IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Farida B. Rahman
, : Appellant :

: v. : No. 1574 C.D. 2017

: Submitt ed : May 11, 2018 White Haven Ambulance :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY , Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: August 29, 2018

Farida B . Rahman (Appellant), proceeding pro se, appeals from the September 27, 2017 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (common pleas),
which granted the four preliminary objections (POs) in the nature of a demurrer filed by White Haven Ambulance (Appellee) , struck Appellant’s civil complaint (Complaint), and dismissed the case . On appeal, Appellant asserts common pleas’
decision should be reversed and the matter remanded because : common pleas should have given her the opportunity to amend the C omplaint ; Appellee is not entitled to immunity ; and she stated claims for invasion of privacy and fraud

. Upon review
, common pleas did not err or abuse its discretion in sustaining Appellee’s POs and dismissing the Complaint
, and, therefore, we affirm.
On or about April 6 , 2017 , Appellant filed the Complaint against Appellee , an ambulance company, based on allegations related to the parties’ interactions on2

February 21, 2016, when, pursuant to an approved Section 302 Petition
, 1 Appellee removed Appellant from her property , placed her into an ambulance, and transported her to a local medical facility without Appellant’s consent. The Complaint contains

two counts: Count One is labeled “Willful Misconduct” and Count Two is labele d “Fraud Allegations.” (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 100a

- 01a.) Although Appellant
include s in her filings with common pleas and her brief to this Court numerous factual allegations about what occurred during and after the events of February 21,
2016 , whi ch she believes should be considered
, this matter was disposed of on POs

. Thus , the only facts that can be considered are those averred in the Complaint “and no testimony or other evidence outside of the Complaint may be considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by [a] demurrer.” Drack v. Tanner , 172 A.3d 114, 120 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Applying this well

- settled principle, we set forth the
facts averred in Appellant’s Complaint. 2

Count I Willful Misconduct

4. On or about February 21, 2016, [Appellant] refused service from [Appellee], but [Appellee] refused to leave her property; she did not call . . . 911.

5. [ Appellee ] filed a petition for A ct 302, under the Mental Health Procedures Act [(MHPA)] . . ., and f orced [Appellant] inside the ambulance with the help of Police Officers.

6. As a direct result of the action by [Appellee], [Appellant] suffered injury, mental pain and suffering, invasion of privacy, [and] intrusion

1 Section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA) , Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 817, as amended , 50 P.S. § 7302.

2 We are cognizant of Appellant’s concerns regarding her privacy. Therefore, we have included only the factual averments set forth in her C omplaint, as th ey are relevant to our determination, and limit ed our discussion to that which is necessary to the dis position of her appeal.3

upon seclusion. The interference with [Appellant’s] seclusion is a substantial and highly offensive [act] of a kind [sic] that would be offensive to the ordinary reasonable (person) as a result of conduct to which the reasonable (person) would strongly ob ject, which cause[d] mental suffering, shame, humiliation s to [Appellant] resulting from [Appellee’s] actions, [and] causing mental suffering to [Appell ant] is an injury to the person, s ee Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Company , . . . 129 F. Supp. 817 [ , ] 825 [, 830 ( D. D.C. 1955), aff’d , 232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ] . As a direct result of the action by [Appellee] [Appellant] received a bill for $599.90 from the Rehab Center.

7. On or about February 0 1, 2017, [Appellant] filed a cross

complaint[,] which cost her $42.44, to answer the complaint[,] which was filed by [Appellee] on or about January 19, 2017.

8. At the hearing, on February 16, 2017, the Honorable Judge aske d [for] a copy of the Act 302 [P etition], but [Appellee] never provided a copy . . . to the court and/or to [Appellan t].

9. [Appellant] called the [Appellee] several times, and as ked for a copy of the Act 302 [P etition], but [Appellee] never provided [Appellant] with a copy of the Act 302 [ P etition].

