www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 3 1 

From a Euro-Atlantic perspective, relations with Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union have proven challenging. On numerous occasions, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have reached out to the Russian Federation in an attempt to 

build a cooperative security framework. While inroads have been made over 

the years, the overall relationship has been hit or miss, leading to regular resets 

of bilateral U.S.-Russia relations and periodic efforts by NATO to reengineer 

its relationship with Russia. In 2011, in the wake of an upswing following the 

U.S.-Russia reset policy launched by the Barack Obama administration and 

the positive spin on NATO-Russia relations in the aftermath of the 2010 

Lisbon Summit, experts and decisionmakers already wonder whether the reset 

will continue to move forward or whether relations with Russia will again run 

aground on longstanding differences. For most of the successful results in the 

past two decades, there have been downturns. In reality, the Euro-Atlantic 

community and Russia have collectively failed to create a European security 

framework addressing shared challenges through common responses for the 

post–Cold War era. Some ambitious attempts have raised hopes, but none has 

led to building the community of trust needed to lay the past to rest once and 

for all.

This paper revisits Dmitry Medvedev’s initiative on European security,1

one of the few comprehensive approaches to reshapıng the framework to 

address the new security environment, and offers new ideas in an attempt 

to develop a genuine strategic partnership between NATO and Russia beyond the positive rhetoric of the 2010 NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Lisbon summit. As the Alliance prepares for its May 2012 summit in Chicago, 

NATO and Russia have yet to develop a mutually agreeable framework for 

European security that reflects the interests of all NRC members. Whatever 

Whither the Medvedev 

Initiative on European Security?

by Isabelle François

Transatlantic Current

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Isabelle François is a Distinguished 

Senior Visiting Research Fellow in 

the Center for Transatlantic Security 

Studies, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, at the National 

Defense University.

Key Points

◆ The past 20 years have been 

marked by several U.S. and NATO 

attempts to reach out to the 

Russian Federation to develop a 

cooperative security framework 

aimed at facing common threats 

and challenges through joint 

actions. European security, 

however, remains marred by 

significant security challenges.

◆ In 2009, Russian President Dmitry 

Medvedev launched an initiative 

investing considerable efforts in 

redefining the European security 

architecture in an inclusive and 

comprehensive manner, but fell 

short of defining and addressing 

common interests.

◆ A broad dialogue on “hard 

security” issues that addresses 

Russian perceptions and concerns 

is required with a genuine 

attempt to reconcile differences. 

This paper offers the basis for 

developing such a dialogue 

making best use of the 2009 

Russian proposal in the event that 

the United States and Allies can 

address the Russian desire to have 

a more expansive role and garner 

respect at the European table.

December 2011

Center for Transat

lantic Security Studies

The research and writing for 

this paper were completed in 

August 2011.
2 Transatlantic Current No. 3 www.ndu.edu/inss

may be the specific areas of progress in NATO-Russia 

practical cooperation, the overall relationship remains 

fragile without a broad strategic dialogue. This paper 

acknowledges the limits and the main reasons behind 

the lukewarm reaction among Allies to the Medvedev 

initiative. At the same time, it points to the current 

challenges in facing European security without an adequate framework, as the Euro-Atlantic community 

addresses the stalemate to revive the Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty following Russia’s unilateral suspension of its CFE commitments. 

The inability of the Allies, their partners, and Russia 

to modernize and ratify the CFE Treaty, which has 

been a main pillar of European security, points to the 

limits of their relationship. The challenge of developing a mutually agreeable vision for European security 

will require some creative thinking, and the Medvedev 

initiative may still offer some insights into Russian 

fundamental concerns. These have to be addressed to 

overcome what has become, over the past two decades, 

a NATO-Russia ritual dance—one step forward, two 

steps backward. A new approach might also provide 

depth to improved U.S.-Russia relations and avoid 

having to invest in yet another “reset” in the future.

Context of the Initiative

In June 2008, Russian President Medvedev delivered a speech in Berlin that marked the first step toward what would become his initiative on European 

security.2 This speech had a somewhat less strident tone 

toward the West than that taken by his predecessor, 

Vladimir Putin, in his February 2007 speech in Munich.3

 Nonetheless, Medvedev’s speech in Berlin made 

clear that the aim of what would become the Russian 

blueprint for a European security treaty (EST) a few 

months later was to prevent other countries or particular groupings, notably the United States and NATO, 

from pursuing objectives and policies that Moscow perceived as directed against Russian security interests.

