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95–246PDF 2015

COLOMBIA: PEACE WITH THE FARC?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 24, 2015

Serial No. 114–58

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Bernard Aronson, Special Envoy to the Colombian Peace 

Process, U.S. Department of State ..................................................................... 6

Mr. Alex Lee, Deputy Assistant Secretary for South America and Cuba, 

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................ 13

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Bernard Aronson: Prepared statement ........................................ 9

Mr. Alex Lee: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 15

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 36

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 37

The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of South Carolina, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: Letter from the Honorable Marco Rubio, a U.S. Senator in Congress 

from the State of Florida, to the Honorable Bernie Aronson, Special Envoy 

for the Colombia Peace Process, United States Department of State, dated 

February 26, 2015 ................................................................................................ 38

The Honorable Albio Sires, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New Jersey: Statement of the Honorable Sam Farr, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of California ........................................................... 40

The Honorable Alan S. Lowenthal, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................ 42

Written responses from Mr. Alex Lee to questions submitted for the record 

by the Honorable Alan S. Lowenthal ................................................................. 45

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: Material submitted for the record ............................................... 47

(1)

COLOMBIA: PEACE WITH THE FARC? 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. DUNCAN. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will 

come to order. 

And I would now like to recognize myself for an opening statement. Colombia and the United States have been fierce friends and 

allies for a very long time, and I believe that Colombia is critical 

to regional security in the Western Hemisphere. The leadership 

demonstrated by President Santos and former President Uribe 

have helped to shape Colombia into a model for the region. Today, 

Colombia stands as a strong democracy, economic and financial 

powerhouse, and a leader in training other countries’ police and 

military forces in the region. 

We have a free trade agreement with Colombia that shows every 

sign of benefiting both countries, and Colombia has been a leader 

in creating the Pacific Alliance to further the economies of the free 

trade trading bloc of countries in the hemisphere. In particular, the 

South Carolina National Guard and Colombian military have been 

working together since 2012 in the State Partnership Program to 

develop ties and partner capacity and build regional stability. 

However, even though Colombia is a leader in the region in so 

many ways, it is also home to the hemisphere’s longest running 

and only active armed conflict that has claimed over 220,000 lives 

and displaced more than 5 million people. Let me repeat that: It 

has claimed over 220,000 lives and displaced more than 5 million 

people. 

According to a recent United Nations report, Colombia has the 

world’s second highest rate of internal refugees after Syria. We all 

want to see these problems resolved and peace achieved. Today, we 

meet to examine the issue of peace talks between the Colombian 

Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or 

FARC, which have been ongoing since 2012 after three previous 

failed attempts in 1984, 1991, and 1998. We want to better understand recent developments in the peace talks, examine what elements should be included in a successful agreement, and determine 

2

what a good end state to the conflict would look like for the United 

States, Colombia, and regional interests. 

After nearly 50 years of war, the Colombian people have a vital 

interest in pursuing peace. Similarly, the American people have 

given almost $10 billion to help Colombia achieve the end of this 

conflict, combat drug trafficking, and promote internal development 

through Plan Colombia. Colombia is the single largest recipient of 

U.S. foreign assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 

we have many deep security, economic, and political ties that bind 

us together. 

After 21⁄2 years of negotiations and over 30 rounds of talks, the 

Colombian Government and the FARC have reached partial agreements on three of five critical points: Land reform, political participation, and drug trafficking. Yet the thorniest of issues—victims’ 

reparations and disarmament and traditional justice and how the 

final agreement will be approved, verified, implemented, and paid 

for—remain unresolved. 

Given the joint efforts by the United States and Colombians to 

gain peace, it is critical that whatever outcome Colombia and 

FARC achieve through the peace process results in peace, justice 

for crimes committed, and a demobilized FARC that renounces violence, criminal activities, and terrorism in Colombia and neighboring countries, and the FARC’s reintegration into Colombia’s society through solely peaceful, democratic means. 

We must not forget who we are dealing with here. The FARC 

was founded in 1964 as a Communist guerrilla movement and the 

military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. Its strategy has 

been shaped by communism and socialism, and it is a terrorist organization, recognized as such by the United States, Canada, New 

Zealand, and the European Union. Through its illicit activities, the 

FARC makes $600 million or more a year and is the third richest 

terrorist organization after ISIS and Hamas. 

It also maintains relations with human rights abusers in the governments of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Cuba; terrorist organizations 

like Hezbollah; and criminal organizations involved if the drug 

trade. Lest we forget, although Cuba has been harboring FARC terrorists who have taken refuge in Havana, the Obama administration dropped Cuba’s terrorist designation earlier this year. That 

should not happen with FARC unless we see demonstrable evidence of change and a complete stop of FARC’s terrorist attacks in 

Colombia. 

Given this history, we should not forget the advice of Chinese 

military theorist Sun Tzu, to know the enemy and know yourself, 

as we pursue options for peace. Why is the FARC at the negotiating table? If the FARC is truly serious about ending the conflict, 

what is motivating it to carry out more than 150 attacks in the last 

month, with numbers that have not been seen in Colombia since 

2011? I support the pursuit of peace, and peace is always desirable 

to war. However, it must be clear that any peace agreement reinforces the gains of the last 15 years. If this peace deal is not a good 

deal and ends up throwing away many of the achievements the 

U.S. and Colombians have fought for, we may all have a greater 

problem on our hands. 

3

The U.S. has helped Colombia with the reintegration of former 

guerrillas. And when I was in Cartagena last year with the full 

committee chairman, Chairman Royce, we had a meeting with 

former National Liberation Army, ELN, guerrillas who were discovering the dignity and hope that comes from the entrepreneurial 

spirit rather than from a life of terrorism. There is a lot of potential when guerrillas lay down their arms and seek to reintegrate 

back into society peacefully. 

I just hope that President Santos does not sacrifice the integrity 

of his military and Colombia’s rich democracy to accomplish the 

lofty goals of reaching an agreement without demanding changes 

from the FARC. Let’s not make the same mistake in Colombia that 

we seem to be making with the Iranian nuclear talks. We must 

make sure that the Colombian peace deal is a good deal. 

So, in particular, I am concerned that the preliminary drug-trafficking agreement would roll back efforts gained in Plan Colombia 

to eliminate the cultivation of coca through aerial spraying. This is 

problematic because these efforts have been working. According to 

the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, coca fields in Colombia have fallen from more than 345,000 acres in 2001 to about 

118,000 acres by the end of 2013, yet in the partial agreement, only 

manual eradication is permitted. I have seen manual eradication 

firsthand in Peru. I know what it entails. And I know how difficult 

it is. The Colombian Government also has to negotiate eradication 

with local communities by providing a series of welfare benefits. 

Such actions could delay eradication and allow the FARC to continue its coca source of income. 

This announcement last month that Colombia had decided to 

completely stop aerial fumigation of drug crops, a centerpiece in 

U.S. and Colombia efforts to counter the cocaine production, threatens to undo much of the work our countries have done on this 

issue. In addition, the FARC has requested the United States release Ricardo Palmera, a FARC leader, extradited to the United 

States in 2004, currently serving a 60-year sentence for his role in 

a FARC kidnapping and hostage situation involving three Americans. 

Similarly, there were at least 60 FARC members who have U.S. 

indictments against them from the U.S. Department of Justice. 

While the FARC leadership has made it clear that they will not 

agree to demobilize unless they will not be extradited to the United 

States, it is important for the rule of law that criminals face justice 

for their crimes. There are two cases in particular that deserve review. The United States has requested the extradition of FARC 

leaders Rodrigo Perez Alzate and Eduardo Cabrera, El Cura is his 

name, for drug trafficking. 

As of March, Colombia has decided not to extradite these individuals to the United States to face justice. I strongly urge Colombia 

to reconsider. I strongly urge the Obama administration to maintain a firm focus on upholding the rule of law. 

So, in conclusion, my message for our Colombian friends is this: 

We stand with you in your pursuit of peace, but do not give up the 

military successes we have achieved together at the negotiating 

table. Colombia’s history is full of attempted peace settlements that 

set up the next war. Let’s make sure that this time is different, 

4

that we do not repeat the same mistakes of the past. And let me 

just say this: I love Colombia. I love the Colombian people. I want 

peace for Colombia. And I hope that there is success at the negotiating table with the FARC. Peace is desired I think by everyone 

here for the Colombian people. It is alarming that 220,000 people 

have died and 5 million people have been displaced. It is time for 

peace in Colombia. 