10. [Appellant] filed an appeal on March 16, 2017, in this case, which cost her $159.50. Proof of service of Notice of Appeal, Notary, cost her $12.68

. Count II Fraud Allegations

11. The allegations contained in paragraph[s] 1 through 10 abo [ ve ] are incorporated herein as if fully set forth hereinafter.

12. On or ab out February 21, 2016, [Appellee] forced [Appellant] into the ambulance with the help of Police Officers after [it] received the Act 302 [Petition] on hand.

13. [Appellant] refused service at all time[s] from [Appellee], but [Appellee] lied on the petitio n to receive[] the Act 302, which is a violation.4

14. Any person who provides false information purpose[ly] when he completes the petition form for Act 302 may be subject to criminal prosecution and may face criminal penal t ies includ ing conviction of a mi sdemeanor. [ 3 ]

15. As a direct result of [Appellee’s] fraudulent, malice, scandalous petition for the Act 302, [Appellant] is suffering injury, [and] causing mental suffering to [Appellant] is an injury to the person, see Bernstein [.]

16. This matter is s ubject to compulsory arbitration.
WHEREFORE, [Appellant] respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter judgment in her favor and against [Appellee] in the amount of $814.52 dollars, plus additional sums for her pain and suffering, interest, penalties, and other relief that this Court may deem proper.

(Complaint (Compl.) ¶¶ 4

- 16, Wherefore Clause, R.R. at 100a

- 02a.) Appellee filed POs to the Complaint, asserting four reasons why Appellant had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Appellee’s first PO
asserted it was immune from suit for the “Willful Misconduct” claims, which generally alleged common law tort claims of invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion, pursuant to Section 8151(7) of the Emergency Medical Services Syst em Act (EMS Act) , 35 Pa. C.S. § 8151(7) (related to immunity to EMS providers for
actions based on failure to obtain consent for the treatment rendered where the person was unable to give consent)

. 4 Appellee asserted that Appellant was being

3 It appears that Appellant may be referring to Section 110 (a) of the MHPA, which requires that “[a]ll written statements pursuant to section 302(a)(2), and all applications, petitions, and certifications required under the provisio ns of this act shall be made subject to the penalties provided under 18 Pa. [] C.S. § 4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities) and shall contain a notice to that effect .” 50 P.S. § 7110(a).

4 Section 8151(7) states:

No EMS provider or EMS agency may be subject to civil liability based solely on failure to obtain consent in rendering EMS to any person, regardless of age, where5

transported a nd treated pursuant to Section 302 of the MHPA, which
, by its nature, does not contemplate an individual giving consent to the treatment , 50 P.S. § 7302

. Under these circumstances, Appellant’s lack of consent was immaterial as “the consent authority of th e government” was invoked pursuant to the granted Section
302 Petition

. (POs ¶ 12.) Therefore, Appellee asserted it was entitled to immunity
, and Appellant had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted

. Appellee’s second PO maintained that, to the extent Appellant was attempting to impose liability upon it pursuant to the MHPA, 5 the MHPA did not apply to ambulance companies. Citing Section 103 of the MHPA, 50 P.S. § 7103, which
defines a “facility” under that act , Appellee pointed out that this definition does not include ambulance companies and, therefore, any claim based on the MHPA had to
be dismissed

. Appellee’s third PO contended that Appellant’s allegations of fraud
were insufficient. Relying on Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1019(b), Pa.R.C.P. No. 1019(b) (“[a]verments of fraud . . . shall be averred with particularity”), and In re Estate of Schofield , 477 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. 1984) (setting
forth two conditions that must be m et to satisfy the requirement that fraud be pled
with particularity), Appellee asserted that the mere claim that Appellee “lied on the petition” is insufficient to meet this heightened pleading requirement. (P Os ¶¶ 28,

the person is unable to give consent for any reason, including minority, and where there is no other person reasonab ly available who is legally authorized to give or refuse to give consent, if the EMS provider has acted in good faith and without knowledge of facts negating consent.

