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64–261 2015

RUSSIA, GEORGIA, AND THE RETURN OF POWER 

POLITICS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2008 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

( 

Available via http://www.csce.gov 


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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

SENATE HOUSE 

BENJAMIN CARDIN, Maryland, 

Co-Chairman 

RUSSELL FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHRISTOPHER DODD, Connecticut 

HILARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

JOHN KERRY, Massachusetts 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

ALCEE HASTINGS, Florida, 

Chairman 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey 

ROBERT ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

DAVID KRAMER, Department of State 

MARY BETH LONG, Department of Defense 

DAVID STEEL BOHIGIAN, Department of Commerce 


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RUSSIA, GEORGIA, AND THE RETURN OF 

POWER POLITICS 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2009 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 1 

Hon. Alcee Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 7 

Hon. Chris Smith, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 12 

WITNESSES 

Matthew Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, European and Eurasian Affairs ...................................................... 2 

David Bakradze, Speaker of the Parliament of Georgia, Georgian Government ..................................................................... 17 

Paul Sanders, Executive Director, The Nixon Center .............. 28 

Paul Goble, Director of Research and Publications, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy in Baku ..................................... 31 


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RUSSIA, GEORGIA, AND THE RETURN OF 

POWER POLITICS 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2009 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, Washington, DC. 

The hearing was held at 1:35 p.m. EST in 2325 Rayburn House 

Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Alcee Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. Chris 

Smith, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe. 

Witnesses present: Matthew Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State, European and Eurasian Affairs; David Bakradze, Speaker of 

the Parliament of Georgia, Georgian Government; Paul Sanders, 

Executive Director, The Nixon Center; and Paul Goble, Director of 

Research and Publications, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy in 

Baku. 

HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, CO-CHAIRMAN, 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. CARDIN. The Helsinki Commission will come to order. Let me 

first apologize for the schedule we’re going to have to follow for today’s hearing. The House members are in the midst of a series of 

votes, and we expect that they’ll be here probably in the next 15– 

20 minutes. 

I’m required to be on the Senate floor at 2:00. I’m going to have 

to leave here about at about 10 of two in order to be able to get 

back to the Senate floor. We could have a break in the action, and 

if that happens I will recess the committee subject to the call of the 

chair at that time, which will be Chairman Hastings when he gets 

back from the floor. We do apologize for that. 

But I must tell you, this is one of the most important hearings 

that the Helsinki Commission is conducting this year dealing with 

Russia, Georgia and the return of power politics. 

I was attending a Foreign Relations Committee hearing a little 

bit earlier today where we were having a hearing on NATO expansion dealing with Albania and Croatia. Most of the questions at 

that hearing by senators focused on Russia. Even though their impact on Croatia and Albania is not very great, what they did during the Bucharest Summit, their influence in the judgment made 

collectively by our NATO allies on extending invitations to Georgia 

and Ukraine is well documented. And since that time, of course, 


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with the Russian use of military within Georgia, it represents a 

new chapter in the relationship between the United States and 

Russia. 

We obviously strongly condemn in the strongest possible terms 

Russia’s use of military force within Georgia. We also are concerned as Russia is gaining more aggression internationally they 

are also internally moving in the wrong direction as it relates to 

the liberties of the people within Russia. The freedom of press, the 

freedom of expression—all that is being moving in the wrong direction. One of the consequences of what has been done by Russia and 

Georgia is a concern that there could be more independent 

thoughts within Russia in which how Russia responded to 

Chechnya we are concerned we could see a breakout of certain concerns within Russia itself. 

For all of these reasons, today’s hearing becomes particularly important. I think what we’re looking for, we’re looking for a way in 

which the United States can constructively engage Russia. Russia 

is a major player internationally. We need to constructively engage 

Russia. But at the same time we’ve got to make it clear that we 

cannot allow or tolerate or condone Russia’s aggression and the use 

of military in the sovereign country of Georgia. 

That’s going to be our challenge, and I really do look forward to 

our witnesses. We have three panels that we will hear from today, 

starting with the deputy assistant secretary for the State Department, Matthew Bryza. It’s a pleasure to have you back before our 

committee. We would welcome your testimony. 

MATTHEW BRYZA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, 

EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS 

Mr. BRYZA. Thank you, Senator. It’s a pleasure to be here, and 

I’m so pleased to have a chance to speak about something a lot of 

us feel passionately about Georgia and its freedom, its democracy, 

its prosperity—as well as what you talked about: coming up with 

a way to engage with Russia in a constructive way, which we believe is possible if we handle what just happened in Georgia appropriately. 

As you were suggesting, by simply acquiescing to Russia’s flouting of its international commitments to recognize and support 

Georgia’s territorial integrity as expressed in numerous UN Security Council resolutions, we do not do a service to Russia. Russia 

for centuries, as many of the experts sitting behind you and in the 

audience are aware, has had a centuries-old foreign policy quest of 

stabilizing its southern border, going back to Ivan the Terrible and 

even before. Therefore, a stable Georgia that’s democratic, prosperous, successful—even, we would argue, within NATO—is something that ultimately help Russia achieve one of its most enduring, 

most fundamental national security objectives. 

For a moment, I’d like to talk about why Georgia matters to us. 

I mean, we all feel strongly about Georgia in this room. Then I’d 

like to address the narrative that’s been coming out of Russia with 

which we have some serious differences. And finally for a couple of 

minutes describe where we go from here with Georgia and in the 

region. 


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Georgia matters to us. It mattered to us in the beginning of the 

last decade, in the ’90s, initially in a strategic way because of oil 

and gas pipelines. That’s how many people in Washington first 

drew their attention to Georgia. We were successful in working 

with the Georgian government, with the Azerbaijani government, 

with the Turkish government to develop a new generation of oil 

and gas pipelines that for the first time provided a way to get Caspian oil and gas to global markets free from either geographic 

chokepoints, like the Turkish Straits or the Straits of Hormuz, and 

free of monopoly power. 

Georgia then came to matter to us even more because of security, 

a second set of interests, especially after September 11th. And we 

know that in the case of Iraq, Georgia had the third largest contingent in our coalition. And then Georgia in recent years has really 

elevated its strategic importance to us because of democracy, because of a remarkable transformation that began with President 

Eduard Shevardnadze—let’s be fair. He was a leader of heroic proportions. Unfortunately, under his leadership, his tiring leadership, 

the State of Georgia nearly ceased to exist. He acquiesced in an attempt by a regional strongman, the Ajaran leader Aslan Abashidze, 

to steal an election, contravening an agreement that former Secretary Baker had negotiated with the opposition and Eduard 

Shevardnadze. The Rose Revolution followed. 

The Rose Revolution brought to power people that we knew well 

but, not as well as we knew Eduard Shevardnadze. He was a darling of Washington, as you recall. But the people that came into 

power through the Rose Revolution were friends whose friendships 

we had developed through their active participation in a whole variety of assistance programs here in the United States that aimed 

to strengthen democracy and, well, by design build a cadre of 

young reformers who we hoped someday would take over. Suddenly 

in November of 2003 they found themselves in power. And their 

record on reform has been remarkable. Today we learned that this 

year the World Bank has dubbed the Georgian economy the 15th 

easiest place to do business in the world—it was 18th last year— 

15th in the world. The only EU member states that are ahead of 

it are the United Kingdom, Finland, Ireland, and Denmark. So 

Georgia’s doing pretty well on economic reform. The World Bank 

also in 2006 tallied Georgia the world’s reforming economy. 

On democracy there’ve been dramatic strides, but there are 

shortcomings. Perhaps we’ll talk about those in the question and 

answer session. Difficulties came to the fore last November. I had 

the honor to come up here and testify before you in the wake of 

those events in November of last year. 

Georgia matters to us for these three sets of interests: energy, security cooperation, and democracy. 

What’s the narrative, my second set of points? The narrative 

that’s been coming out of Russia is that Russia was obligated to intervene in Georgia to protect its citizens in South Ossetia and defend its peacekeepers because Georgia, out of the clear blue sky, 

started to attack Russian peacekeepers and the city, or the town, 

of Tskhinvali in South Ossetia on August the 7th. We have said— 

I have said, but my superiors have said repeatedly, we urged the 

Georgian government not to attack the town of Tskhinvali and not 


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to engage the Russian military at any cost because there was no 

way to prevail in such a conflict. That’s true. That’s on the record. 

But there’s much more to the story than that. The conflict certainly did not begin on August 7th. If we just dial back a couple 

of days, in the early part of August there was a tit-for-tat exchange 

of explosions, on August 6th some firing of artillery initiated by the 

South Ossetian side, we believe, and rocket-propelled grenades by 

so-called South Ossetian peacekeepers whom we believe were positioned behind Russian peacekeepers firing over the head of the 

Russian peacekeepers at Georgian villages and Georgian peacekeepers. Already we saw that the Russian peacekeepers were playing a role in providing a shield, we believe, to the South Ossetians 

who were shooting at the Georgian positions. 

We also know that atop the chain of command in the South 

Ossetian de facto government were active duty Russian officials 

from military and other services in positions such as the so-called 

minister of defense, secretary of the national security council, head 

of the security services, who were running the security apparatus 

of South Ossetia. It appears that the chain of command of those 

South Ossetians firing on the Georgians before the Georgians attacked Tskhinvali were Russian officials seconded from Moscow. 

It’s an oversimplification by far to say that the Georgians attacked 

Tskhinvali; the Russians intervened to protect their citizens and 

their peacekeepers. 

We should really look at what actually happened and then recognize that for months before that Russia had put in place a whole 

series of provocative steps in Abkhazia—including declaration that 

Russia essentially would no longer honor its commitments to support Georgia’s territorial integrity but would instead develop new, 

specific special relations with the separatist leaders in Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia, as the shooting down of an unmanned aerial vehicle, reinforcement with combat troops of so-called Russian peacekeepers—a whole series of steps that escalated tension in Abkhazia 

in the period from April to June. It led to a very active period of 

diplomacy with our German allies taking the lead within the UN 

grouping, the UN friends group that mediates the Abkhazia conflict. 

Throughout that period, I hate to say, my very professional and 

pleasant Russian diplomatic colleagues did not wish to engage, 

failed to show up to a couple of meetings, and as the tension was 

really increasing in July said they were simply unavailable due to 

vacations. This was in a period of heightening tension that culminated, unfortunately, in armed conflict in August. 

The narrative is much different from what we’ve been hearing 

from Russia. It wasn’t that the Georgians out of the blue provoked 

something. It’s that the Georgians were provoked for months, and 

I would even argue years—and we can go into that in the question 

period. 

Finally, where do we go from here? We believe we need to pursue 

three sets of goals. 

One, we need to support Georgia. We need to support its economy, as is evident in this $1 billion economic support package we’re 

pulling together. We need to make sure that the presence of Russian troops in the Port of Poti and along the east-west highway 


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does not strangle the Georgian economy or undermine confidence 

in the banking sector. 

We welcome news that there appears to be a new agreement, 

brokered by French President Sarkozy with President Medvedev, 

according to which the Russians will pull those troops, and already 

may be pulling out the troops from the Port of Poti, and will pull 

back all of their forces by October 1st from anywhere in Georgia 

beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia. That’s a step forward. 