And so I look forward to a robust discussion about this issue. 

Americans are concerned about peace in Colombia as well. So, with 

that, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

And I now turn to Ranking Member Sires for his opening statement. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to Special Envoy Aronson and Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Lee for testifying here today. 

We are here to examine the ongoing peace talks between Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. In the 1960s, 

leftist groups inspired by the Cuban revolution accused the Colombian Government of rural neglect that resulted in poverty and 

highly concentrated land ownership. The ensuing internal civil conflict between violent leftist guerrilla groups and the government 

has continued unabated for half a century. 

Colombia has been a source country for both cocaine and heroin 

for more than four decades. Drug trafficking has helped perpetuate 

Colombia’s internal conflict by funding both leftwing and rightwing 

armed groups. Tens of thousands of Colombians have died in the 

conflict, and the government has registered more than 25,000 as 

missing or disappeared. 

An originally published U.N. report indicates that nearly 6 million people have been internally displaced in Colombia, the largest 

displacement in the world after Syria. This displacement has generated a humanitarian crisis which has disproportionately affected 

women, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous populations. In addition, 

the use of landmines laid primarily by the FARC has caused more 

than 10,000 deaths and injuries since 1990. 

Through close security cooperation and Plan Colombia, the U.S. 

gave nearly $10 billion to Colombia over the last 15 years, preventing Colombia from spiralling into a failed narcotrafficking 

state. With our help, Colombia has succeeded in reestablishing government control over much of its territory, reducing poverty and 

homicide rates, and making significant progress in combating drug 

trafficking. 

After 50 years of conflict in Colombia and $10 billion in U.S. investments, the FARC and Colombian Government are sitting down 

for another attempt at finding peace. A comprehensive peace deal 

is necessary to help Colombia move past this chapter in history and 

continue the progress they have steadily gained in the past. Twoand-a-half years and 37 rounds of negotiations have led to accords 

on three of the six main points. Additionally, the FARC has agreed 

to work with the international community to remove landmines littered throughout Colombia. Rural development, FARC’s political 

participation, and drug trafficking have been resolved. 

But the controversial issues of victims’ reparations, disarmament, and reintegration of FARC rebels into civilian society reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:41 Jul 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\062415\95246 SHIRL
5

mains on the table. A swift and credible resolution to these outstanding issues is critical to ensuring the peace process remains 

credible in the eyes of the Colombian people. I am interested in 

hearing how the U.S. can play a productive role in the peace process without playing into the narrative that the U.S. is inserting its 

own agenda in Colombia. 

The Colombian people will only accept an agreement that respects their sovereignty and strikes a balance between retribution 

and reconciliation. After supporting the Colombian people for decades as they struggle with the internal armed conflict, it is imperative that we continue to support them as they work toward peace. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the peace 

process will move forward. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the ranking member. 

And now recognize the chairwoman of the Middle East and 

North Africa Subcommittee for an opening statement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you much so much, Chairman Duncan 

and Ranking Member Sires. 

When discussing the ongoing peace talks between the Colombian 

Government and the U.S.-designated terrorist group FARC, it is 

vital that we examine all the ramifications. And the first problem 

is where these talks are being held, in Cuba, under the auspices 

of the Castro regime, where repression is the order of the day. 

But it isn’t just the Castro brothers, who have known sympathies 

for terrorists and a proclivity for undermining U.S. interests whenever and wherever possible, who have been acting as interlocutors. 

Maduro in Venezuela and Chavez before him have also been doing 

this. The Castro brothers, Maduro, and Chavez when he was alive, 

cannot be trusted, cannot be seen as neutral interlocutors because 

they all benefited greatly from their relationship with the terrorist 

group FARC through financing by the drug trade. The materials 

captured from the 2008 raid of a FARC camp in Ecuador confirmed 

the cooperation between Venezuelan officials and FARC members. 

And now Castro has used a charade of these FARC talks to give 

the Obama administration the cover it needed to remove Cuba 

from the state sponsor of terrorism list. We must remain highly 

skeptical of these talks. 

Mr. Chairman, many Cuban nationals in Colombia who are doctors have escaped from their medical slave camps in Venezuela. 

They sought asylum in Colombia. Under U.S. law, these eligible 

Cuban nationals can come to the United States under the Cuban 

Medical Professional Parole Program, yet these Cubans in Colombia are having problems with our embassy vetting their cases. Are 

embassies in Latin America sending a message to Cuban nationals 

that are seeking asylum that due to this dangerous establishment 

of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba, that 

the legitimate cases of Cuban asylum cases will no longer be welcome? 

And today I was joined by my colleagues Mario Diaz-Balart, 

Albio Sires, and Carlos Curbelo in sending a letter to Ambassador 

Whitaker and Immigration Director Rodriguez urging our Government to prioritize these cases and allow any eligible Cuban to come 

to the United States. 

6

And, Mr. Chairman, I will ask for unanimous consent to make 

these letters a part of the record. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I also ask unanimous consent to enter into the 

record a letter from Senator Marco Rubio, chairman of the Western 

Hemisphere Subcommittee, to Mr. Aronson, dated February 26, 

2015. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Before I recognize the panelists, just to explain the lighting system. You are given 5 minutes. And when it gets down to a minute, 

it will turn yellow. And when it gets to red, please try to find a 

wrap up. 

I may have a little leniency because there is only two of you, but 

I am sure our committee have has a lot of questions, and we will 

have votes later on this afternoon. 

Other members of the committee are reminded they can submit 

opening statements for the record. 

And so we will go ahead and get started. First, the biographies 

are in your materials provided, so I am not going to read those. 

The first panelist to be recognized will be the Honorable Bernard 

Aronson, Special Envoy to the Colombian Peace Process. 

And Mr. Aronson, I am going to recognize you first. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BERNARD ARONSON, SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE COLOMBIAN PEACE PROCESS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. ARONSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Sires, my old friend Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, 

and others on the committee. 

I think it is very important that the committee is holding this 

hearing today. We have had a 25-year partnership with Colombia. 

The first thing that crossed my desk when I was Assistant Secretary of State in 1989 was a $50-million request from Colombia 

to help them defeat the Medellin Cartel and Pablo Escobar. And 

that was passed with bipartisan support. Passed the Andean Trade 

Preference Initiative. Plan Colombia was an unprecedented bipartisan commitment to another country, which I think, as both President Uribe and President Santos have acknowledged, helped Colombia save itself from being the potential of being a failed state, 

as the chairman said, and really allowed it to fundamentally 

change the relationship on the battlefield to the advantage of the 

government. And we now have a free trade agreement, as you 

know. 

And I would just remind the committee that this partnership has 

been a two-way street. When the United States in 1991 was assembling a Security Council vote to take on Saddam Hussein’s invasion 

of Kuwait, Colombia was a member of the Security Council and 

stood by our side. In Afghanistan, Colombia, at U.S. request, provided assistance and personnel and training to the Afghan Government in counternarcotics. They are working with us today in Central America and with the Mexican Government. So this has been 

a very powerful and important strategic relationship. The Colombian people greatly value this relationship. 

7

And, Mr. Chairman, you said, you know, expressed your love for 

Colombia. I would say, of all the countries in Latin America, the 

one in which that love is most reciprocated is Colombia. They appreciate the role we played. So I think I applaud this committee 

for continuing that bipartisan interest and that commitment. 

You know, just the other day, a 7-year-old girl was killed in Colombia when she stepped on an explosive device. And she is one of 

the 225,000 Colombians killed in this conflict that you have cited. 

If we translated that into U.S. population terms, that would mean 

we would have lost 1.4 million Americans. So this is a terrible, devastating conflict, as you noted, Mr. Chairman and ranking member. 

It has gone on for 51 years. It has displaced 5 million to 6 million 

Colombians; polluted the waters; particularly impacted indigenous 

people, Afro-Colombians, and marginalized people; and it is time to 

end the war. 