35 Pa. C.S. § 8151(7)

. Appellee also asserted immunity under Section 8151(2) of the EMS Act, 35 Pa. C.S. § 8151(2) (related to immunity for good faith attempts to render or facilitate emergency medical care absent a showing of gross negligence or willful misconduct).

5 The Complaint does not expressly invoke any section of the MHPA as a basi s for Appellant’s relief.6

31.) Appellee’ s fourth PO maintained that Appellant did not clearly allege a claim
for i ntrusion upon seclusion, and her claim sounding in invasion of privacy did not include any allegation that publicity was given of this matter to “the public at large,” as required by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D ( Am. Law. Inst. 1977), 6 to
make a cl aim for invasion of privacy

. (POs ¶¶ 36

- 37.) For any or all of these reasons, Appellee asserted the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After Appellant filed responses in opposition to the POs , in which she asserted
additional facts , common pleas hear d argument on September 27, 2017. During
argument , Appellee explained the bases for each of its demurrers

. Ap pellant disagreed with those arguments on all counts, asserting facts not cont ained in the Complaint. She furt her maintained that Appellee, and its employees, should be held criminally responsible for their behavior. Common pleas explained that “any allegations of any criminal activity [were] not before [it].” (Hr’g Tr. at 8, R.R. at 84a.) Upon considering the parties’ filings and argument, common pleas issued its
Order sus taining all of Appellee’ s POs, stri k ing the Complaint, and dismissing the

case.

6 Section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized i s of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D. Comment ( a ) explains that “[p]ublicity” “means that the matter is made public, by communicati ng it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D c m t

. (a).7

Appellant appealed, and common pleas directed her to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal (Statement) in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), 7 Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely filed her Statement, in which she asserted she “intend [ ed ] to challenge all four of the [POs that] were granted by” common pleas. (R.R. at 73a.) Specifically, she argued the following. C ommon pleas should have given her the opportunity to amend the Complaint to exclude any reference to criminal activity, which she
believed was the basis fo r the dismissal of the Complaint. Appellee was n ot entitled to immunity because its employees acted with actual malice or willful misconduct and it was vicariously liable for the negligent acts of those employees, who caused her injury while acting in the course of their employment

. Valles v. Albert Ei nstein
Med

. Ctr

. , 758 A.2d 1238, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2000)
, aff’d , 805 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2002)

. Appellee prepared the Section 302 Petition and, therefore, can be held liable under the MHPA. In addition, Appellant attached a letter , dated before the Complaint, but
not referenced in or attached to the Complaint , which she contended established her invasion of privacy/intrusion on seclusion claims. In its responsive opinion (1925(a) Opinion), c ommon pleas summarized Appellant’s issues as: “[t]he Co urt abused its discretion in dismissing the case without granting [Appellant] an opportunity to amend the Complaint”; and “[t]he Court erred in dismissing the case when [Appellee] was vicariously liable and is not

7 Rule 1925(b) provides, in pertinent part:

If the judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of appeal (“judge”) desires clarification of the errors complained of on appeal, the judge may enter an order directing the appellant to file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge a concise stateme nt of the errors complained of on appeal (“Statement”).

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).8

immune.” (1925(a) Op inion (Op.) at 3.) A ddressing Appellant’s amendment argument, common pleas obs erved Appellant never request ed leave to amend the Complaint. It further stated the manner in which she would have amend ed the Complaint, to remove the criminal allegations set forth therein, would not have changed the result because that was not the basis upon which common pleas
dismissed the matter. Common pleas interpreted Appellant’s argument that Appellee was not immune, because its employees committed willful misconduct and
acted with actual malice, as being based up on Section 8550 of the act commonly
known as the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), 42 Pa. C.S. § 8550. 8 This reflects, common pleas concluded, Appellant’s incorrect belief that vicarious liability is disposi tive of her case. Common pleas held Appellant had not, in her pleadings, “establish[ed] a vicarious association through [Appellee] as an employee of a government unit.” (1925(a) Op

