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IRAN AND HEZBOLLAH IN

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 18, 2015

Serial No. 114–34

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Joseph Humire, Author .................................................................................... 9

Mr. Dardo Lo ́pez-Dolz (former Vice Minister of Interior of Peru) ....................... 26

Mr. Scott Modell, senior advisor, The Rapidan Group ......................................... 36

Mr. Michael Shifter, president, Inter-American Dialogue ................................... 44

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Joseph Humire: Prepared statement .............................................................. 11

Mr. Dardo Lo ́pez-Dolz: Prepared statement .......................................................... 28

Mr. Scott Modell: Prepared statement ................................................................... 39

Mr. Michael Shifter: Prepared statement .............................................................. 46

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 74

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 75

The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of South Carolina, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: Material submitted for the record ......................................................... 76

(1)

IRAN AND HEZBOLLAH IN

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan 

(chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere) presiding. 

Mr. DUNCAN. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will 

come to order. 

I will start by asking unanimous consent that two written testimonies be entered into the congressional record—first, the testimony of Mr. Leonardo Coutinho, a reporter with Veja Magazine, 

and second, the testimony of Mr. William Ross Newland III, managing director of The Delion Group, a former station chief in Havana and Buenos Aires. With no objection, so ordered. 

Given this is a joint subcommittee hearing, opening statements 

will be limited to the subcommittee chairs and the ranking members. All other members may submit statements for the record 

within 5 business days and I would now like to recognize myself 

for an opening statement. 

Before I do so, the ranking member is on his way so hopefully 

he will be here by the time I conclude my opening remarks. 

At a time when world powers are negotiating with Iran over its 

illicit nuclear weapons program to reach a deal by the March 31st 

deadline, Iran has not shown a commitment to good faith negotiations to peace. 

For years, Iran has tested the patience of the world with its defiance of international sanctions and its support for terrorism. Nowhere is this more concerning for U.S. national security interests 

than in our own neighborhood, the Western Hemisphere. 

Today, I want to consider implications for the U.S. and countries 

in this region if we continue to ignore Iran and Hezbollah’s activities here in our hemisphere. 

Given the significance of the P5+1 negotiations with Iran and potential effects resulting from a deal or lack thereof, it is critical 

that Iran not have an opportunity to exploit vulnerabilities in our 

region to cause harm. 

2

Congress has focused extensively on this issue with several hearings, visits to the region, and legislation which I authored, entitled 

the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, which became 

public law in 2012. 

I want to pause and thank Representative Higgins and Chairman Ros-Lehtinen for their assistance in getting that passed into 

law. Nevertheless, I am deeply concerned that in their hope for a 

nuclear deal with Iran, the Obama administration and governments in the region are not paying enough attention to this issue. 

In September 2014, the GAO released a report that found that 

U.S. State Department had only fully addressed two of the 12 elements required by that public law—Countering the Iranian Threat 

in the Western Hemisphere. 

As of today, the State Department has not fixed these gaps or 

conducted a reassessment of the Iranian threat in the Western 

Hemisphere. I believe this negligence is misguided and dangerous. 

Iran and Hezbollah have already demonstrated a willingness to 

conduct terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere. Consider the 

recent foiled plot by a Hezbollah operative in Peru in October 2014 

and the attempted attack linked to an Iranian diplomat in Uruguay last month. Or recall the 2011 attempted assignation of the 

Saudi Ambassador to the United States in Washington DC and the 

foiled Iranian plot in 2007 to blow up the John F. Kennedy Airport 

in Queens, New York. 

These events follow Iran’s 1992 attack on the Israeli Embassy, 

23 years ago yesterday, and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine 

Israelite Mutual Association, AMIA, in Buenos Aires. Yet, today in 

Argentina no one has been brought to justice for these attacks, 

even though Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman determined in 

2006 that Iran was responsible—in contrast, the U.S. State Department’s findings in its 2013 report to Congress that Iran’s influence 

in the region was waning. 

Nisman published a report about the same time that provided 

evidence of Iran’s subversive infiltration of multiple countries in 

the Caribbean and in Latin America. Unfortunately, much of Mr. 

Nisman’s report went unheeded by the U.S. and the countries 

named in the report. 

Then 2 months ago, Nisman indicted the President of Argentina, 

alleging that the Governments of Argentina and Iran had engaged 

in a cover-up regarding Iranian officials linked to the 1994 AMIA 

terrorist attack in exchange for oil and weapons. 

On January 18, Mr. Nisman was mysteriously found dead in his 

apartment with a bullet wound to the back of his head right behind 

the ear, presumed to be murdered. 

This past Friday, Brazilian Veja magazine published another 

stunning report. The report found that representatives of the Argentine Government received large amounts of cash from Iran in 

exchange for the AMIA attack to be covered up. 

Reportedly, Venezuela even facilitated the transfer of money directly from Tehran to the tune of about $800,000, according to the 

report, to Argentine President Cristina Kirchner’s election campaign. 

Significantly, the report alleged that Iran gave this money in 

order to obtain nuclear technology and knowledge of Argentina’s 

3

nuclear program. I recommend that article for other members of 

the committee. 

These are very serious findings that demand further scrutiny by 

the U.S. and governments within the region. Although these events 

seem to be compelling evidence that Iran and Hezbollah are up to 

no good in the Western Hemisphere, some believe that Iran doesn’t 

prioritize Latin America as highly under President Rouhani as was 

the case under previous Presidents, for Rouhani has yet to visit the 

region. 

However, Iran’s diplomacy should not be the only indicator of 

Iran’s activity in the region. According to Mr. Newland’s written 

testimony that was submitted for the record, the Iranian logistical 

and intelligence infrastructure is in place in Latin America even if 

their political and economic relations within the region have 

waned. 

Newland also states that the two most important centers of the 

Iranian influence are Cuba and Venezuela, while the Tri-Border region contains a community with many individuals providing financial support to Hezbollah. 

Similarly, Mr. Coutinho, the same individual who broke the Veja 

story this past weekend, submitted written testimony that was included in the record. His statement outlines Iranian activity in 

Brazil and explains that the country plays the role of a safe haven 

for Islamic extremist groups. 

Coutinho further elaborates that Brazil served as a planning and 

operations hub for the Iranian 1992 and 1994 attacks in Argentina 

and continues to exist today as an operational base, a weapons 

cache, a source of revenue for generation for the financing of terrorist operations and organizations, most notably Hezbollah. 

Coutinho’s testimony quotes from numerous Brazilian law enforcement sources that Hezbollah and Hamas supporters have been 

detected in Brazil and that Hezbollah has sold weapons to Brazilian criminal organizations. 

In view of this information, I find it incredible that, according to 

Coutinho, Brazil recognizes Hezbollah as a legitimate political 

party rather than a foreign terrorist organization, and Brazil’s Parliament has not passed anti-terrorism legislation which could improve coordination on these issues. 

Yet, Brazil is not alone. The recent situations in Peru, Uruguay, 

Argentina and bombing Iran shows clear areas of vulnerability in 

the region. Additionally, the Central America four-border control 

agreement originally signed in 2006 permits the free movement of 

citizens from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua 

without any restrictions, similar to the Schengen agreement in Europe. 

This measure, while beneficially portrayed, offers opportunities 

for exploitation by drug traffickers, terrorists, or even foreign fighters. Similarly, the Caribbean is also a growing place for trans shipments of drugs and other contraband that Iran and Hezbollah 

could exploit. 

So, in conclusion, Iran and Hezbollah are present in the Western 

Hemisphere. Last week, the U.S. Southern Commander, General 

John Kelly, testified to the presence of these actors in the region 

4

and also stated the U.S. challenge is our limited intelligence capabilities. 

In view of the fact that Iran is the world’s largest state sponsor 

of terrorism, it is pursuing nuclear weapons, and recent events 

show that Iran has capacity to conduct terrorist attacks in the 

Western Hemisphere, I believe the U.S. and other governments in 

the region must do more to address this issue. 

So with that, I will turn to the ranking member, who just joined 

us, for his opening statement. 

Albio, welcome to the committee and you are recognized for as 

long as it takes. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Chairman, and let me apologize to you for 

not being here on time. I had another hearing. I apologize to you 

for not being here on time. 

Look, I will be very short. I certainly agree with the chairman’s 

assessment. You know, we have to be on the lookout on the Iranian 

influence in the Western Hemisphere. It seems to me that we are 

preoccupied with all the events in the world and yet when it comes 

to—close to our what we call our back yard it seems like we don’t 

pay as much attention as we should. 

I am concerned about the influence in Venezuela. I am concerned 

about the influence and what is going on in Argentina. We were—

last 2 years ago with Chairman Salmon we were in Argentina and 

we raised the issue and, basically, they had no answers for us. 

The issue whether we are going to Iran to question some of the 

generals, I mean, that never panned out. So it is all a sham what 

is going on, and now you have an issue where they just killed a 

prosecutor. 

So I am very concerned about the issue of the Iranian influence 

in the Western Hemisphere. And with that, I will just turn it over 

back to the chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

I too was in Argentina in 2012 with Chairman Michael McCaul, 

the Homeland Security chairman currently. He was chairman of 

OME Subcommittee and a lot of the things that the ranking member mentioned about the dialogue with Argentina were completely 

similar. 

They just didn’t have an answer or tried to sort of downplay that. 

So with that, I will recognize a former chairman of the committee, 

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Chairman Duncan, 

Ranking Member Sires, Ranking Member Deutch. It is a pleasure 

to work with all of you and to hold this subcommittee jointly. I 

thank all of you for your leadership. 

Two years ago, these two subcommittees held a similar joint 

hearing to discuss the State Department’s reports on Iran’s influence in Latin America that you spearheaded, Mr. Chairman. 

Our assessment then, that the report was woefully inadequate, 

that State did not follow the law as required, that our Federal 

agencies lack a coherent and detailed strategy to combat Iran in 

the hemisphere, was confirmed by a GAO report published last 

year. 

5

It is simply unacceptable for our administration to ignore the 

threats in the region simply because the President wishes to forge 

a foreign policy legacy, whether it be with Cuba or Iran. 

State should immediately provide our subcommittees with the 

missing information on Iran’s activities in the Western Hemisphere 

and explain why the information was not included in the first 

place. 

Despite State’s intransigence, its partners at SOUTHCOM disagreed with its assessment and have been forthcoming, as you 

pointed out, Mr. Chairman, about the nature and the risk of the 

Iranian threat. 

SOUTHCOM has repeatedly stated that its very own limited intelligence capabilities in the region combined with the lack of partner capacity has prevented our full awareness of Iran and 

Hezbollah’s activities and that is where our problem lies. 

The Obama administration has failed to allocate the necessary 

resources to truly assess the threat of Iran and Hezbollah not just 

in our hemisphere but throughout the world. 

The intelligence community does not have the resources nor the 

political support to properly address the threat because so much attention is being paid elsewhere. And as General Kelly stated, Mr. 

Chairman, and you pointed it out, it isn’t just Iran that is threatening our region. It is ISIL and other terrorist groups. But we have 

not given this threat its due attention. 