At the end of 2009, in the run-up to the Organisation 

for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Ministers’ Council meeting in Athens and the NRC meeting 

of foreign ministers in Brussels, the Kremlin Web site featured a draft EST4

 that was forwarded to relevant heads 

of state and government, as well as heads of international 

organizations such as NATO. This proposal was the result 

of significant efforts led by the Kremlin and developed by 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials with the engagement 

of a wide community of experts and officials. Since 2008, 

unprecedented consultations had occurred between Russian officials and the country’s expert community to discuss the idea of a new framework for European security. 

Authorities in Moscow organized roundtable discussions, 

often including officials from European and North American embassies, to hear from not only their own experts, 

but also foreign think tank representatives.

Two major issues loomed large in these discussions. 

The first was whether this initiative should push for a 

legally binding framework, an approach supported by 

Russian officials, or for something looser and limited to 

political commitments, as favored by some Russian experts but mostly by foreign officials. Second, the debate 

revolved around the balance between soft and hard security measures in this proposal.5

 While Russian officials 

were clearly looking for a new approach to hard security issues (which most critics read as a move to replace 

NATO or at least to offer an alternative to it), experts 

and officials outside Russia were making a strong plea for 

Russia to push soft security as well, addressing issues of 

human rights in particular.

The proposal made by the Kremlin consisted of a 

legally binding document offering a draft treaty, including typical elements of an international treaty such as articles dealing with rules and decisionmaking procedures. 

With regard to the balance between soft and hard secudeveloping a mutually agreeable 

vision for European security will 

require some creative thinking
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 3 3 

rity issues, Russian authorities heard the call to be more 

forthcoming on soft security. As a result, Moscow chose 

to table the draft treaty in the run-up to the OSCE ministerial for a first discussion within the OSCE, despite a 

lukewarm approach in Russian circles toward the organization during that period. That said, Russian officials 

remained more interested in defining a new approach 

to hard security and resetting relations around what was 

typically a NATO agenda. Reinforcing that point, at the 

December 2009 NATO ministerial (a few days after the 

OSCE ministerial), Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov tabled a draft agreement on basic principles governing relations among NRC member states in the security sphere.6

This draft agreement was also looking for a binding 

commitment on the basis of politically agreed principles 

enshrined in the 2002 Rome Declaration and the 1997 

Founding Act,7 which presided over the creation of the 

NATO-Russia Council. The link between the draft treaty 

posted on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web 

site and the internally circulated draft agreement for the 

NRC was never spelled out clearly, but the simultaneous 

tabling of a document in the NRC in the margins of the 

OSCE debate on the draft EST indicated Russia’s focus 

on hard security and the importance it still attached to 

the NRC as it was developing the draft treaty.

The Medvedev initiative rose out of the ashes of the 

Russian-Georgian war in the summer of 2008 and in the 

aftermath of one of the lowest points in NATO-Russia 

relations of the past 20 years. Tabling the EST on the eve 

of the December 2009 NRC meeting of foreign ministers was perceived within NATO as a Russian attempt 

to become the driving force in the debate on European 

security (at best) or to bypass NATO (at worst). Russian 

officials seemed to be looking for a way to reengage in 

the aftermath of the 2008 war, arguing for a need to deal 

with shortcomings in the European security architecture 

that, from their perspective, did not allow for addressing 

Russian post–Cold War concerns and, therefore, led to 

the war and the freeze in NATO-Russia relations.

In looking more closely at the content of the document, it is clear that Moscow, interested mostly in hard 

security issues, aimed to address some of its key concerns 

in dealing with NATO, offering only lip service to soft 

security as a second track approach for deliberations 

within the OSCE. Nonetheless, there are some important principles in the draft EST worth considering and 

building upon, as they will probably be critical to further 

engagement with Russia on the reset trajectory, whether 

in the NATO-Russia context or in the U.S.-Russia security agenda. Moreover, these key principles reflecting 

longstanding Russian concerns over European security 

are likely to remain central to Moscow’s position both in 

NATO and the OSCE, as well as within the context of 

bilateral relations.

Main Tenets of the Initiative

First, the Medvedev initiative departed significantly 

from traditional Russian foreign policy development insofar as it proceeded in full transparency, both internally 

(within the Russian community of security experts) and 

externally (with Russian officials reaching out to foreign 

experts and academic institutions as well as to some 

foreign officials). The early proposal was presented as a 

work in progress with a clear intent by officials to further develop the draft on the basis of inputs from various 

partners within and outside of Russia. Moscow seemed 

open to substantial amendments to its original idea. This 

approach denoted a willingness to engage and open up 

through significant outreach efforts rather than to impose Russian views.

