* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-30951

(Summary Calendar)

SAMMY NAGEM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY

AND CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Middle District of Louisiana

(96-CV-394)

August 3, 1998

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiff-Appellant Sammy Nagem appeals the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee American

National Property and Casualty Co. (“ANPAC”), dismissing Nagem’s

action to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) benefits

under a policy issued by ANPAC. Nagem asserts that rejection of2

those benefits was invalid under Louisiana law, as (1) ANPAC’s UM

selection/rejection forms were insufficient to satisfy the

requirement that the insured be given the opportunity to make a

meaningful selection from the options listed on the forms, and

(2) his agent recommended that he decline UM coverage, without

pointing out that he did not have coverage to compensate him for

general damages caused by an UM motorist, thereby depriving him of

the opportunity to make a meaningful selection from his coverage

options. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s grant

of summary judgment rejecting Nagem’s claim, we affirm.

I

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In November 1993, Nagem purcha sed an automobile liability

insu r ance policy with American National General Insurance Co.

(“ANG”), re questing bodily injury limits of $50,000/$100,000 and

rejecting UM coverage. In May 1995, Nagem submitted a new

appl ication for a policy, transferring him from ANG (a standard

program) to ANPAC (a preferred program) as a result of a change in

his driving record. His bodily injury limits were increased to

$250,000/$500,000.

The ANPAC application (“the general application”) contained a

separate section for the selection/rejection of UM coverage. Nagem

signed the general application in two places: First, he signed the

section specifically relating to UM coverage; second, he signed an3

acknowledgment, located on th e same page as the UM provision,

stating “I have been advised and have had the various other

coverages a nd limits available to me under this policy fully

explained. It is my decision to purchase the coverages and limits

set forth herein.” In addition, the application contained a

separate UM selection/rejection form (“the selection/rejection

form”), which Nagem signed. Immediately preceding his signature is

the following acknowledgment:

I a cknowledge that the coverages and options shown on

this form have been explained to me. It is hereby agreed

that my selections apply to all insureds under this

liability insurance policy and future renewals,

replacements, or reinstatements of such policy. If I

decide to se lect another option at some future time, I

must advise my ANPAC agent or the company in writing

before the selection becomes effective.

Both forms provide options for seven different levels of

coverage from the minimum of $10,000/$20,000 to the maximum of

$500,000/$500,000, including the bodily injury limits requested in

the application of $250,000/$500,000. An applicant can select one

of these coverages by placing an “X” in the box next to the choice.

Similarly, the applicant can reject UM coverage by placing an “X”

in the box preced ing the statement “I do not desire to purchase

Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage.”

Prior to his automobile accident in August 1995, which is the

subject of this litigation, Nagem reca lls discussing UM coverage

with his agent when he obtained the ANG policy in 1993. He states

that the agent recommended that he not purchase UM coverage, as his2 Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

, 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir.

1988).

3 F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56(c).

4 other coverage was sufficient. He also says that the agent told

him that he did not carry UM coverage on his own pol icy. Nagem

does not recall discussing UM coverage while going through the 1995

application process. Finally, Nagem recalls discussing UM coverage

with his agent after his accident, at which time, he contends, the

agent made the same recommendation as he had in 1993.

Following his accident, Nagem brought suit against ANPAC

seeking recovery of UM benefits under his policy. Both parties

filed for summary judgment. In August 1997, the district court

granted ANPAC’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the case.

Nagem timely appealed.

II

ANALYSIS

On appeal from summary judgment, we review the record de novo

"under the same standards whi ch guided the district court." 2

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material

fact has been shown and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. 3 In determining whether summary judgment was

proper, all facts are viewed in t he light most favorable to the

nonmovant.

Louisiana law requires insurance companies, such as ANPAC, to

offer UM coverage to its insureds. The availability and amount of4 L A

. R EV

. S TAT

. A NN

. § 22:1406D(1)(a)(i)-(ii) (West 1995),

amended

, Acts 1997, No. 1476 “Omnibus Premium Reduction Act of

1997.”