We are currently not able to track national security threats in 

the region including potential instability, the influence of Iran and 

other actors like Russia and China, and the collaboration between 

criminal and terrorist networks. 

The administration continually underestimates the threat in the 

region that pose a grave risk to our own national security as well 

as that of our partners. 

What we do know is that Iran and its proxy Hezbollah want to 

circumvent sanctions to counter U.S. influence and to make use of 

growing networks of transnational organized crime in order to finance its own terror activities. 

Iran has opened up more than 80 cultural centers in Latin America in order to export its toxic brand of political influence and serve 

its interest, focusing on partnering with nations well known for 

their anti-American rhetoric including Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. 

The Treasury Department has sanctioned multiple Venezuelan 

banks and Venezuelan regime operatives including the former Minister of Interior and Justice. The State Department has designated 

Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, and CAVIM, the 

Venezuelan weapons company, for their role in helping Iran circumvent sanctions. 

Yet, the Obama administration continues to buy oil from the 

same entity that it sanctioned in 2011 for shipping two cargoes of 

gasoline to Iran. And we are seeing terrorist groups forge connections to drug cartels in the region, forging a deepening narcoterror 

connection that is funding so many of the terror groups and their 

activities. 

6

Drug trafficking funds terrorism. It is that simple. So our comprehensive strategy must also address this fundamental cause of 

the problem. 

Recent reports of the connections between Hezbollah and the 

FARC, the murder of the special prosecutor of Argentina, Alberto 

Nisman, and the alleged conspiracy between the Argentine Government, Venezuela and Iran to cover up Hezbollah’s activities and involvement in the AMIA bombing do nothing to quell doubts about 

Iran’s activities in Latin America. 

Alberto Nisman was a courageous and strong leader who was 

dedicated to pursuing the truth behind the AMIA terrorist attacks 

wherever they may have led. His murder must be investigated in 

a comprehensive and transparent manner to search for the truth 

and his work on AMIA must continue forward. 

The AMIA attack wasn’t the first time we saw Iran’s deadly activities in Argentina. Yesterday was the 23rd anniversary of the 

bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires which killed 29 

and injured hundreds more. 

I stand in solidarity with the people of Argentina in mourning 

this horrific attack, the AMIA bombing, and the tragic loss of 

Alberto. We must ensure that Nisman’s memory and his life work 

carry on. 

So the question is why is this administration so intent on 

downplaying the Iranian threat? It now appears that the administration has even scrubbed its most recent worldwide threat assessment report of all Iranian connections to terrorism or Hezbollah in 

order to make it easier to eventually lift sanctions on Iran. 

The parallels between the administration’s misguided Iran policy 

and its Cuba policy are clear. The President has been using Cuba 

as a test case for normalizing relations with Iran. 

So it should come as no surprise that the Iranian threat in our 

own hemisphere is also downplayed by the administration. It is 

time for the President to stop trying to burnish his foreign policy 

legacy and stop putting politics ahead of national security. 

The White House must let the truth about Iranian involvement 

in the Western Hemisphere be exposed, put the necessary intelligence capabilities in place to monitor Iran and its activities, and 

develop a serious strategy to counter what can only be called a 

threat. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentlelady for her leadership and the 

chairman of the Middle East and North Africa. 

I now turn to the ranking member of that Subcommittee on the 

Middle East and North Africa, Mr. Deutch from Florida, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sires 

and Chairman Ros-Lehtinen for holding this hearing. 

As the international spotlight is focused on Iran’s illicit nuclear 

weapons program we can’t be distracted from Iran’s other dangerous and subversive acts around the world. 

This is our subcommittee’s second hearing on Iran’s efforts to expand its network of influence into the Western Hemisphere since 

Congress passed the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere 

7

Act championed by Chairman Duncan and Congressman Higgins in 

2012. 

That legislation made clear that Congress would not turn a blind 

eye to Iran’s work in the hemisphere done both in a public way and 

in any clandestine way and that there must be a viable strategy 

to counter the manipulative tactics and deplorable goals of the regime. 

We knew then that the Iranian regime has and will resort to almost any illicit activity that furthers its ambitions of being a global 

force against the United States and our allies. 

Iran’s fingerprints have been found in numerous instances of illegal arms shipments from West Africa to Yemen and its notorious 

network of terror proxies including Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic 

Jihad, and other groups. 

Since a growing and more unified international coalition began 

exerting crippling political and economic pressure on Iran, it started seeking out countries that were inclined to align with it against 

the United States and would be willing to help it evade international sanctions and that were in need of economic support and 

trade deals. 

In Latin America, Iran found several partners that were open to 

collaborating with a pariah state and were willing to accept the 

risks of violating international sanctions to do so. 

Alberto Nisman witnessed this. The Argentine investigator knew 

that Iran and its proxies were active in Argentina. He knew that 

Iran was behind the bombing of the Buenos Aires Jewish Community Center and how Iran used its proxy Hezbollah to carry it out. 

Clearly, Iran wasn’t and still isn’t afraid of committing brazen 

and public attacks on Jews around the world, and aside from small 

and ineffective punitive measures Iran has yet to be deterred from 

financing terrorist groups and encouraging attacks on innocent civilians. 

But Nisman also knew that Iran’s presence wasn’t restricted to 

Hezbollah’s cells around the region. Rather, traces of Iranian influence could be found in high levels of leadership in the region. 

According to recent press reports, there is evidence of considerable collaboration between Hugo Chavez, former President 

Ahmadinejad, and Argentina’s current President, Cristina 

Kirchner, with guarantees of energy deals, cash transfers, and assistance in clearing Iran’s name from its involvement in the AMIA 

bombing. 

Tragically, Nisman’s voice was silenced when he was found shot 

in his home in January. We must honor him by continuing to push 

for justice not only for his work but for his death. 

Some have wondered if events of late might have changed the 

calculation of Iran and its friends in the Western Hemisphere. 

With Chavez’s death in March 2013, Latin America lost its most 

outspoken critic of the United States and leader of the anti-American alliance with Iran. 

A few months later, President Ahmadinejad left office and was 

replaced by President Rouhani. So within the course of a few 

months, Iran in Western Hemisphere countries lost two of its most 

vocal leaders who enjoyed a close personal relationship, calling into 

question the sustainability of the union without them. 

8

The State Department’s country reports on terrorism for 2013 

noted that Iran has been unable to expand its economic and political ties in Latin America and I think there are many who would 

question that declaration. 

Regardless, we can’t afford to shift our attention away and let 

Iran’s influence grow under the radar. President Rouhani has made 

it very clear that he has no intention of letting his country’s ties 

with the region weaken. 

There have been a number of visits and exchanges between leaders and lawmakers from Latin American countries and Iran in the 

past few years. And just as our hopes for a more moderate Iran 

have been crushed as we witnessed no drop—no drop in support for 

terrorist groups or in the number of human rights violations 

against the Iranian people, we should not be surprised that President Rouhani has not stepped back from the foundation laid by 

President Ahmadinejad. 

So there remains work for the United States to do to counter the 

Iranian influence and stem the infiltration of terrorist groups in 

the Western Hemisphere. 

Last September, the GAO released a report on the government’s 

efforts to meet the obligations included in the 2012 Countering 

Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act. 

In its assessment there are considerable numbers the chairman 

referred to earlier—there are a considerable number of elements 

that have yet to be addressed or were not addressed sufficiently. 

We should double down on our commitments to identify and designate terrorists and Iranian proxies that intend to destabilize the 

region and harm innocent civilians. 

We have to ensure that Iran cannot use other countries to circumvent sanctions and that other countries recognize the real risk 

of violating U.S. and international sanctions. 

And we must work with our allies in the region to bolster 

counter terrorism capabilities and prevent Iranian proxies from 

targeting and terrorizing communities and Jewish populations. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about what 

they view as the most immediate and significant concerns posed by 

Iran in the hemisphere, where the United States and the international community can take action to counter and deter this influence, and we are grateful for your presence here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman for his comments. I think 

you are spot on. Before I recognize you to provide testimony, let me 

explain the lighting system before you. 

Each of you have 5 minutes to present your oral statement. That 

light will be green until you are getting close to the end. With 1 

minute left it will go to yellow. So when you see the yellow, again, 

wrapping up. So if you see it turn yellow wrap up your statement 

and anyway so I will give a little leeway if you are—if you are 

making a point. 

But when we get to the end we will wrap it up, and that goes 

for the members as well. With a large—four panelists and a lot of 

questions we will try to stay on the 5-minute time frame. 

9

So the first—the biographies are in your notebook. I am not 

going to do the biographies. We are going to recognize in essence 

of time. 

Mr. Humire, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH HUMIRE, AUTHOR 

Mr. HUMIRE. Thank you. Chairman Duncan, Chairwoman RosLehtinen, Ranking Members Sires and Deutch, distinguished members of both subcommittees, good morning. It is a privilege to appear before you today. 

The death of Dr. Alberto Nisman on January 18th shocked us all. 

I remember receiving the news on a late Sunday afternoon in quite 

disbelief, hoping that these were just Internet rumors. Unfortunately, several hours later his death was confirmed. 

Aside from the shock, at the time my initial reaction was that 

Iran was involved. Of course, this is not proven and most likely we 

will never know all the circumstances surrounding his mysterious 

death. 

But as time goes by and more evidence is revealed, what we do 

know is more about the extent to which Iran has infiltrated Argentina. 

Just last week—Chairman Duncan, you referred to this—the 

highly respected Brazilian weekly Veja reported that the Argentine 

President, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, had received Iranian financial support for her Presidential campaign all the way back in 

2007. 

This means that that highly controversial memorandum of understanding between Iran and Argentina signed in 2013 was a 

campaign promise made by Argentine President 6 years earlier. 

Moreover, through the wiretaps related to Dr. Nisman’s most recent investigation, we are realizing that the mastermind of the 

AMIA attack—Iranian intelligence operative Mohsen Rabbani, who 

the Brazilians call the terrorist professor—is still active in Argentina, sending money, making orders, and interfering in Argentine 

diplomatic affairs. 

But the most interesting revelation from the Veja piece is not 

who Iran has bought in Latin America but why. According to the 

Venezuelan military defector who was the source for this report, 

whitewashing Iran’s accused from the AMIA attack was only a secondary objective for Iran’s controversial outreach to Argentina. 

The primary objective was to gain access to Argentina’s nuclear 

technology and her materials, a goal the Islamic Republic has had 

for over 20 years—the same goal that, according to Dr. Nisman, is 

partially the reason why Argentina was targeted in the first place 

back in the early 1990s. 

In this Veja piece, there is a recount of private meeting between 

former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the late 

Hugo Chavez in which Ahmadinejad told Chavez, and I quote, 

‘‘This is a matter of life or death. I need you’’—referring to Chavez—‘‘to be an intermediary with Argentina to get help for my 

country’s nuclear program. We need Argentina to share its nuclear 

technology with us. It will be impossible to advance our program 

without Argentina’s cooperation.’’

