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Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

A HARD LOOK AT HARD POWER:

ASSESSING THE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF

KEY U.S. ALLIES AND SECURITY PARTNERS

Gary J. Schmitt

Editor

July 2015

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ISBN 1-58487-684-0
v

CONTENTS

Foreword ....................................................................vii

1. Introduction .................................................... 1

Gary J. Schmitt 

2. Italian Hard Power: Ambitions 

 and Fiscal Realities.................................................. 5

Gary J. Schmitt 

3. Australian Defense in the Era of Austerity: 

 Mind the Expectation Gap ..................................35

Andrew Shearer 

4. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

 at Sea: Trends in Allied Naval Power................67

Bryan McGrath

5. German Hard Power: 

 Is There a There There? ................................95

Patrick Keller

6. South Korea: Responding to the 

 North Korean Threat ...........................................119

Bruce E. Bechtol

7. Polish Hard Power: Investing in 

 the Military as Europe Cuts Back ..................149 

Andrew A. Michta

8. French Hard Power: Living 

 on the Strategic Edge .................................173

Dorothée Fouchaux
9. Taiwanese Hard Power: Between a ROC 

 and a Hard Place ..........................................201

Michael Mazza

10. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 

 Land Forces: Losing Ground ........................231

Guillaume Lasconjarias

11. United Kingdom Hard Power: 

 Strategic Ambivalence ..............................257

Paul Cornish

12. Pooling and Sharing: The Effort to 

 Enhance Allied Defense Capabilities ............287

W. Bruce Weinrod

13. Japanese Hard Power: Rising 

 to the Challenge .....................................315

Toshi Yoshihara

14. North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

 Air Power: A Self-Reliant Europe? ................351

Craig Franklin

About the Contributors ...........................................381

vi
vii

FOREWORD

Since the end of World War II, the United States 

has made maintaining a favorable balance of power 

in Eurasia a core element of its national security strategy. It did so in good measure by maintaining a large 

conventional military force that was based not only 

at home, but also in bases spread across Europe and 

Asia. That strategy was buttressed by developing security ties and alliances with key powers and frontline states. The implicit bargain was that the United 

States would help keep the peace on their door front 

if they would provide access from which American 

forces could operate and, in turn, maintain credible 

forces themselves to reinforce and support U.S. efforts 

at keeping the great power peace.

The question raised by this collection of essays is: 

Is that bargain unraveling? As the following chapters 

note, since the end of the great power threat posed by 

the Soviet Union, both the United States and its principal allies have seen fit to cut the size of their forces 

substantially and, in most cases, slowed efforts at replacing military systems and platforms. The quandary many of America’s allies have faced is, on the one 

hand, reforming their militaries to make them more 

expeditionary and useful for addressing various security problems—such as piracy, terrorism, and the instability brought about by collapsing regimes. On the 

other hand, not having the political resources at home 

to prioritize defense spending in the face of domestic 

demands and, more recently, faltering economies are 

also problems that need to be considered. The result is 

smaller, half-modernized militaries with often significant gaps in key capabilities.

The strategic problem is that, while its allies and 

partners have shrunk their militaries, so too has the 
United States. It no longer retains a military sized to 

handle multiple major contingencies at once as it once 

did and is now facing the prospect of not only continuing to deal with large-scale disorder within the 

Middle East but also the problematic behavior of two 

major military powers, China and Russia. In short, at 

a time when the United States needs the most help, the 

prospects for receiving it, with the exception of a few 

allies, look more worrisome than at any point since 

perhaps the immediate aftermath of World War II.

A Hard Look at Hard Power provides in-depth analysis of the state of key allied militaries. It could not be 

more timely.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Gary J. Schmitt

Since World War II, a key element of America’s 

grand strategy has been its worldwide network of 

strategic allies and partners. This network has provided the United States with the framework for sustaining its global presence, enhanced deterrence against 

adversaries in key regions of the world, and, when 

called upon, provided men and materiel necessary 

to fight wars. Indeed, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 

with one exception—the U.S. invasion of Panama in 

December 1989—American forces have not engaged 

in a major conflict without allies fighting alongside 

them. Although, in the words of Bill Clinton administration Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the 

United States might be “the indispensable nation,” as 

a matter of practice, America is so in conjunction with 

its security partners.1

This practice is grounded in four simple considerations. The first and most straightforward is that 

allies might have capabilities that increase the overall “punching power” of a given military campaign. 

Second, allied militaries, even when requiring the assistance of U.S. enablers, will often reduce the overall 

burden on U.S. forces. Third, and related to the second 

consideration, is that, when confronted with two major military campaigns as in Iraq and Afghanistan in 

the last decade, the United States required additional 

forces to sustain both campaigns simultaneously. As a 

matter of “economy of force,” allied militaries helped 

“hold” Afghanistan against the Taliban as the body 

of American military forces turned their attention to 
2

the main action in Iraq from 2003 to 2009. And, finally, although U.S. administrations routinely claim the 

prerogative of acting unilaterally to address threats to 

U.S. security, the American body politic prefers to act 

in conjunction with allies—especially democratic allies—when engaging in military operations. It does so 

for the simple reason that the American public and its 

leaders believe that coalitions of like-minded liberal 

governments confers a degree of legitimacy on such 

operations that unilateral action is short of. Whether 

this is necessarily the case—and, arguably, unilateral 

actions can be just as legitimate as those undertaken 

under “collective security” arrangements in certain 

circumstances—the political and diplomatic reality is 

that the United States favors going to war with other 

democracies.

Despite this preference for coalitions, following 

the end of the Cold War and the existential threat 

posed by the Soviet Union and its Iron Curtain allies, 

increasingly less attention was paid to America’s allies—especially their “hard power” capabilities—in 

the 1990s. Everyone, including the United States, was 

busy collecting on the “peace dividend” that seemed 

to flow from the fact that the West was no longer facing a military superpower. To be sure, there were new 

missions for our European allies, such as in the Balkans and Africa, but those missions did not require 

militaries of the scale that had previously been under 

arms. Moreover, savings from cutting the size of the 

militaries could then be put to modernizing and reshaping them; it would be a “win-win” for America’s 

security partners. Except it was not.

New platforms cost more than expected. Personnel costs for all-volunteer forces continued to rise, 

and governments continued to expand domestic so-
3

cial programs, squeezing out what little budget space 

remained for defense spending. Compounding these 

problems for allies who joined the fight in either Iraq 

or Afghanistan, or both, was the reality that those campaigns were prolonged, “boots-on-the-ground” intensive, and required equipment and platforms unique to 

those fights. Toss in economies hard hit by the “great 

recession” of 2008 and the lackluster recoveries that 

followed, and one has a recipe for an even further 

decline in the hard power capabilities of key allies. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies’ 

continued effort to try to “do more with less” has resulted in a decade-long series of complaints from senior U.S. officials that too many of our allies have not 

kept to the 2002 agreed-upon benchmark of spending 

a minimum of 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. Nor is this a problem confined 

to NATO and Europe. Key Asian security partners—

South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Australia—fall 

below the 2 percent line, as well. 

As justified as those complaints are and as useful 

as it is for generally measuring a country’s defense 

burden, focusing on military spending as a percentage of GDP is insufficient for fully understanding 

each country’s military-strategic plans, capacities, and 

outlook. The chapters which follow, commissioned 

over the past few years by the Marilyn Ware Center 

for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, are intended to fill in that gap. 

The chapters, written by country and security experts, 

examine current and planned defense budgets, troop 

strengths, deployable capabilities, procurement programs, research and development efforts, doctrinal 

updates, and strategic guidance documents in an ef-
4

fort to provide an accurate, well-rounded account of 

various key allies’ hard power capabilities.

In addition to the country-specific chapters, there 

are also chapters that provide an overview of NATO 

land, air, and maritime forces, and a chapter discussing the possibilities and limitations of the attempt to 

squeeze more capabilities of allied militaries through 

“smart defense” and “pooling” initiatives. 

This focus on “hard power” is not intended to 

shortchange the utility of “soft power”—what Harvard professor Joseph Nye has described as being the 

ability to attract rather than coerce other states into 

doing what you want. But, as we have seen in Eastern 

Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia in recent years, 

the absence of military capabilities or the strategy to 

deploy them effectively can create regional dynamics that invite instability or, worse, a vacuum that soft 

power cannot fill by itself. 

Having a fuller understanding of allied military 

capabilities, plans, and strategies is becoming even 

more important as the U.S. Government cuts its own 

defense budget and force structure. For American 

policymakers and strategists, knowing what relative assistance allies and partners can provide now 

and in the future, will only grow in importance. The 

chapters that follow are intended to deepen that 

understanding. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Madeleine Albright, Interview on NBC-TV, The Today Show 

with Matt Lauer, February 19, 1998, available from www.state.

gov/1997-2001-NOPDFS/statements/1998/980219a.html.
5

CHAPTER 2

ITALIAN HARD POWER:

AMBITIONS AND FISCAL REALITIES1

Gary J. Schmitt

KEY POINTS

• Although Italy has the eighth largest economy 

in the world, its military capabilities fall short 

of key allied countries of similar size and economic strength because of its government’s 

long-term failure to increase its defense budget.

• Facing severe fiscal constraints, the Italian government has issued a new round of defense 

spending cuts that has substantially lowered 

overall force structure, but which the government hopes will still allow for continued 

modernization of its forces.

• The question going forward is whether the regional and global ambitions Rome once had for 

its military will diminish as its forces contract.

Although recent headlines have highlighted Italy’s 

dire fiscal situation, its defense capabilities have been 

in decline since well before the latest economic crisis. 

For Americans who grew up reading about the sometimes poor performance of Italian forces in World War 

II or watching movies set in Rome in which the theme 

is la dolce vita, perhaps this comes as no surprise.
6

However, Italy remains one of the world’s leading 

economies; it had the eighth largest gross domestic 

product (GDP) in 2011.2 Indeed, in terms of the size 

of its economy and population, the two nations Italy 

most resembles are France and the United Kingdom 

(UK). But, in terms of willingness to turn these attributes into hard military power, Rome falls short of 

benchmarks set by Paris and London.

As Figure 2-1 elucidates, Italy’s defense burden 

(measured as a percentage of GDP), while never high 

in the past, has declined even more in recent years.3

As a percentage of GDP, Italy’s defense burden has 

dropped substantially from what it was just a decade 

ago—and well below the 2 percent minimum that 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies agreed to try to obtain at the alliance summit in 

Prague in 2002.

Source: Data derived from “Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Difesa per l’Anno” (“Additional Note to the Defense 

Budget for the Year”), 2003-2011/2012. Data expressed in current 

prices.

Figure 2-1. Italy’s Defense Expenditure as a 

Percentage of GDP.
7

Although both France and the UK have also seen 

defense spending decline, Italy’s per-capita expenditure on defense, according to the Italian defense ministry, lags significantly behind that of its NATO allies 

(see Figure 2-2). On the face of it, Italy is punching 

well below its weight (see Figure 2-3).

Source: Data Derived from “Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Defesa” (2003-2011/2012). Data expressed in current 

prices.

Figure 2-2. Defense Spending per Capita (€).
8

Source: Data derived from International Institute for Strategic 

Studies, The Military Balance, 1991-2012, London, UK: Arundel 

House.

Figure 2-3. Base Defense Budget (Millions €).

Nor is Italy’s defense budget picture improving. 

According to the Italian defense ministry, its base 

defense budget [Funzione Difesa (FD)]—never large 

to begin with—will fall to €13.6 billion this year (see 

Figure 2-4).4
9

Source: “Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Difesa 

per l’Anno 2012” (“Additional Note to the Defense Budget for the 

Year 2012”), p. 140.

Figure 2-4. Italian Base Defense Budget 

(Millions €).

Compared to the FD average of the previous 4 

years (2008–11), this amounts to a cut of some 7 percent. Significantly, the “investment” (procurement) 

portion of the budget for 2012 has been shorn by 25 

percent from the previous 4 years and has seen a drop 

of nearly 30 percent from 2011 to 2012 alone.

Also important is the reduction in funds allotted 

to Italy’s Ministry of Economic Development, which 

subsidizes Italian defense research and development 

and procurement programs, as well as a 30 percent 

reduction in funds for military operations abroad. 
10

Under new austerity measures, Italy will reduce its 

defense budget by €3 billion over the next 3 years.5

ITALY’S STRATEGIC VISION

Any analysis of Italian grand strategy faces one 

overriding difficulty: there is no systematic production by the government of national-level strategy 

papers. To the extent that strategic documents have 

been issued, more often than not, they have been at 

the initiative of individual ministers rather than an established policy planning process.

That said, there have been various government 

papers issued over the past decade that allow one to 

tease out Italy’s strategic ambitions, and the military—

the government believes—is required to obtain them. 

The most relevant documents of this sort have been 

the 2001 defense ministry’s New Forces for a New Century; the post–September 11, 2001 (9/11) Defense White 

Paper, issued by the ministry in 2002; the 2005 Defense 

Chief of Staff’s Strategic Concept paper; the defense 

staff’s 2005 Investing in Security: The Armed Forces, An 

Evolving Tool; and the defense ministry’s annual Addendum to the Defense Budget, which attempts to give 

strategic and political context to the approved budget, 

as well as provide details on specific accounts within 

the budget.

The 2001 document was the first formal paper of 

its kind produced by the Italian defense ministry since 

the end of the Cold War—indeed, it was the first since 

the mid–1980s.6 The paper notes the obvious but important point that Italy will not be facing a conventional military threat to its homeland anytime soon. 

But it couples that fact with the assertion that Italy’s 

interests are “quite broad,” ranging from Southeast-
11

ern Europe to the Caucasus, from the Horn of Africa 

to the Maghreb, and that Italy’s military contribution 

to collective security and stabilization efforts in recent 

years has ranged far, wide, and outside the areas directly affecting Italy’s own strategic national interest.7

New Forces offers up a relatively ambitious strategic 

outlook, including Italy potentially having the capability to take the lead in military operations. To meet 

those ambitions, the paper notes that Italy will need 

to progress in creating an all-professional military, 

work with allied countries to develop and produce a 

plethora of new weapons systems, and increase its defense expenditures from 1.5 to 2.0 percent of GDP. The 

post–Cold War “peace dividend” had to end if Italy’s 

military was going to be able to handle the expected 

increased involvement in multilateral (NATO- and 

European Union [EU]-led) military operations, and do 

so as a capable allied force.

The 2002 white paper was published in the wake 

of the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the subsequent removal of the Taliban-led government from 

power in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, the paper 

pays particular attention to the then-emerging threat 

of Islamist terrorism and, similar to the previous 

year’s document, emphasizes the military’s need to 

operate abroad in concert with allies or under the auspices of the United Nations. With the recent conflict 

in the Balkans and Afghanistan being on the defense 

ministry’s mind, stabilization missions were at the 

forefront, leading, among other things, to a potentially enhanced role for the Carabinieri—Italy’s national 

military police force—in peacekeeping operations.

As in 2001, the 2002 white paper reemphasized the 

need to reform and modernize the Italian military. It 

noted that the air force was short on modern fighters 
12

and even missiles for its planes. It also pointed out that 

much of the navy fleet was aging, and advocated accelerating the transition to an all-professional Italian 

military, with a total active duty level for the armed 

forces set at 190,000, and 12 to 13 smaller but more 

capable army brigades. To help pay for this transformation, the white paper hoped to find savings in 

lower overall force structure and a new level of allied 

defense industrial cooperation to reduce costs while 

simultaneously increasing interoperability.8

The 2005 Strategic Concept paper was not a substantial break from previous papers, but it did attempt to 

provide a somewhat fuller account of the military tasks 

confronting a European power in the post–Cold War, 

post–9/11 era. The paper claimed that, in addition to 

traditional requirements such as protecting the homeland, Italy faces threats that are increasingly “multilayered and unpredictable,” requiring a preemptive 

military capability and a capacity to intervene rapidly 

even when the threat is some distance from Italy.9

Italian forces will thus need to act more jointly and, 

more often than not, in concert with allied militaries. 

To do so, the military will require enhanced command 

and control capabilities, surveillance assets, mobility, logistic support, and precision-guided weaponry. 

The Italian military should aim for a qualitative improvement of its capabilities that are more in line with 

NATO’s leading powers and that allow the military to 

address the wide range of security problems it might 

be asked to address.

After the Strategic Concept paper, the defense staff’s

Investing in Security paper was published.10 With its 

focus on the likely requirements for the Italian military over the next 15 years, the document drills down 

even further than the Strategic Concept paper in its 

matching of specific scenarios with force require-
13

ments. It lays out what capabilities it would need to 

secure “national spaces” and an immediate-reaction 

expeditionary (land, air, and naval) force that could 

act as an independent entry force, operate alone for 30 

days if necessary, and for 6 months as part of a larger 

multinational operation.11

Also useful for understanding Italy’s strategic 

posture or, more specifically, the connection between 

the country’s ambitions and the military resources it 

is willing to apply are the yearly Nota Aggiuntiva allo 

Stato di Previsione per la Difesa (Additional Note to the 

Defense Budget). The “Additional Note” to the defense budget is sent to the Italian parliament under 

the signature of the defense minister and provides an 

overview of how the ministry views the overall security situation and, in turn, its plans and programs for 

the military to meet its security objectives.

Starting with the Nota Aggiuntiva for the 2001 

budget—a document released in October 2000—and 

ending with the Nota Aggiuntiva for 2012, Italy’s post–

Cold War view of the security environment has been 

relatively stable. The notes first and foremost recognize that Italy faces no conventional military threat 

of any consequence to its homeland. However, since 

the late-1990s, Italian governments of both the left 

and right perceive Italy’s security as being affected by 

instability in the Balkans, North Africa, the Horn of 

Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean Basin, and, 

since the 9/11 attacks, even farther afield.

Hence, the country’s security problems are “multidimensional” and of “undefined contours.”12 This, in 

turn, requires, as note after note suggests, a military 

that is deployable, flexible, sustainable for extended 

periods, and modernized so as to be capable of operating in conjunction with top-line forces of both NATO 

and the EU.
14

Indeed, at the turn of the century, in the 2001 note, 

Italy was not shy about its ambitions. With plans to 

begin reversing the “peace dividend” cuts to the military that took place throughout the 1990s, Minister of 

Defense Sergio Mattarella declared that Italy’s global 

“credibility” had grown, making Italy “one of the 

leading” countries in NATO and the EU, as well as, 

he pointed out, being the fourth largest contributor to 

UN peacekeeping missions.13

With more than 8,000 of its military deployed 

abroad—ranging from operations in the Balkans to a 

stabilization mission in East Timor—Italy was asserting itself in a manner that allowed it to increasingly 

play a role in that group of nations driving international affairs. The 2001 bump in defense spending was 

only the first step, the note argued, in Italy’s military 

acquiring the kind of capabilities needed to match its 

ambitions and ensuring that it would not be a “mere 

spectator” in addressing future security problems.14

Indeed, by 2006, more than 10,500 of Italy’s military were deployed abroad, including to Iraq and Afghanistan. While the numbers were “unprecedented” 

for post–World War II Italy, the note also stipulated 

that, in light of the generally unpredictable security environment, those numbers could no longer be 

thought of as “unusual.”15

Of course, increasing deployments abroad, while 

at the same time modernizing Italian forces, required 

greater resources for Italy to fulfill its new strategic 

ambitions. As with most European states following 

the end of the Cold War, Italy had made deep cuts 

in its defense budget. The increase in defense spending in 2001 was meant to be the first step in reversing course and, eventually, putting Italy on par with 

France and the UK when it came to defense spending 

and military credibility.
15

According to the note attached to the 2002 budget, the goal was to have the base defense budget 

(FD) equal 1.5 percent of GDP and then be sustained 

there.16 At that level, the FD would be more or less 

aligned with other “major” European allies. However, 

this would require a change in Italian spending priorities since, in 2002, the FD was less than 1.1 percent of 

the country’s GDP.

Even with the slight bump in resources in 2002, 

however, the increase in personnel costs was squeezing the training, maintenance, and investment accounts. Indeed, by 2006, more than 70 percent of the 

base defense budget was going to personnel costs—far 

from the “model” allocation in which 50 percent goes 

to personnel costs, 25 percent is spent on maintaining 

the force, and 25 percent is spent on procurement and 

recapitalization.

Further complicating matters was the fact that, between 2002 and 2006, the defense budget was cut every year. By 2006, the base defense budget was down 

to 0.82 percent of GDP, and the ministry began announcing delays in modernization plans and increasing problems in sustaining the overall readiness of the 

force. After an increase in the defense budget in 2007—

but, according to the note, just enough of one to support the most pressing operational requirements for 

overseas operations and to “only partially allow” the 

ministry to deal with “the already difficult” problem 

of too few resources—the tsunami of the global economic crisis hit.17 By 2009, the note was warning that, 

if the downward direction of the budget continued, 

the ministry would have to slash the size of its force 

by tens of thousands, plans for modernization would 

dramatically slow, and “important programs” would 

need to be “reduced or postponed.”18 The trend has 
16

not been reversed, and, as predicted in the 2012 note, 

the ministry has formalized plans to shrink the Italian 

military by 40,000 and cut back or delay procurement 

programs designed to modernize Italy’s military.

In short, since 2007, resources for training and 

modernization have dropped by over 40 percent and 

30 percent, respectively. Like other European states 

that are reducing numbers of people and platforms, 

the pledge is that Italy’s military will be “of smaller 

dimensions but with higher quality.”19 Whether that 

will happen remains to be seen.

But the ambitions Italy set for itself a little more 

than a decade ago cannot, as the ministry itself made 

clear from the start, be fulfilled in the absence of a sustained increase in defense funds. In this context, was 

the fact that Italy was forced to withdraw its aircraft 

carrier—the Garibaldi—from ongoing NATO operations against Libya in July 2011 in order to cut costs 

the low point from which the Italian forces will now 

move forward, or a harbinger of things to come?20

ITALY’S MILITARY ABROAD

Italy’s military during the Cold War was principally focused on defending the country itself. This 

strategic posture was reinforced by the fact that, as 

one of World War II’s defeated Axis powers, Italy was 

reluctant (like post-war Japan and Germany) to be 

viewed as believing that its military was for anything 

but defending the homeland proper.

To a very limited degree, this attitude toward the 

use of the military has changed in Japan in the wake of 

9/11. Judging by Berlin’s use of the military in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa over the past 

decade and a half, it appears that Germany has modi-
17

fied its views about what constitutes a legitimate use 

of military force. So too Italy, if judging by the number 

of times its military has been involved in operations 

outside its borders.21 Italian forces were sent to Iraq 

during the first Gulf War, followed shortly thereafter 

by a deployment to Somalia, and then to Bosnia. Other 

deployments have included operations in Central Africa, East Timor, Mozambique, the Balkans, Iraq again, 

Afghanistan, Lebanon, and, most recently, against 

Libya, where the Italian Air Force flew air defense 

suppression and strike missions and helped enforce 

the United Nations (UN)-sanctioned no-fly zone over 

the country.

While the activity level of the Italian military has 

certainly picked up in recent years, perhaps the origins 

of this new attitude toward using the military dates to 

1982 when Italy—along with France and the United 

States—sent troops into Lebanon in the wake of the 

First Lebanon War between Israel and the Palestine 

Liberation Organization and Syria. The deployment 

arose because Rome believed that, given its geographic location, Italy should have a more prominent role 

in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean security affairs.

But it was not until Italy’s participation in Operation DESERT STORM in 1991—the first time the Italian Air Force had been involved in actual military 

operations since World War II—that the rate of the 

military’s deployments surged and appeared to open 

the door to more kinetic use of force. For example, in 

the 1991 Kosovo War air campaign against Yugoslav 

forces, Italy was the third largest contributor of aircraft and flew the fourth largest number of sorties by 

a NATO member.22

However, more recent deployments present a 

mixed picture when it comes to the use of military 
18

force, especially in the cases of Italian ground contingents sent to Iraq in 2003 after Saddam Hussein was 

removed from power, to Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, 

and to Lebanon following the “33-Day War” between 

Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. Wary of casualties and 

unwilling to provide the extended security rationale 

that would be needed to justify Italy’s involvement in 

all three missions, successive governments in Rome 

have sold these deployments—involving thousands 

of Italian soldiers in total—to the Italian public as 

“peacekeeping” and “humanitarian” missions. But, 

of course, neither the Iraq nor the Afghanistan mission turned out to be the “soft” power, light security 

missions the Italians expected.

Iraq. 

The Italian military’s deployment to Iraq—which 

lasted from June 2003 until November 2006—was certainly as difficult an experience for Italy’s forces as 

what they faced in Afghanistan, and undoubtedly reinforced Rome’s inclination to take a cautious operational approach in Afghanistan. Coming on the heels 

of the American-led military campaign removing 

Saddam Hussein from power—a campaign decidedly 

unpopular with the Italian electorate—the decision to 

send Italian troops was justified by the government as 

an “urgent intervention in favor of the Iraqi people.” 

Keeping with this theme, Italy’s defense minister at 

the time said the intervention was just the “opposite 

of war.”23

But war it was. Just a few short months after deploying almost 3,000 troops to Nasiriyah, a city in Dhi 

Qar Province southeast of Baghdad, a lightly protect-
19

ed Italian outpost was attacked by a suicide bomber, 

which killed 13 Italian military policemen and four 

soldiers. In response, the order was given to move 

most of Italy’s forces out of the city. This was not going 

to be the kind of “peacekeeping” and “stabilization” 

operation Italian forces had previously conducted in 

the Balkans.

Indeed, throughout the spring of 2004, Italian 

forces were engaged in a form of urban warfare with 

the Mahdi Army, as this Shia militia attempted to take 

advantage of Rome’s decision to reduce its footprint 

in the city.24 Lacking firepower, numbers, sufficiently 

armored vehicles, and surveillance capabilities, the 

best the Italian forces could do was establish a strategic standoff for control of the city. Eventually, the 

decision was made to concentrate the vast bulk of Italian troops at Tallil Air Base outside the city. With the 

change of government in Rome in April 2006, the decision was made to end the Iraq mission altogether.

Afghanistan. 

There is little question that the Italian military’s involvement in Afghanistan has been the largest, most 

complex, and most difficult campaign for the country 

since World War II. A little over 2 months after the 

9/11 attacks, elements of Italy’s navy (an aircraft carrier, two frigates, and a tanker) were steaming toward 

the Indian Ocean in support of Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM (OEF). Engaged principally in sea-control 

duties and at-sea inspections of suspicious vessels, the 

carrier Garibaldi deployed with eight AV-8 (Harrier) 

ground-attack jets that flew nearly 300 missions over 

Afghanistan. However, Rome had restricted the Harriers’ use to target identification, leaving actual strike 

missions to other allied planes.25
20

On the ground, Italy’s contribution to ISAF has 

recently topped 4,000 troops (see Figure 2-5). In addition, the Italian military assumed overall command of 

ISAF from September 2005 to May 2006, took the ISAF 

lead in 2005 of the geographically large and forbidding area of western Afghanistan, headed up the Provisional Reconstruction Team in Herat, and contributed forces to several mentoring teams tasked with 

training Afghan security forces by partnering with 

them in the field.

Source: Data derived from The Military Balance, 2002-12, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK: Arundel House. 

Figure 2-5. Deployment of Italian Troops 

in Afghanistan.
21

While all this information is well known, very little 

has been written about combat operations involving 

Italian forces. At least initially, this was due to the fact 

that the troops sent to Afghanistan were lightly armed 

and equipped as though their mission would be 

Kosovo-like peacekeeping. Indeed, the original UNsanctioned ISAF mission, as opposed to the OEF effort 

to overthrow the Taliban and hunt down al-Qaeda 

remnants, was understood as having the more limited 

mandate of providing security to support efforts at rebuilding the Afghan state. The last thing Rome wanted to talk about was the idea that “providing security” 

might require more robust military operations.

This is not to say that Italian troops have not been 

involved in kinetic operations. For example, from 

mid–March 2003 to mid–September 2003, a contingent 

of 1,000 Italian troops was involved in Operation NIBBIO. Operating out of a base in Paktia, a province on 

the border with Afghanistan, the Italian forces were 

tasked with helping coalition forces disrupt efforts by 

al-Qaeda and the Taliban to reinsert themselves into 

this heavily Pashtun area.26

However, the Italian government having sent 

them—without helicopters, heavy weaponry, or armored land transport—to eastern Afghanistan, there 

was a limit to what Italian forces could do. As a result, 

the bulk of their efforts consisted of setting up checkpoints, establishing blocking positions at potential 

insurgent escape routes, and conducting intelligencegathering patrols.

Although RC-West (the ISAF designation for the 

four provinces of Herat, Farah, Badghis, and Ghor 

over which Italy’s military had overall command for 

the region) was not a hotbed of Taliban activity by 

2006, insurgent activity was increasing in the region. 
22

But in an area nearly half the size of Italy and containing more than 2.5 million Afghans, the resources the 

Italian forces had been provided in manpower, firepower, and transport meant that, even in conjunction 

with allied forces in the region, fulfilling the ISAF mission of “securing” the region became an increasingly 

improbable task.

As a result of pressure from both its own military 

and ISAF allies, Rome did increase the size of the Italian force in RC-West and provided more assistance in 

terms of armor, jet aircraft, air transport, unmanned 

aerial vehicles, and attack helicopters. This gave the 

Italians a greater capacity to engage in blocking operations as the Taliban fled from ISAF operations in 

nearby Helmand into RC-West and, in a limited number of cases, to participate in operations designed to 

clear pockets of Taliban in their area of responsibility.

Nevertheless, it is also the case that Italian governments—both of the left and the right—have not wanted Italian soldiers to participate in operations in the 

more dangerous areas in the south or the east regions 

of the country. It was only in 2008 that the Italian government modified its caveat that Rome would have to 

approve any and all requests for Italian forces to assist 

coalition forces outside of RC-West by lowering the 

time allotted for it to respond from 72 hours to 6.

As with other ISAF contributors, Italy has begun 

to draw down the numbers deployed to Afghanistan. 

Because it is pressed financially, Rome would like to 

reduce the Italian deployment by 1,200 over the next 

year and gradually wind down force levels to no more 

than 800 to 1000 troops in country by the end of 2014, 

with 2014 being the year the Afghan government 

takes the lead in providing security throughout the 

country.27
23

Although the Italian military’s experience in Iraq 

and Afghanistan can, at best, be described as problematic, there is no question that the deployments 

have helped the Italian military in its goal of creating 

a more professional force. Working with allies in a 

hostile environment far from Italy has forced Italian 

forces to “up their game” when it comes to training, 

logistics, and field-level modernization.

Whether the same can be said for the Italian policymakers who decide how to employ Italy’s military 

abroad and provide the rationale for doing so is a different question. As former chief of Italy’s defense staff 

General Mario Arpino pointedly remarked regarding 

the mission in Afghanistan: “If Italy participates in 

international missions just to be there, to get a little 

prestige, but without understanding what the dangers 

are . . . we risk doing damage to the interests of our 

country.”28

MOVING FORWARD

As noted previously, in 2012, the Italian government proposed plans to restructure its defense effort 

to keep it more in line with the resources at hand. 

According to the defense ministry’s note for this 

year, “Today’s reality [is marked by a] significant 

imbalance” between personnel costs and the monies available to keep the military trained, ready, and 

modernized.29

The heart of the plan is to reduce personnel costs, 

now more than 70 percent of the base defense budget 

(see Figure 2-6), by dropping the active duty numbers 

authorized from 190,000 to 150,000, and by slicing the 

civilian work force to 20,000 from its current 30,000. 

With the cut in force structure, expected savings from 
24

eliminated military overhead and the sale of no-longer-needed infrastructure, the hope is to free up resources for the “investment” and “training” accounts. 

If successful, the budget’s general parameters would 

be more in line with what the defense ministry calls its 

“most significant allies,” meaning 50 percent would 

go to personnel, 25 percent to modernization, and 25 

percent to training and maintenance.

Source: “Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Defesa 

per l’Anno, 2012” (“Additional Note to the Defense Budget for the 

Year 2012”), p. 142.

Figure 2-6. Breakdown of the Defense Function 

by Spending Area.

In the short term, however, the defense investment 

account is taking a beating, with a reduction in spending of 28 percent from 2011 to 2012. (For the individual services and their respective investment budgets, 
25

this means a cut of 52 percent for the army, 40 percent 

for the navy, and 29 percent for the air force.) Given 

the 30 percent reduction in defense investments since 

2007, the modernization hole is deep and will require 

a substantial effort to be dug out of.

Moreover, while the 2012 budget increased spending on operations and maintenance and training by 

5.4 percent, since 2007, spending in this area had 

fallen by 40 percent—again, a deep hole to climb out 

of. According to commander of the Italian joint operations headquarters General Marco Bertolini, if funds 

for training were not boosted, Italy would not be able 

to undertake another mission like Afghanistan; or, as 

the defense ministry itself notes more prosaically, this 

year’s increase will still be “insufficient” to meet the 

services’ needs.30

As for the Italian Air Force, the budget reductions 

have substantially reduced the number of fourth and 

fifth generation fighter aircraft it will be flying. A decade ago, the initial goal was to replace Italy’s aging 

fleet of F-104s, AMX fighter bombers, and leased F-16s 

with a buy of 121 Eurofighter Typhoons, 40 F-35Bs, 

and 69 F-35As. The Typhoon order has, however, been 

cut back to 96, with some 62 now in service; the F-35B 

buy reduced to 15; and the F-35A purchase pared back 

by 9.31 Although these new acquisitions will clearly be 

an upgrade in individual aircraft capabilities, the fleet 

itself has declined from 313 fighter aircraft in 2001 

to 220 today and, once the 70 or so multirole, 1970sdesigned Tornadoes are retired from service over the 

next decade, the Italian tactical fighter fleet could consist of only 150 aircraft.

The Italian Navy is following a similar path. In 

June 2012, navy chief Admiral Luigi Binelli Mantelli 

announced that 26 or 28 vessels would be retired over 
26

the next half-decade. Although new and more capable 

platforms will be added to the fleet, overall numbers 

will drop as the replacement vessels will not be 1:1 

for those withdrawn from service. Indeed, to save the 

cost of decommissioning the ships, the government is 

looking to sell them at a discount to other countries or, 

even, to simply give them away.32 Examples of the cuts 

include reducing the submarine force from the current 

six to four (about half the number in 2001), dropping 

the number of new frigates to be bought from 10 to 6 

(leaving the total number of frigates at 10 after seven 

or eight older frigates are pulled from service), cutting 

minesweepers from 12 to 8, and patrol boats from 18 

to 10. Moreover, plans for replacing the retiring carrier Garibaldi and amphibious transport docks with the 

much larger carrier Cavour and amphibious assault 

ships (LHDs) has been complicated by a reduced buy 

of F-35Bs and the freezing of the LHDs’ acquisition.33

The number of army combat brigades has also 

shrunk. In 1991, there were 19 combat brigades. By 

1997, the number had dropped to 13. Under the new 

plan, the combat brigades will go from the current 11 

to 9. Concurrently, the Italian army has seen the number of tanks cut by more than half since 2001, with 

an equally substantial loss in numbers of field artillery and mortars. Smaller and less “heavy,” the army 

hopes to use the savings from fielding a leaner force 

to upgrade its fleet of attack helicopters, increase the 

capabilities of its special operations forces, and modernize its inventory of land vehicles. 

To maximize the effectiveness of its smaller armed 

forces, the ministry’s plan is to invest in greater service 

jointness; enhanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities; a 

digitalized (net-centric) land force; and upgraded sur-
27

veillance and target acquisition systems for the navy 

and air force. And, indeed, other than line items for 

expenditures on the F-35 program (€548.7 billion) and 

the final two U-212 submarines (€170.7 billion), the two 

most expensive programs listed in the defense budget 

are for programs involving C4I and ground surveillance (€160 billion) and jointness (€154 billion).33

Even so, the efforts to enhance the effectiveness 

of the smaller force despite budget cuts have meant 

some important programs have “slipped.” For example, delivery of the last pair of U-212 submarines has 

been pushed back a year, while the time frame for the 

planned procurement of medium armored vehicles, 

multirole helicopters, and various advanced munitions has been shuffled to the right by 2 to 4 years. 

This collectively suggests that, even with the substantial cuts in the overall size of the military, the number 

of civilian employees, and no-longer-needed military 

infrastructure, the margin of error for Minister of Defense Di Paola’s vision of creating a smaller but better 

equipped and advanced military is a thin one. Unexpected cost increases for major programs, fewer savings from personnel and infrastructure reductions, or 

further cuts in defense spending to address current 

deficits in government spending could undercut his 

plans for Italy’s military.

CONCLUSIONS

Under current plans, Italy’s military will retain 

a wide spectrum of capabilities befitting a mediumsized global power. As such, according to Di Paola, 

the government will not only have sufficient “hard 

power” to ensure Italy’s own defense, but a range of 

military tools from which Rome can pick and choose 
28

how it will involve the country in operations abroad. 

But without strategic airlift and sealift, Italy will, in 

most instances, either require a relatively permissive 

environment to deploy a substantial number of forces 

or the assistance of NATO allies. Moreover, with cuts 

in numbers to personnel, platforms, and resources, 

Italian policymakers will find they have less discretion in where and when they use the military. While 

the forces themselves might be more capable, a smaller military in a tight fiscal environment will inevitably 

lead Rome to conserve the capabilities it has.

A decade ago, Rome acted on the unstated but implied quid pro quo that, in exchange for U.S. and allied 

assistance in stabilizing the Balkans, ensuring energy 

supplies from the Persian Gulf, and keeping Islamist 

terrorism at bay, Italy would offer military assistance 

in places like Iraq and Afghanistan—locations which 

the Italian public, however, did not readily consider 

vital to Italy’s national security. This dynamic also fit 

Rome’s sense that it could and should play a larger 

role on the world stage. But that implicit deal and the 

ambition that accompanied it have gradually come 

undone in the face of fiscal pressures and the public 

sense that Italy did not face the kind of immediate 

threats that required maintaining, let alone increasing, 

Italy’s defense burden.

However, if the United States follows through on 

its decision to focus more of its attention on ensuring 

a favorable military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, 

and does so by reducing its military footprint in Europe, then countries such as Italy will be expected to 

do more in meeting their own security needs. Those 

security tasks appear to be growing, not receding. Not 

only is Iran’s threat to stability in the Gulf increasing, but the Horn of Africa and large segments of the 
29

Mediterranean Basin appear less and less stable—all 

of which could, and probably will, impact Italy’s security. But with military spending cut to the bone, Italy’s 

ability to help address those challenges will likely fall 

short not only of what one might expect of a country 

its size and economic weight, but also of Rome’s own 

ambitions at the century’s turn.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. This essay was originally published on November 1, 2012.

2. World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product, 2011,” available 

from databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/GDP.pdf.

3. Determining Italy’s level of defense spending is complicated by the fact that the government’s overall defense budget includes funds for Italy’s national military police, the Carabinieri—

a force of some 100,000. Approximately a quarter of Italy’s overall 

defense budget goes to pay for the Carabinieri and the internal 

security function. At the same time, the defense budget does not 

include funds spent on overseas operations, such as in Afghanistan; those funds are approved separately by Italy’s parliament. 

Nor does the nominal defense budget include funds spent by Italy’s Ministry of Economic Development on military procurement 

and research and development. Although the ministry does not 

publish the exact amount it contributes to defense-related spending, estimates were that, in 2011, the ministry spent €1.85 billion, 

and, in 2012, the total will drop to somewhere between €1.30 and 

€1.67 billion.

4. The FD includes funding for the three military services 

(army, navy, and air force), training and maintenance, personnel, 

and weapons development and procurement.

5. Andy Nativi Genoa, “Italy Wants More For Less With Defense Cuts,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 3, 

2012, available from www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/articlexml/AW_09_03_2012_p16-486416.xml&p=1.
30

6. The last white paper was published in 1985. See Maurizio 

Cremasco, “Italy: A New Role in the Mediterranean?” John Chipman, ed., NATO’s Southern Allies, London, UK: Routledge, 1988.

7. Italian Ministry of Defense, Nuove Forze per un Nuovo Secolo

(A New Force for a New Century), Rome, Italy, 2001, available from 

www.difesa.it/InformazioniDellaDifesa/periodico/IlPeriodico_AnniPrecedenti/Documents/2001_-_Nuove_forze_per_un_nuovo_secolo.

pdf#search=Nuove%20Forze%20.

8. Italian Ministry of Defense, Libro Bianco (2002 White Paper), 

2002, Rome, Italy, December 20, 2001, available from www.difesa.

it/Approfondimenti/ArchivioApprofondimenti/Libro_Bianco/Pagine/

Premessa.aspx.

9. Italian Ministry of Defense, Il Concetto Stategico del Capo 

di Stato Maggiore della Difesa (The Chief of the Italian Defence Staff 

Strategic Concept), Piedimonte Matese, Italy, April 2005, available 

from www.aeronautica.difesa.it/Missione/Documents/libroconcettostrategico.pdf.

10. Italian Ministry of Defense, Investire in Sicurezza: Forze

Armate: Uno Strumento in Evoluzione (Invest in Security: The 

Armed Forces: An Evolving Tool), Piedimonte Matese, Italy, 

October 2005, available from www.difesa.it/InformazioniDellaDifesa/

periodico/IlPeriodico_AnniPrecedenti/Documents/Investire_in_

sicurezza.pdf#search=Investire%20in%20Sicurezza.

11. For the army, this meant an Italian combat land force consisting of 10 brigades (three light, three medium, three heavy, 

and one airborne), with planned modernization of ground combat vehicles and attack and transport helicopters. For the navy, 

it meant a smaller but more capable fleet, with larger amphibious transport ships, a new aircraft carrier flying F-35Bs, replacing 

an existing carrier with new amphibious assault ships, and new 

diesel submarines. For the air force, the future fleet would eventually consist of a mix of Eurofighter Typhoons and F-35s, and a 

sustained deployment capability of 45-50 Aircraft, with four new 

KC-767 aerial refueling tankers. See Italian Ministry of Defense, 

Ivestire in Sicurezza.
31

12. For characterization of Italy’s threat environment as 

“multidimensional,” see Il Concetto Stategico, p. 10.

13. Italian Ministry of Defense, Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di 

Previsione per la Difesa per l’Anno 2001 (Additional Note to the Defense 

Budget for the Year 2001), October 2001, available from www.difesa.

it/Approfondimenti/Nota-aggiuntiva/Documents/58570_na_2001.pdf.

14. Ibid.

15. Italian Ministry of Defense, Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di 

Previsione per la Difesa per l’Anno 2006, 2006, available from www.

difesa.it/Approfondimenti/Nota-aggiuntiva/Documents/86808_NotaAggiuntiva2006.pdf.

16. Italian Ministry of Defense, Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di 

Previsione per la Difesa per l’Anno 2002 (presented to the Italian 

Senate March 18, 2002), available from www.difesa.it/Approfondimenti/Nota-aggiuntiva/Documents/22689_notaaggiuntiva2002.pdf.

17. Italian Ministry of Defense, Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato 

di Previsione per la Difesa per l’Anno 2007 (presented to the Italian Senate May 15, 2007), available from www.difesa.it/Content/

Documents/nota_aggiuntiva/86808_NotaAggiuntiva2007.pdf, 

accessed on September 25, 2012.

18. Italian Ministry of Defense, Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato 

di Previsione per la Difesa per l’Anno 2009 , 2009, available from 

www.difesa.it/Content/Documents/nota_aggiuntiva/3171_Nota_

Aggiuntiva_2009.pdf, accessed on September 25, 2012.

19. Italian Ministry of Defense, Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Difesa per l’Anno 2012 (presented to the 

Italian Senate in April 2012), available from www.difesa.it/

Approfondimenti/Nota-aggiuntiva/Documents/NotaAggiuntiva2012.

pdf, accessed on September 1, 2012.

20. “Italy Removes Aircraft Carrier from Libya Campaign,” 

Defense News, July 7, 2011, available from www.defensenews.com/

article/20110707/DEFSECT05/107070311/Italy-Removes-AircraftCarrier-from-Libya-Campaign.
32

21. For an overview of Italy’s military operations abroad, see 

Piero Ignazi, Giampiero Giacomello, and Fabrizio Coticchia, Italian Military Operations Abroad; Just Don’t Call it War, New York: 

Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

22. John E. Peters et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation, Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND Corporation, 2001, p. 21, available from www.rand.org/

content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1391.pdf.

23. Ignazi, Giacomello, and Coticchia, pp. 76, 140–141. It is 

useful to remember in this context that before an international 

mission is undertaken by Italian forces, the parliament votes on 

the government’s proposal, which includes the language for the 

mission’s mandate and the size of the force to be sent.

24. Riccardo Cappelli, “Iraq: Italian Lessons Learned,” 

Military Review, March–April 2005, available from www.scribd.

com/doc/8352865/Iraq-Italian-Lessons-Learned-Military-Reviewwith-errata.

25. Gianandrea Gaiani, Iraq-Afghanistan: Guerre di Pace Italiane (Iraq-Afghanistan: Wars of Italian Peace), Venice, Italy: Studio 

LT2, 2008.

26. Task Force Nibbio, General Office of the Chief of Staff Office of Public Information, Italian Ministry of Defense, October 

13, 2003, available from www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_int_

concluse/Afghanistan_Nibbio/Documents/92952_SchedaNIBBIO131003.pdf, accessed on September 7, 2012.

27. “Italian Defence Minister Visits Afghan Bases as Troops 

Prepare Handover,” BBC Monitoring Service Europe, September 

25, 2012.

28. Vincenzo Nigro, “Arpino: Afghanistan, le Critiche si Fanno 

a Porte Chiuse” (Arpino: The Criticisms of Afghanistan Take Place 

behind Closed Doors), La Repubblica, July 27, 2007, available from 

ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2007/07/27/arpinoafghanistan-le-critiche-si-fanno-porte.html.
33

29. Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Difesa per 

l’Anno, 2012.

30. Tom Kington, “Finmeccanica CEO Warns of Italian 

Defense Cuts’ Consequences,” Defense News, September 28, 

2012, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20120927/DEFREG01/309270005/Finmeccanica-CEO-Warns-Italian-Defense-Cuts8217-Consequences.

31. Tom Kington, “Italian AF, Navy Head for F-35B Showdown,” Defense News, May 15, 2012, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20120515/DEFREG01/305150010/Italian-AF-NavyHead-F-35B-Showdown.

32. Tom Kington, “Italy Looks to Sell Used Ships, Vehicles,” 

Defense News, June 4, 2012.

33. The minimum number of F-35Bs required to outfit the carrier was 22, according to the navy. In an agreement struck with the 

air force, the navy will be able to borrow F-35Bs from the air force 

inventory, if necessary, during a deployment. See Tom Kington 

and Vago Muradian, “F-35 Base-Sharing Plan Defuses Spat between Italy’s AF, Navy,” Defense News, July 2, 2012, available from 

www.defensenews.com/article/20120702/DEFREG01/307020002/F35-Base-Sharing-Plan-Defuses-Spat-Between-Italy-8217-s-AF-Navy.

34. Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Difesa per 

l’Anno, pp. II-1; C/2–14.

35

CHAPTER 3

AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE IN THE ERA 

OF AUSTERITY: MIND THE 

EXPECTATION GAP1

Andrew Shearer

The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s 

and in no way reflect the position of the State Government of Victoria.

KEY POINTS

• After sustaining a 10 percent cut in 2012, Australia’s defense budget is unlikely to exceed 1.7 

percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over 

the next 5 years.

• As China and other regional powers procure 

advanced weapons systems, Australia risks 

losing its long-standing capability edge in key 

categories such as naval warfare and air combat, a risk that will only be exacerbated by future shortfalls in planned spending.

• Australia must make a commitment to boosting its military capabilities to ensure that it 

can make a credible contribution in the unilateral and multilateral defense roles it has signed 

up for.

Like many Western countries, Australia looked for 

a peace dividend when the Cold War ended. Defense 

spending fell, ground forces in particular were cut, 

and key capabilities such as strategic lift were allowed 

to wither. By the mid-1990s, Australia had only four 

undergunned and understrength infantry battalions. 
36

It made a token contribution (two frigates, a supply 

ship, and a handful of medical and other support 

personnel) to the first Gulf War in 1991 and provided 

peacekeeping forces, most notably in Cambodia. But 

the military participated in no major combat operations for more than 2 decades after the Vietnam War. 

High-end defense capabilities such as antisubmarine 

warfare were starved of funds and training opportunities and were allowed to atrophy.

Before coming to office in 1996, former prime minister John Howard had been a strong critic of the preceding government’s underfunding of defense. At the 

start of the Howard government’s tenure, it made extensive spending cuts to restore the national budget to 

a surplus, but deliberately quarantined defense. The 

real watershed for defense, however, came with Australia’s leadership of the International Force for East 

Timor, the regional coalition that in 1999 intervened 

to restore order in East Timor.

The East Timor operation was a major military, 

diplomatic, and political risk for an Australian government that was relatively inexperienced in international affairs. Notwithstanding a United Nations 

mandate for the operation, opposition by rogue Indonesian military units or even inadvertent conflict with 

Indonesia could not be ruled out. These outcomes 

were avoided, and the operation was judged a success. But the Australian government was alarmed 

by the capability gaps revealed by the operation—in 

particular, the shortcomings in what was needed to 

deploy and sustain a modest expeditionary force even 

a short distance from Australia.

The result was the 2000 Australian defense white 

paper that committed to grow the defense budget by 

an average of 3 percent per year, in real terms, over 
37

the following decade.2 It outlined a 10-year plan to 

boost air, maritime, and strike capabilities and to ensure that Australia could sustain a brigade-sized force 

on operations for an extended period, while still having a smaller reserve available for other contingencies. During the Howard government’s years in office, 

Australian defense spending increased by 47 percent 

in real terms and approached 2 percent as a proportion of GDP.

The 2000 white paper highlighted the importance 

of the United States to Asia-Pacific security while also 

flagging that China was likely to pose challenges for 

the U.S. strategic role in the future. It likewise emphasized that, through the alliance, Australia gained 

invaluable access to U.S. military technology, intelligence, and training opportunities. As a result, the 

Howard government placed a premium on interoperability with the United States when the government 

made major defense acquisition decisions. However, 

the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks and the Australian government’s response—which included invoking the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) for the first time and committing 

air, naval, and special forces to coalition military 

operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban—took 

Australia-U.S. military and intelligence cooperation 

to a new level.

Australian Defence Force (ADF) participation in 

U.S.-led coalition operations in the global war on terror saw Australian air, naval, and special forces operate more closely with their U.S. counterparts than at 

any time since Vietnam and across a much larger and 

vastly more complex area of operations. The sharing 

of intelligence and access to battlefield information 

systems between the two countries reached unprec-
38

edented levels.3 There were, however, limits to the 

ADF’s contribution. Australia lacked the full range of 

capabilities, particularly those enablers necessary to 

deploy and sustain conventional ground forces at (or 

above) battalion strength in major combat or stabilization operations in Afghanistan or Iraq.

In 2007, Kevin Rudd’s government sought to differentiate itself from Howard’s by opposing Australia’s military involvement in Iraq; however, it offset 

this by sustaining Australia’s troop contribution in 

Afghanistan and by reaffirming its strong support for 

the U.S. alliance. The Rudd government’s 2009 defense white paper extended Howard’s 3 percent real 

growth spending target to 2017–18.4 It also called for 

a “more potent and heavier” maritime force by 2030, 

including a fleet of 12 larger and more capable submarines. It also emphasized the need for the ADF to 

strengthen its offensive strike capabilities; modernize 

its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

systems; and expand its cyber warfare capacity.

In the white paper and the accompanying media briefing, the government clarified that the major 

driver of these decisions was the regional uncertainty 

caused by China’s rapid military modernization. It 

went further than previous Australian governments 

in publicly querying the strategic intentions underlying Beijing’s rapid acquisition of blue-water naval 

capabilities and in calling for greater transparency regarding China’s defense plans.5

However, the 2009 white paper was undermined 

from the outset by a mismatch between strategic aspirations and capacity to pay for them. The document 

provided a credible analysis of the regional security 

environment and a force structure to match, but the 

funding commitments were weakly rooted.6 The doc-
39

ument’s strong association with Rudd became a further vulnerability when the Labor Party peremptorily 

replaced him as prime minister with Julia Gillard in 

June 2010. 

The extent of the 2009 white paper’s overreach became obvious in the 2012 budget, when the politically 

and fiscally embattled minority Gillard government 

slashed defense spending by 10 percent—the largest reduction since the end of the Korean War. This 

followed a 5 percent cut the year before.7 A total of 

Australian dollars (AUD)5.5 billion was stripped from 

the budget over 4 years, including AUD3 billion in reductions for new military equipment and AUD1.2 billion in facilities construction. Equipment procurement 

was further reduced by AUD2.9 billion as a result of 

government reallocations. Consequently, Australia’s 

defense spending fell to 1.56 percent of GDP—the 

lowest level since 1938. Faced with this obvious gap 

in strategic vision and available resources, the Gillard 

government moved up the scheduled 5-year defense 

review from 2014 to 2013.

2013: PAPERING OVER THE CHASM

The defense planners who drafted the 2013 white 

paper faced the unenviable task of repairing the view 

that the government was not serious about the country’s defenses. However, the paper’s proximity to the 

forthcoming Australian election on September 7, 2013, 

means it has inevitably been interpreted as a political 

as much as a strategic document.

The 2013 white paper’s greatest distinguishing 

factor is its tone regarding China’s growing regional 

influence. In contrast to its 2009 predecessor, the newest paper proclaims that “Australia welcomes China’s 
40

rise” and, rather defensively, that “the Government 

does not approach China as an adversary.”8 While acknowledging that “China’s defence budget continues 

to record significant year-on-year increases,” it describes China’s ensuing rapid military modernization 

as “a natural and legitimate outcome of its economic 

growth.”9 It highlights the China–U.S. relationship as 

the single most important determinant of Australia’s 

strategic environment in coming decades and forecasts that a degree of Sino-American competition is 

inevitable.

But the 2013 paper concludes (without much compelling evidence) that “Australia sees the most likely 

future as one in which the United States and China 

are able to maintain a constructive relationship encompassing both competition and cooperation.”10 It 

also emphasizes Australia’s commitment to pursue 

“strong and positive” defense relations with China, 

including annual defense talks, ministerial-level 

strategic discussions, working-level exchanges, and 

humanitarian and disaster-relief exercises.11

The message was not lost on Beijing: a Chinese 

foreign ministry spokeswoman said the white paper 

shows “respect” for Australia’s relationship with 

China and expressed hope that it marked a “turning 

point” in Australian attitudes.12 China’s continued 

maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea and 

in waters disputed with Japan, as well as the Australian public’s deep-seated ambivalence about aspects 

of China’s rise, mean that this is unlikely.13 But the 

fact that Australia has toned down its official public 

position on China’s military modernization represents a significant tactical victory for Beijing in the 

Western Pacific.
41

The second prominent theme of the 2013 white paper is its fin de siècle emphasis on the drawdown of 

long-standing ADF contributions in East Timor (withdrawn in March 2013), the Solomon Islands (withdrawn in mid-2013), and Afghanistan (withdrawn by 

the end of 2013). Former prime minister Gillard emphasized this drawdown when she declared the end 

of the 9/11 era.14

The white paper anticipates that the drawdowns 

will allow the ADF to refocus its efforts on stabilization and humanitarian assistance operations in Australia’s immediate region and on enhancing the ADF’s 

presence in northern and northwestern Australia, 

where much of Australia’s natural resources wealth is 

located.15 This echoes U.S. President Barack Obama’s 

Middle East drawdown and “pivot” to Asia, with perhaps similar wishful thinking that Australia’s national 

interests can be circumscribed to its immediate neighborhood and that tomorrow’s threats to Australia’s 

security can be divined today.

The third change in emphasis in the 2013 white 

paper was the adoption of the Indo-Pacific as an organizing principle for Australian strategic policy. It confirms that “The Indian Ocean will increasingly feature 

in Australian defense and national security planning 

and maritime strategy,” and that the ADF needs to be 

prepared to play a part in securing these sea lanes.16

This is consistent with Australia’s Indian Ocean littoral status and the increased prominence of the Indian 

Ocean in developing U.S. strategic policy. While the 

emphasis given to the Indo-Pacific region is in some 

respects a continuation of previous defense thinking, 

the increased focus is significant nonetheless.

The final noteworthy thematic departure of the 

2013 white paper is the emphasis on fiscal uncertain-
42

ty. The chapter on finances commits the government 

to a defense budget that delivers the capabilities to 

meet preparedness requirements and to protect Australia’s national security interests. But it flags that the 

Australian fiscal environment “remains challenging” 

and stipulates that this commitment is subordinate to 

the priority the government places on improving the 

overall budget situation.17 Many Australian defense 

commentators expressed skepticism about the likelihood of the force structure outlined in the white paper being adequately funded and about the likelihood 

that defense spending would return to the aspirational 

target of 2 percent of GDP.18

AUSTRALIA’S DEFENSE BUDGET: 

NOT KEEPING UP WITH THE JONESES

After the 10 percent 2012–13 defense budget cut, 

the 2013–14 budget represented something of a return 

to normalcy. The government allocated AUD25.3 billion for defense, an increase of AUD1.2 billion (2.25 

percent) over the previous year. This modest increase 

will nudge defense spending from 1.56 percent of 

GDP to 1.6 percent (see Figure 3-1). The planned allocation will grow to AUD30.7 billion in 2016–17, with 

AUD 8.3 billion budgeted for new projects across the 

next 4 years—representing real growth of 10 percent 

annually in capital investment.19
43

Source: “The Cost of Defense: ASPI Defense Budget Brief, 2013-

14,” Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 

30, 2013, available from www.aspi.org.au/publication/publications_

all.aspx.

Figure 3-1. Defense Expenditure as a 

Percentage of GDP, 2000-14.

Overall, however, the budget does not redress 

the cuts of the previous 2 years.20 The budget documents reaffirm the government’s intention to attain 

the 2 percent of GDP target, but this will not happen 

soon: “This is a long-term objective that will be implemented in an economically responsible manner as and 

when fiscal circumstances allow.”21 According to the 

government’s own estimates, defense spending will 

be capped as a share of GDP at 1.66 percent through 

at least 2017–18.22

This leisurely return to a credible level of defense 

spending is difficult to reconcile with a regional security environment that, if anything, has deteriorated 

since the 2009 white paper was published. As the 2013 

paper makes clear: “We are witnessing the evolution 

of a more complex and competitive order” and “Australia’s relative strategic weight will be challenged as 

the major Asian states continue to grow their economies and modernize their military forces.”23
44

The paper notes that neighboring countries are 

introducing advanced weapons systems including 

beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, air-to-air 

refueling, modern surveillance radars, digital data 

links, highly capable airborne early warning and control platforms, and electronic warfare (EW) systems. 

Together, they can provide a significant increase in 

combat capability.24

For Australia—a country with a small population 

that occupies a vast island continent with an extensive 

coastline and massive territorial waters—maintaining 

sophisticated forces with a technological edge over 

neighboring countries has long been a keystone of its 

defense policy. Recent regional defense acquisition 

trends are reducing the strategic depth that has long 

benefited Australian security and are making it more 

expensive to maintain that capability edge.

As noted previously, the 2013–14 budget does 

commit additional funds for procuring equipment, 

including AUD2.94 billion to acquire 12 EA-18G 

Growler aircraft, which will complement the existing 

24 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets purchased in 2006, as 

a hedge against late delivery of the F-35 Lightning II 

aircraft.25 Australia has allocated up to AUD16 billion 

for the F-35 program, with plans to buy up to 72 F35s initially and potentially another 28 later on. The 

budget also allows for:

• Fast-tracking replacement vessels for the 

existing fleet of Armidale-class patrol boats;

• Replacing two fleet replenishment ships;

• Installing Australian-designed phased-array 

radar on the navy’s future frigates;

• Establishing a joint U.S.–Australia-operated 

C-band radar space surveillance installation in 

Western Australia; and,
45

• Acquiring P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance 

aircraft.26

Funding for operations is down, ostensibly reflecting the drawdown of ADF operations in Australia’s 

immediate region and the departure of 1,000 of Australia’s 1,650 troops in Afghanistan by the end of 2013. 

Spending on operations will drop from AUD1.5 billion in 2012–13 to less than AUD1.0 billion in 2013–14.

Australia’s two largest political parties—Labor 

and Liberal—agree that current levels of defense 

funding are inadequate. As noted earlier, the current 

Labor government has set 2 percent of GDP as a longterm goal for defense spending, conditioned on the 

fiscal situation. The Liberal Party, which leads the Coalition of opposition parties, has said it will “restore 

sensible defense spending to 3 percent real growth per 

year subject to improvements in the Budget.”27 In both 

cases, the devil will be in the details. The outlook is far 

from promising, owing to rapid expansion in government spending by successive Labor governments, ballooning health care costs, and deteriorating national 

revenues tied to a variety of factors, including a slowdown in commodity exports to China. As a result, 

economic forecasters are warning that Australia could 

face annual budget deficits for the next decade.28 Add 

in the costs of new entitlement programs, and it is difficult to be optimistic about Australia returning to a 

credible level of defense spending anytime soon.

This funding crunch comes at a time when the 

United States faces its own fiscal pressures and deep 

defense budget cuts. Consequently, Washington’s expectations for its allies are rising. The Obama administration is demanding U.S. partners make credible 

contributions to defense and security by maintaining 
46

modernized and ready forces and by taking the lead 

in regional security and stabilization operations. Senator John McCain’s pointed criticism of the Gillard government’s defense cuts likewise suggests that a future 

Republican administration is unlikely to have lower 

expectations.29 Australia has made a clear commitment 

to support the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, yet 

it remains to be seen whether the Australian defense 

budget will be able to meet its side of the capability, 

readiness, and operational bargain.

PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS: 

SEEKING AN EDGE

Australia has introduced a number of significant 

new military capabilities in the past decade, many 

of them as a result of decisions made by the Howard 

government. These include E-7A Wedgetail airborne 

early warning aircraft, C-17 Globemaster III transport 

aircraft, KC-30 air-to-air refuelers, M1 Abrams tanks, 

F/A-18E/F Super Hornet combat aircraft, and Tiger 

ARH attack helicopters. The regular army and special 

forces have expanded since 2000. Nevertheless, Australia faces a number of major capability challenges 

over the next decade and beyond.

Foremost among these is replacing Australia’s increasingly unreliable fleet of six conventional Collinsclass submarines. These boats have been plagued with 

problems since they were delivered between 1996 and 

2003, including propulsion system issues, poor availability, a shortage in skilled operators, and significant 

limitations in combat capability.30 Efforts to address 

some of these problems with a new combat system 

and the acquisition of new heavyweight torpedoes 

began in 2002. But based on current plans, it will not 
47

be until 2016 that all of the submarines will have the 

new combat system installed.31 Moreover, retirement 

of the Collins-class fleet is expected between 2022 and 

2031, resulting in a potential submarine capability gap 

in the late-2020s.32

The 2009 white paper committed the government 

to acquiring 12 larger, more capable conventional submarines to replace the Collins class—all of which were 

to be built in South Australia. Despite many commentators’ views that this commitment was financially 

unsustainable and technologically beyond Australia’s 

reach, the 2013 white paper reaffirmed both the need 

for 12 conventionally powered submarines and the 

plan to have them built in Australia.33

Australia’s long coastline and distances from key 

operating areas necessitate a submarine force with 

extensive range and endurance, capabilities that go 

well beyond those provided by most conventional designs. These characteristics can only be incorporated 

in a very large hull. Indeed, a number of Australian 

and U.S. analysts have argued that Australia’s needs 

could be best met by acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, most likely from the United States.34

Despite arguments in favor of this option, it remains politically controversial and the Labor Party 

has expressly ruled it out. Officials have, however, 

confirmed that the submarines will be equipped with 

U.S. heavyweight torpedoes and a U.S.-supplied 

combat system.35 Defense technological cooperation 

with Japan on this front is also a possibility.36 But 

in the meantime, the looming submarine capability 

gap is becoming a matter of increasing urgency for 

Australia’s defense planners.

The other major potential gap is in air-combat capability. Australian governments are typically sen-
48

sitive to any suggestion of a gap in air capabilities. 