President Santos ran on a clear reelection platform that he was 

committed to negotiating an end to the war. He won reelection. I 

think he won a mandate to pursue this. And I would say that he 

has pursued the peace with great courage and at some political 

cost. And as difficult as war is, it is kind of clear what to do always, and you know who the enemy is and you know the choices 

you make. 

The peace process is very complicated and not so easy to push 

forward. It is a bit of a roller coaster. When things are going well, 

when they pass an agreement to cooperate in demining, support for 

the peace process goes up. When the FARC blows up power systems and water systems and oil pipelines, as it has done in recent 

weeks, and killed policemen and Armed Forces, not surprisingly 

support goes down. 

Let me just say a word about my role, and then really let Deputy 

Assistant Secretary—I am sorry, I called you by your colleague’s 

name. 

Anyway, President Obama had spoken with both President 

Santos, Secretary of State Kerry had spoken to President Santos on 

several occasions toward the end of last year and early in this year. 

And the President voiced a desire to see the U.S. more visibly engaged in the peace process. And he raised the idea of the U.S. appointing a special envoy. And as I said, President Obama and Secretary of State have enormous respect and confidence in President 

Santos. And they acceded to that request. And I was asked if I 

would serve in this position. 

Let me just say what I am not and let me say what I do. I am 

not a classic mediator. I don’t go and sit at the bargaining table. 

I don’t convene meetings. I don’t shuttle between the two sides. I 

don’t offer bridging proposals. This is a negotiation between the 

Government of Colombia and the FARC with various friends of the 

process who have been invited in by the parties. 

So what do I do? Well, I am available to President Santos and 

his advisers to share ideas, to talk about strategy, to review past 

peace processes that I may have some experience with, such as El 

Salvador, that could be relevant. 

I sit in on sessions solely with the FARC and then separately 

with the government because the government felt that that might 

be useful to try to educate the FARC about U.S. policy, whether we 

8

would support a peace settlement if it happened, and to some extent interpret where they are to the government. And that is the 

role I play. I have been to Havana four times. I am going on my 

fifth trip on Thursday morning. 

And I also interact with significant players in Colombian political 

life. I talk to President Uribe. I am seeing President Gaviria, President Pastrana, all of whom I have known and worked with over the 

years when I go to Bogota. 

It is not a secret that the peace talks are in a difficult moment. 

The unilateral cease-fire that the FARC had announced in December broke down after the FARC attacked and killed an Army unit, 

killing 11 soldiers, wounding 17. And the President responded by 

resuming aerial bombardment. And there has been escalating conflict since that time. 

You know, at the end of the day, the FARC has to decide whether it is serious about peace and whether it has the will to embrace 

a peace that the Colombian people will accept. And I think the two 

of you, the ranking member and the chairman, laid out those principles pretty well. They have to relinquish armed struggle, give up 

their weapons, renounce and get out of any criminal activity, make 

reparations, submit themselves to transitional justice, and demobilize and rejoin Colombian society as a lawful political entity. 

Whether they will get there or not I honestly can’t tell you. There 

is a lot of history to overcome, a lot of suspicion. And I don’t think 

they are improving their case at all by blowing up water systems 

and pipelines and making life hard and difficult for ordinary Colombians. 

But the United States wants to be supportive, as this committee 

has done. We don’t intend to interfere. As I said, we do not always 

announce. I don’t have a blueprint to impose, nor is it our place to 

impose a settlement on the Colombian people. They do the fighting 

and the dying. But we have made it clear, you know, our strong 

concern on counternarcotics and our strong concern on the rule of 

law and our strong concern on meeting international obligations. 

So I think I will just close there and turn it over to my colleague. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aronson follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the gentleman. 

The next panelist is Mr. Alex Lee. He is Deputy Assistant Secretary of South America and Cuba in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State. 

And I will say this, you used to have a gentleman working there 

in your department, Tim Hall from South Carolina, who I know 

well. And he is now in Iraq, economic affairs. But you lost a good 

one there. 

So now, Mr. Lee, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ALEX LEE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH AMERICA AND CUBA, BUREAU OF 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Mr. LEE. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Sires, and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity. I would like 

to focus my comments on some of the implications of our bilateral 

relationship and our regional interests and global concerns related 

to the Colombia peace process. 

In naming Special Envoy Aronson to his position, Secretary 

Kerry noted, quote:

‘‘Today Colombia is a critical ally for the United States. But 

despite Colombia’s remarkable story and all that it has 

achieved as a nation, the country has continued to suffer the 

tragic effects of one of the longest running wars on the planet. 

For 20 years, the United States has been Colombia’s steadfast 

ally. We know that if the parties were able to reach an agreement, this would unleash enormous potential for the Colombian people, and it would have a profound impact throughout 

Latin America.’’

I am not suggesting that we get ahead of ourselves. Make no 

mistake, the talks are at a critical stage. We condemn the continuing terrorism by the FARC. We agree with President Santos 

that these actions are wholly inconsistent with a commitment to 

peace. At the same time, we should bear in mind that the progress 

in achieving peace is part of a virtuous circle which benefits not 

just the victims but all of Colombia and, indeed, the wider community of nations. Building a durable peace can help Colombia invest 

more in education and development. With growing security and defense of human rights, more children will succeed, and vulnerable 

populations will begin to participate fully in the economic and social life. Broad-based economic growth, together with a safe and secure population, will boost Colombia’s ability to engage regionally 

and globally to support our common interests. 

This virtuous circle is not theoretical. It describes Colombia’s history over the last decade. We got to this point not by accident but 

rather by ongoing international effort, including strong bipartisan 

support in Washington. The support of the U.S. Congress has been 

instrumental to everything we have achieved. Together with Colombia, we have worked to promote reconciliation, compensate victims, return land to the displaced, and prepare for the post-conflict 

period. We are helping Colombia build safer communities, training 

police, judges, and prosecutors. 

14

Since 2000, kidnappings in Colombia have plummeted 90 percent, and homicides have dropped nearly 50 percent. There has 

been significant media attention to the 2014 increase in coca production as well as Colombia’s decision to halt aerial eradication in 

the coming months. We are working with the Colombian Government to develop alternative plans. We anticipate that Colombia will 

support expanded manual eradication, more vigorous interdiction 

to compensate for the loss of aerial eradication, and continued U.S. 

assistance will be important to this effort. 

Colombia’s commitment to combat counternarcotics has been evident for more than a decade and has led to a trend of declining 

coca cultivation. We do not question Colombia’s commitment to 

counternarcotics. With our Colombian partners, we are expanding 

educational opportunities, including training more than 800 Colombian public school teachers in English. We are investing in opportunities for vulnerable groups. Through the Women’s Entrepreneurship of the Americas, we helped more than 80 women business 

owners grow their businesses. We are strengthening their already 

robust economic ties with a Colombia that has significantly reduced 

poverty. The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement boosted U.S. exports to Colombia by 42 percent, to $20 billion since 2012. 

We are also making progress in promoting human rights, although they remain significant challenges. The government provides protective services for over 7,500 at-risk citizens, which is 

commendable, yet much more must be done to prosecute those who 

kill, attack, and threaten human rights defenders and others. Our 

bilateral regional security plan will implement more than 200 capacity-building programs in Central America and the Caribbean. 

And we have trained over 22,000 Colombian law enforcement officials to share their expertise in the region. 

I would urge caution in any talk of a peace dividend. The investments we have made in Colombia over close to two decades, whether through foreign assistance, continuing messages of bipartisan 

political support in Washington, or in time invested in building relations, have benefited the United States in security, economic, and 

political gains. But we should not spike the ball at the 5-yard line 

by cutting back on this investment. 

Chairman Duncan and Ranking Member Sires, members of the 

committee, those of us who have followed Colombia closely during 

the last decade have been profoundly inspired by how Colombia has 

turned itself into a self-confident, prosperous, and sought-after 

partner on the world stage. I know that if we can help the Colombian people reach their enduring quest for peace, we will come to 

see how much more Colombia has to offer. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lee follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the gentleman. 

