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86–401 PDF 2014

S. HRG. 113–159 

HOUSING FINANCE REFORM: ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS 

OF THE MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

EXAMINING THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE MARKET CURRENTLY SERVED BY 

FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC MULTIFAMILY SECURITIES 

OCTOBER 9, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

( 

Available at: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota, Chairman 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

KAY HAGAN, North Carolina 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania 

MARK KIRK, Illinois 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

CHARLES YI, Staff Director 

GREGG RICHARD, Republican Staff Director 

LAURA SWANSON, Deputy Staff Director 

ERIN BARRY FUHER, Professional Staff Member 

BETH COOPER, Professional Staff Member 

GREG DEAN, Republican Chief Counsel 

CHAD DAVIS, Republican Professional Staff Member 

TRAVIS HILL, Republican Counsel 

DAWN RATLIFF, Chief Clerk 

KELLY WISMER, Hearing Clerk 

SHELVIN SIMMONS, IT Director 

JIM CROWELL, Editor 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2013 

Page 

Opening statement of Chairman Johnson ............................................................. 1 

Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of: 

Senator Crapo ................................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Thomas S. Bozzuto, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The Bozzuto 

Group, on behalf of the National Multi Housing Council and the National 

Apartment Association ........................................................................................ 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Responses to written questions of: 

Chairman Johnson .................................................................................... 82 

Senator Warren ......................................................................................... 88 

Senator Coburn ......................................................................................... 90 

E.J. Burke, Executive Vice President and Group Head, KeyBank Real Estate 

Capital, Key Corporate Bank, on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers 

Association ............................................................................................................ 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 57 

Responses to written questions of: 

Chairman Johnson .................................................................................... 96 

Senator Warren ......................................................................................... 98 

Senator Coburn ......................................................................................... 102 

Shekar Narasimhan, Managing Partner, Beekman Advisors, Inc. ..................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 64 

Terri Ludwig, President and Chief Executive Officer, Enterprise Community 

Partners, Inc. ........................................................................................................ 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 74 

Responses to written questions of: 

Chairman Johnson .................................................................................... 103 

Senator Warren ......................................................................................... 105 

Senator Coburn ......................................................................................... 107 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUPPLIED FOR THE RECORD

Statement of the National Association of Home Builders .................................... 110 

Principles for Multifamily Housing Finance Reform and the Government 

Sponsored Enterprises ......................................................................................... 118 

(III)

(1) 

HOUSING FINANCE REFORM: ESSENTIAL 

ELEMENTS OF THE MULTIFAMILY HOUSING 

FINANCE SYSTEM 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD–538, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tim Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN TIM JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. I call this hearing to order. 

Today’s hearing is continuing work on housing finance reform. 

This hearing will focus on the future of the multifamily housing finance market currently served by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 

multifamily securities. 

The topic of multifamily housing finance is often overlooked in 

broader housing finance reform discussions, so today’s hearing will 

bring this important issue into focus for the Committee. Multifamily housing is a key source of housing to the one-third of Americans who are renters. Demographic trends indicate there will be 

growing demand for multifamily housing in the years to come. 

Without an adequate supply of such housing, the affordability challenges facing many American families will only increase. 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac multifamily securities help ensure 

broad access to credit across the whole market, serving small communities as well as larger cities on the coasts. It also makes housing affordable to families with a range of incomes. Through the recent financial crisis, these securities performed very well, with collective default rates peaking at less than 1 percent. They also provided liquidity to the multifamily sector at the height of the financial crisis when other sources of financing withdrew. 

In our discussion today, I hope to highlight the key elements of 

the enterprises’ multifamily strengths and weaknesses before and 

during the crisis to help inform our discussions of the future. The 

hearing gives us a chance to examine recommendations from our 

witnesses and what essential elements of our Nation’s multifamily 

housing finance system should be going forward, including the potential roles of private capital and the Government guarantee, as 

well as how a new system should be structured and regulated. 

I also look forward to considering what reforms in this area will 

mean for rural and small communities like those in my State and 

2 

how it may affect small lenders and small properties as well as the 

workforce and affordable housing supply. At a minimum, we must 

make sure that broad access to credit is preserved in a new housing finance system going forward. 

With that, I turn to Senator Crapo for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE CRAPO 

Senator CRAPO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today we continue our series of hearings on housing finance reform. More than 5 years after the collapse of the housing market 

and the beginning of the bailouts of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 

reforming our housing system is urgently needed and is a top priority for this Committee. 

As we have noted in previous hearings, we are now holding a 

number of hearings examining the specific aspects of our housing 

finance system. This morning we take an in-depth look into multifamily housing, which refers to loans secured by properties with 

five or more residential units. 

Although the multifamily market is much smaller than the single-family market with around $850 billion in outstanding mortgage debt, it still serves as a vital source of housing for more than 

15 million American households across the country. 

The multifamily market differs significantly from the single-family market. While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suffered enormous 

losses on single-family mortgages during the recent crisis, multifamily loans at both enterprises experienced delinquency rates of 

less than 1 percent. There are some important lessons we can learn 

from the enterprises’ multifamily activities as we continue to work 

for reform of the single-family market. 

Fannie and Freddie both require private sector risk sharing and 

high-quality underwriting on all guaranteed multifamily loans. 

Fannie Mae employs strict underwriting guidelines and requires 

originators to retain risk through its delegated underwriting and 

servicing system or program. Freddie Mac underwrites all its own 

loans and shares risk with secondary market participants through 

structured transactions known as ‘‘K deals’’. These types of policies 

have helped ensure that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac only guarantee mortgages of high credit quality in the multifamily space. 

Still, by insuring mortgages against default, whether under the 

conservatorship or under a new system that involves a Government 

guarantee, the Government is inherently putting taxpayer money 

at risk. 

The Government’s market share of multifamily housing spiked 

dramatically during the financial crisis from around 30 percent of 

originations in 2006 to around 80 percent in 2009. This number 

has moderately decreased, but Fannie and Freddie along with the 

FHA still finance a significant portion of multifamily originations, 

and the GSEs’ market shares remain at a higher level than has 

historically been the case. 

Historically, private sources of capital, including banks, life insurance companies, the commercial mortgage-backed securities 

market, and real estate investment trusts, have played an important role in multifamily markets. 

3 

Given the exceptional performance of multifamily loans, it is 

worth investigating whether we can do more to encourage the private sector to finance more of these loans on its own, thus shrinking the Government’s footprint in the market. 

We all agree that the status quo in housing finance is not an option. I have seen a number of thoughtful proposals offering different views on how best to structure the future multifamily market, and I am interested to hear your views on these proposals, 

along with any recommendations regarding how to best reform the 

system in a way that ensures a liquid, well-functioning housing 

market. 

How should the future multifamily housing system be structured? Who in the market should play the various roles needed for 

a healthy secondary market? MBA supports well-capitalized private insurers while other groups have advocated private issuer 

guarantors. How should any guarantee fee be priced to ensure that 

the Government is not underpricing risk and crowding out private 

capital? 

I look forward to working with Chairman Johnson and the other 

Members of the Committee toward a bipartisan agreement that addresses these critical issues. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Crapo. 

I understand that there is an event at 11:30 that many of our 

Members will be attending this morning, so we will need to adjourn 

this hearing at 11:15. Because of this, opening statements will be 

limited to myself and Ranking Member Crapo. 

I would like to remind my colleagues that the record will be open 

for the next 7 days for additional statements and other materials. 

I would now like to introduce our witnesses that are here today. 

Our first witness is Mr. Thomas Bozzuto, who is chairman and 

CEO of the Bozzuto Group. Mr. Bozzuto is also representing the 

National Multi Housing Council and the National Apartment Association. 

Mr. E.J. Burke is executive vice president and group head of the 

KeyBank Real Estate Capital. Mr. Burke is also here on behalf of 

the Mortgage Bankers Association. 

Mr. Shekar Narasimhan is managing partner of Beekman Advisors. 

And, finally, we have Ms. Terri Ludwig, president and CEO of 

Enterprise Community Partners, Incorporated. 

Mr. Bozzuto, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS S. BOZZUTO, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE BOZZUTO GROUP, ON BEHALF OF 

THE NATIONAL MULTI HOUSING COUNCIL AND THE NATIONAL APARTMENT ASSOCIATION 

Mr. BOZZUTO. Thank you, Senator Johnson, Ranking Member 

Crapo, and distinguished Members of the Committee. On behalf of 

NMHC and NAA, I thank you for this opportunity. My name is 

Thomas S. Bozzuto, and I am chairman and CEO of the Bozzuto 

Group, a 25-year-old privately held integrated real estate company. 

During my career, I have been responsible for the creation of approximately 50,000 homes, most of them apartments. 

4 

The apartment industry is a competitive and robust $1.1 trillion 

industry. We serve more than 35 million residents, and that number has been expanding and is expected to continue at the rate of 

a million a year. 

In my written testimony, I highlight the important changes in 

supply and demand as well as the economic contributions apartments make to society to explain to Congress why it is so important to pursue mortgage finance reform separately for this housing 

segment. 

While the housing crisis exposed serious flaws in our Nation’s 

home mortgage finance system, the same cannot be said about the 

GSEs’ multifamily programs. The industry did not overbuild, and 

the GSEs’ multifamily programs performed well. Loan performance 

remains strong with delinquency and default rates at less than 1 

percent. 

In conservatorship, the GSE multifamily programs have netted more than $10 billion for the Federal Government. Most importantly, when all other sources of capital fled the market during the 

housing crisis, the GSEs increased their participation, providing 

much needed liquidity, and they did so throughout the country. In 

other words, they functioned as intended. 

We share your collective desire to return to a marketplace dominated by private capital. The industry relies on a variety of sources 

besides Fannie and Freddie, including commercial banks, thrifts, 

life companies, FHA, CMBS, pension funds, and private mortgage 

companies. Together these sources have provided the apartment 

sector with up to $150 billion annually to develop, refinance, purchase, renovate, and preserve apartments. 

However, each of these sources has its own focus, strengths, and 

limitations and has either been unwilling or unable to meet the full 

range of the multifamily industry’s capital needs, even during 

healthy economic times. There is no evidence to suggest that that 

situation is any different today. 

Yes, in the past few years, private capital has returned to the 

apartment sector, but it is typically concentrated in a handful of 

cities and on trophy assets. People who want to live in apartments 

in secondary and tertiary markets in rural areas are not benefiting 

from this resurgence. 

Even in the major markets, firms providing workforce housing 

find themselves shut out. In 2013 alone, an estimated $100 billion 

in multifamily mortgages will need to be refinanced, and many of 

these are in areas that private capital will not go into. For these 

needs, the sector will need to rely on the GSEs. 

But I am not here to suggest that GSEs continue. I would highlight instead for the Committee those elements of the existing system that worked well for apartment lending and, most importantly, 

did so at no cost to the taxpayer. It is our hope that these elements 

will be carried forward in any new program. 

Overall, we support reform that will ensure broad liquidity at all 

times and in all markets. This can only be accomplished if the Federal Government maintains a role. That is the starting point. From 

there, we propose that any legislation include a separate title to 

address the reforms specific to multifamily housing, including the 

process for privatizing entities, transitioning to a new system, and 

5 

defining eligible successors. Our written testimony provides specific 

details and recommendations. 

Finally, we understand the desire to include an affordability 

mandate in any proposed legislation. It is important to note that 

multifamily housing is inherently affordable with 82 percent of existing apartments affordable to households earning 80 percent of 

area median income. We strongly encourage caution in defining a 

mandate to avoid unintended consequences. There are many options available, some better than others, and currently we are considering them. However, we fear that in the desire to achieve affordability, Congress will severely compromise the primary objective of ensuring adequate liquidity to all apartment markets at all 

times. 

Most importantly, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, as part of your deliberation, we urge you to recognize the 

unique needs and characteristics of the rental industry and to retain the successful components of the existing multifamily program 

in whatever succeeds them. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Burke, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF E.J. BURKE, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND 

GROUP HEAD, KEYBANK REAL ESTATE CAPITAL, KEY CORPORATE BANK, ON BEHALF OF THE MORTGAGE BANKERS 

ASSOCIATION 

Mr. BURKE. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo, and 

Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today. My name is E.J. Burke, and I am the 2014 chairman of the 

Mortgage Bankers Association as well as executive vice president 

and group head of KeyBank Real Estate Capital. I have over 34 

years of experience in banking and commercial real estate finance. 

At KeyBank, I oversee multiple commercial real estate lending 

platforms in our commercial and multifamily finance business. 

KeyBank provides community banking services in 14 States and is 

a national commercial real estate lender and servicer. 

The multifamily rental housing market is a critical component of 

our housing system—in size, reach, and the households that it 

serves. More than one in three American households rent their 

home, and more than 16 million of those households live in multifamily rental housing. 

Renters include workers who want to live near their jobs, retirees on a fixed income, families with children, students, and households who value the convenience and mobility that renting offers. 

A large and diverse group of capital sources currently provide liquidity for multifamily housing, and that diversification continues 

to increase. 

Private capital also bears significant risk in existing GSE multifamily finance platforms. The Government-backed sources have experienced, even through the recent financial crisis, very strong 

credit performance. Importantly, as the recent downturn demonstrated, the countercyclical role is one that only the Government 

can fill. 

6 

With Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s conservatorship going on 

more than 5 years, policy makers must develop a long-term plan 

for the future role of the Government in the mortgage market. This 

plan must address the GSEs’ unique role in multifamily rental 

housing. It is clear that the current state of the GSEs should not 

last indefinitely. However, policy makers should ensure the ongoing 

stewardship of valuable resources that support the multifamily 

market and utilize them to transition to a stronger housing finance 

system. 

As the Committee considers the structure of a multifamily housing finance system, we believe that policy makers should focus on 

ensuring the availability of capital in all market cycles. MBA believes that public policy should strike a balance that continues to 

attract and deploy private capital in the multifamily market while 

establishing a focused Government guarantee that enables liquidity 

and stability in all markets and all economic cycles. 

Bearing this in mind, MBA believes that a new system should incorporate several structural recommendations which I describe in 

more detail in my written testimony. 

First, a wholly owned Government corporation should function as 

a catastrophic guarantor, administrator of a risk insurance fund, 

and regulator of secondary market entities. This guarantor would 

be funded by guarantee fees paid by issuers. 

The new system should also allow multiple privately capitalized 

issuers of Government-guaranteed securities in the secondary multifamily mortgage market. 

Next, the GSEs’ existing multifamily assets and infrastructure 

should be preserved and carried over to a new system. Not only are 

these businesses valuable to U.S. taxpayers, transferring them to 

new entities would minimize market disruption and allow them to 

continue to serve the multifamily housing finance market. 

Finally, we firmly believe that proposed approaches should also 

be reasonable, flexible, and balanced with regard to the need to attract private capital. For example, policy proposals contemplating 

affordability requirements should take into account that 93 percent 

of multifamily units have rents affordable to households earning 

area median incomes or less. 

We are encouraged by recent legislative activity that has revived 

the policy debate on the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 

and commend the efforts of the Chairman and Ranking Member 

and those on this Committee who have introduced thoughtful proposals that would create a comprehensive framework for the future 

of housing finance. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. MBA 

remains committed to its key principle that a successful multifamily secondary market should rely primarily on private capital 

while ensuring stable and continued liquidity in all economic cycles 

through a Government role. We believe that this can be achieved 

in a manner that protects taxpayers, encourages competition, and 

builds upon the successes and strong foundation that exists today. 

We stand ready to work with the Committee as it continues to engage in this critically important effort. 

I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. 

7 

Mr. Narasimhan, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF SHEKAR NARASIMHAN, MANAGING PARTNER, 

BEEKMAN ADVISORS, INC. 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. Good morning. Chairman Johnson, Ranking 

Member Crapo, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing on housing finance reform. My 

name is Shekar Narasimhan, and I am managing partner of 

Beekman Advisors. I have spent the past 35 years in housing and 

finance, including 4 years building single-family homes in eastern 

Kentucky. Later, when I was CEO of one of the first publicly traded commercial mortgage finance companies, we developed loan 

products to serve the low-income housing tax credit market. My experience in running and operating a real estate financial services 

business as a partner with the multifamily businesses at Fannie 

Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHA is what brings me here today. 

Through all of this, I developed a deep and abiding passion for affordable housing. 

The multifamily businesses at the GSEs are not part of the problem in the housing finance system. In fact, they are part of the solution. Every major principle that has been articulated by stakeholders with regard to what a new housing finance system should 

look like is already in practice at these businesses today: 

Alignment of interest between the borrower, the lender/investor, 

and the issuer; 

Detailed underwriting of every loan; 

Service of virtually every market segment with a menu of stable 

and responsible lending products. They have consistently served 

the middle market in multifamily, which is for lower-income households and working families, for the last 27 years; 

Participation of both small and large private lenders. Lenders 

from Nebraska, lenders from California, large banks, publicly traded companies have been part of this system with skin in the game; 

And a lengthy record of profitable operations, which is what 

gives us considerable hope that private capital can, in fact, be 

brought in to capitalize these entities; 

And, finally, a footprint that responds appropriately to changing 

economic conditions. At a point when the capital markets were very 

frothy, the GSE multifamily businesses had approximately a 25- 

percent market share, and at the point when there was virtually 

nobody else in the capital markets during the crisis, they increased 

their market share to 70 percent. It is already down to 55 percent 

and will continue to shrink as the private capital market comes 

back in. 

So I am here today to propose that the multifamily businesses 

at the GSEs should be used to really demonstrate the path to the 

housing finance system of the future. Let us spin them out as privately capitalized entities with Government guarantees that are 

limited to only the securities that they issue. 

We all recognize that change is needed. Everyone would agree 

that 5 years of conservatorship, as Ranking Member Crapo said, is 

already too long. It has discouraged the best and brightest from 

working and remaining at the GSEs. It is, frankly, not allowing the 

secondary market to return to normal. But we have a large rental 

8 

population that is growing: 41 million Americans live in rental 

housing today, and that number is actually growing. So we have 

rental demand. We need money to both refinance existing loans as 

well as to build new rental properties across the country. 

The GSEs have played an enormously important role in this sector. We are arguing simply in order to keep rental burdens manageable, we need to keep the operations of these entities within the 

framework that they have operated, and one of the most important 

frameworks where perhaps we are going to be more prescriptive is 

to argue that since they have for the past 11 years of kept records 

demonstrated that they can serve families at 60 percent of area 

median income and do so profitably, they should be continued to 

be held to that standard in the future. 

Responsible change does involve doing the least damage and encouraging the introduction of private capital. So the work that has 

been done recently at the multifamily units of Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac to determine how a spinout would occur is enormously 

valuable to this Committee and, frankly, gives you the blueprint for 

this to occur. 

What we proposed, therefore, is an immediate spinout of the 

multifamily operations and that can fit into the architecture of any 

bipartisan proposal that you come up with. There is no reason to 

wait given rental demand, the need for rental units, and the profitable track records of these current businesses. 

Thank you for the opportunity to make these remarks. I look forward to your questions and comments. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Ms. Ludwig, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF TERRI LUDWIG, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ENTERPRISE COMMUNITY PARTNERS, INC. 

Ms. LUDWIG. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo, and 

Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

this morning, and thank you for holding this hearing on a crucial 

but often overlooked segment of our housing market—the one-third 

of families that rent their homes. I am Terri Ludwig, the president 

and CEO of Enterprise Community Partners. We are a national 

nonprofit organization that creates opportunity for low-income families, starting with a stable home in a vibrant community. 

One of our many business lines is multifamily lending with a 

focus on apartments that working families can afford. Today we 

have the opportunity to build a more perfect system of housing finance in this country, one that fixes the problems of the past system while building off the parts that worked. 

As we work out the details, I urge Congress to keep two overarching goals in mind: 

First, we must continue to have a liquid, stable, and affordable 

housing market that appropriately supports both homeowners and 

renters; 

And second, whenever possible, Government support must be targeted to the families and communities that need it most. 

Multifamily housing is a key consideration in both goals. Today 

roughly 100 million Americans are renters, a number that is exVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON
9 

pected to rise significantly in the coming years, and about 40 percent live in apartment buildings of five or more units. 

On average, renters are younger, earn less income, live in smaller households, and are more likely to be people of color compared 

to homeowners. 

Each of these populations rely heavily on multifamily housing. 

And even with the current levels of support to that market, renters 

face an unprecedented affordability crisis. 

After adjusting for inflation, the typical renter’s income has 

dropped over the past few years while their housing costs have 

steadily risen. At the same time, the number of apartments that 

are affordable to low-income families have declined while demand 

for these apartments has increased. 

As a result, it is more and more difficult for working families to 

find a quality, affordable home. All told, nearly 11 million renter 

families are paying at least half of their income on housing, a severe cost burden that often leaves them one paycheck away from 

losing their home. That is more than a quarter of the Nation’s renters, an all-time high. 

This crisis would be much worse without Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac’s presence in the multifamily market. More than twothirds of the apartments financed by the GSEs last year were affordable to low-income families, and many were affordable to very 

low income families. 

Meanwhile, other sources of capital, namely banks, thrifts, and 

life insurance companies, tend to stay away from this segment of 

the market, instead focusing on Class A properties in top-tier housing markets. 

Fannie and Freddie bring other benefits to the market as well, 

including strong underwriting, broad liquidity, and a buffer from 

severe downturns. My written testimony goes into detail on each 

of these critical roles. 

A key to their ability to perform these roles is access to a limited, 

explicit Government guarantee. And thanks to a series of recent reports from FHFA, we know what the rental market would look like 

without that guarantee. 

The entire rental market would be subject to wild boom-and-bust 

cycles, causing interest rates to skyrockets New construction on 

multifamily properties would plummet. Average rents would increase. And since private capital would be less likely to invest in 

lower-end developments or second-tier markets, low-income families would be carrying the heaviest burden. 

Thus, any reform must start with an explicit, limited, and paidfor guarantee on multifamily mortgages, and there are several 

other important steps that need to be taken to ensure a well-functioning rental market, many of which Shekar just laid out. 

We think it is a good idea for Congress to spin off the GSE multifamily businesses starting immediately. When the public guarantor 

is fully operational, the insurance function should be transferred to 

the Government. And from that point on, new approved issuers 

should be allowed to purchase that same guarantee. We recommend starting with a co-op made up of small and community 

lenders. 

10 

These businesses are effective, efficient, and profitable, and they 

must be preserved to avoid unnecessary disruptions in the rental 

market. But we also need to ensure that the issuer of a Government-insured security has a defined public purpose. 

First, the clear majority of apartments financed by Governmentbacked securities must be affordable to working families. Under 

our proposal, each issuer must prove at least 60 percent of the 

apartments they finance each year are affordable to low-income 

families. 

Second, issuers should be encouraged to lead the market in affordable housing investments as Fannie and Freddie have for decades. 

Third, we recommend levying a 5- to 10-basis-point fee on all insured securities to fund programs that will go to the very low income families. 

Fourth, we recommend requiring all issuers to establish annual 

plans for serving historically underserved segments of the market. 

Again, thank you for tackling this important issue today. The decisions made in the coming months will determine whether a stable 

home is within reach for millions of working families. We look forward to working with the Committee on these important issues. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you all very much for your testimony. 

We will now begin asking questions of our witnesses. Will the 

clerk please put 5 minutes on the clock for each member. 

Ms. Ludwig, in smaller communities in South Dakota, a limited 

supply of housing contributes to both affordability and economic development challenges as workers have trouble locating housing. 

These multifamily rental properties are also often smaller. 

With these factors in mind, what steps should we take in legislation to address the issue of serving smaller and rural communities 

in a new system? 