Second, the draft EST summarized most of the key 

arguments and problems expressed by Russian officials 

over the previous 5 years in their relations with allies and 

other countries in terms of European security. First and 

there are some important principles 

in the draft European security 

treaty worth considering and 

building upon
4 Transatlantic Current No. 3 www.ndu.edu/inss

foremost, it sought to broaden the principle of indivisibility of security well beyond the understanding prevailing 

among the 28 NATO member states. For the Alliance, 

an attack on one of its members is an attack on all, and 

therefore their security is indivisible.8

 Although NATO 

had, over the years, developed a political understanding 

of indivisibility in a Euro-Atlantic context in the light of 

its cooperation with its Euro-Atlantic partners, Russia 

was seeking with the draft EST to go beyond the political implications developed within NATO partnerships. 

The EST was to elevate the principle of indivisibility as 

a justification for legal obligations among parties to the 

treaty, according to which parties would be barred from 

strengthening their own security at the expense of other 

parties to the treaty, member states, or organizations.9

Third, the EST attempted to redefine an Article 

5–type of obligation beyond that of NATO. Intent on 

diluting NATO’s Article 5 commitment, which Moscow had long perceived as a remnant of the Cold War 

that prevented meaningful cooperation with Russia, 

the EST gave any party to it the right to intervene 

militarily in support of another party in case of an attack or the threat of an attack. It stipulated in Article 

7 that “every party shall be entitled to consider an 

armed attack against any other party an armed attack 

against itself.” In including such a clause, Moscow 

pursued its interest in a legally binding commitment 

akin to NATO’s Article 5 commitment but opening it 

to non-NATO members. This was perceived as inimical to NATO’s interests, obviously undermining the 

Alliance’s open door policy.

Fourth, the draft EST reflected a strong desire on 

the part of Russian officials to be inclusive. Beyond the 

outreach made while developing the draft, the EST was 

meant as a document open for signature by all EuroAtlantic states “from Vancouver to Vladivostok,” as well 

as by international organizations such as the European 

Union, the OSCE, NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Commonwealth of Independent States in light of their respective areas of interest 

and competence in European security.

Limits to the Medvedev Initiative

NATO Resistance. From the start of discussions, 

notwithstanding the significant differences among 

Allies vis-à-vis NATO’s policy toward Russia and the 

debilitating lack of consensus within NATO on Russian matters, the overall impression in the West was 

rather negative. It ranged from skepticism by the Allies friendly to Russia to absolute opposition on the 

part of the Allies most cautious regarding Russia.10

There were several reasons for the lack of enthusiasm. 

Most importantly, it was commonly accepted that the 

European security architecture, albeit imperfect, was 

still able to deliver, and there was little appetite for a 

complete departure from existing structures,11 especially at a time when transition and transformation 

were on the agenda of various organizations and the 

security environment was eminently volatile and even 

at times dangerous. The problem, however, remained 

that Russia did not feel that the existing European 

security structure was taking its interests into account, and turning a deaf ear to Russia’s complaints 

was not acceptable.

From the beginning of his tenure, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen had made it 

clear that he intended to listen to Russia and that the 

Alliance had to pay attention to Russian concerns regarding the inability in the West to accommodate Russian interests within the existing European security 

framework.12 The challenge with the draft EST, and 

ultimately the main stumbling block, was its overarching approach to European security: the treaty, with 

its wider approach to indivisibility of security and its 

the European security treaty was 

meant as a document open for 

signature by all Euro-Atlantic states 

“from Vancouver to Vladivostok”
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 3 5 

overarching defense clause, would become the overall 

framework and would therefore subsume NATO within a new structure. Considering Article 7 together with 

Article 9, which added that “the Parties to the Treaty 

shall not assume international obligations incompatible with the Treaty,” the EST would effectively limit 

NATO’s ability to call on its own Article 5 and to exercise its own obligations and privileges.

While the draft EST was not going to be acceptable to NATO, the Alliance nonetheless stood ready to 

discuss the Russian proposal. At the NRC ministerial in 

December 2009 and thereafter, the Secretary-General 

welcomed the draft as a contribution to greater transparency regarding Russian views and objectives, but ultimately the position within NATO developed toward 

the necessity to debate the draft treaty within the OSCE 

rather than NATO and the NRC.13 Given the Russian 

focus on debating hard security issues, discussions on the 

draft EST died out, leaving a sour note in Moscow. Russian authorities and the expert community remain skeptical about the reset agenda, convinced that the West is 

not serious about addressing Russian concerns. Perhaps 

more problematic, many feel that even when Moscow 

engages and contributes a new idea instead of denying 

or pushing against Western policies and objectives, Moscow is still unable to get its point across and to contribute 

to shaping decisions on European security.