I will now open it up for the question segment. And I recognize 

myself for 5 minutes. In March, Mr. Aronson, you held separate 

closed-door meetings with the Colombian Government and the 

FARC negotiators in Havana. This was the first meeting between 

the U.S. and FARC since 1998. What role does the FARC say the 

U.S. should play in the region going forward? What is their 

thought process about the U.S. involvement? 

Mr. ARONSON. Well, thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman. 

I think they were, frankly, curious about what role we would play 

in two dimensions. One, are we supportive of the peace process? 

And will we be supportive of the settlement? And they have some 

legitimate concerns in that area, particularly about their own security, given the history of the Union Patriotica in 1985. And I was 

able to tell them that in fact if they disarm, demobilize, reintegrate, get out of criminal activity, meet their responsibilities 

under justice, you know, the United States is not hostile to an 

agreement that includes rural development and land for 

campesinos, and roads and bridges to allow peasants to get their 

crops out of the country. So I think that is an important message. 

It is a similar message, frankly, that I delivered to the FMLN a 

long time ago when we were trying to negotiate an end to the Salvadoran war. 

Mr. DUNCAN. They are pretty clear on the U.S. position that they 

need to lay down their arms and stop the violence and be held accountable under the rule of law? 

Mr. ARONSON. I don’t think they have any illusions about that. 

But I would say that is the coming government’s position, and we 

completely agree with that and support it. But I am always careful 

to make it clear that we don’t have a separate position from the 

Colombians. But I don’t think they have any illusions about those 

issues. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So is your role more of just one of observation if 

you are not carrying a message from the American Government 

about what peace looks like? 

Mr. ARONSON. I do carry such a message. But it is in support of 

the Colombian Government’s agenda. I certainly make it clear that 

we support both the implementation of an agreement in areas that 

we have been supporting for many years, such as I mentioned, 

rural development, but also that we support the government’s demand that they disarm and demobilize and reintegrate, that they 

give up criminal activity. You know, they have no illusions that 

that is what the United States believes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. If the FARC refuses to lay down their arms, demobilize, or face jail time or some sort of reparations for the crimes 

that they have committed, what hope is there for justice and a 

peace accord? 

Mr. ARONSON. What hope is there for justice in a peace accord? 

Mr. DUNCAN. What hope is there for justice and a peace accord? 

If they are refusing to meet some of the requirements that Santos 

has put forward, and I believe the free world stands with that—

lay down your arms, demobilize, and pay reparations for your 

crimes, whether that is jail time or what not—what hope is there? 

20

Mr. ARONSON. Well, I think if they don’t lay down their arms in 

a reasonable timetable, there is no hope for a peace agreement. No 

government of Colombia is going to make a peace agreement in 

which they remain an armed force for some extended period of 

time. So I think disarmament is key. Justice for victims and the 

transitional justice that you mentioned is also a significant element 

of the end game. But if they are not willing to embrace disarmament, then you are not talking peace, you know, you are talking 

some armed truce. I don’t think the Colombian Government is 

going to accept that. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. Let me shift to Mr. Lee. 

I traveled down with Chairman Royce back in November. And we 

visited with President Santos in Bogota. But before we got to Colombia, kind of reversing our trip back, we spent some time in 

Peru. And we saw the manual eradication process of coca fields in 

the mountains. 

And when Chairman Engel gets here, he was there. We actually 

participated to see the significant effort, really, to eradicate those 

crops manually. And so I am not going to question the Colombian 

people’s decision because I believe it was the Colombian people’s 

decision not to do aerial spraying. But I do think that not allowing 

aerial spraying will have a detrimental effect on the progress made 

to eradicate the coca crops because I believe that the manual process is time-consuming, labor-intensive, and it is going to be tough 

in the mountains of Colombia. So what are your thoughts on that? 

If we don’t eradicate the coca crop, then we don’t cut off the funding source for the FARC. How is that going to affect their ability 

to operate? So you can talk broadly about the eradication aerial 

spraying issue, but kind of shift it more toward funding for FARC 

if you don’t mind. 

Mr. LEE. We respect the decision and the sovereign decision of 

the Colombian Government to terminate aerial eradication. We 

may regret it, but that is a decision that we respect that the Colombian Government has made. But we are in the process of thinking through with the Colombian Government on ways that we can 

both work together to take advantage of the various tools that we 

have and augment them to address the counternarcotics challenge 

because both countries remain firmly committed to combating narcotics cultivation, production, and trafficking. And some of the 

things that we are talking about we have been already doing, such 

as manual eradication or interdiction, and in addition to developing 

and prosecuting cases against major traffickers. 

But there are also additional tools that we are in discussion with 

the Colombian Government in order to reach a package that we 

can put forward to our respective leaders to deal with this challenge. It is our goal to cut the recipients of narcotics trafficking to 

all illicit actors, including the FARC, including those that have no 

pretense of ideological affiliation. And we see a Colombian Government equally determined in that shared goal. 

Mr. DUNCAN. You know how difficult it is to manually eradicate 

a coca tree. You can’t just machete these things. You need to pull 

them up by the roots. 

Mr. LEE. We are aware of the particular challenges of manual 

eradication. It puts the eradicators in a certain danger. It is laborVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:41 Jul 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\062415\95246 SHIRL
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and time-intensive. It requires security packages. But as I said, I 

think there are a variety of other tools that we can use in combination to——

Mr. DUNCAN. I agree with you. Let me ask you this. Are you 

aware of USAID’s, anything that they are doing in Colombia for alternative crop production, training these farmers? A lot of them are 

peasants hired by the FARC to go out and plant these areas, slash 

and burn the jungle, come back and replant, and then harvest the 

coca leaves. So are you aware—and what we saw in Peru is a 

USAID program which I think is very effective in alternative crop 

training. Are you aware of anything going on in Colombia like 

that? 

Mr. LEE. That is one of the areas that we are talking with the 

Colombian Government. We have done it in the past. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Is Colombia doing any of that as well? 

Mr. LEE. I think that it has—we did it for a while, and we are 

looking at ways in certain areas that we can start up additional 

programs. But I think it depends on specific locations. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. And I will finish up with this. The FARC 

is known to have deep ties with Hezbollah and other transnational 

criminal organizations. This committee well aware knows very fully 

my interest in the Iranian threat in this hemisphere and Iranian 

activity in this hemisphere, either through its proxy Hezbollah or 

directly. And I am curious about what impact a peace agreement 

may have on Hezbollah and Iran’s activities in the Western Hemisphere. If you could touch on that. 

Mr. LEE. That is a bit of a hypothetical. I guess I would make 

the observation that we remain acutely alert to whatever activities 

Hezbollah or other groups or Iran in the region, we certainly will 

call out any activities that we find suspect. But I will have to see—

we will have to see how a peace process would affect those sets of 

relationships because I am not in a position to forecast it. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I would encourage the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs to take a closer look at the Iranian activity directly 

or indirectly through its proxies in the Western Hemisphere. I 

would recommend that the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 

talk with General Kelly at SOUTHCOM. I would recommend that 

the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs be very aware of what 

is here. 

And, with that, I will turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. I see that the ranking member of the full committee 

is here, and he asked me if he could speak. 

So I am going to let Congressman Engel. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Engel, you are recognized. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Chairman Duncan. Thank 

you for calling the hearing. 

Mr. Sires, thank you very much for your courtesy. And I listened 

as I came in to some of your observations, Mr. Chairman, about the 

trip we took together to Colombia and Peru several months ago. 

And these trips are always eye-opening. In my previous life, I 

served as chairman of this subcommittee. And I think of all the 

work I have done, this is the most gratifying. 

There is so much that needs to be done, so much where our presence is necessary, and so much—when it comes to Colombia—

22

progress that has been made. And I have been to Colombia many, 

many, many, many times. And each time I go, I always feel an exhilarating feeling because when you look at Colombia on the verge 

of really becoming a failed state not that long ago, the United 

States has had no better partner and ally in South America than 

Colombia. And in the 1990s, they teetered on the edge of being a 

failed state. And over the last decade, the progress made in Colombia has just been unbelievable. 

A couple of statistics: Between 2002 and 2014, Colombia saw a 

90-percent decrease in kidnappings and a 54-percent reduction in 

homicides. And it was partnership here in Washington that helped 

with that process. When the Clinton administration and the Republican-controlled Congress got behind Plan Colombia in the late 

1990s, there were clear goals: Weaken the FARC to the point that 

they would sit down at the negotiating table and close the chapter 

on the longest ongoing armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere. 

That is precisely what is happening now. 

And I want to thank Special Envoy Aronson for supporting the 

Colombian Government during these ongoing negotiations. It is 

very, very important, and I commend all your good work. 

And Mr. Secretary, as well, we appreciate all the people that just 

do so much. 

The Western Hemisphere is our hemisphere. And I have long 

thought that we don’t give it the attention it deserves, mainly because we always seem to have pressing problems elsewhere in the 

world. But we should really remember that things that happen 

here have a direct effect on us in the same hemisphere. So our 

work is obviously not over. And now more than ever, the United 

States must continue to stand with Colombia. We have supported 

the Colombian Government through years of war. And I believe we 

must support the country in peace just as in war. And if a peace 

agreement is reached, we in Congress need to do our part to provide Colombia with the assistance it needs. 

So thank you for allowing me the opportunity to join you today. 

And let me ask the witnesses, both of them, what role do you envision for the United Nations, the OAS, and other international bodies if a peace agreement is reached with the FARC? Do you think 

that U.N. peacekeepers will be needed in Colombia? And I personally strongly support new assistance for Colombia to implement a 

peace agreement with the FARC. At the same time, though, Colombia no longer needs the U.S. to provide funding in the same way 

it once did. So if a peace deal was reached with the FARC, how do 

you envision foreign assistance to Colombia over the next 5 to 10 

years? 

Mr. ARONSON. Mr. Engel, thank you for those very helpful remarks and your personal remarks toward me. And I just want to 

underscore what you said. Latin America usually suffers because 

we don’t pay enough attention. But when we pay attention in a bipartisan way, you know, we can have great success. We did so in 

Central America when we negotiated a bipartisan accord on Central America in 1989 and defeated the Sandinistas with Violeta de 

Chamorro’s democratic government and ended the war in El Salvador. Plan Colombia, as you say, is another great example of that. 

23

The parties have discussed possible roles for outside monitors 

and verifiers in a disarmament demobilization regime. They 

haven’t agreed on exactly what role for what agency, but they have 

been talking to both the OAS and the U.N. and UNASUR. And I 

think that it is not unlikely that there will be some kind of 

verification monitoring role for one or several of those institutions. 

But, again, the parties haven’t reached agreement on that. As for 

the funding levels, I will let Deputy Assistant Secretary Lee discuss that. I think he is the best source. 

Mr. LEE. Thank you very much, Congressman Engel. 

Right now we are essentially in a wait and see mode on how the 

peace process unfolds. That said, many of the things that we have 

been doing, particularly in recent years, and the programs that we 

have been championing to Congress and received support from 

Congress, and working with our Colombian partners, actually will 

form a good basis in any peace agreement because many of the 

things that we are doing include strengthening law enforcement, 

strengthening rule of law, working for building capacity of NGOs 

to monitor human rights. A whole variety of humanitarian programs that support the victims law, which provides a whole variety 

of assistance to many of those who have been direct victims of the 

conflict. There are approximately 7 million individuals, most of 

those have been internally displaced. And so we provide prevention 

support. We provide comprehensive assistance and job retraining, 

medical attention. Those kinds of programs, obviously, I think will 

continue. 

We also have programs that have been very targeted to Afro-Colombians and indigenous groups. And since about 2011 to this year, 

you know, we have channeled about $61 million for programs that 

help these groups that have been disproportionately hit hard by the 

conflict to get employment, to get land titles, to seek legal redress. 

So these kinds of programs I think are already in place. We will 

probably continue, expand, or contract, depending on what our Colombian partners come to us and say after they have negotiated a 

peace agreement. But we have I think a basis on which to build, 

a good foundation on which to build, that could support a peace 

process. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, again, both of you for 

your good work. 

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Sires, thank you for your 

courtesy. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

Ranking Member Engel was, along with Chairman Royce, on the 

trip in November, as was Mr. Yoho from Florida, and Mr. Salmon, 

where we saw the eradication process that I talk about. We also 

had the opportunity to sit down with President Santos and hear 

about the progress as of November. So it was very informative. 

The Chair will now go to recognize the gentlelady from Florida, 

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Aronson, on February 28, the Colombian Navy seized a Chinese freighter en route to Havana. And the vessel’s cargo? Around 

100 tons of powder, 2.6 million detonators, 99 projectiles, and 

around 3,000 cannon shells. The weapons and the war materiel 

24

were hidden in the hull of a ship under 28,451 tons of cereal. Colombia’s Defense Minister had said his military had confiscated 

and destroyed the war materiel from the FARC. So the Chinese 

ship was captured by the Colombian Navy, and it was scheduled 

to make stops in the Colombian ports of Cartagena and Barranquilla. 

So, Mr. Aronson, in your trips to Cuba did you ask the Cuban 

authorities if the large weapons shipment bought by Havana was 

intended for the FARC? Did you ask the Cuban authorities the reason for hiding the shipment under tons of grain? 

Mr. ARONSON. Congresswoman, it is a very important question. 

But let me make it clear I don’t engage with the Cuban authorities 

on any bilateral issue. I really have only talked to them once when 

I was down there, about the progress of the peace talks. So that 

wouldn’t have been an issue that I would normally be involved in. 

But I think DAS Lee——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If I could interrupt, but when you talk about 

peace talks and you have a vessel’s cargo filled with war materiel, 

and then you have these peace talks that are going on in Cuba and 

it is given as a justification for lifting all kinds of—trying to lift all 

kinds of sanctions, it calls into question what these peace talks are 

all about. If the peace is about the FARC and the FARC, according 

to the Colombian Defense Minister, he says it is for the FARC, and 

the FARC is talking in Cuba with Colombians about peace, what 

are they doing with 100 tons of powder, 2.6 million detonators? Is 

that outside of your scope? It is about peace talks with a group that 

is transferring war materiel. 

Mr. ARONSON. What I was trying to say, Congresswoman, and 

maybe I didn’t speak clearly enough, is that I don’t engage the 

Cuban Government or Cuban officials on bilateral issues or issues 

that are not directly on the table of the negotiations. That issue 

hasn’t been on the table. That is all I was saying. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Okay. Let me just continue. I realize my 

time is limited. 

So I remain very skeptical about these talks due to so many 

questions that remain about justice for victims, human rights, disarmament, impunity. And last month, along with my colleagues 

Mario Diaz-Balart and Carlos Curbelo, we wrote a letter to Attorney General Lynch expressing our concern that Simon Trinidad 

may be permitted to attend the talks in Cuba. Trinidad was the 

only person held responsible for the hostage-taking of three Americans. He was convicted of that crime in U.S. courts, sentenced to 

60 years. It is not the first time the Obama administration releases 

criminals who have been targeted or even killed—who have targeted or even killed U.S. citizens. Gerardo Hernandez, one of the 

Cuban 5, was released by Obama. He was convicted of conspiracy 

to commit murder of three Americans and one U.S. resident. I fear 

that the Obama administration may offer up FARC leader Simon 

Trinidad in return for nothing in these talks. 

You recently stated that Trinidad has not been discussed at all 

with the FARC. So my first question is, has the FARC requested 

to anyone, do you know of anyone they have requested for the U.S. 

to allow Simon Trinidad to attend the talks in Cuba? 

25

Mr. ARONSON. I think, just to correct the record, I think you are 

referring to a Washington Post article that said that—but it wasn’t 

exactly accurate. So I don’t want it to be taken as my words because they weren’t my words. But I have not—I have never seen 

any request from the FARC or the Government of Colombia that 

Mr. Trinidad be released. And I made it clear that that is not a 

subject I would be prepared to talk to the FARC about. It is not 

on the table. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So, as far as you know, no one has discussed 

Trinidad with the FARC, which I think is one of their top priorities. Have you discussed Trinidad’s fate indirectly with the FARC 

or through Colombians or other interlocutors? 