10

Impossible is a strong word. This suggests that Iran needs Latin 

America to complete its highly ambitious nuclear program. If this 

is the case, then I believe we have all underestimated Latin America’s importance to the Islamic Republic and by extension can no 

longer afford to divorce the ongoing nuclear negotiations with the 

P5+1 and Iran’s activities in the region. 

And as these negotiations come to a critical juncture, it is more 

important than ever to understand to what degree does Latin 

America benefit Iran. Venezuela, Argentina is just the tip of the 

iceberg. 

In my written testimony, I describe a conceptual model for how 

Iran has infiltrated and gained an inordinate amount of influence 

in just about every country in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Of course, there is varying levels of success. In some countries, 

namely the Bolivarian Alliance Nations, Iran has embedded themselves completely into the highest levels of those governments. In 

other countries, they are still operating at a covert level, perhaps 

through their proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah. 

But in all cases, it is safe to say that Iran has a footprint in 

every country throughout the region. In my book, I call this—I call 

this pattern of infiltration the pattern of penetration which is why 

we called the book ‘‘Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America,’’ 

which is co-authored with several prominent Latin American scholars, officials, military officers, and policymakers, all who themselves describe how Iran and Hezbollah is operating in their respective countries. 

We uses the term ‘‘strategic penetration’’ in the title on purpose 

because the word strategic implies that Iran has a plan. The word 

‘‘penetration’’ means that they are executing this plan through covert methods. 

So as we examine the issue in today’s hearing, I ask that you 

keep in mind that there is a degree of difference between what Iran 

and Latin American allies say they are doing and what they are 

actually doing behind the scenes, because it is the work behinds 

the scenes, their covert work, that is driving their influence in the 

region—an influence that extends to the United States through 

Latin American politicians. 

And to pay special attention to the Organization of American 

States. The Argentine Ambassador, Nilda Garre, is proven to have 

a close relationship to Venezuela as becoming the former Argentine 

Ambassador to Venezuela and also a close relationship to Iran by 

being the former Minister of Defense of Argentina. 

Also today there is a vote on the Organization of American 

States for a new general secretary. The most likely candidate, Luis 

Almagro, also had a close relationship to Iran, being an Ambassador to that country many years ago. 

For a long time, Iran and Hezbollah’s presence in Latin America 

was viewed as a defensive posture in case of conflict with Israel or 

the West erupts in the Middle East. 

But as the Iranian nuclear negotiations heat up, the question we 

must all ask and answer is at what point does a good offense become your best defense. 

And with that, I yield my time. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Humire follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman for his testimony. There will 

be an opportunity for us to delve more into that during the question and answer time. 

So I will recognize Mr. Lo ́pez-Dolz. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DARDO LO ́ PEZ-DOLZ (FORMER VICE 

MINISTER OF INTERIOR OF PERU) 

Mr. LO ́ PEZ-DOLZ. Thank you. Ranking Member, Chairman and 

members of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, I very 

much appreciate the invitation sent by Committee Chairman Royce 

permitting me the opportunity to appear before you today. 

My testimony began with the case of Muhamad Amadar, a presumed Lebanese terrorist and confessed Hezbollah member, who 

was arrested by the Peruvian National Police in October 2014 for 

possession of explosives that have distant similarities with explosives usually employed by Hezbollah. The intended target of these 

explosives was not identified. Photos were found on his iPad by the 

Peruvian-North American Cultural Institute and the Lima International Airport. 

But since clear is that Amadar is not—is an explosives manufacturer but not an operator. He was not going to be the engineer who 

would carry out the attack that was presumably being prepared. 

His network will continue to be around and should be assumed 

to be intact. Therefore, its operational regional capability can continue to build and intensify without difficulty. 

In my testimony, I describe Hezbollah recruitment in Peru. Since 

at least the end of the 1990s, Iran had recruited native-born Latin 

Americans into training, where they use faith with military and political indoctrination and a key precept is that Iran’s mission—indeed, its obligation—is ostensibly expressed as a movement to liberate the oppressors of the world. 

This purported goal is one also embraced by the violent radical 

movements in South America that almost all have clear anti-Western and anti-Reagan inspiration. 

Hezbollah recruitment activity has been focused in southern 

Andes, the poorest region of Peru, an area of rampant and flagrant 

trafficking in drugs, weapons, and human trafficking—without any 

real possibility of detecting what or who enters or leaves the area 

that has many conditions that are a clear advantage for the expansionist plans of Iran. 

The southern border with Bolivia and Chile is highly porous and 

permeable in the jungle regions as well as the highland and mountain ranges. Consider the great interest of Iran in Bolivia and the 

apparent closeness of the two governments, the dangers stemming 

from their presence in the area expands geometrically. 

Another significant concern is that Peruvian national intelligence 

source speak of more than 120 military reservists, meaning former 

active duty soldiers, who were recruited and sent to Iran via Quito 

in Ecuador for political indoctrination and possible advanced military training. 

In terms of risk, the Hezbollah reserves in Bolivia could be easily 

used as a support element or an attack element against entities 

perceived as U.S. or Israeli interests. 

27

In fact, they are already acting to undermine democratic institutions and the political capacity of the Peruvian economy in coordination with their obvious allies, receiving inspiration from 

Chavista or Bolivarian movements. 

It is important to stress that fundamental characteristics of Andean culture. It’s considered a fertile breeding ground for totalitarian ideological proposition or fundamentalist theocratic concepts. 

The cultural similarity between the Shi’ite worldwide and the 

southern Andean world could, given funding and sufficient education, generate a rapid expansion of Hezbollah cells. 

Finally, there is a dangerous proximity between these cells, the 

Governments of Cuba and Venezuela, and Latin American terrorist 

organizations that joined to direct the so-called Fronts for the Defense of the Environment, positions to which no one has elected 

them, in titles that they themselves have appropriated. 

Using this cover, they systematically and flagrantly oppose all 

major investments and development projects, leaving illegal mining 

and illegal narcotics production as the only de facto industries in 

these poverty-stricken areas. 

I will say it is imperative to reinforce ties with the Peruvian police force, its legal system, Peruvian intelligence, and the Peruvian 

armed forces to combat these new enemies to democratic stability, 

freedom, and economic growth, which is in the common interest of 

my country and the U.S. 

This new focus, if backed by your country, would support not 

only security in the U.S. and Peru, but also freedom and free markets in the Western Hemisphere, all of which are undermined by 

narcotics trade and extremists in the region. 

Human intelligence networks are also needed in a broad area 

and electronic communication to ensure that Hezbollah and their 

partners cannot expand their influence and ultimately cannot 

threaten the common interest as well as the internal security of 

both Peru and the United States. 

Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lo ́pez-Dolz follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. I thank you. 

Mr. Modell, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT MODELL, SENIOR ADVISOR, THE 

RAPIDAN GROUP 

Mr. MODELL. Chairman Duncan, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, 

Ranking Member Sires and Deutch, thank you, members of the 

committee, fellow panelists. Good morning. 

I was planning on spending the first part of my statement going 

over what I thought was the Iran Action Network, a combination 

of the ministry of intelligence and the IRGC and all the things that 

they have done over the years in the region. 

But I think that has been adequately—more than adequately 

covered. I would like to spend the little time that I have to discuss 

some of the things that I think we should do going forward as far 

as solutions as a government looking at this region, particularly 

given the inadequacies that have been pointed out as far as the 

lack of attention and resources toward this region. 

In my opinion, even if sanctions and diplomacy lead to a nuclear 

agreement with Iran, the activities of both Iran and Hezbollah will 

continue to post significant challenges to any long-term relationship or rapprochement with the West. 

To address the threats that are likely to live on long after any 

deal is reached, in my opinion we should consider the following recommendations. 

First, we need to take more of network approach to countering 

Iran. I think it was pointed out here that the State Department is 

woefully inadequate in the attention that it gives toward the Iranian threat in Latin America. There is a government-wide lack of 

attention. 

I think when you look at the agency or look at DEA and others 

who have very specific mission sets, I would argue that they actually are adequately focused on, whether it is narcotrafficking or 

Iran or other hard targets in the region, but there is not a combined whole of government counter network approach that I think 

we really need to start looking at. 

In particular, when you are looking at Hezbollah, which I think 

is arguably even more dangerous than Iran as a whole across the 

region, there is a real need to identify the external security organization—Hezbollah’s armed wing overseas that has been responsible 

for all of the terrorism. 

All of the failed attempts, all the successful attempts most of its 

criminality tend—really, tend to go back to the ESO, also known 

as the IJO. 

There is broad disagreement within the U.S. Government as to 

what that organization does, what it is, who is affiliated with it. 

We need to all be on the same page and there needs to be a 

networked plan for figuring out how to better go after that. 

Anti-illicit finance measures—Hezbollah activity in Venezuela, 

Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil has been linked directly to several 

drug related trade-based money laundering schemes, which I think 

we are all familiar with. All of these were—the key point to take 

away in this is all roads generally lead back to Lebanon. 

37

One of the things I would recommend is enhancing the role of 

Treasury not only in designations but resume the overseas presence of the Treasury where they can kind of roll up their sleeves 

and be involved in financial investigations, building that Treasury 

attache for us but as long—but with the idea of having a more of 

a systematic approach to financial targeting and criminal disruption. 

Hezbollah’s finances within the Lebanese banking system have 

been widely exposed. Lebanese-Canadian banking—the Canadian 

bank case was a very good example of it. The degree of vulnerability, I think, is underestimated. 

We need to give Treasury more latitude to actually put pressure 

on that banking system in order to change Lebanon—Lebanese 

Hezbollah’s behavior. 

Software initiatives—one of the things I mentioned the Supreme 

Leader and senior Iranians conservatives in their government consistently refer to the software from the United States as being the 

single biggest threat to the Islamic Republic. 

One of the things that I think we need to do is a much better 

job of exposing and trying to neutralize its nonofficial cover organizations, its religious, cultural and charitable organizations, and the 

businesses that effectively blur the lines between its official and its 

unofficial activities. 

I would also focus on transnational organized crime. Again, 

Hezbollah has become a global criminal enterprise. It is a shadow 

of its former self. Mughniyah and the others, some of the key 

founding members of the ESO, had this in mind 25 years ago. 

It has blossomed into a global commercial network that leads 

back to the Jihad Council and the decision-making apparatus in 

Lebanon is responsible for the worst attacks and the kinetic activities that we are all concerned about, particularly in this hemisphere. 

Finally, I think that the U.S. needs to find creative incentives for 

working with our liaison partners across the region, whether it is 

Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil. I don’t think that our good old fashioned military-to-military or intel-to-intel relationships are enough. 

I think that we need to do better to incentivize our foreign liaison partners to go after Iran. I served across the region and what 

I saw was a willingness to do that, but without properly 

incentivizing our partners to actually take the risks of engaging in 

higher impact operations against these types of threats, which are 

higher priority to us than they are to them, there is a limit to what 

we can do down there. 

One of the things that I have always focused on and I have always talked about is the Rewards for Justice program. Generally, 

in my experience people do things—corruption is rampant almost 

everywhere in Latin America from what we saw. 