Lack of Support Beyond NATO. In its attempt to get 

the draft EST to gather momentum, Russian authorities reached out beyond NATO and the Allies toward 

NATO partners and other organizations. Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, 

all members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, expressed support for the initiative in a joint statement with Russia. However, vested interests on the part of 

other organizations and the lack of appetite all around for 

a significant reformulation of the European security architecture did not offer much traction to Russian authorities. The OSCE already served as a forum to address soft 

security issues, covering them more broadly than what the 

Russian draft offered in this area. The Russian proposal 

remained seen in the West as a clear attempt to circumvent existing international security agreements concluded 

within the auspices of the OSCE. Moreover, the NRC 

was already providing a forum to address issues of common concern between Russia and its allies in Europe, even 

issues on which the parties “agree to disagree.” And the 

prevailing authority of the United Nations and its Security 

Council was felt to be sufficient in terms of enforceable 

commitments. The overarching and legally binding nature 

of the draft EST largely buried the proposal.

Incoherence in the Russian Position. From an intellectual perspective, the draft EST seemed inconsistent 

with Russian policy vis-à-vis Georgia and the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Ukraine 

(with which Russia was having a dispute over gas at the 

time), and Moldova. Some argued that had the EST existed in its legally binding nature, it would have served 

as a platform to prosecute recent Russian policies and 

actions in Georgia and beyond, notably through the 

preamble of the EST, which recalls that “the use of 

force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 

other way inconsistent with the goals and principles 

of the Charter of the United Nations is inadmissible.” 

Moreover, some experts pointed to the “very ambiguous” terms used in the draft EST, which would likely 

trigger “dozens of disputes as to meaning.”14

Potential for Recasting and 

Further Developing the Initiative

Because of its overarching approach to European security, reminiscent of Moscow’s interest in designing a new 

European security architecture in the early post–Cold War 

the Russian proposal remained seen 

in the West as a clear attempt to 

circumvent existing international 

security agreements
6 Transatlantic Current No. 3 www.ndu.edu/inss

period, the draft EST is highly unlikely to gain the necessary support to see the light of day. It is rarely mentioned 

in European security talks and certainly is no longer on the 

NATO-Russia agenda. There remains little prospect for a 

legally binding overall framework that would reconcile two 

different approaches and fundamentally opposite analyses 

of today’s security environment in Russia and the West.

On the one hand, Russia has aimed toward a hierarchical structure subsuming multilateralism and key security organizations to prevailing national interests in the hope 

of sitting at the table with nations whose representatives 

would speak exclusively in their national capacity, instead 

of reflecting an agreed position developed in a multilateral 

forum such as NATO. Allies and their partners, on the 

other hand, have favored a looser arrangement that allows 

for coalitions of the willing to make the best use of each 

organization on the basis of its respective value added in 

the face of today’s multidimensional and multidirectional 

threats. This approach, offering maximum flexibility to adjust both to a changing international environment and to 

evolving policies and interests among Allies and partners, 

clashes with the idea of a neatly hierarchical structure with 

clearly defined roles and responsibilities.

However, the reasons that prompted Moscow to develop the draft EST as an alternative framework have not 

disappeared. Russian authorities continue to believe that 

their interests are not being taken into account and, from 

their perspectives, systemic flaws remain in today’s European security environment. Officials remain convinced of 

the need to develop a common approach to European security and continue to remind their Euro-Atlantic partners of 

the existing proposal on the table.15 Russian concerns with 

the current European security environment beg for a clear 

response; as long as they are pushed aside or absorbed into 

some looser and broader process, these concerns will remain 

a significant handicap undermining any real progress in 

NATO-Russia cooperation and will hamper a full reset of 

U.S.-Russia relations in the long run.

Adapted Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe Treaty and 

Draft EST

So far, the Allies have responded to the Russian 

EST proposal with the OSCE “Corfu process”—a dialogue on European security launched in June 2009 at 

an informal gathering of OSCE foreign ministers to 

discuss European security challenges. This meeting fell 

short of the Russian call for an OSCE summit to discuss the Medvedev proposal. Nonetheless, it was possible to use this process constructively to address security 

in the broad sense of the Helsinki Accords, across the 

three Helsinki baskets, while addressing CFE-specific 

concerns on a separate track. One could consider revisiting the Russian proposal on European security to help 

resolve the impasse on the CFE Treaty, as both treaties 

aim at keeping Europe undivided and at guaranteeing 

predictability and transparency. Both treaties provide for 

a multilateral process for joint consultations where the 

current security challenges can be addressed, thus contributing to conflict prevention.

