[Cite as State ex rel. Knox v. Russo, 2015-Ohio-3773.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

Nos. 102859 and 103003 

STATE OF OHIO, EX REL. 

LARRY KNOX

RELATOR 

vs. 

HONORABLE JUDGE JOSEPH D. RUSSO 

RESPONDENT 

JUDGMENT:

WRIT DENIED 

Writ of Procedendo 

Motion No. 486139 

Order No. 488482 

RELEASE DATE: September 11, 2015 
FOR RELATOR

Larry Knox, pro se 

Inmate No. 0285905 

Cuyahoga County Jail 

P.O. Box 5600 

Cleveland, Ohio 44101 

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: James E. Moss 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J.: 

{¶1} Relator, Larry Knox, filed a petition for writ of procedendo, which was 

captioned, State ex rel. Knox v. Russo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102859. The pleading was 

unreadable and incomprehensible and this court issued an order striking it 1

 but also 

granted Knox leave to file a petition that complied with Civ.R. 8 and Loc.App.R. 45. 

Instead of refiling the petition in State ex rel. Knox v. Russo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

102859, Knox filed a new petition which was captioned State ex rel. Knox v. Russo, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103003. The matters have been consolidated. Respondent filed a 

motion for summary judgment and Knox has filed objections to the motion for summary 

judgment. For the reasons that follow, respondent’s motion is granted and the writ is 

denied. 

{¶2} Knox’s pending petition for writ of procedendo and “to compel the specific 

performances, to wit: * * * ” is basically incomprehensible to this court in terms of what 

relief Knox is seeking by way of a writ of procedendo. The petition contains a rambling, 

handwritten litany of unrelated, generalized legal theories, such as 

pattern, practice of abuse power [sic], ineffective assistance of counsel’s 

[sic] (attorney’s) in all said cases 2010 thru 2015, Section 10, Article I, of 

Ohio Constitution. As a matter of law (produce all criminal complaints 

from the municipal courts) pretrials on records, granted these continuances, 

 1The attachments/exhibits to the petition were retained by the court and 

Knox was not required to resubmit them with the new petition. 
produce all in pending case also, and proof, facts, Judge Joseph Russo, is 

know [sic] longer acting as a judge, has been prosecuting accused cases, 

2010 thru 2015 [sic], compel to produce all continuances at defendants 

request, waivers, motions filed by counsels, CR-13-576939-A, granting on 

records As a right and case CR-14-590340 A, and case CR-550801, and 

Judge McMonagle’s certified copy of January 24-25-2008, Ohio Supreme 

Courts notice of final order, judgment in case CV-08-646011 (compel to 

produce 911) Journal entry, In the Cuyahoga Court, Common Pleas Courts. 

The balance of the petition is similarly confusing and disjointed. 

{¶3} Respondent also expressed having difficulty in comprehending Knox’s 

second petition but made an effort to respond to it. Respondent first maintains that the 

petition is defective for failure to attach the statement of account required by R.C. 

2969.25(C). However, the attachments to Knox’s initial petition did comply with the 

statute and we ordered that those attachments would be retained and need not be 

resubmitted with the refiled petition. Therefore, the second petition is not subject to 

dismissal on that basis. 

{¶4} Alternatively, respondent argues that Knox is not entitled to a remedy by 

way of procedendo. We agree that Knox has failed to establish the elements that are 

required for issuance of the writ. 

{¶5} In order for this court to issue a writ of procedendo, Knox must demonstrate 

that he possesses a clear legal right to the relief requested and that there exists no 

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Brown v. Shoemaker, 38 

Ohio St.3d 344, 528 N.E.2d 188 (1988). Knox must also demonstrate that Judge Russo 

possesses a clear legal duty, which requires him to proceed to judgment. State ex rel. 

Cochran v. Quillin, 20 Ohio St.2d 6, 251 N.E.2d 607 (1969). Finally, a writ of 
procedendo is appropriate when a court has refused to render a judgment or has 

unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment. State ex rel. Doe v. Tracy, 51 Ohio 

App.3d 198, 555 N.E.2d 674 (12th Dist. 1988). 

{¶6} Knox’s objections to respondent’s motion for summary judgment complain 

that respondent has not responded to all the claims he filed in the petition. However, like 

respondent, the only basis we have been able to discern2

 from Knox’s filings before this 

court that could relate to a writ of procedendo is that he has filed some pro se motions for 

which he seeks a ruling, including a motion to waive counsel and to represent himself. 