Faced with an aging F/A-18A/B fleet, the earlierthan-anticipated withdrawal from service of its fleet 

of F-111 Aardvark strike aircraft, and delays in the 

development of the fifth-generation F-35, the Howard 

government decided to purchase 24 Super Hornets as 

a hedge against this eventuality.

The 2013 white paper continues this prudential 

approach. It takes note of the emerging advanced 

air-combat and air-defense systems in the region, the 

proliferation of modern EW systems, and the growing 

risk EW systems pose to Australia’s ability to control 

the air, conduct strikes, and support land and naval 

forces.37 Against this challenging backdrop, the white 

paper is unequivocal that “The Government will not 

allow a gap in our air-combat capability to occur.”38 It 

reaffirms Australia’s commitment to the F-35 program, 

with an expectation that three operational squadrons 

of up to 72 aircraft will enter service around 2020. 

In response to the proliferation of sophisticated EW 

systems, it also commits to acquiring 12 new Growler 

electronic attack aircraft, which will make Australia 

the only country outside of the United States with this 

capability.

Together with the six E-7 Wedgetail early warning 

and control aircraft, these new systems will provide 

Australia with significantly enhanced networking capability among its forces, interoperability with U.S. 

forces, and the ability to operate in a more “contested” 

regional environment. After delays in development, 

the Wedgetail is now meeting or exceeding performance parameters and will have the capability to detect and identify potential enemy electronic emissions 

at great ranges.39 The Royal Australian Air Force’s 

future dependence on the F-35, however, means that 
49

Canberra will remain acutely sensitive to any further 

delays and capability issues affecting the program and 

to future reductions in the overall size of the program 

that would drive up the F-35’s unit cost.

The middle of this decade will also see the transformation of Australia’s amphibious capabilities with 

the introduction into service of two Spanish-designed 

Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs) which, at 27,000 

tons, will be the largest-ever ships to serve with the 

Royal Australian Navy. They will improve interoperability with the United States and regional partners and increase Australia’s ability to respond to a 

range of contingencies. The rotation of U.S. Marines 

in Northern Australia will provide extensive training opportunities to build on Australia’s increased 

amphibious capabilities.

Under Plan Beersheba, the Australian Army is being restructured into three multirole combat brigades, 

including a battalion designated as the core of a future 

amphibious force.40 It remains unclear, however, how 

much ground combat power Australia will be able 

to deploy and sustain. A combination of capability 

and political considerations has constrained the situations in which the Australian government has been 

prepared to use land forces.

In 2006, for example, Canberra deployed an amphibious task force to waters off of Fiji in response to 

an anticipated military coup. However, a major factor 

in the government’s ultimate decision to not intervene 

was the concern that the ADF lacked the firepower to 

overcome the well-trained Fijian military at an acceptable cost to Australian forces. In Iraq and Afghanistan, 

the government preferred to commit special forces to 

initial combat operations rather than commit larger 

ground forces, again in part because of perceived 
50

capability limitations in firepower, force protection, 

and combat enablers and the resulting political risks 

such a deployment would entail.

In both cases, Australia did subsequently take 

on larger stabilization responsibilities—in Iraq’s Al 

Muthanna Province and in Afghanistan’s Uruzgan 

Province. It is unclear, however, whether the ADF 

could have on its own held down a “hotter” province 

in either country for a prolonged period if the Australian government had made a decision to do so—as the 

Australian Army did in Vietnam, for example.

As Australian force planners examine the lessons 

learned from recent operations, they should advise 

Australia’s current and future political leaders on 

whether the ADF has the capabilities they assume 

it has and, if not, whether the ADF should develop 

them. Coalition planners in the Pentagon likewise 

need to know what the ADF’s actual capabilities are.

The 2013 white paper left two other key capability decisions unresolved. The first of these is whether 

to equip Australia’s three new air-warfare destroyers 

with Standard Missile 3s so Australia can be involved 

in missile defense operations. The ships will be actively 

outfitted with the U.S. Aegis Combat System, capable 

of detecting and tracking a variety of missiles including ballistic missiles, and will operate with American, 

Japanese, and South Korean naval forces. While the 

white paper recognizes the increasing threat posed by 

ballistic missiles, it rather vaguely commits the government to “continue to examine potential Australian 

capability responses.”41

The second unresolved matter is cruise missiles. 

Currently, Australia’s main weapon for strike missions is the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, 

launched from the air force’s F/A-18 aircraft and with 
51

a range of over 200 nautical miles. This capability will 

be augmented when the F-35 is introduced, with its 

stealth characteristics and suite of precision weapons 

and ISR systems. The 2009 white paper, however, 

went further, committing the government—in a major 

departure for Australia and for the Southeast Asian region—to acquiring maritime-based land-attack cruise 

missiles to be fitted to the new air-warfare destroyers, 

future frigates, and to the successors to the Collinsclass submarine fleet.42

With no explanation, however, the 2013 white 

paper seems to have stepped back from this commitment, stating only that it would look into “options for 

the Government to expand strategic strike capabilities 

if required.”43 This development presumably owes as 

much to the government’s current fiscal problems as it 

does to any alteration in the regional security environment outlined in the 2009 white paper.

SUSTAINABILITY, READINESS, AND POSTURE 

IN NORTHERN AUSTRALIA

Sustainment has been a major challenge for the 

ADF since the late-1990s. Multiple operations abroad 

have placed significant strain on personnel, equipment, and support systems. ADF recruitment and retention have generally held up well, with Australia’s 

military forces enjoying public support and with enhanced pay and housing conditions boosting the attractiveness of military service. With the acquisition 

of C-17 and C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft 

and the LHDs, the ADF will enjoy enhanced strategic 

lift capabilities and an increased capacity to support 

deployed forces.
52

Although the defense budget has come under pressure in the last few years, the 2013 white paper avoided declaring a post-drawdown “peace dividend,” 

stating that despite the more fiscally constrained environment, there would be no reduction in overall ADF 

personnel numbers.44 Significant pressures and deficiencies remain, however. Shortages of specialist skills 

in some areas have been exacerbated by the Australian 

minerals boom, with the demand for engineering and 

related trades in particular draining individuals from 

the military.

This has resulted in reduced operational availability in some arms of the ADF such as the submarine 

fleet. The navy’s amphibious fleet has suffered a series of major mechanical failures owing to systemic 

sustainment and maintenance failures, forcing the 

government to make the rushed purchase of a former British vessel to make up the shortfall.45 As noted 

earlier, the army’s fleet of light armored vehicles has 

experienced unanticipated wear and tear as a result 

of sustained deployments and will require significant 

rehabilitation as troops deploy back to home bases.

Maintaining readiness during a period of reduced 

operational tempo will be another major challenge for 

the ADF. One possible consequence of the reduction 

in the operational budget noted previously will be 

fewer funds for training.46 This is likely to affect the 

active duty army in particular, but will also impact the 

training for reserve forces.

A more uncertain regional security environment, 

the growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, 

and community concerns about the potential vulnerability of Australia’s vital natural resources led the 

government to commission a review of the ADF’s 

force posture in 2011.47 The review found that the 
53

ADF needs to be postured to support high-tempo military operations in Australia’s northern and western 

approaches and recommended a number of steps to 

strengthen the ADF’s presence and ability to sustain 

such operations, including:

• Upgrading airbases in Northern and North 

Western Australia to handle larger aircraft types 

(necessary to implement the agreement reached 

during President Obama’s November 2011 visit 

to Australia for increased rotations of U.S. aircraft);

• Increasing ADF aircraft and ship deployments 

to the area;

• Upgrading airfield facilities at Cocos Island (an 

offshore Australian territory proximate to the 

Bay of Bengal and the western approaches to the 

strategically vital Strait of Malacca) to support 

future operations by P-8A maritime surveillance 

aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs);

• Expanding facilities at HMAS Stirling, the Royal 

Australian Navy’s major west-coast base near 

Perth, to support deployments by major surface 

combatants of the U.S. Navy;

• Giving consideration to hardening forward-operating bases; and,

• Enhancing facilities and opportunities for training with U.S. and other partner militaries.

The government has accepted the thrust of the 

force posture review and is already implementing 

some of its more straightforward recommendations.48

The government also announced that it would seek 

opportunities with the United States to fund jointly 

improvements to bases, facilities, and training infra-
54

structure as part of the enhanced practical defense cooperation measures announced in 2011.

THE U.S.-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE: 

SOUTHERN HINGE OF THE U.S. PIVOT?

U.S.-Australia security cooperation deepened and 

broadened significantly during the post-9/11 decade. 

This included closer operational, intelligence, and 

counterterrorism collaboration; greater Australian 

access to U.S. defense information and systems; and 

the 2007 signing of the Australia–U.S. Defence Trade 

Cooperation Treaty to streamline defense industrial 

cooperation. The treaty, which came into force in May 

2013, is intended to facilitate exports of defense goods, 

services, and technology and to improve delivery 

times and sustainment. It complements the ADF’s acquisition of a range of weapons systems that are able 

to operate seamlessly with U.S. forces.

Initial talks on enhanced U.S. military access to 

Australia preceded the Obama administration’s pivot, 

or rebalance, to Asia, and should be seen in the context of intensifying strategic links. The talks were quietly initiated by the Howard government in 2007 with 

the George W. Bush administration, building not only 

on the post-9/11 alliance relationship but also with 

an eye toward shifting power dynamics in the AsiaPacific region.49

By 2011, governments around the region were becoming concerned with China’s increasingly assertive 

behavior and looking for reassurance about America’s 

staying power in the Western Pacific following the 

2008 global financial crisis. Washington, for its part, 

was seeking options to facilitate a more distributed 

military footprint in Asia, closer engagement with 
55

Southeast Asia, and enhanced access to vital Indian 

Ocean sea lanes of communication.

The result was President Obama’s speech to the 

Australian parliament in November 2011 in which he 

laid out Washington’s rebalancing strategy. During 

his visit, the two governments announced that Australia was the first country in the region to agree to an 

enhanced U.S. military presence. This would include 

both a rotational Marine Corps presence in Darwin—

which, by 2016–17, would build to a 2,500-strong 

Marine Air-Ground Task Force—and increased use 

by U.S. Air Force aircraft of airbases in Northern 

Australia.

The current marine rotation numbers around 200, 

and an assessment has just been released to prepare 

for rotations of up to 1,100 personnel.50 While there 

has been some concern that the Labor Party’s support 

for these initiatives may be ebbing, Defense Minister 

Stephen Smith is on record as stating that the government’s current fiscal difficulties will not have an 

adverse impact on enhanced cooperation with the 

United States.51

What could have an impact over time, however, 

is an increasingly vocal strand of elite opinion in 

Australia that sees the country’s growing economic 

interdependence with China as incompatible with 

its security ties to the United States.52 Beijing exploits 

this anxiety in an increasingly sophisticated public diplomacy effort in Australia.53 U.S. officials, however, 

have grounds for cautious optimism on this score. 

First, neither major political party shows any sign of a 

weakened commitment to the U.S. alliance. The Labor 

Party went out of its way to state in the 2013 white paper that “The Government does not believe that Australia must choose between its long-standing Alliance 
56

with the United States and its expanding relationship 

with China.”54 The Liberal-led coalition took this view 

under Howard and maintains that position.

Second, public opinion is unequivocal. Support for 

the U.S. alliance is strong, with more than 80 percent 

of Australians regarding the alliance as either “very 

important” or “fairly important” for Australia’s security.55 Nearly three-quarters believe the United States 

will be Australia’s most important security partner 

over the next decade and a similar proportion are in 

favor of “up to 2,500 U.S. soldiers being based in Darwin.”56 Third, China’s behavior in disputed waters in 

the Western Pacific shows few signs of moderating 

and is likely to sustain support for the alliance as a 

hedge against future uncertainty and as a counterweight to China’s economic influence in Australia. 

(See Figure 3-2.)

Figure 3-2. Australia’s Strategic Neighborhood.
57

Assuming that the base of support for the alliance 

in Australia remains strong, enhanced defense cooperation is likely to deepen and to continue extending 

into newer areas. During World War II, Australia was 

vital to the U.S. Pacific War effort because Australia 

offered strategic depth and access to crucial sea lanes 

of communication. The joint Australia–U.S. intelligence facilities have made a vital contribution to the 

security of both nations for the past several decades. 

While circumstances are obviously different today, 

those strategic considerations remain important.

In addition to the aforementioned increased deployments of American sea and air assets to Australia, 

the ramped-up program of amphibious training exercises with the ADF, and the potential creation of a 

genuinely joint expeditionary capability, discussions 

have started about the use of the enhanced airfield on 

Cocos Island to support operations by maritime surveillance aircraft and UAVs. Australia and the United 

States have also stepped up defense cooperation in the 

realms of cyberspace and space, including the establishment of the new joint space surveillance installation in Western Australia.

Close defense industrial, intelligence, and operational cooperation will also remain vitally important, 

particularly for Australia. U.S. technical support was 

essential to rehabilitating the Collins-class submarines, and the 2013 white paper makes explicit that 

Canberra will look to Washington for assistance to deliver its ambitious submarine replacement program.57

Integrating the sophisticated F-35 into the ADF and 

networking it with a suite of other interoperable capabilities will likewise require unprecedented levels of 

Australia–U.S. collaboration.
58

The ADF can make an important operational contribution to the evolving Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept, 

not only by facilitating a more distributed American 

force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, but also by 

participating in “distant blockade” operations around 

Southeast Asian maritime chokepoints and by augmenting U.S. enabling capabilities such as tanker aircraft, EW assets, and strategic lift in contingencies.58

But deepening cooperation will require greater 

effort on Washington’s part to articulate more fully 

its vision for ASB and the roles allies are expected to 

play. At the same time, deepened defense and strategic ties will require more maturity in Australia about 

the need for closer involvement in a range of detailed 

U.S. military contingency planning and the attendant diplomatic challenges that will inevitably arise 

as a result.

CONCLUSION

Australia, the United States, and their alliance 

face major strategic challenges as global power shifts 

increasingly toward Asia. China’s rise and its rapid 

military modernization are transforming the regional 

security environment. The People’s Liberation Army’s 

development of anti-access and area denial capabilities is challenging the U.S. military’s ability to operate 

in the Western Pacific and is reshaping the regional 

military balance. Moves by other Asian powers to 

acquire sophisticated weapons are contributing to a 

more complex and contested region and eroding Australia’s long-standing military capability edge.

Against this backdrop, it seems imperative that 

Australia’s own military modernization agenda proceed apace. As a result of the Gillard government’s 
59

defense cuts and predicted revenue pressures for 

the next decade, however, Australia’s modernization 

plans are now at risk. The funding shortfalls outlined 

in the 2009 and 2013 white papers may be as much 

as AUD33 billion for the period 2009–22.59 The consequence, according to a leading expert on the Australian defense budget, is an inevitably slow modernization of the defense force.60

A related alliance-based challenge will be managing U.S. expectations. Reasonably enough, the United 

States is looking to its Asia-Pacific allies, including 

Australia, to shoulder a greater share of the burden 

of maintaining a favorable balance of power in the region. Continuing support for enhanced defense cooperation in Australia is part of this expectation, as is an 

increased Australian contribution to maintaining deterrence through stepped-up operational cooperation. 

Australia is doing this unobtrusively in the realms of 

space and cyber warfare, intelligence collection, and 

ballistic missile early warning, but it must accept a 

more public and upfront role in other areas such as 

missile defense and participation in ASB.

Australia will also need to continue efforts to step 

up its own defense engagement with other U.S. regional partners such as Japan, Indonesia, India, and 

South Korea, utilizing mechanisms such as the Australia–Japan–U.S. Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and 

establishing new, informal “minilateral” security 

groupings that incorporate India and Indonesia. It is 

unclear how the forthcoming Australian election will 

affect the nation’s defense policy. The center-right 

coalition traditionally places importance on defense, 

and the opposition has committed itself to producing 

a new, properly priced defense white paper within 18 

months of taking office and to making the necessary 
60

decisions within that time frame to avoid any submarine capability gap.61

The opposition has also signaled a less constrained 

approach to supporting U.S. military forces in Australia should it win office. Ultimately, however, the Liberal Party-led coalition’s ability to deliver on defense 

would depend on its success in restoring the budget 

to a sustainable trajectory and the priority it places on 

defense and maintaining a strong U.S. alliance.

The defense implications of a Rudd election victory are even less clear. Judging by the 2009 white 

paper, Rudd’s instincts on defense are hawkish, and 

he may seek to restore its ambitious force structure 

goals. His ability to deliver on them, however, would 

be significantly constrained by Australia’s difficult fiscal outlook and his own party’s appetite for increased 

domestic spending.

The jury will remain out until Australia’s new 

government confronts its own inevitable first national 

security test and delivers its first defense budget.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. This chapter was originally published as an essay on 

August 22, 2013.

2. Department of Defence, White Paper: Defence 2000, 

Canberra, Australia: Australian Government, 2000, p. xvii.

3. See, for example, Greg Sheridan, The Partnership: The Inside 

Story of the US-Australian Alliance under Bush and Howard, Sydney, 

Australia: University of New South Wales, 2006.

4. Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2009, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Canberra, 

Australia: Australian Government, 2000.
61

5. WikiLeaks cables subsequently revealed that earlier in 2009, 

Rudd told incoming U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that 

Australia’s intelligence agencies were closely monitoring China’s 

military expansion and that Australia’s planned naval build-up 

was in direct response to China’s growing power-projection capabilities. See Dan Flitton, “Rudd the Butt of WikiLeaks Expose,” 

The Age, December 6, 2010, available from www.theage.com.au/

technology/security/rudd-the-butt-of-wikileaks-expos-20101205-

18lf2.html.

6. Andrew Shearer, “Australia Bulks Up,” The Wall Street Journal Asia, May 6, 2009, p. 15.

7. The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2012–13, Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2012, p. vi.

8. Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, 

Canberra, Australia: Australian Government, 2013, p. 11.

9. Ibid., pp. 9, 11.

10. Ibid., p. 9.

11. Ibid., pp. 61–62.

12. John Garnaut, “Why the World is Reading Gillard’s Defence Paper,” The Age, May 10, 2013, available from www.theage.

com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/why-the-world-is-readinggillards-defence-paper-20130509-2jak2.html.

13. On the latter point, see Andrew Shearer, Sweet and Sour: 

Australian Public Attitudes toward China, Sydney, Australia: Lowy 

Institute for International Policy, August 1, 2010, available from 

www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/sweet-and-sour-australian-publicattitudes-towards-china.

14. Julia Gillard, “Australia’s National Security Beyond the 

9/11 Decade,” speech, Canberra, Australia: Crawford School of 

Public Policy, Australian National University College of Asia & 

the Pacific, January 23, 2013, available from https://acbee.crawford.

anu.edu.au/news/132/prime-minister-julia-gillards-speech-nationalsecurity-college. The 2013 white paper acknowledged that, in the 
62

period following the East Timor intervention and 9/11, the Australian military has experienced a high operating tempo, with the 

ADF having undertaken some 100 operations since 1999. It also 

correctly highlights the importance of learning the right lessons 

from the current period and avoiding the pitfalls that followed 

the ADF’s withdrawal from Vietnam in the 1970s, such as the loss 

of hard-won counterinsurgency capabilities.

15. Defence White Paper 2013.

16. Ibid., pp. 25–26.

17. Ibid., p. 71.

18. See, for example, Paul Dibb, “Show Us the Money for Defence Spending,” The Australian, May 6, 2013, available from www.

theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/show-us-the-money-fordefence-spending/story-e6frgd0x-1226635611440.

19. Mark Thomson, “Second Chance: Will They Deliver?” 

Defence Special Report, May 25–26, 2013, p. 1, available from 

www.aspi.org.au/publications/opinion-pieces/second-chance-will-theydeliver/Second_chance-will_they_deliver.pdf.

20. Ibid.

21. See John Kerin, “Cuts Halted Despite Troop Drawdown,” 

Australian Financial Review, May 15, 2013, available from www.afr.

com/p/national/budget/cuts_halted_despite_troop_drawdown_8bYul1v

RFZka5t7GJYN6jI.

22. See Christopher Joye, “The Lowest Military Spending 

Since 1938,” Australian Financial Review, May 15, 2013, available 

from www.afr.com/p/national/budget/the_lowest_defence_spending_

since_aaGRxTIKT1YZFOZzYfneBK.

23. Defence White Paper 2013, pp. 8, 15.

24. Ibid., p. 14.

25. Australian Government, Department of Defence, Budget: 

Portfolio Budget Statements 2013–14: Budget Related Paper No. 

1.4A: Defence Portfolio: Budget Initiatives and Explanations of 
63

Appropriations Specified by Outcomes and Programs by Agency, 

Canberra, Australia, 2013.

26. Stephen Smith, “Minister for Defence—Budget 2013–14: 

Defence Budget Overview,” May 14, 2013, available from www.

minister.defence.gov.au/2013/05/14/minister-for-defence-budget2013-14-defence-budget-overview/.

27. Our Plan—Real Solutions for All Australians: The Direction, 

Values and Policy Priorities of the Next Coalition Government, Canberra, Australia: Liberal Party of Australia, 2013, p. 48.

28. See David Crowe and David Uren, “Treasury Rings 

Alarm on Surplus as Budget Hole Means Decade of Deficits,” The 

Australian, May 23, 2013, available from www.theaustralian.com.

au/national-affairs/treasury-rings-alarm-on-surplus-as-budget-holemeans-decade-of-deficits/story-fnhi8df6-1226648770308.

29. See Greg Sheridan, “McCain Slams Labor for ‘Imprudent’ Cuts,” The Australian, April 27, 2013, available from www.

theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/mccain-slams-labor-forimprudent-cuts/story-e6frg8yo-1226630344660.

30. See Andrew Davies and Mark Thomson, “Mind the Gap: 

Getting Serious about Submarines,” Strategic Insight, No. 57, 

Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 

2012, pp. 2–6.

31. Ibid., p. 6.

32. The white paper suggests, perhaps optimistically, that it 

might be possible to close this gap by extending the retirement 

window by 7 years. See Defence White Paper 2013, p. 83.

33. Smith, “Minister for Defence—Budget 2013–14.”

34. See, for example, Ross Babbage, “Why Australia Needs 

Nuclear Subs,” The Diplomat, November 8, 2011, available from 

thediplomat.com/2011/11/08/why-australia-needs-nuclear-subs/; and 

John Kerin and Christopher Joye, “Labor Split on Nuclear Submarines,” Australian Financial Review, November 12, 2012, available from www.afr.com/p/national/labor_split_on_nuclear_submarines_Q5hmLHBo7pneF4K8LpZ4wN.
64

35. Brendan Nicholson, “Subs Need To Be Out There Doing 

the Damage,” The Weekend Australian, May 25–26, 2013.

36. Japan is building its own advanced 4,000-4,200 ton submarine. See, for example, Rex Patrick, “Japanese Flavoured Submarines for Sea 1000,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, October 31, 2012, 

available from www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/270/JAPANESE-FLAVOURED-SUBMARINES-FOR-SEA-1000.

37. Defence White Paper 2013, p. 88.

38. Ibid.

39. Kym Bergmann, “Better Late Than Never: Wedgetails 

Overcome Obstacles to Become Envy of the World,” Defence 

Special Report, May 25–26, 2013.

40. Defence White Paper 2013, p. 85.

41. Ibid., pp. 81–82.

42. Defence White Paper 2009, p. 81.

43. Defence White Paper 2013, p. 77.

44. Ibid., p. 71.

45. The vessel is the HMAS Choules, formerly Royal Fleet 

Auxiliary Largs Bay. For details on sustainment and maintenance 

issues affecting the Royal Australian Navy’s amphibious fleet, see 

Paul J. Rizzo, Plan to Reform Support Ship Repair and Management 

Practices, Canberra, Australia: Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2011.

46. See, for example, John Kerin, “Military training to get 

chop in budget,” Australian Financial Review, April 2, 2013, available from www.afr.com/news/policy/defence/military-training-to-getchop-in-budget-20130401-j0yo5.

47. Allan Hawke and Ric Smith, Australian Defence Force Posture Review, Canberra, Australia: Australian Government, Department of Defence, March 30, 2012.
65

48. Defence White Paper 2013, pp. 47–51. The paper announced, for example, that plans will continue to enhance HMAS 

Stirling to support major surface combatant and submarines operations, and it also confirmed the upgrading of the Cocos Island 

airfield.

49. I was former Prime Minister Howard’s international 

policy adviser at the time.

50. Brendan Nicholson, “US Alarm At ‘Cooling’ On Marines,” 

The Australian, April 2, 2013, available from www.theaustralian.

com.au/national-affairs/defence/us-alarm-at-cooling-on-marines/storye6frg8yo-1226610490588; and Australian Associated Press, “200 

More US Marines To Arrive in Darwin,” April 20, 2013, available 

from www.news.com.au/breaking-news/national/more-us-marines-toarrive-in-darwin/story-e6frfku9-1226624990044.

51. Smith, “Minister for Defence—Budget 2013–14.”

52. Hugh White has been the leading academic advocate of 

this argument. See Hugh White, Power Shift: Australia’s Future 

between Washington and Beijing, Melbourne, Australia: Black Inc., 

September 2010. Others expressing misgivings include former 

Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating, former Coalition Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, former Coalition leader and current opposition front-bencher Malcolm Turnbull, and leading business 

figure Kerry Stokes, who said he was “physically repulsed” by 

the thought of U.S. forces on Australian soil. See Phillip Hudson, 

“Stop Lecturing China, Says Stokes,” Herald Sun, September 14, 

2012, available from www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/stop-lecturing-china-says-stokes/story-fndo48ca-1226474468140.

53. This reportedly includes efforts by Chinese intelligence to 

influence elite opinion. See, for example, John Garnaut, “Chinese 

Spies Woo Business Leaders,” The Age, May 25, 2013, available 

from www.theage.com.au/business/world-business/chinese-spies-woobusiness-leaders-20130524-2k717.html.

54. Defence White Paper 2013, p. 11.

55. Fifty-four percent say “very important,” 28 percent say 

“fairly important.” See Alex Oliver, The Lowy Institute Poll 2013: 
66

Australia in the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Sydney, 

Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 24, 2013, 

p. 7. See also Fergus Hanson, The Lowy Institute Poll 2012: Australia and New Zealand in the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 

Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 5, 

2012, pp. 9–10.

56. Support for basing U.S. military forces in Australia has 

grown from 55 percent in 2011 to 61 percent in 2013, perhaps in 

response to increasing reports of China’s military assertiveness 

during 2012. See Olivier, The Lowy Institute Poll 2013, p. 8.

57. Defence White Paper 2013, p. 82.

58. See Ben Schreer, “Australia and Air-Sea Battle,” PacNet 

Newsletter, No. 30, May 1, 2013.

59. John Kerin, “Arms Wish-List $33bn Short,” Australian Financial Review, May 30, 2013. At least one senior Obama administration official has voiced clear criticism of the Gillard government’s defense cuts. See Peter Hartcher, “US To Take Up Defence 

‘Freeloading’ with Cabinet,” Sydney Morning Herald, November 

10, 2012, available from www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/us-to-take-up-defence-freeloading-with-cabinet-20121109-

293dr.html.

60. Thomson, “Second Chance: Will They Deliver?”

61. Our Plan—Real Solutions for All Australians, p. 48.
67

CHAPTER 4

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION AT SEA: 

TRENDS IN ALLIED NAVAL POWER1

Bryan McGrath

KEY POINTS

• The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 

(NATO) intervention in Libya during the 

spring and summer of 2011 raised serious questions about the naval capabilities of America’s 

European allies.

• Despite declining defense budgets, the major 

European naval powers have sought to retain 

a broad array of naval capabilities, resulting in 

modern but substantially smaller fleets.

• With U.S. armed forces increasingly focused on 

the Asia-Pacific region, there are growing concerns as to whether the navies of America’s continental allies are up to meeting the challenges 

arising from the general unrest on Europe’s eastern and southern maritime flanks.

Taking its name from one of the world’s great 

oceans, NATO has throughout its history been a military alliance focused primarily on land. Although several of its members have built and maintained first-rate 

navies, sea power served largely as a flanking force 

for what was envisioned as the main Cold War battle 

on the central front. After the fall of the Soviet Union, 

land conflict continued to be a primary emphasis of 

the alliance, first in dealing with the disintegration of 
68

Yugoslavia, and then as NATO assumed a central role 

in the Afghan conflict.

That said, naval power has historically been a defining feature of the alliance. While the United States 

provided a preponderance of alliance naval power, 

several allies—including the United Kingdom (UK), 

France, Germany, Spain, and Italy—created fleets capable of global power projection, and others chose to 

pursue niche capabilities to supplement the striking 

power of the larger fleets. This chapter assesses the 

state of the former group.

It is a propitious time to review NATO’s naval 

capabilities. Continental Europe is at peace. The only 

trouble has been on NATO’s eastern and southern 

maritime flanks. Unrest throughout North Africa and 

the Levant raises the very real possibility that NATO’s 

European nations will have to shoulder a larger share 

of a growing maritime security burden than they 

have been accustomed to or have been preparing for. 

The largest naval force contributor to the alliance—

the United States—is increasingly focusing its attention on the Pacific, and it has not routinely operated 

large naval task forces in the Mediterranean Sea for 

decades. The 2011 military intervention in Libya and 

recent discussions about possible intervention in the 

Syrian civil war raise questions about NATO’s ability 

to project naval power effectively, especially without 

the full participation of the U.S. Navy.

Several trends are evident among the major NATO 

navies. First, they are getting smaller. All of the navies 

analyzed here have fewer ships today than in the year 

2000—in some cases, significantly fewer. While ship 

counts do not tell the entire story of a nation’s naval 

might (especially in the age of networked operations), 

they remain a useful proxy for naval capability, espe-
69

cially with respect to blue-water operations far from 

home waters. The primary reason these navies are getting smaller is a decline in general defense spending, 

including shipbuilding.

Second, the ships that are being built are increasingly capable and sophisticated—and therefore expensive—which serves only to drive down fleet size 

in an era of fiscal restraint. 

Third, historically maritime nations seem to desire 

to retain broad, general purpose fleets even if it means 

smaller fleets overall. For example, the once-mighty 

UK Royal Navy is planning for a surface fleet of only 

19 major surface combatants, while moving forward 

on construction of two aircraft carriers and a replacement submarine class for its aging strategic deterrent, 

both of which consume considerable shipbuilding resources.2

OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR

The controversy over the participation of major 

NATO partners in the Libyan intervention has encompassed operational effectiveness as well as political will. The contributions of the five major allies surveyed in this chapter vary widely. Britain and France 

proved both highly capable and highly committed, 

while Italy, Spain, and Germany provided, respectively, partial, minimal, and nonoperational support.

NATO’s reliance on the United States from March 

to October 2011 to carry out the allied mission—despite President Barack Obama’s admonition that the 

United States would not take the lead in the military 

operation—is the result of two distinct causes: NATOwide underinvestment in military capability and a 

lack of political will on the part of uniquely capable 
70

countries. Capability is absent in some areas; in others, it is unevenly distributed. When key platforms 

were present and fielded, they were often numerically 

too few.

The case of the Charles de Gaulle demonstrates that 

numbers matter. France’s aircraft carrier, the only 

non–U.S. catapult assisted take-off but arrested recovery carrier in Europe, accounted for 33 percent of 

allied-strike sorties before its withdrawal in August 

2011.3 The endurance of even the largest ships is limited, however, by crew fatigue and maintenance requirements.4

 When Italy, citing austerity measures, 

withdrew its carrier, the Giuseppe Garibaldi, from the 

Libyan operation, only amphibious ships and short 

take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) carriers remained to replace the de Gaulle.

5

 Indeed, extended 

global deployments preceding those to Libya taxed 

even the endurance of U.S. amphibious warships, 

which departed before de Gaulle and Garibaldi.

6

 The 

remaining large-deck ships—the French landing platform dock (LPD) Tonnerre and the British vessels Albion and Ocean—supported only attack helicopters.7

Lack of available land-based aircraft would have 

resulted in significantly slower operations.

Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, the NATO 

name given to the Libyan campaign, cannot be considered a stressing scenario for NATO’s naval and air 

forces. Targets were located primarily along Libya’s 

coast, well within the range of land-based aircraft. The 

enemy was entirely unprepared for NATO intervention.8

 The strategic geography of the Libyan civil war 

greatly facilitated intervention. To attack rebel-held 

areas, Muammar Gaddafi’s forces often had to move 

across long stretches of flat, exposed, sparsely populated terrain. The weakness of Libyan air defenses 
71

permitted relatively rapid degradation, reducing requirements for specialized electronic attack aircraft.9

Future operational environments may lack these favorable characteristics. Conversely, Libya’s operational strengths—for example, its air defenses’ ability to 

leverage civilian networks to manage engagements—

are likely to exist in the authoritarian areas where future NATO interventions are possible.10

Some vital “niche” operational capabilities simply 

do not exist in sufficient numbers within NATO. The 

United States provided fully 80 percent of refueling 

support during the course of Operation UNIFIED 

PROTECTOR, spurring France, Germany, and the 

Netherlands to announce cooperative tanker purchases.11 Standoff precision-strike firepower was also 

lacking. France’s SCALP (long range standoff cruise 

missile) naval cruise missile was not ready in time for 

Libya.12 A report in The Telegraph suggested the UK 

expended a high proportion of its limited stock of 

Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) in the first 

days of the conflict.13 In contrast, by May 2011, two 

U.S. destroyers and one nuclear-powered Ohio-class 

submarine launched 199 TLAMs, ultimately launching 220 weapons in the course of the operation.14 Similarly, the UK was short on advanced shorter-range 

munitions in some key categories.15

UNITED KINGDOM

The Royal Navy has dramatically declined in size 

by a third since 2000, but retains the desire and plans 

to remain a “balanced force” capable of naval airpower projection, limited amphibious operations, strategic 

nuclear deterrence, and sea control (see Figure 4-1). 

This goal remains even in view of the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 8 percent de-
72

fense budget reduction.16

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter 4, 

Europe,” The Military Balance 2013, Vol. 113, No. 1, pp. 89-198; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO and Non-NATO Europe,” The Military Balance 2000, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 35-108; 

and International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO,” The 

Military Balance 1995, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 33-67.

Figure 4-1. UK (Total Ships by Category).

A key question, however, is whether a balanced 

force is ultimately in the strategic interests of the UK, 

or whether such a force should be abandoned in favor of a “cruising” navy requiring a greater number 

of frigates and destroyers and providing more naval 

presence in a greater number of places than the current fleet plan can accomplish. The costs associated 

with fielding two aircraft carriers and the air assets 
73

necessary to equip them, in addition to the costs of replacing the current fleet of ballistic missile submarines 

(SSBNs) with four new boats, will strain resources 

required for building surface combatants and attack 

submarines.17 Considering the UK’s global economic 

interests and its desire to remain closely aligned with 

the U.S. Navy, a force of less than 20 combatants might 

not suffice.

Upgrades to the Royal Navy will include fielding 

two new aircraft carriers carrying the F-35 Lightning 

II and the ongoing operation of the new, technologically advanced Type 45 destroyers.18 Other upgrades 

include the continuing introduction of the five nuclear-powered, Astute Class attack submarines and the 

construction of the Type 26 Global Combat Ships.19

Here as elsewhere in major NATO navies, numbers 

are being traded for capability.

When assessed against the roles articulated in the 

NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy of 2011—which includes deterrence and defense, crisis management, cooperative security, and maritime security—the Royal 

Navy presents a mixed story.20 Continuing to move 

forward with both an aircraft carrier development 

program and a ballistic missile submarine program 

demonstrates national resolve to contribute to collective conventional and nuclear deterrence. However, 

the resources necessary to achieve these goals are to 

some degree harvested from savings gained from a 

significantly smaller escort and combatant fleet.

While the Type 45 destroyer is more capable than 

the Type 42s it replaces, there will be fewer of Type 

45s, as there will be fewer Type 26 frigates to replace 

the Type 23s. This numerical decline creates presence 

deficits that impact the navy’s ability to perform crucial traditional naval missions such as antisubmarine 
74

warfare (ASW) and antisurface warfare (ASUW), 

which underpin both conventional deterrence and 

cooperative and maritime security. Adding to a decline in traditional sea-control capabilities was the 

2010 SDSR decision to eliminate the Nimrod maritime 

patrol aircraft from the inventory.

In summary, the Royal Navy continues to maintain a balanced fleet, one that looks strikingly like the 

U.S. Navy, except a fraction of its size. Its contributions on the high-end of the naval warfare operational 

spectrum (strategic deterrence, attack submarines, 

and anti-aircraft warfare [AAW] destroyers) are notable, while a declining number of surface combatants will bedevil its ability to remain globally postured and will contribute to naval missions of a more 

constabulary nature.

FRANCE

French defense policy in the post–Cold War era 

has tended toward greater equity among its armed 

services, what one analyst called the “gradual equalization” between French ground power and air and 

naval power.21 Nevertheless, the overall downward 

trend in fleet size is clear (see Figure 4-2). In 2001, chief 

of staff of the French Navy Admiral Jean-Louis Battet 

identified a “2015 model” for the navy with a target 

fleet of 80 warships; the current trajectory is far more 

limited.22
75

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter 4, 

Europe,” The Military Balance 2013, Vol. 113, No. 1, pp. 89-198; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO and Non-NATO Europe,” The Military Balance 2000, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 35-108; 

and International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO,” The 

Military Balance 1995, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 33-67.

Figure 4-2. France (Total Ships by Category).

Generally, the French Navy is currently faring better than land or air forces, but the declining share of 

French wealth spent on national defense—2.8 percent 

of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 and 1.76 percent in 2013—has inevitably impacted the fleet. And 

while the “main battery” of the French Navy—its aircraft carrier and 10 submarines—remain untouched, 

France’s surface fleet will lose three destroyers and 

one amphibious ship. If there is any good news on 

this front, it is that France’s 2008 defense white paper called for deeper cuts in fleet size and, unlike the 
76

Royal Navy, the French Navy will not face, in the near 

term, the budgetary pressure of having to replace its 

relatively new SSBN force of four boats. Although the 

French fleet is shrinking, its international responsibilities remain. The 2013 white paper defined French 

geographic interests as “the European periphery, the 

Mediterranean area, a part of Africa—from Sahel to 

Equatorial Africa—the Persian Gulf and the Indian 

Ocean.”23 This perceived gap between strategic vision 

and actual capabilities has led some analysts to suggest 

that congruence between British and French interests, 

as well as a desire to control procurement costs and 

improve coalition interoperability, is driving France 

toward increasing cooperation with the UK.24

The 1998 Anglo-French Saint Malo declaration announced the beginning of heightened cooperation.25

Attempts to establish effective cooperation on aircraftcarrier procurement and operations consumed much 

of the last decade. By 2007, an Anglo-French consortium looked to build three carriers for purchase by the 

two governments to maximize interoperability, but 

this plan did not come to fruition. Rumors that the 

two countries would actually share individual warships were again raised but quickly deflated in 2010.26

In contrast to the UK, which has primarily exported 

major warships and aircraft as second-hand articles to 

close British Commonwealth allies, France’s defense 

industry competes actively to sell major platforms in 

the global market. The state-owned shipbuilder DCNS 

is set to deliver six Scorpène-class diesel-electric submarines to the Indian Navy starting in 2015.27 The Indian order supplements two each already delivered to 

the Malaysian and Chilean navies.28

Additionally, France’s DCNS shipbuilder and Italy’s Fincantieri have been cooperating on the multimis-
77

sion frigate (FREMM) program. (At one point, France 

was planning to build 19 of these ships, but cuts in the 

ensuing years have dropped the buy to only 8.29) This 

industrial capacity augurs well for France, regardless 

of whether it increases the size of its navy, as international sales will protect a minimum level of shipbuilding capacity that is increasingly at risk in the UK.

With respect to NATO’s stated maritime roles, the 

French Navy punches at a weight similar to the Royal 

Navy, though the French Navy’s capacity for sea-control missions is somewhat better because of the numbers and age of its surface escort ships. Additionally, 

the French Navy’s amphibious capabilities resident in 

its three Mistral-class LHDs and its one Foudre-class 

LPD provide a limited capacity for crisis response and 

humanitarian intervention. France’s blue-water power-projection capability gives it the option of projecting power far from home waters, something the Royal 

Navy appears very much to desire as it proceeds to 

build its two Queen Elizabeth–class carriers.

Essentially, the Royal Navy and the French Navy 

are roughly equally sized and structured. Yet to 

many observers, the Royal Navy is in distress and the 

French Navy sails in relatively calmer waters. This 

stems at least in part from the pressure of history and 

the place of the Royal Navy in the hearts of average 

Englishmen.

GERMANY

Unlike the Royal Navy and French Navy, Germany lacks a history and culture (since World War II) of 

a “balanced” fleet capable of the full range of modern naval operations. With no carrier or amphibious 

fleet to speak of, and without a sea-based nuclear de-
78

terrent, the German navy historically has focused on 

sea-control missions centered around ASW, ASUW, 

and maritime security. While the number of ships devoted to these missions has fallen from 28 to 23 since 

2000, the most precipitous decline has occurred within 

the submarine force, with older submarines having 

been replaced by four more-sophisticated submarines 

(Type 212As), and with two on order. (See Figure 4-3.)

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter 4, 

Europe,” The Military Balance 2013, Vol. 113, No. 1, pp. 89-198; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO and Non-NATO Europe,” The Military Balance 2000, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 35-108; 

and International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO,” The 

Military Balance 1995, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 33-67. 

Figure 4-3. Germany (Total Ships by Category).
79

Chief of Staff of the Navy Vice Admiral Axel 

Schimpf wrote in 2011 that Germany’s armed forces 

in general, and the navy in particular, are favoring 

“width over depth” (or capability over capacity).30 For 

the navy, which retained a greater share of its force 

structure than the other services as a result of recent 

budget cuts, this has meant continuing to build sophisticated air-independent propulsion diesel attack 

submarines for both domestic and international sale 

while maintaining a force of frigates and destroyers 

for blue-water operations focused mainly on ASUW 

and ASW. In fact, one reason the surface fleet appears 

to be maintained in the numbers it has been stems 

from the aggregate loss in ASUW power because of 

the smaller submarine force.

On the high-end of the operational spectrum, 

the three F124 Sachsen–class AAW destroyers are 

equipped with the Evolved SeaSparrow missile, an 

antiship defense missile, and the Standard Missile-3 

Block IIA for point and area air defense. Of note, these 

ships integrate an active phased array radar with 

search and missile guidance capabilities, providing 

protection against both advanced aircraft and cruise 

missiles with reduced radar cross sections. When operating out of area, the German navy will likely deploy 

an F124 to provide air and missile defense to other 

less-capable German surface combatants. An interesting development in Germany has been the debate surrounding planning for the “common” procurement of 

a joint support ship (JSS). According to Vice Admiral 

Schimpf, such a ship (akin to a U.S. LPD) would have 

several missions, including military evacuation operations, humanitarian aid from the sea, conduct of land 

operations from the sea, special forces employments, 

and “ensured military maritime deployability.”31 Cur-
80

rently two are planned, but they have not been funded because of debate over the cost to be allotted to 

Germany’s army and air force.

The German navy’s contributions to NATO’s 

maritime roles fall mainly within the lower end of the 

operational spectrum. Germany’s cruising navy provides little in the way of power projection, but, for outof-area operations, the fleet adds to alliance maritime 

security and cooperative security, and, though the 

sea-control capabilities resident in these platforms, it 

can contribute to collective defense. Should Germany 

proceed with the JSS, it would have greater capacity to engage in maritime humanitarian assistance 

operations and to marginally increase its ability to 

project power.

The German navy—unlike the Royal and French 

navies—does not have a desire to be a balanced force 

capable of significant power projection, amphibious 

operations, and strategic deterrence. As its aims have 

been historically more modest, they have been more 

capable of being supported. To the extent that Germany continues to support NATO maritime operations 

of a largely constabulary nature, Germany’s contributions to NATO remain consistent. The interesting 

question is not whether the navy supports Germany’s 

worldview and view of itself; it is whether a nation 

as powerful, rich, and networked as Germany is underinvesting in naval power while free-riding on the 

backs of U.S., UK, and French naval capabilities to a 

greater extent than other European nations.

SPAIN

In the last decade, Spain appeared to be a nation 

putting its best defense (and naval) foot forward. 
81

With a moderately rising defense budget in the first 

half of the decade and a number of international shipbuilding partnerships underway, the Spanish navy 

was quantitatively and qualitatively improving. This 

progress was halted by the global economic crisis that 

has caused Spain to cut defense spending three times 

since 2008: by 3 percent in 2009, by 6.2 percent in 2010, 

and by nearly 17.6 percent in 2012.32 Interestingly, 

Spain has not announced any plan to reduce commitments, missions, or capabilities, deciding instead to go 

the route of other European nations, which is to favor 

cuts in capacity rather than capability.33

The financial crisis–induced cuts were made to 

a budget that was already one of the worst within 

NATO in terms of meeting the 2 percent-of-GDP defense-spending goal agreed to by NATO members in 

2002. In 2010, Spain spent just 0.72 percent of its GDP 

on defense, with no year in the previous 5 years even 

coming close to approaching 1 percent.34

Spain has sought a balanced navy, operating a 

flagship aircraft carrier (Príncipe de Asturias), five AEGIS-enabled guided missile destroyers (DDGs) of the 

Álvaro de Bazan class, six frigates of the Santa Maria class—a Spanish version of the U.S. Navy’s FFG7-class guided missile frigates—and four Galernaclass diesel submarines, in addition to three principal 

amphibious ships (see Figure 4-4).35
82

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter 4, 

Europe,” The Military Balance 2013, Vol. 113, No. 1, pp. 89-198; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO and Non-NATO Europe,” The Military Balance 2000, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 35-108; 

and International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO,” The 

Military Balance 1995, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 33-67.

Figure 4-4. Spain (Total Ships by Category).

Spain’s shipbuilding industry has competed 

strongly on the world market, cooperating with 

France’s state-owned DCNS on the Scorpène submarine program, which morphed into Spain’s S-80 class, 

four of which remain under construction even in light 

of ongoing defense cuts.36 Additionally, Spanish shipbuilders are constructing the second of two 27,000-ton 

Canberra-class LHDs for the Royal Australian Navy.37

The primary threat to Spain’s navy from ongoing 

budget woes is its inability to modernize and maintain 
83

fleet size. Insufficient funds in 2012 caused the navy to 

cannibalize one of its four Galerna-class submarines 

for parts to keep the other three boats operational.38

Additionally, five vessels were decommissioned in 

2012, and in early-2013, even the Príncipe de Asturias

was decommissioned. The 2012 budget virtually eliminated spending for the majority of Spain’s 19 major 

defense-wide procurement programs.39

Spain’s contributions to NATO’s maritime roles, 

while not in the class of the UK or France, remain 

relatively strong in what is admittedly an increasingly 

weak field. The loss of its aircraft carrier and the decline in ship numbers essential to complex ASW and 

ASUW missions have been somewhat offset by the 

emergence of the five highly capable F100 destroyers 

equipped with the U.S. AEGIS system featuring the 

SPY-1D radar. Additionally, Spain’s modest amphibious capability contributes to both power projection 

and humanitarian missions.

ITALY

Italy historically fields a balanced fleet with aircraft 

carriers, diesel submarines, surface combatants, and 

amphibious ships. Without an undersea strategic deterrent, its navy resembles that of Spain, though somewhat larger and more powerful. Like the other navies 

surveyed, it is getting smaller. Its shrinking predates 

the global financial crisis, but financial restraints have 

clearly accelerated the condition.

The Italian navy has a goal of allocating 50 percent 

of its budget to personnel costs; 25 percent to investment and procurement; and 25 percent to operations, 

maintenance, and training. However, personnel costs 

have consumed upward of 70 percent of the budget in 
84

recent years, even as the navy strove to keep important acquisition programs going. This has inevitably 

squeezed the operations, maintenance, and training 

budget, which was allotted only 11.2 percent of the 

2012 budget.40

In May 2012, in testimony before parliament, the 

navy’s chief of staff called the current force structure 

“unsustainable,” announcing plans to retire 26 to 28 

ships by 2017.41 Recent austerity measures have seen 

major purchases reduced or delayed. The head of Italy’s navy stated that “funding issues” exist with the 

final two of the six frigates Italy has thus far ordered 

from the Franco-Italian FREMM program.42 Two more 

German U212A submarines will be purchased, but 

likely at the cost of retiring the Sauro-class boats, reducing the current submarine fleet from six to four.43 Italy 

initially planned to purchase six Horizon-class AAW 

destroyers produced by an earlier joint venture with 

France, but by 2006 judged two sufficient for escort of 

its carriers or amphibious warships.44

With respect to NATO maritime roles, Italy, like 

the UK, has favored power projection over sea control. 

This is plain from Italy’s current order of battle, which 

features an aging and shrinking frigate force (see Figure 4-5). The FREMM program appears designed to 

bring additional balance to the fleet by increasing seacontrol capabilities. The navy’s chief of staff has reiterated the service’s strong desire for 10 FREMM ships, 

while admitting that Italy’s shaky finances threaten 

this goal.45
85

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter 4, 

Europe,” The Military Balance 2013, Vol. 113, No. 1, pp. 89-198; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO and Non-NATO Europe,” The Military Balance 2000, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 35-108; 

and International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO,” The 

Military Balance 1995, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 33-67.

Figure 4-5. Italy (Total Ships by Category).

With respect to higher-end missions including air 

and missile defense, the new Andrea Doria–class destroyers are a formidable escort with capabilities tested against advanced cruise-missile targets. However, 

they number only two. When the Durand de la Penne 

class retires its medium-range surface-to-air missiles 

in “5 to 6 years,” Italy will be left with only two effective anti-air escorts.46

The Italian navy is headed in the same direction as 

the UK, France, and Spain: it will have a technologically advanced naval force structure that is balanced 
86

among power projection, amphibious operations, and 

classic sea-control missions but that is dramatically 

smaller than its year 2000 predecessor.47 Like other 

NATO navies, Italy believes the prudent path is to 

keep the basic architecture for a fleet with global influence while procuring ships in numbers that raise 

doubt as to how influential such a navy could be.

WHERE STANDS NATO?

The major navies of the NATO alliance (including the U.S. Navy) have much in common. With the 

exception of Germany, the focus remains on having 

a “balanced fleet” capable of the spectrum of naval 

operations from cooperative security through war at 

sea and power projection. Of course, France and the 

UK continue to maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent 

through ballistic missile submarines.

It is not inconceivable that in the near future (early-2020s), only the United States, France, and the UK 

will routinely operate aircraft carriers within NATO, 

with the UK program seemingly always on the edge 

of the budgetary chopping block. The difficulty 

NATO had in waging air surveillance and strike from 

the sea during the Libya operation, without a U.S. 

carrier, is likely to be exacerbated. But even if the UK 

and France continue to operate carriers, the likely cost 

will be reduced global presence in maritime security 

and constabulary missions that require a larger fleet 

of blue-water surface combatants. Those countries are 

likely to be willing to pay that price, as the ability to 

contribute carrier-striking power to U.S.-led operations—NATO and otherwise—continues to provide a 

sine qua non of naval relevance.
87

The desire to maintain a balanced fleet—irrespective of its size—cannot help but raise the question of 

whether what is driving these decisions is as much 

about national pride as national or alliance strategy. 

Certainly, eliminating either their aircraft carriers or 

their ballistic missile submarines would free up funds 

for an expanded French or British fleet of surface 

combatants.

Moreover, China’s naval renaissance impacts 

NATO nations’ force-structure decisions. As the United States turns more of its interest to the Pacific, baseline security requirements in the Mediterranean will 

become more important to Europe’s NATO navies, 

perhaps creating greater incentive to resource them. 

Additionally, both France and the UK see themselves 

as global nations with global interests that extend far 

into the Pacific. If these nations perceive China’s rise 

as threatening these interests, they will likely find their 

navies too small to provide any real impact, given the 

great distances involved and the paucity of ships to 

maintain constant presence. There is a real tension between global presence and a “balanced fleet,” one that 

currently only the United States is able to resolve, and 

barely at that.

The United States must come to grips with the 

likelihood that, even with its Navy declining in size, 

over time, it will comprise an increasing percentage 

of alliance striking power. The 2007 maritime strategy 

designated the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf as well 

as the Western Pacific as the U.S. Navy’s two major 

operational hubs, recognizing in print what had been 

practiced operationally since the First Gulf War. This 

posture leaves the Mediterranean routinely without 

carrier or amphibious striking power, something that 

was evident in the early days of the Libya campaign. 
88

With European carrier-striking power likely to wane, 

the United States will find itself trying to stretch its 

11-carrier fleet across three operational hubs, something it did in the 1980s with 15 carriers. While 11 

aircraft carriers are currently written into public law 

as the minimum number the Navy must maintain, 

Congress can even change that if it sees fit.

Absent a crisis or a threat that manifests itself in 

large part as a naval threat, Europe is unlikely to return to large, balanced fleets. Once lost, however, it 

could take decades to rebuild naval force structure because of the capital-intensive nature of shipbuilding 

and the time it takes to build sophisticated, modern 

warships in an increasingly small number of capable 

shipyards. NATO members should be wary about 

continuing declines in force structure. While current 

efforts to coordinate militaries (“pooling and sharing”) may on the surface seem beneficial, care must 

be taken that such efforts are not simply window 

dressing for further decline.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. This essay was originally published on September 18, 2013.

2. Compare this number with two authoritative ship counts 

bracketing the Falkland Islands conflict, in which the Royal Navy 

fielded 67 combatants in 1980 and 56 in 1985. See Gavin Berman, 

Defence Statistics 2000: Research Paper 00/99, London, UK: House 

of Commons Library, December 21, 2000, available from www.

parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP00-99.

3. Jorge Benitez, National Comparison of NATO Strike Sorties 

in Libya, NATO Source, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the 

United States, August 22, 2012, available from www.acus.org/natosource/national-composition-nato-strike-sorties-libya; and “France 

to Withdraw Aircraft Carrier From Libya Ops,” Agence France-
89

Presse, August 4, 2011, available from www.defensenews.com/

article/20110804/DEFSECT03/108040307/France-Withdraw-AircraftCarrier-From-Libya-Ops>.

4. For quantitative analysis of maintenance cycles and alternatives to the U.S. Nimitz class, see Roland J. Yardley et al., 

Increasing Aircraft Carrier Forward Presence: Changing the Length 

of the Maintenance Cycle, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008, available from www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/

monographs/2008/RAND_MG706.pdf.

5. The STOVL carriers remaining were Britain’s LPD, H.M.S. 

Albion, and the landing platform helicopter H.M.S. Ocean, alongside the French LPD Tonnere, the U.S. Wasp-class LHDs Kearsage and Bataan, and the San Antonio-class Mesa Verde. See 

“Italy Removes Aircraft Carrier from Libya Campaign,” Agence 

France-Presse, July 7, 2011, available from www.defensenews.com/

article/20110707/DEFSECT05/107070311/Italy-Removes-AircraftCarrier-from-Libya-Campaign.

6. The Mesa Verde and the Bataan had already deployed in 

March. See William H. McMichael, “Bataan ARG Heads to Libya 

Duty in Med,” Marine Corps Times, March 23, 2011, available from 

www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2011/03/navy-libya-bataan-arg-deploys-early-032311w/. By the time it returned from Libya in May 

2011, Kearsarge had been deployed for 9 months and continuously 

at sea for 4 months in support of Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. See William H. McMichael, “Kearsarge Back from Extended 

Deployment,” Navy Times, May 16, 2011, available from www.

navytimes.com/news/2011/05/navy-kearsarge-ready-group-home051611w/.

7. The Albion (lead ship of its class) is 176 meters in length, 

while the Tonnere is 199 meters long. Both are around 21,000 tons 

and both are appreciably smaller than the 40,000-ton, 250-meter 

Kearsarge and Bataan. If deployment of STOVL aircraft is possible at all from these smaller ships, it would require substantial 

modifications.

8. For the regime’s pre–Civil War forces, see International 

Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Five: Middle East and 

North Africa,” The Military Balance, Vol. 110, No. 1, pp. 262–263.
90

9. Craig Hoyle, “NEWS FOCUS: How ‘Odyssey Dawn’ Tamed 

Libya’s Air Defences,” Flightglobal, March 28, 2011, available from 

www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/news-focus-how-odyssey-dawntamed-libyas-air-defences-354736/.

10. See Jeff Kassebaum, “The Art of SEAD: Lessons from 

Libya,” Journal of Electronic Defense, Vol. 34, No. 12, December 

2011, pp. 58–62.

11. “NATO Trio Team Up to Boost Air Refueling Capacity,” Agence France-Presse, April 18, 2012, available from www.

defensenews.com/article/20120418/DEFREG01/304180013/NATOTrio-Team-Up-Boost-Air-Refueling-Capacity.

12. The program was previously known as Missile de Croisière 

Naval. See Richard Scott, “MBDA Completes First Scalp Naval 

Test-Firing,” Jane’s International Defence Review, June 17, 2010.

13. Thomas Harding, “Libya: Navy Running Short of Tomahawk Missiles,” The Telegraph, March 23, 2011, available from www.

telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8400079/

Libya-Navy-running-short-of-Tomahawk-missiles.html. Harding’s 

figure of 12 missiles is corroborated in Jeremiah Gertler, Operation 

Odyssey Dawn, Libya: Background and Issues for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 30, 2011, p. 18, 

available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41725.pdf.

14. Norman Polmar, “The Latest Conflict,” Proceedings of 

the U.S. Naval Institute, Vol. 137, No. 5, May 2011, pp. 166–167; 

and “Navy Replenishing Tomahawk Stockpile Used in Libya,” 

Defense Daily International, June 14, 2012.

15. British analysts felt the Royal Air Force’s supply of dualmode seeker-equipped Brimstone and Paveway IV air-to-ground 

weapons needed restocking during or shortly after the end of 

operations. See Lessons Offered From the Libya Air Campaign, London, UK: Royal Aeronautical Society, 2012, p. 4, available from 

aerosociety.com/Assets/Docs/Publications/SpecialistPapers/LibyaSpecialistPaperFinal.pdf; and “UK to Buy at Least 500 Paveway IVs To 

Restock after Libya,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 15, 2011. 

(Although it appears that the UK’s supply of air-launched Storm 

Shadow cruise missiles appears to have been sufficient.)
91

16. Nicholas Watt, “Next Generation of Nimrod ‘Spy In the 

Sky’ Surveillance Planes To Be Scrapped,” The Guardian, October 

17, 2010, available from www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/oct/17/nextgeneration-nimrod-scrapped.

17. In response to questions about the costs associated with 

the SSBN programs, British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond insists that “The government remains 100% committed 

to maintaining and renewing the Trident system.” See “U.S. Defense Chief Bashes Idea of Reducing SSBN Fleet,” Global Security 

Newswire, July 15, 2013, available from www.nationaljournal.com/

global-security-newswire/u-k-defense-chief-bashes-idea-of-reducingssbn-fleet-20130715.

18. The Type 45 is built primarily as an AAW combatant capable of local and area fleet defense. Capable of controlling fighter 

aircraft, it can coordinate fleet AAW operations and should be 

considered roughly comparable to a U.S.-guided missile destroyer. It is equipped with long-range weapon systems to intercept 

increasingly sophisticated and maneuverable missiles. The Type 

45 destroyer will be able to operate an embarked helicopter.

19. Due to begin joining the fleet in 2021, the Type 26 frigates will completely replace the Type 23 frigates. The Type 26 is 

planned in three variants: an ASW variant, an AAW variant, and 

a general purpose variant.

20. NATO, “Alliance Maritime Strategy,” March 18, 

2011, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_

75615.htm.

21. Lutz Unterseher, Europe’s Armed Forces at the Millennium: 

A Case Study of Change in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, 

Washington, DC: Project on Defense Alternatives, 1999.

22. Jean-Louis Battet, “The French Navy in the TwentyFirst Century,” NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace, No. 3, 

2001, pp. 23–29.

23. Government of France, Livre Blanc: Défense et Sécurité Nationale 2013 (White Paper: Defense and National Security-2013), 

Paris, France, 2013, p. 82, available from www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/le_livre_blanc_de_la_defense_2013.pdf.
92

24. Ben Jones, Franco-British Military Cooperation: A New Engine for European Defence? Paris, France: European Union Institute 

for Security Studies, February 2011, pp. 13–17.

25. “Anglo-French Military Pact,” BBC News, December 4, 1998, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/

227598.stm.

26. Tim Fish, “Anglo-French Carrier Co-operation Moves 

Forward,” Jane’s Navy International, November 16, 2007; and Dave 

Clark, “France, Britain: No Plans to Share Aircraft Carriers,” 

Agence France-Presse, September 3, 2010, available from www.

defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=20109030305.

27. The project has not been without political trouble. See Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian Minister Rejects Charges Connected 

with Sub Deal,” Defense News, July 19, 2012, available from www.

defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2012306190001.

28. “SSK Scorpene Class Attack Submarine, France,” Naval 

Technology, available from www.naval-technology.com/projects/

scorpene/; and “DCNS, Navantia Part Ways on Submarines,” 

United Press International, November 15, 2010, available from 

www.upi.com/Business_News /Security-Industry/2010/11/15/DCNSNavantia-part-ways-on-submarines/UPI-29901289850253/.

29. Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Marine : Ce Sera 8 Fremm au 

Lieu de 11: Le Nombre de Nouvelles Frégates Multimissions Sera 

Réduit” (“Marine: It Will Be 8 FREMM Instead of 11: The Number of New Multimission Frigates Will Be Reduced”), Secret Defense, available from www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefense/Marine-cesera-8-Fremm-au-lieu-de-11_a1028.html.

30. Axel Schimpf, “The German Navy of the Future,” European Security and Defence 3–4, 2011, pp. 7–12, available from www.

scribd.com/doc/144757062/European-Security-Defence-MagazineIssue-Nos-3-4-2011#scribd.

31. Schimpf, “The German Navy of the Future,” p. 12.

32. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter 

Four: Europe,” The Military Balance 2011, Vol. 111, No. 1, pp. 144–
93

147. See also, “Chapter Four: Europe,” The Military Balance 2013, 

Vol. 113, No. 1, p. 95.

33. Caroline Baxter et al., NATO and the Challenges of Austerity, 

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012, p. 46.

34. Ibid., p. 51.

35. The Príncipe de Asturias was taken out of service in early 2013. See “El Príncipe de Asturias’ llega a Ferrol Para Su Desarme” (“The Príncipe de Asturias Arrives in Ferrol for Its Disarmament”), El País, Spain, February 8, 2013, available from ccaa.

elpais.com/ccaa/2013/02/08/galicia/1360342099_511362.html.

36. Christina Mackenzie, “Spanish S-80 Subs Sailing Forward,” Aeropspace Daily and Defense Report, July 18, 2012. The S-80 

class has had challenges in construction, including the first hull 

displacing more than 100 tons than was designed, which could 

impact the boat’s ability to submerge and resurface. Additionally, 

there have been reports of problems in the boat’s air-independent 

propulsion system. See “GD To Help Fix Spanish Navy’s Overweight Issue of S-80 Submarine” Naval Techology, June 7, 2013, 

available from www.naval-technology.com/news/newsgd-to-help-fixspanish-navy-overweight-issue-s80-submarine.

37. David Ing and Richard Scott, “Arrested Development: 

Austerity Stunts Spain’s Naval Industrial Sector,” Jane’s Navy International, September 7, 2012.

38. “Durante este tiempo, las necesidades de mantenimiento 

de los buques han hecho que se empleen piezas del ‘Siroco’ en 

el resto de la flota de los S-70. Defensa admitió en su día que se 

iba a utilizar piezas del ‘Siroco’ para las carenas del ‘Tramontana’ y ‘Galerna’” (“During this time, the maintenance needs of 

the ships have required that parts from the ‘Siroco’ be used in 

the rest of the S-70 fleet. The ministry of defense admitted that it 

was going to use the parts for the hulls of the ‘Tramontana’ and 

‘Galerna’.”) See Jose Alberto Gonzalez, “La Armada da de Baja el 

‘Siroco’ y Centra Sus Esfuerzos en Los Submarinos S-80” (“The 

Navy Withdraws the ‘Sirocco’ and Focuses Its Efforts on the Submarines S-80”), La Verdad, August 5, 2012, available from www.

laverdad.es/murcia/v/20120508/cartagena/armada-baja-siroco-centra20120508.html.
94

39. Pedro Arguelles, Comparencencia Presupuestos 2012 

(2012 Budgets Appearance), testimony before the Spanish Congress of Deputies, April 17, 2012, available from rojoygualda.files.

wordpress.com/2012/04/secdef170412.pdf.