In fact, speaking at the OSCE meeting on December 1, 2009, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner 

was quick to point out that the Russian proposal omitted the issue of arms control.16 His British colleague also 

highlighted the need for a “resolution of the crisis of 

the CFE Treaty.” It might be interesting for policymakers to consider whether President Medvedev’s proposal 

for a European security treaty could be considered and 

coopted in an ultimate effort to preserve and update the 

CFE Treaty and to reengage with Moscow, which announced in December 2007 that it was “suspending” its 

observance of the original treaty.

The CFE Treaty, signed in 1990, has remained the 

cornerstone of European security and is de facto linked 

to the debate over the Russian proposal on a draft EuRussian concerns with the current 

European security environment beg 

for a clear response
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 3 7 

ropean security treaty. CFE helped stabilize military relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact through 

limitations on military materiel, resulting in the destruction of tens of thousands of pieces of equipment. 

CFE was, however, the legacy from another era of European security. With the end of the Warsaw Pact, the 

collapse of the Soviet Union, and NATO’s successive 

enlargements, the European security landscape was 

dramatically altered. As a result, CFE member states 

signed in 1999 an adapted CFE treaty to take account 

of these changes. Although ratified by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, the adapted treaty was never 

ratified by NATO members, who linked their ratification process to the fulfillment of side commitments 

Moscow entered into with regard to Russian troops 

and equipment at bases in Georgia (South Ossetia) and 

Moldova (Transnistria). Incensed by the lack of ratification by the Allies while Russia had to abide by its 

legal treaty limitations, effectively restricting its ability 

to deploy additional forces on its southern flank to cope 

with threatening instability from the North Caucasus, 

President Putin decided to suspend observance of the 

original treaty. Nearly 4 years later, the CFE Treaty regime remains in limbo.17

A diplomatic effort led by the United States was 

launched in April 2010 to develop a framework statement of key provisions and principles that could guide 

negotiations to strengthen the CFE regime. Allied and 

Russian leaders met on numerous occasions in this context, having overcome the initial Russian opposition to 

any preconditions for resuming CFE talks. Russian opposition to the principle of host-nation consent (linked 

to the flank issues previously mentioned) and to resuming its own compliance with the suspended CFE Treaty 

led to a stalemate.

Recent attempts at resuming negotiations have 

not yet led to a change of heart in Moscow. Given 

the complexity of the CFE and confidence-building 

measure negotiations, it is clear that CFE negotiations 

will demand a separate approach. However, progress 

on a separate track toward developing a set of “common understandings”18 on European security requirements and a dialogue on a pan-European security vision could assist the resumption of CFE negotiations 

by addressing longstanding Russian concerns, while 

reassuring Russian neighbors on Moscow’s intentions 

and plans.

Identifying Redlines, Building on the Agreeable.

Given the lack of consensus among Allies on the best 

way to cooperate with Russia, how does one develop a 

clear joint response to the Russian concerns expressed 

in the draft EST? Creative thinking will be required, but 

a broad strategic dialogue should be launched without 

further delay in response to the Russian EST proposal. 

This dialogue should first set out clearly why the proposal was met with lukewarm reactions on the part of 

Allies and draw redlines on what was deemed unacceptable. Second, it should stress the readiness to engage in 

a fruitful debate and outline how to develop common 

understandings for European security, which might ultimately help in future negotiations, notably on CFE. It 

could also assist with ongoing discussions with regard to 

missile defense and help launch a process aimed at addressing future potential negotiations on tactical nuclear 

weapons. Through the development of specific common 

understandings, this strategic dialogue would help the 

overall arms control agenda.

The dialogue should start by formally spelling out 

the redlines with regard to the draft EST. First, the idea 

of an overall legally binding treaty is inconceivable, given the differences of threat perceptions and diverging 

national interests in Europe. Second, it should be clear 

that no Ally and very few partners would be prepared 

to subsume the authority of NATO to a higher body, 

which would limit its ability to act and to accept new 

a dialogue on a pan-European 

security vision could assist the 

resumption of CFE negotiations 
8 Transatlantic Current No. 3 www.ndu.edu/inss

members. As pointed out by some analysts, diluting 

existing treaties and alliances would be destabilizing.19

Third, any attempt by Moscow to develop a self-proclaimed sphere of privileged interests will continue to 

be met with considerable resistance.20 Fourth, it should 

be equally clear that preserving an undivided Europe 

cannot be achieved without Russia and that the fact 

that Russia feels excluded from the European security 

framework requires a serious and joint response.