Knox advances a host of other fragmented arguments, including that his speedy trial 

rights have been violated and that his case(s) should be dismissed for that reason, along 

with numerous other reasons that he believes warrant dismissal. He also believes his 

indictment is defective, that he was improperly reclassified under the laws regarding 

registration and notification requirements for sexual offense convictions and maintains 

that the municipal and common pleas court lack jurisdiction. He generally alleges fraud 

and conspiracy on behalf of respondent, court officials, his attorneys, the sheriff, and 

clerks. He seeks an order compelling respondent to produce numerous documents to him, 

 2Knox was expressly directed by this court to clearly set forth a coherent 

claim and requested relief in his petition. He has not done so. We granted him leave 

to state a claim for relief, yet we are still endeavoring to decipher a cognizable claim 

and requested relief, which is not the court’s obligation. E.g., Glazer v. Chase Home 

Fin. L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 99875 and 99736, 2013-Ohio-5589, ¶ 101;

Sonoga v. Trumbull Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency, 11th Dist. Trumbull 

No. 2004-T-015, 2005-Ohio-3615, ¶ 10 (it is not the court’s job to clean up pleading 

deficiencies). Knox cannot complain that his claims are not fully addressed when he 

has failed to present them in a reasonably comprehensible fashion. 
including attorney fee bills, municipal court transcripts and all journal entries issued in all 

cases from “2010 to 2015.” 

{¶7} It appears Knox is seeking to obtain a writ of procedendo from this court 

that would compel respondent to produce documents and issue specific rulings, which is 

improper. “The writ of procedendo is merely an order from a court of superior jurisdiction 

to one of inferior jurisdiction to proceed to judgment. It does not in any case attempt to 

control the inferior court as to what that judgment should be. * * * ” State ex rel. Davey v. 

Owen, 133 Ohio St. 96, 106, 12 N.E.2d 144 (1937). “Procedendo is a high prerogative 

writ of an extraordinary nature. It is an order from a court of superior jurisdiction to 

proceed to judgment and does not lie to control or interfere with ordinary court procedure. 

* * * ” State ex rel. Ratliff v. Marshall, 30 Ohio St.2d 101, 102, 282 N.E.2d 582 (1972). 

{¶8} Knox has not clearly identified which pro se motions are at issue since his 

petition identifies numerous different lower court case numbers. The caption of his 

petition identifies lower court case number Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-14-590340-A but the 

body of his petition cites all cases from “2010 thru 2015” and also references Cuyahoga 

C.P. Nos. CR-13-576939-A and CV-08-646011. 

{¶9} Knox has not established that the trial court has a clear legal duty to proceed 

to judgment on any specific or identifiable motion and he has not established that 

respondent has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment. In CR-14-590340-A, Knox 

is represented by assigned counsel and the case has been transferred from respondent’s 

docket to the docket of the administrative judge of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas 
Court by order dated August 13, 2015. The law in this district generally provides that a 

court may not entertain pro se motions that are filed while the defendant is represented by 

assigned counsel. E.g., State v. Mongo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100926, 2015-Ohio-1139, 

¶ 14. While this does not apply to motions for self-representation,3

 it is still incumbent 

upon Knox to identify such a pending motion and to demonstrate that respondent has 

refused to render judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment on it. 

We note that on June 9, 2015, the court allowed one assigned counsel to withdraw and 

appointed the county public defender to represent Knox. Subsequently, he filed another 

motion to waive counsel. Thereafter, the docket reflects that a competency hearing was 

set and the case was scheduled for another hearing on August 13, 2015. The docket does 

not reflect an unreasonable delay in these proceedings. Furthermore, respondent has 

recused himself from CR-14-590340-A and the matter is now proceeding before the 

administrative judge of the common pleas court. 

{¶10} The docket of CR-13-576939-A reflects that the matter was dismissed 

without prejudice and defendant was ordered released on that case by order dated May 1, 

2015. Therefore, respondent cannot proceed in that matter. 

{¶11} Besides Knox’s allegations regarding alleged pending (but unidentified) 

pro se motions, Knox’s petition, and his objections to respondent’s motion for summary 

judgment, present various arguments that are not cognizable in an original action and do 

not provide any basis for issuing a writ of procedendo. For example, Knox presents 

 3See Turner v. McGinty, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102074, 2015-Ohio-529. 
arguments as to why he believes his case(s) should be dismissed, including violations of 

speedy trial rights due to allegedly unauthorized continuances; he seeks to compel 

respondent to produce various entries; he alleges fraud by court officials and law 

enforcement; he challenges the validity of the complaints or indictments; he maintains 

that the municipal and common pleas courts lack jurisdiction; and he alleges that his 

reclassification as a sex offender was unconstitutional. Defects in the indictment and 

alleged violations of speedy trial rights cannot be collaterally attacked in an original 

action. State ex rel. Lisboa v. McCafferty, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93051, 

2009-Ohio-4377, ¶ 9 (“an extraordinary writ, such as prohibition, is not the proper 

remedy for addressing speedy trial issues”); State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Matia, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 79115, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 769, *1 (8th Dist. 2001) (the issue of a 

defective indictment is properly raised through a direct appeal). In essence, Knox is 

advocating for the dismissal of criminal matters rather than seeking a writ compelling the 

court to proceed to judgment. Therefore, a writ of procedendo is not warranted. 

{¶12} For all of the foregoing reasons, respondent’s motion for summary 

judgment is granted and the petition for writ of procedendo is denied. Relator to pay 

costs. The court directs the clerk of courts to serve all parties with notice of this judgment 

and its date of entry upon the journal as required by Civ.R. 58(B). 

{¶13} Writ denied. 

 

MELODY J. STEWART, PRESIDING JUDGE 
MARY J. BOYLE, J., and 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR