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Filed 12/9/14 P. v. Pimentel CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(San Joaquin) 

---- 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

ISAEL VILLA PIMENTEL, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

C075824 

(Super. Ct. No. SF124905B) 

After receiving an anonymous tip regarding possible criminal activity, dispatch 

notified Lodi Police Officer Brannon Haro, who stopped defendant Isael Villa Pimentel, 

asked him his name, and searched him for weapons. Defendant gave Officer Haro a false 

name. A different officer, who knew defendant, approached and told Officer Haro 

defendant’s real name. Defendant was arrested and taken to jail for giving a false name 

to a police officer. At the jail, police found an unloaded revolver in defendant’s front 

pocket. Defendant was charged with three counts of possession of a concealed firearm 

based on different theories. 
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At a preliminary examination, defendant moved to suppress several pieces of 

evidence, including the gun and his statements to police, asserting among other things 

that the original detention was unlawful. The trial court denied his motion and defendant 

pled no contest to one count of possessing a concealed firearm by a gang member; the 

remaining counts and allegations were dismissed. 

In accordance with the plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to 365 days 

in jail and 5 years on probation. The trial court ordered defendant to register as a gang 

member in compliance with the plea agreement. Registering as a gang member, 

however, was never actually part of the plea agreement. 

On appeal from the judgment, defendant challenges the trial court’s ruling denying 

his motion to suppress on grounds that Officer Haro did not have reasonable suspicion to 

detain him. We agree and reverse. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On July 31, 2013, several Lodi police officers, including Officer Brannon Haro, 

received calls from dispatch at approximately 8:00 p.m. Although three officers testified 

differently to what dispatch said, Officer Haro believed dispatch told him there were five 

to six “gang-type” Hispanic males at Leroy Nichols School, one wearing gray clothing, 

and any number of them “possibly having guns.” Dispatch had received this information 

from an anonymous source. At least six officers responded to the call and drove toward 

Leroy Nichols School. As Officer Haro approached the school, he saw three males 

walking away from the school -- two were on one side of the street, and one (defendant), 

was crossing the street approximately 15 feet away from the others. 

Officer Haro watched the police officer ahead of him pull his patrol car over and 

walk toward the first two males. Officer Haro saw that defendant was wearing a charcoal 

gray shirt, so he parked his patrol car and approached defendant, who had now crossed to 

the other side of the street. Officer Haro asked defendant his name and defendant said his 

name was “Jose Torres.” Thereafter, Officer Haro frisked defendant to see if defendant 
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was in possession of any weapons; he did not find defendant’s gun at that time. Upon 

noticing defendant’s blue belt and bandana, Officer Haro asked defendant if he was a 

Sureño gang member and defendant said “yes.” 

Approximately one to two minutes after contacting defendant, Officer Haro 

learned that a man walking on a different street near the school named Ricardo Gonzalez 

had been stopped and questioned by police. Shortly thereafter, Officer Haro received 

news that other officers had discovered a gun hidden in the bushes on the street where 

Gonzalez was detained. At that time another police officer approached Officer Haro, 

recognized defendant, and told Officer Haro that defendant’s name was Isael Pimentel. 

Confronted with this information, defendant admitted that his real name is Isael Pimentel. 

Officer Haro then arrested defendant for giving a false name to a police officer. 

Officer Haro transported defendant to jail, where he was searched again. Police 

discovered an unloaded silver revolver deep in defendant’s front pocket. Defendant was 

charged with three counts of unlawful possession of a concealed firearm based on three 

different theories and one count of criminal street gang activity. The information alleged 

defendant possessed the gun for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Defendant pled not 

guilty to all counts and denied the allegation. 

At a preliminary examination, defendant moved to suppress the: 1) blue bandana; 

2) blue belt; 3) unloaded Smith and Wesson revolver; 4) all observations made by police 

after the initiation of the unlawful detention; 5) all statements made by defendant or 

Gonzalez after the unlawful detention; 6) the results of any tests run on the revolver; and 

7) all other evidence obtained after the unlawful detention. He argued, among other 

things, that the detention was unlawful because police did not have reasonable suspicion 

of criminal activity. His motion to suppress was denied. 

DISCUSSION 

 On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that 

Officer Haro did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him. Defendant also argues he 
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was not required to register as a gang member pursuant to the plea agreement or the 

applicable statute and the court abused its discretion when it ordered him to do so. 

Because we conclude that defendant’s detention was unlawful, we need not address 

defendant’s second argument. 

On review of a motion to suppress, we defer to the lower court’s factual findings, 

whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. 

Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597.) Whether, on the facts found, the search was 

unreasonable under the Constitution is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. (Id. at 

p. 597.) 

The decisive facts in this case are what Officer Haro believed dispatch said and 

what actions he took thereafter to detain defendant. (See People v. Leyba, supra, 29 

Cal.3d at p. 596 [“the trial court must ‘find the facts’ relating to the challenged search or 

seizure: e.g., it must decide what the officer actually perceived, or knew, or believed, and 

what action he took in response”].) Therefore, on appeal we must exercise our 

independent judgment to determine as a matter of law whether, based on Officer Haro’s 

beliefs and perceptions, his detention of defendant was unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment. 

 A police officer may justifiably stop and frisk a subject if the officer has sufficient 

knowledge to create a reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot and that 

the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.” (Terry v. 

Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911].) For an anonymous tip to provide 

reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, it must be sufficiently corroborated to 

exhibit indicia of reliability. (Florida v. J. L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266, 270 [146 L.Ed.2d 

254, 264] (J. L.).) To provide reasonable suspicion, the criminal element of the tip must 

typically be corroborated, not merely the noncriminal elements of the tip (such as the 

clothing and location of the alleged suspect). (Ibid.) This is not the case, however, when 

the informant accurately predicts the behavior of the suspect and police witness the 
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suspect carrying out several of the predicted acts. (Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 

325 [110 L.Ed.2d 301] (White) [finding sufficient indicia of reliability to provide 

reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop when anonymous telephone tip accurately 

predicted the defendant would leave a particular apartment at a particular time in a 

particular vehicle and drive to a particular motel].) 

Courts require “something more” than just an anonymous tip -- such as 

corroboration of the criminal element of the tip or confirmation of predictive information 

-- because “[u]nlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and 

who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, [citation], ‘an 

anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or 

veracity.’ ” (J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 270 [146 L.Ed.2d at p. 260]; White, supra, 496 

U.S. at p. 329 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 308].) 

 Our case is very similar to J. L. In J. L., an anonymous caller reported to police 

that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was 

carrying a gun. (J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 268 [146 L.Ed.2d at pp. 258-259].) Nothing 

was known about the informant, and police did not know why the informant believed the 

man was carrying a gun. (Ibid.) When police arrived at the bus stop, they saw three 

black males; one, J. L., was wearing a plaid shirt. (Ibid.) Apart from the tip, the officers 

had no reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct. (Ibid.) The officers did not 

see the gun and J. L. did not engage in any threatening or suspicious activity. (Ibid.) 

Nevertheless, the officers approached J. L., told him to place his hands up on the bus 

stop, frisked him, and found a gun in his pocket. (Ibid.) 

 The Supreme Court held the detention of J. L. was unlawful because despite the 

accurate description of the location and appearance of J. L., the anonymous tip “lacked 

the moderate indicia of reliability” necessary for reasonable suspicion. (J. L., supra, 529 

U.S. at pp. 269, 271 [146 L.Ed.2d at pp. 259-260].) In reaching this conclusion, the court 
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focused on two ways the tip was lacking. First, because the informant did not provide 

any predictive information like the informant did in White, the police were left with no 

means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility. (J. L., supra, 529 U.S at p. 271 

[146 L.Ed.2d at p. 260].) Second, there was no corroboration to suggest that the tip was 

reliable in its assertion of illegality. (Id. at p. 272 [146 L.Ed.2d at p. 261].) 