The dialogue should pursue the development of 

common understandings on European security. When 

Moscow unveiled the text of its proposed legally binding treaty, much of it was familiar and agreeable: notably, the respect of members’ territorial integrity, conflict 

prevention, and the inadmissibility of the use and threat 

of force. Moreover, one could build on the four main tenets of the draft EST: transparency, indivisibility, legal 

commitment, and inclusiveness. These principles did 

not find their way into the draft fortuitously. They are 

indicative of a deep malaise in relations between Russia and the West in general, and Russia and NATO in 

particular, despite significant recent successes in U.S.-

Russia security relations and pragmatic steps forward 

in the NATO-Russia relationship. The overall relationship remains marred by mistrust and fundamental 

differences in threat perception and can hardly yield 

joint responses to address current and emerging security challenges. Building trust will take a long time, and 

remarkable successes like the ratification of the New 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty may lead the way but 

will not be sufficient to nurture the reset of relations.

Moscow’s desire for legally binding commitments is 

symptomatic of the prevailing mistrust toward Western 

intentions vis-à-vis Russia—a lack of trust shared by 

many in the West. Given the Russian insistence on 

legal commitments in various areas,21 it would be useful to ultimately tie discussions on a pan-European 

security vision to a process of negotiations that will 

result in a treaty, thus providing formal assurances to 

Russian authorities. Through the adapted CFE negotiations, Moscow has been seeking a way to address 

its inferiority in terms of conventional weapons—an 

objective well known to its Western partners who addressed the same dilemma through the original CFE 

Treaty 20 years ago as they were facing the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. Arms control 

in general and the specific case of the adapted CFE 

Treaty would naturally build confidence and provide 

for legally binding commitments able to reassure Russia in the area of European security. These are likely to 

be the only formal multinational negotiations able to 

yield a legally binding document in the area of European hard security.

Moreover, building transparency in European security is one of the major achievements of the CFE 

regime. In that sense, the adapted CFE would respond to the Russian desire in developing the draft 

EST to reach out to various audiences multilaterally 

and show a real commitment to transparency. In addition, the CFE inspections, information exchanges, 

and monitoring have long contributed to building 

transparency in Europe aimed at diminishing tensions 

and suspicions on all sides. This remains one of the 

main objectives in wanting to preserve the CFE regime and resume negotiations. The call for enhanced 

transparency in the draft EST would be best addressed through the CFE regime and its confidencebuilding measures.

The principle of inclusiveness stressed in the draft 

EST is another area where the adapted CFE could pave 

the way in concrete terms. The adapted CFE provides 

for a multilateral process for joint consultations where 

current security challenges can be addressed. More importantly, it extended CFE discussions to nonsignatories 

Moscow’s desire for legally binding 

commitments is symptomatic of 

the prevailing mistrust toward 

Western intentions
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 3 9 

to the original treaty,22 some of which became NATO 

members, thus potentially extending transparency and 

inspections to Russian neighbors—a useful reciprocal 

process that could greatly contribute to building confidence and reassuring many in Europe. Finally, through 

this inclusive process of CFE discussions currently extending to 36 nations, the adapted CFE treaty would 

be the most concrete—and possibly the only—example 

where one can talk of the indivisibility of security in the 

sense of the draft EST.

While setting aside the original attempt to design 

a comprehensive, legally binding framework for European security, the Medvedev initiative may still prove 

useful toward developing “common understandings” 

in terms of European security, where Russia would 

feel that its interests are not ignored. A set of common 

understandings making best use of the key principles 

outlined in the Medvedev initiative could provide a 

framework for a genuine reset of NATO-Russia relations beyond the mere rhetoric that has prevailed in 

the aftermath of the Lisbon summit. It may also assist 

in drawing Russia back into negotiations over CFE.

Carving a Role for the NATO-Russia Council. A 

political declaration could recall the principles of transparency, inclusiveness, and indivisibility of security as 

they prevail in the Euro-Atlantic community, along with 

the principles enshrined in the 1997 Founding Act on 

Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between 

NATO and the Russian Federation, and initiate a broad 

strategic dialogue between the Allies and Russia as a 

follow-up to the Medvedev initiative.