40. Schmitt, “Italian Hard Power: Ambitions and Fiscal 

Realities,” p. 8.

41. Luca Peruzzi, “Cuts Loom for Italian Navy,” Jane’s Navy 

International, June 11, 2012.

42. Luca Perruzzi, “Fincantieri Launches First Italy’s FREMM 

Multi-Mission Frigate,” European Security and Defense Press 

Association, July 23, 2011, available from www.esdpa.org/2011/07/

fincantieri-launches-first-italy%E2%80%99s-fremm-multi-missionfrigate/.

43. Luca Perruzzi, “Interview: Admiral Luigi Binelli Mantelli, Chief of the Italian Navy,” Jane’s International Defense Review, 

March 16, 2012.

44. “DCN Launches Final Horizon,” Jane’s Navy International, 

July 13, 2006.

45. Perruzzi, “Interview: Admiral Luigi Binelli Mantelli.”

46. Ibid.

47. One example of this desire to hold onto the trappings of a 

high-end navy is the recent decision by the Italian government to 

reduce its purchase of F-35Bs for the Italian Navy to 15 after the 

head of Italian naval aviation claimed that the minimum number of STOVL aircraft required was 22. See Tom Kington, “Italian Navy, AF Head for F-35B Showdown,” Defense News, May 

15, 2012, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20120515/

DEFREG01/305150010/Italian-AF-Navy-Head-F-35B-Showdown.
95

CHAPTER 5

GERMAN HARD POWER:

IS THERE A THERE THERE?1

Patrick Keller

The opinions expressed in this chapter should be attributed to 

the author alone. The author thanks his research assistant, Aylin 

Matlé, for her support.

KEY POINTS

• German ambivalence on the use of military 

power continues to bedevil German politicians 

and leaders.

• A stagnant defense budget will be a challenge 

to the German defense ministry’s plan to establish a leaner, more flexible, and more deployable 

German armed forces.

• As Europe’s economic leader and central political actor, Germany should guide the way in 

reversing the problematic decline in European 

hard power.

Two very different stories are in competition for 

the “grand narrative” of current German security 

policy. The first could be called “look how far we’ve 

come” and goes like this: Since reunification restored 

the state to full sovereignty in 1990, a thriving Germany has accepted its increasing share of responsibility 

in international security affairs. It has done so gradually—mindful of its historic baggage—but efficiently. 

After the 1994 breakthrough decision by the Federal 

Constitutional Court to allow out-of-area deployments 

of the Bundeswehr (German armed forces), the forces 
96

have been partaking in many North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) missions, including the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan 

and the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia.2

Currently, Germany deploys about 6,200 troops in 

missions abroad; it is the third largest contributor to 

the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 

Afghanistan and the lead nation in the NATO-led 

Kosovo Force (KFOR). Thus, contemporary Germany 

has finally established itself as a “normal nation” that 

contributes to international stability. It does so—if 

necessary—by military means as well, and certainly 

in a manner that is commensurate with its size and 

economic strength.

The other story could be called “too little, too late” 

and scoffs at these alleged achievements. From this 

perspective, German security policy during the last 

25 years has always oscillated between two conflicting conclusions drawn from German history. One is 

never again to stand opposed to the United States and 

Germany’s (major) European neighbors; the other is 

never again to experience war. Hence, although Germany has made military contributions to international 

missions, it has never done so by its own initiative. 

Germany’s allies (mostly the United States) and partners in the EU had to drag Germany into its commitments. As a consequence, German leaders of various 

political persuasions have always tried to commit as 

few troops with as many caveats (such as restricted 

rules of military engagement) as possible without 

losing face among allies and friends. One can debate 

whether this is a prudent strategy and whether it 

worked well, but few would argue that it is a policy 

befitting the most prosperous, populous, and politically influential nation-state in the EU.
97

Every German security policy expert puts forward 

a version of one of these two stories or a combination 

of both, depending on circumstance. (The politically 

savviest tell the first story to international audiences, 

while saving the second story for domestic consumption.) This unresolved “grand narrative” debate betrays German policymakers’ fundamental insecurity 

about their country’s role in the world and about the 

proper bearing for a leading power. What is even 

more curious, however, is how abstract this debate really is: very few talk seriously about the fundamentals 

of German security and defense policy—that is, about 

Germany’s military capabilities.

Both narratives implicitly assume that German 

military capabilities exist in sufficient number and 

quality to give policymakers a broad range of strategic 

choices, while in fact such hard power assets are waning in Germany and almost everywhere else in the 

West.3 If current trends continue, a different pair of 

competing stories might occur because “we cannot, as 

we are simply lacking the capabilities to do so,” versus 

the more sophisticated, “We cannot fight anymore because we do not want to and took all necessary steps 

to prevent us from having those capabilities.” Either 

way, the continuation of current trends will result in 

calamity—not just for German security interests but 

also for the overall stability of a liberal international 

system.

GERMAN ARMED FORCES IN 

TIMES OF AUSTERITY

Since 1990, the Bundeswehr has been undergoing 

constant reform. Main drivers of these reforms were 

the incorporation of the East German army (German 
98

Democratic Republic’s National People’s Army) into 

the Bundeswehr, the adaptation to new tasks in a 

changed security landscape after the Cold War, and 

the constraints of a limited defense budget. In fact, 

the military and the German ministry got so tired of 

the unending reform cycles that current minister of 

defense Thomas de Maizière prefers instead to call 

his reform a new orientation (Neuausrichtung). Tellingly, this latest wave of Bundeswehr reform did 

not originate with a security-political decision by the 

defense minister but with a budget decision by the 

finance minister.

This daunting requirement propelled then–minister of defense Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg to initiate 

the most far-reaching reform of the Bundeswehr since 

its founding in 1955. In a first step, he killed one of his 

conservative party’s sacred cows: conscription. The 

practicality (and feasibility) of maintaining a conscription army in a post–Cold War security environment 

that required leaner and more professional forces had 

been contested for years. Sold as a cost-saving exercise in dramatic financial times by Germany’s most 

popular minister, protests against the change were 

suddenly soft. As it turned out, however, ending conscription did not save money but created extra cost for 

recruiting and maintaining salary levels competitive 

with the private sector.

In response to the 2008 global financial crisis and 

the ensuing European debt crisis, German Chancellor 

Angela Merkel’s government adopted a constitutional 

amendment limiting new federal debt to 3.5 percent 

of gross domestic product (GDP). To comply with this 

break on debt (Schuldenbremse), in 2010, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble prescribed every ministry an 

exact amount of money to be saved over the following 
99

4 years. In relation to its overall budget, defense had to 

cut the most: €8.3 billion until 2014. Considering that 

the annual German defense budget is only about €30 

billion, the prescribed reduction was substantial—especially for a military establishment already existing 

on limited means.

Thus, other elements of zu Guttenberg’s reform 

package—downsizing the armed forces, reducing 

procurement of new weapons systems and platforms, 

trimming resources for research and development 

(R&D) for future systems, and increasing cooperation with EU partners on military matters (“pooling 

and sharing”)—became even more relevant. The actual concepts behind those general ideas, however, 

remained nebulous. When zu Guttenberg had to resign in March 2011 over allegations of plagiarism in 

his dissertation, it fell to de Maizière, zu Guttenberg’s 

successor, to develop a strategy that satisfied both 

the treasurers and the generals. Such a strategy, de 

Maizière decided, should consider Germany’s negative demographic trend, should be derived from an 

analysis of Germany’s political and security situation, 

and should be financially sustainable.

Surprisingly, de Maizière—who is one of Angela 

Merkel’s closest advisers and was, in her first term, 

the chief of her chancellery—proved capable of working under less harsh conditions than assumed: the 

prescribed cuts of €8.3 billion were taken off the table. 

To the contrary, the administration and parliament 

even agreed to a slight increase in defense spending 

and to project more modest reductions over the next 2 

years. (See Table 5-1.)
100

Source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany, “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen” (National Accounts), available from 

www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Indikatoren/Konjunkturindika 

toren/VolkswirtschaftlicheGesamtrechnungen/vgr111.html; Federal 

Ministry of Defence, “2012 Defence Budget,” August 14, 2012, 

available from www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxBCoNADAB_tJFCL976iqqXJdYQg0kqa3b7ffVQhjkNDExw4diEMeTrqDDA-JF-_qXZGicT lyOoSLXUqATJIlydjxXrpUZ-dN0zLVQyblFJlfI_

wfueK8NIDrv Z6wSyiBio/; and German Bundestag, Unterrichtung 

durch die Bundesregierung (Briefing by the Federal Government: 

The Federal Budget 2011 to 2015), December 8, 2011, available 

from dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/066/1706601.pdf.

Table 5-1. German Defense Spending 

as a Percentage of GDP.

From 1991 until 1997, German defense spending 

was continually decreasing (from about €28 billion to 

€23 billion and, correspondingly, from approximately 

2 percent of GDP to 1.6 percent). With the Kosovo 

War, the “peace dividend” era was over. Since 2001, 

defense spending has been on a slow but steady rise, 

with only minor cuts in 2003 and 2010. The financial 

Year Defense Spending

(in billions of euros) % of GDP

2006 27.87 1.2

2007 28.38 1.2

2008 29.45 1.2

2009 31.18 1.3

2010 31.11 1.3

2011 31.55 1.2

2012 31.70 1.2

2013 33.30 To be determined

2014 30.90 (projected) To be determined

2015 30.40 (projected) To be determined
101

crisis, starting in 2008, did not have a discernible effect on this trend. Indeed, the projected cuts for 2014 

and 2015 might yet be reversed—after all, the administration’s original projected defense budget for 2013 

was €31.4 billion, well below the €33.3 billion that was 

actually allocated.

At the same time, German increases in defense 

spending have remained modest and have not even 

offset the effects of inflation over the past 20 years. 

In real terms, defense spending has been decreasing. 

Moreover, with defense spending at around 1.25 percent of GDP, Germany obviously does not make defense a budget priority. (The budget of the ministry of 

labor and welfare is more than four times the size of 

that of the ministry of defense.) Needless to say, Germany does not meet the pledge made by the NATO 

allies at the 2002 Prague NATO Summit to spend at 

least 2 percent of national GDP on defense.

The budget increase of about 5 percent in 2013 

seems striking, but it is because of a significant rise in 

the personnel cost of federal employees and a projected 

rent hike for some buildings used by the armed forces. 

It is not a gain in substance for military planners;4 in 

fact, the budget share allocated to the investment in 

actual defense-related capabilities (including not only 

military procurements but also R&D) has declined in 

both absolute and relative terms. In 2012, R&D and 

procurement constituted approximately 23.1 percent 

(€7.4 billion) of the total defense budget, but was reduced to 21.4 percent (€7.1 billion) for 2013. The figures for military procurements alone also reflect this, 

with a reduction from 17.2 percent to 15.4 percent (or 

€5.5 billion to €5.1 billion in absolute figures).5

In an effort to ease the budgetary squeeze, de 

Maizière proceeded to trim ministry structures and 
102

to downsize the armed forces. Upon completion of 

his new orientation in 2017, the Bundeswehr is envisioned to consist of no more than 185,000 active duty 

military and 55,000 civilian employees (down from 

250,000 and 75,000, respectively, in 2010), with 10,000 

soldiers deployable simultaneously in two areas of 

operation (up from 7,000).6 In the new personnel structure, the army, air force, and navy will consist of approximately 62,000 soldiers, 32,000 airmen, and 16,000 

sailors, respectively, and the Joint Support Service and 

the medical service will consist of roughly 46,000 and 

19,000, respectively.7 (The remaining members are 

distributed among equipment, infrastructure, human 

resources, and other services.)

This development is accompanied by reductions 

in military materiel through cuts in prospective procurement and decommissioning of active systems. 

Although the German Navy is to remain more or less 

the same (albeit at a lower level of personnel), these 

reductions will strongly affect Germany’s army and 

air force.8 (Table 2 shows some of the prospective 

changes.) To assess what this means for German defense policy, one needs to consider the strategic context of these changes.
103

Source: Federal Ministry of Defense, “Ressortbericht zum Stand 

der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr” (Interagency Report on 

the State of the Reorientation of the Bundeswehr), Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, May 8, 2013, p. 24, available from www.

bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYvBCsIwEET_aDcBRerNEhSvvdh4S9sQVpqkrJt68eNNDs7AO8 xj8Im1ye0UnFBObsUR7Uzn6QNT3AO8cuG6QqREb_FMJeKjfRYPc05eGsUnocrATjLDllnWZgpzNUALWqVNr7T6R3-70-1qzUEfzb0fc Ivx8gOBJaR2/.

Table 5-2. Change in German Defense Procurement.

STRATEGIC BACKDROP AND LEVEL 

OF AMBITION

According to Minister de Maizière, the cuts described in Table 5-2 are not primarily dictated by budget constraints but reflect security-political considerations. Using Germany’s 2006 white book as a starting 

point, the minister outlined the strategic thinking 

System

Current or 

orginally planned 

number

New ceiling

Combat tank Leopard 2 350 225

Armored personnel carriers Puma/

Marder 410/70 350/0

Armored howitzer 2000 148 89

Multipurpose helicopter NH-90 122 80

Support helicopter Tiger 80 40

Eurofighter Thyphoon 177 140

Combat aircraft Tornado 185 85

Transport aircraft C-160/A400M 80/60 60/40

Multipurpose warship (MKS 180) 8 6

Naval mine countermeasures unit 20 10
104

that was to guide the “new orientation” in a series of 

documents and speeches. The most important of those 

are the Defense Policy Guidelines (DPG) and and the 

principles (Eckpunkte) papers, both published in May 

2011.9 They provide a rationale for the German military in the early-21st century by explaining Germany’s 

vested interest in a stable liberal international order 

and by analyzing current and likely future threats to 

that order.10 The ministry emphasizes that neither retrenchment nor the sole focus on traditional concepts 

of territorial defense are promising strategies in dealing with these challenges. Hence, Germany should 

take on a greater share of the burden in upholding 

global order, including military contributions to UN, 

EU, or NATO missions.

Consequently, the “new orientation” seeks to develop a sleeker force that is highly deployable and effective in crisis management and crisis resolution missions. “The ability to fight . . . is thus a benchmark for 

operational readiness,” states the DPG.11 Because of 

Germany’s size and geostrategic position, the ability to 

fight cannot be limited to a few specialized and highly 

qualified capabilities but must encompass a full-spectrum force, the DPG argues. Hence, a key slogan for 

the new orientation’s force structure is “breadth rather 

than depth” (“Breite vor Tiefe”), meaning a preference 

for “a little bit of everything” over further military 

specialization. This strategy incurs deficits in sustainability and effectiveness in operations but is said to 

give Germany a key political role in cooperating with 

European partners of small and medium size. By offering broad basic capabilities, Germany allows other 

partners to develop highly specialized forces that can 

then be pooled and shared in common operations—

presumably, at times, under German leadership and 

with financial benefits for all.
105

In assessing this strategy and its translation into 

military reform, several problems stand out. For instance, with the end of conscription, it is yet unclear 

whether the envisioned troop strength will be sustainable, and at what cost. To maintain a force of 185,000 

troops, about 12,500 new career and longer-term service members need to be recruited each year.12 Given 

the rule of thumb that the Bundeswehr needs four 

applicants to fill one job satisfactorily, this is more of 

a challenge than it might seem at first glance. Early 

data on recruitment under the new system have been 

inconclusive.

Even if the ranks can be filled, the restructuring 

of the Bundeswehr into a rapidly deployable fighting force still stops half way. Of 185,000 troops, the 

government is only aiming to deploy a maximum of 

10,000. That is a low level of ambition, even if one 

takes into account that to deploy 10,000, an additional 

20,000 will be either in preparation and training to 

deploy or resting from a previous deployment. The 

political decision to limit each tour to just 4 months 

(instead of the more common 6 to 8 months) adds further pressure on personnel planning. Finally, it should 

be noted that having a capability to deploy 10,000 personnel is the defense ministry’s stated goal; it remains 

unclear whether it will be achieved.

The idea of a force geared toward deployable operations abroad is not fully realized in terms of military 

hardware either. The Bundeswehr still lacks essential 

capabilities in areas such as tactical and strategic airlift. 

The proposed further reductions in helicopters and 

planned procurement of transport aircraft (A400M) 

do not mesh with the strategic analysis set out by the 

ministry, but they are a consequence of rising prices 

for new equipment and limited budgets.13
106

Especially in terms of capabilities, the current reform is designed very tightly, not allowing for much 

wiggle room for when a specific system runs into development problems or fails to materialize altogether. 

As the procurement process is notoriously unpredictable, this can thwart strategic planning—with serious 

consequences for German freedom of action. The most 

recent example of this is the cancellation of the unmanned aerial vehicle Euro Hawk because of licensing problems.14 The ministry’s decision, which came 

rather late in the procurement process, prompted a 

parliamentary investigation into whether money was 

wasted on a system that was known to be unfit. In 

the midst of a federal election campaign, that investigation received much attention, overshadowing the 

more central question of why Germany needs (armed 

and unarmed) unmanned aerial vehicles and how to 

fill this capability gap.

Beyond these issues of manpower, hardware, and 

procurement, there are also political problems. The 

rather ambitious role envisioned by the defense ministry for German armed forces in international security 

is lacking support from the public, parliament, and 

even parts of Chancellor Merkel’s coalition government. Most Bundeswehr missions abroad are not supported by a majority of the German people. German 

support for the largest and most well-known mission, 

ISAF, has been dwindling for years, from 64 percent in 

2005 to 44 percent in 2010 to 37 percent in 2011.15 More 

consequential than this assessment of current or past 

missions is the deep reluctance to engage in similar 

operations again.

This tension is perhaps best encapsulated in foreign minister Guido Westerwelle’s self-proclaimed 

doctrine, the Culture of Military Restraint, which is at 
107

odds with de Maizière’s plea to take on “more military responsibility.”16 It is no accident that the DPG 

paper issued by de Maizière is only a ministerial one; 

its bold assignment of tasks to the Bundeswehr would 

most likely not be approved by Westerwelle’s foreign 

ministry and would therefore not make it into a government-approved white book or similar statement by 

the German government as a whole. This lack of strategic consensus, of course, also affects the reform of 

the armed forces. In fact, it goes a long way in explaining the root causes of the problems outlined earlier.

These political divisions and the general desire not 

to repeat the Afghanistan experience point to a larger 

issue: Germany’s political leadership is instinctively 

reluctant to use hard power. The use of military means 

is suspected to be rarely effective in producing desired 

political outcomes and always incurs political costs at 

home. As a nation deeply ashamed of the horrors of 

Nazi militarism and having been reeducated as freeriding consumers of security, Germany still struggles 

with the appropriate approach to military means as an 

instrument of foreign policy. Moreover, the average 

German does not feel threatened by turmoil abroad 

and sees little or no connection between safety at home 

and the need to maintain a stable liberal international 

order. It is little or no surprise, then, that so much of 

German foreign policy is predicated instead on trade, 

soft diplomacy, and on occasion, unilateral disarmament initiatives.

This combination makes Germany an unpredictable partner in international security affairs. There 

is always a chance that Germany’s aversion to hard 

power will trump its strategic interests. Most prominently, that was the case in Libya in 2011 when Germany abstained in the United Nations Security Coun-
108

cil—the first time it did not vote with France or the 

United States in that body—and subsequently refused 

to let its airborne surveillance capability (AWACS) 

contribute to NATO’s Unified Protector mission.17

AWACS is a typical multinational capability, the 

very embodiment of the pooled and shared arrangements of “smart defense” that Germany keeps advocating in both the EU and NATO councils. Given 

such an example, it is not surprising that pooling-andsharing arrangements are making little progress these 

days. This is not just a problem for Germany’s and 

the EU’s credibility as effective actors in international 

security, but also for the “new orientation” that is 

designed with a view to deeper European defense integration. The whole concept of “breadth rather than 

depth,” for instance, will prove hollow without sufficient cooperation with others, especially in Europe.

CONCLUSION

Assessing Germany’s hard power is a treacherous 

undertaking. There are two main reasons for this: first, 

in the midst of far-reaching Bundeswehr reform, all 

hard facts—from the eventual size of the force to actual capabilities—are uncertain and in flux. Minister 

de Maizière aims to complete his new orientation in 

2017; until then, many of the numbers discussed here 

are goals or data whose programs are works in progress. While certain trends are discernible, their extrapolation is by no means reliable. After all, the Merkel 

government has undertaken several surprising reversals on defense issues already—for example, the sudden suspension of conscription or the unexplained 

retraction of the announced €8.3 billion in defense 

budget cuts.
109

Second, the development of German hard power 

over the last 10 to 20 years has been characterized by 

deep ambiguity, in terms of both posture and policy. 

This is a reflection of the two competing stories about 

the grand narrative of Germany’s security policy. In 

describing this ambiguity, it is important to note that 

the topic of German hard power does not lend itself 

to a straight story of unmitigated decline. The study 

of German hard power is not the opening line of a bitter joke. It rests on a modest but solid base of steady 

budgets in recent years and acquisition programs that, 

while modest in scale, are technologically advanced. 

This cautiously positive assessment of German hard 

power gains particular traction in comparison to the 

developments of other European nations, large or 

small. In the conventional military balance among 

Europe’s big three, for instance, Germany is catching up—although admittedly, this is due in no small 

part to the severe defense budget cuts in both France 

and the United Kingdom (UK).18 While Paris and 

London command crucial capabilities that Germany 

does not—nuclear weapons, amphibious forces, aircraft carrier(s)—these high-value assets eat up much 

of their shrinking budgets, giving Germany an edge 

in other areas such as tanks (vis-à-vis the UK) and 

aircraft (vis-à-vis France).

THE GERMAN MILITARY IN AFGHANISTAN 

German military involvement in the ISAF in Afghanistan epitomizes the ambiguities of German security policy discussed here. It can serve as an example 

for both narratives presented in the introduction: that 

of a strong and increasingly confident nation shouldering its share of the burden of upholding interna-
110

tional stability and that of an indecisive nation pursuing a minimalist approach to its role in international 

security affairs because of its instinctive rejection of 

hard power means.

After September 11, 2001, Chancellor Gerhard 

Schröder declared Germany’s “unlimited solidarity” 

with the United States, and it was in Germany’s former capital where, in accordance with the international Bonn Agreement, the foundation for ISAF was laid. 

Schröder put his own chancellorship on the line when 

he combined his decision to send German armed 

forces to Afghanistan with a parliamentary vote of 

confidence. He won narrowly. Also, it was Schröder’s 

defense minister, Peter Struck (a Social Democrat as 

well), who coined the enduring rationale for this mission of the Bundeswehr, reflecting a new reality in the 

age of globalized threats such as international terrorism: “Germany’s security is also to be defended at the 

Hindu Kush.”19

It is telling that such strong political backing was 

required for a relatively modest contribution: the 

initial number of German soldiers to be deployed 

to Afghanistan was a mere 1,200. Today, almost 12 

years later, the size of the mandate encompasses 4,400 

soldiers. These numbers indicate that Germany underestimated the difficulty of the challenge at hand 

and chose a strategy of minimalist incrementalism 

in dealing with it. This is also evident from the fact 

that German decisionmakers always emphasized 

the nonviolent nature of the Bundeswehr’s job in the 

stable northern provinces of Afghanistan: networked 

security (Vernetzte Sicherheit), a German version of 

NATO’s “comprehensive approach,” was the key 

phrase, meaning that the armed forces did everything 

from painting schools to drilling wells, but would 
111

refrain from engaging the enemy. In fact, one of the 

German caveats in the NATO plan of operations for 

Afghanistan dictated that German soldiers were to 

shoot only in self-defense in face of an attack or imminent threat—after having yelled warnings in several 

languages. The German parliament’s somewhat fanciful insistence on a clear separation between Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM (understood as the bloody 

counterterrorism mission in which Germany could 

not participate) and ISAF (understood as the civilian 

reconstruction mission in which German soldiers participated as a kind of armed technical relief agency) 

underscored this general discomfort with hard power 

in action.

True to its reactive nature, German policy toward 

Afghanistan did not change until the deteriorating 

security situation in northern Afghanistan revealed 

a glaring gap between rhetoric and reality. In April 

2010, Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg was the first high-ranking German official who 

called the Bundeswehr’s mission a war. Fearing the 

legal and political implications, he added “colloquially speaking.” (Officially, “non-international armed 

conflict within the parameters of international law” 

remained the German phrase of choice.20) Around the 

same time, some of the caveats were dropped, and the 

extreme restrictions of the rules of engagement were 

abandoned. As it turned out, despite limited equipment—in tactical airlift and reconnaissance, for example—the Bundeswehr performed admirably against 

the insurgents.

Between January 2002 and July 2013, 54 German 

soldiers lost their lives in Afghanistan. Although Germany has never before experienced such high casualties, public reaction was muted. Arguably, this is a 
112

sign of what former German president Horst Köhler 

called the public’s “benevolent indifference” toward 

its armed forces rather than an expression of general 

agreement with Germany’s fight alongside its allies 

and the Afghan government. After all, when in September 2009 an American fighter jet responded to a 

German colonel’s call, striking two fuel tankers captured by insurgents and killing more than 90 civilians 

in the process, Germany—8 years into the war—had 

its first intense public debate about military operations 

in ISAF. Former defense minister Franz Josef Jung; his 

deputy Peter Wichert; and the highest-ranking German soldier, Inspector General Wolfgang Schneiderhan, lost their jobs over the incident.21

The debate also highlighted increasing frustration 

with the perceived lack of progress in Afghanistan. 

Given the length and cost of the mission, Germany 

experienced the same kind of fatigue other allies did; 

strategic concern quickly turned to finding an honorable exit strategy. The changing face of ISAF was the 

main catalyst for this. The mission had been sold to 

the German public as a stabilization effort in which 

German forces would assist in Afghanistan’s peaceful development toward democracy and prosperity; it 

was not advertised as a prolonged war against insurgents of dubious background and motivation.

Accordingly, NATO’s decision to redeploy by 2014 

was met with an audible sigh of relief in Berlin and 

in most other member states. As of yet, it is uncertain 

how many Western troops will remain in Afghanistan 

after that date—not as a fighting force, but as advisers 

in training the Afghan security forces. It is a testament 

to Germany’s complicated relationship with its hard 

power that it was the first NATO state to specify an 

“after 2014” contingent of about 800 soldiers. While 
113

most observers applaud this bold commitment to alliance solidarity and Afghan stability, German officials keep their fingers crossed that this training 

mission does not evolve into a war-fighting operation 

once again.

Moreover, the direction of de Maizière’s reform 

is sensible: focus on deployability, create leaner and 

more flexible forces, push for better cooperation 

among EU and NATO partners, and emphasize the 

need to be able to actually fight. So when the Atlantic Council states that “German military weakness is 

NATO’s most significant problem,” one could easily 

think of weaker and faster declining powers within the 

alliance—and more significant problems, too, such as 

diverging threat perceptions among most members.22

Still, there is something to the charge brought forth 

by the council and others. The numbers—stable as 

they may be—are not impressive for a state of Germany’s size, location, wealth, and political power. They 

are, of course, even less impressive in comparison to 

the increases in the defense budgets of rising powers such as China, Brazil, and India. If Germany will 

one day be able to send 10,000 soldiers into combat 

abroad equipped with some of the remaining Leopard 

2 tanks, or to deploy abroad a dozen brand-new Eurofighter Typhoons (a nonstealthy aircraft of disputed 

competitiveness), will it make much of a difference?

One of NATO’s lessons from the 2011 war in Libya 

is that without U.S. support, the European allies, led 

by Britain and France, could not mount a sustainable 

campaign for lack of ammunition and planes, among 

other things.23 Germany did not participate in that operation against one of the world’s weakest militaries, 

but in terms of more effective air-defense suppression 

and close-air support, it would hardly have improved 

Europe’s performance in any case.
114

That Germany did not even try to make a difference in this UN-mandated NATO mission makes matters worse. It is indicative of a disconnect between the 

country’s strategic interests and its political will to use 

force. For every step forward toward a normalization 

of German security policy (Kosovo and Afghanistan), 

there is a step backward (utterly restrictive rules of 

engagement and Libya). When German armed forces 

are sent into international missions, it is usually, first 

and foremost, explained to the public as a necessary 

act of solidarity with Germany’s allies. Although this 

is a good argument, it should never be a substitute for 

a lucid formulation of German interests and a cleareyed analysis of the threat to be countered.

One emerging threat is the increasing weakness of 

the European states when it comes to their hard power 

capabilities and thus their ability to secure their own 

periphery, let alone their global strategic interests. 

Germany, as the undisputed economic powerhouse 

and central political actor in Europe, would be well 

advised to lead the charge in reversing this dangerous 

trend. This, however, would require much stronger 

leadership on German security policy than the country has enjoyed over most of the last 2 decades.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. This chapter was originally published as an essay on 

October 8, 2013.

2. Up until the court’s decision in July 1994, the Basic Law for 

the Federal Republic of Germany was understood as restricting 

the use of German armed forces for collective geographical security of NATO member states and the Western European Union 

(WEU). The court held that the government was free to deploy 

German troops in NATO or WEU operations “to implement resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations” but that, to 
115

do so, the government would need the approval of the German 

parliament (Bundestag) first. See Karl-Heinz Börner, “The Future 

of German Operations Outside NATO,” Parameters, Spring 1996, 

pp. 62–72, available from strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/

parameters/Articles/96spring/borner.htm.

3. See Gary J. Schmitt, “The West’s ‘Hard Power’ Deficit,” The 

Los Angeles Times, September 11, 2012.

4. Some in the ministry even make the argument that, compared to the 2010 budget, such nonsubstantial, nominal increases 

mask the fact that in real money, the savings until 2015 practically 

amount to the storied $8.3 billion.

5. See Federal Ministry of Defence, “The 2012 Defence Budget,” 

August 14, 2012, available from www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/

c4/NYxBCo NADAB_tJFCL976iqqXJdYQg0kqa3b7ffVQhjkNDExw4

diEMeTrqDDAJF_qXZGicTlyOoSLXUqATJIlydjxXrpUZ-dN0zLVQyblFJlfI_wfueK8NIDrvZ6wSyiBio/.

6. See Federal Ministry of Defence, “Ressortbericht zum 

Stand der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr” (Interagency Report 

on the State of the Reorientation of the Bundeswehr), Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, May 8, 2013, pp. 13–16, available from

www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYvBCsIwEET_aDcBRerNEhSvvdh4S9sQVpqkrJt68eNNDs7AO8xj8Im1ye0UnFBObsUR7Uzn6QNT3AO8cuG6QqREb_FMJeKjfRYPc05eGsUnocrATjLDllnWZgpzNUALWqVNr7T6R3-70-1qzUEfzb0fcIvx8gOBJaR2/; 

and Bundeswehr, “Die Starke der Streitkrafte” (“Strength of Forces”), August 9, 2013, available from www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/

bwde/streitkraefte/grundlagen/staerke/.

7. The Joint Support Service (Streitkräftebasis) was created in 

2000 as a distinct organizational unit, unifying the armed forces’ 

logistical services at home and abroad. The Joint Support Service 

also includes the two universities of the armed forces (in Hamburg and Munich) and the the secret service agency (Militärische 

Abschirmdienst) of the Bundeswehr.

8. Brian McGrath, “NATO at Sea: Trends in Allied Naval 

Power,” Chap. 4, this volume.
116

9. See Federal Ministry of Defence, “Information on the Personnel Structure Model (PSM) 185,” March 7, 2012, available 

from www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYyxDoMwDET_yCFdWnUrYulaqS2wBbCCVXAix4GlH98w9E56yzud6U0pu428UwrsFtOabqTrsMOwbh 4SjTPKjKQphoWUPjBknjDtOAswZpeTlI1m9uZ9

nE0IY2DUg4qsVOjFaRCIQXQ5TBYpBmgyXWWburLVP_Z7eT2bvrXnU3OvHyau6-0HVC1uPA!!/; and Federal Ministry of 

Defence, “Reorientation of the Budeswehr: The Implementation 

Plans,” December 6, 2012, available from www.bmvg.de/portal

/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYzBCsIwEET_KJsiQvFmqQcvHgTReEvbJV1sN2WzaS9-vOnBGXiXNwy8oZT9SsErRfYTvMD1

dOo2081rMIn6EWVE0rTEiZQpss8YNpwFMOYfU5SNpo5wHM_G9D0kVF3KrJSYRCvUcwSRafdZJFiDA3gbNU2trL_

VN_64S6H27G27bW5wzLP5x8aaE_T/.

10. This analysis is very much in line with similar statements 

by NATO in 2010 and by the EU in 2008. See North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic 

Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Lisbon, Portugal: NATO, November 20, 

2010, available from www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf; and European 

Union, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World, Brussels, Belgium: EU, 

December 11, 2008, available from www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf.

11. German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines: 

Safeguarding National Interests—Assuming International Responsibility—Shaping Security Together, Berlin, Germany: May 18, 

2011, p. 10, available from www.nato.diplo.de/contentblob/3150944/

Daten/1318881/VM_deMaiziere_180511_eng_DLD.pdf. The German version does not say “a benchmark” but rather says “the 

benchmark.”

12. “Ressortbericht zum Stand der Neuausrichtung der 

Bundeswehr,” p. 24. Germany’s armed forces consist of service 

men or women who intend to spend their whole professional 

lives in the military, others who sign contracts to serve from 2 

to 20 years, and enlistees who agree to serve much shorter service periods of anywhere between 7 and 23 months. The figure of 

12,500 annually required new recruits noted in the text does not 

include those enlisting for this shorter period.
117

13. For a critique of the “missing link” in official German 

strategy documents between the analysis of the international security situation and the recommendations for German military 

planning, see Nick Witney and Olivier de France, “Europe’s Strategic Cacophony,” Policy Brief, London, UK: European Council on 

Foreign Relations, April 25, 2013, p. 5.

14. Minister de Maizière cancelled the development of the 

Euro Hawk drone in May 2013, citing massive problems in obtaining flight permits for European airspace because of an insufficient automatic anticollision system and a lack of access to 

construction documents. According to the German air force, the 

necessary updates would amount to an additional cost of €500 

to €600 million—a proposition unacceptable to the political leadership. The leading producing companies, Northrop Grumman 

and European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company N.V., dispute the ministry’s assessment. For a chronicle of the Euro Hawk 

“scandal,” see Helena Baers, “The Euro Hawk Scandal: A Chronicle,” Deutsche Welle, April 6, 2013, available from www.dw.de/theeuro-hawk-scandal-a-chronicle/a-16856113.

15. See Thomas Bulmahn, Rüdiger Fiebig, and Carolin Hilpert, 

Sicherheits-und Verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsklima in der 

Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Security and Defense Policy and 

Public Opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany), Strausburg, 

Germany: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 

May 2011, p. 6; and “Halten Sie die den Afghanistan—Einsatz der 

Bundeswehr fur Richtig?” (“Is Keeping the Army in Afghanistan 

Right?”), Statistica, January 2011, available from de.statista.com/

statistik/daten/studie/37270/umfrage/beteiligung-der-bundeswehr-ameinsatz-in-afghanistan/. Interestingly, there are no reliable polls on 

this question for 2012–13. In the case of Afghanistan, however, the 

public’s growing skepticism did not fully translate into political 

decisionmaking. With the exception of the radical leftist party, all 

six parties represented in parliament did, at least at one point, 

vote in favor of the ISAF mandate.

16. Guido Westerwelle, “Das amt macht mir freude” (“The 

Office Makes Me Happy”), Stern, July 11, 2013, available from 

www.fdp.de/Das-Amt-macht-mir-Freude/4943c18747i1p452/index.

html; and Thomas de Maizière, “Warum Schweigt der Kerl? Hat 

der was zu Verbergen?” (“Why Is He Silent? Does He Have Some-
118

thing To Hide?”), Die Welt, May 27, 2013, available from www.

welt.de/politik/ausland/article116574251/Warum-schweigt-der-KerlHat-der-was-zu-verbergen.html.

17. After much embarrassment, Germany finally decided to 

send 300 additional soldiers to Afghanistan, thus freeing allied 

AWACS units to move from there to Libya.

18. In 2013, Germany’s defense budget is at €33 billion; the 

UK and France have €37 billion and €32 billion, respectively. By 

2015, Germany plans to reduce spending to €30 billion, the UK to 

€35 billion, and France to €30 billion. See Christopher Chantrill, 

“Public Spending Details for 2010,” available from www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/year_spending_2010UKbn_12bc1n_30; and Martial 

Foucault, “The Defense Budget in France: Between Denial and 

Decline,” Ifri Focus Stratégique, December 2012.

19. R. Nicholas Burns et al., Anchoring the Alliance, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, May 2012, p. vi.

20. For a biting critique, see Steven Erlanger, “Libya’s Dark 

Lesson for NATO,” The New York Times, September 3, 2011.

21. Steffen Heberstreit, “Peter Struck ist tot” (“Peter Struck Is 

Dead”), Frankfurter Rundschau, December 19, 2012, available from 

www.fr-online.de/politik/ex-verteidigungsminister–peter-struck-isttot,1472596,21150806.html.

22. “Tabu-Bruch: Guttenberg spricht von Krieg in Afghanistan” (“Breaking Taboo: Guttenberg Speaks on War in Afghanistan”), Der Spiegel, April 4, 2010, available from www.spiegel.de/

politik/ausland/tabu-bruch-guttenberg-spricht-von-krieg-in-afghanistan-a-687235.html.

23. For a succinct analysis of Germany’s changing Afghanistan policy—and the political fallout of the Kunduz incident in 

particular—see Timo Noetzel, “The German Politics of War: Kunduz and the War in Afghanistan,” International Affairs, Vol. 87, 

No. 2, March 2011, pp. 397–417.
119

CHAPTER 6

SOUTH KOREA:

RESPONDING TO THE NORTH KOREAN 

THREAT1

Bruce E. Bechtol

KEY POINTS

• South Korea faces a clear, present, and evolving threat from North Korea, with Kim Jong-un 

showing no indication of moving away from 

his father’s violent and corrupt policies.

• South Korea’s response to the North Korean 

threat has been uneven, with increased capabilities in some areas but less than what is needed 

in others.

• A key issue facing the Republic of Korea (ROK)-

U.S. alliance is command and control of allied 

forces during wartime on the Korean Peninsula. A combined operating force must continue 

to exist to ensure full readiness and capability.

When analyzing the readiness, capabilities, and future initiatives of ROK’s military, one must take into 

account the unique geopolitical position in which the 

ROK government finds itself. There is no ambiguous 

set of threats for South Korea. Rather, the largest and 

most dangerous threat to the stability and security 

of the Korean Peninsula is obvious: the Democratic 

People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK).
120

It is for this threat that policymakers in Seoul must 

ensure their military is ready. Providing an adequate 

defense against this threat is the cornerstone of the 

ROK–U.S. alliance and the most important foreign 

policy issue between these two allies. As survival of 

the nation-state is the number one priority for any national leader, all other issues for Seoul will be ancillary 

as long as there is a DPRK.

Recognizing that the threatening behavior of its 

belligerent neighbor to the north is the key military 

issue for the ROK, it is important to analyze that threat 

to determine what the priorities of the South Korean 

military will be and how the threat will influence planning for the ROK–U.S. alliance. Since 2010, North Korea has conducted two violent military provocations: 

one with a submarine that sank a ROK naval ship and 

one that involved an artillery barrage against a South 

Korean island that killed both military and civilian 

personnel.2 North Korea also conducted yet another 

nuclear test in February 2013.3

In addition, the DPRK has shown with a test 

launch conducted in mid-December 2012 that it is now 

capable (or close to it) of building a missile that can hit 

Alaska, Hawaii, or perhaps even the west coast of the 

United States.4 Pyongyang also has the capability of 

targeting all of South Korea and most of Japan with its 

ballistic missiles.5

North Korea has also continued to advance the 

capabilities and numbers of its armored forces, longrange artillery forces, and special operations forces.6

Finally, Kim Jong-un has shown no indication that he 

has any intentions except to carry on the violent and 

corrupt policies of his father, Kim Jong-il. This means, 

of course, that South Korea and the ROK–U.S. alliance 

must continue to prepare for the multifaceted North 

Korean threat for the foreseeable future.
121

INITIATIVES AGAINST THE NORTH KOREAN 

THREAT

Despite calls by the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003–08) for a “balancer policy”—a policy that 

moved South Korea away from its traditional security 

ties with the United States to a more neutral or balancing role between the United States, Japan, and the 

old communist bloc of China, Russia, and North Korea—the fact remains that the primary issue for which 

Seoul must build its military capabilities and plan its 

contingencies is North Korea.7 This process has been 

exacerbated by the fact that the threat the DPRK presents has evolved and become even more complicated 

in recent years.

Following the two violent provocations in 2010 

already described, it became obvious that the South 

Korean government and military needed to take steps 

to counter future provocations from North Korea. 

As noted North Korean specialist Robert M. Collins 

has stated: 

Since the end of the Korean Conflict in 1953, the ROK–

U.S. alliance has done a very good job of deterring 

against a war initiated by North Korea. The alliance 

has not done a good job of deterring North Korean 

provocations.8

 Thus, the planning, policies, and procedures South 

Koreans initiated (and coordinated with their key ally 

in Washington) are very timely and needed now more 

than ever.

During April 2013, it was reported that the United 

States and South Korea had finalized a plan to respond more forcefully and appropriately to North 

Korean provocations.9 This new “counterprovoca-
122

tion” plan will ensure that there is a speedy “response 

in kind” that still prevents escalation to all-out war. 

The existence of the plan was also made public in part, 

it seems, because Seoul and Washington wanted to 

both warn the North Koreans and reassure the South 

Korean populace.

In an earlier and equally important move, the South 

Korean military established a separate Northwest Islands Command. The establishment of the new command and the appointment of a commander with the 

autonomy to respond with necessary force in a timely 

manner under more liberal rules of engagement empower the South Korean military to respond more effectively to violent provocations the North initiates in 

the Northern Limit Line (NLL) area.10

Formally established in June 2011, the command 

was first headed by Lieutenant General Yoo Nakjun, the commandant of the ROK Marine Corps, with 

a Marine major general as deputy commander and 

a staff that includes colonels from each of the ROK 

military services. Built around a division-sized joint 

unit, with the key contingents being the ROK Marine 

Sixth Brigade and the Yeonpyeong Defense battalion, 

the new command now has the ability to respond to 

North Korean attacks more effectively and rapidly. As 

such, ROK forces are now better positioned to deter 

and defend against North Korean provocations.11

The attacks in 2010 and the rhetoric from North 

Korea since have had the opposite effect of what 

Pyongyang likely wanted. If anything, DPRK behavior has strengthened South Korea’s resolve to strike 

back against North Korean aggression.12 The South 

Korean Navy is now on a heightened state of readiness in the NLL area—the demarcation line in the 

West (Yellow) Sea between the DPRK and ROK—and 
123

has been equipped with the best maritime equipment 

that the government can provide.13

As part of its support for these new initiatives, the 

United States also stepped up exercises and training 

with ROK forces in the West Sea, close to the NLL 

area.14 Although much of the effort for counterprovocation deterrence has focused on the NLL, this is not 

the only area where readiness is being upgraded. For 

example, in June 2013, additional self-propelled airdefense missiles were assigned to front-line units near 

the demilitarized zone (DMZ).15

South Korea also faces a threat from the DPRK’s advances in cyber and electronic warfare. In recent years, 

North Korea has engaged in a series of cyber and electronic warfare attacks against the South Korean military, government, businesses, and nonprofit entities.16

In response, the Defense Ministry established a Cyber 

Policy Department in early-2013, and the National Intelligence Service announced that its third department 

would give greater attention to “monitoring of cyberspace and telecommunications.”17 The North Koreans 

reportedly have 3,000 to 4,000 personnel engaged in 

cyber warfare. To enhance the ROK’s capability to 

counter this rather large and well-trained force, the 

Defense Ministry announced that it will be working 

with the United States to deter and defend against this 

emerging threat.18

Meanwhile, because North Korea used global positioning system (GPS) jamming on hundreds of commercial flights and maritime navigational units in 

South Korea during 2012 and 2013, Seoul increased its 

surveillance of North Korean electronic jammers. The 

Ministry of Science and Future Planning announced 

plans to set up a system that can track down the “attack point and impact of jamming attempts.”19
124

The DPRK’s missile program has grown in both 

numbers and capabilities. It poses a serious problem 

to both South Korea and Japan. In response to that 

threat, Tokyo acquired the land-based PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) from the United States, 

deployed the Standard Missile (SM-3) on its Aegisequipped Japanese destroyers, joined the U.S.-led ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, and established 

the Bilateral Joint Operating Command Center at Yokota Air Base with the United States to provide a common operating picture of any missile threat.20

In contrast, South Korea has not, as of yet, done 

any of these things—though Seoul has begun to develop a less expensive and less capable BMD system of its 

own. Despite the considerable threat the DPRK’s arsenal of missiles aimed at South Korea poses, as recently 

as May 2013, the South Korean Defense Ministry reiterated the government’s intention not to participate in 

a joint U.S.-ROK missile defense effort, let alone the 

trilateral (Japan, U.S., and ROK) ballistic missile defense architecture suggested by the chairman of the 

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, 

during a visit to South Korea in late April 2013.21

While keeping its distance from the kind of cooperation on missile defenses undertaken by Japan and the 

United States, South Korea is moving forward with its 

own missile defense upgrades; in a recent budget, the 

defense ministry indicated it intends to spend nearly 

14 percent of its entire budget on improving its missile defense capabilities.22 In 2012, for example, South 

Korea purchased two Green Pine land-based missile 

defense radars and, under new budget plans, recently 

announced it would acquire PAC-3s.23 In addition, 

South Korea announced in June 2013 that it would 

equip its Aegis destroyers with the Standard Mis-
125

sile 6 (SM-6) for low-altitude defense against cruise 

missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and aircraft. The 

SM-6 is an upgrade to the SM-2s that were deployed 

on South Korean Aegis destroyers.

More ambitiously, Seoul plans to establish a Missile Destruction System by 2020. According to reports, 

the system will be designed to detect imminent North 

Korean missile launches and enable South Korea to 

strike missile sites before an attack can be carried out. 

According to South Korean sources, the system will 

involve “spy satellites, surveillance drones for monitoring and attack systems, including missiles, fighter 

jets and warships.”24

Indeed, it appears that a key reason the United 

States and South Korea negotiated new, more lenient 

guidelines to the Missile Technology Control Regime 

(MCTR) in 2012 was to give the ROK the option of 

deploying longer-range missiles and more sophisticated drones to cover all of North Korea. Under the 

previous MCTR 2001 agreement, South Korean missiles were limited in range to no more than 186 miles. 

With the new accord, South Korean missiles will have 

a maximum range of 500 miles, which is sufficient to 

give them the capability of reaching any area of North 

Korea from launch points well south of Seoul and the 

DMZ.25 Although the new agreement regarding missile range adds to Seoul’s ability to target key nodes in 

the North, actually doing so would be both an expensive undertaking and a capability the United States 

already provides. In addition, it will do nothing to 

enhance badly needed improvements in ROK ballistic 

missile defense capabilities.

The fact remains that the missile defense systems 

currently deployed by the South Koreans are inferior 

to those currently deployed by the United States and 
126

Japan. If the ROK had simply purchased the systems 

American experts recommended, such as the PAC-3 

and SM-3, South Korea would be better prepared for a 

ballistic missile attack from North Korea. In addition, 

by joining a U.S.-led BMD system, the South Koreans 

would have access to the U.S. Navy’s X-Band radar 

and the U.S. Army’s land-based radar associated with 

the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. The U.S.-

led system links together the capabilities of detection 

and destruction systems around the globe and matches them up with mobile BMD platforms such as Aegisequipped ships.26 By going its own way when it comes 

to missile defense, the South Korean government is 

limiting its ability to defend itself and its citizens.

Cost Sharing and Repositioning U.S. Bases.

The cost for stationing U.S. forces in South Korea 

has been, and remains, an important issue in both 

South Korea and the United States. The perception 

of some in the United States, particularly members of 

Congress, has been that Seoul needs to do more to cover its “fair share” given the level of security the United 

States provides its ally from North Korean aggression. 

Americans see a South Korea that is now a thriving 

democracy and an economic powerhouse and expect 

the South Koreans to pay more of the cost for stationing U.S. troops there.27 Conversely, many on the left in 

South Korea believe that their government is paying 

more than its fair share, arguing that American estimates that South Korea has been paying 40–45 percent 

of the basing costs are on the low side, and that South 

Korea is already paying more than the 50 percent of 

the costs for which Washington is calling.28
127

The accord governing South Korean payments is 

known as the “Special Measures Agreement” (SMA) 

and covers nonpersonnel stationing costs (NPSC), 

such as labor costs for South Korean employees working with U.S. forces, the purchase of logistics and supplies, and the construction of military facilities. The 

first SMA took effect in 1991, and South Korea’s contribution levels have increased steadily as the costs 

associated with NPSC have grown predictably.29 The 

last SMA was signed in December 2009, with Seoul 

and Washington agreeing that South Korea would 

pay 760 billion won (roughly $570 million at the time) 

for NPSC costs and Seoul also agreeing to cost hikes 

not to exceed 4 percent a year.30 With the SMA set to 

expire in December 2013, Washington and Seoul had 

set the end of October as a deadline for reaching a new 

agreement. Talks in October did not result in an agreement but the Americans keep pushing for an SMA 

in which the South Koreans would pay 50 percent 

of the cost. However, a new SMA was negotiated in 

January 2014.31

Another important initiative is the Land Partnership Program, based largely on a 2006 agreement 

between Washington and Seoul to consolidate significantly the U.S. military footprint in South Korea (see 

Figure 6-1). The deadline initially set for completing 

the consolidation was 2012, but, given the scale of the 

endeavor, it is no surprise that the deadline has not 

been exactly met, and a large portion of forces north 

of Seoul are yet to be repositioned.
128

Source: Ministry of National Defense, ROK, “Defense White 

Paper,” 2006.

Figure 6-1. Projected Relocation of 

U.S. Bases in South Korea.

Nevertheless, according to General James D. Thurman, commander of U.S. forces in Korea, “transitioning from 107 bases to less than 50” will ultimately 

result in “enhanced force protection, survivability, 

and lower cost maintenance in Korea.”32 The effect of 

this plan is already saving money for both the United 

States and South Korea.
129

BUDGETS AND ACQUISITIONS: PAYING FOR 

THE FUTURE

The Roh government in 2005 unleashed the most 

substantial reform agenda in recent years for the 

South Korean military, “Defense Reform 2020.” This 

was the Roh government’s vision for a ROK military 

that would be smaller, more modern, and capable of 

global missions—not just one focused on dealing with 

the North Korean threat. By 2020, the total military 

manpower would be cut by some 25 percent, with the 

ROK army seeing its numbers drop from 548,000 to 

371,000—a loss of four corps and 23 divisions. These 

cuts were combined with reductions in the time conscripts would have to serve in the nation’s army and 

navy by 6 months and in the air force by 8 months, 

with a deadline of 2014 for putting these new service 

requirements in place. In theory, these reductions in 

manpower would be made up with acquisition of 

new, advanced military hardware and systems.33

The plan, however, suffered from a number of 

problems. First, it required more resources than were 

budgeted. Second, many experts assessed the original 

schedule for systems acquisition and troop cuts to be 

inadequate to account for North Korea’s own growing 

asymmetric capabilities in nuclear and ballistic missile 

weapons—a problem no doubt exacerbated by President Roh’s overly sanguine view of North Korea’s 

own strategic intentions. Third, the plan did not anticipate the command-and-control requirements that 

would flow from South Korea’s decision to transition 

by 2015 to a more self-reliant force.34

Shortly after Lee Myung-bak was elected president 

in 2008, his government moved to modify both the 

substance and the timelines of Defense Reform Plan 
130

(DRP) 2020. Taking the threat from North Korea more 

seriously, beginning in 2009, the ROK military reinforced plans to defend against the North Korean nuclear threat and to initiate troop cuts only after weapons systems have been brought online that would 

make up for the decrease in manpower.

Specifically, the revised plan, made public in 2009, 

included delaying the DRP 2020 reform endpoint to 

2025, slowing defense budget increases as a result of 

slowdown in the Korean economy, and raising the 

planned 2020 troop level to 517,000 from the original 

goal of 500,000. The Lee government also modified 

the plan’s reduction in service time for conscripts, 

with draftees in the army and the marines serving 

21 months, navy conscripts 23 months, and air force 

draftees 24 months. Even so, the country’s navy and 

air force are still likely to face manpower shortages in 

the coming years.35

The defense budget under President Roh began at 

2.28 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) his first 

year in office. This percentage gradually went up and 

continued to go up after Lee Myung-bak assumed the 

presidency. Under Lee, it peaked at 2.72 percent of 

GDP in 2009 and was 2.60 percent in his last year in 

office.36

Before assuming office in February 2013, South 

Korean President Park Geun-hye stated that she intended to increase spending in light of Pyongyang’s 

third nuclear test and its provocative behavior. In fact, 

her announced plan is to increase the defense budget 

at a higher rate than the overall state budget.37

In accord with those plans, the Defense Ministry 

announced in April 2013 that it intended to spend an 

extra $200 million during 2013—raising the 2013 budget from $30.5 billion to $30.7 billion. More recently, 
131

the ministry submitted a request to South Korea’s 

legislature for a 2014-18 defense budget of $192.6 billion—an average annual expenditure of $38.52 billion. About half of 2013’s increase was earmarked 

for strengthening defense capabilities along the ROK 

western maritime border with North Korea, and a bit 

less than half will be spent on upgrading existing conventional weaponry, such as South Korea’s self-propelled 155 millimeter (mm) howitzers (K9 Thunder) 

and procuring additional unmanned reconnaissance 

aircraft.38

But challenges remain—as shown by the sinking 

of the ROKS Cheonan in March 2010 by a DPRK submarine. Increasing the ROK Navy’s antisubmarine 

warfare capabilities should be a priority. Moreover, 

some key mainline battle systems need replacing, but 

replacements have been slow to come. One example 

is the K-2 Black Panther, an indigenously produced 

main battle tank intended to replace the Americanmade M-48 Patton tanks that the ROK Army still has 

in its inventory. (M-48s date from the 1950s and were 

the principal tank the U.S. Army used during the Vietnam War.) Mass production of the tank was originally 

set to begin in 2011, but the project was set back by 

numerous delays, including a failed engine durability 

test just in 2013.39

Also worrisome is the fact that South Korea’s plan 

to buy 60 new fighter jets has been delayed. Only 

recently has the competition been reopened after all 

three of the entries—Boeing’s F-15, Lockheed Martin’s 

F-35, and European Aerospace Defense and Space 

Company’s Eurofighter Typhoon—failed to fall below 

the price level set by the ROK’s acquisition agency.40

The country needs to replace its very old fleet of F-4 

Phantoms and F-5 Tigers, and the F-35 would be the 
132

most advanced aircraft of the three—but also the most 

expensive. Whether South Korea’s defense budget can 

accommodate such a purchase, whether offset proposals to reduce overall costs for the proposed acquisition can be arranged, or whether the government will 

simply be forced to buy fewer planes remain open 

questions.

WARTIME OPERATIONAL CONTROL: A KEY 

DEFENSE ISSUE

Since 1994, the Combined Forces Command (CFC) 

has had a planning staff of hundreds of ROK and U.S. 

personnel. The staff is commanded by a U.S. fourstar general. During peacetime, ROK forces report to 

their relevant commands, which then answer to South 

Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. During wartime, designated ROK forces fall under the operational control 

(OPCON) of the commander of CFC, who in turn 

reports to the national command authorities in both 

Washington and Seoul. However, this long-standing 

agreement has been subject to intense negotiation and 

a number of proposed changes.

In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and 

Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo reached an agreement 

that CFC would be disestablished, and the two militaries stationed in Korea would continue to function 

as allies but with two separate wartime operational 

commands. The new command architecture was to 

become operational in April 2012.41

The issue of American and South Korean forces 

fighting a conflict with North Korea under two separate military commands became an immediate source 

of contention in this new agreement. Senior politicians 

on the right and many retired military officers were 

highly critical of the change because they believed it 
133

was both premature and dangerous to the security of 

South Korea.42

Under the current CFC structure, the military chain 

of command is transparent and seamless while falling under two separate national command authorities 

(NCA) in Washington and Seoul (see Figure 6-2). Although planning is conducted using a combined staff 

and exercises are held every year that utilize that planning, the ROK military does not “come under” the 

U.S. military even when CFC is activated because the 

American CFC commander answers to both NCAs.

Source: Lieutenant General Stephen G. Wood, USAF, and Major 

Christopher A. Johnson, MD, USAF, “The Transformation of Air 

Forces on the Korean Peninsula,” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. 

22, No. 3, Fall 2008, p. 6, available from www.airpower.maxwell.

af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/fal08/wood.html.

Figure 6-2. Current Wartime Command 

Relationships, ROK-U.S. Forces.
134

As originally conceived in 2008 and agreed to by 

Gates and Kim, the new command arrangement would 

no longer have ROK forces being put under the command of the CFC and its U.S. four-star commander. 

The CFC would no longer exist and, in its place, there 

would be two separate war-fighting commands—one 

American and one South Korean (see Figure 6-3). Unity 

of command, so important in war, would vanish, and 

U.S. and South Korean forces would be fighting in the 

challenging and restricted terrain of the Korean Peninsula, while answering to two separate NCAs. Much 

of the combined operations and planning today was 

slated to become cooperative through newly created 

boards, bureaus, coordination centers, and cells—a 

bureaucratic and complicated endeavor, to be sure.

Source: Lieutenant General Stephen G. Wood, USAF, and Major 

Christopher A. Johnson, MD, USAF, “The Transformation of Air 

Forces on the Korean Peninsula,” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. 

22, No. 3, Fall 2008, p. 7, available from www.airpower.maxwell.

af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/fal08/wood.html.

Figure 6-3. Projected Wartime Command 

Relationships Originally Slated for Post-2012.
135

In June 2010, Presidents Lee and Barack Obama 

agreed that the command changes would be delayed 

until December 2015.43 This would give the ROK military more time to prepare for the types of planning 

and operations that separate warfighting commands 

would warrant; equally important, it would give the 

American and South Korean militaries time to modify 

and ameliorate some of the problems tied to the originally proposed command architecture.

Following Kim Jong-il’s death and the accession of 

his son, Kim Jong-un, to the leadership of the DPRK 

in December 2011, events on the ground caused many 

in South Korea to again bring up the issue of the disestablishment of CFC.44 North Korea conducted two 

long-range missile tests; staged another nuclear test; 

and, during the early spring of 2013, upped its level of 

threatening rhetoric.

As an editorial in a widely read South Korean 

newspaper put it: 

The South Korean government has proposed to the 

United States that the two allies reassess North Korean threats and the South Korean military’s readiness 

posture ahead of the planned [change] . . . scheduled 

for December 2015. The proposal indicates that Seoul’s 

security situation and its military’s actual capabilities are more important than implementing the OPCON transfer on schedule. What is important, is that 

whether or not the OPCON transfer is implemented 

on schedule, the combined operational capabilities of 

the two allies’ militaries for coping with threats from 

the North should not be weakened.45

But South Koreans were not the only ones to suggest the command reforms should be put on hold. In 

April 2013, former U.S. Forces Korea (and CFC) Com-
136

mander General B. B. Bell argued that, in light of the 

DPRK’s nuclear and missile capability, the changeover should be delayed to sometime past 2015—this 

from a general, who when CFC commander, had been 

a strong proponent of the change in command arrangements.46

Nevertheless, in April, the ROK defense ministry 

reiterated its intention to move forward with a new 

command structure and have it operational by the 

December 2015 deadline.47 By early April 2013, reports had begun to circulate that, following the disestablishment of CFC in 2015, a new combined command would be stood up to take its place—essentially 

keeping the extremely important combined aspect of 

the ROK–U.S. alliance’s fighting forces intact during 

wartime—though details were sketchy at the time (see 

Figure 6-4).48

Source: Song Sang-ho, “Allies Agree on New Combined Command,” Korea Herald, June 2, 2013, available from www.koreaherald.

com/view.php?ud=201306020000282.

Figure 6-4. Projected ROK-U.S. Combined 

Command Structure Post-CFC, April 2013.
137

Although many details still needed to be worked 

out, in June 2013, it was reported that the new combined command would be headed by a ROK four-star, 

with an American general serving as deputy commander of the combined forces and an American air 

force general heading up the combined air component. 

By some accounts, ROK officers would command the 

other components.49

In July 2013, the South Korean government reportedly proposed to the United States that the originally 

agreed date for disestablishing CFC be once again delayed in light of the ongoing threat from North Korea. 

It is thus now unclear if “wartime OPCON” and the 

end of CFC will once again be pushed back to a date 

beyond 2015 or if the new combined command structure will, in fact, be implemented on that date.

According to press reports, in October 2013, U.S. 

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and South Korean 

Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin agreed to delay the 

final decision until 2014.50 What is most important for 

the future is maintaining a combined command that 

gives these two long-standing allies the optimum capability for combat readiness and deterrence of the 

North Korean threat.

THE U.S.–ROK NUCLEAR PACT

The United States and South Korea first signed a 

nuclear cooperation agreement in 1956, and it was 

last amended in 1974. With the accord set to expire in 

March 2014, Washington and Seoul have been in negotiations for over the past 2 years to extend and update the agreement. The main sticking point has been 

South Korea’s desire to reprocess spent nuclear fuel of 

U.S. origin used in South Korean reactors—a practice 

effectively prohibited under the previous accord.
138

Unable to reprocess spent fuel, South Korea expects to run out of storage space for its spent fuel rods 

by 2016.51 While Seoul has stated it wants to use “proliferation-resistant” technology for enriching uranium 

and reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, Washington has 

been hesitant to agree.

In light of North Korea’s nuclear violation of the 

Nonproliferation Treaty and continuing nuclear program shenanigans, most states with an interest in the 

region are highly sensitive to any programs that might 

possibly increase the chances of weapons proliferation. Also, a likely issue for the United States is the 

past history of South Korea’s own nuclear weapons 

program. Although Seoul had denied that it intends 

to engage in any effort that might lead it to acquiring 

nuclear weapons, recent polls show that a majority of 

the South Korean populace would support such an 

initiative.52

By March 2013, the United States and South Korea 

had failed to agree on how Seoul should (or should 

not) enrich uranium and process spent nuclear fuel 

rods. In talks held during June 2013, Ambassador 

Park Ro-byug from South Korea and Thomas Countryman from the United States continued to discuss 

the issues surrounding what Seoul would do with its 

“nuclear waste.” As a temporary solution, the two 

countries have agreed to extend the existing accord by 

2 more years, to March 2016. The 2-year extension of 

the present agreement must be approved by the U.S. 

Congress.53

Both countries hope to have reached a satisfactory compromise by then.54 As long as the North Korean threat exists—and the perceptions about nuclear 

weapons that come with it—prospects for a South 

Korean reprocessing program will continue to be an 

issue. (It is important to note that while this book was 
139

in production the U.S. and South Korea signed a new 

nuclear energy cooperation pact on April 22, 2015.)

CONCLUSION

Since becoming an independent nation following the end of World War II, South Korea has never 

been more powerful on the world stage—militarily or 

economically. But the continuing unpredictable threat 

from North Korea means that South Korea must make 

significant investments in its national security.

South Korea needs to make important decisions 

regarding BMD; the future of its air force; numerous 

conventional systems that are vital to any conflict it 

would have with the DPRK; and, perhaps most important, the ROK–U.S. alliance and the commandand-control issues associated with the projected disestablishment of CFC in December 2015. These decisions 

are important, often quite expensive fiscally, and often 

very controversial politically. But this is nothing new.

South Korea is in a unique position. It is a thriving, transparent democracy, with perhaps the most 

ominous and imminent threat on its borders of any 

democracy. Decisions regarding the ROK military in 

coming years will be important to not only South Korea but also all nation-states that have an interest in 

the region.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. This essay was originally published on November 5, 2013.