“All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, 

unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied 

any basis for believing he had inside information about J. L.” (J. L., supra, 529 U.S at 

p. 271 [146 L.Ed.2d at pp. 260-261].) The officers’ suspicion “arose not from any 

observations of their own but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an 

unknown caller.” (Id. at p. 270 [146 L.Ed.2d at p. 260].) “That the allegation about the 

gun turned out to be correct d[id] not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks, had a 

reasonable basis for suspecting J. L. of engaging in unlawful conduct: The 

reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before 

they conducted their search.” (Id. at 271 [146 L.Ed.2d at p. 260].) 

 Like the police in J. L., here Officer Haro knew nothing about the anonymous 

informant or why the informant believed defendant and/or his companions were 

“possibly” carrying guns. Like the anonymous informant in J. L., the anonymous 

informant here did not state a basis of knowledge or veracity and could not be evaluated 

or held accountable if the tip was false. These concerns are exactly why the Supreme 

Court requires anonymous tips to be “ ‘suitably corroborated’ ” to exhibit “ ‘sufficient 

indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop.’ ” 

(J. L., supra, 529 U.S at p. 270 [146 L.Ed.2d at p. 260].) 

 Furthermore, unlike the anonymous informant in White, the anonymous informant 

here did not make any predictions regarding defendant’s behavior. (White, supra, 496 

U.S. at pp. 326-327 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 306-307].) Like the police in J. L., Officer Haro 

was left with no means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility. Without this 
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predictive information, Officer Haro needed independent corroboration of illegal conduct 

before he could stop and frisk defendant. (See People v. Saldana (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 

170, 175 [finding corroboration of the criminal element is required when an anonymous 

tip does not include predictive information because there is no internal indicia of the basis 

for or reliability of the informant’s information).] 

 Other than this anonymous tip, there was no reason for the police to suspect 

defendant of any illegal conduct. Just like in J. L., police could not see defendant’s gun, 

and he was not engaging in any suspicious activity -- he was crossing the street away 

from a school. It is not enough that defendant’s location and appearance corroborated the 

anonymous informant’s tip because though the location and appearance “help[s] the 

police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. . . . [It] does not 

show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity.” (J. L., supra, 529 

U.S at p. 272 [146 L.Ed.2d at p. 261].) The reasonable suspicion necessary for a stop and 

frisk “requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to 

identify a determinate person.” (Ibid.) 

Moreover, Officer Haro’s recollection of the anonymous informant’s information 

further weakens the People’s argument of reasonable suspicion. Officer Haro testified 

that he believed the informant said that the men “possibly” had guns. This is even 

weaker than in J. L., where the informant said that the man at the bus stop did in fact 

possess a gun. (J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 268 [146 L.Ed.2d at p. 259].) Furthermore, 

Officer Haro did not know if the anonymous informant specified which male was 

carrying a gun. In J. L., the informant said that the black man wearing plaid possessed 

the gun. (J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 268 [146 L.Ed.2d at p. 259].) If this accurate 

description of one man having a gun was not enough for reasonable suspicion in J. L., an 

anonymous informant’s description of several different men “possibly” having guns is 

certainly not enough for reasonable suspicion without any corroboration of criminal 
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activity. Wearing gray near other males and crossing a street away from a school is not 

corroboration of criminal activity. 

The anonymous informant’s tip was not suitably corroborated to exhibit sufficient 

indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop. The 

detention was therefore unlawful and the motion to suppress should have been granted. 

Because defendant’s motion to suppress was erroneously denied, the judgment must be 

reversed and defendant must be given the opportunity to withdraw his no contest plea. 

(People v. Ruggles (1985) 39 Cal.3d 1, 13.) 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with 

instructions to allow defendant to withdraw his no contest plea, to vacate its order 

denying the motion to suppress, to enter a new order granting the motion to suppress, and 

for further proceedings in accordance with the law. 

 ROBIE , Acting P. J. 

We concur: 

 BUTZ , J. 

 MAURO , J.