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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

NATHAN L. CHANDLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of 

Social Security,

Defendant.

CASE NO. C05-5302KLS

ORDER REVERSING THE

COMMISSIONER’S DECISION

TO DENY BENEFITS

Plaintiff, Nathan L. Chandler, has brought this matter for judicial review of the denial of his

applications for disability insurance and supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits. The parties have

consented to have this matter be heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and Local Magistrates Rule 13. After reviewing the parties’

briefs and the remaining record, the undersigned hereby finds and ORDERS as follows:

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Plaintiff’s date of birth has been redacted in accordance with the General Order of the Court regarding Public Access

to Electronic Case Files, pursuant to the official policy on privacy adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States.

2

Plaintiff’s actual alleged date is unclear, as the record indicates he is alleging disability both as of December 15, 2002

(Tr. 60, 230) and October 23, 2001 (Tr. 74). 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff currently is thirty-one years old.1 Tr. 36. He has a tenth grade education and has past work

experience as a laborer and part-time fast food worker. Tr. 13, 75, 80, 93. 

Plaintiff protectively filed applications for disability insurance and SSI benefits on March 18, 2002,

alleging disability as of December 15, 2000,2 due to a crushed left foot, a back injury, calcium in his ears,

arthritis, and memory problems. Tr. 14, 36, 60, 74, 230, 233. His applications were denied initially and on

reconsideration. Tr. 36-38, 44, 233, 235-36. Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held on March 15,

2004, before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Tr. 239. At the hearing, plaintiff, represented by counsel,

appeared and testified, as did a lay witness. Tr. 239-69. 

On June 14, 2004, the ALJ issued a decision determining plaintiff to be not disabled, finding

specifically in relevant part as follows: 

(1) at step one of the disability evaluation process, plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of disability; 

(2) at step two, plaintiff had “severe” impairments consisting of degenerative disc

disease, back pain, left foot pain status post fractured third metatarsal, bilateral

knee pain, headaches, neck pain, sensorineural hearing loss, a probable

personality disorder, and depression; 

(3) at step three, none of plaintiff’s impairments met or equaled the criteria of any of

those listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;

(4) at step four, plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform essentially

the full range of light work, but was further limited to simple, repetitive tasks and

occasional contact with others, which precluded him from performing his past

relevant work; and

(5) at step five, plaintiff was not disabled based on the application of 20 C.F.R. Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 202.17.

Tr. 20-22. Plaintiff’s request for review was denied by the Appeals Council on March 7, 2005, making the

ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Tr. 4; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. 

On May 3, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint in this court seeking review of the ALJ’s decision. (Dkt.

#1). Plaintiff argues that decision should be reversed and remanded for an award of benefits because the

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ALJ erred by relying on 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 202.17 to find him not disabled at

step five of the disability evaluation process. The undersigned agrees the ALJ erred in finding plaintiff not

disabled at this step of the disability evaluation process, but, for the reasons set forth below, finds remand

for further proceedings to be appropriate in this case. 

DISCUSSION

This court must uphold the Commissioner’s determination that plaintiff is not disabled if the

Commissioner applied the proper legal standard and there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to

support the decision. Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence is

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson

v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Fife v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1985). It is more than

a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir.

1975); Carr v. Sullivan, 772 F. Supp. 522, 524-25 (E.D. Wash. 1991). If the evidence admits of more than

one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner's decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d

577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). 

I. The ALJ Erred in Finding Plaintiff Not Disabled at Step Five of the Disability Evaluation Process

If a disability determination “cannot be made on the basis of medical factors alone at step three of

the evaluation process,” the ALJ must identify the claimant’s “functional limitations and restrictions” and

assess his or her “remaining capacities for work-related activities.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p,

1996 WL 374184 *2. A claimant’s residual functional capacity assessment is used at step four to determine

whether he or she can do his or her past relevant work, and at step five to determine whether he or she can

do other work. Id. Residual functional capacity thus is what the claimant “can still do despite his or her

limitations.” Id. 

A claimant’s residual functional capacity is the maximum amount of work the claimant is able to

perform based on all of the relevant evidence in the record. Id. However, a claimant’s inability to work

must result from his or her “physical or mental impairment(s).” Id. Thus, the ALJ must consider only those

limitations and restrictions “attributable to medically determinable impairments.” Id. In assessing a

claimant’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ also is required to discuss why the claimant’s “symptomrelated functional limitations and restrictions can or cannot reasonably be accepted as consistent with the

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medical or other evidence.” Id. at *7. 

In the “Evaluation of the Evidence” section of his decision, the ALJ set forth the following residual

functional capacity for plaintiff:

[T]he record generally supports the residual functional capacity outlined by the

consulting examiner, which involved the ability to lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally

and 25 pounds frequently. He can stand, walk, and sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour

workday. I also find that he is limited to work that requires simple, repetitive tasks and

occasional contact with others. Giving the claimant some benefit of the doubt, I find

that he has a slightly more restricted capacity for walking than was opined by the

consultative examiner . . . At this, he is limited to only a light residual functional

capacity. 

Tr. 19. In the “Findings” section of his decision, the ALJ described plaintiff’s residual functional capacity in

relevant part as follows:

6. The claimant has the following residual functional capacity: he has the ability [sic]

lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. He can stand,

walk, and sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. He also is limited to work that

requires simple, repetitive tasks and occasional contact with others. . . .

11. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform substantially all of the

full range of light work (20 CFR §§ 404.1567 and 416.967). . . .

13. The claimant’s capacity for light work is substantially intact and has not been

compromised by any nonexertional limitations. 

Tr. 21. Plaintiff argues that because the residual functional capacity with which he was assessed included

significant non-exertional limitations, that is, limitations to simple, repetitive tasks and occasional contact

with others, the ALJ erred in relying on the Grids to find him disabled. The undersigned agrees. 

If the claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant work at step four of the disability evaluation

process, at step five, the ALJ must show there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy the

claimant is able to do. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d)-

(e). There are two ways that the ALJ can to this: “(a) by the testimony of a vocational expert, or (b) by

reference to the [Commissioner’s] Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2.”

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100-1101 (emphasis in original); see also Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162

(9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s ability to rely on the Grids is limited, however, as noted by the Ninth Circuit in

describing their purpose and function:

In some cases, it is appropriate for the ALJ to rely on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines

to determine whether a claimant can perform some work that exists in “significant

numbers” in the national economy. The Medical-Vocational Guidelines are a matrix

system for handling claims that involve substantially uniform levels of impairment. . . .

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However, “[I]f a claimant is found able to work the full range of heavy work this is ‘generally sufficient for a finding

of not disabled.’” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101 n.5 (quoting 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 204.00). 

4

“Exertional limitations” are those that only affect the claimant’s “ability to meet the strength demands of jobs.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1569a(b). “Nonexertional limitations” only affect the claimant’s“ability to meet the demands of jobs other than the

strength demands.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(c)(1). 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

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The Guidelines present, in table form, a short-hand method for determining the

availability and numbers of suitable jobs for a claimant. These tables are commonly

known as “the grids.” The grids categorize jobs by their physical-exertional

requirements and consist of three separate tables-one for each category: “[m]aximum

sustained work capacity limited to sedentary work,” “[m]aximum sustained work

capacity limited to light work,” and “[m]aximum sustained work capacity limited to

medium work.”[3] . . . Each grid presents various combinations of factors relevant to a

claimant’s ability to find work. The factors in the grids are the claimant's age, education,

and work experience. For each combination of these factors, . . . the grids direct a

finding of either “disabled” or “not disabled” based on the number of jobs in the national

economy in that category of physical-exertional requirements.

This approach allows the Commissioner to streamline the administrative process and

encourages uniform treatment of claims. . . . 

The Commissioner’s need for efficiency justifies use of the grids at step five where they

completely and accurately represent a claimant’s limitations. . . . In other words, a

claimant must be able to perform the full range of jobs in a given category, i.e.,

sedentary work, light work, or medium work.

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101 (emphasis in original) (internal citations and footnote omitted). 

If, on the other hand, a claimant has “significant non-exertional impairments,” those impairments

“may make reliance on the grids inappropriate.”4

 Id. at 1101-02; see also Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1162

(ALJ cannot rely on Grids where claimant has significant non-exertional impairments); Moore v. Apfel, 216

F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000) (Grids inapplicable when they do not completely describe claimant’s abilities

and limitations). Proper use of the Grids depends in each case upon the nature and extent of the claimant’s

impairments and limitations:

The ALJ must apply the grids if a claimant suffers only from an exertional impairment .

. . In such cases, the rule is simple: the grids provide the answer. Where the grids

dictate a finding of disability, the claimant is eligible for benefits; where the grids

indicate that the claimant is not disabled, benefits may not be awarded. However,

where a claimant suffers solely from a nonexertional impairment . . . the grids do not

resolve the disability question . . . other testimony is required. In cases where the

claimant suffers from both exertional and nonexertional impairments, the situation is

more complicated. First, the grids must be consulted to determine whether a finding of

disability can be based on the exertional impairments alone. . . . If so, then benefits must

be awarded. However, if the exertional impairments alone are insufficient to direct a

conclusion of disability, then further evidence and analysis are required. In such cases,

the ALJ must use the grids as a “framework for consideration of how much the

individual’s work capability is further diminished in terms of any types of jobs that

would be contraindicated by the nonexertional limitations.” . . . In short, the grids serve

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as a ceiling and the ALJ must examine independently the additional adverse

consequences resulting from the nonexertionary impairment.

Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 

Mental activities are considered to be non-exertional:

Jobs at various levels of complexity require mental functions such as intellectual

competence and ability to function in terms of behavior, affect, thought, memory,

orientation and contact with reality. Exposure to particular work stresses may not be

medically sustainable for some persons with mental impairments, as would be the case

with some persons who have physical impairments . . . Depending on the nature and

extent of a person’s mental impairment . . . relatively broad or narrow types of work

may be precluded (e.g., dealing with a variety of abstract and concrete variables with

nonverbal symbolism -- a highly skilled level of work -- or dealing frequently with

members of the public -- a particular type of work at any level of complexity). 

SSR 83-14, 1983 WL 31254 *2. Here, the ALJ found plaintiff had limitations consisting of being able to

perform only simple, repetitive tasks and to have only occasional contact with others. The undersigned

finds these limitations to be “significant”, and therefore the ALJ was precluded from relying on the Grids to

find plaintiff disabled. 

Defendant argues the ALJ properly applied the Grids, because he “clearly stated” that plaintiff was

able to perform “substantially all of the full range of light work,” and that plaintiff’s capacity for light work

was “substantially intact” and had “not been compromised by any nonexertional limitations.” Defendant’s

Brief, p. 7; Tr. 21. The undersigned finds it difficult to understand, however, how the ALJ could find that

plaintiff’s ability to perform light work had not been compromised by any non-exertional limitations, and

yet, elsewhere in his decision (and even on the same page), determine that he was limited to only simple,

repetitive tasks and occasional contact with others. It is hardly debatable that such limitations would have a

significant impact on an individual’s ability to perform work. 

At least with respect to the occasional contact with others limitation though, defendant argues SSR

83-14 states that “frequent limitation to the public may only preclude reliance on the grids, depending on the

nature and extent of the limitation.” Defendant’s Brief, p. 8. Defendant, however, misreads this section of

SSR 83-14. Properly read, that section refers to a restriction on the ability to deal frequently with the

public. SSR 83-14, 1983 WL 31254 *2. That is, a claimant may suffer from a significant mental functional

limitation, if he or she is unable to deal frequently with the public. Another way of stating the same thing

would be to say, for example, that the claimant is limited to being able to deal with the public on only an

occasional basis. This is the situation we have here. 

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Even if defendant was correct in her reading of SSR 83-14, the ALJ still found plaintiff was limited

to simple, repetitive tasks. The undersigned fails to see how such a limitation does not significantly restrict

the range of work plaintiff is able to do. In addition, while the ALJ may have stated that he was using Rule

202.17 as a “framework” for finding plaintiff not disabled, rather than using it to “direct” such a finding, it is

not at all clear that he in fact did so. As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Cooper, in cases such as this, the

Grids “serve as a ceiling and the ALJ must examine independently the additional adverse consequences

resulting from the nonexertionary impairment. Cooper, 880 F.2d at 1155-56 (emphasis added). However,

in this case it does not appear that the ALJ conducted any such further examination, but rather applied Rule

202.17 in a manner permissible only where no significant non-exertional impairments are present. That is, it

appears the ALJ used Rule 202.17 to “direct” a finding of non-disability. 

II. This Matter Should Be Remanded for Further Administrative Proceedings

The court may remand this case “either for additional evidence and findings or to award benefits.”

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292. Generally, when the court reverses an ALJ’s decision, “the proper course, except

in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Benecke v.

Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Thus, it is “the unusual case in which it is

clear from the record that the claimant is unable to perform gainful employment in the national economy,”

that “remand for an immediate award of benefits is appropriate.” Id. 

Benefits may be awarded where “the record has been fully developed” and “further administrative

proceedings would serve no useful purpose.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292; Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d

1195, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001). Specifically, benefits should be awarded where:

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting [the claimant’s]

evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a

determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ

would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited.

Smolen, 80 F.3d 1273 at 1292; McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2002). Because,

as discussed above, issues remain with respect to whether plaintiff is disabled at step five of the sequential

evaluation process, it is appropriate to remand this matter to the Commissioner for further administrative

proceedings. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing discussion, the court finds the ALJ improperly determined plaintiff was not

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disabled. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for further administrative

proceedings in accordance with the findings contained herein. 

DATED this 5th day of January, 2006.

A

Karen L. Strombom

United States Magistrate Judge

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