The Rewards for Justice program could be something that could 

be effectively used in a positive way to further incentivize policemen, intelligence officers, the foreign governments that are working closely with us against these threats. 

In conclusion, I would just say with or without a nuclear deal I 

don’t think this regime is going to change. The conservative establishment that has been there since the beginning is still in power. 

38

You are starting to see more maneuvering behind the scenes 

with regard to the Supreme Leader and his upcoming succession 

transition. He has been given 18 to 24 months to live. Cancer—his 

prostate cancer has apparently metastasized. 

So the assembly of experts, the body responsible for choosing the 

next Supreme Leader, has already—he has already started to 

make—he has already started to position people in that body that 

are going to ensure that the succession goes toward—leans toward 

the hardliners. 

So a number of things that are being done inside the apparatus 

are only going to verify that this externalization of the Islamic regime is going to go on. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Modell follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. I appreciate those questions and we can get into 

that a little bit more going forward. 

I will recognize Mr. Shifter for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL SHIFTER, PRESIDENT, INTERAMERICAN DIALOGUE 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you very much, Chairman Duncan, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Sires. It is a pleasure to be 

here this morning and I appreciate the opportunity to share some 

of my views about Iran’s agenda in the Western Hemisphere. 

Let me start by saying that this is an issue that needs to be 

taken seriously. No one has any illusions about the nature of the 

Iranian regime and its history in flouting international law, supporting terrorist groups, threatening Israel and violating U.N. resolutions in its nuclear program. 

When it comes to Iran’s role and influence in the Western Hemisphere, we need to keep our eyes wide open and be vigilant. Some 

of Iran’s allies—some of Iran’s ties in the region are of concern including its relationship with Venezuela, the allegations in the 

Nisman case in Argentina, and Brazil’s previous support for Iran’s 

nuclear program. 

But in my judgment, these do not amount to very much and, if 

anything, since I last appeared before the House Committee on 

Foreign Affairs over 3 years ago, the situation has improved. 

The good news in the region in this regard is overwhelming. Iran 

has little real influence in the region today and what influence it 

had has declined in the recent period. 

There is no evidence that Latin America has an interest in aligning itself strategically with Iran. That would be irrational and 

counter-productive for a region that over the last decade has moved 

forward in many respects. 

If we consider Iran’s main entry point in Latin America Venezuela, while the geopolitical alliance between the two countries remains, the relationship today is weaker than it was a few years ago 

when Chavez and Ahmadinejad were in charge. 

Many of the development projects announced between Iran and 

Venezuela along with Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador have simply 

not materialized. Although Brazil is Iran’s largest trading partner 

in Latin America, the political relationship has cooled. 

To be sure, the Brazilian Government took a stand supporting 

Iran’s position on the nuclear program in 2008. But today, 7 years 

later, there is a distance between the two governments and President Rousseff has criticized Iran’s human rights record. 

There have been reports and allegations in the past about Iranian agents sponsoring training camps for terrorists in Latin 

America and Iranian support for prospecting uranium in Venezuela 

and Ecuador. But these remain unsubstantiated. 

In Argentina, prosecutor Alberto Nisman accused President 

Kirchner of trying to shield Iran in the investigation of involvement 

in the bombing of the Israeli Embassy. I was in Argentina in Buenos Aires when that Embassy was bombed, just a few blocks from 

the Embassy back then, and in AMIA in 1994 that killed 85 people. 

Nisman was found dead right before he was set to testify before 

the Argentine Congress. But even if one accepts Nisman’s troubling 

45

report that Argentina and Iran were negotiating an exoneration of 

Iran in the 1994 attack in exchange for increased trade relations, 

this does not necessarily show a growing influence of Iran in Argentina or the wider region. 

The circumstances of Nisman’s death remain mysterious but so 

far there is nothing to indicate that Iran was involved in any way. 

There have also been more plausible allegations of money laundering through the region’s banks to finance Hezbollah activity. 

But this is a fundamental problem not just related to Iran’s role 

and influence in Latin America but is much broader. 

In my judgement, the time, effort, and resources that are being 

spent on the subject of Iranian intervention in the Western Hemisphere should, rather, be devoted to proactive engagement and support around the very real security issues that Latin America is confronting today—a robust drug trade and other illicit commerce, an 

epidemic of violence and crime, a deteriorating political, economic, 

and human rights situation in Venezuela, and widespread corruption and state weakness. 

These are critical questions that risk being neglected when we 

focus all of our attention on Iran. Indeed, the best way for Washington to address concern about Iran’s role in the hemisphere is to 

help improve the capacity and effectiveness of Latin American governance to protect their citizens against varied sources of insecurity 

and instability. 

That is where we should place our policy priority. Issues of organized crime and governance challenge need greater attention and 

enhanced cooperation from Washington. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shifter follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the—all four of the panelists for 

great testimony and I will begin with the question period. 

First off, let me say, Mr. Humire, your written testimony is chock 

full of information. Thank you for your longstanding work into this 

issue and you provide me a lot of information. I will come back to 

you in just a second with some questions. 

But as I was reading and listening to Mr. Lo ́pez-Dolz’s testimony, 

I was in Peru in November and I understand the vastness of the 

country and the different—jungle, mountains, desert—all the elements. And thank you for your service there. 

But it is interesting. You were the Minister of Interior in 2006. 

Were you aware of Iran’s activity at that point in time? 

Mr. LO ́ PEZ-DOLZ. When I was Vice Minister of Interior, I didn’t 

have a sign of Iran at the beginning. After a few months and a few 

weeks in the position, I started to see some relation but not something to pay too much attention. 

We were more concerned about other houses—more about the 

Venezuelan Government’s involvement in these organizations. 

Iran’s presence was not clear at this time. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Do some of the cultural centers that General Kelly 

talks about, the general commander of SOUTHCOM, are they located in Peru? Are you aware of any of that? I am just curious. 

Mr. LO ́ PEZ-DOLZ. At least one that I know. The name is Inkarri 

Islam. It is a mix between Islam and Inkarri. Inkarri is a myth of 

Southern Andes culture about an Incan will be reborn and free the 

people from any kind of oppressor. Similar to another myth from 

the followers of Ali, one of the sons of Muhammad, and they mix 

both and use it to recruit people in the center. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Not putting you on the spot but in 2012–2013 are 

you aware that—of any conversations elements of the Department 

of State had with Peruvian officials about the Iranian threat as 

part of their application of the law to counter the Iranian threat 

and do an assessment? Do you know if they have contacted any Peruvian officials? 

Mr. LO ́ PEZ-DOLZ. I don’t know if in 2012 or 2013. But right now, 

there is some contact between the American Embassy and the special task—small special task force to Interpol in the case of international terrorists. 

Actually, now, clearly, they are in contact. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Humire, given the recent events with attempted attacks in 

Peru but also Uruguay, the Iranian-Argentine scandal this last 

week, do you agree with the State Department’s assessment that 

Iranian influence is waning in the hemisphere? 

Mr. HUMIRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

No, I don’t agree. I think the State Department’s assessment 

when it came out—at least the public portion that came out the 

annex—lacked the depth and the seriousness to really examine this 

issue and offer some type of insight. 

The work I have done there is plenty that you can get on the 

granular level to look at anecdotal evidence of this. But if you look 

at the strategic level on pretty much every indicator, even if you 

look at the indicators of what is out there in the public, the agreements in the trade and everything, there is an increase. 

52

There is a marked increase. But those aren’t the indicators that 

I think are particularly worrisome. The most worrisome indicators 

is what they are not telling you that they are doing. 

So when they create a factory, say, in Venezuela or they create 

a cement plant in Bolivia and those factories don’t produce anything or don’t create cement, what are they doing? 

Some wisdom—conventional wisdom might say okay, they are 

just politically posturing. But my evidence suggests that they serve 

a dual function, a dual purpose, and it is that other function that 

we need to examine. 

So I think that has been the focus of my research and what you 

are seeing Iran’s influence today as it was yesterday when 

Ahmadinejad was in power is that it is expanding beyond the 

ALBA nations. The ALBA bloc as a political power project is weakened. 

But the sentiments that brought the ALBA to power in Latin 

America—the anti-U.S. sentiments, the—specifically the anti-Israel 

sentiments—are stronger than ever throughout the region. 

And Cuba and Venezuela have a new political soapbox now to 

project this influence called the CELAC and Iran, under Rouhani, 

has made a concerted effort to align himself closer to that kind of 

narrative, moving into countries like Peru, countries like Chile, and 

even countries like Mexico and El Salvador, which are not typically 

ALBA-associated nations. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I mean, you can understand the sympathy with especially Chavez in power with ALBA countries and the ties there 

that possibly Chavez opened some doors in the ALBA countries for 

Iran as he furthered that relationship. 

But let me delve into the Veja report for just a minute, which 

I thought was fascinating. I don’t know—I am still reading it and 

chewing on whether, you know, it is factual. I want to go a little 

bit further on that. 

But in that Veja report—article it talks about Iran trying to procure some nuclear capability, intelligence research components, 

whatever. I just find that hard to believe in that Iran seems to me 

like they are further down the road than that and why would they 

not go to Pakistan or somewhere like that to get that versus a relationship with Argentina. 

So is there anything else that Iran may have been going—interested in that Argentina could provide? 

Mr. HUMIRE. Well, there is two major strategic programs that 

you have to look at when you examine Iran. One is the one that 

is the most paid attention to here in Washington which is the nuclear program. 

The other is their ballistic missile program. These aren’t mutually exclusive, of course. But raw materials that are perhaps needed for the ballistic missile program sometimes aren’t always needed 

for their nuclear program and Latin America has an abundance of 

these raw materials. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil—all these countries 

have an abundance of minerals that have dual-use functions. They 

have commercial applications——

Mr. DUNCAN. Would you say Argentina has long-range missile 

technology or expertise in any way for a payload delivery system? 

53

Mr. HUMIRE. They have medium range missile technology. From 

my understanding they don’t have an intercontinental ballistic missile or any of that kind of know-how. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. Okay. Lord, there is just so much to ask. Let 

me ask this of Mr. Lo ́pez-Dolz. Do you have any additional information surrounding the recent incidents in Uruguay and what does 

this event show about Iran’s activities? 

Because that is probably the most recent. Assuming that Iran 

wasn’t involved in Alberto Nisman’s demise, Uruguay was one of 

the most recent incidents. Do you have anything to point to—Iranian activity, Hezbollah’s activity—with relation to that? 

Mr. LO ́ PEZ-DOLZ. We don’t have information about—I don’t have 

information if there is a connection or there is not a connection 

with the cells. We are not sure yet because he was captured very 

soon and the information was released to the press pretty soon. So 

when information was public, if there wasn’t something that they 

were hiding, there is no single piece of information to know who 

is with him. 

But what is important to remark is he was manipulating explosives. Not weapons, not ammunition, something that you could expect to wait for some time to use it all or sending it across the border. 

When you manipulate explosives in a big city, as Lima, with millions of inhabitants, it means will they use it or somebody else. We 

don’t know who. We don’t know the target and they have—I think 

they have this explosives ready to use. We don’t know when and 

we don’t—and we don’t know against what. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes. I was asking about Uruguay, though, if you 

knew of anything about Uruguay and the recent bombing attempt 

there or on the Israeli Embassy, in Uruguay. 

Mr. LO ́ PEZ-DOLZ. No, I don’t have more information about it. I 

read it in the press. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Thank you. 

So I will just stop and hopefully we will have a second round of 

questioning and I will recognize the ranking member, Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. You know, one of the hearings that we had here, some 

of the people that came and spoke before this committee, mentioned that Iran had a number of flights into Venezuela per week, 

and they were delivering crates and so forth. 

I was just wondering if you have any information as of late 

whether those flights are still going in and out of Venezuela, whoever—I guess you don’t. 

Mr. HUMIRE. No. The flights, from my knowledge, Mr. Sires, 

stopped in the end of 2010, beginning of 2011. But it should be 

noted that the President of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro, in his last 

trip to Iran late last year asked President Rouhani if they could resume that flight. 

It is not clear whether he agreed or what his response was. But 

that flight that existed for about 3 years nobody knows as to what 

exactly was in the contents. There is rumors of drugs, explosives, 

terrorists and other. 

But I can tell you that the flight, which was a commercial flight, lost more than $30 million in those 3 years and those $30 million 

were subsidized by the Venezuelan Ministry of Mines, which you 

54

have no—which doesn’t make sense. It would have been subsidized 

by the transportation ministry. But there was something very nefarious going on with that flight. 

Mr. SIRES. Anybody else? 

Mr. MODELL. Mr. Sires, the only thing I would add to that is a 

meeting in the Iranian Supreme Council on national security where 

they discussed the use of Mahan and other—and Iran Air and 

other airlines for the purpose of transporting lethal supplies and 

other forms of aid to Syria and to Iraq, and have considered the 

use of it in non-geostrategic areas like Latin America and Africa. 

Mr. SIRES. Anybody else? Mr. Shifter? 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you. 

The only thing I would say is that, you know, if one reads all the 

press reports and media accounts there was a lot of attention paid 

to this a few years ago and, I mean, I follow it pretty closely. 

I haven’t seen anything on these flights. Doesn’t mean it doesn’t 

exist but, you know, that does suggest that there were a lot of people that were following this and writing about it that no longer is 

out there. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Shifter, I just wonder if you know anything about 

the relation between Hezbollah with the Colombian guerillas and 

the Mexican drug traffickers’ organization. 

Mr. SHIFTER. I think there have been—as I said in my testimony, 

I think—Mr. Sires, I think that the main connection there is 

through—is through money laundering for support of—these are 

groups, obviously, that are very wealthy through the drug trade 

and what concerns me is their connections through money laundering—they are supporting some of the groups in the Middle East. 

I think that is the main connection and I think, you know, that 

is something that we are aware of and we need to address and I 

think the governments in Colombia and Mexico that are concerned 

about—we haven’t talked about the government—the regional governments. 

But they are, obviously, worried about their own security and are 

also focusing on this effort. So I think that is the connection that 

concerns me and I think we need to do more. 

Mr. SIRES. Anybody? 

Mr. MODELL. Congressman, I would just suggest that you have 

a series of briefings with DEA if you haven’t already to discuss the 

links between several senior Hezbollah members who are currently 

residing in Lebanon because they have to reside in Lebanon who 

were previously based in Mexico and Venezuela and places like Colombia where the cartels operate. 

There have been a number of high-profile cocaine busts, drug 

stoppages, investigations that have led back to Hezbollah. The only 

question is to what extent was Hezbollah institutionalizing—was 

there an institutional program on the part of the Hezbollah leadership council with regard to its involvement in drug trafficking. 

But DEA can give you a long list of Hezbollah affiliation with 

drug-related activities in Latin America that will actually pertain 

to trade-based money laundering that not only expands into Latin 

America but goes into—deep into West Africa as well. 

55

Mr. HUMIRE. Mr. Sires, I agree with Mr. Shifter. There is a huge 

laundering component. But the question you have to ask is who is 

the one doing the laundering. 

One of the connections to the FARC and Hezbollah resides in 

Venezuela. The current governor of a very important state in the 

northern Caribbean coast called Aragua is a gentleman named 

Tareck El Aissami. 

He is connected through Hezbollah to the former intelligence director, Hugo Carvajal, that was detained through the U.S. authorities in Aruba and he is connected to Hezbollah through his—

through his financial network. This is a clear connection with the 

Venezuelan Government that links the FARC with Hezbollah. 

There is probably more connections but that is one that has been 

relatively looked at publicly that I know our law enforcement and 

intelligence officials are examining very closely. 

Mr. SIRES. And I was just wondering if you know where the investigation is to the prosecutor in Argentina today. Is it done? It 

just went by the wayside or is there any effort? Does anybody—

where is that at? 

Mr. HUMIRE. The investigation on his death? 

Mr. SIRES. Yes, the circumstances of his death. 

Mr. HUMIRE. It is still ongoing. My understanding is that they 

asked for a second autopsy and they are proceeding the investigation on the circumstances around his death. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. Thank you. My time is up. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen had to leave. Just for the committee members, 

there was a terrorist attack in Tunis, Tunisia. I know of 12, I believe, people killed, 17 wounded, and I am sure that is part of why 

she had to leave. But I just wanted to let you be aware of that. 

I will now recognize Mr. Weber from Texas for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Modell—is that how you pronounce your name? You said 

earlier that there seems to be a government-wide lack of attention 

to this connection in South America. Can you elaborate on that? 

Mr. MODELL. Are you referring to the governmen- wide lack of 

attention to Iran and Hezbollah in Latin America? 

Mr. WEBER. Correct. 

Mr. MODELL. When you look at most of the government—let me 

just reiterate—when you look at most of the government agencies 

and what they are doing based out of Embassies and other activities throughout Latin America, I would say that most of them recognize that Iran is an important thing to be looking at. 

But there are some exceptions. I think it was mentioned that the 

State Department has neglected Iran. I mean, if you worked at an 

average Embassy and you watch what the Embassy—political officers are doing, what the Ambassador is doing, for the last 10 years 

for the most part they avoid Iran at all costs. 

So that is not necessarily true in the intelligence business and 

the defense business. But the point I wanted to make wasn’t necessarily that it was being totally neglected but that there wasn’t 

a very well thought out networked plan and approach to figuring 

out what the true threats of Iran and Hezbollah are across the reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:23 Jun 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\031815\93819 SHIRL
56

gion and how do—and whatever residual elements have been left 

behind over the years by their attempts to build infrastructure——

Mr. WEBER. You are talking about the United States government-wide? 

Mr. MODELL. Exactly right. Yes. I am talking about the U.S. 

Government agencies who are operating outside the United States 

in Latin America who are trying to address threats posed by Iran 

and Lebanese Hezbollah. 

Mr. WEBER. That is not very encouraging. 

Mr. MODELL. I would agree. Let me make one—let me make one 

other point. I would agree with Mr. Shifter in one sense. 

In terms of a geostrategic alliance—I mean, people are wondering. You know, while Iran has pulled off some, you know, obviously, some bombings and they have done some horrible things and 

we have foiled a lot of their plots across the Western Hemisphere, 

is there a geostrategic alliance that has formed between Latin 

American governments and Iran? 

I would say with the exception of maybe Venezuela and a few of 

the ALBA countries that Joseph mentioned I would say no. They 

have very little in common. 

But what is more striking to me is when you have—we have an 

Iranian Ambassador, for instance, in 2005 who shows up on a country like Mexico and he tells the Mexican Government that his main 

priorities in that country during his tenure are to proselytize and 

spread Twelver Shi’a Islam in a country that is—it is 99.9 percent 

Catholic. 

Nevertheless, they are headstrong and they are going to push 

their form of Islam in that country. And the other objective that 

they had, according to this Ambassador, was to break the relationship between Mexico and the United States. So, obviously, incredibly unrealistic. 

No foundation for geostrategic alliance but the point isn’t necessarily that he was—that Iran is on the verge to actually succeeding in that. It is that they are headstrong and they are willing 

to push and——

Mr. WEBER. Hold that thought. I appreciate you going there, and 

I am going to go to Mr. Shifter next. 

Having heard that, Mr. Shifter, you know, you made the statement earlier that you didn’t see that overall alliance, basically. But 

let us talk about fraudulent documents. 

It has been reported that several countries in Latin America 

have provided fraudulent documents for Islamic radicals—passports, national ID cards, birth certificates, et cetera. Are you aware 

of those reports? 

Mr. SHIFTER. To those reports, yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Do you have—is it—are they true? Do you have any 

information, any background? 

Mr. SHIFTER. I can’t verify those reports but if—you know, I 

wouldn’t be shocked if they were true. I think that—you know, the 

reports of fraudulent passports of that for lots of governments and 

they need to be investigated and I think they need to be seen what 

is the significance of that, what are——

Mr. WEBER. So you don’t seem to think it is a concern, this—apparently, as Mr. Modell just described, a growing alliance with no 

57

other—if no other purpose with the intent to divide America or 

United States and Mexico. You don’t seem to be concerned about 

that kind of alliance. 

Mr. SHIFTER. I don’t think strategically it is of concern. I think 

these incidents of the passports and the other fraudulent documents are of concern. They are always of concern for any government. 

But I don’t think that one should exaggerate the threat that that 

poses to——

Mr. WEBER. Well, what I think when there is Islamic militants 

who have created a kind of mayhem that they have, I mean, how 

do you exaggerate those who are intent on killing men, women and 

children, in some instances with suicide bombers? That is a pretty 

heavy threat. I mean, how do you exaggerate that? 

Mr. SHIFTER. Well, I think that—I think that if you look at from 

country to country there have been mentioned—leaving aside Venezuela but if you look at Mexico and Peru and Colombia these are 

all countries with governments that are committed to trying to improve the security situation. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, they are but——

Mr. SHIFTER. They are more concerned than we should be. 

Mr. WEBER [continuing]. Well, we happen to have less than—

someone called it a porous border between—I was—in the Texas 

legislature I was the vice chairman of the borders committee. 

I can tell you how porous the border is in many instances. So the 

fact that we have Islamic militants that are getting forged documents and coming up into the country just to the south of us how 

would you mitigate that? 

Mr. SHIFTER. I think there must—has to be a much stronger 

pressure and more cooperation to try to guard against that. I agree 

that that is a concern. I share that. But I don’t think that we 

should—I don’t think it poses a major threat to the United States. 

I think these are specific questions that need to be addressed 

that should be addressed, and I wanted to make that point in my 

testimony that there are things that are troubling and this troubles 

me. 

But I don’t think it means—I don’t think we should—we should 

take it beyond what the evidence suggests. 

Mr. WEBER. You don’t think it is a major threat? So if nine people—I think, Mr. Chairman, was it Tunisia—were killed or 12, 

whatever the total is—if nine or 12 were killed in the United 

States then that is not a major threat? 