Mr. ARONSON. Yeah. I meant to finish the point. Early in my visits to the negotiating process, the FARC raised the question about 

whether or not Trinidad could join the talks in some fashion, Skype 

or something like that. And neither the Government of Colombia—

and it is really their decision if they wanted to propose that, but 

they have not proposed that, and I have not suggested that at this 

time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

And I just have a few seconds left. Has the FARC asked the 

United States to remove the FARC from the foreign terrorist organization list if a deal is signed? Is the U.S. considering removing 

FARC from the terrorist list? 

Mr. ARONSON. They have not asked for that, but I would not be 

surprised if they had some hope for that, but that isn’t a subject 

they have asked yet. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Absolutely. 

The Chair recognizes the ranking member for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, I have been involved with Colombia a long time, long 

before I ever became a Congressman. My district has a large number of Colombians. I have been going to Colombia many times. 

And I talk to the people all the time, you know, when I go back 

to the district. And one of the things they are concerned is that we 

may be giving the FARC much too much and allow them just to 

become part of the society without any consequence at all for the 

crimes that they committed. 

And to me, it is going to be more important for us to support Colombia if anything comes out of this treaty than before. And one 

of the concerns that I have—and I expressed this to Secretary 

Kerry—is the fact that we are involved in this process, the fact 

that America is involved. It is my view that this is an internal conversation within Colombia, with the FARC, with the Government 

of Colombia, who are a country of their own. 

I don’t see why we have to be in this negotiation. I tell you this 

because I think—I think—that we may be blamed if this doesn’t go 

well. You know, we don’t have a great history, South America, in 

the past. And I am concerned that if these negotiations don’t go 

well, we are going to be used as the scapegoat in saying: Well, you 

know, the United States was there and they were asserting more 

influence than they needed to be and trying to influence the Santos 

Government or saying, Don’t give in, don’t give in. 

26

So I expressed this to Secretary Kerry. I know you don’t feel the 

same way, okay. So tell me why. Tell me if you ever had this scenario. You know, have you ever thought of this scenario? 

Mr. ARONSON. Well, I appreciate the question. And the larger 

question you raised is very important every time we are involved 

in Latin America, which is to not overdo our role, not to impose our 

role, not to be——

Mr. SIRES. You don’t want to be the ugly Americans. 

Mr. ARONSON. Exactly. And I think we have learned some lessons over decades that I think have served us well in the region. 

And I might quarrel with you in a little bit in another forum if we 

had time about our record in the region because I think there is 

many, many things we can point to where we can be very proud 

of the role the United States has played. 

Mr. SIRES. Yeah, from this perspective. But from the people in 

the Western Hemisphere, they are not so good. 

Mr. ARONSON. Well, let’s agree to disagree. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. 

Mr. ARONSON. I think we still have work to do. But, look, you 

are sending a strong caution to me about my role, which I accept, 

which is: Don’t substitute a U.S. view for a Colombian view. 

And I don’t intend to do that. I am only there because the President of Colombia asked the United States to appoint such a person. 

I have to respect his judgment that he thinks it is useful. 

And I would urge you to talk to his government and his negotiations about whether they feel it has been helpful to the process. I 

think I could discuss some ways that I think it has been helpful, 

but I will leave that to the Colombians to decide. 

But your overriding point I think is legitimate. I am not worried 

about being blamed. I would rather somehow be blamed or I don’t 

think that would happen than to be accused of having failed to respond when Colombia asked us to help. 

You know, if they think we can help end this war, which as you 

describe, has been a horrendous, terrible cycle of destruction and 

death in this country for 50 years, if we can help or they think we 

can help, I believe we should try. But your caution about being 

overbearing and, you know, throwing our weight around is a good 

caution. I respect what you are suggesting. 

Mr. SIRES. I also say that because Uribe, he negotiated a peace 

treaty with the paramilitaries. And we were not really involved. 

We didn’t send a special envoy when we asked them to drop their 

arms. 

Mr. ARONSON. Well, I don’t think that was a successful negotiation, but each President of Colombia, I think has to decide in the 

circumstances what is helpful. I don’t know, you know, that the circumstances——

Mr. SIRES. Well, there was a significant reduction of violence and 

human rights violation that Uribe negotiated. 

Mr. ARONSON. Well, I am not sure what you are referring to. I 

give great credit to President Uribe for his leadership in confronting the FARC, and he saved his country, and I speak to him 

often. But I am not sure what you are referring to. 

But regardless of which process you are referring to, President 

Santos is the democratically elected president of the country. I feel 

27

he has a right to make such a judgment. But I take your caution 

that we have to be careful in the role we assume. 

Mr. SIRES. You know, I was one of the few Members to went to 

his swearing in. 

Mr. ARONSON. To President Santos? 

Mr. SIRES. President Santos’ swearing in. We did not send one 

high-level dignitary—we were there, and we got rained on. Right 

or wrong? 

Mr. ARONSON. I know, Congressman——

Mr. SIRES. At the time, I remember telling my colleague, you 

know, that where is the high-level dignitaries from our country 

here? 

Mr. ARONSON. Right. Right. 

Mr. SIRES. And it really was, to me, it was not right. 

And I will just say something about the programs, you know, and 

I will finish with this: Some of these programs were started under 

Uribe, especially the Afro-Colombia programs, because I know that 

my colleague was very instrumental in talking to the leaders and 

was instrumental in getting Santos to continue the programs. 

Mr. ARONSON. Yeah. 

Mr. SIRES. So we have been involved in Colombia a long time. 

So my concern has been this: You know, I don’t want us to be 

blamed for failure. You know, we get blamed for just about everything in the world. 

Mr. ARONSON. This is true. 

Mr. SIRES. So. 

Mr. ARONSON. Well, thank you, Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. All right. Thank you. I will end there. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I will thank the gentleman. 

I also have an article from Jose Cardenas, who is in the front 

row there, that I would like to submit for the record. It is worth 

reading on the committee. 

So, without objection, so ordered. 

The Chair will now go to Mr. Yoho from Florida for 5 minutes. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Appreciate you gentlemen being here. 

And I was just going to reference that article of Jose Cardenas, 

‘‘Colombia’s Peace Talks are on the Brink of Failure.’’ What led to 

the increase in the FARC terrorist attacks? What led to this? I 

mean, we are on, what, round 38 of the peace talks? 

Mr. ARONSON. Something like that, yes. 

Mr. YOHO. What do you feel has led to this? 

Mr. ARONSON. The breakdown? 

Mr. YOHO. Yeah. 

Mr. ARONSON. You know, it is a good question. There was a unilateral cease-fire declared by the FARC in December, but a unilateral cease-fire is inherently unstable. There are no demarcations. 

There is no separation of forces. There is no monitors separating 

the two sides. And so in the first few months of the year, as I think 

some of your colleagues noted, there has been a—there was a significant decrease in military encounters in violence and killings of 

police and Army that were——

Mr. YOHO. Right. And that is encouraging. But, you know, now 

we are at the——

28

Mr. ARONSON. Correct. 

Mr. YOHO [continuing]. End of the 37th talk, and we see them 

backing away. 

Mr. ARONSON. Yeah, I was just trying to get to that point. The 

precipitating cause of it was this attack in Cauca upon an Army 

unit that the FARC attacked and killed 11 soldiers and wounded 

17 others. And I think President Santos felt that he wasn’t going 

to stand for that. He reassumed aerial bombing and started to hit 

the FARC very hard and has done so. They have lost about 42 

guerrillas, I think, since that time. 

But I think it is a symptom of the fact that we are not at the 

end of the peace process in that the sides are jockeying, and the 

FARC wants to show that it is not going to be pressured into agreeing to something. But if you are saying, is it a bad sign, of course, 

it is a bad sign. It is a worrisome sign. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, it leads me to the next question because it says 

in this study, and this is when, you know, Germany is getting involved back in April, it says they would have a panel, it would have 

11 members, 3 of whom could be foreigners, and it would have 3 

years to perform its work on assessing a so-called cease-fire. And 

it kind of worries me that, you know, if they are just posturing 

now, we have got a long way to go. 

And what influenced the Colombian Government to move away 

from the chemical eradication of the cocaine fields? 

Mr. ARONSON. I think their stated reason was—and Alex Lee can 

augment this, is that they were concerned about a study by an organization that claims an affiliation with the World Health Organization that claimed that spraying of glyphosate was a carcinogen 

potentially, but——

Mr. YOHO. But when you have 230,000 people killed over a 

course of years, what is more dangerous? And that is something I 

think that should be negotiated maybe a little bit differently. 

I want to move on to another question. Do you see President 

Santos suspending the talks and remounting the military offensive 

against FARC because of what just happened with this article that 

we are reading where they have increased their terrorism? 

Mr. ARONSON. Well, he definitely has stepped up the military offensive against the FARC, and the Army has had numerous successes. He did not choose to suspend the talks. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Lee, what about you? 

Mr. LEE. I will go on part about the Colombian Government’s decision to halt aerial eradication using glyphosate. Basically, it was 

a decision that the Ministry of Health in Colombia saw a report 

saying that there was a possibility that the use of glyphosate in 

aerial eradication was carcinogenic, and then they just made a decision on that. 

And so, you know, like I said a little bit earlier, we may regret 

that decision, but we recognize that this is the Colombian Government’s sovereign right. And we are very encouraged by the conversations we are having with the Colombian Government now on 

figuring out how we can step up our cooperation in a variety of 

other areas to compensate for their decision to remove aerial eradication. 

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Mr. YOHO. Okay. Let me ask you another question for either one 

of you. What influence has Venezuela had in leading up to a breakdown of these peace talks? Especially when we see, you know, 

Hezbollah being a proxy of Iran moving in there. And then with the 

follow up of that, if the peace talks are effective with FARC, do you 

see ELN filling the void that is left? 

Mr. ARONSON. On the first item, Congressman, I have not seen 

any type of evidence that Venezuela played any role in this breakdown of the cease-fire. You know, they claim that the war injures 

their interests, that there are many millions of refugees that come 

across their border, and there is instability. And so they have their 

own interest in wanting to see it end. But I haven’t seen any evidence at all that they played any role in that. 

And as far as the ELN, as you know, the Government of Colombia has made several attempts to reach out to the ELN to see if 

there is a framework that they could agree to, to start talks. The 

ELN has resisted the basic item that we—I talked about with Mr. 

Sires and Mr. Duncan, which is laying down of weapons and disarmament. And so the government has said, unless you are willing 

to commit to that, there is nothing to talk about. 

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate it. 

We are out of time, and I want to yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. ARONSON. But I don’t think that they will fill the same vacuum militarily. If the government makes peace with the FARC and 

the FARC disarm, the ELN doesn’t have as many cadre. It doesn’t 

have the same capabilities. But they can cause a lot of damage. I 

don’t want to be blase ́ about it, but they are not at the same 

strength as the FARC. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Gentleman’s time has expired, and I thank him. 

I will now go to the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Kelly, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Earlier when asked, you said to my colleague that we are at the 

table because we were asked to be at the table by the Colombian 

President. Well, in your view, what are the most significant U.S. 

interests in seeing that a negotiated end to Colombia’s internal 

conflict occurs? 

Mr. ARONSON. Well, that is a very good question. You know, we, 

as was discussed earlier in this hearing, have had a 25-year partnership with Colombia. They have been our ally and friend when 

we needed them, and we have been theirs, I think. And so we have 

invested enormous amount in the success of this country. I think 

most Colombians give us enormous credit for the role we have 

played, though they took the lead. And I would emphasis, they deserve most of the credit. They raised their taxes. They expanded 

their Army. 

But, obviously, to see the success of Colombia in ending this war 

would be also seen as a foreign policy bipartisan success for the 

United States. It would clearly contribute to regional stability. 

Under the agreement, the FARC will have to renounce and get out 

of drug trafficking, illicit mining, extortion, kidnapping. And, obviously, that is a blow to transnational crime if it were to succeed. 

And then I think, you know, there is a great moral benefit, which 

is, you know, not seeing another 7-year-old Colombian infant step 

30

on an explosive device and be killed. I mean, I think we all care 

about the Colombian people. The chairman expressed his strong, 

personal feelings, and I think as Americans we want to see others, 

you know, enjoy the fruits of peace. And, you know, the Colombians 

have certainly known the horrors of war long enough. 

Ms. KELLY. My other question, you talked about drug trafficking, 

and I think we were saying up here what we could do to eradicate 

that. What percentage of their trafficking comes to the United 

States? 

Mr. ARONSON. I will let Deputy Secretary Lee answer that. 

Mr. LEE. I don’t have the exact figure, but the majority of their 

cocaine comes from—the last studies that I remember looking at 

showed that the majority of the cocaine that was consumed in the 

U.S. came from Colombia. I have to update that, relook at that, but 

that certainly was the case several years ago. 

Ms. KELLY. So, of course, I would like to see that end, but also, 

I also see it on the part of the United States that if we didn’t ask 

for or want or use so much that would help eradicate some of it 

also. 

Mr. LEE. Correct. 

Ms. KELLY. I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

And the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Arizona, former 

chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee and now 

chairman of the Asia Pacific Subcommittee for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SALMON. Hi. This whole process is starting to remind me of 

our situation with Iran. We have got a President that wants to negotiate a deal so badly that any deal will do. And I am kind of wondering if we are in the same spot here. We have spent $10 billion 

through Plan Colombia, courtesy of the U.S. taxpayer. 

Peace is always a desirable outcome. We all want that. But if 

this peace deal is not a good deal, and it ends up throwing away 

all the gains or even many of the gains that the U.S. and Colombia 

has made and fought for over the last 15 years through negotiating 

away tactical things to achieve a strategic end of peace, would this 

not be a major problem for the U.S. national interest and a waste 

of almost $10 billion in American tax dollars? 

And can you explain to me how these peace talks are any different than the other 38 that have happened? Is this a new and 

improved one, and how is this going to be any better? 

Mr. ARONSON. Thank you, Congressman. 

Just to clarify, the reference to 38 is 38 sessions in this peace 

process. This is the fourth sort of formal negotiation with the 

FARC. 

Mr. SALMON. Okay. 

Mr. ARONSON. But doesn’t change the input of your question. I 

just want to clarify that. 

Mr. SALMON. That is fine. I guess, my point is that we have been 

at this a long, long, long time, and there has been incredible violence still coming from the FARC. It doesn’t seem like they are 

really serious about it. It is kind of like with us, you know. Our 

President comes out and says we’ve got a framework for a deal and 

their supreme leader in Iran comes out chanting ‘‘Death to America.’’ And we don’t have a deal, and they can’t come on our military 

31

bases. And I am just seeing so many eerie comparisons here, and 

I am just wondering, you know, is this going to cause more problems than it creates? 

Mr. ARONSON. Well, I think President Santos has committed 

himself to peace because he got a mandate from his democratic 

constituency to do so. So I think we can’t question his, you know, 

commitment to the process because he’s the leader of that country, 

and he had a mandate from the population to pursue the peace. 

You know, these are very hard questions, and I don’t envy President Santos in making them. There are lots of signs of progress in 

the peace talks, and then there is this escalation of violence which 

calls into question the FARC’s commitment and how serious they 

are. I don’t personally think that there is any evidence that President Santos has or would give up, you know, gains that are important to the United States and that we would somehow come to regret a peace settlement that they would negotiate. I haven’t seen 

any evidence of that. And I think that we are ignoring the gains 

in the counternarcotics effort——

Mr. SALMON. Those are a mess. 

Mr. ARONSON. Let me just finish my point. If the FARC actually 

dismantles its network, gets out of—you know, they are one of the 

largest drug-trafficking cartels in the world. It is not a bad thing 

if they disarm and get out of the drug business and stop illegal 

mining, extortion. I mean, it is a good victory for democracy and 

the rule of law. 

And it is an ally who is known as one of America’s closest ally. 

Congressman Sires was pointing out that oftentimes we neglect 

Latin America. This is a good counter example where we have been 

a partner to Colombia, and I think seeing it to——

Mr. SALMON. I am going to reclaim my time. We have been a 

great partner. And I have met with President Santos on numerous 

occasions as well. I think he is a great guy. He was part of the 

Uribe administration with President Uribe. And, honestly, all the 

money that we spent in Colombia is beside the point. It would have 

never happened without the political will of one man, and that was 

President Uribe. I don’t think it would ever happened without his 

political will to finally get it done. 