That said, it’s essential that we remember that we are, well, 

under UN Security Council resolutions, obligated to support Georgia’s territorial integrity. We cannot simply acquiesce to Russian 

claims that it can keep, as it says, now 7,600 soldiers in Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia. That is in sharp contrast to a whole line of Security Council resolutions until now. 

We need to support Georgia, make sure that the democratically 

elected government of Georgia cannot be ousted by this Russian 

military operation. Our own secretary of state had stated how she 

had heard from the Russian foreign minister that, in fact, changing 

the government in Georgia was one of the objectives of these military operations. Cannot oust a democratically elected government. 

Secondly, we need to then blunt these objectives of Russia including the potential ouster of this democratic government. We need to 

make clear that the east-west corridor on energy, which I began 

talking about, continues to function fine. Even the Russian military 

operations cut the flow of oil to the Black Sea coast of Georgia. The 

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline continue to function throughout these military operations. 

Finally, we need to shore up the neighbors of Georgia but also 

all the states along Russia’s periphery. Many of these countries 

worry that somehow Russia has dealt a serious blow to stability in 

the region. They want to make sure the United States is going to 

remain engaged. We are going to remain engaged. We are going to 

do all we can to strengthen our relations with Azerbaijan, with 

Ukraine, with the Baltic states, with Kazakhstan. I myself am 

leaving in a couple of hours to go to Armenia, to NagornoKarabakh and the rest of Azerbaijan in an attempt to lay the foundation for a highly energized effort to come up with a framework 

agreement to that conflict within the next couple of months. 

That’s it. I’ve gone, probably, over my time. I just wanted to lay 

out where we hope to go from here, try to correct the narrative, and 

underscore the importance the Georgia to us. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

It is extremely disturbing to hear that one of the strategies is to 

unseat the the democratically elected government of Georgia. There 

was almost universal support for Georgia’s policies in regards to 

what Russia was doing within Georgia. But the ground circumstances being what they were, it clearly has an impact on the 

domestic politics within Georgia. 

I know we have the speaker of the parliament that’s with us 

today, but I would like to get your assessment as to what impact 

this has had on the stability of the current government in Georgia 

and the politics within the country itself. 

Mr. BRYZA. It appears that Georgians have rallied behind their 

elected government. There have been large-scale demonstrations, 


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and statements across the board from former opposition leaders, 

perhaps future opposition leaders, that first and foremost it’s important that this democratically elected government of Georgia 

flourishes, survives, is not threatened. We heard statements from 

very senior leaders within the NATO alliance, some people who 

had their own questions about the way their relations were going 

with the current government of Georgia, who have echoed exactly 

what I said. Given what we had heard and what transpired on the 

floor of a UN Security Council at the very beginning of this conflict, 

it’s critical that we all make clear we support this democratically 

elected government of Georgia. 

But I want to make clear that what we support is any democratically elected government of Georgia. We may be personally fond of 

or dislike current leaders in Georgia—that’s not relevant. Our personal feelings are not relevant about personal leaders in Georgia, 

with all due respect to the speaker of whom everyone in this room 

I’m sure is quite fond. What matters is that the Georgian people 

elected this leadership, and it is the Georgian people that must determine the political future of the country. There may be early elections. Who knows? There could be referendum. Whatever the Georgian people decide in consultation with their elected leaders is fine 

by the United States government as long as it is the Georgian people deciding the course of their political development. 

Mr. CARDIN. I should point out that we did extend invitations to 

both the Russian Federation and Georgia for representation here 

today. We’re very pleased that the government of Georgia made 

available the speaker of the Georgian parliament for our hearing. 

We regret that the Russian Federation did not accept our invitation 

and, therefore, we do not have a representative from the Russian 

Federation that is with us today. 

You believe that what Russia is doing here as a signal to Georgia 

is meant to be a clear warning to some of the republics of the 

former Soviet Union that Russia intends to be active—they said 

they’re going to protect Russians wherever they may be. I assume 

that the most direct focus of that statement would be the former 

republics of the Soviet Union, even though Russian population is 

throughout the world including the United States. But what impact 

is this having on the Ukraine? Or what impact is this having on 

some of the other former republics that are developing close ties 

with the West? 

Mr. BRYZA. Yes, it’s hard to discern what was floating through 

the minds of those decision makers in Moscow when they decided 

to invade Georgia in terms of relations of Russia with the other 

states in its periphery. The impact has been quite negative. In 

Ukraine, in particular, people listen very carefully to some statements coming from the very top in Moscow suggesting that Russia 

reserves the right to use force again, to, quote, ‘‘protect the rights,’’ 

unquote, of its citizens, instant citizens—people who are suddenly 

issued passports and then are dubbed a justification for the potential use of force. In Ukraine, of course all eyes are on Crimea. And 

there have been additional statements, rumblings, coming out of 

high levels in Moscow that will perhaps the decision of Nikita 

Khrushchev to cede Crimea to Ukraine was a wrong decision. 


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We can only hope that those are no more than bluster, those 

sorts of statements. Those sorts of policies hearken back to, actually, a different century. A different century is when the invocation 

of protection of either Orthodox Christians in the Balkans or Russian Citizens led to outright warfare. We hope these are mere examples of bluster when it comes to Ukraine. 

When it comes to some of Russia’s closest allies, let’s say in the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization, again the impact of the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and 

the invasion of Georgia has not gone over well. If you look at the 

statement that was issued, the communique issued by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes the five Central 

Asian states, Russia and China, it’s remarkable. It’s remarkable in 

what it doesn’t say, which is that it does not endorse at all the recognition by Russia of the independence of Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia. It’s remarkable in what it does say, which is that all states 

reiterate their support for the principle of territorial integrity, 

which is amazing in that every time we try to insert reference to 

territorial integrity at the United Nations, Russia vehemently opposes that. 

Mr. CARDIN. What good timing. 

I’m going to turn the gavel over to Chairman Hastings. I thank 

you very much for your testimony. Chairman Hastings is a very 

quick learn. He’s going to pick up immediately every word you said 

and is going to be ready to challenge the statements and properly 

represent the commission. 

Mr. BRYZA. Thank you. 

Mr. CARDIN: And thank you for being here. And I apologize to the 

witnesses of my requirement to be on the Senate floor. 

Mr. BRYZA: Thank you. 

HON. ALCEE HASTINGS, CHAIRMAN, 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. HASTINGS. Secretary, how are you doing? 

Mr. BRYZA. Hello, Mr. Chairman, very well, thank you. Thank 

you for a chance to speak here today. 

Mr. HASTINGS. OK. You just finished testifying, I gather. 

Mr. BRYZA. Yes. 

Mr. HASTINGS. And did the senator get an opportunity to ask you 

some questions? 

Mr. BRYZA. He sure did. Yes. 

Mr. HASTINGS. OK. Well, correct me if I then ask a question that 

he’s already asked. 

But let me begin by asking you what if any leverage do you feel 

that we have in dealing with this situation, more specifically dealing with the Russian Federation. 

Mr. BRYZA. Number one, our leverage is limited in a situation in 

which a country with 30 times the population of its neighbor and 

a military that’s nearly 100 times larger than that neighbor decides 

to invade it. Once you get into that situation there’s, I don’t think 

any country on earth has leverage to turn around that calculus. 

Now we are in a different realm—a realm in which, I think as 

our president, our secretary of state has said, Russia is forced to 

weigh some serious costs not only to its reputation but in addition 


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to its economy. We have seen already that there have been over 

$20 billion worth of investment that have left Russia since this 

happened. There was a drop in the stock market just last night— 

8 to 10 percent—$200 million plus have gone away in the stock 

market. 

There have been some serious economic impacts. There’s been serious reputational damage to Russia. I think that in this case 

words really do matter. I think back to my experience when I was 

on the ground in Georgia during the military operations when 

there was serious concern that perhaps there was about to be Russian assaults on Tbilisi. It happened three or four times while I 

was there where everybody in the city got very nervous, and we 

wondered what was going to happen. At one point, the reports of 

Russian armor moving toward Tbilisi happened to coincide with 

President Bush’s impending press conference. I can say I talked to 

several European journalists who were positioned up in hills above 

the road between the town of Gori and Tbilisi who said that within 

minutes of President Bush’s strong statement finishing, they saw 

those armored columns turn around and head back toward Gori. 

To me at the time, that was a powerful reflection of the fact that 

words really do matter and that Russia really does care about its 

reputation. It cares about the reputation in terms of its investment 

climate. It cares about its reputation in the world. If it didn’t, Russia wouldn’t want to be a member of the G–8. Russia wouldn’t say, 

‘‘We don’t care about being in the G–8’’ if it really didn’t care. If 

Russia didn’t care about being in the G–8, it wouldn’t mention it 

at all. It would just remain silent. 

We have leverage that can play itself out in a whole series of 

ways—in terms of reputation, in terms of economics. And it could 

go beyond that in terms of other measures that are being considered. But for now, we don’t want to be sounding like we’re wagging 

our finger, raising threats. We don’t want to burn bridges. We want 

to escalate, if need be, prudently, whatever leverage we might employ, but always with the hope and the anticipation that at some 

point Russia will recognize the costs are simply too high of continuing on this path and that Russia will fully implement its obligations under the cease-fire agreement and will restore its respect 

for Georgia’s territorial integrity as outlined in so many Security 

Council resolutions. 

Mr. HASTINGS. In South Ossetia and in Abkhazia in the last few 

days, Russia has increased its number of troops and indicated very 

strongly that they are going to be there for a substantial period of 

time and then are making the efforts in the United Nations to have 

recognition of these two areas. How do we assess their actions in 

that regard, and is it not that they are in complete derogation of 

international norms as it pertains to sovereignty when it comes to 

invading a sovereign territory? 

Mr. BRYZA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Yes, we do take that position, 

that Russia has made numerous commitments, again under Security Council resolutions to which it signed on, that it will support 

Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. And it has blatantly 

contradicted those commitments. It’s not ironic, but maybe it’s just 

unfortunate that Russia was able to contradict itself after a few 


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weeks earlier it invoked the principle of noninterference in other 

countries’ internal affairs. 

Mr. HASTINGS. On that point, do you that they adhered to the 

six-point agreement to the letter? 

Mr. BRYZA. No, absolutely not, absolutely not. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Tell me where they did not. 

Mr. BRYZA. Sure. First of all, in point five of the agreement, 

there’s talk of additional security measures. What those security 

measures are is clarified in a subsequent letter from President 

Sarkozy and in additional clarifications that Secretary Rice negotiated with our French ally. 

Taking that body of information, what is there is a statement 

that Russia has the right to carry out patrols within a few kilometers of Tskhinvali, not fix checkpoints either along the highway 

or any road in Georgia, and certainly not 200 kilometers from 

South Ossetia out in Poti or in Sinaki. That’s a blatant violation. 