Ms. LUDWIG. Certainly. So today there are a number of programs 

that the GSEs already have in effect that help the ability to have 

underserved markets, particularly rural communities, to be able to 

have capital flow directly. For example, Fannie Mae today has a 

small loan lenders program which specifically targets loans that 

are less than $3 million in some markets and $5 million in others. 

I would say that that has been a very substantial program, but 

compared to the need, we need to do significantly more. 

So what we are proposing is to use the affordability fee to not 

only go to help extremely low income families, but also to look at 

underserved markets. For example, it has been proposed that there 

is established a market access fund that could be used to provide 

credit enhancements, reduce cost of underwriting, and look to set 

up other pilots that could address your question about how to further promote the small loan programs. 

We think that some specific pilots around securitization are essential. And as I mentioned in my written testimony a moment 

ago, we think that Congress should stand up a new issuer to serve 

small and community banks, since that’s where a lot of these loans 

are being made. These banks need to be well-positioned to keep 

making loans. 

11 

And, finally, I would say that it is not to be overlooked that 

Fannie and Freddie have been important investors in these markets over a long period of time. I know from Enterprise’s experience, Fannie Mae has partnered with us to do over 700 affordable 

homes on Native lands, including those in South Dakota and Idaho. 

So we certainly would like to see that some of the opportunities for 

those GSEs to continue to invest in programs that support affordability remain in place. 

Chairman JOHNSON. This question is for the full panel. Do each 

of you believe that the whole market will have access to affordable 

credit without the presence of a Government guarantee? Yes or no. 

Let us begin with Mr. Bozzuto. 

Mr. BOZZUTO. No. 

Mr. BURKE. No. 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. No. 

Ms. LUDWIG. No. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Mr. Narasimhan, you have recommended an 

affordability threshold. Why is your proposed threshold important? 

And do you think the new issuers in your system will be capable 

of meeting your proposed target? 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. The current multifamily businesses at the 

GSEs have been monitoring and tracking under a different regime, 

a goals regime, what they do in different segments of the market. 

So we have a methodology to track the income of tenants and the 

affordability of rents in units across both 100 percent of median income, 80 percent of median income, and in other ways. If this is 

done one time at the time of origination of a loan, it is not an intrusive requirement. It does not require interviewing tenants. It just 

involves using a rent roll and using AMI. 

Over the past 11 years of keeping these records, they have traditionally, as part of their normal business, done more than 60 to 65 

percent of their business on units that are affordable to those at 

80 percent of median and below. 

One of the precepts of our proposal is that private capital will 

come into these issuers and take the first loss prior to any Government guarantee and in addition to any other losses that are incurred by lenders or other participants in the system. 

In order to bring in private capital, the first and most important 

requirement is that we have a stable regime so we have a track 

record here of performance with profitability at a standard that is 

already accepted in the market as being the middle of the multifamily market. So that is number one criteria. 

Number two, to conclude, basically in order to be able to meet 

the standard, the GSEs are not stretching and taking more credit 

risk; they are doing what is within their capability to do. So we 

think a reasonable standard that is measured once a year should 

be applied as a public policy requirement. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Crapo, do you choose to pass? 

Senator CRAPO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Because of the time constraints, I will let my other colleagues go first, and so I will defer 

to Senator Corker. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you both. That is most generous, and 

thanks for having this hearing. And to all of you as witnesses, 

12 

thanks for your outstanding testimony. It is kind of refreshing to 

have people whose titles are ‘‘Mr.’’ and ‘‘Mrs.’’ here, so thank you 

very much. 

I do want to specifically ask a few questions—is it 

‘‘Narasimhan’’? 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. ‘‘Narasimhan.’’ 

Senator CORKER. I am going to let you say it. 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. I live in eastern Kentucky, and they just call 

me ‘‘Shekar.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CORKER. Well, Mr. Shekar—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CORKER. If you would, please walk us through the case 

series and how it works with multifamily. I know there are basically two types: there is a K-series and DUS. But if you would, 

walk through briefly, if you would, the basis structure of how the 

general financing arrangement works. 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. Sure. The difference is that one is what is 

called an ‘‘issuer-based model,’’ which is the DUS program, where 

on every single loan a lender that meets the capital standards required to be a lender and issuer under that program takes the 

first-loss risk if a loan goes bad. So they make a loan. They can 

sell it to Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae securitizes it. If that loan goes 

bad, they take one-third of the first of the losses on that loan. 

Senator CORKER. Right. 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. Which has typically amounted to over 10 percent of the outstanding principal balance. But in order to do that, 

they have to meet these standards, they have to meet the underwriting and so on. That is a loan-by-loan issuer-based system 

where I look at the financials of my counterparty. 

The K-series is a securitization-based risk sharing where I buy $1 billion in loans, assume that every loan is $10 million. The average single-family loan, by the way, is $6 million, so let us say it 

is $10 million to simplify it. We have 100 loans in this pool made 

across the country. For the sake of comity, it is two loans per State. 

But we make 100 loans. We put them into a trust. We securitize 

them, and we sell typically the first 14 or 15 percent of the loss 

in the form of a two-tranche security, what is called an ‘‘unrated, 

bottom-of-the-barrel B piece.’’ 

Senator CORKER. And that is private sector risk, first—— 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. Somebody else is examining every loan, taking 

the risk, earning a yield on their risk, and then a mezzanine piece, 

which takes the second-loss risk, before anybody can hit the issuer. 

Senator CORKER. And the overall risk to private investors is 15 

percent, generally? 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. Typically 14 to 15 percent. 

Senator CORKER. So it looks like we are way low at our 10-percent level on single-family. I do want to point that out. So there 

are people willing to take 15-percent risk on these loans. 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. Mr. Senator, in defense of those in the singlefamily business, this is a bulkier business. In securitization, when 

you have—— 

Senator CORKER. You can stop now. 

[Laughter.] 

13 

Senator CORKER. And what is the role of the risk-sharing component in multifamily? In other words, in addition to putting up risk 

capital, what other attributes to the deal is having that risk capital 

there in advance of the public guarantee? 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. I think the most important is that this is a 

very selected group of small and large lenders who lend mainly regionally and nationally. So you know and can look in the eye of 

your counterparty; you know who is doing this business. Multifamily is essentially business-to-business lending where the 

counterparty in the landlord and the borrower is a sophisticated 

party that is borrowing a significant amount of money. It is not— 

and we actually in every single loan on a quarterly basis collect financials, on an annual basis do inspections. So the lender has tremendous obligations to not only make a good loan, but to monitor 

it, manage it, ensure that the property is being maintained and 

kept up to standards, and then worry about when it comes due for 

a refinance that a balloon payment is coming due and it can be refinanced. 

Senator CORKER. And that is one of the reasons that they perform better than the single-family. Is that correct? The underwriting is just different because you are looking at each transaction 

in a very focused way. And if I could, and very briefly because I 

want to ask one more questions, Mr. Bozzuto, has that played a 

role in ensuring that there was not the overbuilding that you referred to in your testimony? 

Mr. BOZZUTO. Yes, Senator. There are a variety of factors that 

are related to that. The multifamily business as opposed to the single-family business tends to be a relationship business. It really is. 

It is not just a business-to-business business, but it is a people-topeople business. People who are in this business are in it a very 

long time. 

Second, leverage is considerably lower. We have typically 30 percent, 25-percent equity in our projects, real equity, before the debt, 

and that has certainly contributed to the solvency. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, and because of the generosity, I will 

stop just with making this statement, and you can nod your heads 

for brevity of time. But it is my understanding that most of you are 

pretty familiar with a bill that is before—Senate bill 1217 that a 

lot of people are involved in here. It is my understanding that relative to the multifamily piece, the only change that you would like 

to see happen is that the issuer be a private issuer, not a public 

issuer. And other than that, the bill works very well compared to 

the experiences that you have had in the past. Is that correct? 

[Witnesses nod affirmatively.] 

Senator CORKER. I will note that everybody is shaking their head 

up and down, and I will yield the floor. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. Bozzuto and I think the whole panel concurred that because 

of much more effective underwriting, the multifamily programs 

were credible, durable, and, in fact, contributed significantly and 

are still contributing. And that is going to continue regardless of 

whatever we do, we hope. 

14 

But there is one aspect, I think, in terms of attracting capital to 

the mortgage market there, and that is the role of Section 8 vouchers. Mr. Bozzuto, to what extent is a Section 8 voucher, particularly 

when you talk about the affordable market, critical to attracting 

private capital and also to ensuring that these projects not only can 

be built but they can continue to pay on the mortgages? 

Mr. BOZZUTO. Senator, without subsidy, without Section 8 vouchers, without tax credits, it is virtually impossible in most parts of 

the country to build new construction that is affordable at the 

kinds of levels that you would be talking about. 

Senator REED. So, you know, all of—and I think your testimony 

is extremely valuable—is premised upon not only sort of structural 

changes perhaps to the GSEs, et cetera, but also the continuation 

of these programs that support housing through tax credits and 

Section 8. Is that—I see nodding of heads. 

Mr. BOZZUTO. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator REED. And the other way to say that is if you look at 

the luxury market for residential, there is no problem there, there 

has never been a problem. Is that pretty fair? 

Mr. BOZZUTO. No, I would not agree with that, sir. We build, my 

company, in my career—probably 7,500, 8,000 of the units I built 

have been affordable. It is impossible to build affordable housing 

without some form of subsidy. Market rate housing, luxury housing, which can be defined differently no matter where you are, can 

be built when capital is available, but private capital comes and 

goes. And part of the reason we maintain that liquidity is the public purpose is because if you look back at 2009, when there was a 

need for jobs, there was a need for rental housing, the only capital 

that was available for the apartment industry was coming from the 

public sector. So I would not say that at all times the luxury or the 

market rate business survives on its own. 

And, second, even today, when there is private capital, if I went 

into a smaller community—and it does not have to be in Nebraska 

or West Virginia. 

Senator REED. Westerly, Rhode Island. 

Mr. BOZZUTO. Or Westerly, Rhode Island. 

Senator REED. As you point out in your testimony. 

Mr. BOZZUTO. Yes, sir. We were thinking about Point Judith. 

Senator REED. You are getting close. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BOZZUTO. But even here, if I were to go to Hagerstown, 

Maryland, which is, you know, in theory a suburb of Washington, 

I could not today get a private insurance company to provide financing for a new project in all likelihood. 

Senator REED. And the final point in your testimony in this area 

is that we are underbuilding given the projected demand, significantly; that even with this program that is working effectively, we 

need to do much, much more because just the projected demand for 

rental housing is so much greater. 

[Witnesses nod affirmatively.] 

Senator REED. Everyone is nodding their heads. I will take that 

agreement. 

A final question, given all your expertise here, and given the fact 

that we are looking next week to this cataclysmic possibility of deVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON
15 

fault, what would that do to your financing operations, Mr. 

Bozzuto, for example? 

Mr. BOZZUTO. Even now our ability to plan new projects, our 

ability to get debt for new projects is essentially on hold because 

of great insecurity about what is being done by Congress. 

Senator REED. Mr. Burke, does your business rely on overnight 

financing in terms of—I am sure the bank does, but are you beginning to see sort of the retraction-retention because of this debate? 

Mr. BURKE. Yes. My business line—there is a different part of 

the bank that funds the bank and has more interaction with the 

markets. But I can tell you that there is a great—that uncertainty 

creates this—— 

Senator REED. So the secondary effect would be the part of the 

bank that funds you basically will stop doing anything because 

they are either uncertain or cannot get liquidity themselves. Is 

that—— 

Mr. BURKE. It would be the latter. 

Senator REED. Yes, the liquidity would dry up, so you are seeing 

a potential huge contraction, which is two and three steps away 

from simply interest rates going up. 

Mr. BURKE. Correct. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you all for your excellent testimony 

and for your great work. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Johanns. 

Senator JOHANNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me also say to 

the panel, your testimony has been extremely informative, and I 

must admit it is a bit head scratching, and let me offer a thought, 

and then I would like your reaction to it. 

I do not think anyone on the panel is looking to this area of the 

real estate economy or industry and trying to make the claim that 

you were the problem. I think the testimony is accurate. This part 

of the real estate industry functioned as we hoped it would function, and that is on the good-news side of things. 

On the other hand, it does not appear to me that historically or 

even now it has functioned very well outside of sizable metropolitan areas, and I think, Mr. Bozzuto, your testimony kind of nails 

it. If you think you are having that kind of challenge in Hagerstown, what would you say about Sidney, Nebraska, where these 

people are doing absolutely everything right, it is the home base of 

Cabela’s, but they have some of the best economic development initiatives in the State of Nebraska—I mean, as their former Governor, I used to go out there and just marvel at what they were 

doing. You know what the first item on the list was every meeting 

I have ever had with them? Housing. 

Now, this is an area where incomes are strong, job creation is 

strong, opportunities are strong, and they are constantly battling 

to get housing. 

So to me, whether you are talking about Sidney, where everything is going right, or a very impoverished area of a community 

where things are not going so right, the job is not getting done. 

So my question is: How do we get that job done? How do we do 

something that helps those extremes—an area that is blighted and 

needs help and an area where everything is happening but it is not 

in a major metropolitan area? Mr. Bozzuto, I will give you that 

16 

puzzle, because I think that is a pretty important issue to folks like 

me from more rural States. 

Mr. BOZZUTO. Senator, I absolutely agree with you. And I am not 

sure I can give you a prescription except that it would appear to 

me that unless we can figure some form of continued Government 

role with relatively clear legislation that describes—that provides 

a mandate, that talks about communities like that, and talks about 

affordable housing, but that allows the flexibility for the regulator 

that we would recommend be installed to manage that so that at 

different points in time, adjustments can be made, I am not sure 

that I know the answer. I would tell you that if—as difficult as it 

has been, without the GSEs it would have been truly impossible. 

Insurance companies work on an allocation basis. They get a certain amount of money, and they get it in the beginning of the year, 

and it is much easier for them to spend their money in places like 

Washington, DC, or New York City, or L.A., or San Francisco than 

it is in places like Nebraska. 

Senator JOHANNS. Mr. Burke. 

Mr. BURKE. Senator, what I might suggest is that the way I see 

that problem is that the money manager in New York will not do 

the work to understand Sidney, Nebraska. So what you have to 

have is a mechanism where you can attract the capital from a 

money manager who is not going to take the time to understand 

the local economy. And what we are suggesting here is that 

through a mechanism similar to what the GSEs do today, you create a regime where people who understand real estate, people who 

understand the communities, for instance, community banks, have 

an opportunity to originate loans which then can be securitized 

with a Government guarantee. That would then funnel capital into 

those communities that need it. 

For instance, a community bank knows—community banks have 

done a great job because they know their clients. But they have a 

liability structure that is short. So what you need to do is get longterm capital to be invested in these communities, and that is part 

of the reason I think we all today are saying that the program the 

GSEs have, something similar to that, could address that problem. 

Senator JOHANNS. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time, but if I could 

ask the panel to put some brain power behind this, because what 

I worry is that we pass a piece of legislation, we kind of declare 

victory—and I hope the legislation passes; I am one of the cosponsors—but at the end of the day we look back in 2 years and 4 years 

and 5 years and say, my goodness, there is a huge gap out there. 

But there has always been a huge gap out there, and it would be 

good to have some strategies to figure out how we can improve that 

situation, whether it is an inner-city area or it is a rural area in 

one of our States. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for 

your testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you holding this hearing. In a context like New Jersey, multifamily housing is a big reality for people 

to have a place to call home. And it replicates the third of all American households that live in multifamily housing, 17 million houseVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON
17 

holds in the country. In my State there is a fair amount of that. 

In my own life, I know that that has been a reality. 

I also know that 27 percent of them pay over half—half—of their 

income toward rental payments. And so that is an enormous challenge in the lives of individuals because when you are paying that 

much in rental payment, you know, there is very little else to do 

other things—educate your children and realize your hopes and 

dreams and aspirations, which is why I have been a big advocate 

for quite some time of having Fannie and Freddie expand their 

multifamily operations. And, in fact, they performed well during 

the crisis. They have lower serious delinquency rates than singlefamily lines and other sources of multifamily credit, such as private 

label commercial-backed securities and bank and thrift loans. 

As a matter of fact, the FHFA’s Inspector General has Fannie’s 

and Freddie’s multifamily programs as their only profitable major 

business segments from 2008 to the third quarter of 2011. That is 

pretty significant. 

So my question to the panel is: What do you believe were the 

major drivers for that strong performance? And what lessons can 

we take away that can be more broadly applied? 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. Senator, if I may, I think the first and most 

important is risk sharing. I think there has always been a very 

strong component in the multifamily programs of everyone is in 

this, and, of course, market conditions can change and loans can 

go back, but everybody loses something in the bargain. And you try 

not to have that loss at the community, but with the developer or 

the borrower, the lender or the issuer, and, in effect, the guarantor. 

I do believe that that fundamental principle is probably—that led 

to good underwriting, that led to an avoidance of a race to the bottom. When the rest of the market started doing crazy stuff, they 

did not go there, because they had lenders and participants and 

borrowers saying we do not need to go there, we can do our business, reduce our market share, and stay fine. So I fundamentally 

believe that is the number one reason. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Anyone else? 

[No response.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you this, then: You know, if— 

we want availability, but we also want affordability, and I understand the concerns that have been raised about what that mechanism looks like and how that might undermine the other elements 

of the market. But how does one—I think both you and Ms. Ludwig 

mentioned in your testimony some suggested mechanisms to improve affordability and access rather than simply subsidizing developments that would ultimately have no trouble getting finance in 

purely private sources. Can you talk a little bit about what those 

can be? 

Ms. LUDWIG. Sure. So, first of all, as part of the recommendation, 

we propose an annual fee from 5 to 10 basis points on securities 

that are issued that would go toward promoting affordability. In 

past legislation Congress established the National Housing Trust 

Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund, both of which should be funded regularly in the future system. We also propose putting some of 

that money into a Market Access Fund, which will look to serve underserved markets and ensure that capital is available. We have 

18 

the ability to do research and development to really push our 

thinking on how to promote affordability through credit enhancements, new product creation. 

So, really, there are three primary uses of that fee: one is to provide through the National Housing Trust Fund essentially a block 

grant to lower income populations; the second is to the Capital 

Magnet Fund, to be able to use that to leverage private investment; 

and then the third is for this R&D type of facility. 

And, finally, I think it is really important also that we take a 

very proactive approach to underserved markets and we are not 

thinking just retroactively about what we have done in reporting 

but, rather, we’re recommending an annual planning process where 

each of the issuers sit down with their regulator and actually form 

a very targeted plan to address some of those underserved markets. 

So those would be essential. 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. Senator, 2 seconds. I think we have talked 

about the creation of a market access fund which can enable private institutions to take more risk and push the envelop a little bit 

on the risk curve to be able to serve these kinds of markets. And 

I think we want to flesh that out further and then discuss it with 

you. But I think that is the way to get to this with the private sector taking the first-loss risk, with them doing the innovation. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, we would love to work with you and 

anyone else on this issue, because at the end of the day, if you have 

availability but not affordability, you do not have availability. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Moran. 

Senator MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you to you 

and Senator Crapo for hosting this hearing. This is the first time 

in a few days that I have actually felt like a legislator. Your testimony was very valuable, well spoken, and I appreciate it. 

First of all, I would say, I think in answer to Chairman Johnson’s questions, all of you made clear the necessity or the importance of GSE financing in housing, and that was done with your 

yes or no answer, and all of you indicated the importance of that 

GSE for housing broadly across the country. 

I also want to follow up on what Senator Johanns said. Our 

States are similarly situated, but I want to make certain that in 

any GSE legislation we are not committing the mistakes that have 

been made in the past, which seems to me to be mandating, requiring loans to be made that are not otherwise financially sound, that 

the risks are not accommodated by the return. And so when we 

talk about housing in rural communities, there needs to be a different fashion than forcing the lenders to allocate resources where 

the loans have a higher potential of going bad, they do not reflect 

market risk. 

Mr. Burke, you indicated about the unknown, that somebody who 

is making a decision does not know Sidney, Nebraska, or communities in Kansas. Mr. Bozzuto, you talked about Topeka, Kansas, 

as well as Rhode Island in your testimony. Tell me, is there something unique about multifamily housing in a rural setting that 

makes the market—that markets would need to price at a higher 

return, a greater risk is encountered? Or is it only what Mr. Burke 

said about lack of really understanding? And then I want to follow 

19 

up with the idea about community banks. Is there something 

unique about multifamily housing in a rural setting that increases 

the risk and, therefore, requires a greater return? 

Mr. BURKE. I think the first thing to think about is loan size. 

The loan sizes are smaller in smaller communities. So the economics of doing the underwriting, the processing, and the closing of 

small loans has always made it difficult—— 

Senator MORAN. So the fixed costs—— 

Mr. BURKE. Right. 

Senator MORAN. ——of that project—— 

Mr. BURKE. That is right. 

Senator MORAN. ——associated with the financing makes it less 

economically viable. 

Mr. BURKE. That is right. 

Senator MORAN. OK. 

Mr. BURKE. And part of the—I would say, just to buttress some 

of the comments that Shekar has made, the underwriting of multifamily is a very detailed and very complicated thing. So the smaller 

the loan, the higher those up-front costs are, the more unaffordable 

it gets. 

So if we have lenders who are in those communities that already 

know those communities and give them access to capital where an 

investor does not have to do that work, they do not have to do that 

underwriting, you have a more efficient system. 

Senator MORAN. Would that suggest the opportunity for a developer packaging multifamily housing in a number of communities to 

make a larger project? Is that—— 

Mr. BURKE. Well, you still have to understand—— 

Senator MORAN. The community. 

Mr. BURKE. ——each individual project in each individual community, so I do not know that the package would help. But I think 

that if we have a mechanism for community lenders to access a 

Government guarantee, then I think we could make a dent in the 

problem. 

Senator MORAN. Mr. Burke, do you have any knowledge—is this 

a question that is fair to direct to you? Our community bankers 

would continually tell us that they are overregulated in ways that 

lack common sense, that do not reflect the risk that the regulators 

presumably are trying to overcome. Are there regulations that reduce the chances that a community banker is going to make this 

kind of loan, originate this loan? 

Mr. BURKE. I do not know that there are specific regulations that 

would, but I think when you sit down across the table from your 

examiner and the examiner has read in the Wall Street Journal 

that XYZ market a thousand miles away is experiencing problems 

and, you know, prove to me that your market is not, that has a 

dampening effect on the next loan that you are going to think 

about. 

Senator MORAN. So the broad regulatory environment as compared to a specific regulation—— 

Mr. BURKE. That is right. 

Senator MORAN. ——has this dampening effect. 

Mr. BURKE. That is right. 

20 

Senator MORAN. Are there States in which there is a role model 

for increasing the housing stock? Have any of you experienced a 

place where this works better in Kentucky than it does in Kansas? 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. No, I do not think so. Terri? 

Ms. LUDWIG. No, I would say not. But I would also add that I 

think your question goes right to the heart of the need to do more 

testing around securitizing the smaller product, the small multifamily products. That is so essential for the markets we are talking 

about, regardless of which community you are in, but if you are in 

a smaller rural community. So I would turn to that recommendation as well. 

Senator MORAN. OK. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Crapo. This is an excellent hearing, and I echo my colleagues in 

thanking you for your testimony today. 

It seems like a lot of us are talking about the geographic diversity and the need for affordable and available housing in our rural 

communities. And North Carolina is certainly front and center in 

that situation, too. 

I can think back to hurricane seasons and people saying, well, 

you know, from FEMA’s perspective we will just people up in 

apartment buildings. There are none. So there is a huge need. And 

there is also a huge need in some of the resort communities for affordable housing for workers that are not in the luxury beachfront 

homes. 