2. For more analysis on the two violent provocations North 

Korea conducted against the South during 2010, see Alexander 

Zhebin, “The Korean Peninsula: Approaching the Danger Line,” 

Far Eastern Affairs, No. 1, 2011, available from www.eastviewpress.
140

com/Files/FEA_FROM%20THE%20CURRENT%20ISSUE_No.%20

1_2011_small.pdf.

3. For details on North Korea’s most recent nuclear test, see 

Kelsey Davenport, “North Korean Conducts Nuclear Test,” Arms 

Control Today, March 2013, available from www.armscontrol.org/

act/2013_03/North-Korea-Conducts-Nuclear-Test.

4. “North Korea’s Missile Programme,” BBC News, April 12, 

2013, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17399847.

5. Duyeon Kim, “Fact Sheet: North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs,” Washington, DC: Center for Arms Control 

and Non-Proliferation, July 2013, available from armscontrolcenter.

org/fact-sheet-north-koreas-nuclear-and-ballistic-missile-programs/.

6. For details on the recent updates, upgrades, and increasing numbers of North Korean conventional systems and forces, 

see Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

2012,” Annual Report to Congress, Washington, DC: Department 

of Defense, 2013, available from www.defense.gov/pubs/Report_to_

Congress_on_Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_

DPRK.pdf.

7. For more analysis on the “Balancer Policy,” see Yōichi 

Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second North 

Korean Nuclear Crisis, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 

Press, 2007, pp. 252–257.

8. Robert M. Collins, Remarks at the “Confronting Security 

Challenges on the Korean Peninsula” conference, Marine Corps 

University, Quantico, VA, September 1, 2010. See also Robert Collins, “North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and 

the Northern Limit Line,” Bruce Bechtol, ed., Confronting Security 

Challenges on the Korean Peninsula, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps 

University Press, 2011, p. 13, available from community.marines.

mil/news/publications/Documents/Confronting%20Security%20

Challenges.%20On%20The%20Korean%20Peninsula.pdf.

9. David Sanger and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Designs a Korea 

Response Proportional to the Provocation,” The New York Times, 
141

April 7, 2013, available from www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/world/

asia/us-and-south-korea-devise-plan-to-counter-north.html.

10. For more on the origins, history, and strategic importance 

of the Northern Limit Line and its role in the ongoing tense relationship between the two Koreas when it comes to the de facto sea 

border, see Terence Roehrig, “The Origins of the Northern Limit 

Line Dispute,” Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars, May 2012, available from www.wilsoncenter.

org/sites/default/files/NKIDP_eDossier_6_Origins_of_the_Northern_

Limit_Line.pdf.

11. For information regarding the establishment and implementation of the Northwest Islands Defense Command, see “S. 

Korea Sets Up Defense Command for Yellow Sea Islands Near 

N. Korea,” Yonhap, June 14, 2011, available from english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/06/14/85/0301000000AEN20110614004500

315F.HTML; and “Marines Recall Yeonpyeong Shelling with New 

Perspective,” Korea Times, November 21, 2011, available from 

www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/11/117_99175.html.

12. Chico Harlan, “Island Attack Boosted S. Korea’s Will 

to Strike Back against North,” The Washington Post, April 

14, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_

pacific/island-attack-boosted-s-koreas-will-to-strike-back-againstnorth/2013/04/14/5d6a8a8c-a4d9-11e2-9c03-6952ff305f35_story.html.

13. Song Sang-ho, “Navy Committed to NLL Defense,” Korea Herald, July 1, 2013, available from www.koreaherald.com/view.

php?ud=20130701001036.

14. Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea, U.S. Hold Submarine Drill in 

Yellow Sea,” Yonhap, May 6, 2013, available from english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/05/06/16/0301000000AEN20130506003200

315F.HTML.

15. “S. Korea Deploys Anti-Aircraft Missiles against N. Korea,” Yonhap, June 24, 2013, available from www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/130624/s-korea-deploys-anti-aircraftmissiles-against-n-korea.
142

16. For examples of North Korean cyber and electronic warfare attacks against the South, see Choe Sang-hun, “Cyber Attacks 

Disrupt Leading Korean Sites,” The New York Times, June 25, 2013, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/world/asia/cyberattacks-shut-down-leading-korean-sites.html; and Shaun Waterman, 

“North Korean Jamming of GPS Shows System’s Weakness,” The 

Washington Times, August 23, 2012, available from www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/23/north-korean-jamming-gps-showssystems-weakness.

17. To read more about initiatives within the ROK Defense 

Ministry to combat cyber warfare attacks and efforts to work with 

the United States in this arena, see Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korean Military to Prepare with U.S. for Cyber Warfare Scenarios,” Yonhap, 

April 1, 2013, available from english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/20

13/04/01/20/0301000000AEN20130401004000315F.HTML; “Seoul 

Needs to Counter N. Korea’s Cyber Espionage Capabilities: 

Defense Chief,” Yonhap, June 20, 2013, available from www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/130620/seoul-needscounter-n-koreas-cyber-espionage-capabilities-de; Kim Tae-gyu, “Spy 

Agency Ups Capabilities against Cyber Attacks,” Korea Times, 

April 12, 2013, available from www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/04/116_133851.html; and “Defense Ministry to Establish 

Cyber Policy Department,” Arrirang News, April 2, 2013, available 

from www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=145526.

18. Ibid.

19. Lee Minji, “S. Korea to Set Up GPS Jamming Surveillance System,” Yonhap, April 10, 2013, available from www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/asianet/130410/s-korea-set-gps-jammingsurveillance-system.

20. “Japan Deploys PAC-3 and SM-3 Missile Interceptors,” 

Defense Updates, April 10, 2013, available from defenseupdates.

blogspot.com/2013/04/japan-deploys-pac-3-and-sm-3-missile.html; and 

Ian Rinehart, Steven Hildreth, and Susan Lawrence, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition, 

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 24, 2013, 

available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf.
143

21. Karen Parrish, “Leaving Asia, Dempsey Discusses Combined Defense, China Engagement,” American Forces Press, 

April 28, 2013, available from www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.

aspx?id=119894.

22. Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea to Deploy Indigenous Missile 

Defense System in July,” Yonhap, April 10, 2013, available from 

english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/04/10/17/0301000000AEN20

130410010900315F.HTML; and Zachary Keck, “South Korea Goes 

All In on Missile Defense,” Diplomat, July 26, 2013, available from 

thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/26/south-korea-goes-all-inon-missile-defense/.

23. “PAC-2 Missiles Flunk Intercept Test,” Chosunilbo, August 10, 2013, available from english.chosun.com/site/data/html_

dir/2012/10/29/2012102901030.html; and Keck.

24. Kim Eun-jung, “South Korea Aims to Establish Missile Destruction System by 2020,” Yonhap, June 11, 2013, available from 

www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/130611/skorea-aims-establish-missile-destruction-system-2020-0.

25. Jung Ha-Won, “U.S. Lets S. Korea Raise Missile Range 

to Cover North,” Agence France Presse, October 7, 2012, available from sg.news.yahoo.com/korea-us-agree-raise-missile-rangelimit-054723718.html.

26. For details regarding the American BMD system and the 

enhancements it would bring to BMD on the Korean Peninsula, 

see Loren Thompson, “Can U.S. Defenses Cope with North Korea’s Missiles?” Forbes, April 5, 2013, available from www.forbes.

com/sites/lorenthompson/2013/04/05/can-u-s-defenses-cope-withnorth-koreas-missiles/. For details regarding the capabilities and 

deployment of the SM-2 and SM-6 BMD systems, see Kim Eunjung, “S. Korea to Deploy New Surface-to-Air Missiles for Aegis 

Destroyers,” Yonhap, June 12, 2013, available from english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/06/12/37/0301000000AEN20130612004900

315F.HTML.

27. See Chung Min-uck, “ROK, U.S., Differ in Troop Cost 

Sharing,” Korea Times, June 4, 2013, available from www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/06/120_136899.html.
144

28. “Civic Groups Call for End of U.S. Troops Cost-Sharing,” 

Yonhap, July 2, 2013, available from english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/

2013/07/02/0200000000AEN20130702008000315.HTML.

29. “S. Korea, U.S. to Begin Defense Cost-Sharing Meeting in 

Washington,” KBS News, July 2, 2013, available from world.kbs.

co.kr/english/news/news_Po_detail.htm?No=96978.

30. Lee Chi-dong, “S. Korea to Pay 760 Billion Won for U.S. 

Troops in 2009,” Yonhap, December 23, 2008, available from 

english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2008/12/23/0200000000AEN200

81223007900315.HTML.

31. See “Korea-U.S. Defense Cost Sharing Talks,” KBS 

News, July 7, 2013, available from english.kbs.co.kr/news/hot_issues_view.html?No=113154; and “Seoul, Washington Fail to 

Agree on Defense Cost Sharing,” Yonhap, October 31, 2013, 

available from english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.

html?cid=AEN20131031005152315; and “United States and Republic of Korea Finalize New Special Measures Agreement,” Embassy of the United States, Seoul, Korea, January 12, 2014, available from seoul.usembassy.gov/p_pr_011214.html.

32. See Statement of General John D. Thurman before the 

House Armed Services Committee, March 28, 2012, available 

from www.usfk.mil/usfk/Uploads/110/Statement.pdf?AspxAutoDetect

CookieSupport=1.

33. For details about Joint Vision 2020, see Bruce Klingner, 

“South Korea: Taking the Right Steps to Defense Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2618 on Asia and the Pacific, October 

19, 2011, available from www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/10/

south-korea-taking-the-right-steps-toward-defense-reform.

34. Jung Sung-ki, “Defense Reform Faces Overhaul,” Korea 

Times, August 27, 2008, available from www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/

news/nation/2008/08/116_30141.html.

35. For details of requested ROK Defense Ministry changes 

to its projected budget plans, and the slowdown of troop cuts, 

see Jung Sung-ki, “Less Spending for Military Modernization,” 

Korea Times, April 7, 2009, available from www.koreatimes.co.kr/
145

www/news/nation/2009/04/113_42785.html; Jung Sung-ki, “S. Korean Military to Slow Down Troop Cuts,” Korea Times, November 24, 2008, available from www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/

nation/2008/11/205_34989.html; and Jung Sung-ki, “Service Period Cuts Will Fan Manpower Shortage in Military,” Korea Times, 

October 9, 2008, available from www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/

nation/2008/10/113_32457.html.

36. “S. Korea’s Defense Spending Rises Amid N. Korea’s Nuclear Threat,” Yonhap, April 7, 2013, available from english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/04/07/91/0301000000AEN20130407000700

315F.HTML.

37. Park Byong-su, “Incoming Park Administration Plans 

to Increase Defense Spending,” Hankyoreh, February 22, 2013, 

available from www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/

575126.html.

38. “S. Korea to Increase Defense Spending by $200 Million 

This Year,” Arrirang News, April 16, 2013, available from www.

arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=146064.

39. Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea’s K2 Battle Tank Fails Another 

Engine Test,” Yonhap, April 22, 2013, available from english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/04/22/23/0301000000AEN20130422007

100315F.HTML.

40. See Kim Tae-gyu, “Will Korea Barter F-35 for T-50?” Korea Times, May 9, 2013, available from www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/

news/nation/2013/05/205_135445.html; Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korean 

Fighter Jet Project Stuck Over Pricing,” Yonhap, July 8, 2013, available from english.yonhapnews.co.kr/fullstory/2013/07/08/98/4500000

000AEN20130708004600315F.HTML, and “South Korea Reopens 

Bidding for 8.3 Trillion Won Fighter Jet Competition,” Reuters, 

July 25, 2013, available from www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/25/

korea-fighter-bidding-idUSL4N0FV1RK20130725.

41. For details of the signed agreement between Secretary 

Gates and Minister Kim, see “Secretary Gates Holds Consultations with ROK Minister of National Defense,” Defense Link, February 23, 2007, available from www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2007/

d20070223sdrok.pdf.
146

42. “Former Generals Criticize Seoul-Washington Deal on 

Wartime Control Transfer,” Yonhap, February 26, 2007, available 

from english.yonhapnews.co.kr/Engnews/20070226/610000000020070

226140348E0.html.

43. Victor Cha, “U.S.-Korea Relations: The Sinking of the 

Cheonan,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2010, available 

from csis.org/files/publication/1002qus_korea.pdf.

44. Kim Tae-gyu, “Wartime Command Transition Now in 

Doubt,” Korea Times, March 10, 2013, available from www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/03/116_131848.html.

45. “National Security Is Key in Determining Delay in OPCON Transfer,” Donga Ilbo, July 18, 2013, available from english.

donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=080000&biid=2013071868238.

46. See Ashley Rowland, “Former USFK Commander Speaks 

Out Against Giving S. Korea Operational Control,” Stars and 

Stripes, April 29, 2013, available from www.stripes.com/news/pacific/

former-usfk-commander-speaks-out-against-giving-s-korea-operationalcontrol-1.218742.

47. See Song Sang-ho, “Calls against Wartime Control Transfer Resurface Amid Tension,” Korea Herald, April 22, 2013, available from www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130422000911; and 

Kim Eun-jung, “Seoul Vows to Keep Deadline for Wartime Control Transfer,” Yonhap, April 22, 2013, available from english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/04/22/42/0301000000AEN20130422003

451315F.HTML.

48. “Transfer of Wartime Control Unclear in Military’s Plans,” 

Hankyoreh Ilbo, April 2, 2013, available from www.hani.co.kr/arti/

english_edition /e_national/580872.html.

49. For details regarding the many aspects of the new projected structure as of June 2013, see Song Sang-ho, “Allies Agree on 

New Combined Command,” Korea Herald, June 2, 2013, available 

from www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130602000282.

50. “Troop Control Handover is a Vital and Delicate Issue,” 

Chosun Ilbo, October 4, 2013, available from english.chosun.com/site/

data/html_dir/2013/10/04/2013100401664.html.
147

51. Hwang Sung-hee, “Korea, U.S. Agree to Extend Current 

Nuclear Pact by 2 Years,” Arrirang News, April 25, 2013, available 

from www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=146394.

52. Ibid.

53. Mark Manyin et al., U.S.–South Korea Relations, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 26, 2013, available 

from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41481.pdf.

54. “S. Korea, U.S. Fail to Bridge Gaps on Reprocessing, Uranium Enrichment,” Yonhap, June 4, 2013, available from english.

yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/06/04/1/0301000000AEN201306040

07700315F.HTML.

149

CHAPTER 7

POLISH HARD POWER: 

INVESTING IN THE MILITARY AS EUROPE 

CUTS BACK1

Andrew A. Michta

Andrew Michta would like to thank his research assistants, Jacob Foreman and Matthew Washnock, for 

their contribution to this chapter.

KEY POINTS

• Unlike America’s other major European allies, 

Poland’s growing economy has allowed it to 

increase its defense spending.

• Warsaw’s strategic focus has increasingly 

turned to improving Poland’s territorial defenses and working with neighboring allies to 

bolster regional security.

• Poland has begun a major military modernization program whose success will depend on the 

continued health of the Polish economy and the 

transformation of the Polish defense industry 

into an efficient producer of advanced military 

equipment.

Poland’s security strategy rests on the twin pillars 

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

and the European Union (EU). As the American military presence in Europe continues to shrink, however, 

Poland’s support for the EU has increased, benefitting 

from EU structural-fund transfers, expanded trade, 

and integration under the Schengen Agreement. Consequently, while NATO and the United States remain 
150

essential to Poland’s security, today Germany is Poland’s key ally on the continent, with Polish public 

opinion showing for the first time in a 2012 survey a 

preference for Germany over the United States.2

Though positive attitudes toward the United 

States rebounded somewhat a year later, clearly the 

Polish public has become more distant in its view of 

America. The Barack Obama administration’s 2009 

decision to cancel the George W. Bush–era missile 

shield whose ground interceptors were to be based in 

Poland was a shock to bilateral ties. Announced on 

the 70th anniversary of the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland, it became a public relations debacle for Washington. Compounding problems is the administration’s 

more recent decision to scrap its plans for deploying 

high-speed Standard Missile 3 Block IIB interceptors 

in Poland and Romania (Phase Four of the European 

Phased Adaptive Approach) and Washington’s continued reluctance to lift the visa requirement for Poles 

travelling to the United States. While there remains a 

large reservoir of public goodwill in Poland toward 

the United States, which has a large Polish-American 

ethnic community and a history of close military cooperation in recent years, these decisions have chipped 

away at traditional pro-U.S. sentiments in Poland.

Similarly, while Poland remains committed to 

NATO as the military pillar of its national security 

and, as such, a strong supporter of NATO’s Article 

V tasks of collective defense, it has also become more 

vocal in support of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy. Again, while the United States remains 

Poland’s principal ally and the country has been an 

active participant in American-led operations—with 

the largest being in Iraq and Afghanistan—there has 

been a marked decline in public support for current 
151

and future expeditionary missions, as exemplified in 

Warsaw’s decision to not join other NATO allies in 

Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, the 2011 Libyan 

military campaign.

Poland’s increased focus on Article V matters is 

tied largely to its growing concern about the resurgence of Russia’s power and influence along Poland’s 

eastern border. Since eastward NATO enlargement, 

especially to Ukraine, has all but vanished from U.S. 

and European security policy agendas, Poland finds 

itself in a border-state position within the alliance. 

Warsaw’s perception of a changing regional power 

balance has brought about a new emphasis on the defense of national territory in Poland, making Warsaw 

refocus its attention closer to home as it plans to adapt 

the armed forces accordingly.

Over the past 5 years, Poland has focused more and 

more on its indigenous national defense capabilities, 

with the government funneling resources for military 

modernization. Because of its history of foreign invasions, the country has a keen appreciation of the vital 

importance of a strong military to the nation’s sovereignty and security. An old Polish saying captures 

well the public mood on national defense: “If you can 

count, ultimately count on yourself.”

BUCKING EUROPEAN TRENDS

Amidst the current protracted economic crisis in 

Europe and despite a 2013 slowdown in growth in 

Poland’s own economy, Poland remains one of the 

EU’s most dynamic countries. Today, it is its ninthbiggest economy, having increased by almost onefifth since 2009.3

 Because the government is required 

under Polish law to spend 1.95 percent of its annual 
152

gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, a growing 

economy has allowed Warsaw to buck the general European trend of cutting national defense budgets (see 

Figure 7-1).

Source: Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Poland, 

“Basic Information on the MoND Budget, 2001-12,” available 

from archiwalny.mon.gov.pl/en/strona/126/lg_89.

Figure 7-1. Total Defense Spending (Billions of 

Polish PLN) and Defense Spending as a Percentage 

of GDP.

With increased resources, Poland’s ministry of defense has launched “The Modernization Plan for the 

Armed Forces in the Years 2013–2022”—the country’s 

most ambitious program to date, which will include 

new ships, helicopters, tanks and armored personnel 

carriers, additional aircraft, and most importantly, 

new air and missile defenses.4 The antiballistic missile 

(ABM) system is the most significant of Poland’s military modernization efforts in terms of planned dedicated resources. The estimated cost of Poland’s ABM 
153

program is set between $4 and $6 billion, making it the 

largest acquisition program in the country’s history.

In mid-2013, however, with the economy slowing, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was forced 

to revise the government’s budget, resulting in a 10 

percent cut to the defense budget.5 Despite these reductions, Minister of Defense Tomasz Siemoniak has 

emphasized that the country’s strategic projects will 

be protected, announcing in late September 2013 that 

military modernization will reach PLN 91.5 billion 

(approximately $30 billion) through 2022, covering 14 

specific programs.

Consistent with Poland’s desire to develop its military capabilities, the Polish government has renewed 

its focus on modernizing and expanding the country’s 

indigenous defense industrial sector. In the fall of 

2013, the government began the process of consolidating Poland’s defense industry into a unified Polish Defense Group (Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa [PGZ]) with 

the expectation that it would improve the sector’s efficiency and competitiveness. The PGZ will combine 

the flagship Polish Defense Holding [Polski Holding 

Obronny, formerly Bumar] with Huta Stalowa Wola, 

among others. The effort has just begun, so it is too 

early to judge its ultimate impact on the industry. But 

the decision indicates the seriousness of the government’s commitment to modernizing the defense sector and to making it more competitive in international 

markets.

The immediate question going forward will be 

whether the Polish military can still leverage available resources and complete the key elements of the 

modernization program despite the 10 percent budget 

decrease. Since it is government policy that modernization be done through the Polish defense industry 
154

whenever possible, there will be considerable focus on 

whether those firms can, in fact, deliver the product 

the military needs, and especially whether they can 

partner with foreign firms to leverage synergies with 

the domestic sector. In short, will Poland manage to 

continue committing enough resources to remain 

one of the few countries in Europe that is still serious 

about military power, and thereby become a NATO 

ally with growing capabilities and political clout?

MILITARY MODERNIZATION PLANS

Poland has doubled its defense spending over the 

past decade. Initially, the government budgeted PLN 

31.4 billion on defense (approximately $10 billion) for 

2013. Even with the planned 10 percent reductions in 

the 2013 defense budget, there has been a significant 

infusion of resources into the Polish armed forces. The 

current military modernization plan calls for spending PLN 91.5 billion through 2022 and stipulates that 

PLN 16 billion will be expended by 2016. The government has also restated that maintaining 1.95 percent of 

GDP on defense remains a priority.

As part of the modernization process, Poland began establishing two new high-level military commands starting January 1, 2014.6

 The goal is to create a 

joint operational command by replacing the separate 

service commands, converting them into departments, 

and turning the general staff into a strategic planning 

and advisory command.

The government also intends to maximize the use of 

the Polish defense industry with “Polonization” of the 

defense modernization effort tied to technology transfer from international partners as acquisition plans 

move forward. In addition, the government plans to 
155

spend PLN 40 billion on purchases not included in the 

2014–22 operational plans. In total, Poland plans to 

spend approximately PLN 139 billion ($U.S.46.3 billion) on equipment modernization across the services, 

on added information technology capabilities, and on 

increasing the overall combat readiness of the Polish 

forces. In the process, Poland plans to build its modernization effort around 14 major programs.7

 Considering the scope of programs and resources allocated, 

a significant challenge for the defense ministry will be 

to improve the acquisition process to ensure platforms 

and equipment are fielded; in previous years, the ministry has even returned funds to the state budget.

For 2013, the Polish ministry of defense planned 

to increase capital expenditures to 26.2 percent of the 

budget—a 4.2 percent increase compared to the previous 3 years (see Figure 7-2).8

 The structure of the 

current Polish defense budget reflects the ministry’s 

commitment to reverse the current approximate oneto-three ratio of modern-to-legacy military systems. 

Polish military equipment remains a mix of Sovietera legacy systems (sometimes adapted with Western 

equipment) and innovative Polish designs developed 

in cooperation with Western firms.

For example, Polish land forces maintain 901 main 

battle tanks, of which 128 are the older-generation 

German Leopard 2A4s, 232 are PT-91 Twardys (a Polish modification of the Soviet T-72), and 541 are obsolete T-72s of three different types. Likewise, Poland 

maintains a fleet of 1,784 armored infantry fighting 

vehicles (AIFV), of which more than two-thirds are 

legacy Soviet BMP-1s, but nearly 500 are the highly 

capable KTO Rosomak, a Polish version of a Finnish 

AIFV that has been battlefield tested in Afghanistan.
156

Source: Ministry of National Defence, Finance Department, Podstawowe informacje o budzecie resort obrony narodowej na 2013 (Basic Information on the Ministry of National Defense Budget in 

2013), Warsaw, Poland, March 2013, available from mon.gov.pl/z/

mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2013/09/informator_o_budzecie_

resortu_ON_na_2013_r..pdf.

Figure 7-2. Increase in Procurement Expenditures

(Missions PLN).

To help address this problem, however, in November 

2013 Poland signed an agreement to purchase from 

Germany an additional 105 Leopard 2A5s, plus 14 

Leopard 2A4s and 200 support vehicles.9

Addressing deficiencies in air mobility also remains 

a priority, as Polish military helicopters are currently a 

combination of Soviet-era systems and the aging PZL 

Sokół platform and its derivatives. To do so, the army 

will be seeking to acquire up to 70 new helicopters. 

The defense ministry also plans to issue funds for new 

modular armored vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles 

(including armed drones), self-propelled howitzers, 

heavy mortars, antitank missiles, and new communication equipment.
157

The Polish navy has five tactical submarines (four 

German-built, 1960s-era Kobben class and one Sovietlegacy Kilo), two principal surface combatants (Oliver 

Hazard Perry–class frigates), a corvette (Polish-built 

ORP Kaszub class), and a number of mine warfare, 

mine countermeasure, patrol, amphibious, and support ships. The navy’s aviation element includes 

two naval aviation bases, with equipment deployed 

in three locations. Two of those locations are home 

to air groups that include planes and helicopters for 

transport, antisubmarine, and search-and-rescue operations. The navy’s modernization program includes 

new patrol boats, minesweepers, coastal-defense 

vessels, and possibly up to three submarines.10

Of the three major services, the Polish air force 

ranks as the most modern among post-communist 

states of Central Europe, averaging 160–200 flying 

hours per year (comparable to France’s and exceeding 

Germany’s). The air force operates three squadrons 

of F-16C/Ds, two squadrons of MiG-29A/UBs, and 

two squadrons of fighter/ground-attack Su-22M-4s. 

The Sukhoi aircraft have been slated for removal from 

service, and Poland will be looking to purchase additional Western planes or unmanned aerial vehicles. 

Two air force transport squadrons fly a combination 

of C-130E, C-295M, and Polish PZL M-28 Bryza aircraft. The air force also operates two squadrons of 

transport helicopters which, as noted previously, are 

aging platforms.

On balance, the most successful air force program 

so far has been the addition of F-16 jet fighters to its 

fleet of aircraft, accelerating the modernization process and increasing NATO interoperability. A visible 

sign of progress has been the opening of a U.S. training facility in the central Polish town of Łask for rotational exercises of U.S. and NATO aircraft.
158

Air and missile defenses (AMD), however, remain 

Poland’s top defense priority. A law Poland passed 

this year appears to guarantee stable funding for the 

systems.11 The program will combine a medium-range 

missile and air defense system and a variety of shorter-range systems with plans to expand the coverage 

for the country’s entire territory. The government will 

allocate PLN 26.4 billion for AMD through 2022, with 

PLN 1.2 billion planned for 2014–16.12

Overall, Poland’s shopping list is extensive; some 

would call it overly ambitious. While the air and missile defense budget seems protected, in light of the 

slowing economy and this year’s reduction in planned 

defense expenditures, there is already talk of reducing 

the number of helicopters in the initial order and of 

cuts in other procurement programs. Indeed, there are 

also questions as to whether—even if all the acquisition programs were fully funded—Poland’s defense 

ministry would be able to meet its acquisition plans. 

Some analysts have pointed out that based on the current track record of procurement, and especially the 

rate of contract fulfillment in 2012, Poland may again 

have a shortfall from the original spending plans.13

LEVERAGING DEFENSE FOR 

INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY

The Polish government sees military modernization as a path to modernizing the country’s defense 

industry. The increase in procurement funds has attracted a lot of attention from U.S. and European defense industries—something the Polish government is 

determined to leverage for national defense industry 

modernization. Until 2013, Poland spent between 15 

to 22 percent of its defense budget on equipment mod-
159

ernization. Poland’s expeditionary missions in both 

Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for 

a better equipment kit for its forces, and the current 

program ultimately aims to shift about one-third of 

the defense budget to equipment modernization over 

the next decade.

Here, the AMD project is seen as central not just 

to the national defense strategy but also to preserving 

and expanding Poland’s indigenous defense industrial capacity. Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak has 

repeatedly made clear that any AMD solution adopted by the government will need to involve extensive 

cooperation with Polish defense companies. It must 

include both long-term partnerships and significant 

technology transfers.

The army expects the initial components of the system to be tested in 2017 and a working system capable 

of defending national territory from an attack is to be 

in place by 2023—all procured with the direct participation of the Polish defense sector. For the Polish 

defense industry, this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to partner with the best Western firms. Eventually, the government hopes to shift up to 80 percent 

of future work on particular defense projects to Polish 

suppliers.

One aspect of Polish military modernization seldom discussed is its intra-EU political dimension. As 

Poland undertakes its military modernization effort 

and defense ministry officials push for the maximum 

possible participation of Polish firms in plans to buy 

missiles, ships, helicopters, tanks, and small arms, it 

will run up against the growing pressure within the 

EU to reduce national preference in defense contracts.14

The planned purchases also seek to leverage domestic industry on smaller ticket items such as the 
160

MSBS 5.56 program to develop a new modular assault 

rifle for Polish forces and the Tytan program comprising a system of technologies, similar to the U.S. Land 

Warrior, to be used by an individual soldier.15 This 

effort to maximize domestic industry participation 

applies to both equipment upgrades and new system 

purchases; however, it may meet serious obstacles 

considering the imbalances of expertise and capacity 

in the Polish defense sector, as seen in the delays in 

modernizing Poland’s Leopard 2 tanks.

The extent to which Polonization is likely to work 

will be best tested on high-end systems. There will be 

mounting pressure to give as much of the ABM work 

as possible to Polish companies.16 Initial competition 

for the AMD contract is already underway with U.S., 

French, and Israeli systems expected to emerge as the 

principal contenders. But the key question for Polish 

officials is likely to be: Which of the foreign contractors 

can best coordinate with Polish defense firms to build 

a long-term and mutually beneficial partnership?

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

Poland’s level of defense spending and new acquisition programs reflects growing concern about the 

changing geostrategic environment in Central Europe 

following two landmark developments: The 2008 Bucharest NATO summit that, for all practical purposes, 

ended prospects of NATO membership for Ukraine 

and Georgia, and the 2008 Russo-Georgian war that 

brought back the specter of conventional state-on-state 

conflict along Europe’s periphery. NATO’s refusal to 

offer Ukraine a Membership Action Plan, combined 

with Russia’s growing geostrategic assertiveness, has 

forced Poland to revisit traditional dilemmas associ-
161

ated with being a boundary state along the frontier of 

the West. More than anything else, Russia’s invasion 

of Georgia drove home the critical importance of having workable NATO contingency plans and sufficient 

capabilities to perform key national defense tasks to 

make those plans credible.

The Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, adopted in 2009, captures both the enduring principles 

and the changing context of Poland’s strategic thinking.17 While NATO and the United States remain central to Poland’s security, there has been a reorientation in Poland’s strategy leading to an emphasis on 

regional and traditional territorial defense tasks over 

the past 5 years. Warsaw would like to keep relations 

with Washington close, and military and intelligence 

cooperation between the American and Polish militaries remains exemplary, with the Poles having accumulated a wealth of experience working closely with the 

United States in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, there is a sense within Poland of 

a growing “transatlantic deficit” in ties between the 

United States and its NATO allies in Central Europe, 

with the United States being seen as increasingly absent from the region. In particular, the Obama administration’s decision to cancel both the George W. Bush 

administration’s plans for antimissile deployments to 

Poland and its own plans to do the same—along with 

its 2012 decision to reduce the number of American 

forces based in Europe—has led Poland to give more 

attention to its own strategic and military options 

should the American security guarantee grow even 

weaker.

While the Polish government remains committed 

to NATO as the core pillar of its national security, Poland is also looking for greater regional security coop-
162

eration among the Nordic, Baltic, and Central European states to bolster its own security plans. Warsaw 

is also actively seeking to reenergize the Weimar Triangle (Poland, France, and Germany) and the Visegrád Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 

and Slovakia). Although Poland considers the possibility of a large-scale conflict with Russia unlikely, 

Poland has increasingly focused on the potential of local conflicts with states close to its border.18 Here, the 

militarization of Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave in the 

northeast has become a major issue.

Although Poland shares alliance-wide concerns 

about cyber and other nontraditional security issues, 

regional geostrategic considerations remain paramount to how the country approaches national security. Most importantly, while Poland continues to 

invest in regional security cooperation, it has made 

it clear that better regional ties should never come at 

the expense of allied solidarity or weaken the NATOwide Article V security guarantee.

In 2013, Poland’s National Security Bureau [Biura 

Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego], an advisory body to 

the country’s president, published a comprehensive 

review on Poland’s strategic position.19 Without naming Russia as an outright foe, the white paper reflects 

Warsaw’s growing preoccupation with resurgent 

Russian power as one of four key variables defining 

Poland’s security (the other three being NATO, the 

United States, and the EU). Though not ruling out the 

possibility that Russia might choose a path of cooperation with the West, Poland’s strategists have been 

skeptical about Russia’s willingness to abandon its 

imperial aspirations, especially in light of reports that 

Russia has threatened to deploy 9K720 Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and Moscow’s actions in the postSoviet “near-abroad.”20
163

The relationship between the two countries has 

been further complicated by the aftermath of the Smolensk plane crash in 2010, which killed then-president 

Lech Kaczyński, his wife, and more than 90 of Poland’s 

most senior military and political leaders. Continuing 

problems with Russia during and after the investigation of the crash, including Moscow’s refusal to return 

the black boxes and wreckage of the Polish aircraft, 

have caused further friction between the two countries and remain an important domestic political issue 

in Poland.

Although few in Poland would argue that there is 

an imminent threat of aggression from Russia, Poles 

continue to see Russia as the principal threat to Poland’s security and sovereignty. For this reason, some 

analysts have even suggested that if NATO solidarity 

continues to weaken, Poland will need to seek bilateral security agreements with the United States and 

Germany.21

Analysts have also been considering creating an 

improved conventional deterrent posture at the national level by mixing defensive and offensive systems, and adapting planning accordingly. To that end, 

Poland has closely followed the approach taken by the 

Finns, exploring the option of equipping its F-16s with 

stealth AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles. Another consideration has been the possibility 

of purchasing tactical ballistic missiles for its Multiple 

Launch Rocket System launchers and other systems 

that would give Poland medium- and possibly longrange strategic strike capability.22

Both the 2009 Defense Strategy of the Republic of 

Poland and the 2013 white paper reflect an evolving 

consensus on defense policy. The 2009 paper emphasizes the core importance of the dual pillars of NATO 
164

and EU membership for Poland’s security. Recognizing the broadening array of nonstate and unconventional threats, the strategy paper emphasizes the 

core importance of balancing collective defense and 

international crisis response. The 2013 white paper 

recommends an approach that combines ongoing efforts to “internationalize” Poland’s security within the 

existing alliance structure to ensure that an attack on 

Poland would generate a collective allied response. 

Finally, the paper seeks to place Polish strategic priorities in a larger context, with uncertainty surrounding the future of the EU and with declining American 

involvement in Europe—all pointing to the increasing 

need for Poland to become self-reliant in security matters, commensurate with the country’s economic and 

military potential.

POLAND’S MILITARY ABROAD

Poland has a strong military tradition, a reputation 

it has lived up to in Iraq and Afghanistan. Poland’s expeditionary missions in Iraq in support of Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM and in Afghanistan as part of the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have 

been instrumental in shaping today’s Polish armed 

forces.

Poland was an early participant in the 2003 Iraq 

military operation to oust Saddam Hussein, sending 

a small contingent at the start of the war and 2,500 

troops for security and stability operations after the 

fall of Baghdad. Soon thereafter, on September 3, 

2003, Poland assumed leadership of one of two multinational divisions and responsibility for a region 

covering five provinces. The core of the Polish-led divisions consisted of three brigades: Polish, Ukrainian, 
165

and Spanish, with military contingents and personnel 

from 24 other countries. Over time, the composition of 

the division changed with different countries offering 

contributions and others withdrawing their contingents. The mission evolved as well, changing from a 

post-conflict stability and reconstruction operation to 

one of combat and providing local security. Over time, 

the number of Polish troops deployed decreased from 

2,400 to 900, with the last Polish troops withdrawing 

from Iraq in 2008.

On balance, Poland’s participation in the Iraq mission gave the armed forces invaluable experience, 

laying the foundation for much of the country’s current modernization plans. On the political side of the 

ledger, however, public support for the mission rapidly declined as Poles, contrary to expectations, saw 

few reconstruction projects in Iraq go to Polish firms 

and the security situation in Iraq worsened in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. In the end, Iraq inaugurated a new, more complex phase in U.S.-Polish 

relations.

As Poland pulled out of Iraq, it increased its contribution to the ISAF mission. At its peak, Poland deployed 2,600 soldiers to Afghanistan, at one point assuming responsibility for the entire Afghan province 

of Ghazni. The mission in Afghanistan was ultimately 

on an order of magnitude more challenging than the 

deployment in Iraq, both in terms of the threat environment and logistical difficulties. The Polish military 

is largely responsible for the mission’s success, having 

adapted both personnel and equipment to the task. 

As the ISAF mission winds down, the key challenge 

for the Polish army is to repatriate and refurbish its 

equipment currently deployed in Afghanistan. Lacking indigenous capabilities for long-range lift, Poland 
166

will rely on the United States to facilitate the return of 

Polish equipment.

As with the Iraq mission, however, the Afghanistan 

operation has witnessed dwindling public support. 

This was especially true after the Obama administration decided to scrap deployment to Poland of the antiballistic missile system, and Poles began to question 

whether the sacrifices their military was making in 

Afghanistan and before that in Iraq were duly appreciated in Washington. As a result, Polish support for 

expeditionary operations has declined precipitously, 

as has overall public confidence in NATO’s value to 

Poland’s security. Polling data from a 2013 report by 

the German Marshall Fund of the United States suggests that when citizens of various NATO nations 

were asked whether NATO is still essential to their 

respective countries’ security, Poles are 11 percentage 

points behind the EU average.23

In late-2013, Poland had approximately 1,940 soldiers deployed on various missions abroad, with the 

largest contingent deployed under ISAF in Afghanistan, followed by a contingent with the Kosovo Force, 

troops with the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

and a number of United Nations observers in Western Sahara, the Congo, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Liberia, 

South Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire. Following the French 

campaign in Mali, Poland has also deployed trainers 

there. In addition, there are Polish military observers 

as part of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia. The 

total number of Polish military troops deployed outside of Poland was expected to decline further at the 

end of 2014 as the ISAF mission shifted from a combat 

to a support role.
167

CONCLUSION

Poland is, by any measure, the most successful case 

of post-communist political and economic transition 

to market democracy in Europe. As a relatively new 

member to NATO, it has made significant contributions to American and NATO military missions.

But Poland is entering an era of increasing uncertainty. America’s commitment to European security 

appears to Poland to be waning, while Russia’s resurgence as a military power in the context of Europe’s de 

facto disarmament and the economic crisis within the 

EU raise even greater questions about Poland’s future 

security environment.

To meet these challenges, Poland has clearly been 

an outlier among European NATO allies when it 

comes to national defense. Simply put, it is one of the 

few remaining European states serious about investing in its military despite the current economic crisis. 

As noted earlier, the primary focus of Poland’s 10-year 

defense modernization plan is territorial defense rather than out-of-area capabilities, though Poland tries to 

balance the two with planned capabilities important 

to both, such as command, control, communications, 

computers, and intelligence as well as helicopter lift.

Two key questions loom over modernization 

plans. The first is the potential risk associated with the 

desire to use Polish defense companies to carry out 

the bulk of the modernization effort. There is no question that giving the lion’s share of the work to Polish 

companies has great potential benefits for industrial 

modernization and employment, and employment is 

no doubt important to the government in Warsaw as 

Poland approaches its next parliamentary election in 

2015. However, the record of the Polish industry has 

been spotty, with program delays and cost overruns.
168

The government seems aware of the risk. It has 

pushed to initiate the consolidation of the industry 

parallel with the modernization effort, as the Polish 

defense sector gears up for its largest contracts to 

date. However, the challenge will be to remain realistic about what can be achieved in the near term, 

recognizing that some of these companies face a steep 

learning curve when it comes to the kind of advanced 

manufacturing and systems engineering required to 

produce first-rate, up-to-date equipment. The key 

will be successful partnering with top international 

defense firms in a way that brings about transfers of 

manufacturing technology and has Polish companies 

focusing on those parts of the program where they are 

most competitive. Most importantly—and politically 

difficult—the government will need to be prepared 

for a course correction in its plans should Polonization 

of the modernization effort not deliver equipment and 

weapons platforms on time and in sufficient quantities. While domestic industrial priorities are important, they cannot overshadow the strategic requirements of the Polish Armed Forces.

The second question is whether the Polish economy will continue to grow at sufficient rates to sustain steady defense spending allocations to make the 

programs a reality. The 2013 cuts were not crippling 

for the Polish modernization effort, but if the government fails to stick by the 1.95 percent of GDP formula 

its ambitious program will need to be revised. The 

squeeze already seen in the defense budget should 

serve as a warning sign for the government that cutting defense—though politically seemingly less toxic 

than cuts in public spending—will eventually damage 

Poland’s procurement plans and ultimately the nation’s security. Hence, it is the 2014 state budget rather 
169

than the modifications to 2013 spending that will serve 

as a clear indicator of whether Poland remains serious 

about defense modernization.

With an economy that has performed better than 

its European neighbors, a desire to bolster and modernize its military capabilities, and a record of commitment to the transatlantic alliance, Poland continues to 

buck the trend when it comes to America’s continental 

security partners. And with increasing influence in the 

EU, Poland continues to rise in the ranks as a midsize 

power and, as such, grow its potential to play an even 

greater role in Western security affairs in the future. 

But the budget decisions and program choices Poland 

makes in the next year and over the next decade will 

go a long way to determining just how great a role it 

will in fact play.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. This chapter was originally published as an essay on December 19, 2013.

2. German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic 

Trends 2012, Washington, DC, p. 11, available from trends.gmfus.

org/files/2012/09/TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdf.

3. In 2012, Poland’s GDP was PLN 1.6 trillion, $530 billion. 

See Ministry of Treasury, “Macroeconomic Analysis of Polish 

Economy,” December 13, 2013, available from www.msp.gov.pl/en/

polish-economy /macroeconomic-analysis/4983,Macroeconomic-Analysis-of-Polish-economy.html.

4. “Program rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych RP w latach 2013─2022” 

(“Program for the Development of the Polish Armed Forces, 

2013–2022”), Polska Zbrojna, December 12, 2012, available from 

www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/5744?t=Minister-okreslilkierunki-rozwoju.
170

5. In 2011, Poland’s GDP grew 4.5 percent but is expected to 

expand by just 1.1 percent in 2013. See “Economic Activity Accelerates on Stronger Exports,” FocusEconomics, August 30, 2013, 

available from www.focus-economics.com/en/economy/news/PolandGDP-Economic_activity_accelerates_on_stronger_exports-2013-08-30. 

The planned 2013 defense budget amounted to PLN 31 billion. 

The revised budget scaled defense spending back by PLN 3.3 billion. Poland will be spending approximately the same amount as 

it did on defense in 2012.

6. Remigiusz Wilk, “Poland Creating New Military Commands,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 17, 2013, available 

from www.janes.com/article/27152/poland-creating-new-militarycommands.

7. Krzysztof Wilewski, “Pewne pieniądze na nowe uzbrojenie” (“Money for New Equipment Available”), Polska Zbrojna, 

September 17, 2013, available from www.polska-zbrojna.pl/mobile/

articleshow/9575?t=Pewne-pieniadze-na-nowe-uzbrojenie.

8. Ministry of National Defence, Budget Department, Podstawowe informacje o budzecie resortu obrony narodowej na 2013 (Basic 

Information About the Budget for the Ministry of National Defense in 

2013), Warsaw, Poland, March 2013), available from mon.gov.pl/z/

pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2013/09/informator_o_budzecie_resortu_ON_

na_2013_r..pdf.

9. Ministry of National Defence, “Kolejne Leopardy dla wojsk 

lądowych” (“More Leopard for Ground Troops”), November 22, 

2013, available from mon.gov.pl/aktualnosci/artykul/najnowsze/2013-

11-21-leopardy-dla-wojsk-ladowych/.

10. “Renowacja Floty” (“Renovation of the Fleet”), Polska Zbrojna, July 24, 2013, available from wiadomosci.wp.pl/

kat,1020223,title,Renowacja-floty-do-2030-roku-Marynarka-WojennaRP-otrzyma-ponad-20-nowych-okretow,wid,15835580,wiadomosc.

html?ticaid=111a17.

11. “Poland Starts Work on Missile Defense System,” NewsEurope, May 11, 2013, available from newseurope.eu/2013/05/11/

poland-starts-work-on-missile-defense-system/.
171

12. “Rzad uchwalil program finansowania modernizacji 

wojska” (“The Government Has Adopted a Plan for Financing the 

Modernization of the Army”), ONET.biznes, September 17, 2013, 

available from biznes.onet.pl/rzad-uchwalil-program-finansowaniamodernizacji-wo,18512,5577553,news-detal.

13. Zbigniew Lentowicz, “Armia musi mocno zacisnac pasa” 

(“The Army Has Tightened Its Belt”), Rzeczpospolita, July 19, 2013, 

available from archiwum.rp.pl/artykul/1212341-Armia-musi-mocnozacisnac-pasa.html.

14. There is a growing realization in the EU that national preferences in defense contracting reduce efficiency. For a good summary of the debate, see Joachim Hofbauer et al., European Defense 

Trends 2012: Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial Base, 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

2012, pp. 43–46, available from csis.org/files/publication/121212_

Berteau_EuroDefenseTrends2012_Web.pdf.

15. Marek Kozubal and Zbigniew Lentowicz, “Budujemy 

zolnieza przyszlosci” (“We Are Building the Future Soldier”), 

Rzeczpospolita, June 7, 2013, available from archiwum.rp.pl/

artykul/1191346-Budujemy-zolnierza-przyszlosci.html.

16. Jan Cienski, “Defense: Polish Military Prepares for Modernization,” Financial Times, May 22, 2013, available from www.

ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d46e4d06-bbba-11e2-82df-00144feab7de.html#

axzz2k5kIzEAY.

17. All references to the document are drawn from the official 

translation issued by the Ministry of National Defence in 2009. 

See Ministry of National Defence, Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Sector Strategy of the National Security Strategy of the 

Republic of Poland, Warsaw, Poland, 2009, available from www.isn.

ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=156791.

18. Ibid., p. 5.

19. See National Security Bureau, “Biala Ksiega Bezpieczenstwa Narodowego Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej” (“White Paper on Polish National Security”), Warsaw, Poland, 2013, available from 

www.spbn.gov.pl/sbn/biala-ksiega/4630,Biala-Ksiega.html.
172

20. If true, the deployment of Iskander to the Kaliningrad district would change how Poland, the Baltic states, and Scandanavia look at their regional security. See Steve Gutterman, “Russia 

Has Stationed Iskander Missiles in Western Region: Reports,” 

Reuters, December 16, 2013, available from www.reuters.com/

article/2013/12/16/us-russia-missiles-idUSBRE9BF0W020131216.

21. Andrzej Talaga, “Pytania, ktorych nie wolno zadac” 

(“Questions That Can’t Be Asked”), Rzeczpospolita, May 24, 2013, 

available from blog.rp.pl/talaga/2013/05/24/pytania-ktorych-niewolno-zadac/.

22. Tomasz Szatkowski, “Polish Defense Modernization in 

the Era of U.S. Strategic Rebalancing,” Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis, March 1, 2013, available from 

www.cepa.org/content/polish-defense-modernization-era-us-strategicrebalancing.

23. German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic 

Trends: Topline Trends 2013, Washington, DC, September 18, 2013, 

p. 24, available from trends.gmfus.org/files/2013/09/TT-TOPLINEDATA.pdf.
173

CHAPTER 8

FRENCH HARD POWER: 

LIVING ON THE STRATEGIC EDGE1

Dorothée Fouchaux

KEY POINTS

• With its 2013 defense white paper, France reaffirmed its intent to maintain its strategic autonomy by dint of its nuclear deterrent and by 

retaining a conventional power-projection capability.

• To carry out this program and do so while 

facing budget constraints, French forces will 

continue to decline both in total numbers and 

numbers deployable.

• Meeting the white paper’s goals rests on potentially overly optimistic assumptions about 

program savings, export offsets, and future European defense cooperation.

Before the publication of France’s latest defense 

white paper in April 2013, French newspapers were 

predicting a virtual “tsunami” in cuts to the country’s 

defense budget and force structure.2 Although the finance ministry hoped to use savings from a greatly 

reduced defense budget to help bring the country’s 

public deficit down to less than 3 percent of its gross 

domestic product (GDP), Defense Minister Jean-Yves 

Le Drian, key members of the French Parliament, and 

the French defense industry lobbied French President François Hollande to stave off deep cuts to the 

military.3 Then, in a televised speech a month before 

the white paper’s publication, Hollande said defense 
174

would not face greater budget reductions than any 

other government ministry.

According to the appropriations statute that follows and implements the white paper’s program, the 

French defense budget would flat line at €3.38 billion 

over the next 2 years and creep ever so slowly to €32.51 

billion in 2019. A decline, to be sure, from the resource 

expectations set out in the 2008 white paper—but not 

as precipitous as some had predicted.4

Although not as confident sounding as the 2008 

white paper with regard to France’s ability to meet 

the security challenges of the current year, the 2013 

white paper nevertheless maintains the country’s core 

strategic ambitions by protecting the defense budget 

in three areas: “autonomy in decision-making, protection of the French territory, [and] nuclear deterrence.”5

 The question, however, is whether even after 

fending off more serious cuts, there remain sufficient 

resources for France to retain its capacity to field an 

adequately sized, fully trained, and modernized force 

that can meet those strategic goals.

Indeed, there is already a gap of approximately 

€45 billion between the military’s past plans and resulting budgets.6

 Should the French economy continue to lag, there will be pressure again to look to the 

defense budget for additional savings. In short, is the 

2013 white paper a realistic assessment of the future 

of French defense capabilities, or does it signal the 

start of a subtle but noticeable decline in the country’s 

strategic ambitions?
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TRANSFORMATION IN AN ERA OF 

DECLINING RESOURCES

Since the end of the Cold War, France has, like 

other major Western powers, set about reforming its 

armed forces to meet the challenges of the new security environment. In 1994, a government white paper 

sought to create a plan for the military that no longer 

focused on dealing with a threat posed by the Soviet 

Union, but instead was directed at dealing with pockets of instability around the globe, the increased risk 

tied to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the appearance of asymmetric threats such 

as terrorism.

To maintain strategic relevance, the government 

reasoned that, while it needed to maintain its nuclear 

forces as a hedge against the threat of proliferation 

and to support French foreign policy independence, 

France required a new model for its armed forces. The 

Model 2015 (as it was then called) was to be: 

a professional, more compact army, better equipped 

and better adapted to actions outside the national territory. Its capacities were defined so as to allow, simultaneously, the development of permanent arrangement of prevention, a visible and significant presence 

in an international coalition, as well as more limited 

operations under national command, while providing 

the protection of the territory and its approaches.7

When Jacques Chirac came to power in 1995 as 

the French President, the government decided to end 

peacetime conscription and create an all-professional 

armed force. The goal was to form a military that 

would be readily deployable; could operate modern, 

complex weapon systems; and was capable of operating within an international coalition. This was a fun-
176

damental transformation of the French military both 

in terms of capabilities and size. According to the 

International Institute for Strategic Studies’ annual 

Military Balance, France’s active duty forces in 1997 

totaled 358,800 (203,200 army, 63,300 navy, and 78,100 

air force); in 2002, the numbers were 259,050 (137,000 

army, 44,250 navy, and 64,000 air force).8 In 2012, 

French active duty personnel had shrunk to 228,850 

(122,500 army, 38,650 navy, and 49,850 air force).9

By 2020, the expectation is that the military’s active 

duty numbers will decline even further, dropping to 

approximately 190,000.10

At the same time that France was moving to an allprofessional force, the government launched several 

major acquisition programs. These included the Tiger 

attack helicopter; the NH90 multirole helicopter; the 

armored infantry combat vehicles (VBCI); the nuclearpowered Barracuda-class attack submarines; and surface-to-air missile platform/terrain, a theater antimissile defense system. During this period, France also 

introduced into its fleet Europe’s largest warship, the 

nuclear aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle; a new generation of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines 

(SSBNs); and launched two Helios 1 optical surveillance satellites.

Though France’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP started to decrease during that time, it 

dropped even further between 1997 and 2002, when 

France was governed by a coalition led by the Socialist Party. In 2002, the defense budget dropped to 

€28.85 billion (excluding pensions)—the lowest total 

since the end of the Cold War.11 In addition to cuts in 

training and procurement, research and development 

(R&D) funding decreased by some 30 percent between 

1997 and 2002. As in other Western countries, cuts in 
177

defense spending were used by the government as a 

means to reduce the public deficit.

The third white paper was released in summer 

2008 following Nicolas Sarkozy’s election as president 

the year before.12 The paper, which purports to rest on 

a “strategic appraisal for the next 15 years,” highlights 

the threats posed by cyber warfare, transnational actors, and nuclear proliferation. It puts special emphasis 

on increasing French intelligence capabilities to meet 

France’s evolving security needs. It also announced 

the continued downsizing of defense personnel (civilian and military) by 54,900. To be carried out over a 

6-year period, the downsizing was intended to free up 

monies to spend on new modernization programs for 

France’s conventional and nuclear forces and the continuation of existing acquisition programs such as the 

army’s Fantassin à Équipement et Liaisons Intégrés 

(Integrated Infantryman Equipment and Communications [FELIN]) infantry combat system and the navy’s 

multirole frigate program (FREMM). The paper also 

set a goal for the French government of it being capable of deploying 30,000 soldiers abroad, with necessary air and naval support forces, for 1 year.

The economic crisis that followed the issuance of 

the 2008 white paper, however, made it fiscally challenging for the government to meet the paper’s goals. 

As Figure 8-1 shows, the difference between planned 

and actual procurement expenditures had risen to 

more than €3 billion between 2009 and 2012. Several 

factors explain this decline, including the unexpected 

cost of operations in Libya in 2011, the expenditures 

related to creating the French military base in Abu 

Dhabi, and France’s reintegration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) military command structure. In addition, the government expected 

to reap more savings than occurred with the previous 
178

downsizing of the French military and civilian defense workforce.13 Consequently, in 2012 the defense 

ministry decided to postpone €5.5 billion in procurement to help bring the budget back in line with 

existing resources.14

Source: French National Assembly, rapport d’information No. 1388

(Information Report No. 1388), September 18, 2013, p. 20, available 

from www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-info/i1388.pdf.

Figure 8-1. Planned Spending and Actual Spending

(Billions €).

A SHRINKING MARGIN OF DEFENSE

The next defense white paper was published in 

2013. Though originally only intended to be an update of the 2008 white paper, the global financial crisis, Arab Spring, American pivot to Asia, and French 

intervention in Mali necessitated significant changes, 

resulting in a new document. The new paper also 

provided the recently elected President François Hollande an opportunity to put his own stamp on French 

defense policy.
179

France had not had a Socialist president in nearly 

2 decades, and the last Socialist government was perceived as particularly difficult for the French military. 

Despite Hollande’s statements to the effect that France 

needed to provide for its own security and maintain 

its nuclear deterrent, the defense community’s memory of the previous Socialist government combined 

with the ongoing economic crisis led many to expect 

the worst. On its face, however, the 2013 white paper was not a major break from its 2008 predecessor. 

Nevertheless, because the document calls for further 

reduction in forces, argues for resizing the geographic 

region in which French military interventions would 

be legitimate, and indicates that military resources 

will be divvied up depending on the readiness and 

operational requirements of particular military units, 

the white paper’s broader implications require more 

analysis.

In addition to eliminating 24,000 employees from 

the current staffing of the defense ministry, including 

troops and civilians (a figure that increases to nearly 

34,000 when the 10,000 planned but still unexecuted 

cuts from 2008 are factored in), the white paper provides for a reorganization of the armed forces on the 

basis of what it calls “the principle of differentiation.” 

Although exact details on the principle’s implementation were not provided by the paper, it is described 

as “giving priority to the equipment and training” 

of some elements of the armed forces versus others. 

When combined with the effort to save additional 

monies by financing “costly or cutting-edge capabilities only when they are indispensable and benefit, in 

particular, forces set up to combat state-level actors,”15

the two initiatives will undoubtedly have an impact 

on the state of the French military going forward.
180

The white paper appears to suggest that there will 

be a two-tiered system for the armed forces: one wellequipped and trained, the other slated for domestic 

security missions not requiring sophisticated or costly 

equipment.16 The military personnel involved in domestic operations will have fewer opportunities to 

participate in operations abroad and will train with 

equipment that is less than state-of-the-art. On the 

whole, this makes the French Army less attractive as 

a profession, and could lead to major problems operationally should those troops be required to conduct 

operations abroad.

A second major concern generated by the white 

paper is its implications for military procurement. In 

March 2013, France’s largest defense firms wrote a letter to Hollande expressing their concerns that when 

it comes to possible cuts in defense spending, “it is 

essential that industrial and socio-economic issues be 

taken into account as seriously as budget issues.”17

The defense budget is perceived differently than 

other elements of public spending. French defense 

firms are seen as a pillar of French industry, providing high-skilled jobs and generating technological innovations that are of use in both the military and civilian domains. The defense industry also contributes 

positively to the country’s balance of trade: one-third 

of its annual revenue, nearly €15 billion, comes from 

defense-related exports.18

To square the circle of saving money but maintaining France’s defense industrial base, Hollande decided to continue procurement of most major weapons 

systems but simultaneously renegotiate the contracts 

for those systems by either buying fewer allotments 

or delaying deliveries and payments. Defense companies were compensated for the renegotiation of these 
181

contracts with firm orders in the amount of €45.2 

billion (see Table 8-1).19 While the French military 

remains one of the best-equipped militaries in the 

world in terms of the systems themselves, there are increasing worries as to whether they will be fielded in 

operationally relevant numbers.

Sources: Directorate General of Armaments, “Equipement” 

(“Equipment”), available from www.defense.gouv.fr/ga/equipement; 

and French Court of Auditors, Le bilan à mi-parcours de la loi de 

programmation militare (Midterm Review on the Military Programming Law), Paris, France, July 2012, p. 71, available from www.

livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/2012_07_11-cour-des_comptes_

rapport_thematique_bilan_lpm.pdf.

Table 8-1. Orders for Major Weapons Systems.

Programs 2008 Planned 

Orders Firm Orders

A400M aircraft 50 50

Rafale aircraft 286 180

Barracuda-class submarines 6 3

FREMM frigates 11 11

ASTER missiles 575 535

Naval cruise missiles 200 200

NH90 helicopters 160 61

Tiger attack helicopters 80 80

FELIN equipment 22,588 22,588

VBCI armored vehicles 630 630
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STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE 

FRENCH ARMED FORCES 

Strategic Forces. 

Nuclear deterrence remains at the heart of French 

defense policy; it is seen as guaranteeing France a 

prominent place on the international stage and, as 

then–presidential candidate Hollande said in March 

2012, protecting “the autonomy of our choices.”20

France’s nuclear forces consist of four ballistic missile–carrying submarines and a squadron of fighter 

bombers carrying cruise missiles. Ten percent of the 

overall defense budget and 20 percent of R&D funds go 

to maintaining these forces.21 Although few in France 

question the need to retain a nuclear deterrent, some 

have argued that the aerial component is not required 

to sustain deterrence and, hence, could be shed to save 

money.22 But as a recent report of the French Senate 

points out, the government is not facing an immediate 

need to spend large new sums to maintain its nuclear 

deterrent.23 Previous investments in modernization 

have resulted in the deployment of a new generation 

of SSBNs; acquisition of a new ballistic missile and an 

advanced medium-range cruise missile; and the addition of the Rafale, a fourth-generation fighter jet, to its 

aerial nuclear strike force.

Army. 

The French army retains 106,000 soldiers in 81 specialized regiments, making it one of the largest armies 

in Europe. It is also one of the best equipped with 

VBCIs, a FELIN, CAESER self-propelled howitzers, 

and Tiger attack helicopters.24 But getting the most 
183

out of this equipment requires sustained training. In 

2012, the army’s days for training were down to 105, 

even though the law governing the French military for 

2009–14 had authorized 120. The French court of auditors (Cour des Comptes) noted that even this level 

was somewhat misleading in that much of the training 

activity is focused on units deploying for low-intensity or counterinsurgency operations overseas, meaning 

the army has less time to hone other skills in areas of 

“high-intensity” conventional combat.25

Again, in an effort to reconcile reduced resources 

with the necessities of keeping the force modernized 

and trained, the white paper states that the army will 

make significant cuts to existing fleets of tanks and 

combat vehicles, while moving forward with a new 

generation of SCORPION networked armored combat 

vehicles. At the same time, however, the 2013 white 

paper has called for cutting in half the 2008 white 

paper’s goal of being able to deploy 30,000 French 

troops. As the French chief of staff said, the 2008 white 

paper’s objective was “unattainable,” given current 

resources.26 This reduction in capability has been criticized by others, including General Vincent Desportes, 

former head of the Joint Service Defense College, who 

suggested that this and other measures laid out in the 

2013 white paper would “[relegate] France to a second 

tier. France will be unable to influence major strategic 

options internationally. Its role will be that of a junior 

partner.”27

Although the French army is relatively small, the 

operational skills of its helicopter pilots are considerable, including the ability to conduct missions at 

night.28 The recent experience in Mali, and, above all, 

in Afghanistan, has shown the importance of having 

a relatively large fleet of multirole helicopters avail-
184

able. According to the 2013 white paper, the goal is 

for the army to be equipped with 140 reconnaissance 

and attack helicopters, 115 tactical helicopters, and 30 

tactical drones.29

Navy. 

The French navy now has one aircraft carrier, 75 

vessels and logistics ships, four nuclear-powered SSBNs, six nuclear-powered attack submarines, and less 

than 40,000 men. Since 2008, navy personnel have been 

cut by 6,000. Nineteen ships were taken out of service 

between 2009 and 2012, and only four new ships were 

added. According to Admiral Bernard Rogel, navy 

chief of staff, the size of the French fleet is “sufficient 

but just barely.”30 That said, the navy’s budget for 2013 

is set at €4.273 billion, the highest budget for equipment in the French armed forces.

Moreover, the French navy is one of the best trained 

in Europe, with 91 days at sea in 2010 and 92 in 2011. 

Major components of the fleet—SSBNs, amphibious 

assault ships, naval fighters, marine helicopters, and 

aircraft carriers—have recently been modernized or 

are in the process of being modernized. Plans are for 

France to replace its six Rubis-class, nuclear-powered 

attack submarines with the latest generation of Barracuda-class submarines, although only one is currently 

under construction. Finally, the 2013 white paper 

states that existing shortfalls in other parts of the fleet 

will be addressed with the acquisition of “15 first-class 

frigates, about 15 patrol vessels and six surveillance 

frigates, as well as maritime patrol aircraft and a mine 

warfare capability sufficient to protect our approaches 

and projection in expeditionary operations.”31
185

Given budget constraints, however, there are concerns that orders for the FREMM frigates may still be 

cut back. France has already reduced its orders from 

18 in 2005 to 11 in 2008. In June 2013, reports said the 

final number may be as low as nine or even eight.32

But since the purpose of this program was to acquire 

frigates capable of performing missions that are currently carried out by several vessels, any reduction 

in the order will both increase the unit price for new 

FREMMs and require costly overhauls and modifications to existing platforms, such as the older La 

Fayette–class frigates.33

Air Force. 

The French air force has also undergone profound 

changes since 2008. Personnel numbers dropped from 

66,000 to 50,000, its air fleet was reduced by 30 percent, six fighter squadrons were disbanded, and eight 

air bases in France plus another four overseas were 

closed.

The 2013 white paper has announced that the air 

force fleet will be further reduced; the stated objective 

is 225 aircraft in place of the 300 planned in 2008. This 

means the air force will also reduce its orders for the 

Rafale multirole fighter and will look to extend the life 

of existing Mirages. In addition, the air force will be 

reducing the number of aircraft available for major 

operations from 70 to just 45.34

The air force is the branch of the armed forces with 

the most obvious capability gaps that, in turn, are in 

tension with France’s efforts to maintain its strategic 

autonomy. The French fleet lacks long-distance strategic airlift. France has no equivalent to the U.S. Air 

Force’s C-5 Galaxy or C-17 Globemaster III. France’s 
186

fleet of smaller tactical transport aircraft is composed 

of 54 C-130 Hercules and Transall aircraft.35 The lifespan of the C-160 Transall, which was put into service 

in 1967, has had to be extended because of delays in 

production and deliveries of Airbus A400Ms.