. at 5 .) Here, common pleas explained, Appellee’s immunity was founded on Section 8151(7) of the EMS Act because Appellant was asserting a civil claim against Appellee due to the actions it took on February 21, 2016 , without her consent. Although no specific challenge to its decision granting the other three POs

was directly asserted in the Statement, common pleas explained its rationale in

8 Section 8550 of the Tort Claims Act states:

In any action against a local agency or employee thereof for damages on account of an injury caused by the act of the employee in whi ch it is judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the injury and that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct, the provisions of sections 8545 (relating to official liability generally), 8546 (relati ng to defense of official immunity), 8548 (relating to indemnity) and 8549 (relating to limitation on damages) shall not apply.

42 Pa. C.S. § 8550.9

granting those POs. First, it granted the second PO because although th e MHPA grants rights to covered persons against , among others, “facilities,” the definition of
“facilities” does not include ambulance services. (1925(a) Op

. at 6 ( quoting Section 103 of the MHPA, 50 P.S. § 7103 ) .) Thus, common pleas held, “[i]n so far as [Appellant’s] claim appears to stem from a lack of consent to actions taken under the [MHPA] that resulted in alleg ed injuries, [she] cannot make a claim against [Appellee].” ( Id. ) Next, common pleas granted the third PO because Appellant did not allege fraud with the necessary particularity, which requires the claim to be adequately explained so as to permit the opp osing party to prepare a defense and “to convince the court that the averments are not merely subterfuge.” ( Id. ( quoting Schofield , 477 A.2d at 477 ) .) Appellant’s allegation that Appellee lied to obtain approval of the Section 302 Petition was insufficie nt because there was no evidence in the pleading to support that claim. Last, common pleas indicated it granted the fourth PO because the nature of the Section 302 process invariably results in an intrusion upon a person’s seclusion because it “compels an unwilling party to be subject to” treatment. ( Id. ) With regard to the letter Appellant attached to her
Statement
, which she asserted established the requisite publicity for an intrusion of privacy claim , common pleas noted this was not a fact pled in th e Complaint. 9 ( Id.

at 6

- 7 .) Th is appeal is now ready for this Court’s consideration. 10

9 In addition, common pleas observed, to the extent the letter was premised on information obtained from court records, this one letter was not indicative of the widespread publicity required to support a cause of action for invasion of privacy. (1925(a) O p. at 7 ( citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 65 2 D ) .) Common pleas further stated that a ruling that court documents could be the publicity required to satisfy this element “would condemn virtually all court filings as subject to inducing a violation of privacy and seclusion through publicity.” ( Id. )

10 This Court’s “ review of a decision by [common pleas] sustaining preliminary objections is limited to a determination of whether the

. . . court abused its discretion or committed an error of law, or whet her constitutional rights were violated. ” Drack , 172 A.3d at 118 n.6. In an appe l late10

As a threshold matter, Appellee asserts 11 that, while appellate jurisdiction exists, it is not vested in this Court beca use Appellant’s appeal does not fall within the scope of Section 762 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 762 (setting forth the types of appeals from courts of common pleas that fall within this Court’s appellate jurisdiction)

. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction, Appellee asserts, we should
dism iss this appeal.

challenge to a decision sust aining POs in the nature of a demurrer, we must determine “whether on the facts averred, the law states with certainty that no recovery is p ossible.” Hawks by Hawks v. Livermore , 629 A.2d 270, 271 n. 3 ( Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). The test for sustaining POs is whether, based on the pleadings, it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establis h a right to relief. Bower v. Bower , 611 A.2d 181, 182 ( Pa. 1992). The court need not accept a rgumentative allegations or expressions of opinion as true. See Firing v. Kephart , 353 A.2d 833, 834 ( Pa. 1976).

