U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

95–604 PDF 2015

S. HRG. 114–46 

THE IMPACT OF THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT 

OF 2011 AND SEQUESTRATION ON NATIONAL 

SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JANUARY 28, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

JANUARY 28, 2015

Page 

THE IMPACT OF THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 2011 AND SEQUESTRATION

ON NATIONAL SECURITY ....................................................................................... 1 

Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army ............................. 4 

Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations ......................... 13 

Welsh, Gen. Mark A., III, USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force ........................ 21 

Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps ......... 27 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 77 

(III) 

(1) 

THE IMPACT OF THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT 

OF 2011 AND SEQUESTRATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SD– 

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, 

Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Graham, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, 

Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. The hearing will come to order. 

I will ask all spectators who are here to observe the hearing 

today to observe the courtesy of allowing us to hear from the witnesses and for the hearing to proceed. Of course, if you decide to 

disrupt the hearing, as you usually do, we will have to pause until 

you are removed. I do not see what the point is, but I would ask 

your courtesy to the witnesses and to the committee and to your 

fellow citizens who are very interested in hearing what our distinguished panelists who have served our country with honor and distinction have to say. I hope you would respect that. 

So we will move forward. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to receive 

testimony on the impacts of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) 

and sequestration on U.S. national security. I am grateful to our 

witnesses not only for appearing before us today but also for their 

many decades of distinguished service to our country in uniform. 

I also appreciate their sincere and earnest attempts over many 

years to warn Congress and the American people of what is happening to their Services, the brave men and women they represent, 

and our national security if we do not roll back sequestration and 

return to a strategy-based budget. We look forward to their candid 

testimony on this subject today. 

Such warnings from our senior military and national security 

leaders have become frustratingly familiar to many of us. Despite 

an accumulating array of complex threats to our national interests, 

a number of which arose after our current 2012 strategy was developed and then adjusted in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review 

2 

(QDR), we are on track now to cut $1 trillion from America’s defense budget by the year 2021. 

While the Ryan-Murray budget agreement of 2013 provided some 

welcome relief from the mindlessness of sequestration, that relief 

was partial, temporary, and ultimately did little to provide the kind 

of fiscal certainty that our military needs to plan for the future and 

make longer-term investments for our national defense, and yet, 

here we go again. If we in Congress do not act, sequestration will 

return in full in fiscal year 2016, setting our military on a far more 

dangerous course. 

Why should we do this to ourselves now? Just consider what has 

happened in the world in just this past year: 

Russia launched the first cross-border invasion of another country on the European continent in 7 decades. 

A terrorist army with tens of thousands of fighters, the Islamic 

State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has taken over a swath of territory 

the size of Indiana in the Middle East. We are now on track to having nearly 3,000 U.S. troops back in Iraq, and we are flying hundreds of airstrikes a month against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. 

Yemen is on the verge of collapse, as an Iranian-backed insurgency has swept into Sana’a and al Qaeda continues to use the 

country’s ungoverned spaces to plan attacks against the West. 

China has increased its aggressive challenge to America and our 

allies in the Asia-Pacific region where geopolitical tensions and the 

potential for miscalculations are high. 

Of course, just last month, North Korea carried off the most brazen cyberattack ever on U.S. territory. 

Let us be clear. If we continue with these arbitrary defense cuts, 

we will harm our military’s ability to keep us safe. Our Army and 

Marine Corps will be too small. Our Air Force will have too few aircraft, and many of those will be too old. Our Navy will have too 

few ships. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will not get 

the training or equipment they need. It will become increasingly 

difficult for them to respond to any of a number of contingencies 

that could threaten our national interests around the world. 

We have heard all of this from our top military commanders before. Yet, there are still those who would say never fear. The sky 

did not fall under sequester. What a tragically low standard for 

evaluating the wisdom of Government policy. 

The impacts of sequestration will not always be immediate or obvious. But the sky does not need to fall for military readiness to 

be eroded, for military capabilities to atrophy, or for critical investments in maintaining American military superiority to be delayed, 

cut, or canceled. These will be the results of sequestration’s quiet 

and cumulative disruptions that are every bit as dangerous for our 

national security. 

I will say candidly that it is deeply frustrating that a hearing of 

this kind is still necessary. It is frustrating because of what Dr. 

Ash Carter, President Obama’s nominee for Secretary of Defense, 

said before this committee 2 years ago. I quote Dr. Carter. 

‘‘What is particularly tragic is that sequestration is not a result 

of an economic emergency or a recession. It’s not because discretionary spending cuts are the answer to our Nation’s fiscal challenge; do the math. It’s not in reaction to a change to a more peaceVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
3 

ful world. It’s not due to a breakthrough in military technology or 

a new strategic insight. It’s not because paths of revenue growth 

and entitlement spending have been explored and exhausted. It’s 

purely the collateral damage of political gridlock.’’ 

I would also like to echo what General James Mattis told this 

committee yesterday: ‘‘No foe in the field can wreck such havoc on 

our security that mindless sequestration is achieving.’’ 

America’s national defense can no longer be held hostage to domestic political disputes totally separated from the reality of the 

threats we face. More than 3 years after the passage of the BCA, 

it is time to put an end to this senseless policy, do away with budget-driven strategy, and return to a strategy-driven budget. Our 

troops and the Nation they defend deserve no less. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for calling this very important hearing and for your very timely 

and insightful remarks. 

I would also like to welcome our witnesses and thank these gentlemen for their extraordinary service to the Nation and to the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen that they every day represent 

and lead. Thank you. 

This hearing takes place as the administration and Congress continue to wrestle with two intersecting policy problems and debate 

on how to solve them. 

Because of sequester, we have a strategic problem, which Senator McCain has illustrated very well. Every senior civilian and 

military leader in the Department of Defense (DOD) has told us 

that if defense budgets continue to be capped at sequestration levels, we will likely not be able to meet the national defense strategy 

without an unacceptable level of risk. 

As Senator McCain has indicated, we face a variety of new and 

continuing threats around the world, from the Ukraine to Syrian, 

to Yemen, and beyond. If we do not address the problem of sequestration, we will severely limit the range of available military options to address these threats and protect our national interests. 

For the last 3 years, in numerous rounds of congressional hearings and testimony, our witnesses have described the increased 

strategic risk and damaging impact of BCA top-line caps and sequestration restrictions on our military readiness, modernization, 

and the welfare of our servicemembers and their families. I am 

sure that we will hear a similar message today. 

Compromise and difficult choices will be required to provide sequestration relief for DOD and for other critical national priorities, 

including public safety, infrastructure, health, and education. 

Mr. Chairman, I know you are committed to working with our 

Budget Committee to find a way to work through these challenges, 

and I am eager to help in this effort. In the meantime, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Just for a moment, since a quorum is now present, I ask the committee to consider a list of 41 pending military nominations. All of 

4 

these nominations have been before the committee the required 

length of time. 

Is there a motion to favorably report these nominations? 

Senator REED. So moved. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Second? 

Senator MANCHIN. Second. 

Chairman MCCAIN. All in favor, say aye. [Chorus of ayes.] 

The ayes have it. 

[The list of nominations considered and approved by the committee follows:] 

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION ON JANUARY 28, 2015. 

1. In the Air Force, there are 31 appointments to the grade of brigadier general 

(list begins with Tony D. Bauernfeind) (Reference No. 24). 

2. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(Rodrick A. Koch) (Reference No. 73). 

3. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(James F. Richey) (Reference No. 74). 

4. In the Marine Corps, there are three appointments to the grade of lieutenant 

colonel (list begins with Morris A. Desimone III) (Reference No. 78). 

5. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant 

colonel (list begins with Steven P. Hulse) (Reference No. 79). 

6. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Brian L. White) (Reference No. 81). 

7. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant 

colonel (list begins with Steven R. Lucas) (Reference No. 83). 

Total: 41. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome to all of our witnesses, and we will 

begin with you, General Odierno. 

STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF 

STAFF OF THE ARMY 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, other distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Thank you for allowing us the opportunity to talk 

about this important topic today. 

As I sit here before you today as sequestration looms in 2016, I 

am truly concerned about our future and how we are investing in 

our Nation’s defense. I believe this is the most uncertain I have 

seen the national security environment in my nearly 40 years of 

service. The amount and velocity of instability continues to increase around the world. The Islamic State in Iraq and the 

Levant’s unforeseen expansion, the rapid disintegration of order in 

Iraq and Syria have dramatically escalated conflict in the region. 

Order within Yemen is splintering. The al Qaeda insurgency Shia 

expansion continues there and the country is quickly approaching 

a civil war. 

In north and west Africa, anarchy, extremism, and terrorism continue to threaten the interest of the United States, as well as our 

allies and partners. 

In Europe, Russia’s intervention in the Ukraine challenges the 

resolve of the European Union and the effectiveness of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Across the Pacific, China’s military modernization efforts raise 

concerns with our allies and our regional interests while the cycle 

of North Korean provocation continues to increase. 

5 

The rate of humanitarian and disaster relief missions, such as 

the recent threat of Ebola, heightens the level of uncertainty we 

face around the world, along with constant evolving threats to the 

homeland. 

Despite all of this, we continue to reduce our military capabilities. I would like to remind everyone that over the last 3 years, we 

have already significantly reduced the capabilities of the U.S. Army 

and this is before sequestration will begin again in 2016. In the 

last 3 years, the Army’s Active component end strength has been 

reduced by 80,000, the Reserve component by 18,000. We have 13 

less Active component brigade combat teams. We have eliminated 

three active aviation brigades. We are removing over 800 rotary 

wing aircraft from the Army inventory. We have already slashed 

investments in modernization by 25 percent. We have eliminated 

our much-needed infantry fighting vehicle modernization program, 

and we have eliminated our Scout helicopter development program. 

We have significantly delayed other upgrades for many of our systems and aging platforms. 

Readiness has been degraded to its lowest level in 20 years. In 

fiscal year 2013 under sequestration, only 10 percent of our brigade 

combat teams were ready. Our combat training center rotations for 

seven brigades were canceled, and almost over a half a billion dollars of maintenance has been deferred, both affecting training and 

readiness of our units. Even after additional support from the BBA, 

today we only have 33 percent of our brigades ready to the extent 

we would expect them to be if asked to fight. Our soldiers have undergone separation boards, forcing us to involuntarily separate 

quality soldiers, some while serving in combat zones. 

Again, this is just a sample of what we have already done before 

sequestration even kicks in again in 2016. When it returns, we will 

be forced to reduce another 70,000 out of the Active component, another 35,000 out of the National Guard, another 10,000 out of the 

Army Reserve. We will cut an additional 10 to 12 brigade combat 

teams. We will be forced to further reduce modernization and readiness levels over the next 5 years because we simply cannot draw 

down end strength any quicker to generate the required savings. 

The impacts will be much more severe across our acquisition programs, requiring us to end, restructure, or delay every program 

with an overall modernization investment decrease of 40 percent. 

Home station training will be severely underfunded, resulting in 

decreased training levels. Within our institutional support, we will 

be forced to drop over 5,000 seats from initial military training, 

85,000 seats from specialized training, and over 1,000 seats in our 

pilot training programs. Our soldier and family readiness programs 

will be weakened, and our investments in installation, training, 

and readiness facility upgrades will be affected, impacting our longterm readiness strategies. 

Therefore, a sustainable readiness will remain out of reach with 

our individual and unit readiness rapidly deteriorating between 

2016 and 2020. 

Additionally, overall the mechanism of sequestration has and 

will continue to reduce our ability to efficiently manage the dollars 

we, in fact, do have. The system itself has proved to be very ineffiVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
6 

cient and increases costs across the board, whether it be in acquisition or training. 

So how does all of this translate strategically? It will challenge 

us to meet even our current level of commitments to our allies and 

partners around the world. It will eliminate our capability on any 

scale to conduct simultaneous operations, specifically deterring in 

one region while defeating in another. Essentially for ground 

forces, sequestration even puts into question our ability to conduct 

even one long, prolonged, multi-phased, combined arms campaign 

against a determined enemy. We would significantly degrade our 

capability to shape the security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. It puts into question our ability to deter and compel 

multiple adversaries simultaneously. Ultimately, sequestration limits strategic flexibility and requires us to hope we are able to predict the future with great accuracy, something we have never been 

able to do. 

Our soldiers have done everything that we have asked of them 

and more over the past 14 years, and they continue to do it today. 

Today our soldiers are supporting five named operations on six continents with nearly 140,000 soldiers committed, deployed, or forward-stationed in over 140 countries. They remain professional and 

dedicated to the mission, to the Army, and to the Nation, with the 

very foundation of our soldiers and our profession being built on 

trust. 

But at what point do we, the institution, and our Nation lose our 

soldiers? trust to trust that we will provide them the right resources, the training and equipment, to properly prepare them and 

lead them into harm’s way, trust that we will appropriately take 

care of our soldiers and their families and our civilians who so selflessly sacrifice so much? In the end, it is up to us not to lose that 

trust. Today they have faith in us, trust in us to give them the 

tools necessary to do their job. But we must never forget our soldiers will bear the burden of our decisions with their lives. 

I love this Army I have been a part of for over 38 years. I want 

to ensure it remains the greatest land force the world has ever 

known. To do that, though, it is our shared responsibility to provide our soldiers and our Army with the necessary resources for 

success. It is our decisions, those that we make today and in the 

near future, that will impact our soldiers, our Army, and the joint 

force and our Nation’s security posture for the next 10 years. We 

do not want to return to the days of a hollow Army. 

Thank you so much for allowing me to testify today and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Odierno follows:] 

PREAPRED STATEMENT BY GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA 

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and other distinguished members, 

thank you for inviting us to speak this morning about the impacts and challenges 

of sequestration on the military. 

I want to begin by thanking each member of the committee for their unwavering 

support and commitment to U.S. Army soldiers, civilians, and families, particularly 

while we remain committed around the globe with the specter of strategic uncertainty ever present. The Nation’s investment in our Armed Forces over the past decade has proven decisive in ensuring the success of American service men and 

women to achieve our national security objectives. 

7 

For nearly 4 years now, you have charged me with leading our Nation’s Army and 

providing my best military advice. Sequestration is the single greatest barrier to the 

effectiveness of our Armed Forces—to its Training, Readiness, and Modernization. 

I assure you that ending sequestration is the most prudent measure we can take 

for ensuring that our military is able to meet the demands of global security now 

and in the future. Today, the Army is meeting every mission, just as it always has, 

but at a long-term cost to our people, our facilities, and our equipment. 

CONSEQUENCES OF FISCAL YEAR 2013 SEQUESTRATION

As I have already testified, the abrupt nature of sequestration in fiscal year 2013 

has significantly impacted every aspect of the Army, from training to readiness to 

family programs. Although the Bi-Partisan Budget Act (BBA) gave us some relief 

from sequestration, the reduced spending levels in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 

2015 have forced us to reduce our training, jeopardize readiness, defer needed maintenance upgrades, and delay or cancel much-needed procurement programs. Should 

sequestration or sequester funding levels return in fiscal year 2016, the Army will 

have to further limit the readiness of forces around the world while slashing Army 

modernization, extending and postponing maintenance cycles, and standing by as 

the conditions of our facilities deteriorate. 

Fiscal year 2013 sequestration compelled the Army to take drastic measures: 

• Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations for seven brigade combat teams 

(BCT) were cancelled—the equivalent of two divisions—that were not slated 

to deploy to Afghanistan or serve in the Global Response Force. The seven 

BCTs funded for collective training at a CTC in preparation for an Afghanistan deployment were trained for the Train and Assist mission required for 

that theater; they were not prepared for any other contingency operation; 

• Approximately $716 million of fiscal year 2013 equipment reset (maintenance) was deferred into fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015 and contributed to a backlog of 172 aircraft awaiting maintenance; 

• The reset of nearly 700 vehicles, almost 2,000 weapons, over 10,000 

pieces of communications equipment, Army Prepositioned Stocks and numerous doldier equipment and clothing items was postponed; 

• In our aviation program, procurement of a new Armed Aerial Scout helicopter could not be afforded requiring the development of new organizational concepts to mitigate our shortfalls in Aerial Reconnaissance; 

• Implementation of the Aviation Restructure Initiative; • Modernization of our Apache helicopters was delayed from fiscal year 

2013 to fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015; 

• System upgrades for unmanned aerial vehicles were delayed and cancelled; 

• Modernization of Air Defense Command and Control systems were delayed at a time North Korea risks increased in North East Asia; 

• New basic research grants in fiscal year 2013 and affected grants at more 

than 120 universities in 38 States were halved; 

• From the end of fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2014, boards convened to separate up to 30 percent of the captains from year groups 2006, 

2007, and 2008, the majority of whom have served multiple deployments in 

combat; 

• Approximately 197,000 civilian employees were furloughed, 48 percent of 

whom are Veterans, forcing them to take a 20-percent pay cut for 6 weeks; 

and 

• Base sustainment funds were reduced by $2 billion, a 70 percent drop 

from historic levels of funding. 

In sum, the Army has adjusted to the realities of sequestration and sequestration 

level-funding since fiscal year 2013. But despite our expectations, the demands for 

Army forces have increased rather than decreased around the world. In my 38 years 

of service, I have never seen a more dynamic and rapidly changing security environment than the one we face now. We no longer live in a world where we have the 

luxury of time and distance to respond to threats facing our Nation. Instead, we face 

a diverse range of threats operating across domains and along seams—threats that 

are rapidly changing and adapting in response to our posture. 

SEQUESTRATION IN AN EVOLVING GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

As the Army draws down, we have had to reduce and reorganize our force structure and involuntarily separate quality soldiers, including some while they were 

serving in a combat zone. In the last 12 months, we reduced the size of the Active 

component from 532,000 to 503,000, with end strength set to fall to 490,000 in fiscal 

8 

year 2015; and then to 450,000. Similarly, the end strength in our Army National 

Guard is set to fall to 335,000 and the Army Reserve to 195,000. But if sequestration returns, we will need to reduce end strength even further to 420,000 in the Active component by fiscal year 2020; and 315,000 in the National Guard and 185,000 

in the Army Reserve, both by fiscal year 2019. Yet, the reality we face is that the 

demand for Army forces throughout the world is growing while the size of the force 

is shrinking. 

Today, we are increasingly called upon to meet the demands of combatant commanders. We continue to support our partners in Afghanistan. We have returned 

to Iraq to advise and assist Iraqi Security Forces as they fight the Islamic State 

of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). We have deployed forces to Jordan and throughout 

the Middle East, where terrorism continues to spread and destabilize the region. In 

West Africa, more than 2,000 soldiers are providing humanitarian assistance to 

combat the Ebola epidemic, while another 1,000 soldiers are actively engaged in 

supporting partners as they combat extremism in the Horn of Africa. In Europe, 

Army forces have been deployed to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania since last 

spring to counter Russian aggression and assure our European allies. We stand beside these Allies who have recently been shaken by attacks in Paris. Across the Pacific, thousands of Army forces are supporting operations whether in Thailand, the 

Philippines, or Malaysia; Australia, Indonesia, or Korea. Around the world, we are 

training alongside allies and partners to help them develop professional and capable 

armies; and at home we are supporting civil authorities while defending our critical 

networks against cyber attacks. 

With each one of these diverse missions, units rely on tailored teams of experts, 

logistics capabilities, transportation, intelligence, and communication support to accomplish the mission. In sum, we remain fully engaged with nearly 140,000 soldiers 

committed, deployed, or forward-stationed conducting 5 named operations on 6 continents in nearly 140 countries, with 9 of our 10 division headquarters employed 

across the globe. But in spite of the range of threats facing our Nation, sequestration remains the law of land, and we are reducing our capacity and capability. 

RETHINKING PAST ASSUMPTIONS

For the past 3 years, we have developed several budget strategies in response to 

fiscal constraints that we knew we were going to face. In 2012, we worked very hard 

on drafting strategic guidance within the Pentagon based on the budget prior to sequestration—guidance that was approved by the President and discussed with Congress. 

We made some assumptions in that budget that must now be revisited. We assumed we could accept risks in Europe. Now, we face major security issues in Europe ranging from increasing Russian aggression to a rise in soft target attacks by 

terrorist networks. We made decisions based on the fact that we were coming out 

of Iraq and Afghanistan and did not anticipate sending people back into Iraq. We 

made an assumption that although we knew we had a long fight against extremist 

organizations around the world, we could focus our budget primarily on defeating 

al Qaeda. We now have emerging extremist networks that are destabilizing regions 

around the world in ways we did not foresee. Over the last year, we witnessed the 

growing threat and gruesome toll of ISIL. 

We assumed that future conflicts will be short in duration. But the threats we 

face today cannot be solved quickly. Defeating ISIL will require years of sustained 

international commitment. Without persistent pressure and focus, groups such as 

ISIL will continue to ravage populations and undermine regional stability. So we 

must recognize that the operating environment has changed. It is important to now 

have a new discussion as we consider the impacts and potential risks of sequestration based on the world we live in and not the one we wish it to be. 

With an increase in threats around the world that have rendered some of our 

planning assumptions optimistic, we must acknowledge that the fiscal year 2016 

post-sequestration spending cap, which was set almost 4 years ago, has not kept 

pace or accounted for an increasingly complex and dangerous world. We are now operating on multiple continents simultaneously. With the velocity of instability increasing around the world, continuing unrest in the Middle East, and the threat of 

terrorism growing rather than receding—witness the recent tragedies in Paris and 

Nigeria—now is not the time to be dramatically reducing capability and capacity. 

If we are forced to take further endstrength reductions beyond the planned levels 

in the President’s budget due to sequestration, our flexibility deteriorates, as does 

our ability to react to strategic surprise. We are witnessing firsthand mistaken assumptions about the number, duration, location, and size of future conflicts and the 

9 

need to conduct post-stability operations. These miscalculations translate directly 

into increased military risk. 

LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF SEQUESTRATION

A return to sequestration-level funding would require the Army to size and equip 

the force based on what we can afford, not what we need, increasing the risk that 

when called to deploy, we will either not have enough soldiers or will send soldiers 

that are not properly trained and equipped. As I have stated before, if the discretionary cap reductions from sequestration occur, the Army will be at grave risk of 

being unable to fully execute the Defense Strategic Guidance requirements. In fiscal year 2014, we operated with almost $10 billion less in funding than in 

fiscal year 2012, which is a major reduction. The 2014 budget, with the support of 

Congress, provided us some relief while enabling us to reinvest in readiness. But 

in fiscal year 2015, we have significantly less funding than we executed in 2014 and 

frankly we are going to be challenged to maintain the readiness of our force. Any 

readiness we do generate in fiscal year 2015 is coming at the expense of our longterm modernization and sustainment. Future reductions devastate the delicate balance between end strength, readiness, and modernization. Although the 2014 Bipartisan Budget Agreement and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding provided some welcome relief in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, sequestration has 

debilitated readiness and severely reduced modernization and manpower. The Army 

has in effect mortgaged its future to buy back partial readiness today. 

Through fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2018, as we draw down and restructure 

the Army into a smaller force, the Army will have significantly degraded readiness 

and extensive modernization program shortfalls. The Army will only start to regain 

balance between end strength, readiness, and modernization in fiscal year 2020, albeit for a much smaller Army—not until fiscal year 2023 do we begin to achieve 

required readiness and reinvest in modernization programs. Until then, we will 

have to undertake even more significant reductions in force structure and end 

strength at the cost of readiness and modernization, which will further frustrate our 

ability to fully execute the defense strategy. 

Force Structure and End Strength 

The Army is preparing to drawdown to 980,000 (450,000 Active component, 

335,000 Army National Guard, and 195,000 U.S. Army Reserve). But if sequestration returns, Total Army end strength will fall an additional 60,000 to 920,000 

(420,000 Active component; 315,000 Army National Guard; 185,000 U.S. Army Reserve). The impacts of these reductions will be spread across the Total Army. These 

are not cuts we want to make but rather cuts we are compelled to make. 

We have already cut 11 BCTs from our force structure, and we will reduce an additional 4 Active component BCTs from the fiscal year 2015 total of 32 (to 28) to 

achieve a 450,000 Active component force. But, despite operational requirements to 

support the strategic guidance, a return to sequestration will cut another 2 BCTs 

(to 26) from the Active component and 2 BCTs (to 24) from the Army National 

Guard; as well as associated enablers. 

The Army has to date worked deliberately to mitigate the impacts of sequestration-level funding on U.S. installations by cutting Europe and Korea-based forces 

and enlarging U.S.-based BCTs. However, despite efforts to implement these efficiencies, we are now compelled to reduce military and civilian personnel at U.S. installations across the country. We are reducing the size of every headquarters by 

25 percent by fiscal year 2019. Duty positions and personnel requirements at every 

installation will be reduced to mission critical levels only. Across the Army, the impacts will be broad and deep. 

The Army released a Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Assessment 

(SPEA) assessing the impacts of sequestration driving Active component end 

strength to 420,000 soldiers; it identified 30 installations with the potential to lose 

1,000 or more Active component soldiers and Army civilians. These force cuts have 

severely impacted communities across the United States. The breadth and adverse 

effects of future force cuts and forced involuntary separations of thousands of soldiers will accelerate under full sequestration each year through fiscal year 2020. 

Readiness 

To maintain a high level of sustained readiness, it is critical that the Army receive consistent and predictable funding. Sequestration puts the Army on a path of 

accelerated and much deeper cuts to our forces while debilitating readiness and reducing modernization and manpower. Funding fluctuations force the Army to train 

and maintain the force in fits and starts, which is cost inefficient and damaging to 

long-term readiness. 

10 

The impacts of continued sequestration will endure for at least a decade. It is 

going to be the next Chief and the Chiefs after that who must respond to the longterm and hidden impacts of sequestration. Readiness is not something that we can 

just fund piecemeal—once in a while and year to year. It has to be funded consistently over time. If not, it is fleeting, and it goes away. As we approach 2016, we 

can’t take end strength out any faster without impacting our ability to conduct operations already committed. The Army will only be able to meet priority Global Force 

Management missions, and must rely on OCO funding to maintain any additional 

readiness for emergent needs. Under sequestration, sustainment readiness remains 

extremely reliant on OCO funding to mitigate risk to the program. In fiscal year 

2013, the Army deferred $323.3 million in Depot Maintenance and was only recently 

funded through the Army’s fiscal year 2015 OCO submission. The Army must also 

accept additional risk by deferring the emplacement of the Southwest Asia Army 

Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Fires and Sustainment brigades, an important element 

of the Army’s revised APS strategy, for 2 years. The rolling sequestration impacts 

on readiness thus handcuff our strategic flexibility. 

The Bipartisan Budget Act allowed us to buy back some training readiness in 

2014 and increased funding for some training support system enabling capabilities. 

In fiscal year 2014, the Army completed 19 rotations at the CTCs, including 6 rotations for deploying BCTs and 13 decisive action training rotations (12 Active component and 1 Reserve component BCTs). We restored two of four cancelled CTC Rotations. But due to sequestration, the Army cancelled two Reserve component rotations. Comparatively, even though we received some relief from sequestration in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, just a third of our BCTs—23 of 66—are trained 

in their core mission capabilities in Decisive Action and Unified Land Operations. 

Reducing CTCs erodes the capacity of our formations from conducting Combined 

Arms Maneuver. CTCs are the culmination of a comprehensive training and readiness cycle for our BCTs, enabling them to deploy worldwide at a moment’s notice. 

Although the Army attempts to mitigate the impacts on training readiness, we 

must continue to implement the Contingency Force model of fiscal year 2015 in 

order to maintain readiness for the 24 of 60 BCTs that will receive sufficient funding to conduct training at CTCs and home station. The remaining 36 BCTs will be 

limited to minimum Individual/Crew/Squad resourcing levels through sufficient 

Training Support Systems (TSS). In short, sequestration forces the Army to ration 

readiness. But regardless of funding levels, we have committed to keeping CTCs a 

priority. That means our home station training goes unfunded except for brigades 

going to CTCs. 

At the soldier level, Institutional Training will also take a significant reduction 

that will take years to recover. Already strained, the Army will further reduce Specialized Skill Training by 85,007 seats (65 percent drop) and fund only the most critical courses resulting in 47,659 seats funded out of 199,212 seats (23.9 percent). 

Furthermore, this causes a training backload that will take years to reduce, hindering units’ abilities to train and negatively affecting unit readiness. Ultimately, 

this further reduces the Army’s ability to meet combatant commander needs for critical capabilities and skills. 

Installations across the Army where soldiers train and families live are severely 

impacted under current law. To contain the impacts of sequester-level funding, we 

have assumed significant risk within installations by relegating the impacts to installation support. These impacts will be further magnified as we mitigate readiness 

shortfalls. If sequestration level funding returns in fiscal year 2016, Base Operations Support will be decreased by $1 billion. No installation will be untouched by 

the reductions. This reduction will eliminate jobs and contract funding for grounds 

maintenance, pest control, custodial services, and refuse collection at all garrisons. 

Family programs, such as child and youth services and MWR services, will have to 

be reduced or fees increased to absorb this reduction. 

The reduced funding levels required by sequestration, should it occur again in fiscal year 2016, would only afford funding for life, health, and safety issues. The costs 

accumulate and for every year of sequestration level funding, it takes 2–3 years to 

address facility maintenance backlogs with facility sustainment reduced by over 

$750 million. The cuts also reduce funding available for installation security by $162 

million, directly reducing the capability of security forces at all installations worldwide and resulting in a loss of uniformed personnel available for other missions as 

they assume the critical base security role. Network Services and information assurance will have to be reduced by almost $400 million. This reduction will decrease 

the Army’s ability to protect itself from cyber attacks across all spectrums. The fact 

is that traditional efficiency-seeking initiatives are not keeping pace with the decline of spending power in the defense budget. 

11 

Modernization 

The Army has already undertaken significant cost cutting efforts and reduced personnel and equipment requirements during the first 2 years of sequestration. In the 

triad of impacts to sequestration, Army modernization suffers the most. Modernization accounts have been reduced by 25 percent and every program affected; maintenance deferred; and the defense industrial base increasingly skeptical about investing in future innovative systems needed to make the force more agile and adaptive. 

As part of the balancing process, the Army has already made difficult choices in 

dropping the Armed Aerial Scout, Unmanned Ground Vehicle upgrades, the Mounted Soldier System, and Ground Combat Vehicle program. Under sequestration, 

planned upgrades to our current systems, such as UH–60 Blackhawk, Abrams, 

Bradley, and Stryker would be reduced or slowed (e.g. Stryker DVH upgrades will 

cease) leaving our soldiers more vulnerable, especially if deploying as part of a 

smaller force where technology optimizes soldier performance and capabilities. Over 

270 acquisitions and modernization programs have already been impacted by sequestration, and more than 137 additional programs may also be affected under continued sequestration. 

The Army is unable to protect upgrades and procurement on top of an already 

depleted capital investments portfolio at sequestration level funding. These modernization disruptions will stop development and production in critical programs 

that enable a smaller force to accomplish diverse missions. Under sequestration, the 

Army will have to stop the 4th Double-V Hull Brigade conversion; slow the Patriot 

system upgrade; halt the procurement of one new MQ–1C Gray Eagle Company and 

the accelerated fielding of another, both of which are needed to address the increased UAV demand in Syria and Iraq; delay the Aerial Intelligence Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance 2020 strategy by several years; reduce and extend the active 

electronically scanned array radar development; and delay development of Radaron-the-Network for Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense-integration 

until fiscal year 2022, which is a vital capability protecting our homeland from missile threats. 

In fiscal year 2014, we also continued our Aviation Restructuring Initiative. Our 

current aviation structure is unaffordable, so the Army’s plan avoids $12.7 billion 

in costs while sustaining a modern fleet across all components, although there is 

no funding for an Armed Aerial Scout replacement. We cannot afford to maintain 

our current aviation structure and sustain modernization while providing trained 

and ready Aviation units across all three components. Therefore, we are supporting 

the comprehensive review of our strategy. ARI will ultimately allow us to eliminate 

obsolete airframes, sustain a modernized fleet, and reduce sustainment costs while 

maintaining all aviation brigades in the Reserve component. 

Modernization enables a smaller, agile, and more expeditionary Army to provide 

globally responsive and regionally engaged forces demonstrating unambiguous resolve. But sequestration adversely impacts the Army’s ability to modernize and field 

critical capabilities that improve operational readiness of aging equipment. Predictable and consistent funding is required to modernize on the current timeline, meet 

the evolving threat, and fully execute Defense Strategic Guidance requirements. The 

cumulative cuts in modernization programs threaten to cede our current overmatch 

of potential adversaries while increasing future costs to regain or maintain parity 

if lost. 

Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 

Even as the Army confronts the many challenges wrought by sequestration, we 

continue to seek efficiencies while adapting to the complexities of an evolving and 

unstable security environment. It is imperative that our Army adapts to the future 

Joint operating environment, one that consists of diverse enemies that employ traditional, unconventional, and hybrid strategies which threaten U.S. security and vital 

interests. In October of last year, we introduced the new Army Operating Concept, 

Win in a Complex World. This concept recognizes the changing world around us. 

The Army Operating Concept reinforces our five strategic priorities: 

1. Develop adaptive Army leaders for a complex world; 

2. Build a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army; 

3. Provide a ready and modern Army; 

4. Strengthen our commitment to our Army profession; and 

5. Sustain the premier All-Volunteer Army. 

The Army Operating Concept describes the Army’s contribution to globally integrated operations. It recognizes the need for Army forces to provide foundational capabilities required by the combat commanders and to synchronize and integrate efVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
12 

fects across land and from land into the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. 

The Army Operating Concept ensures that we are prepared to lead Joint, Interorganizational, and Multinational Teams in complex security environments through 

a dedicated ‘‘Campaign of Learning’’ under Force 2025 Maneuvers to assess new capabilities, design, and doctrine. This enables expeditionary capabilities and enhances agility. We are assessing key capabilities such as manned-unmanned 

teaming, operational energy and expeditionary command posts. The Army Operating 

Concept represents a cost-effective way to enhance readiness, improve interoperability, and modernize the force. It is also a cost-effective way to assess and demonstrate joint and multi-national interoperability and readiness. 

We are rethinking how the Army operates to ‘‘Win in a Complex World,’’ and we 

ask Congress to enable us to adapt to meet what is demanded of us at home and 

abroad. 

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

As I have detailed above, the impacts of sequestration today and in the near future continue to be bleak. If Congress does not act to mitigate the magnitude and 

method of the reductions under the sequestration, the Army will be forced to make 

blunt reductions in end strength, readiness, and modernization. We cannot take the 

readiness of our force for granted. If we do not have the resources to train and equip 

the force, our soldiers, our young men and women, are the ones who will pay the 

price, potentially with their lives. It is our shared responsibility to ensure that we 

never send members of our military into harm’s way who are not trained, equipped, 

well-led, and ready for any contingency to include war. We must come up with a 

better solution than sequestration. 

As Congress continues to work through the challenges of passing a budget and 

of confronting sequestration, we ask that you consider the following actions to allow 

us to deal with these cuts in a cost-effective way that meets strategic demands. 

Relief from Sequestration 

Relief from sequestration’s immediate impacts has already proven effective, but 

under current law, there is no flexibility within the budget to adjust to these effects. 

The fiscal year 2014 Balanced Budget Act resulted in the Army managing the impacts to which I testified in November 2013. Without relief from sequestration, the 

Army cannot meet defense strategic requirements, and we will be on a path to a 

hollow Army. 

Predictable Funding 

Sequestration and continuing resolutions disaggregate Army budgets and make 

responsible planning almost impossible. Funding fluctuations force the Army to 

train and maintain the force in fits and starts, which is cost inefficient and damaging to long-term readiness. As a result, things cost more and take longer to get. 

Modernization efforts are disrupted and training is inefficient. Predictable funding 

enables the Army to minimize costs by sustaining training across the Total Army 

at home-station; and by maximizing agility and adaptability at combined arms 

training exercises, and as part of other joint, multinational exercises. 

Support for Cost-Saving Reforms 

Sequestration’s debilitating impacts will be compounded if we are denied the flexibility to manage these smaller budgets. The Army has made tough choices and 

needs congressional support for compensation reform, force restructuring, and a 

cost-saving Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). 

Compensation Reform 

We are extremely grateful for the high quality care and compensation our Nation 

has shown to our service men and women over the last decade. Military manpower 

costs remain at historic highs and consume 46 percent of the Army budget. As we 

go forward, we must develop compensation packages that reduce future costs but 

at the same time recognize and reward our soldiers and their families for their commitment and sacrifice. If we do not slow the rate of growth of soldier compensation, 

it will consume a higher, disproportionate percentage of the Army budget. 

Force Restructuring 

As we move forward, the shaping and restructuring of the Total Army is necessary to ensure we have the right mix of talent and skills to support our Army 

for the future. These are crucial to us in order to maintain our professional and capable uniformed and civilian workforce. 

13 

BRAC 

To offset the wide impact of sequestration, the Army supports another round of 

BRAC in fiscal year 2019. As the Army’s end strength, force structure, and funding 

decline, hundreds of millions of dollars are wasted maintaining underutilized buildings and infrastructure at installations we no longer need. If we do not make the 

tough decisions necessary to identify inefficiencies and eliminate unused facilities, 

we will divert scarce resources away from training, readiness, and family programs, 

and the quality of our installation services will suffer. 

CONCLUSION

We are developing a leaner, smaller Army that remains the most highly-trained 

and professional All-Volunteer land force in the world; one that is uniquely organized with the capability and capacity to provide expeditionary, decisive landpower 

to the Joint Force, and is ready to perform the range of military operations in support of combatant commanders to defend the Nation and its interests at home and 

abroad, both today and against emerging threats. 

The choices we must make to meet sequestration-level funding are forcing us to 

reduce our Army to a size and with limited capabilities that I am not comfortable 

with. If we follow this path to its end, we will find a hollow Army. For those that 

present the choice as one between capacity and capability, I want to remind them 

that for the Army, soldiers are our capability. The Army must train and equip soldiers to achieve decisive strategic results on the ground. If the funding dictates a 

smaller Army, then we must be prepared for both reduced capacity and reduced capability. 

If we do not have the resources to train and equip the force, our soldiers, our 

young men and women, are the ones who will pay the price, potentially with their 

lives. The lack of funding for readiness places the burden of our decisions on the 

shoulders of our soldiers. I have a great concern about that burden. It is our shared 

responsibility to ensure that we never send members of our military into harm’s 

way who are not trained, equipped, well-led, and ready for any contingency, to include war. 

Today, we have the best Army in the world because we stand on the shoulders 

of those who came before us. It is our charge, Congress and DOD working together, 

to ensure that by the end of this decade, we still have the best Army as part of 

the greatest Joint Force in the world. Thank you for allowing me to testify today 

and for listening to our concerns. 

The strength of our Nation is our Army. 

The strength of our Army is our Soldiers. 

The strength of our Soldiers is our Families. 

This is what makes us Army Strong! 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, General. 

Admiral Greenert. 

STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, CHIEF 

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Admiral GREENERT. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 

and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify about the impact of sequestration on our Navy 

thus far and the impact of a potential return to that in 2016. 

Mr. Chairman, presence remains the mandate of our Navy. We 

must operate forward where it matters and we need to be ready 

when it matters. I have provided a chart to show you where it matters around the world to us and where it matters to our combatant 

commanders that we be. 

Now, recent events testify to the value of forward presence. For 

example, when tasked in August, the USS George H.W. Bush strike 

group relocated from the Arabian Sea to the north Arabian Gulf 

and was on station within 30 hours ready for combat operations in 

Iraq and Syria. Navy and Marine strike fighters from the carrier 

generated 20 to 30 combat sorties per day and for 54 days repVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
14 

resented the only coalition option, strike option, to project power 

against ISIL. 

The United States shipped trucks that arrived in the Black Sea 

to establish a U.S. presence and reassure our allies within a week 

after Russia invaded the Crimea. 

Over a dozen U.S. ships led by the USS George Washington 

strike group provided disaster relief to the Philippines in the wake 

of the super typhoon Hayan just about a year ago. 

The USS Fort Worth and the USS Sampson were among the first 

to support the Indonesian-led search effort for the AirAsia aircraft 

recovery. 

Mr. Chairman, we have been where it matters when it matters 

with deployed forces. 

However, due to sequestration in 2013, our contingency response 

force—that is what is on call from the United States—is one-third 

of what it should be and what it needs to be. Sequestration resulted in a $9 billion shortfall in 2013 below our budget submission. This shortfall degraded fleet readiness and created consequences from which we are still recovering. 

The first round of sequestration forced reductions in afloat and 

shore operations. It generated ship and aircraft maintenance backlogs, and it compelled us to extend unit deployments. 

Now, since 2013, our carrier strike groups, our amphibious ready 

groups, and most of our destroyers have been on deployments lasting 8 to 10 months or longer. This comes at a cost of our sailors’ 

and our families’ resiliency. It reduces the performance of the 

equipment and it will reduce the service lives of our ships. 

Navy’s fleet readiness will likely not recover from the ship and 

aircraft maintenance backlogs until about 2018. Now, that is 5 

years after the first round of sequestration. This is just a small 

glimpse of the readiness price that is caused by sequestration. 

Although the funding levels provided to us under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013—they were $13 billion above sequestration— 

those budgets were $16 billion below the resources we described in 

our submission as necessary to sustain the Navy. So now to deal 

with these shortfalls, we slowed—that means we just pushed out— 

modernization that we had scheduled to be done during this Future 

Years Defense Plan. We reduced procurement of advanced weapons 

and aircraft. We delayed upgrades to all but the most critical shore 

infrastructure. 

The end result has been higher risk, particularly in two of the 

missions that are articulated in our Defense Strategic Guidance. 

That is our defense strategy, and I also provided a copy of that. It 

has a synopsis of the 10 missions and what is the impact of sequestration. The missions with the highest risk are those missions requiring us to deter and defeat aggression and the mission to project 

power despite an anti-access area denial challenge. 

Now, a return to sequestration in 2016 would necessitate a revisit and a revision of our defense strategy. We have been saying 

this for years. That would be a budget-based strategy for sure. We 

would further delay critical warfighting capabilities, further reduce 

readiness of contingency response forces, the ones that are only at 

a one-third level, and perhaps forgo our stretched procurement of 

ships and submarines and further downsize our munitions. 

