial, LLC v. Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered, 2013 IL App 

(1st) 123660. The court held, “[a]s there is no language in the statute restricting its 

application to legal malpractice claims or claims brought by an attorney’s client, the 

plain language of the statute directs that the two-year limitation applies to all claims 

against an attorney arising out of acts or omissions in the performance of professional 

services, and not just legal malpractice claims or claims brought against an attorney by 

a client.” Id. ¶ 13. 

¶ 23 We reject the interpretation advanced by the appellate court in Ganci and in the 

case at bar that section 13-214.3(c) applies solely to claims brought by a client against 

an attorney who owes professional or fiduciary duties to the plaintiff. This narrow 

reading overlooks the language in the statute that the repose period applies to claims 

“arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services.”

(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b), (c) (West 2008). The “arising out of” 

language indicates an intent by the legislature that the statute apply to all claims against 

attorneys concerning their provision of professional services. There is no express

limitation that the professional services must have been rendered to the plaintiff. Nor 

does the statute state or imply that it is restricted to claims for legal malpractice. Had 

the legislature wished to do so, it could have limited the statute to legal malpractice 

actions or to actions brought by a client of the attorney. Instead, the statute broadly 

applies to “action[s] for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise *** arising out 

of an act or omission in the performance of professional services,” which encompasses 

a number of potential causes of action in addition to legal malpractice. (Emphasis 

added.) 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b) (West 2008). A court may not read into a statute any 

limitations or conditions which are not expressed in the plain language of the statute. 

Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 446 (2002) (citing Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 

178, 189 (1990)). “It is the dominion of the legislature to enact laws and it is the 

province of the courts to construe those laws. We can neither restrict nor enlarge the 

meaning of an unambiguous statute.” Id. at 448. The statute unambiguously applies to 

all claims brought against an attorney arising out of actions or omissions in the 

performance of professional services. To the extent that Ganci holds that section 

13-214.3 is applicable only to actions brought by clients for legal malpractice, that case 

is overruled.
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¶ 24 Our broad reading of section 13-214.3 is consistent with interpretations by Illinois 

courts of other, similarly-worded limitations and repose statutes. Statutes relating to the 

same subject are governed by one spirit and a single policy, and we must presume that 

the legislature intended these statutes to be consistent and harmonious. Uldrych v. VHS 

of Illinois, Inc., 239 Ill. 2d 532, 540 (2011). See Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical 

Center, 136 Ill. 2d 450 (1990) (statute of repose for actions against physicians and 

hospitals arising out of patient care (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, ¶ 13-212(a)) applied 

to third-party contribution claim); Polsky v. BDO Seidman, 293 Ill. App. 3d 414, 424 

(1997) (statute of limitations for actions against public accountants (735 ILCS 

5/13-214.2(a) (West 1996)) was not limited to professional malpractice actions but 

applied to claims of fraud and tortious interference by former employee suing 

accounting firm); Donnybrook Investments Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson LLP, No. 05 C 

4883, 2006 WL 1049588, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2006) (statute of repose for actions 

against public accountants (735 ILCS 5/13-214.2(b) (West 2004)) applied to the 

plaintiffs’ third-party action against the auditor of a failed bank, even though the 

auditor had not provided accounting services to the plaintiffs); Citgo Petroleum Corp. 

v. McDermott International, Inc., 368 Ill. App. 3d 603, 607 (2006) (statute of repose for 

actions against persons in the design, planning, supervision, observation, or 

management of construction (735 ILCS 5/13-214(b) (West 2002)) applied to 

third-party complaint brought by the defendant manufacturer against former owner of 

refinery for negligent installation, inspection, maintenance, and operation of the 

facility).