So it is really something that I think this Committee is understanding the need and the real desire that something needs to be 

done. 

And besides the issue of geographic diversity, Mr. Burke, regarding the recently reproposed rule on credit risk retention for 

securitized loans, does your institution see any potential cost impact to borrowers and, by extension, to the tenant families as a result of the rule? And to what extent will this rule help or hurt liquidity for new projects and maturing debt? 

Mr. BURKE. Are you referring to the CMBS risk retention? 

Senator HAGAN. Yes. 

Mr. BURKE. I think the rule that allows an issuer to transfer its 

risk retention obligation to a third-party BP Spire, the rules that 

require that buyer to retain the investment for a certain period of 

time will inevitably require a higher yield because it’s a more illiquid investment by virtue of this restriction, and that ultimately 

would end up finding its way into the yield that you have to charge 

the borrower. 

Now, having said that, I think the rule overall that allows a sophisticated third-party investor to acquire—or to take over that 

risk retention requirement is a good one. In CMBS, my own personal experience is that when you know that a third-party investor 

is going to sit across the table and tell you to remove certain loans 

because they just do not like them, it creates a lot of discipline. 

So I think the rule overall is a good one, but it will inevitably 

result in a cost. 

Senator HAGAN. Any other panelists? 

21 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. We probably slightly disagree on this. It would 

be a good thing. But I think that the CMBS business turned during 

the crisis or prior to the crisis into essentially a storage business, 

where loans were being warehoused with the sole intention of 

being securitized even before the ink was dry on the paper. And 

part of that behavior occurred because very few people had really 

any skin in the game other than the ultimate investor, who might 

or might not have understood what the collateral was. And certainly the rating agencies played a part in that. 

So I think the notion that there should be skin in the game, how 

that is done to manage around risk-based capital and create a 

framework for competitive pricing is I think the issue. But we 

should not be debating whether there should be skin in the game 

at all. 

Senator HAGAN. Let me ask about the private capital, too, and 

when we were talking—Mr. Bozzuto, I think you were talking 

about building a different part of Maryland. And yet the private 

capital, the insurance companies would not step forward. What will 

it take to get once again the community banks—and that might be 

from a regulatory situation, but insurance companies to start stepping back up to the plate and bringing private capital back into the 

market? 

Mr. BOZZUTO. Senator, the insurance companies have come back 

into the market. In fact—— 

Senator HAGAN. In the rural areas, perhaps. 

Mr. BOZZUTO. You have to imagine what happens at an insurance company in Hartford or a pension institution. A loan officer 

goes into a conference to make a presentation on a project: ‘‘I have 

a project I want to do in Raleigh.’’ Well, you know, everybody 

knows where Raleigh is. Everybody has a preconception. It is easy 

to talk about the market. There are comparables. 

‘‘I want to do a project in Whiteville, North Carolina’’? I mean, 

nobody knows what he is talking about. And that fellow or that 

woman is going to be very worried about their credibility. They are 

not going to do it. And that is why we need some sort of an inducement in the form of Government guarantee that will allow us to 

have access to capital for those kinds of markets. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Crapo, would you yield to Senator 

Warner? 

Senator CRAPO. I definitely will, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. That is extraordinarily generous, 

and I am going to owe you big time, not only letting me jump but 

letting it go not in order. And I asked Senator Johanns to stay for 

a minute because I just wanted to make three really quick points. 

If we are going to make sure that Nebraska and Kansas and 

rural North Carolina and rural Virginia and Idaho and South Dakota stay in the mix, what we have got right now is—you know, 

the main thing we need to do is do not mess this up. And the activities right now of the FHFA by saying let us arbitrarily cut back 

10 percent on multifamily—and you just got a nod on this one as 

well—would you not agree that if that 10-percent arbitrary cutback, the people who are going to get hit first are the affordable 

universe that Senator Menendez is interested in and the rural comVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON
22 

munities, because those would be the first lopped off the list. Is 

that a yes? 

Mr. BOZZUTO. Yes. 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. Yes. 

Ms. LUDWIG. Yes. 

Mr. BURKE. Well, Senator, in fact, Fannie Mae in the beginning 

of the year put out a rule that said, ‘‘We will not grant waivers. 

Do not bring us waivers on loans less than $10 million.’’ 

Senator WARNER. So if we do not do reform, the status quo is 

going to even further harm rural communities, point one. 

Point two, you know, Ms. Ludwig had made a lot of comments 

about the need for this market access fund that S.1217 has. Mr. 

Bozzuto made the point, I thought a good one, that, you know, 

there are a lot of existing tools—Section 8, housing credits, and 

others—that make these deals doable at all, they have to remain 

in place. And one of the remarkable things about the Housing 

Trust Fund and all these other great ideas, we create them, but we 

have never funded them. Wouldn’t the market access fund be the 

first time ever that there would be this stable existing fee that 

would be charged that would help provide some funding in this 

area? 

Ms. LUDWIG. Absolutely. 

Senator WARNER. Would that be a nod yes? 

[Witnesses nod affirmatively.] 

Senator WARNER. And that could help in rural communities as 

well as affordability communities. 

And the third point—I know Senator Corker made this point already—what is the right capital number of risk sharing? And it 

seems like the multifamily business has kind of got it right. I do 

think we need more work, echoing what Senator Johanns said, on 

how we make sure the community banks—we can do more experimentation on securitization of those smaller communities’ pools. 

But for those who feel that those of us who have said at the 10- 

percent level we have overstretched the amount of capital, I would 

again point out what Shekar’s comments were. The market does a 

pretty good job of being able to tranche that, so if we put in too 

much protection, I actually trust your colleagues on the single-family side will figure out a way to tranche that, to price that risk accordingly. 

But at the end of the day, I’d rather overshoot because never has 

there been taxpayer losses of any significance on multifamily. We’d 

like to have the same on single-family. 

And my real great thanks to the Chair and the Ranking Member 

for letting me jump line. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Crapo. 

Senator CRAPO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate our witnesses. Your testimony has been very 

good today. 

I want to follow up on this same issue that we have been talking 

about in terms of access to the rural and smaller communities. And 

each of you have talked about it, but, Mr. Burke, I am going to direct my question to you. 

You have all said basically that we need to have a mechanism 

to give the lenders in the smaller communities access to capital. 

23 

Specifically, what are we saying? Is it simply opening up to the 

community banks access to a guarantee, a Government guarantee? 

Or is there more of a mechanism that we need to be dealing with 

here? Mr. Burke, could you just walk us through how would we do 

this, getting access opened up to the community banks? 

Mr. BURKE. If we were to create secondary mortgage market entities that had access to the guarantee and built some incentives 

for them to accumulate mortgages in these areas, I am highly confident they would develop partnerships with community banks to 

source these loans. Alternatively, if we could make it easier for a 

community bank to participate, I think it would help. 

I mean, the problem, as I see it, is that, you know, we are talking—typically a multifamily mortgage is 10 years or more, and to 

put a 10-year fixed-rate asset on your books in a small bank is a 

difficult thing to do. So it is really a way to—it is a funding mechanism more than anything else. 

I think banks would be—I think banks would welcome the opportunity to partner with a secondary mortgage market entity. I think, 

Terri, you suggested a co-op, which would be another mechanism. 

But I see it simply as a way to bring more permanent capital to 

those banks. 

Senator CRAPO. Thank you very much. 

And, Ms. Ludwig, would you—— 

Mr. BOZZUTO. I just wanted to add briefly to that. There is inherent inefficiency not only in the financing but in the construction 

and operation particularly of small properties. And as part of your 

discussion, you really need to, I think, recognize or consider some 

form of subsidy to make it worthwhile to do these smaller projects 

in rural areas. 

Senator CRAPO. All right. Thank you. And just in the minute or 

so I have left, Ms. Ludwig, could you give a little more detail to 

the co-op suggestion you have made? How would that work? 

Ms. LUDWIG. Sure. I actually might yield my time to Shekar, who 

has been probably more involved in the discussions, but at the 

highest level, I would say to set up an issuer that is a co-op of 

smaller and community banks essentially to be able to do these 

types of things. 

Senator CRAPO. Shekar. 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. The Federal home loan banks have already approached the idea of forming a cooperative of community banks and 

independent mortgage lenders, including CDFIs, that can participate in the secondary mortgage market, can put risk sharing in 

front of any Government guarantee, can have participants that can 

use their own documentation, their own credit standards, but have 

to meet certain norms of underwriting. I think the mechanism is 

exactly what E.J. Burke said: Figure out a way to give them access 

to long-term fixed-rate financing that is stable, allow them to continue to do the business they do and perform on their track record. 

Senator CRAPO. All right. Thank you very much. And one last 

question, back to you, Mr. Burke. Some experts have indicated 

that, at minimum, there are certain markets in this country in 

which there is sufficient private capital to satisfy the needs of the 

market without taxpayer backing. Would you agree with that posiVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON
24 

tion, that there are some markets where there does not need to be 

the Government guarantee? 

Mr. BURKE. Today there is. I think we have all said that certainly, you know, if you are doing a luxury apartment, luxury highrise apartment in Los Angeles, today there would be no shortage 

of lenders that would raise their hand to make that loan. As Mr. 

Bozzuto has said, in 2009 no one raised their hand. So I think that 

is the challenge we have, is that markets change every day, and 

availability of capital changes every day. And whatever legislation, 

you know, comes through, we have to keep that in mind. 

Senator CRAPO. All right. Thank you. 

Senator MERKLEY [presiding]. Thank you very much. I appreciated all your testimony, and we are now in overtime, and in that 

sense, I will be very brief. But I want to address really kind of 

these different affordability strategies. 

One suggestion is that there be basis points at the point of closing and basis points per year on various mortgage-backed securities to fund the Affordable Housing Trust Fund as one way of providing funds that might serve a variety of purposes to assist with 

affordable housing. 

A second approach has been to say that there is a very good 

chance we are going to have two entities here, spinning off the 

Fannie and spinning off the Freddie version, and that each of them 

should have responsibility to serve a significant share of affordable 

housing, and the suggestion has been that 60 percent of the units 

should be serving families at 80 percent or less. 

We have just heard mention of the co-op strategy, and then also 

there has been a suggestion that the enterprises that qualify under 

the multifamily section submit an annual plan on how they are 

serving rural areas and so on and so forth. 

I do not think there has been much discussion to this point today 

about the concept of the basis points funding the trust fund and 

about the possibility of a requirement that 60 percent of the units 

financed by each of the entities serve under 80 percent. So, Mr. 

Shekar and Ms. Ludwig, would you like to comment on those approaches and the pros and cons? 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. Sure. Let me take on the affordability criteria. 

My principal objective is to try to get them to do what they have 

been doing, that there has not—that has proven to be successful. 

They have done this before. They have done it over 10 years. They 

did it through the crisis. So, therefore, there is no logical reason 

that private capital can argue, when they have to invest billions of 

dollars in this business, that it cannot be done or that it requires 

moving out on the risk curve or otherwise. 

So the principal argument is this is the middle of the market. We 

absolutely want private unguaranteed capital in the market as 

well, and we want to assure that they stay in the middle of the 

market and give them a simple level playing field standard that everybody knows up front and they can abide by, not goals that can 

change over time but this is the standard that they have to live 

with; when I invest my first dollar of private equity, I know the 

rules of the game. 

25 

Senator MERKLEY. So when folks say to you this has been done 

by the market without such a requirement, what is the counter position as to why it should now become a specified requirement? 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. Well, perhaps you do things inadvertently, and 

now you can do them more deliberately. I do not think we fully recognized the consequences of implied guarantees until 2008. So I 

would argue we are doing something very cognitively here to say 

we will give a limited Government guarantee on securities for certain loans through certain guarantors and issuers that abide by 

certain rules. And we are setting the rules of conduct, if you will, 

for the secondary market going forward. 

Senator MERKLEY. So in some ways you are saying that given 

that we are now making an explicit Government guarantee, there 

should be some standards for how that is utilized to the whole 

spectrum of housing. 

Mr. NARASIMHAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator MERKLEY. OK. Thank you. 

Ms. Ludwig. 

Ms. LUDWIG. Yes, I would agree with Shekar’s point of view on 

that, so I would turn to the fee question, and what we have proposed is a 5- to 10-basis-point fee at the time of securitization on 

those tranches. And, you know, I guess I would add that this has 

been congressionally mandated to date for the Affordable Housing 

Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund, but it has not been 

funded. 

We need assurance of that critical funding for affordable housing. 

We have just spent a lot of time talking about that need and how 

essential that is to be able to get into underserved markets and 

also to serve folks that are lower than 80-percent AMI. Fifty percent and lower in particular for the Housing Trust Fund is one of 

the uses. The second use, again, is the Capital Magnet Fund, which 

allows us to leverage private dollars with this capital. And then the 

third use of those funds would be to create this capacity to address 

some of the underserved markets, think about product creation, 

guarantees, subsidies to help on the underwriting costs on some of 

these pilots. That is the type of innovation that I think we need 

in this space and that continuing obligation to serve the markets 

that currently are not getting served. 

Senator MERKLEY. Senator Crapo, is there anything else you 

want to ask? 

Senator CRAPO. No. 

Senator MERKLEY. I have lots of things I would like to ask, but 

I am out of time. So in that regard, thank you to all of our witnesses for sharing their thoughts, not just today but in many conversations with different Senators on the panel as we work on 

these issues. And we look forward to your future input as we continue to work on this. 

Thank you very much, and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Prepared statements, responses to written questions, and additional material supplied for the record follow:] 

26 

1 2012 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, U.S. Census Bureau, ‘‘Tenure’’. 2007 

American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, U.S. Census Bureau, ‘‘Tenure’’. 2 Based on Harvard University Joint Center for Housing Studies’ forecast of 13.8 million new 

households by 2030. The State of the Nation’s Housing 2012, The Joint Center for Housing 

Studies of Harvard University, p. 16. http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/ 

files/son2012.pdf 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS S. BOZZUTO 

CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE BOZZUTO GROUP, ON BEHALF OF THE

NATIONAL MULTI HOUSING COUNCIL AND THE NATIONAL APARTMENT ASSOCIATION

OCTOBER 9, 2013 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo and distinguished Members of the 

Committee, the National Multi Housing Council (NMHC) and the National Apartment Association (NAA) would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify on 

housing finance reform and the multifamily perspective. We applaud your leadership in seeking to address the fatal flaws in our finance system that led to the fiscal 

crisis of 2008. 

For more than 20 years, the National Multi Housing Council (NMHC) and the National Apartment Association (NAA) have partnered in a joint legislative program 

to provide a single voice for America’s apartment industry. Our combined memberships are engaged in all aspects of the apartment industry, including ownership, development, management and finance. NMHC represents the principal officers of the 

apartment industry’s largest and most prominent firms. NAA is a federation of more 

than 170 State and local affiliates comprised of 63,000 multifamily housing companies representing 6.8 million apartment homes throughout the United States and 

Canada. 

My name is Thomas S. Bozzuto and I am the Chairman and CEO of The Bozzuto 

Group. The Bozzuto Group is a privately held, integrated real estate services organization. In our 25-year history, we have created quality homes and extraordinary 

communities—some 35,000 residences to date. Our more than 1,000 team members 

pride ourselves on providing outstanding service and consistent value for customers 

and partners. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to present the multifamily industry’s 

perspective on the role of the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac, and specifically how the meaningful differences between the 

multifamily market and single-family market require very different solutions in the 

context of housing finance reform. I will also discuss why we believe there will be 

a continued need for Federal involvement in the multifamily sector even after 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are phased out. 

Before I do that, however, allow me to describe some key aspects of the apartment 

market and how changing demographics will demand a continued flow of capital 

into this sector if we are to meet the future housing needs. 

The apartment sector is a competitive and robust industry that helps 35 million 

renters live in homes that are right for them. We help build vibrant communities 

by offering housing choice, supporting local small businesses, creating millions of 

jobs and contributing to the fabric of communities across the country. And we are 

increasingly important. 

More than a third of America rents, and that number is growing. Between 2007 

and 2012, the number of renter households grew by almost five million. 1 In this 

decade, renters could make up half of all new households—upwards of seven million 

new renter households. 2 An estimated 300,000 to 400,000 units a year must be built 

to meet expected demand; yet just 158,000 apartments were delivered in 2012—less 

than half of what is needed. 

While some of this growth is clearly due to the challenging economic circumstances following the recession, the upward trend in renter households predates 

the fiscal crisis and is increasingly the result of Americans’ changing housing preferences. In 1955, married couples with children made up 44 percent of all households. Today they constitute just 20 percent, and that number continues to fall. 

Among the fastest growing population segments in the next decade will be young 

adults in their 20s and empty nesters in their 50s—those most likely to seek options 

other than single-family houses. 

In addition, almost 80 million Echo Boomers are beginning to enter the housing 

market, primarily as renters. Furthermore, many of their parents, the more than 

77 million Baby Boomers, are beginning to downsize, and some will choose the convenience of renting. 

All this increasing demand is good news because meeting it will create millions 

of jobs. Apartments are more than just shelter. They are also an economic powerVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON
27 

house. The $1.1 trillion industry oversees apartment stock valued at $2.2 trillion. 

In 2011, the apartment industry and its residents supported 25.4 million jobs. Moreover, in 2011, new apartment construction alone produced $14.8 billion in spending, 

supported 323,781 jobs and had a total economic contribution of $42.5 billion. The 

same year, the operation of the Nation’s existing apartments accounted for $67.9 billion, 2.3 million jobs and a total economic contribution of $182.6 billion. Apartment 

resident spending in 2011 totaled $421.5 billion, supporting 22.8 million jobs and 

a total economic contribution of $885.2 billion. To put these numbers into perspective, apartments and the people who live in them contribute, on average, more than 

$3 billion a day to the economy. 

Finally, apartments also produce societal benefits; not only are they environmentally sustainable, resource-and energy-efficient, but they also help create a mobile workforce that can relocate to pursue job opportunities. 

I highlight these important changes in housing choice, supply and demand as well 

as the economic and social contributions apartments make to society to explain why 

it is so important for Congress to consider the unique needs of the apartment industry as it pursues mortgage finance reform options. 

Many factors influence the apartment industry’s health and ability to meet the 

Nation’s growing demand for rental housing, but the availability of consistently reliable and competitively priced capital is the most essential. 

The Great Recession exposed serious flaws in our Nation’s residential home mortgage finance system. The apartment industry did not overbuild and for the most 

part did not overleverage during the housing boom, and the GSEs’ multifamily programs did not contribute to the housing meltdown and are not broken. Unfortunately, the losses experienced in their single-family divisions have overshadowed the 

strong mortgage financing and credit performance of their multifamily programs. 

More than just performing well, the GSEs’ multifamily programs serve a critical 

public policy role by addressing a market failure in the housing finance system that 

results in an overabundance of capital for high-end properties in top-tier markets, 

but leaves secondary and tertiary markets like Westerly, RI, or Topeka, KS, underserved. The GSEs ensure that multifamily capital is available in all markets and 

at all times, so the apartment industry can address the broad range of America’s 

housing needs from coast to coast and everywhere in between. 

Let me be clear, I am not here to defend the GSEs or to suggest that they be 

continued in their current form. Instead, I would like to highlight for the Committee 

those elements of the existing system that worked well for multifamily lending and, 

more importantly, at no cost to the taxpayer. It is our hope that these successful 

elements can be incorporated into whatever Congress designs to replace Fannie Mae 

and Freddie Mac. 

Multifamily Performance: A Success Story 

It is hard to imagine a success story coming out of the worst housing crash in 

recent history, but the performance of the GSEs’ multifamily businesses stands out. 

Overall loan performance remains strong with delinquency and default rates at less 

than 1 percent, a tenth of the size of the delinquency/default rates plaguing singlefamily. The GSEs’ multifamily programs have also outperformed Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), commercial banks and even FHA. In addition, since 

the Federal Government placed the GSEs in conservatorship, the multifamily programs have generated over $10 billion in net profits for the Federal Government. 

Not only are the GSEs’ multifamily programs operating in a fiscally sound manner, but they are also doing so while offering a full range of mortgage products to 

meet the unique needs of the multifamily borrower and serve the broad array of 

property types. This includes conventional market rental housing, workforce rental 

housing, and targeted affordable housing (e.g., project-based Section 8, State and 

local government subsidized and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) properties). 

The GSEs’ multifamily programs adhere to a business model that includes prudent underwriting standards; sound credit policy; effective third-party assessment 

procedures; risk-sharing and retention strategies; effective loan portfolio management; and standardized mortgage documentation and execution. In short, the GSEs’ 

multifamily models hit the mark. They have attracted enormous amounts of private 

capital; helped finance millions of units of market-rate workforce housing without 

direct Federal appropriations; sustained liquidity in all economic climates; and ensured safety and soundness of their loans and securities. As a result of the liquidity 

provided by the GSEs, the United States has the best and most stable rental housing sector in the world. 

28 

A One-Size-Fits-All Solution Will Not Work 

It is tempting to believe that a single solution will solve all that ails our housing 

finance system. Unfortunately, that simply is not the case. Multifamily finance and 

single-family finance operate differently. The capital sources for multifamily are not 

as wide or as deep as those financing single-family, and the loans themselves are 

not as easily commoditized. Moreover, the financing process; mortgage instruments; 

legal framework; loan terms and requirements; origination; secondary market investors; underlying assets; business expertise; and systems are all separate and unique 

from single-family home mortgage activities. It is, therefore, critical for Congress to 

pursue a separate solution for multifamily. Failure to do so puts the millions of 

Americans who rely on the apartment industry for their housing and the $862 billion multifamily debt market at risk. 

Although I talked about rising demand and the need for new construction to meet 

it, preserving liquidity for multifamily is about more than just building new apartments. Unlike residential mortgages, which are typically for 30-year terms, most 

multifamily mortgages are for a period of 7 to 10 years. This ongoing need to refinance apartment mortgages makes it imperative for the industry to have access to 

reliable and affordable capital at all times, in all markets and in all market conditions. In 2013 alone, an estimated $100 billion in multifamily mortgages will need 

to be refinanced, many of which finance apartments that are not located in areas 

that attract private capital. 

Private Capital Is Necessary, but Not Sufficient 

We share your collective desire to return to a marketplace dominated by private 

capital. Even with the critical backstop provided by the GSEs, private capital has 

always been an integral part of the multifamily housing finance system. However, 

historically, private capital has been either unwilling or unable to meet the full 

range of the multifamily industry’s capital needs, even during healthy economic 

times. There is no evidence to suggest that the situation is any different today. 

Historically, the apartment industry has relied on a variety of capital sources to 

meet its liquidity needs. They include: 

• Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 

• Commercial Banks and Thrifts 

• Life Insurance Companies 

• Federal Housing Administration 

• Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities/Conduits 

• Pension Funds 

• Private Mortgage Companies 

Together, these capital sources have provided the apartment sector with $100 billion to $150 billion annually, reaching as high as $225 billion last decade, to develop, refinance, purchase, renovate, and preserve apartment properties. Each of 

these capital sources has its own focus, strengths and limitations. 

Commercial banks and thrifts generally serve as a source of credit for smaller, 

local borrowers. They typically provide floating rate, short-term debt, and often their 

willingness to extend this credit is based on the availability of permanent take-out 

financing offered by the GSEs. They have resumed lending to multifamily after the 

crisis, but they are unlikely to return to their precrisis levels because of higher riskbased capital requirements. 

Life insurance companies tend to restrict their lending to a handful of primary 

markets and to luxury apartment properties. They do not generally finance affordable apartments, and their loan terms typically do not extend beyond 10 years. Importantly, they enter and exit the multifamily market based on their investment 

needs and economic conditions. On average, they have generally provided 10 percent 

or less of the annual capital needed by the multifamily industry, but that number 

has gone as low as 3 percent. 