We hope that this agreement that President Sarkozy negotiated 

yesterday with President Medvedev will lead to Russia pulling out 

its forces from Poti. We did receive initial reports today that Russia 

has begun removing its equipment from around Poti. But at the 

same time, Russia has announced that it is reserving the right to 

bring in another 7,600 soldiers into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 

they say at the request of the leadership of South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia. Again, to us that absolutely violates the territorial integrity of Georgia. South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain part of Georgia. It’s irrelevant that Nicaragua, the only country in the world 

besides Russia, recognized the independence of Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia. These areas remain part of Georgia. Point five is 

where there’s a blatant violation of the cease-fire agreement. 

In point six, we believe that’s violated because by recognizing the 

independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we believe Russia is 

prejudging the outcome of the negotiations that are foreseen in 

that sixth point of the cease-fire agreement. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Secretary Bryza, there are few people that have 

had as much input and involvement in Central Asia and Georgia 

specifically, the Caucasus, than yourself. And I have great respect 

for the extraordinary work in the area of diplomacy that you and 

Dan Fried and others have put forward. Last week, the vice president went to Tbilisi and in the course of his meetings offered that 

there would be $1 billion that would be in the hands of the Georgian government for purposes of infrastructure development. 

I’ve had a little involvement in these areas as well. It is so regrettable that for 10 years, really 11 years, I served on a committee 

dealing with Abkhazia in the OSCE, and we were never really able 

to get the cooperation that we needed to try and remedy what was 

described as the ‘‘frozen conflict.’’ I have concerns about the $1 billion, and yesterday I filed legislation that is missing a component 

that I intend to amend that legislation. 

It’s the question that I put to you. One, do we have the exacting 

restrictions or outlines and guidelines as to how the money is to 

be spent? Second, if all of it is to be spent—the $1 billion I’m talking about now—for infrastructure and reconstitution and humanitarian aid, does that not ignore the extraordinary need for a country that has made positive steps in democratization to make furVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:08 Jul 25, 2015 Jkt 061261 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A261.XXX A261

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ther steps and to have the needed resources in order to be able to 

do that, in two areas, maybe three: judicial reform and/or the development of an independent judiciary? I have maintained and will 

continue to maintain that for as long as we promote democracy, if 

we do not promote judicial independence in the various countries 

that we participate in, then we are missing a major component. 

You and I know that before the presidential elections that the 

media was under assault by the Georgian government as is presently constituted, or at least some of this administration and more 

specifically President Saakashvili and those that were associated 

with him—closing the television station that you and others and I 

and all of this commission railed against them actively about. 

Obviously there’s a need to understand that in a democracy there 

is a component called media that needs to be addressed in a positive manner, and the further development of civic society, a society 

where people have freedom of expression and their rights. If we 

spend $1 billion, shouldn’t we spend some money to develop in 

those areas? Otherwise, you build a road, and you still have the 

same inequities in the society that are missing. That was a long 

way to say that I want to know what’s going to happen with the 

billion dollars. 

Mr. BRYZA. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you could imagine, of course I couldn’t agree with you more 

about the need to keep working on Georgia and helping Georgia 

strengthen its democratic institutions. Independent judiciary of 

course is crucial to that, as is free media, as is the emergence of 

a viable opposition that will contribute to an open and constructive 

debate on how to improve the country. Of course we’re going to continue our democracy assistance. In FY ’08 we’ve got $14 million 

budgeted. In FY ’09, $15 million. 

Mr. HASTINGS. That’s a pittance. 

Mr. BRYZA. Well, it’s where we were earlier, and it’s what we calculated working together with congressional staffs as what we 

thought was a reasonable amount at the time given the absorptive 

capacity. But of course, we’re happy to look again at it, particularly 

in this environment now where there’s so much more money, as 

you just described, coming in. 

In my testimony, in my statement I should say, I did talk about 

the fact that of the three sets of interests we have in Georgia, strategic interests—in energy and regional economic cooperation, security, and democracy—democracy has become the most strategically 

relevant of the factors of them all in the last couple of years. Of 

course we have to keep working on democracy. 

Let me answer the second part of your question: Where the heck 

is this money going, and how did this come about? It came about 

in conversations we were having when I was in Tbilisi in the midst 

of the military operations with the prime minister of Georgia, Lado 

Gurgenidze, who expressed real concern that it was possible the 

banking system could suffer a loss of confidence and that commercial goods shippers could also lose confidence and therefore not 

wish to let contracts or implement them and provide Tbilisi and 

other Georgian cities with the goods they need because of the military operations. At the time, nobody knew what was going to happen with the military operations. Still, when you’ve got Russian 


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military checkpoints, or observation points, around the Port of Poti 

and along roads that are used for commerce, there is a danger that 

the Georgian economy could lose the confidence that has sustained 

it. We already have seen a drop, a severe drop, in foreign direct investment. It is FDI that has sustained Georgian economic growth, 

near double-digit growth. If that’s gone, if the confidence is gone, 

then the economy can suffer seriously, and that can lead to a nondemocratic change in government. 

The initial, urgent request from the Georgian government was 

for budget support to help them address what the Georgian government estimates is about $400 million in immediate needs—immediate damage, immediate steps that must be taken to get people in 

shelter, to address their basic humanitarian needs, to begin repairing some of the damage, and also to sustain confidence in the economy. We’re not doing this all on our own. There’s $400 million in dam- age to the Georgian economy. We’re going to provide $250 million 

quickly. There’s still almost half that’s left for someone else to handle. We hope the European Union is going to pick up that part of 

the tab. Then there’s the need to shore up confidence in the banking system. The IMF is taking that on with a $750 million standby 

program. We worked actively, of course, with the government of 

Georgia and the IMF to set that up. It’s not as if the U.S. government is trying to take on the task of repairing all this damage on 

its own. But we wanted to make sure that we sent a clear signal 

to everybody who cares about the Georgian economy that the Georgian economy is not going to go away. Then we also want to provide $150 million worth of assistance 

from OPIC to help with mortgages so that the Georgian people can 

rebuild and purchase new houses. In general what we’re trying to 

do besides addressing humanitarian concerns is to restore growth 

in the economy and then, as I said, repair the damage. 

That’s what it’s all going to. We could down into even more detail 

if you wish. 

Mr. HASTINGS. I understand. Then let me ask you to make a submission to us that would be more detailed. 

Mr. BRYZA. OK. 

Mr. HASTINGS. It would be deeply appreciated. In an effort not 

to take up all the time. I do have one more question. I have several, but this one is just a question of how diplomacy is undertaken 

and coordinated with those who are involved. First, my compliments to Mr. Sarkozy and the EU and those who have been involved in working to achieve some positive results. I have a concern, and I’ll share it from the perspective of one who is not a diplomat but that from time to time, I think that I have tried, especially in this area, to wear a bigger hat than just a policy-maker’s. 

When I first became president of the Parliamentary Assembly, my 

first act was to go to Russia and to meet with Sergei Lavrov. Obviously, 31 countries later in two years supplied an opportunity to 

meet with lots of folk and, indeed, go back and meet often with our 

Russian interlocutors. When the vice president or Secretary Rice 

were the two of them are recent visitors to Tbilisi and elsewhere 

in Georgia, they did not go to Moscow. I think that’s a mistake. I 

understand that there are all sorts of channels of communication 


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that are undertaken between parties of interest. But as a for example, in the development of the six-point plan, Mr. Sarkozy did go 

to Moscow and did go to Tbilisi. Earlier this week, he did go to 

Moscow, and he did go to Tbilisi. 

I don’t understand that missing link. I don’t suggest that you 

should have an answer. I communicated to you for purposes of carrying it back to those that are going to be involved. There are two 

sides, and probably as many as 20 sides in this story, and they 

have to be communicated with actively and directly. Otherwise, I 

think, we send bad signals. That is my story, and I’m sticking to 

it. 

Mr. BRYZA. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Smith. 

HON. CHRIS SMITH, COMMISSIONER, 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening 

this very important hearing. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for testifying. 

You know, the week before last, I went to Georgia and spent four 

days on the ground there. I first want to commend our ambassador, 

Ambassador John Teft, for the extraordinary job I believe that he 

has done, is doing, and I hope will continue to do. He is a seasoned 

professional. It came through in all that I found that he was doing 

on the ground, a good manager, and really helped to cobble together what was a crisis situation, a good response, and I think he 

represented our country extraordinarily well. 

Along the way, while I was there I joined Senators Lieberman 

and Graham and met with President Saakashvili and the prime 

minister and others. We did hear from them in terms of their economic needs. They provided us with a detailed road map to recovery. I know that they had also met with Senator Biden as well as 

with Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Berman and provided them with that same information, and the billion-dollar price 

tag order of magnitude was what was discussed as well in our conversations as enough to really make the difference and to help keep 

that confidence in this very important democracy and economy. 

I also met with the patriarch, and I want to commend him publicly for his bravery in going to the war-torn area and retrieving 

some of the dead individuals. Though he did it as an act of bravery, 

I think he sent a clear message to all that the church cares for the 

dispossessed, the disenfranchised, and in this case those who had 

died a very cruel death. 

I met with a number of the representatives. Human Rights 

Watch had a strong message, especially as it relates to cluster 

bombs. You might want to speak to that. As people flow back, they 

were very concerned that, the Russian cluster bombs and those red, 

looks like toys type of deal, that many people could find themselves 

dead as they’re plowing their fields or as kids walk in the meadows. I also met with the Red Cross. 

I will say that, and this is with a little bit of regret or disappointment, one of the things, the overriding reason why I first got on 

the plane and went to Tbilisi was the fact that two young people 

from my congressional district were in Chiatura and were behind 


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the Russian lines, had tried at least once to make their way 

through, were turned back at gunpoint. This 7-year-old and 3-yearold, who were not with their parents but with the grandparents, 

were very frightened. When I got over there, because of the publicity that was generated about these two Evans girls, Sophia and 

Ashley, all of a sudden a number of members of Congress and individual families contacted me with a very similar plight of Russian 

children who were in harm’s way. 

My first stop was with the OSCE Mission and with the Red 

Cross, both of whom said that they would be more than happy, and 

the Red Cross says ‘‘This is what we do,’’ to send in a van, a vehicle, with all sides aware of it, and that includes the Russians, retrieve these children and bring them to safety. To my shock, our 

consulate general did not know about this option. I brought the 

names to the Red Cross, and several of those kids now have been 

safely extracted. 

I want to thank Eric Fournier, the French ambassador, and John 

Teft again for his marvelous work in helping to facilitate this. He 

went and got the two kids from my district and went through what 

should’ve been a two-and-a-half-hour trip, it turned into a six-hour 

trip—three hours at one particular Russian checkpoint. Not only 

was he very brave, but he was very diplomatic and as the father 

of the Evans girls said at a press conference in Tbilisi, ‘‘Viva la 

France.’’ I think it brought us closer together because it was an act 

of kindness, but it was also of courage. 

My hope, Mr. Secretary, would be that we really, stay up a little 

bit later at night and think how we can come up with a protocol 

that when Americans are behind lines, no matter where it is—Lebanon, and most recently, and of course this South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia turmoil—that there is an immediate go-to to the NGOs. 

And it seems to me the Red Cross jumps off the page as the people 

who do this and do it extraordinarily well. So I would hope there 

would be a lesson learned on that one because my trip might not 

have been necessary if the Red Cross had done that, that job. 