Mr. SHIFTER. If they were killed in the United States it would 

be a very, very significant and troubling event. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

I think if you talk to Paraguayans they would tell you that there 

are a lot of false documents that are transferred between Lebanese 

that are traveling in other Tri-Border region. 

I think it is very prolific there. The question, I think, the gentleman was trying to get to is Venezuela’s role—what Chavez may 

have provided to the Iranians on the flights that went from Caracas to Tehran and where terrorists or other Iranian operatives may 

have been able to travel on Venezuelan documents and other 

58

things. I think that is something to delve into. I think that is what 

the gentleman was getting to. 

So with that, I will recognize Mr. Deutch from Florida for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Humire—is that right? You spoke as the chairman did of the 

Brazilian newspaper article that alleged Iran and Venezuela were 

part of a scheme aimed at restarting nuclear cooperation between 

Iran and Argentina. 

The report is based on three high-ranking former officials of the 

government of Hugo Chavez, all of whom are now in the United 

States and requested asylum in this country. 

According to three officials, on January 13th, 2007, Iranian 

President Ahmadinejad asked Venezuelan President Chavez for assistance in securing nuclear cooperation from Argentina and in dissuading Argentina from pursuing Interpol Red Notices, which are 

akin to arrest warrants in connection with the bombing of the 

AMIA Jewish Center, Buenos Aires. 

I just got a few questions based on that article. First of all, what 

is your assessment of Prosecutor Nisman’s complaint that Argentina was seeking to absolve Iran of responsibility in the AMIA attack? 

Mr. HUMIRE. I think Dr. Nisman is probably the most credible 

Latin American governing official that has worked on the portfolio 

of Iran in Latin America. Not just in Argentina, in general. His report in 2013 provided a lot of details about seven countries that 

had the same kind of activity. 

Dr. Nisman’s most recent report was—unfortunately, was not 

surprising because our independent investigation came to very 

similar conclusions. Argentina’s economic deficits puts them in a 

very vulnerable position. Even if they say they don’t want to align 

themselves with Iran, they may have to out of necessity. 

Argentina did align themselves with Venezuela because they 

needed energy, because they needed help financially. We know that 

the former President, Hugo Chavez, authorized the purchase of almost $10 billion worth of Argentine debt. That gives him an inordinate amount of influence and that could be triangulated toward 

Iran. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So you don’t have any—you don’t have any reason 

to believe that Prosecutor Nisman was operating at the request of 

interested parties and not simply following the evidence? 

Mr. HUMIRE. The only interested party that I know that he had 

in his mind was the AMIA victims and he spoke about them quite 

frequently and he sought justice and truth for the case in Argentina. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Interpol said that no official requests have been 

made to cancel the Red Notices. So on what basis then would 

Nisman have said that Iran sought to lift them? 

Mr. HUMIRE. Well, I mean, one thing is what the Argentine Government can do and another thing is what they promise Iran. You 

know, they might make promises that they can’t actually deliver 

but they will make those promises to get whatever benefits that 

they can receive. 

59

I am not—I can’t tell you if they actually made the request but 

Nisman didn’t say that they actually were going to go through it. 

What he said was that they told Iran that that is what they were 

going to do and that is based on wiretaps so there is audio recording evidence and that is also based on eyewitness accounts. So he 

had the evidence to make those statements. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And the Foreign Minister Timerman said that Argentina’s refineries wouldn’t be able to process the high sulfuric 

content of Iran’s crude oil and therefore, he has claimed, that 

Nisman’s allegations on that front couldn’t be true. How do you respond to his rebuttal? 

Mr. HUMIRE. Again, this is—these are not the purpose of what 

Nisman—he wasn’t trying to make a sophisticated case as to what 

Argentina could actually get. 

He is only telling you what they told them. Argentina has energy 

agreements with other countries—Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela—

where they perhaps could get the refineries they need to get the 

crude. 

I couldn’t tell you if that is what they actually are going to do. 

But there was triangulation with a lot of their activities with Iran, 

not just with Venezuela. Perhaps with Bolivia as well. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And do you know how Argentina would be able to 

share nuclear information or material with Iran, considering the 

sanctions that are in place on Iran? 

Mr. HUMIRE. I would say it would be a third-party country, most 

importantly through Venezuela. At the same time that Argentina 

started to become more active with Iran they became more active 

with Venezuela, especially on the financial level and also through 

social projects—projects that actually never were completed but yet 

the money was still being moved between two countries. 

They would have to shield this through other activities, through 

other projects that perhaps wouldn’t get the scrutiny that would a 

military project or something else. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And, finally, what has to happen in order for us to 

ensure that the work that Nisman did is not lost and that it is seen 

through? 

Mr. HUMIRE. I think one of the things that Dr. Nisman was really focused on was how to take the AMIA case and particularly the 

Iranian accused to be focused on the international level. 

The Red Notices for him just didn’t work because in order for 

that to happen the Iranian Government would have to arrest their 

own accused and send them for custody. He knew that was never 

going to happen. 

However, if he was able to move the case to a third party court 

international—on an international level, perhaps the United Nations, they can maybe obligate not as—perhaps as a—I am sorry, 

not as a accused but as a witness to another crime, perhaps a 

criminal conspiracy. 

So in my opinion, Dr. Nisman knew that in order for the AMIA 

case—in order for the conspiracy in Argentina to be paid attention 

to, he had to take it to a higher level to the international community. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Great. I really appreciate your insight. Thanks for 

being here and thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

60

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from Illinois is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you and Ranking 

Member Sires and Deutch and the witnesses here today. 

The State Department has maintained for a number of years, as 

you know, in its annual terrorism report that there are no operational cells of al-Qaeda or Hezbollah in the hemisphere but that 

ideological sympathizers in the region provide financial support to 

these and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South 

Asia. 

In contrast, as we have talked about a little bit, General John 

Kelly has maintained in the SOUTHCOM’s 2014 posture statement 

that he remains concerned that Hezbollah maintains an operational presence in the region. 

In your opinion, what accounts for the apparent discord between 

the State Department’s terrorism report and SOUTHCOM’S 2104 

posture? Why is there a difference of opinion? Anyone who dares. 

Mr. MODELL. Based on my own experience in the region, I can 

tell you that people focus on different things. Going back to the 

issue of false documentation in the region, one of the things that 

Hezbollah has developed a very, very good skill in is counterfeiting—counterfeiting false documentation and they have long relied on Latin America not necessarily as a base of terrorist operations but as a fund-raising center. 

So whether you are talking about the Tri-Border area or the free 

trade zones where they have been reportedly active, there are certain things that they do very well down there. 

And the U.S.—let me just mention something—the U.S. Government needs to get on the same page with the regard to the extent 

of those activities and the extent to which there is a very formally 

approved process between the chain of command in Beirut and 

what goes on in places like the Tri-Border area, the extent to which 

people are actually doing Hezbollah-specific or Hezbollah-supported 

activities. 

But to address the idea that there is a discrepancy between the 

two, again, in my experience in the region, while we were very focused on Iran or on Russia and other what we call hard targets, 

State Department wasn’t focused on them at all and there was a 

different—there was a fundamental difference in their approach 

and the way they view the problems and the tools they had and 

the resources they had for dealing with it. And that—for me, that 

is the only explanation. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you. I would only add that I think there is 

no question—again, I think we have to distinguish between—in the 

Tri-Border area there is contraband, there is smuggling, there is 

money laundering, there is illicit commerce, and there are Muslim 

communities there as well. 

Whether there is an operational cell there, I think some of it is—

you know, one has to have—apply very high standards of evidence 

and make sure that that is confirmed. 

And there may be information that—different kinds of information that get to different parts of the U.S. Government and they 

reached different conclusions and I think the State Department 

61

said, we really want very, very hard incontrovertible evidence that 

there is an operational cell before we include it in our report, and 

whereas perhaps other parts of the government say there is a lot 

of information that we are getting that lead us to this conclusion. 

So there are different emphases that happen. 

My own sense and just consulted a lot of people who are very familiar with that area say that, you know, there is no question that 

there is enormous, you know, contraband and illicit trafficking and 

there is a big Muslim community. But whether there is an operational cell there is still not yet substantiated. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. 

Beyond Hezbollah, is there evidence to suggest that there is 

other extra-hemisphere foreign terrorist organizations that maintain operational presence in Latin America and the Caribbean—

and/or the Caribbean? 

Mr. SHIFTER. Terrorist organizations? 

Ms. KELLY. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. SHIFTER. Not that I am aware of. 

Mr. HUMIRE. Ms. Kelly, yes. To answer your question, there is 

operational intelligence—operational presence of other foreign terrorist organizations even though they are Islamic terrorist organizations. 

The case in 2007 that was a thwarted plot against the John F. 

Kennedy International Airport—that is a very interesting case to 

study because here you have a Sunni Islamic terrorist group, 

Jamaat al-Muslimeen, in Trinidad cooperating with the Shi’a imam 

and political figure in Guyana to coordinate an attack against a 

U.S. target. 

The Caribbean has a lot of this type of activity that is not particularly always Iranian funded or supported that is supported by 

other elements and other groups that are looking also at different 

type of terrorist operations. 

But I also want to make a quick point on your earlier question. 

There is also a legal distinction that needs to be understood and 

it creates a big vacuum in the region that could be a vulnerability 

for the United States. 

If you are the State Department and you were to call Brazil and 

say, you know, is there a Hezbollah-operated presence in your 

country, they will say no and they would be legally correct because 

they don’t distinguish legally Hezbollah as a foreign terrorist organization. 

Until Hezbollah commits a crime or a member of Hezbollah commits a crime—narcotrafficking, extortion or other—they are not 

considered a terrorist in their country, and that legal distinction is, 

I think, what causes some of the confusion. 

When people on the ground like, perhaps, people in Southern 

Command or special operations commander or other, are seeing 

some of the same individuals that they see are on watch lists in 

other parts of the world operating in those countries they don’t 

make those legal distinctions and so they understand that there is 

a Hezbollah presence. 

But there is a vacuum in Latin America with anti-terror legislation. They don’t look at Islamic extremism the way we look at it 

and so that causes some of that confusion. 

62

Ms. KELLY. My time is up. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. Thank you—a 

great question. The chair will—okay. The chair will recognize Mr. 

Weber. Mr. Yoho—I am sorry. Mr. Yoho from Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here and your testimony, and 

this is something that I think we are all very well concerned with 

what is going on in our Western Hemisphere and I think it is 

something that has been overlooked. 

I want to reference—go back to the State Department request for 

the report on the Western Hemisphere, and they finally reported 

in 2012—they gave a report and it says—it found that Iran’s influence in the Western Hemisphere was waning. 

And if so, if that was—do you feel that was true back then in 

2012 when the report came out from the State Department about 

the influence of Iran and Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere? 

Was it waning? 

Mr. MODELL. I thank you for your question. 

You know, in 2012—between 2012 and today, budgets at the Iranian Government as for any types of activities whether you are 

talking about in their own immediate back yard in Iraq and Syria, 

intelligence activities further afield in Africa and Latin America, 

have gone drastically down. 