The private-label CMBS market did not become a material source of capital to the 

apartment industry until the mid-1990s, peaking at 16.5 percent of the market 

($17.6 billion a year) in the housing bubble years of 2005–2007. The CMBS market 

completely shut down after the 2008 crisis and suffered high delinquency rates— 

reaching 17.4 percent in 2011. While CMBS is rebounding, regulatory changes imposed by financial regulatory reform legislation will mean that it will not return to 

its pre-bubble levels of lending. 

Some have suggested that the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) could step 

in and fill the liquidity provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This solution is 

unrealistic. FHA serves a very different market from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 

29 

3Freddie Mac, ‘‘Report to the Federal Housing Finance Agency: Housing Finance Reform in 

the Multifamily Mortgage Market’’, pp. 24–32. http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/25161/ 

FREReportlMFlMarketAnalysis.pdf 

focusing on construction lending and affordable rental properties not served by other 

sources of capital. 

In all, however, FHA represents 9 percent of all outstanding multifamily mortgage debt, and even at that level has experienced serious capacity issues. When demand for FHA financing spiked during the credit crisis, FHA’s backlog was so significant that borrowers reported loan applications languishing for 18 months or 

more. 

Private capital has returned to the apartment sector, but already in this recovery 

we are seeing the historical pattern of uneven access to capital repeat itself. The 

new private capital coming into the apartment sector is concentrating in a handful 

of cities and on trophy assets. Apartment firms providing critical housing in secondary and tertiary markets and rural areas are not benefiting from the resurgence 

in private capital. Even in the larger markets, firms providing workforce housing 

find themselves equally shut out. The market failure the GSEs’ multifamily programs addressed was ensuring capital reached markets deemed too risky or otherwise undesirable by institutional capital. It is imperative that a reformed system 

continue to fill this important public policy need. 

Finally, it must be noted that a December 2012 Freddie Mac report commissioned 

by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) estimated the potential consequences to the apartment sector of eliminating the Federal guarantee. According 

to that research, which was undertaken by Freddie Mac and independent thirdparty experts, interest rates would rise and debt financing capital would fall by 10 

percent to 20 percent. That could result in a 27-percent drop in apartment supply, 

which could, in turn, cause rising rents nationwide and significant spikes in tertiary 

geographic markets. 3

Federal Credit Guarantee: Meeting the Needs When Private Capital Disappears 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have served as the cornerstone of the multifamily 

housing finance system, successfully attracting private capital to the sector. Unlike 

any other single source of capital, they offer long-term debt for the entire range of 

apartment properties (market-rate work-force housing and subsidized properties, 

large properties, small properties, etc.), and they are active in all markets (primary, 

secondary and tertiary) during all economic conditions. 

As the chart below shows, the Enterprises’ share of the multifamily mortgage 

market has varied considerably over time, increasing at times of market dislocation 

when other sources of capital are scarce and scaling back during times when private 

credit is widely available. 

When credit markets have been impaired for reasons that have nothing to do with 

multifamily property operating performance, the federally backed secondary market 

has ensured the continued flow of capital to apartments. For example, when private 

capital left the housing finance market in 2008, the apartment industry relied almost exclusively on Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHA/Ginnie Mae for capital. 

30 

Between 2008 and 2010, the GSEs provided $94 billion in mortgage debt to the 

apartment industry. Without that critical backstop, thousands of otherwise performing multifamily mortgages would have gone into default because there were no 

private capital sources willing to refinancing maturing loans. This could have meant 

disruption to millions of renter households. The GSEs served a similar role during 

the 1997–1998 Russian financial crisis and in the post-9/11 recession of 2001. 

Even now, with all players back in the market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac still 

provided 45 percent to 50 percent of multifamily mortgage debt in 2012. Again, this 

is not meant to suggest that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac be allowed to continue. 

Rather it is to point out how large a chasm private capital would have to fill and 

to emphasize the public policy mission the existing system has served, ensuring liquidity and avoiding widespread adverse effects for the millions who rent. 

Principles of Reform 

There is widespread agreement that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must be dissolved. A reformed housing finance system should, however, retain the successful 

components of the existing multifamily programs in whatever succeeds them. Accordingly, multifamily housing reform must: 

1. Provide Access to Federal Credit Support. 

Given the market failure of the private sector to meet the apartment industry’s 

broad capital needs, an explicit Federal guarantee for multifamily-backed mortgage 

securities should be available in all markets at all times. A private-only housing finance system would result in an abundance of capital for high-end properties in toptier markets but leave secondary and tertiary markets like Sioux Falls, SD, or 

Boise, ID, underserved. 

2. Provide Broad Liquidity Support at All Times, Not Just ‘‘Stop-Gap’’ or Emergency 

Financing. 

Any Federal credit facility should be available to the entire apartment sector and 

not be restricted to specific housing types or renter populations. Moreover, it would 

be impossible to turn on and off a Government-backed facility without seriously 

jeopardizing capital flows. 

3. Restrict Federal Credit Support to the Security Level. 

The benefit of any Federal guarantee should only accrue to the investors of multifamily mortgage-backed securities; it should not apply to the underlying multifamily 

mortgages or the entities issuing the securities. 

4. Support Private Capital and Protect Taxpayers Through Effective Guarantee 

Structure and Pricing. 

Borrowers should pay for the guarantee in the form of an appropriately priced 

credit enhancement fee that insures taxpayers against future losses. Additionally, 


10913001.eps
31 

the fee should be priced to ensure that any advantage the GSEs historically have 

enjoyed over private mortgage capital is addressed and market participants not 

using Government guarantees are not crowded out. 

5. Encourage Competition. 

Other entities should be allowed to obtain a Federal charter to compete with the 

GSEs or their successors if they can meet mandated requirements, including robust 

levels of core capital and significant experiences in mortgage underwriting. 

6. Empower a Strong Regulator. 

A strong and independent regulator with expertise in multifamily lending is critical. To ensure sufficient financial resources and political independence, the regulator should be funded through industry assessments instead of congressional appropriations as is the case with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal 

Reserve, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 

7. Impose Effective Capital Requirements. 

Effective capital reserve requirements, both for mortgages held in portfolio and 

those securitized, are vital to further protect taxpayers from future losses. 

8. Retain Limited Portfolio Lending (Without a Federal Guarantee) While Expanding 

Securitization. 

Any restructured or successor entity should be able to retain limited multifamily 

mortgage portfolios, but no Government guarantee should apply to mortgages held 

in portfolio. Limited retained portfolios would be allowed for the following activities: 

(1) aggregating mortgages for pooled securities executions; (2) implementing pilot 

mortgage programs and product modification testing; (3) engaging in targeted higher-risk transactions (e.g., financing properties with rent-regulatory restrictions, student housing and senior and assisted-living developments); and (4) engaging in pilot 

and risk-sharing transactions for affordable and workforce housing production. To 

avoid a return to an overreliance on portfolio lending, portfolio loans would be subject to: (A) commercial bank mortgage risk-based capital standards; and (B) limits 

regarding absolute levels and percentage of guaranteed mortgage securities. 

9. Reduce Existing Portfolios in a Responsible Manner. 

As the GSEs are wound down, the current GSE multifamily portfolios should be 

largely transferred to the Federal Government to allow taxpayers to capture the 

portfolios’ positive income stream and to eliminate any market advantage the GSEsuccessor entities would gain by retaining them on their balance sheets. However, 

any GSE-successor entities should be allowed to retain the minimum number of 

mortgages currently held in portfolio that are necessary to make them operationally 

viable. The GSE-successor entities should be charged with continuing to service the 

mortgages transferred to Government control and would be paid a fee for doing so. 

10. Create Certainty and Retain Existing Resources/Capacity During the Transition. 

To avoid market disruption, it is critical that policy makers clearly define the Government’s role in a reformed system and the timeline for transition. Without that 

certainty, private capital providers (e.g., warehouse lenders and institutional investors) are likely to limit their exposure to the market, which could cause a serious 

capital shortfall to rental housing. In addition, during the transition years, it is vital 

to retain many of the resources and capacity of the existing GSEs. The two firms 

have extensive personnel and technological expertise, as well as established thirdparty relationships with lenders, mortgage servicers, appraisers, engineers and 

other service providers, which are critical to a well-functioning secondary market. 

11. Focus on Liquidity, Not Mandates. 

The public mission of a federally supported secondary market for multifamily 

should be clearly defined and focused primarily on using a Government backstop to 

provide liquidity and not for specific affordable housing mandates. 

Essential Elements of a Reformed Multifamily Housing Finance System 

Putting the principles outlined above into legislative action could be accomplished 

in a number of ways. We have provided additional details in Appendix I. NMHC/ 

NAA believe that Congress would be well served by including the following provisions in any housing finance reform legislation: 

1. Separate Title Addressing the Unique Needs of the Multifamily Sector 

As noted earlier, a one-size-fits-all solution will not work in housing finance reform. We strongly recommend that any reform measure include a separate multifamily title. This separate title should address not only what will replace the GSEs’ 

32 

multifamily programs, but also how the transition to that new system will be handled. 

2. Establish an Office of Multifamily Mortgage Oversight 

An Office of Multifamily Mortgage Oversight should be established to oversee and 

regulate all aspects of Government-backed multifamily mortgage finance. In addition to serving as regulator, this Office should be charged with establishing and collecting fees paid by borrowers for Government-backed mortgages. 

3. Transfer the Enterprises’ Multifamily Activities to Successor Entities 

Having documented the need for an ongoing Federal presence in multifamily finance, namely to serve properties and localities not well served by private capital, 

and having established the strong performance record of the existing GSEs’ multifamily programs, reform legislation should include a mechanism for explicitly transferring Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s multifamily lines of business to successor entities. This transfer should be separate and apart from the GSEs’ single-family business given the significant differences between the two. We recommend that the regulator oversee the complete privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s multifamily lines of business beginning no later than one year after a new regulator is 

put into place. In addition to overseeing the transition of Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac’s multifamily programs from Government-sponsored enterprises to privately 

held entities, the regulator should evaluate whether there should be more than two 

private entities chartered to issue guaranteed mortgage-backed securities. 

Focus on Liquidity Given the Innate Affordability of Multifamily 

Policy makers are understandably still struggling to determine the degree to 

which an ongoing Federal role in the rental finance system should be connected 

with the pressing need to address the Nation’s affordable housing shortage. We 

begin by noting that multifamily housing is inherently affordable housing; fully 82 

percent of existing apartments are affordable to households earning 80 percent of 

area median income, a common standard for measuring affordability. Therefore, the 

mere extension of a Government role to ensure liquidity to the multifamily sector 

is, by definition, supporting affordable housing. 

It is tempting to believe that more can be done to address affordability through 

housing finance reform, namely through imposing limitations on Federal guarantees 

or other mandated benchmarks. We caution policy makers not to overreach, however, as such well-intended moves, if overly prescriptive, could have adverse consequences. 

To begin with, one way the GSEs have been able to produce such a stellar performance record in multifamily is by being able to build a balanced book of business 

where lower-risk, higher-end properties enabled them to take on riskier, deeply targeted affordable housing properties, such as Section 8 and Low-Income Housing Tax 

Credit properties. Just as critical, the GSEs’ multifamily programs have been able, 

through their broad platforms, to provide capital for projects located in markets that 

do not meet the credit or return standards required by many private capital debt 

providers. 

Not only does a broad multifamily lending platform help the GSEs and successor 

entities manage risk, but it also ensures that there is a sufficient supply of liquidity 

in severe market downturns. For instance, in the most recent financial crisis, even 

firms and properties that would normally be well served by private capital found 

themselves with no options. 

After 2008, the insurance companies, banks and other private capital debt providers exited the market leaving even higher-rent or luxury properties scrambling 

for debt capital to refinance maturing mortgages. Publicly traded apartment REITs 

were unable to issue bonds to finance their assets and had to seek funding from 

Government programs. If the successor entities to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 

more limited in what markets or properties they can serve, they will be unable to 

fill the critical public policy mission they have historically served. Failure to ensure 

sufficient liquidity for all types of apartments will have a spillover effect that could 

be disastrous for America’s renters. 

Nevertheless, we understand the need to tackle housing finance reform and affordability in the same debate. NMHC/NAA are reviewing the spectrum of options 

that could serve the Nation’s affordability needs without putting the broader multifamily market at risk. They include portfolio goals, explicit on-budget funding, loan 

limits and affordability-based-guarantee-fee pricing. NMHC/NAA look forward to 

working with Congress on developing workable solutions to this vital policy issue. 

33 

Comment on Federal Housing Finance Agency Action To Curtail Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac’s Multifamily Activities 

Before closing, I would like to draw to the Committee’s attention a letter that 

NMHC/NAA submitted to the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) regarding 

strategies it is considering as part of its 2014 Scorecard to reduce Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac’s multifamily businesses. We appreciate that FHFA is seeking input 

before making this decision. However, placing caps on the GSEs’ multifamily lending volume and reducing the diversity and availability of multifamily mortgage 

products as FHFA has proposed are not justified or necessary and will only lead to 

market uncertainty and instability. For this reason, we cannot support any further 

actions to restrict liquidity to the industry and residences we serve. Moreover, decisions made regarding the Enterprises’ future activities are best left to Congress as 

opposed to their regulator. (Appendix II: NMHC/NAA Comment Letter: FHFA Letter To Limit Enterprises’ Multifamily Activities.) 

Finally, I would like to take a moment to address the opportunity you have to 

rebalance our national housing policy through housing finance. For decades, the 

Federal Government has pursued a ‘‘home ownership at any cost’’ housing policy, 

ignoring the growing disconnect between the country’s housing needs and its housing policy. That had a devastating effect on our national economy, on local communities and for millions of households. 

We now know that housing our diverse Nation means having a vibrant rental 

market along with a functioning ownership market. How we as a Nation tackle the 

housing finance reform effort that must be undertaken will, in large part, determine 

whether or not the country continues to have a strong rental sector. The stakes are 

too high to let the multifamily market become a collateral victim of the single-family 

housing crash. 

I thank you for the opportunity to present the views of NMHC and NAA. 

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1For example, both GSE multifamily businesses have been profitable and have been prudent 

in their lending practices, as reflected in their current credit performance with less than a 20 

basis point delinquency rate. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF E.J. BURKE 

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GROUP HEAD, KEYBANK REAL ESTATE CAPITAL, KEY CORPORATE BANK, ON BEHALF OF THE MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION

OCTOBER 9, 2013 

Introduction 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo, and Members of the Senate Banking 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers Association. My name is E.J. Burke, and I am Chairman-Elect of MBA, as well 

as Executive Vice President and Group Head of KeyBank Real Estate Capital. I 

oversee multiple commercial real estate lending platforms for KeyBank, NA in its 

commercial and multifamily real estate finance business, including construction and 

development lending, portfolio lending, community development lending, commercial 

mortgage-backed securitization, life company placement, FHA multifamily programs, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac multifamily lending. I have over 34 years 

of experience in banking and commercial real estate finance. KeyBank, NA is a $91 

Billion regional bank that is headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio. KeyBank, NA provides community banking services in 14 U.S. States and corporate banking services 

nationwide. KeyBank Real Estate Capital is a national commercial real estate lender and commercial loan servicer. 

Today’s hearing serves as a catalyst to underscore the importance of multifamily 

rental housing. With Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac having been in conservatorship 

for more than 5 years, it is imperative that policy makers define a long-term plan 

for the future role of the Federal Government in the mortgage market. This plan 

must fundamentally include their unique role in multifamily rental housing. I commend the Chairman and Ranking Member for your leadership toward this end. We 

look forward to working with the Committee to help shape a vibrant rental housing 

market that builds upon the foundation that exists today. 

As this Committee considers the essential elements of the multifamily housing finance system, we believe that policy makers should focus on ensuring that capital 

continues to be available in all market cycles. With this in mind, the policy discussion on the role of private capital and that of the Federal Government, in our view, 

is not mutually exclusive in character. We believe that public policy can strike a 

durable balance that continues to attract and deploy private capital in the multifamily market, while establishing a focused Government guarantee that enables liquidity and stability in all cycles—a role that only the Government can fulfill. This, 

in turn, will protect taxpayers and strengthen the financing system for rental housing. 

These goals can be accomplished by building upon the strong foundation that currently exists in multifamily finance—where there is greater and increasing diversification in capital sources for multifamily housing, where private capital bears significant risk in existing multifamily finance platforms, and where Governmentbacked sources have experienced, even through the recent financial crisis, very 

strong credit performance. 1

My testimony begins with an overview of the multifamily housing market and 

capital sources, including the GSEs, that support this market. 

I then discuss overarching policy principles that we believe should guide the future of multifamily housing finance. 

Based on these principles, I recommend a system that would strengthen multifamily housing finance, while providing commentary on current legislative approaches. 

I conclude my testimony by emphasizing the importance of ensuring a stable transition and careful stewardship of taxpayer assets, in order to provide greater flexibility for Congress as it frames the regime that will govern the housing finance market. 

Overview of the Multifamily Housing Market 

Importance of Multifamily Rental Housing 

More than one in three American households rent their home, and more than 16 

million of those households live in multifamily rental housing, a development with 

five or more units. The multifamily rental housing market is a critical component 

of our housing system—in size, reach and the households that it serves. Renters include workers who want to live near their jobs, young professionals, empty-nesters, 

58 

2 Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, State of the Nation’s Housing 2013. 

3 Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, State of the Nation’s Housing 2011. 

4MBA’s Quarterly Analysis of Commercial and Multifamily Mortgage Debt Outstanding. 

retirees on a fixed income, families with children, students, and households who 

value the convenience and mobility that renting offers. The vast majority of multifamily rental housing provides homes for households earning modest incomes, with 

93 percent of multifamily rental apartments having rents affordable to households 

earning at or below the area median income. Overall, renters’ median household income is about half of that of homeowners. 2

The share of households renting their homes has risen to 35 percent from a low 

of 31 percent in 2004. And since the end of 2006, the number of renter households 

has increased by five million, while the number of owner-occupied households has 

declined by 1.5 million. 

The number of renter households is expected to continue to increase substantially 

over the next decade. Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies ‘‘estimates that 

the number of renter households could increase by 360,000–470,000 annually between 2010 and 2020, in line with growth over the past decade.’’ 3 This growth in 

renter households will require substantial investment in multifamily housing. 

The nature of financing multifamily rental housing differs from that in singlefamily lending in important ways. Among them, multifamily lending involves loans 

that have larger balances with more complex and heterogeneous properties, compared to single-family loans. Multifamily loans require a detailed underwriting process due to the fact that the repayment of the loan is dependent on the ongoing financial performance of the property, which is in turn dependent on the property’s 

income streams, expenses, market conditions and outlook, and numerous other factors. As a result, careful underwriting is required to confirm a property’s creditworthiness and the borrower’s ability to successfully operate the apartment property. The origination, underwriting, securitization and investor reporting, and servicing expertise necessary to successfully finance multifamily rental properties is considerable. 

The finance market that supports multifamily rental housing is substantial and 

includes a range of market participants. The total amount of multifamily mortgage 

debt outstanding is approaching $900 billion. 4 Capital sources that finance the multifamily housing market include Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, commercial banks, 

the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) multifamily programs, life insurance 

companies, commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) issuers, REITs, pension 

funds, State and local government agencies, and others. While all sources play an 

integral role in supporting the multifamily market, each has its own focus, strength, 

and limitations. 


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5MBA defines the institutional market as the part of the market served by lenders with a 

platform dedicated to lending to commercial and multifamily property owners. 

Importantly, when most private capital sources exited the multifamily finance 

market during the recent economic downturn, the GSEs and FHA continued to provide liquidity during this period of unprecedented market disruption. 

The GSEs’ Performance and Countercyclicality During Market Downturn 

Let me turn to the role that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have recently played 

in the multifamily housing markets. The GSEs’ role during the financial crisis demonstrates that they served a countercyclical role as providers of liquidity in the multifamily market when other sources pulled back. The GSEs’ peak market share 

reached 59 percent of the total multifamily mortgage originations (and 85 percent 

of the institutional market) 5 in 2009. And since the crisis, their market share has 

trended downward—in 2012, 40 percent of the total multifamily market and 57 percent of the institutional market—even as overall multifamily origination volumes 

have increased. 

As the market has stabilized, other lending sources have increased market share, 

with non-GSE capital sources competing vigorously with Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac to finance multifamily properties. 


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6FHFA’s Conservatorship Priorities for 2013, Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Edward J. 

DeMarco, Acting Director, FHFA (March 4, 2013). 

In sum, the GSEs’ multifamily businesses, their performance and role in the market are unique in many respects. As Acting FHFA Director Edward DeMarco observed in a speech earlier this year: 

Unlike the single-family credit guarantee business, the Enterprises have a 

smaller market share and there are other providers of credit in the multifamily market . . . Another difference from the single-family business is 

that each Enterprise’s multifamily business has weathered the housing crisis and generated positive cash flow. In contrast to their common approach 

to their single-family businesses, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not take 

the same approach to their multifamily businesses. Each approach also already embeds some type of risk sharing. For a significant portion of its 

business, Fannie Mae shares multifamily credit risk with loan originators 

through its delegated underwriting program. For a significant and increasing portion of its business, Freddie Mac shares multifamily credit risk with 

investors by issuing classes of securities backed by multifamily mortgages 

where the investor bears the credit risk. 6

Policy Principles for Multifamily Housing Finance 

Recognizing the unique attributes of the multifamily market, MBA recommends 

that policy makers support proposals that advance the following principles. 

Our Nation’s multifamily housing finance system should rely on private capital. 

Private capital should be the primary source of financing for multifamily rental 

housing. Private capital has historically been brought to bear through the range of 

lending institutions that have supported multifamily finance, such as portfolio lenders and CMBS issuers, the GSEs’ multifamily programs that require loss sharing 

with originators and with investors, and the capitalization of the GSEs themselves. 

We believe that Government policies should maintain this reliance on private capital going forward. 

Past experience shows that the Federal Government is the only entity that can ensure the availability of liquidity in all market cycles. The recent financial crisis and 

recession demonstrated that only the Federal Government can ensure liquidity 

through all market cycles, and, as demonstrated by the conservatorship of Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as programs like the Federal Reserve’s asset purchases, the Federal Government will fill this role when necessary. Government policies should anticipate and prepare for this role. 

The Government should ensure liquidity for multifamily mortgages through a carefully crafted guarantee on multifamily mortgage-backed securities. The Federal Government should provide a catastrophic backstop guarantee on mortgage-backed seVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON

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curities. The catastrophic backstop role would be similar to that of the U.S. Government in a number of sectors and markets, including Federal deposit insurance in 

the banking system. This Government backstop should be available at the mortgage-backed securities level (rather than at the level of the issuer, as it is today 

with the GSEs) at all times to ensure liquidity in the multifamily finance market. 

Taxpayers and the mortgage finance system itself should be protected through a 

strong regulatory framework and multiple layers of private capital. To protect taxpayers and the system itself, the Government guarantee-related market should be 

subject to strong and independent regulatory oversight and risk-based capital requirements. Taxpayers also should be protected through multiple layers of private 

capital, including the equity in the multifamily property itself and the entity-level 

capital of the security-issuing institution and any risk sharing it may undertake. As 

noted above, a Federal risk insurance fund should also be established, capitalized 

by risk-based premiums paid by participating firms. Only when all layers of capital 

are exhausted would a draw on the U.S. Treasury be authorized. 

Policy makers should protect and preserve existing resources, as well as support 

greater transparency, during the transition to an overhauled housing finance system. 