15 

In terms of warfighting, the sequestered Navy of 2020 would be 

left in a position where it could not execute those two missions I 

referred to. We go from high risk to we cannot execute those missions, and we would face higher risk in five additional missions of 

those 10. So that is 7 out of 10. More detail on the impact, as I 

just described, is on a handout in front of you and it is outlined 

in my written statement, which I request be added for the record. 

Now, although we can model and we can analyze and we can 

quantify warfighting impacts, as General Odierno said, what is less 

easy to quantify is sequestration’s impact on people. People underwrite our security. We call them our asymmetric advantage. They 

are the difference in the Navy for sure between us and even the 

most technologically advanced navy close to us. We have enjoyed 

meeting our recruiting goals, and until recently, our retention has 

been remarkable. 

However, the chaotic and indiscriminate excursion of sequestration in 2013—it really left a bitter taste with our sailors, with our 

civilians, and with our families. The threat of looming sequestration, along with a recovering economy, is a troubling combination 

to me. We are already seeing disconcerting trends in our retention, 

particularly our strike fighter pilots, our nuclear trained officers, 

our SEAL’s, cyber warriors, and some of our highly skilled sailors 

in information technology, our Aegis radar, and our nuclear fields. 

These retention symptoms that I just described remind me of the 

challenges that I had as a junior officer after the Vietnam War period on the downsize, and it reminds me of when I was in command 

of a submarine in the mid-1990s downsize, periods that took decades to correct. However, the world was more stable then, Mr. 

Chairman, than it is today, and I would say we cannot create that 

same circumstance. Sequestration will set us right on that same 

course that I just described and, frankly, I have been before. As 

General Odierno said, I do not think we need to go there again. 

Now, the shipbuilding and related industrial base also stand to 

suffer from a sequestered environment. Companies, not necessarily 

the big primes, but the companies that make the key valves, the 

key circuit cards, and the things that put us together, make us the 

great sea power we are might be forced to close their businesses, 

and it takes a long time to build a ship and longer yet to recover 

from the losses of these skilled workers or the materials that some 

of these companies provide. The critical infrastructure in this vital 

section of our Nation’s economy is key to sea power. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I understand the pressing need for our Nation 

to get the fiscal house in order. I do. It is imperative we do so, I 

say, in a thoughtful and a deliberate manner to ensure we retain 

the trust of our people—we have to retain that trust—and to sustain the appropriate warfighting capability for your Navy, the forward presence, and its readiness. So unless naval forces are properly sized, modernized at the right pace with regard to the adversaries that we might have, ready to deploy with adequate training 

and equipment, and capable to respond in the numbers and at the 

speed required by the combatant commanders, they will not be able 

to answer the call. 

I look forward to working with this committee, with Congress to 

find the solutions that will ensure that our Navy retains the ability 

16 

to organize, to train, and to equip our great sailors and marines 

and soldiers and airmen and Coast Guardsmen in defense of this 

Nation. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM JONATHAN GREENERT, USN 

Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify about the effects of sequestration on our Navy to 

date and the potential impacts of reverting back to the sequestration-level discretionary caps imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) in fiscal year 2016. 

In this statement, I will describe the lingering consequences of sequestration in 

2013, the current situation resulting from the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA), 

and specific impacts to readiness and modernization should we revert back to the 

sequestration-levels in fiscal year 2016. will also assess specific. mission risks and 

critical assumptions I use to base my assessments. 

CONTINUING IMPACT OF SEQUESTRATION IN FISCAL YEAR 2013

Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 resulted in a $9 billion shortfall in Navy’s budget, as compared to the President budget for 2013 submission. This instance of sequestration was not just a disruption, it created readiness consequences from whichwe are still recovering, particularly in ship and aircraft maintenance, fleet response 

capacity, and excessive carrier strike group (CSG) and amphibious ready group 

(ARG) deployment lengths. As I testified before this committee in November 2013, 

the continuing resolution and sequestration reductions in fiscal year 2013 compelled 

us to reduce both afloat and ashore operations, which created ship and aircraft 

maintenance and training backlogs. To budget for the procurement of ships and aircraft appropriated in fiscal year 2013, Navy was compelled to defer some purchases 

to future years and use prior-year investment balances to mitigate impacts to programs in fiscal year 2013 execution. The most visible impacts occurred in Operations and Maintenance funded activities. Specific impacts to Navy programs: 

• Cancelled five ship deployments; 

• Delayed deployment of USS Harry S. Truman strike group by 6 months; 

• Inactivated, instead of repaired, USS Miami; 

• Reduced facilities restoration and modernization by about 30 percent (to 

about 57 percent of the requirement); 

• Reduced base operations, including port and airfield operations, by about 

8 percent (to about 90 percent of the requirement); 

• Furloughed civilian employees for 6 days, which, combined with a hiring 

freeze and no overtime, reduced our maintenance and sustainment output 

through lost production and support from logisticians, comptrollers, engineers, contracting officers, and planners; and 

• Cancelled fleet engagements and most port visits, except for deployed 

ships. 

While the Navy was able to reprioritize within available resources to continue to 

operate in fiscal year 2013, this is not a sustainable course for future budgets. The 

actions we took in 2013 to mitigate sequestration only served to transfer bills 

amounting to over $2 billion to future years for many procurement programs—those 

carryover bills were addressed in Navy’s fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015 budgets. If we were sequestered again, we would be forced to degrade current and future 

fleet readiness since sources available to mitigate in fiscal year 2013 are no longer 

available. 

Shortfalls caused by the fiscal year 2013 sequestration remain in a number of 

areas and the Navy is still working to recover from them. For example, we have 

not yet recovered from shipyard maintenance backlogs. We are working through 

shipyard personnel capacity issues to determine when ships can be fit back into the 

maintenance cycle and are balancing that against operational demands on the ships 

to ensure we meet the global force management requirement for combatant commands. The result of maintenance and training backlogs has meant delayed preparation for deployments, forcing us, in turn, to extend the deployments of those units 

already on deployment. Since 2013, our ships have deployed beyond the traditional 

6-month deployment—many CSGs, ARGs, and destroyers (DDG) reaching 8–9 

months or longer. This comes at a cost to the resiliency of our people, sustainability 

of our equipment, and service lives of our ships. 

Maintenance and training backlogs have also reduced Navy’s ability to maintain 

required forces for contingency response to meet combatant command operational 

17 

plan requirements. Although the requirement calls, on average, for three additional 

CSGs and three additional ARGs to deploy within 30 days for a major crisis, Navy 

has only been able to maintain an average of one group each in this readiness posture. Root causes can be traced to the high operational tempo of the fleet, longer 

than expected shipyard availabilities, and retirements of experienced shipyard workers, but the fiscal year 2013 sequestration exacerbated the depth of this problem 

and interfered with our efforts to recover. 

With a stable budget and no major contingencies for the foreseeable future, I estimate that we will recover from the maintenance backlogs that have accumulated 

from the high operational tempo over the last decade of war and the additional effects of sequestration by approximately 2018, 5 years after the first round of sequestration. This is a small glimpse of the readiness ‘‘price’’ of sequestration. 

CURRENT SITUATION

The President’s budget for fiscal year 2014 (PB–2014) was the last budget submission to fully meet all the missions of the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). The 

DSG and Quadrennial Defense Review are the foundation of our current planning, 

programming, and budgeting. Congress’ passage of the BBA averted about $9 billion 

of an estimated $14 billion reduction we would have faced under sequestration. It 

enabled us to fund all planned ship and aircraft procurement in fiscal year 2014, 

but cumulatively the shortfalls increased risk in Navy’s ability to execute DSG missions. The BBA still left a $5 billion shortfall below the PB–2014 submission in our 

investment, operations and maintenance accounts. The shortage in funding compelled us to reduce procurement of weapons (many missile types) and aircraft spare 

parts, defer asymmetric research and development projects, cancel repair and maintenance projects for facilities ashore, and defer procurement of maintenance/material support equipment for the fleet. 

The recent passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2015 and Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act averted about $4 

billion of the estimated $15 billion reduction that Navy would have faced under sequestration; an $11 billion shortfall remains (as compared to PB–2014). We are 

again able to fund all planned ship and aircraft procurement in fiscal year 2015. 

This enabled us to continue the refueling and complex overhaul of the USS George 

Washington (CVN 73). This carrier and her associated air wing are critical to maintaining power projection, presence and contingency response capacity. Having the 

additional global presence resident in this carrier and air wing will decrease the demand placed on the remaining carrier fleet, thus reducing the operating tempo impact on the ship, aircraft, and their crews. 

Navy balanced its portfolio to mitigate the $11 billion shortfall by making choices 

between capability, capacity, cost, and risk. We were compelled to further reduce the 

capacity of weapons and aircraft, slow modernization, and delay upgrades to all but 

the most critical shore infrastructure. As I described in my testimony to this committee in March 2014, the fiscal year 2015 budget represented another iterative reduction from the resources we indicated were necessary to fully resource the DSG 

missions, making Navy less ready to successfully Deter and Defeat Aggression and 

Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges. Continuing 

along this budget trajectory means by 2020 (the DSG benchmark year), Navy will 

have insufficient contingency response capacity to execute large-scale operations in 

one region, while simultaneously deterring another adversary’s aggression elsewhere. Also, we will lose our advantage over adversaries in key warfighting areas 

such as Anti-Surface Warfare, Anti-submarine Warfare, Air-to-Air Warfare, and Integrated Air and Missile Defense. 

RETURN TO SEQUESTRATION STARTING IN FISCAL YEAR 2016

A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would necessitate a revisit and revision of the DSG. Required cuts will force us to further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed for contingency response, forego or 

stretch procurement of ships and submarines, and further downsize weapons capacity. We will be unable to mitigate the shortfalls like we did in fiscal year 2013 because prior-year investment balances were depleted under fiscal year 2013 sequestration. 

The revised discretionary caps imposed by sequestration would be a reduction of 

about $10 billion in our fiscal year 2016 budget alone, as compared to PB–2015. 

From fiscal year 2016–2020, the reduction would amount to approximately $36 billion. If forced to budget at this level, it would reduce every appropriation, inducing 

deep cuts to Navy Operation and Maintenance, investment, and modernization accounts. The Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation accounts would likely exVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
18 

perience a significant decline across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), severely curtailing the Navy’s ability to develop new technologies and asymmetric capabilities. 

As I testified to this committee in November 2013, any scenario to address the 

fiscal constraints of the revised discretionary caps must include sufficient readiness, 

capability, and manpower to complement the force structure capacity of ships and 

aircraft. This balance would need to be maintained to ensure each unit will be effective, even if the overall fleet is not able to execute the DSG. There are many ways 

to balance between force structure, readiness, capability, and manpower, but none 

that Navy has calculated that enable us to confidently execute the current defense 

strategy within dictated budget constraints. 

As detailed in the Department of Defense’s April 2014 report, ‘‘Estimated Impacts 

of Sequestration-Level Funding,’’ one potential fiscal and programmatic scenario 

would result in a Navy of 2020 that would be unable to execute 2 of the 10 DSG 

missions due to the compounding effects of sequestration on top of pre-existing fiscal 

year 2013, 2014, and 2015 resource constraints. Specifically, the cuts would render 

us unable to sufficiently Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges 

and unable to Deter and Defeat Aggression. In addition, we would be forced to accept higher risk in five other DSG missions: Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare; Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities; Provide a Stabilizing Presence; Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations; and Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. (Table 1 provides more 

detail on mission risks.) In short, a return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 will 

require a revision of our defense strategy. 

Critical assumptions I have used to base my assessments and calculate risk: 

• Navy must maintain a credible, modern, and survivable sea-based strategic deterrent; 

• Navy must man its units; • Units that deploy must be ready; • People must be given adequate training and support services; • Readiness for deployed forces is a higher priority than contingency response forces; 

• Capability must be protected, even at the expense of some capacity; • Modernized and asymmetric capabilities (advanced weapons, cyber, electronic warfare) are essential to projecting power against evolving, sophisticated adversaries; and 

• The maritime industrial base is fragile—damage can be long-lasting, hard 

to reverse. 

The primary benchmarks I use to gauge Navy capability and capacity are DOD 

Global Force Management Allocation Plan presence requirements, Combatant Commander Operation and Contingency Plans, and Defense Planning Guidance Scenarios. Navy’s ability to execute DSG missions is assessed based on capabilities and 

capacity resident in the force in 2020. 

The following section describes specific sequestration impacts to presence and 

readiness, force strUcture investments, and personnel under this fiscal and programmatic scenario: 

Presence and Readiness 

A return to sequestration would reduce our ability to deploy forces on the timeline 

required by global combatant commands in the event of a contingency. Of the 

Navy’s current battle force, we maintain roughly 100 ships forward deployed, or onethird of our entire Navy. Included among the 100 ships are 2 CSG and 2 ARG forward at all times. CSGs and ARGs deliver a significant portion of our striking 

power, and we are committed to keeping, on average, three additional CSGs and 

three additional ARGs in a contingency response status, ready to deploy within 30 

days to meet operation plans (OPLANs). However, if sequestered, we will prioritize 

the readiness of forces forward deployed at the expense of those in a contingency 

response status. We cannot do both. We will only be able to provide a response force 

of one CSG and one ARG. Our current OPLANs require a significantly more ready 

force than this reduced surge capacity could provide, because they are predicated 

on our ability to respond rapidly. Less contingency response capacity can mean 

higher casualties as wars are prolonged by the slow arrival of naval forces into a 

combat zone. Without the ability to respond rapidly enough, our forces could arrive 

too late to affect the outcome of a fight. 

Our PB–2015 base budget funded ship and aviation depot maintenance to about 

80 percent of the requirement in fiscal years 2016–2019. This is insufficient in 

maintaining the Fleet and has forced us to rely upon Overseas Contingency Operations funding to address the shortfall. Sequestration would further aggravate existVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
19 

ing Navy backlogs. The impacts of these growing backlogs may not be immediately 

apparent, but will result in greater funding needs in the future to make up for the 

shortfalls each year and potentially more material casualty reports, impacting operations. For aviation depot maintenance, the growing backlog will result in more aircraft awaiting maintenance and fewer operational aircraft on the flight line, which 

would create untenable scenarios in which squadrons would only get their full complement of aircraft just prior to deployment. The situation will lead to less proficient 

aircrews, decreased combat effectiveness of naval air forces, and increased potential 

for flight and ground mishaps. 

Critical to mission success, our shore infrastructure provides the platforms from 

which our sailors train and prepare. However, due the shortfalls over the last 3 

years, we have been compelled to reduce funding in shore readiness since fiscal year 

2013 to preserve the operational readiness of our fleet. As a result, many of our 

shore facilities are degrading. At sequestration levels, this risk will be exacerbated 

and the condition of our shore infrastructure, including piers, runways, and missioncritical facilities, will further erode. This situation may lead to structural damage 

to our ships while pierside, aircraft damage .from foreign object ingestion on deteriorated runways, and degraded communications within command centers. We run a 

greater risk of mishaps, serious injury, or health hazards to personnel. 

Force Structure Investments 

We must ensure that the Navy has the required capabilities to be effective, even 

if we cannot afford them in sufficient capacity to meet the DSG. The military requirements laid out in the DSG are benchmarked to the year 2020, but I am responsible for building and maintaining capabilities now for the Navy of the future. While 

sequestration causes significant near-term impacts, it would also create serious 

problems that would manifest themselves after 2020 and would be difficult to recover from. 

In the near term, the magnitude of the sequester cuts would compel us to consider 

reducing major maritime and air acquisition programs; delaying asymmetric capabilities such as advanced jammers, sensors, and weapons; further reducing weapons 

procurement of missiles, torpedoes, and bombs; and further deferring shore infrastructure maintenance and upgrades. Because of its irreversibility, force structure 

cuts represent options of last resort for the Navy. We would look elsewhere to absorb sequestration shortfalls to the greatest extent possible. 

Disruptions in naval ship design and construction plans are significant because 

of the long-lead time, specialized skills, and extent of integration needed to build 

military ships. Because ship construction can span up to 9 years, program procurement cancelled in fiscal year 2016 will not be felt by the combatant commanders 

until several years later when the size of the battle force begins to shrink as those 

ships are not delivered to the fleet at the planned time. Likewise, cancelled procurement in fiscal year 2016 will likely cause some suppliers and vendors of our shipbuilding industrial base to close their businesses. This skilled, experienced, and innovative workforce cannot be easily replaced and it could take years to recover from 

layoffs and shutdowns; and even longer if critical infrastructure is lost. Stability and 

predictability are critical to the health and sustainment of this vital sector of our 

Nation’s industrial capacity. 

Personnel 

In fiscal year 2013 and 2014, the President exempted all military personnel accounts from sequestration out of national interest to safeguard the resources necessary to compensate the men and women serving to defend our Nation and to 

maintain the force levels required for national security. It was recognized that this 

action triggered a higher reduction in non-military personnel accounts. If the President again exempts military personnel accounts from sequestration in fiscal year 

2016, then personnel compensation would continue to be protected. Overall, the 

Navy would protect personnel programs to the extent possible in order to retain the 

best people. As I testified in March 2014, quality of life is a critical component of 

the quality of service that we provide to our sailors. Our sailors are our most important asset and we must invest appropriately to keep a high caliber All-Volunteer 

Force. We will continue to fund sailor support, family readiness, and education programs. While there may be some reductions to these programs if sequestered in fiscal year 2016, I anticipate the reductions to be relatively small. However, as before, 

this would necessitate higher reductions to the other Navy accounts. 

CONCLUSION

Navy is still recovering from the fiscal year 2013 sequestration in terms of maintenance, training, and deployment lengths. Only one-third of Navy contingency reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
20 

sponse forces are ready to deploy within the required 30 days. With stable and consistent budgets, recovery is possible in 2018. However, if sequestered, we will not 

recover within this FYDP. 

For the last 3 years, the Navy has been operating under reduced top-lines and 

significant shortfalls: $9 billion in fiscal year 2013, $5 billion in fiscal year 2014, 

and $11 billion in fiscal year 2015, for a total shortfall of about $25 billion less than 

the President’s budget request. Reverting to revised sequester-level BCA caps would 

constitute an additional $5–$10 billion decrement each year to Navy’s budget. With 

each year of sequestration, the loss of force structure, readiness, and future investments would cause our options to become increasingly constrained and drastic. The 

Navy already shrank 23 ships and 63,000 personnel between 2002 and 2012. It has 

few options left to find more efficiencies. 

While Navy will do its part to help the Nation get its fiscal house in order, it is 

imperative we do so in a coherent and thoughtful manner to ensure appropriate 

readiness, warfighting capability, and forward presence—the attributes we depend 

upon for our Navy. Unless naval forces are properly sized, modernized at the right 

pace, ready to deploy with adequate training and equipment, and capable to respond 

in the numbers and at the speed required by combatant commanders, they will not 

be able to carry out the Nation’s defense strategy as written. We will be compelled 

to go to fewer places, and do fewer things. Most importantly, when facing major contingencies, our. ability to fight and win will neither be quick nor decisive. 

Unless this Nation envisions a significantly diminished global security role for its 

military, we must address the growing mismatch in ends, ways, and means. The 

world is becoming more complex, uncertain, and turbulent. Our adversaries’ capabilities are diversifying and expanding. Naval forces are more important than ever 

in building global security, projecting power, deterring foes, and rapidly responding 

to crises that affect our national security. A return to sequestration would seriously 

weaken the U.S. Navy’s ability to contribute to U.S. and global security. 


128ful2.eps
21 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General Welsh. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. MARK A. WELSH III, USAF, CHIEF OF 

STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE 

General WELSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Reed, and members of the committee. It is always an honor to be 

here. It is a special honor to sit before you today with three people 

I consider to be friends and mentors and literally heroes. 

My pride in our Air Force and the airmen who give it life has 

not changed since the last time I appeared before you, but what 

has changed is that we are now the smallest Air Force that we 

have ever been. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Repeat that again. Repeat that. We are now 

the smallest Air Force—— 

General WELSH. We are now the smallest Air Force we have ever 

been, Mr. Chairman. 

When we deployed to Operation Desert Storm in 1990, the Air 

Force had 188 fighter squadrons. Today we have 54 and we are 

headed to 49 in the next couple of years. In 1990, there were 

511,000 active duty airmen alone. Today we have 200,000 fewer 

than that. As those numbers came down, the operational tempo 

went up. Your Air Force is fully engaged. All the excess capacity 

is gone and now, more than ever, we need a capable, fully ready 

force. We simply do not have a bench to go to, and we cannot continue to cut force structure, as we have been doing for the last few 

years, to pay the cost of readiness and modernization or we will 

risk being too small to succeed in the tasks we have already been 

given. 


128ful1.eps
22 

But BCA level funding will force us to do exactly that. We will 

have to consider divestiture of things like the KC–10 fleet, the U– 

2 fleet, the Global Hawk block 40 fleet, and portions of our airborne 

command and control fleet. We would also have to consider reducing our MQ–1 and MQ–9 fleet by up to 10 orbits. The real-world 

impact of those choices on current U.S. military operations would 

be significant. In the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) mission area alone, 50 percent of the high altitude ISR missions being flown today would no longer be available. Commanders 

would lose 30 percent of their ability to collect intelligence and targeting data against moving vehicles on the battlefield, and we 

would lose a medium altitude ISR force, the size of the one doing 

such great work in Iraq and Syria today. The Air Force would be 

even smaller and less able to do the things that we are routinely 

expected to do. 

I would like to say that that smaller Air Force would be more 

ready than it has ever been, but that is not the case, 24 years of 

combat operations have taken a toll. In fiscal year 2014 and 2015, 

we used the short-term funding relief of the Balanced Budget Act 

to target individual and unit readiness and the readiness of our 

combat squadrons has improved over the past year. Today just 

under 50 percent of those units are fully combat-ready—under 50 

percent. Sequestration would reverse that trend instantly. Just like 

in fiscal year 2013, squadrons would be grounded. Readiness rates 

would plummet. Red and green flag training exercises would have 

to be canceled. Weapon school classes would be limited, and our 

aircrew members’ frustration and their families’ frustration will 

rise again just as the major airlines begin a hiring push expected 

to target 20,000 pilots over the next 10 years. 

We also have a broader readiness issue in that the infrastructure 

that produces combat capability over time, things like training 

ranges, test ranges, space launch infrastructure, simulation infrastructure, nuclear infrastructure, have all been intentionally underfunded over the last few years to focus spending on individual and 

unit readiness. That bill is now due. But BCA caps will make it impossible to pay. The casualty will be Air Force readiness and capability well into the future. 

I would also like to tell you that your smaller Air Force is younger and fresher than it has ever been, but would not be true either. 

Our smaller aircraft fleet is also older than it has ever been. If 

World War II’s venerable B–17 bomber had flown in the first Gulf 

War, it would have been younger than the B–52, the KC–135, and 

the U–2 are today. We currently have 12 fleets—12 fleets—of airplanes that qualify for antique license plates in the State of Virginia. We must modernize our Air Force. We want to work with 

you to do it within our top line. It certainly will not be easy and 

it will require accepting prudent operational risk in some mission 

areas for a time. 

But the option of not modernizing really is not an option at all. 

Air forces that fall behind technology fail, and joint forces that do 

not have the breadth of the airspace and cyber capabilities that 

comprise modern air power will lose. 

Speaking of winning and losing, at the BCA funding levels, the 

Air Force will no longer be able to meet the operational requireVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
23 

ments of the Defense Strategic Guidance. We will not be able to simultaneously defeat an adversary, deny a second adversary, and 

defend the homeland. I do not think that is good for America no 

matter what angle you look at it from. 

We do need your help to be ready for today’s fight and still able 

to win in 2025 and beyond. I believe our airmen deserve it. I think 

our joint team needs it, and I certainly believe that our Nation still 

expects that of us. 

I would like to offer my personal thanks to the members of this 

committee for your dedicated support of airmen and their families. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Welsh follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. MARK A. WELSH III, USAF 

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee, it is 

an honor to appear before you. Thank you for your continued support of our Air 

Force, our airmen, and their families. 

In November 2013, I spoke to this committee about sequestration and asked that 

you: 

‘‘ . . . pass funding bills that give us stability, both in the near term and 

the long term. If not, we’ll have these same conversations year after year. 

Help us be ready now . . . and still able to win in 2023. Let us focus on combat capability, on our five core missions, and on global vigilance, global 

reach, and global power for America. Our airmen deserve it, our joint team 

needs it, and our Nation expects it.’’ 

My pride in our airmen and the remarkable way they accomplish our five core 

missions of: (1) air and space superiority; (2) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); (3) rapid global mobility; (4) global strike; and (5) command and 

control has not changed since my last testimony. Nor has my plea to this committee 

for the leadership, resources, funding stability, and decision flexibility required to 

keep America’s Air Force formidable. 

What have changed are the global operational environment and the demand signals created for the Air Force and other Services; the level of effort in Iraq and 

Syria that is much greater than planned; the continuing requirement for Air Force 

support in Afghanistan; a resurgent and aggressive Russia and the need for U.S. 

military presence to assure allies and deter further aggression; an unraveling Libya 

and Yemen; an increase in counterterrorism activity on the African continent; an 

increasing domestic terrorism concern that has already manifested itself in Europe; 

and technological advances by both Russia and China that could dramatically narrow capability gaps between our Air Force and any air force using their new systems. 

Sequestration imposed sudden and significant budget cuts and restrictions without any reduction in operational requirements while we were still fully engaged in 

combat operations. Since sequestration took effect, Air Force operations have not 

slowed down. 

AIR FORCE OPERATIONS IN 2014

In calendar year 2014, our combat air forces flew 19,959 close air support sorties 

in Operations Enduring Freedom and Inherent Resolve. In support of U.S. Central 

Command alone, airmen flew 35,163 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) missions, identified 1,700 improvised explosive devices, helped remove over 

700 high value enemy combatants from the battlefield, responded to 1,500 troopsin-contact events, disseminated 18 million images, analyzed 4 million signals intelligence reports, and collected more than 1.6 million hours of full motion video. Over 

the last 7 months, 24 percent of those ISR missions directly supported Operation 

Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State. 

While Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan dominated the headlines, airmen never took 

their eyes off the rest of the globe. Since June, they’ve conducted 1,518 ISR missions 

in support of other combatant commands. Airmen launched 25 space missions, 9 of 

which were National Security Space missions. Their hard work this year brought 

the total number of consecutive successful Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 

space launches to 79. Air Mobility airmen flew 79,445 airlift sorties supporting operations on every continent. As the linchpin to the U.S. military’s ability to rapidly 

24 

project power, Air Force tanker crews flew 29,892 sorties worldwide and offloaded 

over 172 million gallons of fuel to joint and coalition air forces. Aeromedical evacuation crews airlifted 6,075 wounded soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and injured 

civilians around the globe. 

IMPACT OF SEQUESTRATION

Many of the accomplishments of our airmen in 2014 would not have been possible 

at sequestered levels of funding. As you will remember, when sequestration took effect in 2013 we grounded 31 flying squadrons (including 13 combat-coded squadrons), furloughed most of our 180,000 civilian airmen, and made deep cuts to flying 

hours, weapon system sustainment, facility sustainment, training, and equipment. 

Our facilities and base infrastructure suffered, and we faced a $12 billion back-log 

in much needed facility maintenance. We deferred maintenance, repair, and upgrades to our operational training ranges and decreased their ability to support 

high-end combat training. Sequestration caused months of aircraft maintenance 

backlog and reduced advanced pilot training, things that can only be corrected with 

time and additional resources. We deferred critical long-term investment in nuclear 

infrastructure, black and white world test infrastructure, and space launch infrastructure. 

The Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA), the limited, short-term budget relief that Congress provided for fiscal years 2014 and 2015, started the long process of readiness 

recovery after more than 20 years of overseas combat engagement. BBA did two 

things for us: first, it removed the threat of sequestration for those fiscal years 

which would have resulted in immediate across the board reductions, where we had 

no ability to prioritize the reductions based on mission needs. Second, the BBA provided funding levels higher than sequestration levels, although it still left us with 

difficult choices to make. Because of BBA, we began to recover Airmen’s individual 

readiness for the full spectrum of missions we provide the joint force; started to regain ground on aircraft and facility maintenance; invested in our nuclear Force Improvement Program; increased funding in our training ranges; and sustained our 

priority investments in the F–35, the KC–46, and the Long-Range Strike Bomber; 

three programs that will be essential to joint mission success in 2025 and beyond. 

It was not enough, but it was a start. A return to sequestered levels of funding in 

fiscal year 2016 will reverse any progress we made in addressing our infrastructure 

and facility maintenance and exacerbate our problems with readiness and modernization. It will also make it impossible for us to meet the operational requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance. 

IMPACT TO READINESS

Nuclear 

Air Force nuclear forces remain safe, secure, and effective, but only sustained, significant investment in our nuclear infrastructure will prevent long-term readiness 

problems. The Air Force has investment plans for facilities and large military construction programs to address findings from the recent Nuclear Enterprise Reviews. 

All require resources over time to realize. Those resources will not be available at 

sequestered funding levels. Sequestration level funding would leave all nuclear enterprise military construction projects unfunded except a $95 million Weapon Storage Facility project at F.E. Warren Air Force Base. Sustainment and recapitalization of legacy facilities would also be crippled. In short, sequestration level funding 

counters our commitment to get healthier and threatens our ability to ensure nuclear readiness and unquestionable deterrence in the future. 

Individual Readiness 

We will work very hard to maintain the short-term individual readiness of our 

force by cutting only small percentages of our flying hour program and weapon system sustainment account. A 4- to 5-percent cut in Training and Exercise accounts 

will be unavoidable. That cut is the equivalent of one Weapons School and a 50 percent reduction in Red and Green Flag exercises. At our current pace of operations, 

we expect individual readiness to decrease only slightly in fiscal year 2016. But in 

order to minimize impacts to individual readiness, we will be forced to cannibalize 

other accounts, and exacerbate other, long-term institutional readiness issues, such 

as the readiness of our Total Force for the high-end fight that Weapons School, Red 

Flag and Green Flag are designed to emulate. 

25 

Depots 

Funding our Depot workforce at sequestered levels will result in over 1.8 million 

fewer work hours and potentially impact over 2,000 jobs. The impact of that on unit/ 

individual readiness is very difficult to measure, but it is certainly not insignificant. 

Global Mobility 

Sequestration level funding will further degrade global access and engagement. 

The majority of our mobility air forces, the backbone of our Nation’s Global Reach 

and the Air Force’s Rapid Global Mobility mission, reside in the Air Reserve Components (ARC). A full 73 percent of our tactical airlift, and 66 percent of our tanker 

fleet, is assigned to either Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve units. The ARC 

still has not fully recovered from fiscal year 2013 sequestration. If we return to sequestered funding levels, the ARC will absorb a large percentage of the mobility 

force’s Flying Hour Program cuts in fiscal year 2016, further delaying combat readiness and capacity to support national requirements. The ability of their aircrew 

members to regain/retain proficiency will also be challenged by reduced man-day 

funding levels. 

Weapons 

Sequestration funding levels will intensify significant weapons shortfalls. We are 

already thousands of weapons below our stockpile requirements. Direct attack munitions remain well below acceptable inventory levels and the high demand of current 

operations, as well as Foreign Military Sales to our allies and coalition partners further depletes the remaining inventory. The industrial base has almost no capacity 

to ‘‘surge’’ in case of a new conflict and we cannot afford to have that industrial base 

atrophy. Weapons expenditures in support of Operation Inherent Resolve since August of 2014 total more than $215 million. Since 2012, Hellfire expenditures in Operations Inherent Resolve, Enduring Freedom, and Freedom Sentinel increased 

nearly 500 percent, and procurement has not kept pace. An additional $180 million 

added in fiscal year 2015 (1,700 missiles) helped, but only pushed the problem to 

the right by 1 year. Under sequestration funding levels, Hellfire and Joint Direct 

Attack Munition (JDAM) procurement would plummet 61 percent (3,197 weapons) 

and guidance kit procurement would fall 19 percent (24,474 kits). Sequestration 

level funding would delay the munition requirement recovery by an additional 5 to 

15 years, and in the case of the JDAM, a preferred weapon, even longer. 

Our overall readiness as a force is already significantly impacted by the size and 

age of our current aircraft fleet. It is now the smallest and oldest in the history of 

our Service. It is also the least ready—less than half of our combat coded units are 

fully combat capable. As Secretary James and I testified a year ago, a return to sequestered levels of funding in fiscal year 2016 will multiply the number of very 

tough choices we will be forced to make in our fiscal year 2016 POM recommendations. All of them impact our ability to do the jobs the Nation, and the Joint Force, 

expect of us. 

Possible fiscal year 2016 sequestration level actions that directly impact readiness 

include: 

- Divest the KC–10 fleet (cuts 13 percent of available refueling booms and 21 

percent of fuel capacity) 

• Airpower could be late to the fight. Sustaining operations would be difficult, especially in the Pacific. 

- Divest the U–2 fleet (reduces high-altitude ISR capacity by 50 percent) 

• Decreases high altitude airborne imagery collection by 70 percent; eliminates high-altitude multi-spectral capability; leaves a State Department 

critical treaty mission (Olive Harvest) unsupported. 

- Divest the RQ4 Block 40 fleet 

• Reduces CENTCOM and PACOM intelligence collection on ground moving targets by 6,000 hours per year. 

- Divest a portion of the E–3 AWACS aircraft fleet 

• Further degrades our ability to meet combatant commander requirements 

for airborne command and control. 

- Reduce the MQ1/MQ–9 fleet by 10 orbits 

• Reduction is equivalent to the level of medium altitude ISR activity supporting air operations in Syria and Iraq today. 

We cannot repair readiness without people and we do not plan to cut airmen to 

pay a sequestration bill. We are fully engaged in operations around the world and 

simply cannot get smaller and still meet the demand of current and projected operVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
26 

ations. Sequestration level funding would drive Total Force end strength down by 

nearly 10,000 personnel. The Air Force is at a Red Line for personnel strength now; 

further reductions will cause us to become too small to succeed. If we return to sequestered funding levels, we will choose to further reduce modernization and recapitalization investment instead of cutting people. 

IMPACT ON MODERNIZATION

For the Air Force, and the Joint Force, to be successful over time, we must very 

carefully balance readiness, capability, and capacity. Over the last 10 to 15 years, 

the Air Force chose to trade capacity (force structure) for both readiness and capability (modernization). But in the warfighting business, quantity has a quality all 

its own. The Air Force has downsized our force structure as far as we can go and 

in many areas must surge to do the jobs we have been asked to be ready to do. 

Because we have not been allowed to take any significant savings in personnel accounts, or to close installations, reductions to meet sequestered funding limits will 

continue to come from readiness, force structure or modernization accounts. Since 

cutting more capacity (force structure), beyond what is necessary to wisely build tomorrow’s Air Force, is a bad idea, what sequestration level funding will do is drive 

a choice between ‘‘ready and capable now’’ and ‘‘ready and capable in the future.’’ 

It is a false choice . . . we must be both for the Joint Force to be successful—sequestration may make that impossible. The following paragraphs contain examples of 

specific modernization program impacts at sequestered levels of funding. 

Nuclear 

A sequestration level budget would cut roughly 66 percent of currently planned 

funding intended to modernize nuclear systems and infrastructure. This would include weapons storage areas at two intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) bases; 

the UH–1N recapitalization; modernization programs for bombers and nuclear 

weapon components; and long-term risk reduction for future modernization programs. We will be prepared to discuss details during the fiscal year 2016 posture 

hearings, but these cuts would severely challenge legacy facility/system 

sustainment, recapitalization for things like ICBM and cruise missile replacements, 

and F–35 Dual Capable Aircraft certification. 

F–35 

Sequestration level funding would likely require the Air Force to defer a number 

of aircraft from the fiscal year 2016 buy (Low Rate Initial Production 10—delivers 

in 2018). It could also delay development of Software Block 3F, with an accompanying possibility of a delay to Full Operational Capability and Dual Aircraft Capability efforts. 

Science and Technology (S&T) 

Sequestration level funding will reduce Air Force S&T funding by an estimated 

$223 million in fiscal year 2016 and by approximately $1.08 billion over the FYDP. 

This will delay or terminate approximately 100 contracts across the following technology areas: air dominance; directed energy; manufacturing; human systems; munitions; propulsion; structures; cyber; sensors; and space technologies. 

Adaptive Engine Transition Program 

At sequestered funding levels, we will be hard pressed to continue this program. 

It has the potential to produce fuel savings of up to 25 percent on every aircraft 

we fly in the future, but we will likely not have the investment dollars we need to 

continue it in the near term. This may have a devastating impact on the industrial 

base. 

RQ–4 Block 30 

In addition to divestment of the RQ–4 Block 40 fleet, a sequestration level budget 

will delay approximately $110 million in investments for RQ–4 Block 30 reliability, 

viability, and sensor enhancements. These are the enhancements needed to replace 

current U–2 capabilities. 

Facilities 

In addition to the specific program impacts above, sequestration level will force 

us to cut 24 military construction projects and 126 other facility restoration and 

modernization projects across the Air Force and at combatant commands. 

The bottom line is that the sequestration level of funding will have a very clear 

impact on the Air Force’s ability to develop the force required to train and operate 

efficiently and successfully execute our core missions against a capable, wellequipped adversary in 2025 and beyond. 

27 

IMPACT ON MISSION

There are three critical assumptions that underlie this assessment: 

1. The Defense Strategic Guidance remains the same. Should it change, I would 

need to reassess the impacts of sequestration level funding against the new Defense Strategic Guidance tasking. 

2. Current combatant command operational plans, force requirements, and response timelines remain unchanged. Again, should they change, I would need 

to reassess. 

3. Budget Control Act caps and the mechanism of sequestration remain as currently stipulated in law. 

With those assumptions, the mission risk is clear. The impacts on readiness and 

modernization outlined above would result in an Air Force that, at sequestered levels of funding, cannot successfully execute all Defense Strategic Guidance requirements. We will not have sufficient force structure to meet the fundamental requirement to simultaneously Defeat an adversary, Deny a second adversary, and Defend 

the Homeland. I would be happy to discuss this in more depth in a classified forum. 

IN CLOSING

The U.S. Air Force is still the best in the world. When the bugle calls, we will 

answer, and we will win. But the vulnerabilities sequestration introduces into our 

force will encourage our adversaries, worry our allies, limit the number of concurrent operations we can conduct, and increase risk to the men and women who fight 

America’s next war. 

Thanks to the members of this committee for your persistent support of our military. We need your continued help to be ready for today’s operations . . . and still 

able to win in 2025. Please give us the stable funding profiles we need to focus on 

combat capability, on our five core missions, and on global vigilance, global reach, 

and global power for America. Our airmen deserve it, our joint team needs it, and 

our Nation still expects it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General Dunford. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, 

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS 

General DUNFORD. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 

and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored to represent 

your marines and testify on the impact of sequestration. 

I would like to begin by thanking the committee for your steadfast support for the past 13 years. Due to your leadership, we fielded the best trained and equipped Marine Corps our Nation has 

ever sent to war. 

I know this committee and the American people have high expectations for marines as our Nation’s naval expeditionary force-inreadiness. You expect the marines to operate forward, engage with 

partners, deter potential adversaries, and respond to crises. When 

we fight, you expect us to win. You expect a lot of your marines 

and you should. 

This morning, as you hold this hearing, your marines are doing 

just what you expect them to be doing. Over 31,000 are forwarddeployed and engaged. Mr. Chairman, I have captured what those 

31,000 are doing in my statement. I just ask that that be accepted 

for the record in the interest of time. 

Our role as the Nation’s expeditionary force-in-readiness informs 

how we man, train, and equip the Marine Corps. It also prioritizes 

the allocation of resources that we receive from Congress. Before I 

address what would happen if a BCA level of funding with sequestration, let me quickly outline where we are today. 

28 

As we have experienced budget cuts and fiscal uncertainty over 

the past few years, we prioritized the readiness of our forward-deployed forces. But in order to maintain the readiness of our forward-deployed forces, we have assumed risk in our home station 

readiness, modernization, infrastructure sustainment, and quality 

of life programs. As a result, approximately half of our nondeployed 

units, those who provide the bench to respond to the unexpected, 

are suffering personnel, equipment, and training shortfalls. In a 

major conflict, those shortfalls will result in a delayed response 

and/or additional casualties. 

We are investing in modernization at an historically low level. 

We know that we must maintain at least 10 to 12 percent of our 

resources on modernization to field a ready force for tomorrow. To 

pay today’s bills, we are currently investing 7 to 8 percent. Over 

time, that will result in maintaining older or obsolete equipment at 

higher cost and more operational risk. 

We are funding our infrastructure sustainment below the DOD 

standard across the Future Years Defense Program. At the projected levels, we will not be properly maintaining our enlisted barracks, training ranges, and other key facilities. 

While we can meet the requirements of the Defense Strategic 

Guidance today, there is no margin, and even without sequestration, we will need several years to recover from over a decade of 

war and the last 3 years of flat budgets and fiscal uncertainty. In 

that context, BCA funding levels with sequester rules will preclude 

the Marine Corps from meeting the requirements for the Defense 

Strategic Guidance. Sequester will exacerbate the challenges we 

have today. It will also result in a Marine Corps with fewer Active 

Duty battalions and squadrons than would be required for a single 

major contingency. Perhaps as concerning, it will result in fewer 

marines and sailors being forward deployed and in position to immediately respond to crises involving our diplomatic posts, American citizens, or interests overseas. 

While many of the challenges associated with sequestration can 

be quantified, there is also a human dimension to what we have 

been discussing today, and the other chiefs have addressed that. 

Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and their families 

should never have to face doubts about whether they will be deployed without proper training and equipment. The foundation of 

the All-Volunteer Force, as General Odierno has said, is trust. Sequestration will erode the trust that our young men and women in 

uniform, civil servants, and families have in their leadership. The 

cost of losing that trust is incalculable. 

Given the numerous and complex security challenges we face 

today, I believe DOD funding at the BCA level with sequestration 

will result in the need to develop a new strategy. We simply will 

not be able to execute the strategy with the implications of that 

cut. 

Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you 

this morning, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:] 

29 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC 

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and member of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today on this important matter. The 

Marine Corps is the Nation’s expeditionary force-in-readiness. Congress specificallyand uniquely-structured the organization and prescribed the role of the Marine 

Corps as a ’’ . . . balanced force-in-readiness, air and ground . . . to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large scale war.’’ To that end, marines serve 

forward to shape events, manage instability, project influence, respond to crises, and 

when necessary, serve as the initial response force that enables heavier contingency 

forces to deploy from the United States. Marines are expeditionary-partnered with 

the Navy, we come from the sea, to operate ashore, but without dependence on fixed 

bases or facilities. Our role as America’s 9–1–1 force informs how we man, train, 

and equip our force. It also drives how we prioritize and allocate the resources we 

are provided by Congress. 

Today, there are over 31,000 marines forward engaged conducting a full range of 

theater security and crisis response missions. Marine Expeditionary Units are embarked and underway aboard Amphibious Ready Groups as part of a strong NavyMarine Corps team. These combined arms air-ground-logistics forces, consisting of 

approximately 2,400 marines and sailors, are capable of responding rapidly to a 

wide range of forward presence and stability missions. Marines are currently conducting security cooperation activities in 29 countries across the globe. Marines are 

deployed to Iraq supporting Operation Inherent Resolve and in Afghanistan supporting Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. They are on alert status in Moron, Spain, 

and Sigonella, Italy—ready to respond to crises across Africa and Europe. Over 

22,000 marines are west of the international dateline in the Pacific building partnership capacity, strengthening alliances, deterring aggression, and preparing for 

any contingency. Marines are routinely serving at 175 embassies and consulates 

around the globe and currently reinforcing security with additional forces at our embassies in Iraq to deploy, or have recently returned from deployment. Our operational tempo since September 11, 2001, has been high and remains high today. We 

expect this trend to continue. 

Your marines are proud to be the Nation’s ready force. They are proud that they 

were the force of choice for immediate response during the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, the earthquake in Turkey, the flood in Pakistan, the devastating 

tsunami in the Indian Ocean basin, and the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. Marines 

are proud of their recent role in safely evacuating American citizens in South Sudan 

and Libya. They are proud of their performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the 

support of Congress, they are committed to remaining ready and continuing a tradition of innovation, adaptation, and winning the Nation’s battles. 

Maintaining the readiness of our forward deployed marines during a period of fiscal uncertainty has come at a cost. To meet our responsibilities as the Nation’s 9– 

1–1 force, we prioritized near-term readiness while assuming risk in our home station readiness, modernization, infrastructure sustainment, and quality of life programs. Today, approximately half of our home station units are at an unacceptable 

level of readiness. Our investment in the future is less than what we believe is required, and we are funding our infrastructure sustainment below the Department 

of Defense standard. We have significantly reduced many of the programs that have 

allowed us to maintain morale and family readiness through over a decade of war. 

We are also maintaining a very challenging level of deployment-to-dwell time. Our 

operating forces are deploying for up to 7 months and returning home for 14 or less 

months before redeploying. 

While we can meet the requirements of the President’s Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) today, there is no margin. We have yet to fully appreciate the impact 

of cuts that have been made to Marines Corps’ share of this cut has caused us to 

make difficult decisions that have significantly degraded our ability to respond to 

a major contingency today and adversely affected our ability to maintain a ready 

force for tomorrow. The sequestration cuts to date, combined with a sustained high 

level of operations, will challenge our future ability to be the Nation’s force-in-readiness. 

The Marine Corps views readiness through the lens of the five pillars of readiness: high quality people, near-term unit readiness, capability and capacity to meet 

combatant commanders’ requirements, infrastructure sustainment, and modernization. The sequestration cuts to date, and the challenges associated with an increasingly dangerous and uncertain world, have precluded us from maintaining balanced 

readiness even as we stretch to meet the DSG requirements. However, the possibility of an extended period of severely reduced funding as a result of sequestration 

coupled with the inefficient manner in which those cuts must be applied will preVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
30 

clude the Marines Corps from meeting the requirements of the DSG and the requirements of the geographic combatant commanders. We will continue to protect 

near-term unit readiness at the expense of other areas, but our capacity for crisis 

and major contingency response will be significantly reduced. In short, the full 

weight of the sequestration reductions will preclude the Marine Corps from meeting 

its full title 10 responsibilities and adequately preparing for the future. 

The Marine Corps continues to evaluate the long-term impacts of the sequestration reductions. The fiscal challenges we already face today will be exacerbated and 

significant additional challenges will be forced on all the Services. Through thorough 

analysis, we have determined that the Marine Corps will assume additional significant risk in long-term modernization and infrastructure sustainment as well as further detrimental impacts to readiness. The Marine Corps’ capacity to meet operational requirements in the long-term will be reduced. We expect that we will be 

forced to further reduce our Active component force resulting in an unacceptable deployment to dwell ratio of less than 1:2 for most of our key operational units and 

their critical enablers. Our non-deployed units will not be ready to fight. Other probable impacts include: 

• Further delay of major acquisition programs. • Forced sustainment of aged legacy systems resulting in increased operations and support costs and higher defense bills. • Risk to the realignment to the Pacific. 

• Infrastructure sustainment funding would be cut well below current 

standards (less than 70 percent of the model requirement vice 90 percent) 

creating increased costs sooner for the American public. 

• Morale and family support services would be further reduced or eliminated including child care and family readiness. This will lead to foreseeable morale issues and quality of life degradation. 

As Commandant, I am also sensitive to the impacts that a sequestered budget will 

have on your marines, sailors, and civilians. Beyond the specific and tangible challenges described above is the human cost. Sequestration will create great uncertainty in the force. It is important that our people know they will have the resources 

to get the job done. It is important that they know they will have the training, 

equipment, support, family services, and quality of life they need and deserve. The 

impacts of sequestration, in all these areas, will chip away at their confidence. Our 

servicemembers should be singularly focused on accomplishing their mission. They, 

and their families, should never have to face doubts of whether they will be deployed in harm’s way without the best training and equipment our Nation can afford. The foundation of the All-Volunteer Force is trust—sequestration will erode 

the trust that our young men and women in uniform, civil servants, and families 

have in their leadership. The cost of losing that trust is incalculable. 

The American people have come to expect their marines to do what must be done 

in ‘‘any clime and place’’ and under any conditions. They expect us to respond quickly and win. To meet their expectations, I will ensure that the Marine Corps will 

provide the most ready crisis response forces our Nation can afford. I will do my 

best to manage the institutional risk we will incur with the resources that are made 

available. However, the support of Congress and the American people is a critical 

requirement for your Corps of Marines to remain the Nation’s expeditionary forcein-readiness. I most strongly urge that we avoid sequestration. 

Lastly, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I want to reinforce Chairman 

Dempsey’s recent comments related to sequestration. I share his and my fellow 

Service Chiefs’ concerns that, under the full effects of sequestration, we will have 

less capability and capacity to bring options to our National Command Authority, 

our elected leaders and the American people. When our Nation has options, we have 

strategic flexibility. When our options are limited, we create strategic risk. We want 

to be forward-engaged to reduce the risk of going to war and don’t ever want our 

young men and women in a fair fight—we want them to have a decisive edge over 

any adversary. In the context of today’s strategic landscape, sequestration will cause 

great harm to the security of our Nation. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, thank you and I thank you all for very 

compelling statements. I hope that all of our colleagues and, in 

fact, all the American people could hear the statements and see the 

statements that you made today, our most respected members of 

our society. 

I would also have an additional request, and that is that if you 

could provide for the record, all of you, a list of some of the deciVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
31 

sions you would have to make if sequestration continues to be enacted and there is no amelioration of the situation that you are in. 

[The information refered to follows:] 

General ODIERNO. A return to sequestration-level funding would require the Army 

to size and equip the force based on what we can afford, not what we need, increasing the risk that when called to deploy, we will either not have enough soldiers or 

will send soldiers that are not properly trained and equipped. As I have stated before, if the discretionary cap reductions from sequestration occur, the Army will be 

at grave risk of being unable to fully execute the Defense Strategic Guidance requirements. 

SEQUESTRATION IMPACTS TO FORCE STRUCTURE AND END STRENGTH

The Army is already preparing to drawdown to 980,000 (450,000 AC, 335,000 

ARNG, and 195,000 USAR). But if sequestration returns, Total Army end strength 

will fall an additional 60,000 to 920,000 (420,000 AC; 315,000 ARNG; 185,000 

USAR). The impacts of these reductions will be spread across the Total Army. These 

are not cuts we want to make but rather cuts we are compelled to make. 

We have already cut 11 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) from our force structure, 

and we will reduce an additional 4 AC BCTs from the fiscal year 2015 total of 32 

(to 28) to achieve a 450,000 AC force. But, despite operational requirements to support the strategic guidance, a return to sequestration will cut another 2 BCTs (to 

26) from the AC and 2 BCTs (to 24) from the ARNG; as well as associated enablers. 

The Army has to date worked deliberately to mitigate the impacts of sequestration-level funding on U.S. installations by cutting Europe and Korea-based forces 

and enlarging U.S.-based BCTs. However, despite efforts to implement these efficiencies, we are now compelled to reduce military and civilian personnel at U.S. installations across the country. We are reducing the size of every headquarters by 

25 percent by fiscal year 2019. Duty positions and personnel requirements at every 

installation will be reduced to mission critical levels only. Across the Army, the impacts will be broad and deep. 

The Army released a Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Assessment assessing the impacts of sequestration driving AC end strength to 420,000 soldiers; 

it identified 30 installations with the potential to lose 1,000 or more Active component soldiers and Army civilians. These force cuts have severely impacted communities across the United States. The breadth and adverse effects of future force cuts 

and forced involuntary separations of thousands of soldiers will accelerate under full 

sequestration each year through fiscal year 2020. 

SEQUESTRATION IMPACTS TO READINESS

To maintain a high level of sustained readiness, it is critical that the Army receive consistent and predictable funding. Sequestration puts the Army on a path of 

accelerated and much deeper cuts to our forces while debilitating readiness and reducing modernization and manpower. Funding fluctuations force the Army to train 

and maintain the force in fits and starts, which is cost inefficient and damaging to 

long-term readiness. 

The impacts of continued sequestration will endure for at least a decade. It is 

going to be the next chief and the chiefs after that who must respond to the long 

term and hidden impacts of sequestration. Readiness is not something that we can 

just fund piecemeal—once in a while and year to year. It has to be funded consistently over time. If not, it is fleeting, and it goes away. As we approach 2016, we 

can’t take end strength out any faster without impacting our ability to conduct operations already committed. The Army will only be able to meet priority Global Force 

Management missions, and must rely on OCO funding to maintain any additional 

readiness for emergent needs. Under sequestration, sustainment readiness remains 

extremely reliant on OCO funding to mitigate risk to the program. In fiscal year 

2013, the Army deferred $323.3 million in Depot Maintenance and was only recently 

funded through the Army’s fiscal year 2015 OCO submission. The Army must also 

accept additional risk by deferring the emplacement of the Southwest Asia Army 

Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Fires and Sustainment brigades, an important element 

of the Army’s revised APS strategy, for 2 years. The rolling sequestration impacts 

on readiness thus handcuff our strategic flexibility. 

The Bipartisan Budget Act allowed us to buy back some training readiness in 

2014 and increased funding for some training support system enabling capabilities. 

In fiscal year 2014, the Army completed 19 rotations at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), including 6 rotations for deploying brigade combat teams (BCTs) and 

13 decisive action training rotations (12 Active component and 1 Reserve component 

32 

BCTs). We restored two of four cancelled Combat Training Center (CTC) Rotations. 

But due to sequestration, the Army cancelled two Reserve component rotations. 

Comparatively, even though we received some relief from sequestration in fiscal 

year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, just a third of our BCTs—23 of 66—are trained in 

their core mission capabilities in Decisive Action and Unified Land Operations. Reducing CTCs erodes the capacity of our formations from conducting Combined Arms 

Maneuver. CTCs are the culmination of a comprehensive training and readiness 

cycle for our BCTs, enabling them to deploy worldwide at a moment’s notice. 

Although the Army attempts to mitigate the impacts on training readiness, we 

must continue to implement the Contingency Force model of fiscal year 2015 in 

order to maintain readiness for the 24 of 60 BCTs that will receive sufficient funding to conduct training at CTCs and home station. The remaining 36 BCTs will be 

limited to minimum Individual/Crew/Squad resourcing levels through sufficient 

Training Support Systems (TSS). In short, sequestration forces the Army to ration 

readiness. But regardless of funding levels, we have committed to keeping Combat 

Training Centers a priority. That means our home station training goes unfunded 

except for brigades going to CTCs. 

At the soldier level, Institutional Training will also take a significant reduction 

that will take years to recover. Already strained, the Army will further reduce Specialized Skill Training by 85,007 seats (65 percent drop) and fund only the most critical courses resulting in 47,659 seats funded out of 199,212 seats (23.9 percent). 

Furthermore, this causes a training backload that will take years to reduce, hindering units’ abilities to train and negatively affecting unit readiness. Ultimately, 

this further reduces the Army’s ability to meet combatant commander needs for critical capabilities and skills. 

Installations across the Army where soldiers train and families live are severely 

impacted under current law. To contain the impacts of sequester-level funding, we 

have assumed significant risk within installations by relegating the impacts to installation support. These impacts will be further magnified as we mitigate readiness 

shortfalls. If sequestration level funding returns in fiscal year 2016, Base Operations Support will be decreased by $1 billion. No installation will be untouched by 

the reductions. This reduction will eliminate jobs and contract funding for grounds 

maintenance, pest control, custodial services, and refuse collection at all garrisons. 

Family programs, such as child and youth services and MWR services, will have to 

be reduced or fees increased to absorb this reduction. 

The reduced funding levels required by sequestration, should it occur again in fiscal year 2016, would only afford funding for life, health, and safety issues. The costs 

accumulate and for every year of sequestration level funding, it takes 2–3 years to 

address facility maintenance backlogs with facility sustainment reduced by over 

$750 million. The cuts also reduce funding available for installation security by $162 

million, directly reducing the capability of security forces at all installations worldwide and resulting in a loss of uniformed personnel available for other missions as 

they assume the critical base security role. Network Services and information assurance will have to be reduced by almost $400 million. This reduction will decrease 

the Army’s ability to protect itself from cyber attacks across all spectrums. The fact 

is that traditional efficiency-seeking initiatives are not keeping pace with the decline of spending power in the defense budget. 

SEQUESTRATION IMPACTS TO MODERNIZATION

The Army has already undertaken significant cost cutting efforts and reduced personnel and equipment requirements during the first 2 years of sequestration. In the 

triad of impacts to sequestration, Army modernization suffers the most. Modernization accounts have been reduced by 25 percent and every program affected; maintenance deferred; and the defense industrial base increasingly skeptical about investing in future innovative systems needed to make the force more agile and adaptive. 

As part of the balancing process, the Army has already made difficult choices in 

dropping the Armed Aerial Scout, Unmanned Ground Vehicle upgrades, the Mounted Soldier System, and Ground Combat Vehicle program. Under sequestration, 

planned upgrades to our current systems, such as UH–60 Blackhawk, Abrams, 

Bradley, and Stryker would be reduced or slowed (e.g. Stryker DVH upgrades will 

cease) leaving our soldiers more vulnerable, especially if deploying as part of a 

smaller force where technology optimizes soldier performance and capabilities. Over 

270 acquisitions and modernization programs have already been impacted by sequestration, and more than 137 additional programs may also be affected under continued sequestration. 

The Army is unable to protect upgrades and procurement on top of an already 

depleted capital investments portfolio at sequestration level funding. These modVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
33 

ernization disruptions will stop development and production in critical programs 

that enable a smaller force to accomplish diverse missions. Under sequestration, the 

Army will have to stop the 4th Double-V Hull Brigade conversion; slow the Patriot 

system upgrade; halt the procurement of one new MQ–1C Gray Eagle Company and 

the accelerated fielding of another, both of which are needed to address the increased UAV demand in Syria and Iraq; delay the Aerial Intelligence Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance 2020 strategy by several years; reduce and extend the Active 

Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar development; and delay development of 

Radar-on-the-Network for Patriot and THAAD-integration until fiscal year 2022, 

which is a vital capability protecting our homeland from missile threats. 

In fiscal year 2014, we also continued our Aviation Restructuring Initiative. Our 

current aviation structure is unaffordable, so the Army’s plan avoids $12.7 billion 

in costs while sustaining a modern fleet across all components, although there is 

no funding for an Armed Aerial Scout replacement. We cannot afford to maintain 

our current aviation structure and sustain modernization while providing trained 

and ready Aviation units across all three components. Therefore, we are supporting 

the comprehensive review of our strategy. ARI will ultimately allow us to eliminate 

obsolete airframes, sustain a modernized fleet, and reduce sustainment costs while 

maintaining all aviation brigades in the Reserve component. 

Modernization enables a smaller, agile, and more expeditionary Army to provide 

globally responsive and regionally engaged forces demonstrating unambiguous resolve. But sequestration adversely impacts the Army’s ability to modernize and field 

critical capabilities that improve operational readiness of aging equipment. Predictable and consistent funding is required to modernize on the current timeline, meet 

the evolving threat, and fully execute Defense Strategic Guidance requirements. The 

cumulative cuts in modernization programs threaten to cede our current overmatch 

of potential adversaries while increasing future costs to regain or maintain parity 

if lost. 

CLOSING

As I have detailed above, the impacts of sequestration today and in the near future continue to be bleak. If Congress does not act to mitigate the magnitude and 

method of the reductions under the sequestration, the Army will be forced to make 

blunt reductions in end strength, readiness, and modernization. We cannot take the 

readiness of our force for granted. If we do not have the resources to train and equip 

the force, our soldiers, our young men and women, are the ones who will pay the 

price, potentially with their lives. It is our shared responsibility to ensure that we 

never send members of our military into harm’s way who are not trained, equipped, 

well-led, and ready for any contingency to include war. We must come up with a 

better solution than sequestration. 

Admiral GREENERT. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would necessitate a revisit and revision of the defense strategy. As I have testified before, sequestration would significantly reduce the Navy’s ability to fully implement the 

President’s defense strategy. The required cuts would force us to further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed for contingency responses, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego or stretch procurement of 

force structure as a last resort. Because of funding shortfalls over the last 3 years, 

our fiscal year 2016 President’s budget represents the absolute minimum funding 

levels needed to execute our defense strategy. We cannot provide a responsible way 

to budget for the defense strategy at sequester levels because there isn’t one. 

Today’s world is more complex, more uncertain, and more turbulent, and this 

trend around the world will likely continue. Our adversaries’ are modernizing and 

expanding their capabilities. It is vital that we have an adequate, predictable, and 

timely budget to remain an effective Navy. Put simply, sequestration will damage 

the national security of this country. 

General WELSH. The fiscal year 2016 President’s budget supports our critical 

needs to execute the defense strategy, but we made tough choices in capacity and 

capability/modernization. The Office of Management and Budget has provided direction through the Office of the Secretary of Defense that the Air Force does not support any reductions to the President’s budget. Without a repeal of sequestration the 

Air Force will simply not have the capacity required to fully meet the current Defense Strategic Guidance. Therefore, support of the President’s budget and repeal 

of 2013 Budget Control Act (BCA) is essential. If forced into BCA funding levels in 

fiscal year 2016, we would, out of necessity divest entire fleets, reduce quantities 

for procurement of weapons systems, and reduce readiness accounts. Potential impacts include: 

• Divest RQ–4 Block 40 fleet and cut Block 30 modifications 

34 

• Reduce MQ–1/MQ–9 ISR capacity by 10 CAPs—equivalent to current operations in Iraq/Syria 

• Retire KC–10 fleet—15 in fiscal year 2016 and 59 total across Future 

Years Defense Program 

• Defer second Presidential Aircraft Recapitalization 

• Reduce Flying Hours, Weapon System Sustainment, range support and 

munitions 

• Reduce quantities for fighter recapitalization (F–35As) by 14 aircraft in 

fiscal year 2016 

• Reduce investments in Space programs, Cyber Mission Areas, Nuclear 

Enterprise, and Science and Technology 

• Terminate Adaptive Engine Program 

• Divest seven E–3s in fiscal year 2016 

• Divest U–2 

Bottom line—stable budgets at a higher level than BCA are critical to long-term 

strategic planning, meeting the Defense Strategic Guidance, and protecting the 

Homeland. 

General DUNFORD. Any discussion regarding how the Marine Corps would implement a sequester or reduce its budget request to a Budget Control Act level would 

need to be part of a larger conversation about the priorities of the Department and 

the defense strategy. Decisions regarding the appropriate size of the Marine Corps, 

and the resources required, need to be made with a full understanding of the expectations of the Corps at a severely reduced funding level. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I guess the only other comment I would like 

for you to answer because I would like all my colleagues to be able 

to have time to answer questions is the old line about those of us 

that ignore the lessons of history. General Odierno, you made reference to it. When General Shy Meyer came before this committee 

and said that we had a hollow Army—I know that my friend, Senator Reed, remembers that also. We were able to recover hardwarewise and ships and airplanes and guns, but it took a lot longer 

than that to restore the readiness and even the morale of members 

of our military. And all four of you made reference to it. 

But I would like you to perhaps elaborate a little bit on the personnel side of this because it seems that there is always the best 

and the brightest that leave first when you are a pilot that cannot 

fly and you are on a ship that does not leave port and you are in 

a Marine Corps or Army outfit that does not exercise and does not 

have equipment. So maybe each of you could give a brief comment 

about this intangible that makes us the greatest military on earth. 

I will begin with you, General Odierno. 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Senator. 

The center of everything we do is our soldiers. The Army is our 

soldiers, and without them and their capabilities, our ability to do 

our job becomes very, very difficult. It is something that happens 

over time. My concern is when you are funding readiness, you are 

funding leader development. You are funding the development of 

our young soldiers. You cannot just do that episodically. You have 

to do it in a sustained manner because it is a continuous learning 

cycle that allows them to execute the most difficult and complex 

missions that we face. In today’s world, those missions are becoming more complex and more difficult. 

My concern is as they see that maybe we are not going to invest 

in that, they start to lose faith and trust that we will give them 

the resources necessary for them to be successful in this incredibly 

complex world that we face. I think sometimes we take for granted 

the levels of capability that our soldiers bring and the investment 

35 

that we have made into their education and training, which is central to everything that we do, and we cannot lose sight of that. 

Unfortunately, with sequestration, we are going to have to reduce that over the next 4 to 5 years for sure because we cannot 

take end strength out fast enough to get to the right balance because of our commitments that we have. So, therefore, you have to 

then look at readiness, training, and modernization. We are losing 

cycles of this training that develops these young men and women 

to be the best at what they are and the best at what they do. So 

for us, we can never ever forget that. 

Admiral GREENERT. Mr. Chairman, I bring something to 

everybody’s attention. When we had sequestration, we said, well, 

we exempted personnel as if, hey, that is good. That means they 

got paid, but that does not mean that they got—that is kind of 

their quality of life and we gave them their housing allotment and 

all. That is good. But the quality of their work, which is what you 

are alluding to, when they go to work and what the General was 

alluding to—they are not proficient at what they do. Therefore, 

they are not confident. And as a sailor, you are out to sea. You are 

on your own. You have to have that confidence, know that you can 

be proficient. 

You alluded to pilots. You kind of have a have and a have-not. 

If you are deployed, you are flying 60 hours a week sometimes. If 

you are not deployed, you may be flying 10 hours a week, and some 

of that, by the way, may be in the simulator. So you are sitting 

around the classroom looking out the window at your strike fighter 

Hornet. It looks really great, but it is on the tarmac. That is not 

why you joined. The same goes at sea if you are a destroyer man 

and the same in the submarine. So you are not operating. 

That becomes behavioral problems eventually because the idle 

mind is the devil’s workshop. So we are out and about. Our alcohol 

problems go up. I alluded to it. I saw it in command. I saw it as 

a junior officer, and this is what happens. Then that gets to family 

problems. It just starts cascading. 

So you bring all that together. We have an All-Volunteer Force 

that wants to contribute and they want to do things. They want to 

be professionally supported in that regard. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. General Welsh? 

General WELSH. Chairman, during the first round of sequestration, our civilian airmen felt like we committed a breach of faith 

with them. They have still not recovered completely from that, and 

if it happened again, it would be absolutely horrible and I believe 

we would see the effect immediately in retention. 

I cannot emphasize enough my agreement with what John just 

said about people not joining this business to sit around. Pilots sitting in a squadron looking out at their airplanes parked on the 

ramp certainly feel like a hollow force, whether we define it that 

way or not. The same thing with the people who want to fix those 

airplanes, load weapons on them, support them from the storage 

areas. They join to be really good at what they do. In fact, all they 

want is to be the best in the world at whatever it is they do. All 

of our people are that way. If they do not think that we will educate them and train them and equip them to do that and to fill that 

36 

role, then they will walk. They are proud of who they are. They are 

proud of who they stand beside, and they are proud of what they 

represent. And when they lose that pride, we will lose them, and 

if we lose them, we lose everything. 

Chairman MCCAIN. And also, we are going to have, as you made 

reference to, a significant draw from the airlines as the Vietnam 

era pilots retire from the airlines. I think that is an additional 

issue that we are going to have to face up to anyway without sequestration. 

Admiral GREENERT. We see it today, sir. 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

You alluded to the hollow force in the 1970s, and like the other 

chiefs, I was on Active Duty during that time. I was a platoon commander. We had an organization of about 190,000 marines, but we 

did not have proper manning. We did not have proper training. We 

did not have proper equipment, and where we saw the impact was 

in poor reenlistments. We saw it in discipline rates. We saw it in 

poor maintenance of our equipment and the lack of professionalism. 

We were unable to maintain the quality of people that we wanted 

to have and, quite frankly, I know myself and many of my counterparts at the time had a very difficult decision to stay in the Marine 

Corps. Many of us only made the decision to stay once the Marine 

Corps started to turn around in the 1980s. As you alluded to, it actually took 5 to 7 years, even after we started to make an investment, for the morale to catch up. 

The thing that I would add to what the other chiefs have said, 

though, is that I think most of us would not have been able to predict the quality of the All-Volunteer Force and its ability to sustain 

now over 13 years at war. There is nothing that has allowed that 

force to sustain except for intangible factors. It has not been how 

much we have paid them. It has been their sense of job satisfaction, their sense of purpose, their sense of mission and, as I alluded 

to in my opening statement, their sense of trust. I think I probably 

speak for all the chiefs. None of us on our last tour on Active Duty 

want to be a part of returning back to those days of the 1970s 

when we did have, in fact, a hollow force. I think we are fortunate 

that we were not tested at that time. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, gentlemen, again for your testimony and for your great service 

to the Nation. 

You have already reduced end strength. You have already reduced training. You have already reduced maintenance. You have 

already stretched out acquisition programs, et cetera. Whatever we 

do, I think you will manage, which presents the interesting problem that we could be in a period of a steady accelerating but invisible decline until a crisis, and then the reckoning will be severe. 

So we have to, I think, take appropriate action now, and the chairman’s leadership is absolutely critical in that. 

But let me just go and ask you individually. With all these cuts 

you have already made, with all the losses, looking forward, what 

are the one or two capabilities that you will see leaving or lost if 

sequester goes into effect? I will ask each of you gentlemen. General Odierno? 

37 

General ODIERNO. I often get asked the question, Senator, what 

keeps me up at night. The number one thing that keeps me up at 

night is that if we are asked to respond to an unknown contingency, I will send soldiers to that contingency not properly trained 

and ready. We simply are not used to doing that. The American 

people and we expect our soldiers to be prepared and that they 

have had the ability to train, that they understand their equipment, they have been able to integrate and synchronize their activities so they are very successful on the ground. That is the one 

thing that I really worry about as we move to the future. 

The second thing is our ability to do simultaneous things. We are 

coming to the point now where we will be able to do one thing. We 

will able to do it pretty well, but that is it. But this world we have 

today is requiring us to do many, many things, maybe smaller, but 

many, many things simultaneous. I worry about our ability to do 

that. 

Senator REED. Admiral Greenert, please. 

Admiral GREENERT. We are at a time of modernization. So our 

benchmark is the year 2020 and our ability to do these missions 

that I referred to. For the Navy, a lot of those missions require 

joint access to areas around the world against an advanced adversary. So what I am talking about, as I look in the future, is perhaps the inability—we will fall further behind in what I call electromagnetic maneuver warfare. It is an emerging issue. It is electronic attack, the ability to jam, the ability to detect seekers, radars, satellites, and that business. We are slipping behind and our 

advantage is shrinking very fast, Senator. 

Also anti-air warfare. Our potential adversaries are advancing in 

that. We are losing that. If we do not have that advantage, we just 

do not get the job done in the 2020 timeframe. 

The undersea domain. We dominate in it today. But again, we 

have to hold that advantage, and that includes the Ohio replacement, the sea-based strategic deterrent, in addition to anti-submarine warfare. 

So it is about access and the ability to get that access where we 

need. 

Cyber is also another one that we talk about a lot. 

Lastly, I cannot underestimate the fact that we are good and we 

will continue. As General Dunford said, our forces we put forward 

we will put forward and they will be the most ready. But we are 

required to have a response force, a contingency force. We owe that 

to the combatant commanders. It has to be there on time and it 

has to be proficient. We are not there today, and we will just never 

get there if we go to sequestration. We will remain at about onethird of what we need to be. 

Thank you. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

General Welsh, if you could be succinct. 

General WELSH. Infrastructure that gives you long-term capability, training ranges, test facilities, those kind of things over time. 

We have not been investing. It will cost us the ability to operate 

in the future. Multiple simultaneous operations. We simply do not 

have the capacity anymore to conduct that, particularly in areas 

like ISR, air refueling, et cetera. The capability gap is closing, as 

38 

John mentioned, between the people trying to catch up with us 

technologically and they have momentum. If we let the gap get too 

close, we will not be able to recover before they pass us. 

Space and nuclear business. In the space business, we cannot forget that that is one of the fastest growing and closing technological 

gaps. In the cyber arena, if we do not try and get ahead in that 

particular race, we will be behind for the next 50 years, as everybody else has been behind us in other areas. 

Those are my biggest concerns. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Commandant? 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

The two capability areas. First would be our ability to come ship 

to shore. We are in a vehicle right now that is over 40 years old, 

and replacing that is both an issue of operational capability as well 

as safety. 

Also our airframes. The AV–8 and the F–18 are both over 20 

years old. Once again, an issue of both operational capability and 

safety. 

But I would say, Senator—and you alluded to it—that my greatest concern, in addition to those two capability areas, is actually 

the cumulative effect of the cuts that we have made to date and 

the cuts that we would make in the future. Quite frankly, every 

day I am still finding out second- and third-order effects of the cuts 

that have been made to date in the sequestration that was put in 

effect in 2013. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Further complicating your lives and our lives is that this is a 

focus today on DOD, but the ramifications go across this Government and the impacts will roll back on you. One of the more obvious examples is if the State Department is subject to sequestration, 

they will not be able to assist you in the field. General Mattis, who 

was brilliant yesterday in his testimony, said last March that if you 

do not fund fully the State Department, then I need to buy more 

ammunition. So that is one effect. 

But there are even more subtle effects. We provide Impact Aid 

to the Department of Education. They administer it. If the Department of Education is subject to sequestration, then there will be an 

impact. In fact, Secretary of Education Duncan before the Appropriations Committee last year said the Killeen Independent School 

District in Texas, which has 22,000 federally connected children, 

including 18,000 military dependents in Fort Hood, would lose an 

estimated $2.6 million. 

So we have to take not only a view towards DOD but across the 

whole Government because you all talked about retaining troops. 

When those young soldiers down at Fort Hood do not think their 

education opportunities for their children are as good as they were, 

they are going to vote with their feet. 

So that is not your responsibility. That is our responsibility. This 

has to be a comprehensive solution to this issue because it will affect you in so many different ways. You, as General Dunford, will 

be waking up getting complaints about how the schools are bad 

and I am leaving. That is not title 10. 

So, gentlemen, thank you for your service and your testimony. 

39 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Wicker? 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, gentlemen. This is very profound 

testimony today and very helpful to us. 

There are members of this committee who are also going back 

and forth today to the Budget Committee hearing. We have a debt 

problem in this country. General Mattis spoke about it yesterday 

with another distinguished panel. No nation in history has maintained its military power if it failed to keep its fiscal house in 

order. So we are balancing a spending problem we have in the Government overall with really, frankly, the lack of funds in DOD that 

you have talked about today. 

General Odierno, you said in your 40 years or so of service, this 

is the most uncertain time you have seen as a professional military 

person. 

Admiral Greenert, this is the fewest number of ships we have 

had since World War I. Is that correct? 

Admiral GREENERT. That is correct, sir. 

Senator WICKER. General Welsh, as an Air Force veteran myself, 

it is astonishing to hear that this is the smallest Air Force ever in 

the history of the United States. 

General WELSH. Since we were formed in 1947, yes, sir. 

Senator WICKER. Right. 

General Dunford, in talking about sequestration, you say it is the 

funding levels and also it is the rules of sequestration. So I thought 

I would start with you and then we would go back up the panel 

here. 

If we were able a little more easily and quickly to give you flexibility within the funding levels and some relief from the rules, to 

what extent would that help you in the short run or in the long 

run? 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Senator, for that question. 

Just the funding caps alone would reduce our overall budget by about $4 billion to $5 billion a year from where we were in President’s budget 2012. So that is for us about 18 to 20 percent. It 

would certainly be better if we did not have the rules associated 

with sequestration. What I can guarantee you, Senator, is whatever amount of money Congress provides to the U.S. Marine Corps, 

we will build the very best Marine Corps we can. But even at the 

BCA levels without sequestration, we will reduce the capacity to 

the point where we will be challenged to meet the current strategy. 

Senator WICKER. General Welsh, to what extent would flexibility 

within these very low levels be somewhat of a help? 

General WELSH. Senator, I think all of us understand that our 

Services and DOD has to be part of the debt solution for the Nation. We do not live in a mushroom farm and not believe that that 

has to be true. 

The things that we would need, though, with any kind of reduced 

levels of funding as we have been looking at is stability and predictability in funding over time and then the ability to make the 

decisions that will let us shape our Services to operate at those 

funding levels that are less than predicted. 

For the Air Force, if you look back to the 2012 budget, which is 

where we kind of came out of and said, okay, we can execute this 

new Strategic Guidance, the 2012 budget projected then for fiscal 

40 

year 2016 was $21 billion more per year than we will have at BCA 

levels. $21 billion a year requires some very tough decisions to be 

made, some very hard and unpopular decisions to be made, but 

without the ability to make those decisions, we will continue to be 

stuck not sure of where we are going in the future. 

Senator WICKER. The clock is ticking away on that predictability. 

Is it not, General? 

General WELSH. Yes, sir, it is. 

Senator WICKER. Admiral? 

Admiral GREENERT. My colleagues have spoken to the number, 

that is, the dollar value. But I would say if the verb ’sequestered’— 

that is an algorithm. All accounts—and we have been through 

this—they get decremented, and then we spend months reprogramming with your help up here on the Hill. We lose months. We lose 

4, 5, 6 months on a program like for us the Ohio replacement program where we do not have time. So shipbuilding gets held up. 

Projects get held up. People are not hired. That loses that trust 

with industry. So precluding getting sequestered is helpful and continuing resolutions have a similar effect in that we are not doing 

any new projects and some of these are pretty critical as we go into 

the years and need to modernize. 

General ODIERNO. Senator, the first comment I would make is 

over the last 2 years, we have been given money above the level 

of sequestration. In the Army, we are still only 33 percent ready. 

So, yes, flexibility will give us the ability to manage insufficient 

funds in our department, but that is all it does. It allows us to better manage because today we have had to extend all our aviation 

programs. So the cost for every Apache has gone up. The cost for 

every UH–60 has gone up. The cost for every CH–47 has gone up 

because we have had to extend the programs longer and longer and 

longer. So we are paying more money per system. So we are inefficient with the less dollars we have. So that even exacerbates the 

readiness problems even more. So flexibility would help, but it is 

not going to solve the problem we have, which is a problem of insufficient funds to sustain the right level of readiness. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Let me just ask briefly. There was a decision we were going to 

pivot to Asia-Pacific. To what extent were the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

consulted on that? We have eastern Europe. We have Russia. We 

still have the Middle East and everything going on there. It does 

not seem to have calmed down as some people thought. To what 

extent was this a Pentagon decision that we could even have a repivot to Asia-Pacific and afford it? 

Admiral GREENERT. That was part of our discussions. We had 

numerous discussions with the White House and within the Pentagon when we did the Defense Strategic Guidance in 2012. So that 

was one of kind of the foundations of that strategy. So I would say, 

Senator, I felt we had a good discussion on what we call the rebalance to Asia-Pacific. 

General ODIERNO. I would just comment I agree with that. We 

had thorough discussions and we thought the rise of China—this 

was 2012—was very important, and we had to be able to have the 

capability to respond potentially to that and also the problems with 

North Korea and other problems in the Asia-Pacific. We made some 

41 

assumptions about where we would be in the rest of the world. 

Those have not quite played out the way we thought with Iraq, 

ISIS, and specifically Russia and their increased aggression. 

The strategy is still good. We just have to recognize that there 

are some additional threats out there that we did not expect and 

that we are going to have to deal with those. That increases the 

risk as we look at sequestration and other budget cuts. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your service. 

General Welsh, I wanted to ask you in regards to our nuclear 

mission. It is a very, very critical mission obviously. What impact 

is sequestration going to have on your efforts in this area? 

General WELSH. Sir, two specific areas I think are at the top of 

the list. The first is that nuclear infrastructure I mentioned before. 

We are at a point in time where we have to start modernizing and 

recapitalizing some of that infrastructure in terms of facilities that 

were built 50 years ago now. We have an investment plan designed. It is prepared to be put into place. We actually have it in 

the President’s budget this year. If we go to sequestration, all of 

the facility maintenance and new buildings that we have put into 

that proposal will fall off the table except for a single weapons storage area at one of the bases. So that is the first point. 

The second one is that we do have a requirement as a Nation to 

make decisions on what do we want to recapitalize and modernize 

in terms of nuclear weapons and nuclear command and control capability over the next 15 to 20 years. It affects the Air Force and 

the Navy. The decisions on that need to be made in the near future. Sequestration and BCA caps will limit the amount of things 

you can do in that arena, and they will make those decisions more 

important to make earlier so we do not waste money leading into 

the time when those things have to be done. 

Senator DONNELLY. Admiral, how will this affect the plans you 

have for the Ohio class? 

Admiral GREENERT. I get back to the verb. If we are sequestered, 

we lose months, as I was saying before, hiring engineers. We are 

on a very tight timetable to start building the first Ohio-class in 

2021. So that is kind of one piece. We have to continue to do that. 

The sea-based strategic deterrent, including the Ohio-class replacement, is my number one program. But in fiscal years 2017 through 2020, we have $5 billion invested as advanced procurement for the first Ohio-class which in 

2021 is $9 billion built, on top of the shipbuilding plan that we 

have now. Very difficult to do. We have to do it, though, Senator, 

so we will have to continue to work in that regard. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. 

I obviously have the same concern you all do on our warfighting 

capabilities. When you look at the difficulties in Syria and Iraq and 

that area, what are the kind of things we are not able to do there 

that you look and you go if we were doing this and this, it would 

really help move the ball forward? Where are you being placed in 

a tighter spot right now? General Odierno, if you would give us a 

start. 

42 

General ODIERNO. Well, I would just say it is—the first thing is 

this fight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria is a long-term issue. So 

this is not something that is going to be resolved in weeks and 

months. It is something that is going to have to be resolved in 

years. It is going to require a combination of efforts with the local 

indigenous governments. It is going to require efforts from training 

indigenous forces, and it is going to require support from us for a 

very long period of time. It is going to require continued assessments and adjustments on how we believe we will continue to support that effort. I think over time, if that threat continues, we will 

have to reassess what our strategy is. 

So that is the hard part about it. This is not a short-term problem. It is a long-term problem, and it is going to take a long-term, 

dedicated effort to solve it across many different lines of effort, 

whether it be through diplomatic efforts, whether it be through a 

combination of joint capability and enabling indigenous forces, our 

ability to train indigenous forces, and the capability that we will 

need to do that for long periods of time. 

Senator DONNELLY. So, in effect, you are facing a long-term challenge, and as you look long-term, you may have less tools in the 

toolbox to deal with it. 

General ODIERNO. That is correct. 

Senator DONNELLY. General Dunford? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks for that question. 

Right now, as I mentioned earlier, we are taking all the risk not 

with our deployed units but our units in home station. So everything that General Austin has asked us to do from a Marine Corps 

perspective we are able to do right now. 

But as General Odierno said, should this continue on, really for 

us it is a question of capacity to do everything that we are doing 

at a sustainable deployment-to-dwell rate. Just to give you some 

idea of how fast our marines are turning right now, they are all 

deploying for about 7 months. They are home for 14 months or in 

some cases less and then back out for 7 months in perpetuity. So 

that sustained level of operational tempo is something that concerns me, and ISIL is really just a part of that. 

Senator DONNELLY. That also makes it pretty difficult on the 

homefront. Does it not? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there are really two issues. One is 

the time available to train for all of your missions, and the second 

is obviously the time available to spend time with your family. We 

are particularly concerned with our mid-grade enlisted marines 

when it comes to that particular challenge. 

Senator DONNELLY. General Odierno, as you look forward, how 

are you planning to mix with the National Guard and how does 

that figure into your plans as we look forward? 

General ODIERNO. So clearly if you look at what we have done— 

so in the end, if we go to full sequestration, we are taking 150,000 

people out of the Active Army. So the large majority of our cuts are 

coming out of the Active Army. So because of that, we are going 

to have to rely more on the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves. 

We have to remember what we are trying to achieve is our National Guard and Reserve provides us a depth to respond to comVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
43 

plex problems. So the issue becomes we are going to have to rely 

in some areas more on them in the beginning such as in logistics 

and areas like that where we do not have enough structure in the 

Active component now because of these reductions. We are going to 

have to rely more heavily on the National Guard and U.S. Army 

Reserve for things such as that. 

In terms of the combat capability, they are still going to have to 

provide us the depth. We might have to use that depth earlier because we are going to have less capability in the Active component. 

So this all gets to this balance that we are trying to achieve. 

I worry about the fact that if we reduce the Active component too 

much, our ability to respond quickly is going to be affected because 

the world today spins much quicker than it used to. Instability 

happens quicker and the necessity for us to respond has to be 

quicker. I worry that we are going to lose that capability because 

that is what we expect our Active component to do, and then we 

expect our National Guard and Reserves to be right behind us 

helping us as we move forward with this. I worry about that as we 

go forward. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you all for your leadership. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it. 

I want to thank all of you for your leadership and what you are 

doing for the country and most importantly this discussion about 

sequestration. I think it is very clear the impact that it is going to 

have, and our ability to defend the Nation is one that calls all of 

us to act to address this for each of you. So I thank you for being 

so clear about what the impacts will be today. 

Yesterday, we heard the same thing from General Mattis and 

General Keane and Admiral Fallon about the impacts of sequester, 

and I think there is a clear consensus among those who have 

served and have formerly served in the military, the devastating 

impact on our ability to defend the Nation and our men and women 

in uniform. 

I want to ask each of you. When our men and women volunteer 

for service in the armed services, they give up a number of rights 

that the rest of us enjoy. They volunteer to tell our Government— 

we tell them what to wear, what to do, where to live, and to some 

extent they give up to some degree what they can say. Most importantly, they obviously are willing to sacrifice their lives to defend 

our Nation. 

In return for these restrictions and expectations, Congress has 

guaranteed these brave men and women the ability to communicate with us. I believe that this is very important. In fact, Congress put in place a law, title 10, U.S. Code 1034, that prohibits 

anyone from restricting a member of the Armed Forces in communicating with a Member of Congress. Do all of you agree that this 

law is important? Yes or no. 

General ODIERNO. Yes. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, ma’am. 

General WELSH. Absolutely. 

General DUNFORD. Yes, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

44 

General Welsh, I want to ask you about comments that have 

come to my attention that were reported to have been made by 

Major General James Post, the Vice Commander of Air Combat 

Command. He is reported to make these comments when addressing a group of airmen this month, and what he is said to have 

made in comments to the airmen was anyone who is passing information to Congress about A–10 capabilities is committing treason. 

As part of those comments, he also said: if anyone accuses me of 

saying this, I will deny it. 

Let me just ask you this, General Welsh. Do you find those comments to be acceptable in any way, to accuse our men and women 

in uniform to say you are committing treason if you communicate 

with Congress about the capabilities of the A–10 or the capabilities 

of any other of our weapon systems? Yes or no. 

General WELSH. No, ma’am, not at all. There is an investigation 

currently ongoing into that incident. When I read the newspaper 

article, I actually contacted the general officer involved and his 

commander. The DOD IG is overseeing an investigation being run 

by SAF–IG and will present the facts to the committee as soon as 

that investigation is completed. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I hope that this is a very thorough investigation because, obviously, I think this is very serious to accuse 

people of treason for communicating with Congress. 

One thing I would like your commitment on that I think is very 

important. Do you unconditionally denounce, if it is found to be 

true? By the way, Air Combat Command in responding to press inquiries about this, has not denied that the general made those comments. But do you denounce those comments, and do you support 

the legal rights of members of the Air Force to communicate lawfully with Congress about the A–10 or any other issue? Do you 

commit that the Air Force will take no punitive action against airmen who are exercising their lawful right to communicate with 

Congress? 

General WELSH. Senator, I completely commit to the lawfulness 

of communication with Congress. I support any airman’s right to 

discuss anything that you would like to discuss with them and to 

give you their honest opinion. 

In this particular case, with the investigation ongoing, my job is 

to wait until the facts are known, make recommendations to my 

secretary, and then we will report the decisions that she makes as 

a result of that when it is done. 

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate that, General Welsh, because it 

worries me about the climate and the tone that is set if airmen/ 

airwomen are told that they would be committing treason for communicating with us. I just want to be clear because what I am 

hearing is that there is actually an investigation going on in reverse to find out who has communicated with Congress. To me that 

seems the opposite of what we would be trying to accomplish in 

looking at what General Post said and whether it was lawful or 

not. So I hope that there will be no punishment or any kind of pursuit of people trying to communicate with Congress. Will you commit to me with that? 

45 

General WELSH. Senator, I know of nothing along those lines at 

all. I would be astonished by that. Certainly I am not part of it. 

The Secretary is not part of it, and I would not condone it. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen, happy birthday. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will not talk 

about which birthday it is. [Laughter.] 

But it is certainly better than the alternative. So I appreciate 

that. 

Thank you very much for being here, gentlemen, and for your 

service to the country. 

Apropos Senator Ayotte’s questions, one of the things I would 

hope is that our men and women in the military would let Members of Congress know about their concerns with respect to sequestration because I do think it is helpful for each of us to hear from 

people serving what they see firsthand about the impacts of some 

of these policy decisions. So I am hopeful that we will hear more 

of those discussions. 

Now, I have been pleased that Chairman McCain has started the 

Senate Armed Services Committee hearings this year with a broader view of national security policy. One of the issues that has been 

brought up with respect to national security policy is that one of 

the concerns is the fact that we have not had an ongoing budget 

process that people can count on, that we have a debt that in the 

future is a concern, and that it would be important for us to address that. I certainly put sequestration in that category that it is 

important for us to address this and to do it in a way that provides 

certainty that deals with the shortfalls that our military is facing 

and that it is important for us to do that with respect to all of the 

agencies of the Federal Government that deal with national security. I wonder, gentlemen, if you would agree that that is an important goal that we should be working towards in Congress. General 

Odierno? 

General ODIERNO. Well, I think, again the strength of our country is based on many different factors. It is important that we understand that as we go forward. We certainly understand that. 

What I would just say to that is that the important part of our 

defense spending, the important role that plays in ensuring our security should also be considered as we do that. I know you know 

that, Senator. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Does everyone agree with that? 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, ma’am. 

General WELSH. Yes, ma’am. 

General DUNFORD. Yes, Senator. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So to be a little parochial this morning, as I 

think most of you are aware, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is a 

shipyard that is shared between New Hampshire and Maine and 

is, I think, one of our very important public shipyards. Admiral 

Greenert, I know you know this. I wonder if you could talk about 

the importance and the impact of sequestration on our shipyards, 

on our depots and the concern that that provides. We have talked 

a lot about the impact on our Active Duty military, but our civilian 

workforce is also affected. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Senator. 

46 

I would say the impact was very much underestimated and that 

is part of your point. 

So a few facts. We lost 75,000 man-days of planned shipyard 

work that we had to defer because we had no overtime. We could 

not hire, and then, of course, on top of that we furloughed them. 

So how do they feel about the importance of it? 

But what did we lose in that? We lost—you understand this— 

1,700 submarine days. So that is like taking five submarines and 

tying them up for a year. So, I mean, that is the kind of impact. 

So I worry about—and as I said, it takes 5 years to recover from 

that collectively. 

We talked about the importance of the nuclear deterrence. Well, 

these public shipyards underwrite all that. That is our SSBNs. Because of Portsmouth, I can do work in the other shipyards on the 

other SSBNs. Portsmouth is a major, major part of a ship maintenance enterprise that we must have, and I worry about it in sequestration. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Does anybody want to add to the impact on depots in the country? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can add from an aviation perspective. When we did furlough folks, we lost a lot of engineers and artisans. Right now, 50 percent of our F–18s are out of reporting, and 

we are having a very difficult time recovering from the loss of 

maintenance throughput capacity as a result of those furloughs. 

Also importantly, because it was mentioned in most of our opening statements, when we talk about trust and we talk about retaining high quality people, predictability is very important to people. 

I fear that some of those folks that were furloughed will not come 

back because they do have other opportunities. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I certainly share that. Admiral Greenert, I 

know you appreciate this with respect to the shipyard. One of the 

things that I have heard from some of our shipyard employees is 

that as we are looking at an aging workforce and the need to hire 

new people and the shortage of STEM-educated people, that engineers, mathematicians, scientists—they are all in very short supply. If they do not feel like there is certainty about Government 

work, then they are going to look in the private sector, and that 

creates a real issue for all of us. 

Admiral GREENERT. Senator, if I could add. We have already reduced about 4,500 out of our depots, contractors, civilian employees. What we found following the furlough, as you just pointed out, 

is our doctors, our engineers, our behavioral health specialists, all 

of these people, because now they are worried about the uncertainty and there are jobs available for them other places—they are 

taking those jobs at a higher rate than they have in the past. That 

is the impact that this has. This capability that we have developed 

and experience that we are developing we are losing, and it is a 

big concern for us specifically in the STEM area that you are talking about. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Yes. Thank you all very much. My time has 

expired. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Colonel Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

47 

Gentlemen, thank you all for being here today. I do appreciate 

your continued service to the United States. 

General Odierno, thank you for mentioning in your brief the Reserve and National Guard forces and also to Senator Donnelly for 

bringing that point up as well. We do feel the impact. We are hurting. We are hurting too through sequestration. 

With respect to the DOD and sequestration, General, you mentioned just this morning that we must appropriately care for our 

soldiers. Our soldiers and their families are bearing the burden of 

our decisions. We must train, maintain, and sustain a force and 

our equipment. But with sequestration in place, we also recognize 

that we have to utilize taxpayer dollars to the best of our ability. 

So could you please give examples to the panel on where we are 

holding our military leaders accountable and how they are best utilizing taxpayer dollars in such a time as this? 

General ODIERNO. So there are a couple of things that we continue to do that I think are important. We are reducing all our 

headquarters. The reason we are doing that, so we can get more 

capability to the soldiers that are serving. So we made a decision 

in the Army to reduce all our headquarters down to the two-star 

level by 25 percent to free up dollars in order to train our soldiers 

which helps. We have reorganized our brigade combat teams and 

eliminated headquarters. So we are able to fund and train the best 

we can. 

We are trying to reorganize in our aviation capability. So we are 

getting rid of aircraft that are no longer capable of doing the things 

we need them to do. 

We are transforming our training strategies. We have just now 

developed a total force strategy in Forces Command where we are 

training every—all training we do is a combination of active, 

Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve so we can maintain that capacity. 

So we are trying to make it as efficient as possible. 

We are also looking at how we are making the most out of our 

training dollars in live training, virtual training, and constructive 

training. 

So all of those things are the kind of things we are doing. 

We are also streamlining some of our sustainment activity because we became too over-reliant on contractors, especially during 

peak years in Iraq and Afghanistan. We want to retrain our green 

suit capability because we have to sustain that at very high levels. 

That also will reduce our dollars we are spending on contracts that 

allow us to do this. 

So these are just a sample of the kind of things we are trying 

to do to put money back in that allow us to take care of our soldiers. The best way to take care of our soldiers in my opinion is 

to make sure they are prepared and trained to do their jobs. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. Thank you, General. 

As a follow-on to that—and maybe all of you can just very briefly 

respond—just last week we had the State of the Union. I had invited a friend of mine from Iowa State—we were cadets together— 

to attend. He lives here in Washington, DC, at least temporarily. 

He responded, Joni, I would love to but I cannot. I am being fitted 

for my new leg. Well, he is stationed at Fort Bragg but he lives 

here right now at Walter Reed. A great friend of mine. I was able 

48 

to visit with him on Monday. So his last tour to Afghanistan was 

a little more difficult than most, and because of that, he has lost 

his left leg. 

We have a lot of soldiers, a lot of members that are going 

through difficulties and challenges. I would like to know, just briefly from each of you, the impact of sequestration in regard to our 

medical care and follow-on for soldiers and their families. Just very 

briefly, gentlemen. 

General ODIERNO. One of the issues that we are working through 

that we have to watch very carefully is we have to consolidate our 

medical capability and facilities. As we do that, we have to make 

sure that every soldier and their family member gets provided the 

same level of support no matter where they are stationed, and that 

becomes a challenge as you start to reduce. So we have to be careful to ensure that. We will still have the best, highest level care. 

The issue becomes the sustained care over time across the country and overseas where our people are serving and making sure 

that they get the right coverage for themselves and their families. 

There are some difficult decisions that are going to have to be 

made. I do worry that they should be able to rely on the best medical care for them and their families as we move forward. So this 

is something that we are going to have to watch very carefully as 

we move forward. 

Senator ERNST. Admiral? 

Admiral GREENERT. I think the General got the key points there. 

For us, it is about the resiliency programs and the Wounded 

Warrior care and recovery programs. We have to fund them and we 

have to make sure they do not get caught up in some overall reduction. So we have to be very vigilant in that. For us, it is a program 

called Safe Harbor. I watch it myself to make sure that we do not 

inadvertently—heaven help us we do it consciously, but inadvertently have these kinds of things caught up and—again the verb— 

they get sequestered. So we got to watch that. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. 

General WELSH. Senator, I think the thing for us is what John 

highlighted there and that is identifying where they could get 

caught up in this and then come to you and ask for help because 

I know you will provide it. This committee will provide it. This is 

one of those sacred trust things that we owe our people. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. 

General? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, maybe I would just address also the 

non-medical care aspect of it. We established a Wounded Warrior 

regiment to take care of our wounded warriors about 10 years ago, 

and we are very proud of the way that we take care of marines. 

As General Welsh said, it is about keeping faith. We have funded 

that to date through OCO funding, and so one of the challenges 

now, as we move forward and OCO goes away, we have to move 

that into the base and we have to move it into the base at the very 

same time we are dealing with sequestration. So that will certainly 

remain a priority for us. It will be one of the other things that competes with the resources that we are going to have fewer of. 

Senator ERNST. Right. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

49 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To the witnesses, thank you all. I did my back-of-the-envelope 

math, and I think this is 156 years of service to the United States 

that is sitting before us at the table in military capacity. We owe 

you thanks, but we ought to also listen to you. 

For the record, I would just note I voted with enthusiasm for the 

nominations that were before us earlier. But there were 42 nominations to lieutenant colonel and colonel, and there was not one 

woman among the nominees. Those nominated had superb qualifications, but that is a fact of interest and I just wanted to bring 

it up that people on the committee pay attention to that. 

The sequester was voted in by Congress in August of 2011, and 

I think as some of your testimony indicates and as we all know, 

when it was voted in, everyone wanted it not to happen. The idea 

was that Congress would find a better path forward. All agreed 

that a sequester path would have exactly the kinds of consequences 

that you have testified to this morning. 

Since August of 2011, as you have also testified, the world has 

not gotten simpler. We have seen the rise of ISIL, an Ebola threat, 

increasing Russian bellicosity toward neighboring nations, North 

Korea’s cyber attacks, a devastating Syrian civil war, a decline in 

the situation in Libya and other nations in Africa, flexing of the 

muscles by the Chinese, flexing of the muscles by the Iranians. The 

challenges have gotten only more intense since August 2011. 

But while the challenges are getting more intense, we are needlessly inflicting pain through budgetary mechanisms on our military. 

General Mattis testified yesterday—and the chairman indicated 

this in his opening statements. It is a pretty powerful statement 

when you think about it. No foe in the field can wreck such havoc 

on our security that mindless sequestration is achieving. There are 

some powerful foes in the field. General Mattis’ testimony yesterday was that none of them will have as much effect on American 

national security as sequester. That is why it is imperative that we 

reverse it. We have to take steps to reverse it. 

If you look at budgets, budgets tell you about priorities. We can 

say all we want about how we value military service and the defense mission, but at the end of the day, our budgets tell us something about what we really value. In 2015, 1.3 percent of Americans’ GDP was spent on interest payment. That number is rising, 

3.2 percent of the GDP was on defense. That number is dramatically falling. 3.3 percent on non-defense discretionary. That number 

is falling even more dramatically. 5.6 percent of our GDP was 

spent on Federal health care. That is growing dramatically. 4.9 

percent on Social Security. That is growing dramatically. But by 

far the largest item on the expenditure side is tax expenditures, 

$1.5 trillion year of deductions, exemptions, loopholes, credits, et 

cetera, 8.1 percent of the GDP and rising. What our budget is telling us is that we support tax expenditures much more than any of 

these other areas and we need to find appropriate ways to rebalance the budget in the sequester and invest what we need to to 

combat the challenges that we have discussed. 

50 

General Dunford, I wanted to dig in with you a little bit on some 

of the testimony you gave about the relationship in the Marine 

Corps between readiness and forward deployment. We have demanded of you that you be more forward deployed. In the aftermath, for example, of the horrible tragedy in Benghazi, we have 

asked you to restructure to have expeditionary units and rapid response teams closer to the action. We have asked the same of other 

Service branches. 

But forward deployment has a cost. Talk a little bit about what 

sequester does in terms of whether you have folks forward deployed 

or whether you have to have them back home. If that is the case, 

what is the effect of that on our ability to respond to crises? 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator, for that question. 

Our ability to be forward deployed is based on our capacity. As 

I mentioned earlier, today our units are deploying for about 7 

months; they are home for 14 months and back for 7 months. If we 

get sequestered, we will reduce capacity, and we will reduce capacity to the point where we will be closer to a 1-to-1 deployment to 

dwell rate, meaning that our marines will be deployed for 7 

months—our marines and sailors—back out for 7 months and deployed for 7 months. So that is a pretty significant cost. Again, we 

talked earlier about both the impact on training. Very difficult to 

maintain core competencies with that quick a turnaround. We have 

experience doing that. We were about that level about 4 or 5 years 

ago at the peak of the requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq. So 

that is the biggest impact on sequestration is that reduced capacity. Now, that is the most significant one. 

The other impact, though, is because of its mindlessness—and it 

cuts across all of the lines—it will also have an impact on home 

station training, facilities that are available, amount of ammunition, amount of fuel, amount of batteries, the things that you need 

to do to properly train when you are back at home station. 

All of that degrades two things, Senator. One is the number of 

marines that are forward deployed. As we discussed before, in the 

wake of Benghazi, I think there is an expectation that marines and 

sailors will be there and respond within hours to a threat against 

our diplomatic core, U.S. citizens, or interests abroad. The fewer 

marines and sailors there are forward deployed, the longer the 

timeline it is for us to be able to respond. 

With sequestration, I also have concerns over time about the capabilities that those marines have both from the equipping and 

training perspective and the human factors, again because of that 

quick turnaround from a deployment-to-dwell perspective. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

Colonel Sullivan? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your wonderful service to our country. 

I just wanted to echo what Senator Wicker mentioned in terms 

of General Mattis’ comments yesterday about the strategic aspects 

from a national security perspective of the national debt that we 

have racked up over the last several years, $18 trillion and increasing. So I think we all see that we are struggling with the issues 

of sequestration, with the issues of readiness, but with the broader 

51 

issues of how our fiscal situation in this country actually impacts 

national security. So I appreciate the testimony here. 

I also appreciate the focus on what is happening, what potentially could be happening with regard to training, readiness, morale, particularly given the global security threats that I know that 

we all recognize are out there. 

Similar to Senator Shaheen, I also would like to focus a little bit 

more, though, on local impacts. I think it is important that the people that we represent also hear what the potential for local impacts 

could be with regard to sequestration. 

I am sure all of you gentlemen would agree that Alaska is one 

of the most strategic, most important military places that we have 

in this country, whether it is missile defense, world-class unrivaled 

training areas and ranges, a platform for rapid deployment into the 

Asia-Pacific and to Eurasia. You will be hearing me talk about that 

a little bit in some of our hearings. I am sure my colleagues will 

as well. 

But the large number of Army and Air Force bases and personnel in Alaska I think is a testament to the important 

geostrategic location and training. General Welsh, you mentioned 

the importance of training. Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex 

(JPARC) in Alaska is probably the premier airspace for Air Force 

training in the world, larger than several American States. 

General Odierno, I know that you are heading up to Alaska soon. 

Sir, we are looking forward to that. I wanted to let you know there 

was an article today in the Alaska Dispatch. It mentioned how the 

Army is looking to eliminate 120,000 positions, looking at potentially 30 installations that could be impacted, including a couple 

combat brigades possibly from Fort Rich or Fort Wainwright in 

Alaska. Obviously, this is having big concerns in my State. 

Is sequestration driving this focus in the Army to look at 30 different installations, including brigades, in Alaska? Is that something that is being driven directly by sequestration? 

General ODIERNO. It is being driven directly by sequestration 

and the fact that we will have to reduce significantly the amount 

of forces that we have in our Active component and National Guard 

and Reserve component. So throughout all of the United States and 

overseas, we will have to take reductions. Every installation could 

be affected as we make these decisions. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So that exercise right now, as described in the 

Alaska Dispatch, is a direct result of you preparing for a sequestration? 

General ODIERNO. Direct result, yes, sir. 

Senator SULLIVAN. General Welsh, I know that the F–35 is a top 

program with regard to the Air Force. Alaska is a front-runner for 

a future F–35 basing, something that we are quite excited about. 

I think it would be great not only for Alaska but for the country, 

given our location. I look forward to having future discussions with 

you on how to cement that decision. But I actually wanted to ask 

you about the impact of sequestration on that program, if there is 

any, if the future basing could be delayed or undermined with regard to the F–35s. Is that something that could also be impacted 

by sequestration? 

52 

General WELSH. Senator, if sequestration occurred again in 2016, 

it might be necessary to defer some of the aircraft buy in fiscal 

year 2016 out of 2016, and the details of that will be in our budget 

rollout. We will be able to discuss those in detail with you and your 

staff beginning next week. But that is a possibility. We have defended this program from the beginning as a priority program for 

us, and so we hope that does not become reality. That would not, 

by the way, put the initial operational capability date at risk in my 

view. 

Clearly, your emphasis on the strategic benefits of the State of 

Alaska and the training capability at JPARC are pretty well supported by the decisions we are trying to make with F–22 bed-down 

already made, tanker bed-down already made, and now consideration of Eielson as the leading candidate for our Pacific bed-down. 

So I would agree with everything you said about the location and 

the strategic value. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Thank you. Again, I look forward to 

having that discussion in more depth with you and other members 

of your staff. 

General Dunford, you mentioned—actually several of you mentioned—your experience with, when you initially joined the Service, 

kind of the hollow Army or the hollow Marine Corps. Could you 

provide a little bit more details, any of you or all of you, quickly 

on specifics of kind of then and now, when you joined the Service, 

saw the initial kind of hollow military versus the high level of 

training that we have had with regard to our troops and readiness? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would start by talking about the 

quality of people in the aggregate. There is absolutely no comparison between the quality of the men and women that we have in 

uniform today and the quality that we had in the wake of Vietnam 

during the late 1970s. We certainly had some very, very good people, but the comparison I would make today in the quality of people 

would be very significant. 

But really what was going on in the 1970s is we did not have 

sufficient money to train, and so the training was not effective. Our 

capabilities were not growing. We did not have a significant 

amount of money to take care of our infrastructure and our barracks. Frankly, I can remember days of asbestos carpeting, lead 

pipes, raw sewage in the barracks, and conditions of habitability 

that frankly we were embarrassed about in the 1970s. 

But I think the one thing that is different today and the 1970s 

is the spirit, the will, and the discipline of the force in addition to 

being very well equipped. Of course, much of the equipment we had 

was old. But the most important thing of the intangible quality of 

the force today—and again, we have all spoken about trust. We 

have all spoken about the ability to predict the support that you 

are going to have when you go into harm’s way. All of those things 

have given us that spirit, will, and discipline. That is the thing I 

would be most concerned about losing is the quality of the force 

and those characteristics that we see in our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines today. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin? 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

53 

Thank you all for your outstanding service to our country, and 

we appreciate it very much. 

I do not know a person in West Virginia that would not sacrifice 

for our military. Not one that would not do without, that would not 

give up something that they are getting now or a benefit for our 

military. I do not know of one. But they do ask the question, can 

we do it better? Can we make it more efficient? 

I just remember the omnibus bill we just passed. There was $5 

billion of new equipment in there for DOD that I understand nobody asked for. So I am sure if it was built in my State or some 

other State, we are wanting you all to buy and pushing it on. There 

has to be a more effective, efficient way of procurement. We have 

to have enough resilience. 

I know the chairman has fought on this forever. I have heard 

him when I was Governor of the State and when I was in the legislature. There has to be a better way. When Eisenhower said beware of the industrial military complex, man, he knew what he was 

talking about. Even back to George Washington knew that there 

could be a problem. 

We have to break that so that we can go back to the people who 

are willing to sacrifice, whether it is in my State of West Virginia, 

Arizona, or wherever it may be. They said, fine, what is everybody 

else doing? I will sacrifice but are we doing it better? We do not 

have an audit. So without an audit, I have never been able to run 

a business without an audit knowing where my problems were. We 

have a hard time getting an audit out of DOD so that we know 

where the waste or efficiencies or things of that sort. 

We force stuff upon you all that you all do not want. I know you 

cannot speak and it makes it politically very challenging. But we 

have to be there for you. If we are going to have the best readiness 

and prepared and support the greatest DOD the world has ever 

seen, we have to make sure we are doing it in the most efficient 

fashion. 

So I look at that, and I have a whole different approach to this 

2 years of Military Service. I was a product of the Reserve Officers’ 

Training Corp (ROTC), a mandatory ROTC, in West Virginia University, and I enjoyed it. I would never have had that chance if I 

did not, with the draft process and all, everything that went with 

that. I still believe in 2 years of public service for every young person. Really, we could tie it to this 2 years of college of the President 

and say you earn 2 years of college if you give 2 years of public 

service. It does not have to be the military. You all could pick and 

choose the best if they wanted to go there. We still have that option. I think it has more value and buy-in to our country if they 

do that. 

I just want to know—and I have the most frustration with the 

procurement of this process of ours—why it takes so long to get an 

idea for new technology to market. Why is it so long for us to get 

that and the cost that goes in that. F–35. I know our chairman has 

been on this for as many years as I can remember. There is no quid 

pro quo. There is no incentive or reward or penalty, it seems like. 

We do not run the private sector the way we are running the procurement in the military that I know of. 

54 

So it is kind of an open end, and I would like anybody’s comment 

that would want to chime in. We can start with General Odierno 

and go down if any of you want to chime in on this. But give us 

some direction that we can help you and how an audit would work 

to reveal the inefficiencies so the transparency that we need up 

here to give you all the support you need. General? 

General ODIERNO. Senator, thank you. 

First, we are working very hard towards auditability. We are 

starting to put the systems in place that are enabling us to better 

see ourselves and where we are spending money, where we are 

wasting money, and where we are underfunding money. We are 

getting there, and I think the requirement is by 2017, but we are 

working very fast to get there. We are starting to see some of that 

come to fruition. So I want you to know we are taking that very 

seriously and we are making some progress. We are not where we 

need to be yet, but we are making progress and we should be prepared by 2017 to meet that goal. 

A couple things I would just comment on what you said. Yes, we 

are still having to procure systems we do not need. Excess tanks 

is an example in the Army. Hundreds of millions of dollars spent 

on tanks that we simply do not have the structure for anymore. 

There are reasons for that, I can understand. But there are things 

that go on. When we are talking about tight budgets, a couple hundred million dollars is a lot of money, and we got to understand 

how we do it. 

The other thing is I know there are lots of people that have 

looked at procurement reform, and the one thing that has been 

frustrating to me as the Chief of Staff of the Army is how little authority and responsibility that I have in the procurement process. 

I have a say in requirements to some extent, but I have very little 

say. Now, what I have to do is use my influence, use my influence 

as a four-star general and the Chief of Staff of the Army, to try to 

influence the process. But frankly I have no authority inside of that 

process outside of requirements. So I think when you are in this 

position, you have been in serving for decades, you fought wars, 

you have some experience in what is needed and how we develop 

and procure items. I would like to see us in the uniform get a bit 

more involved. I would ask as we review this, that we would all 

take a look at that, sir. 

Admiral GREENERT. We too are working on auditability. This 

year we are going under what is called the schedule of budgetary 

activity. That means the financial transactions. We should complete that by December. That takes us to the next step, which is 

to look at the four classic areas of auditability. So I tell you the 

Navy is on track. We will continue to keep the committee and yourself informed. 

When I look at the procurement process—Ray has it about 

right—we need to clarify the chain of command. There are too 

many people involved in the process. If I say I need a thing and 

it starts moving towards somebody building it and there are a 

whole lot of people telling us, no, this is what you really need. I 

am talking about in the Pentagon, just to get it out of the building. 

That is one. 

55 

Two, we need to be able to compromise once we tell somebody to 

go build us something. If I say it has to be this fast, do this greatness, and I am reaching hard, it can be quite expensive, and the 

technology just may not be there. We may need to de-scope this. 

It is too expensive. It will not deliver on time. Cost and schedule 

need to become a much bigger factor in this process than it is 

today. I think it ought to be a key performance parameter. That 

is big speak in the Pentagon. It means if you breach this, you got 

to go back and stop, take a pause, and look at this again. 

Senator MANCHIN. If I could just finish. My time is up. 

But I would love to speak to you all, if I can, because I am really 

interested in the procurement and changing the procurement, how 

we do it. I am more interested in finding how many ideas come 

from you all, what you just described as what you need, versus 

what some on the outside think you need. Those are the things I 

would like for you to think about, and I will come and visit with 

you all if I may. 

Thank you very much. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you, Senator Manchin. That is our 

second top priority item I think for this committee in the coming 

session. 

Senator Tillis. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here, your leadership, and your 

service to our Nation. 

I apologize for being out. I have a competing committee meeting 

over in Judiciary with the appointment of the nominee. 

But my question to you—I came from the North Carolina legislature and we had a budget crisis back in 2011. We had to cut. What 

I heard from the heads of the various administration members 

were that they could absorb some of these cuts if the legislature 

were willing to provide them with the flexibility to determine 

where they do it and potentially even changing some of the processes, I think alluding to what maybe the Admiral said on procurement processes. 

Has there been much of a comprehensive focus on if you could 

make changes to the way you procure, deploy, and prioritize spending and provide that feedback to Congress? That is one. 

Another question is with respect to sequestration—I do not know 

that much about it, although I do know that I would vote to repeal 

it—can you describe what kinds of constraints prevent you from 

being able to absorb the suggested cuts with sequestration that 

may make it easier if it were to stay in place and go down the line? 

General ODIERNO. Senator, the one thing I would say is I think 

sequestration level of budget is simply not enough budget for us to 

meet the demands that are on the force. I want to be very clear 

about that up front. I just think it does not allow us to meet what 

is our defense strategy and the Defense Strategic Guidance that we 

are operating under now. 

That said, we are inefficient. Just sequestration itself is inefficient because it is in some cases salami slice cuts that limit how 

you manage. What it has done is it has stretched programs longer 

than they need to be. So the cost per item is more. It is causing 

us to reduce training and some of our other modernization activiVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
56 

ties much broader than we need to. It is causing us to cut end 

strength too quickly. So all of those add to an inefficient use of the 

resources that we are provided. So we can make some adjustments 

around, that would help if we were able to change some of the 

mechanisms associated with sequestration. That said, I just believe 

the level of funding under sequestration is simply not enough for 

us to do the things that we need to do. 

Senator TILLIS. General, does that suggest that—if I were to 

have that discussion with someone in business, the question that 

I would ask is how productive and how efficient do you think your 

organization is. So are you suggesting that now that the cuts suggested by sequestration are beyond your capacity to drive additional efficiencies and productivity out of the organization? 

General ODIERNO. No. I would not, no. There is always room in 

the Army for a continued efficiency. We have taken several steps 

to try to improve our efficiency, whether it be in how we get contracts, whether it be how we size our headquarters, whether it be 

how we manage some of our programs. We always have to be doing 

that and adjusting and adapting how we do things and be more efficient in our ability to train. We are always looking at those items. 

So there is always room for that. 

But I think we have to understand the levels we are talking 

about really hinders us, I believe, in a very difficult security environment to meet the needs of the Nation. 

Thank you. 

Senator TILLIS. Admiral? 

Admiral GREENERT. I echo what General Odierno said. The absolute value of money that it takes to do the strategy and what the 

country needs the military to do today—it does not balance. So 

what I am saying in my testimony was you have to change what 

you are asking us to do. Well, the world is getting a pretty big vote 

on this. So there is a mismatch and imbalance in that. 

As General Odierno said—I will give you just a quick anecdote. 

In the President’s budget 2015, which we brought up here, there 

was a $90 billion change—or difference in what we say we needed 

and what we had. $20 billion of that we made up through overhead 

reduction, efficiency, buying more efficiently, if you will. We call it 

better buying power. So, sir, we are doing our best to be as efficient 

as possible. I would say that takes time for these things to come 

to roost—the efficiencies. The kind of reductions we are talking 

about are today. So there is a mismatch in that as well. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

General Welsh? 

General WELSH. Senator, sequestration is a blunt force instrument. It was intended to be, as was referenced earlier in the hearing, so that we would not keep it in the law. The problem with it 

is there is nothing about that instrument that you would use in the 

business world. You would never expect to create great savings the 

first year you decided to restructure your entire business. 

Senator TILLIS. Just for the record, that is why I agree. I think 

just strategically it is a poor approach towards addressing or driving out efficiencies. So I agree with that, General Welsh. 

General WELSH. Yes, sir. When it comes to efficiency, we in the 

Air Force have not used our auditor general well. We have never 

57 

done implementation audits for new programs, new ideas, new organizations. We have started that over the last 18 months. We 

found that if you get off to a good start in these changes, you have 

a much better chance of success. That same logic applies to acquisition programs. If you start procurement with a bad milestone 

chart, a bad funding plan, or a bad acquisition strategy, we will 

end up in here explaining to you why the program is failing. We 

have to do a better job of starting the right way, and that involves 

a number of people supporting us and changing policy law and us 

paying more attention to it. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

General Dunford? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would associate myself with the 

comments of the other chiefs. 

You asked about what about the methodology makes it very difficult. In 2013, our manpower account was exempt from sequestration. We spent somewhere—almost 70 percent of our budget is towards people. So the full weight of sequestration then fell within 

30 percent of our budget. So if we went back to sequestration in 

2016, it would be a similar impact where the full weight of sequestration comes against 30 percent of the budget. So not only do you 

have no flexibility in its application, but it is a very narrow part 

of my budget where the full weight of sequestration would fall. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, General. That really gets to the point 

about the constraints. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Senator. 

I just returned from the Budget Committee. I apologize for missing some of the discussion, and I may touch upon some of the 

points. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Not accepted. 

Senator KING. Thank you. Always a pleasure to work with you, 

Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.] 

I want to emphasize a point that I understand Senator Kaine 

made and that is, number one, sequestration was designed to be 

stupid. Did you know that? It was expressly designed to be so stupid and unacceptable that Congress would never allow it to go into 

place. I remember campaigning in 2012. People said, well, what do 

you think of the sequester? I said it will never happen. Congress 

will not let that happen. But here we are. 

One of the reasons that it does not make much sense is that we 

are focusing all our budgetary attention on the declining part of the 

budget. The growth in the budget right now is in mandatory programs and particularly in health care costs, Medicare, Medicaid, 

the children’s health program. That is what is driving the Federal 

deficit. It is not defense. It is not national parks. It is not the Head 

Start program. The sequester is like invading Brazil after Pearl 

Harbor. It is a vigorous reaction, but it is the wrong target because 

this is not where the problem is. 

We are headed for a moment, by the way, Mr. Chairman, where 

discretionary spending, including defense, is at the lowest level 

ever—ever. We really should not even be having this discussion because it is a pointless exercise in terms of trying to deal with the 

58 

budget. We need to be talking about a much larger question, particularly the extraordinary cost of health care in this country as a 

percentage of GDP and per capita. 

So I know you have had all the testimony and I heard it at the 

beginning about how devastating it will be. We really have to start 

talking about how to deal with it. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this 

committee, which sees the impact of sequester more than any other 

committee in Congress because more than half of it falls within our 

jurisdiction, can lead the way in trying to find some kind of solution that will make sense. 

So I do not really have any specific questions except to underline 

what I heard all you gentlemen say in your opening statements, 

that this will really be devastating. 

Americans’ lives are being put at risk by this policy. Would you 

agree with that, General Odierno? 

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. Admiral? 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir, I do agree. 

General WELSH. Yes, sir. 

General DUNFORD. Yes, Senator. 

Senator KING. That should be the headline, that Americans’ lives 

are being put at risk. We go to such extraordinary lengths to protect the lives of our people, and yet by compromising readiness, by 

compromising morale, by compromising modernization, by compromising training, that is the inevitable result. You guys are having 

to go through these extraordinary gyrations to try to deal with the 

uncertain budget situation, and the danger is risk to American 

lives, both our people in uniform and our civilians. So I certainly 

want to thank you for your testimony. 

Also, I would like to ask one other question. I would assume that 

the uncertainty of this whole situation is almost as bad as the dollars. Is that correct, General? 

General ODIERNO. It is. There is a lot of angst in the force about 

what is in the future, what is going to happen. They are focused 

on what they are doing today, but they do worry a bit about what 

it means to them for the future, our soldiers and their families. So 

it is creating some angst in the force, and that is concerning to me. 

For the Army especially, because we are reducing so much force 

structure and might be required to reduce so much more force 

structure, it is creating great angst in the force itself. 

Senator KING. One final question for you, Admiral. Talk about 

the risk to the industrial base. My concern is that you cannot turn 

on and off the industrial base. When welders leave to go somewhere else, you cannot just pick them back up the next year. Is 

that not a deep concern to the Navy? 

Admiral GREENERT. It is, Senator. We are at the point—in our 

shipbuilding plan, we are about, if you will, minimum sustaining. 

The good news is we are buying efficiently. But that all comes unraveled if you start dropping out ships here or there. In aircraft 

and weapons, we are at minimum sustaining. 

So what happens is people think, well, the big primes are going 

to go under, and they say that will not happen. That is not the concern. It is what you said. It is kind of the mom and pop, the smaller or mid-business people that make very specific and refined 

59 

equipment. Over half of our nuclear industrial base is sole source. 

So we really, really need them. So this lack of planning, the inability—it cannot keep them open. You cannot buy an economic order 

quantity and it is a deep concern. As you said, we cannot bring it 

back fast. 

Senator KING. Well, and the irony is that when you have to delay 

a multiyear procurement, for example, you end up paying more in 

the end. So the taxpayers lose both ways. 

Admiral GREENERT. They absolutely do. It is like some say eating 

at 7–11 every night. It is not sustainable and it is more expensive. 

Senator KING. I have 7–11s in Maine so I am not going to comment on that. [Laughter.] 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King, I want to thank you for the 

work that you are doing, along with a number of efforts, to try to 

address this issue, and I thank you very much. 

Senator Cotton? 

Senator COTTON. Thank you very much, Chairman McCain. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your distinguished service to our 

country. 

I want to look back on a few of the statements you made at the 

last hearing we had, General Odierno, starting with you. You had 

said that if sequestration level reductions continue in fiscal year 

2014, 85 percent of our BCTs would not meet readiness levels appropriate for contingency requirements. Are we in a situation now 

where 85 percent of our BCT’s are not in fact ready? 

General ODIERNO. We got down to actually 90 percent at one 

time in 2013. Because of the BBA, we built that up back in 2014 

and 2015 to 33 percent. But if sequestration begins in 2016, we will 

be headed right back down to those numbers again. 

Senator COTTON. How are you managing that lack of readiness? 

General ODIERNO. Sir, what we have had to do is we have had 

to develop a force. So we are saying, okay, we are going to take this 

amount of the Army and we are going to give you the money and 

train you to the highest level, which means the rest of the Army 

is training at a significantly lower level, which really concerns me 

because what I worry about is I have to have some level of the 

force capable of deploying to an unknown or no-known contingency. 

But what that does is it means we are not funding the rest of the 

force. It affects morale. It affects capabilities and it takes longer to 

recover from it. 

Senator COTTON. So in a concrete sense, does that mean certain 

BCT’s are only doing individual tasks or platoon and company level 

collective training? 

General ODIERNO. Individual squad and some platoon and that 

is it. 

Senator COTTON. You had said that only 20 percent of the operating force would have sufficient funds for collective training. Is 

that the case? 

General ODIERNO. That was the case. Again, when we got the additional money in 2014 and 2015 above sequestration, we were able 

to increase that to about 35 percent of the force. But if it kicks 

again in 2016, then we will go right back down again. 

60 

Senator COTTON. Where do we stand on schools now, basic professional schools like Warrior Leader, BNOC, ANOC? 

General ODIERNO. Right now they are funded fully. If sequestration kicks in, we will start to see a reduction in our special training 

schools. So ANOC, BNOC—we will try to fund those. Where we are 

going to have to limit is Ranger, Airborne, Pathfinder. About 

85,000 spaces will be unfunded in our specialty schools which are 

critical to providing the high-level competence that we need. 

Senator COTTON. What kind of percentage decrease would that 

be for the specialty training schools like Ranger, Airborne, and 

Pathfinder? 

General ODIERNO. Well, it will be somewhere around the 50 to 

60 percent level. 

Senator COTTON. Have you seen that affecting retention? 

General ODIERNO. Well, we have not done it yet. We would have 

to do that if we go back into sequestration. 

Senator COTTON. Do you foresee it affecting retention? 

General ODIERNO. Yes, I think it will affect retention. All of this 

affects retention. The most important thing we do is to make sure 

they are absolutely trained to do their mission. When we start 

backing off on the ability to train, it will affect the retention. 

Senator COTTON. You had projected the need to go from just over 

533,000 troops to 420,000. Is that still your assessment? 

General ODIERNO. That is in fact the case, Senator. 

Senator COTTON. At what levels are we going to see the most declines in personnel? Soldier or junior or senior noncommissioned officer, company grade, field grade officer? 

General ODIERNO. It is all. So we manage officers by year group. 

We are already going through boards now. Even just to get to 

490,000, we are involuntarily separating officers at the captain, 

major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel level. We are also reducing 

the amount of noncommissioned officers. We are reducing the 

amount of soldiers we are bringing in. We actually over the last 

couple years have reduced the ability for people to reenlist. That 

will increase if we have to go to sequestration. 

Senator COTTON. At those levels, those are the soldiers who tend 

to have the multiple combat deployments underneath their belts? 