But with “downtimes” for repairs more frequent 

than newer planes, the C-160 has been expensive to 

maintain and operate. Further, the eight CASA/IPTN 

CN-235s acquired to fill the gap do not meet force projection needs, as was the case of the 2013 operation in 

Mali that required air logistic support from French allies.36 In addition, resource constraints resulting from 

operations in Libya and Mali have impacted flight 

hours available to French pilots for training. The situation is particularly worrisome for transport pilots, 

who have had an activity level of only 287 hours instead of the planned 400.37 Finally, it is worth noting 

that while the 2008 white paper set as an objective 70 

tactical transport aircraft for the French air fleet, the 

2013 paper lists “about 50.”

The second significant gap in the air force’s capabilities concerns tanker aircraft; in both the operation 

over Libya and the operation over Mali, the French 

required allied tanker support. In Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (Libya), for example, the United 

States performed about 70 percent of in-flight refueling missions, whereas France performed only about 

10 percent.38 The A330 MRTT is intended to replace 

the current aging fleet of French tankers. The first 

delivery of the plane, however, is not expected until 

2017 at the earliest; the last is not expected until 2024.39

The air force was planning to order 14 planes, but that 

number has now dropped to 12 tankers—a number 

that is probably insufficient if recent operations are a 

benchmark.40
187

Finally, the military intervention in Libya in 2011 

also revealed the French air force’s lagging capacity 

to neutralize land-based air-defense systems. In this 

instance, most Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) missions were performed by American 

forces despite the fact that Libya’s air defenses were 

relatively weak.41 France could potentially modify the 

armement air-sol modulaire (AASM, a modular airto-ground missile) to carry a passive electromagnetic 

homing system to give it the SEAD capacity it currently lacks.42 However, until it can acquire such a system, 

the air force will not have the ability to take the lead in 

similar air operations.

Intelligence. 

The white paper says intelligence “must serve 

political and strategic decision-making as much as it 

serves planning and tactical conduct of operations. It 

should also shed light on our foreign and economic 

policies.”43 French intelligence services are known for 

their efficiency even though they have fewer resources with which to work than their major allies: 1.3 percent of the defense ministry’s budget was designated 

for intelligence, or €655 million in appropriations, in 

2013.44

Since the 2008 white paper, the government has 

placed increased emphasis on building up French intelligence capabilities, especially in the area of cyber, 

with special attention being paid to creating an offensive capability and in air- and space-based intelligence 

systems.45 The equipment France uses to gather and 

analyze intelligence has changed significantly since 

the end of the Cold War. France now has strategic 

and tactical intelligence resources that it did not have 
188

during the wars in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia, when 

France was largely dependent on American strategic 

and tactical intelligence assets.

Maintaining and increasing that capability is also 

key to the French government’s efforts to enhance 

France’s strategic autonomy. While France was the 

coalition’s second-largest contributor to intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance during operations in 

Libya in 2011, and despite the United States declaring it was “leading from behind,” American Predator drones guided the French on their way to strike 

bunkers in Tripoli.46 Accordingly, the French defense 

minister has affirmed that:

 several programs, too long delayed, have now been 

decided on and amplified: observation satellites, electronic listening satellites, embedded resources in airborne platforms, combat and tactical unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs), and light surveillance and observation aircraft with their sensors.47

To that end, France’s goal is also to have at its disposal 12 UAVs and seven detection and surveillance 

aircraft, in comparison with the four detection and 

surveillance aircraft in service today.48

Priority Zones and Pooling and Sharing.

For 20 years, the French military has been involved 

in numerous operations abroad, with the justification 

being, inter alia, the responsibility to protect the innocent, the war against terrorism, humanitarian crises, 

and missions of stability or peacekeeping. A review 

of French military interventions reveals that African 

conflicts are a French trademark. Since 1990, French 

armed forces have been involved in more than 20 
189

African operations including in Rwanda, Somalia, 

Zaire, Comoros, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, 

Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

the Gulf of Aden, Chad, Libya, and Mali.

Several of these interventions have involved the 

commitment of significant French military resources. 

In Operation LICORNE in the Côte d’Ivoire, French 

troop presence increased to a height of 1,600. In Operation HARMATTAN in Libya, France committed 

fighter and reconnaissance aircraft, aerial refuelers, an 

airborne command and control plane, an aircraft carrier, an amphibious assault helicopter carrier, frigates, 

destroyers, and submarines. In Operation SERVAL in 

Mali, more than 4,000 French soldiers were deployed 

and more than 1,000 remain in country to support the 

new government and conduct stability operations. 

Even more recently, in December 2013, France sent 

1,200 troops to the Central African Republic to help 

restore order and disarm the Muslim militias who had 

deposed the country’s president earlier in the year.49

French forces have been deployed outside the African theater as well. Since the Cold War’s end, French 

troops have been involved in several multilateral interventions, including the First Gulf War (contributing nearly 18,000 military personnel); the conflicts in 

the Balkans; in Lebanon as a major contributor to the 

United Nations Interim Force; and in Afghanistan, 

where France deployed more than 60,000 soldiers 

from 2001 to 2012.

But the cost of these interventions combined with 

the apparent lack of success in missions as in the case 

of Afghanistan have resulted in France’s decision to 

scale back its strategic sights and more strictly define 

“priority zones” for its military interventions. These 

priority zones are the European periphery, the Mediterranean Basin, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, 
190

and Northern Africa from the Sahel to the equatorial 

countries. The Sahel corresponds to the zone of vital 

interest that France should, it believes, be able to defend. As a result of France’s historical presence, Africa 

is home to one of the largest groups of French expatriates: more than 210,000 French citizens live there.50

Additionally, special defense agreements with Gabon, 

Senegal, Djibouti, and Chad give France a higher degree of legitimacy and an operational advantage when 

it comes to intervening in the region.

Moreover, major security challenges exist just outside the gates of Europe, with the rise in terrorism 

and criminal activities resulting from instability in the 

wake of the Arab Spring and the need to secure major 

resource and supply routes from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Indeed, America’s planned pivot 

to Asia and its reluctance to intervene further in the 

Middle East was duly noted in the 2013 white paper: 

The evolving strategic context may place our country 

in a position in which we are obliged to take the initiative in operations, or to assume, more often than in the 

past, a significant part of the responsibilities involved 

in conducting military operations.51

Given this strategic context, it is no surprise that 

France is attempting once again to jumpstart the European common defense effort. After the principle of 

differentiation within French forces and the concept 

of strategic autonomy, the white paper’s third pillar of 

French defense policy is greater reliance on the pooling and sharing of defense capabilities by European 

powers. The decrease of European defense capabilities combined with the budgetary crisis is seen as an 

opportunity to promote greater cooperation among 

countries in defense of European vital interests. As the 
191

white paper puts it, France aims for greater pooling of 

capabilities on the European level to “replace forced 

dependency with organized inter-dependency.”52 To 

obtain this goal, however, Europe’s capitals will need 

to establish a deeper consensus on the most important 

security issues they might face and a greater willingness to address them by joint action.

It will also require a tough-love approach to Europe’s national defense companies who, with the continuing decline in European defense spending, face 

a smaller market at home and increased competition 

from the United States, Russia, and China abroad. The 

risk is that the budgetary pressures on investment in 

the short term will translate into a general decline in 

the specialized industrial know-how that the companies must maintain if they are to remain competitive. 

To avoid this, European capitals will have to put aside 

the desire to protect their respective national companies and allow a continent-wide restructuring of 

Europe’s defense industry to move forward.53

CONCLUSION

French military ambitions are increasingly limited 

by the economic crisis and France’s fiscal problems. 

As a percentage of French GDP, defense is less of a 

national priority today. (In 1997, the military budget 

equaled 2 percent of GDP; today, it stands at approximately 1.5 percent.) That said, France’s decision to intervene in Mali this past year is a sober reminder of 

France’s need to maintain serious military capabilities 

to protect its interests and address the existing gaps in 

needed capabilities.

But the actual risk France runs lies less in the condition of today’s French forces than in their future 
192

state. Essentially freezing the defense budget for several years as planned will cost the French military in 

a number of ways. By not replacing equipment in an 

orderly fashion, an increasing portion of the defense 

budget will go to maintaining aging equipment; already, the amount devoted to maintenance is up by 8 

percent in 2013.54 Indeed, according to the French chief 

of the defense staff, estimates in 2013 for the availability of armored personnel carriers, frigates, and combat 

planes would be 40, 48, and 60 percent, respectively.55

While French forces are no longer in Afghanistan, 

budget constraints will make it more difficult to keep 

training levels up to previous standards, which is a 

must for some units such as joint tactical battalions 

that, moving forward, will be the core building block 

for French interventionist forces. Moreover, if France 

wants to continue to be a global leader in developing 

and fielding military technologies, it will need to maintain a significant level of investments in R&D. In fact, 

before the expiration of the recently passed military 

programming law in 2019, France will need to have 

begun work on next-generation weapons systems if it 

expects to sustain itself as a modern fighting force.

Naturally consumed with dealing with today’s 

problems, the fact remains that it is President Hollande’s responsibility to plan for the armed forces of 

2035. Even though Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has stated that he intends to safeguard the defense 

budget until 2016, French Parliament members’ temptation to make defense even more so the “bill payer” 

for reducing the government’s deficit will remain. 

Past history provides little support for that pledge 

as no multiyear military programming law passed 

by the legislature has ever escaped modification by 

the government and French legislators in subsequent 
193

years. The state of the French military is at a critical 

juncture. A wrong step now could leave France with a 

future military that can no longer adequately address 

the country’s security interests or sustain its goal of 

strategic autonomy.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. This chapter was originally published as an essay on 

February 4, 2014.

2. Government of France, Livre Blanc: Défense et Sécurité Nationale 2013 (White Paper: Defense and National Security 2013), Paris, 

France, 2013, available from www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.

fr/pdf/le_livre_blanc_de_la_defense_2013.pdf. For an example of 

press reports about expected cuts to defense, see Michel Cabirol, 

“Un tsunami s’annonce sur le budget de la Défense” (“Promise 

of a Tsumani in the Defense Budget”), La Tribune, July 12, 2012, 

available from www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/20120711trib000708598/un-tsunami-s-annonce-surle-budget-de-la-defense.html.

3. Heads of the seven major French defense firms, Thales, 

Nexter, DCNS SA (Dassault Aviation, Safran, MBDA, and European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company NV) sent a letter 

to the French president stating, “It is essential that industrial and 

socio-economic issues be taken into account as seriously as budget issues.” In addition, five political groups from across the political spectrum stated their concerns about reductions in defense 

spending in July 2012 during a meeting of the French Senate’s 

foreign affairs, defense, and armed forces committee. See “Inquiets, les industriels de l’armement demandent audience à l’Elysée” 

(“Concerned, the Arms Manufacturers Require Hearing at the 

Elysée”), Les Échos, March 13, 2013, available from www.lesechos.

fr/13/03/2013/LesEchos/21395-064-ECH_inquiets–les-industriels-del-armement-demandent-audience-a-l-elysee.htm; and French Senate, 

“Le seuil de 1.5% du PIB consacré à l’effort de défense est incompressible” (“The 1.5 Percent of GDP Devoted to Defense is an Incompressible Amount”), July 26, 2012, available from www.senat.

fr/presse/cp20120726a.html.
194

4. Government of France, “LOI n° 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 

2013 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à 

2019 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense et la 

sécurité nationale” (“Law No. 2013-1168 of December 18, 2013, 

Pertaining to the Military Program for the Years 2014 to 2019”), 

January 1, 2014, available from www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.

do;jsessionid=?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028338825.

5. Entretien du président de la République sur France 2” (“Interview with the President of the Republic on France 2”), France 

2, March 28, 2013, available from www.elysee.fr/interviews/article/

entretien-du-president-de-la-republique-sur-france/.

6. Vincent Lamigeon, “Défense et livre blanc: la demi-victoire 

budgétaire des militaires et de l’industrie de l’armement” (“Defense White Paper: Fiscal Half-Victory for the Military and the 

Defense Industry”), Challenges, April 4, 2013, available from www.

challenges.fr/economie/20130404.CHA7981/bercy-defense-et-livreblanc-la-demi-victoire-budgetaire-des-militaires-et-de-l-industrie-de-larmement.html.

7. See Government of France, “LOI no 96-589 du 2 juillet 1996 

relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 1997 à 2002” 

(“Law No. 96-589 of July 2, 1996, Related to the the Military Programming Law for the Years 1997 to 2002”), July 2, 1996, available 

from legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=9CB2BFEB3123BFA

5C927AEA3F57F2FE2.tpdjo09v_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT0000005602

00&categorieLien=id.

8. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO and 

Non-NATO Europe,” The Military Balance 1998, Vol. 98, No. 1, 

p. 50; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Europe,” The 

Military Balance 2003, Vol. 103, No. 1, p. 39.

9. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Four: 

Europe,” The Military Balance 2013, Vol. 113, No. 1, p. 131.

10. Emmanuel Cugny, “Budget Defense 2014–2019: Les 

longs soupirs de la Grande mette” (“Defense Budget 2014–19, 

The Army’s Big Sigh”), France Info, November 26, 2013, available 

from www.franceinfo.fr/economie/tout-info-tout-eco/budget-defense2014-2019-rendez-vous-a-l-assemblee-nationale-1227037-2013-11-26.
195

11. During 1997–2002, €12.6 billion allotted to the procurement budget was not distributed.

12. See Government of France, Livre Blanc: Défense et Sécurité 

Nationale 2008 (White Paper: Defense and National Security 2008), 

Paris, France, 2008, available from archives.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/2008/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_

sur_defense_875/livre_blanc_1337/livre_blanc_1340/index.html.

13. French Court of Auditors, Le bilan à mi-parcours de la loi 

de programmation militaire (Midterm Review on the Military Programming Law), Paris, France, July 2012, p. 71, available from 

www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/2012_07_11-cour_des_

comptes_rapport_thematique_bilan_lpm.pdf.

14. Véronique Guillermard and Cécile Crouzel, “Défense: 

5,5 milliards de report de commandes” (“Defence: 5.5 Billion 

in Deferred Orders”), Le Figaro, September 28, 2012, available 

from www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2012/09/28/20002-20120928ARTFIG00443-defense-55-milliards-de-report-de-commandes.php.

15. Livre Blanc: Défense et Sécurité Nationale 2013, p. 69.

16. Vigipirate is France’s national security alert system.

17. Emmanuel Grasland and Alain Ruello, “Les industriels de 

l’armement adressent un message d’alerte à Hollande” (“Defense 

Industry Players Send Hollande a Word of Warning”), Les Échos, 

March 13, 2013, available from www.lesechos.fr/13/03/2013/lesechos.

fr/0202639098086_les-industriels-de-l-armement-adressent-un-message-d-alerte-a-hollande.htm.

18. Direction Générale de l’Armement (General Directorate for Armament, or DGA) is the French government defense 

procurement agency.

19. See French Senate, Rapport D’Information N°680 (Information Report No. 680), July 18, 2012, p. 42, available from www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/2012_07_18-rapport_senat-format_

emploi_armees.pdf.
196

20. “Discours de François Hollande sur la défense nationale à 

Paris le 11 mars 2012” (“François Hollande’s Speech on National 

Defense in Paris”), March 11, 2012, available from www.gilbertroger.fr/files/fh-de%25CC%2581fense-11-mars.pdf.

21. Robert Carmona, “Un budget de transition pour la Défense 

en 2013” (“A Transition Budget for Defense in 2013”), La Tribune, 

No. 313, March 2013.

22. “Hervé Morin veut supprimer la composante aérienne de 

la dissuasion pour faire des economies” (“Hervé Morin Wants 

to Remove the Air Component of Deterrence to Save Money”), 

Zone Militaire, January 10, 2013, available from www.opex360.

com/2013/01/10/herve-morin-veut-supprimer-la-composante-aeriennede-la-dissuasion-pour-faire-des-economies/.

23. See French Senate, Rapport d’Information N°668 (Information Report No. 668), July 12, 2012, available from www.senat.fr/rap/

r11-668/r11-6681.pdf.

24. The 110e Régiment d’Infanterie (110th Infantry Regiment) 

will be dissolved in 2014.

25. French Court of Auditors, Le bilan à mi-parcours de la loi de 

programmation militaire, pp. 65-66.

26. Michel Cabirol, “La France, l’adieu aux armes?” (“France, 

A Farewell to Arms?”), La Tribune, August 26, 2012, available 

from www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/20120826 trib000716279/la-france-l-adieu-aux-armes-.html.

27. “Général Vincent Desportes: La défense française est 

dégradée et déséquilibrée” (“General Vincent Desportes: The 

French Defense Is Degraded and Unbalanced”), La Croix, May 

1, 2013, available from www.la-croix.com/Actualite/France/General-Vincent-Desportes-La-defense-francaise-est-degradee-et-desequilibree-2013-05-01- 955039.

28. Jean-Dominique Merchet “Aérocombat: Nos alliés sont 

bluffés!” (“Air Combat: Our Allies Are Bluffed!”), Marianne, February 1, 2013, available from www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefense/

Aerocombat-Nos-allies-sont-bluffes-_a932.html.
197

29. Government of France, Livre Blanc: Défense et Sécurité 

Nationale 2013, p. 73.

30. See French National Assembly Committee on National 

Defense and Armed Forces, “Audition de l’admiral Bernard Rogel, chef d’ état -major de la marine” (“Testimony of General Bernard Rogel, Chief of Staff of the Navy”), July 18, 2012, available 

from www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/11-12/c1112006.asp.

31. Government of France, Livre Blanc: Défense et Sécurité 

Nationale 2013, p. 110.

32. Jean-Marc Tanguy, “Le Livre blanc lave plus blanc que 

blanc” (“The White Paper Washes Whiter than White”), Le mamouth blog, April 30, 2013, available from lemamouth.blogspot.

com/2013/04/le-livre-blanc-lave-plus-blanc-que-blanc.html; and 

Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Marine: ce sera 8 Fremm au lieu de 

11” (“Navy: That Will Be 8 FREMM Instead of 11”), Marianne, 

April 30, 2013, available from www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefense/

Marine-ce-sera-8-Fremm-au-lieu-de-11_a1028.html.

33. The decision on whether to complete the FREMM program or begin work on an alternative program will be made by 

2016. See “Le remplacement des trois dernières FREMM par des 

FTI n’est plus tabou” (“The Replacement of Three Last FREMM 

by FTI Is No Longer a Taboo”), Mer et Marine, October 10, 2013, 

available from www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/le-remplacementdes-trois-dernieres-fremm-par-des-fti-nest-plus-tabou.

34. “Projet de LPM: Un moindre mal” (“MPL Project: A Lesser 

Evil”), Mer et Marine, August 5, 2013, available from www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/projet-de-lpm-un-moindre-mal.

35. Figures refer to 2012.

36. “Qui participe à l’opération Serval au Mali?” (“Who Is 

Participating in the Operation Serval in Mali?”), Le Monde, January 

29, 2013, available from www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/01/29/

qui-participe-a-l-operation-serval-au-mali_1824111_3212.html.

37. See French Senate, Rapport d’Information N°668, p. 42.
198

38. See French National Assembly Committee on National 

Defense and Armed Forces, Compte rendu n°18 (Report No. 18), 

October 30, 2012, available from www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/

cr-cdef/12-13/c1213018.asp#P5_424.

39. French Court of Auditors, Le bilan à mi-parcours de la loi de 

programmation militaire, p. 61.

40. Government of France, Livre Blanc: Défense et Sécurité 

Nationale 2013, p. 74.

41. See French National Assembly Committee on National 

Defense and Armed Forces, Compte rendu n°18.

42. Lieutenant Yohan Droit, “Mission et capacités SEAD—

Une perspective de l’armée de l’air” (“SEAD Mission and Capabilities —A View of the Air Force”), Paris, France: Centre d’études 

stratégiques aérospatiales, September 2012, available from www.

cesa.air.defense.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Mission_et_capacites_SEAD-_sept_

2012.pdf.

43. Government of France, Livre Blanc: Défense et Sécurité 

Nationale 2013, p. 70.

44. See French Senate, Projet de Loi N°23 (“Law Draft No. 23”), 

October 21, 2013, available from www.senat.fr/leg/tas13-023.html;

and French National Assembly Committee on National Defense 

and Armed Forces, Compte rendu n°56 (Report No. 56), February 20, 

2013, available from www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/12-13/

c1213056.asp.

45. Johan Galtung, “Les formes alternatives de défense: 

l’exemple européen” (“Alternative Forms of Defense: The European Example”), Érudit, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1989, pp. 625–645, available from www.erudit.org/revue/ei/1989/v20/n3/702545ar.html.

46. Catherine Durandin, Le déclin de l’armée française (The 

Decline of the French Military), Paris, France: François Bourin, 

2013, p. 84.

47. Jean-Yves Le Drian, Discours aux commandeurs (Speech to 

the Commanders), Paris, France: Ministry of Defense, École Mili-
199

taire, April 29, 2013, available from www.defense.gouv.fr/content/

download/206259/2287506/file/DISCOURS-DU-MINISTRE-AUXCOMMANDEURS-LE-LUNDI-29-AVRIL-2013-A-L-ECOLE-MILITAIRE.pdf.

48. France acquired two MQ-9 Reapers last year. See Pierre 

Tran, “French AF Conducts First Reaper Flight,” Defense News, 

January 16, 2014, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20140116/DEFREG01/301160030/French-AF-Conducts-FirstReaper-Flight.

49. Cordélia Bonal, “Centrafrique: pourquoi la France intervient” (“Central Africa: Why France Is Intervening”), Libération, December 5, 2013, available from www.liberation.fr/monde/2013/12/05/

pourquoi-la-france-va-en-centrafrique_964366.

50. “French Overseas,” Paris, France: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 31, 2012, available from www.diplomatie.

gouv.fr/en/french-overseas/.

51. Government of France, Livre Blanc: Défense et Sécurité 

Nationale 2013, p. 63.

52. Ibid., p. 5.

53. The proposed merger of European Aeronautics and Defense and Space (EADS) and Britain’s BAE Systems is a good example of what probably should have taken place but did not. For 

analysis of why the proposed merger did not work out, see Carol 

Matlack, “Why the EADS-BAE Deal Collapsed,” Bloomberg Businessweek, October 10, 2012, available from www.businessweek.com/

articles/2012-10-10/why-the-eads-bae-deal-collapsed.

54. See French Senate, Projet de Loi N°23.

55. Frédéric Charillon, “France’s New Military Budget: Rethinking Power,” RUSI, November 13, 2013, available from 

www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/ref:A528361D338FD6/#.UuZY

VRAo5pg.

201

CHAPTER 9

TAIWANESE HARD POWER: 

BETWEEN A ROC AND A HARD PLACE1

Michael Mazza

KEY POINTS

• Over the past decade, the cross–Taiwan Strait 

military balance has shifted in favor of the Chinese military.

• Taiwan’s efforts to meet that challenge have 

been slowed by insufficient defense budgets; 

difficulties in establishing an all-volunteer, 

active duty force; and a complicated political 

and economic relationship with the mainland.

• The United States has a statutory interest in 

and obligation to help Taiwan maintain an adequate defense posture, but in recent years has 

fallen short of meeting those goals.

Taiwan’s 2013 National Defense Report, a biennial 

publication of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense 

(MND), paints a bleak picture of the island’s future 

security. It asserts that China “plans to build comprehensive capabilities for using military force against 

Taiwan by 2020.”2 The People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) is apparently well on its way to achieving that 

objective.

The report describes worrisome advances across 

the spectrum of PLA capabilities. According to the 

MND, the PLA’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are sufficient “to support 

the use of military force for resolving the Taiwan issue.” The ground force can already conduct a landing 
202

on, and seizure of, Taiwan’s offshore islands, while 

the Chinese navy can “effectively blockade the Taiwan 

Strait and seize near shore islands” and “blockade key 

air space.” The air force, for its part, is currently “capable of fighting for air superiority and control over 

the first island chain,” which stretches from the Japanese home islands through Taiwan and south to the 

Philippines.3

The report also highlights advances in China’s missile force, notably, the fielding of advanced anti-ship 

ballistic missiles and the deployment of more than 

1,400 missiles with conventional warheads aimed 

against Taiwan. The bottom line: “Combined with the 

Navy and Air Force, the PLA is now capable of conducting large scale joint firepower strikes and denying 

foreign forces from intervening in disputes across the 

Taiwan Strait.”4

Together, these developments mark a major shift in 

the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, not 

all that long ago, the balance favored Taiwan. For example, in 2000, Michael O’Hanlon argued that “China 

cannot invade Taiwan, even under its most favorable 

assumptions about how a conflict would unfold.”5 According to O’Hanlon, even coercive operations short 

of a full-scale invasion would have been difficult for 

the PLA to pull off.

In the MND’s previous National Defense Report, released in 2011, negative trends were evident but not so 

starkly stated. Now the MND assesses that the PLA is 

only 6 years away from fielding an effective invasion 

force, and that it can already prevent outside powers 

from intervening in a timely way. How did Taiwan 

arrive at this juncture?
203

DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS

While Beijing has sustained 2 decades of doubledigit growth in its defense budget, Taipei has not 

evinced a similar commitment to defense spending. 

In 1996, the year of Taiwan’s first free presidential 

election, Taiwan’s military expenditures stood at 

U.S.$12.9 billion (in constant 2011 dollars), accounting for 4.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). 

The defense budget’s share of GDP had already been 

trending downward, but that trend accelerated from 

1996 onward. Between 1991 and 1995, the average percentage change in the military’s share of GDP was -4.4 

percent; between 1996 and 2000, that rate dropped to 

-8.3 percent.6

Today, Taiwan only commits 2 percent of its GDP 

to defense, well short of the 3 percent goal set by both 

previous Taiwanese Presidents Chen Shui-bian and 

his successor, Ma Ying-jeou.7 In 2012, Taiwan spent 

U.S.$10.5 billion on defense, 20 percent less than it 

was spending in 1996 (again, in constant 2011 dollars). 

(See Figure 9-1.)8

Defense spending as a share of GDP provides a 

rough measure of a country’s overall commitment to 

its defense. The military budget’s share of the total national budget provides a similar indicator and points 

to how the government prioritizes defense spending 

in any given year. A Congressional Research Service 

analysis found that Taiwan’s military budget was responsible for 22.8 percent of total government spending in 1996. In 2013, that share stood at only 16.4 

percent.9
204

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 

Military Expenditure Database, available from www.sipri.org/

research/armaments/milex/milex_database.

Figure 9-1. Taiwan’s Defense Spending, 1990-2012.

TAIWAN’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 

These trends are surprising when one considers 

the inhospitable security environment in which Taiwan has found itself in the past 2 decades. In 1995, 

the PLA conducted a series of missile tests in waters 

around Taiwan to express its displeasure at former 

Republic of China (ROC) President Lee Teng-hui’s 

visit to the United States. China did so again in the 

lead-up to Taiwan’s 1996 presidential election. In both 

cases, the United States responded by sending aircraft 

carriers to the region.

In 2005, Washington was seemingly preoccupied 

with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and Beijing was 

facing a Taiwanese president (Chen Shui-bian) who 

prioritized asserting Taiwan’s status as an independent democratic state. Against this backdrop, Beijing 
205

promulgated the Anti-Secession Law “for the purpose 

of opposing and checking Taiwan’s secession from 

China by secessionists in the name of ‘Taiwan independence’.” Although the law asserts a preference for 

pursuing “peaceful unification,” Article 8 stipulates 

China’s right to use “non-peaceful means and other 

necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty 

and territorial integrity.”10

Kuomintang candidate Ma Ying-jeou’s election as 

Taiwan’s president in 2008 and his subsequent crossStrait economic policies helped stabilize relations between Taipei and Beijing. Yet even as Beijing acted 

with less overt hostility toward Taiwan, it pursued 

policies that did little to reduce the ROC’s international isolation, continued to increase its military capabilities vis-à-vis Taiwan, and left the island generally less secure. In 2011, two PLA fighter aircraft even 

entered Taiwanese airspace in an attempt to scare off 

an American spy plane, a reminder that, to the leaders 

in Beijing, Taiwan has no sovereign airspace.

China’s attempt to wrest control of the disputed 

Senkaku Islands, which Taiwan also claims, from 

Japan threatens to turn Taiwan’s northern flank. Beijing’s apparent aim of turning the South China Sea into 

a Chinese lake likewise threatens Taiwan’s security. 

Chinese success there would not only have implications for Taipei’s own claims in the sea but would also 

enhance Beijing’s ability to coerce Taiwan militarily.

China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification 

Zone (ADIZ) and its behavior in the South China Sea, 

moreover, amount to an outright challenge to freedom 

of navigation through the seas and skies, on which 

Taiwan depends for its economic vitality. In short, 

Taiwan’s security environment has deteriorated substantially since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96.
206

POLITICAL ROADBLOCKS

With Taiwan’s transition to full-fledged democracy in the mid-1990s, Taipei began finding it difficult 

to sustain previous levels of defense spending. As in 

many democratic societies, the influence of various 

interest groups has increased over time. Over the last 

2 decades in particular, the Taiwanese government 

has dedicated relatively larger shares of the national 

budget toward social welfare, economic development, 

education, and pension payments, putting downward 

pressure on defense spending.11

Moreover, with Taiwan’s anemic birthrate, the traditional welfare system, in which children take care of 

their parents, and siblings assist each other in times of 

need, has shown signs of fraying. As a result, in recent 

years the government has eased criteria for securing 

access to welfare, which has once again lessened the 

government revenues available for national security.12

Even when the leadership has wanted to spend 

more on defense, domestic politics have gotten in the 

way. Chen Shui-bian, who served as ROC president 

from 2000 to 2008, was in favor of more social spending and a strong defense. In 2001, the George W. Bush 

administration approved a major arms package for 

Taiwan, which included submarines, antisubmarine 

warfare aircraft, torpedoes, and anti-ship cruise missiles, among other systems.

But in the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s legislature), 

the national security debate became highly politicized. 

With the legislature failing to approve of spending 

funds that the executive branch had earmarked for 

these purposes, the defense budget actually declined 

during the Chen administration.
207

The Ma Ying-jeou administration likewise has had 

difficulty boosting the defense spending level to its 

stated goal of 3 percent of GDP. This has been in part 

because of the global economic downturn and its impact on the export-dependent Taiwanese economy.

But Taiwan’s struggling economy does not alone 

explain the administration’s failure to reach its defense spending target. Although President Ma has 

consistently claimed a need for Taiwan to maintain a 

strong defense, his cross-Strait policies may also make 

it difficult to sustain public support for more defense 

spending.

Under Ma, Taipei has succeeded in reducing tensions across the Taiwan Strait. The president’s “three 

nos” policy—no unification, no independence, no 

use of force—has served to reassure Beijing after the 

8-year, independence-minded Chen Shui-bian administration. Ma’s cross-Strait policy has moreover emphasized opportunities for cooperation with the mainland. The signature achievement of this policy is the 

Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which 

loosened restrictions on cross-Strait trade and paved 

the way for Taiwan to complete free-trade agreements 

with Singapore and New Zealand.

Ma, of course, has been eager to tout the successes 

of his policies. But a side effect has been for his administration to underemphasize those aspects of Beijing’s policies that continue to threaten Taiwan. To 

emphasize those aspects would be to undercut, at 

least rhetorically, the Ma administration’s claimed accomplishments. This perhaps explains why Taipei’s 

reaction to China’s 2013 ADIZ announcement, while 

critical, was more muted than that of its Japanese and 

South Korean neighbors.
208

President Ma has argued that a robust defense 

allows Taiwan to deal effectively with China from 

a position of strength. This is sensible. But in telling 

the Taiwanese public that all is going swimmingly in 

cross-Strait relations, he may well be weakening his 

own calls for a strong military deterrent.

TAIWAN’S DEFENSE AND MILITARY 

STRATEGIES

While the island’s level of defense spending may 

fall short of stated goals, the military has nevertheless added new capabilities in recent years. Since 

2001, Taiwan has purchased Kidd-class destroyers, 

P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, Patriot Advanced 

Capability-3 (PAC-3) defense missiles, Black Hawk 

utility helicopters, Osprey-class coastal mine-hunter 

ships, Apache attack helicopters, retrofits of its 145 

F-16 fighter jets, and numerous sea, ground, and airlaunched munitions, all from the United States.13 Domestically, Taiwan has been upgrading its Indigenous 

Defense Fighters (IDFs), building fast-attack missile 

boats, and developing anti-ship and land-attack cruise 

missiles.

Taiwan’s second and most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released in 2013, lays out strategies that are both consistent with previous planning 

documents and mindful of current conditions. Taiwan’s national defense strategy rests on five pillars: 

war prevention, homeland defense, contingency response, conflict avoidance, and regional stability. 

The strategy equally emphasizes measures aimed at 

ensuring the Taiwanese military’s ability to fight and 

those designed to ensure a fight will not be necessary.
209

For example, the MND claims it will “develop 

defense technologies, continue to procure defensive 

weapons, establish ‘innovative and asymmetric’ capabilities, and strengthen force preservation and infrastructure protection capabilities.”14 However, the ministry also vows to institute “information transparency 

measures” to “help enhance surrounding countries’ 

understanding of the ROC’s defense policy, objectives 

of military preparation and readiness, and contents of 

military activities,” the aim being to “reduce distrust, 

miscalculation and misunderstanding.”15 The defense 

strategy also emphasizes collaborative approaches 

to security: promoting enhanced security dialogues 

and exchanges, working with others to establish regional “security mechanisms,” and establishing programs to “jointly safeguard regional maritime and air 

security.”16

Taipei’s military strategy is more narrowly focused 

on how ROC forces will defend against threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, 

the strategy’s overarching theme—“resolute defense, 

credible deterrence”—is not well defined. MND’s 

2013 National Defense Report describes “resolute 

defense” thusly: 

A defense force that is only used when attacked by 

the enemy, and is the minimal force required only for 

defense. The defense force is also limited to protecting 

territorial integrity, and thus adopts a passive defense 

strategy.17

The 2013 QDR’s description is somewhat more specific, describing a requirement “to be able to conduct 

fortified defense, reinforce and support, and recapture 

operations,” but the emphasis remains defensive in 

nature.18
210

Here, there may be tension with the “credible deterrence” aspect of Taiwan’s military strategy. As with 

“resolute defense,” the QDR’s definition of “credible 

deterrence” is problematic:

The ROC Armed Forces should continue force training and combat preparation, effectively integrate the 

interoperability of weapon systems, enhance joint operational performance, and exert overall warfighting 

capabilities, forcing the enemy to consider the costs 

and risks of war, thereby deterring any hostile intention to launch an invasion.19

First, it is unclear what Taiwan’s military intends 

to hold at risk that would effectively deter China. In 

contemplating an invasion, Beijing can be expected as 

a matter of course to consider the costs and risks of 

war. The QDR fails to explain how Taiwan will raise 

those costs and deepen those risks. Second, the military presumably wants to deter not only a full-scale 

invasion but also a missile barrage, blockade, or other 

coercive use of force. The omission is curious.

Looking beyond the “resolute defense, credible deterrence” slogan, however, the QDR offers more concrete plans for contending with the PLA. In particular, 

the QDR describes requirements to counter a blockade 

of the sea or air lines of communication, for joint interdiction of forces approaching from mainland China, 

and for ground forces capable of denying Chinese 

forces from establishing a beachhead.

The QDR goes on to emphasize the need for the continued development of joint warfighting capabilities 

based on the military’s “innovative and asymmetric” 

concept, which recognizes that Taiwan cannot compete with China on quantitative grounds and should 

develop capabilities to target China’s weaknesses. 
211

Even so, the QDR describes a force that can contend 

with PLA forces in the air, at sea, on the ground, and 

in the cyber and electronic domains.

Enabling all activities in the future will be effective 

joint command, control, communication, computers, 

and ISR. According to the QDR, the military “must 

strengthen battlespace management, command, control, intelligence and early warning capabilities to accurately monitor enemy activities and flexibly execute 

force maneuver.”20

What Taiwan requires, in short, is a highly skilled, 

innovative, high-tech force. But it is questionable 

whether Taiwan can successfully create this defense 

force, given resource and manpower constraints and 

shortcomings in U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation.

SHIFTING FORCE STRUCTURE

Over the past 15 years, Taiwan has been shifting 

to a smaller, more high-tech force. In 1999, its armed 

forces consisted of 370,000 active duty members; that 

number dropped to 290,000 in the first half of the last 

decade. While Taiwan’s military has pursued modernization across all three services, the largest forcestructure changes have occured in the navy.

On the whole, the fleet has shrunk, both in numbers 

of ships and in average ship size. At the beginning of 

the century, Taiwan’s navy had a traditional surfacewarfare emphasis. The fleet included 12 destroyers, 

which constituted more than a third of Taiwan’s principal surface combatants.

Since that time, the navy has retired all of those 

ships, replacing them with just four Keelung-class destroyers. The Keelungs, former American Kidd-class 

destroyers, are the largest warships the ROC Navy 
212

has ever operated. Equipped with SM-2 Block IIIA 

and RGM-84L Block II Harpoon missiles, the ships 

provided the navy with enhanced modern air defense 

and anti-surface warfare capabilities.

The navy has also focused on recapitalizing its fleet 

of small missile boats. Since 2005, it has retired all 48 of 

its 1970s-era Hai Ou-class ships, replacing them with 

31 Kwang Hua VI-class vessels. The larger but stealthier Kwang Huas carry a slightly larger, more modern 

armament of anti-ship cruise missiles. In March 2014, 

the navy received the Tuo River, the first of up to 12 

new fast-attack missile boats that have been dubbed 

“carrier killers” in Taiwan. Also described as corvettes, the craft will be stealthy and armed with eight 

anti-ship cruise missiles.21

Taiwan’s navy continues to prioritize modernizing its undersea force as well. It has two Dutch submarines built in the 1980s and two World War II-era, 

U.S. GUPPY-class submarines, all four of which are in 

need of replacement. (The GUPPY-class submarines 

are now used only for training.)

In 2000, U.S. President George W. Bush agreed to 

sell Taiwan eight new diesel-electric submarines. For 

a variety of reasons, none of them have been built or 

sold. While the Taiwanese navy continues to insist 

that acquiring new submarines is a priority—they 

would be particularly useful for counterblockade and 

anti-surface warfare missions—it has continued to upgrade munitions for its two deployable Dutch boats. 

Last year, the navy received 32 submarine-launched 

anti-ship cruise missiles from the United States, which 

may also allow for strikes on Chinese coastal targets.22

The navy has been upgrading not only its fleet but 

also its maritime air capabilities. Most notable in this 

regard is the purchase of 12 P-3C Orion patrol aircraft 
213

from the United States. The navy received the first four 

of these planes in 2013; five more are set for delivery 

in 2014, with the remainder arriving in Taiwan by the 

end of 2015. With China enhancing its undersea force, 

the Orions will provide the ROC Navy with a proven 

anti-submarine warfare capability.

The military has likewise pursued army aviation 

upgrades, though new capabilities have only just 

begun to enter the force. In November 2013, Taiwan 

received the first batch of an expected 30 total AH65E Apache Guardian attack helicopters from the 

United States, becoming the first foreign operator of 

the updated chopper. The helicopters, which will be 

a marked improvement over Taiwan’s current AH1W Cobras, will enhance Taiwan’s ability to counter 

a cross-Strait invasion force and to prevent an enemy 

from establishing a beachhead.

The first delivery of UH-60M Black Hawk utility 

helicopters occurred in 2014; Washington approved 

the sale of a total of 60 Black Hawks to Taipei. These 

aircraft, which replace 1950s-designed UH-1H choppers, provide the army with greater mobility. They 

will be key assets for an army expected to play a greater role in responding to natural disasters—to which 

Taiwan is prone—and will provide the ability to move 

quickly around the mountainous island in the event of 

Chinese aggression.

One of the army’s most important acquisitions in 

recent years has been the PAC-3 ground-based missile 

defense system. Taiwan currently operates one battery on the northern end of the island and has plans 

to add three more to the south.23 PAC-3 missiles provide defense against cruise and ballistic missiles and 

enemy aircraft.
214

Although the army and navy have been successfully upgrading their aerospace capabilities, the air 

force has had difficulty doing so. The air force has 

been able to secure from the United States munitions 

and upgrades for its current fleet of F-16A/B fighter 

jets, but those upgrades are now at risk.

In its 2015 budget request, the U.S. Air Force deleted funding for the Combat Avionics Programmed 

Extension Suite, which was meant to “replace the 

avionics and radars for 300 U.S. F-16s” and for Taiwan’s 146 F-16A/Bs.24 Upgrades will remain available 

for Taiwan’s planes, but likely at an additional cost 

of tens of millions of dollars. Whether those estimates 

grow and whether the Legislative Yuan will approve 

the additional expenditure remain open questions.25

Just as troubling, Taiwan has been unsuccessful 

in securing new aircraft needed to replace old F-5s 

and Dassault Mirage 2000s that must be retired. As a 

result, Taiwan will continue flying legacy aircraft at 

least over the next decade. Without upgrades to those 

aircraft, a cross-Strait air-power capability gap will 

continually grow in China’s favor (see Figure 9-2).

Taiwan’s Missile Program. 

Taiwan has an active indigenous cruise missile 

program. While U.S. officials have at times expressed 

unease with the program, Taiwan has been undeterred 

in producing weapons it believes are necessary for the 

island’s defense. In recent years, Taiwan has fielded 

two new cruise missiles: the Hsiung Feng IIE (HF-2E) 

and the Hsiung Feng III (HF-3).

The less controversial of the two is the HF-3, an anti-ship cruise missile that can be fired from land-based 

and seaborne platforms. Many of the navy’s ships are 
215

Source: The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap, U.S.-Taiwan Business 

Council, October 1, 2012, p. 27, available from www.us-taiwan.org/

reports/2012_the_looming_taiwan_fighter_gap.pdf.

Notes: Total estimated available signifies the total number of aircraft in the ROC fleet. Total estimated operational signifies total 

estimated available minus aircraft not expected to be available 

for use because of maintenance issues, aircraft out of service for 

planned modernization, and aircraft based in the United States 

for training.

Figure 9-2. Timeline of Estimated Total Fighters, 

2012-23.

already outfitted with the missile; a mural at the 2011 

Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition 

depicted the HF-3 sinking China’s sole aircraft carrier. 

At the 2014 exhibition, the navy unveiled a prototype 

of a road-mobile launcher carrier for the HF-3.26

The HF-2E, on the other hand, is a surface-tosurface cruise missile designed to strike the Chinese 
216

mainland. It has a reported range of 600 kilometers. 

As recently as November 2012, former Taiwan deputy 

defense minister Andrew Yang told Defense News that 

“the U.S. is concerned about the development [of the 

HF-2E]. They are encouraging [China and Taiwan] 

to discuss the problem.”27 Even so, the HF-2E has entered active service and is deployed on road-mobile 

launchers.

There are conflicting reports on a possible new 

missile known as the Cloud Peak. Initial reports indicated that the missile would be supersonic, with a 

1200-kilometer range allowing it to reach Shanghai 

and, perhaps, Chinese naval bases at Qingdao and 

Hainan island.28 More recent reports described the 

Cloud Peak as a new land-based anti-ship cruise missile with a longer range than the HF-3.29 Regardless 

of the precise nature of the Cloud Peak, Taiwan’s 

missile program clearly remains a priority for the 

armed forces.

Taiwan’s missile program flows in part from the 

MND’s effort to develop “innovative and asymmetric” weapons and strategies to deal with the Chinese 

threat. As China knows, cruise missiles are a relatively 

low-cost capability against which it is costly and technologically difficult to defend. They are attractive to 

Taiwan’s military for a number of reasons, including 

the fact that, in the event of a conflict, cruise missiles 

might be more likely than manned fighters to reach 

targets on the mainland. Strikes on critical Chinese 

command-and-control nodes could significantly 

impede PLA operations.

In addition, in fielding modern cruise missiles, 

Taipei conveys to Beijing that a war would not be 

confined to the island and surrounding waters. Cruise 

missiles allow Taipei to inflict costs on China, both by 
217

striking PLA targets and by bringing the war home 

for Chinese citizens. Deterrence, Taiwan believes, is 

enhanced as a result.

ISR. 

To make effective use of all of these assets, Taiwan 

requires a suite of ISR systems. The pride of Taiwan’s 

ISR is the military’s new ultra-high-frequency (UHF) 

radar, which can track ballistic and cruise missiles and 

peer deep into China. A U.S. defense industry source 

told Defense News that “it’s more of an intelligence collection system than a ballistic missile defense warning 

system” and that “Taiwan can see almost all of China’s significant Air Force sorties and exercises from 

this radar.” The radar is reportedly “capable of tracking 1,000 targets simultaneously.”30

The new UHF radar, however, is just one piece of 

a larger picture. During the first decade of the 2000s, 

Taiwan made a concerted effort to develop its Po 

Sheng (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) 

system. According to Mark Stokes: 

the original Po Sheng concept . . . envisioned the installation of more than 750 data link terminals on most 

major weapons platforms that are integrated with joint 

[MND], army, air force, and naval operations centers.31

These links would provide for a common operating 

picture (COP), common operating environment, and 

enhanced command and control. Although resource 

limitations later restricted the scope of the system, one 

U.S. defense analyst has suggested that “Taiwan has 

the best common tactical picture in the world today, 

outside of the United States.”32
218

Going forward, however, Stokes argues that 

Taiwan needs a “survivable network of sensors” 

for “pervasive and persistent surveillance,” which 

might include earth observation satellites, “manned 

or unoccupied airborne sensors,” and passive and 

active ground- and maritime-based sensors.33 The 

MND shares a similar vision for its ISR capabilities. 

According to the most recent QDR, to enhance ISR, 

Taiwan will: 

effectively employ mid- and long-range electronic 

surveillance systems, extend ground, sea and air 

surveillance capabilities, integrate C2 systems, establish COP, and share battlefield information to 

enhance early warning capacity and battlefield 

transparency.34

AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Setting aside Taipei’s difficulties in meeting its 

own defense spending targets, Taiwan faces two other 

significant obstacles to fielding the kind of force it envisions. First, the military’s transition to an all-volunteer force faces major implementation problems and 

threatens to consume too many of the defense dollars 

that Taiwan does spend. Second, Taiwan continues 

to rely on defense articles from the United States at a 

time when Washington has a decreasing appetite for 

selling Taiwan the weapons it most needs and has an 

increasingly different vision than Taipei of Taiwan’s 

optimal defensive strategy.

The All-Volunteer Force. 

On its face, the rationale behind Taiwan’s transition 

to an all-volunteer force makes sense. With Taiwan’s 

low birthrate leading over time to a smaller labor force 
219

and considering the pull of the island’s vibrant private 

sector on the smaller labor pool, a smaller active duty 

force has become increasingly attractive.

The MND has, moreover, reasoned that the development of high-tech weaponry allows for such a 

smaller force but does require a more highly trained 

one. Yet as the Legislative Yuan continued to reduce 

the amount of time that conscripts were required to 

serve in the military, maintaining such a highly trained 

force became increasingly difficult.

Taiwan is accordingly in the process of shrinking 

its military, which will come down from the current 

215,000 personnel to between 170,000 and 190,000 by 

the end of 2019.35 But the shift from a conscription 

system to a voluntary system is not going as well as 

hoped. For the first 11 months of 2013, recruitment 

levels were at only 30 percent of the target; “in infantry and armored units, the recruitment rates are even 

lower, at just 4 percent and 16 percent, respectively.”36

The MND had planned on having an all-volunteer 

force in place by January 1, 2015, but that was postponed to 2017.37 To boost recruitment, the ministry 

has plans to raise the starting monthly salary by more 

than 25 percent and to provide retirement benefits after 4 years of service rather than 10 years.38

In 2011, spending on personnel was at its highest since 2000. Moreover, after several years in which 

spending on personnel as a share of the total defense 

budget was well under 50 percent, that share was 

moving up again, hitting 45.36 percent in 2010 and 

47.52 percent in 2011.39 According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the rise in personnel costs is 

already “diverting funds from foreign and indigenous 

acquisition programs, as well as near-term training 

and readiness.”40
220

Not only will Taiwan’s transition to an all-volunteer force affect its ability to invest in new capabilities, 

but it also may negatively affect Taiwan’s ability to defend against the most stressing of scenarios: an invasion by the PLA. The MND places an understandable 

emphasis on mobilizing reserves during such a scenario. The military’s concept of “active duty force for 

strike and attack, reserve force for homeland defense” 

highlights the importance of the reserves, which is 

tasked with carrying out (alongside the active force) a 

key piece of Taiwan’s defense strategy.

But maintaining an effective reserve force and 

promoting what the MND calls “all-out defense” is 

likely to become a greater challenge. Although all men 

of military age will continue to receive rudimentary 

training, the reserve force will be less well-trained 

than it was when all conscripts were required to serve 

on active duty.41 While military personnel will serve in 

the reserves following their active duty service, these 

experienced servicemen and servicewomen will make 

up a smaller share of the reserve force as the activeduty force shrinks.

Not only does this look insufficient for building 

a force able to contend with a Chinese invasion, but 

it would also seem inadequate in the vein of MND’s 

efforts to accumulate all-out defense capabilities. The 

QDR lists “all-out defense” as an important piece of 

the defense strategy’s homeland defense mission:

Continue to promote all-out defense education, cultivate the public’s patriotism and support for national 

defense; coordinate interagency efforts to establish a 

robust all-out defense system; maintain capabilities 

of reserve force through mobilization and training 

to ensure rapid mobilization during peacetime and 

wartime.42
221

“All-out defense” includes an effort to improve 

civil-military relations, encourage an esprit de corps

in the reserves, and promote willingness among the 

general population to support defense initiatives (and 

spending) and to actively contribute to defending the 

homeland in an emergency. Rather than achieving 

these goals, however, switching to an all-volunteer 

force and providing a bare minimum of reserve training may put these goals further out of reach.

U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relations. 

From 1983 until the spring of 2001, when the United 

States held its last annual arms sales talks, American 

and Taiwan defense officials met once a year to discuss Taiwan’s requirements and opportunities to acquire defense articles from the United States. The talks 

were halted during the first months of the George W. 

Bush administration, which had described China as 

a strategic competitor and wanted to put America’s 

relationship with Taiwan on firmer footing. The end 

of the annual talks was envisioned as embodying an 

upgrade in U.S.-Taiwan relations.

The effect, however, was to remove the institutional 

impetus for regular arms sales to the island. Relieved 

of the requirement to discuss Taiwan’s defense needs 

formally on an annual basis, the U.S. Government has 

frequently neglected to discuss them at all. The upshot 

is that since the last round of talks, new U.S. approvals 

of arms sales to Taiwan have been infrequent. In effect, the arms sales process has broken down over the 

last 13 years, and Taiwan has found it more difficult 

to purchase the defense articles it requires from the 

United States.
222

Taiwan’s quest for new F-16 C/D fighter jets is illustrative. Taiwan first broached the subject with the 

George W. Bush administration in 2006. In what was 

then an unprecedented move, the administration refused to accept Taiwan’s letter of request. Rather than 

approve or deny the request, the Bush administration 

would not even consider it. The Barack Obama administration adopted the same approach to Taiwan’s F-16 

C/D request, with the letter of request continuing to 

sit unopened in some Foggy Bottom inbox.

In 2011, U.S. President Obama did approve the 

sale of retrofits for Taiwan’s existing F-16 A/B fighters, which the MND saw as a necessary complement 

to the acquisition of new fighters. But the decision to 

do so, while essentially continuing to ignore the question of new C/Ds for the island, demonstrated with 

surprising clarity a troubling development.

Under the Obama administration, the U.S.-China 

relationship has become, at the expense of Taiwan’s 

defense needs, an increasingly central factor in decisions on U.S. arms sales to the island. The Obama 

administration’s decision to upgrade Taiwan’s F-16s 

while refusing to discuss new jets reflected a split-thebaby calculus: Washington would do the minimum 

for Taiwan, while keeping China happy. This sets a 

troubling precedent for future arms sales to the island.

Not only has the arms sales process largely broken down, but Taiwanese and American defense establishments are also disagreeing over the optimal 

strategy for Taipei to pursue and thus over what arms 

the island needs most. The provenance of this division appears to be, or is at least related to, U.S. Naval War College Professor William Murray’s journal 

article recommending that Taiwan adopt a porcupine 

strategy. The article, which has been read widely at 

DoD, argues:
223

Rather than trying to destroy incoming ballistic missiles with costly PAC-3 SAMs, Taiwan should harden 

key facilities and build redundancies into critical infrastructure and processes so that it could absorb and 

survive a long-range precision bombardment. Rather 

than relying on its navy and air force (neither of which 

is likely to survive such an attack) to destroy an invasion force, Taiwan should concentrate on development of a professional standing army armed with mobile, short-range, defensive weapons. To withstand a 

prolonged blockade, Taiwan should stockpile critical 

supplies and build infrastructure that would allow it 

to attend to the needs of its citizens unassisted for an 

extended period. Finally, Taiwan should eschew destabilizing offensive capabilities, which could include, 

in their extreme form, tactical nuclear weapons employed in a countervalue manner, or less alarmingly, 

long-rang conventional weapons aimed against such 

iconic targets as the Three Gorges Dam.43

The strategy, which DoD has apparently endorsed 

in a less extreme form, calls for Taiwan to eschew expensive conventional capabilities—such as major surface and undersea combatants, fighter jets, and missile defenses—in favor of a ground-based, survivable, 

relatively inexpensive defensive force. The armed 

forces would focus on repelling an invasion and on 

homeland defense, to the exclusion of other missions 

such as counterblockade. Therefore, Taiwan would 

achieve deterrence through demonstrating to China 

that Taiwan would be a bitter pill to swallow, rather 

than through doing so in addition to holding at risk 

anything of value on the Chinese mainland.

While the argument for a porcupine strategy is 

not without merit, adopting it would severely limit 

Taiwan’s options in the event of a crisis. It would 
224

also require Taiwan to outsource the job of countering coercive uses of force short of invasion, when no 

other country (including the United States) has made 

a binding commitment to assume that responsibility.

Taiwan’s own strategy, explicated in its QDR and 

biennial national defense reports, is less narrowly focused. Taiwan’s armed forces have identified a need 

to counter China across the possible spectrum of coercive scenarios and in all domains of warfare. The 

MND argues that it can adopt innovative asymmetric approaches to doing so, but it does not consider 

hunkering down during a blockade or missile barrage 

to be a realistic option, for reasons of deterrence or 

domestic politics.

IS SECURITY WITHIN REACH?

Taiwan faces significant impediments to fielding a 

force capable of carrying out its stated military strategy and, thus, to ensuring its security. The challenges 

are few but significant: declining budgets, questions 

about the viability of an all-volunteer force, uneven 

and uncertain relations with the United States, and, 

of course, the existence of an increasingly imposing 

military force across the Taiwan Strait.

But no less an issue is the political-rhetorical problem in which Taiwan finds itself. To please Washington—Taiwan’s only real security partner—and 

to claim success in managing cross-Strait relations, 

Taipei has had to argue that those relations are better 

than they have ever been. Of course, in some respects 

that is accurate. However, it has not lessened the actual military threat posed by mainland China to Taiwan.

Simply put, Taiwan’s government must do a better 

job of explaining that its policy of engaging with the 
225

mainland does not eliminate the need to provide the 

island with an effective defense; indeed, only when 

Taiwan is secure can it, over the long run, engage China with confidence. Given China’s assertive actions in 

the East and South China Seas and the more forceful 

and ambitious leadership of China’s new president, Xi 

Jinping, addressing this shortcoming is more urgent 

than ever.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. This chapter was originally published as an essay on April 

24, 2014.

2. Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96–8, 96th Cong., April 

10, 1979.

3. Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China, National Defense Report 2013, pp. 58, 60, 61, 66, available from report.

mnd.gov.tw/en/m/minister.html.

4. Ibid., p. 62.

5. Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” 

International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall 2000, p. 82.

6. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 

Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, available from www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.

7. Shirley Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, 

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 3, 2014, 

p. 34, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf.

8. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

9. Kan, pp. 33-34.
226

10. Anti-Secession Law, 10th National People’s Congress, 

3d Session, March 14, 2005, available from www.china.org.cn/

english/2005lh/122724.htm.

11. Executive Yuan, Republic of China Directorate-General of 

Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 2012, Taipei, Taiwan, October 2013, available from 

ebook.dgbas.gov.tw/public/Data/3117141132EDNZ45LR.pdf.

12. Cindy Sui, “Changing Times Force Taiwan to Raise Welfare Spending,” BBC News, April 24, 2013, available from www.

bbc.co.uk/news/business-22243977.

13. Kan, pp. 57-58.

14. National Defense Report 2013, Beijing, China: Ministry of 

National Defense of the Republic of China, 2013, p. 68.

15. Ibid., p. 83.

16. Quadrennial Defense Review 2013, Bejing, China: Ministry 

of Defense of the Republic of China, p. 36, available from qdr.mnd.

gov.tw/file/2013QDR-en.pdf.

17. Chinese National Defense Report 2013, p. 274.

18. Chinese Quadrennial Defense Review 2013, p. 38.

19. Ibid., p. 39.

20. Ibid., p. 38.

21. Zachary Keck, “Taiwan Receives First ‘Carrier Killer’ 

Ship,” The Diplomat, March 14, 2014, available from thediplomat.

com/2014/03/taiwan-receives-first-carrier-killer-ship/.

22. Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan’s Sub-Launched Harpoons Pose New Challenge to China’s Invasion Plans,” Defense 

News, January 6, 2014, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20140106/DEFREG03 /301060013/Taiwan-s-Sub-launched-Harpoons-Pose-New-Challenge-China-s-Invasion-Plans.
227

23. “Taiwan to Deploy 3 More PAC-3 Antimissile Batteries,” 

Want China Times, April 26, 2013, available from www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20130426000077&cid=1101.

24. Aaron Mehta and Wendell Minnick, “F-16 Upgrade 

Dropped From US Budget Proposal, Sources Say,” Defense News, 

January 27, 2014, available from www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.

dll/article?AID=2014301270023; and Wendell Minnick and Aaron 

Mehta, “Taiwan Faces Tough Choices after US Cancels F-16 Upgrade,” Defense News, March 8, 2014, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20140308/DEFREG03/303080020/Taiwan-FacesTough-Choices-After-US-Cancels-F-16-Upgrade.

25. Wendell Minnick and Aaron Mehta, “US Reassures Taiwan on Funding for F-16 Radar Upgrade,” Defense News, March 

23, 2013, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20140323/

DEFREG03/303230008/US-Reassures-Taiwan-Funding-F-16-RadarUpgrade.

26. Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan Displays New Missile Launch 

Vehicle,” Defense News, August 14, 2013, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20130814/DEFREG03/308140013/Taiwan-Displays-New-Missile-Launch-Vehicle.

27. Wendell Minnick, “Q&A with Nien-Dzu Yang,” Defense 

News, November 14, 2012, available from www.defensenews.com/

article/20121114/DEFREG03/311140011/Q-Nien-Dzu-Yang.

28. Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan Working on New ‘Cloud Peak’ 

Missile,” Defense News, January 18, 2014, available from www.

defensenews.com/article/20130118/DEFREG03/301180021/TaiwanWorking-New-8216-Cloud-Peak-8217-Missile.

29. Wendell Minnick and Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan, Taiwan Upgrade Strike Capability,” Defense News, May 7, 

2013, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20130507/DEFREG03/305060016/Japan-Taiwan-Upgrade-Strike-Capability.

30. Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan’s BMD Radar Gives Unique 

Data on China,” Defense News, November 26, 2013, available from 

www.defensenews.com/article/20131126/DEFREG03/311260013/Taiwan-s-BMD-Radar-Gives-Unique-Data-China.
228

31. Mark A. Stokes, Revolutionizing Taiwan’s Security: Leveraging C4ISR for Traditional and Non-Traditional Challenges, Arlington, 

VA: Project 2049 Institute, February 19, 2010, available from www.

project2049.net/documents/revolutionizing_taiwans_security_leveraging_c4isr_for_traditional_and_non_traditional_challenges.pdf.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Chinese Quadrennial Defense Review 2013, p. 53.

35. “Size of Taiwan’s Armed Forces to Be Cut Further,” Focus Taiwan, January 20, 2014, available from www.freesun.be/news/

index.php/size-of-taiwans-armed-forces-to-be-cut-further/.

36. Shang-su Wu, “Taiwan’s All-Volunteer Military,” The Diplomat, December 25, 2013, available from thediplomat.com/2013/12/

taiwans-all-volunteer-military/.

37. Joseph Yeh, “MND Postpones Full Voluntary System to 

2017,” China Post, September 13, 2013, available from www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2013/09/13/388793/

MND-postpones.htm.

38. Cindy Sui, “Can Taiwan’s Military Become a Voluntary 

Force?” BBC News, December 30, 2013, available from www.bbc.

co.uk/news/world-asia-25085323.

39. Joachim Hofbauer, Priscilla Hermann, and Sneha Raghavan, Asian Defense Spending, 2000–2011, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Defense-Industrial 

Initiatives Group, October 2012, available from csis.org/files/

publication/121005_Berteau_AsianDefenseSpending_Web.pdf.

40. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China 2013, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 7, 2013, available from www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_

china_report_final.pdf.
229

41. Once the transition is completed, there will continue to be 

universal training for young men of service age, but that training 

will last only 4 months. Beyond that, MND plans to provide 5 to 7 

days of reserve force training twice yearly.

42. Chinese Quadrennial Defense Review 2013, p. 34.

43. William Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” 

Naval War College Review, Vol. 61, No. 3, Summer 2008, available from www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/Research---Gaming/ChinaMaritime-Studies-Institute/Published-Articles/Murray-NWCRSummer08WEB1.pdf.

231

CHAPTER 10

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION’s 

LAND FORCES: LOSING GROUND1

Guillaume Lasconjarias

The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s 

own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the 

NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization.

KEY POINTS

• Of all the service branches, allied land forces 

have borne the brunt of declining defense 

budgets.

• In recent years NATO’s land forces have been 

professionalized and transformed, but their 

ability to carry out the various missions they 

might be tasked with is at risk because of a 

shortage of men and key materiel.

• Maintaining the operational experience and 

combat skills gained from deployments to Iraq 

and Afghanistan will be difficult, although the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Response Force could, if properly structured, 

help ease that problem.

The state of NATO’s land forces is something of a 

paradox. Although the alliance has no equal in terms 

of its gross domestic product, commands a wealth 

of human and social capital, and boasts the world’s 

largest aggregate defense sector, NATO’s land forces 

in particular have lost ground when it comes to their 

overall combat capacities.
232

In member states, the effects of the worldwide 

economic crisis on defense budgets have been compounded by dwindling public support for the continued commitment of national armed forces to apparently insoluble foreign conflicts. Nevertheless, as the 

alliance draws down its longest and costliest mission 

in Afghanistan, now is the time to review the lessons 

learned from a decade of sustained combat operations 

and to ensure they are implemented in time for the 

next major deployment. Overall, the idea is to shift 

from a “NATO deployed” to a “NATO ready” mode; 

the challenge, according to U.S. General Philip Breedlove, current supreme allied commander in Europe, is 

to maintain the operational excellence acquired over 

the past decade.2

At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, 

land forces play a vital role, ensuring not only readiness for action at very short notice, but also ability to 

stay the course. Ground action is a major requirement 

in the three-step sequence of intervention, stabilization, and normalization and includes a wide range of 

missions from coercion to civil assistance.3 To quote a 

former chief of staff of the French Army:

Since war is mainly a question of controlling the population concerned . . . it will inevitably involve controlling the territories where these populations live—particularly urban areas, but also areas where ports and 

airports are situated. This means that troops on the 

ground will always be needed—and in sufficient numbers!—if one wishes . . . to obtain anything like a decisive victory. As a result, these troops on the ground 

will remain at the core of any future forces system.4

This is all the more problematic with the types of 

operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, where 
233

civil war-like conditions raised the need for a very demanding level of territorial control only achievable by 

ensuring a high ratio of soldiers per inhabitant. Yet, 

with few exceptions, European armies continue a deflationary trend, moving more and more toward the 

status of “sample” or “bonsai” armies, which, in turn, 

risks breaking these smaller forces when deployed 

often and continuously.5

Some analysts see the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific 

region as portending more generally the downsizing 

of both land force capacities and the role of land forces 

in future defense strategies. The growing emphasis on 

a new anti-access and area denial paradigm prioritizes 

air, naval, and amphibious operations. This idea is 

also gaining currency in Europe, where some politicians have even gone so far as to propose excluding 

land forces from any future operations.6

But many lessons learned over the past 2 decades 

of alliance operations lend support to the idea of maintaining credible land capabilities of an appropriate 

size and with a high level of technological sophistication. As Lieutenant General Frederick Hodges stated 

when NATO Allied Land Command Izmir (Turkey) 

became operational: 

Our tradition after every war has been repeating the 

mistake of reducing land forces to save money, believing that we can avoid casualties in future wars by 

relying more on air and sea power . . . and each time, 

we are required to hastily rebuild land forces to meet 

the threats the nation consistently fails to accurately 

anticipate.7

But whether NATO can avoid repeating this mistake in the face of eroding defense budgets and the 

uncertainty of a larger allied strategic vision is a ques-
234

tion that remains both open and in need of answering 

sooner rather than later.8

TRANSFORMING LAND FORCES

The major challenge NATO member states face 

is to translate current security requirements into real 

operational capabilities.9 Threats such as international 

terrorism and failed states have emerged alongside 

the more traditional threats posed by interstate tensions—a problem set that has reemerged with the 

Russian invasion of Ukraine.

To meet this complex set of security problems, 

since the end of the Cold War, NATO and its member 

states have made extraordinary efforts to transform 

their command and force structures, even in the face 

of declining budgets. Among the European NATO 

members, land forces have a number of common 

features:

• With few exceptions, conscription armies have 

been superseded by wholly professional forces.

• The “heavy” equipment for land forces of 

the Cold War period (for example, tanks and 

ground-based artillery) geared to an East-West 

conflict has given way to a new generation of 

high-tech equipment based on the principles of 

network-centric warfare.

• Command structures have been radically 

changed with the advent of standing multinational commands.

• New doctrines highlight the crucial role land 

forces play in stabilization operations and need 

to take a comprehensive approach involving 

political, military, and civilian assets when 

managing an armed intervention.10
235

But these changes have, in the face of fewer overall resources, come at a cost. No armed-service branch 

seems to have borne the brunt of these budget cuts 

more than the land forces, with troop numbers in 

some cases halved and equipment budgets slashed by 

two-thirds.11

The professionalization of NATO armies began in 

the 1990s. With the exceptions of Norway, Denmark, 

Estonia, Greece, and Turkey, most armies are now 

wholly professional. This meant a complete change 

not only in format, but also in the very way forces are 

structured. Thus, between 1996 and 2013, numbers 

in the French Army decreased from 268,572 to just 

more than 119,000. In the United Kingdom (UK), current troop numbers (99,800 in 2013) will be brought 

down to 82,000 by 2020.12 For Germany’s army, the 

trend is even clearer: the ongoing reform envisages 

a maximum of 61,000 soldiers. This compares with a 

total of 239,950 troops in 1996, of which 124,700 were 

conscripts.

The cuts are even more substantial among the former Warsaw Pact members. Joining NATO spurred 

them to place a priority on quality of land forces over 

quantity. For example, Polish land forces now total 

just 25 percent of the numbers they boasted just 20 

years ago, while the Bulgarian army has shrunk from 

50,400 (33,300 conscripts) in 1996 to 16,300 in 2013 

and has eliminated all four tank brigades in favor of 

lighter infantry and more mobile mechanized units.13

Throughout the alliance, units are being disbanded, 

facilities closed, and territorial defense structures 

reviewed.

This erosion of troop numbers limits the possible 

number of operational commitments a government 

can make and the size of the contingents that can be 
236

deployed. In France, for instance, the land forces envisaged under the 2014-19 military planning law will 

total 66,000 deployable soldiers, with a maximum 

commitment of 15,000 at any one time.14 This means 

that, in little over a decade, France has gone from having a goal of being able to deploy 50,000 at any given 

time to a number less than two-thirds that figure.

The UK, meanwhile, aims to have a rapid-response 

force totaling five brigades, with the goal of having one 

brigade available at all times.15 Based on a 36-month 

training and potential deployment cycle, this would 

allow the UK to undertake a brigade-level operation 

and two additional missions, one complex (up to 2,000 

troops) and one simple (up to 1,000 troops).16 Finally, 

in the case of the other major European power, Germany plans to have the ability to deploy up to 4,000 

troops in two operational theaters and contribute 

about 1,000 troops for special operations, evacuation 

missions, or the NATO Response Force and European 

Union (EU) Battlegroups.17 Given the potential manpower and resources available to both of these countries, the goals set on the number of deployable land 

forces are relatively modest.

For other nations, levels of potential operational 

commitment are less clearly formulated. In Italy, 

where land forces are still in the process of downsizing, projectable contingents are defined by the annual 

budget. Poland, after having been heavily involved 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, seems to be abandoning expeditionary capacity in favor of solely territorial deployment. In an official statement on August 15, 2013, 

President Bronisław Komorowski announced that the 

days of sending “Polish soldiers to the antipodes” 

were past.18
237

These limitations in deployable numbers are, theoretically, mitigated by the fact that national doctrines 

in most cases assess the legitimacy of any potential 

operation according to the number of democratic allies that would be involved. Thus, the general trend 

is in favor of coalition-based operations, either with 

a preferred partner (as in the case of the future Franco-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, born 

from the November 2010 Lancaster House Treaties) 

or by participating in an EU- or NATO-sanctioned 

operation.

Further efforts at mitigating the impact of shrinking force sizes include the introduction of unmanned 

robotic systems to replace personnel in certain functions—for example, the growing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the deployment of robots for 

anti-improvised explosive device (IED) operations—

and the greater reliance on smaller, albeit expensive, 

special forces to carry out specified missions.19 In addition, reserve troops in some countries are growing 

in strength. Here, the British and Canadian models 

seem to be better established than in most other member states. However, the use of reserve troops is still 

subject to two major constraints: the actual availability 

of reservists and the quality of their training.20

But the fact remains that the nature of the conflicts experienced by NATO members since the end 

of the Cold War inescapably indicates that troops 

are still needed on the ground—and sometimes in 

considerable numbers if the overall mission is to be 

accomplished.
238

WHAT EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH OPERATIONS?

The economic crisis affects not only troop numbers 

but also the ability to introduce new equipment, with 

consequences for future force models. Further complicating the effort to upgrade platforms and weapon systems has been the constant pace of recent operations 

and those operations’ particular equipment needs.

These considerations have led to radical choices in 

some nations. One example is European allies decommissioning their heavy tank units. While the modern 

tank is still a potent weapon and often overlooked as 

an efficient and relevant tool in current stability operations, Europe may only have 450 to 600 modern main 

battle tanks to be distributed among France, the UK, 

and Germany in a near future.

In the Netherlands, battle tanks have been totally 

eliminated. Interestingly, this decision was based not 

on an analysis of the operational environment but on 

budget-related considerations: 

The cuts imposed on the Royal Netherlands Forces . . .

are an indirect consequence of the international economic crisis [and] there are no underlying strategic or 

political considerations other than the obvious need to 

recover economic health.21

Similarly, budget constraints have led Germany to 

halve its orders for Tiger attack helicopters (from 80 

to 40) and those for the multirole NH90s (first from 

122 to 80, then to 64). The budget forecast for Puma 

vehicles has been reduced from 410 to 342 while the 

number of Leopard 2 tanks will drop from 350 to 225.22

The same trend can be seen in the UK, where 188 main 

battle tanks are to be cut from the land force, and the 

AS-90 self-propelling artillery system phased out.23
239

Squeezed by tight budgets, governments tend to 

view the modernization process as an opportunity to 

maintain national industries. France, Italy, the UK, 

and Germany, for example, each have their own model of heavy tanks. Meanwhile, in Turkey, where the 

first wave of modernization in the late-1980s included 

updating the oldest equipment with foreign buys, priority has now been given to the production and adoption of military equipment that has been domestically 

produced since the late-2000s. Pride of place goes to 

the $500 million Altay T battle tank project, with delivery scheduled to start in 2015.24 Poland, too, has 

outlined a modernization effort it hopes to use to support and transform its defense industry.25

There is both an economic and political rationale 

for nations to keep specific manufacturing competences. No nation with a defense industry wants to 

give up such a resource, particularly when doing so 

could cause an increase in unemployment. Yet, for the 

period from 2010 to 2020, there are no fewer than 17 

programs for the production of armored vehicles.26

Moreover, there is a tension between the desire to 

quickly update obsolescent materiel and the need to 

procure equipment over a period of years for budgetary reasons. This creates a stock of equipment from 

different generations. The British FV432 armored 

caterpillar-track troop carrier, first introduced in the 

1960s, has received upgrades that would extend the 

vehicle’s lifespan to 2020 and beyond and allow it to 

operate alongside much more modern equipment.27

In addition, the need to test new materiel in real-life 

conditions further draws out the lifespan of their predecessors.

Land forces have in some cases also benefited from 

their combat deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
240

obtaining equipment they would otherwise probably 

not have acquired as quickly. This can also result in 

what some experts call the hyper-specialization of 

land forces, with armies’ procurement and logistic 

needs geared to the operational needs of a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.28 Admittedly, modernization has also been positively informed by the 

practical experience of addressing urgent operational 

requirements, even at great expense. For example, 

when faced with new threats such as IEDs, allied land 

forces have chosen to move rapidly toward adopting 

better-protected vehicles.29

For many nations, the urgency to meet this need 

required purchasing vehicles from outside their own 

countries. Following its engagement in Afghanistan, 

the Netherlands purchased 76 Thales Australia Bushmasters between July 2006 and August 2009. Similarly, after seeing dozens of their armored vehicles 

destroyed by IEDs, the British contracted in November 2006 with Force Protection Inc., the producer of 

the American-made Cougar Mine-Resistant Ambush 

Protected Vehicle (MRAP) and supplier to the U.S. 

Marines Corps.

The Mastiff and Ridgeback variants of the Cougar 

MRAP are major items of expense at $623,000 and 

$600,000, respectively. One study estimates that the 

UK purchase of more than 750 vehicles under urgent 

operational procedures, mostly from U.S. suppliers, 

cost more than £260 million (€313 million).30 Norway 

has approached BAE Systems for the upgrading of 

103 CV90 combat vehicles, which were purchased 

from the mid-1990s onward, and the supply of 41 new 

CV90s between 2015 and 2017, accounting for a total 

outlay of about $1 billion.31 In these cases, fleets could 

be too piecemeal or too small to be run effectively. 
241

Vehicles purchased in response to particular needs can 

become the backbone of future fleets, compromising 

plans to modernize future land fleets with significantly 

different architectures.

Currently, European NATO member states are in 

a paradoxical situation, with certain items of capacity 

in excess (particularly infantry combat vehicles) and 

glaring shortfalls in other areas. These shortfalls are 

not tied to land forces alone, of course. For example, 

while difficulties related to strategic aerial transport 

should be corrected with continued procurement of 

the A400-M common European platform, many states 

depend either on extremely expensive outsourcing 

agreements with the private sector or on help from allies with C-5 and C-17 transport aircraft in their fleet 

inventory. Another well-known example is the shortage of UAVs, leading to almost exclusive dependence 

on the United States for battlefield intelligence from 

such platforms, as was the case in Libya and at the 

start of the French operation in Mali.

Helicopters are in particularly short supply. NATO’s experience in Afghanistan has shown their importance in a broad range of missions including timely 

transport, convoy protection, fire support, and intelligence gathering. Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR 

also underlined the full extent of their importance for 

strikes against Muammar Gaddafi’s army in 2011 and 

in providing very close support for the rebel forces.32

Despite their proven utility, there are simply too 

few helicopters and crews in NATO armies. Note the 

British experience in Afghanistan: At the time of its 

initial deployment in Helmand in 2005-06, the UK 

command had eight Apaches and 10 utility helicopters. Parliament soon became concerned about the 

insufficient number and availability of helicopters for 
242

a range of different missions.33 During the following 

years, the number of helicopters deployed grew continuously, reaching a peak of 35 in 2011. Even so, the 

Ministry of Defence had to outsource private helicopter services for delivery of supplies to their troops at 

Helmand bases, at an estimated cost of £4 million per 

month.34

Moreover, the helicopter fleets generally lack interoperability. European allies have two main types of 

new-generation utility helicopters, which are slowly 

being brought into service: the AgustaWestland Merlin HM1 and the NH90. A total of 58 Merlins have 

been ordered by three countries (Italy, Denmark, and 

Portugal), while 270 of the NH90s have been contracted for eight different countries.35 Both models are 

more complex than their predecessors and capable of 

a wider range of tasks, resulting in higher costs and, in 

turn, smaller orders. At the same time, several former 

Warsaw Pact members (namely Hungary, the Czech 

Republic, Poland, and Slovakia) still use old Soviet 

Mil Mi-8s, Mi-17s, or Mi-24s. A declaration of intent 

was signed in 2009 to speed up work on compatibility 

between these helicopters and NATO’s standard for 

its helicopters, but the economic crisis has hindered 

progress.36

Finally, there is no joint multinational helicopter 

command, and few NATO nations have the resources, 

including pilots, for complex air-land operations involving large numbers of helicopters. Moreover, the 

NATO standard of 180 hours of flying time per year is 

rarely met. Pilots in Italy, Germany, and Spain log an 

average of about 100 hours and Polish pilots fly only 

about 40 hours, which is complemented somewhat by 

training on simulators.37 Here again, cost is a major 

consideration. According to one officer, the only way 
243

of ensuring adequate training for French pilots to deploy in operations was an appeal to superiors on the 

need to meet the NATO requirement.38

Recently, increased efforts have been made to 

enhance synergies, increase exchange programs for 

pilots, conduct joint exercises, and develop compatible doctrines. But gaps remain, including the pressing need for allied agreement on the requirements 

tied to the future development of a heavy-transport 

helicopter.

LESSONS FROM THE PAST DECADE

After a decade of crisis management and peacekeeping, the return to war in the early-2000s has had a 

lasting effect on allied land forces. Whereas the contingents deployed to the Balkans—the Implementation, 

Stabilization, and Kosovo Forces—thought in terms 

of stabilization and reconstruction, the turning point 

came with the engagement in Iraq, and then again in 

Afghanistan. In both cases, existing military resources 

and doctrines were ill-suited to the complexities of 

those environments and no longer attuned to the demands of the kind of asymmetric warfare allied land 

forces faced.

Forces were maladapted to the specificities of this 

new warfare on two counts. First, there was an urgent 

need to update materiel with a view to protecting 

forces. Second, there was a pressing need to face the 

challenge of a different environment. From a doctrinal 

perspective, this required an understanding of how 

forces were to be used in COIN operations, which 

was unfamiliar territory to all but a few allies. This 

prompted urgent work on new field manuals by the 

allies, borrowing heavily from the U.S. Army’s 2006 
244

Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency.

39 NATO got into 

the act as well, belatedly publishing the Allied Joint 

Publication (AJP) 3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) in February 2011. While describing 

the need for a “comprehensive approach” involving 

multiple civilian, political, and military organizations 

and agencies in the COIN effort, the document focuses, not surprisingly, on the political role played by 

land forces in this asymmetric environment.40

Undoubtedly, the most significant takeaway from 

allied armies’ experience in Iraq and Afghanistan is 

that the expertise of land forces has to be extended to 

new domains. Originally devised simply to coerce the 

enemy, armies in these environments will now have 

responsibilities across a broad spectrum and, hence, 

will need additional capabilities to address them effectively. This means combining multiple approaches 

to accomplishing strategic goals, emphasizing decentralized command and control, effectively training indigenous forces and, in general, being willing to work 

in a joint forces setting and in conjunction with other 

ministries to provide security in distinct regions, reassure local populations, and rebuild social and governing institutions to reattach the population to a legitimate political authority.

Another key capability that has already proved its 

worth is the security forces assistance mission. Successful training missions can help prevent crises, help 

failed states recover, shorten intervention times, and 

facilitate the withdrawal of foreign allied forces.

From 2004 to 2011, NATO Training Mission-Iraq 

trained more than 15,000 personnel with less than 200 

trainers. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan 

(NTM-A) has been even more successful. At its peak, 

NTM-A employed 2,800 trainers and was working 
245

with 34,000 Afghans across 70 training sites. Even today, there are 1,900 personnel from 39 nations, and 

on any given day, more than 20,000 personnel are 

being trained.

Before NTM-A was operational, only a third of Afghan soldiers met NATO marksmanship standards. 

Today, that figure is 97 percent. The NTM-A’s desired 

end state is one of Afghan ownership. Today, 95 percent of all conventional operations and 98 percent of 

all special operations are conducted by Afghan military and security personnel. While allied and partner 

forces have helped create a space in which a fledging 

army in Afghanistan could get its feet on the ground, 

it is the training mission that will ultimately provide 

the Afghans with the capacity to secure their own 

nation. All of this requires boots on the ground.

THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE

After years of discussion regarding the rationale, 

effectiveness, and role of the NATO Response Force 

(NRF), it has the potential to be a catalyst for maintaining a modern, allied land force.41 Conceived as a 

multinational joint force, the NRF is intended to provide a robust and rapidly deployable coalition force to 

meet a range of missions, from the evacuation of civilians to a high-intensity engagement. The makeup of 

the NRF is straightforward: individual nations make 

contributions to the force structure for 1 year while 

a multinational rapid response command is kept on 

standby. Once a command’s readiness is certified, it 

is set to perform the tasks entrusted to it by the alliance. The NRF is also important as a setting for major 

live exercises. The most recent, Steadfast Jazz 2013, 

brought together some 6,000 troops in Poland. While 
246

there is still considerable discussion about the NRF’s 

potential uses, the force is nevertheless a formidable 

resource that ensures basic levels of training, available 

manpower, and military capacity.

However, the present state of the NRF reflects the 

strengths and weaknesses of the current state of allied armed forces. For 2014, the land component of 

the NRF involves 12 allied countries and one partner 

state, Ukraine. The challenge is keeping the dedicated 

forces operationally prepared for possible deployment 

at short notice. Here, the main problem is that the NRF 

command is not directly in charge of the units that can 

be assigned to it, which are spread out among contributing nations. In addition, there is the problem that 

certain capacities—such as helicopters or UAVs—are 

missing or insufficient in number.

According to some analysts, however, the real issue is somewhat different. The NRF is viewed by some 

in the alliance as not so much a resource for actual use 

as a test bed for increasing interoperability among alliance partners. From this viewpoint, the NRF is about 

allied forces getting acquainted with each other, training under shared procedures, and exploring new operational possibilities. The NRF thus offers a platform 

for operational convergence, promoting a common 

spirit through a network of certified units.42

The NRF is particularly important in relation to 

the upcoming withdrawal from Afghanistan and the 

apparent end of alliance forces’ major foreign engagements. It can help ensure that standards are maintained and that some percent of the forces are kept in 

a state of readiness. Participation in exercises and the 

mandatory certification process also ensure that financial resources are earmarked by governments. Finally, 

the NRF process allows alliance forces the unique 
247

opportunity to experiment with new technologies and 

operational concepts, with an important trickle-down 

effect on their respective militaries.

CONCLUSION

The ongoing reforms in European armies were initially nurtured in the 1990s by a number of illusions, 

starting with the idea that land force-intensive wars 

were a thing of the past and, in turn, that peacekeeping 

or peacebuilding missions were going to predominate 

future land force use. These reforms thus faced the 

challenges of governments giving even greater priority to domestic programs and of a major economic crisis in recent years. The result: cost-saving became the 

principal consideration, with the brunt of the related 

cuts mostly borne by member states’ land forces. The 

low level of overall strength they have now reached 

leaves them weakened and even jeopardizes their 

overall coherence. Facing on the one hand demanding 

deployments over the past decade and, on the other, 

continual attempts at reorganization and transformation, it is hardly surprising that, while Europe’s allies 

have an abundance of manpower, in 2012 they had 

some 1.56 million soldiers under arms, but less than 5 

percent really deployable.

Concentrating on core combat capabilities at the 

expense of combat support functions such as logistics 

and engineering initially made it possible for defense 

ministries to continue making substantial contributions to alliance military missions. However, the shortfalls are now apparent, with the major European land 

powers (France, the UK, and Germany, followed by 

Italy and Spain) struggling to maintain the necessary 

component parts that constitute a land force capable 
248

of joint air-land operations. They are now mere “sample” forces, kept at a level of numbers and materiel 

that makes them increasingly irrelevant as individual 

nation-state combatants.

How might the future look, then? One possible 

model now being touted is that of the 2013 French-led 

operation in Mali. With Paris in the lead and its forces 

with resources in locations in and around the zone of 

conflict, NATO and EU allies were able to support the 

French operation by providing additional needed capabilities such as UAVs, airlift, and intelligence. But 

this model might not be so easily duplicated, requiring a political leadership, like the French, willing to 

assert its strategic will and have sufficient deployable 

combat power both to address the contingency and be 

the core element around which allies can help fill in 

missing operation pieces. Whether this coalition of the 

willing can be a true model for future force planning 

is far from clear.43

But as Western armies have discovered in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Lebanon with Hezbollah, dealing 

with irregular forces is operationally difficult, complex, and resource intensive. This has generated reluctance among both politicians and publics to deploy 

their forces, especially their land forces, far afield and 

for a long time. Not surprisingly, this has, in turn, 

led governments and strategists to look to high-tech 

weaponry and special forces conducting quick in-andout strikes to carry the load. But, like the Mali model, 

there are limits to what U.S. General H. R. McMaster 

calls “global swat teams” can accomplish.44

Nevertheless, a fundamental reality of war and 

politics remains: at times, only the physical presence of 

land forces can offer the hope of resolving a crisis and 

stabilizing the situation on the ground. These forces’ 
249

adaptability and capacity to engage in a broad range 

of missions is thus part of the resources that government leaders must still have if they hope to meet their 

respective countries’ larger foreign policy goals.45 War 

weary or not, NATO members are ignoring tactical 

and strategic realities—and, indeed, history—if they 

believe that continuing to drain their land forces of 

numbers and capabilities is either wise or sustainable.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. This chapter was originally published as an essay on June 

4, 2014.

2. Jonathan Marcus, “NATO Commander Philip Breedlove 

on Post-Afghan Future,” BBC News, July 3, 2013, available from 

www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23157256.

3. Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, “Stratégie, ‘opératique’ et tactique: La place des forces terrestres” (“‘Operatic’ Strategy and Tactics: The Place of Ground Forces”), December 2005, 

available from www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/anciennespublications/articles-sur-le-retex/retex-doctrine/doctrine-07; Charles 

Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block 

War,” Marines Magazine, January 1999, available from www.au.af.

mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm; and Rupert Smith, 

The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, London, 

UK: Allen Lane, 2005.

4. Elrick Irastorza, “Forces armées: peut-on encore réduire un 

format ‘juste insuffisant’?” (“Armed Forces: Can a “Just Enough” 

Format Be Further Reduced?”), Paris, France: French Senate, 

Commission on Foreign Affairs and Defense, July 18, 2012, available from www.senat.fr/rap/r11-680/r11-680_mono.html.

5. Christian Mölling, “Europe without Defense,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2011, available from www.isn.ethz.

ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=135191&lng=en.
250

6. Ben Barry, “The Age of Gloom? Implications for Key NATO 

Armies,” Land Warfare, Vol. 33, No. 4, July 2013, p. 3, available 

from www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201307_NB_Barry.pdf.

7. Frederick Hodges, “Ensuring That Land Forces Remain 

Decisive for NATO,” Army Magazine, May 2013, pp. 51-54, available from www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2013/05/

Documents/Hodges_May2013.pdf.

8. The economic crisis has accentuated the already-marked 

reductions in defense budgets. Currently, all European NATO 

members except Poland are following this trend. Average defense 

expenditure for member states is 1.6 percent, with considerable 

disparities. According to the latest official NATO figures, 2 countries (Greece and the UK) meet the objective of spending 2 percent 

of gross domestic product on defense (excluding pensions); eight 

countries (Albania, Croatia, Estonia, France, Norway, Poland, 

Portugal, and Turkey) spend 1.5 to 2 percent, 12 countries spend 

1 to 1.5 percent (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Czech Republic, 

Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, 

and Slovenia), and only three countries spend less than 1 percent 

on defense (Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Spain). See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Public Diplomacy Division, “Financial 

and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” press release, 

April 13, 2012, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_

85966.htm.

9. Olivier de France and Nick Whitney, Étude comparative des 

livres blancs des 27 états membres de l’Union européenne: pour la définition d’un cadre européen (Comparative Study of White Papers of 

the 27 Member States of the EU: To Define a European Framework),

Paris, France: Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire, 2012, available from www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/185008/2037037/file/Etude%2018-2012.pdf.

10. This partly reflects information given by Antonio Missiroli, ed., Enabling the Future: European Military Capabilities 2013-2025: 

Challenges and Avenues, Report No. 16, Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, May 2013, p. 9, available from www.

iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_16.pdf.
251

11. This is particularly true in Southeast Europe, according to Anton Bebler, Sodobni vojaški izzivi (Security Challenges in 

South Eastern Europe), Ljubljana, Republic of Slovenia: Ministry of Defence, November 2013, pp. 39-50, available from www.

slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/

svi_15_3.pdf.

12. The British model nevertheless prioritizes the role of 30,000 

trained reservists within an integrated army, bringing total numbers to 112,000. See UK Ministry of Defence, Transforming the British Army: An Update, July 2013, p. 18, available from www.army.mod.

uk/documents/general/Army2020_Report_v2.pdf#search=July2013.

13. “Chapter 4: Europe,” The Military Balance 2012, London, 

UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS), March

2012, pp. 112, 143.

14. The military planning law also entails a reduction of land 

forces by 6,000 and the loss of a joint-force brigade. See Gwenegan 

Bui, “Avis relatif à la programmation militaire pour les années 

2014 à 2019 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense 

et la sécurité nationale” (“Notice on the Military Planning for the 

Years 2014-19 and Containing Various Provisions on Defense and 

National Security”), No. 1540, French National Assembly, November 2013, pp. 18-19, available from www.assemblee-nationale.

fr/14/rapports/r1540.asp.

15. Transforming the British Army, p. 6.

16. See Her Majesty’s Government, Securing Britain in an Age 

of Security: Strategic Defence and Security Review, October 2010, pp. 

19, 24, available from www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/

dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf.

17. Federal Ministry of Defence, Die Neuausrichtung der 

Bundeswehr (The Reorientation of the Bundeswehr), March 2013, p. 

39, available from www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzIzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY4NjY2NjM2NmM2Mjc5NjQyMDIwMjAyMDIw/

Die%20Neuausrichtung%20der%20Bundeswehr_M%C3%A4rz%20

2013_final_Internet.pdf.
252

18. Patrycja Bukalska, “The Polish Army: New Armor for a 

New Mission,” Visegard, Hungary, October 5, 2013, available 

from www.visegradrevue.eu/?p=1840.

19. This trend was reflected in the establishment of the NATO 

Special Operations Headquarters in June 2007. According to its 

website, its “co-location with the Allied Command Operations 

(ACO) strongly affirms the NSHQ’s function and support in 

providing Special Operations advice to SACEUR.” See NATO, 

“NSHQ: About,” available from www.nshq.nato.int/nshq/about/.

20. Hence the need for innovative reforms in this area. See 

Guillaume Lasconjarias, Send the Reserve! New Ways to Support 

NATO through Reserve Forces, Research Paper No. 99, Rome, Italy: 

NATO Defense College, 2013, available from www.ndc.nato.int/

download/downloads_fr .php?icode=398.

21. Interview with Peter van Uhm, Défense et Sécurité Internationale, (International Defense and Security), No. 74, October 

2011, pp. 40-43.

22. Federal Ministry of Defence, Die Neuausrichtung der 

Bundeswehr, pp. 35-45.

23. Andrew Dorman et al., The Implications of Military Spending 

Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members, Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution, July 2012, p. 12, available from www.brookings.edu/

research/papers/2012/07/military-spending-nato-odonnell.

24. With initial delivery of 250 tanks and a subsequent 

batch of an additional 750, the aim is to replace the venerable 

M48 Patton.

25. Dominik P. Jankowski, Beyond Air and Missile Defense: Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces, Issue Brief No. 132, Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis, September 5, 2013, 

available from cepa.org/content/beyond-air-and-missile-defense-modernization-polish-armed-forces. See also Andrew A. Michta, “Polish 

Hard Power: Investing in the Military as Europe Cuts Back,” AEI 

National Security Outlook, December 2013, available from www.aei.

org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/nato/polish-hard-powerinvesting-in-the-military-as-europe-cuts-back/.
253

26. Acquiring equipment from national manufacturers rather 

than off the shelf or through participation in multinational programs is not wholly disadvantageous, however. Consider the 

French Army’s armored combat infantry vehicle (véhicule blindé 

de combat d’infanterie), which, at a unit cost of €4 million, is six 

times more expensive than its predecessor. However, the new 

vehicle proved its worth during Operation SERVAL in Mali, enhancing troops’ effectiveness by offering increased protection and 

fire support. See Jacques Marie Bourget, “‘On y allait pour leur 

casser la figure’, déclare le Général Barrera” (“’We Went There 

to Hit Them Hard,’ Said General Barrera”), Mondafrique, November 22, 2013, available from www.mondafrique.com/lire/decryptages/2013/11/22/on-y-allait-pour-leur-casser-la-figure-declare-le-generalbarrera.

27. Jean-Jacques Mercier, “La reconstruction des APC, deux 

approches” (“The Reconstruction of APC, Two Approaches”), 

Défense et Sécurité Internationale, No. 67, February 2011, pp. 93-97. 

The British Army still has more than 1,500 FV432s, including almost 1,000 that were involved in this upgrade between 2005 and 

2011 at a cost of nearly £230 million.

28. See Mark Philips, Exercise Agile Warrior and the Future 

Development of UK Land Forces, RUSI Journal, May 2011, p. 15, 

available from www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/agilewarrior.pdf; and 

Barry.

29. The procurement procedures are very cumbersome in 

some nations. In France, according to official statistics issued by 

the integrated structure in charge of ensuring operational readiness of materiel for land operations (the SIMMT), the lead time 

is “7 months, on average, to purchase a complete item of materiel by adapted procedure . . . and 18 months on average for an 

agreement regarding maintenance.” See “Le bilan contractuel” 

(“The Contract Review”), Les échos de la SIMMT, (The Echoes of the 

Integrated Structure of the Operational Maintenance of Army Equipment [SIMMT]), No. 6, February 2012, pp. 2-5, available from 

www.asso-minerve.fr/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Les_Echos_de_la_

SIMMT_n-_6.pdf.

30. Chris Maughan, “The Impact of UORs on the UK Defence 

Industry,” RUSI Journal, February 2009, pp. 90-93, available from 

www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_Maughan_Feb09.pdf.
254

31. Stephen Gilbert, “Improving the Survivability of NATO 

Ground Forces,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly, October 13, 2013, p. 5, available from www.nato-pa.

int/shortcut.asp?FILE=3302.

32. Apache attack helicopters operating from the HMS Ocean

logged about 50 sorties, firing 99 Hellfire missiles and 4,800 

30-millimeter shells against a total of 116 targets. French helicopters launched from landing platform docks destroyed more than 

550 targets in 40 sorties. The Tiger, operating mostly at night, fired 

1,500 rockets, and the Gazelle shot 430 high subsonic optical remote-guided, tube-launched missiles. See Lessons Offered from the 

Libya Air Campaign, London, UK: Royal Aeronautical Society, July 

2012, pp. 10-11, available from www.aerosociety.com/Assets/Docs/

Publications/SpecialistPapers/LibyaSpecialistPaperFinal.pdf.

33. Parliament, House of Commons Defence Committee, 

“The UK Deployment to Afghanistan: Government Response 

to the Committee’s Fifth Report,” Sess. 2005-06, June 13, 2006, 

p. 5, available from www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/

cmselect/cmdfence/1211/1211.pdf.

34. Caroline Wyatt, “Crucial Role of Helicopters in Afghanistan,” BBC News, March 2, 2010, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

uk_news/8545695.stm.

35. It should be noted that delivery times are long, and cancellations or reductions could further limit the final total. For 

France, delivery of NH90s will continue until 2024, meaning that 

almost-obsolescent helicopters will have to be kept until 2030. See 

French National Assembly Committee on National Defense and 

Armed Forces, Compte rendu n°13 (Report No. 13), October 16, 

2013, available from www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/13-14/

c1314013.asp.

36. Enhancing NATO’s Operational Helicopter Capabilities: The 

Need for International Standardisation, Kalkar, Germany, Joint Air 

Power Competence Center, August 2012, p. 10, available from 

www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/Helicopter_Capabilities_web.pdf.

37. Ibid., p. 7.
255

38. Private interview with a French officer in Marseille, 

France, April 15, 2013.

39. Field Manual (FM) 3-24: Counterinsurgency, Washington, 

DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 16, 2006, available from www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf.

40. See AJP-3.4.4, pp. 1-5, available from info.publicintelligence.

net/NATO-Counterinsurgency.pdf: 

It should invigorate existing processes and strengthen 

relationships at the joint, inter-agency and multinational 

levels. A comprehensive approach should also consider 

actors beyond government, such as NGOs, IOs and others all conduct activities that have a bearing on the overall outcome. This is particularly relevant for land forces 

at all levels where they should expect to operate alongside these actors.

41. For more on the NRF and related topics, see Guillaume 

Lasconjarias, The NRF: From a Key Driver of Transformation to a 

Laboratory of the Connected Forces Initiative, Research Paper No. 88, 

Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, January 2013, available from 

www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=363.

42. Anthony King, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces: 

From the Rhine to Afghanistan, New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 2011, p. 92.

43. Sidney Freedberg, “The Army Cuts: 3 Truths, 4 Fallacies,” 

Breaking Defense, February 24, 2014, available from www.breakingdefense.com/2014 /02/the-army-force-cuts-3-truths-4-fallacies.

44. Ibid.

45. The tensions and violence in the Central African Republic 

are a case in point, requiring France to deploy several hundred 

extra troops.

257

CHAPTER 11

UNITED KINGDOM HARD POWER: 

STRATEGIC AMBIVALENCE1

Paul Cornish

KEY POINTS

• On a comparative scale, the United Kingdom 

(UK) remains a significant military power with 

significant operational experience.

• Since the Cold War’s end, Britain has attempted to adapt to a more complex set of security 

problems while simultaneously cutting force 

structure.

• As a result, the UK strategic field of vision has 

shrunk: it has increasingly adopted a preference for military operations that are far away, 

fairly small, or relatively brief.

Over the past 2 decades, the relatively settled animosity of the Cold War has been replaced by a range 

of diverse, complex, and often very urgent security 

threats and challenges, albeit of a lesser scale. The 21st 

century is not proving to be as dangerous as some had 

feared, but neither is it as stable as many would wish.

As well as uncertainty, diversity, complexity, and 

urgency, there are scarcity and austerity: national 

strategy must compete for scarce resources and must 

take its share of continuing retrenchment in public 

spending. Pity the strategist expected to make durable 

and coherent decisions under such circumstances.

Yet national strategy is not a fair-weather activity; 

decisions must be made and cannot be postponed until 
258

more favorable circumstances arise. Among the most 

complicated of these decisions are those that concern a 

country’s military force structure—the material basis 

of its so-called hard power. These decisions require a 

reasonably settled “threat picture” around which to 

construct a military architecture; sufficient flexibility 

to deal with unanticipated threats and challenges; political, public, and media support if the decisions are 

to be maintained over time; advanced technological 

knowledge; and, finally, a very high level of political 

and institutional confidence in spending vast amounts 

of public money on platforms and equipment that 

might well be in service for decades.

The purpose of this chapter is to gauge the strategic 

quality and vitality of UK hard power. I argue that it is 

not currently in the best of health and for reasons that 

are often misunderstood. There is widespread concern that UK armed forces have recently been reduced 

too far and, furthermore, that these reductions are 

symptomatic of a deep malaise in the British national 

psyche: a form of strategic “declinism,” perhaps.

I do not believe that a narrow assessment of the 

size, shape, and capability of a country’s armed forces 

reveals all that is to be said about its strategic ambition and, indeed, its hard power. UK armed forces are 

certainly smaller in 2014 than they were in 1945 (at 

the end of World War II), in 1982 (at the beginning 

of the Falklands War), and in 1989 (at the beginning 

of the end of the Cold War), but these comparisons 

tell us little. As well as assessing size and capability, 

a complete analysis of a nation’s hard power requires 

an answer to one further question: what will it be for?

Since the end of the Cold War, UK military power 

has become less concerned with the defense of the 

country’s territory (including its overseas posses-
259

sions), its airspace, and its territorial waters and is 

much more concerned with addressing strategic challenges to the UK at those challenges’ point of origin. 

In his introduction to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review

(SDR), then-secretary of state for defense George Robertson argued that “[i]n the post-Cold War world, we 

must be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than have 

the crisis come to us.”2 This notion of self defense at 

arm’s length subsequently became a leitmotif in UK 

national strategy, attracting bipartisan consensus.

The first and most obvious indicator of the strength 

and scope of UK hard power is the amount Her Majesty’s Government spends on the country’s military 

force posture. The next indicator is capabilities: the 

platforms, equipment, weaponry, and personnel necessary for military commitments and for what are now 

described as expeditionary operations. Hard power is 

also reputational, concerned with the nation’s experience with military operations and those operations’ 

effectiveness. Finally, hard power is the expression of 

foreign policy outlook and strategic intent.

Although national strategy is concerned with the 

future, a nation’s strategic posture—particularly its 

hard power—cannot develop in an instant and must 

evolve over time. This chapter covers the 15-year period from July 1998 to December 2013, beginning with 

the publication of the newly elected Labour Party government’s SDR, which marked the beginning of a new, 

genuinely post-Cold War era in strategic UK thinking.

UK MILITARY EXPENDITURE 

Military expenditure can be surprisingly difficult 

to track, as accounting procedures change from time 

to time. Nevertheless, it offers some indication of a 

country’s intentions and seriousness.
260

The data in Figure 11-1 do not paint a picture of 

radical decline in UK military expenditure since 1998, 

nor even gradual decline, for that matter. On the contrary, annual spending has been held at a healthy 

level, allowing the UK to maintain its position as 

one of the world’s top military spenders, even in the 

straitened economic circumstances following the 2008 

financial crisis. Military expenditure as a percentage 

of gross domestic product (GDP) has likewise remained above the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) benchmark: together with the United States 

and Greece, the UK is one of only three NATO allies 

to have held to the 2006 commitment to spend a minimum of 2 percent of GDP on defense.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database, available from www.sipri.org/

reesearch/armaments/milex/milex_database.

Notes: Beginning in the late-1990s, UK defense budgeting was 

moved over a period of years from cash accounting to resource accounting and budgeting. The percentage of GDP figure includes 

military pensions, in accordance with NATO’s 2004 revised definition of military expenditure.

Figure 11-1. Military Expenditure, 1998-2013.
261

This is not to suggest that discussion of UK military expenditure has been entirely free from contention. Since the transfer of power from the Labour to 

Coalition government in 2010, the UK defense debate 

has been dominated by the discovery of a so-called 

black hole in the defense budget: an unfunded liability of committed expenditure (largely on new equipment) between 2010 and 2020. A figure of £38 billion 

(roughly equivalent to the UK annual defense budget) 

is most often cited, although there are uncertainties as 

to how that sum was calculated.

Nevertheless, in September 2011, Defense Secretary Liam Fox announced that the shortfall had almost 

been eliminated, and just months later, Philip Hammond, Fox’s successor, was reportedly confident that 

the black hole had been entirely eliminated and that 

the government would indeed be able to fund the Future Force 2020 (FF2020) modernization program that 

was announced in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).3

In January 2013, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced that it was now in a position to commit as 

much as £160 billion over 10 years to a defense equipment plan “that will enable the MoD to deliver Future 

Force 2020.” In Hammond’s words: 

This £160 billion equipment plan will ensure the UK’s 

Armed Forces remain among the most capable and 

best equipped in the world, providing the military 

with the confidence that the equipment they need is 

fully funded.4

Hammond’s confidence is open to question, however. In the first place, some defense industrialists and 

acquisition analysts are concerned that the MoD has 

simply replaced the irresponsibility of overspend-
262

ing with the neurosis of underspending. By one account, successive “reform,” “transformation,” and 

“efficiency” programs have eroded the skills, morale, 

and strength of the MoD’s civilian staff, resulting in “a 

department of state which, rather unusually, is both 

short of money and, with reduced personnel, lacking 

the capacity to spend the budget allocated to it.”5

Furthermore, certain budgetary assumptions upon 

which the FF2020 construct was based were challenged by a series of cuts and adjustments made in the 

2013 UK government spending review. Not the least 

of these was the decision to depart from past practice 

in the funding of operational military deployments. 

Whereas in the past such costs had come from the 

treasury’s contingency reserve, henceforth, the MoD’s 

main budget will be liable for as much as 50 percent of 

operational costs.

With a recent assessment suggesting that the overall cost of UK involvement in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq could be close to £30 billion, operational 

costs might represent a very significant new charge 

on the defense budget.6 As Andrew Dorman and I 

have argued: 

for these financial reasons alone it is difficult to see 

how the structure and goal of FF2020, as published in 

SDSR 2010, can be considered affordable and therefore 

achievable-unless, as some world-weary commentators suggest, 2025 is to become ‘the new 2020’.7

UK MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The picture is less encouraging when military capabilities are considered. Figures 11-2, 11-3, and 11-4 

show trends in land, naval, and air capabilities, respectively. Each figure shows the regular (full-time 

professional) personnel strength of its featured force 
263

and the key hard-power expeditionary capabilities in 

each case.8

Source: “UK Defence Statistics Compendium,” London, UK: UK 

Ministry of Defence, 1998-2013, available from https://www.gov.uk/

government/statistics/uk-defence-statistics-compendium-2013.

Figure 11-2. UK Land Forces: Strength and 

Deployable Units, 1998-2013. 

The principal land force capability is the battalionsized unit that could form the basis of a deployable 

battlegroup: the army’s armored regiments and infantry battalions, together with Royal Marine commandos. Artillery tactical fire support would also be 

essential to any operational deployment.

Figure 11-2 shows a reduction of land-force personnel by approximately 14 percent between 1998 and 

2013, while the number of deployable battalion-sized 

combat units (including Royal Marine commandos) 

decreased by some 10 percent.9 Although these reduc-
264

tions could scarcely be described as radical, they are 

certainly significant, particularly when lengthy operational commitments are undertaken: the fewer the 

units, the greater the frequency of deployment, with 

attendant effects on morale, family life, and retention. 

Projections to FF2020 show a further 11 percent reduction in both personnel and deployable units from 2013.

Source: “UK Defence Statistics Compendium,” London, UK: UK 

Ministry of Defence, 1998-2013, available from https://www.gov.uk/

government/statistics/uk-defence-statistics-compendium-2013.

Figure 11-3. Deployable Naval Forces, 1998-2013.

As well as the strength of regular naval personnel, 

Figure 11-3 shows the number of warships in three 

categories: attack submarines (SSN); aircraft carriers, 

destroyers, and frigates (principal surface combatants, 

or PSC); and principal amphibious ships (PAS).10
265

The personnel trend in Figure 11-3 shows a reduction of approximately one-third in regular naval personnel between 1998 and 2013, with further reductions 

to be implemented under the FF2020 plan. Although 

the number of PAS has been held constant over this 

period, the number of SSN has been reduced by more 

than 40 percent, and the number of PSC by almost 50 

percent. The PSC trend line includes the temporary 

abandonment of UK aircraft carrier capability, but 

with at least one of the two Elizabeth-class carriers expected to be in commission by 2020.

Source: “UK Defence Statistics Compendium,” London, UK: UK 

Ministry of Defence, 1998-2013, February 25, 2014, available from 

www.dasa.mod.uk/index.php/publications/UK-defence-statistics-compendium; International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military 

Balance.

Notes: The six aircraft categories are fighter and fighter/ground 

attack aircraft; attack helicopters; command, control, and communication aircraft; strategic transport/tanker aircraft; heavy/

medium transport aircraft; and transport helicopters.

Figure 11-4. Deployable Air Forces, 1998-2013.
266

Figure 11-4 shows the regular personnel strength 

of the Royal Air Force and the number of aircraft in six 

key categories. Many UK combat aircraft (both fixed 

wing and rotary) are manned by personnel from both 

the Royal Navy and the British Army; these numbers 

are not represented in the shown personnel strengths.

Between 1998 and 2013, the personnel strength of 

the Royal Air Force shrunk by roughly 37 percent. In 

the same period, the number of fighter and fighter/

ground attack aircraft—arguably the most vivid and 

potent symbol of modern air power—were reduced 

by more than 40 percent. Yet the deployable strength 

of UK command, control, and communication aircraft 

(C4ISTAR) and attack helicopters and transport aircraft (fixed wing and rotary)—collectively essential 

for the projection of hard power in an expeditionary 

setting—were held more or less stable.

Taken together, Figures 11-2 to 11-4 clearly indicate major reductions in the military capability and 

personnel strength of UK armed forces since 1998. But 

the deeper significance of these changes is harder to 

gauge. Reductions in UK military power cannot be 

said to have been negligible, but neither do they seem 

to have been irreversible and fundamental.

Where national military posture is concerned, 

balance should be measured both quantitatively and 

qualitatively. Quantitatively, balance means consistency and equilibrium in political and budgetary commitment to land, sea, and air forces, respectively. By 

this definition, an unbalanced force would be one that 

sacrificed, say, air power to fund a naval construction 

program.

Qualitative balance is achieved by setting the size 

of a force, on the one hand, against its technological 

proficiency and military effectiveness, on the other. 
267

Thus, if a smaller force with better equipment can 

achieve as much or more than a larger force with inferior equipment, then the smaller force might still be 

said to be balanced.

There are, of course, important gaps in this overview—most notably in aircraft carriers, carrier-borne 

fixed-wing air power, and C4ISTAR (including 

maritime patrol). Nonetheless, equipment programs 

are underway to help remedy these acknowledged 

deficiencies.

What should also be borne in mind in this survey 

of UK military capability is military equipment quality 

(MEQ).11 For example, the MEQ of obsolescent aircraft 

such as the Jaguar cannot usefully be set against that 

of the Typhoon and the F-35 Lightning II; the Astute 

class of submarines is more capable than its predecessor, as is the Type 45 destroyer; and the A330 Voyager 

tanker aircraft will be more reliable than its predecessors. Old equipment is scarcely, if ever, replaced on a 

one-for-one basis; where military force is concerned, 

numbers and size are emphatically not everything.

It should also be borne in mind that “capability” 

has long since ceased to be synonymous with “weapon” or “weapon platform”: modern military capability is best understood as a highly sophisticated, integrated C4ISTAR system. This is the case even at the 

level of the individual combatant. The modern infantry soldier, for example, should deploy on operations 

with a variety of high-quality personal, crew-served, 

and indirect-fire weaponry at his or her disposal. Body 

armor and vehicle protection have seen considerable 

improvements, while advanced communications, reconnaissance, and surveillance equipment have ensured unprecedented levels of battlefield situational 

awareness.
268

UK MILITARY OPERATIONS

UK armed forces approached the end of the 1990s 

having acquired considerable and varied operational 

experience. With the bulk of an armored division supported by air and sea power, the UK was the largest 

European contributor to the U.S.-led coalition operations in the 1991 Gulf War.

From 1992 to 1996, UK armed forces were closely 

involved in conflicts resulting from the breakup of 

Yugoslavia, contributing armed troops with air support to the “robust peacekeeping” mission of the 

United Nations Protection Force and the NATO-led 

Implementation Force. During the same period, the 

Royal Air Force contributed to NATO air campaigns 

in former Yugoslavia. It was not until the Good Friday 

Agreement in 1998 that the UK could begin to make 

substantial reductions in its considerable military 

commitment to Northern Ireland, where UK army, 

marine, and air force units had all acquired experience 

over decades in urban counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.

In December 1998, the UK and U.S. air forces undertook Operation DESERT FOX, a 4-day bombing 

campaign against targets in Iraq, in which Royal Air 

Force aircraft flew some 15 percent of the sorties. The 

following year, the UK air force participated in two 

NATO campaigns: Operation ALLIED FORCE against 

targets in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

and, later, Kosovo Force. That same year, one Royal 

Navy warship (HMS Glasgow) and a small contingent 

of British Army troops (with transport aircraft and 

helicopter support) participated in Operation WARDEN, the multinational peacekeeping force deployed 

to East Timor under Australian command.
269

In 2000, the UK mounted two joint operations 

involving land, sea, and air forces in Sierra Leone, 

Africa: Operation PALLISER to evacuate noncombatants from Freetown, and Operation BARRAS to rescue captured British troops. For some months during 

summer 2003, a small contingent of British land and 

air forces took part in Operation ARTEMIS, the European Union-led crisis management operation in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo.

UK military involvement in Afghanistan began 

in late-2001 with a series of joint operations, including Operations VERITAS and FINGAL. In June 2002, 

Operation HERRICK, the UK contribution to the 

NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, 

was launched. Operation HERRICK has involved UK 

land, air, and sea forces in a series of 19 deployments. 

In 2009-10, at the height of the campaign, some 9,500 

UK military personnel were deployed to Afghanistan, 

including infantry, light armor, artillery, and support 

troops, with fixed-wing and helicopter attack aircraft 

and transport and surveillance aircraft.12

In terms of scale, the most demanding UK military 

operation of the past decade was Operation TELIC, 

the British contribution to U.S.-led operations in Iraq 

in March 2003 and the subsequent civil-military occupation and counterinsurgency campaign that lasted 

until 2011. The UK deployed no fewer than 46,000 personnel at the start of the commitment, and the force 

comprised 30 navy warships and support ships, an 

armored division with three combat brigades and a 

logistics brigade, and the full range of fixed-wing and 

helicopter attack aircraft and transport aircraft.13 As 

with Operation HERRICK, Operation TELIC made 

use of the roulement system, with 13 deployments between 2003 and 2011, each lasting about 5 to 6 months.
270

Finally, the UK also contributed to the military 

intervention in Libya from March to October 2011. 

Operation ELLAMY was principally a joint naval-air 

commitment: naval forces included principal surface 

combatants, cruise missile-firing submarines, mine 

countermeasure vessels, and a helicopter carrier (HMS

Ocean); air forces included fighter, strike, C4ISTAR, 

and tanker aircraft, as well as attack and transport

helicopters.

The UK armed forces have acquired a very high 

level of operational experience in the past decade and 

a half. British land, sea, and air forces have been involved in a wide variety of operations: from the very 

brief (4 days) to the very lengthy (13 years), from the 

relatively small (Operation WARDEN) to the very 

large (Operation TELIC), and in several different regions of the world (Africa, Europe, the Middle East, 

South Asia, and Southeast Asia). Although the roulement system used in Afghanistan and Iraq imposed 

significant strain on units and individuals, these longterm military operations in particular have spread the 

direct experience of warfare across UK armed forces.

UK STRATEGIC INTENT

UK national strategic outlook and intent are revealed in four sets of documents that punctuated 

its aforementioned operational experience: the SDR 

(1998), the SDR: New Chapter (2002), the Defence White 

Paper 2003, and the National Security Strategy and 

SDSR (2010).
271

1998: SDR. 

The July 1998 SDR marked a fundamental transition in UK strategic outlook. The confusion and lack 

of direction brought about by the collapse of the 20thcentury Cold War strategic order gave way to a mood 

of cautious engagement with an emergent 21st-century strategic order characterized by insecurity, diversity, and urgency.

The SDR had six significant themes, each of which 

has resonated powerfully in the UK national strategic 

debate ever since. The first of these was the Labour 

government’s determination to conduct a “foreignpolicy led strategic defence review”—an acknowledgement that in all the complexity of the emerging 

international security order, it made little sense for 

foreign policy and national defense to be considered 

separate domains.14

The second theme was risk management. The tone 

of the SDR was cautious: 

there is today no direct military threat to the United 

Kingdom or Western Europe. Nor do we foresee the 

re-emergence of such a threat. But we cannot take this 

for granted.15

Importantly, the argument advanced here was not 

that a defense posture of the Cold War style should 

therefore be maintained “just in case,” but that it was a 

“vital British interest” that these benign trends should 

be encouraged by UK foreign policy. The implication 

for UK national strategy and defense was that they 

should move from “stability based on fear to stability 

based on the active management of these risks.”16
272

The third theme of the SDR was affordability. The 

stated aim of the review was to “provide the country 

with modern, effective and affordable Armed Forces 

which meet today’s challenges but are also flexible 

enough to adapt to change.”17 In an era where no 

“existential” threat to the UK could be identified, the 

defense budget would have to compete with other demands on public expenditure. In the uncertain times 

of the 21st century, spending on security and defense would be expected to provide a certain level of 

“future-proofing” in equipment acquisition.

Savings would also be achieved through technology, the fourth key theme, with the SDR calling for 

“much more precise application of force as a result 

of improvements in intelligence gathering, command 

and control and precision weapons.” The fifth theme 

was alliance building: “For the foreseeable future we 

envisage that the largest operation we might have to 

undertake would be involvement in a major regional 

conflict, whether as part of NATO or a wider international coalition.”18

The sixth and final theme of the SDR is captured in 

the term “expeditionary.” The SDR promised “a fundamental reshaping of our armed forces” resulting in 

a “modernised, rapidly deployable and better supported 

front line.”19 Emphasis was laid on the effectiveness 

and efficiency of joint forces. The SDR confirmed 

the decision to build two new aircraft carriers with 

which UK maritime power would shift from “largescale maritime warfare and open ocean operations in 

the North Atlantic” to “littoral operations and force 

projection.”20

The SDR furthermore stressed the need to be able 

to deploy land forces, making use of improved battlefield reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities and 
273

new platforms such as the Apache attack helicopter. 

Air power, too, would be geared to expeditionary operations: the need for both air superiority and air defense would remain, but air defense of the UK would 

be at a lower priority.21

UK expeditionary force posture also shaped the 

SDR’s defense planning assumptions (DPAs), according to which the UK would either “respond to a major 

international crisis” (such as a full-scale, tri-service 

commitment along the lines of the 1991 Gulf War) or 

“undertake a more extended overseas deployment 

on a lesser scale (as over the last few years in Bosnia) 

while retaining the ability to mount a second substantial deployment.” In the event of the latter, dual 

commitment, the SDR would not expect “both deployments to involve warfighting or to maintain them simultaneously for longer than 6 months.”22

2002: SDR: New Chapter. 

No further, more formal account of the UK strategic outlook was published before the July 2002 appearance of the New Chapter to the SDR.23 The New 

Chapter was an acknowledgement both of the events 

of September 11, 2001, and of the government’s determination not to hold a formal national strategy and 

defense review so soon after the 1998 SDR. The new 

focus on terrorism as a strategic threat did, however, 

prompt an important change of emphasis in the DPAs: 

our analysis suggests that . . . several smaller scale operations are potentially more demanding than one or 

two more substantial operations. And there are now 

signs that frequent, smaller operations are becoming 

the pattern.24
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2003: Defence White Paper.

The expeditionary theme, coupled more closely 

with the idea of long-distance counterterrorism and 

stabilization missions, was taken up again in the 2003 

white paper, which was intended to build on both the 

SDR and the New Chapter “to provide a comprehensive statement of Defence Policy and an assessment of 

the strategic environment in which our Armed Forces 

operate.” The Defence White Paper would be the “security and policy baseline against which future decisions 

will be made to enable the UK’s Armed Forces to meet 

the full range of tasks they can expect to undertake 

in the future.”25 The document remained true to the 

expeditionary idea, albeit with a more pronounced 

counterterrorist flavor than the SDR:

We must extend our ability to project force further 

afield than the SDR envisaged. In particular, the potential for instability and crises occurring across subSaharan Africa and South Asia, and the wider threat 

from international terrorism, will require us both to 

engage proactively in conflict prevention and be ready 

to contribute to short notice peace support and counter-terrorist operations.26

The Defence White Paper thus favored more, lighter, 

and smaller missions for the armed forces. This position was encapsulated in a subtle yet important shift 

in DPAs. Although the document insisted that “our 

forces must retain the capacity to undertake Large 

Scale operations at longer notice in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Gulf Region,” the underlying UK 

strategic intention was clear enough: “Multiple concurrent Small to Medium Scale operations will be the 

most significant factor in our force planning.” The 
275

Defence White Paper continued, “We must therefore 

plan to support the three concurrent operations, of 

which one is an enduring peace support operation, 

that have become the norm in recent years.”27 This was 

no minor reorganization of existing military means: 

the 2003 Defence White Paper confirmed a significant 

change in strategic outlook as the UK began to focus 

more closely, and more explicitly, on “small wars.”

2010: National Security Strategy and SDSR. 

The most recent formal UK strategic review was 

published in 2010 in two parts: the National Security Strategy (NSS), published on October 18, and the 

SDSR, published the following day.28

The NSS was clear in one important respect: “we 

face no major state threat at present and no existential 

threat to our security, freedom or prosperity.” Rather than thinking in terms of large-scale, traditional 

threats, the authors of the NSS thought in terms of risk: 

“The risk picture is likely to become increasingly diverse. No single risk will dominate.” In a three-tiered 

list of “priority risks,” the NSS set out a familiar mix of 

substrategic threats, in response to which UK conventional armed forces would most likely be used at long 

distance and at a relatively low scale. The four Tier 

One risks were international terrorism, cyber attacks 

and cyber crime, a major accident or natural hazard, 

and an “international military crisis between states” 

involving the UK and its allies.29

Other than in the case of the “international military crisis between states” (Tier One) and the case of 

the increased risk of terrorism resulting from “major 

instability, insurgency or civil war overseas” (Tier 

Two), the deployment of UK armed forces in the con-
276

ventional role does not feature prominently in the first 

two tiers of the NSS priority risks table. Significantly, 

the possibility of a “major accident or natural hazard” 

appears as the third of four Tier One risks (a higher 

priority, therefore, than the “international military crisis”), while the prospect of a “large-scale conventional 

military attack on the UK by another state” appears 

only as a Tier Three risk.

To meet the wide and varied range of security risks 

and challenges set out in the NSS, the SDSR offered a 

new strategic policy framework that, in turn, generated eight national security tasks:

1. Identify and monitor national security risks and 

opportunities;

2. Tackle the root causes of instability;

3. Exert influence to exploit opportunities and 

manage risks;

4. Enforce domestic law and strengthen international norms to help tackle those who threaten the UK 

and its interests, including maintenance of underpinning technical expertise in key areas;

5. Protect the UK and its interests at home, at its 

border, and internationally to address physical and 

electronic threats from state and nonstate sources;

6. Help resolve conflicts and contribute to stability 

by, where necessary, intervening overseas, including 

legally using coercive force in support of vital UK interests, and protecting overseas territories and people;

7. Provide resilience for the UK by being prepared 

for all kinds of emergencies, being able to recover from 

shocks, and being able to maintain essential services; 

and,

8. Work in alliances and partnerships wherever 

possible to generate stronger responses.30
277

These eight tasks capture the wide-ranging and 

generally sober tone of both the NSS and SDSR. Yet 

they are not too narrowly concerned with hard power. 

Similarly, of the SDSR’s 35 planning guidelines, only 

eight are directly concerned with the traditional, conventional use of military power. In keeping with the 

mood of caution and constraint, the SDSR’s DPAs 

held to the pattern of the previous decade, expressing 

a preference for military deployments that would be 

either far away, fairly small, or relatively brief. The 

DPAs gave the following alternatives:

1. Conducting an enduring stabilization operation 

at around brigade level (up to 6,500 personnel) with 

maritime and air support as required, while also conducting one nonenduring complex intervention (up to 

2,000 personnel) and one nonenduring simple intervention (up to 1,000 personnel);

2. Conducting three nonenduring operations if the 

UK is not already engaged in an enduring operation; 

or,

3. Committing, for a limited time and with sufficient warning, all UK military effort to a one-off intervention of up to three brigades, with maritime and 

air support (around 30,000, or two-thirds of the force 

deployed to Iraq in 2003).31

Judging by the 2010 NSS and SDSR, the UK strategic outlook is one in which the country will encounter a wide variety of security risks and challenges, 

ranging from natural hazards such as flooding to cyber crime to humanitarian crises to more traditional 

defense tasks, yet stopping short of an “existential” 

threat to the UK and its interests. Consequently, the 

armed forces are expected to undertake a wide variety of tasks, including early warning and intelligence 

gathering, aid to emergency organizations, the provi-
278

sion of a defense contribution to UK influence, and the 

projection of military power within the parameters of 

the 2010 DPAs.

ASSESSMENT

This chapter has charted the recent evolution of 

UK hard power in terms of four performance indicators. The first, military expenditure, has been relatively constant, while the second, military capabilities, shows downward trends, at least in quantitative 

terms. A qualitative assessment of UK hard power 

would certainly be more useful than a simple exercise 

in counting numbers. But because assessment methodologies are relatively underdeveloped, a qualitative 

assessment is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Operational experience, the third indicator of hard 

power, is the only one to show a firm upward trend: 

over the period covered by this chapter, and for several years previously, the UK acquired and consolidated 

a very strong reputation in the effective use of military 

force. The final indicator is strategic intent. Here, UK 

strategic rhetoric has very clearly shrunk.

I suggest three competing explanations for this 

mixed set of results. The first contender is that the evolution of UK hard power since 1998 has been driven 

largely by austerity, and remains so. By this view, 

the priority of successive governments has been to 

reduce the proportion of public expenditure devoted 

to defense as quickly as possible, accepting increased 

strategic risk in what is assumed to be a more benign 

world, to concentrate on restoring the health of the 

national economy.

The “peace dividend” of the early post-Cold War 

period, the argument might continue, was therefore 
279

no passing craze: it outlasted the 1990s and endured 

until it could be reincarnated in the post-2007 mood 

of austerity. There is a convincing aspect to this argument; UK defense is in the grip of austerity budgeting and will remain so for years to come, but it is 

also somewhat exaggerated. Since the 1990s, the UK 

government has, after all, spent a great deal of public money on defense: UK defense spending has consistently exceeded the NATO commitment to spend 

a minimum of 2 percent of GDP on defense, and the 

UK remains in the top ranks globally when it comes to 

defense spending.

The second possible explanation is that in recent 

years there has been a quiet campaign within government to design out UK capacity to act militarily. The 

purpose of this “anti-strategic” effort has allegedly 

been to dismantle UK hard power on the grounds 

that the capacity to intervene gave rise to the temptation to intervene, resulting in the deaths, injuries, expense, and reputational damage to the UK caused by 

Prime Minister Tony Blair-era wars, most notably in 

Afghanistan and Iraq.

Certainly, there are persistent, muttered allegations of government ministers and senior officials who 

have taken it upon themselves to exclude hard power 

from the UK strategic toolbox in preference for an emphasis on the so-called soft power of diplomacy, trading relations, and cultural interaction. By removing 

the capacity to act, the high-minded, internationalist, 

interventionist rhetoric of the government’s declared 

strategic intent would thus become relatively free of 

risk and cost, since little could ever be done about 

it. Although national defense would still consume a 

large share of public spending, that sum would be far 

less than the cost of going to war.
280

This explanation is also unconvincing, however. 

Where defense, security, and military matters are concerned, soft power is valid and valuable, but it is best 

seen as a proxy for hard power rather than a sufficient 

alternative to it. It requires very little understanding 

of strategy to see that the result of a self-emasculation 

program would be for UK hard power to be replaced 

not by soft power but by bluff, and there might be 

nothing more expensive than the insecurity that is exposed when a bluff is called. Fortunately, it is barely 

conceivable that senior people charged with UK national security could have adopted such a strategically 

irresponsible, politically dishonest, and intellectually 

weak position.

If neither austerity nor anti-strategy offers a convincing explanation for the evolution of UK hard 

power, there is a third alternative. The only clear positive trend in the story of UK hard power over the past 

15 or so years is the very high level of operational experience gained by UK armed forces. If the forces have 

remained so effective even under conditions of austerity, then it is at least possible that their success might 

have worked against them by providing a perverse 

disincentive for sustained investment in hard power, 

whether financial, intellectual, or political.

Operational experience might also mask the most 

convincing yet least attractive explanation for the current condition of UK hard power: strategic ambivalence. It cannot be said that the UK has altogether lost 

interest in hard power. But neither can it be said with 

much confidence what that interest is: Why should the 

UK remain interested in hard power? How important 

is hard power to the UK national strategic outlook? Is 

military expenditure seen as a government obligation 

or as a burden to be offloaded whenever and wherever possible?
281

Strategic ambivalence is a national strategic outlook that barely qualifies as such, where the aspiration is to commit as little as possible (politically and 

financially) while retaining the widest possible range 

of strategic options. Ambivalence can be seen at the 

political, strategic, financial, technological, and moral 

levels. Politically, the diminishing capacity for UK 

major operational deployments chimes with public 

antipathy toward large-scale military interventions, 

yet does not remove that option altogether.

Therefore, the expeditionary rhetoric found in the 

NSS and SDSR of 2010, as in earlier statements of strategic intent, need never be tested. Something of this 

sentiment can be found in a comment made by Secretary Hammond in oral evidence to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee in October 2013: 

It would be realistic of me to say that I would not expect—except in the most extreme circumstances—to 

see a manifestation of great appetite for plunging into 

another prolonged period of expeditionary engagement any time soon.32

Strategically, any adjustments in UK expeditionary hard power are offset by competence in other matters, such as counterterrorism and rescue operations, 

which are still perceived by the public and media to 

be serious national security tasks. Financially, the impressive reputation of UK armed forces holds out the 

alluring possibility that further cuts might be made 

(especially in personnel) without any obvious loss of 

competence, particularly if the scale and duration of 

operations are reduced.

Technologically, reductions in bulk hard power 

might rationalize a shift to a more technologically 

oriented posture involving intelligence, surveillance, 
282

precision strike, unmanned combat air vehicles, and 

similar features. These equipment and platforms are 

of interest not only because they are often less costly 

to operate than their conventional equivalents, but 

also because they offer a degree of political deniability 

that is not so readily available when there are boots 

on the ground. Technological warfare might even be 

considered morally preferable in that it should mean 

fewer troops being exposed to the risks of combat.

In some respects, strategic ambivalence is to be 

welcomed. At its most constructive, ambivalence 

could be the basis of a national strategy based on risk 

analysis and management—an approach that is most 

appropriate when national strategy must respond not 

only to a diverse range of security threats and challenges but also to scarcity and austerity.

Yet where matters of hard power are concerned, a 

national strategy based on ambivalence and risk must 

be deliberate rather than accidental and must involve 

careful and difficult decisions rather than expect to 

avoid them altogether. For a risk-based national strategy to be effective, it will require serious thought and 

investment in capabilities such as intelligence gathering, early warning, and communications.33 It remains 

to be seen whether the UK government will remain 

meaningfully committed to a risk-based national 

strategy.

In his first speech as chief of the defense staff in 

December 2013, General Sir Nick Houghton observed 

that “[UK] Defence has for many years, certainly since 

the end of the Cold War, and in strong international 

company within Europe, been managing the decline 

of military hard power.”34 But managed decline is not 

the same as decline; there must be strategic capacity 

and purpose in whatever remains of the process—

however inevitable—of retrenchment.
283

As the basis for national strategy, ambivalence is 

no substitute for analysis and decision, and it cannot 

offer a reassuring glimpse of the future; national strategy will continue to require complex judgments that 

are periodically revised as circumstances change. Finally, it is unwise to expect to be ambivalent about everything in national strategy, particularly hard power: 

national hard power either exists on a militarily meaningful scale or it does not; it either has purpose or it 

does not. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. This chapter was originally published as an essay on July 

8, 2014.

2. Strategic Defence Review, London, UK: UK Ministry of Defence, July 1998, p. 5, available from fissilematerials.org/library/

mod98.pdf.

3. James Blitz, “Fox Claims ‘Black Hole’ of Defence Costs 

Eliminated,” Financial Times, September 26, 2011, available from 

www.ft.com/cms/s/0/22559c66-e847-11e0-9fc7-00144feab49a.html# 

axzz3325j39Yh; and James Blitz, “MoD Plugs £38bn Budget ‘Black 

Hole’,” Financial Times, May 14, 2012, available from www.ft.com /

cms/s/0/efed7ef2-9de9-11e1-9a9e-00144feabdc0 .html#axzz3325j39Yh.

4. UK Ministry of Defence, MoD Reveals £160 Billion Plan to 

Equip Armed Forces, January 31, 2013, available from www.gov.uk/

government/news/mod-reveals-160-billion-plan-to-equip-armed-forces.

5. Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, “Fifty Shades of Purple? A Risk-Sharing Approach to the 2015 Strategic Defence and 

Security Review,” International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 5, September 2013, pp. 1183–1202, available from www.chathamhouse.org/

publications/ia/archive/view/194088.
284

6. Ben Farmer, “Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Were a ‘Failure’ Costing £29bn,” The Telegraph, May 28, 2014, available from 

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10859545/Wars-in-Iraqand-Afghanistan-were-a-failure-costing-29bn.html.

7. Cornish and Dorman, “Fifty Shades of Purple,” p. 1187.

8. All personnel data in Figures 11-2 to 11-4 have been drawn 

from official UK publications. See UK Defence Statistics Compendium (1998–2002) and UK Defence Statistics Factsheets (2003–13), 

London, UK: UK Ministry of Defence, available from www.dasa.

mod.uk/index.php/publications/UK-defence-statistics-compendium. 

Since a single, consistent data series on UK armed forces personnel strength is not readily available, personnel data entries are 

best read as trend indicators rather than real values.

9. For the purposes of this chapter, land-force personnel include the regular, full-time strength of the British Army (as published) plus 6,000 to cover the nominal strength of the Royal 

Marines.

10. For the purposes of this chapter, naval personnel include 

the regular, full-time strength of the Royal Navy (as published) 

minus 6,000, representing the nominal strength of the Royal 

Marines counted in Figure 11-2.

11. For leading analysis on this subject, see Steven Bowns 

and Scott Gebicke, “From R&D Investment to Fighting Power, 

25 Years Later,” McKinsey on Government, No. 5, Spring 2010, 

pp. 70–75, available from www.technology-futures.co.uk/MoG5_

DefenseR&D_VF.pdf.

12. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter 

Four: Europe,” The Military Balance 2011, Vol. 111, No. 1, 2011, p. 

160; and “Chapter Four: Europe,” The Military Balance 2012, Vol. 

112, No. 1, 2012, p. 172.

13. BBC News Middle East, “Iraq War in Figures,” December 14, 2011, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middleeast-11107739.
285

14. Strategic Defence Review, London, UK: UK Ministry of 

Defence, p. 8.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 9.

18. Ibid., pp. 13, 16.

19. Ibid., p. 5 (emphasis added).

20. Ibid., p. 30.

21. Ibid., p. 25.

22. Ibid., p. 26.

23. See The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, London, 

UK: UK Ministry of Defence, July 2002, available from www.comw.

org/rma/fulltext/0207sdrvol1.pdf.

24. Ibid., p. 14.

25. Policy Director, UK Ministry of Defence, The Defence White 

Paper & Operations in Iraq—Lessons for the Future, London, UK: UK 

Ministry of Defence, December 11, 2003, available from webcache.

googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://webarchive.national

archives.gov.uk/%2B/http:/www.mod.uk/publications/iraq_future

lessons/chap3.htm.

26. Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper, London, UK: UK Ministry of Defence, December 2003, p. 7, 

available from www.mocr.army.cz/images/Bilakniha/ZSD/UK%20

Defence%20White%20Paper%202003.pdf.

27. Ibid., p. 7.

28. “Her Majesty’s Government, Securing Britain in an Age 

of Uncertainty,” The Strategic Defence and Security Review, October 

2010, available from www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf.
286

29. All quotes in this paragraph can be found at A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, London, UK: Her Majesty’s Government, pp. 15, 18, 27, available from 

www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/

file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf.

30. The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Her Majesty’s 

Government, pp. 10–12.

31. Ibid., p. 19.

32. House of Commons Defence Committee, Towards the 

Next Defence and Security Review: Part One, January 7, 2014, available from www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/

cmdfence/197/197.pdf.

33. Paul Cornish, Strategy in Austerity: The Security and Defence 

of the United Kingdom, London, UK: Chatham House, 2010, pp. 

23–24, available from www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/

view/109490.

34. General Sir Nicholas Houghton, “Annual Chief of 

the Defence Staff Lecture 2013,” lecture, RUSI, London, UK, 

December 18, 2013, available from www.rusi.org/events/past/

ref:E5284A3D06EFFD.
287

CHAPTER 12

POOLING AND SHARING: 

THE EFFORT TO ENHANCE ALLIED DEFENSE 

CAPABILITIES1

W. Bruce Weinrod

KEY POINTS

• In the face of declining defense budgets, transatlantic allies have shown increased interest in 

pooling-and-sharing defense efforts.

• The results have been mixed, with some notable successes, such as the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), and other less-successful efforts, 

such as the European Union’s (EU) attempt to 

establish a common training program for jet pilots.

• Large-scale pooling and sharing tends to infringe on national sovereignty issues. Consequently, successful programs are most likely 

tied to discrete areas of cooperation and are 

often carried out by smaller groups of nations.

Recent developments in Crimea and Ukraine highlight the crucial importance of robust transatlantic 

military capabilities. However, these capabilities are 

on a downward trajectory. If current trends continue, 

the weakening of collective defenses may reach a tipping point where significant collective power projection would be problematic at best.

This need not happen. The transatlantic nations 

have the collective resources to ensure a credible and 

robust defense capability, and allied governments 

continue to proclaim the need for a capable nation-
288

al defense while believing that their own security 

can best be ensured by joining in common defense 

commitments and programs.

To these ends, transatlantic defense officials are 

giving increased attention to ways in which defense 

budgets can be more efficiently and effectively allocated. Most allies are largely rejecting budget increases as 

unfeasible in today’s economic climate and are looking to each other to better utilize existing resources 

through pooling-and-sharing efforts.

This exploration is all the more urgent, given that 

the United States may not always provide substantially more than its fair share of transatlantic military 

resources. (According to most recent figures, the U.S. 

share of allied defense expenditures was over 70 percent.2

) The September 2014 NATO summit in Wales, 

United Kingdom (UK), presents the most promising 

overall opportunity for the highest levels of allied 

governments to provide an impetus for the full development and implementation of pooling-and-sharing 

initiatives.

BACKGROUND

“Pooling” and “sharing” are complementary 

terms applied to various cooperative defense arrangements for bringing together the resources of two or 

more nations to enhance effectiveness or lessen costs. 

Pooling and sharing can be accomplished within a 

transatlantic or European-wide framework (such as 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] or 

the EU) or through dedicated bilateral or multilateral 

arrangements.

Although pooling-and-sharing defense programs 

have attracted substantial attention in recent years, 
289

such arrangements existed before the emergence of the 

term. What is new is the high priority being placed on 

pooling-and-sharing projects as a way to reduce costs 

to individual nations, while ensuring the existence of 

necessary military capacities.

At the same time, implementing pooling-andsharing programs on a large scale is challenging. For 

example, programs tied to logistics or to tactical intelligence are relatively easy to implement. However, 

activities that delve more deeply into operational capabilities can become more politically and economically complex. Further, nations considering pooling 

and sharing can face difficult decisions regarding the 

allocation of defense resources that impact national 

defense industries and that rely on other nations to 

provide necessary military capabilities in times of 

crisis or conflict.

NATO POOLING AND SHARING

Pooling and sharing is a priority objective for 

NATO and is included in its broad Smart Defence initiative, which was launched by current and outgoing 

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in 

2011 and was affirmed at the 2012 NATO summit.3

Pooling and sharing has a number of antecedents 

within NATO.4 The best known is the NATO airborne 

early warning and control system (AWACS), which 

became operational in December 1978. The force consists of 17 E-3A aircraft and is supported by 18 participating NATO nations, which share operational costs. 

The UK makes an in-kind contribution of its E-3D 

aircraft. The AWACS has proven to be a successful, 

cooperative program that has provided an important 

operational capability, including, most recently, its 

deployment in the Afghan theater of operations.
290

Separately, NATO operates a jet-fuel pipeline linking 13 NATO nations to provide for NATO requirements. NATO also utilizes the NATO Support Agency, which handles the organization’s logistics and 

procurement. The pipeline and support agency are 

examples of pooling-and-sharing initiatives launched 

in the early days of the alliance.

A more recent cooperative program that fulfills a 

key operational need for participating nations is the 

SAC, a 12-member consortium that, at present, deploys three C-17 transport aircraft. SAC aircraft are 

available to contributing nations to meet their national 

military needs, including those related to NATO and 

European Union (EU) commitments. SAC consortium 

nations include 10 NATO nations and NATO Partnership for Peace members, Finland and Sweden. Based 

in Hungary, SAC aircraft utilize multinational crews 

and are supported by personnel from all participating 

nations.

SAC members need the lift capability of large aircraft, but most do not have the financial resources to 

acquire or maintain such a major capability. Thus, the 

SAC offers a cost-effective approach that permits participants to purchase specific sets of flying hours as 

needed. All SAC partners pay operational costs and 

can utilize the SAC for any purpose such as airdrops 

and assault landings. The consortium has already been 

used for operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and 

Libya, as well as for peacekeeping and humanitarian 

relief operations.

The SAC also provides an alternative structural 

model to the AWACS. While AWACS aircraft are 

owned by NATO and are thus part of NATO’s overall 

structure, SAC aircraft are owned by a legally separate 

consortium of nations that includes both NATO and 
291

non-NATO countries and that has an arrangement 

that allows the SAC to use NATO support structures. 

One advantage of SAC arrangements is that, while 

the AWACS program requires unanimous consent 

by its partners for use, the SAC does not have such a 

requirement.

NATO is also currently developing another commonly supported capability known as the Alliance 

Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, which is to include five Global Hawk high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), with operations expected to begin 

in several years. These UAVs will be deployed with 

sophisticated radars and will allow NATO to monitor ground activities over wide areas and under all 

weather conditions.

The AGS will be purchased by 14 NATO nations. 

Its infrastructure and operational support will be 

funded through NATO’s common funding program, 

which is composed of financial contributions from 

all NATO members. In addition, France and the UK 

will provide in-kind service support, while other nations will supplement the AGS with national air surveillance capabilities as required. Industries from all 

of the AGS nations will participate in the AGS program, and all NATO nations will have access to AGSacquired information. As with the AWACS, AGS will 

be a NATO system with the international status of a 

formal subsidiary organization of NATO. Program 

management will be provided by the NATO Alliance 

Ground Surveillance Management Agency.

The aforementioned programs reflect the fact that 

pooling-and-sharing activities can involve establishing a dedicated coordinating framework. Indeed, 

NATO has established specific bureaucratic structures 

for the AWACS and SAC. Other dedicated bureau-
292

cratic structures that were launched in the early days 

of the alliance, such as the NATO pipeline and NATO 

Maintenance and Supply Agency, are also examples 

of successful pooling-and-sharing programs.

There are also a number of more recently established NATO pooling-and-sharing arrangements. For 

example, multiple NATO nations take turns providing fighter aircraft to patrol the airspace over the three 

Baltic allied states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. As 

a result, these smaller nations do not need to acquire 

this capability and can spend their defense resources on other priorities. Similarly, Germany provides 

maritime surveillance in the North Sea, thus alleviating the need for such a capability on the part of the 

Netherlands.

Near-term projects envisioned by NATO include 

the development of a multinational cyber defense capability; creation of a multinational chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalion with pooled 

equipment and training; establishment of a multinational aviation training center for helicopter pilots 

and ground crews; and pooling of allied maritime 

patrol aircraft.

EU POOLING AND SHARING

Just as NATO has capitalized on the pooling and 

sharing of resources, the EU has adopted pooling and 

sharing as a focal point for efforts to develop common European security programs. In 2004, the EU 

established the European Defence Agency (EDA) as 

a framework for coordinating European defense cooperation activities.5

 EU-EDA pooling-and-sharing 

efforts have consisted of a modest number of specific 

projects and a variety of planned initiatives.
293

An important ongoing program area facilitated by 

the EDA involves military air transport. In 2010, the 

EDA began operation of the European Air Transport 

Command (EATC), based in the Netherlands. The 

EATC coordinates military transport fleets of its five 

member nations (France, Germany, the Netherlands, 

Belgium, and Luxembourg) and undertakes occasional exercises and training programs. In 2013, eight 

nations—four EATC states plus the Czech Republic, 

Italy, Sweden, and Spain, the host nation—participated in the European Air Transport Training Exercise.

In addition, the EDA has established the framework for a European Air Transport Fleet (EATF). 

The EATF has 20 members but is currently more of 

a notional structure than an operational enterprise. 

Over time, the EDA would like the EATF to expand 

to include the exchange or acquisition of aircraft and 

supporting capacities, including maintenance, cargo 

handling, and common training.6

An important recent development was the Ghent 

Initiative, presented to the EU in September 2010 by 

Sweden and Germany. The initiative proposed that 

the EDA could, in close cooperation with other organizations, coordinate and potentially link various EU 

pooling-and-sharing efforts. The initiative also urged 

EU nations to divide their military capabilities into 

several categories: capabilities that are indispensable 

to the state’s security and need to be maintained exclusively by the state, capabilities that could be maintained in closer cooperation with partners without the 

state losing authority over them (pooling), and capabilities that could be eliminated when provided by 

other states (sharing).

Over the past few years, EU member states have 

put forward many ideas for enhanced pooling and 
294

sharing in areas that are key military and operational 

enablers: strategic transport, air-to-air refueling, medical support, surveillance and reconnaissance, maritime surveillance, pilot training, naval logistics, and 

military communication satellites. As yet, however, 

there has been halting progress in implementing these 

ideas at the EU level.7

Independently, the EDA has offered to assist EU 

nations with pooling and sharing in areas such as 

shared use of fixed military infrastructure and in defense acquisition and manufacturing. The EDA is also 

assessing potential projects in maritime surveillance 

capabilities, surveillance and reconnaissance, military 

satellite communications, smart munitions, and naval 

logistics. Further, in November 2012, the EDA promulgated a voluntary code of conduct whose stated 

purpose is to support cooperative efforts to develop 

defense capabilities.

That said, a substantial part of EDA activities have 

thus far consisted of studies and recommendations as 

opposed to actual programs. The absence of more definitive defense projects is a result of several factors: 

1) the lack of major financial commitments for such 

projects, 2) the view in most EU nations that national 

interests, including sustaining national defense industrial bases-take priority over cooperative endeavors, 

and 3) the firm UK position that EDA programs must 

be limited in scope and cost.

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS

In addition to pooling-and-sharing activities within NATO and EU frameworks, various European nations have developed bilateral or multilateral defense 

relationships that include pooling and sharing. Such 
295

arrangements typically involve nations in geographical proximity. The following subsections detail some 

of these arrangements.

Nordic Defence Cooperation. 

Established in 2009, the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) framework has reinforced an already-existing history of cooperation among the Nordic countries of Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, 

and Iceland. Defense cooperation has focused on joint 

training, exercises, and capability development.

Indeed, NORDEFCO holds promise to be the most 

advanced regional grouping in the years ahead. At a 

December 2013 meeting, NORDEFCO nations agreed 

on a future plan of action, outlined in the Nordic Defence Cooperation 2020.

8

 The plan calls for air surveillance patrols (by Sweden, Finland, and NATO members, Norway and Denmark) over Iceland.

NORDEFCO also announced its Cooperation Air 

Transportation initiative for using air transport assets 

and, possibly, in the future, pooled efforts in the areas 

of maintenance, spare parts, and procurement. Nordic 

countries will also, according to the December 2013 

plan, focus on developing joint rapid deployment 

capabilities, including Arctic missions, along with developing new rules and processes for enhancing prospects for joint procurements.

The Visegrad Group. 

The Visegrad Group (VG), established in 1991, 

consists of the Central European nations of Poland, 

Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The VG 

was formed to increase cooperation among the four 

countries in a range of policy areas, including defense.
296

Early VG efforts to enhance collaboration on defense projects were unsuccessful. More recently, 

catalyzed by the EU Ghent Initiative and the NATO 

Smart Defence program, the VG has given increased 

attention to cooperation in this area. One tangible result has been an agreement to develop the Visegrad 

Battle Group, with an operational target date in the 

first half of 2016.9 The group is projected to consist of 

approximately 3,000 troops, and Poland will serve as 

its lead nation. In addition, the VG has helped coordinate training for helicopter pilots under the NATO 

HIP helicopter support program.10 Separately, the 

Czech Republic and Slovakia (both VG nations) have 

joined with the United States and Croatia to develop a 

Multinational Aviation Training Centre to train crews 

of Russian-made, Mi-8-type helicopters.11

The Weimar Triangle. 

The Weimar Triangle (WT) was established in 1991 

as a mechanism for cooperation among France, Germany, and Poland. As with the VG, the WT has focused principally on political, economic, and cultural 

relationships. Defense efforts have consisted mainly 

of meetings and communiqués. However, as with 

the VG, the WT agreed to develop a Weimar Triangle 

Battlegroup consisting of 1,500 troops ready for rapid 

deployment, which became operational in 2013.12

The France-UK Defense Treaty.

Seeking to work around constrained defense budgets, in 2010, the UK and France reached an agreement 

envisioning significant pooling-and-sharing efforts in 

which the two nations would share nuclear-weapons 
297

testing facilities, defense research, and aircraft carriers. The agreement also called for developing a joint 

expeditionary force and for cooperation in maintenance, training, and logistics in connection with the 

French and British air forces’ acquisition of the A400M 

transport aircraft.13

Implementation of the agreement has been thus 

far incomplete but has included regular joint military 

exercises. Some British officers have been deployed 

on a French aircraft carrier,14 and pilots from each 

country have flown the other’s fighter jets as an initial 

step toward establishing a combined joint expeditionary force by 2016.15 France has also agreed to a British 

proposal to jointly develop and build a new anti-ship 

missile and a new generation of advanced unmanned 

aircraft.16

Benelux Defense Cooperation. 

Defense cooperation between Belgian and Dutch 

naval forces began in the early post-World War II period and has included the establishment of a single 

commanding officer for the two navies, of an integrated naval staff, and of integrated support structures.17

An accord was signed in 2012 for increased joint naval 

training between Belgian commandos and the Dutch 

Airmobile Brigade. The two air forces also agreed to 

cooperate more closely in using each other’s airfields, 

in joint deployments, and in integration of materiel 

support. Future areas of cooperation include logistics 

and maintenance, military education, defense acquisition, and joint military operations.18

Another multilateral arrangement involving Belgium and the Netherlands is the European Participating Air Forces (EPAF) program, which also includes 
298

Denmark and Norway. EPAF emerged from the initial acquisition of F-16s by these nations. In the ensuing years, the nations have trained together and used 

common logistics facilities. Although not formally a 

part of NATO, EPAF fighters have deployed on NATO 

missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan.19

KEY CHALLENGES FOR POOLING 

AND SHARING

Pooling and sharing can be an important mechanism for maintaining transatlantic military capabilities over the longer term. At the same time, economic, 

technological, military, and political challenges exist. 

Any of these challenges, much less a combination of 

them, can make the successful development and implementation of pooling-and-sharing projects difficult 

to accomplish.20

Economic issues can delay or even block poolingand-sharing programs. Domestic-based defense industries can place great pressure on their respective 

governments to gain the largest possible share of 

work in any cooperative project. Resolving the conflicting interests may take lengthy negotiations that 

can substantially delay, or even render futile, the 

development of a new initiative.

For example, the AGS program discussed earlier 

was first proposed by NATO in the late-1980s. Despite 

AGS having been the top priority for NATO military 

leaders, it took a decade and a half for NATO leaders 

to reach the agreement to deploy AGS, with the delay 

due largely to discussions about which defense companies in which countries would get what share of 

the work.
299

In addition, nations working together do not always produce a more cost-effective outcome or a 

more effective capability. With shrinking defense 

budgets, there is even more pressure to distribute 

development dollars and acquisition dollars to keep 

companies afloat. In some instances, this can lead to 

the division of project work in inefficient or not-costeffective ways, including requirements that a certain 

percentage of work be allocated to specific nations to 

assuage domestic constituencies.

For example, the NH90 helicopter, developed 

under a multilateral program by NATO nations, witnessed significant delays and a series of technical 

problems in development, with further complications 

arising from the fact that the helicopter was being designed for use by different military services and had 

different design configurations for some nations. The 

result was a significant increase in expected costs—

probably well above what the system would have cost 

if the helicopter had been developed by one nation. 

A similar story can be told regarding the multinational programs to develop and build the Eurofighter 

Typhoon and A400M transport plane.

Coordination of pooling-and-sharing projects 

among participants can also prove challenging. Nations have different planning, programming, and 

budgeting cycles. For example, budget cycle variances were the principal cause of France’s hesitation 

and delays in agreeing to a UK request to develop 

jointly an anti-ship missile system. Moreover, nations 

participating in pooling-and-sharing efforts need to 

reach agreements on such matters as system ownership, military command structures, the use of bases, 

and possible national caveats regarding the conduct 

of actual military operations.
300

The proposed Advanced European Jet Pilot Training System illustrates some of these difficulties. The 

program, whose planning began a decade ago and 

which was approved by the EDA in 2009, contemplated using European bases for pilots to train on a 

common fleet of aircraft. However, national differences about key elements of the project—including 

which bases and aircraft should be used—and about 

training methods have prevented the program from 

moving forward. Interestingly, a similar program already exists within NATO, which for many years has 

conducted jet pilot training for 13 nations at Sheppard 

Air Force Base, Texas.

Domestic considerations can also delay or block the 

implementation of a project, even after a government 

agrees to join a specific program.21 Finance ministries 

or individual military services may balk at providing 

the funding necessary to implement an agreement. 

For example, the United States pledged at an early 

point to participate in the NATO SAC program, but it 

delayed signing the required memorandum of understanding to begin American participation because the 

U.S. Air Force was reluctant to provide the necessary 

funding from its budget. It finally did, but only after 

being ordered to do so.22

It must also be kept in mind that both NATO and 

the EU can only undertake those projects that member 

nations authorize and are willing to fund. In addition, 

there is at present an inherent limit on EDA activities, 

given the differing EU member views on the nature 

and extent of the EU’s role in security matters.

Pooling and sharing requires the cooperation of 

national militaries, and while multinational coordination has occurred successfully at times, such arrangements face hurdles in overcoming differences in capa-
301

bilities, in military doctrines, in weapons systems, in 

training, and in personnel and command structures.

In addition, pooling and sharing has the potential to constrain collective military capabilities. If, for 

example, a nation entirely gives up a certain capability in deference to another nation with similar capabilities, the loss of redundancy could be a problem 

in protracted or large-scale conflict operations. Also, 

interoperability gaps may make it challenging for a 

nation with advanced capabilities to work effectively 

with a smaller nation that possesses a similar but lessdeveloped capability.

Of course, a critical concern is whether shared capabilities will be available when needed. If a nation 

possessing a necessary capability refuses to participate in a collective military action, this will obviously 

make it more difficult to carry out an operation and 

could even alter the calculus of whether to undertake 

the operation altogether. Furthermore, a fundamental 

concern standing in the way of large-scale pooling and 

sharing is how it infringes on national sovereignty. By 

eliminating a particular capability, it is argued that a 

nation becomes dependent on other nations to provide capabilities necessary for its own security and, 

in turn, risks its ability to carry out a core task of a 

nation-state.

MAKING POOLING AND SHARING WORK

Even considering the limitations and challenges 

outlined previously, pooling and sharing has the 

potential to be an important instrument for helping 

sustain necessary transatlantic military capabilities, 

especially in the current constrained economic environment. Pooling-and-sharing efforts can be most 
302

successful if they follow the guidelines outlined in the 

following list.

1. NATO should be open to creative pooling-andsharing arrangements, such as the SAC, which includes NATO (and non-NATO) members but is not 

within NATO.

2. Although rarely popular in member states’ capitals, common funding (for example, NATO nations’ 

financial contributions for common endeavors) is 

necessary to carry out new programs.

3. NATO should reform its decisionmaking processes (especially those NATO procedures that currently call for unanimity on all major decisions) to 

ensure that one nation cannot block or delay a project 

indefinitely.

4. NATO should explore pooling-and-sharing arrangements that are developing under the recently 

proposed initiative to establish “framework nations.” 

Under this approach, member states who have retained a broad range of military capabilities would 

act as lead nations in coordinating programs with an 

eye to meeting NATO defense planning targets on 

a tailor-made, multinational, but not alliance-wide 

basis. Smaller allied militaries would then plug into 

the enabling capabilities that only the big nations can 

provide (for example, air-to-air refueling or strategic 

surveillance and reconnaissance).

5. Nations should be more forthcoming with defense plans. So far, the practice has been for individual member states to consider, decide, and announce 

defense cutbacks without either consulting with or 
303

informing allies or NATO. Thus, under current circumstances, important NATO capabilities can be 

weakened without any advance opportunity to consider how they might be maintained in different ways.

Such advance notice can allow time for an assessment to be made regarding the nature and extent of 

any effect of a reduction in collective transatlantic 

military capabilities. A dedicated evaluation center, 

such as a consortium of independent policy organizations, should be established. This center could assess 

national plans and their effect on collective capacities 

and could suggest alternative approaches—including 

pooling and sharing—that might maintain or develop 

a needed capability.

6. It bears repeating that the EU and NATO must 

avoid redundancy. There are simply insufficient resources for the organizations to be undertaking duplicative projects. At the same time, both organizations 

should strive to identify synergies.

In theory, both organizations recognize the need 

for enhanced coordination. The 2012 NATO summit 

specifically endorsed European programs to strengthen air-to-air refueling capacities. Further, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has developed 

a number of potential pooling-and-sharing projects 

that consult with the EDA. In addition, NATO and the 

EU meet regularly in the EU-NATO Capability Group 

to discuss common capability requirements. NATO’s 

ACT and the EU’s EDA are also in regular contact.23

There may also be programs that NATO chooses 

not to pursue that would nonetheless enhance overall 

transatlantic security or provide capabilities helpful 

for localized contingencies. In this regard, the EDA 

Code of Conduct’s call for giving pooling-and-sharing 
304

programs priority protection from defense cuts is sensible, and the permanent, structured cooperation arrangements envisioned under the EU Treaty of Lisbon 

could provide a mechanism for pooling and sharing 

by small groups of nations.24

7. Pooling and sharing should focus on practical 

cooperation that can truly enhance capabilities. Such 

cooperation also has the added virtue of often being 

the easiest to implement. Indeed, as described earlier, 

there are already a number of ongoing pooling-andsharing arrangements in basic areas such as education, 

training, and exercises. More advanced efforts could 

focus on developing multinational logistics-andmaintenance support for selected capabilities. In any 

event, NATO can and should build on the cooperative 

efforts developed during its mission in Afghanistan.25

It could also make sense for multilateral programs 

to address core mission or functional areas, as the 

EATC does for airlift and air-to-air refueling. One approach would be to cluster nations by mission area 

(such as maritime power projection), function (airlift), 

or system (for example, NH90 helicopter users or F-35 

users).26

8. Industry has an essential role in ensuring that 

pooling-and-sharing projects are cost effective and of 

requisite quality. To facilitate that goal, a focus on industrial issues must begin at the conceptual stage of a 

project to work out arrangements that ensure positive 

industry participation that continues throughout the 

program’s operations or life cycle.27

External factors—including a more open European defense market, more cross-border cooperation, 

or mergers among European defense companies—can 
305

also facilitate industry involvement in pooling and 

sharing. Since most of the government-to-government 

frameworks for international defense cooperation 

have thus far been bilateral, the regulations and procedures for armaments cooperation need to be adapted 

for multinational procurement and cooperation.

9. Enhanced coordination of national defense 

programing timetables is also essential for significant pooling and sharing to succeed. Nations must 

exchange information on projected national procurement processes to ensure that production cycles in 

such areas as requirements, development, procurement, and maintenance are in sync. All such coordination should also be linked to NATO defense planning, 

as appropriate.

Further, the number of variants of military systems 

should be minimized. This will make maintenance 

and training, coordination of doctrine and operational 

concepts, and the use of common logistics easier and 

less costly. Of course, the most effective allied cooperation requires that military systems be interoperable, 

with common standards and certifications.

10. Bottom-up involvement in pooling and sharing is likely to be the most successful approach. As 

described previously, pooling-and-sharing activities 

by small groups of nations have been ongoing, for decades in some instances, and such regional and subregional arrangements will likely be the major engine 

for more of these arrangements. Experience indicates 

that projects organized by nations that are geographically close, that generally share common values, and 

that have similar threat perceptions are more likely 

to be developed and actually implemented. At the 
306

same time, such groups can take in additional participants when practical and when likely to enhance 

capabilities.28

However, a challenge for such bottom-up initiatives is to ensure coordination with NATO. A multiplication of separate multinational arrangements might 

not enhance overall transatlantic military capabilities, 

so these efforts should be coordinated within a NATO 

framework to ensure maximum results.

11. A key aspect of 21st-century NATO that is 

growing in importance is NATO’s partnership structure. Non-NATO nations have in recent years assumed 

an increasing role in NATO programs and activities. 

Thus, it is essential to enhance NATO’s relationship 

with its most militarily capable partner nations and 

to identify further pooling-and-sharing programs in 

which such partners can participate. Countries such 

as Finland and Sweden bring much to the table and 

are already working closely with NATO.29

12. Finally, and most crucially, concerns about the 

potential availability of military assets during a time 

of crisis or conflict understandably exist in a number 

of nations. Unless or until this issue is resolved, it will 

likely place inherent limits on the nature and extent 

of pooling and sharing and, thus, pooling and sharing 

will of necessity need to focus on discrete and manageable capabilities.

CONCLUSION

The protection of U.S. and transatlantic national 

security interests and, indeed, the furtherance of crucial foreign policy objectives in general cannot be suc-
307

cessfully managed without underlying credible and 

robust military capability.30 While specific required 

military capabilities may be different than those of the 

past, the need for a highly capable and ready military 

remains. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea is a useful reminder that military force 

remains a fact of international life—if a reminder was 

even needed.

Ensuring necessary defense capabilities has become much more challenging because of the economic downturn and the absence of a shared consensus about the threats the democratic West faces. As 

a result, European military capabilities are without a 

doubt in decline. However, collective European military resources can still produce capable military forces 

if exploited in an effective manner. Such forces could 

handle security issues within the European region 

and adjacent areas, with the United States cooperating as appropriate, and be in a position to participate 

in international security coalitions addressing broader 

threats involving larger-scale cooperation between the 

United States and transatlantic nations.

The September 2014 NATO summit should endorse a specific pathway for the development of a 

robust transatlantic pooling-and-sharing program. 

NATO and the EU can both provide structural frameworks for pooling-and-sharing activities, but NATO 

can and should remain the principal mechanism for 

transatlantic military cooperation. NATO remains the 

strongest global military organization and is also the 

institutional link connecting the United States directly 

to transatlantic security.

That said, as previously noted, pooling and sharing need not always emanate from NATO or the EU. 

Various regional groupings are already playing a role 
308

in enhancing cooperation, and these organizations 

may well prove to be more effective in this regard 

than either NATO or the EU. But this should be accomplished within broader institutional frameworks 

and in a consistent manner with broader alliance capability requirements.

At the end of the day, it is most important that the 

requisite military capabilities exist and are available 

when needed to protect transatlantic security interests. If nations have the political will to allocate necessary funds and address coordination issues, pooling 

and sharing can be a key mechanism for the development of necessary technologies and weapons systems 

and can play an important role in the maintenance of 

essential transatlantic military capabilities.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. This chapter was originally published as an essay on 

August 11, 2014.

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Secretary General’s 

Annual Report 2013, January 27, 2014, available from www.nato.

int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_106247.htm.

3. NATO describes Smart Defence as “a renewed culture of 

cooperation that encourages allies to cooperate in developing, 

acquiring, and maintaining military capabilities to undertake the 

Alliance’s essential core tasks. . . . That means pooling and sharing 

capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better.” For 

details on the Smart Defence initiative, see North Atlantic Trade 

Organization, “Smart Defence,” available from www.nato.int/cps/

en/natolive/78125.htm.

4. For example, in 2002, NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment called for “multinational commitments and pooling of 

funds.” For more information on the Prague Capabilities Commitment, see Carl Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commit-
309

ment,” January 24, 2007, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/

RS21659.pdf.

5. It should be noted as context that within the EU, there are 

differences regarding the nature and extent of European-only defense activities. The UK, in particular, has voiced a string of concerns about any EU defense projects or capabilities that would 

undermine the primacy of NATO or its own capabilities. That 

said, there is general acceptance by EU members of the concept of 

pooling and sharing as an appropriate EU activity.

6. The EDA envisions that the EATF will consist of a framework federating different projects identified, different structures 

and different types of assets, in order to create synergies through 

far-reaching cooperation and coordination. It will be a flexible 

and inclusive partnership between national and multinational 

military air transport fleets and organizations in Europe, aimed at 

the enhancement of standardized air transport services through 

cost-effective pooling, sharing, exchange and/or acquisition of 

various capabilities, including aircraft, training programs, crossservicing activities, cargo handling, maintenance activities, spare 

parts, etc. See European Defence Agency, European Air Transport 

Fleet (EATF) Fact Sheet, May 19, 2011, available from www.eda.

europa.eu/docs/documents/factsheet_-EATF_final.

7. See Joint Statement on the Common Security and Defense Policy, 

Brussels, Belgium: European Council, December 19, 2013, available from www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/

en/ec/140214.pdf.

8. Interestingly, the Baltic states, Poland, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, the EDA, and NATO’s Allied Command Transformation attended the meeting. There was specific discussion of 

developing cooperation with the Baltic nations. See Nordic Defence 

Cooperation 2020, December 4, 2013, available from www.nordefco.

org/Nordic-Defence-Cooperation-2020.

9. A battle group is a multinational rapid-reaction force with 

separate internal command and logistics capabilities intended to 

provide a quick reaction capability.
310

10. HIP is a NATO designation for the Soviet-era Mi-8 transport helicopter.

11. See Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of the Czech 

Republic, Multinational Aviation Training Centre Document 

Signed by Four Nations, February 25, 2013, available from www.

army.cz/en/ministry-of-defense/newsroom/news/multinational-aviation-training-centre-document-signed-by-four-nations-80184/.

12. The Weimar Battle Group entered operational standby for 

the first time in the spring of 2013.

13. See UK Ministry of Defence, “UK-France Defence Cooperation Treaty Announced,” November 2, 2010, available from 

www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-france-defence-co-operation-treatyannounced--2.

14. See Royal Navy, “Royal Navy Officers Join French 

Flagship’s Gulf Deployment, March 3, 2014, available from 

www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2014/

march/03/140303-rn-french.

15. See Ministry of Defence, “Double First for French and British Fast Jet Pilots,” February 11, 2013, available from www.gov.uk/

government/news/double-first-for-french-and-british-fast-jet-pilots.

16. See Pierre Tran, “UK, French Leaders Agree to Cooperate on Drone, Missile and More,” Defense News, February 1, 

2014, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20140201/DEFREG01/302010025/UK-French-Leaders-Agree-Cooperate-DroneMissile-More.

17. For more information on the Belgium-Netherlands defense cooperation accords, see Advisory Council on International Affairs, European Defence Cooperation: Sovereignty and 

the Capacity to Act, January 2012, available from www.gov.uk/

government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224227/

evidence-adviesraad-internationale-vaagstukken-european-defencecooperation.pdf.
311

18. See “Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg Enhance 

Defence Co-operation,” Dutch Daily News, April 26, 2012, 

available from www.dutchdailynews.com/netherlands-belgium-andluxembourg-enhance-defence-co-operation/.

19. For a concept paper regarding an expanded EPAF, see, 

“Regional Fighter Partnership: Options for Cooperation and Cost 

Sharing,” Kalkar, Germany: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 

March 2012, available from www.japcc.org/portfolio/regional-fighterpartnership-options-for-cooperation-and-cost-sharing/.

20. This chapter focuses on Europe’s role in pooling and sharing. The United States and Canada can, of course, participate in 

such programs, but a primary objective should be to enhance 

European capabilities. Canada has played an outsized role in 

NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan and takes its defense capabilities very seriously. For a Canadian perspective, see Mike 

Greenley, Canadian Views on Smart Defence, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries, 

October 30, 2011, available from www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/

International/Documents/_Greenley_CADSI_-_Greenley_-_Quadrilateral_-_Oct_2012[1].pdf.

21. It must also be kept in mind that both NATO and the EU 

can only undertake those projects that member nations authorize 

and are willing to fund. In addition, there is at present an inherent 

limit on EDA activities, given the differing EU member views on 

the nature and extent of the EU security role.

22. This made it somewhat awkward for U.S. officials at 

NATO who were urging other nations to join the program while 

the United States was not doing so.

23. However, while there is regular interaction between 

NATO and the EU, much of it has been pro forma. Any truly significant enhancement of their relationship will most likely have to 

await resolution of underlying political issues such as the TurkeyCyprus question.

24. This provision permits a few nations, rather than all EU 

nations, to cooperate. As noted earlier, to date, much of the EU 

pooling-and-sharing effort has consisted of analyses, communi-
312

qués, speeches, and initiatives. At the same time, through this 

process, the EU and the EDA have developed a wide-ranging and 

very ambitious menu of program priorities, with some more practical than others. Of course, the fact remains that all EDA efforts 

depemd wholly on having adequate resources made available 

and, as importantly, on national government decisions to provide 

funding and actual participation in specific activities. It remains to 

be seen how much of this agenda can and will go beyond studies 

and planning documents and be translated into active programs.

25. NATO is, in fact, developing a Connected Forces Initiative 

to build on connections established in Afghanistan.

26. Multinational storage of Grippen aircraft spare parts is already taking place among Sweden, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Such pooling and sharing among European allies could also 

facilitate better burden sharing with the United States in meeting 

NATO capability and force generation requirements. There might 

be instances where the pooling and sharing should include the 

United States, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; special operations forces; and ballistic missile defense.

27. The principal NATO mechanisms for addressing industrial matters are the Conference of National Armaments Directors 

and the office of the NATO assistant secretary general for defense 

investment.

28. As noted previously, NORDEFCO is developing activities 

with Baltic nations. A forthcoming opportunity for cooperation 

will arrive with the acquisition by several European nations of the 

F-35 jet fighter. Norway and Britain have agreed to cooperate on 

their maintenance and use, and Norway will seek to extend that 

cooperation to the Netherlands.

29. For example, the very first signer of the memorandum of 

understanding for the SAC program was partner nation Sweden, 

and both Sweden and Finland have been active in various NATO 

military missions and activities.
313

30. It should be kept in mind that strong European military capabilities are in the U.S. national interest and have the potential to 

lessen the U.S. defense burden, especially given that U.S. defense 

capacities are becoming increasingly stretched. The United States 

does have very important allies and friends in Asia. Nonetheless, 

it remains the case that when push comes to shove, it is, above all, 

European nations that are most likely to join forces to assist the 

United States in military operations when U.S. security interests 

are at stake. In addition, NATO is the optimum mechanism for 

enhancing the military capacity of non-NATO nations that could 

contribute military forces to U.S.-led coalition military operations.

315

CHAPTER 13

 JAPANESE HARD POWER: 

RISING TO THE CHALLENGE1

Toshi Yoshihara

KEY POINTS

• Japan’s ambition to play a larger role on the 

world stage and address the security problems posed by a rising China have led Tokyo 

to undertake institutional, policy, and defense 

reforms.

• Japan’s military reforms are intended to move 

its defense force from a posture of passive 

deterrence to one that is agile and forward 

leaning.

• Given Japan’s budgetary restraints, however, it 

is unclear whether its resources can match its 

strategic ambitions.

No longer is Japan the political shrinking violet of the immediate post-war years. Historians will 

look back on the first decades of the 21st century as 

a turning point for Japanese strategy, both in East 

Asia and beyond. From major national security decisions—including the recent move to assume a limited 

right of collective self-defense—to a shift in military 

posture to counter a rising China, Japan is steadily 

loosening the constraints on its security policy. Japanese hard power, which includes Japan’s first rate 

but constitutionally handicapped military, will correspondingly play a more prominent role in Tokyo’s 

strategic calculus.
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Understanding how Japanese policymakers will 

wield that hard power as an instrument of statecraft 

is thus crucial to Asian and global security. To explore 

how Japan’s newfound assertiveness will shape Japanese hard power, this chapter will 1) assess recent developments in Japan’s national security establishment 

and the deteriorating regional environment, 2) evaluate Japan’s defense posture and military modernization efforts, and 3) identify the various financial and 

demographic constraints that could limit the material 

dimensions of Japanese strategy.

A “NORMAL” JAPAN AT LAST?

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, who returned to power in late-2012 following the Liberal Democratic Party’s landslide victory in the Diet’s lower-house elections, has pushed aggressively to realize his ambitious 

agenda. Within a year of being elected, Abe instituted 

sweeping reforms to the national security apparatus. 

In December 2013, Japan announced the formation 

of a National Security Council (NSC) modeled after 

that of the United States. The council streamlines the 

prime minister’s decisionmaking process while breaking down the various bureaucratic barriers that have 

impeded effective crisis management. Tokyo also enacted a controversial state secrets law that tightened 

the government’s control over sensitive and classified information, enabling the NSC to centralize the 

handling of intelligence.

Concurrent with the NSC’s creation, Tokyo issued three defense policy documents that furnish 

the roadmap for developing and sustaining Japanese 

hard power. The National Security Strategy (NSS), the 

first of its kind, sets forth “Japan’s fundamental poli-
317

cies pertaining to national security.”2 The document 

is a welcome expression of Japan’s long-term vision 

for securing the nation’s regional and global security 

objectives. The fifth National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) establishes Japan’s longer-term defense 

policy and force structure.3 The Medium Term Defense 

Program (MTDP) is a programmatic statement of defense requirements and acquisition plans over a 5-year 

period.4 For the first time in Japan’s post-World War 

II history, Tokyo has produced policy documents that 

systematically align Japanese policy, strategy, and 

capabilities.

Notably, the NSS promotes the concept of “proactive contribution to peace” that commits Japan to an 

even more forward-leaning posture in world affairs. 

Describing the concept as a “fundamental principle 

of [Japan’s] national security,” the NSS argues that 

the security of Japan and of the wider international 

community have become indivisible:

Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan 

to play a more proactive role for peace and stability 

in the world, in a way commensurate with its national 

capabilities.5

In other words, Japan advances global security 

by safeguarding its own neighborhood, while Japanese defense of the international order benefits Asian 

regional stability.

As such, the NDPG contends that Japan must: 

contribute even more proactively in securing peace, 

stability and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as well as peace 

and stability in the Asia—Pacific region.6
318

Indeed, Prime Minister Abe can look to Japanese 

contributions to international peace and security since 

the end of the Cold War as the basis for his foreign 

policy vision.

In a concrete manifestation of this proactive stance, 

the Abe administration relaxed Japan’s arms exports 

ban, which had been in place for nearly 5 decades. Issued in April 2014, the new guidelines for transferring 

defense equipment intend to enhance technological 

cooperation with partners and friends, raising Japan’s 

profile in regional and global arms markets. The move 

quickly bore fruit. A week after the new policy was 

announced, Australia and Japan agreed to a joint 

research project on marine hydrodynamics for constructing new submarines.

In July 2014, the newly established NSC approved 

Japan’s research with Britain on the Meteor air-to-air 

missile and approved exporting a sensor component 

for the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 air defense system to the United States. A network of defense collaboration centered on developing hard power among 

like-minded nations could well emerge from these 

joint ventures. A proactive contribution to peace is 

thus as much about empowering other defenders of 

the status quo as it is about strengthening one’s own 

capabilities.

In an even more consequential move, Abe partially lifted Japan’s self-imposed ban on the right of 

collective self-defense, the hallmark of the nation’s 

post-World War II foreign policy. For decades, successive Japanese governments strictly followed the 

constitutional interpretation that permitted Japan to 

exercise the right of individual self-defense, which 

forbids Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) from aiding 

friendly or allied military units that have come under 

enemy assault.
319

This self-denial of a universal right, a right recognized under the United Nations (UN) charter, has 

long imposed a highly asymmetric and awkward arrangement on the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Washington 

would be obliged by treaty to defend Japan should it 

be attacked, while Tokyo could not reciprocate without violating its constitution. To Abe and his followers, such a legal constraint has become untenable in an 

increasingly dangerous security environment.

Among the scenarios used to advance Abe’s initiative, two relating to the U.S.-Japan alliance stand out. 

Imagine that a Japanese warship were in the vicinity of 

an American naval unit under attack, and the warship 

took no action because of constitutional constraints. 

Imagine, too, that a Japanese destroyer equipped with 

the Aegis ballistic missile defense system were in a position to intercept a long-range missile headed for the 

United States, but the destroyer failed to do so, owing 

to Japan’s ban on collective self-defense. To Abe and 

his lieutenants, if either of these crises occurred and 

Japan did nothing, then the alliance might not survive the subsequent political blowback in Washington. Thus, adopting the right to collective self-defense 

would signal Japan’s determination to act alongside 

the U.S. military, sustaining the alliance’s integrity 

while enhancing allied deterrence.

In July 2014, after intense negotiations with the 

New Komeito—the Japanese government’s ambivalent junior coalition partner—Abe’s cabinet approved 

the reinterpretation of the constitution, allowing Japan to nominally exercise its right of collective selfdefense. Under the new understanding, use of force 

would be permitted “not only when an armed attack 

against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack 

against a foreign country that is in a close relationship 
320

with Japan occurs.”7 However, in a compromise acknowledging the New Komeito’s concerns, the Japanese government attached three key conditions necessary to invoke the right:

1. Only an attack or an impending attack that 

“threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger 

to fundamentally overthrow people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness” would meet the constitutional standards for engaging in collective selfdefense.

2. Moreover, policymakers must determine that 

“no other appropriate means” were available to counter the threat to Japan.

3. Even then, the SDF must limit its use of force to 

“the minimum extent necessary” to repel or defeat the 

threat.8

Abe’s cabinet further acknowledged that “prior 

approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders” to the SDF for collective self-defense missions.9

 By no means, has Japan been unshackled from 

its constitutional restraints or from its exclusively 

defensive orientation.

The cabinet decision represents just the first step 

in what will likely be a deliberate political process to 

operationalize this broader constitutional interpretation. The Abe administration will need to submit a 

legislative package to the Diet that would provide the 

proper legal framework for the SDF to help assist or 

defend allies and friends, should they come under attack. At least 10 existing laws would be reviewed, updated, and revised in this process. Opposition parties 

will have another chance to litigate the issue.

In the meantime, changes in popular opinion or 

other domestic political developments, such as local 
321

election outcomes, could influence the momentum 

behind Abe’s initiative. Public debate and legislative 

scrutiny—integral to Japan’s open democratic system—will inevitably accompany this important shift 

in defense policy. Change will come incrementally 

through careful and transparent negotiations.

It is still unclear how the concept of limited collective self-defense will translate into operational 

practice for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Planned revisions 

to the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, which spell out 

the allied division of labor, will reportedly incorporate an expanded defensive and logistical role for 

the SDF. Due for completion at the end of 2014, the 

guidelines called on the SDF to provide maintenance, 

supplies, and fuel to American military units heading 

into a combat zone—all rear-area activities that were 

previously prohibited.

In addition to improving allied cooperation, the 

cabinet decision could broaden the scope of the SDF’s 

out-of-area operations. For example, the Abe administration has identified minesweeping as a potentially 

permissible action under UN Security Council authorization. Given Japan’s dependence on energy from 

the Persian Gulf region, the mining of the Strait of 

Hormuz could constitute a clear threat to the nation’s 

survival and well-being. This and other scenarios will 

likely be the subject of further debate when the government submits its legislative package to the Diet.

Japanese officials must strike a balance between 

adhering to the constraints of the cabinet decision and 

ensuring sufficient flexibility to account for the uncertainties of real-world military contingencies. Limited 

collective self-defense will open the door for Japanese 

hard power to play a more effective and meaningful 

role in maintaining regional and global security.
322

JAPAN’S NEIGHBORHOOD GETS ROUGHER

Mounting pressures close to home, including China’s rise and North Korea’s unpredictability, largely 

explain the quickening pace of Japan’s normalization. China’s assertiveness in the East China Sea over 

the past 5 years has been most troubling to Japan. 

In September 2010, China reacted vociferously after 

Japanese law enforcement arrested a Chinese fishing 

boat skipper who was filmed ramming Japanese Coast 

Guard vessels in the waters off the Senkaku Islands. 

Beijing used economic coercion, cutting off Japan’s 

only supply of rare earth minerals critical to electronic 

manufactures.

After Tokyo nationalized the Senkakus in September 2012, Chinese maritime law enforcement flotillas 

began making the rounds in the disputed waters near 

the islands, and China has insisted that the regular patrols are routine. In response, Japanese Coast Guard 

vessels have been working overtime to monitor and 

trail every Chinese “intrusion,” lest Tokyo concede 

Beijing’s jurisdictional claims. Japan and China have 

been staring each other down in the East China Sea 

ever since.

Beyond the Senkakus dispute, Japan and China 

are locked in a budding naval rivalry. As China’s 

rapidly modernizing navy extends its reach, it has become commonplace for Chinese naval flotillas to sail 

through Japanese-held narrow seas. Beginning in 2008 

as sporadic forays into the Pacific, these expeditions 

now take place regularly year round. Moreover, the 

Chinese navy has steadily expanded the scope of its 

peacetime operations.
323

Notably, in July 2013, a surface action group 

steamed through the Sōya Strait (the first time Chinese 

units had conducted such a transit), circumnavigated 

Japan, and circled back to port by way of the international strait between Okinawa and Miyako Islands. 

Reflecting Tokyo’s growing concerns about China’s 

naval activism, Japan’s annual defense white papers 

meticulously report the courses taken by Chinese 

naval task forces.

Chinese military aircraft, including fighter jets, 

have also ramped up flight operations over the East 

China Sea. In July, September, and October 2013, Y-8 

airborne early warning aircraft and H-6 medium—

range bombers conducted long range flight operations over the Pacific Ocean, passing between Miyako 

and Okinawa to reach the open sea.10 Japan’s Air Selfdefense Force (ASDF) launched a record number of 

intercepts against Chinese aircraft in fiscal year 2013, 

surpassing the number of scrambles in fiscal year 2012 

by more than 30 percent.11

In November 2013, Beijing unilaterally declared 

an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the 

East China Sea that requires all foreign aircraft entering the zone to submit flight plans to Chinese aviation 

authorities. The Chinese ADIZ pointedly overlaps 

with Japan’s, extending to the Senkakus. Given that 

China is committed to making these increased naval 

and air activities the new status quo, frequent run-ins 

between Chinese and Japanese forces within the relatively confined spaces of East Asian seas will likely be 

the norm in the coming years.

Japanese policy documents routinely express Tokyo’s misgivings about China’s maritime rise. The 

NSS asserts: 
324

China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based 

on their own assertions . . . in the maritime and aerial 

domains, including the East China Sea and the South 

China Sea.12

The NDPG further observes: 

China has taken assertive actions with regard to issues 

of conflicts of interests in the maritime domain. . . . 

As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has 

intruded into Japanese territorial waters, frequently 

violated Japan’s airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unexpected situations.

The report singles out China’s newly established ADIZ 

over the East China Sea as destabilizing, concluding, 

“As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities it will need to pay utmost attention to them.”13

Successive editions of the Japanese Defense Ministry’s annual defense white papers have devoted more 

attention to China’s maritime activism. In response to 

recent Chinese provocations at sea, the 2013 edition 

uses unusually blunt language to admonish Beijing: 

Some of these activities of China involve its intrusion 

into Japan’s territorial waters, its violation of Japan’s 

airspace and even dangerous actions that could cause 

a contingency situation, which are extremely regrettable. China should accept and stick to the international 

norms.14

Since 2011, the defense ministry’s internal think 

tank, the National Institute for Defense Studies, has 

published annual reports on China’s security policy, 

offering a valuable regional perspective and a second opinion to the Pentagon’s assessment of Chinese 
325

military power. Notably, the institute devoted the 

entire 2012 issue to Chinese maritime strategy and 

activities.15

In the meantime, North Korea refuses to fade into 

the background. In a series of provocations in 2010, 

North Korea sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan, revealed a new uranium enrichment facility, and 

shelled an island along the inter-Korean frontier. 

Pyongyang’s ongoing development of its nuclear 

weapons and missile programs continues to pose a 

major security threat to Tokyo. North Korea has thus 

far conducted a nuclear test in 2006, 2009, and 2013. 

A fourth test will reportedly provide the reclusive regime sufficient data to design a nuclear warhead small 

enough to fit atop a ballistic missile.

Since the 1990s, North Korea has test-launched 

a series of ballistic missiles, with varying degrees of 

success. In December 2012, Pyongyang placed a satellite into orbit following a failed bid 8 months earlier. 

Widely seen as a disguise for a missile test, the successful space launch demonstrated North Korea’s advances in long range rocketry and its potential ability 

to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. After a 

nearly 5-year hiatus, the country resumed testing of 

its medium range Nodong ballistic missile, splashing 

two into the Sea of Japan in March 2014. With an estimated range of at least 1,000 kilometers, the Nodong 

can reach large parts of Japan. As the NDPG asserts: 

North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such 

as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious 

and imminent threat to Japan’s security.16
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THE DYNAMIC JOINT DEFENSE FORCE

Chinese naval and air activities in and around the 

East China Sea and the employment of paramilitary 

maritime units near the Senkakus pose particularly 

taxing challenges for Japan. These peacetime tactics 

have enabled Beijing to apply constant pressure on 

Tokyo. China has thus far kept its frequent encounters 

with the SDF and Japanese Coast Guard at a low simmer, avoiding escalation, yet ensuring that the standoff remains in play.

Short of capitulation, Japan has had no choice but 

to oblige in the cat-and-mouse game, lest it concede to 

China’s jurisdictional claims or to its larger strategic 

aims in maritime Asia. Because Beijing has carefully 

calibrated its displays of force, Tokyo must respond 

judiciously to Chinese provocations. As China grows 

more powerful, this twilight phenomenon—featuring nervy close encounters falling well short of armed 

conflict—is likely to become a new “normal.” Japan 

thus finds itself in a protracted contest of wills with no 

end in sight.

As the NSS observes: 

The Asia-Pacific region has become more prone to 

so-called ‘gray zone’ situations, situations that are 

neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests. There is a risk that these 

‘gray zone’ situations could further develop into grave 

situations.17

An incident at sea or a midair collision could trigger Sino-Japanese interactions that quickly spin out of 

control. In January 2013, a Chinese frigate locked its 

fire control radar on a Japanese destroyer, a threatening gesture that typically precedes weapons release. 
327

Chinese fighters’ dangerously close intercepts of Japanese surveillance aircraft in May and June 2014 lend 

credibility to fears that frequent military encounters 

could lead to accidents and even spiraling escalation.

The NDPG further notes: 

Amid the increasingly severe security environment 

surrounding Japan, the SDF, in addition to its regular activities, needs to respond to various situations, 

including ‘gray zone’ situations which require SDF 

commitment. The frequency of such situations and the 

duration of responses are both increasing.18

Tokyo clearly recognizes that China’s aggression is 

not a passing phenomenon; rather, it will likely intensify in the coming years. As such, the NDPG asserts, 

“Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations including gray zone situations, and will establish the necessary posture to continuously address a 

protracted situation.”19

To cope with the ambiguities and complex demands of gray zone contingencies, the NDPG 

pledges to: 

build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by 

advanced technology and capability for C3I, with a 

consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF’s operation.20

Such a force, according to the MTDP: 

will provide an effective defense which enables the 

SDF to conduct a diverse range of activities based on 

joint operations seamlessly and dynamically, adapting 

to situations as they demand, while prioritizing par-
328

ticularly important functions and capabilities through 

optimal resource allocation.21

Despite the impenetrable jargon typical of defense 

reports, these stated objectives provide a roadmap to 

the SDF’s modernization programs and future force 

structure.

The Dynamic Joint Defense Force concept is the 

product of a steady evolution in Japanese strategic 

thought. Notably, the 2010 NDPG formally jettisoned 

the Basic Defense Force Concept, a Cold War legacy 

premised on strong, yet relatively immobile, defenses 

designed to repel assault and predicated on a largely 

passive deterrence posture. Instead, according to the 

2010 NDPG, a dynamic defense force would take 

the place of static defense, and agility would be the 

watchword of the new force. Such forces could swiftly 

deploy to remote islands for a variety of contingencies, meeting challenges as they arose. To develop a 

dynamic defense force, the SDF would concurrently 

rejuvenate aerial, surface, and underwater surveillance operations.

The dynamic joint defense force thus carries forward many of the key tenets developed in 2010. In addition to mobility and readiness, the 2013 NDPG emphasizes the close coordination among naval, air, and 

ground forces. The inherently amphibious character 

of the Japanese-held islands in the East China Sea demands such integration of capabilities. At the same 

time, the 2013 NDPG calls on the SDF to establish an 

effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) architecture that would blanket the East China 

Sea with a variety of sensors to better monitor China’s naval and air activities. All three services would 

benefit enormously from such an enhanced ability to 
329

keep track of Chinese forces. To meet the ambitions 

of the dynamic joint defense force concept, the SDF 

has embarked on a series of military modernization 

programs.

FORCE MODERNIZATION TRENDS

Japan boasts one of the most modern and professional militaries in the world. During the Cold War, 

the SDF complemented—and filled the gaps of—the 

U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific. Japan’s 

armed forces shielded the home islands while the 

major forward bases along the Japanese archipelago 

allowed the United States to project power across 

Asia and beyond. The Japanese Maritime Self-defense 

Force’s (MSDF) surface, undersea, and air units bottled up Soviet naval forces in the Sea of Japan. The 

maritime service also kept open the sea lanes and secured the maritime approaches to Japan, which were 

critical to the nation’s economic well-being.

The ASDF’s modern fighters ensured that Japan 

could defend the airspace over and near the country. The nation’s Ground Self-defense Force (GSDF) 

bristled with tanks and artillery to defend against a 

full-scale Soviet invasion of the homeland, particularly against Hokkaido Island. The SDF was—and remains—largely a defensive force designed to maintain 

the nation’s territorial integrity, possessing limited offensive power projection capabilities. Japan’s current 

force structure and posture are thus legacies of this 

superpower rivalry.

As a quintessential maritime nation, it is not surprising that Japan counts the MSDF as its leading service. Over the past decade, Japanese naval power has 

evolved in both quantitative and qualitative terms. In 
330

2010, Tokyo announced its plan to increase its world 

class submarine fleet from 16 to 22 boats, representing 

a nearly 40 percent jump in size. The decision was all 

the more remarkable because the number of boats had 

stayed fixed at 16 since 1976.

Leading this growth is the cutting-edge Sōryūclass diesel-electric submarine. The largest of its kind 

in the world, the Sōryū is superior to its predecessor 

by virtually every index of performance. It is the first 

Japanese boat fitted with air independent propulsion, 

a fuel-cell technology that permits submarines to operate underwater for extended periods while quieting 

their noise signature. In short, the MSDF leads the region in conventional submarine warfare, constituting 

the benchmark against which other Asian navies will 

be compared over the next decade.

Notably, Japan has been able to invest in its undersea prowess without imposing undue burdens on 

its fiscal position. The MSDF has traditionally decommissioned its submarines unusually early, introducing more advanced boats to replace older ones that 

could have stayed in active service for at least another 

decade. To support the current buildup, the maritime 

service began keeping its existing boats at sea longer, 

allowing for a steady growth in fleet size without substantially increasing acquisition costs. Japan will likely 

meet its 22-boat target before the end of the decade.

The MSDF’s surface fleet, comprised of nearly 50 

major surface combatants, has also undergone a makeover. In 2009, the maritime service commissioned the 

first of two Hyūga-class helicopter carriers with a full 

load displacement of 19,000 tons. Capable of embarking as many as 11 helicopters, the carrier is a powerful 

antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platform.
331

In 2013, Japan launched the first of two Izumoclass ASW helicopter carriers that displace 27,000 tons 

at full load and carry up to 14 helicopters. Measuring 

nearly 250 meters in length, the Izumo will enter service in 2015 as the largest warship the Japanese have 

built since World War II. It promises to boost substantially Japan’s ability to conduct and sustain ASW operations alongside the Hyūga-class carriers.

Additionally, two more Aegis-equipped surface 

combatants will join the four Kongō-class and two 

Atago-class guided missile destroyers to enhance Japan’s missile defense capabilities at sea. In 2012, the 

first of four Akizuki-class guided missile destroyers 

was commissioned to provide anti-air, anti-surface, 

and anti-submarine cover for the helicopter carriers 

and Aegis-equipped destroyers. For the MSDF’s air 

fleet, the P-1s—the next generation maritime patrol 

aircraft—will eventually replace the aging P-3Cs as 

Japan’s main shored-based, fixed-wing ASW unit.

The ASDF fields a mix of fourth— and third—generation fighters, including nearly 200 F-15s, 90 F-2s (a 

variant of the American F-16), and 60 F-4s. A modest 

number of KC-767 aerial refueling tankers, E-767 Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, and E-2C 

airborne early warning aircraft provide support to 

Japan’s air superiority and multirole combat aircraft. 

A fleet of C-130 and C-1 transports furnishes limited 

strategic lift to Japanese forces.

The most prominent and expensive modernization 

program for the air service is that of the fifth-generation F-35 fighters. Because of the prohibitive per unit 

cost of the aircraft, which has risen further with Japan’s participation in the local production of the fighters’ parts, the ASDF currently plans to acquire only 42 

F-35s. (See Table 13-1.)
332

Japan is also developing its own stealth fighter, the 

Advanced Technology Demonstrator-X, to replace the 

F-2s. The C-2 transport, the successor to the C-1, promises to improve substantially the range and capacity of 

the ASDF’s lift. Japan’s air service will acquire new 

airborne early warning aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, and transports to augment the ASDF’s ability to 

patrol the airspace around the Japanese islands. Japan 

will also invest in UAVs—a joint asset available to the 

three services—to enhance its ISR capabilities. The 

leading contender to enter service with the ASDF is 

the high altitude, long endurance Global Hawk.

The GSDF is undergoing the most dramatic restructuring and reorganization of recent years. Reflecting Tokyo’s judgment that the risk of a homeland 

invasion is negligible, about 700 main battle tanks and 

600 artillery pieces will be reduced to 300 and 300, respectively, over a 10-year period. Tank and artillery 

units will also be removed from Honshu Island and 

consolidated on Hokkaido and Kyushu Islands. (See 

Table 13-1.)
333

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, “Defense of Japan 2014,” 

Figures II-4-3-2 and II-4-3-3, available from www.mod.go.jp/e/

publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_Figure_1st_0730.pdf.

Notes: An asterisk denotes approximate figures. The “Figure” 

column derives from the 2013 NDPG’s discussion of a future 

defense posture that will probably be achieved within a 10-year 

period.

Table 13-1. NDPG Comparison of Personnel and 

Equipment.

To enhance responsiveness and mobility, the GSDF 

will form two rapid-deployment divisions and two 

rapid-deployment brigades. Most notably, the ground 

service will create a new marine brigade capable of 

conducting amphibious operations to retake remote 

islands seized by enemy forces. Japan will procure the 

AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicles and V-22 tiltrotor aircraft that would provide Japanese marines with 

organic lift capability to project forces ashore.

1995

NDPG

2013

NDPG Future

SDF

Active Duty Personnel 145,000 151,000* 151,000

GSDF

Tanks 900* 700* 300*

Artillery 900* 600* 300*

MSDF

Destroyers 50* 47 54

(Aegis-equipped destroyers) -- 6 8

Combat aircraft 170* 170* 170*

Submarines 16 16 22

ASDF

Combat aircraft 400* 340* 360*
334

It is worth noting that these modernization efforts 

will likely strengthen the SDF’s capacity to project 

only limited power in the coming years. Notwithstanding breathless commentary surrounding the 

unveiling of the Izumo-class helicopter carrier, the 

MSDF is many steps and years away from acquiring 

a fixed-wing carrier strike force. Long range bombers 

or intercontinental ballistic missiles are conspicuously 

missing from the ASDF’s inventory, and the GSDF 

can only conduct limited expeditionary operations for 

territorial defense.

The SDF is still very much the shield that counts 

on the American spear to fulfill the full range of missions in Japan’s defense. This is consistent with Tokyo’s current constitutional interpretation prohibiting 

the possession of weaponry capable of prosecuting 

offensive operations. Any attempt to depart from this 

defensive orientation will not escape Japan’s democratic processes, involving painstaking negotiations 

and debates. Fears of creeping Japanese militarism are 

thus unwarranted.

DEFENDING THE SOUTHWEST ISLANDS

As successive policy documents make clear, Tokyo 

will strengthen its defense posture along the Ryūkyū 

Islands in the southwest, the geographic epicenter 

of the Sino-Japanese rivalry. By beefing up defenses 

along the Ryūkyūs, Japan might be able to exploit a 

permanent geographic advantage. The island chain 

gives the SDF the option of closing off Chinese access to the high seas—much as Japan’s Home Islands 

formed a physical barrier that kept the Soviet Navy 

bottled up in the Sea of Japan—and provide a form of 

strategic leverage. Indeed, given Beijing’s deeply em-
335

bedded fears of being denied access to the global commons, a powerful blocking force along the Southwest 

Islands could bolster Japan’s deterrence posture.22

The MTDP directs the GSDF to establish a new 

coastal reconnaissance unit on Yonaguni, the westernmost island of the Ryūkyū archipelago, strategically located about 70 miles east of Taiwan and about 

100 miles southwest of the Senkakus.23 A garrison on 

Yonaguni would extend Japan’s situational awareness to its largely undefended and potentially vulnerable southern flank. In a cross-Taiwan Strait war, 

for example, Chinese forces would likely transit the 

seas and airspace near Yonaguni to attack Taiwan’s 

less-defended east coast. The ASDF will redeploy an 

airborne early warning squadron and a fighter squadron to Naha Airbase in Okinawa, reinforcing the 

squadrons already there. The MSDF will refit its three 

Ōsumi-class tank landing ships to accommodate the 

planned purchases of the MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft and 

the AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicle. In June 2013, 

in an early sign of Japanese intentions, a U.S. Marine 

Corps MV-22 landed on the Hyūga helicopter carrier 

during an allied exercise.

Japan is also applying lessons learned from its Cold 

War experiences. In anticipation of a massive Soviet 

amphibious assault on Hokkaido Island, the Japanese 

developed an anti-invasion strategy that employed 

shore-based missile units to strike approaching enemy 

transports. Tokyo is now replicating this asymmetric 

tactic in the south. The 2013 NDPG calls on the GSDF 

to “maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units in 

order to prevent invasion of Japan’s remote islands 

while [invading forces are] still at sea.”24

Two years earlier, the GSDF deployed several units 

armed with Type 88 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) 
336

to Amami Ōshima, which is near the northern end of 

the Ryūkyūs. In November 2013, the GSDF put ashore 

Type 88 missiles on Miyako Island as a part of a larger 

military exercise. These unprecedented shows of force 

were no doubt directed at Beijing, as Chinese naval 

flotillas frequently transit the strait between Miyako 

and Okinawa Islands. The message was not lost on 

the Chinese.

The GSDF’s truck-launched Type 88 ASCM makes 

for an ideal weapon on the Southwest Islands. With 

a range of 110 miles, Type 88s can strike warships at 

sea from sites far inland. Well-placed ASCM batteries 

could cover all Ryūkyū narrow seas, while converting 

the eastern edge of the East China Sea into a no-go 

area for Chinese surface forces. The GSDF has begun 

acquiring the Type 12 ASCM, the successor to the 

Type 88.25 Boasting greater reach, precision, and survivability, these new missile units promise to render 

transiting straits or nearby waters even more perilous 

for Chinese mariners.

As the Dynamic Joint Defense Force concept illustrates, an effective defense of the Ryūkyūs would 

require unprecedented coordination among the three 

services. The GSDF’s amphibious forces and shorebased anti-ship missile units would rely on the lift capabilities of the ASDF’s air transports and the MSDF’s 

vessels to reach rapidly islands stretching over 1,000 

kilometers between Kyushu Island and Taiwan. The 

coastal reconnaissance garrison on Yonaguni would 

provide early warning to air and naval units. The Type 

88 and Type 12 ASCM launchers would require the 

cueing and targeting data from the MSDF’s airborne 

early warning aircraft to conduct over-the-horizon 

strikes against enemy surface forces. When they enter 

service, ASDF UAVs would enhance the situational 
337

awareness of all units operating around the Southwest 

Islands. Above all, Japanese warships, submarines, 

and fighters must ensure sea control and air superiority, without which amphibious operations and island 

defense would founder. Mutual support among the 

three services in a complex operational environment 

is thus essential to success.

A CONVENTIONAL COUNTERSTRIKE OPTION?

If the military balance continues to tilt in Beijing’s 

favor, Tokyo could feel compelled to deter by punishment, which could entail inflicting unacceptable levels 

of pain on China should the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) ever attack Japan and Japanese forces. To retaliate directly against China with such force, Japan 

would have to develop offensive strike capabilities 

designed to hold at risk a range of assets, especially 

those on the mainland that Beijing highly values. In 

theory, Tokyo’s ability to impose prohibitive costs on 

China would deter the Chinese military from acting 

in the first place. Dating back to the 1950s, Japanese 

debates about the constitutionality of attacking enemy 

territory suggest that a decision to pursue deterrence 

by punishment is not far-fetched.

While an offensive posture would no doubt stoke 

political controversy, serious debates about acquiring land attack cruise missiles have surfaced in Japan 

from time to time since at least 2005.26 The discourse 

has centered primarily on the legalities of Tokyo’s 

hypothetical decision to attack North Korean missile 

bases in the event of a crisis. But it can be assumed 

that Japan would not limit the missile’s use to Pyongyang if Japan ever acquired such a weapon system.
338

In 2009, the subcommittee of the defense policymaking council of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 

submitted a proposal endorsing the acquisition of 

offensive missiles. The committee called on Japan 

to “maintain the capability to attack enemy missile 

sites” and recommended developing cruise and ballistic missiles and the space-based systems to support 

missile operations.27 The LDP’s electoral defeat in September 2009 ended further discussions on this issue.

Nevertheless, the report represented a significant 

milestone in post-war Japanese thinking about defense and helped legitimize the notion of going on 

the offense. Prime Minister Abe’s electoral victory has 

resurrected the debate. In reference to the North Korean missile threat, the latest NDPG and the MTDP 

obliquely hint at revisiting a counterstrike capability. 

The NDPG states:

Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the 

deterrent of the Japan-U.S. alliance as a whole through 

enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response 

capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take means as 

necessary.28

In other words, all options are back on the table. 

What would a conventional missile option look like? 

Tokyo would almost certainly limit itself to counterforce strikes aimed exclusively at enemy military 

units. This would require Japan to plan for counteroffensive operations against Chinese military forces, 

including those deployed on the mainland.

Equipping Japanese forces with conventional long 

range precision-strike weapons, such as the venerable 
339

Tomahawk land attack cruise missile, would not only 

be relatively affordable but also technically feasible. 

In particular, Japanese destroyers, submarines, and 

aircraft armed with Tomahawks or their equivalents 

could strike large fixed targets, such as the over-thehorizon radars, essential for conducting Chinese 

anti-access operations. As Chinese dependence on 

land-based sensors to effectively employ its theaterstrike systems increases, Japan may find the strategic 

dividends of a counterstrike capability operationally 

attractive and, thus, politically persuasive.

DEFENSE BUDGET WOES

While Tokyo’s modernization plans are well tailored to address China’s growing challenge, Japan 

may have trouble sustaining or expanding them to 

keep up with the Chinese military. On paper, Japan’s 

annual defense budget, at nearly $48.6 billion in 2013, 

is impressive.29 Indeed, Japan is ranked fifth in the 

world in military expenditures, following the United 

States, China, Russia, and France. But such a high figure paints a superficial picture at best. For decades, 

Japan capped its defense budget at 1 percent of gross 

domestic product (GDP)—far below figures expected of great powers—as an expression of its pacifist 

orientation.

Although Tokyo is not legally committed to such 

fiscal constraint, longstanding practice has formed a 

powerful normative prohibition against shattering 

this ceiling. Consequently, the fixed defense budget 

has plateaued alongside anemic economic growth 

since the early-1990s. Moreover, Japanese government 

debt is nearly 250 percent of GDP, and soaring social 

security expenditures owing to Japan’s rapidly aging 
340

society have intensified competition over ever scarcer 

financial resources. Such fiscal burdens could prove 

crippling in the years ahead, draining the political will 

to spend substantially more on defense.

The past decade’s budgetary trends reflect Japan’s 

monetary predicament. The defense budget suffered 

cuts for 11 consecutive years, dropping from ¥4.94 trillion in 2002 to ¥4.64 trillion in 2012.30 In 2013, Prime 

Minister Abe’s government announced a very modest 0.8 percent budgetary increase over the previous 

year, reversing the steady decline. The cabinet then 

approved a 2.8 percent boost to its defense budget for 

fiscal year 2014, the largest year-on-year increase since 

the mid-1990s.

In light of the deteriorating security environment, 

the decision to reverse the steady decline was long 

overdue. While the spending hikes are welcomed 

news, they are unlikely to provide sufficient relief. 

Military modernization programs will compete with 

other priorities. For example, compensation for government pay cuts following the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disasters could largely 

nullify the growth in outlays. It thus remains unclear 

how much more capability these modest increases 

will buy.

Japan’s budgetary woes are even more alarming in 

comparative terms. China has dramatically surpassed 

Japan in defense spending over the past decade. The 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that the Chinese defense budget, measured in 

constant 2011 dollars, grew from $52.8 billion in 2002 

to $159.5 billion in 2012. Japan, by contrast, virtually 

stood still, with its budget declining slightly from 

$60.7 billion to $59.5 billion over the same period.31

The Japanese Ministry of Defense reckons that Chi-
341

na’s defense spending grew by 350 percent from 2003 

to 2012, while Japan’s budget shrank slightly during 

that decade.32 The International Institute for Strategic 

Studies paints a similarly stark picture. In 1990, Japan 

spent, in nominal terms, nearly $29 billion on defense 

compared to China’s $6 billion. By 2013, Chinese expenditures soared to $112 billion, more than doubling 

Japan’s $51 billion defense budget.33 (See Figure 13-1.) 

Such an extraordinary reversal in fortunes between 

two rival regional powers is rare by historical standards. Ominously, Japan’s persistently low economic 

growth rates will likely permit China to further widen 

the spending gap.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 

Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, available from www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/

milex_database.

Figure 13-1. Japanese versus Chinese Defense 

Expenditures.
342

STRATEGY—RESOURCE MISMATCH?

Beyond budgetary constraints, Japan’s long-standing ambitions to fulfill wider international responsibilities befitting a major power—captured by Abe’s 

concept of “proactive contribution to peace”—could 

spread the SDF too thin. Since Japan’s dispatch of 

minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the First Gulf 

War in 1991, successive Japanese administrations have 

deployed ground, air, and naval forces far beyond Japan’s own neighborhood to conduct “international 

peace cooperation operations.”

The 2013 MTDP defines such operations as: 

activities cooperatively carried out by the international society to improve the international security 

environment such as UN Peace Keeping Operations, 

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), 

and others in the fields of non-traditional security.34

Since Japan’s first peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in 1992, Japan has sent peacekeepers around the 

world, including to the Golan Heights in the Levant, 

to South Sudan, to East Timor, and to Haiti. Japanese 

forces distinguished themselves in rendering assistance to stricken nations following the 2004 Indian 

Ocean tsunami and to the Philippines in the aftermath 

of the 2013 Haiyan typhoon.

In a post-September 11, 2001, show of solidarity with the United States, Tokyo committed MSDF 

vessels to the coalition naval contingent supporting 

combat operations in Afghanistan. MSDF tankers 

resupplied coalition warships, and Aegis destroyers 

guarded against air and surface threats in the Arabian 

Sea. MSDF vessels supplied fuel oil and water to cus-
343

tomers from about a dozen countries—including the 

United States, Pakistan, France, Britain, and Germany—until the mission lapsed in January 2010.

Over the past decade, Japan has participated in 

various global efforts to secure peace. The country 

was a founding participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative in 2003 and has remained one of the 

initiative’s foremost proponents. Moreover, a modest-sized GSDF contingent deployed to Iraq in January 2004 for noncombat duty. Tokyo joined the fight 

against Indian Ocean piracy in July 2009, committing 

to an open-ended, out-of-area deployment. Finally, 

Japanese mariners continue to ply the anarchic Gulf 

of Aden and Arabian Sea alongside a multinational 

contingent of naval forces. Tokyo subsequently established a military base at Djibouti to support forward 

deployed MSDF units, Japan’s first overseas base since 

World War II.

While these praiseworthy activities have set a 

powerful precedent for fulfilling Prime Minister Abe’s 

wider agenda, competing imperatives will likely force 

Japan to prioritize narrower national interests above 

global security. As the security environment deteriorates closer to home, Japan’s willingness to spend political and military capital on extraregional missions 

will diminish commensurately.

Moreover, the Japanese government will place 

greater weight on managing direct threats to sovereignty and material prosperity than on meeting 

abstract, diffuse challenges in regions where Japan 

remains a marginal player. As an economically dynamic, militarily strong China eyes the Senkakus and 

the wider East China Sea, Japan’s SDF, which is already inferior in numbers to the PLA, is losing its edge 

in its main East Asian theater, even as threats to Japa-
344

nese interests in other parts of the world remain remote, ill-defined, and of indefinite duration. Whether 

the Japanese government can allocate resources deftly 

enough to balance traditional against nontraditional 

military functions remains uncertain. If Tokyo fails 

to prioritize, then it is entirely possible that Japanese 

political ends will outstrip ways and means.

JAPAN’S LOOMING DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS

Over the long term, Tokyo will confront a structural and virtually irreversible challenge to its hard 

power. Japan’s rapidly aging society is pushing the 

nation toward an unprecedented demographic crisis 

that could have dire implications for its defense posture in the coming decades. Owing to low fertility, 

high life expectancy, and trifling immigration, Japan 

will be significantly older and smaller in 2030 than it 

is today. The population will likely decline from 128 

million in 2010 to 116 million 20 years hence, averaging a loss of more than 660,000 Japanese citizens 

per year.

During this same period, Japan’s working-age 

population (ages 15 to 64) will shrink by 17 percent, 

from 81 million to 67 million. The median age of the 

population will rise from 45 to 50, and about a third 

of the population will be over 65 years old by 2030. 

Some forecasts estimate that Japan’s population may 

shrink to 90 million by mid-century, representing an 

astounding 30 percent decrease from its peak years in 

the late-2000s.35

Population decline inevitably reduces the pool of 

manpower available for military service. The figures 

are sobering. The male population eligible to join the 

SDF (ages 18 to 26) peaked at 9 million in 1994. In 
345

just over 15 years, this age group recorded 30 percent 

drop, plummeting to around 6 million.

By 2030, SDF-eligible males will fall to less than 

5 million. By contrast, the United States will likely 

experience a 16 percent increase for the same cohort 

between 2010 and 2030. The cost of fielding troops for 

combat will rise as manpower availability dwindles. 

In the coming years, maintaining satisfactory levels 

of recruitment and retention will likely tax Tokyo’s 

resources. Indeed, the 2013 NDPG specifically cites 

the declining birthrate as a factor in pressurizing the 

recruiting environment.36

Recent defense policy documents have held out 

hope that technology will potentially lessen the effect of personnel shortages. But most military operations—ranging from high-end conventional wars to 

post-conflict reconstruction—soak up manpower. Gee 

whiz technologies, such as unmanned systems, only 

go so far. Warfighters in the field and support crews 

in the rear must still do much of the heavy lifting. 

Japan’s response to the March 2011 tsunami was the 

starkest reminder of this reality: Tokyo called up more 

than 100,000 military personnel—about 40 percent of 

the active duty force—for relief operations, the largest deployment of troops in Japan’s postwar history. 

In short, boots on the ground still count as much in 

peacetime as they do in war.

Unless Japan is prepared for a major military 

buildup, which appears politically doubtful and fiscally unsustainable, the country’s shrinking pool of 

manpower will weigh heavily on Japanese decisionmakers. It remains to be seen whether such socioeconomic pressures will increase temptations to turn 

inward, even as Japan’s external security environment 

grows more contentious.
346

WILL JAPAN RISE TO THE CHALLENGE?

China’s rapid ascent has spurred Japanese policymakers to reallocate considerable material resources 

and to expend intellectual energy on hard power 

during an era of fiscal austerity. Chinese behavior 

in recent years suggests that the stakes now involve 

nothing less than Japan’s and China’s future places in 

maritime Asia. At the very least, Tokyo’s choices have 

narrowed: it can either accommodate Beijing in the 

near future, or it can act now to preserve the freedom 

of action it has enjoyed for decades. Not since the 1969 

Richard Nixon Doctrine—a presidential call to America’s Asian allies to protect themselves against external threats, even as the United States retrenched—

has Japan confronted such strategic danger and 

stark options.

Only sound strategy will help Tokyo navigate the 

uncertainties of living in an unstable security environment. The extent to which Japan can shape its hard 

power to serve an effective strategy will depend on 

meaningful progress along multiple fronts. Tokyo 

must pivot even more decisively away from its northward orientation toward Russia—an anachronistic 

Cold War legacy—and toward its southern flank 

along the Ryūkyūs. Japan must stubbornly hold the 

line there, maintaining high levels of alertness, even 

while keeping its cool in the face of persistent Chinese 

probes and provocations. To do so, the SDF must develop unprecedented levels of cooperation and trust 

among its services to secure an extended front far from 

the Home Islands. Above all, Tokyo must sustain the 

political will and invest in the capabilities necessary 

to take up the Chinese challenge. Only thus can Japan 

hope to stay in a competition that promises to be a 

long one.
347

ENDNOTES — CHAPTER 13

1. This chapter was originally published as an essay on 

August 25, 2014.

2. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, National Security Strategy, London, UK, December 17, 2013, 

p. 1, available from www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/

nss-e.pdf.

3. The NDPG was previously published in 1976, 1995, 2004, 

and 2010.

4. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 

Medium Term Defense Program, FY2014-FY2018, London, UK, December 17, 2013, available from www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/

guideline/2014/pdf/Defense_Program.pdf.

5. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 

National Security Strategy, pp. 3-4.

6. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 

National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond, London, UK, December 17, 2013, p. 5, available from www.mod.go.jp/j/

approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf.

7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival 

and Protect Its People, Tokyo, Japan, July 1, 2014, p. 8, available 

from www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e_000273.html.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. For detailed flight paths of Chinese aircraft over the East 

China Sea and through the Ryūkyū Islands, see Japanese Ministry 

of Defense, “China’s Activities Surrounding Japan’s Airspace,” 

Tokyo, Japan, available from www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/ryouku/index.

html.
348

11. Kosuke Takahashi and James Hardy, “Japan Sees Big Rise 

in Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft,” HIS Jane’s, Vol. 360, April 

9, 2014.

12. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 

National Security Strategy, p. 12.

13. For block quote and this quote, see Prime Minister’s 

Cabinet and National Security Council, National Defense Program 

Guidelines, pp. 3-4.

14. Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2013, 

July 2013, p. 39, available from www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/

2013.html.

15. NIDS China Security Report 2011, Tokyo, Japan: National 

Institute for Defense Studies, February 2012, p. 4, available from

www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_

web_2011_A01.pdf.

16. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 

National Defense Program Guidelines, p. 3.

17. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,

National Security Strategy, p. 11.

18. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 

National Defense Program Guidelines, p. 7.

19. Ibid. p. 13.

20. Ibid. p. 8.

21. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 

Medium Term Defense Program, p. 1.

22. See Michael Pillsbury, “The Sixteen Fears: China’s Strategic Psychology,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 54, No. 

5, October-November 2012, pp. 152-154.
349

23. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 

Medium Term Defense Program, FY2014-FY2018, p. 7.

24. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 

National Defense Program Guidelines, p. 22.

25. Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense Programs and Budget 

of Japan: Overview of FY 2014 Budget, March 20, 2014, p. 8, available 

from www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/251009.pdf.

26. See, for example, Sugio Takahashi, “Strike Capability 

against Enemy Territory under Exclusive Defense Policy: One Option for Coping with Enemy Missile Threats,” NIDS Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2005, pp. 105-121; and Hideaki Kaneda, 

“Is It Possible for the SDF to Attack Enemy Missile Bases?” Sekai 

No Kansen, February 2007.

27. National Defense Division of the Liberal Democratic Party, Subcommittee of the Defense Policymaking Council, A Proposal Regarding the New National Defense Program Guidelines, London, 

UK, June 6, 2009, pp. 11-12.

28. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 

National Defense Program Guidelines, p. 20.

29. The defense budget is given in 2013 dollars. For more 

information, see Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, available from www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/

milex_database.

30. Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2013, p. 119.

31. Data drawn from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2014, 

available from milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+military+expendi

ture+database+1988-2013.xlsx.

32. Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2013, p. 122.

33. I thank Bradford Lee for this insight. See The Military Balance 1991, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 150, 165; and The Military Balance 2014, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 230, 250.
350

34. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 

Medium Term Defense Program, pp. 1-2.

35. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision 1, New York: 

UN Population Division, 2008, pp. 292-293.

36. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 

National Defense Program Guidelines, p. 26.
351

CHAPTER 14

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION AIR POWER: 

A SELF-RELIANT EUROPE?1

Craig Franklin

KEY POINTS

• With a decreasing U.S. Air Force presence in 

Europe and increasing pressure to address security concerns in Asia and the Middle East, 

non-U.S. North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) air forces must shoulder more of the 

burden in Europe and its periphery.

• The strength of non-U.S. NATO air forces lies 

in their personnel, tactical fighter strength, and 

basing infrastructures.

• These air forces have plans to address key 

shortfalls in intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance; transport; air refueling; and 

stealth aircraft, but successful implementation 

will depend on Smart Defence initiatives and 

stable budgets.

• More broadly, two issues continue to hamstring 

NATO planning and execution: the fact that the 

alliance lacks a common understanding of the 

threats it faces, and the trend of NATO members placing caveats on the types of missions 

they will fly.

Although it is unlikely that NATO would ever 

participate in a conflict without significant airpower 

contributions from the United States, cuts to Ameri-
352

can capabilities necessarily lead one to wonder what 

America’s NATO partners can bring to the table. Certainly, the U.S. Air Force presence in Europe is nowhere near what it once was—or even what it was in 

the 1990s.

In the 1990s, the U.S. Air Force in Europe had 25 

main operating bases, 34 aircraft squadrons, and approximately 72,000 personnel. Today, there are just 

five main operating bases, eight aircraft squadrons, 

and approximately 25,000 personnel. Logically, this 

should mean that an ever-increasing part of any 

NATO air effort would be non-U.S. NATO’s Smart 

Defence concept encourages NATO nations to shoulder a greater share of defense and to not just rely on 

U.S. capabilities. NATO describes the origins of Smart 

Defence as follows:

From 2008 the world economy has been facing its 

worst period since the end of the Second World War. 

Governments are applying budgetary restrictions to 

tackle this serious recession, which is having a considerable effect on defense spending.

Furthermore, in the course of this crisis, the Alliance’s 

security environment has been changing, and has become more diverse and unpredictable. The crisis in 

Libya is a recent example, underlining the unforeseeable nature of conflicts, but also showing the need for 

modern systems and facilities, and for less reliance on 

the United States for costly advanced capabilities.

In these crisis times, rebalancing defense spending 

between the European nations and the United States 

is more than ever a necessity. The other Allies must 

reduce the gap with the United States by equipping 

themselves with capabilities that are deemed to be 

critical, deployable, and sustainable, and must dem-
353

onstrate political determination to achieve that goal. 

There must be equitable sharing of the defense burden. Smart Defense is NATO’s response to this.2

This chapter provides an overview of non-U.S. 

NATO air capabilities. It assesses the current state of 

non-U.S. NATO command and control (C2), airmen, 

aircraft, munitions, basing, air and missile defense 

and readiness. It concludes with 10 challenges facing 

America’s NATO partners in these fields and outlines 

how NATO is or should be addressing each.

C2

NATO’s Allied Air Command at Ramstein Air 

Base, Germany, is the singular NATO command for 

organizing air operations and is led by a four-star 

U.S. Air Force officer who is a dual-hatted U.S. and 

NATO commander. His Allied Air Command staff 

comes from a variety of NATO nations and currently includes a French three-star general as vice commander; a German two-star general as chief of staff; 

and Turkish, American, and British one-star generals 

as, respectively, deputy chiefs for plans, operations, 

and support.

Presently, the command has established nine focus 

areas: NATO charter Article 5 operations, NATO-integrated air and missile defense, NATO air policing, 

ballistic missile defense (BMD), support to ongoing 

NATO operations, Air Command (AIRCOM) joint 

force air-component readiness, partnerships with 

non-NATO member states’ air forces, air and space 

advocacy, and air-capability development.3

Using lessons it has learned from NATO operations in the Balkans in the 1990s and Libya in 2011, 
354

NATO has streamlined and concentrated its air C2 

structure, resources, and associated training efforts 

at two static air-operations center (AOC) locations 

(Torrejon, Spain; and Uedem, Germany) and in one 

deployable AOC headquartered in Poggio Renatico, 

Italy. This more focused effort has increased training 

proficiency and readiness levels across the board in 

support of current allied air operations.

NATO can also exercise tactical-level C2 closer 

to actual air operations. NATO operates 17 E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft 

stationed at Geilenkirchen, Germany. These aircraft 

are part of the NATO Airborne Early Warning and 

Control (NAEW&C) Program established in 1978.

The United States, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 

Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 

Romania, Spain, and Turkey participate as full members in NAEW&C. The United Kingdom’s (UK) seven 

AWACS aircraft also participate in the program and 

would be a key part of any NAEW&C effort. With the 

historic return of France to NATO military operations 

in March 2009, its four E-3F aircraft could also now be 

available.4

The current allied air commander, General Frank 

Gorenc, recently highlighted the continuing value of 

the AWACS:

The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control E-3A 

Force has been absolutely critical to the success of 

NATO operations and providing Air Battle Management, Command and Control and Situational Awareness for the Alliance. The versatility of the E-3A force 

continues to be demonstrated today as we have seen 

during the ongoing crisis in the Ukraine.5
355

AIRMEN

Air forces might have the best aircraft available, 

but without solid airmen of all ranks to operate and 

maintain them, they will not be successful. From general officers to midgrade and junior officers to the 

noncommissioned officer and enlisted force, NATO 

nations have air force leaders and airmen of great capacity. Senior leaders have a passionate vision of air 

power’s importance to the security of the alliance and 

to any military campaign or operation.

However, these leaders are also struggling with 

how to provide the best airpower capability to their 

respective nations and NATO under a fiscally constrained environment. NATO nations are making 

huge strides in professionalizing and recognizing the 

value of the enlisted force. For example, Poland, a relatively new member of the alliance that has a military 

that once largely consisted of conscripts, has made 

significant investments in training and professionalizing its air arm.

AIRCRAFT

NATO member nations collectively have well over 

3,000 tactical-fighter aircraft of various types and capabilities. Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK all operate the modern Eurofighter Typhoon. France operates 

the fourth-generation Rafael and the latest versions of 

the Mirage. Several countries fly older F-16s, but ones 

with midlife upgrades— Denmark, the Netherlands, 

Norway, Portugal, and soon Romania.

Turkey flies newer Block 30, 40, and 50 F-16s, 

and Greece and Poland fly Block 52 F-16s. Spain and 

Canada operate very capable F-18s. Several countries 
356

still fly older but very capable aircraft, such as the Tornado, Mirage, and Phantom. Finally, some countries 

fly fleets of Russian-produced aircraft with Westernstyle, NATO-compatible modifications. For example, 

Poland recently deployed four MiG-29s to do Baltic 

air policing over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.6

NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations—

Sweden, Finland, and Austria—also have advanced 

fighter capabilities. While there are more than enough 

aircraft available, the issue is whether nations will 

commit enough of these aircraft to fly specific types 

of missions in particular NATO operations. As former 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and 

NATO policy Ian Brzezinski has noted, “Little more 

than a handful of NATO’s 28 members proved willing 

to fly strike missions in Libya.”7

Areas for improvement in non-U.S. NATO aircraft 

are 1) stealth capability, 2) air-refueling tankers, 3) 

strategic airlifters, and 4) intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. NATO operations 

have long relied on the U.S. Air Force for the bulk 

of these types of aircraft. These challenges and nonU.S. NATO nations’ efforts to address them will be 

discussed later.

MUNITIONS

Collectively, NATO nations have a variety of 

close-in, precision-guided weapons. They also have a 

number of precision standoff munitions that can suppress enemy air defenses and conduct standoff precision strikes so aircraft do not have to penetrate lethal 

air-defense rings. However, potential adversaries’ air 

defenses continue to advance and mature, creating increased risk and difficulties for air forces to provide 
357

traditional close-in, air-to-ground weapons employment. As Brzezinski said:

The preponderance of the initial salvo that disabled 

Gadhafi’s air defense came from U.S. forces, and afterwards U.S. aircraft were relied on heavily for intelligence gathering, surveillance, air-to-air refueling, 

electronic jamming, and the suppression of enemy air 

defenses. European allies soon ran out of precisionguided munitions and other key wartime consumables 

and had to turn to U.S. inventories for replenishment.8

At a 2014 Air Force Association conference, General Philip Breedlove, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, also addressed the need to maintain 

larger NATO stockpiles of standoff and precision 

weapons:

. . . what we learned in Libya and other places, we do 

not have enough precision strike munitions to carry 

on a concentrated campaign at length helping all of 

our allies to be there with us. I think we need to think 

through where we are on precision munitions.9

Likewise, upgrading these weapons’ precision and 

survivability in response to evolving and improving 

enemy defense countertechnologies will be essential 

for any future operations.

BASING

Basing is a tremendous strength for NATO. It is superb across NATO and at the extreme edges of the alliance. Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey provide 

excellent airfields in the far eastern portions. When 

Kyrgyzstan asked the United States to depart Manas 

Air Base by July 2014, Romania quickly volunteered 
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Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base as the new multimode 

logistics location for flow in and out of Afghanistan.

Greece, Italy, France, and Spain also provide firstrate bases in the extreme southern boundaries, as 

seen during Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. Portugal provides basing in the far western boundary. 

Iceland, the UK, Denmark, Norway, Lithuania, and 

Estonia provide robust basing options for operations 

in the northern borders. The question, again (as with 

aircraft), is whether nations will make some or all of 

their bases available for a specific NATO operation or 

even restrict the type of aircraft and mission that can 

fly from a base.

Basing is a straightforward example of NATO’s 

Smart Defence principle. Not every nation needs to 

have every aspect of airpower in its inventory. Estonia is a good example. The Estonian Air Force is small 

but has a great airfield, and it makes available to all 

NATO air forces. Likewise, Estonia provides some of 

the best cyber expertise to the alliance and hosts NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. 

In brief, Estonia provides the kind of pooled, shared, 

and coordinated capabilities that NATO needs in a 

time of budgetary austerity.10

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Many NATO nations have surface-based airdefense systems to defend against aircraft threats. 

Surface-based air-defense missiles and surveillance 

radars are spread among various service components 

in each country, but for any NATO operations, they 

would fall under the C2 of the Allied Air Command. 

In combination with advanced air defense, multi-role 

fighters, and AWACS, non-U.S. NATO nations can 

adequately defend airspace against enemy attack.
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However, there is a shortfall in BMD capabilities. 

Both the 2010 and 2012 NATO summits identified the 

need to strengthen BMD. At the 2012 summit, NATO 

declared that it had an interim BMD capability based 

largely on U.S. contributions under the U.S. Missile 

Defense Agency’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).11 The NATO interim capability consisted of the integration of a U.S. Navy Aegis ship; a 

U.S. land-based, long-range radar; and a C2 capability 

located at Allied Air Command.

A second phase of the EPAA, to be implemented 

in 2015, will make this BMD capability more robust 

through improvements to the Aegis radar and its defense missile capabilities. This phase will also add an 

Aegis-ashore system in Romania and upgrade the C2 

systems.

In 2018, phase three will provide another round 

of Aegis software and missile updates, add a second 

Aegis-ashore system in Poland, and provide more advances in C2 systems at Allied Air Command. NATO 

leadership continues to encourage alliance nations 

to provide additional capabilities (or funding) to improve NATO coverage against ballistic missile threats, 

and NATO nations are responding, as captured in the 

2014 Wales Summit Declaration:

58. Today we are also pleased to note that additional 

voluntary national contributions have been offered, 

and that several Allies are developing, including 

through multinational cooperation, or are acquiring 

further BMD capabilities that could become available 

to the Alliance. Our aim remains to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational BMD that can provide 

full coverage and protection for all NATO European 

populations, territory, and forces, based on voluntary 

national contributions, including nationally funded 
360

interceptors and sensors, hosting arrangements, and 

on the expansion of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) capability. Only 

the command and control systems of ALTBMD and 

their expansion to territorial defence are eligible for 

common funding.

59. We note the potential opportunities for cooperation on missile defence, and encourage Allies to explore possible additional voluntary national contributions, including through multinational cooperation, to 

provide relevant capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in planning, development, procurement, 

and deployment. We also note that BMD features in 

two Smart Defence projects.12

With the Syrian civil war potentially spilling over 

into Turkey in 2012, Ankara requested support from 

its NATO allies to bolster its air defense and BMD capabilities. In response, On December 4, 2012, NATO 

foreign ministers agreed to the request, with Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States deploying 

a total of six Patriot-missile batteries in response. By 

February 16, 2013, the last battery had arrived and 

was operational. This deployment should be hailed as 

an example of successful collaboration and flexibility 

in NATO’s growing BMD role.

Spanish Defense Minister Pedro Morenés announced in September 2014 Spain’s intent to deploy 

Patriots to Turkey in January 2015. Spanish missiles 

and soldiers are expected to replace the two Dutch 

batteries deployed in Adana, Turkey.13

A near-term challenge for NATO air and missile defense, however, will be intertwining various 

defense systems. Currently, there is a mix of former 

Soviet and current western systems. Possibly adding 

to this problem, in September 2013, Turkey publicly 
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announced that it intended to procure Chinese-made 

air-defense systems.14 The United States and other 

NATO countries made their displeasure with that decision clear, and Congress took the unusual step of actually writing into the defense authorization bill a provision denying the use of any American government 

funds to help “integrate the Chinese missile defense 

systems into U.S. or NATO systems.”15 Ankara has 

since postponed its decision to procure the Chinese 

systems to consider purchasing alternative systems.16

READINESS

Regular NATO exercises are intended to hone 

NATO airmen’s skills at both the operator and command-and-control levels. Likewise, individual NATO 

nations often host or participate in bilateral and multilateral exercises. For example, three to four times a 

year, Spain hosts the Tactical Leadership Program to 

train aircrews in large mission employment, and Portugal hosts the multilateral Real Thaw exercise every 

year. NATO nations also participate in air exercises 

outside of Europe. Israel’s most recent Blue Flag exercise included aircraft and airmen from the United 

States, Italy, and Greece.

NATO’s Allied Air Command recently conducted its largest exercise to date, Ramstein Ambition II 

2014—a computer-assisted, command-post exercise 

simulating continuous operations—in which 400 airmen from 26 nations participated. According to General Gorenc, Ramstein Ambition II 2014 is a great 

validation point on the march toward AIRCOM’s full 

operational capability.17

However, it is important to note that each nation funds its own participation in most exercises. If 
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NATO nations continue decreasing defense funding, 

the level of participation in NATO-level exercises and 

nationally hosted multilateral or bilateral training will 

almost certainly fall as well. To forestall this, NATO 

and alliance militaries should be examining increased 

use of linked, high-end simulators.

Simulation capabilities are advancing every year, 

enabling aircrews to make “fatal” mistakes that they 

learn from without experiencing the costly loss of 

life and aircraft resources. The challenge with linking high-fidelity aircraft simulators is that it requires 

a significant upfront investment from NATO nations.

CURRENT CHALLENGES

NATO’s leaders currently face 10 key challenges 

to the alliance’s air capabilities and operations. The 

following subsections detail NATO’s current plans 

to address these issues and identify what it can do 

to overcome these shortages in a more effective and 

sustainable manner.

Stealth Capability. 

Stealth capability is not a luxury; it is a necessity 

in the context of the advancing defense designs that 

NATO airmen could face. Currently, the United States 

provides the only stealth aircraft capability. But the 

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will fill this void for 

non-U.S. NATO nations, seven of which have ordered 

or stated intent to buy a total of 512 F-35s: the UK, 

the Netherlands, Italy, Canada, Denmark, Norway, 

and Turkey.18 This international venture is a win for 

NATO. The fifth-generation F-35 provides a commonality of logistics and tactics for any future NATO 
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operation and reduces the number of support-package aircraft required, such as those used for dedicated 

electronic attack or air superiority.

ISR. 

The strategic level of ISR can be divided into spacebased and aircraft-based systems. The larger NATO 

nations have their own space-based systems or have 

collaborated for many years to cooperatively fund, 

develop, launch, operate, and sustain various types 

of space surveillance systems that would support a 

NATO military effort.

Regarding aircraft, both the French and the British 

have strategic- and operational-level ISR aircraft. For 

example, the UK operates five Sentinel aircraft that 

have advanced surveillance radars mated to Bombardier Global Express business jets. The system reached 

initial operational capability in July 2008. The UK 

also just received the first of two Northrop Grumman 

E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

aircraft from the United States to replace their aging 

Nimrod R1.

Likewise, the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) 

system is scheduled to reach initial operating status 

(with basing in Italy) by 2016. NATO AGS will use 

five remotely piloted Block 40 Global Hawks. Fifteen 

NATO member countries are currently contributing 

to the acquisition of the aircraft—Bulgaria, the Czech 

Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, 

Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, 

Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United States.19 These highin-demand, short-in-supply aircraft will undoubtedly 

be a great utility in almost any NATO contingency.
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The UK and Italy provided remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) for NATO operations in Afghanistan 

(MQ-9 and MQ-1 RPAs, respectively). Italy began accepting six total MQ-9s in 2011, and France accepted 

two of an eventual 12 MQ-9s in January 2014 in an 

effort to replace its less-capable Harfang RPA. Germany and the Netherlands have also expressed interest 

in operating tactical-type RPAs. The NATO alliance 

is growing its ISR capability and must maintain this 

momentum in light of the reduction of RPA systems 

in future U.S. defense budgets. ISR is one of the main 

focus areas for NATO’s Smart Defence concept.

As NATO increases its ISR capability, it must also 

grow a parallel processing, exploitation, and dissemination capability for the data it gathers. The United 

States learned some hard lessons in this area when it 

rapidly grew its MQ-1, MQ-9, and Global Hawk force. 

The U.S. Air Force is sharing these lessons with NATO 

nations to help them avoid similar growing pains.

Investment Levels. 

NATO has a long-established defense spending goal of 2 percent of each member nation’s gross 

domestic product (GDP). Unfortunately, only four 

nations (the United States, the UK, Greece, and Estonia) achieved that goal in 2013, and many even decreased spending levels.20 The general trend is in the 

wrong direction, but Poland is a notable exception: 

it has increased defense spending, up to 1.9 percent 

of GDP in 2013,21 and discussions at the 2014 Wales 

summit indicated a commitment and intent by the nations to reverse the trend. An excerpt from the Wales 

summit states:
365

We agree to reverse the trend of declining defence 

budgets, to make the most effective use of our funds 

and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and 

responsibilities. Our overall security and defence 

depend both on how much we spend and how we 

spend it. Increased investments should be directed 

towards meeting our capability priorities, and Allies 

also need to display the political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are 

needed. A strong defence industry across the Alliance, 

including a stronger defence industry in Europe and 

greater defence industrial cooperation within Europe 

and across the Atlantic, remains essential for delivering the required capabilities. NATO and EU efforts to 

strengthen defence capabilities are complementary.22

In these austere times for most of Europe, nations 

are carefully balancing defense dollars across personnel, training, sustainment, current national operations, 

and future capabilities. Nations should consider making the same tough decisions the United States had 

to make in carefully cutting personnel to afford more 

military hardware.

Notably, when it comes time to deploy for a 

NATO operation, it is a pay-your-own-way system. 

Establishing a common fund for operations could 

encourage more national airpower contributions to 

any NATO operation. But creating a common operational fund is problematic, since NATO would either 

have to look for donors or tax each nation a percentage of its defense budget (or GDP). At this point, it 

may be easier to simply continue with the pay-yourown-way model.
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National Caveats. 

Once NATO becomes engaged in a particular operation, nations will sometimes have caveats (or particular restrictions) on the types of missions they will fly 

or how they will execute portions of missions. Though 

not insurmountable, this effectively handcuffs the 

NATO joint force air-component commander (JFACC) 

planning and execution. When allocating forces to a 

mission, the JFACC must consider these caveats and 

plan around them. Elimination of all mission caveats 

is the ultimate goal. In the absence of that, nations 

should provide NATO air-planning staffs with a list 

of their most likely national caveats well in advance of 

any operation.

In a June 2011 visit to Brussels, then–U.S. Secretary 

of Defense Robert Gates expressed his frustrations 

with operations in Afghanistan, noting that the war 

effort had been hobbled by “national ‘caveats’ that 

tied the hands of allied commanders in sometimes 

infuriating ways.”23 Ironically, the United States effectively imposed national caveats during Operation 

UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya by not allowing its 

air and naval air forces to perform strike missions; 

these forces only performed enabling missions such 

as ISR, air refueling, suppression of enemy air defenses, and electronic attack. For the first time, and 

despite Washington’s previous complaints about allied caveats, the United States became, in the words of 

Brzezinski, a “caveat nation.”24

Strategic Lift. 

Strategic airlift is the key to moving troops, equipment, or a fighter or ISR aircraft package to the optimum location within or outside of NATO. However, 
367

among allied states and as seen in the French operation in Mali in 2013, this necessary capability is limited 

and currently relies too heavily on the U.S. C-17 and 

C-5 strategic airlift force.25 Currently, the UK has eight 

C-17s that would be used extensively in any NATO 

operation.26 Canada has four C-17s, and 10 NATO nations have access to a separate group of three C-17s, 

known as the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC).

Established in September 2008 in Hungary, the 

Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) conducts SAC operations. 

The HAW is not a NATO organization, but a number 

of NATO and PfP nations—including Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, 

Poland, Romania, Slovenia, the United States, Finland, and Sweden—contribute personnel and money for access to a proportionate share of the HAW’s 

annual flying hours.

Many nations also collaborate to meet their strategic airlift needs with commercial aircraft they contract 

from other non-NATO nations. However, these aircraft may not be available in a conflict, for a variety of 

reasons. The future looks better with the purchase of 

the Airbus A-400M strategic airlifter by Germany (53), 

France (50), Spain (27), Turkey (10), Belgium (7), and 

Luxembourg (1).27 Deliveries began in 2013 and will 

extend through 2024.28 The UK is purchasing 14 of the 

A-330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft, 

and France is hoping to purchase 12 MRTTs.29

Air Refueling. 

The United States provided the majority of the 

air-refueling capability for NATO’s 1999 Operation 

ALLIED FORCE in the Balkans. It also provided approximately 80 percent of all the air refueling missions 
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in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in 2011 and sent 

tankers in support of French fighters and bombers 

during France’s 2013 Mali operation.

A March 2014 analysis by the Joint Air Power 

Competence Centre summarized NATO’s current airrefueling capability with and without U.S. contributions. With U.S. capability, NATO has 709 air-tankercapable aircraft spread across multiple aircraft types, 

some with boom-type capability, some with droguetype capability, and some with both. Without U.S. 

capability, NATO nations collectively have only 71 

air-refueling aircraft, many of which are aging and are 

spread across multiple types of airframes.30 For example, the French operate three KC-135s and 11 C-135Rs, 

Turkey operates seven KC-135Rs, the UK operates 

four Lockheed TriStars, and the Netherlands operates 

two KDC-10s.31

The outlook is improving somewhat. In 2011, Italy 

received four new Boeing KC-767s with drogue and 

boom capability. Germany and Canada operate small 

fleets of modern military A-310 Airbus cargo and passenger aircraft with extra fuel capacity and a probeand-drogue system added to each wing.

As noted previously, in the near term, the UK is 

procuring 14 Airbus A330 MRTT, with 9 of 14 in operation as of May 2014, while France announced that 

it intends to buy 12. In addition, some of the NATO 

nations buying the A-400M plan to equip them with 

underwing drogue-refueling systems. The challenge 

for NATO will be achieving the right mix of boom and 

drogue capability to match the NATO fighter aircraft 

fleets’ current and future requirements.

However, if defense budgets remain strained and 

some planned procurements are put to the side, a remedial strategy could be for nations to create a shared-
369

tanker capability similar to the C-17 HAW. Participating nations would contribute dollars and personnel to 

a common air-refueling capability and then get access 

based on their prorated contribution.

The Consensus Mechanism. 

All NATO decisions are made by consensus after 

discussion and consultation that give alliance members the opportunity to exchange views and information. Certainly, this process can produce well-thoughtout actions with thorough discussions of possible 

unintended second- or third-order consequences. But 

decisiveness is not its hallmark, and the challenge is 

reaction time.

Articles 4 and 5 of the NATO charter provide key 

principles for how the alliance consults and takes 

action. Article 4 effectively says that any nation can 

bring security issues and concerns to the North Atlantic Council for discussion and can seek NATO help 

in bolstering defense. Nations have invoked Article 4 

only four times in NATO history; most recently, Poland invoked it after Russia invaded Crimea. The three 

previous times, Turkey invoked Article 4: in 2003 at 

the start of the Iraq War, in June 2012 after Syria shot 

down a Turkish military jet, and in October 2012 after 

Syrian attacks in Turkey.32

Article 5 is the basis of a fundamental principle of 

NATO: collective defense. The article provides that if 

a NATO ally is the victim of an armed attack, every 

other member of the alliance will consider this act of 

violence an armed attack against all members and 

will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the 

ally that is attacked. NATO has only invoked Article 

5 once, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks.33
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Airpower is the most rapid response capability 

NATO has. The NATO Response Force, which includes 

an air component, is designed for crisis response and 

to do three things: deploy as a standalone force for 

Article 5 operations or non–Article 5 crisis response, 

deploy as an initial entry force until larger forces can 

arrive, and deploy as a demonstrative force to deter 

a crisis.34 Yet, the NATO staffing and consensus process can be lengthy, even for Article 5. When NATO 

reaches consensus, nations must still offer force capability for the agreed-to operation. During this waiting 

period, individual NATO nations may take unilateral 

or multilateral action outside of NATO.

One example of the lengthiness of the consensus 

process is Libya. While NATO eventually supported 

UN Security Council Resolutions and led Operation 

UNIFIED PROTECTOR, the first missions did not 

occur until March 27, 2011, almost 10 days after the 

UN Security Council Resolutions were published 

and long after France started the initial strikes. By the 

time NATO took over, a coalition of NATO and nonNATO countries was already executing combat air 

operations.

Following Russian aggression in Ukraine, Poland 

sought Article 4 consultations on March 1, 2014. In response, NATO leaders met from March 2-4 to discuss 

possible actions but did not declare any additional 

defensive actions. Within a week, the United States 

had bilaterally deployed an additional six F-15C Eagle 

aircraft and a KC-135 tanker to bolster the ongoing 

U.S. rotation in the NATO Baltic air-policing mission. 

Likewise, by March 9, the United States had bilaterally increased the size of an already-planned F-16 exercise with Poland to 12 aircraft. Within 2 weeks, NATO 

was flying surveillance missions over alliance terri-
371

tory in the proximity of Ukraine, using its NAEW&C 

program E-3As.

During an April 3 press engagement at NATO 

headquarters with the new Estonian prime minister, 

the NATO secretary general said:

We have more than doubled the number of fighter 

aircraft allocated to our air policing mission in the 

Baltic States, thanks to the United States. Many European Allies have also offered additional planes, air-toair refueling tankers and other capabilities. And we 

will make sure that we have updated military plans, 

enhanced exercises and appropriate deployments.35

However, it was not until after a North Atlantic 

Council meeting on April 16, that the secretary general formally announced larger NATO air, land, and 

sea responses to bolster the defense of the Baltics and 

Poland.36 By early May 2014, NATO was deploying 

these non-U.S. aircraft to Poland and to the Baltic airpolicing mission (replacing the bolstered U.S. F-15 

rotation). As General Gorenc noted:

What you see here is Allied solidarity. Under our 

long-standing plans for NATO’s Baltic Air Policing, 

the Polish Air Force deployed MiG-29 fighters in May, 

leading the mission from Siauliai Air Base, Lithuania. 

The effort has been supported by Royal Air Force Typhoons also flying out of Siauliai and Royal Danish 

Air Force F-16s flying out of Amari, Estonia. At the 

same time France has supported the mission with its 

Mirage 2000 fighters here at Malbork (Poland).37

Long-Range Bombers. 

Non-U.S. NATO air forces do not have a longrange bomber capability, despite the efficacy of such 

a platform: it can operate, without needing refueling, 
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at long ranges and with heavy precision payloads and 

long target loiter times. Because of declining budgets 

and NATO nations’ closer proximity to their likely areas of operation, it is probably beyond the scope of 

any single NATO nation to procure such a capability.

But could NATO nations agree to a commonly 

funded long-range bomber capability using a model 

such as the NAEW&C, NATO AGS, or even the nonNATO HAW? At a minimum, it is important that 

NATO maintain bases capable of hosting forwarddeployed U.S. bombers. As the United States designs 

and procures a new long-range bomber, it must consult closely with NATO allies to ensure that some existing and future NATO airfields can host the aircraft.

A Common Vision of Strategic Threats. 

Is the resurgence of Russia in the East or the terrorist threats emanating from Africa and the Middle 

East the main strategic threat to NATO? Arguably, 

both are. Therefore, non-U.S. NATO air forces must 

train for both high-end and counterinsurgency-type 

conflict. Strategic and tactical ISR platforms are crucial 

to both efforts, so non-U.S. NATO nations must maintain ISR investment strategies for the future. The Chicago NATO summit in May 2012 reinforced the need 

to strengthen multinational cooperation—in particular, on some strategic programs, including the AGS 

program. At a press briefing on March 5, 2012, NATO 

Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said:

We will target a number of strategic projects for 2020 

and beyond. As our operation in Libya showed, we 

still face some specific capability gaps, such as air-toair refueling and joint intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance. And we know that we will need stron-
373

ger cooperation, across the Atlantic and in Europe, to 

fill them.38

Cyber Preparedness. 

Integrating cyber readiness into air operations is 

absolutely critical for NATO to keep positive C2 of 

assets and missions. Admiral James Stavridis, former 

supreme allied commander Europe, commented on 

cyber preparedness when he was commander:

Top of my list. Here we see the greatest mismatch between the level of potential threat and our preparation 

for it. While the 28 NATO nations collectively have 

enormous skill and capability in this area, we have yet 

to find ways to work together, largely due to national 

caveats and concerns about sharing such sensitive 

technology, intelligence, and knowledge.39

Last November, NATO kicked off its annual Cyber Coalition exercise in Estonia. Jamie Shea, NATO’s 

deputy assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, explained:

Cyber-attacks are a daily reality, and they are growing in sophistication and complexity. NATO has to 

keep pace with this evolving threat and Cyber Coalition 2013 will allow us to fully test our systems and 

procedures to effectively defend our networks—today 

and in the future. . . . NATO has to keep pace with this 

evolving threat.40

Cyber was the focus topic at the November 2013 International Seminar of the Alfredo Kindelán Chair—a 

renowned forum for the study and debate of military 

air strategy and doctrine—in Madrid.41 The conference’s keynote speaker discussed cyber preparedness 
374

in air operations and challenged NATO air force leaders in the audience to consider:

1. If I suffer a cyber attack, do I know? Do active, 

layered network defense sensors alert me?

2. Once I realize I am under attack, do I have a reporting procedure and repair plan that isolates the attack and gracefully degrades air C2 to a backup plan 

(if required)?

3. Am I truly prepared? Have I practiced 1 and 2 

above?42

Since then, NATO has updated its cyber defense 

policy. The new policy considers a cyber attack no differently than an attack with conventional weapons, 

stating that cyber attacks are covered by Article 5. The 

new cyber policy was approved by defense ministers 

and gained endorsement at the 2014 NATO summit.43

This is the warfare of the future, and NATO and its 

airmen are preparing for it.

CONCLUSION

NATO C2, airmen, aircraft, munitions, basing, air 

and missile defense, and readiness are all pertinent 

factors when examining the status of NATO air power 

without a U.S. capability. NATO is addressing each 

of the 10 challenges outlined earlier, but it is doing so 

with budgets that may or may not allow it the resources to fully fix these shortages.

Under NATO’s Smart Defence banner, coordination among nations to procure similar capabilities 

will be key. Nations should consider where they have 

expertise and capability to contribute and should not 

procure unnecessary, duplicative capabilities that 

other NATO nations could provide. The NAEW&C 
375

and AGS programs should be considered the norm for 

the future. Pooling resources to share airlift or tankers 

with organizational construct like the HAW in Hungary could be essential to the future success of nonU.S. NATO air power.

During the U.S. Air Force Association’s September 

2011 conference, French Air Force General Stéphane 

Abrial, former NATO supreme allied commander for 

transformation, said that non-U.S. NATO air forces 

“could not have performed to the same level of effectiveness without heavy contribution from the U.S.” 

and would be severely limited if the United States 

chose not to join a foreign operation such as the one 

conducted in Libya.44

Although it is doubtful that NATO would ever 

participate in a major conflict without significant U.S. 

contributions, the fact is that in the 1990s, the U.S. Air 

Force presence in Europe was much larger than it is 

today. Numbers do count in any conflict. Non-U.S. 

NATO nations must maintain their current air force 

capabilities while procuring more advanced capabilities, such as the A-330 MRTT, A-400M, and JSF. They 

must also procure enough advanced standoff munitions for any projected conflict.

During fierce internal budget battles, vocal ministers of defense will be key to NATO’s goal of each 

nation spending 2 percent of its GDP on defense. Certainly, recent Russian aggression in Ukraine and the 

brutality of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria should 

provide a wake-up call to NATO’s national capitals. 

The climate could be the necessary impetus to spend 

more on defense and, in turn, commit forces to future 

NATO endeavors.
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14

1. This chapter was originally published as an essay on 

October 30, 2014.

2. NATO, “Smart Defence,” Brussels, Belgium, NATO, 

July 16, 2014, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_

84268.htm.

3. Headquarters: Allied Air Command, “AIRCOM Focus Areas,” Ramstein Air Base, Germany, available from www.airn.nato.

int/04FocusAreas/01focusareas.html.

4. NATO NAEW&C Programme Management Agency, 

“NAEW&C Programme Management Organisation,”Brunssum, The Netherlands, available from www.napma.nato.int/

organisation/2.html.

5. Headquarters: Allied Air Command, “AIRCOM Leadership 

at the E-3A Component,” Ramstein Air Base, Germany, March 

24, 2014, available from www.airn.nato.int/03NewsRoom/022014/

1405.html.

6. NATO, “Allies Enhance NATO Air-Policing Duties in Baltic States, Poland, Romania,” Brussels, Belgium, April 30, 2014, 

available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_109354.htm.

7. Ian Brzezinski, “Lesson from Libya: NATO Alliance Remains Relevant,” National Defense, November 2011, available from 

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/November/Pages/

LessonFromLibyaNATOAllianceRemainsRelevant.aspx.

8. Ibid.

9. Air Force Association, Annual Air & Space Conference and 

Technology Exposition 2014: The Future of NATO (transcript, 

September 15, 2014, National Harbor, Maryland, available from 

www.airforcemag.com/afatranscripts/Documents/2014/September%20

2014/091514breedlove.pdf.pdf.

10. “Smart Defence,” NATO Review, available from www.nato.

int/docu/review/Topics/EN/Smart-Defence.htm.
377

11. NATO, NATO Ballistic Missile Defence, October 2012, available from www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/

pdf_2012_10/20121008_media-backgrounder_Missile-Defence_en.pdf.

12. NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, September 5, 

2014, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_

112964.htm.

13. NATO, Allied Command Operations, “General Breedlove 

Thanks Spain for Patriot Commitment,” news release, September 

18, 2014, available from aco.nato.int/general-breedlove-thanks-spainfor-patriot-commitment.aspx.

14. Edward Wong and Nicola Clark, “China’s Arms Industry 

Makes Global Inroads,” The New York Times, October 20, 2013.

15. Denise Der, “Why Turkey May Not Buy Chinese Missile System After All,” The Diplomat, May 7, 2014, available from 

thediplomat.com/2014/05/why-turkey-may-not-buy-chinese-missilesystems-after-all/.

16. “Made in China? U.S. Warns Turkey Its Missile Deal with 

Beijing May Be Incompatible with NATO,” RT, October 24, 2013, 

available from rt.com/news/us-turkey-china-missile-defense-689/.

17. Headquarters: Allied Air Command, “An Ambitious Exercise at AIRCOM,” Ramstein Air Base, Germany, available from 

www.airn.nato.int/03NewsRoom/022014/1409.html.

18. Lockheed Martin, “F-35 Lightning II Program Status and 

Fast Facts,” Bethesda, MD, December 8, 2014, available from www.

lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/australia/documents/

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html?d=10060279.

20. Ewen MacAskill, “U.S. Presses NATO Members to Increase Defence Spending,” The Guardian, June 23, 2014, available 
378

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Globalist, March 30, 2014, available from www.theglobalist.com/10-

facts-sizing-up-natos-defense-spending/.

22. NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, para. 14.

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Future,” The New York Times, June 10, 2011.

24. Brzezinski.

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Article/10206/us-airlift-of-french-forces-to-mali.

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article/20131124/DEFREG01/311240001/UK-Shows-Interest-BuyingAnother-C-17.

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www.occar.int/340.

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Consolidation—An Update, Kalkar, Germany, March 2014, available from www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/AAR-Consolidation_

web.pdf.
379

31. The Military Balance 2014, London, UK: International 

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natohq/topics_49187.htm?selectedLocale=en.

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North Atlantic Council,” Brussels, Belgium, April 16, 2013, 

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380

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42. This information derives from a summary of the author’s 

keynote speech at the 2013 International Seminar of the Alfredo 

Kindelán Chair in November 2013.

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381

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

BRUCE E. BECHTOL, JR., is an associate professor 

of political science at Angelo State University.

PAUL CORNISH is professor of strategic studies in 

the Strategy & Security Institute at the University of 

Exeter.

DOROTHÉE FOUCHAUX is a French defense analyst 

who has worked at the European Society of Strategic 

Intelligence and the French Ministry of Defence, Delegation for Strategic Affairs, as a research officer.

CRAIG FRANKLIN served in the U.S. Air Force for 

more than 3 decades before retiring in April 2014. 

His last position was commander of the 3rd Air Force 

and 17th Expeditionary Air Force, Ramstein Air Base, 

Germany. Before that, he was vice director of the Joint 

Staff at the Pentagon.

PATRICK KELLER is the coordinator of foreign and 

security policy at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in 

Berlin, Germany. 

GUILLAUME LASCONJARIAS is a research adviser 

at the NATO Defense College. 

MICHAEL MAZZA is a research fellow in foreign and 

defense policy studies at AEI.

BRYAN MCGRATH is the managing director of the 

FerryBridge Group (a defense consultancy) and is a 

former officer of the U.S. Navy.
382

ANDREW A. MICHTA is the M. W. Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College 

and a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy 

Analysis in Washington, DC. 

GARY J. SCHMITT is co-director of the Marilyn Ware 

Center for Security Studies, the American Enterprise 

Institute for Public Policy, Washington, DC.

ANDREW SHEARER is a senior official in the State 

Government of Victoria’s Department of Premier 

and Cabinet. 

W. BRUCE WEINROD served as the U.S. Secretary of 

Defense’s representative for Europe and as defense 

adviser to the U.S. mission at NATO from 2007 to 

2009. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for European and NATO policy from 1989 to 1993.

TOSHI YOSHIHARA is the John A. van Beuren Chair 

of Asia-Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College.
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