Given the significant role of the GSEs in the multifamily market, their infrastructures, human capital, and resources should be carefully managed to avoid disruptions to the market, as well as to ensure an orderly transition to a new housing finance system. Prudent management of existing multifamily executions and mortgage portfolios is important due to its quality and positive cash flow generated— 

all of which are taxpayer assets. 

Structural Recommendations for the Future of Multifamily Housing Finance 

To implement these principles, MBA believes that a legislative solution should incorporate the following structural recommendations: 

Establish a Government Guarantor. A wholly owned Government corporation 

should function as a catastrophic guarantor, administrator of a risk insurance fund, 

and regulator of secondary market entities. The Government guarantor, which 

would be backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S., would not be subject to 

the Federal appropriations process, but be funded by guarantee fees paid by issuers, 

as well as other statutorily defined assessments. 

The Government corporation would, pursuant to statutory guidelines, approve private sector secondary market entities, as well as set standards by which secondary 

market entities would be eligible to issue Government-backed securities. The pricing 

of the guarantee should encourage competition, be commercially reasonable, and be 

subject to calibration based on predetermined criteria that considers market conditions. 

Allow Multiple, Privately Capitalized Issuers of Government-Guaranteed Securities 

in the Secondary Multifamily Mortgage Market. Privately capitalized secondary market entities would be eligible to purchase mortgages, aggregate (if applicable), and 

issue Government-backed mortgage-backed securities that support the multifamily 

market. Regular and dependable security issuances would create the liquidity in the 

market to get attractive pricing and broad market participation by bond investors. 

These issuers would be expressly permitted to purchase catastrophic reinsurance 

from the Government guarantor to wrap the MBS. The Government guarantee 

should be structured so that it can be expanded in times of market disruption. A 

mono-line structure, with segregated assets and separate capital standards, would 

facilitate capital adequacy determinations, regulatory oversight, and aggregation capabilities to support structured risk-sharing transactions. The Government guarantor/regulator would be able to authorize the establishment of multiple such entities. 

The secondary market entities should be required to be separately capitalized. 

Governance structures that enhance independence from potential affiliated business 

lines (if any) should be considered. We believe that these entities could be (but need 

not be) affiliated with single-family market entities. They would provide liquidity to 

the workforce rental housing market, including secondary and tertiary markets. 

Preserve and Carry Over Execution Models. The GSEs’ multifamily executions incorporate substantial private capital and risk sharing with other market participants, and have exhibited strong credit performance with current delinquency rates 

of less than 20 basis points. This and other flexibility in the structure of the Government wrap on MBS is important to allow for multiple risk-sharing executions to 

manage credit risk. These businesses are valuable to U.S. taxpayers and should be 

transferred to new entities that would serve the multifamily housing finance market. Notably, in the multifamily space, we do not believe there is a need for utilizaVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON
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tion of a common securitization platform, private mortgage insurance, or other single-family-specific concepts at this time. 

Consider Affordable Character of Multifamily Rental Housing. By its very nature, 

multifamily rental housing tends to be affordable, with 93 percent of multifamily 

units having rents affordable to households earning area median incomes or less. 

Policy proposals contemplating affordability requirements, if any, on secondary market entities should take this into account. Any proposed approaches also should be 

reasonable and flexible, as well as balanced with regard to the need to attract private capital. 

Pending Legislative Proposals 

MBA is encouraged by recent legislative activity that has revived the policy debate on the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Senate and House members 

have introduced thoughtful proposals that would create a comprehensive framework 

for the future of housing finance. We commend these efforts. MBA views all such 

proposals through the lens of our guiding principles. In particular, the future system 

of multifamily finance should rely on private capital and protect taxpayers, while 

ensuring stable and continued liquidity in all economic cycles through a Government 

backstop. 

In the Senate, Senators Corker and Warner have introduced bipartisan legislation 

that would transform the housing finance system. To the extent that the Committee 

considers portions of this bill in its efforts to craft comprehensive GSE reform legislation, we offer several recommendations. 

With regard to its treatment of multifamily housing finance, MBA strongly supports the bill’s approach that provides an explicit Government guarantee (through 

a Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation (FMIC)) for multifamily loans. We also 

support the establishment of premiums paid into an FMIC-administered insurance 

fund, oversight by the FMIC as a strong regulator, and recognition of the value and 

retention of the GSEs’ multifamily executions (i.e., Delegated Underwriting and 

Servicing and Capital Markets Execution/K-Deals). 

However, we would urge that the statutory language explicitly distinguish between the roles of the FMIC and multifamily private sector participants: The FMIC 

should retain the role of regulator, Government guarantor and administrator of an 

insurance fund—but other roles should be transferred to private sector entities. Specifically, the bill should direct the FMIC to establish privately capitalized secondary 

mortgage market entities to serve as issuers in the multifamily housing finance 

market. The current multifamily platforms of the two GSEs could be moved over 

into such new entities. Moving these businesses to the private sector (through a sale 

or public offering)—with continued access to a Government guarantee—would likely 

return substantial capital to the U.S. Treasury. 

These secondary market entities would purchase multifamily mortgages, aggregate loans, manage and distribute credit risk, credit enhance, and structure and 


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7Some of the major FHA multifamily programs are: (1) new construction/substantial rehabilitation (NCSR); (2) section 223(f) for the purchase or refinancing of existing multifamily properties; and (3) section 223(a)(7) for the refinancing of loans that already have an FHA-insured 

mortgaged. FHA and its lender partners also provide financing programs to support health care 

and assisted-living facilities. 8The Treasury Department’s August 2012 announcement on the most recent amendment to 

the agreement, requiring an expedited reduction in the GSEs’ retained portfolios and an all income sweep of the GSEs’ profits (but for specified capital reserve amounts), further underscores 

the integral tie between these entities and the Federal Government. 

issue Government-backed MBS that support the multifamily market. In other 

words, the secondary market entities would have access to purchase catastrophic reinsurance from the Government guarantor that wraps the MBS. We also believe 

that the FMIC should be authorized to approve several such companies in order to 

foster competition and innovation, setting forth criteria for the approval of these 

multifamily issuers. Governance guidelines and approval standards should be established as well. 

Importance of FHA Multifamily and Health Care Programs 

While not the focus of today’s hearing, I would like to emphasize the essential role 

that FHA plays in supporting the multifamily housing market. The Federal Housing 

Administration is a critical source of the long-term, fixed-rate debt needed to build 

and refinance affordable rental units for working families, seniors, and underserved 

populations. FHA’s multifamily and health care loan programs are each designed to 

address a different loan type or segment of the market. 7 FHA has played a strong, 

countercyclical role in this market as well. Its status as a Government agency subject to the Federal appropriations process, however, has presented inherent limitations in FHA’s capacity, as we are witnessing today with commitment authority limitations and the recent Federal Government shutdown. 

FHA provides an explicit Federal Government guarantee on multifamily and 

health care loans through a range of programs established by Congress. The guarantee is paid for through a mortgage insurance premium set by HUD and paid by 

the borrower. Not only have FHA multifamily and health care loans performed well 

with low default rates (as published by HUD in May 2013), but the programs generate significant revenue to the Federal Government in the form of a negative credit 

subsidy, generating positive cash flow to the U.S. Treasury. Diversification in business mix for FHA multifamily programs is essential and has contributed to their 

strong credit performance. Mortgage insurance premiums are deposited into FHA’s 

GI/SRI fund, separate from the MMI fund that supports FHA’s single-family programs. FHA serves a wide market that is sometimes bypassed by other capital 

sources. Many properties are in secondary or tertiary markets supported by niche 

borrowers and lenders, and this capital source supports a vital need in these areas. 

Accordingly, MBA strongly recommends that Congress (1) reduce disruptions—at 

this time and on an ongoing basis—to the FHA multifamily and health care programs; (2) provide adequate FHA Commitment Authority for the full fiscal year to 

avoid costly and counterproductive stop and start problems; and (3) continue to encourage FHA to maintain a balance of affordable and market rate FHA multifamily 

financings. 

Transition and Stewardship of GSE Multifamily Resources 

As the Committee is well aware, the GSEs are subject to FHFA’s conservatorship 

and the Treasury Department’s controlling interest pursuant to the preferred stock 

purchase agreement originally entered into in September 2008. 8 With the GSEs 

controlled by the Federal Government, we urge policy makers to exercise stewardship with regard to the resources and assets of the GSEs’ multifamily businesses— 

for purposes of ensuring a stable transition to the future system of multifamily 

housing finance. 

While it is clear that the current state of the GSEs should not last indefinitely, 

policy makers should ensure the ongoing stewardship of valuable resources that 

support the multifamily market, utilizing them to transition to a stronger multifamily housing finance system. The resources of the GSEs, as taxpayer assets, 

should be preserved to support an orderly transition to a new mortgage finance system and ultimately to optimize potential returns to taxpayers. 

The talent, expertise and intellectual capital of their staff are valuable to the Federal Government, and the future deployment of these resources should be a core 

consideration in the transition to the future state of housing finance. Similarly, the 

mulitfamily market executions of the GSEs (each utilizes a distinct structure as its 

primary execution and attract private capital that assumes a substantial credit risk 

position) and their existing multifamily books of business are clearly taxpayer asVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON
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sets, and should be viewed in a manner that supports the pathway toward the future state of multifamily finance. 

We also caution that the multifamily finance market and the role GSEs play 

should not be viewed as a potential thought experiment to test out scenarios. Blunt 

or dramatic changes imposed in conservatorship, for example, would be highly disruptive, risk the loss of significant talent, and reduce the value of taxpayer assets. 

Regulatory or legislative actions that could substantially jeopardize the viability and 

value of key resources within the GSEs’ multifamily businesses should be avoided. 

While policy makers should continue to explore steps to faciliate the transition forward, the do no harm principle should equally govern. 

Conclusion 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. MBA remains committed to its key principle that a successful multifamily secondary market should 

rely primarily on private capital, while ensuring stable and continued liquidity in 

all economic cycles. We believe that this can be achieved in manner that protects 

taxpayers and builds upon the successes and strong foundation that exists today. 

We would be pleased to assist the Committee as it continues to engage in this critically important effort. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHEKAR NARASIMHAN 

MANAGING PARTNER, BEEKMAN ADVISORS, INC. 

OCTOBER 9, 2013 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo, Members of the Committee: Good 

morning. Thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing on Housing Finance 

Reform. My name is Shekar Narasimhan, and I am Managing Partner of Beekman 

Advisors, which provides consulting services to various commercial real estate and 

financial services companies. I have spent the past 35 years in housing and finance, 

including 4 years building single-family homes in Eastern Kentucky. Later, when 

I was CEO of one of the first publicly traded commercial mortgage finance companies, we developed loan products to serve the low-income housing tax credit market. 

My experience in running and operating a real estate financial services business as 

a partner with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and FHA is what brings me here today. 

Through all this, I developed a deep and abiding passion for affordable housing. 

The multifamily businesses at the GSEs are not part of the problem in the housing finance system. In fact, they are part of the solution. Every major principle articulated by stakeholders with regard to what a new housing finance system should 

look like is in practice at the multifamily businesses of the GSEs: 

• Alignment of interest between the borrower, lender/investor, and issuer. Typically 20-percent borrower equity, lender, or investor taking risk if loan defaults 

and issuer putting its capital and reputation on the line; 

• Detailed underwriting of every loan. Significant property, borrower and financial reviews with quarterly monitoring after loan closes and annual inspection 

to ensure maintenance; 

• Service of virtually every market segment with a menu of stable and responsible lending products. Consistently serving the multifamily market for working 

class and lower-income households—strong rationale for policy makers to consider limited Government support for multifamily finance; 

• Participation of both small and large private lenders in the system with skin 

in the game. Both issuer- and security-based risk-sharing models are already 

in place; 

• A lengthy track record of profitable operations, even through conservatorship 

($13.6 billion in profits over the last 3 years). Gives credence to the belief that 

private capital will be willing to capitalize these companies; and 

• A footprint that responds appropriately to economic conditions. Market share 

ranging from 25 percent during a bull period for the capital markets to 70 percent at the height of the crisis. 

I am here today to propose that the multifamily businesses at the GSEs should 

be used to demonstrate the path to the new housing finance system, by spinning 

them out as privately capitalized entities with Government guarantees limited to 

only the securities they issue. 

We all recognize change is needed as everyone agrees that 5 years of conservatorship is already too long. It has discouraged the best and brightest from remaining 

65 

at the GSEs and has stifled creativity. Moreover, it has left secondary markets uncertain. This is not good given that the significantly larger rental population (41 

million at last count) desperately needs a steady supply of new rental housing units 

to keep housing burdens manageable. This is especially true for renters earning less 

than 80 percent of area median income. This is the market the current GSE multifamily businesses have served yesterday and today with over 60 percent of the units 

they finance affordable to those at 80 percent of area median income or below. 

Responsible change, however, should involve doing the least damage. The work 

done recently at the multifamily units of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (at the behest of their regulator, FHFA) supports our conclusions on how to make this shift. 

Continue the focus of the new entities on the middle of the market and that they 

meet reasonable standards. Allow multiple entities to become issuers, but do not 

allow one to become dominant. Regulate the resulting issuers and guarantors to ensure a level playing field and have the ability and motivation to serve the broad 

markets now and in the future. In short, we believe our proposed pathway, if followed, will result in the least disruption to the markets and maximize the return 

to the Treasury. 

What I propose therefore is an immediate spinout of the multifamily operations 

of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It can fit into the architecture of any bipartisan 

proposal that embodies the principles of private risk capital in front of a limited 

Government guarantee and continued availability of multifamily financing at all 

times in all markets. Transition to this new multifamily state can occur within a 

2–3 year period. First, create wholly owned multifamily subsidiaries of the current 

GSEs that can operate autonomously with a contract to manage the multifamily assets of their parent companies. Then, as soon as the Government guarantor is stood 

up, spin them out with a well-constructed regulatory framework that encourages 

private capital to invest in these entities for the long-term. 

There is no reason to wait given rental demand and the profitable track record 

of these current businesses. This is laid out in the paper and subsequent proposal 

my two colleagues and I have written. 

Thank you for the opportunity to make these remarks. I will enter our proposal 

and the supporting information into the record, and look forward to your questions 

and comments. 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF TERRI LUDWIG 

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ENTERPRISE COMMUNITY PARTNERS, INC. 

OCTOBER 9, 2013 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo, and Members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. I am Terri Ludwig, president 

and CEO of Enterprise Community Partners. 

Enterprise works with partners nationwide to build opportunity. We create and 

advocate for affordable homes in thriving communities linked to jobs, good schools, 

health care, and transportation. We lend funds, finance development and manage 

and build affordable housing, while shaping new strategies, solutions, and policy. 

Over more than 30 years, Enterprise has created 300,000 affordable homes across 

all 50 States, invested $14 billion into communities and improved millions of lives. 

One of Enterprise’s many business lines is mortgage debt financing with a focus 

on affordable multifamily rental housing in low-income communities. Last year we 

originated $788 million in multifamily mortgages through our subsidiary, Bellwether Enterprise Real Estate Real Estate Capital, Inc., working with the Federal 

Housing Administration (FHA), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the GSEs), private 

investors, and other partners. We are an FHA Multifamily Accelerated Processing 

(MAP) lender and Ginnie Mae issuer, a Fannie Mae Special Affordable Delegated 

Lender, a Freddie Mac Program Plus Seller Servicer and Targeted Affordable Housing lender and a U.S. Department of Agriculture Section 538 lender. We also make 

loans through the FHA Section 232 program and operate a registered community 

development financial institution, Enterprise Community Loan Fund, which invested $97 million into communities last year. 

Before becoming president and CEO of Enterprise, I worked for more than 20 

years in investment banking. My team and I used capital markets to efficiently invest in affordable housing and community development, often partnering with 

groups like Enterprise. This experience taught me that public–private partnerships 

are critical to bringing capital to working families in low-income neighborhoods. In 

countless communities across the country—rural, urban, and suburban—the combination of public and private financing is effectively producing quality affordable 

housing. 

Still, there is an urgent and growing need for decent and affordable rental housing. Enterprise is working with Members of this Committee and others in Congress 

on several issues to ensure that the needs of low-income renters are met, including 

housing finance reform, preserving and expanding the Low Income Housing Tax 

Credit (Housing Credit), ensuring adequate appropriations for critical housing and 

community development programs, authorizing much needed reforms to rental assistance programs such as public housing and Housing Choice Vouchers, and finding 

new ways to preserve and improve the country’s aging affordable housing stock. We 

look forward to continuing to work with you on these important issues as we work 

toward a day when every person in the U.S. has a quality and affordable home in 

a vibrant community. 

We greatly appreciate the leadership of the Chairman, the Ranking Member and 

Members of this Committee as you work to determine the future of Fannie Mae, 

Freddie Mac, and the rest of the country’s housing finance system. And we thank 

you for focusing today on an often-overlooked component of the reform effort: the 

multifamily mortgage market, which finances rental buildings with five or more 

units. 

Above all else, we believe that any GSE reform plan must start with a simple 

goal: ensuring a liquid, stable and affordable housing market with appropriate support for both homeowners and renters, especially low income families. 

In my testimony this morning, I will make the following points: 

• Multifamily housing is a key part of a well-functioning housing market. Today 

more than one-third of the U.S. population rents, and that number is expected 

to grow in the coming years. And given who we expect these new renters to 

be—namely older or younger single-person households—multifamily will play 

an increasingly important role. 

• Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play a critical role in multifamily housing finance 

today. Among other things, Fannie and Freddie provide broad liquidity to the 

multifamily mortgage market, much-needed financing for affordable housing 

and a buffer from severe booms and busts in the rental market. 

• A limited, explicit Government guarantee is essential to a well-functioning rental 

market. According to a series of recent studies from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), without a Government guarantee on multifamily mortVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON
75 

1Federal Housing Finance Agency. News Release: ‘‘FHFA Releases Fannie and Freddie Reports on Viability of Their Multifamily Business Without Government Guarantees’’. Attachment: 

‘‘2012 Conservatorship Scorecard: The Enterprises’ Reports on a Multifamily Future State Without a U.S. Government Guarantee’’. FHFA, 3 May 2013. 2 Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. Chapter 5: ‘‘Rental Housing, The 

State of the Nation’s Housing 2013’’. JCHS, June 2013. 3 Ibid. 

4 Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. ‘‘America’s Rental Housing: Meeting Challenges, Building on Opportunities’’. JCHS, April 2011. 5 Ibid. 

6 Janet Viveiros and Maya Brennan. ‘‘Housing Landscape 2013: An Annual Look at the Housing Affordability Challenges of America’s Working Households’’. National Housing Conference, 

Center for Housing Policy, May 2013. 7 Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. ‘‘Fact Sheet, The State of the Nation’s Housing 2013’’. JCHS, June 2013. 

gages new construction of rental housing would plummet, average rents would 

rise significantly, and the entire rental market would be more vulnerable to 

boom-and-best cycles. 1 Low-income families would be disproportionately 

harmed, at a time when they already face an unprecedented affordable housing 

crisis. 

• Congress should pursue smart reforms to the multifamily market that preserve 

the business lines and other activities that work. I will lay out a series of steps 

Congress should take to ensure a liquid, stable, and affordable rental market, 

starting by spinning off Fannie’s and Freddie’s multifamily businesses and providing access to a limited, paid-for Government guarantee. 

• Any future system of multifamily housing finance must have explicit provisions 

to support affordable housing, reach underserved segments of the market, and 

promote long-term sustainability. I will lay out specific recommendations for 

each of these goals, which Congress should include in any housing finance reform legislation. 

I’d like to start by providing a bit of context, including some background on the 

U.S. rental market and the Government’s essential role in it. 

Background on the U.S. Rental Market, Multifamily Housing, and the 

Growing Affordable Housing Crisis 

More than 100 million people in the United States—about 35 percent of the population—rent their homes. In recent years more and more families have turned to 

the rental market, some because they are not ready for or not interested in home 

ownership, others because they have no other option. Over the past 8 years, the percentage of renters in the U.S. has increased by 4 percentage points. 2

On average, renters are younger, earn less income, are more likely to be people 

of color and live in smaller households compared to homeowners. Their median age 

is 40, compared to 54 for homeowners. The typical renter household earns just over 

$31,000 per year, almost exactly half of the typical homeowner. Forty-seven percent 

are households of color, compared to 22 percent for homeowners. And 37 percent of 

renters are single-person households, compared to 23 percent for homeowners. 3

Analysts predict a further shift toward rentals in the coming years. Part of this 

is due to the carry-over effects of the recent housing crisis, but the key driver is 

changing demographics. Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies projects an additional 3.6 million new households will become renters between 2010 and 2020, led 

mostly by an increase in younger, senior, and minority households. 4

These populations increasingly rely on multifamily housing as a source of stable, 

affordable rental housing. Today 40 percent of rental units in the U.S. are in multifamily buildings, but roughly 60 percent of single-person renters—often a sign of a 

younger or senior household—live in multifamily buildings. In addition, analysts at 

Harvard have found that younger renters ‘‘tend to favor multifamily housing in center city locations’’ linked to transit, jobs, and other opportunities. 5

Regardless of what type of housing America’s renters live in, one thing is clear: 

they are facing an unprecedented affordable housing crisis. That’s especially true for 

renters at the lower end of the income scale. 

Housing costs for the typical renter rose by 6 percent between 2008 and 2011, 

while their income dropped more than 3 percent after adjusting for inflation, according to the Center for Housing Policy. 6 While the number of very low-income renters 

has increased by 17 percent since 2007, the total number of affordable rental units 

has actually declined. 7 As a result, of the 17.1 million very low-income renters in 

the U.S. today, 7.1 million spend more than half their income on rent, live in subVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON
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8 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research. ‘‘Worst Case Housing Needs 2011: Report to Congress’’. HUD, PD&R, August 2013. 9 Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. Chapter 6: ‘‘Housing Challenges, 

The State of the Nation’s Housing 2013’’. JCHS, June 2013. 10Mortgage Bankers Association. ‘‘MBA Commercial Real Estate/Multifamily Finance: Mortgage Debt Outstanding: Q2 2013’’. MBA, September 2013. 11David Brickman. ‘‘K-Deals A Model for the Future of Mortgage Securitization. Freddie Mac, 

Executive Perspectives Blog: Insights on Housing Finance’’, September 2013. Available at 

http://www.freddiemac.com/news/blog/davidlbrickman/ 

20130906lmortgagelsecuritization.html. 

standard conditions, or both, according to the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development. 8

All told, 27 percent of renters—about 11 million families—are paying at least half 

of their monthly income on housing, a severe cost burden that often leaves families 

one paycheck away from losing their home. That’s an all-time high. 9

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Play a Critical Role in Multifamily Housing 

Finance Today 

Today there is roughly $875 billion in multifamily mortgage debt outstanding. 10

Capital flows to the multifamily mortgage market from five main sources and several smaller ones: 

• Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which account for 36 percent of multifamily debt 

outstanding. The GSEs serve a wide geography and a range of income levels 

and housing types, during both good and bad economic times. 

• Banks and thrifts insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 

which account for 28 percent of multifamily debt outstanding. Banks and thrifts 

typically offer floating-rate, short-term debt, serving a broad range of lenders 

and communities. But their presence in the multifamily market has shrunk significantly since the start of the financial crisis. 

• The Federal Government, which accounts for 10 percent of multifamily debt outstanding. This includes Ginnie Mae securities backed by mortgages insured by 

the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Department of Agriculture, and 

other Federal agencies. The FHA insures high-leverage loans with terms of up 

to 40 years and offers construction financing as part of the permanent loan. 

• Conduits for commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), which account for 

9 percent of multifamily debt outstanding. These are securities issued by financial institutions made up of multifamily, office, retail, and other loans that are 

not backed by the Federal Government. The CMBS market was a leading 

source of capital during the recent housing bubble—peaking at 17 percent of the 

market in 2007—before it practically shut down during the crisis. 

• Life insurance companies, which account for 6 percent of multifamily debt outstanding. Historically, life insurance companies have preferred to finance ‘‘Class 

A’’ multifamily assets, such as luxury apartment buildings in top-tier housing 

markets. 

• Other sources, which account for the remaining 11 percent of multifamily debt 

outstanding. This includes State and local governments, private pension funds, 

Real Estate Investment Trusts, and nonbank corporate businesses. 

From their volume alone, it’s clear that Fannie and Freddie are a critical part of 

today’s multifamily market. By purchasing and securitizing a range of multifamily 

mortgages across geographies and lender types, Fannie and Freddie ensure that developers and owners have the capital they need to build, maintain, and preserve 

rental housing. But increased liquidity is just one of many roles the GSEs play. 

First, they promote stability and broad access to credit through flexible products. 

Fannie and Freddie tend to offer longer-terms and more fixed-rate loans than banks, 

thrifts, and life insurance companies, which helps owners plan for future costs. 

Shorter-term, adjustable-rate mortgages, on the other hand, require frequent refinancing and recapitalization, which could discourage owners from holding onto a 

property over a long period. 

Second, the GSEs promote strong underwriting, which mitigates systemic risk in 

the rental market. Fannie and Freddie multifamily deals are carefully underwritten 

and include a significant amount of risk sharing with purely private investors, 

which further limits taxpayer exposure to risk. For example, Freddie Mac’s K-Series 

deals typically require private investors to cover the first 15 percent of losses without a guarantee, while Fannie Mae’s mortgage-backed securities require its licensed 

lenders to cover the first 5 percent plus a significant portion of further losses. 11

77 

12Mortgage Bankers Association. ‘‘MBA Commercial Real Estate/Multifamily Finance: Mortgage Delinquency Rates for Major Investor Groups: Q2 2013’’. MBA, August 2013. 13Federal Housing Finance Agency, Office of Inspector General. ‘‘FHFA’s Oversight of the 

Asset Quality of Multifamily Housing Loans Financed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’’. FHFA 

OIG, February 2013. 14Fannie Mae financed 559,000 multifamily units in 2012, 376,000 of which were affordable 

at 80 AMI or below and 109,000 of which were affordable at 50 AMI or below. Freddie Mac 

financed 435,000 multifamily units in 2012, 299,000 of which were affordable at 80 AMI or 

below and 60,000 of which were affordable at 50 AMI or below. 15Federal Housing Finance Agency. News Release: ‘‘FHFA Releases Fannie and Freddie Reports on Viability of Their Multifamily Business Without Government Guarantees’’. Attachment: 

‘‘2012 Conservatorship Scorecard: The Enterprises’ Reports on a Multifamily Future State Without a U.S. Government Guarantee’’. FHFA, 3 May 2013. 16 Ibid. 

As a result, GSE multifamily loans have experienced much lower delinquency 

rates than similar loans from private investors. According to the Mortgage Bankers 

Association, today only about 0.2 percent of Fannie- or Freddie-backed multifamily 

loans are delinquent by 60 or more days, compared to 2.1 percent for loans held by 

banks and thrifts and 7.8 percent for loans in commercial mortgage-backed securities. 12

Third, they provide crucial countercyclical support to the market. As recently as 

2007, Fannie and Freddie combined for less than 30 percent of multifamily loan 

originations, while private investors absorbed the rest of the market in their eagerness for mortgage debt. By 2009—the year after the housing market collapsed, taking the entire financial system with it—Fannie’s and Freddie’s share nearly tripled 

to 85 percent as investors were leery of putting their money into housing without 

a Government guarantee. 13 Without that support, financing for multifamily housing 

would have all but dried up, halting all new construction and making it extremely 

difficult for building owners to refinance maturing loans. 

Finally, the GSEs are critical sources of financing for affordable rental housing. 

This includes both the apartments financed through GSE multifamily securities and 

the investments held in each company’s portfolio. Over the years, Fannie and 

Freddie have developed working relationships with small community banks, State 

housing finance agencies, and community development financial institutions across 

the country, allowing them to efficiently and profitably finance affordable housing 

in lower-income communities. 

Last year, 67 percent of the rental units financed by Fannie or Freddie were affordable to families earning less than 80 percent of Area Median Income (AMI), 

commonly referred to as ‘‘low-income,’’ while roughly 17 percent were affordable to 

families earning less than 50 percent of AMI, commonly referred to as ‘‘very lowincome.’’ 14 While rent data are not available on units financed by banks, we know 

that private investors tend to prefer higher-end properties in top-tier markets. 

A key to Fannie’s and Freddie’s ability to play this important role in the market 

is their access to an explicit guarantee from the Federal Government. 

A Limited, Explicit Government Guarantee Is a Key Part of a Well-Functioning Rental Market 

After 5 years of conservatorship, we are pleased to see Congress making meaningful progress on housing finance reform. Regardless of what lawmakers decide to do 

with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, I urge you to preserve the aspects of the current 

system that have proven to work. This includes an explicit, limited guarantee on 

multifamily mortgages. 

The Government guarantee on multifamily mortgages makes the U.S. rental market more liquid, more stable, and more affordable. These are four powerful reasons 

for maintaining it in any reform effort. 

Eliminating the multifamily guarantee would have devastating consequences for 

the U.S. rental market, with low-income communities bearing the largest share of 

the burden. Earlier this year FHFA asked Fannie, Freddie and external consultants 

to assess what the market would look like without a Government guarantee on multifamily mortgages. 15 They found that: 

1. Without a Government backstop, the rental market would be subject to wild 

boom-and-bust cycles, leading to significantly less development during market 

downturns. According to Freddie Mac’s estimates, this lack of stability would 

cause multifamily interest rates to increase by 150 basis points and multifamily property values to decrease by as much as 16 percent; and 16

2. Rental housing would be much more difficult to find and much more expensive. 

If the Government guarantee were to go away, new construction on multifamily 

housing would plummet by as much as 27 percent, while average rents would 

78 

17Freddie Mac. ‘‘Report to the Federal Housing Finance Agency: Housing Finance Reform in 

the Multifamily Mortgage Market’’. Freddie Mac, December 2012. 18Fannie Mae. ‘‘Form 10-K: Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934’’. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, December 2012. 19Freddie Mac. ‘‘Form 10-K: Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934’’. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, December 2012. 20Federal Housing Finance Agency. News Release: ‘‘FHFA Releases Fannie and Freddie Reports on Viability of Their Multifamily Business Without Government Guarantees’’. Attachment: 

‘‘2012 Conservatorship Scorecard: The Enterprises’ Reports on a Multifamily Future State Without a U.S. Government Guarantee’’. FHFA, 3 May 2013. 21Mortgage Finance Working Group. ‘‘Multifamily Housing Finance Reform Proposal for 

Corker-Warner’’. Center for American Progress, August 2013. The Working Group’s full proposal 

is available at: http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/MFWG-CorkerWarner-multifamily-recommendations-Aug1-FINAL.pdf. 

rise by as much as 2 percent. 17 And since purely private investors would be 

less likely to finance lower-end developments in second- and third-tier markets, 

lower-income families would likely see even bigger increases in rent. 

It’s also important to note that Fannie’s and Freddie’s current multifamily businesses are quite profitable—as they have been throughout the housing crisis—and 

have steadily returned money back to the U.S. Treasury in recent quarters. According to 2012 financial reports, Fannie Mae’s multifamily business reported a net income of $1.5 billion last year, 18 while Freddie Mac reported $2.1 billion. 19 Meanwhile, according to FHFA’s own analysis, ‘‘there is little inherent value in (Fannie’s 

and Freddie’s) current multifamily businesses without the Government guarantee.’’ 20

Our Plan for Multifamily Housing Finance Reform 

Last month, Enterprise coauthored a detailed plan for multifamily housing finance reform, along with members of the Mortgage Finance Working Group. The 

plan was initially drafted as a supplement to the bipartisan Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2013 (S.1217), which preserves a limited and 

paid-for Government guarantee on qualifying multifamily securities. We propose: 21

• Starting immediately, spin off Fannie’s and Freddie’s multifamily businesses 

into two self-contained subsidiaries of their respective corporations. The new entities would maintain the current multifamily products—namely the Fannie 

Mae DUS Program and the Freddie Mac CME Program K-Series—and contract 

with Fannie and Freddie to manage the existing multifamily assets. 

• During a brief transition period, these entities would continue to purchase, 

securitize, and insure qualifying multifamily mortgage-backed securities, with 

support from the U.S. Treasury as needed. 

• When the public guarantor (the FMIC under S.1217) is fully operational, the 

insurance function would be transferred to the Federal Government. From that 

point on, the new entities would have the option of purchasing FMIC insurance 

on the multifamily securities they issue, backed by the full faith and credit of 

the U.S. Government. The FMIC maintains all multifamily guarantee fees in 

a separate insurance fund. 

• Over time, the new entities would be required to raise private capital with the 

option of buying out the Government’s interest. Meanwhile, other Governmentapproved, privately funded companies would have the option of purchasing 

FMIC insurance on the multifamily securities they issue. As soon as possible, 

the FMIC would establish a third issuer (beyond the two new entities) to ensure 

that smaller banks have access to the secondary market for multifamily mortgages. 

By spinning off the GSEs’ multifamily businesses, Congress can ensure that the 

multifamily market continues to function smoothly through any transition period. 

By preserving Fannie’s and Freddie’s tried-and-true multifamily products, Congress 

can provide much-needed certainty to multifamily investors, ensuring that money 

keeps flowing into the rental market. And by setting a clear path forward for the 

companies’ multifamily businesses—which remain profitable—Congress can help 

Fannie and Freddie keep top talent, retain institutional memory, and invest in the 

staff, systems and technology necessary to compete in a constantly evolving market. 

In addition, by opening the Government guarantee to other Government-approved 

issuers down the line, Congress can promote competition in the market and protect 

taxpayers from ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ bailouts. And by setting up a third approved issuer 

put in place to support smaller lenders, lawmakers can ensure that all communities 

have equitable access to the Government guarantee. 

79 

22 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Community Development Financial Institutions Fund. 

‘‘Treasury Officials, Congresswoman Lee Announce $80 Million in Awards for Affordable Housing: Inaugural Round of Capital Magnut Fund Awards Provides Critical Financing To Meet Affordable Housing Need’’. CDFI Funds, October 2010. Available at http://www.cdfifund.gov/ 

newslevents/CDFI-2010-43-Treasury-Officials-Congresswoman-Lee-Announce-80-Million.asp. 

Other Important Components of Any Future System of Multifamily Housing 

Finance 

There are other important issues that require attention in any multifamily reform 

legislation. These include: 

Broad Affordability Mandate for Issuers of FMIC-Insured Multifamily Securities 

A Government guarantee on multifamily securities is remarkably valuable. So it 

makes sense for policy makers to target the benefits of that support to the renters 

who need it most—namely low- and moderate-income families. 

We propose a broad affordability mandate for all issuers of FMIC-insured multifamily securities. For each issuer, not less than 60 percent of the rental units financed through FMIC-insured securities in a given year must be affordable to low 

income families making 80 percent of AMI or less. This requirement would be assessed at the time of origination based on a 30-percent affordability standard and 

would be reported to the FMIC at the end of each fiscal year. 

Support for Deeply Affordable Housing for Lower-Income Families 

During the past two decades, Fannie and Freddie have shown that investors can 

finance affordable housing in a way that’s both responsible and profitable. For very 

low-income renters below 50 percent of AMI, however, it’s very difficult to make 

those deals pencil out without outside subsidy to help cover operating costs. 

Therefore, instead of mandating that a certain percentage of Government-backed 

issuers serve very low-income families, we recommend levying an additional 5–10 

basis point fee on all FMIC-insured multifamily securities to fund programs that 

provide housing to families earning 50 percent of AMI or less. Specifically, the proceeds from that fee would fund the National Housing Trust Fund, the Capital Magnet Fund and additional programs to support broad access to safe, affordable mortgage credit in low-income communities. 

These funds have the potential to meaningfully expand the supply of affordable 

rental housing in the U.S.—through States for the Housing Trust Fund and through 

community development financial institutions and nonprofit housing developers for 

the Capital Magnet Fund. The Capital Magnet Fund is particularly effective at encouraging private investment in affordable housing; in the initial round of funding 

in 2010, recipients were able to leverage 15:1 with private capital sources. 22 As 

originally envisioned, both funds should have received funding through assessments 

on the GSEs’ ongoing business, but those obligations were suspended when Fannie 

and Freddie were put into conservatorship. 

While we don’t recommend placing a hard limit on the type of multifamily properties the FMIC can insure, there could be a benefit in discouraging higher-end 

properties from accessing the Government guarantee. For example, if the majority 

of units in a multifamily property financed by a FMIC-backed security are 

unaffordable to families earning less than 150 percent of AMI, the FMIC could collect an additional fee to fund affordable housing programs. 

Plans To Reach Underserved Segments of the Multifamily Market 

Private investors have historically done a poor job of serving the entire rental 

market on their own. Certain segments—namely low-income communities, rural and 

Native American communities, subsidized affordable multifamily housing and small 

multifamily housing—have been underserved by traditional capital markets, resulting in housing scarcity, disproportionately expensive rents, and unacceptably poor 

conditions. 

Fannie and Freddie are critical sources of capital for these underserved segments. 

For example, prior to 2008 Fannie Mae was a primary investor in several affordable 

housing developments in tribal lands financed with the Housing Credit. In fact, 

Fannie was one of the only private investors in this market at the time. Over the 

past two decades Enterprise has partnered with Fannie to build or preserve nearly 

700 affordable homes on Native Lands. 

We recommend addressing this problem through an annual strategic planning 

process. Each year, each approved issuer of FMIC-insured multifamily securities 

should work with the FMIC to create a plan for serving underserved market segments. At the end of each year, each issuer would report on their performance toward that plan. If the issuer does not comply or routinely misses their targets under 

80 

23 National Association of Home Builders.‘‘ The Low Income Housing Tax Credit: The Most 

Successful Affordable Rental Housing Production Program in Our Nation’s History’’. NAHB. 24Tim Takaro, James Krieger, Lin Song, Denise Sharify, and Nancy Beaudet. ‘‘The BreatheEasy Home: The Impact of Asthma-Friendly Home Construction on Clinical Outcomes and Trigger Exposure’’. American Journal of Public Health, January 2011. 25 Jill Breysse, David E. Jacobs, William Webber, Sherry Dixon, Carol Kawecki, Susan Aceti, 

and Jorge Lopez. ‘‘Health Outcomes and Green Renovation of Affordable Housing’’. Public 

Health Reports, 2011. 

this plan, the FMIC can apply financial penalties or revoke their approved-issuer 

status. 

In addition, we recommend mandating that the FMIC establish at least one pilot 

program to test the securitization of small multifamily loans, which typically finance 

rental properties with between 5 and 50 units. These buildings are a critical source 

of affordable housing in many communities, but they are often difficult to execute 

profitably through traditional capital channels. 

Encouraging Investments in Low-Income Housing Tax Credits 

For decades, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac played a critical role in the Housing 

Credit market. Since its inception in the late 1980s, the Housing Credit has been 

America’s main tool for building and preserving affordable homes, creating 2.6 million and counting. Each year the program finances roughly 90 percent of affordable 

homes created in the U.S., generating 140,000 jobs and $1.5 billion in State and 

local tax revenues in the process. 23

Before the financial crisis, the GSEs provided roughly 40 percent of Housing Credit investments producing tens of thousands of affordable apartments each year, including in markets with little to no CRA-related investment. After the financial crisis began, Fannie and Freddie all but withdrew from the Housing Credit market. 

The market has since rebounded and is running smoothly today, but it lacks a stable entity to keep money flowing into Housing Credit deals during future economic 

downturns. 

To further promote affordable housing, we believe that any future system of multifamily housing finance should include rules that encourage issuers of FMICbacked securities to invest in Housing Credit deals. As one possible approach, the 

FMIC could count any affordable units financed through Housing Credit investments toward the issuer’s annual affordability requirement described above. 

Promoting Energy Efficiency and Long-Term Sustainability in Multifamily Housing 

There are tremendous economic benefits to investments in energy-efficient systems for multifamily buildings. That’s especially true for the existing affordable 

housing stock, where we’re seeing rising utility costs straining many owners. 

For example, Enterprise recently extended a line of credit to owners of a large 

multifamily development in Brookline, Massachusetts. The owners made an up-front 

investment of just under a million dollars to install energy-efficient boilers, water 

pumps, and controls. The retrofits brought a 25-percent reduction in energy usage 

in the first year, translating to $170,000 in savings. The owners project that future 

savings will stay around that level, meaning they’ll recoup their investment in less 

than 6 years. 

And that doesn’t even account for the broad social and environmental benefits of 

greener housing. For example, green homes have proven to improve a resident’s 

asthma, 24 cardiovascular health, mental health, and other major health issues. 25

Because low-income families have so much to gain from living in healthy, energyefficient homes, we launched the Enterprise Green Communities initiative more 

than a decade ago, and today we’re working to make green building the norm for 

our industry. 

In recent years, Fannie Mae has been an important partner in that effort. Despite 

clear evidence of the long-term benefits of green investments, owners and developers 

often have difficulty securing financing to cover the up-front costs. Fannie is working to solve this problem through its Green Refinance Plus program, which helps 

owners of affordable multifamily housing access the capital they need to make economically justifiable energy and water retrofits. This also helps Fannie’s bottom 

line: the lower operating costs in green multifamily properties tend to lower the risk 

of default. 

The program is still in the pilot phase, but it has already helped several developers complete energy-efficiency retrofits that otherwise would not be possible. And 

perhaps most importantly, the program is taking steps toward creating a new industry standard by incorporating future energy savings into the underwriting and physical needs assessments for multifamily developments. 

81 

We believe that Congress should pursue similar programs that promote healthy, 

energy-efficient rental housing with any future replacement for Fannie and Freddie 

to. 

Conclusions and Next Steps 

Thank you again for tackling this important issue. The decisions made in Congress today on GSE reform will have a profound impact on the U.S. housing market 

and the broader economy, so it’s important that we get the details right. 

A liquid, stable and affordable market for multifamily mortgages is absolutely 

critical to a well-functioning housing market—and that depends on a limited, explicit guarantee. It’s also important that any reform effort preserves other components of the existing system that have proven to work, including Fannie’s and 

Freddie’s existing multifamily products and underwriting standards and a clear requirement that investors who benefit from a Government guarantee support affordable rental housing investments. 

That said, housing finance reform on its own will not solve all of our Nation’s 

housing problems. We are facing a critical affordable housing crisis in this country, 

with more than a quarter of renters living one paycheck away from losing their 

homes, while rental demand is expected to rise exponentially in the coming years. 

So GSE reform must be part of a series of policy changes and investments to address the needs of low-income families and communities, including preserving and 

expanding the Housing Credit, reforming rental assistance programs and investing 

in proven housing and community development programs with adequate appropriations that help communities build capacity to meet their specific housing needs. 

I look forward to working with you Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo, 

and other Members of the Committee on these and other critical reforms. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look forward to your questions. 

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RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF 

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON FROM THOMAS S. BOZZUTO 

Q.1. Can you share with us any recommendations you have regarding the multifamily housing provisions in S.1217? 

A.1. As lawmakers look ahead to reforming the housing finance 

system, NMHC/NAA urge them to recognize the unique needs of 

the multifamily industry, an industry that provides housing to 35 

million Americans. The single-family and multifamily sectors operate differently, have divergent performance records, and require 

distinct reform solutions. A one-size-fits-all solution will not work. 

The capital sources for multifamily are not as wide or as deep as 

those financing single-family, and the loans themselves are not as 

easily commoditized. In addition, the financing process; mortgage 

instruments; legal framework; loan terms and requirements; origination; secondary market investors; underlying assets; business expertise; and systems are all separate and unique from single-family 

home mortgage activities. 

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RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR WARREN 

FROM THOMAS S. BOZZUTO 

Q.1. According to a September 2012 GAO report, multifamily housing programs played a large role in helping Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac achieve their annual affordable housing goals. As the 

report states, ‘‘multifamily mortgages had a disproportionate importance for the housing goals because most multifamily housing 

serves targeted groups.’’ Meanwhile, the delinquency rates on the 

GSEs’ multifamily mortgages were extremely low. Even during the 

height of the housing crisis, less than 1 percent of the GSEs’ multifamily mortgages were delinquent. Does this demonstrate that a 

Government-backed multifamily housing program can pursue affordable housing goals without creating excessive risk of delinquency or default? 

A.1. Yes. It’s true that multifamily housing is inherently affordable, which played a significant role in the low delinquency rates 

for the GSEs when it came to multifamily mortgages. In addition, 

approximately 90 percent of the apartment units the GSEs financed—more than 10 million units—were affordable to families at 

or below the median income for their community. This included an 

overwhelming number of market-rate apartments with no Federal 

rent subsidies that were produced with virtually no risk to Federal 

taxpayers. 

Multifamily Housing Provides a Diversity of Credit Risk 

One of the ways the GSEs were able to produce such a stellar 

performance record in multifamily is by building a balanced book 

of business where lower-risk, higher quality loans enabled them to 

take on riskier loans like deeply targeted affordable housing properties, such as Section 8 and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit properties. This diversification of credit risk across the guaranteed portfolio (both securitized and balance sheet) is necessary in order to 

provide competitive and affordable loans to a wide range of borrowers, properties, and locations. 

Many targeted affordable loans have demonstrated strong performance, but due to their income restrictions and other factors, 

they present greater risk to the lender. Often less experienced and 

financially strong owners, weaker market locations, and typically 

higher operating costs are what create greater risk both during the 

loan term and at maturity. In addition, the value of targeted affordable properties does not typically appreciate like market-rate 

apartment properties, which adds to the loan maturity risk. 

Higher quality loans with lower-risk profiles are not only luxury 

rental communities, they include a wide range of properties. They 

can be newer or older, with significant amenities, or their location 

can be such that amenities are not significant to the value. High 

quality loans often include properties with rents serving a range of 

income levels, from workforce households to meeting the housing 

needs of families with incomes above the area median income. Most 

properties built after 1980 typically have some set-aside of units 

that meet the needs of lower-income households. 

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Multifamily Programs Help To Provide Capital in Underserved Areas 

Just as critical, the GSEs’ multifamily programs have been able, 

through their broad platforms, to provide capital for projects located in secondary and tertiary markets that do not meet the credit 

or return standards required by many private capital debt providers. The GSEs have to vary their portfolio through being active 

in geographic diversification and do so in as many markets as possible—avoiding any geographic concentration. This has the added 

impact of providing capital to preserve and support rental housing 

in these markets. Much of this rental housing is targeted at moderate and lower-income households and is not as focused on meeting goals as it is on providing capital on good quality multifamily 

properties in sound rental housing markets. 

In addition, the extent to which the goals have an impact on the 

performance of the GSEs needs to be put into the context of a mortgage lender that cannot diversify their debt investments beyond 

multifamily rental housing. This, along with the goals, creates the 

need to expand their debt offerings in order to cover a broader 

range of market locations and meet the needs of borrowers. 

Q.2. Could you describe what the multifamily housing market 

would have looked like—before, during, and after the crisis—if the 

GSEs had not had affordable housing goals? 

A.2. It is difficult to quantify the impact the affordable housing 

goals have had on the GSEs’ multifamily lending activities. The 

GSEs’ affordable housing financing is the result of many factors 

other than the influence of the Government-mandated goals. Since 

the early 1990s the primary focus of the GSEs’ multifamily financing activities has been on meeting the sector’s liquidity needs. It 

is this comprehensive approach that has had a significant impact 

on financing workforce and affordable rental housing. 

Multifamily Housing Is Inherently Affordable 

Without question, an overwhelming number of apartment properties are affordable to households below the area median income. 

The majority of rental housing units are also affordable at rents between 60 to 100 percent of area median income and the demand 

for rental housing is only expected to grow in the coming decade 

and beyond. 

The current multifamily lending structure has allowed the GSEs 

to diversify the risk in their lending activities, giving them greater 

reach to address affordable housing needs. Without this diversification, the expense associated with higher risk affordable housing 

would have been higher mortgage costs. 

In addition, even when the regulator specifically asked that there 

be a greater focus on credit, over meeting goals, the GSEs multifamily programs continued to implement sound credit policy and 

serve the rental housing needs of America’s families. All this reflects the strength of the multifamily market and helps emphasize 

that it is inherently affordable. 

It is important to note that certain activities may have been impacted more than others if the affordable housing goals were not 

in place. For example, a large number of older properties would 

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likely not have received important investments, fewer private activity bonds would have been issued to support low-income rental 

housing, and owners in secondary markets would not have had access to competitive mortgage capital. Although it would be difficult 

to quantify, the goals may also have provided additional assistance 

to both the LIHTC and the Section 8 Project-based housing program. 

One thing is clear, multifamily housing’s core business practices 

support lending on workforce housing, and housing in all markets, 

during all economic conditions. The broad multifamily lending platform has helped the GSEs manage risk and ensured that there was 

a sufficient supply of liquidity—before, during and after the most 

recent crisis. It is this comprehensive approach, more than the affordable housing goals that support the production and the preservation of multifamily affordable rental housing. 

RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR COBURN 

FROM THOMAS S. BOZZUTO 

Q.1. In addition to the financing activities of the GSEs, the Federal 

Government has a number of direct spending programs and tax expenditures to support multifamily housing. An essential component 

of housing finance reform must be an examination of existing Federal subsidies for multifamily housing. Please identify all of the 

Federal programs and tax expenditures that support multifamily 

housing and the total Federal cost of these programs. 

A.1. The Federal Government supports rental housing using direct 

loans, loan guarantees, and grants through a variety of programs 

designed to support broad and discrete housing needs including 

senior assisted living, military housing, farm labor housing, low income, and housing for person with disabilities. The primary programs NMHC/NAA members engage with are listed below. 


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Department of Housing and Urban Development 

Federal Housing Administration: Section 221(d)(3) and (4): The 

Section 221(d)(4) program insures mortgage loans to facilitate the 

new construction or substantial rehabilitation of multifamily rental 

or cooperative housing for moderate-income families, elderly, and 

the handicapped. The program insures loans made to nonprofit and 

cooperatives (Section 221(d)(3) profit-motivated borrowers by private lenders (Section 221(d)(4)). 

Federal Housing Administration: Section 232/223(f): The Section 

223(f) program insures loans for the purchase or refinancing of existing multifamily rental properties financed with conventional or 

FHA loans. 

Section 8: Project-Based Voucher Program: The PBV Program operates as a contract between a local housing authority and a private property owner, wherein a tenant will pay 30 percent of their 

monthly income and HUD will pay the remaining cost for that unit. 

The subsidy remains on the unit for a contractual term, and is not 

portable with the tenant. 

Section 8: Tenant-Based Voucher Program: The Tenant-Based 

Voucher Program provides a rent subsidy to a family to use for any 

qualifying rental unit, wherein the family will pay 30 percent of 

their monthly income toward their rent and HUD will pay the remaining cost for that unit. The subsidy is portable with the tenant, 

who can move from one property to another and apply their subsidy as appropriate. 

Department of Agriculture, Rural Housing Service 

Section 538 Loan Guarantee Program: The 538 Program encourages private sector financing for rural rental housing for low- and 

moderate-income families. Approved activities for financing include 

construction of new rental housing, acquisition, and rehabilitation 

of existing rural rental properties, Eligible borrowers for this program include Individuals, general and limited partnerships, corporations, LLC’s, trusts, nonprofits, tribes, and public bodies. 

Section 515 Direct Loan Program: The 515 Program makes direct, competitive mortgage loans to provide affordable multifamily 

rental housing for very low-, low-, and moderate-income families, 

elderly persons, and persons with disabilities. Individuals, partnerships, limited partnerships, for-profit corporations, nonprofit organizations, limited equity cooperatives, Native American tribes, and 

public agencies are eligible to apply. 

[For more information on these programs, please contact the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department 

of Agriculture, Rural Housing Service.] 

With respect to tax expenditures that impact multifamily housing, these must be divided into two categories: (1) tax expenditures 

that are directly targeted to multifamily housing; and (2) tax expenditures that can benefit owners, operators and developers of 

multifamily housing but are not uniquely designed to benefit the 

apartment sector (e.g., like-kind exchanges, the deduction for taxes 

on real property, and the exclusion of capital gains at death). For 

simplicity’s sake, the remainder of our response is focused on the 

former category. 

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To identify the tax expenditures specifically targeted to multifamily housing and their cost, we have looked to Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2012–2017, which was prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and released 

February 1, 2013 (JCS-1-13). The value of tax expenditures cited 

covers the 2013 to 2017 period. Our analysis of this document indicates that the following tax expenditures are directly targeted to 

multifamily housing: 

• Credit for low-income housing ($36.5 billion); 

• Exclusion of interest on State and local government qualified 

private activity bonds for rental housing ($5.2 billion); and, 

• Depreciation of rental housing in excess of alternative depreciation system ($21.0 billion). 

Q.2. Would you agree many of these Federal programs, such as 

Low-Income Housing Tax Credits and tax-exempt bonds, have the 

same purpose and generally overlap one another? 

A.2. We would disagree with the premise that many of these Federal programs are duplicative and make the argument that each 

serves to benefit a segment of renter populations. Accordingly, the 

various housing programs are actually quite complementary of one 

another. An analysis of each type of incentive is illustrative. 

The tax provision allowing for 27.5-year depreciation of rental 

property, for example, is designed to enable investors in rental 

housing to recover the cost of buildings serving the broadest spectrum of renters. Lengthier depreciation schedules would make multifamily housing developments less attractive relative to other 

types of investments. The provision helps to ensure that the Nation 

can continue to provide safe and decent housing to 18 million 

households. It is noteworthy that whereas just 158,000 apartments 

were delivered in 2012, an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 units 

must be built each to year to meet expected demand. 

Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 

Turning to programs targeted to meet the needs of income-restricted residents, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is 

a public–private partnership program designed to serve families 

with incomes of 60 percent of area median income or less. As a key 

driver of the production of affordable units, the vast majority of 

which would otherwise not be constructed, the LIHTC program has 

done so admirably, financing more than 2.6 million units since its 

inception in 1986. 

According to a New York University Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy study, What Can We Learn About the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit Program by Looking at the Tenants? 

(October 2012), which analyzes the program’s performance in 16 

States, 43 percent of LIHTC units serve households with incomes 

of between 0 percent and 30 percent of area median income. 

Section 8 Housing Voucher Program 

The Section 8 Housing Voucher Program has long served as 

America’s primary rental subsidy program. Funded by HUD and 

administered by local public housing authorities, the program provides subsidized rents for qualifying low-income families in private 

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rental housing, including apartments. The Section 8 program is required to distribute 75 percent of vouchers to those with incomes 

of 30 percent or less of area median income. 

This public–private partnership has the potential to be one of the 

most effective means of addressing our Nation’s affordable housing 

needs and supporting mixed-income communities. However, the 

program’s potential success is limited by too many inefficient and 

duplicative requirements, which discourage private providers from 

accepting vouchers. These include a required three-way lease between the provider, resident, and the public housing authority; repetitive unit inspections; resident eligibility certification and other 

regulatory paperwork. Collectively, these make it more expensive 

for a private owner to rent to a Section 8 voucher holder. 

The program has also been plagued with a flawed and volatile 

funding system that has undermined private sector confidence in 

the program. With Congress focused on austerity measures, insufficient funding is expected to be worse in the near-term budget cycles. 

Commonsense reforms that could help control costs, improve the 

program for both renters and property owners and increase private 

housing participation include: (1) putting a reliable funding formula in place; (2) streamlining the property inspection process; (3) 

simplifying rent and income calculations; (4) reducing costly Limited English Proficiency (LEP) translation requirements; and, (5) 

extending the contract term for project-based vouchers from 15 to 

20 years. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 

these reforms would reduce Section 8 program costs by more than 

$3 billion over 5 years. 

FHA Multifamily Programs 

The FHA multifamily programs (Section 221(d)(3) and (4) and 

Section 232/223(f)) continue to be a credible and reliable source of 

construction and mortgage debt. FHA not only insures mortgages, 

but it also builds capacity in the market, providing developers with 

an effective source of construction and long-term mortgage capital. 

In normal capital markets, FHA plays a limited, but important, 

role in the rental housing sector. During the economic crisis, however, FHA became virtually the only source of apartment construction capital. Applications have increased from $2 billion annually 

to $10 billion, and HUD anticipates that demand for FHA multifamily mortgage insurance will remain high for the next several 

years. 

Since its inception in 1934, FHA has insured over 53,000 multifamily mortgages and has been a cornerstone for the construction 

and permanent financing and refinancing of apartments. According 

to HUD, FHA holds approximately 13,000 multifamily mortgages 

in its portfolio (compared to 4.8 million single-family mortgages). 

While it accounts for 9.2 percent of the total outstanding multifamily mortgage debt, it is a material and important source of capital for underserved segments of the rental market. 

FHA multifamily is best known for offering an alternative source 

of construction debt to developers that supplements bank and other 

private construction capital sources. It also serves borrowers with 

long-term investment goals as the only capital provider to offer 35– 

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40-year loan terms. FHA lending is essential to borrowers in secondary markets, borrowers with smaller balance sheets, new development entities, affordable housing developers and nonprofit firms, 

all of which are often overlooked or underserved by private capital 

providers. 

FHA’s Multifamily Programs have continually generated a net 

profit, and have met all losses associated with the financial crisis 

with reserves generated by premiums paid through the loan insurance program structure. Because premiums have consistently reflected the risk associated with the underlying loans, and because 

underwriting requirements have remained strong within the program, FHA’s Multifamily Programs are able to operate as self-funded, fully covered lines of business at HUD. Some programs have 

struggled during the real estate downturn, however, any losses 

have been covered by the capital cushion the multifamily programs 

collectively generate. 

Rural Rental Housing Programs 

The Guaranteed Rural Rental Housing Program (Section 538) 

and Rental Housing Loan Program (Section 515), administered by 

the Rural Development Housing and Community Facilities Programs within the U.S. Department of Agriculture, are important 

programs that encourage commercial financing of rural rental 

housing. 

The Section 538 program is focused on affordable housing for 

low- and moderate-income rental populations. While HUD has several multifamily mortgage insurance programs, none of these programs can take the place of the Section 538 program. HUD’s programs are designed for larger, more expensive properties than are 

generally seen in rural areas. 

Section 515 is one of the few resources that enable very low-income and low-income renters in rural America to access decent, 

safe and affordable housing. The Section 515 program also reduces 

homelessness and overcrowding. 

LIHTC and Tax-Exempt Housing Bonds 

Finally, the question above specifically asks whether the LIHTC 

and tax-exempt housing bonds have the same purpose and overlap. 

Just as is the case with the various housing incentives, tax-exempt 

bonds enable a key prong of the LIHTC program, the so-called 4- 

percent credit, to operate. 

The LIHTC has two components: (1) a 9-percent tax credit that 

subsidizes 70 percent of new construction and cannot be combined 

with any additional Federal subsidies; and (2) a 4-percent tax credit that subsidizes 30 percent of the unit costs in an acquisition of 

a project or a new development financed in conjunction with taxexempt private activity housing bonds. 

Whereas States are limited in the amount of 9-percent LIHTCs 

they may award, there is no limit applicable to 4-percent LIHTCs. 

Thus, so long as a State has not exceeded its overall cap on private 

activity bonds, the 4-percent LIHTC program can enable the overall LIHTC program to finance the production of additional units. 

Investors are willing to accept lower returns applicable to private 

activity bonds because tax is not owed on interest paid. These 

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lower returns, however, are exactly what make the underlying tax 

credit projects economical. 

Q.3. Would you agree consolidation of these programs could achieve 

efficiencies with which the Federal Government could do ‘‘more 

with less,’’ i.e., help more families without needing to increase program funding? 

A.3. Ensuring taxpayer dollars are utilized in the wisest possible 

manner must be of paramount concern to Congress and all Americans, particularly at a time of high national deficits. While we welcome the opportunity to work with policy makers to improve the effectiveness of the Nation’s housing programs, ensuring all Americans have access to quality rental housing is critical, particularly 

when current demand for such housing is literally surging and supply is falling short. 

Given the discussion above that makes the case that the various 

housing programs complement one another, we believe that policy 

makers should look to improve these programs before they look to 

consolidation. The bursting of the housing bubble exposed serious 

flaws in our Nation’s housing finance system. Yet, those shortcomings were largely confined to the residential home mortgage 

sector. The multifamily housing programs administered by the 

GSEs, HUD, RHS, and others worked in concert to meet America’s 

increasing demand for rental housing during the crisis, and continue to address the needs of underserved or unserved populations 

today. Because the financing structures used by the multifamily industry are often as varied as the properties themselves, programs 

designed to meet the needs of a certain rental class often do so in 

the absence of other programs. This dynamic must be acknowledged in any debate over consolidation or elimination of housing 

programs, taking in to account the populations that stand to be 

harmed by such actions. 

While our testimony before the Committee outlines our recommendations for reforming the Government-Sponsored Enterprises’ multifamily programs, we would like to use this opportunity 

to offer our support to make a critical improvement to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. As is noted above, the 

LIHTC is composed of a 9 percent and a 4-percent credit. However, 

because these rates float and are not fixed, their value can be reduced by as much as 50 basis points, which, in turn, reduces the 

amount of resources available to finance affordable housing. Notably, in January 2013, Congress enacted the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 that extends the temporary fixed rate on the 9-percent tax credit, which was first enacted as part of the Housing and 

Economic Recovery Act of 2008, for projects that received a LIHTC 

allocation prior to January 1, 2014. Given the current low interest 

rate environment, the actual value of the credit is likely to fall 

below the 9-percent mark for projects receiving an allocation following the deadline, reducing investors’ activity in the affordable 

housing sector. In fact, in the absence of the temporary 9-percent 

credit, the credit would actually be worth 7.59 percent as of November 2013. The 4-percent credit is currently worth 3.25 percent. 

For this reason NMHC and NAA propose to make the fixed 9- 

percent credit permanent and to extend the fixed rate policy to the 

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4-percent tax credit, keeping financing flowing for acquisitions. 

S.1442, Improving the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Rate Act, 

introduced by Senator Cantwell, makes these changes, and we urge 

Congress to enact it as soon as possible. 

In addition, NMHC and NAA have continued to support cost effective reforms to the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher programs. 

RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF 

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON FROM E.J. BURKE 

Q.1. Can you share with us any recommendations you have regarding the multifamily housing provisions in S.1217? 

A.1. The recent financial crisis and recession demonstrated that 

only the Federal Government can ensure liquidity through all market cycles. The provisions of S.1217 appropriately provide for a 

Federal backstop to ensure liquidity for multifamily housing finance in all markets. We also support the provision that would require the Federal guarantee to be paid for—thereby helping capitalize the Federal insurance fund, as well as promoting competition among capital sources in the multifamily finance market. In 

addition, S.1217’s approach that preserves and carries over the 

GSEs’ multifamily businesses (e.g., the Delegated Underwriting 

and Servicing (DUS) and Capital Markets Execution/K-Deal programs), with a Government backstop, would continue to provide liquidity in a broad range of markets, geographic locations, and 

through various market conditions. We strongly support these provisions. 

We note, however, that the multifamily businesses of both GSEs 

go beyond the DUS and CME/K-Deal programs identified in 

S.1217. For example, the GSEs operate affordable lending programs with additional lender networks. Thus, we recommend that 

any legislation specify that the multifamily businesses of Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac be moved over to new or successor entities 

pursuant to the legislative proposal. By doing so, the activities that 

the GSEs engage in to serve various geographic regions, specialized 

housing (e.g., seniors housing, student housing) and smaller properties could be transferred to the entities and serve as a foundation 

to serve such markets going forward—if so directed by Congress. 

We also note that S.1217 provides that the GSE’s multifamily 

businesses would be transferred to the Regulator (FMIC) in their 

entirety and there would be no private capital at risk for multifamily backed securities. Importantly, legislators should distinguish the roles between the Government guarantor/regulator and 

private sector participants. The Government agency should retain 

the role of regulator, Government guarantor and administrator of 

an insurance fund(s)—but other business roles should be transferred to private sector entities. Specifically, the bill should direct 

the Government agency to establish/approve multiple (at least two) 

secondary mortgage market entities to serve as issuers in the multifamily housing finance market. In contrast, S.1217 provides that 

for single family mortgage loans, these functions would be performed by privately capitalized secondary market entities with access to a limited Government guarantee. Authorizing multiple secondary market entities that pay guarantee fees to access the GovVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON
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ernment guarantee would foster competition among such entities 

and with other sources of capital in the multifamily finance market. 

Q.2. Each of you propose to establish new issuers in a reformed 

multifamily housing finance system. Can you discuss how the new 

issuers will attract private capital, how many you anticipate to 

form, and how small lenders could participate in this system? 

A.2. As we pointed out in our written and oral testimony, there is 

strong demand for multifamily housing in the U.S. today and this 

demand is expected to continue for many years to come. To meet 

this demand, a significant amount of capital must be raised to finance a growing population of renter households. This capital must 

be longer term in nature. With access to a limited Government 

guarantee, private issuers can fund a significant portion of their 

capital structure without being required to pay onerous liquidity 

premiums that are associated with longer duration liabilities. With 

strong demand for mortgages and a stable funding source, private 

capital can focus on managing credit risk instead of managing liquidity risk. 

With respect to private capital, we believe that the new issuers 

should seek to attract private capital in three respects. 

First, they should attract private capital to share in the credit 

risk of the multifamily finance transaction. To the extent that the 

GSEs’ existing multifamily platforms are preserved and carried 

over into the new system, the new private issuers should be able 

to continue to attract private capital that provides a buffer to protect taxpayers as part of core business of the new issuers. 

Second, the historical credit performance and prospects going forward (dependent on policy maker decisions) will likely attract private investors to fund the capital structure of the new issuers and/ 

or successors to the current GSE multifamily businesses. The existing multifamily books of the GSEs (multifamily loans and securities) could be used to transition to the future state where, for example, the new issuers could earn an asset management fee to help 

capitalize its new operations. 

Third, that the approved new issuers (whether successors to the 

GSE multifamily platforms or new market entrants) would be able 

to access a Government guarantee would attract capital to the sector and to the entities themselves. In this regard, we would recommend that the platforms of the new issuers be broad enough 

(and the regulatory regime be flexible enough) to attract private 

capital to the new entities. That these entities would be mono-line 

institutions (in the housing finance sector, whether as multifamily 

or single-family and multifamily finance entities), charged premiums when accessing the Government guarantee, subject to significant regulation, and required to hold meaningful capital, would 

appropriately confine their scope. Because private capital is opportunistic, policy makers should exercise care in order to enable the 

new entities to attract capital and operate as viable entities. 

With regard to the number of such entities, we believe that the 

regulator should be authorized to approve enough entities that 

would provide stability to the multifamily finance market, but balanced with the goals of competition among the range of capital 

98 

sources that support this market, as well as the financial viability 

of approved, privately capitalized entities. At a minimum, we believe there should be no less than two issuers and likely more than 

two. 

For the small multifamily loan market, we would note that there 

is a significant amount of lending that occurs today. According to 

MBA research, small multifamily loan lenders (typically, community banks/depository institutions), defined as lenders with an average loan size of $1 to $3 million, made 47 percent of all 2012 multifamily loans (over 19,000 loans; $34 billion in volume) and the very 

small loan lenders (those with an average loan size of $1 million 

or less) made an additional 26 percent of all 2012 multifamily loans 

(approximately 10,800 loans; $6 billion in volume). These loans 

typically have shorter terms, simpler loan documentation, and 

often are recourse loans. However, a large portion of this lending 

is believed to occur in larger, urban markets. Attracting multifamily capital to rural areas or very small markets is difficult 

today. Part of this difficulty may be attributed to the fact that 

without access to longer term capital, Community Banks have 

avoided long term multifamily loans. Other natural sources of long 

term mortgage capital (Life Insurance Companies and CMBS lenders) have difficulty with the economics of small loans. To remedy 

this, the Regulator could work with issuers to create programs 

where local lenders could partner with issuers that either specialize in small loans or offer small loans as part of a broader loan 

offering. 

RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR WARREN 

FROM E.J. BURKE 

Q.1. According to a September 2012 GAO report, multifamily housing programs played a large role in helping Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac achieve their annual affordable housing goals. As the 

report states, ‘‘multifamily mortgages had a disproportionate importance for the housing goals because most multifamily housing 

serves targeted groups.’’ Meanwhile, the delinquency rates on the 

GSEs’ multifamily mortgages were extremely low. Even during the 

height of the housing crisis, less than 1 percent of the GSEs’ multifamily mortgages were delinquent. Does this demonstrate that a 

Government-backed multifamily housing program can pursue affordable housing goals without creating excessive risk of delinquency or default? 

A.1. By its very nature, multifamily rental housing tends to be affordable, with 93 percent of multifamily units having rents affordable to households earning area median incomes or less. Overall, 

renters’ median household income is about half of that of homeowners. As a result, the GSEs’ multifamily finance activities historically assisted their efforts to meeting the affordable housing 

goals, particularly when compliance with the affordable housing 

goals were based on the combined affordability of their single-family and multifamily mortgage purchase transactions. We agree that 

the GSEs’ multifamily businesses have largely been able to meet 

applicable affordable housing requirements (which have changed 

over time by regulation or statute) while maintaining strong credit 

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performance—with current delinquency rates at less than 20 basis 

points. 

We support affordability in the multifamily rental housing and 

believe that new or successor issuing entities should focus on the 

workforce segment of the multifamily housing market. We recommend an affordability approach in which the vast majority of the 

annual cohort of an entity’s multifamily activities would finance 

properties with units affordable to families at or below 100 percent 

of area median income (i.e., the lower half of the income spectrum). 

Other affordability thresholds also could be appropriate. Overall, 

we recommend a rational approach that clearly advances policy objectives to support workforce rental housing and provides flexibility, as determined by the regulator subject to market conditions, 

during periods of market disruption and illiquidity. Affordability 

standards, including the overall number of such requirements, 

should also be balanced with the need of the new or successor entities to attract private capital, mitigate potential market distortions, 

and prudently manage credit risk. 

To the extent that Congress establishes new affordable housing 

goals or other affordability requirements, we would support a regime that would incentivize the new issuers to serve the broad 

multifamily housing finance market, rather than restricting the entities to narrow market segments. Importantly, neither the statute 

nor the regulatory regime should be overly prescriptive or excessive 

in implementing an affordability objective. For example, any affordability requirement should not be structured to apply on a property-by-property basis (such as loan or AMI limits at the property 

level). In addition, the Government guarantee on a particular 

transaction or security should not be tied to compliance with a particular affordability standard, as this could create significant uncertainty for investors relying on the security-level guarantee. (If an 

issuer pays a guarantee fee/premium to the regulator/guarantor for 

a particular transaction, the guarantee should attach.) The issuer 

itself would be subject to any governing affordability requirements. 