So has their influence gone down? I would point out there was 

mentioned earlier today Mr. Rabbani, the guy who was the Iranian 

cultural attache at the time in the bombing in 1994 who has since 

remained in Iran and reportedly left a few times here and there—

that he is still doing—but he is in charge of a network of people 

that the Iranian Government relies on, whether they are people 

who have gone—who are running mosques, cultural centers and so 

forth, throughout Iran. So—go ahead. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, that is what I wanted to ask you. I mean, if they 

are waning but they are building mosques at the time and they are 

donating $800,000 to the Argentinian President—Presidential race, 

it seems like their influence was pretty strong and we know that. 

So to say it was waning I think was a mischaracterization, and 

they had a report and it says in this here that they can only submit 

five pages back to Congress, which is very limiting. 

It would be like, you know, having a cake recipe and you only 

can do three pages of it or, you know, three sentences of how to 

make that and then the rest is on your own. 

It just seems very limiting. So I feel like they have been growing 

and it just wasn’t a correct conclusion. Mr. Humire? 

Mr. HUMIRE. Correct, Mr. Yoho. 

The—you know, there was some evidence to say that perhaps 

they were maintaining. But I will give you a point that supports 

the evidence that they are growing. This was mentioned just a 

minute ago. 

The commander, Southern Command General John Kelly, just 

testified before Congress saying that there is 70 culture centers or 

80 culture centers——

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. HUMIRE [continuing]. In Latin America. In 2012, the former 

commander of Southern Command, Doug Fraser, testified that 

63

there was 36. That is a 55-percent increase, and those culture centers are what is linked to those influence operations. 

The gentleman that Mr. Modell mentioned, Mohsen Rabbani, has 

a network of disciples in Latin America that are in charge of those 

operations. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. HUMIRE. That number has multiplied. So if you talk about 

terms of influence, there is more agents of influence. There is more 

access of influence and these individuals are the ones that make 

contacts with the host governments. 

Mr. YOHO. Is there a Muslim-practicing population sufficient 

enough to warrant 80 mosques in Latin America? 

Mr. MODELL. I would point out one thing with regard to the 80 

mosques and the cultural centers, and I agree with Joseph that 

they have expanded those efforts. 

Mr. Rabbani invites people from all over Latin America to come 

in and do training courses and learn about Islam, and then he has 

this leave behind—this sort of operational force or influence force 

around Latin America. 

I would say no. In most cases, they would be happy to take any 

person who walks through the door who expresses even the smallest willingness to learn about Islam. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. MODELL. And then they are happy to say hey, go run our cultural center or our mosque. And I am not suggesting that that is 

not influential or dangerous or maybe something needs to be monitored. But it is very tenuous and to call it an operational cell in 

a lot of cases is an overstatement. 

Mr. YOHO. I would agree with that, and then I have got a minute 

left here, roughly, and I don’t know if you guys have touched on 

that structure in Bolivia that is built by Iran, supposedly, and 

heavily guarded. 

Do you have a feel for what that is or has that already been discussed? And if so, I apologize. 

Mr. HUMIRE. I have looked at the facility in great detail. I could 

tell you this. The facility doesn’t function the way it is supposed 

to function. It is a military academy of some sort for asymmetric 

warfare but is an academy that doesn’t receive students, that 

doesn’t have operational presence as far as, like, logistics and others. 

Mr. YOHO. How large is that compound or structure? 

Mr. HUMIRE. It is not entirely large. There are more administrative buildings—about four buildings. I couldn’t tell you the exact 

geographic dimension but it is about four administrative. 

Mr. YOHO. I have heard all kinds of theories and rumors about 

it—you know, launch sites and all that. You know, I just wanted 

to make sure it has been looked at well. 

Mr. HUMIRE. Okay. 

Mr. YOHO. Anybody else have an opinion on that? 

I am out of time and I appreciate your testimony. I yield back, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

64

One thing I think that is interesting to note is the amount of student travel from South American countries to Tehran, and based 

on those cultural centers. 

So Mr. Castro from Texas is recognized. 

Mr. CASTRO. Well, thank you, Chairman, and thank you to each 

of the witnesses. Thank you for your testimony and for your scholarship and work on these issues. 

I think our nation should, of course, be vigilant about any kind 

of growing influence that Iran may have whether it is in Latin 

America, Europe or anywhere else. 

But I guess let me ask you a baseline question. How many people 

have been radicalized in Latin America and gone over to fight for, 

say, in ISIS or in al-Qaeda? Has anybody been radicalized that you 

all know of? 

Mr. HUMIRE. I think there has been individuals in Venezuela and 

several countries in the Caribbean that have gone over to Syria to 

fight. But the numbers aren’t significant. They are relatively small. 

Mr. CASTRO. Do we know their names or what impact they have 

had? I know you gave the example of the Guyanese man, of course, 

who has been convicted here for his actions. 

Mr. HUMIRE. Correct. 

Mr. CASTRO. Is there anybody else that we know of by name? 

Mr. HUMIRE. To that level of such a high profile I don’t know a 

specific name but I can tell you that there is a criminal terrorist 

pipeline that has developed through Venezuela that sends funds 

and drugs from Latin America to the Middle East and, in turn, 

sends foreign fighters from the Middle East back to Latin America. 

That pipeline is still active today. 

Mr. CASTRO. Is it safer to say that there have been more folks 

radicalized both in the United States and Europe than they have 

in Latin America? 

Mr. HUMIRE. Correct. 

Mr. CASTRO. Okay. What would be the advantage to a Latin 

American country? I guess—or let me preface my question by reiterating some of the points that have been made. 

Iranian—the Iranian budget is drastically down for some of these 

outreach efforts. Their economy right now is—I don’t want to say 

quite in shambles but is going through a very rough time. So what 

is the advantage of a Latin American to cozy up to Iran, at least 

in the period that we find ourselves now? 

Mr. SHIFTER. Well, Congressman Castro, I don’t think there is 

much of an incentive. That is why—precisely why I am trying to 

make the case that although there are concerns and we should 

watch closely, Latin America, you know, wants to be prosperous. 

They want investment. They want democracy. I mean, this is a 

region that is in a very different state and I think that this—they 

are not going to find what Iran has to offer very, very attractive, 

either economically or in any other way. 

So I don’t think there are great incentives. There are, obviously, 

a few—a handful of countries we know—they have already been 

mentioned that have more of an anti-U.S. agenda and so they will 

find common cause with Iran because they share that to sort of—

to curtail the influence of the United States. And so the geopolitical—they are joined in sort of a geopolitical alliance. Some of 

65

that exists. But beyond a few countries and beyond that issue, I see 

very little. 

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. Yes, sir? 

Mr. LO ́ PEZ-DOLZ. In the case of my country, Peru, the advancements that were obtained by radical movements is money because 

in general terms the violent movements in my country don’t have 

the money. They obtain some money from drug trafficking but any 

kind of money they receive will be well received. 

What I want to remark is the same people that is—they are acting—are heads of every single violent movement against any kind 

of legal production or whatever in the deep country, in order to preserve the drug trafficking and illegal money is that all activity that 

could be done in this area is the same people connected with Iran 

activity. 

So we will find people who are chiefs of a party or an organization leading to FARC, leading to Venezuela, and the same are pretty close to those Iranian activities in the area. 

Mr. CASTRO. Okay. Thank you. 

Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the gentleman. 

We are going to enter in a second round, if the gentlemen would 

like to stay. I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Last Congress, the House passed the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act, which died over in the Senate. It targets 

foreign banks and requires that the administration to determine 

whether Hezbollah is a transnational organized criminal significant 

narcotic trafficker. 

So I would ask this of Mr. Modell, do you believe that this legislation could effectively enhance our ability to target Hezbollah in 

Latin America? 

Mr. MODELL. I do think it could make a difference. I was—I am 

aware that legislation, and we had some meetings to discuss that 

legislation as it was being formed. 

I think that any time you can put additional pressure on the 

Lebanese banking system to—for them to crack down on Hezbollah 

within Lebanon is going to help and it is going to reverberate out. 

I think—I think as far as the U.S. Government that we can do 

in addition to passing legislation anything that enables Treasury to 

have more latitude in pursuing banks, particularly with banks that 

we have already identified, but people are concerned that it is 

going to destabilize the Lebanese banking system and they don’t 

want to—they don’t want to do anything about it, recognizing that, 

well, it is too bad because we see so much IRGC Quds Force or we 

see so much Syrian money illegally going through there. We even 

see Lebanese bulk cash shipments coming from West Africa going 

right into these banks. 

But yet, it is part of a major banking center within the region. 

We don’t want to destabilize it. So if that led—to the extent that 

that legislation can lead to more latitude and better tools at our 

disposal for putting pressure on that financially I am entirely in 

favor of it. I think it could have an impact, yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I mean, we have focused on Latin America here but 

the 2012 law was Iran’s presence in the Western Hemisphere. So 

we are talking about financial transactions. We can’t ignore the CaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:23 Jun 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\031815\93819 SHIRL
66

nadian Bank and the fact that there is very clearly transactions 

that were going, whether it was money laundering and other 

things. 

And as we mentioned Paraguay earlier, you know, anybody in 

Ciudad del Este, whether it is Paraguayans or others, will tell you 

Hezbollah’s activity there, which is financial transactions to fund 

Hezbollah. 

Now, whether it is skimming rents or whether it is, you know, 

contraband that is being sold and I have seen it with my own eyes. 

And so I think you are right. I think that is just—this would be 

just another tool and I am going to talk with the author about possibly reintroducing that. 

In your written testimony, you make several specific policy recommendations for the—Mr. Modell, for the U.S. to consider. Of 

these recommendations, which do you believe has the highest priority? 

If you had to rank them, give me the first one or two. 

Mr. MODELL. First one or two is the first thing that I mentioned 

today and I would say first—if we are really serious and, again, I 

don’t want to overstate the threat. 

I mean, I think that when you have somebody like Rabbani or, 

you know, and other Iranians who have made a consistent effort 

to build networks of influence in Latin America, I don’t deny that 

that is going on. 

I don’t want to inflate that, though, to a geostrategic problem in 

the region. That said, if I was going to do one thing—if I could 

make one recommendation, distill all of this down to one thing, 

that would be getting everybody on the same page. 

I hear a lot of talk about whole of government solutions within 

DoD, and DoD says well, wait a minute—we have got to enable 

whole of government solutions where we are going to work with 

State and we are going to work with the agency and everybody 

else, and rarely does that happen. 

Everybody is pursuing different aspects of the problem set and 

there are working groups that get together—counter threat mitigation working groups that get together and they talk about problems 

like Hezbollah and they say, here are our transnational criminal 

organizational problems and nobody agrees and nobody is forced to 

work together, to take it to the next level and actually implement 

steps that are coming to a common set of platforms that can last 

the test of time in a place like Latin America. 

And, again, I don’t see the hordes coming over the gates, you 

know, coming across the wall. I think that Iran is a problem we 

need to be looking at. 