11 In her reply brief, Appellant requests that this Court dismiss Appellee’s brief on the basis that it was untimely filed and grant her appeal

. Appellant’s brief includes an affidavit of service indicating she mailed Appellee, via United Parcel Service, her brief and reproduced record on March 23, 2 018, making Appellee’s brief due on Thursday, April 26, 2018. See Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 121(e), Pa.R.A.P. 121(e) (providing that when a party is required to “act within a prescribed period of time after service of a paper upon that pa rt y . . . and the paper is served . . . by commercial carrier, three days shall be added to the prescribed period ” of time). Appellee’s brief was not filed until Monday, April 30, 2018. However, the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure are to be liber ally construed, and this Court has discretion to extend the time periods set forth therein so long as the time period being extended is not jurisdictional, e. g. , the time for filing an appeal. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 105, Pa.R.A.P. 105. Here, we discern no pre

judice to Appellant in Appellee filing its brief two day s late, particularly where Appellant received an extension to file her brief, resulting in her having more than three months to prepare and file her brief. See Rahman v. White Haven Ambulance (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1574 C.D. 2017, filed Jan. 16, 2018) (granting Appellant’s application for extension of time to file her brief but noting that because she “will have had more than 3 months within which to prepare a brief .

. . no furthe r extensions [ would ] be granted”). Accordingly, we will not dismiss Appellee’s brief

. We note, however, that even if we did so , this does not lessen Appellant’s burden of establish ing that common pleas erred or abused its discretion in sustaining the POs and dismissing the Complaint

.11

However, where appellate jurisdiction exists, an objection to a particular appellate court’s jurisdiction must be made by a specific time during the appellate proceeding

. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 741(a) provides that

T he failure of an appellee to file an objection to the jurisdiction of an appellate court on or prior to the last day under these rules for the filing of the record shall, [ 12 ] unless the appellate court shall otherwise order, operate to perfect the appellate jurisdiction of such appellate court, notwithstanding any provision of law vesting jurisdiction of such appeal in another appellate court.

Pa.R.A.P. 741(a). Appellee’s objection to this Court’s jurisdiction was raised in its appellate brief, which was f iled long after the last day for filing the record with this Court, and, therefore, this objection is waived. Bolus v. Murphy , 823 A.2d 1075, 1077 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), disapproved of on other grounds
, Reed v. Harrisburg City Council , 995 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 2010). R egardless of whether this Court would
otherwise have been the proper forum for exercising appellate jurisdiction, our jurisdiction has been perfected by the lack of timely objection. We now turn to Appellant’s arguments

. 13 Appellant first asserts she should have been granted leave to amend the Complaint before her action was dismissed

12 Pennsylvania Rule of Appe llate Procedure 1931(a) generally requires that “the record on appeal . . . shall be transmitted to the appellate court within 60 days after the filing of the notice of appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a). The appellate court’s prothonotary , upon receipt of the record, “shall file the record in the appellate court.” Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1934, Pa.R.A.P. 1934.
13 Appellee asserts Appellant has failed to develop or provide legal support wit hin her brief

on the issues set forth in her “Issues Presented” and, therefore, those issues are waived for appellate review. Because we can discern from her arguments in her brief issues that were both raised before common pleas and this Court, we will not find waiver

. We have read Appellant’s brief, which contains an exhaustive list of perceived injuries she alleges she has endured because of the February 21, 2016 incident and the events that followed. While we understand her frustration, we are constrained, under the law, by the facts alleged and claims asserted within the Complaint itself.12

based on the POs

. She indicates that, in a different case before common pleas, she was given an opportunity to amend her C omplaint despite not requesting to do so. Appellant argues she should have been given the same opportunity here. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1033 allows a party to amend his or her pleadings “either by filed consent of the adverse party or by leave of court.”
Pa.R.C.P. No. 1033. “The decision about whether to allow an amendment is within the discretion of the trial court, but su ch discretion is not unfettered .” Burger v. Borough of Ingram , 697 A.2d 1037, 1041 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). Amendments to a pleading “are to be liberally permitted except where surprise or prejudice to the other party will result, or where the amendment is against a positive rule of law.” Id. Here, Appellant neither sought the consent of Appellee to amend her Complaint, nor did s he request leave of the court to amend. Alt hough Appellee indicates she was given leave to amend a complaint in another case , she cites no authority, and we can find none, requiring a court to sua sponte order a party to
amend her pleading. See Werner v. Zazyczny , 681 A.2d 1331, 1338 (Pa. 1996) (stating that “Appellant fails to cite to any case law, and we can find none, requiring

a court to sua sponte order or require a party to amend his pleading”). Moreover, as common pleas explained in its 1925 (a) Opi nion, the removal of the criminal allegations from the Complaint would not have made a difference because its
decision sustaining the POs was not based on the inclusion of that material in the Complaint . (1925(a) Op

. at 4 .) Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion in common pleas not sua sponte allowing Appellant to amend her Complaint. Next, Appellant asserts that she stated claims for invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion. Appellant ’s brief asserts numerous reasons for claiming an invasion of her privacy . However, Appellant does not address common pleas’13

conclusions that the Section 302 process necessarily intrudes on one’s seclusion and that the Complaint did not plead the required level of publicity to state a cl aim for invasion of privacy. Appellee reiterates its arguments that Appellant did not really assert an intrusion on seclusion claim and did not aver the level of publicity required to state a claim for invasion of privacy.
I nvasion of privacy is comprised of four distinct torts: (1) intrusion upon
seclusion ; (2) appropriation of name or likeness ; (3) publicity given to private life ; and (4) publicity placing the person in a false light. Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co. , 327 A.2d 133, 136 n.9 (Pa. 1974). Invasion of privacy based on publicity given to private life occurs when “[o]ne

. . . gives publicity to matters concerning the private life of another, of a kind highly offensive to a reasonable man.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967 14 ). “The crux of [this] tort . . . is publicity[ ; w]ithout it there is no actionable wrong.” Id. at 136. In Vogel , our Supreme Court held that disclosure of such matters to four people was insufficient to establish the required level of publicity to state a claim. Id. at 137. Reviewing the Complaint, it does not contain any allegations about how Appellee publicized matters concerning Appellant’s private life to the public

. Wit hout publicity, “there is no actionable wrong.” Id. at 136. Accordingly
, Appellant did not state a claim under this theory, and common pleas did not err in sustaining the PO to Appellant ’s claim

. Intrusion upon seclusion occurs when “[o]ne

. . . intentio nally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another, or his private affairs or concerns, . . . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
man.” Id. at 136 n.9 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B Ten t. Draft No.

14 The 1977 version of Section 652D similarly defines this tort

. See supra note 6.14

13, 1967 15 ). To state a c laim, the “ plaintiff must aver that there was an intentional
intrusion on the seclusion of ” his or her “ private concerns which was substantial and highly offensive to a reasonable person, and aver sufficient facts to e stablish that the
information disclosed would have caused mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. ” Pro Golf Mfg., Inc. v. Tribune Review Newspaper
Co. , 809 A.2d 243, 2 47 (Pa. 2002 )

. While this form of invasion of privacy does not require publicity, Harris by Harris v. Easton Publ ’g Co. , 48 3 A.2d 1377, 1383 (Pa. Super. 1984)
, it does require disclosure
, Pro Golf Mfg. , 809 A.2d at 247. “ [T] he theory of ‘intrusion upon seclusion [] ’ . . . requires an intentional and unwarranted [ disclosure or action] by the defendant.” Burger v. Blair Med. Assoc s ., Inc. , 964 A.2d 374, 379 (Pa. 2009).
The February 21, 2016 interaction between Appellant and Appellee was premised on Section 302 of the MHPA, the purpose of which is to compel a person,
without her consent, to submit to treatment. As common pleas aptly explained
, “[f]ulfilling the [MHPA’s] obligations necessarily requires an intrusion upon the subject’s seclusion.” (1925(a) Op

. at 6.) In such circumstances, the intrusion is not unwarranted. Moreover, similar to the lack of averments related to publicity, the Complaint does not allege sufficient facts regarding how Appellee disclosed Appellant’s private concerns or how that disclosure caused her “ mental suffering,
shame or humiliation .” Pro Golf Mfg. , 809 A.2d at 247. For these reasons, Appellant did not state a claim under this theory, and common pleas did not err in sustaining the PO to Appellant’s claim s in Count I

. As for Count II
, which averred that Appellee committed fraud by lying on the
Section 302 Petition
, Appellant does not explain how common pleas erred in finding

15 The 1977 version of Section 652B is practically identical to the 1967 Tentative Draft version cited by the Supreme Court in Vogel

.15

that she did not plead fraud with the particularity required by precedent or the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Pr ocedure . Rather, Appellant asserts what she believes is proof that Appellee lied on the Section 302 Petition , none of which was averred in the Complaint. Appellee responds, as it claimed in its demurrer, that the Complaint did not plead the facts with th e particularity necessary to state a claim for
fraud. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1019(b), “[a]verments of fraud . . . shall be averred with particularity.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1019(b). O ur Supreme Court has explained that “[a]verments of fraud are ‘meaningless epithets unless
sufficient facts are set forth which will permit an inference that the claim is not without foundation or offered simply to harass the opposing party and to delay the pleader’s own obligation.’” Schofield , 477 A.2d a t 477 (quoting Bata v. Central

Penn Nat’l Bank of Phila. , 224 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1966)). Thus, to satisfy the particularity requirement, “two conditions must always be met: the pleadings must adequately explain the nature of the claim to the opposing par ty so as to permit him to prepare a defense[;] and they must be sufficient to convince the court that the averments are not merely subterfuge.” Id. In the Complaint, and particularly in Count II, Appellant aver red that Appellee
forced her into an ambula nce, despite her “refus[ing] service, ” after it applied for
and received the 302 Petition “on hand.” (Compl. ¶¶ 4

- 5, 12

- 13 , R.R. at 100 a

- 01a .) Count II then states, simply, “[Appellee] lied on the petition to receive[] the Act 302, which is a violation,” and “[a]s a direct result of [Appellee’s] fraudulent
, malice, scandalous petition for the Act 302 [Appellant] is suffering injury.” ( Id. ¶¶ 13, 15
, R.R. at 102a .) These are the only allegations made in support of the fraud claim and are, essentially, “b ald accusation[s] of fraud [,] which [are] insufficient to satisfy16

Pa.R.C.P. [No.] 1019(b).” Schofield , 477 A.2d at 477. The allegations are defective in that they do not advise Appellee of the nature of the claim being raised, thereby preventing it from preparing a defense. Further, the lack of particularity “make [s] it impossible for a court to determine whether the allegations have merit or are mere subterfuge.” Id. at 477

- 78. Therefore, common pleas did not err in sustaining Appellee’s PO to Count I I based on the Complaint not having stated a claim for fraud because it did not aver that allegation with the particularity required by the rules and precedent. 16

Accordingly, we affirm.

_____________________________________ RENÉE COHN JUBELIR ER, Judge

16 Because common pleas properly sustained the se POs, which support the dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety , we ne ed not ad dress the remaining PO s ( immunity under the EMS Act and applicability of the MHPA to ambulance companies) ruled upon by common pleas.IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Farida B. Rahman, : Appellant :

: v. : No. 1574 C.D. 2017

: White Haven Ambulance :

O R D E R

NOW
, August 29, 2018 , the O rder of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, entered in the above

- captioned case, is AFFIRMED

.

_____________________________________ RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge