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 The remaining defendants have filed a separate motion for summary judgment

which is noted for February 16, 2007.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

MART LIIKANE, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SEATTLE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. C05-1829L

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY

DEFENDANTS HANK LANDIS

AND WASHINGTON STATE

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #58)

filed by defendants Washington State Department of Licensing (“DOL”) and Hank

Landis, a DOL hearing examiner (collectively, the “moving defendants”).1

For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the moving defendants’ motion.

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Background Facts.

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FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

Landis was the hearing examiner appointed by the Director of DOL to preside over

a hearing to suspend plaintiff’s driver’s license. Plaintiff was stopped by Officer Eric

Michl on or around November 12, 2002 and his blood alcohol level at the time was

allegedly above the legal limit. The hearing occurred in January 2003. Landis

considered the evidence, including documents submitted by Liikane, and issued a written

decision sustaining DOL’s intention to suspend plaintiff’s driver’s license for 90 days. 

Plaintiff subsequently appealed the decision in King County Superior Court. The action

was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.

In his Complaint, plaintiff alleges the following regarding the moving defendants:

[DOL] and on or about January 13, 2003 the said Defendant erroneously

suspended the plaintiff’s driver’s license, placing the plaintiff into a difficult

situation by not allowing him to carry on his business as needed for his livelyhood

[sic], along with pain and suffering and extra waist [sic] of time, effort and money

in an attempt to regain his driver’s license. Complaint at pp. 4-5.

On or about January 7, 2003, the Defendant Hank Landis conducted a hearing in

connection with a unlawful and illegal traffic stop without a valid probable cause

by Defendant Eric Michl. Defendant Landis knowingly & purposefully produced

a totally incorrect “findings of fact and conclusions of law” in order to cover-up

for Defendant[s] [Officer Michl and the Department of Planning and

Development]. Defendant Landis did not mention at all in his “findings” the

actual and factual truth that occurred on November 13, 2002. Complaint at p. 5.

B. Summary Judgment Standard.

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether there are any genuine

issues of material fact.” Holley v. Crank, 386 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 2004). All

reasonable inferences supported by the evidence are to be drawn in favor of the

nonmoving party. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.

2002). “[I]f a rational trier of fact might resolve the issues in favor of the nonmoving

party, summary judgment must be denied.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec.

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 Even if he asserted claims under Section 1983, they would fail. Landis was

acting in a quasi-judicial role as a DOL hearing examiner, and is therefore entitled to

absolute immunity. See, e.g., Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916 (9th

Cir. 2004). Furthermore, neither of the moving defendants is a “person” capable of being

sued for money damages under Section 1983, and claims against state agencies are barred

by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989) (explaining that states and their agencies are not “persons” under Section 1983);

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987).

C. Analysis.

In his opposition to the moving defendants’ motion, plaintiff repeatedly notes that

he is not asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s Opposition at p. 4 (“Again,

Liikane has not asserted any claims under § 1983”); id. at p. 5. Instead, he asserts a claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Id. at p. 4. Plaintiff, however,

cannot assert a claim directly under the Constitution against state entities and officials

because Congress has provided an alternative, effective remedial scheme in § 1983.2

 See

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980) (explaining that where Congress has

provided an alternative remedial scheme, which is intended to be a substitute for direct

recovery under the Constitution, a direct action is unavailable). Accordingly, plaintiff is

precluded from bringing a direct action under the Constitution for the claims alleged

against the moving defendants.

Plaintiff also alleges that he has a right to recover damages under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343. Plaintiff’s Opposition at p. 7. However, Section 1343 does not create a cause of

action. Instead, it confers jurisdiction where plaintiff has otherwise stated a valid cause

of action. See, e.g., Deleo v. Rudin, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1114 (D. Nev. 2004). 

Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Section 1343. 

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FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4

Because plaintiff is not entitled to relief directly under the Constitution or Section

1343, he has disclaimed any Section 1983 claim, and he has not asserted claims under

any other statute, he has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted. His

claims must therefore be dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the moving defendants’

motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #58) and dismisses plaintiff’s claims against Landis

and DOL.

DATED this 7th day of February, 2007.

A

Robert S. Lasnik

United States District Judge

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