General ODIERNO. That is correct. That is absolutely correct. 

Senator COTTON. So you are losing their combat experience and 

replacing it with new privates and lieutenants who do not have it. 

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir. 

Senator COTTON. General Dunford, if I could switch to you for a 

moment. Your predecessor had projected that you would have to 

decrease your end strength of about 187,000 to 174,000. Is that 

projection still accurate? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that is correct with sequestration. 

Senator COTTON. With sequestration. 

Could you explain to a layman why what might seem like a relatively small reduction of about 13,000 could be so hurtful to the 

Corps? 

General DUNFORD. I can, Senator. Thanks for that question. 

The biggest impact would be—that reduced capacity would have 

an impact on the deployment-to-dwell ratio of our marines. So 

today we consider the optimal force—and we did a study on this 

61 

in 2011—would be 186,800 marines. That would allow marines to 

be gone for 7 months, home for 21 months, and gone for 7 months 

again. We call that a 1-to-3 deployment-to-dwell. When we came 

down to 182,000, that puts us at a 1-to-2 deployment-to-dwell. So 

we are deploying 7 months, home for 14 months, back out for 7 

months. If we go down to 174,000 and really with a marine security 

guard plus-up, that would be about 175,000. It would be the only 

change I would make from my predecessor’s comment. If we go 

down to that level, many of our units will be closer to 1-to-1 than 

1-to-2. So marines would be home for about 8 or 9 months between 

7-month deployments with an impact on the quality of training 

that we are able to provide, as well as impact on families. 

Senator COTTON. Admiral, you had testified that if sequestration 

remained in place, you would only be able to sustain about 255 

ships, which is approximately 50 less than today. Is that still the 

case? 

Admiral GREENERT. It is not, Senator. That was about 15 months 

ago when I gave that testimony. That was a scenario based on our 

using force structure retirement to garner savings and mandates 

from Congress, and we have kind of taken that off the table. So I 

would look in other avenues, probably other modernization. It concerns me about—when I talk to capability and the future, that is 

more likely where we would go for that kind of savings. 

Senator COTTON. My time has expired. Thank you all. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you might be 

able to tell, I do not have much a voice today, which is a fact that 

is being celebrated many places around here. I will not spend a lot 

of time questioning because I have questions for the record that I 

would like. 

I know that Senator Manchin touched on the acquisition process. 

I would certainly recommend to the members of this committee and 

to the leaders in our military the report that was issued by the 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations under the leadership of 

Senators McCain and Levin where they took information from a 

variety of important experts about our acquisition process and particularly the challenges that the bifurcation represents between the 

civilian and the military and how awkward that has been and how 

freaking expensive it has been in the long run. That is a technical 

term, ‘‘freaking.’’ I figure I can say that since I cannot talk. [Laughter.] 

I will just use this time to briefly ask one question. One of the 

things I have discovered as I have done an enormous amount of 

work in the area of acquisition—and by the way, getting rid of sequestration I think is maybe the most imperative bipartisan challenge we have in the Senate. It is a bipartisan challenge, and we 

are going to have a lot of them. How we on this committee step up 

in a bipartisan way to try to address it I think will be very meaningful. 

But one of the problems in the military is that it is based on 

leadership and your ability to be promoted, and what positions you 

have are relevant to whether or not you are promoted. It is kind 

of the short stick to get to be a systems manager. So what happens—these program managers—they do not want to hang out in 

62 

those jobs because they get all the heat when things go wrong. 

They are not seen as bright and rising starts within the military. 

It is not the career path that is the most desirable whether you are 

back in the days when we could not get the companies to even give 

anybody with authority that clipboard to check on contracting, the 

corps’ representatives. I mean, when I started doing this, it was the 

lamest member of the company that was handed that clipboard to 

do the contracting checks. 

So I would love, not now but in writing later, how you all believe 

you can elevate these positions so they are seen as part of a trajectory of success within the military because until we get quality 

leaders running these acquisition systems, these programs, we are 

going to continue to struggle with costs that we just frankly cannot 

afford in this country anymore. 

I only have 3 minutes left. So if any of you want to take a stab 

at that, that would be great. I apologize for my voice. 

General ODIERNO. Senator, we are very aware of the issue you 

just brought up in terms of ensuring that in certain parts of our 

Service, they have the ability to move up and get rewarded for the 

work that they are doing. We manage it very carefully. With our 

acquisition corps specifically, we have management guidelines that 

we are attempting to follow. For me, it is not only that, but it is 

more about the mixture of experience between acquisition and 

operational experience. That would help also in that area where we 

make sure we have that dual experience. We have moved away 

from that a little bit where we make somebody an acquisition officer very early on. But that said, we have put programs in place to 

ensure that their promotion rates are at least equal. But with that 

said, I believe we have to constantly review it, look at it, and ensure that they are having the opportunities for promotion. I will respond in writing in more detail. 

Admiral GREENERT. Ma’am, in the Navy, we have a corps called 

acquisition professionals. It is not literally a corps. It is a subspecialty and it is in statute how they are promoted and what jobs 

they are required. But we need to do some work in there. 

Number one, the report of fitness is very similar to an unrestricted line officer. So the attributes that they are evaluated on do 

not match up with the reality of what they do day-in and day-out. 

We need to revise that. That is in progress. I am working with our 

acquisition professional. 

Number two, we need to cross pollinate. People who may not be 

acquisition professionals need to serve with them and understand 

what do they do so that as we go back and forth and describe what 

I need, what they need, their reality—we need to understand that 

so we can do better. 

Number three, the assignment process needs to be—it is like a 

conga line right now. We need to go in and find out, to your point, 

who are these people who are performing very well, get them in the 

right job, keep them there so that they can develop the program 

and we are not just shifting people through there. 

Then lastly, encourage our program managers to come forward. 

If the program is not doing well, we have to evaluate them and actually reward them for coming forward and saying I got a problem 

here because what happens is they fill in the data and they say 

63 

check it out, doing well. I got to get out of here before this thing 

goes bad. Then the poor person that comes in and it explodes gets 

the heat. 

General WELSH. Senator, I think this is a fascinating area for 

study. I spent about 21⁄2 years in the acquisition business, and the 

thing I walked away with is my primary lesson was I did not understand any of the rules when I left any more than I did when 

I walked in. It is complicated. 

But what I did understand is the quality of the people we have 

in the acquisition business in the Air Force. It is a specialty for us. 

We get a lot of people actually wanting to come to the Air Force 

as young acquisition and contracting officers. The talent level is 

phenomenal. Where we start to lose them is when they become disconnected in their duties, when they get to the mid-career, with 

what the rest of the Air Force is doing. They do not feel that they 

are critically important to the big Air Force. They feel they are 

critically important to their program. Not having that connection is 

a big problem in my view. We have a number of general officers 

who are acquisition officers. We have some who are contracting officers. So there is a path for them if we can make them want to 

stay long enough to enjoy it. It is tough work. You have to be very 

talented to do it well, and we have to make sure they understand 

that they are critically important to the Air Force. This is where 

that civilian-military connection I think will make a big difference 

if we can get it right. They have to feel like we are all in the same 

Air Force, not that they are in a separate section just buying things 

for us. That will not work over time. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think we have a similar construct 

to what Admiral Greenert talked about with the Navy. I understand the question you were asking. I do not have anything to add 

that the other chiefs have not already said, but we will take the 

time to respond thoughtfully in writing. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

General ODIERNO. The military officer element of the Army’s Acquisition Corps 

(AAC) is a strong, competent, professional workforce grounded in operational experience and reinforced with robust acquisition education, training, and experience. 

Military officers are accessed into the AAC through the Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP) after demonstrating 6–8 years of successful operational experience in one of the Army’s basic branches. Acquisition is one of the most highly 

sought after functional areas through VTIP with only approximately half of those 

requesting accession into the Acquisition Corps getting selected. 

Once accessed into the AAC, officers spend the rest of their Army career exclusively in acquisition assignments. For those focusing on the program management 

career field, accession is followed by 6 weeks of foundational training. Once their 

6-week training is complete, officers spend the next 12–14 years in acquisition assignments gaining the experience required to be level three Defense Acquisition 

Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certified in program management. This is 

prior to assuming a centrally selected program manager (PM) position at the lieutenant colonel (LTC) level. Also during the 12–14 year time period, virtually all acquisition officers have earned a Master’s degree. LTC level PM positions require a 

3-year tenure. Upon completion of a PM position at the LTC level, the officer usually attends the Senior Service College and obtains acquisition experience at OSD, 

Joint Staff, or HQDA. The best qualified AAC officers are then selected for promotion to colonel (COL) and serve as a PM. As a result, our COL level PMs serve 

an additional 3 or 4 year tenure, based on the acquisition category of their program. 

If for some reason tenure must be shorter, it is only waived by the Army Acquisition 

Executive. 

Over the past 4 years, the AAC promotion rates have on average been commensurate with the Army Competitive Category (ACC). Data from the fiscal year 2011– 

64 

2014 promotions show that AAC promotion rates for both COLs and LTCs have on 

average exceeded that of ACC by approximately 2.5 percent. Although the number 

of PM positions available for fill varies from year to year, AAC Central Select List 

selection rates have also kept pace with the ACC over time. Additionally, in the last 

several years those selected for CSL have possessed an advanced degree at a rate 

of greater than 95 percent. 

For the opportunity to be a PM, Army Acquisition Officers must complete not only 

the Branch specific Pre-Command Course (for instance, the Infantry Pre-Command 

Course for PMs assigned to PEO soldier), the Ft. Leavenworth Pre-Command 

Course, but also the Acquisition Leaders Preparation Course. They must take PMT 

401, a 10-week course on program management, as a LTC. When selected for a COL 

PM, they complete PMT 402, a 4-week executive program management course. In 

addition to the DAWIA levels of certification above, our ACC officers must also meet 

all of the Army Professional Military Education requirements the rest of the Amy 

officers must meet. As a result, we have a highly trained and skilled set of AAC 

officers. 

Admiral GREENERT. Ma’am, in the Navy, we have a corps called acquisition professionals. It is not literally a corps, it is a subspecialty. It is in statute how they 

are promoted and what jobs they are required. But we need to do some work in 

there. 

Number one, the report of fitness is very similar to an unrestricted line officer. 

So the attributes that they are evaluated on do not match up with the reality of 

what they do day-in and day-out. We need to revise that. That is in progress. I am 

working with our acquisition professional. 

Number two, we need to cross pollinate. People who may not be acquisition professionals need to serve with them and understand what do they do so that as we 

go back and forth and describe what I need, what they need, their reality we need 

to understand that so we can do better. 

Number three, the assignment process needs to be it is like a conga line right 

now. We need to go in and find out, to your point, who are these people who are 

performing very well, get them in the right job, keep them there so that they can 

develop the program and we are not just shifting people through there. 

Then lastly, encourage our program managers to come forward. If the program is 

not doing well, we have to evaluate them and actually reward them for coming forward and saying I got a problem here because what happens is they fill in the data 

and they say check it out, doing well, I have to get out of here before this thing 

goes bad. Then the poor person that comes in and it explodes gets the heat. 

General WELSH. Our experience in the Air Force is actually quite different from 

what you describe. The Air Force deliberately develops military and civilian acquisition professionals according to well defined career path models which serve as a 

guide for professional experience opportunities, education, and training. These career models provide ample opportunity and experience for acquisition professionals 

at all ranks, and provide a defined path to greater rank and responsibility within 

the acquisition workforce. Since 2002, when we implemented formal processes for 

‘‘Force Development,’’ the development of acquisition workforce members has been 

enhanced by the use of career field Development Teams (DTs) consisting of senior 

leaders from within each career field. Using published career path models as a 

guide, DTs provide tailored developmental guidance to individuals based on their 

past record of training, education, and experiences. This action gives them a specific 

path or vector for greater progression and opportunity in the Air Force. The DTs 

also vector officers and civilians for developmental education, including Professional 

Military Education, and identify military and civilian candidates for command and 

Materiel Leader positions within the acquisition workforce. 

Defense acquisition professionals—especially PMs, have a special body of knowledge and experience that is not easily attained. Our PMs must deal with enormous 

complexity. The problems defense acquisition professionals are asked to solve are 

not simple; they are entrusted to develop and field the most complicated and technically advanced systems in the world and to conduct efforts spanning a huge variety of products and services. Program management doesn’t lend itself to easily 

learned ‘‘check-lists.’’ There are no one-size-fits-all solutions that apply to all acquisition situations. The Air Force deliberate development approach is designed to 

guide and enable our acquisition managers to gain depth and breadth in acquisition, 

helping the workforce to think critically about their programs and focus on sound 

decisions tailored to the problem at hand. We give them the opportunities to understand through education, training, and experience, what works, what doesn’t, and 

most importantly the why and how to best implement a specific decision. 

Rather than feeling like they’ve been handed the short stick when they’re selected 

to lead a program, our aspiring program managers probably feel like they’ve 

65 

grabbed the brass ring. For our major acquisition programs at the Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) level, selection means the culmination of almost two decades of 

preparation gained through successful performance in multiple acquisition jobs of 

increasing complexity and responsibility, often in not only acquisition program management, but another acquisition discipline such as engineering or test and evaluation. To compete for these PM jobs, they must first be selected as a Senior Materiel 

Leader candidate through the Chief of Staff’s Command Screening Board process 

(the same process used for their peers in operational group and wing command billets). They must have attained Level III certification in the PM specialty (standards 

established under the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)), 

and have maintained professional currency (at least 80 hours of professional development training every 2 years). They must exhibit not only the technical proficiencies demanded by the acquisition profession, but the leadership skills and potential 

for greater responsibility expected of all officers selected for command and command-equivalent roles at the Colonel level. From the candidate list produced by this 

board, the SAE, collaborating with the four-star commanders of Air Force Materiel 

Command and Air Force Space Command, selects the PM and Deputy PM (DPM) 

for each ACAT I and II program. Recommendations are approved by the Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force. 

Current Air Force PMs and DPMs reflect the high standards and intense focus 

on professionalism established for acquisition. On average, our PMs and DPMs have 

18 years of acquisition experience, with 55 percent holding not only a Level III 

DAWIA certification in PM, but at least one other Level III certification in a related 

acquisition function. Many of our military PMs also have had at least one assignment in an operational career broadening assignment, gaining invaluable perspective from the operational community. 

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps recognizes and fully embraces the challenge 

to recruit, train, develop, and sustain through carefully managed career paths the 

high-quality officers required to succeed in the critical role of acquisition program 

managers. To this end, in 2004, the Commandant of the Marine Corps formally established the Acquisition Management Professional Officer Military Occupational 

Specialty with the following purpose: ‘‘To develop a population of professional acquisition officers who meet statutory requirements under the Defense Acquisition 

Workforce Improvement Act and are competitive for selection to Program Management (PM) and other Key Leadership Positions of major defense acquisition programs for which the Marine Corps has a unique or vested interest.’’ Since then, we 

have increasingly focused on tracking and improving this critical officer population. 

As substantiated by data in the enclosed information paper, our efforts to track and 

improve what Senator McCaskill referred to as a ‘‘trajectory of success’’ for these 

officers have realized significant progress. For example, during the period of fiscal 

years 2008 through 2016, the selection rate to Colonel for Marine Acquisition Officers was 61 percent as compared to the average promotion rate to Colonel across 

all Marine Corps occupational specialties of 52 percent. We deliberately select and 

cultivate highly talented prospects for acquisition duty. A key criterion is that the 

candidate must be a field grade officer. As a result, officers selected for assignment 

to the acquisition specialty bring formative experience and proven success in a combat arms or support specialty. As every Marine is first a rifleman, every acquisition 

officer is first a successful Marine officer with the innate understanding of fellow 

Marines as our ultimate acquisition customer. This connectivity is a crucial constant. For example, one of our current PMs served in an acquisition assignment as 

a major, returned to the operating forces to command an infantry battalion in combat as a lieutenant colonel, and subsequently came back to his competitively selected present acquisition assignment as a colonel. Our acquisition leadership positions are rigorously competitive by design. For the Marine Corps, the Commander, 

Marine Corps Systems Command is the general officer who has the authority and 

responsibility to screen and slate individuals to fill designated acquisition billets. He 

utilizes an annual board predominantly comprised of general officers and senior civilian members from Department of the Navy acquisition organizations, but may 

also include senior members from Headquarters Marine Corps stakeholder organizations when appropriate. Such diversity and cross-organizational membership ensures a broad range of views are considered in an open and transparent board process. In recognizing the challenge articulated by Senator McCaskill we are encouraged by our progress but not complacent. This continues to receive our focused attention to grow the best talent for managing the acquisition investments of the Marine Corps and equipping our marines with the best affordable weapons and systems. With the continued support of Congress, we will continue recruiting strong 

applicants to transition to the acquisition career field while building a solid foundation of qualified, competitive, and successful Marine acquisition professionals. 

66 

Chairman MCCAIN. Colonel Graham? 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Captain. 

NATO partners are reducing their spending regarding defense in 

general. Is that fair to say? 

General ODIERNO. Yes, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. How many NATO nations spend 2 percent of 

their GDP on defense? 

General WELSH. Senator, the answer is two or three I believe. 

Estonia does. 

Senator GRAHAM. Two or three. So that is a dilemma for us because as you look over the next coming years, the capabilities of 

our NATO partners are diminishing, not increasing. Is that fair to 

say? 

General ODIERNO. On the ground side, yes. 

Admiral GREENERT. The UK is improving their navy but the capacity is small. 

Senator GRAHAM. Same for the Air Force? 

General WELSH. Yes, sir. The problem is a capacity problem for 

our traditional allies. 

Senator GRAHAM. So what will be spending on defense at the end 

of sequestration? What percentage of GDP will we spend on defense? 

Admiral GREENERT. I believe it is about 3 percent, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think it is 2.3. Can you do me a favor and 

check among yourselves and send us, if you can find agreement 

among the four of you, the number that the military views that we 

will spend on defense relative to GDP? Also add into that letter the 

average the Nation has been spending on defense, let us say, since 

Vietnam. I think that would be very instructive to the committee 

to understand the true effects of sequestration. I believe it is 

around 2.3 percent, and that is about half of what we normally 

spend on defense since Vietnam. But I could stand to be corrected. 

Just let us know. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) that is estimated to be spent on 

the Department of Defense in 2016 is 2.84 percent. 

• For year-to-year detail, see attached chart. 

67 

Admiral GREENERT. The current percentage of GDP spent on the Department of 

the Navy budget is 0.82 percent. The average since Vietnam is 1.32 percent. 

• For year-to-year detail, see chart below. 


128ful5.eps
68 

General WELSH. The Budget Control Act expires in 2023 and according to the 

CBO Budget and Economic Outlook: 2014 to 2024 (dated February 2014), the Department of Defense Budget estimate for 2023 is 2.7 percent of the GDP. The average spent by our Nation on defense since Vietnam is approximately 5.4 percent of 

the GDP (1962–2014). 

General DUNFORD. The current percentage of GDP spent on the Department of 

the Navy budget is 0.82 percent. The average since Vietnam is 1.32 percent. 


128ful6.eps
69 

Senator GRAHAM. Have each of you talked to the President about 

this problem with sequestration? 

General DUNFORD. We have, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. All of you? 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. What does he say? 

General ODIERNO. The conversations that we are having—I think 

as you see our submission of the 2016 budget, you will see that in 

fact our budget is well above sequestration, and that is a budget 

that we have worked with the President. So I think you would see 

that he believes that DOD cannot operate under a budget with sequestration. 

Senator GRAHAM. Has he suggested a solution to replace or repeal sequestration beyond the 2016 budget? 

General DUNFORD. Not to us, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Does he seem upset when you mention to him 

the consequences of what Congress has decided to do with his signature? 

General ODIERNO. I think the discussions that we have had with 

the President—he understands the challenges we have. He understands the security environment. He understands the pressure that 

is being put on all of our Services. 

Senator GRAHAM. But has he submitted a plan to you and say 

I understand what you are telling me? This is unacceptable. As 

commander in chief, here is how I intend to fix it. Has he suggested such a plan to any of you? 

Admiral GREENERT. I am not aware of one directly, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. I do not mean just to beat on the President. 

I think that applies to us too. We are the ones that created this 

mess. The President signed the bill. So it is not just fair for me to 

comment on the President. Congress is in the same boat. We do not 

have a plan. But Senator McCain, to his credit, is challenging some 

of us on the committee to find a plan. Mr. President, help us. We 

cannot do this by ourselves. We are going to need the commander 

in chief to weigh in and inform the American people that the sequestration cuts are unacceptable not just on the defense side. 

Are you familiar with the foreign operations account under—the 

150 account, our foreign aid account? Are you all familiar with 

what we do, the State Department, other agencies? Do you agree 

that that is a vital program in terms of national defense all on its 

own? 

General DUNFORD. It is. 

Senator GRAHAM. Have you looked at what happens under sequestration to our ability to be engaged in Africa to deal with malaria, with AIDS, and a variety of other health care issues? 

General DUNFORD. I have not, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Have you, General Odierno? 

General ODIERNO. We have through our commands, understanding the cuts and what that could mean to stability. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, you need to take a look because the military has been the strongest advocate for a robust foreign assistance 

account. If you think sequestration is a problem for you, you ought 

to look at what it does to our State Department. 

70 

Having said all of that, do you all agree that once we get sequestration fixed and right, whatever that turns out to be, that we 

should reform our benefit, pay, and compensation packages to 

make the military more sustainable? 

General ODIERNO. Yes, Senator, because if we do not, regardless 

of sequestration, we would have to take significant cuts in our capacity. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do all of you agree with what the Army just 

said? 

Admiral GREENERT. I agree. 

Senator GRAHAM. So would you urge Congress to look at this 

commission report seriously on the pay and benefit reform? 

General ODIERNO. Senator, I would urge them to look at it seriously, but not having to get into the details of the report itself, I 

am not sure of the merits of the report at this point. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, nor am I. But I would just suggest that 

we need to look at reforming pay and benefits, be generous but sustainable. 

As to the Marine Corps, what is your infrastructure account looking like, General Dunford? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we are programmed for about 70 

percent of the DOD recommended amount against our infrastructure. Because of OCO over the last couple years—— 

Senator GRAHAM. What does that mean to the Marine Corps? 

General DUNFORD. What means is we had an unprecedented $8 

billion military construction program over the last few years. What 

will happen over time is that we will not be able to properly maintain it. That will mean there will be mold in the barracks. That 

means that the barracks will not be maintained at a rate where 

they are suitable. Now, that means our ranges will not be properly 

sustained. Those are some of the impacts. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do the other Services have similar concerns? 

General ODIERNO. Absolutely. We have taken significant risk, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Will that affect retention and family quality of 

life? 

General ODIERNO. It will affect family programs. It will affect 

quality of life, and it will affect the ability to train the way we need 

to train. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you all. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I would apologize for being absent but I know 

that my apology will be rejected so I will not even endeavor because there is no committee hearing or meeting more important 

than this one going on today. 

Chairman MCCAIN. You are forgiven. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

But on a more serious note, I would like to thank the chairman 

for his constant and relentless focus on this topic and for raising 

it again at the very outset of this session of Congress so that we 

can put a lot of these issues in context. 

Many of my constituents who are digging out from a major 

weather event in the Northeast might be forgiven for comparing seVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
71 

questration to the weather. There is an old saying: everybody talks 

about the weather but nobody does anything about it. We have 

talked about sequestration a lot on this side of the dais, but Congress has yet to do anything meaningful about it. I thank the chairman for putting it very much on the front burner as we begin consideration of this budget. 

I take it, Admiral Greenert, that in your testimony there is no 

mention of a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round because 

there is no planning for a BRAC and none is on the table at this 

point. 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, DOD has requested a BRAC. In my 

testimony, I did not speak to it. I am always open to a BRAC. It 

is a good process, but I am satisfied with the Navy’s infrastructure 

as it exists today—base infrastructure. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So there is no immediate need for a BRAC 

in your view. 

Admiral GREENERT. In the Navy, I am satisfied with my base 

lay-down there in that regard. But again, the process makes the 

bases that I have that much more efficient. It is not a bad process 

per se. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. You spoke very cogently in your testimony 

about the fragility of the maritime industrial base, which I think 

is a major consideration that very often the public does not understand as a consequence of sequestration. You note that the damage 

can be long-lasting and hard to reverse. That is true of facilities 

and manufacturing plants not only at places like Electric Boat but 

also in the supply chain across the country and particularly in the 

immediate vicinity, in Connecticut for example, where parts and 

components and supplies are necessary to, in effect, make the 

weapons systems and platforms that make our military as powerful 

as it is. Is that correct? 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir, it is correct. In fact, I would worry 

less about a company like Electric Boat, a larger company. But as 

you said, the key is they have to go to these sub-primes, if you will, 

particularly nuclear, and we are sole-sourced in so much of our nuclear technology and our plants. That is a huge asymmetric advantage of ours. That goes at risk if these smaller businesses close. 

Where do we go? Do we go overseas? I mean, this is really a serious 

subject, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

There has been some discussion of the mental health consequences of losing professionals as a result of the sequestration 

process. As you may know, Senator McCain and I have spearheaded a bill to provide better mental health care to our veterans, 

the Clay Hunt bill, which I hope will be voted on literally in the 

next day or so, next few days if not today. General Odierno, I wonder if you could speak to that issue because it is very, very concerning. The suicide rate among veterans is 22 a day, and within 

the active military, also extremely, deeply troubling. Perhaps you 

could elaborate on that point. 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Senator. Unfortunately, we have 

had to decrease actually our behavioral health capabilities over the 

last couple of years, not something we want to do. This is during 

a time of concern where we believe we should be increasing our beVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
72 

havioral health capabilities in order to support our soldiers. This 

is a long-term problem and it is not one that goes away because 

we are out of Iraq or out of Afghanistan. It is one that will sustain 

itself for a period of time, and it is our requirement to do this. It 

is one thing that is very important to us and we are trying to be 

as efficient as we can. We are trying to get it down to the lowest 

levels possible. But I worry about that. We are trying telebehavioral health to improve it. But it is an issue that is of great concern 

to us. 

Frankly, when we had to furlough civilians, one of the specialties 

that walked away from us was our behavioral health specialists because there is such a need for them in many other walks of life, 

that they decided because of the uncertainty that they would go 

work somewhere else. That is very problematic for us as a Service. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me ask generally. There has been a 

lot of talk about retention, which is extraordinarily important. 

What about recruitment, which is as important. You want the best 

to be attracted. Has sequestration affected recruitment? 

General ODIERNO. We have been able to meet our goals for recruiting, but it is starting to get more difficult. So we are a bit concerned as we look ahead to the next 2 or 3 years. We have high 

standards to be able to meet those standards. But frankly, part of 

the problem as well is the population that is eligible is decreasing 

because of the other problems we are having in the youth of our 

society. So for us, it is becoming critical. I think the uncertainty of 

a military service and the constant discussion of reducing the military budget is going to have an effect, I think, on reenlistment potentially and recruitment. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Is that true of the other Services as well? 

Admiral GREENERT. We are meeting our goal, but one of the 

measures is at what week of the month of the 4 weeks do you finally meet goal. We are starting to get into the third week, which 

is very unusual for the last 4 years in the high tech ratings. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

General WELSH. Senator, I think for us the big draw to the Air 

Force is word of mouth from those who have served or testimony 

from those currently serving. Increasingly that testimony is from 

social media, and people see it on blog sites and other comments. 

Sequestration lit up the blog sites with ‘‘this job sucks’’ kind of 

comments. That has died off. It will come back and it will come 

back stronger than it happened before. Those are the testimonials 

I am worried about affecting recruiting. We have not seen an impact yet. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it is an area—we are certainly not 

complacent about the need to recruit high quality people. We have 

not yet seen an impact. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal, for your 

leadership on this issue that you just discussed with the witnesses. 

I am afraid it is only the beginning, but I think it is a good beginning. 

Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

73 

As we struggle with sequestration—and yes, we all agree that we 

should eliminate it, but as we, as I said, struggle with how to do 

that, though—generally when confronted with a complex issue like 

this, you look at how you can achieve more efficiencies, and you 

have talked about that. There is a whole range of other things that 

should be on the table. I think Senator King also mentioned that 

we should be looking at the mandatory spending side of things, 

which is a whole other ball of problems. 

Should we not also be looking at the revenue side of things in 

order to look at how best can we have more revenues so that we 

can have less of these kinds of huge cuts all across the board, not 

just to the military but on the domestic side? Do you have any 

thoughts about that, any of you? 

General WELSH. Senator, I am not sure what you are referring 

to by the revenue side. If you are talking about efficiency of operations internal to our budget, absolutely. 

Senator HIRONO. No. I am not talking about those kind of efficiencies. Revenues such as we look at our tax structure, for example. 

General WELSH. Yes, ma’am. Well, I think that is really the issue 

for Congress. As we have heard discussed already, where are the 

cuts coming from? Where do they have most benefit to the Nation? 

We have the real privilege and the much easier task of making recommendations to you on budgets based on military risk. You have 

a much broader problem and have to consider risk from many different factors in society, and that is why you deserve the big 

money, ma’am. [Laughter.] 

Senator HIRONO. Anyone else want to chime in? Really, we talk 

about a big picture. I do think that we need to have an honest discussion, a frank discussion on the revenue side of the picture. 

General Odierno, I noticed in your testimony that you mentioned 

the supplemental programmatic, environmental assessment. Even 

as we speak, the Army is conducting listening sessions in Hawaii. 

I think we can agree that the men and women at Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter have made tremendous contributions to our 

national security, as do our men and women who are serving in all 

other areas. 

But I am also aware that the second Stryker brigade combat 

team, the 25th infantry division from Schofield Barracks, is preparing to leave for joint military exercises in Thailand, South 

Korea, and the Philippines. Can you speak to the importance of 

this kind of mil-to-mil program and maintaining stability in the 

Asia-Pacific region, especially as when the rest of the world, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, are very unstable? At least 

if we can provide a level of stability in the Asia-Pacific area, I 

think that is worth pursuing. So would you give us your opinion? 

General ODIERNO. First, Senator, this program, under the guise 

of what we call Pacific Pathways, is an incredibly important program that we have done now. This is the third year we have done 

it, but it is increasing each year. What this is is to build confidence 

in our allies, our strong allies that we have, and developing capabilities that allows us to sustain strong partnerships with many 

militaries. 

74 

As was discussed here, with us being reduced, it is important 

that we are able to leverage our multinational partner capability, 

and through these exercises, we were able to gain more interoperability capability working together, gaining confidence with each 

other, getting used to working with each other. So it is absolutely 

critical to our future strategy. 

Having these forces forward in Hawaii is incredibly important to 

us because that gets us about halfway there. If we have to go from 

the continental United States, it becomes much more difficult. So 

having those forces in Hawaii becomes very important for us because of the ability to do this in quicker fashion. 

Senator HIRONO. So is sequestration going to negatively impact 

our ability to engage in these military-to-military programs? 

General ODIERNO. It will. It will reduce the dollars we have 

available to do events like this. We certainly would rather not have 

it reduced. We think they are very important, but I believe we will 

not be able to do events like that as much. We will have to reduce 

them and it will cause us problems in developing a future security 

architecture throughout the Pacific region. 

Senator HIRONO. Can you provide us with the specifics of which 

of these kinds of programs you would have to reduce if the 2016 

sequester comes into play? 

General ODIERNO. So the problem we have in the Army is if sequestration goes into effect in 2016, there are only two places it can 

come out of: modernization accounts and readiness accounts. Part 

of the readiness accounts is operation and maintenance which 

funds many of these exercises. So we will have to make decisions 

on which exercises we do not do. So although we would like to continue to do some of these, all will be affected. So we are going to 

have to reduce them to some level, and frankly, we will also reduce 

the readiness of our units that are conducting these missions. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

In some of your testimonies, you discuss the importance of sustained investment in technological infrastructure. As we know, 

cyber warfare is very much upon us. So for what you can say in 

this forum with the increased threat of cyber warfare, could you 

address the potential impacts to our cybersecurity capabilities 

should sequestration come into play in 2016? 

General ODIERNO. We have increased the spending in cyber, but 

we have a lot of infrastructure kind of things that we have to do 

in order to better protect our networks that better protects our Nation. That is going to be prolonged. In fact, last year at the end of 

the year, we were hoping for about $800 million we would be able 

to use in OCO to improve our infrastructure, specifically aimed at 

increasing our cybersecurity. Unfortunately, it was not approved. 

Because of that, that puts more strain on the dollars we will have 

available for the next 4 or 5 years. So if sequestration comes into 

play, it will take us longer to consolidate our networks and make 

them more capable of protecting them from outsider attacks, and 

I am very concerned about that. 

Senator HIRONO. So although my time is up, I assume that the 

rest of you agree that this is going to make it very difficult for you 

to keep your cybersecurity infrastructure in place or to even build 

it. 

75 

Admiral GREENERT. It would be hard in the Navy, but it would 

be a top priority right after the sea-based strategic deterrent, for 

us. 

General WELSH. Yes, ma’am. Same comment. Nothing to add to 

that. 

General DUNFORD. It is a core capability, Senator, that is going 

to suffer from the same effects as all the other capability areas 

with sequestration. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Heinrich? 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for your service and really for your 

decades of commitment. Seeing the level of experience at this single table, it highlights something that I think is worth mentioning 

just so that the public understands why these recruitment and retention issues are so incredibly important. The military is fundamentally different from other Government agencies, from the private sector. You cannot hire in a colonel or a general from the private sector or from another agency. I think the incredible amount 

of experience that all of you represent really helps highlight that 

to our constituents. 

I have a couple of questions that I want to ask General Welsh 

in particular. I want to thank you for, one, on my first question, 

speaking to this issue in the media recently. It is something I have 

been very concerned about recently, and that is with respect to remotely piloted aircraft pilots and the crews that make those missions possible. I have become very concerned about the current 

level of resources supporting the training, the retraining, the retention of those personnel. I know you share some of that concern. 

What I want to ask you is if we are as challenged as we appear 

to be because of the tempo pace in large part, if the BCA goes into 

effect, can you give us a sense of the scale of what we are going 

to be facing in terms of not meeting the demand with regard to remotely piloted aircraft in a way that is really going to put us at 

an enormous disadvantage in my view? I do not want to put words 

in your mouth, but I really want you to articulate, if you would, 

the scale of the challenge there for my colleagues. 

General WELSH. Senator, if sequestration went into effect, we believe we would have to cut the number of orbits that those pilots 

and the other crew members fly, which in a strange way would actually make the problem we are discussing better. We have enough 

manning to fly 55 orbits with a sustainable life battle rhythm work 

schedule over time, but we are flying 10 above that and we have 

been since 2007, 10 above the number we had because we have 

been surging. We surged nine times in 8 years with this particular 

force because of mission requirements, which those crews understand. They love doing the mission. They are excited about the 

work, but they are tired. If we went to 45 caps, we would create 

a more sustainable battle rhythm virtually as soon as that happens. So the problem would be operational requirements that 

would not be met but the manning problem would be alleviated to 

a great extent. So the issue really is meeting combatant commander requirements once sequestration hits, and that is a different problem but still a significant one. 

76 

Senator HEINRICH. I hear you. But do you see that operational 

tempo and the demand for that going down in the near future? 

General WELSH. No, Senator, I do not. We keep thinking we have 

it topped out and we have a plan to get there, and then it increases 

again. We have just been chasing this requirements rabbit for a 

long time, and we have to get ahead of it because we have to be 

able to train more people than move in and out of the system every 

year and we have not been able to do that yet because all the trainers are doing operational support. 

Senator HEINRICH. Right. 

On another separate issue, General Welsh, if the BCA levels do 

go into effect, do you see any feasible way to modernize the existing 

triad-based nuclear deterrent that we have? 

General WELSH. Senator, it is going to have to be modernized. 

The question is what parts of it do you modernize and what do we 

as a Nation expect of our strategic deterrent force. 

Senator HEINRICH. I guess I should in its entirety because I 

think that forces some very difficult conversations, and we have 

seen talk here within the last few days of a dyad as opposed to a 

triad. Would it force those kinds of decisions? 

General WELSH. I do not think that discussion will ever go away, 

Senator. I am a believer in the triad, but we will clearly have to 

have discussions that involve the Air Force, the Navy, DOD, Congress, the National Security Council, and the White House to decide where is the Nation going to go with this. We just do not have 

enough money in our budgets in the Air Force and the Navy to do 

all the modernization that you would need to do if we took 

everybody’s desire and tried to meet it. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you all. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I want to thank the witnesses. 

Just for the record—I know the answer, but for the record, if sequestration returns next year, can your Service execute the Defense Strategic Guidance? Yes or no. 

General ODIERNO. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral GREENERT. No, Mr. Chairman. 

General WELSH. No, Mr. Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. I want to thank you all for your 

very straightforward testimony and candid testimony, and I would 

like to mention two things with you. One—and it was referred to 

earlier—the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization 

Commission is reporting out. They will be appearing before the 

committee and we will be looking at their recommendations. We 

are going to need your input as to whether those are doable, the 

effect on the military, on the All-Volunteer Force, on our retirees. 

So I know you will be looking at that commission’s recommendations. We are going to need your input and evaluation of it. 

Finally—again, it was raised by several members. We are here 

fighting as hard as we can to repeal sequestration, and that is a 

bipartisan effort. But we have to do a better job on acquisition reform, and we are going to be spending a lot of time on that in this 

committee. I have come to one conclusion already and that is, in 

the whole process, it requires your input in a much more meaningful fashion, and I think you would all agree with that. After all, 

77 

if you are responsible, you should play a much greater role in the 

process. That is one of the conclusions that I think that we are in 

agreement on and that we will probably try to add to the National 

Defense Authorization Act. But there is a lot more that needs to 

be done. So I will be counting on you to understand that you will 

probably be asked some pretty tough questions in the days ahead. 

So I thank you for being here. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank the witnesses. 

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

SEQUESTRATION

1. Senator MCCAIN. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General Dunford, reports indicate that the budget request will come in at approximately 

$37 billion above the budget caps established in the Budget Control Act (BCA) for 

the Department of Defense (DOD). Would each of you provide a detailed list of what 

you would recommend be reduced from your portion of the DOD fiscal year 2016 

budget and Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) request, if Congress were forced 

to mark to the BCA budget caps rather than the anticipated president’s budget request? The list should include budget appropriation, budget activity, dash one line 

item, sub-activity group, program element and or project level detail as applicable. 

General ODIERNO. For the Army, the President’s budget represents the bare minimum needed for us to carry out our missions and execute and meet the requirements of our defense strategy. We cannot sustain any reduction in funding less than 

what was requested without severely degrading our ability to train, build, and sustain readiness, or modernize for the future. At this time, the Army cannot provide 

a list of programs that can or should be reduced if Congress appropriated fewer dollars than expected. What I can tell you, is that in my professional military judgment, we will be unable to meet the demands of the defense strategy at sequestration funding levels. 

Admiral GREENERT. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would necessitate a revisit and revision of the defense strategy. As I have testified before, sequestration would significantly reduce the Navy’s ability to fully implement the 

President’s defense strategy. The required cuts would force us to further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed for contingency responses, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego or stretch procurement of 

force structure as a last resort. Because of funding shortfalls over the last 3 years, 

our fiscal year 2016 President’s budget represents the absolute minimum funding 

levels needed to execute our defense strategy. We cannot provide a responsible way 

to budget for the defense strategy at sequester levels because there isn’t one. 

Today’s world is more complex, more uncertain, and more turbulent, and this 

trend around the world will likely continue. Our adversaries are modernizing and 

expanding their capabilities. It is vital that we have an adequate, predictable, and 

timely budget to remain an effective Navy. Put simply, sequestration will damage 

the national security of this country. 

General WELSH. The fiscal year 2016 President’s budget supports our critical 

needs to execute the defense strategy, but we made tough choices in capacity and 

capability/modernization. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has provided direction through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that the Air 

Force does not support any reductions to the President’s budget. Without a repeal 

of sequestration the Air Force will simply not have the capacity required to fully 

meet the current Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). Therefore, support of the President’s budget and repeal of 2013 BCA is essential. If forced into BCA funding levels 

in fiscal year 2016, we would, out of necessity divest entire fleets, reduce quantities 

for procurement of weapons systems, and reduce readiness accounts. Potential impacts include: 

• Divest RQ–4 Block 40 fleet and cut Block 30 modifications 

• Reduce MQ–1/MQ–9 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

capacity by 10 CAPs—equivalent to current operations in Iraq/Syria 

• Retire KC–10 fleet—15 in fiscal year 2016 and 59 total across FYDP 

78 

• Defer second Presidential Aircraft Recapitalization 

• Reduce Flying Hours, Weapon System Sustainment, range support and 

munitions 

• Reduce quantities for fighter recapitalization (F–35As) by 14 aircraft in 

fiscal year 2016 

• Reduce investments in Space programs, Cyber Mission Areas, Nuclear 

Enterprise, and Science and Technology 

• Terminate Adaptive Engine Program 

• Divest seven E–3s in fiscal year 2016 

• Divest U–2 

Bottom line—stable budgets at a higher level than BCA are critical to long-term 

strategic planning, meeting the DSG, and protecting the Homeland. 

General DUNFORD. Any discussion regarding how the Marine Corps would implement a sequester or reduce its budget request to a BCA level would need to be part 

of a larger conversation about the priorities of the Department and the defense 

strategy. Decisions regarding the appropriate size of the Marine Corps, and the resources required, need to be made with a full understanding of the expectations of 

the Corps at a severely reduced funding level. 

2. Senator MCCAIN. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General Dunford, given the president’s budget request is still expected to be significantly below the funding level for DOD originally recommended to support the DSG 

if sequestration were not in effect, would each of you provide for the record your 

fiscal year 2016 list of unfunded priorities? Please provide information in priority 

order and with associated costs, and the same budget level detail as cited in Question 1 above. 

General ODIERNO. It is imperative that the Army maintain strategic and operational flexibility to deter and operate in multiple regions simultaneously—in all 

phases of military operations—to prevent conflicts, shape the security environment 

and, when necessary, win in support of U.S. policy objectives. The accelerating insecurity and instability across Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific, coupled 

with the continued threat to the Homeland and our ongoing operations in Afghanistan, remain a significant concern to the Army. The fiscal year 2016 President’s 

budget request, while emphasizing readiness, will only generate the minimum readiness required to meet the current Defense Strategy. 

Our Army needs congressional support now more than ever. Operational and fiscal environments are straining the Army as we attempt to balance end strength, 

readiness, and modernization to meet current demands while building the foundations of a force that can meet future challenges. In accordance with section 1003 

of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. 

112–239, and in accordance with the current House Armed Services Committee’s request, the Army has provided to DOD the Army’s list of unfunded priorities for submission to Congress. 

Admiral GREENERT. Let me start by saying that our fiscal year 2016 President’s 

budget (PB–16) is carefully balanced to meet the DSG and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Because of funding shortfalls over the last 3 years, we still face high 

risk in executing 2 of the 10 DSG missions. However, our PB–16 budget is the minimum funding needed to execute our defense strategy. 

The Navy’s fiscal year 2016 Unfunded Priorities List is has been approved by the 

Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013. As before, 

the items on my list are not of higher priority than items in our PB–16 budget and 

I request they not be funded at the expense of our fiscal year 2016 budget request. 

I ask for Congress’ support in fully funding our PB–16 budget and preventing the 

return to sequestration level funding. 

General WELSH. The Secretary of Defense submitted the DOD consolidated Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) above our fiscal year 2016 President’s budget request 

to the Congressional Defense Committees on March 27, 2015. It is imperative Congress prioritizes and supports those requirements included in the fiscal year 2016 

PB request as it carefully balances capability, capacity, and readiness. Any extra 

program inserted into our budget submission will come at the expense of other programs we deemed more important, with ripple effects across the rest of the budget. 

79 

General DUNFORD. DOD has submitted to Congress a consolidated list of the Services’ unfunded priorities. The Marine Corps portion of this list totals $2.1 billion. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

RISK OF SEQUESTRATION

3. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General Dunford, each year you have testified that your Service is accepting more risk. 

What is your Service’s current risk level? 

General ODIERNO. The compromises we have made to modernization and readiness, combined with reductions to our force size and capabilities, translates directly 

into strategic risk. Today, we are generating just enough readiness to meet our dayto-day needs for immediate consumption. We are unable to generate any residual 

readiness to respond to unknown contingencies or to even reinforce ongoing operations. This is a dangerous balancing act. We have fewer soldiers, the majority of 

whom are in units that are not ready; and they are manning aging equipment at 

a time when demand for Army forces is higher than we originally anticipated. 

If we are forced to take further endstrength reductions beyond the planned levels 

in the President’s fiscal year 2016 budget due to sequestration, our flexibility deteriorates, as does our ability to react to strategic surprise. We are witnessing firsthand mistaken assumptions about the number, duration, location, and size of future 

conflicts and the need to conduct post-stability operations. These miscalculations 

translate directly into increased military risk. 

In this unclassified medium, we can only speak in general terms about the level 

of risks we are facing. The Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA) and Secretary of Defense’s Risk Mitigation Plan (RMP), both submitted to Congress on February 12, 

2015, provide a more detailed assessment. 

Admiral GREENERT. The cumulative effect of sequestration and budget shortfalls 

over the last 3 years has forced the Navy to accept significant risk in key mission 

areas, notably if the military is confronted with a technologically advanced adversary or forced to deny the objective of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region 

while engaged in a major contingency. If sequestration were to occur in fiscal year 

2016, we would be compelled to further reduce the capacity of weapons and aircraft, 

slow modernization, and delay upgrades to all but the most critical shore infrastructure. 

General WELSH. Even with the funding increases in the fiscal year 2016 President’s budget we believe our current air and space advantages are increasingly at 

risk. The Air Force is at the ragged edge to meet the DSG at the fiscal year 2016 


128ful3.eps
80 

PB funding level. The Air Force faces critical capability, capacity and readiness 

shortfalls to meet the current security environment and defense strategy demands. 

Recovering and resetting the force for full-spectrum operational readiness is at high 

risk as the Air Force has taken capacity reductions necessitated by funding cuts and 

continues to be engaged in current operations around the world. 

Further discussion regarding risk levels would need to occur in a classified setting. 

General DUNFORD. Risk to Service is best illustrated by our deployment-to-dwell 

ratio, which is currently around 1:2. Generally speaking, this means for every 6 

months deployed, many Marine units spend 12 months at home before deploying 

again. This is not much time for commanders to ready their units. Due to competing 

demands, and the Marine Corps imperative to deploy ready forces, shortfalls in 

equipment and personnel make the time at home even more challenging for units 

in dwell. Add to this the strain on your marines, their spouses and children, and 

it makes for a significant institutional challenge. 

The Marine Corps is operating at an elevated risk level in meeting the tenants 

of the defense strategy. At funding below the President’s budget request, we would 

not have adequate forward presence to assure allies or respond to crisis in the manner needed. The defense strategy requires a sustained ability to deter aggression, 

operate effectively across all domains, and respond decisively to emerging crises and 

contingencies. The Marine Corps, as the Nation’s expeditionary-force-in-readiness, 

does this by defending the Homeland with forward presence. Under sequestration, 

there will be less forward deployed forces resulting in increased risk to our national 

security interests. 

For classified details on the Marine Corps risk level, please see the 2015 CRA and 

the accompanying the Secretary of Defense’s RMP submitted to Congress in February. 

4. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General Dunford, are we accepting too much risk today? What does that mean? 

General ODIERNO. The compromises we have made to modernization and readiness, combined with reductions to our force size and capabilities, translates directly 

into strategic risk. Today, we are generating just enough readiness to meet our dayto-day needs for immediate consumption. We are unable to generate any residual 

readiness to respond to unknown contingencies or to even reinforce ongoing operations. This is a dangerous balancing act. We have fewer soldiers, the majority of 

whom are in units that are not ready; and they are manning aging equipment at 

a time when demand for Army forces is higher than we originally anticipated. 

If we are forced to take further endstrength reductions beyond the planned levels 

in the President’s fiscal year 2016 budget due to sequestration, our flexibility deteriorates, as does our ability to react to strategic surprise. We are witnessing firsthand mistaken assumptions about the number, duration, location, and size of future 

conflicts and the need to conduct post-stability operations. These miscalculations 

translate directly into increased military risk. 

In this unclassified medium, we can only speak in general terms about the level 

of risks we are facing. The CRA and Secretary of Defense’s RMP, both submitted 

to Congress on February 12, 2015, provide a more detailed assessment. 

Admiral GREENERT. We continue to accept significant risk in two DSG missions, 

making Navy less ready to successfully Deter and Defeat Aggression and Project 

Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges. While this risk is currently manageable, continuing along the budget trajectory of significant funding 

shortfalls each year means by 2020 (the DSG benchmark year), Navy will have insufficient contingency response capacity to execute large-scale operations in one region, while simultaneously deterring another adversary’s aggression elsewhere. 

Also, we will lose our advantage over adversaries in key warfighting areas such as 

Anti-Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Air-to-Air Warfare, and Integrated 

Air and Missile Defense. 

General WELSH. Bottom line: The capability gap is closing and the Nation risks 

losing in a contested environment if the Air Force does not have fiscal year 2016 

PB level funding. While the fiscal year 2016 PB restores some capacity to meet combatant commanders’ most urgent needs (e.g. U–2, E–3) while enhancing capability 

and rebuilding readiness, it also reduces some force structure to meet budget targets 

(e.g., A–10, EC–130H). We are at the ragged edge, in this budget environment, to 

provide the capabilities required to meet the DSG. 

Specifically, the Air Force must modernize a primarily fourth-generation fleet 

with F–22 Increments 3.2A and 3.2B, F–16 and F–15 avionics upgrades, and recapitalize to the next generation of capability. We must procure the F–35 Lightning II, 

KC–46A, and the LRS–B. Moreover, the Air Force’s fighter fleet is approaching an 

81 

average age of 30 years—the oldest in the history of the Air Force-closing the capability gap with potential adversaries. At 55 combat-coded squadrons reducing to 49, 

the Air Force is fielding its smallest fighter force ever. By comparison, the Air Force 

had 134 combat-coded fighter squadrons in Operation Desert Storm. Additionally, 

the Air Force is currently well below total fighter aircraft manning requirements 

and current funding level projections indicate this deficit will continue to grow, degrading vital air operations, test, and training expertise, slowing the transition to 

next generation capability. 

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps can meet the DSG at PB–16 levels, but 

there is no margin. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified earlier 

this month, ‘‘It [PB–16 level] is what we need to remain at the lower ragged edge 

of manageable risk in our ability to execute the defense strategy.’’ 

What that means. 

Maintaining the readiness of our forward deployed forces during a period of high 

operational tempo (OPTEMPO) while amidst fiscal uncertainty; as well as fiscal decline, comes with ever increasing operational and programmatic risk. Today, approximately half of the Marine Corps’ home-station units are at an unacceptable 

level of readiness in their ability to execute wartime missions, respond to unexpected crises, and surge for major contingencies. Furthermore, the ability of non-deployed units to conduct full spectrum operations continues to degrade as home-station personnel and equipment are sourced to protect and project the readiness of 

deployed and next-to-deploy units. As the Nation’s first responders, the Marine 

Corps’ home-stationed units are expected to be at or near the same high state of 

readiness as our deployed units, since these non-deployed units will provide the capacity to respond with the capability required (leadership and training) in the event 

of unexpected crises and or major contingencies. 

Despite this challenge and imbalance, the Marine Corps continues to provide 

units ready and responsive to meet core and assigned missions in support of all directed current operational, crisis, and contingency requirements. However, we continue to assume long-term risk particularly in supporting major contingencies in 

order to fund unit readiness in the near term. Consequently, the Marine Corps’ future capacity for crisis response and major contingency response is likely to be significantly reduced. Quite simply, if those units are not ready due to lack of training, 

equipment, or manning, it could mean a delayed response to resolve a contingency 

or to execute an operational plan, both of which create unacceptable risk for our national defense strategy as well as risk to mission accomplishment and to the force 

as a whole. 

5. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General Dunford, do you agree that risk equals lives? 

General ODIERNO. Yes. If we do not have the resources to train and equip the 

force, our soldiers, our young men and women, are the ones who will pay the price, 

potentially with their lives. The lack of funding for readiness and modernization 

places the burden and consequences of our resourcing decisions on our soldiers. We 

cannot take the readiness of our force for granted. It is our shared responsibility 

to ensure that we never send members of our military into harm’s way who are not 

trained, equipped, well-led, and ready for any contingency, to include war. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, it can. By ‘‘risk,’’ we mean that some of our platforms 

will arrive late to the combat zone, and engage in conflict without the benefit of 

markedly superior combat systems, sensors and networks, or desired levels of munitions inventories. In real terms, this means longer timelines to achieve victory, more 

military and civilian lives lost, and potentially less credibility to deter adversaries 

and assure allies in the future. 

General WELSH. Yes, we agree that risk equals lives. 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, risk equals lives lost, not only for the current force, 

but also for the future force. The current imbalance in our institutional readiness 

comes with long-term impacts. The funding problem has already created a physics 

problem that will take years to fix. BCA level funding/sequestration will make it 

worse: 

• While the President’s budget moves us in the right direction, it will take 

many years and a sustained effort to address the serious risk in the current 

inventory and availability of amphibious ships. 

• Our declining budget has forced the Marine Corps to make difficult 

choices at the expense of modernization to maintain current and near-term 

readiness. If we do not modernize, we will actually move backwards. 

• Our adversaries continue to develop new capabilities exploiting any technology gaps. By under-resourcing equipment modernization we will ultimately fall behind. 

82 

• Increasing threats, the proliferation of A2/AD weapon systems, and the 

aging of key material capabilities present an unacceptable risk to forcible 

entry operations and our overall combat effectiveness if modernization continues to be diminished or halted. 

6. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General Dunford, what impact does sequestration have on our national military strategy? 

General ODIERNO. Sequestration will challenge us to meet even our current level 

of commitments to our allies and partners around the world. It will eliminate our 

capability, on any scale, to conduct simultaneous operations, specifically deterring 

in one region while defeating in another. Essentially, for ground forces, sequestration even puts into question our ability to conduct even one prolonged multiphase, 

combined arms, campaign against a determined enemy. We would significantly degrade our capability to shape the security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. It puts into question our ability to deter and compel multiple adversaries 

simultaneously. Ultimately, sequestration limits strategic flexibility and requires us 

to hope we are able to predict the future with great accuracy. Something we have 

never been able to do. 

Admiral GREENERT. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would necessitate a revisit and revision of the defense strategy. For the Navy specifically, the 

cuts would render us unable to sufficiently meet 2 of the 10 missions in the DSG: 

Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges and Deter and Defeat 

Aggression. In addition, we would be forced to accept higher risk in five other DSG 

missions: Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare; Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities; Provide a Stabilizing Presence; Conduct Stability 

and Counterinsurgency Operations; and Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, 

and Other Operations. 

General WELSH. The Air Force cannot meet the DSG if sequestration is triggered. 

General DUNFORD. Sequester will exacerbate the challenges we have today. It 

may result in a Marine Corps with fewer active duty battalions and squadrons than 

would be required for a single major contingency. It will result in fewer marines and 

sailors being forward deployed in a position to immediately respond to crises involving our diplomatic posts, American citizens or interests overseas. 

Given the numerous and complex security challenges we face today, I believe 

DOD funding at the BCA level, with sequestration, will result in the need to develop 

a new strategy. We simply will not be able to execute the strategy with the implications of that guidance. 

7. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General Dunford, do you believe that the dangers of sequestration were exaggerated or 

do critics fail to understand how much damage was actually done? 

General ODIERNO. I believe this is the most uncertain I have seen the national 

security environment in my nearly 40 years of service. The amount and velocity of 

instability continues to increase around the world. The Islamic State in Iraq and 

the Levant’s unforeseen expansion and the rapid disintegration of order in Iraq and 

Syria have dramatically escalated conflict in the region. Order within Yemen is 

splintering; the al Qaeda insurgency and Shia expansion continues there; and the 

country is quickly approaching a civil war. In North and West Africa, anarchy, extremism, and terrorism continue to threaten the interests of the United States, as 

well as our allies and partners. 

In Europe, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine challenges the resolve of the European Union and the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Across 

the Pacific, China’s military modernization efforts raise concerns with our allies and 

our regional interests while the cycle of North Korean provocation continues to increase. The rate of humanitarian and disaster relief missions, such as the recent 

threat of Ebola, heightens the level of uncertainty we face around the world, along 

with constant evolving threats to the Homeland. 

Despite all of this, we continue to reduce our military capabilities. Over the last 

3 years we have already significantly reduced the capabilities of the U.S. Army, and 

this is before sequestration begins again in 2016. In the last 3 years, the Army’s 

Active component end strength has been reduced by 80,000; the Reserve component 

by 18,000. We have 13 less Active component Brigade Combat Teams. We have 

eliminated three active aviation brigades. We are removing over 800 rotary wing 

aircraft from the Army inventory. We have already slashed investments in modernization by 25 percent. We have eliminated our much needed infantry fighting vehicle modernization program. We have eliminated our scout helicopter development 

83 

program. We have significantly delayed other upgrades for many of our systems and 

aging platforms. 

Readiness has been degraded to its lowest levels in 20 years. In fiscal year 2013, 

under sequestration, only 10 percent of our Brigade Combat Teams were ready. 

Combat Training Center rotations for seven brigade combat teams were cancelled 

and over half a billion dollars of maintenance was deferred, both affecting training 

and readiness of our units. Even after additional support from the BBA, today, we 

only have 33 percent of our brigades ready, to the extent we would ask them to be 

if asked to fight. Our soldiers have undergone separation boards forcing us to involuntarily separate quality soldiers, some while serving in combat zones. 

Again, this is just a sample of what we have already done before sequestration 

kicks in again in fiscal year 2016. When it returns, we will be forced to reduce another 70,000 out of the Active component, another 35,000 out of the National Guard, 

and another 10,000 out of the Army Reserves by fiscal year 2020. We will cut 10– 

12 additional combat brigades. We will be forced to further reduce modernization 

and readiness levels over the next 5 years because we simply can’t drawdown end 

strength any quicker to generate the required savings. 

The impacts will be much more severe across our acquisition programs requiring 

us to end, restructure, or delay every program with an overall modernization investment decrease of 40 percent. Home station training will be severely underfunded, 

resulting in decreased training levels. Within our institutional support, we will be 

forced to drop over 5,000 seats from Initial Military Training, 85,000 seats from specialized training, and over 1,000 seats in our pilot training programs. Our soldier 

and family readiness programs will be weakened, and our investments in installation training and readiness facility upgrades will be affected impacting our longterm readiness strategies. Therefore, sustainable readiness will remain out of reach 

with our individual and unit readiness rapidly deteriorating between 2016–2020. 

Additionally, overall the mechanism of sequestration has and will continue to reduce our ability to efficiently manage the dollars we in fact do have. The system 

itself has proven to be very inefficient and increases costs across the board, whether 

it be in acquisitions or training. 

How does all of this translate strategically? It will challenge us to meet even our 

current level of commitments to our allies and partners around the world. It will 

eliminate our capability, on any scale, to conduct simultaneous operations, specifically deterring in one region while defeating in another. Essentially, for ground 

forces, sequestration even puts into question our ability to conduct even one prolonged multiphase, combined arms, campaign against a determined enemy. We 

would significantly degrade our capability to shape the security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. It puts into question our ability to deter and compel 

multiple adversaries simultaneously. Ultimately, sequestration limits strategic flexibility and requires us to hope we are able to predict the future with great accuracy. 

Something we have never been able to do. 

Admiral GREENERT. Critics fail to understand how much damage was actually 

done. Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 resulted in a $9 billion shortfall in Navy’s 

budget, as compared to the fiscal year 2013 President’s budget. This instance of sequestration was not just a disruption, it created readiness consequences from which 

we are still recovering, particularly in ship and aircraft maintenance, fleet response 

capacity, and excessive carrier strike group and amphibious ready group (ARG) deployment lengths. As I testified before this committee in November 2013, the continuing resolution and sequestration reductions in fiscal year 2013 compelled us to 

reduce both afloat and ashore operations, which created ship and aircraft maintenance and training backlogs. To budget for the procurement of ships and aircraft 

appropriated in fiscal year 2013, Navy was compelled to defer some purchases to 

future years and use prior-year investment balances to mitigate impacts to programs in fiscal year 2013 execution. 

While the Navy was able to reprioritize within available resources to continue to 

operate in fiscal year 2013, those actions we took to mitigate sequestration only 

served to transfer bills amounting to over $2 billion to future years for many procurement programs—those carryover bills were addressed in Navy’s fiscal year 2014 

and fiscal year 2015 budgets. If we were sequestered again, we would be forced to 

degrade current and future fleet readiness since sources available to mitigate in fiscal year 2013 are no longer available. 

Shortfalls caused by the fiscal year 2013 sequestration remain in a number of 

areas and the Navy is still working to recover from them. Even with a stable budget 

and no major contingencies for the foreseeable future, I estimate that we might be 

able to recover from the maintenance backlogs that have accumulated from the high 

OPTEMPO over the last decade of war and the additional effects of sequestration 

by approximately 2018 at the earliest for CVN and 2020 for large deck amphibious 

84 

ships, 5 years after the first round of sequestration. This is a small glimpse of the 

readiness ‘‘price’’ of sequestration 

General WELSH. The dangers are not exaggerated. Sequestration will further reduce our readiness instead of spurring recovery from more than a decade of war and 

the most recent sequestration. It will impact our ability to respond to the next crisis, 

make us more vulnerable to emerging threats, and limit our ability to exploit the 

next technological revolution. If we lag behind near-peer threats, it could take decades to catch up. 

Allowing another sequestration will give allies reason for doubt and potential adversaries cause for opportunism. 

General DUNFORD. Today, approximately half of the Marine Corps’ home station 

units are at an unacceptable level of readiness. Investment in the future is less than 

what is required, and infrastructure sustainment is being funded below the DOD 

standard. The Marine Corps has significantly reduced many of the programs that 

have helped to maintain morale and family readiness through over a decade of war. 

Additionally, the deployment-to-dwell time ratio is being maintained at a very challenging level. The operating forces are deploying for up to 7 months and returning 

home for 14 or less months before redeploying. These are some of the damages to 

date caused by sequestration and lower funding levels. 

The fiscal year 2016 President’s budget is the bare bones budget for the Marine 

Corps that can meet the current DSG. The budget prioritizes near-term readiness 

at the expense of modernization and facilities, and only achieves a 1:2 deploymentto-dwell ratio, which is unsustainable over the long term. Another round of sequestration would force the Marine Corps to significantly degrade the readiness of our 

home station units, which is the Marine Corps’ Ready Force to respond to crises or 

major combat operations. The fiscal challenges we face today will be further exacerbated by assuming even more risk in long-term modernization and infrastructure 

in order to maintain ready forces forward. This is not sustainable and degrades our 

capacity as the Nation’s force-in-readiness. 

FORCE STRUCTURE

8. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General Dunford, what is your assessment of the current global security environment? 

General ODIERNO. In my 38 years of service, I have never seen a more dynamic 

and rapidly changing security environment than the one we face now. We no longer 

live in a world where we have the luxury of time and distance to respond to threats 

facing our Nation. Instead, we face a diverse range of threats operating across domains and along seams—threats that are rapidly changing and adapting in response 

to our posture. 

We continue to experience a diverse and complex array of threats through a combination of transnational extremist organizations and the aggressive actions of several Nation-States. We continue to witness an increase in the velocity of instability 

that was unforeseen just a few years ago. 

In Iraq and Syria, we continue to see the ruthless behavior of Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the smoldering of sectarian conflict; which is threatening regional stability and has the potential to escalate international terrorism. 

Order within Yemen has fully collapsed with the country now facing civil war. Anarchy, extremism, and terrorism are running rampant in Libya and other parts of 

North and Central Africa. Transnational terrorist groups are exporting violence 

from new safe havens where they intimidate populations, prepare for future attacks, 

and foment instability to secure their influence. 

In Europe, Russian aggression and its intervention in Ukraine challenges the resolve of both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Across the Pacific, China’s military modernization efforts alarm our allies and concern our regional interests, while North Korean belligerence continues. We continue 

to have ever-evolving threats against our Homeland. 

In my opinion, this should not be the time to divest of our military capability and 

capacity, but that is what we are doing. 

Admiral GREENERT. Today’s world is more complex, uncertain, and turbulent, and 

this trend will likely continue. We face an environment in which our adversaries’ 

capabilities are modernizing and expanding, and the ongoing development and fielding of A2/AD capabilities challenge our global maritime access. The environment is 

also marked by: continued threats from expanding and evolving terrorist and criminal networks; nation-wide upheavals as a consequence of the Arab Spring; climate 

change that increases natural disasters and humanitarian crises; revanchist nationVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
85 

states; tensions as a result of maritime territorial disputes; and threats to maritime 

commerce from piracy. 

General WELSH. The instability arising from internal unrest in other nations 

poses a threat to U.S. interests and places continued demands on our limited resources. Potential adversaries will increasingly incorporate technologies and capabilities to create A2/AD environments and use unconventional and hybrid approaches to compete with U.S. power and influence. Furthermore, individuals and 

non-state actors continue their efforts to acquire weapons and other technologies 

that were once the exclusive Reserve of technologically advanced nation-states. The 

broad range of threats facing the U.S. suggests the time and place of the next crisis 

is unpredictable. Further, today’s challenging fiscal environment threatens the Air 

Force’s ability to meet DSG and combatant commander demands. National security 

objectives require an Air Force that is flexible, precise, lethal, and rapidly 

deployable anywhere on the globe. 

General DUNFORD. [Deleted.] 

9. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General Dunford, do your Services have the force structure required to meet all U.S. 

national security requirements given the current global environment? 

General ODIERNO. As the Army draws down, we have had to reduce and reorganize our force structure and involuntarily separate quality soldiers, including some 

while they were serving in a combat zone. In the last 12 months, we reduced the 

size of the Active component (AC) from 532,000 to 503,000, with end strength set 

to fall to 490,000 in fiscal year 2015; and then to 450,000. Similarly, the end 

strength in our Army National Guard is set to fall to 335,000 and the Army Reserve 

to 195,000. But if sequestration returns, we will need to reduce end strength even 

further to 420,000 in the AC by fiscal year 2020; and 315,000 in the National Guard 

and 185,000 in the Army Reserve. Yet, the reality we face is that the demand for 

Army forces throughout the world is growing while the size of the force is shrinking. 

Today, we are increasingly called upon to meet the demands of combatant commanders. We continue to support our partners in Afghanistan. We have returned 

to Iraq to advise and assist Iraqi Security Forces as they fight ISIL. We have deployed forces to Jordan and throughout the Middle East, where terrorism continues 

to spread and destabilize the region. In West Africa, more than 2,000 soldiers are 

just returning from providing humanitarian assistance to combat the Ebola epidemic, while another 1,000 soldiers are actively engaged in supporting partners as 

they combat extremism in the Horn of Africa. In Europe, Army forces have been deployed to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania since last spring to counter Russian aggression and assure our European allies. Across the Pacific, thousands of 

Army forces are supporting operations whether in Thailand, the Philippines, or Malaysia; Australia, Indonesia, or Korea. Around the world, we are training alongside 

allies and partners to help them develop professional and capable armies; and at 

home, we are supporting civil authorities while defending our critical networks 

against cyber attacks. 

With each one of these diverse missions, units rely on tailored teams of experts, 

logistics capabilities, transportation, intelligence, and communication support to accomplish the mission. In sum, we remain fully engaged with nearly 140,000 soldiers 

committed, deployed, or forward-stationed conducting 5 named operations on 6 continents in nearly 140 countries, with 9 of our 10 division headquarters employed 

across the globe. But in spite of the range of threats facing our Nation, sequestration remains the law of land, and we are reducing our capacity and capability. 

The President’s fiscal year 2016 budget represents the bare minimum needed for 

us to carry out our missions and execute and meet the requirements of our defense 

strategy. 

Admiral GREENERT. The 2014 update to the ‘‘2012 Force Structure Assessment’’ 

(FSA) and other Navy analysis describe the objective force needed to support the 

primary missions of the DSG. Provided sufficient readiness is maintained throughout the Fleet, our fiscal year 2016 President’s budget puts Navy on a path to procure the right mix of ships as defined by the FSA. However, fiscal constraints have 

necessitated reduced procurement of weapons and deferral of air and missile defense 

capabilities, which, when coupled with joint force deficiencies in wartime information transport, C2 resiliency, and airborne ISR, result in high risk in conducting 2 

of the 10 DSG primary missions, specifically Deter and Defeat Aggression and 

Power Projection Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges. 

General WELSH. Because of the current uncertain fiscal environment, the Air 

Force has been forced to make difficult choices within an incredibly complex security 

environment. Air Force readiness and capacity are degraded to the point where our 

core capabilities are at risk. To correct this, the fiscal year 2016 President’s budget 

86 

(PB) preserves the minimum capability to sustain current warfighting efforts and 

places the Air Force on a path toward balancing readiness with the modernization 

needed to meet evolving threats. That path toward rebalance included divesting 

some capacity to make room for the next generation of capability required for the 

future. 

The 2012 DSG—‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership’’—(as updated by the 2014 

QDR) requires healthy and sustainable Air Force combat readiness, modernization, 

and recapitalization programs. Since passage of the 2011 BCA, the Air Force has 

been forced to trade capacity in an attempt to preserve capability. With the fiscal 

year 2016 PB proposal, we have reached the point where any further reduction in 

capacity equals a reduction in capability—the two are inextricably linked. Combatant commanders require Air Force support on a 24/7 basis, and the Air Force does 

not have excess capacity to trade away. 

General DUNFORD. A discussion of required force structure to meet U.S. national 

security requirements must be viewed from the lens of the five pillars of readiness. 

At PB16 funding levels, the Marine Corps meets current Crisis and contingency response force levels, but with some risk. We will meet the Nation’s requirements, the 

question is, how well can we prepare those troops for deployment? In order to make 

continuous and long-term readiness a reality, we have to be able to train personnel 

and perform maintenance on equipment. Right now, we have about a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio. That is, marines are deployed for 7 months and home for 14. 

This allows a proper unit rotation to ensure that each time a unit deploys they are 

fully ready. If we are forced to take further cuts, that level will decrease closer to 

1:1.5 or 1:1. What this means is that units have less time between deployments to 

conduct the required training prior to their next deployment. 

The same discussion must be had with regard to equipment. As our inventory of 

equipment decreases our ability to perform depot maintenance also decreases because items must stay engaged in either training or operations. This has negative 

and compounding effects because equipment gets worn out more quickly, ultimately 

must be retired, and further decreases the inventory, which creates an accelerating 

spiral. We must maintain our equipment levels to avoid this reality. 

10. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and 

General Dunford, are all your forces being provided the training required to meet 

combatant commander requirements? 

General ODIERNO. Today, only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when our sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent. We are taking a small portion 

of the Army and are giving them the money and train to the highest level, while 

the rest of the Army is training at a significantly lower level. This really concerns 

me. 

Under our current budget, Army readiness will, at best, flat-line over the next 3 

to 4 years. We are generating just enough readiness to meet our day-to-day needs 

for immediate consumption. We are unable to generate any residual readiness to respond to unknown contingencies or to even reinforce ongoing operations. 

Admiral GREENERT. Navy forces that have deployed and will deploy in the near 

term to meet global presence requirements defined by the Global Force Management 

Allocation Plan are trained to meet combatant commander requirements. We are 

confident in this assessment. It is informed by: (1) a continuous feedback loop between Navy component commanders and training commands; and (2) post deployment briefs. 

General WELSH. Units are generally trained and ready for those portions of the 

mission necessary for current operations. 

The unrelenting OPTEMPO, coupled with fewer resources to fund, coordinate, and 

execute training and exercises, has resulted in units trained in only subsets of their 

mission and not full spectrum operations. This narrow training focus causes atrophy 

of critical mission skills and leaves our forces ill-prepared for the high-end threats 

the Nation may have to face in the near future. Right now, more than 50 percent 

of our Combat Air Force units are not fully combat ready. 

General DUNFORD. We are able to meet our current training requirements. However, in order to make continuous and long-term readiness a reality, we have to 

strike the right balance between deployment for operations and training time here 

at home. Right now, we have about a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio. That is, marines 

are deployed for 7 months and home for 14. This allows a proper unit rotation to 

ensure that each time a unit deploys they are fully ready. If we are forced to take 

further cuts, that level will decrease closer to 1:1.5 or 1:1. What this means is that 

units have less time between deployments to conduct the required training prior to 

their next deployment. 

87 

More specifically, home station readiness is at risk when personnel and equipment are sourced to protect the readiness of deployed and next-to-deploy units. This 

is a logical decision when validated operational requirements exceed resource availability. Home station units are expected to be in a higher state of readiness since 

the Marine Corps is charged to be the Nations’ force in readiness. The way they 

preserve this readiness is through training. By way of example, five of the last six 

infantry battalions assigned to Marine Expeditionary Units were not prepared until 

30 days before deployment. This is sufficient for planned deployments, but becomes 

problematic and dangerous as conflicts extend or the need to respond to unexpended 

crises arises. 

The other aspect of training readiness is equipment availability. It isn’t enough 

just to have a sufficient inventory with which to fight. You must also have sufficient 

inventory to train here at home. Examples of this are myriad, but one of the most 

salient, is the availability of amphibious shipping. Conducting amphibious operations with our joint Services is not just a matter of putting marines on Navy ships. 

Those units must have the opportunity to operate with each other during their 

workup to establish relationships, tactics, techniques, procedures, and build interoperability. This is one of the reasons why the shortfalls in amphibious shipping are 

so concerning. Maintaining enough equipment to meet combatant commander requirements is only part of the equation. 

11. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and 

General Dunford, do you have tiered readiness? 

General ODIERNO. In 2014, I testified that fiscal shortfalls have caused the Army 

to implement tiered readiness. Today, only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, 

when our sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent. We are taking 

a small portion of the Army and are giving them the money and train to the highest 

level, while the rest of the Army is training at a significantly lower level. This really 

concerns me. Under our current budget, Army readiness will, at best, flat-line over the next 3 

to 4 years. We are generating just enough readiness to meet our day-to-day needs 

for immediate consumption. We are unable to generate any residual readiness to respond to unknown contingencies or to even reinforce ongoing operations. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes. Navy has historically used a tiered readiness approach 

to balance the need for major maintenance and modernization on our capital intensive platforms while sustaining our forward presence commitments with fullytrained, ready, and capable rotational forces and maintaining an ability to surge 

forces for contingency response. Navy’s force generation process, the Optimized Fleet 

Response Plan (O–FRP), steps units/groups through increasing levels of readiness 

and operational certifications to support both deployment and contingency response 

requirements. 

General WELSH. The Air Force does not use tiered readiness. Tiered readiness 

does not support the requirement for the Air Force to provide forces with the immediacy combatant commanders require. We have structured and resourced our forces 

to meet the demands and timelines of the joint fight. 

General DUNFORD. As the Nation’s ready force, Marine units are expected to be 

in high states of readiness to respond to current and unforeseen crises and major 

contingencies. Tiered readiness is incompatible with being the Nation’s ready force. 

My priority remains those rotational Marine units that are forward deployed and 

engaged. These Marine units are ready and responsive to meet combatant commander requirements. Marine rotational units follow a cyclical scheme where units 

returning from deployments typically experience reduced readiness levels as personnel rotate and equipment is repaired; but, those readiness levels are increased 

as soon as possible. Tiered readiness is when units are purposely programmed at 

varying degrees of readiness, based on how long it would take them to be ready to 

deploy. The Marine Corps does not program some units at lower readiness levels 

than others. Further budget cuts under sequestration, however, would force the Marine Corps into adopting some variation of a less ready, tiered status, within the 

next few years—the makings of a hollow force we have fought so hard to avoid. 

12. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and 

General Dunford, are we still headed for a hollowing of the force, or have we already 

arrived there? 

General ODIERNO. Today, only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when our sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent. In the last 3 years, the Army’s 

Active component end strength has been reduced by 80,000; the Reserve component 

by 18,000. We have 13 less Active component Brigade Combat Teams. We have 

eliminated three active aviation brigades. We are removing over 800 rotary wing 

88 

aircraft from the Army inventory. We have already slashed investments in modernization by 25 percent, and we have significantly delayed other upgrades for many 

of our systems and aging platforms. 

For the last 3 to 5 years, we have been moving towards a hollow Army which I 

define as one where our soldiers are not properly trained; where our soldiers won’t 

be able to do the exercises that they need; where our soldiers won’t have the equipment they need; and the equipment that they do have, they will not be able to sustain. 

The choices we must make to meet sequestration-level funding are forcing us to 

reduce our Army to a size and with limited capabilities that I am not comfortable 

with. If we follow this path to its end, we will find a hollow Army. For those that 

present the choice as one between capacity and capability, I want to remind them 

that for the Army, soldiers are our capability. The Army must train and equip soldiers to achieve decisive strategic results on the ground. If the funding dictates a 

smaller Army, then we must be prepared for both reduced capacity and reduced capability. 

Admiral GREENERT. After a decade of war, the Navy is faced with many readiness 

challenges, but we are not a ‘‘hollow force.’’ Of particular concern is our capacity to 

complete maintenance on our ships and aircraft in a timely manner. This is precisely why we need the funding requested in the Navy budget submission to achieve 

the necessary readiness of both our platforms and our personnel to execute our missions. Funding below this submission or a return to sequestration would put us on 

a path to ‘‘hollowness.’’ This year, Navy began implementing the O–FRP to focus 

on preserving the time required to maintain its capital-intensive platforms, train 

the force and align other readiness enablers to sustain persistent presence globally 

while retaining contingency response capacity. We continue to provide ready, operationally certified forces forward to the combatant commanders, but at best, it will 

take us 3 to 5 years to recover the required contingency response capacity for major 

crises. 

General WELSH. By almost any means or measure, we are certainly teetering on 

the edge of a hollow force due to the effects of budgeting uncertainty, high 

OPTEMPO affecting ability to train, decades-long overseas engagement, and steady 

funding cuts. Let me be clear that a return to the 2013 BCA funding level will require extensive measures and years to recover readiness and capability. 

General DUNFORD. Yes. We continue to head to a hollowing of the entire force and 

currently a portion of the force is hollow. A hollow force is typically the result of 

reductions in defense spending without concomitant reductions in forces; thus, there 

is not enough equipment to train to those levels of manning. Declining defense 

budgets, operational commitments that exceed capacity, and having to mortgage 

modernization and investments to meet current operational requirements are corrosive factors that degrade readiness and contribute directly to the onset of internal 

decay-a hollowing of the force. 

Approximately half of Marine Corps units are insufficiently resourced to achieve 

those readiness levels needed for a major contingency. Using Marine aviation as an 

example, approximately 80 percent of Marine aviation lack the minimum required 

Ready Basic Aircraft (RBA) to train to the minimum readiness levels. Lack of procurement (future readiness) and aging legacy aircraft negatively impact aircraft 

availability for training and meeting operational demands. A significant training 

and warfighting requirement gap of RBA exists. Operational commitments have increased while the overall number of available aircraft for operations and training 

has decreased. Shallow procurement ramps (not buying aircraft fast enough) directly 

increase both the cost and complexity of maintaining legacy systems beyond their 

projected life. Marine aviation is 106 aircraft short of the training requirement or 

158 aircraft (10-squadron equivalent) short of the wartime formations. Of the remaining 31 squadrons, 22 are below the minimum training level required to go to 

combat in the event of a contingency. 

Our metrics to monitor manning, equipment, and training levels, and assessment 

process provides near-term analysis of readiness of the Marine Corps’ ability to execute operational plans. The full weight of the BCA would preclude the Marine Corps 

from meeting its full statutory and regulatory obligations, and adequately prepare 

for the future. Under sustained sequestration for forces not deploying, the fuel, ammunition, and other support necessary for training would be reduced thus inhibiting 

our ability to provide fully-trained marines and ready units to meet emerging crises 

or unexpected contingencies. We would see real impacts to all home station units, 

then our next-to-deploy and some deploy forces.this constitutes the internal decay, 

the beginnings of the hollow force we have fought so hard to avoid. 

89 

13. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and 

General Dunford, what are the tangible indicators of a hollow force? 

General ODIERNO. I define a hollow force as one where our soldiers are not properly trained; where our soldiers won’t be able to do the exercises that they need; 

where our soldiers won’t have the equipment they need; and the equipment that 

they do have, they will not be able to sustain. 

The choices we must make to meet sequestration-level funding are forcing us to 

reduce our Army to a size and with limited capabilities that I am not comfortable 

with. If we follow this path to its end, we will find a hollow Army. For those that 

present the choice as one between capacity and capability, I want to remind them 

that for the Army, soldiers are our capability. The Army must train and equip soldiers to achieve decisive strategic results on the ground. If the funding dictates a 

smaller Army, then we must be prepared for both reduced capacity and reduced capability. 

Admiral GREENERT. The term ‘‘hollow force’’ has been used differently by many 

speakers and authors over a number of years. From the Navy perspective, ‘‘hollow 

force’’ generally means maintaining a certain capacity, but not having sufficient 

manning, training, or equipment to complete assigned missions or exercise the full 

capability of a unit. This does not translate into a specific quantitative criterion 

with a threshold that specifies whether the Navy is hollow or not because the many 

dimensions of readiness interact with each other. For example, a moderate readiness problem in one dimension can be compensated by strength in another dimension. Thus, in our view, it is not possible in any practical sense to provide a definition of a ‘‘hollow force.’’ However, we can describe degrees of ‘‘hollowness’’ in terms 

of the significance and impact of that dimension on the capability and capacity of 

the Navy as a whole, or individual Navy units, to perform their assigned missions. 

General WELSH. The current DOD readiness systems, Defense Readiness Reporting System, and the Status of Training and Resources System provide the first and 

most ‘‘tangible’’ indication of a hollow force. These systems provide readiness assessments that analyze our capability to meet the demands of the National Military 

Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance. Given our current low readiness levels 

(less than 50 percent of Combat Air Force squadrons are currently ready), these reporting systems were the first indicators that directed our attention to the issue of 

force readiness and the problems we are experiencing. 

Other indicators are the shortfalls we have experienced over the last several years 

in our Weapon System Sustainment accounts, shortages of flight line maintenance 

personnel, and imbalances in experience levels, all of which contribute to our inability to fully execute planned flying training in some weapons systems. OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation validated maintenance manning shortfalls in the 

NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015 directed report, ‘‘Analysis on Air Force Fighter Manning.’’ These constraints limit our production to approximately 95 percent of the 

minimum requirements for our training and readiness needs. 

Furthermore, the current low state of readiness is a direct result of the persistent 

global demands placed on our force amidst significant declines in both force structure and manpower. The result is an Air Force that is deployed on a demanding 

rotation schedule but engaged in operations that encompass only a small subset of 

combat skills that are required to meet operation plan (OPLAN) demands for fullspectrum operations. 

General DUNFORD. There are many indicators that point to a hollow force. Our 

challenge is to recognize such indicators before the onset of hollowing versus recognizing hollowness once decay has set. Underfunding readiness leads to a hollow 

force. Budgetary uncertainty that results in a mismatch between end strength and 

force structure is another leading indicator to a hollow force. Sequestration would 

produce irreversible impacts to readiness that would lead to the hollowing of the 

force. We are already seeing indicators of a hollowing of the force-approximately half 

of Marine Corps units are not resourced to be at the readiness levels needed for a 

major contingency. A hollow force is typically the result of reductions in defense 

spending without concomitant reductions in forces; thus, there is not enough equipment to train to those levels of manning. Other tangible indicators include: (1) insufficient manning to meet force structure for organizational and operational requirements; (2) inability to train due to shortages of equipment, lack of maintenance, and 

insufficient Operations and Maintenance funds; (3) resultant limitations on the ability to respond to contingencies or be forward deployed per operational requirements; 

and (4) transferring funds among accounts to support increased planned and unexpected operational requirements that results in planned maintenance, training, or 

logistics support activities having to be decreased, cancelled, or deferred. 

90 

ASSUMPTIONS

14. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and 

General Dunford, our military budget appears to be based on assumptions developed 

to cut the size and funding for our military, not to protect this Nation against potential future threats. Assumptions such as accepting increased risk in Europe, short 

duration of future conflicts, end of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a more 

stable global security environment do not appear grounded in past, present or future 

reality. What is the impact to national security if these assumptions are wrong? 

General ODIERNO. With an increase in threats around the world that have rendered some of our planning assumptions optimistic, we must acknowledge that the 

fiscal year 2016 post-sequestration spending cap, which was set almost 4 years ago, 

has not kept pace or accounted for an increasingly complex and dangerous world. 

If we are forced to take further endstrength reductions beyond the planned levels 

in the President’s budget due to sequestration, our flexibility deteriorates, as does 

our ability to react to strategic surprise. We are witnessing firsthand mistaken assumptions about the number, duration, location, and size of future conflicts and the 

need to conduct post-stability operations. These miscalculations translate directly 

into increased military risk while the President’s budget represents the bare minimum needed for us to carry out our missions and execute and meet the requirements of our defense strategy. 

Admiral GREENERT. In developing the Navy’s budget submission Navy evaluated 

its warfighting requirements to execute the primary missions of the DSG. These 

were informed by the current and projected threat, global presence requirements as 

defined by the Global Force Management Allocation Plan, and warfighting scenarios 

as described in the Combatant Commanders’ Operation Plans and the Secretary of 

Defense-approved Defense Planning Scenarios. To arrive at a balanced program 

within fiscal guidance, Navy focused on first building appropriate capability, then 

delivering it at a capacity Navy could afford. Navy used the following six budget 

priorities: 

1. Maintain a credible, modern, and survivable sea-based deterrent 

2. Sustain forward presence of ready forces distributed globally to be where it 

matters, when it matters 

3. Strengthen the means (capability and capacity) to win in one multi-phase contingency operation and deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs 

on—another aggressor in another region 

4. Focus on critical afloat and ashore readiness 

5. Sustain or enhance Navy’s asymmetric capabilities in the physical domains, as 

well as in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum 

6. Sustain a relevant industrial base, particularly in shipbuilding 

The Navy’s budget submission does protect the Nation against foreseeable future 

threats. However, the cumulative effect of budget shortfalls over these years has 

forced the Navy to accept significant risk in key mission areas, notably if the military is confronted with a technologically advanced adversary or forced to deny the 

objectives of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region while engaged in a major 

contingency. If assumptions are wrong, and we are not able to enact PB–16 as submitted, we would put at risk our ability to sufficiently meet the missions stated in 

the DSG. 

General WELSH. If our assumptions are incorrect, we will lack the capability, capacity and readiness to fully execute the DSG as articulated in the 2014 QDR and 

current Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) under current plans and Concepts of Operation. 

The United States continues to face a rapidly changing security environment as 

the nature of conflict evolves across all domains and the information environment. 

The Department must maintain ready forces with superior capabilities to ensure the 

Nation has the ability to defeat and deny or impose costs across the full spectrum 

of conflict and to address a wide range of security challenges and risks. The 2014 

QDR outlines three mutually supportive and interdependent pillars that shape our 

defense priorities: protect the homeland; build security globally; and project power 

and win decisively. Further, the strategy emphasizes key tenets that the future joint 

force will continue to support including: rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region to 

preserve peace and stability; maintaining a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe and the Middle East; sustaining a global approach to countering 

violent extremists and terrorist threats, with an emphasis on the Middle East and 

Africa; continuing to protect and prioritize key investments in technology while our 

forces overall grow smaller and leaner; and, invigorating efforts to build innovative 

partnerships and strengthen key alliances and partnerships. 

91 

Following the fiscal year 2017–2021 DPG, the Air Force fiscal year 2016 President’s budget submission seeks balance across the Air Force’s capability, capacity, 

and readiness, facilitating a smaller but more ready and modern force by fiscal year 

2023. The Air Force funds readiness recovery and sheds capacity in legacy force 

structure in order to invest in modernization, especially in mid- to high-end aircraft, 

advanced munitions, ISR, nuclear, and space enhancements. We also must continue 

to strengthen the nuclear enterprise, recapitalize aging aircraft, expand ISR capabilities, increase cyberspace capability, and provide capability to address A2/AD environments. This will require making tradeoffs to ensure the Air Force builds and 

sustains a force able to meet the DSG and combatant command requirements. 

General DUNFORD. The impact to the Marine Corps under an increasingly unstable global security environment is an increase in demand for forces. This will result 

in increased risk to our national security and increased risk to the force; the Marine 

Corps is currently operating near a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio, which is 

unsustainable for the long-term. 

Executing current requirements at President’s budget 2016 levels already puts the 

Marine Corps at the limits of acceptable risk. BCA level funding and/or sequestration will render the current defense strategy unexecutable. 

SHORT- AND LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF SEQUESTRATION

15. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and 

General Dunford, what are the short- and long-term impacts of each of your Services training and modernization cuts and delays? Why should Congress and the 

American public care? 

General ODIERNO. Sequestration cuts have had a detrimental impact on training 

and modernization. In fiscal year 2013, the Army cancelled combat training center 

rotations for seven brigade combat teams, the equivalent of two divisions. Additionally, the lingering effects of cuts in fiscal year 2014 left the Army just nine brigade 

combat teams that are both available and have the training necessary to conduct 

decisive action. We estimate that sequestration will affect over 80 Army programs; 

for example, approximately $716 million of fiscal year 2013 reset (maintenance) was 

deferred into fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015 and contributed to a backlog of 

172 aircraft awaiting maintenance, directly impacting the ability of combat aviation 

brigades to conduct higher echelon collective training. Similarly, reset was postponed for 700 vehicles, almost 2,000 weapons, over 10,000 pieces of communications 

equipment, equipment destined for Army Prepositioned Stocks and other soldier 

equipment. Within aviation, the procurement of a new Armed Aerial Scout helicopter had to be cancelled, requiring the development of new organizational concepts, which ultimately contributed to the implementation of the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI). Modernization of Air Defense Command and Control systems 

were delayed at a time of increased instability in North East Asia. Finally, sequestration delayed the modernization of our Apache helicopters from fiscal year 2013 

to fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015. 

If sequestration returns in fiscal year 2016, the impacts will be much more severe 

across our acquisition programs requiring us to end, restructure, or delay every program with an overall modernization investment decrease of 40 percent. Home station training will be severely underfunded, resulting in decreased training levels. 

Within our institutional support, we will be forced to drop over 5,000 seats from Initial Military Training, 85,000 seats from specialized training, and over 1,000 seats 

in our pilot training programs. Our soldier and family readiness programs will be 

weakened, and our investments in installation training and readiness facility upgrades will be affected impacting our long-term readiness strategies. Therefore, sustainable readiness will remain out of reach with our individual and unit readiness 

rapidly deteriorating between 2016–2020. 

The lack of consistent and predictable funding for training and modernization impacts the decisions that Army leaders have to make today and tomorrow. To the extent that those decisions may unduly burden our soldiers in their mission accomplishment in garrison and in contingency operations, the American public should be 

very concerned that their Army may be less than fully prepared when called upon. 

Admiral GREENERT. Navy has prioritized training for deploying units, even 

through sequestration, to ensure our crews do not bear the brunt of budget shortfalls and were as fully prepared as possible for deployment. The same was not true 

in training for units not next in line to deploy, which has contributed to our reduced 

contingency response capacity today. A return to sequestration would disrupt our 

plan to complete reset of our Fleet and to restore training necessary for full contingency operations capacity. 

92 

Modernization of the Fleet is both a priority and a concern. The pace of modernization is slower than I desire. However, modernization efforts do continue with 

new ships and technology coming online each year of the FYDP. A return to sequestration would further slow modernization, parts, and ordnance procurement needed 

to keep pace with the evolving threat. 

General WELSH. If the Air Force cannot meet the demands of the DSG, it means 

lives will be lost and the United States might not win the next high-end conflict. 

At BCA level funding, the Air Force will not be able to recover readiness, and 

modernization investment will take a substantial hit. 

In training and readiness: BCA-level funding will further cut the Air Force’s flying hour program, which currently only meets approximately 95 percent of our established requirements. All units will be forced to fly a reduced program that falls 

further below the minimum training requirements. The cuts truncate our ability to 

offer key opportunities that provide full-spectrum training, such as Red Flag exercises. The Air Force will lose two of four annual Red Flag exercises at Nellis Air 

Force Base. Additionally, the Air Force will lose 6 of 12 Green Flag exercises, which 

is the capstone event for pre-deployment joint training, and 1 of 2 Weapons Instructor Courses, which is the premier school developing our future tacticians and 

warfighting experts. Those cuts, coupled with a demanding deploy-to-dwell, will result in a significant readiness decline that will take years to recover. 

In modernization: Cuts and delays mean an Air Force less able to meet combatant 

commander capability and capacity requirements now and into the future. The capability gap is closing and many of our systems are outdated and do not fully meet 

the demands of modern warfare. For example, when systems like the B–2 Defensive 

Management System and the F–15 Eagle Passive/Active Survivability and Warning 

System are delayed, our aircrews are increasingly at risk when operating in hostile 

airspace against increasing numbers of very capable air defense systems. Additionally, as modernization is delayed, economies of scale in unit production are not realized, resulting in higher system costs over time. 

To sustain U.S. global leadership, the Nation must field a military more advanced, more ready, and more modern than the enemy. Training cuts and delayed 

modernization continue to contribute to substandard and declining readiness. This 

will create substantial risk to mission success, protracted and prolonged combat operations, and higher casualty rates of our men and women in uniform. 

General DUNFORD. A discussion of the impacts of the cuts to training and modernization must be had through the lens of the Five Pillars of Readiness. But first, 

the American people should care because this affects the ability of their marines to 

be ready to be ready for today’s conflicts and throws into serious doubt their preparedness for future conflicts. History has proven that failure to appropriately train 

and modernize the force will result in larger numbers of casualties and deaths. 

With regard to training, marines must have the appropriate time to reset from 

one deployment and be train for their next deployment. In order to make continuous 

and long-term readiness a reality, we have to be able to train personnel and perform 

maintenance on equipment. Right now, we have about a 1:2 deployment to dwell 

ratio. That is, marines are deployed for 7 months and home for 14. This allows a 

proper unit rotation to ensure that each time a unit deploys they are fully ready. 

If we are forced to take further cuts, that level will decrease closer to 1:1.5 or 1:1. 

What this means is that units have less time between deployments to conduct the 

required training prior to their next deployment. Further cuts will also negatively 

affect the quality of that training. 

More specifically, home station readiness is at risk when personnel and equipment are sourced to protect the readiness of deployed and next-to deploy units. This 

is a logical decision when validated operational requirements exceed resource availability. Home station units are expected to be in a higher state of readiness since 

the Marine Corps is charged to be the Nations’ force in readiness. The way they 

preserve this readiness is through training. By way of example, five of the last six 

infantry battalions assigned to Marine Expeditionary Units were not prepared until 

30 days before deployment. This is sufficient for planned deployments, but becomes 

problematic and dangerous as conflicts extend or the need to respond to unexpended 

crises arises. 

As for modernization, delays and cuts mean that marines will have to deploy 

today with legacy equipment that requires more maintenance and puts them in danger of deploying in the future with obsolete equipment that will be outclassed by 

that of our adversary, putting both mission accomplishment and the safety of your 

marines in jeopardy. 

16. Senator INHOFE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and 

General Dunford, I know each of your Services have transferred bills to the out 

93 

years in hope that there will be more funding in the future. How much funding for 

modernization, sustainment and training has each of your Services pushed into the 

future years? What is the cost increase by postponing this funding? 

General ODIERNO. We have pushed several billions of dollars for equipment modernization, equipment maintenance, facilities maintenance, and leader development 

into the future in order to sustain a minimal level of readiness in our current force. 

Under the effects of sequestration, the readiness portfolio takes a severe reduction 

that the Army will be unable to recover from until fiscal year 2023. The cumulative 

effect of this is that we will have a less ready future force that will require a dramatic infusion of funds when called to war, much like we faced in the 2003–2005 

period where our troops had insufficient equipment. Some of the costs are not possible to quantify, such as the inability to retain our technological overmatch, reduced leader development, and training opportunities. Other costs are easier to 

quantify, such as deferring reset and maintenance funding of nearly 700 vehicles, 

almost 2,000 weapons, over 10,000 pieces of communications equipment, and Army 

Prepositioned Stocks, as well as a backlog of facilities maintenance due to the chronic underfunding of our facilities maintenance accounts. In the end, the entire cost 

will be placed on the back of the soldier, who will to deploy with inadequate equipment and training—that cost can never be quantified. 

Admiral GREENERT. The Navy mitigated the impacts of sequestration in fiscal 

year 2013 by reducing afloat and ashore operations, deferring some purchases to future years, and using prior-year investment balances to mitigate impacts to programs in fiscal year 2013 execution. The actions we took in 2013 to mitigate sequestration only served to transfer bills amounting to over $2 billion to future years for 

many procurement programs. In addition, the Navy deferred about $1 billion in facilities sustainment projects that will need to be executed, likely at an increased 

cost because of further deterioration. 

Our PB–14 FYDP submission represented the baseline required by the Navy to 

carry out all ten DSG missions. Over the last 3 years, though, Navy funding under 

sequestration and the BBA was $25,000 less than the PB–13/14 submissions, shortfalls that manifest in the continued erosion of our warfighting advantages in many 

areas relative to potential adversaries. We were compelled to delay modernization 

in air-to-air warfare, antisurface warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and integrated air 

and missile defense. If sequestered, the Navy’s modernization, sustainment, and 

training would be further impacted, exacerbating an already high risk situation. 

Finally, sequestration in fiscal year 2013 also compelled us to reduce operations 

which cannot be recovered in future years. Deployments and training were cancelled, USS Miami was inactivated instead of repaired, and furloughs and a hiring 

freeze resulted in lost production. Maintenance and training backlogs have reduced 

Navy’s ability to maintain required forces for contingency response to meet combatant command operational plan requirements. Assuming a stable budget and no 

major contingencies for the foreseeable future, I estimate it is possible to recover 

from the maintenance backlogs that have accumulated from the high OPTEMPO 

over the last decade of war and the additional effects of sequestration by approximately 2018 for CSGs and approximately 2020 for ARGs, 5 plus years after the first 

round of sequestration. This is a small glimpse of the qualitative readiness ‘‘price’’ 

of sequestration that is pushed into the future years. 

General WELSH. The Air Force pushed approximately $3.8 billion out of fiscal year 

2016 during the fiscal year 2016 President’s budget build. The cost increase is currently unknown as not every item removed from fiscal year 2016 was replaced in 

a FYDP year. Beyond inflation, it would be difficult to estimate the cost without coordination through all affected program offices. Below is a list of items and the 

amount of money pushed from fiscal year 2016 to future years. 

94 

General DUNFORD. In order to preserve near-term readiness of deployed units, the 

Marine Corps assumed risk in home station unit readiness and investment in infrastructure and modernization. In an attempt to regain balance across the pillars of 

readiness, the fiscal year 2016 President’s budget includes an increase to Marine 

Corps investment by 55 percent across the FYDP. However, this increase is based 

on the current budget’s funding levels. Funding levels below the President’s budget, 

either through a mechanical sequester or BCA-level caps, would significantly increase the assumed risk. 

The risks associated with training stem from a suboptimal deployment-to-dwell 

ratio, as this is more a matter of time than dollars. A lower deployment-to-dwell 

ratio means training is focused on the immediate deployment requirements based 

on the time available. Limited training time decreases the ability to build institutional readiness through training across the full range of military operations. The 

bottom line is that your Marine Corps will remain ready to respond to the Nation’s 

call; however, our capacity to respond may be severely diminished. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

SEQUESTRATION REMEDIES

17. Senator WICKER. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and 

General Dunford, would each of you welcome legislative authority that would enable 

DOD some flexibility as to where to make the budget cuts mandated by the sequester? 

General ODIERNO. The Army has made tough choices and needs congressional 

support for compensation reform, force restructuring to include the Aviation Restructuring Initiative, and a cost-saving Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

eliminating a half a billion dollars per year of excess infrastructure capacity that 

is currently in the Army. 

Additionally, if Congress does not act to mitigate the magnitude and method of 

the reductions under the sequestration, the Army will be forced to make blunt reductions in end strength, readiness, and modernization. We cannot take the readiness of our force for granted. If we do not have the resources to train and equip 

the force, our soldiers, our young men and women, are the ones who will pay the 

price, potentially with their lives. It is our shared responsibility to ensure that we 

never send members of our military into harm’s way who are not trained, equipped, 

well-led, and ready for any contingency to include war. We must come up with a 

better solution to avoid the path of a hollow army. 

Admiral GREENERT. Our first hope is that Congress will be able to lift the spending caps set by the BCA. Our fiscal year 2016 President’s budget represents the abVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE

128ful4.eps
95 

solute minimum funding levels needed to execute our defense strategy. A return to 

sequestration would necessitate a revisit and revision of the defense strategy. 

General WELSH. Legislation providing flexibility during a sequestration is certainly welcome; however, BCA level funding constraints would jeopardize the Air 

Force’s ability to meet the DSG. 

General DUNFORD. In order to ensure the Marine Corps receives the necessary resources to facilitate acceptable levels across troop readiness, equipment modernization, and facilities sustainment, further sequestering of the defense budgets must 

be avoided. If sequestration is again forced upon the Marine Corps, the fiscal challenges we currently face would be exacerbated, and additional risk would be assumed that would greatly reduce our capacity to meet operational requirements in 

the long term. 

18. Senator WICKER. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and 

General Dunford, what additional legislative authorizes do you requires to allow 

your Services the flexibility needed to avoid hollowing out the force? 

General ODIERNO. The Army has made tough choices and needs congressional 

support for compensation reform, force restructuring to include the Aviation Restructuring Initiative, and a cost-saving BRAC eliminating a half a billion dollars 

per year of excess infrastructure capacity that is currently in the Army. 

Additionally, if Congress does not act to mitigate the magnitude and method of 

the reductions under the sequestration, the Army will be forced to make blunt reductions in end strength, readiness, and modernization. We cannot take the readiness of our force for granted. If we do not have the resources to train and equip 

the force, our soldiers, our young men and women, are the ones who will pay the 

price, potentially with their lives. It is our shared responsibility to ensure that we 

never send members of our military into harm’s way who are not trained, equipped, 

well-led, and ready for any contingency to include war. We must come up with a 

better solution to avoid the path of a hollow army. 

Admiral GREENERT. Legislative action to lift the BCA spending caps and prevent 

sequestration would be the best path to avoid hollowing the force. Our fiscal year 

2016 President’s budget is the minimum funding needed to meet the current defense 

strategy. In conjunction with repeal of the BCA, approval of the fiscal year 2016 

President’s budget represents the best hope for our Nation’s future defense. 

General WELSH. To prevent a hollowing of the Air Force, we need relief from BCA 

caps and we need relief from prohibitions and limitations associated with retirement 

and divestiture of aging force structure. Authorization to conduct a BRAC would 

also free up resources for our most important recapitalization and modernization 

programs. 

In addition to force structure divestiture and BRAC authority, we need reprogramming authority to allow flexibility to fund emerging mission requirements 

and cover must pay bills. Specifically, we need increased General Transfer Authority 

and fewer imposed floors. Current Secretary of Defense transfer approval authority 

does not provide adequate flexibility to support emergent warfighter requirements. 

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps’ current resource level represents a bare 

bones budget for the Marine Corps that can meet the current DSG. It allows the 

Marine Corps to protect near-term readiness; however, it does so at the expense of 

long-term modernization and infrastructure, threatening a balance across the Five 

Pillars of Readiness (high quality people, unit readiness, capacity to meet the combatant commanders’ requirements, infrastructure sustainment, and equipment modernization). An imbalance amongst the Pillars will lead to conditions that could hollow the force and create unacceptable risk for our national defense. In order to ensure the Marine Corps receives the necessary resources to facilitate acceptable levels across troop readiness, equipment modernization, and facilities sustainment, further sequestering of the defense budgets must be avoided. If sequestration is again 

forced upon the Marine Corps, the fiscal challenges we currently face would be exacerbated, and additional risk would be assumed that would greatly reduce our capacity to meet operational requirements in the long-term. 

19. Senator WICKER. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and 

General Dunford, the return of sequestration is the law of the land. What are you 

doing differently this year when it comes to planning for sequestration? 

General ODIERNO. The President’s budget represents the bare minimum needed 

for us to carry out our missions and execute and meet the requirements of our defense strategy. A return to sequestration-level funding would require the Army to 

size and equip the force based on what we can afford, not what we need, increasing 

the risk that when called to deploy, we will either not have enough soldiers or will 

send soldiers that are not properly trained and equipped. As I have stated before, 

96 

if the discretionary cap reductions from sequestration occur, the Army will be at 

grave risk of being unable to fully execute the DSG requirements. 

If sequestration returns, we will need to reduce end strength even further to 

420,000 in the AC by fiscal year 2020; and 315,000 in the National Guard and 

185,000 in the Army Reserve. We will cut 10 to 12 additional combat brigades. We 

will be forced to further reduce modernization and readiness levels over the next 

5 years because we simply can’t drawdown end strength any quicker to generate the 

required savings. 

The impacts will be much more severe across our acquisition programs requiring 

us to end, restructure, or delay every program with an overall modernization investment decrease of 40 percent. Home station training will be severely underfunded, 

resulting in decreased training levels. Within our institutional support, we will be 

forced to drop over 5,000 seats from Initial Military Training, 85,000 seats from specialized training, and over 1,000 seats in our pilot training programs. Our soldier 

and family readiness programs will be weakened, and our investments in installation training and readiness facility upgrades will be affected impacting our longterm readiness strategies. Therefore, sustainable readiness will remain out of reach 

with our individual and unit readiness rapidly deteriorating between 2016 to 2020. 

It is our decisions, those that we make today and in the near future, that will 

impact our soldiers, our Army, the Joint Force, and our Nation’s security posture 

for the next 10 years. 

Admiral GREENERT. The fiscal year 2016 President’s budget provides the funding 

and reforms needed to execute the defense strategy. The President has made clear 

that he is not going to accept a budget that locks in sequestration going forward, 

and he will not accept a budget that severs the vital link between our national security and our economic security, both of which are important to the Nation’s safety, 

international standing, and long-term prosperity. 

I stand by the fiscal year 2016 President’s budget as the investments needed to 

protect national security. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would necessitate a revisit and revision of the defense strategy. The required cuts would force 

us to further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed for contingency responses, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego or 

stretch procurement of force structure as a last resort. Because of funding shortfalls 

over the last 3 years, our fiscal year 2016 President’s budget represents the absolute 

minimum funding levels needed to execute our defense strategy. We cannot provide 

a responsible way to budget for the defense strategy at sequester levels because 

there isn’t one. 

General WELSH. The fiscal year 2016 President’s budget supports our critical 

needs to execute the defense strategy, but we made tough choices in capacity and 

capability/modernization. OMB has provided direction through OSD that the Air 

Force does not support any reductions to the President’s budget. Without a repeal 

of sequestration the Air Force will simply not have the capacity required to fully 

meet the current DSG. Therefore, support of the President’s budget and repeal of 

2013 BCA is essential. If forced into BCA funding levels in fiscal year 2016, we 

would, out of necessity divest entire fleets, reduce quantities for procurement of 

weapons systems, and reduce readiness accounts. Potential impacts include: 

• Divest RQ–4 Block 40 fleet and cut Block 30 modifications 

• Reduce MQ–1/MQ–9 ISR capacity by 10 CAPs—equivalent to current operations in Iraq/Syria 

• Retire KC–10 fleet—15 in fiscal year 2016 and 59 total across FYDP 

• Defer second Presidential Aircraft Recapitalization 

• Reduce Flying Hours, Weapon System Sustainment, range support and 

munitions 

• Reduce quantities for fighter recapitalization (F–35As) by 14 aircraft in 

fiscal year 2016 

• Reduce investments in Space programs, Cyber Mission Areas, Nuclear 

Enterprise, and Science and Technology 

• Terminate Adaptive Engine Program 

• Divest 7 E–3s in fiscal year 2016 

• Divest U–2 

Bottom line—stable budgets at a higher level than BCA are critical to long-term 

strategic planning, meeting the DSG, and protecting the Homeland. 

General DUNFORD. The President’s budget represents the limit of acceptable risk 

for the Marine Corps in terms of both end strength and funding; while we can meet 

the requirements of the DSG today, there is no margin. A sequestered budget in 

fiscal year 2016 would preclude the Marine Corps from meeting these requirements 

and would result in a Marine Corps with fewer active duty battalions and squadrons 

97 

than would be required for a single major contingency. It would also result in a 

much smaller forward deployed presence, lengthening response times to crises involving our diplomatic posts, American citizens, or other overseas interests. Furthermore, to protect our near-term readiness to the extent possible, we will be forced 

to take additional risk in infrastructure and equipment modernization, as well as 

the training and equipping of our home station units, exacerbating our current institutional readiness imbalances. 

20. Senator WICKER. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and 

General Dunford, are each of you prepared to execute a budget that incorporates 

sequestration through at least fiscal year 2016? 

General ODIERNO. The President’s fiscal year 2016 budget represents the bare 

minimum needed for us to carry out our missions and execute and meet the requirements of our defense strategy. It is in fact a tenuous House of Cards. In order for 

the President’s fiscal year 2016 budget to work, all of our proposed reforms in pay 

and compensation must be approved. All of our force structure reforms must be supported, to include the ARI. We must be allowed to eliminate $.5 billion per year of 

excess infrastructure that we have in the Army. We potentially face a $12 billion 

shortfall in our budget. If BBA caps remain, that adds another $6 billion in potential problems. 

Anything below the President’s budget compromises our strategic flexibility. It 

would compel us to reduce end strength even further. It inadequately funds readiness. It further degrades an already under-funded modernization program. It impacts our ability to conduct simultaneous operations and shape regional security environments. It puts into question our capacity to deter and compel multiple adversaries. If the unpredictable does happen, we will no longer have the depth to react. 

Admiral GREENERT. No. A return to sequestration-level funding would significantly reduce the military’s ability to fully implement the President’s defense strategy. The required cuts would force us to further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed for contingency responses, further downsize 

weapons capacity, and forego or stretch procurement of force structure as a last resort. We cannot provide a responsible way to budget for the current defense strategy 

at sequester levels because there isn’t one. The Navy hopes that Congress will lift 

the spending caps of the BCA and avoid sequestration. 

General WELSH. The fiscal year 2016 President’s budget supports our critical 

needs to execute the defense strategy, but we made tough choices in capacity and 

capability/modernization. OMB has provided direction through OSD that the Air 

Force does not support any reductions to the President’s budget. Without a repeal 

of sequestration the Air Force will simply not have the capacity required to fully 

meet the current DSG. Therefore, support of the President’s budget and repeal of 

2013 BCA is essential. If forced into BCA funding levels in fiscal year 2016, we 

would, out of necessity divest entire fleets, reduce quantities for procurement of 

weapons systems, and reduce readiness accounts. Potential impacts include: 

• Divest RQ–4 Block 40 fleet and cut Block 30 modifications 

• Reduce MQ–1/MQ–9 ISR capacity by 10 CAPs—equivalent to current operations in Iraq/Syria 

• Retire KC–10 fleet—15 in fiscal year 2016 and 59 total across FYDP 

• Defer second Presidential Aircraft Recapitalization 

• Reduce Flying Hours, Weapon System Sustainment, range support and 

munitions 

• Reduce quantities for fighter recapitalization (F–35As) by 14 aircraft in 

fiscal year 2016 

• Reduce investments in Space programs, Cyber Mission Areas, Nuclear 

Enterprise, and Science and Technology 

• Terminate Adaptive Engine Program 

• Divest 7 E–3s in fiscal year 2016 

• Divest U–2 

Bottom line—stable budgets at a higher level than BCA are critical to long-term 

strategic planning, meeting the DSG, and protecting the Homeland. 

General DUNFORD. Sequestration would force the Marine Corps to significantly 

degrade the readiness of our home station units, which is the Marine Corps’ Ready 

Force to respond to crises or major combat operations. The fiscal challenges we face 

today will be further exacerbated by assuming even more risk in long-term modernization and infrastructure in order to maintain ready forces forward. This is not 

sustainable and degrades our capacity as the Nation’s force in readiness. 

98 

SEAPOWER

21. Senator WICKER. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, can you briefly 

elaborate on how as return to the defense sequester would threaten the Navy and 

Marine Corps’ ability to decisively project power abroad? 

Admiral GREENERT. Naval forces are more important than ever in building global 

security, projecting power, deterring foes, and rapidly responding to crises that affect our national security. A return to sequestration would force Navy to degrade 

current and future fleet readiness, significantly weakening our ability to respond to 

crises and project power overseas. 

The fiscal year 2015 budget represented another shortfall from the resources we 

indicated were necessary to fully resource the DSG missions, making Navy less 

ready to successfully Deter and Defeat Aggression and Project Power A2/AD Challenges. Continuing along this budget trajectory means that by 2020, the DSG benchmark year, Navy will have insufficient contingency response capacity to execute 

large-scale operations in one region while simultaneously deterring another adversary’s aggression elsewhere. Also, we will lose our advantage over adversaries in key 

warfighting areas: air-to-air warfare, integrated air and missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-surface warfare. 

Carrier strike groups (CSGs) and ARGs possess significant power projection capabilities, and we are committed to keeping, on average, three CSGs and three ARGs 

in a contingency response status, ready to deploy within 30 days to meet combatant 

commander (COCOM) OPLANs requirements. However, if sequestered, we will unable to sustain the readiness of both our forward deployed forces and those forces 

in a contingency response status. We will prioritize the readiness of our forward deployed forces and only be able to provide a response force of one CSG and one ARG. 

This reduction in available contingency forces will impact COCOM OPLANs, which 

are predicated on our ability to respond rapidly. Less contingency response capacity 

means longer timelines to arrive and prevail, more ships and aircraft out of action 

in battle, more sailors, marines, and merchant mariners killed, and less credibility 

to deter adversaries and assure allies in the future. 

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps, as the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness, defends the homeland with forward presence. 

BCA funding levels with sequester rules will preclude the Marine Corps from 

meeting the requirements of the Defense Strategy. While we can meet the requirements today, there is no margin. Even without sequestration, we will need several 

years to recover from over a decade of war and the last 3 years of flat budgets and 

fiscal uncertainty. 

Sequester will exacerbate the challenges we have today. We already assume risk 

in amphibious shipping from a requirement of 38 ships to fight a major combat operation, to a fiscally constrained objective of 33. Sequestration will further impact 

the Navy’s amphibious ship program, resulting in fewer marines and sailors being 

forward deployed in a position to immediately respond to crises involving our diplomatic posts, American citizens or interest overseas. 

Sequestration may also result in a Marine Corps with fewer total active duty battalions and squadrons than would be required for a single major contingency. Sequestration triggers the Nation to accept risk in the readiness of the strategic depth 

of its non-deployed forces. These non-deployed units are exactly the forces that allow 

us to globally project power beyond the capabilities of our forward-deployed forces. 

We will have fewer forces, arriving less trained, arriving later to the fight. This 

will delay the buildup of combat power, allowing the enemy more time to build its 

defenses and would likely prolong combat operations all together. The effect is more 

American lives lost. 

22. Senator WICKER. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, what is your assessment of the impact sequestration would have on our amphibious forces and our 

Navy and Marine Corps’ ability to execute the pivot to Asia? 

Admiral GREENERT. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would necessitate a revisit and revision of the DSG. Sequestration would force higher risk in 

our ability to provide a stabilizing presence. We will continue to deploy our most 

advanced units to the Asia-Pacific, but they may not have the sensors, weapons, and 

capabilities to deal with potential adversaries. The fiscal year 2015 budget represented another shortfall from the resources we indicated were necessary to fully 

resource the DSG missions, making Navy less ready to successfully Deter and Defeat Aggression and Project Power Despite A2/AD Challenges. Continuing along this 

budget trajectory means that by 2020, the DSG benchmark year, Navy will have insufficient contingency response capacity to execute large-scale operations in one region while simultaneously deterring another adversary’s aggression elsewhere. Also, 

99 

we will lose our advantage over adversaries in key warfighting areas: air-to-air warfare, integrated air and missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-surface 

warfare. 

General DUNFORD. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would impact the 

Marine Corps’ ability to execute the pivot through its effect on military construction 

(MILCON), as the pivot relies on rebasing marines in Guam and Hawaii, and 

MILCON is an important part of those moves. Impacts to MILCON due to sequestration, including MILCON in the Pacific, would need to be part of a larger conversation about the priorities of the Department and the defense strategy under a 

sequestered budget. Specifically in fiscal year 2016 the construction of the Live Fire 

Training Range Complex, $126 million, would not commence. 

SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE

23. Senator WICKER. Admiral Greenert, given sequestration’s impending return, 

what is the Navy’s near-term contingency plan to help protect and preserve the U.S. 

shipbuilding industry and its employees, and how do we keep them employed if we 

build fewer ships and perform less ship maintenance? 

Admiral GREENERT. Sustaining our industrial base continues to be a budget priority for the Navy. Stability and predictability are critical to the health and 

sustainment of this vital sector of our Nation’s industrial capacity. Disruptions in 

naval ship design and construction plans are significant because of the long-lead 

time, specialized skills, and extent of integration needed to build military ships. Any 

cancelled ship procurements in fiscal year 2016 will likely cause some suppliers and 

vendors of our shipbuilding industrial base to close their businesses. This skilled, 

experienced and innovative workforce cannot be easily replaced and it could take 

years to recover from layoffs and shutdowns; and even longer if critical infrastructure is lost. Because of its irreversibility, shipbuilding cuts represent options of last 

resort for the Navy. We would look elsewhere to absorb sequestration shortfalls to 

the greatest extent possible. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE LEE

SEQUESTRATION

24. Senator LEE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General 

Dunford, to give us a picture beyond some of the programmatic risks that would 

exist if defense sequestration fully starts October, can you please outline a potential 

contingency that you believe your respective branches will likely have to respond 

to in the coming years—such as an aggressive air or naval action against U.S. persons or preventing a terrorist attack on U.S. interests, and how your ability to respond to this contingency will be impacted under sequestration? 

General ODIERNO. For the past 3 years, we have developed several budget strategies in response to fiscal constraints that we knew we were going to face. We made 

some assumptions in that budget that must now be revisited. 

We assumed we could accept risks in Europe. Now, we face major security issues 

in Europe ranging from increasing Russian aggression to a rise in soft target attacks by terrorist networks. We made decisions based on the fact that we were coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan and did not anticipate sending people back into 

Iraq. We made an assumption that although we knew we had a long fight against 

extremist organizations around the world, we could focus our budget primarily on 

defeating al Qaeda. We now have emerging extremist networks that are destabilizing regions around the world in ways we did not foresee. Over the last year, 

we witnessed the growing threat and gruesome toll of ISIL. 

We assumed that future conflicts will be short in duration. But the threats we 

face today cannot be solved quickly. Defeating ISIL will require years of sustained 

international commitment. Without persistent pressure and focus, groups such as 

ISIL will continue to ravage populations and undermine regional stability. So we 

must recognize that the operating environment has changed. 

With an increase in threats around the world that have rendered some of our 

planning assumptions optimistic, we must acknowledge that the fiscal year 2016 

post-sequestration spending cap, which was set almost 4 years ago, has not kept 

pace or accounted for an increasingly complex and dangerous world. If we are forced 

to take further endstrength reductions beyond the planned levels in the President’s 

budget due to sequestration, our flexibility deteriorates, as does our ability to react 

to strategic surprise. We are witnessing firsthand mistaken assumptions about the 

number, duration, location, and size of future conflicts and the need to conduct postVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
100 

stability operations. These miscalculations translate directly into increased military 

risk. 

Admiral GREENERT. Potential scenarios, and the Navy’s ability to respond to 

them, should be discussed at a classified level. Suffice it to say, a return to sequestration would significantly weaken the U.S. Navy’s ability to contribute to United 

States and global security. If sequestered, we will prioritize the readiness of deployed forces at the expense of those in a contingency response status. We cannot 

do both. We will only be able to provide a 30-day contingency response force of one 

CSG and one ARG. Current OPLANs, which are predicated on our ability to rapidly 

surge forces, require a significantly more ready force than we can provide at sequestration levels of funding. Reduced contingency response capacity can mean higher 

casualties as wars are prolonged by the slow arrival of naval forces into a combat 

zone. Without the ability to respond rapidly, our forces could arrive too late to affect 

the outcome of a fight. 

General WELSH. In any contingency scenario involving aggressive air action 

against the United States or our interests, we will likely be forced to redistribute 

deployed Air Force forces due to the limited amount of available force structure. In 

the process of addressing an emerging threat, we would increase the risk to missions and forces in the areas that would be vacated. 

Regardless of the possible scenarios, as I have stated in the past, if we are not 

ready for all possible scenarios, we will be forced to accept what I believe is unnecessary risk, which means we may not get there in time, it may take the joint team 

longer to win, and our people will be placed at greater risk. 

General DUNFORD. The 2014 QDR and other Defense Department planning documents mandate ‘‘.the U.S. Armed Forces will be capable of simultaneously defending 

the homeland; conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and in 

multiple regions, deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward presence 

and engagement. If deterrence fails at any given time, U.S. forces will be capable 

of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and denying the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—a second aggressor in another region.’’ 

This is known as the Defeat/Deny imperative—to defeat a regional adversary 

while simultaneously deterring another. Under sequestration, the Marine Corps 

would have fewer forces forward deployed than today to adequately assure allies 

and partners and to provide a deterrent effect. This also means we would have 

fewer forces than would be required to meet a single, major contingency (defeat imperative), not to mention imposing costs on a second adversary in a different theater 

of war (deny imperative). 

Also, please see the classified 2015 CRA and accompanying the Secretary of Defense’s RMP for amplification, submitted to Congress in February. 

25. Senator LEE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General 

Dunford, as it currently stands in law, sequestration will take effect at the end of 

this fiscal year. In 2013, many in DOD and in Congress expected there would be 

a fix to defense sequester, and were not prepared as needed when sequestration 

started. Have you received any instruction from OMB to prepare for potential sequestration in fiscal year 2016? What have you done in your respective branches 

to start preparing for potential sequestration in fiscal year 2016? 

General ODIERNO. In preparation for fiscal year 2016, we worked closely with 

DOD and OMB in developing our budget request as part of the President’s fiscal 

year 2016 budget request. 

The President’s fiscal year 2016 budget represents the bare minimum needed for 

us to carry out our missions and execute and meet the requirements of our defense 

strategy. It is in fact a tenuous House of Cards. In order for the President’s fiscal 

year 2016 budget to work, all of our proposed reforms in pay and compensation 

must be approved. All of our force structure reforms must be supported, to include 

the ARI. We must be allowed to eliminate $.5 billion per year of excess infrastructure that we have in the Army. We potentially face a $12 billion shortfall in our 

budget. If BCA caps remain, that adds another $6 billion in potential problems. 

Anything below the President’s budget compromises our strategic flexibility. It 

would compel us to reduce end strength even further. It inadequately funds readiness. It further degrades an already under-funded modernization program. It impacts our ability to conduct simultaneous operations and shape regional security environments. It puts into question our capacity to deter and compel multiple adversaries. If the unpredictable does happen, we will no longer have the depth to react. 

Admiral GREENERT. The Department has not yet received direction from OMB to 

begin planning for sequestration in fiscal year 2016. While we are looking at the 

overall impacts of a sequester or reduced spending caps, we have not yet done any 

101 

detailed planning for reduce spending to achieve the mandated caps in fiscal year 

2016. 

General WELSH. The fiscal year 2016 President’s budget supports our critical 

needs to execute the defense strategy, but we made tough choices in capacity and 

capability/modernization. OMB has provided direction through OSD that the Air 

Force does not support any reductions to the President’s budget. Without a repeal 

of sequestration the Air Force will simply not have the capacity required to fully 

meet the current DSG. Therefore, support of the President’s budget and repeal of 

2013 BCA is essential. If forced into BCA funding levels in fiscal year 2016, we 

would, out of necessity divest entire fleets, reduce quantities for procurement of 

weapons systems, and reduce readiness accounts. Potential impacts include: 

• Divest RQ–4 Block 40 fleet and cut Block 30 modifications 

• Reduce MQ–1/MQ–9 ISR capacity by 10 CAPs—equivalent to current operations in Iraq/Syria 

• Retire KC–10 fleet—15 in fiscal year 2016 and 59 total across FYDP 

• Defer second Presidential Aircraft Recapitalization 

• Reduce Flying Hours, Weapon System Sustainment, range support and 

munitions 

• Reduce quantities for fighter recapitalization (F–35As) by 14 aircraft in 

fiscal year 2016 

• Reduce investments in Space programs, Cyber Mission Areas, Nuclear 

Enterprise, and Science and Technology 

• Terminate Adaptive Engine Program 

• Divest seven E–3s in fiscal year 2016 

• Divest U–2 

Bottom line—stable budgets at a higher level than BCA are critical to long-term 

strategic planning, meeting the DSG, and protecting the Homeland. 

General DUNFORD. The fiscal year 2016 President’s budget is the bare bones budget for the Marine Corps that can meet the current DSG. The budget prioritizes nearterm readiness at the expense of modernization and facilities, and only achieves a 

1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio, which is unsustainable over the long term. Sequestration would force the Marine Corps to significantly degrade the readiness of our 

home station units, which is the Marine Corps’ Ready Force to respond to crises or 

major combat operations. The fiscal challenges we face today will be further exacerbated by assuming even more risk in long-term modernization and infrastructure 

in order to maintain ready forces forward. This is not sustainable and degrades our 

capacity as the Nation’s force-in-readiness. 

26. Senator LEE. General Odierno, General Welsh, and General Dunford, the Reserve Forces Policy Board stated in their report last February that: 

‘‘The Department has built a stronger, more capable, better equipped, battled tested Guard and Reserve Force than we have had in any time in our recent history. 

Therefore, the Department should not squander the benefits derived from those investments and hard won experience gained in combat.’’ 

The board has also previously found that the fully burdened and life-cycle cost of 

a reservist or guardsman is less than a third of their Active-Duty counterpart. 

Whether sequestration continues or not, how do you intend to use these efficiencies 

and combat experience identified in your Guard and Reserve units to maintain readiness and combat experience and maximize combat power and depth? 

General ODIERNO. We recognize the significant contributions made by the Army 

National Guard (ARNG) as a part of the Total Force and can ill-afford to allow the 

skills and competencies atrophy. Our goal is to maintain the ARNG as an operational Reserve, a key component in meeting mission requirements at home and 

abroad. To accomplish this, the Army continues to increase the mix of ARNG formations at our Combat Training Centers and Warfighter events. We will partner Active component (AC) and ARNG formations during annual training and will conduct 

integrated pre-deployment collective training to capitalize on the experience and lessons learned during the last 13 years of war. The recent Bold Shift Initiative reorganized 1st U.S. Army to be more responsive to pre-mobilization training support for 

ARNG formations while retaining capability to conduct post-mobilization operations. 

The combined affect of these initiatives will enhance ARNG readiness. The Army 

considered the RFBP study on fully burdened soldier costs incomplete in that it did 

not fully address the impact of cost on soldier (or formation) capabilities. When activated for mobilization or operational support, RC forces cost the same as their AC 

counterparts but, based on the mission assigned, may require more extensive trainup, which costs additional dollars and time. 

102 

General WELSH. The components which collectively comprise our Air Force—the 

Active and the Air Reserve Component (ARC) (which includes the Air National 

Guard and Air Force Reserve)—realize that only by working together, both internally as cohesive teammates and externally with our partners, can we mitigate risk, 

operate within budgetary constraints, and remove existing barriers impeding efficient operation of the Total Force. 

The Air Force fully embraces and continues its flight path toward being the best 

possible integrated Total Force. We are currently working to influence appropriate 

policy and legislative changes to reduce or eliminate Continuum of Service barriers, 

more effectively integrate our components from the Air Staff to the tactical level in 

order to garner operational and fiscal efficiencies, and ensure our Total Force is optimally balanced to minimize warfighting risk and increase effectiveness. Additionally, integration of Active and ARC units, currently underway through varying types 

of association constructs, offers a deliberate, proven, and effective approach to fully 

integrate our Air Force. Finally, using the Air Force’s High Velocity Analysis toolkit, 

we are applying quantitative and qualitative analysis to derive optimal force mix 

options. This information enables senior leaders to maximize the use of the Total 

Force, while minimizing cost and expanding combat power. 

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps fights with a Total Force Concept, 

seamlessly integrating Reserve units into active duty formations. This helps maintain the skills of Reserve units while enhancing depth, maximizing combat power, 

and providing OPTEMPO relief to Active Duty units. The Marine Corps has already 

planned the use of Reserve Forces to meet combatant commander requirements 

under 12304b mobilization authorities. Marine Corps Global Force Management 

seeks the goal of a mobilization-to-dwell ratio of 1:5 minimum for Reserve component units. This means that of those Reserve units mobilized, marines and their 

families can expect the unit will only be mobilized 1 year out of every 5. This helps 

provide predictability and stability for our citizen-soldiers. In case of a major contingency operation, the Reserves will be mobilized as needed to best meet the Nation’s 

requirements. 

WEAPON SYSTEMS

27. Senator LEE. General Welsh, after sequestration took place in 2013, there was 

concern about the ‘‘bow-wave’’ effect on the maintenance of weapons systems in the 

Air Force and the years that it would take to recover from it. If the Air Force budget 

is sequestered in fiscal year 2016, what affects will this have on your logistics and 

sustainment programs, and how are you preparing these programs now in the event 

that sequestration does happen? 

General WELSH. Sequestration would have significant sustainment funding impacts, which would cause substantial disruptions across our logistics and 

sustainment programs. These disruptions include deferring critical maintenance, repair, and overhaul actions for combat and mobility forces, as well as cyber, space, 

and nuclear sustainment programs. Potential long-term aircraft groundings and 

workload bow waves could also occur. In preparation for sequestration, we will analyze our options, including potential overseas contingency operation supplements, 

and attempt to balance readiness risk and other Air Force priorities. 

28. Senator LEE. General Welsh, at the end of last year the Air Force was concerned that the inability to retire certain weapons systems combined with the increased tempo of operations in the Middle East and Europe would prevent the Air 

Force from having the necessary number of maintainers available to transition into 

new weapons programs in order for those programs to meet operational goals. Can 

you give the committee an update on this situation now that the NDAA for Fiscal 

Year 2015 (P.L. 113–291) has passed, and what impact will sequestration have on 

Air Force’s ability to generate the necessary number of persons to maintain the 

force? 

General WELSH. The situation has not improved. While the ability to place some 

A–10s into Backup Aircraft Inventory status as well as using contract support will 

help relieve some immediate pressure, Air Force Active-Duty maintenance manning 

levels continue to fall short as the Air Force adds new weapon systems such as the 

F–35, KC–46, and CV–22 into the inventory without any force structure divestiture. 

Since 2004, Active-Duty maintenance personnel have decreased by 20 percent while 

aircraft inventory has decreased by 12 percent. The OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation analysis on Air Force fighter manning confirmed that a limited 

supply of experienced fighter maintenance personnel is constraining legacy fleet 

readiness and the stand-up of the F35A squadrons. 

103 

Without force structure divestiture, the Air Force will need to add maintenance 

accessions and increase end strength to support maintenance manning requirements 

that are currently unaffordable at BCA caps. Accessions, however, do not solve the 

Air Force’s near-term maintenance experience deficit since maintenance experience 

can only be gained through time. If the Air Force cannot harvest experienced manpower from divestiture of the A–10 fleet, we risk further readiness degradation in 

the remaining legacy fleets. This puts at risk the ability to meet the current operational demand in the Middle East and Europe. Although the Air Force has taken 

some force management actions to minimize the readiness risk, including Reserve 

component activations, high year tenure extensions, and retention bonuses, these 

actions are insufficient to support Air Force readiness requirements. 

CIVILIAN WORKFORCE

29. Senator LEE. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General 

Dunford, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported in November of 2014 that 

the number of civilian employees employed by DOD grew by nearly 10 percent between 2000 and 2014 while the uniformed services shrank by 4 percent. CBO also 

reported that the per-person costs for civilian personnel increased at this time as 

well. This makes the civilian employee growth an issue that, like many others, warrants serious review in the context of any budgetary reductions and spending reforms. However, civilian employees fulfill a vital component of DOD, especially in 

areas like logistics and the maintenance of weapons systems and equipment. Please 

provide an update on how the cost-growth of the civilian workforce, including contractors, is being addressed in your respective branches, and how reforms are being 

implemented in a manner that doesn’t harm the missions where civilian workers 

are uniquely needed? 

General ODIERNO. Civilian cost growth is being addressed primarily through reductions to the civilian workforce. The Army civilian workforce is and will be shaped 

to deliver the critical capabilities to support and enable our soldiers, but within the 

framework provided by diminishing funding, statutory guidance, and Departmental 

priorities. Investments in growth made to acquisition, science and technology, medical, special operations, intelligence, cyber, SHARP, and other capabilities have been 

identified as high priorities and will be maintained and in some cases expanded. 

The bulk of our civilian workforce reductions will fall in areas of logistics, personnel, 

training, and installation support activities and, importantly, in administrative 

headquarters. 

Programmed reductions for civilian Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) in fiscal year 

2015 and fiscal year 2016 are programmed at 3.4 percent and 5.8 percent respectively. During that same time period, military end strength reductions will be 1 percent and 3.3 percent. All of these percentages are calculated from the fiscal year 

2014 position. Deeper cuts are projected for some civilian jobs as a result of sequestration planning in which the Army is accepting greater risk in functions that support readiness and are primarily performed by civilians: Installations Services: ¥7.1 

percent; Support of Forces: ¥7.9 percent and Training: ¥6.8 percent. 

Extending the projection out from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2018 with 

BCA levels of funding will reduce military personnel from 1,049,200 to 980,000, a 

total reduction of 6.6 percent. During the same period civilian FTEs will reduce 

from 265,000 to 238,000, or 10.1 percent. 

To date, most of the service contract reductions have been for overseas contingency operations. Opportunities for contract reductions exist in knowledge-based 

services where overhead costs have sometimes averaged an additional 50 percent 

above what is charged to us for the actual work in direct labor hours, as reflected 

in the Contractor Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA). We plan to leverage 

CMRA to provide program visibility of contract services in our program starting in 

fiscal year 2018. 

Admiral GREENERT. The CBO report included data across all of DOD, not just at 

the DON level. Per-person changes in pay are often driven by changes across the 

Federal workforce. Benefit costs have grown commensurate with general increases 

in costs for health care; revised actuarial costs have increased FERS contributions; 

an aging workforce takes on additional benefits as they near retirement (e.g., Thrift 

Savings Plan matching contributions); pay raises have been held at or below inflation during the last decade, but over that time did grow. 

Much of what appears to be growth in civilian FTEs since 2000 reflects mandated 

staffing adjustments. For example, 13,000 military positions were converted to civilian positions to reduce shore military staffing during the Iraqi conflict. Further, the 

fiscal year 2008 NDAA directed the Department to consider insourcing functions 

104 

regularly performed by contractors, an action which increased the number of civilian 

employees but reduced reliance on contract employees. Congressional language prohibiting the contracting of security guard functions increased these insourcing requirements. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 also established a development program for Acquisition Workforce recruitment, training, and retention, which increased FTEs in an area with critical shortages. We have also increased civilians 

to address critical shortfalls associated with the shipyards, cyber, and the nuclear 

enterprise posture review. At the same time, we are aggressively identifying reductions, particularly with the headquarters reductions. 

Within the DON, we conduct a thorough review of civilian FTEs and the cost of 

those FTEs as part of our budget preparation. Consistent with congressional direction, the Department is reducing contract support and is beginning to monitor contractor work years as it moves toward integration of contractors into the total workforce review. 

General WELSH. The Air Force civilian end strength was 161,000 in fiscal year 

2000 and peaked in fiscal year 2011 at 192,000 as a result of the following actions: 

Resource Management Directive (RMD) 802, Competitive Sourcing/Insourcing (mandated contractor-to-civilian conversion); Working Capital Fund/Foreign Military 

Sales/COCOMs directed growth; Secretary of Defense-directed Joint Basing actions; 

military-to-civilian conversion; Total Force Initiative associations; Business-Based 

Analysis decision to insource Ministry of Defense United Kingdom civilians; and the 

Presidential-directed Veterans Employment Initiative. 

Since fiscal year 2011, the Air Force has taken action to reduce civilian end 

strength by approximately 24,000 positions. Major drivers were: RMD 703; Civilian 

Workforce Efficiencies (2012); Civilian Workforce Review (2013); and management 

headquarters reductions and force structure changes. 

The Air Force has implemented a series of Voluntary Early Retirement Authority 

programs designed to reduce overall manpower costs. In fiscal year 2014, the Air 

Force proposed three rounds of civilian voluntary separation programs: Round 1 targeted residual RMD 703 actions; Round 2 targeted fiscal year 2014 Civilian Workforce Review positions; and Round 3 targeted the 20 percent Management HQs Staff 

reduction and the Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center (AFIMSC) consolidation. 

In fiscal year 2015, the Air Force is proposing two rounds of civilian voluntary 

separation programs as a continuation of the force shaping initiative to target a 20 

percent management headquarters staff reduction and AFIMSC consolidation. Because our civilians are vital to the total workforce, every voluntary reduction opportunity is being exhausted and reductions in force will only be used as a last resort 

to efficiently and effectively manage mission and organizational changes. 

The Air Force manages the civilian requirements from a Total Force perspective. 

Unlike other Services, the Air Force looks at mission requirements to see if a uniformed member is required due to deployments and/or sustainability reasons. In the 

event that a uniformed member is not required, we look at the requirement for any 

inherently governmental functions. The Air Force evaluates the cost of the resources 

(military, civilian, or contractor) and chooses the most cost effective resource available that satisfies the requirements and is in the best interest of the public. 

To control the cost-growth of contractors, the Air Force implemented and closely 

monitors the contract ceiling restriction in accordance with section 808 of the NDAA 

for Fiscal Year 2012 and section 802 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014. The costgrowth of our Air Force civilians are due to normal inflation factors, pay raises, increased retirement costs, and higher benefit rates imposed by OMB. The cost per 

person of Air Force civilians is not higher than the rest of DOD. 

The Air Force continues to look for new ways of accomplishing the mission. We 

examine the full spectrum of operations, from base-level to headquarters, to develop 

a wide range of efficiency initiatives to streamline and right size the organization 

and management staffs to forge a leaner, more effective Air Force. The fiscal year 

2016 President’s budget submission represents the minimum essential workforce (civilian and military) requirements of the Air Force. In order for the Air Force to 

achieve any additional significant reduction in its civilian workforce, a BRAC action 

would be needed since the bulk of the positions are at installation level. 

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps has taken a balanced approach to assessing 

and reshaping its collective workforce to ensure the right labor source and skill level 

supports the mission while also determining areas where risk can be taken without 

jeopardizing the mission. Managing that balance is a continuing effort. 

Civilian Workforce 

The Marine Corps’ appropriated funded civilian workforce grew from 2001 to 2009 

due in large part to higher mandates, e.g., military-to-civilian conversions; 

105 

insourcing; resumption of information network ownership/management; growth in 

the acquisition and cyber workforces; and establishment of a civilian police force to 

permit military police to support operational forces. In 2009, recognizing the changing fiscal climate, the Marine Corps began taking proactive measures to right-size 

the civilian and contractor workforce to include the establishment of an Executive 

Steering Group to strategically assess the size, composition, and allocation of civilian resources with the primary focus on mission requirements. This group recommended and the Marine Corps is now implementing the following: 

• A reduction to the civilian labor budget by 10 percent; 20 percent at 

headquarters. Only a 5 percent reduction was applied to our depots due to 

criticality of their mission. 

• A reduction in FTEs from ∼17,500 civilians to ∼15,800 by fiscal year 2017 

(a savings of $761.5 million/1,675 FTEs). 

• Strategic Total Force Management/Workforce Planning processes to ensure commands can manage their workforce within budget constraints. 

Civilian Cost 

While the Marine Corps is reducing the number of civilians, the cost per FTE continues to gradually increase, primarily due to restructuring lower graded, lower priority positions to accommodate the need for more specialized, higher graded positions (i.e., cyber, acquisition). As we reduce the number of civilians, we are also taking steps to lower the cost of civilian personnel by conducting reviews of position 

descriptions to re-assess grade levels, limiting funds available for performance 

awards and pay increases, limiting overtime, and monitoring payment of recruitment, relocation, and retention incentives at the headquarters level. 

Contractors 

Over the past few years, the Marine Corps has undertaken various steps to understand and accurately identify requirements for contract services. These efforts 

have been both fueled and challenged by numerous contract service reduction requirements, including: 

• OSD directed headquarters contract reductions associated with Executive 

Order 13576, Delivering an Efficient, Effective, and Accountable Government 

• NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, section 808, Limits for Amounts Available 

for Contract Services as well as annual extensions in NDAA for Fiscal Year 

2014, section 802, and NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015, section 813 

• NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, section 955, Savings to be Achieved in Civilian Personnel Workforce and Service Contractor Workforce of DOD 

• Fiscal year 2015 Department of the Navy-directed Contracted Services 

Reduction to reduce dependence on contracted services 

Each of these efforts pressed the Marine Corps to assess its contract services and 

find reductions where possible, but from varying perspectives. In the early stages, 

the contract services data quality was not available to fully assess and identify 

areas of potential savings. As such, the Marine Corps is taking numerous steps to 

improve our data capacity to enable us to make informed reduction decisions as well 

as comply with reporting requirements contained in the PL 113–101 Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act). Those efforts include: 

• Rewriting of the Marine Corps Object Classification/Sub-Object Classification (OCSOC) manual to redefine and better align codes for capturing 

obligation classifications and aligning to budget justification materials 

• Modifications to purchase request and contracting systems to incorporate 

product service code to object classification alignments at contract line item 

level vice document level 

• Monthly command reporting of contract service obligations to determine 

the nature and priority of contract requirements, serving as a foundation 

for additional process changes and policy amendments 

• Training for financial and non-financial personnel involved in the contracting process to improve data recording 

The Marine Corps continues to assess its contract services requirements to ensure 

the most prudent and efficient use of resources is utilized and will implement balanced reductions to the extent possible without jeopardizing mission accomplishment. 

106 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

TEST AND EVALUATION AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IMPACTS

30. Senator NELSON. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and 

General Dunford, please describe the impacts of sequestration on your ability to 

maintain and modernize the laboratory research and test and evaluation facilities, 

workforce, and capabilities you will need to meet Service needs. Are there specific 

capabilities or research initiatives that you will have to eliminate, mothball, or 

downsize if sequestration remains in effect? 

General ODIERNO. The Army has already undertaken significant cost cutting efforts and reduced personnel and equipment requirements during the first 2 years 

of sequestration. In the triad of impacts to sequestration, Army modernization suffers the most. Modernization accounts have been reduced by 25 percent and every 

program affected; maintenance deferred; and the defense industrial base increasingly skeptical about investing in future innovative systems needed to make the 

force more agile and adaptive. 

As part of the balancing process, the Army has already made difficult choices in 

dropping the Armed Aerial Scout, Unmanned Ground Vehicle upgrades, the Mounted Soldier System, and Ground Combat Vehicle program. Under sequestration, 

planned upgrades to our current systems, such as UH–60 Blackhawk, Abrams, 

Bradley, and Stryker would be reduced or slowed (e.g. Stryker DVH upgrades will 

cease) leaving our soldiers more vulnerable, especially if deploying as part of a 

smaller force where technology optimizes soldier performance and capabilities. Over 

270 acquisitions and modernization programs have already been impacted by sequestration, and more than 137 additional programs may also be affected under continued sequestration. 

The Army is unable to protect upgrades and procurement on top of an already 

depleted capital investments portfolio at sequestration level funding. These modernization disruptions will stop development and production in critical programs 

that enable a smaller force to accomplish diverse missions. Under sequestration, the 

Army will have to stop the 4th Double-V Hull Brigade conversion; slow the Patriot 

system upgrade; halt the procurement of one new MQ–1C Gray Eagle Company and 

the accelerated fielding of another, both of which are needed to address the increased UAV demand in Syria and Iraq; delay the Aerial Intelligence Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance 2020 strategy by several years; reduce and extend the Active 

Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar development; and delay development of 

Radar-on-the-Network for Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense-integration until fiscal year 2022, which is a vital capability protecting our homeland from 

missile threats. 

Fiscal year 2013 sequestration also had especially harmful impacts on our workforce and on laboratory research facilities, and we expect any future sequestration 

will be similar. For the workforce, attrition will likely increase as in fiscal year 

2013, when the high risk of furloughs for the workforce more than doubled. Our 

bright talent will depart for better job security in industry and academia, while 

those who stay will be demoralized. 

In fiscal year 2013, the labs were only sustained to 35 percent of their needs. A 

new round of sequestration will result in laboratory facility sustainment reductions 

to support only life, health, and safety requirements. Routine maintenance will be 

deferred while laboratories and test and evaluation sites accept risk in facilities and 

equipment functions. Sequestration would also delay planned upgrades in capability, impacting not only our ability to do cutting edge research, but also our ability 

to attract the best and brightest to work within the Army labs. 

Modernization enables a smaller, agile, and more expeditionary Army to provide 

globally responsive and regionally engaged forces demonstrating unambiguous resolve. But sequestration adversely impacts the Army’s ability to modernize and field 

critical capabilities that improve operational readiness of aging equipment. The cumulative cuts in modernization programs threaten to cede our current overmatch 

of potential adversaries while increasing future costs to regain or maintain parity 

if lost. 

Admiral GREENERT. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would necessitate a revisit and revision of the defense strategy. Sequestration would significantly reduce the Navy’s ability to fully implement the President’s defense strategy. 

The required cuts would force us to further delay critical warfighting capabilities, 

reduce readiness of forces needed for contingency responses, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego or stretch procurement of force structure as a last resort. 

Because of funding shortfalls over the last 3 years, our fiscal year 2016 President’s 

budget represents the absolute minimum funding levels needed to execute our deVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:21 Jul 24, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\95604.TXT JUNE
107 

fense strategy. We cannot provide a responsible way to budget for the defense strategy at sequester levels because there isn’t one. 

If sequestration is implemented, automatic percentage cuts will be required to be 

applied without regard to strategy, importance, or priorities, resulting in adverse 

impacts to almost every contract and program including laboratory research and 

test and evaluation facilities, workforce and capabilities. 

General WELSH. Investment in science and technology (S&T) is essential to innovation and ensuring the Nation’s technological edge into the future. Airpower must 

innovate or it will become irrelevant. The 2011 BCA cut to the fiscal year 2016 

budget would result in a $223 million reduction in S&T. The cuts will cause the following impacts: 

• Delay or terminate approximately 100 contracts across these technology 

areas: Air dominance, directed energy, manufacturing, human systems, munitions, propulsion, structures, cyber, sensors and space technologies. 

• Eliminate approximately 200 university basic research grants which negatively impacts the defense industrial base and academia partnership because Air Force S&T has contracts or university grants in nearly every U.S. 

State. 

• Terminate all Adaptive Engine Transition Program efforts. • Negatively impact the Space Vehicles Component Development Lab 

MILCON project. 

If held to the BCA levels, Air Force S&T funding will be reduced by ∼$1.08 billion 

over the FYDP. These reductions will result in schedule delays and terminations of 

key S&T programs needed to develop future Air Force capabilities. PB level funding 

is needed for the Air Force to remain the world’s most technologically advanced in 

the world now and into the future. 

The Air Force S&T baseline supplemental budget request for fiscal year 2016– 

2020 includes requirements to fill existing and projected capability gaps. Funding 

for these capabilities is foundational to ‘‘continuing the pursuit of game-changing 

technologies,’’ a strategic vector for the future of the Air Force. 

General DUNFORD. The answer to this question has really been the story of sequestration writ large. We have deferred modernization for near-term readiness. 

The answer is yes, because we must prioritize near-term readiness to meet the National Security Strategy today. 

As with all discussions regarding how the Marine Corps would implement a sequester or reduce its budget request to a BCA level, this would need to be part of 

a larger conversation about what the priorities of the Department and the Defense 

Strategy. However, what is clear is that the effects would be detrimental to the Marine Corps ability to modernize and pursue future research. Our major procurement 

programs, including ACV, JLTV, G/ATOR, and AAV as well as our commitment to 

innovation through a robust Science and Technology (S&T) program are protected, 

however the possibility of sequestered budget’s effects on modernization will impact 

even these programs. This will degrade our ability to maintain technical superiority 

over our adversaries. Many of our most important tactical mobility, combat aviation, 

and ground systems require significant maintenance to keep them operational. Modernizing our equipment is therefore essential to replace legacy systems which will 

soon be obsolete and outpaced by our adversaries. Doing nothing actually means 

going backwards. 

If we are forced to do this again, it will absolutely affect not only the current modernization programs being pursued, but also long-term transformational technologies we are researching. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III 

ACTIVE COMPONENT/RESERVE COMPONENT MIX

31. Senator MANCHIN. General Welsh, even before the Air Force Commission report, the Air Force has taken significant strides to adjust the Active component/Reserve component (AC/RC) mix to maintain combat capability at a reduced cost. How 

can Congress help you continue this effort and improve the total Air Force readiness 

capability? 

General WELSH. The fiscal year 2016 President’s budget takes a critical step towards recovering the ready, equipped, and modernized Air Force the Nation needs. 

First, the Air Force cannot return to the 2011 BCA-level funding and still meet the 

DSG requirements. Second, we need favorable consideration of legislative proposals 

that will eliminate barriers to integration among the three components. Finally, the 

Air Force strongly supports the Secretary of Defense’s request that Congress allow 

108 

us to comprehensively and transparently align infrastructure to operational needs 

through an authorization to conduct a BRAC. 

32. Senator MANCHIN. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, and General Dunford, 

in this budget environment, how are your Services looking to adjust the AC/RC mix 

to maximize value? 

General ODIERNO. In the last 12 months, we reduced the size of the Active component (AC) from 532,000 to 503,000, with end strength set to fall to 490,000 in fiscal 

year 2015; and then to 450,000. Similarly, the end strength in our Army National 

Guard is set to fall to 335,000 and the Army Reserve to 195,000. But if sequestration returns, we will need to reduce end strength even further to 420,000 in the AC 

by fiscal year 2020; and 315,000 in the National Guard and 185,000 in the Army 

Reserve. Yet, the reality we face is that the demand for Army forces throughout the 

world is growing while the size of the force is shrinking. 

The large majority of our cuts are coming out of the Active Army, and because 

of that, we are going to have to rely more on the National Guard and U.S. Army 

Reserves to provide us a depth to respond to complex problems. The issue is that 

we are going to have to rely on our Reserve Forces more in some areas, such as 

in logistics. In terms of the combat capability, our Reserve Forces are still going to 

have to provide us the depth. We might have to use that depth earlier because we 

are going to have less capability in the Active component. This all gets to this balance that we are trying to achieve. 

I worry about the fact that if we reduce the Active component too much, our ability to respond quickly is going to be affected because the world today spins much 

quicker than it used to. Instability happens quicker and the necessity for us to respond has to be quicker. I worry that we are going to lose that capability because 

that is what we expect our Active component to do, and then we expect our National 

Guard and Reserves to be right behind us helping us as we move forward with this. 

Admiral GREENERT. We believe we have the AC/RC mix just about right. Cost is 

only one variable when determining the correct AC/RC force mix. Other factors include: sourcing for continuous operations for both forward deployed and homeland 

defense missions, surge and post-surge demands, mission duration, mission frequency, retention, and sustainment. Based on our annual assessment of the AC/RC 

mix, PB–16 continues investments in the Reserve component by expanding several 

critical capabilities: 

(1) surge maintenance, by selectively targeting reservists who bring specific, valuable, civilian skill sets to the Navy Total Force; 

(2) intelligence support, by realigning end strength to support this vital mission; 

(3) cyber warfare, by ensuring the appropriate mix of Reserve manning to augment the Active Navy capability; and, 

(4) high value unit escort, by leveraging the Navy Reserve’s ability to fill short 

notice requirements using Reserve Coastal Riverine Force units to assume 

high value unit escort missions within the continental United States from the 

Coast Guard. 

General DUNFORD. The link between the Active-Duty Marine Corps and the Marine Reserves has always been an important one. Over the past 3 to 5 years, the 

Marine Corps has continually been reviewing and refining its force structure in 

order to maximize forward presence and crisis response capabilities, while accepting 

risk in major combat operations and stability operations. Our goal is to operate as 

a total force (Active and Reserve) as a matter of routine. 

The Marine Corps force structure is generally 75 percent Active component (AC) 

and 25 percent Reserve component (RC), which supports our crisis response orientation. Where possible, the Marine Corps leverages the RC to augment, reinforce, and/ 

or sustain the AC. Mission requirements for Naval Expeditionary Forces and Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) across the range of military operations guide 

AC/RC mix in the Marine Corps. AC/RC balance is based on OPLANs, contingencies, replacement and rotational base considerations, and the need to rapidly expand forces when transitioning from peace to war. Capabilities that must maintain 

high states of readiness and availability are retained in the AC. For instance, crisis 

response MAGTFs (MEU, MEB) are comprised of AC forces, while Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) or MEF-Forward sized MAGTFs that are employed as part of 

a larger campaign are reinforced with RC forces. Further, selective use of the RC 

force during peacetime increases the capacity of the Marine Corps to meet global 

force demands. 

Marine Corps AC & RC forces are organized and equipped similarly and trained 

to the same standards based on their respective deployment to dwell cycles (AC 1:2, 

RC 1:5). The Marine Corps continues to review and manage end strength levels 

109 

under prevailing budget constraints to provide the best balanced ready force the 

United States can afford in order to meet requirements across the range of military 

operations while meeting our objectives for operational and personnel tempo. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

COORDINATING WITH THE STATES

33. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Odierno and General Welsh, representing a 

State that has to deal with being the number one terror target as well as natural 

disasters like Superstorm Sandy, I want to ensure that the needs of the States are 

part of any decisionmaking equation about how to deal with sequestration. How are 

you coordinating with the States to ensure that, as you deal with these cuts, you 

take into consideration the needs of the States for support from the National Guard? 

General ODIERNO. Sequestration will have serious impacts on the Active and Reserve components, so if we want to minimize the impact on the states, the first 

things we need to do is to enact the funding levels requested by the President. Within the Army, we take seriously the need to ensure that the support the National 

Guard provides to the states is taken into account and the National Guard Bureau 

provides us that input. Within our modernization accounts, we place a priority on 

‘‘dual-use’’ equipment, those items that are needed for both the Federal and State 

missions. It is for these reasons that the Army ARI was proposed. Under ARI, the 

National Guard would divest its Apache Attack helicopters in order to ensure we 

have the modernization dollars to upgrade their UH–60 fleet and maintain trained 

and ready pilots. The National Guard will not be immune from reductions, but we 

ask your support in Congress for the reforms we propose that better protect the 

state missions for the National Guard. 

General WELSH. Since 2014, in addition to active participation and collaboration 

with the Council of Governors, the Air Force has included Adjutant General representation in the Air Force corporate process. As such, the needs of the states are 

being introduced to, and considered by, Air Force senior leadership during 

foundational conversations regarding budget cuts and changes to Air Force force 

structure. We have also included TAGs in comprehensive mission area planning efforts led by major commands responsible for our Combat Air Forces, Mobility Air 

Forces, Nuclear Forces, Cyber Forces, and Space Forces. 

SEQUESTRATION IMPACTS ON CYBER

34. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh and 

General Dunford, I am very concerned about ensuring that our military is prepared 

to address cyber threats to our country. How do you all assess the potential impact 

of sequester on your efforts to build cyber capacity by recruiting and retaining the 

best cyber warriors? 

General ODIERNO. Sequestration would have a significant impact on the Army’s 

efforts to build cyber capacity. By shifting funding in 2013, the Army addressed the 

effects of sequestration on the overall accession and retention missions, and these 

measures carried over to our efforts to build cyber capacity. In the current environment, the Army may not be able to mitigate the impacts of another round of sequestration on our cyber accession and retention programs. 

The cyber workforce is vital to the growth of cyber capabilities and is particularly 

vulnerable to funding cuts. To recruit this workforce, the Army has dedicated most 

of our current enlistment incentives to cyber and other information technology Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), and cyber retention incentives are among the 

highest we offer our soldiers upon reenlistment. Funding cuts would curtail these 

programs and others that train new cyber soldiers, transition current soldiers into 

the Cyber MOS and maintain the qualifications of our cyber professionals. When we 

start to curb training, retention will be affected. We cannot fund the development 

of our cyber warriors episodically. Cyber professionals—resourced with the right infrastructure, platforms, and tools—are the key to dominance in cyberspace. 

The Army must remain competitive to recruit and retain the cyber workforce. For 

anything longer than a brief interruption, the Army would be challenged to identify 

sufficient funding that could be shifted to these programs to continue to build and 

maintain our cyber capacity. 

Admiral GREENERT. In the fiscal year 2016 budget, we continue to place priority 

on efforts to build Navy’s portion of the DOD Cyber Mission Forces and strengthen 

cyber defense capabilities afloat and ashore. We have accessed about 80 percent of 

the 1,750 cyber operators who will form 40 cyber mission teams by the end of 2016 

110 

and we will continue to recruit, hire, and train to reach our full planned Force size. 

This is an aggressive timeline and, if sequester occurs, we will adjust resources as 

necessary to deliver the talent, capability, and capacity the Nation requires to perform our mission. 

General WELSH. Recruiting and retention of our cyber professionals is something 

we always monitor closely, and we do not currently have concerns with recruiting 

and retaining our cyber professionals (officer and enlisted) within the Air Force, 

given the incentives we currently have in place. We have an Initial Enlistment 

Bonus as well as a Selective Reenlistment Bonus in place for the 1B4X1 Cyber Defense Operator and 1N4X1A Digital Network Analyst enlisted career fields to mitigate the equitable pay gaps to entice personnel to enlist/reenlist with certain skills. 

We currently do not offer any incentive pays for our cyber officers as we are meeting 

our projected needs for both recruiting and retention. Resource adjustments due to 

sequestration could impact us in all areas. 

Without proper funding, the Air Force will be limited in our efforts to build cyber 

capacity by recruiting and retaining the best cyber-warriors. Sequestration will impact our already limited funding aimed at incentivizing recruits with special technical abilities and skills to enter the Air Force (via Initial Enlistment Bonuses) and 

then remain in the Air Force (via retention bonuses). We are competing with the 

interagency organizations and the private sector for the operational/technical skills 

and expertise that future recruits and our current airmen possess. 

General DUNFORD. If the BCA measures come to fruition, there will be wide 

spread impact on the Marine Corps’ ability to conduct cyberspace operations. In particular, our current initiative to unify the Marine Corps Enterprise Network infrastructure would likely be delayed as would its technical refresh to keep pace with 

the rate of technology change. Additional impacts would likely be felt by our civilian 

workforce if sequestration furloughs become a fiscal reality again. Taking away a 

large portion of our cyber workforce through sequestration also places an additional 

burden on our military and contractor workforce—to work through their absences. 

The work tempo will not slow down . . . the importance of our operate and defend 

mission will not lessen . . . but the workforce will be reduced nonetheless. 

35. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh and 

General Dunford, what will be the biggest challenges in recruiting and retaining 

cyber warriors in light of sequestration? 

General ODIERNO. The Army views people, characterized by high degrees of competence and character, as the centerpiece of cyberspace. A significant element of our 

recruitment and retention programs is founded in an ethos, a culture of doing something that matters in service to the Nation. Our cyber warriors have opportunities 

to do interesting and amazing things, but we must first compete to recruit and retain them—a challenge in the best of fiscal environments. 

Most of our current enlistment incentives are dedicated to cyber and other information technology MOS, and our cyber retention incentives are among the highest 

we offer to soldiers upon reenlistment. The Army recently approved Special Duty 

Assignment Pay, Assignment Incentive Pay and bonuses for soldiers serving in operational cyber assignments. We have also expanded cyber educational programs, 

which include training with industry, fellowships, civilian graduate education and 

utilization of inter-service education programs (e.g., Air Force Institute of Technology and the Naval Postgraduate School). 

We are approaching the first wave of potential separation among the soldiers who 

entered the cyber force 3 to 4 years ago. While the Army has met accession and 

retention targets to date, there are clear indications that we need to holistically 

manage the cyber workforce. On September 1, 2014, the Secretary of the Army established a Cyber Branch. This distinction provides opportunities for promotion, 

alongside leader and professional development, in an enduring, cyber-focused construct that is central to retaining our best cyber warriors. 

We are confident that these efforts will serve as additional incentives in recruiting 

and retaining the best personnel for this highly technical field; however, these programs and initiatives are particularly vulnerable to funding cuts. 

Discussions are ongoing to determine how to unify the management of civilians 

supporting cyberspace operations. Recruiting and retaining Army civilian cyber talent is challenging, given internal Federal employment constraints regarding compensation and a comparatively slow hiring process. Current efforts to attract and 

retain top civilian talent include extensive marketing and leveraging existing programs and initiatives run by the National Security Agency, the Office of Personnel 

Management and the National Science Foundation. The targeted and enhanced use 

of recruiting, relocation and retention bonuses and repayment of student loans will 

111 

improve efforts to attract, develop and retain an effective cyber civilian workforce. 

These authorities exist but require consistent and predictable long-term funding. 

Cyber is a rapidly developing domain that requires a workforce with significant 

technical training and education. It demands depth of skill in a time of exponentially increasing information technology advances. Sequestration would jeopardize 

the Army’s ability to recruit and retain the workforce required to support cyberspace 

operations. 

Admiral GREENERT. Currently, Navy recruiting and retention remain strong, although retaining personnel in certain critical skills continues to present a challenge, 

particularly as the demands we place on sailors and their families remain high. The 

threat of looming sequestration, along with a recovering economy, is a troubling 

combination. We are beginning to see downward trends in retention, particularly 

among highly-skilled sailors. We are using all tools at our disposal, including special 

and incentive pays, to motivate continued service in these critical fields. 

Our budget request continues to place priority on cyber efforts to build Navy’s 

portion of the DOD Cyber Mission Forces and strengthen our cyber defense capabilities afloat and ashore. We have accessed about 80 percent of the 1,750 cyber operators that will form 40 cyber mission teams by the end of 2016; we will continue to 

recruit, hire, and train this force. However, I expect a return to sequestration to 

have a significant negative impact on sailor and civilian quality of life/morale, which 

will challenge our ability to recruit and retain them. 

General WELSH. Anything below fiscal year 2016 PB-level funding reduces the Air 

Force’s ability to meet requirements across all mission areas, and thus the ability 

to meet the DSG requirements which includes capabilities in cyber. BCA-level funding and trigger of sequestration will significantly reduce our ability to attract, recruit, and retain cyber-warriors. Budget uncertainty erodes confidence and trust 

within the Air Force and among its total force airmen. Potential recruits are paying 

attention. 

Sequestration gives no flexibility to logically adjust the funding reduction. It will 

constrain and likely reduce our already limited funding aimed at incentivizing recruits with special technical abilities and skills, to enter the Air Force (via initial 

enlistment bonuses) and then remain in the Air Force (via retention bonuses). These 

bonuses are judiciously and effectively targeted to provide the most return-on-investment in both dollars and capability. We compete with the interagency and the 

private sector for the operational and technical skills and expertise that future recruits and our current airmen possess. We currently do not offer any incentive pays 

for our cyber officers. 

In addition, sequestration reduces operating budgets that ensure our cyber warriors are properly trained and equipped to perform their critical mission. 

General DUNFORD. If the BCA measures come to fruition, impacts would likely be 

felt by our civilian workforce. The furloughs of 2013 hit hard the civilians who felt 

they had job security and stability. These were the same civilian employees who 

passed up more lucrative employment in private industry in favor of remaining as 

civil service employees. In a way, the furloughs broke the social contract between 

employee and employer. Taking away a large portion of our cyber workforce through 

sequestration also put additional burden on our military and contractor workforce— 

to work through their absences. The work tempo did not slow down . . . the importance of our operate and defend mission did not lessen . . . but the workforce was 

reduced nonetheless. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH

REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT PILOT FLEET

36. Senator HEINRICH. General Welsh, recent media reports highlighted that the 

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) community is under strain to fly surveillance and 

combat missions all over the world. One report even indicated the Air Force’s fleet 

of RPAs is being strained to its ‘‘breaking point.’’ This isn’t the first time the Air 

Force has had difficulty matching its RPA pilot force with demand. In fact, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has produced multiple reports documenting 

these challenges—dating all the way back to 2007—and the problems are becoming 

more worrisome as demand for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and 

counterterrorism missions increases. Most recently, the GAO documented in 2014 

that RPA pilots and crews are overworked and under promoted. 

General Welsh, on January 16, 2015 you explained: 

112 

‘‘The biggest problem is training. We can only train about 180 people a year and 

we need 300 a year trained—and we’re losing about 240 from the community each 

year. Training 180 and losing 240 is not a winning proposition for us.’’ 

What is the Air Force doing, and what can the Senate Armed Services Committee 

do, to help ensure the Air Force is able to recruit, train and retain RPA pilots to 

meet mission requirements? 

General WELSH. A Headquarters Air Force ‘‘RPA Tiger Team’’ has identified a 

number of initiatives to assist with current RPA pilot manning challenges and is 

engaged with stakeholders to implement, assess, or further explore these initiatives. 

In the near term, the Air Force elected to retain experienced RPA pilots within the 

RPA community instead of allowing them to return to their manned aircraft as 

originally planned, affecting approximately 30 RPA pilots. The Air Force is also soliciting previously qualified RPA pilots that have since returned to manned aircraft 

to determine whether they can return to the RPA community for 6 months. Additionally, the Air Force is leveraging short-term assistance from both the Air Force 

Reserve and Air National Guard (ANG) to augment the Active Duty community. Finally, the Air Force is implementing retention pay incentives for RPA-only pilots 

with expiring commitments, which will be an increase from $650/month to $1,500/ 

month. 

In the longer term, the Air Force is exploring increased contractor support at the 

schoolhouses and downrange launch and recovery locations, retention bonuses for 

the most stressed platforms, potential ANG associations, and methods to increase 

the capacity of RPA schoolhouses. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee can assist Air Force efforts by: 

1. Supporting the Air Force fiscal year 2016 budget request. 

2. Supporting Air Force initiatives to grow the RPA schoolhouse to meet the 

steady state production requirements and correct the current RPA pilot shortage. The production requirements over the next 4 years will be nearly double 

the current output. The production requirements are necessary to become 

‘‘healthy’’ within the FYDP. Supporting an Air Force request for $12.5 million 

to fund the contractor expansion initiatives at the schoolhouse is the first step. 

3. Supporting Air Force efforts to incentivize RPA pilots with available authorities based on their specific skill (does not require additional assistance from 

Congress at this time). While these will be different authorities than those 

used to incentivize airmen who fly manned aircraft, they will be appropriate, 

and implemented during similar points in a career (e.g., when Active Duty 

Service Commitment associated with initial training is expiring). 

4. Supporting Air Force efforts to seek an additional $10 million a year in funding 

to contract out a portion of downrange launch and recovery support. 

5. Supporting Air Force initiatives to work with the ANG on potential RPA associations in the future. 

6. Support the Air Force pursuit of technology initiatives which will decrease 

workload and increase productivity in the RPA enterprise. 

7. Supporting the integration of RPAs into the national airspace. 

8. Reviewing the language of the ‘‘Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization 

Act’’ as it pertains to the transfer of assets between the ANG and Active Duty 

RPAs. Specifically, the restriction to authorize the temporary transfer of mission-control element (MCE) and the deployed launch-and-recovery element 

(LRE) hardware between Active and Reserve components reduces flexibility 

and inhibits efficient RPA training. 

Æ