But I did learn a lot. It reinforced much of what I had already 

thought. As Chairman Hastings and I know from Nina Berganazi, 

all those years when she would raise the issue of South Ossetia 

and Abkhazia that this has been a simmering, festering problem. 

The Russians, regrettably, acted like bullies and went in and used 

brute force to drive people out and to ethnically cleanse both of 

these areas. 

I couldn’t agree more with the administration that territorial integrity is extremely important. The real politic of it is that those 

lines probably are there at least on the short term because aggression sometimes does work. But now we’ve got to work very hard, 

overtime, to secure and show our solidarity with, along with our 

European Union partners, with the people, with the leadership of 

the Georgian government. They are unified, very, to a large extent 

about the importance. While there may be individual people who 

raise issues about accountability and that all happens in a democracy. But when it comes to this foreign threat, which remains potent and real and menacing, they are in solidarity, and we need to 

be in solidarity with them. 


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The sooner that legislation moves, the better because we have to 

send that clear signal that we stand in solidarity with Tbilisi. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you. Any reaction? 

Mr. BRYZA. Yes, one reaction, sure. I wasn’t privy to, of course, 

the conversation with our consul general. But we were, at least 

back in Washington, looking at all the options possible to get access 

to the Evans girls. And yes, we do, we are deeply grateful to Ambassador Fournier for that and for all that he does. He is a tremendous ambassador and a real ally in every sense of the word. I make 

it a point every time I’m in Tbilisi to spend a few hours with him 

just to think things through. 

But we should also underscore that actually Russia has not been 

allowing international human rights organizations into South 

Ossetia. It’s been blocking them, blocking assistance convoys. We 

strongly support the United Nations’ and the secretary general’s 

push for there to be a humanitarian investigation as well as an investigation of how the conflict started. But people need to get into 

South Ossetia to deliver humanitarian assistance, to assess what 

has happened, to assess the cluster bomb reports that Human 

Rights Watch put out. The Georgian government has also conceded 

that it used cluster bombs, but only against military targets near 

the Roki Tunnel. We hope that nobody ever uses cluster munitions, 

but it’s certain testimony to the Georgian government that it came 

out and came clean that in a military situation it used these munitions on the military situation. 

I’d also like to laud the efforts of Human Rights Watch in general. They somehow got their people in and were able to counter 

the absolutely untrue narrative coming out of Moscow that genocide was committed by the Georgian government, that 2,000 South 

Ossetians were killed or murdered. As Human Rights Watch found, 

during the period of the hostilities, they could identify 44 people 

that were killed rather than 2,000. And now even independent Russian organizations say it could’ve been a bit over a hundred. Also 

Human Rights Watch has documented that the damage inflicted on 

Tskhinvali by the Georgian government was considerably less than 

the damage inflicted on the neighboring villages of Ergneti and 

Tamarasheni, the Georgian villages, by Russian military operations. 

I’m not here to excuse the Georgian military operations against 

civilians in Tskhinvali. We urged the Georgian government not to 

do that. But Georgia found itself in a very difficult situation believing that Russian forces had crossed into South Ossetia through the 

Roki Tunnel, and sensing that despite a cease-fire South Ossetians 

continued artillery fire, heavy artillery fire on Georgian positions, 

and the Georgian government thought they were about to lose 

these villages. Again, we urged the Georgian government not to engage in a military conflict. The Russians claimed, they were simply 

intervening to save these citizens that they had generated through 

passport issuances and that the Georgians had leveled Tskhinvali. 

As Human Rights Watch has shown, that isn’t exactly what happened. 

Mr. SMITH. One quick follow-up. Your assessment of the OSCE 

Mission—I was impressed with Steve Young, the senior military, 


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and Ambassador Hakala They were professional, and they were on 

the job, and they have 20 and upwards of 100 people who will be 

deployed as monitors. They recently got in on September 4th and 

did some monitoring. How would you assess their mission—whether or not it’s enough people, do they have access? Secondly, our 

mission of assessment is there on the ground now. How soon before 

we get some at least preliminary reports of what the needs are for 

the Georgian military as well as the humanitarian crisis, too? 

Mr. BRYZA. Thank you. I have only the highest possible regard 

for Ambassador Hakala and her team, Steve Young and the others. 

They showed foresight, the wisdom and bravery during the military 

operations when Ambassador Hakala had Steve and others out on 

the road to Gori while tanks were bearing down on them to figure 

out what’s going on, to see whether we could get access in the 

international community to these areas of South Ossetia for humanitarian purposes. Then a week-and-a-half ago, we’re on the 

scene in the village of Akhalgori in the southeastern corner of 

South Ossetia, where there was a high degree of tension, and I 

would credit the OSCE directly for helping to reduce the level of 

tension and therefore potentially avoiding further armed conflict. 

Also, we should laud the efforts of the chairman-in-office of the 

OSCE, Foreign Minister Finland Stubb, a fellow countryman of 

Ambassador Hakala, who also has shown strong leadership, particularly in fielding quickly an additional 20 OSCE observers, 

which will then escalate up to a full hundred. We believe that 100 

OSCE observers coupled with the 200 or so EU observers is plenty 

to make clear that the point, by the way we talked about with the 

chairman before, point number five in the cease-fire agreement 

that affords Russians additional security measures, is no longer 

valid because there is an international mechanism in place with 

these OSCE observers augmented by the EU observers. So that 

they’re enough. 

The problem is that Russia is refusing to allow any additional 

OSCE observers entrance into South Ossetia or Abkhazia. We categorically reject that and will continue to fight hard to make sure 

we can get people in to find out what happened but to deter people 

from taking any further actions that violate human rights. 

Today, there was a shooting of a Georgian policeman, it looks 

like by, potentially, by a South Ossetian. We hold the Russian government responsible. If Russia is occupying these areas, it must 

fulfill the obligations of an occupier, and that means law and order 

and preventing human rights violations. We hold Russia responsible for that. 

Our assessment mission, we have EUCOM assessment team on 

the ground now, and we hope that maybe by the middle of October 

they have will completed the assessment. It’s a pretty thoroughgoing assessment, and they have to look some tough choices that 

the Georgian military itself will have to make about whether it 

wants to focus on homeland defense and/or whether it still wishes 

to contribute to more expeditionary ventures, like contributing to 

the coalition in Iraq or Kosovo or Afghanistan. 

Mr. SMITH. Again, will you please convey to John Teft how grateful I and our delegation was very impressed with the professionalism and his leadership. He was excellent. 


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Mr. BRYZA. Thank you. Few things I could hear that make me 

happier than that. He is one of the best ambassadors I’ve ever experienced in any country. And he’s such a human. There were some 

dark moments when we were together as we heard that the Georgian line had broken outside Gori, and we thought that the tanks 

were rolling toward Tbilisi. Besides my wife, there’s nobody else I 

would’ve rather had been with in that situation because it was— 

we were. He was thinking clearly, totally calm. We were talking 

about the Chicago Bears, my team, and his Green Bay Packers. I 

guess he made the right decisions because our team was kept safe. 

And then we got an announcement that the military operation was 

over. We all went home, and we were smiling. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Secretary, just a recommendation and to look 

back in trying to determine what happened, there are obviously 

disagreements. And it would seem to me that an independent analysis would help the reconciliation that’s going to be needed. I recommend, among other things, that OSCE be given a role in that. 

And the reason that I do is very simple: There are opportunities 

for discussions between Russia and Georgia and those who are parties that could assist in various of the structures of the OSCE including the Parliamentary Assembly. Therefore I would hope that 

such a role is envisioned for the OSCE. 

I do want to get to the other panels. But I’d be terribly remiss 

if I did not ask you at least: How do you see the impact of this crisis on other former states? And I guess I specifically raise Ukraine 

as a concern. The governing coalition has already felt some of the 

fallout. Give me a snap reaction to that, if you would. 

Mr. BRYZA. Sure. I agree that there has been a negative impact 

on political stability—if there ever was a lot of stability in Ukrainian politics—unfortunately, as a result of this. The statements that 

came out of senior levels of Moscow in recent weeks are chilling in 

that Russia reserves the right to use force if necessary to protect 

its citizens or passport holders in Ukraine with a particular focus 

on Crimea. That’s simply unacceptable. That is behavior that is not 

consistent with 21st century norms or with membership in the institutions of the 21st century, as Secretary Rice has said so many 

times. We have to make clear we absolutely stand with Ukraine. 

Completely, absolutely, unabashedly support its territorial integrity. By the way, just as the international community stood with 

Russia all of these years as it invoked the right to sustain its territorial integrity within the case of Chechnya; although we condemned the way Russia did that. But the international community 

stood with Russia. 

I wanted to make one point about the resolution in Security 

Council a couple of weeks ago on Zimbabwe. Russia vetoed it citing 

noninterference in internal affairs of foreign countries, and a couple weeks later invaded its neighbor. That is a sharp contradiction, 

and we can’t simply allow that. 

Mr. HASTINGS. I do have a series of questions, and I’d normally 

do this perfunctorily. But because of the heightened importance of 

matters and the fact that I, and I’m sure the International Relations Committee and other members of Congress are going to be 

tooling our legislation supplemental to the administration’s ideas in 


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this matter, I’d appreciate it if I could get as early a response from 

your good offices as I can. 

Mr. BRYZA. Of course. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HASTINGS. All right. I’d like now to call the Honorable David 

Bakradze, the speaker of the Parliament of Georgia and former foreign minister. I’m more than delighted that you are here. I never 

anticipated that we would have an opportunity—we’ve met before 

on a couple of occasions, but I didn’t think we would have this kind 

of meeting. 

The speaker’s biography is on the table available to all of the 

persons that are here. I won’t go into detail of it for the reason that 

I do want to get on to others as well. But, sir, you have the floor. 

DAVID BAKRADZE, SPEAKER OF THE PARLIAMENT OF 

GEORGIA, GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. BAKRADZE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It’s my pleasure and honor to be here. I’ll try to be brief in 

my presentation, and then I’m looking forward for the series of 

questions which will help me to bring my case and clarify the 

issues which you think are interesting and important. 

The topic of this presentation is return of power politics. It’s 

quite precise description of what’s happening and what happened 

in Georgia. And I believe that what happened in Georgia is much 

more important than fate of one small country or fate of two tiny 

separatist enclaves because it challenges the basic principles which 

today constitute the foundation of international security. Let me 

elaborate briefly how we see return of power politics based on what 

happened in Georgia. 

What Russians did in Georgia directly contradicts to the principle of inviolability of borders. This is the key principle which constitutes today the cornerstone for European security. This is the 

key principle recognized by Helsinki Final Act. This is the principle 

on which OSC as an organization is based. By using military force 

against Georgia and by eventually recognizing two Georgian regimes, Russians tried to change Georgian border by use of force. 

That is major development since the post-cold war period because 

this is the first time when Russians openly challenge post-Soviet 

borders by use of force. We had many cases in the past when Russian rhetoric was focused on border changes, Russians had territorial disputes with Baltic countries, and as Secretary Bryza mentioned, Russian statement concerning Ukraine and possibility of revising borders with Ukraine. We had other examples. But it is the 

first case since the dissolution of Soviet Union when Russians actually physically change borders by use of military force. And this is 

something which is a significant challenge not only for my country, 

which is immediate victim of that action, but for the entire international community thinking that inviolability of borders is a key 

principle on which the security rests. 

Now, with this small accident, let me turn to another issue, 

which is energy. Which is also very important. Because what happens, and most of you know the geography, that Georgia is the only 

alternative route for Caspian and Central Asian gas and oil resources to Europe. By controlling Georgia, actually Russia controls 

the bottleneck, and by that completely isolates Azerbaijan, isolates 


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Central Asian states, and leaves no alternative ways of delivery of 

Caspian and Central Asian resources to Europe, which means that 

Russia will significantly strengthen its energy monopoly over European energy resources. Energy is the second very important reason 

why we believe that what is at stake is more important than physical control of these two small regions. 

The third reason, and very fundamental reason in our view, is 

human rights. Because what happened a few days ago in Georgia 

was actually an ethnic cleansing—ethnic cleansing confirmed by all 

observers who were able to reach the area. I agree with Undersecretary Bryza who mentioned Human Rights Watch, and that was 

the organization that confirmed the ethnic cleansing in Georgian 

villages in South Ossetia, confirmed the massive looting of Georgian villages, confirmed the massive execution of male population 

and massive rape of female population and all the terrible facts 

happening on the ground. That’s ethnic cleansing. 

Sometimes people think about Kosovo as a precedent in South 

Ossetia, and I attended yesterday a number of hearings where 

Kosovo was mentioned. So in my vision the difference is very simple but very important. In Kosovo, there was international intervention which stopped ethnic cleansing. In Abkhazia, the reason for 

ethnic cleansing was Russian intervention. This makes these two 

cases absolutely different. Let me be very clear: What happened in 

South Ossetia two weeks ago was ongoing ethnic cleansing which 

changed the balance of population. What happened in Abkhazia in 

1993, 16 or 15 years ago, was then ethnic cleansing. You know better than anybody else, sir, from OSC that this is the ethnic cleansing confirmed by OSC. Three summits of OSC in Istanbul, in Lisbon, and in Budapest confirmed ethnic cleansing. Those are summit documents having signature of then Russian President Boris 

Yeltsin, then U.S. President Bill Clinton, as well as other 53 presidents of OSC member countries. 

We have confirmed cases of ethnic cleansing conducted in 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The scheme is that in Abkhazia, for 

example, from 75 of 80 percent of population has been expelled 

from their houses—based on ethnicity, based on the fact that they 

were loyal to Tbilisi government, based on the fact that they wanted to be part of the Georgian state. One expels 80 percent of population under the foreign military support from homes. Then this 

same foreign country distributes its own passports, and then the 

citizens of that foreign country—actually foreign citizens—make a 

decision whether to be part of that state or not. I mean, it’s simple 

but effective but very brutal in the human scheme. 

How can Russian citizens make a decision to be part of Georgia 

or not after they expelled 80 percent of local population who was 

in favor of Georgia and in favor of being part of Georgia? This is 

something very, very different from Kosovo, from any other case of 

self-determination. By recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia 

what Russia did, Russians recognized and accepted results of ethnic cleansing. By that, Russia legitimized ethnic cleansing as a way 

of self-determination. That is something very dangerous and very 

bad. 

I think this human rights issue, the fundamental human rights 

issue that ethnic cleansing cannot be seen as a legitimate tool of 


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self-determination of any people is at stake now. By not following 

Russia’s example, international community should confirm that 

independence cannot be based on ethnic cleansing, which is one of 

the most terrible human rights violations. 

Another reason and another case what is at stake and why we 

believe that it’s return of power politics is that it’s return of sphere 

of influence and buffer zone policies. The biggest lesson learned by 

Europe after the Second World War was this new concept of security, which is indivisible and where security of small countries matters exactly as much as security of big countries. 

By doing so, by invading, by occupying Georgia, by change borders of Georgia by use of force, actually Russians bring back the 

policy of sphere of influence because they openly claim ‘‘This is our 

area of our national interest.’’ Because we have their Russian citizens, because we have historic ties, because Russian Empire is 

present in this region, was present in this region for last two hundred years, this is our area of influence, so we can do whatever we 

want in our area of influence. If this concept of areas of interest 

and concept of buffer zones and buffer states come back to European security, that will be substantial undermining of European security because it will bring Europe back to 19th century or beginning of 20th century with all the instabilities which were caused 

that time by this concept. 

Last thing which we think is at stake and is more important 

than Georgia, is Russia itself and what kind of Russia we have, 

international community has, as a partner. Absolutely, Russia is 

important partner. Russia is important in terms of political cooperation, in terms of economic cooperation, in terms of energy cooperation. 

The question is: Is it the right Russia which we are having now 

as a partner? Is Russia which made a decision to send tanks to the 

soil of the neighboring country right partner for Europe or for 

United States. What can be the basement of American-Russian cooperation? What kind of values, what kind of interest, this cooperation can be based if Russian policy develops in a way or deteriorates in a way it does? How can Russia able to make a decision to 

send tanks and troops to the neighboring country be a reliable 

partner for United States or for Europe? 

This is a fundamental question. How can Russia which signs 

agreements that it withdrawals from Georgia—and I refer to the 

six-point agreement—and confirms that, the presidential signature 

is there and they will implement this, and it still is not implemented? It was signed Thursday, 29 days ago, and still it is not implemented. How can Russia which does not respect signature of its 

own president, which does not respect its own commitment, which 

does not respect international law, how can such Russia be a reliable partner for United States or for anybody else? 

It’s about Russia, and it’s about what kind of developments will 

take place in Russia tomorrow. Because if there is no price for 

what happened in Georgia, this will clearly encourage this folkish 

thinking in Russia, this thinking that the bullying policy is successful, and this thinking that Russia is too important to pay price for 

anything which they do. In such case, price tomorrow will be much 

higher than the price today. 


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We believe that this is another good reason why this issue should 

be addressed very carefully and based on the long term consideration. We’re talking about set of measures which I believe, I mean, 

are important. So it’s about borders and European security. It’s 

about human rights. It’s about energy. It’s about major geopolitical 

developments in Europe. It’s about Russia as a future partner and 

whether Russia can be a future partner. It’s a set of very important 

issues which we believe make this case an exceptional case. It’s the 

end of the Cold War and the case which can, like 9/11, change the 

entire geopolitics in the upcoming years. 

We have all the signs, unfortunately, that the power politics at 

least from the side of Russians is back. The issue is how to respond, how to answer, and how to go forward. But I guess that will 

be part of your questions as well as how we started and, I mean, 

obviously you may have some of the same questions which you had 

to Undersecretary Bryza to me, I stand ready to answer any questions in good faith and to the knowledge I have. I thank you very 

much for this opportunity again. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, thank you very much for being here 

and for your presentation. I’m going to go straight to the very hard 

question, and it is that there have been a substantial number of 

articles in the press on the crisis, and in many of those articles 

U.S. officials claim they’ve consistently warned Tbilisi not to 

launch a military campaign against South Ossetia. Why, then, did 

President Saakashvili do precisely what it is said that the U.S. had 

warned specifically against? 

Mr. BAKRADZE. Thanks. I regret that Matt Bryza left already the 

room here. I think he could confirm, and I’m talking on the record 

now. It’s a very important clarification. We have been warned 

many times, and I confirm that, not to get entrapped by Russian 

provocations, not to respond to Russian provocations, and to be 

careful in our policy planning. That’s absolutely true, and I confirm. But to my knowledge, at none of the meetings was I presented with this specific case of Georgia in attacks against South 

Ossetia or Tskhinvali because there was no such plan and no such 

attacks planned. 

Mr. Chairman, that we had this plan for South Ossetia. Three 

years ago it was endorsed by OSC. Only reason why it was not implemented was Russia’s resistance. I was myself minister for conflict resolution for seven months. And I’m still proud that I was one 

of the officers of the new peace policy in South Ossetia that was 

policy of reconciliation, policy of investments. 

What happened in South Ossetia: this tiny region was divided in 

two parts. About half was controlled by Moscow-backed parties, 

half was controlled by local administration which was loyal to 

Tbilisi. We heavily invested in that half. We invested not in weapons. We invested in building schools. We invested in building hospitals. We invested in building discos, swimming pools, and amusement parks exactly to show to population on the other side that life 

is not about war, life is not about fight, and life is about much better things than trenches. 

Our policy was policy of economic attraction and economic reintegration, and as one of the authors of that policy I’m still proud. 

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tion of conflict in South Ossetia because we had all the signs of 

heavy erosion of the regime in Tskhinvali. And that’s one of the 

reasons why Russians changed entire leadership in South Ossetia, 

in Tskhinvali and instead of local Ossetian officials, they brought 

Russian high-ranking officers. And as I confirmed words of Matthew Bryza, that all high-ranking security officials in Tskhinvali 

were acting high-level Russian security and military officials. 

We had all the signs of peaceful resolution of conflict and having 

all that—I apologize for this long prehistory—having all that in 

place, we had never planned any kind of military action against 

South Ossetia. That’s true. I confirm that. I can tell you that there 

was no meeting in my memory and in my knowledge where we specifically discussed with anybody from United States administration 

the issue of possible Georgian military action against Tskhinvali. 

It’s absolutely right that we have been warned many times not 

to respond to provocation. We have very good record of not responding to provocations, especially starting from March this year when 

we had non-stop series of provocations, sequence of provocations, 

from side of Russia both in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

But unfortunately what happened on August 7 was no longer a 

provocation. It was already an action. Because when Russian military jet intrudes the Georgian airspace, it’s a provocation, and government may respond or may not respond. But when Georgian villages, Georgian civilian population, are under heavy artillery bombardment, are under heavy artillery barrage and there are civilian 

casualties in place, this is no longer a provocation. This is already 

and action which needs to be addressed by government. I do believe 

that no democratically elected government can sit and wait until 

there are casualties in the civilian population when the civilian 

population is under artillery attack. 

To explain to you that we never had the specific discussion because we never had a plan to attack South Ossetia. I think the timing itself confirms. This was the timing 7th of August when big 

part of Georgian leadership was on vacation, and president himself 

had his plane ready to depart for Beijing, and he has to cancel this 

trip 20 minutes before it was canceled. I think this is a small detail, but again it shows that we had no plans whatsoever to start 

military action that day or any other day against South Ossetia. 

Mr. HASTINGS. But did you start military action? 

Mr. BAKRADZE. Mr. Chairman, I agree with Matthew Bryza who 

described the sequence of events on the ground. We should look 

into the concrete pretext of events but not single out any particular 

event out of this chain. And that’s actually what Russians are trying to do at the moment, the Russian propaganda machine. What 

they are trying to do, they are trying to say that, while for example 

at 11 a.m. Georgians did something and that was beginning of war. 

But they fail to mention what happened at 10:55 a.m. or 11:05 a.m. 

That’s the sequence which shows. It comes how one defines the beginning of military action. 

I told you that our villages have been under heavy artillery barrage. And that was very dangerous because of the civilian population and because of possibly huge civilian casualties which we 

might have on the ground. The same morning, we sent our minister for conflict resolution to Tskhinvali with the objective to negoVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:08 Jul 25, 2015 Jkt 061261 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A261.XXX A261

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tiate with Ossetians and to stop somehow the fire. But he arrived 

to Tskhinvali, he was not met by any South Ossetian official. The 

only person whom he met was commander of Russian peacekeepers, General Kulakhmetov. And General Kulakhmetov confirmed to our minister that Ossetians are acting on their own will, 

and the Russian peacekeepers are not able to control what’s happening on the ground. He had to leave. 

We asked Russian special envoy Ambassador Popov, to go to 

Tskhinvali and to communicate and to talk to local Tskhinvali officials to stop this fire. Popov failed to go there, justifying this failure 

that his car was broken and he was not able to go physically there. 

President Saakashvili spoke with Finnish foreign minister and 

asked to send his special envoy as soon as possible so that he also 

goes to Tskhinvali and negotiates to stop this fire. Because, again, 

our civilian villages, peaceful villages, were under artillery fire, and 

that was something requiring urgent response. 

This diplomacy failed during the daytime of August the 7th, in 

the evening President Saakashvili declared unilateral cease-fire. 

And his hope was that this unilateral cease-fire would cause 

Ossetians to stop firing as well. But it did not happen. 

It’s political conflict; it’s not ethnic conflict. When Tskhinvali 

leaders started more intensive, and this bombardment turned into 

the carpet bombardment of Georgian villages, that is confirmed. I 

again confirm words of Matthew Bryza who said that Human 

Rights Watch confirmed that Georgian villages near Tskhinvali are 

heavily damaged by this bombardment. When this bombardment 

started to be carpet bombardment, so-called indiscriminate bombardment of population, we had to take, government had to take 

a decision to fire back in order back to stop this fire. 

But it would still be a local skirmish unless one thing which happened on the ground, that which influenced every sort of development and that was Russian military call on of about 150 tanks and 

about 2,000 personnel, troops, entering through territorial Georgia 

through the Roki Tunnel. We have evidences of that. Part of that 

evidence is two days ago we made available to, at this level, to ambassadors accredited to Georgia and we’re thinking whether to 

make this evidence public or not. At this point, this is still not public, but I can just mention that we have radio interceptions confirming Russian troops entering Georgian territory in the evening 

of August the 7th. This was the turning point. And plus to that, 

of course, I mean, we have the fact of their physical entry to Georgia. This was the point. 

I have a question whether massive bombardment, 

indiscriminative bombardment of civilian population, can be seen 

as a beginning of war or not. And if it is not beginning of war, why 

response to that bombardment in order to stop it should be seen 

as a beginning of war. I have a question whether intrusion into the 

territory of the neighboring country violating the recognized border 

and sending 150 tanks and 2,000 troops to the neighboring country, 

is this a beginning of war? Or, if it is not, why then the following 

reallocation of Georgian troops is a beginning of war? 

It’s a delicate question how one defines what happened and what 

was the initial point of the war. In our understanding, the immediate reason was massive bombardment of Georgian villages and 


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the starting point of war because otherwise I still think we could 

somehow localize the skirmish. But the immediate point when the 

war started was the fact when Russian troops entered Roki Tunnel 

and entered territory of Georgia. That was the point when government of Georgia was forced to take a decision to about the troop 

allocation. That’s the concrete pretext of these August 7 events. 

Mr. HASTINGS. It sounds, among other things, that there was a 

bit of ingenuity on behalf of the Russians, and your government 

kind of fell into that trap. There are questions that still remain, 

and I understand that. Regrettably, the Russian Embassy, who was 

in fact invited to participate in today’s hearing, chose not to. I 

would urge upon them that I think that’s a mistake. As a former 

judge, I learned in many actions to try and listen to all sides. Hearing one side skews the process, and it gives the impression that 

someone is on one or the other side. 

I would hope because of the extraordinary cultural and historic 

aspects that exist between Georgia and Russia that whatever the 

reason was for this particular conflict would be mediated toward 

positive resolutions in the interests of both countries. I find it all 

over the world astounding that people that know each other very 

well—for example, Mr. Putin’s mother lives in Georgia, you know. 

And Sergei Lavrov is from the Armenian section of Georgia. I could 

go on and on and on. When I’m in Moscow, I don’t drink wine but 

I drink Crouvasier, but I see Georgian wine when I’m in Moscow. 

I see Russian food when I’m in Georgia. And so somehow or another cousins and brothers and sisters have to stop fighting. I don’t 

know how we accomplish that. 

I also note that the realities on the ground have changed. It 

would be difficult. In a totally separate but similar situation, yesterday I participated in a hearing dealing with Iraqi refugees. In 

essence what has happened is Sunnis have been driven from certain areas and replaced by Shiite. The big question is in reintegrating them—and I understand that President Saakashvili’s goal 

is still reintegration of South Ossetia and Abkhazia—if that is true, 

then the question is: Who wants to be the first person that was removed to return? And that was the question that was put to me 

yesterday: What Sunni is going to show up in Anbar and say, ‘‘I’m 

back now’’? You know, it’s kind of difficult, the situation that we’re 

in. I won’t go further because the ranking member has questions, 

and we have two other panelists and I’d like to get to them as well. 

Mr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH. Speaker Bakradze, thank you very much for being 

here, for your wonderful testimony. I think it’s incisive and really 

gives us the lay of the land from your government’s perspective, 

which we need to hear. 

You mentioned a couple of things with regards to massive rapes. 

Is that quantifiable as to how many women were abused in that 

way, and what has happened to those women? 

Mr. BAKRADZE. I’m afraid I’m not able to give you exact figures 

now. And this is something which still needs to be verified and investigated, and we are very open. We invited, and we invite all interested human rights organization to come and to go to those refugees and to check because, I mean, it’s difficult because, you understand, it’s a delicate issue. Not everybody may be willing to deVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:08 Jul 25, 2015 Jkt 061261 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A261.XXX A261

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scribe and to talk about this issue. These ladies need careful approach and very balanced approach. I mean, if any international 

human rights organizations are willing to help us in that, are willing to help our ministry of health and social care in that, we are 

very open, and we ask them to come. But at this point I’m not able 

to give you exact figures. 

What we know, we know evidence is from eyewitnesses that the 

ethnic cleansing was conducted but by so-called Balkan model, 

when we know these irregulars or paramilitaries enter the village, 

and they loot the village. They torch houses. They separate male 

and female population. They take male population out of the village, and then some of them are beaten, some of them are executed, some of them are left somewhere in the forest, and the female population, children, I mean, women, elder people are subject 

to, brutal physical action including also the rape. That was the 

scheme which was used in all Georgian villages in South Ossetia 

that we know from Human Rights Watch, that we know from other 

eyewitnesses, that we know from people who went through themselves. But so far I cannot give you the quantitative assessment of 

victims. 

Mr. SMITH. In the meeting I had with the Deputy Minister of Interior Golodsta she mentioned that there were at least stories of 

women being taken off buses. There was one in particular that I 

guess made the television news while I was there. Have any of 

those women been recovered, brought back to safety? Secondly, is 

there any suggestion that anyone was trafficked? As the irregulars 

and the Russians came in, we saw that during the Kosovo crisis, 

we saw throughout the Balkan Wars that exploiters found opportunity to steal away women and to put them into human trafficking and forced prostitution. 

Mr. BAKRADZE. We still have missing persons, so I cannot confirm whether these missing persons are victims of trafficking or 

they have been executed or they are just hidden somewhere and 

will show up later. We have missing people, yet so far I cannot give 

you exact numbers. When we find everybody, identify everybody, 

then we will be able to give you more detailed information. 

The problem is that so far we are still not allowed to have any 

access to Georgian villages, remaining Georgian villages in South 

Ossetia, and that includes also possibly the remaining population 

being in villages or outside villages in the forests of South Ossetia. 

We still have almost no access even to those villages which are outside South Ossetia but are within the so-called Russian buffer 

zone, or security zone, as Russians describe, so which means beyond the Russian fixed checkpoint. That is completely illegal, and 

I again agree with Matthew Bryza on that, that is completely illegal but that is the de facto reality, and we do not have access beyond checkpoints. We have absolutely no access to South Ossetia 

itself to check the situation on the ground. 

What we know we know from people in mostly international 

human rights organizations or, for example, Council of Europe observers who are able to take this trip. We know it from them, and 

we know it from people who managed to escape from there. But we 

still need to go and make evidences ourselves, which we are not 

able to do at the moment. 


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Mr. SMITH. Are there any preliminary estimates, and perhaps 

you could provide this for the record, as to how many people died, 

how many have been wounded, and how much property damage 

really has been imposed? 

Mr. BAKRADZE. As of casualties, we know exactly about casualties on the side of Georgian militaries and law enforcement because 

besides militaries, our law enforcement structures, our police was 

subject target for very intensive attacks. After the conflict when we 

still had Russian planes bombarding Georgian territories. One of 

their targets was usually police stations or police patrols on the 

roads. That was done on intention, and I have every reason to believe that it was done in order to break down law and order in the 

country because attacking police can lead to nothing else but the 

breakdown of law and order and the establishment of chaos in the 

country. Police was under attack as well as military. 

We have casualties among militaries as casualties among police. 

All in all, that’s about 160 militaries and policemen together. As of 

civilian population, as I said we are still missing people and we 

still cannot identify what happens with those who we are missing. 

Right now we have confirmed deaths of up to about 70 people, civilians. But, again, more than that is considered as missing population, and we still don’t have information on them. 

As of economic damage, again, since we cannot access the area 

we may have only very preliminary estimations, and that was partly what Undersecretary Bryza gave you. What we know that Georgian villages in South Ossetia are completely destroyed using the 

bulldozers and technical equipment. Everything is destroyed there. 

Mr. SMITH. Now, with regard to the IDPs, that number has fallen 

significantly—and it was over 100,000 when I was there. What are 

they returning to? And how are the ones —what’s it, over 60,000 

still, I think you had indicated earlier—how are they faring? Is the 

humanitarian aid getting to them? Secondly on that question, we 

know when people are put to flight that a lot of the individuals, 

especially the children, suffer posttraumatic stress disorder. Are 

there grief counselors or people who can help them cope with, the 

frightfulness of tanks coming down the street? 

Mr. BAKRADZE. Absolutely. We had 118,000 registered IDPs. I 

say registers because we had actually we had even more than that. 

Now this number is down. It’s about 78,000 at the moment, and 

the rest have returned. Because there are three different categories 

of IDPs. One, people from Gori and adjacent Georgian towns and 

villages. Once the Russian occupation of Gori and adjacent villages 

was over, is over, these people were able gradually to start return 

back. Because immediately once Russians are out, our police is in, 

and state is back with its basic functions with supplies, with police, 

with law and order. Immediately we have been able to start return 

of our IDPs from those areas, Georgian villages which are in the 

rest of Georgia, not in or in the vicinity of conflict zones. Majority 

of these people are already back. 