We would be pleased to discuss in greater detail possible affordability-related requirements. 

Q.2. Could you describe what the multifamily housing market 

would have looked like—before, during, and after the crisis—if the 

GSEs had not had affordable housing goals? 

A.2. While the affordable housing goals have clearly had an impact 

on the GSEs and the mortgage market, it is difficult to determine 

what the market would have looked like absent the goals. This is 

further complicated by the fact that the affordable housing goals 

were modified a number of times since they were first statutorily 

enacted in 1992. A fundamental change also occurred as part of the 

Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which decoupled the 

single-family mortgage housing goals from those that govern the 

GSEs’ multifamily finance activities. 

A core strength of the GSEs’ multifamily businesses has been 

that they were a countercyclical source of liquidity to the broad 

multifamily housing market, including to affordable rental units, 

while maintaining strong credit and underwriting discipline. The 

affordable housing goals, along with other mission requirements, 

100 

influenced the businesses lines to provide liquidity to market segments that, absent such requirements, may not have been pursued, 

such as mortgages on very low-income properties or loans that 

were less economically attractive. In the multifamily business lines, 

the GSEs were largely able to balance the various mission requirements, while running profitable businesses. To the extent that Congress considers any affordability regime, we urge a balanced approach that supports a sustainable multifamily finance system. 

Q.3. It appears the GSEs played an important countercyclical role 

during and after the 2008 housing crisis. In 2009, the GSEs financed about 80 percent of the multifamily loans originated that 

year—preventing a terrible crisis from getting even worse. But by 

2012, the GSEs had reduced their role and were only financing 44 

percent of the multifamily loans originated that year. What factors 

allowed the GSEs to play such an effective countercyclical role? 

A.3. The GSEs served a countercyclical role during the financial 

crisis as providers of liquidity in the multifamily housing finance 

market, when other capital sources pulled back. And since the crisis, their market share has trended downward, even as overall 

multifamily origination volumes have increased. As the market has 

stabilized, other lending sources have increased market share, with 

non-GSE capital sources competing vigorously with Fannie Mae 

and Freddie Mac to finance multifamily properties. We believe several factors allowed the GSEs to serve a countercyclical role. 

Government Guarantee. A Government guarantee (an explicit 

guarantee beginning in September 2008) that backed the multifamily finance activities of the GSEs enabled them to provide this 

countercyclical role in the market. To ensure that there is countercyclical liquidity in the market, the Federal Government should 

provide a guarantee on mortgage-backed securities. We believe that 

this Government backstop should be available at the mortgagebacked securities level at all times to ensure liquidity in the multifamily market. 

Scalability, Infrastructure, and Expertise. The infrastructure and 

resources (including their DUS and Program Plus partnerships) of 

the GSEs were scalable, enabling them to play the countercyclical 

role that they did during the financial crisis. Such resources include the talent and expertise of their staff that have enabled the 

multifamily businesses to provide ongoing liquidity, maintain credit 

discipline, and serve a countercyclical role. 

While private capital sources should clearly continue to play a 

substantial and predominant role in the multifamily finance market (as is increasingly the case), new entities with access to a security-level Government guarantee should have the capability to scale 

up as necessary when market disruptions occur. This effectively requires that the entities be viable, privately capitalized business 

that can function during ‘‘normal’’ market conditions as well. The 

nature of multifamily lending (and commercial real estate finance 

generally) is such that it is extremely difficult to expand activities 

in an expedited manner. A mechanism that remains dormant, but 

called to rapidly expand during market disruptions in order to 

meet the needs of a deep and complex market, would not be a viable option. 

101 

Broad Mission Purposes. The public mission of the GSEs, particularly their ‘‘liquidity’’ mission specified by statute, enabled the 

GSEs to play a countercyclical role in multifamily finance. The 

charters of both GSEs specify the following public purposes: (1) To 

provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages; 

(2) to respond appropriately to the private capital market; (3) to 

provide ongoing assistance to the secondary market for residential 

mortgages (including activities relating to mortgages on housing for 

low- and moderate-income families involving a reasonable economic 

return that may be less than the return earned on other activities) 

by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving 

the distribution of investment capital available for residential 

mortgage financing; and (4) to promote access to mortgage credit 

throughout the Nation (including central cities, rural areas, and 

underserved areas) by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investment and improving the distribution of investment capital available for residential mortgage financing. 

The GSEs’ mission—to provide liquidity, stability, and affordability to the residential (both single-family and multifamily) mortgage markets—has remained in effect during the financial crisis. 

While we do not believe that the status quo should be maintained 

in the future state of housing finance—and Congress should proceed with deliberate speed to determine the scope and purposes of 

any future secondary market entities—we believe that a sufficiently broad scope and purpose would be necessary to ensure liquidity in all markets and economic cycles. 

Q.4. What steps do you think Congress can take to make sure that 

some entity—whether it is Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or some new 

entity—plays the same kind of countercyclical role in the multifamily housing market as we move forward? 

A.4. All of the factors identified in response to question three above 

would facilitate the ability of future entities to play a countercyclical role in the multifamily housing market moving forward. In 

other words, (1) a Government guarantee, (2) scalability, stable infrastructure and multifamily finance expertise, and (3) broad business/mission scope, would all be critically important in ensuring 

countercyclical liquidity in the future of multifamily housing finance. 

In addition, we believe that policy makers should ensure the ongoing stewardship of resources that support the multifamily market, utilizing them to transition to a sustainable multifamily housing finance system. While the current state of the GSEs should not 

last indefinitely, the resources of the GSEs, as taxpayer assets, 

should be preserved to support an orderly transition to a new mortgage finance system. The value in the multifamily platforms should 

be preserved in order to ensure an orderly, stable transition that 

does not foreclose options for Congress. With the importance of liquidity, stability and affordability in the multifamily housing market, we believe that FHFA, the Administration and Congress 

should proceed with caution, avoiding risks that come with experimentation. Regulatory or legislative actions that could substantially jeopardize the viability and value of key resources within the 

GSEs’ multifamily businesses should be avoided. Blunt or dramatic 

102 

changes imposed in conservatorship, for example, would be highly 

disruptive, risk the loss of significant talent at the GSEs, and reduce the value of taxpayer assets. While policy makers should take 

steps to facilitate the transition forward, the do no harm principle 

should equally govern. 

RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR COBURN 

FROM E.J. BURKE 

Q.1. In your written testimony, you supported privatizing the multifamily businesses of the GSEs. Please describe why you believe 

the Federal Government should not operate a securitization process 

in the multifamily sector. 

A.1. MBA strongly supports an explicit Government guarantee for 

multifamily loans. We also support an overall approach that supports establishment of premiums paid into a Government-administered FDIC-like insurance fund, oversight by the FMIC as a strong 

regulator, and recognition of the value and retention of the GSEs’ 

multifamily executions (e.g., Delegated Underwriting and Servicing 

and Capital Markets Execution/K-Deals). 

We believe, however, that the actual business of financing multifamily properties should be performed by private sector entities, 

and we would urge that the statutory language explicitly distinguish between the roles of the Government guarantor/regulator and 

new private sector multifamily entities. That is, the Federal Government agency should serve as regulator, guarantor and administrator of an insurance fund—but other roles should be performed 

by private sector businesses. 

Among other things, we believe that the Federal Government’s 

footprint in housing finance should be reduced. Placing and operating the multifamily businesses within a Government agency 

would be counterproductive toward this objective. 

The nature of multifamily finance lends itself to private sectordriven activities. Multifamily loans have much larger balances 

than single-family mortgages, have heterogeneous collateral and involve in-depth property-specific underwriting. The staff resources 

and expertise necessary (e.g., underwriters, credit officers, asset 

managers) would be extensive and would be more efficiently executed by private sector participants, rather than through a large 

Federal workforce. 

Thus, privately capitalized secondary market entities would underwrite (directly and/or through delegation to originators), purchase multifamily mortgages, aggregate loans, manage and distribute credit risk, credit enhance, and structure and issue Government-backed MBS that support the multifamily market. These entities, of course, would be subject to comprehensive regulation by 

the Government agency/guarantor. 

Authorizing multiple secondary market entities—that pay guarantee fees to access the Government guarantee—would also foster 

competition among such entities and with other sources of capital 

in the multifamily finance market. By contrast, a Government-run 

multifamily finance operation would be less nimble and run a 

greater risk of either crowding out other sources of capital or having a diminished impact. 

103 

Finally, the current multifamily platforms of the two GSEs could 

be transferred into new privately capitalized entities. Moving these 

businesses to the private sector (through a sale or public offering) 

with continued access to a Government guarantee would likely return substantial capital to the U.S. Treasury. 

RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF 

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON FROM TERRI LUDWIG 

Q.1. Can you share with us any recommendations you have regarding the multifamily housing provisions in S.1217? 

A.1. We are pleased that S.1217 preserves an explicit, limited and 

paid-for Government guarantee on qualifying multifamily mortgage-backed securities. That said, we have three serious concerns 

about the bill’s impact on the multifamily market as currently written. 

First, as envisioned in the legislation, the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation (FMIC) is primarily an insurance and regulatory entity, with no apparent expertise in underwriting, purchasing or securitizing multifamily mortgages. The securitization 

business requires expertise in identifying and negotiating deals, an 

intimate knowledge of investor demands and the ability to respond 

to changes in the market—which are not common characteristics of 

a typical Government agency. By simply transferring Fannie Mae’s 

and Freddie Mac’s current multifamily businesses into the FMIC, 

Congress would be putting those businesses at risk. 

That’s why we recommend spinning off Fannie’s and Freddie’s 

multifamily businesses into private entities, eventually with the 

option of purchasing Government insurance on the securities they 

issue. My written testimony discusses this proposal in more detail. 

Second, we are concerned with S.1217’s lack of affordability requirements for the multifamily securitization business. We believe 

that any issuer of Government-guaranteed multifamily securities 

must have a clear public purpose and be required to serve people 

across the rental market spectrum, including people in need of affordable housing. Without such a mandate, Congress could meaningfully reduce the availability of affordable rental housing at a 

time when supply is already dwindling nationwide. 

There are several ways to accomplish this goal, but none as clear 

and fair as a firm requirement. For example, for each issuer at 

least 60 percent of the units financed by FMIC-insured multifamily 

securities should be affordable to households earning 80 percent of 

Area Median Income (AMI) or below. Such a requirement can be 

enforced efficiently through the annual approval and reporting 

process for all approved issuers without adding onerous propertylevel compliance requirements. Again, my written testimony discusses this proposal in more detail. 

Third, we are concerned with S.1217’s lack of clear incentives to 

serve traditionally underserved segments of the rental market, including rural and Native American communities, subsidized affordable rentals and small multifamily properties. Today there is very 

little investment in these market segments beyond the GSEs, and 

without some sort of incentive or requirement, private capital is 

not likely to serve these markets. 

104 

That’s why we recommend establishing a third multifamily 

issuer that provides access to small banks and community banks, 

which are most likely to serve smaller and more underserved markets. We also recommend requiring each approved issuer to lay out 

a forward-looking strategy for serving each of these segments of the 

market, then report on the results at the end of the year. 

Q.2. Can you discuss how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac currently 

support/ending to affordable housing, including deals to preserve 

and improve existing affordable housing, and how these functions 

can be supported in your proposed new system? 

A.2. Fannie and Freddie are critical partners in many of Enterprise’s efforts to build and preserve affordable housing. For example, in our mortgage originations business, roughly half of our multifamily production in 2012 went to one of the two companies. 

Fannie and Freddie offer a range of financing options that make 

affordable deals possible, including both long-term, fixed-rate loans 

and shorter-term, floating-rate loans. 

In general terms, life insurance companies and CMBS conduits 

almost exclusively deal with Class A properties, and rarely touch 

deals that involve Government subsidy. So when financing is needed for those Class B or C properties that serve as ‘‘workforce’’ housing, or for properties involving the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 

(also known as the Housing Credit), Section 8 or another form of 

subsidy, the GSEs and the FHA are often the only execution options. 

Nearly every unit of affordable housing created in the U.S. since 

the late 1980s has been financed through the Housing Credit. 

These deals involve a long mandatory affordability period, and the 

long-term, fixed-rate loans offered by the GSEs help make that possible. At the same time, the GSEs’ shorter-term, floating-rate loans 

are useful when a Housing Credit property reaches the end of its 

affordability period. They help keep the building affordable as the 

owner recapitalizes. 

In addition to their securitization businesses, Fannie and Freddie 

promote the creation and preservation of affordable housing 

through structured transactions, credit enhancements on bonds 

issued by State Housing Finance Agencies and equity investments. 

Because of their public mission, the companies have helped Enterprise and similar organizations invest in several underserved communities, including rural and Native American communities. Over 

the past two decades, Enterprise has partnered with Fannie to 

build or preserve nearly 700 affordable homes on Native Lands, including in South Dakota and Idaho. 

Prior to conservatorship, Fannie and Freddie were also key equity investors in the Housing Credit—in addition to providing affordable, long-term debt to make the project pencil out. At one 

point the two companies accounted for 40 percent of annual Housing Credit investments. 

Our proposal maintains these core functions by preserving 

Fannie’s and Freddie’s current multifamily products. Both entities—as well as any other approved issuers in the future—would 

also have a specific requirement to continue serving the affordable 

segment of the market. They will also be allowed to maintain a 

105 

limited and carefully monitored investment portfolio for small multifamily loans, Housing Credit equity investments and other investments in affordable housing. My written testimony discusses each 

of these proposals in more detail. 

RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR WARREN 

FROM TERRI LUDWIG 

Q.1. According to a September 2012 GAO report, multifamily housing programs played a large role in helping Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac achieve their annual affordable housing goals. As the 

report states, ‘‘multifamily mortgages had a disproportionate importance for the housing goals because most multifamily housing 

serves targeted groups.’’ Meanwhile, the delinquency rates on the 

GSEs’ multifamily mortgages were extremely low. Even during the 

height of the housing crisis, less than 1 percent of the GSEs’ multifamily mortgages were delinquent. Does this demonstrate that a 

Government-backed multifamily housing program can pursue affordable housing goals without creating excessive risk of delinquency or default? 

A.1. Yes. For nearly two decades, Fannie and Freddie have shown 

that private investors can provide financing to affordable rental 

housing safely, effectively, and profitably—particularly for people 

with incomes in the 50–80 percent of AMI range. However, we cannot assume that purely private companies will be willing to serve 

this segment of the market on their own. We must make it a firm 

requirement. 

The GSE multifamily businesses are able to limit risks to taxpayers through strong underwriting and a high degree of accountability through risk sharing with private investors. Freddie Mac’s 

K-Series deals typically require private investors to cover the first 

15 percent of losses in a pool without a guarantee. Fannie Mae 

holds licensed lenders at risk on a pari passu basis, sometimes 

with first-loss requirements. Under both models, private capital 

takes a significant loss before either company has to pay out of 

pocket. And under the Fannie model, lenders have significant skin 

in the game, which promotes careful underwriting and servicing of 

each loan. 

Enterprise believes that the Government guarantee can be structured in a way that poses very little risk to taxpayers. That starts 

with preserving the Fannie and Freddie multifamily businesses as 

they are today. These models have proven to be safe, effective, and 

sustainable. 

Specifically, any Government guarantee should be limited (with 

private capital at risk before taxpayers) and paid for through an 

actuarially sound insurance fee. The Government’s multifamily insurance fund should only be tapped when the issuer of the insured 

security fails and all private at-risk capital is wiped out. In other 

words, only the security would be backed by the Government, not 

the institution that issues it. 

Under the current ‘‘affordable housing goals’’ system, Fannie and 

Freddie are expected to finance a certain number of affordable multifamily units each year, as established by their regulator. We recommend tweaking that system in the future, making it a firm reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:30 Oct 17, 2014 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2013\10-09 ZDISTILLER\100913.TXT JASON
106 

quirement for any issuer to maintain their approved status. Each 

year, each issuer must show that a certain percentage of all multifamily units financed through insured securities are affordable to 

families earning 80 percent of AMI or below. My written testimony 

discusses this proposal in more detail. 

Q.2. Could you describe what the multifamily housing market 

would have looked like—before, during, and after the crisis—if the 

GSEs had not had affordable housing goals? 

A.2. By way of background, more than two-thirds of the units financed by the GSEs in recent years were affordable to tenants 

earning 80 percent of AMI or below, according to our analysis. Between 10 and 15 percent of GSE multifamily units were affordable 

to people earning less than 50 percent of AMI. 

We don’t have data on the GSEs’ overall share of the affordable 

market or the affordability of units financed through the purely 

private execution channels. However, we know that life companies, 

banks and thrifts primarily deal with Class A properties in firsttier housing markets, and they rarely finance properties that require Government subsidy, such as the Housing Credit or Section 

8. 

It is unclear how much of this lending activity was due directly 

to affordable housing goals. That said, there is absolutely no indication that any entity on their own would be willing to finance affordable housing without some additional incentive or an explicit requirement. Indeed, recent analyses from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac 

and outside consultants found that, without affordability requirements and access to a Government guarantee on their multifamily 

businesses, lending for affordable housing at the GSEs would decrease dramatically. 

In the absence of specific data, the following is our view on what 

the market would have potentially looked like without the affordable housing goals: 

Before the crisis: In the run-up to the most recent housing crisis, 

some private investors were willing to enter the affordable segments of the multifamily market, mostly banks, thrifts, and conduits of commercial mortgage-backed securities. However, these investors did not offer the same long-term, fixed-rate products or risk 

protections as the GSEs (in part because of the affordable housing 

goals), which eventually led to significantly higher default rates. So 

we might have seen investment in affordable housing without the 

goals, but under riskier terms. 

During the crisis: Starting in 2008, purely private capital all but 

abandoned the multifamily mortgage market, as investors were 

leery of any mortgage debt without a Government guarantee. Even 

in the midst of the worst housing crisis since the Great Depression, 

a significant portion of Fannie’s and Freddie’s multifamily business 

was affordable to low-income and very low-income families—and 

there’s reason to believe that the affordable housing goals played 

a role in those business decisions. 

After the crisis: Banks, thrifts, and life companies have mostly returned to the multifamily market, but they are less likely to invest 

in affordable deals. In contrast, the GSEs in 2012 alone financed 

675,000 multifamily units that were affordable to people earning 

107 

80 percent of AMI or below, and 169,000 units that were affordable 

to people with incomes at 50 percent of AMI or below. It’s reasonable to assume that many of the 80 percent of AMI units, and most 

of the 50 percent of AMI units were pursued at least in part because of the affordable housing goals. 

RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR COBURN 

FROM TERRI LUDWIG 

Q.1. In your written testimony, you supported new funding for the 

National Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund by 

placing a 5–10 basis point tax on all FMIC-insured multifamily securities. However, a number of Federal programs and tax expenditures already target affordable housing. Would you agree adding a 

new funding stream from a tax on FMIC insured multifamily securities would duplicate tens of billions of dollars in existing Federal 

resources supporting affordable housing? 

A.1. While other meaningful Federal programs exist, the resources 

available fall well short of the need. By one estimate, only a quarter of eligible low-income families receive rental assistance today, 

resulting in decade-long waiting lists and sometimes even lotteries 

for rare openings. In the wealthiest country in the world, people 

shouldn’t have to win the lottery to have an affordable home. 

In fact, it’s never been harder for working families to find one. 

According to the Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, 27 percent of renters—nearly 11 million renter households—pay more 

than half their income on housing, often leaving them one paycheck 

away from losing their home. That’s an all-time high. Meanwhile, 

in housing markets across the country, annual increases in rent 

are far outpacing increases in wages. 

This is especially true for families living in poverty. The number 

of very low-income renters in the U.S. increased by 17 percent 

since the crisis began, while the supply of affordable units available 

to them actually decreased. 

The Housing Trust Fund and Capital Magnet Fund focus specifically on serving low-income renters in affordable apartments, 

which often require some sort of outside subsidy to cover operating 

costs. They do so by leveraging private capital, which is a cost-effective way to deliver affordable units without deep taxpayer subsidies. 

The issuer of an insured security benefits in several ways from 

the Government guarantee, so it is fair to impose a very modest fee 

to achieve a broader public purpose. It’s also worth noting that 

both the Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund were 

created by Congress years ago. As originally envisioned, both funds 

should have received funding through fees on the GSEs’ ongoing 

business, but those obligations were suspended when Fannie and 

Freddie were put into conservatorship. So in a way, we’re simply 

proposing that future issuers of insured securities make good on 

that requirement. The initial fee was set up as 4.2 basis points on 

ongoing business. We’re increasing it slightly to 5 to 10 basis 

points. 

Q.2. You noted in your written testimony rental units for very lowincome renters require outside subsidies. To better utilize Federal 

108 

resources to support affordable, would you support stronger targeting requirements in the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 

(LIHTC) program? Tax-exempt rental housing bonds? The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program? Please identify 

other existing Federal programs or tax expenditures you believe 

could be more adequately targeted or consolidated to streamline 

Federal assistance for very and extremely low-income borrowers. 

A.2. The Housing Credit reaches people who really need it. A recent New York University study on Housing Credit tenant incomes 

makes clear that 80 percent of households served by these properties are very low income, earning 50 percent or less of Area Median Income (AMI)—and a majority of Housing Credit properties 

serve households earning less than 40-percent AMI (which is 

roughly $21,000 on a national basis). 

In addition, the National Housing Trust Fund, which was established under the 2008 Housing and Economic Recovery Act, has yet 

to be funded. It is designed to provide safe, decent and affordable 

housing for very low- and extremely low-income families through 

supporting the production, preservation, rehabilitation, and operation of rental homes. Under statute, a minimum of 75 percent of 

the funds must be dedicated to the needs of extremely low-income 

families. 

Q.3. Enterprise Community Partners is a strong supporter of affordable housing projects. A key component of the company’s investments includes Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC). An 

analysis by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found the 

LIHTC program to be more expensive per multifamily housing unit 

than the Section 8 voucher program. Do you agree with GAO’s 

analysis? 

A.3. Both the Housing Credit and Section 8 programs are absolutely essential to building and maintaining stable, affordable 

homes for low-income families. However, the two programs serve 

different purposes in that effort and often support very different 

populations. There are several factors that complicate a direct comparison of their per-unit costs. 

That said, we find that the Housing Credit is not ‘‘more expensive per multifamily housing unit than the Section 8 voucher program’’ for the following reasons. 

First, the GAO study focuses on the all-in cost of building and 

maintaining a rental unit through each program, not the ultimate 

cost to taxpayers. Even if the overall costs were higher for Housing 

Credit-supported units, Federal dollars usually cover a much smaller percentage of those costs compared to Section 8. In fact, the 

same report found that the Housing Credit program typically costs 

taxpayers less per unit than the voucher program. Of all the programs analyzed, the Housing Credit had the lowest Federal share 

of costs. 

Second, we have some methodological concerns with the GAO 

study. The study assumes that tenants of LIHTC and Section 8 

units have the same income, which is not the case. In fact, elsewhere in the report the authors acknowledge that voucher recipients’ incomes were roughly two-thirds that of Housing Credit residents. That assumption likely inflates the cost to taxpayers of the 

109 

Housing Credit program while underestimating the cost of the Section 8 program. 

That income disparity remains true today. A recent study by the 

Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy found that 43 

percent of Housing Credit apartments provide housing for extremely low-income households, compared to 75 percent of Section 

8 apartments. 

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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUPPLIED FOR THE RECORD

STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS 


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PRINCIPLES FOR MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE REFORM AND 

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