5 UM coverage is provided under LA. Rev. Stat. § 22:1406D(1)(a)(i)

which states:

No automobile liability insurance covering liability

arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any

motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery

in this state with respect to any motor vehicle for use

on public highways and required to be registered in this

state or as provided in this Subsection unless coverage

is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less

than the limits of bod ily injury liability provided by

the policy, under provisions filed with and approved by

the commissioner of in surance, for the protection of

persons insured the reunder who are legally entitled to

recover nonpunitive damages from owners or operators of

uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles because of

bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death

resulting therefrom; however, the coverage required under

this Subsection shall not be applicable where any insured

named in the policy shall reject in writing, as provided

herein, the coverage or selects lower limits.

. . . .

(ii) After September 1, 1987, such rejection or selection

of lower limits shall be made only on a form designed by

each insurer. The form shall be provided by the insurer

and signed by the named insur ed or his legal

representative. The form signed by the named insured or

his legal representative which initially rejects such

co verage or selects lower limits shall be conclusively

presumed to become a part of the policy or contract when

issued and delivered, irrespective of whether physically

attached thereto. 4

The Louisiana Supreme Court summarized the requirements of the

UM statute in its Tugwell v. State Farm Ins. Co. opinion, stating

that the law “provides the insured with three options: UM coverage

equal to bodily injury limits in the policy, UM coverage lower than5 Tugwell v. State Farm Ins. Co.

, 609 So. 2d 195, 1 98 (La.

1993).

6 Id. at 197 (citing Henson v. Safeco I ns. Cos. , 585 So. 2d

534, 538 (La. 1991); Giroir v. Theriot , 513 So.2d 1166, 1168 (La.

1987); A.I.U. Ins. Co. v. Roberts , 404 So. 2d 948, 951-52 (La.

1981)).

7 Id. (citing Henson , 585 So. 2d at 539).

8 Id.

6 those limits, or no UM coverage. A rejection on a form that

prohibits the insured from choosing limits below liability coverage

o r which automatically chooses a certain lower amount for the

insured, does not meet the statutory requirements . . . .” 5 The

court noted that “a valid rejection or selection of lower limits

must be in writing and signed by the named insured or his legal

representative.” 6

Moreover, “the insurer must place the insured in a position to

make an informed rejection of UM coverage.” 7 “In other words, the

form used by the insurance company must give the applicant the

opportunity to make a ‘meaningful selection’ from his options

provi ded by the statute . . . .” 8 The T ugwell court gave an

example of how an insurer can make its insured aware of the fact

that he may select lower limits of UM coverage, explaining that

“the insurer can require the insured to acknowledge in writing he

has been informed of the options; or, the application itself can be

set up in such a way through the use of blanks and boxes that it is

apparent to the reasonable person that he has the option of9 Id. at 199.

1 0 An ap plicant could choose coverage in the amounts of

$10,000/$20,000; $25,000/$50,000; $50,000/$100,000;

$100,000/$300,000; $250,000/$500,000; $300,000/$500,000; and

$500,000/$500,000.

7 selecting any lower limit he chooses.” 9

We conclude that ANPAC’s forms were sufficient to give Nagem

the opportunity to make a meaningful selection from his coverage

options provided by the UM statute. We do not agree with Nagem’s

suggestion that a form must explicitly provide options stating, “I

select UM coverage in the sam e amount as the limits of my

automobile liability insurance,” and “I select UM coverage lower

than bodily injury limits in this policy.” The indicated coverages

on the ANPAC form he used encompass both of these choices, as the

form included a choice of $250,000/$500,000

—— Nagem’s bodily

injury coverage limits —— as well as lower coverage limits. 10 The

only variance from the statutory options is the format ANPAC used

to make them available. The statute does not mandate any

particular form or lan guage, and we decline to impose the

recitation of talismanic words to satisfy its requirements. With

regard to Nagem’s contention that his rejection of UM coverage was

invalid because of his agent’s failure adequately to explain (or

alleged m isrepresentation of) the extent of UM coverage, we note

that Nagem signed both forms, in compliance wi th the statute,

attesting to the fact that the policy’s various coverages had been

explained to him. Nagem is bound by his contractual acts, and we8

will not hear parol evidence to vary those acts.

III

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court

is, in all respects,

AFFIRMED.