The second category of IDPs is Georgian villages located between 

Gori and Tskhinvali. Geographically this is southern of Tskhinvali 

and northern of Gori where there is this so-called security buffer 

zone of Russian military forces, and the people there still cannot 

return. But we expect that at least this time Russians will respect 


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their commitment. During President Sarkozy’s trip to Moscow two 

days ago, again it was a very clear commitment from Russia that 

they will withdraw this so-called checkpoint and the security zone. 

Once Russians withdraw from this so-called buffer zone, then we 

expect that we will be able to bring people back to this area. 

The third category of IDPs is IDPs from South Ossetia itself. 

Those are people from mixed villages, from Georgian villages, and 

this is the most painful and vulnerable category because unless 

there is a real perspective of conflict resolution, unless this international remediated process of IDP return starts, these people will 

not be able to return back because they don’t have security guarantees, they have no property, they have no security, they have no 

conditions. We can take care of people from Georgian, from the rest 

of Georgia. We will take care of those people from the so-called security buffer zone once Russians are out. But as of the IDPs from 

the conflict zone itself, there we will need an international directive, international engagement, and the beginning of the genuine 

process of conflict resolution which will include the return of IDPs. 

Mr. SMITH. I have other questions, but I’ll just reduce it to: 

Human Rights Council, have they done anything to investigate, to 

send investigators? We know how the United States has responded, 

many of our European allies, how have other countries, particularly 

in Latin America, Africa, Asia, responded to this crisis? 

Mr. BAKRADZE. We are very open for investigation. We offered 

European Union to set up a special group or commission which will 

look into all the details and investigate happenings including, the 

human rights aspect, which is one of the key components for us. 

I had a meeting two days ago. I was in New York. I met UN secretary general, and one of the topics of our discussion was having 

UN mission to Georgia, special fact-finding mission, which would 

include humanitarian and human rights components to investigate 

to check what happened on ground. I hope that in the near future 

we will have this special UN team arriving verifying the facts on 

the ground. Plus to that, we asked for debates within the UN General Assembly. We asked for debates in Council of Europe. We 

asked for debates in OSC Parliamentary Assembly and NATO Parliamentary Assembly. We are very open for these debates. 

This is coming back to your comment, Mr. Chairman. We are 

very open for these debates. Truth is on our side, so we are not 

afraid. I really regret that I do not have my Russian counterparts 

here today because I believe truth speaks for itself. I would really 

love to have Russian counterparts here to listen to them how they 

explain what happened. We are very open for debates. We are very 

open for any kind of fact-finding mission and investigation, including the one from UN. And I got the promise from UN secretary 

general that this mission will take place. 

As of the reaction of the rest of the world, I had 17 meetings in 

UN during one day. Mostly I met countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and I think they understand. At least those whom I 

met understand that it’s not about making choice between Russia 

and Georgia, because in such case we would be in a very difficult 

situation. Russia is very important partner. For some countries, 

Russia is important as a trade partner. For some countries Russia 


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is important as a security provider. For others there are different 

reasons. We are a small country—we can never compete. 

But what is good is they all understand it’s not about making 

choice for Russia or for Georgia. It’s about making choice for principles. The principles which I said that there should be no forceful 

change of borders. There should be no ethnic cleansing as an instrument to self-determination. 

These principles are very important to many countries across the 

globe, because there are many countries having territorial disputes 

with their neighbors. There are many countries having separatist 

enclaves or having ethnic minorities on their territory. If today we 

all allow a precedent that a big country can use force and change 

borders of the neighboring country, we are the first victims, but 

there may be a lot of countries in many different of the world troubled by that. 

As well as if we allow ethnic cleansing to be recognized as a legitimate way to self-determination, I expect that many countries 

will be in trouble after that. What unites these countries—and despite Russia’s very active diplomacy and active pressure, there is 

still only one country, Nicaragua, which says it will recognize 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia—is, I think, the understanding that 

it’s not about Russia or Georgia. 

It’s about the basic principles on which the international law and 

order rest today. I hope that with this understanding we will be 

able to show to Russia how far it went to isolating itself from the 

world community—not only from United States or European Union, 

but even isolating itself from its traditional allies. Matthew Bryza 

mentioned Central Asian countries, mentioned Shanghai Organization, and I think that was a very good example of how far Russia 

went in isolating itself even from its most important and traditionally loyal allies. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, thank you very much. There will be 

a robust debate, I’m sure, in Toronto next week during the meeting 

of the Parliamentary Assembly. A recommendation to you: After 

the attack on the United States on September 11th in 2001, the 

U.S. government formed a commission to investigate those tragic 

events, and the commission members included very distinguished 

figures from the major parties, and I would urge also the possible 

participation of non-partisan representatives of civil society. You 

might consider that while you’re about your business. But I thank 

you so very much for your participation. 

Mr. BAKRADZE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If I just 

may end with responding to your comment about cooperation with 

Russia. Of course, I can confirm even today in this critical time 

that we are ready to cooperate with Russia. But this cooperation 

should be based on the mutual respect and mutual recognition of 

sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimate interests. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Interesting that you should put that in. That first 

meeting that I said that I had with Foreign Minister Lavrov, the 

first statement out of his mouth was, I appreciate the fact that we 

are dealing in the arena of mutual respect. I’ll never forget it. I’ll 

remind him if I get an opportunity. 

Mr. BAKRADZE. It’s not our guilt that we are located next to Russia as country. It’s not our guilt that we are 5 million but not 500 


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million. And it’s not our guilt that unlike some people in Kremlin, 

we don’t see dissolution of Soviet Union as a disaster and tragedy 

but we see it as a moment of happiness which gave us freedom, life 

to many Central and Eastern European countries. Unfortunately, 

or fortunately, we will not compromise on those values. I will never 

say dissolution of Soviet Union is a tragedy. 

Mr. HASTINGS. All right. I’m going to need to move on to the next 

panel. Thank you so very much. 

Mr. BAKRADZE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. HASTINGS. At this time, I’d like to invite the executive director of the Nixon Center, Mr. Paul Saunders, and Mr. Paul Goble, 

the director of research and publications of the Azerbaijani Diplomatic Academy in Baku. Toward that end, I would appreciate it 

Mr. Saunders if you would proceed, and then you Mr. Goble. If we 

have time for questions—the only reason I say time is the fact that 

we are expecting a vote real soon. I’ll listen to you all as will the 

ranking member, and then we’ll try to get some questions in if time 

permits. 

Mr. Saunders. 

PAUL SANDERS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE NIXON CENTER 

Mr. SAUNDERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, also to the 

ranking member, for the opportunity to be with you here today. I’ll 

try to be very brief and maybe just hit a few high points from my 

written statement. 

The first point that I’d like to make—Mr. Bryza and the previous 

witness, the speaker of the Georgian Parliament, went through the 

long and very complex chronology of events that led up to the 

events last month. I won’t try to do that. I won’t try to assess what 

both of them said. I would like to make one point, however, and 

from my perspective there are really only two things that are important about what happened. One is that Russia clearly had prepared well in advance for this kind of situation and was waiting 

for the right opportunity. The second is that the government of 

Georgia and President Saakashvili personally knowingly gave them 

that opportunity against the advice of American officials. Without 

going into all of the ins and outs, that’s what I really think the central point is there. 

Next, I’d like to focus on what lessons should we draw from this 

experience, because I think there are a number of important lessons. And after touching on those, I’ll try to very briefly talk about 

some of our policy options. 

First of all, frankly, I think the Bush administration has profoundly overpersonalized our relationship with the Georgian government. This was a problem, of course, that executive branches 

under both administrations tend to have. But I really think there 

was an undue focus on President Saakashvili. There was excessive 

and needless praise of President Saakashvili. The president of the 

United States on March 19th when Mr. Saakashvili was meeting 

with him in the Oval Office said that he admired the president of 

Georgia who just a few months before, as we all remember, had declared a state of emergency, forcibly dispersed protesters, shut 

down TV stations. 


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And certainly the administration considers Georgia a friend of 

the United States, but I think it’s absolutely unnecessary for the 

president to say he admires the president of Georgia, and it leads 

Georgian officials to perhaps think that they have a relationship 

with the United States that the facts demonstrated they don’t. 

That’s dangerous. 

Secondly, I think our administration needs to be much more 

careful in how they put American credibility on the line. Our reputation in the former Soviet Union, to my mind, has been very seriously by the events that transpired. How? The United States accepted from Georgia, from its very tiny army, 2,000 soldiers to send 

to Iraq. Georgia sent soldiers to a combat zone to help the United 

States. In Georgia’s hour of greatest need, the United States did 

not reciprocate that commitment. I’m not arguing that we should 

have. I’m arguing that the administration accepted that assistance 

from Georgia without thinking through some of the very predictable expectations and consequences that it could have. This conflict 

in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, they existed at that time. The administration, to my mind, should’ve thought more carefully about 

that. 

Thirdly, I think we should all learn from this that Russia has a 

lot more at stake and is willing to pay a much higher price to advance its interests on its borders than the United States does. That 

doesn’t mean that the United States should allow Russia to create 

a sphere of influence. But it does mean that we need to be extremely careful in the kinds of commitments that we make, the 

kinds of expectations that we create, and we really need to calibrate our policy to what we’re ultimately going to be prepared to 

do. 

Fourthly, I think we’ve learned some lessons about precedents 

and vetoes. The Bush administration and others have been saying 

very energetically that Kosovo is not a precedent, that Russia 

doesn’t have a veto over Georgia joining NATO. The problem with 

that line of argument is that, we get to decide what we think is 

a precedent. We get to decide what we think our national interests 

are. We get to decide what we should do about that. We get to decide how to explain it. We don’t get to decide what other people 

think is a precedent. We don’t get to decide how they react to actions that we take. They get to decide. Russia doesn’t have a veto 

over Georgia joining NATO or not joining NATO. It doesn’t, and it 

shouldn’t. But if we pursue that course of action, then we need to 

understand that the United States doesn’t have a veto over how 

Russia decides to respond. I think that’s something that has been, 

unfortunately, demonstrated very clearly during recent weeks. 

Finally, one other lesson—and it’s useful to reflect back on the 

1990s and NATO enlargement in the 1990s, because NATO did 

something very important at that time which was to insist that aspiring members resolve their internal ethnic conflicts if they wanted to be part of NATO. Because the alliance, did not want to import these problems into its membership. Perhaps in retrospect we 

should’ve thought a little bit more about that before pursuing the 

course that was taken. 

Our policy: What do we do about this situation? I think there’s 

a short-term element to it. I think there’s a long-term element to 


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it. In the short term, we need to make the best of a bad situation. 

We need to salvage what we can of American credibility in this region. To that end, actually I would broadly agree with the position 

that the administration has taken. We need to provide support to 

Georgia. We need to continue to articulate our support for Georgia, 

hopefully more for Georgia and much less for President Saakashvili 

as we do that. 

We need to prevent a situation in which the Kremlin believes 

that it has deposed the Georgian leadership and that we did nothing about it or were not able to do anything about it. 

We also need to ensure that Russia follows through on its commitments and the agreement of the last couple of days to have the 

troops out of these special security zones by October 1st. 

Finally, we need to try to salvage as much as we can of the existing post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. And to do that, 

I think we’re going to have to be very careful. I think that the administration, again, has been correct by all accounts in making a 

determination that unilaterally attempting to punish Russia won’t 

be a successful course of action. 

Over the longer term, we have to do a number of different things. 

First of all, we cannot condone and should continue to express our 

displeasure with what Russia did in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 

But I don’t see how we get those two territories back and make 

them a part of Georgia again. And, you know, we don’t need to announce that. There doesn’t need to be a press release from the 

State Department. But I think we need to acknowledge that to ourselves as we move forward and to be honest with ourselves about 

what our capabilities are and what they’re not. We can’t make this 

issue a defining issue in our relationship with Russia. We have too 

much else at stake: nuclear proliferation, arms control—there’s a 

long list of other issues. 

Secondly, I don’t know whether or when President Saakashvili 

will leave office. Matt Bryza left open the possibility that from his 

perspective it could be before 2013 when his term runs out. Whatever happens, I don’t think we should be excessively concerned 

when Mr. Saakashvili eventually leaves the scene. I think there 

are a number of other politicians in the Georgian leadership who 

are committed to democracy, committed to friendship with the 

United States, and it would not be a tragedy to see Mr. Saakashvili 

go. 

I’ll be very brief and just give kind of telegraphic points for the 

last few things here. 

I think we need to have a real debate about NATO, and I think 

the Congress can play a very important role in that. I don’t think 

we’ve had a serious debate about NATO. I think we had a debate 

about enlargement instead of a debate about NATO. So that’s one 

thing. 

And finally, you’ve already, Mr. Chairman, mentioned the need 

to engage with Russia. I think we do need to engage with Russia. 

We need to come up with some creative new ideas for a security 

architecture in Europe that is going to be sustainable. To be sustainable, they have to buy into it. 

So I’ll wrap it up there and happily turn over the floor. 


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31 

Mr. HASTINGS. I appreciate that very much. For the record, I had 

an opening statement that I did not offer, and I’ll accept it by 

unanimous consent. Any opening statement that Mr. Smith may 

have should be made part of the record as well as if Senator Cardin 

didn’t. I guess he had some things to say, but his official statement 

will be made part of the record. 

Mr. Goble, thank you so much for being patient. It’s hard to 

apologize for working, but we do have to vote. 

PAUL GOBLE, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS, 

AZERBAIJAN DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY IN BAKU 

Mr. GOBLE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for including me. It’s a 

pleasure to appear before you and Congressman Smith again after 

so many years in a very different capacity. Because I’ve prepared 

written remarks, I want to just hit several of the high points. 

First, two preliminary observations. What has happened in Georgia is a disaster that was waiting to happen and that can be repeated elsewhere across the former Soviet space. The reality is that 

the border system that was created in Soviet times was intended 

to create tension and to justify authoritarianism. 

In 1991 the United States welcomed the end of authoritarianism 

but also said the borders could never change because we were concerned that that could tear things apart. The consequence of that 

was to delay this problem. But it is going to be a worse future, not 

a better one. 

Second, I would like to call attention to one specific aspect of this 

conflict that has not been hit very hard. We talk a great deal about 

the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia. If the Republic 

of Georgia has territorial integrity, or did, internationally recognized, that included both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the fact is 

that the actions of President Saakashvili, however foolish they may 

have been, were in full congruence with the right of a government 

to act on its own territory. The actions of the Russian government 

were a violation of international law because they went across an 

international boundary. 

It is important that we do not make a distinction between territorial integrity that we’re talking about now and territorial integrity which existed prior to August 1st. That has tended to get lost 

in most of the media and most of the discussion in this city. 

Now, there are many lessons, and those are what I want to end 

with to be very brief. A large number of countries are going to have 

to learn lessons from this conflict. Georgia, along with its neighbors, is going to have to learn one that many of the post-Soviet 

states have—and that is that 1991 did not repeal history, and it 

did not repeal geography. It’s best that you try to find a way to live 

with your neighbors, as unpleasant as they may be and as much 

as you hate them for what they have done. That’s just a reality. 

The Russian Federation, however, is going to have to learn—and 

how well we can teach it is a big question—that it cannot be a full 

member of the international community if it is not willing to play 

by the rules. The fact is that invading other countries, like killing 

people, is wrong. It is terribly important—many references have 

been made to getting to the essentials. The reality is that the Russian government engaged in an act of aggression across an interVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:08 Jul 25, 2015 Jkt 061261 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A261.XXX A261

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national boundary. That doesn’t mean we nuke Moscow, but it 

means we recognize the fact. And trying to make this into a moral 

equivalency does not justify an act of violation of international law 

of the kind that the Russian government has engaged in. 

But I would like to end by just giving you what I see are the five 

lessons we should learn and give you three policy prescriptions that 

I think are essential 

First, despite all our hopes and expectations, 1991 was not the 

end of history. Ending communism didn’t end conflict, and the fact 

is we’re going to have more conflict in this part of the world in the 

future than we did in the past. As much as people don’t want to 

believe that, that’s going to happen. 

Second, and I will second Paul Saunders’ comment, we have got 

to end our personalization of relations with foreign leaders. It is 

not only that we have sometimes sacrificed our own ideals and interests in the name of maintaining a friendship with the leader of 

a large country—the Russian Federation—but we have found ourselves made hostage to the actions of a leader of a smaller country 

who thinks we will have no choice given what we have often said. 

We have been made hostage, in this case and some others. 

Third, we need to learn how to deliver clear and consistent messages to leaders and populations. The fact is we have delivered a 

consistent message to Georgia over this period. We have had statements about how we always defend our friends from very senior 

people, and we have had specific warnings not to do it. We have 

had people going in and providing military instruction, and we 

have said, ‘‘But you don’t want to use these forces if someone invades your country.’’ The fact is that if you don’t have a common 

that is delivered the same way every time, you have a problem. 

There’s another way about delivering a message: It is one of the 

great tragedies, and it’s one of the reasons I’m no longer in the 

U.S. government, that we have destroyed U.S. international broadcasting; we lack the ability to reach the peoples of this area. The 

Voice of America, Radio Free Liberty, all need to be expanded. 

They’re more necessary now than were 25 years ago, and unfortunately in the last 10 years we have watched them be destroyed. 

That’s one of the reasons I took early retirement and was in Estonia, where I had the pleasure of meeting you, Mr. Chairman, and 

am now in Azerbaijan, because I’m trying to what I can’t do on the 

airwaves by being there. This is critically important. 

Fourth, we need to insist on universal standards of international 

behavior. That has two implications, neither of which is entirely 

welcome. First, we cannot credibly ask other people to obey the 

rules if we don’t obey the rules ourselves. We have to be very careful when we take action that we don’t do things that violate the 

rules, because that subverts our possibility of asking anyone else 

to behave. We have done that, tragically, a number of times. Second, we need to understand that when the Russian government 

currently talks about double standards, and does all the time, the 

Russian government complains that we’re engaging in double 

standards. The fact is the Russian government wants to be treated 

by a different standard than anyone else. It wants us to recognize 

that it has a right to use military force across an international 

boundary, to illegally distribute passports in countries which do not 


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33 

have an agreement with dual citizenship or even constitutionally 

ban it, as is in the case of Ukraine. But the Russians insist that 

because they’re big and important that has to be. 

Fifth, we need to recognize something else. All too many times 

in the last month we have heard people talk about what’s going on 

and what we should do with respect to the Russian Federation in 

terms of the risk of a new Cold War. Let me tell you that invocations of a new Cold War are precisely designed to force the United 

States not to do anything. It is quite amazing to me that with 

every other country in the world we know we have things we agree 

with, and we know we have things we disagree with. That’s going 

to be true with Russia, too. It was even true during the Cold War. 

Invocation of a new Cold War is a way, an act, of public diplomacy 

intimidation against the United States people and against the 

United States government. 

I would recommend three things that we need to do to get out 

of this current problem we’re in. First, I agree that we are not 

going to see South Ossetia and Abkhazia reincorporated immediately. That does not mean there isn’t something we should do. In 

1932, Secretary of State Simpson announced that it was American 

policy never to recognize border changes brought about by force 

alone. That led to the non-recognition policy, which was declared 

in 1940, for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It is my view that the 

United States government should immediately proclaim a new nonrecognition policy that the United States does not recognize the 

forcible inclusion of these countries by military is a violation of a 

policy that we are supposed to have had online since 1932. It is 

something that would be easy to do, would be fully understood, and 

it would signal to those people and to the Georgian people that we 

have accepted a reality even if we can’t change it immediately. 

Second, we need to expand our ties with the peoples of this entire region and our expertise on these areas. It is a tragedy how 

few people there are who speak Georgian, who have lived in Georgia, who know the region or any of these countries. It should never 

happen again, as it did during this crisis, that the Department of 

State should announce that it could not spare Mr. Bryza to take 

a particular trip because it didn’t have anyone else on whom it 

could count here in Washington for expertise. When you don’t have 

a bench, it’s really tough to field the first team. But we have got 

to address that. I believe the way you do that is to rebuild our area 

studies programs by the revival of the National Defense Education 

Act Title VI program which was responsible for a lot of us getting 

trained. 

Finally, it seems to me that recognizing that the borders of the 

republics of the former Soviet Union were drawn in order to create 

problems rather than to resolve them that the United States needs 

to begin to understand that the right of nations to self-determination is also important and not just border stability. When we declared border stability was above everything else in February of 

1992, when we said that we would never recognize any secession, 

we set in play the forces that ultimately led to the destruction of 

Grozny in the genocide of the Chechen people, first by Mr. Yeltsin 

and then by Mr. Putin. It is in many ways our fault because we 

sent the signals. 


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I believe we need under the current circumstances to begin to 

think about how we create mechanisms of negotiation and of conversation so that the rights of nations to self-determination, the 

right of peoples to democratic choice, will be respected rather than 

sacrificed as they have sometimes been in recent years on the altar 

of territorial stability. But if we’re going to say territorial inviolability, then let us make it very clear that if a country does something on its own territory we have said that’s its choice, instead of 

as we have done in the Georgian crisis acting as if Moscow has an 

equal right to be on the territory of the Republic of Georgia as the 

Republic of Georgia government has. This is in no way an endorsement by me of the some of the decisions that Mr. Saakashvili has 

made with respect to the media, with respect to military action, or 

with respect to his moves against the opposition. 

Having said that, we need to take seriously that Georgia is a full 

member of the international community, and that if we’re going to 

recognize the rights of states and the territorial inviolability of 

their borders, then Georgia had a right too, and it has been brutally violated by the Russian Federation and not because of anything the Georgian government did, however unfortunate it was. 

Mr. HASTINGS. I thank you, Paul. We’re going to have to proceed 

apace to vote. I would like to make it clear that all of our testimonies will be on our Web site, and your full written statements 

will be included therein. It would be my hope that, to the extent 

that it would be possible, that I could have a casual meeting with 

either or both of you, even if it requires coming to Estonia. Thank 

you. 

Mr. GOBLE. It would be nice. Thank you. 

Mr. SAUNDERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Æ 


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