But it is the leave behind—the residual leave behind force—the 

influence networks that they have that need to be better identified 

and rooted out. But that will require a counter network strategy 

and I don’t think we have that. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me—let me ask you on that point. After 9/11, 

we saw that stove piping of information was a big factor in allowing a terrorist attack to happen on the United States. 

So do you think—I agree with you. DIA, DoD, elements of DIA 

and others—NCTC, CIA, all these elements—should be talking 

with our neighbors, our allies in the hemisphere about this real 

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threat. And so I gather from what you said they are not, or at least 

we are not forcing them to come up with a comprehensive approach. 

You know, this committee has jurisdiction over State. We don’t 

have jurisdiction over DoD, over intel. But I think there needs to 

be an effort to try to make sure there is no stove piping of that information because we are going to miss something if we do. 

And it may not be an attack on the United States but it may be 

something in our hemisphere that, for our involvement, may be 

able to thwart. Would you agree with that assessment? 

Mr. MODELL. I would agree with that assessment, and when you 

look at the people—the men and women in the United States Government who are working out of our Embassies around—throughout the hemisphere, the Ambassador obviously is the Chief of Mission and he is the one who gets, you know, the country team together and finds out what everybody is working on and he tries to 

drive everyone toward the larger objectives of the United States 

Government in that particular country. 

But one thing I would comment on is yes, I agree with you. The 

State Department needs to have—there needs to be a different dynamic and part of it would be a new series of incentives that would 

have to be created at the Embassy level. 

Everybody, at the end of the day, even post 9/11, goes about their 

good old traditional missions and you can create a DNI. You can 

create an NCTC. It has very, very limited impact on how we do 

business overseas. The agency continues to do what it has always 

done and so does State, and so does DIA, and so does DoD and everybody else. 

So if you really decide that you want a networked approach to 

figuring out how to better go against Hezbollah, which is a complex 

undertaking, particularly because it is a criminal issue more than 

anyone else for the most part until they are called on to do terrorism, you really need to have everybody working together. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, I agree. Look, I think NCTC, CIA—I think all 

of these organizations alphabet soup of them do a great job, and 

if you look at all the worldwide activity whether it is what happened in Tunisia today, what is going on with ISIS across North 

Africa and the Middle East, whether it is Iran and nuclear weapons, whether it is even terrorist attacks in Indonesia and India and 

others that are directly tied to Iran, this is our hemisphere. This 

is our neighborhood. These are our allies, our neighbors, our 

friends, and I will remind the committee that the largest loss of life 

from a terrorist attack prior to 9/11 happened in Buenos Aires in 

the 1994 attack—the largest loss of life from a terrorist attack. 

And many believe that Iran or Hezbollah, its proxy, was directly 

involved in that. We can’t take our eye off that ball and it hits to 

home when it is here. I don’t want to see it happen again here to 

anyone, most importantly, not to the United States or our assets 

or elements. 

And so this has been a great hearing. I am going to recognize the 

former chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee and 

now the chairman of the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee, my friend, Mr. 

Salmon, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SALMON. Thanks a lot, Mr. Chairman. 

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My question is to anybody who has a great answer, or even if it 

is a not so great answer go ahead and take a stab. But as we are 

looking at the Nisman allegations and his subsequent murder, logic 

dictates he must have had something beyond what he revealed before his death to have driven somebody to have murdered him. 

Have any of you looked closely at Argentina’s missile program, 

formerly known as Condor II but reconstituted by President 

Kirchner as Gradicom? 

Is there any indication beyond conjecture that Kirchner transferred missile technology indirectly to Iran via Venezuela? As you 

all know, missile technology is really the missing piece should Iran 

be seeking to militarize its nuclear capability. 

So could this sort of technology transfer have been that grave 

finding that Nisman wanted to take to the U.N. Security Council 

but was murdered before he could reveal it? 

Mr. HUMIRE. Mr. Salmon, the missile technology that was given 

to Venezuela from Argentina, the important component of that 

transfer is who received it in Venezuela. 

The recipient in Venezuela was the Venezuelan military industry 

known as CAVIM. CAVIM has been littered with Iranian agents as 

well as Iranian projects—joint projects that have several dual-use 

capacities. 

The missile transfer was just one of them. There were several 

other projects that were also done with CAVIM. CAVIM was sanctioned for this very purpose. 

I think it is highly probable that something nefarious was in that 

transfer because on the face of it the missile program that Argentina was building didn’t have a real endogenous production. 

It wasn’t something that they necessarily needed or the Latin 

Americans needed that much. They don’t have those kind of conflicts right but—but it is something that perhaps Iran could have 

benefitted from. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

As an aside, I was in Buenos Aires back in April in 2013 right 

around the time that the intercepts revealed that D’Elia and his 

Iranian interlocutor were discussing Foreign Minister Timerman’s 

role in the alleged plan to whitewash Iran’s role in the AMIA 

bombing. 

While I was there along with Ranking Member Sires, I met with 

Timerman and asked him about the Truth Commission his government signed with Tehran. I remember Timerman flying off the 

handle at the very question—very much an overreaction. 

I remember I walked out of my meeting, turned to my staffer and 

I asked, what is wrong with this guy—he seemed like a really extreme and overreaction to a—you know, a reasonable question. 

Now I know. Nisman’s allegations show that Timerman was 

being asked to help cover up Iran’s role in the largest attack 

against Jews since World War II. 

So that was just an aside I would like to share with the chairman, the committee and the panelists. There is a lot of stuff going 

on over there that we need some answers on and I don’t—this administration, dealing with the current President, the current Foreign Minister is not very forthcoming. In fact, they put up brick 

69

walls every time we try to get close to something and people end 

up dead. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. I thank him for his leadership on that. 

We have got one last member, Mr. Yoho, for a final round of 

questions. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me, and gentlemen, I will make this hopefully quick. 

Hezbollah, the Party of God, is a Shi’ite Islamist militia. It was 

founded in 1982 in response to the first Israeli-Lebanese War and 

its stated goal include wiping Israel off the map. 

Has that goal changed, in your opinions? 

Mr. MODELL. I think it—I think it hasn’t changed at all and I 

think that both Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah officials have restated it. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Shifter? 

Mr. SHIFTER. The goal—that goal remains. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. Are we pretty much in agreement that that 

goal has not changed? And then it is disturbing to me that the U.S. 

national intel report that came out has removed Iran and 

Hezbollah off the terrorist threat list. 

Do you see that as just a—what do they call it? A graphical drop 

when they reformat at a graphical format error? Knowing what we 

know, and we also know that Fidel Castro went to Iran I think it 

was approximately 10 years ago and met with the Ayatollah, and 

they said their common goal was to bring America to its knees. 

Has that changed with the Cubans and the Iranians working together? Has that goal changed, in your opinions? Mr. Shifter, we 

will start with you. 

Mr. SHIFTER. I think the goal of Cuba has changed. I think the 

latest change in U.S.-Cuban relations suggests to me that that is 

not what the goal of the Cubans is, that they realize that they can’t 

do that. They need the United States and that is why they are pursuing this opening with the United States. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. So you feel that way. Does anybody else feel 

that way or is there a counterpoint—somebody feel different? That 

the Cuban——

Mr. HUMIRE. No. I believe, Mr. Yoho, that—the Iranians entered, 

by extension also as well, Hezbollah into a global campaign for 

international legitimacy. 

Latin America is a big component of that. The nuclear—the conversations and the negotiations over their nuclear program that 

began in 2013 paralleled the negotiations that were happening in 

Argentina to whitewash themselves from the AMIA attack. 

I mean, there was even some of the same negotiators. The former 

Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, was also the negotiator 

for the nuclear program and we are talking about the same individuals that are looking to do the same things. 

Cuba’s role in Latin America, aside from what they are telling 

the United States, is also a role of an intelligence function. They 

have restructured and enhanced the intelligence apparatus of many 

countries in Latin America to the benefit of Iran. 

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This immigration scheme, which I want to—I want to clarify one 

thing. It is not—they are not fraudulent documents. These are 

state issued documents that are not doctored. They are actually 

given by the government to a Hezbollah member. 

The research at my center, we have a list of 173 individuals that 

have gotten this type of service. That is evidence we have submitted to law enforcement. I would be happy to submit it to 

the——

Mr. YOHO. No, I have seen that and that is the thing that disturbs me about this whole thing. In 2013, the State Department report stated that Iran and Hezbollah terrorist activity has reached 

a tempo unseen since the 1990s, and that is with sanctions on Iran. 

So I think this is something we need to really pay attention to 

and I think it is a misstep by our State Department and this administration to negotiate with Iran and open up that negotiation 

without giving anything. 

I mean, they still have four of our hostages. They have four 

Americans still sitting over there. To even open up those negotiations in good faith I would have asked for those to return. 

And so you kind of wonder why we even entered into this, and 

then you look at the relaxation of the foreign policy with Cuba that 

we got nothing out of, and then we sat here a week ago or 2 weeks 

ago and we asked the experts, did we get anything out of this and 

did the Cuban people—did they get more freedoms and liberties 

with the proposed change through the Obama administration. 

All four of them said no, and they all four said that this negotiation, along with what we are doing with Iran, has weakened the 

Western Hemisphere and has weakened America. And, you know, 

I can only take that as expert opinion and if that is true I just—

I just think this is the wrong way and that we need to heed the 

warning. 

We had a professor in vet school that said if it walks like a duck, 

quacks like a duck, smells like a duck, it is a duck. What we are 

seeing is not good, I feel, for the direction of America and America’s 

security and I think we need to pay strong attention to this. 

Mr. Shifter, do you have anything you want to add? 

Mr. SHIFTER. Just one final comment, if I could. 

Mr. YOHO. Sure. 

Mr. SHIFTER. I think you are right. But I also think that in terms 

of the role of Iran and Hezbollah I would also consult with the 

Israeli Government. 

They are—of all the governments besides ours would be concerned. I have talked to them a lot and at least what I have——

Mr. YOHO. I think that is a wise—a wise decision. 

Mr. SHIFTER. I think they follow it closely. 

Mr. YOHO. Yes, sir. Thank you for your time. Mr. Chairman, 

thank you for the second round. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman from Florida, and there 

being no other committee members we will wrap up. 

I will say that I agree with Mr. Humire that these aren’t fraudulent travel documents. They are issued by a government. They are 

just carried by the wrong person or they are exchanged, as we see 

down in Paraguay, with a lot of Lebanese coming over, and this 

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has been pointed out to me by the Paraguayan intelligence. So I 

think you are right. 

Well, pursuant to Committee Rule 7, the members of the subcommittee will be permitted to submit written statements to be included in the official record. As an addition, they may have additional questions that could be put in. 

So we are going to leave the hearing record open for 5 days to 

allow statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record 

subject to the length of limitations. 

And so there being no further business for the subcommittee, we 

will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JEFF DUNCAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE


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[NOTE: A statement by William Ross Newland III, submitted for the record by the 

Honorable Jeff Duncan, is not reprinted here but the link is available on the Internet at http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=103177]

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