¶ 25 In Hayes, the issue was whether the four-year statute of repose in section 13-212(a) 

of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, ¶ 13-212(a)) applied to third-party 

contribution actions brought against a doctor by the defendants in an underlying 

negligence action. Section 13-212(a) provided that an action for damages for injury or 

death against a physician, “whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, 

arising out of patient care” shall be brought no more than four years after the date of the 

act or omission alleged to have caused the injury or death. Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 453. 

This court held that the application of the repose period in section 13-212 was not 

limited to a direct action by the injured party. Id. at 456-57. We concluded that a 

third-party contribution action constitutes an “action for damages” within the language 

of the statute even though a contribution action need not be predicated on the same 

theory of recovery as that asserted by the plaintiff in the underlying action. Id. at 457. 

Key to the Hayes decision was the legislative purpose underlying the statute of repose, 

which was to provide a definite period in which an action arising out of patient care 
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could be filed, thus preventing extended exposure of physicians and their insurers to 

potential liability for the care and treatment of patients. Id. at 458. We explained that a 

suit for contribution for damages arising out of patient care exposes a physician and his 

or her insurer to the same liability as if the patient were to have brought a direct action 

against the physician for medical malpractice. Id. at 458-59. The all-inclusive term “or 

otherwise” in the statute “demonstrate[d] the General Assembly’s desire at the time it 

originally enacted the statute to limit a physician’s exposure to liability for damages for 

injury or death arising out of patient care under all theories of liability, whether then 

existing or not.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ third-party claims 

for contribution were subject to the repose provision for actions asserting injuries 

arising out of patient care. Id. at 456-57. 

¶ 26 Although the third-party complaints in Hayes were not medical malpractice actions 

brought directly against a physician by a patient to whom the medical services were 

rendered, this court interpreted the repose statute broadly in order to effectuate the 

legislative intent to limit all actions against physicians arising out of patient care. 

Similar to the third-party complaints in Hayes, Evanston has not brought suit against 

defendants for professional legal services rendered to Evanston, but rather for damages 

arising out of professional services rendered by defendants to Kiferbaum. In its second 

amended complaint, Evanston alleged that defendants were attorneys licensed in the 

State of Illinois who represented Kiferbaum as defense counsel in the underlying 

personal injury case, that they participated in settlement negotiations on behalf of 

Kiferbaum, and that on October 23, 2000, they signed and initialed changes to the Fund 

and Fight Agreement on behalf of Kiferbaum. The complaint alleged damages to 

Evanston based on defendant’s actions in executing the agreement in the absence of 

Kiferbaum’s authorization. Thus, under the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, 

Evanston’s claims in its second amended complaint “arose out of” defendants’ actions 

“in the performance of professional services” on behalf of Kiferbaum, defendants’ 

client. We hold that the statute of repose in section 13-214.3(c) applies to Evanston’s 

second amended complaint, which was properly dismissed as time-barred pursuant to 

the statute. 

¶ 27 II. Evanston’s Alternative Arguments
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¶ 28 Evanston contends that, even if the statute of repose in section 13-214.3(c) applies 

to its second amended complaint, its lawsuit was timely filed, or, alternatively, that the 

second amended complaint related back to the original, timely filed complaint. 

Evanston also argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing its original and first 

amended complaints as premature because its cause of action accrued prior to the date 

of filing the original complaint.

¶ 29 A. Original Complaint Remained Pending on the Circuit Court’s Docket

¶ 30 Evanston argues that its lawsuit was timely filed prior to the expiration of the 

six-year repose period and should not have been dismissed. The original complaint 

against defendants was filed on December 22, 2005, less than six years after the act 

upon which the complaint was based. Evanston contends that, since its original 

complaint was dismissed by the circuit court without prejudice and with leave to 

re-plead, the statute of repose did not extinguish its action because it remained pending 

on the docket of the circuit court until such time as the claims alleged in the complaint 

accrued. We disagree. Evanston’s argument that a plaintiff may avoid an applicable

statute of repose by filing a premature complaint alleging claims which have not fully 

accrued has no support in the law. 

¶ 31 Evanston’s initial complaint was dismissed by the circuit court pursuant to section 

2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2008)) because it failed to set forth a cause 

of action upon which relief may be granted. See Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 228 

(2003). Because the circuit court concluded that the complaint did not state a legally 

sufficient claim, the complaint was dismissed without prejudice to later refile. The 

dismissal without prejudice did not mean, however that Evanston preserved its claims, 

safe from the statute of repose, until such time as Evanston was able to state a legally 

sufficient cause of action. “Unlike a statute of limitations, which begins running upon 

accrual of a cause of action, a statute of repose begins running when a specific event 

occurs, regardless of whether an action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.” 

Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill. 2d 304, 311 (2001) (citing 54 C.J.S. Limitations of 

Actions § 4, at 20-21 (1987)). A statute of repose extinguishes an action after a fixed 

period of time, regardless of when the action accrued. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 

49, 61 (2006); Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 311. The purpose of a period of repose is to 

terminate the possibility of liability after a defined period of time. Mega v. Holy Cross 

Hospital, 111 Ill. 2d 416, 422 (1986). The statute of repose began running in this case 
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on October 23, 2000, the date of the act or omission alleged in the complaint. Because 

the circuit court concluded that Evanston failed to file a complaint stating a legally 

cognizable cause of action prior to the end of the six-year repose period, Evanston’s 

claims were extinguished by the statute of repose. 

¶ 32 The cases relied on by Evanston are distinguishable. In Estate of Bass v. Katten, 

375 Ill. App. 3d 62, 65-66 (2007), an action filed by the plaintiffs against their attorneys 

for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duties, and intentional misconduct was 

dismissed without prejudice by the circuit court because the plaintiffs had not yet 

suffered an adverse judgment in the underlying litigation. At the request of the 

plaintiffs, the circuit court stayed the proceedings until the underlying litigation was 

resolved. The appellate court affirmed the imposition of the stay. Id. at 71. In this case, 

Evanston never requested a stay of the proceedings, nor was a stay entered by the 

circuit court. 

¶ 33 Lucey v. Law Offices of Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, 301 Ill. App. 3d 349, 359-61 

(1998), is inapposite because the appellate court held that the circuit court abused its 

discretion in dismissing the plaintiff’s premature complaint for legal malpractice with 

prejudice, but the court acknowledged that the plaintiff may become subject to the 

statute of repose in section 13-214.3 upon later refiling. The same is true for Smith v. 

Central Illinois Regional Airport, 207 Ill. 2d 578, 587-88 (2003), and J. Eck & Son, 

Inc. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 188 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1093 (1989). These cases 

simply held that a dismissal without prejudice is not a final order for purposes of 

appellate review. None of the cases cited by Evanston supports its argument that a 

dismissal of a premature complaint without prejudice allows a plaintiff to circumvent a 

statute of repose when an amended complaint is filed after the repose period has 

expired.

¶ 34 B. Relation Back

¶ 35 Evanston next contends that its second amended complaint related back to its 

original timely-filed complaint. Under the relation back doctrine, a cause of action set 

forth in an amended pleading will not be time-barred and will “relate back” to the date 

of the filing of the original pleading if: (1) the original pleading was timely filed, and 

(2) the cause of action asserted in the amended pleading grew out of the same 

transaction or occurrence as that asserted in the original pleading. 735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) 
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(West 2008); Zeh v. Wheeler, 111 Ill. 2d 266, 270-71 (1986); Avakian v. Chulengarian, 

328 Ill. App. 3d 147, 153 (2002). 

¶ 36 After a careful review of the record in this case, we find that Evanston’s argument 

with respect to the relation back doctrine was argued for the first time in its motion for 

reconsideration of the circuit court’s dismissal of the second amended complaint. 