And God bless him for that. He got it done. 

And now it seems like a lot of the things that he has done and 

accomplished could unravel. I know that he has been very critical. 

He has been in my office several times very critical of these peace 

negotiations, that a lot of the people in Colombia don’t support 

those peace negotiations. And so all I am saying is that I think it 

is all good food for thought. 

You are right. President Santos is the elected leader, democratically elected leader of Colombia. I think he is a great guy and a 

good leader. But we also have a responsibility to advise and counsel. We don’t tell them what to do. We didn’t tell them what to do 

in Plan Colombia. It was a partnership. 

Mr. ARONSON. Correct. 

Mr. SALMON. We work directly with them. And I think we owe 

them some of our skepticism that maybe this peace process isn’t all 

it is cracked up to be. Maybe there are other avenues that need to 

be pursued. 

32

Mr. ARONSON. Well, I have very open and candid conversations 

with President Santos and his negotiating team. We have known 

each other for 20 years. I have known President Uribe for the same 

amount of time. I just had breakfast with him, in fact. It is a democratic society, and those skepticisms and criticisms are a part of 

the democratic process, and I seek out, you know, other voices. 

And you are right that there is not unanimous support. I think 

the peace processes are kind of a roller coaster. When the demining 

agreement was announced, and it was actually the start of an effort to start removing mines, and it looked like the security situation was getting better, there was an uptick in support. Now with 

this violence and the FARC’s attacks on infrastructure, there has 

been a decrease. 

And I don’t want to suggest that we are not, you know, open and 

sharing ideas and thoughts about it because we are. But at the end 

of the day, this is our ally. This is our friend. And that $10 million, 

which is a significant amount of money, was well spent. You are 

right that President Uribe deserves great credit for the success, 

and I have told him that to his face and so have other U.S. officials. But the U.S. really made a difference with which we should 

be proud of as well. 

So it is a different environment and a different set of challenges 

in this peace process. We are not just cheerleading, and we are not 

going to undermine them in public, but we are trying to help them 

be supportive, as you suggest, as an adviser, as a counselor, but not 

to impose our views. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Gentleman’s time is expired. 

They have just called votes, but I think we have time to go to 

Mr. Meeks, who I have learned a lot about the Western Hemisphere from. I appreciate his passion for Colombia in general, and 

he is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Sires. 

You know, years ago, when Congress debated support for Plan 

Colombia, I was one of those Members who supported it because 

I had the hope that it would help the nation come back from the 

brink of war. I knew then what I know now, that the ultimate answer would have to come through political dialogue. 

I was heartened by former President Uribe’s fantastic and tremendous commitment to Plan Colombia. Colombia put up almost 

on a 10-to-1 match, they put up their own money, and President 

Uribe was right in there doing that. And I believe that his success 

in bringing stability to Colombia is what has paved the way for 

President Santos’ courageous embrace of dialogue and negotiations 

through the peace process. 

Colombia’s nearly 50-year internal armed conflict has had devastating consequences in Colombia. And the current peace process, 

in my estimation, is the most recent hope that that conflict can finally end, which would then make it a really good investment if 

we had gone through stability and now have an ending of the conflict. 

And so many other nations were also affected by this conflict. 

You know, those that had to deal with the spillover effects we are 

fighting with the FARC. And that is the reason why it is not a surVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:41 Jul 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\062415\95246 SHIRL
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prise that many of Colombia’s neighbors support the peace talks 

also, the hemisphere, et cetera. But many of their neighbors want 

to see this process work and succeed. 

And some of them have actively engaged in the peace process, in 

support of the peace process. But as the negotiations go on and uncertainty about prospects for conclusion grows, observers are counting the cost of failing, which is what I am concerned about. There 

are also observers who are calculating the cost of protracted negotiations. 

And today what I want to highlight and ask questions about is 

another group that is counting the cost of whether or not the talks 

succeed. But those on the Pacific Coast of Colombia who have lived 

at the heart of the conflict and the scourge of accompanying violence and isolation, the future for them really hangs in the balance 

here. And the Afro-Colombia and indigenous communities on the 

Pacific Coast know the cost of both war and peace. 

So I am hoping to find out, for example, and I guess I will ask 

you, Mr. Aronson, that the situation of the African Colombian community is in dire need right now, particularly with this ongoing 

conflict and the effects of BACRIM. What are we doing to help in 

that area with the conflict, et cetera? What are we doing to help? 

Mr. ARONSON. Well, thank you for the question. And I want to 

pay great tribute to you, Mr. Meeks because I know over the years, 

the interests of the indigenous people, Afro-Colombians, have been 

a central concern of yours. And I think your passion about that and 

your interest has made it a central concern of both the Uribe and 

the Santos government. 

I would say two things and maybe ask Alex to talk a little bit 

about the level of funding and support. But, you know, this is the 

first peace negotiation I think that has put the victims first. And 

as you mentioned, they not only have observed but they have participated in the peace talks and successive waves of victims, including citizens from the Afro-Colombian community and indigenous 

people, and that is really the centerpiece of the negotiation. 

That is what justice is about, reparations for those victims, and 

that has to be a central part of a settlement, and President Santos 

has made that clear. We already have programs in place, as you 

know, to address some of those issues. And Ambassador Whitaker 

himself has made this a very important personal issue. 

As far as the levels of support, Alex, do you have any information 

on that? 

Mr. LEE. On support for the Afro-Colombian programs, it is—as 

Congressman Sires pointed out, these programs started in previous 

administration and have been supported on thanks to the support 

of the Members here in Congress. And since about 2011 to this 

year, we have about $61 million of programs, which I mentioned 

a little bit before, which cover a whole variety to this group that—

you are quite right, Congressman Meeks—is among one of the most 

vulnerable groups that have experienced the conflict in the most direct and terrible manner. 

And so these programs that have been championed by yourself 

and others is very important for Ambassador Whitaker. They provide land retitling assistance——

34

Mr. MEEKS. Let me just ask because I have got one other important question because I know we have got votes, and I want to just 

ask one other question real quick because I just came back from 

Colombia not too long ago, and I sat down with diverse groups of 

individuals from the Pacific Coast, some who don’t even talk to one 

another. 

But they all had one message—and I want to know what your 

opinion was—that as these negotiations are going on that, you 

know, when you talk about land, when you talk about politics, et 

cetera, that they were telling me that they didn’t have a voice at 

the table, at the negotiating table. So my question is, do you know 

all the Afro-Colombians at the table in the negotiations, or are 

talks about after what takes place? 

Because what is going on now if the violence is going to escalate 

or what takes place after the peace process and goes back, they are 

going to be affected. And from what they told me when I was just 

there is that they are not involved, and I was wondering whether 

or not you can let me know if they are at the table or not. 

Mr. ARONSON. Well, that is a good question, Congressman. I do 

think that those communities have been involved at the level of 

going to the table and meeting with both sides in successive groups 

because I know about 120 victims have participated in the process 

at that level. I don’t think any outside group is actually at the 

table when the negotiations are going forward, but I think you 

point to an important point, which is to make sure we use our efforts and remind the Colombian Government that these communities need to be included and their interests have to be taken into 

account, both land and future security. And I think we will make 

note of that. It is an important point. I appreciate it. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the gentleman. 

I want to thank the witnesses for valuable testimony and answering the questions very frankly, I think. 

I will say that the questions about this hearing, the United 

States is not meddling in the affairs of Colombia, but we are very 

interested in seeing a peaceful solution of this. When you look at 

the numbers that I mentioned earlier, 220,000 deaths and 5 million 

people displaced, it is concerning to us. 

And the United States has an investment in success in Colombia. 

And we want to see continuation of a willing ally, a regional ally, 

and great trading partner, which I think we have in Colombia. And 

I think you have heard on both sides of the aisle that we are very 

concerned about seeing success in Colombia. So I want to thank 

you for sharing that. 

And members of the subcommittee will be permitted to submit 

written statements. If they have additional questions, they will be 

submitted, and we will hold the record open for 5 business days to 

allow for that. And there being no further business, due to votes 

being called, we will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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