This broad strategic dialogue would aim at developing in the NRC a set of common understandings on 

European security requirements, which would address 

the hard security aspects to complement the OSCE 

Corfu process. Among these common understandings, 

a particular effort could be launched to come to grips 

with a longstanding dispute between Russia and the 

NATO Allies on the exact meaning of “substantial additional combat forces” as NATO committed in 1997 

to refrain from deploying such forces on the territory 

of its new members.23 This would likely yield sufficient 

progress for Russia to consider reversing its suspension 

of the adapted CFE and for the Allies and Russia to 

agree on the necessary steps toward ratification and 

implementation of the adapted CFE.

As the Alliance prepares for a summit in Chicago 

in 2012, the issue will soon be raised as to the salience 

of an NRC summit in that context. The decision will 

largely depend on the substance and the potential deliverables for such an event. A political declaration, including concrete proposals as a follow-up to the Medvedev initiative, might appeal to both Russia and the 

Allies. Launching a broad strategic dialogue would create the necessary momentum for genuine progress in 

NATO-Russia relations and could also strengthen the 

reset in U.S.-Russia relations.

To the extent that the United States and its Allies 

can address the Russian desire to have a more expansive role and garner greater respect at the European 

table, it is in U.S. interests to take this process seriously.24 Alternatively, it will have to reinvent the reset every 5 years, and the NATO-Russia Council will never 

amount to anything more than a forum to “agree to 

disagree” and occasionally cooperate. Ultimately, Russia’s desire for an equal seat at the European security 

table must build upon the existing system of European 

security structures and must be channeled through approaches that further integrate rather than divide Europe. This requires a genuine attempt to listen to and 

accommodate each other.

Notes 1 The full text of the Medvedev initiative is available at 

<www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/

dv/201/201006/20100622_russianprop_en.pdf>.

the Medvedev initiative could 

provide a framework for a genuine 

reset of NATO-Russia relations
10 Transatlantic Current No. 3 www.ndu.edu/inss

2 Speech available at <www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/C080DC2FF8D93629C3257460003496C4>.

3 Speech available at <www.securityconference.de/Putin-sspeech.381.0.html?&L=1>.

4 Draft European security treaty (EST) available at <www.mid.

ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/dveurope/065fc3182ca460d1c325767f003073cc>.

5 While soft security would deal with issues such as human rights, 

hard security issues would focus on discussion regarding collective 

defense and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense 

commitments.

6 See <https://www.armscontrol.org/print/4041>.

7 See <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm> 

and <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19572.htm>. These 

founding documents for NATO-Russia relations were agreed at the 

level of heads of state and government and offered “political commitments” as opposed to treaties, which have provided “legal commitments.” Russia has long argued for the need to agree to a legally 

binding document for European security to reinforce mutual trust and 

confidence.

8 This pact is enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, 

which founded NATO.

9 Article 2 of the draft EST states that “a party to the Treaty 

shall not undertake, participate in or support any actions or activities 

affecting significantly security or any other party or parties to the 

Treaty.”

10 “European Leaders Split on Russian Security Plan,” Deutsche 

Welle, July 2, 2009.

11 On the American side, the draft EST was welcomed by State 

Department spokesman Ian Kelly as “an important contribution to 

the ongoing debate on European security.” He stated that the administration was going to study it carefully, but it was quickly added that 

from a U.S. perspective, “Any proposal must build on the existing body 

of commitments we have developed together over three decades, as 

well as central structures such as the OSCE and NATO.” See <http://

en.rian.ru/world/20091202/157063806.html>.

12 His very first speech was devoted to NATO-Russia relations 

signaling his own readiness to listen to Russian concerns. See <www.

nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57640.htm>. Others added their 

voices to the need to engage with Russia on these ideas, in particular 

French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela 

Merkel in their joint op-ed. See “La sécurité, notre mission commune,” Le Monde, February 3, 2009.

13 See <www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A45FED8E-A81AAEE9/

natolive/opinions_60223.htm>.

14 Quotes from Steven Pifer from his December 23, 2009, interview. See <www.armscontrol.org/print/4041>.

15 See references to the EST proposal by Sergey Ivanov in 

Washington in May 2010, available at <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100517/159053606.html>.

16 See <www.osce.org/cio/40580>.

17 For a thorough analysis on the Conventional Armed Forces 

in Europe Treaty regime, see Anne Witkowsky, Sherman Garnett, 

and Jeff McCausland, “Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in 

Europe Treaty Regime: Options for Washington,” Brookings Arms 

Control Series, Paper 2, March 2010.