Evanston failed to raise the argument in its response to defendants’ motion to dismiss; 

thus, it has forfeited the argument. The purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to 

the court’s attention newly discovered evidence that was not available at the time of the 

original hearing, changes in existing law, or errors in the court’s application of the law. 

Caywood v. Gossett, 382 Ill. App. 3d 124, 133 (2008). Arguments raised for the first 

time in a motion for reconsideration in the circuit court are forfeited on appeal. Id. at 

134; Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Guaranty Ass’n v. Shapo, 357 Ill. App. 

3d 122, 137 (2005); Holzer v. Motorola Lighting, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 963, 978 (1998) 

(a party may not raise a legal theory for the first time in a motion to reconsider).

¶ 37 C. Circuit Court’s Dismissal of Prior Complaints as Premature

¶ 38 Evanston argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing its original and first 

amended complaints as premature. It asserts that, for purposes of a breach of implied 

warranty of authority, a plaintiff is injured at the time that the plaintiff learns that the 

agent lacked authority, or when the plaintiff suffers damages or fails to gain the 

anticipated benefits, whichever occurs first. See Joe & Dan International Corp. v. 

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 178 Ill. App. 3d 741, 746 (1988); Restatement 

(Second) of Agency § 329 cmt. k (1958). Accordingly, Evanston argues that it was 

injured, and its cause of action accrued, on December 22, 2003, when Kiferbaum 

asserted in an affidavit filed in the coverage action that defendants did not have 

authorization to execute the Fund and Fight Agreement on Kiferbaum’s behalf. In the 

alternative, Evanston argues that its claims fully accrued prior to its original complaint 

because its cause of action for breach of implied warranty of authority is akin to a 

breach of contract action, which accrued at the time of the breach and is subject to the 

discovery rule. 

¶ 39 Evanston’s assertion that it was injured, and its claims accrued, prior to filing the 

original complaint, also was raised for the first time in Evanston’s motion for 

reconsideration of the dismissal of the second amended complaint. In fact, the circuit

court found the argument “waived” in its order denying the motion for reconsideration. 
- 14 -

Evanston’s arguments regarding prematurity were fully available but were not raised at 

the time the dismissal orders were entered on its original and first amended complaints. 

Accordingly, these contentions have been forfeited, and we decline to consider them on 

review. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford, 279 Ill. 

App. 3d 815, 821 (1996).

¶ 40 Conclusion

¶ 41 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and 

affirm the judgment of the circuit court dismissing plaintiff’s second amended 

complaint with prejudice.

¶ 42 Appellate court judgment reversed. 

¶ 43 Circuit court judgment affirmed.

¶ 44 JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:

¶ 45 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I disagree with the 

majority’s statutory analysis. I believe the majority erroneously concludes that section 

13-214.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 2008)), is 

not restricted to legal malpractice claims or to actions brought by a client of the 

attorney. Supra & 23.

¶ 46 I agree with the appellate court’s reasoning that section 13-214.3 “contemplates an 

action where a client brings suit against his or her attorney arising out of an 

attorney-client relationship” and is not applicable to bar a suit brought by a nonclient 

against an attorney in a case that does not allege legal malpractice. 2011 IL App (1st) 

102660-U, & 28. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 47 Before this court, defendants submit that the appellate court failed to apply the 

plain language of section 13-214.3 and, instead, improperly limited the application of 

section 13-214.3 only to those situations where a claim for legal malpractice is asserted 

against the attorney by a client. Evanston contends that the appellate court properly 
- 15 -

construed the plain language of section 13-214.3 in finding that it is inapplicable to 

claims by nonclients that do not involve legal malpractice.

¶ 48 This case involves a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 

ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2008)). A motion to dismiss under section 2-619 “admits the 

legal sufficiency of the plaintiff=s claim, but asserts certain defects or defenses outside 

the pleading that defeat the claim.” Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing 

Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 579 (2006). The circuit court=s dismissal of a complaint pursuant 

to section 2-619 is reviewed de novo. Solaia Technology, 221 Ill. 2d at 579. Likewise, 

the interpretation and construction of a statute is subject to de novo review. Krautsack 

v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541, 553 (2006).

¶ 49 Section 13-214.3 of the Code provides, in relevant part:

“(b) An action for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise (i) against 

an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of 

professional services *** must be commenced within 2 years from the time 

the person bringing the action knew or reasonably should have known of the 

injury for which damages are sought.

(c) An action described in subsection (b) may not be commenced in any 

event more than 6 years after the date on which the act or omission occurred.”

(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b), (c) (West 2008).

¶ 50 Although this court is asked to address the applicability of subsection (c), I 

believe our analysis must necessarily focus on the meaning of the language in 

subsection (b). This court=s primary objective in construing the meaning of a statute is 

to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Solon v. Midwest Medical 

Records Ass’n, 236 Ill. 2d 433, 440 (2010). The plain language of a statute is the most 

reliable indication of legislative intent. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006). 

“[W]hen the language of the statute is clear, it must be applied as written without 

resort to aids or tools of interpretation.” DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d at 59.

¶ 51 I agree with the appellate court that section 13-214.3(b) is unambiguous because 

the plain language indicates the intent of the legislature. See Cotton v. Private Bank & 

Trust Co., No. 01 C 1099, 2004 WL 526739, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2004) (the 

language of section 13-214.3 is “unambiguous with respect to its exclusive 

application to attorney malpractice claims”). The language “in the performance of 
- 16 -

professional services” clearly limits the applicable actions to those situations when 

the act or omission arose while providing “professional services” to a client.

¶ 52 As a matter of law, the attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary relationship. In 

re Schuyler, 91 Ill. 2d 6, 11 (1982). As this court stated in Cornelius v. Wash, 1 Ill. 

98, 100 (1825), “[t]he confidence reposed in counsel is of a personal nature, and can 

not be delegated without the consent of the client.” In Morgan v. Roberts, 38 Ill. 65, 

84 (1865), this court again noted that the attorney=s duty to his client “is a personal 

duty and trust which cannot be delegated or performed by another.” Thus, an attorney 

has a personal, professional, and fiduciary duty only to the client. See Pelham v. 

Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1982) (“The traditional, general rule has been that the 

attorney is liable only to his client, not to third persons.”).

¶ 53 The language of section 13-214.3 clearly contemplates a duty arising from an 

attorney-client relationship and that the alleged injury arose out of the attorney’s 

representation of the person for whom the professional services were rendered. There 

is no language in section 13-214.3 suggesting that the legislature intended it to apply 

in the context of a claim by a nonclient with whom the attorney never had a 

professional fiduciary relationship, and to whom the attorney never owed a legal duty. 

To the contrary, the plain meaning of section 13-214 demonstrates that it 

unambiguously applies exclusively to legal malpractice claims arising out of acts or 

omissions in the performance of professional services. 

¶ 54 This conclusion is consistent with the attorney’s duty to the client in the 

adversarial process. As this court has recognized:

“Where a client=s interest is involved in a proceeding that is adversarial in 

nature, the existence of a duty of the attorney to another person would 

interfere with the undivided loyalty which the attorney owes his client and 

would detract from achieving the most advantageous position for his client. 

(R. Mallen & V. Levit, Legal Malpractice sec. 80, at 159 (2d ed. 1981).) Our 

code of professional responsibility requires that a lawyer represent his client 

with undivided fidelity (84 Ill. 2d R. 5-107), and Canon 7 provides that a 

lawyer should represent a client zealously within the boundaries of the law (84 

Ill. 2d Canon 7). In cases of an adversarial nature, in order to create a duty on 

the part of the attorney to one other than a client, there must be a clear 

indication that the representation by the attorney is intended to directly confer 
- 17 -

a benefit upon the third party.” Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 22-23 

(1982).

¶ 55 Here, Evanston’s complaint set forth claims for breach of implied warranty of 

authority, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, alleging 

defendants falsely or negligently asserted that they had authority to bind their client, 

Kieferbaum, to the FFA. Evanston’s complaint does not claim legal malpractice or 

clearly indicate that the defendants “intended to directly confer a benefit upon”

Evanston (Pelham, 92 Ill. 2d at 23).

¶ 56 Other courts interpreting section 13-214.3 have similarly concluded that it applies 

exclusively to legal malpractice actions. In Ganci v. Blauvelt, 294 Ill. App. 3d 508, 

515 (1998), a decedent=s children brought suit against the son of the decedent=s 

deceased wife, alleging that he deprived them of a portion of the wife=s estate. The 

defendant son then filed a third-party complaint against his deceased mother’s 

attorney seeking contribution. The trial court dismissed the third-party complaint as 

untimely. The appellate court rejected the attorney’s argument that section 

13-214.3(b) applied to bar the third-party complaint because the action against him 

was one “ ‘arising out of an act or omission in [his] performance of professional 

services.’ ” Ganci, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 515. Specifically, the court found that “the 

third-party complaint does not set forth a failure of [the attorney’s] professional duty 

to [the third-party plaintiff] but rather conduct on [the attorney’s] part whereby he 

shared culpability for the injuries to plaintiffs.” Ganci, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 515. The 

court concluded that the third-party complaint was not an action for legal malpractice 

and, therefore, section 13-214.3 did not apply. Ganci, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 515. 

Accordingly, the appellate court held that the third-party complaint was not barred 

under section 13-214.3. Ganci, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 519.

¶ 57 In Cotton, 2004 WL 526739, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that 

the plaintiff’s claims for tortious interference, interference with economic expectancy, 

inducement to breach fiduciary duty, conversion of assets, and conspiracy to breach 

fiduciary duty were time-barred under section 13-214.3’s statute of limitations for 

attorney malpractice actions. The plaintiff argued that section 13-214.3 applies only 

within the context of traditional attorney malpractice and does not bar claims alleging 

attorney wrongdoing outside the attorney-client fiduciary relationship. The court 

found the language of section 13-214.3 “unambiguous with respect to its exclusive 

application to attorney malpractice claims.” Cotton, 2004 WL 526739, at *3. 

Specifically, the court noted:
- 18 -

“Section 5/13-214.3(b) provides explicitly for a limited reach. The statute 

provides for a two-year statute of limitations not merely for ‘an act or 

omission of the attorney’ *** but rather for ‘an act or omission in the 

performance of professional services.’ An attorney who provides professional 

services assumes a fiduciary duty to the person contracting for her services.”

(Emphasis in original.) Cotton, 2004 WL 526739, at *3.

Accordingly, the court held that a professional attorney-client relationship must exist 

between a plaintiff and a defendant attorney for the attorney to invoke section 

13-214.3. Cotton, 2004 WL 526739, at *4.

¶ 58 In Bova v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 446 F. Supp. 2d 926 (S.D. Ill. 2006), the plaintiffs 

brought an action against the defendant bank and the bank’s attorneys, alleging they 

violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 

to 12 (West 2006)) in connection with mortgage foreclosure proceedings. The 

defendant attorneys argued that all claims under Illinois law against an attorney are 

governed by the limitations period of section 13-214.3. The court, following Ganci 

and Cotton, held that section 13-214.3 applies only to actions for legal malpractice

where a defendant attorney renders legal services to the plaintiff. Bova, 446 F. Supp. 

2d at 934. Since the complaint was not for legal malpractice, the court held that the 

limitations period of section 13-214.3 did not apply. Bova, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 934.

¶ 59 In Wilbourn v. Advantage Financial Partners, LLC, No. 09-CV-2068, 2010 WL 

1194950 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2010), the plaintiff brought a complaint alleging that a 

loan company’s attorney committed fraud. The attorney claimed that section 13-214.3 

barred the claim against him. Relying on Ganci and Cotton, the court held that section 

13-214.3 did not apply because the defendant never served as the plaintiff’s attorney. 

Wilbourn, 2010 WL 1194950, at *10.

¶ 60 Thus, my interpretation that section 13-214.3 is unambiguous and applies only to 

claims for legal malpractice is in accord with Ganci, Cotton, Bova, and Wilbourn. In 

fact, this court has recognized that with the passage of section 13-214.3 “ ‘a two-year 

limitations period and a six-year repose period applied—without exception—to all 

attorney malpractice actions.’ ” (Emphasis in original and added.) DeLuna, 223 Ill. 

2d at 75 (quoting Perlstein v. Wolk, 218 Ill. 2d 448, 452 (2006)).

¶ 61 The majority opinion, however, rejects the interpretation advanced by Ganci,

Cotton, Bova, Wilbourn, and the appellate court in this case that section 13-214.3(c) 

applies solely to claims brought by a client against an attorney who owes professional 
- 19 -

or fiduciary duties to the plaintiff. The majority reasons that this “narrow” reading 

overlooks the language in the statute that the repose period applies to claims “arising 

out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services.” (Emphasis in 

original.) Supra & 23. The majority concludes that the “arising out of” language 

indicates an intent by the legislature that the statute apply to all claims against 

attorneys concerning their provision of professional services. Supra & 23. The 

majority makes this conclusion, however, with absolutely no citation to any authority 

to support this overly broad interpretation of the “arising out of” language of section 

13-214.3.

¶ 62 I believe the majority opinion places too much emphasis on the “arising out of”

language, while ignoring the fundamental “in the performance of professional 

services” language. 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(6) (West 2008). It is a tenant of basic 

statutory construction that to determine legislative intent a court should read the 

statute as a whole and consider all relevant parts. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 

176 Ill. 2d 1, 16-17 (1996). I disagree with the majority’s focus on one part of the 

statute and its failure to read the statute as a whole. As this court has indicated “[a] 

fundamental principle of statutory construction is to view all provisions of a statutory 

enactment as a whole. Accordingly, words and phrases should not be construed in 

isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute. 

[Citation.]” DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d at 60.

¶ 63 In my view, the phrase “in the performance of professional services,” clearly 

indicates legislative intent to limit the applicability of the statute of repose to legal 

malpractice claims by clients. The majority simply ignores the plain language of the 

statute. I therefore disagree with the majority’s interpretation that no limitation is 

contained in the statute.

¶ 64 The majority rejects the interpretation advanced by the appellate court as well as 

all other courts that have thoughtfully analyzed and interpreted section 13-214.3 as 

contemplating an attorney client relationship and, instead relies on Uldrych v. VHS of 

Illinois, Inc., 239 Ill. 2d 532 (2011), Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 136 

Ill. 2d 450 (1990), Polsky v. BDO Seidman, 293 Ill. App. 3d 414 (1997), Donnybrook 

Investments Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, No. 05 C 4883, 2006 WL 1049588 (N.D. 

Ill. Apr. 20, 2006), and Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. McDermott International, Inc., 368 

Ill. App. 3d 603 (2006). Uldrych and Hayes both interpreted the medical malpractice 

statute of repose. Polsky and Donnybrook involved the statute of limitations for 

actions against public accountants. Citgo addressed the applicability of the statute of 
- 20 -

repose for actions against persons in the design, planning, supervision, observation, or 

management of construction. Notably, none of those cases involved interpretation of 

section 13-214.3. 

¶ 65 The majority relies primarily on Hayes in concluding that section 13-214.3(c) 

applies to bar Evanston’s claims. In Hayes, this court addressed whether the medical 

malpractice statute of repose bars third-party claims against physicians for 

contribution. The relevant medical malpractice statute of repose provided, in relevant 

part:

“[N]o action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, 

registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether 

based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care 

shall be brought *** more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the 

act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of 

such injury or death.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, &

13-212(a).

¶ 66 This court interpreted the provision “action for damages” to bar “any action after 

the period of repose seeking damages against a physician or other enumerated 

health-care provider for injury or death arising out of patient care, whether at law or 

in equity.” Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 456. We recognized the legislative history of the 

medical malpractice statute of repose indicated that the General Assembly perceived 

a medical malpractice insurance crisis. Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 457-58. We found that 

the term “or otherwise” in the medical malpractice statute of repose includes actions 

for contribution because it “expose[d] insurance companies to the same liability as if 

the patient were to have brought a direct action against the insured.” Hayes, 136 Ill. 

2d at 458. This court therefore concluded that the General Assembly intended to limit 

a physician’s exposure to liability for damages for injury or death arising out of 

patient care under all theories of liability, including a third-party action for 

contribution. Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 459.

¶ 67 In my opinion, Hayes is clearly distinguishable. The language of the medical 

malpractice statute of repose differs significantly from section 13-214.3. The medical 

malpractice statute of repose does not contain language requiring the action to arise 

out of an act or omission “in the performance of professional services.” Rather, the 

language of the medical malpractice statute of repose is much broader than section 

13-214.3, and bars actions against a physician or other enumerated health-care 
- 21 -

provider for injury or death arising out of patient care. In contrast, section 13-214.3 

limits the legal malpractice statute of repose to actions for damages arising out of an 

act or omission “in the performance of professional services,” indicating a duty 

arising from an attorney-client relationship and an injury arising from the attorney=s 

representation of the person for whom the professional services were rendered.

¶ 68 Moreover, the medical malpractice statute of repose was enacted in 1982, under 

entirely different circumstances than section 13-214.3. When section 13-214.3 was 

enacted, the General Assembly was not faced with a perceived legal malpractice 

insurance crisis. Rather, the legislative history of section 13-214.3 indicates the 

General Assembly simply intended to provide a statute of limitation on attorney 

malpractice actions between an attorney and a client because there was no prior 

statute of limitations for legal malpractice. See 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., House 

Proceedings, May 18, 1990, at 55 (statements of Representative Cullerton) (“This Bill 

creates a statute of limitations in a malpractice action brought against an attorney. 

Right now there is no malpractice statute of limitation. *** It provides a two year 

statute of limitation on attorney malpractice actions with a six year period of repose.”

(Emphases added.)). See also 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 18, 

1990, at 59-60 (statements of Representative Preston) (It “is providing for legal 

malpractice ***. *** [T]here is no reason why someone who leaves for any reason, 

the practice of law, should have to continue to buy malpractice insurance, ten, 

twenty, thirty, forty years after they no longer practice law.” (Emphases added.)). 

There is nothing in the legislative history indicating that the legislature intended to 

bar other types of claims by nonclients. Without a clear expression of intent, this 

court should decline to read the statute to bar a third-party action that does not 

involve legal malpractice.

¶ 69 The majority cites to only one case that has considered the applicability of section 

13-214.3 and rejected the reasoning of Ganci: 800 South Wells Commercial, LLC v. 

Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered, 2013 IL App (1st) 123660. South Wells cited 

absolutely no legal authority for its statutory interpretation and conflicted with all 

other published decisions on the issue. See Ganci, 294 Ill. App. 3d 508; Cotton, 2004 

WL 526739; Bova, 446 F. Supp. 2d 926; Wilbourn, 2010 WL 1194950.

¶ 70 Ultimately, I would hold that the limitations period for actions against attorneys 

performing professional services (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 2008)), applies only to 

legal malpractice actions and does not bar other types of actions brought by a 
- 22 -

nonclient against an attorney. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the appellate 

court.

¶ 71 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 72 JUSTICE THEIS joins in this dissent.