18 An agreed definition of European security requirements would 

be impossible to reach between Allies and Russia given the major differences in perception and vision. However, working together toward 

developing common understanding and building on commonly 

agreeable principles while outlining differences and working toward 

narrowing the gaps could slowly help develop a common vision.

19 Marcel H. Van Herpen, “Medvedev’s Proposal for a Pan-European Security Pact,” Cicero Foundation, October 2008, available at 

<www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Marcel_H_Van_Herpen_Medvedevs_Proposal_for_a_Pan-European_Security_Pact.pdf>. 

20 Sally McNamara, “Russia’s Proposed New European Security 

Treaty: A Non-starter for the U.S. and Europe,” Heritage Foundation 

Backgrounder 2463, September 16, 2010.

21 Russia has insisted on the Adapted CFE ratification by Allies 

to force legally binding commitments on the NATO side, although 

Allies were observing these commitments in practice despite the 

absence of ratification. Similarly, Russia offered the draft EST as a 

legally binding document. Finally, Russia more recently insisted on a 

legally binding document with respect to missile defense as a precondition for potential cooperation in this field. 

22 Current discussions to resume Conventional Armed Forces 

in Europe negotiations/implementation include 30 CFE member 

states and six non-CFE NATO Allies. See <www.armscontrol.org/

print/4997>.

23 “NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security 

environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and 

other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, 

and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent 

stationing of substantial combat forces.” See the Founding Act on 

Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the 

Russian Federation, May 27, 1997.

24 Witkowsky, Garnett, and McCausland, 16.
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 3 11 

The Center for Transatlantic Security Studies within the 

Institute for National Strategic Studies provides research 

and policy advice to senior Department of Defense and 

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well as nonresident subject matter experts. The opinions, 

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Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Ambassador Robert Hunter

Director

Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

Francis G. Hoffman

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS

NATO Partnerships and the 

Arab Spring: Achievements 

and Perspectives for the 

2012 Chicago Summit 

Isabelle François

(Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, Transatlantic 

Perspectives 1, December 2011)

In November 2010, heads of state and government 

at the Lisbon Summit called for a “streamlining” 

of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

partnerships. In early 2011, the Alliance developed 

a more flexible and efficient partnership policy. It 

did so in accordance with the Lisbon tasking, and 

prepared simultaneously for a new mission, with contributions from several partner 

countries, as events unfolded in Libya. These developments involved significant NATO 

consultation with partner countries.

In this inaugural Transatlantic Perspectives from the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, Dr. Isabelle François highlights the synergy between the new policy and 

NATO’s response to the Libyan crisis. It points to some of the challenges facing the 

Alliance in the context of Operation Unified Protector, and in further developing 

NATO partnerships with countries south of the Mediterranean. The paper finally offers recommendations in preparation for the next NATO summit so as to make best 

use of Alliance partnerships if the Allies decide to build on the Libyan operation and 

develop a new strategic direction in the face of tumultuous political transition in the 

Arab world south of the Mediterranean.

New Series from NDU Press

NATO Partnerships and the Arab Spring: 

Achievements and Perspectives for the 2012 

Chicago Summit

by Isabelle François

TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES 1

Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
12 Transatlantic Current No. 3 www.ndu.edu/inss

NATO and the Arab Spring

Isabelle François

(Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, Transatlantic 

Current 1, October 2011)

Korean Futures: Challenges to 

U.S. Diplomacy of North Korean 

Regime Collapse

Ferial Ara Saeed and James J. Przystup

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Perspectives 

No. 7, September 2011)

The Ongoing Insurgency in 

Southern Thailand: Trends in 

Violence, Counterinsurgency 

Operations, and the Impact of 

National Politics

Zachary Abuza

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Perspectives 

No. 6, September 2011)

Countering the Lord’s Resistance 

Army in Central Africa

Andre Le Sage

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 270, 

July 2011)

Chinese Military Transparency: 

Evaluating the 2010 Defense 

White Paper

Phillip C. Saunders and Ross Rustici

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 269, 

July 2011)

The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda 

in the Islamic Maghreb

Andre Le Sage

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July 2011)

Joint Interagency Task Force–

South: The Best Known, Least 

Understood Interagency Success 

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Iran’s Islamic Revolution: 

Lessons for the Arab Spring 

of 2011? 

Michael Eisenstadt 

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 267, 

April 2011) 

Secret Weapon: 

High-value Target Teams as 

an Organizational Innovation 

Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing 

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Perspectives 

No. 4, March 2011)

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publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu