MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 7 ME 6 Docket: Wal

- 16

- 133 Argued : December	15,	2016 Decided: January	12,	2017 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY , JJ.

HOLLIE	A.	BEAL

v. TOWN	OF	STOCKTON	SPRINGS

PER	CURIAM [¶1] Hollie	 A.	 Beal appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 Superior	 Court ( Waldo	 County, R.	 Murray , J

. )	 affirming a	 decision	 by	 the	 Town	 of	 Stockton Springs’s	Board	of	Selectman (the	Board) determining	that	a	structure	owned by	Beal	was	a	 dangerous	 building	 or	 nuisance	 pursuant	 to 17	M.R. S.	 §	 2851 (201 6 ).		Beal	contends	that (i) the	Board	violated her due	process	rights	when the	Board allegedly	denied	Beal	the opportunity	to	be	heard,	to	cross

- examine witnesses,	and	to	have	an	impartial	fact

- finder , and ( ii) there	was	insufficient evidence	 in	 the	 record	 to	 support	 the	 Board’s	 findings. We	 affirm	 the j udgment.2 I.		CASE	HISTORY [¶2 ] Beal	acquired	property located	at 65	Sandy	Point Road in Stockton Springs in	 2004

. The	 556

- square - foot	 building	 was	 originally	 built around
1900 as	a	grain	storage	shed	but was more recently used as	a	residence

. In June	 2014,	 the Town’s Code	 Enforcement	 Officer	 (CEO)	 made	 a	 site	 visit	 to Beal’s residence after	 receiving	 a	 complaint about the condition of	 the property

. After the	July	17 ,	2014 , Board	meeting, when Beal	and	her	attorney met	with	the	Board	to	discuss concerns	about	the	habitability	of	her	property raised	 by	 the	 CEO’s	 site	 visit ,	Beal agreed	 to present	a	 rehabilitation	 plan	 to the	Board	within	thirty	days. [¶3 ] About	 a	 month	 later ,	 Beal notified the	 CEO that	 a general contractor	 had assessed her property , and she submitted	 a one - page rehabilitation	 plan

. On	August	 20,	 t he	 CEO	informed	Beal that the plan	was inadequate because	 it	 lacked a	 complete	 list	 of items	 needing	 repair	 and a time	 frame for	 completion. The	 CEO	 further	 informed	 Beal	 that	 the	 Board anticipated that the	 parties	 would	 enter	 a	 consent	 agreement	 at	 the September	4	meeting. Because Beal did	not attend	the	September	4	meeting , the	Board	did	not	take	any	action regarding Beal’s	property. The	matter was discussed by two members	 of	 the	 Board

. One	 of	 the	 Board	 members3 indicated , during	the	conversation , that	he	believed	that	the	structure	should be	 condemned. At	 the end	 of	 September ,	 t he	 Board set	 a	 public	 hearing	 to determine	whether	the	s tructure	constituted	a	dangerous	bu ilding	within	the meaning	of	17 M.R.S.	§ 2851. [¶4 ] Just	 before the start of	 the November	 20,	 2014 , hearing , Beal requested	that	the	three	members	of	the	Board	recuse	themselves	based	upon her concern	 that they had	 already	 prejudged	 the	 case. The	Board	members expressly	stated on	the	record that	they	had	not	already	decided	the	issue	and would base	 their	 decision on the	 evidence	 presented	 at	 the	 hearing. Accordingly,	each	member	of	the	Board	decli ned	to	recuse from	participating in	the	hearing and	subsequent	decision

- making

. [¶5 ] The	Board	proceeded	with	the	public	hearing	and heard testimony from the	 CEO, Beal’s	 general	 contractor ,	 and	 Beal. The	 CEO presented photographs	and testified about	numerous defici encies and	hazards regarding the	 plumbi ng,	 chimney,	 roof,	 and	 structural	 supports

. Beal’s general

contractor testified	that , although	the	building	needed	many	repairs, the	only safety hazard	 in	 the	 building	 was	 a	 support	 issue	 that recently had	 been corrected

.4 [¶6 ] The Board	asked	witness es questions that	were	submitted ,	but	did not	allow	Beal’s counsel to	question	any	 of	 the	witnesses	by	either	direct	 or
cross	 examination

. The	 chair	 invited	 Beal’s	 attorney	 to	 submit	 written questions	 that	 the Board	 would	 then	 pose	 to	 the	 witness

. The	 Board	 also allowed Beal’s counsel to	 present	 a	 summation	 argument. Beal’s counsel formally	objected	to	the hearing	procedure

. At	the	conclusion	of	the	hearing , the	 Board members	 voted unanimously	 that	 the	 struct ure	 was	 a	 dangerous building ,	and	requested that the town	manager	and	CEO draft written findings of fact	to	be	presented	at	its upcoming	meeting. [¶7 ] During	 an	 executive	 session held on	 December	 15,	 the	 Board consulted	 with	 the	 Town’s	 attorney to discuss the	 focus	 of	 a	 dangerous building	 hearing,	 the	 process	 for	 obtaining	 an	 administrative	 site	inspection warrant,	and	the Board’s	ability	to reopen	the	hearing. At its next	meeting ,	the Board	 voted	 to	 re open the	 public	 hearing , “for	 the	 purpose	 of	 a llowing additional	testimony	to	be	presented	to	ensure	all	areas	of	the	definition	of	a dangerous	 building	 have	 been	 thoroughly	 explored.” It	 scheduled	 the

re opened	hearing for January	15,	2015. [¶8 ] At	 the January	 15 hearing ,	 the	Board heard additional testimony from	 the	 CEO regarding his	 concerns	 about	 the	 structural	 integrity	 of	 the5 building.		He	explained	that	the	building	has	rotted	sills	and	a	chimney	in	very poor	condition,	and	 that	his	ability	 to	give	a	more	 thorough report	had	been sty mied	by	Beal ’s	refusal	to	allow	him	“access	to	the	interior	of	the	structure, specifically	the	basement	or	the	lower	level.” The	Town’s	attorney	questioned the	CEO	about	several	aspects	of	his	testimony. [¶9 ] Beal	 attended	 the re opened hearing, but ,	 although	 offered	 the opportunity, affirmatively declined	 to	present	any	 f urther	information	 to	 the Board

. Beal’s	counsel	was	absent	 from	the	hearing. At	the	conclusion	of	the hearing , the	Board	affirmed	its November	20	decision	declaring	 the	building hazardous

. In	 addition,	it continue d the	 hearing with	 regard	 to	 the	issue	 of disposition,	 and	 ordered the	 CEO to apply	 for	 an	 administrative	 warrant to inspect	the	interior	of	the	structure

. [¶1 0 ] On	 Apr il	 16 ,	 2015, after	 the	 administrative	 warrant	 had	 been issued	 and	 executed, the	 Board	 resumed the public hearing	 and	 heard extensive	 testimony	 from	 the	 CEO	 regarding	 the	 interior	 condition	 of	 the

structure. Be al attended	 the	hearing, presented	evidence ,	and	wa s provided an	 opportunity	 to question	 the	 CEO	 and	 dispute	 his	 observations. Again, Beal’s counsel was	 absent	 from	 the	 proceeding. At	 the	 close	 of	 the	 hearing ,6 the	 Board	 unanimously	 concluded	 that	 the	 structure	 was	 a	 dangerous building. [¶1 1 ] In	May 2015 ,	the	Board issued	a written order	in	which	it	found that the	 following	 deficiencies	 collectively	 made	 the	 structure	 unsafe, unstable,	 unsanitary,	 and	 a	 fire	 hazard:	 rotted	 sills that caused	 a	 deck	 to collapse,	a	chimney	with	deteriorated	mortar	an d	no	flue	liner,	a sagging	roof caused	by	an	improper	foundation	and	cracked	r oof	joists,	floor	joists	that	did not	properly	rest	on	a	carrying	beam,	exposed	wiring	and	electric	wires , and unsanitary	and	improperly	installed	plumbing. In	the	“disposition” portion of the	order,	the	Board	included	requirements	that	Beal have	a	licensed	plumber and	a	licensed	electrician	 bring	 the	 building	 up	 to	 code,	and	 required	 her	 to “repair	and/or	replace	all	structural	member s ” by	August 26 ,	2015. [¶1 2 ] Beal filed	 a	 complaint	 for	 review	 of	 government	 action	 in the Superior	 Court

. See M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 80 B;	 17	 M.R.S.	 §	 2852 (2016 )

. The	 court affirmed	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Board	 in	 a	 written	 order	 dated	 March	 3,	 2016. Beal	 timely	 appealed	 to	 this	 Court. S ee M.R. Civ.	 P.	 80B (n) ;	 M.R.	 App.	 P. 2(b)(3).7 II.		LEGAL	ANALYSIS
A. Standard	of	Review [¶1 3 ] O ur review	of administrative decision

- mak ing	is	deferential	and limited. Friends	 of	 Lincoln	 Lakes	 v.	 Bd.	 of	 Envtl.	 Prot. ,	 2010	 ME	 18,	 ¶	 12,
989 A.2d	 1128.	 	 “When	 the	 Superior	 Court	 acts	 in	 an	 appellate	 capacity we review directly	a	local	agency’s	decision	for	abuse	of	discretion,	errors	of	law, and	 findings	 not	 supported	 by	 the	 evidence.” Duffy	 v.	 Town	 of	 Berwick , 2013 ME 105,	 ¶	 13,	 82	 A.3d	 148

. The	 party challenging	 a	 Board’s	 decision bears	the	burden	of	persuasion	on	appeal. Id.
B. Due	Process [¶1 4 ]	 	 Beal	 contends	 that	 the	 Board	 violated	 her	 due	 process	 rights when ,	 at	 the	 November	 2014	 hearing, the	 Board allegedly denied	 her	 the opportunity	 to	present	evidence,	 to cross - examine	witnesses,	and	 to	have	an impartial	fact

- finder. 1 [¶1 5 ] The	 due	 process	 clauses	 of	 the	Maine	and	 federal	 Constitutions
gu arantee	 d ue	 process	 before	a	government	entity deprives	any	 person of	a
pr operty	 right. Kirkpatrick	 v.	 City	 of	 Bangor ,	 1999	 ME	 73,	 ¶	 13,	 728	 A.2d

1 Beal	urges	us	to	confine	our	review	on	appeal	to	the	November	20,	2014,	hearing	because	the Board	did	not	rescind	its	original	decision	when	it	conducted	the	subsequent	hearings. We	are	not persuaded	by	 this	argument.		Beal	appealed	 from	 the final May	2 015	decision	 that	 followed	 three days	of	hearings

— not from the	preliminary	November	2014	decision.8 1268; see also U.S.	Const.	am end.	XIV,	§	1;	Me.	Const.	art.	I ,	§	6

- A.		Due	process will	“vary	from	case	to	case	.	.	.	to	assure	the	basic	fairness	of	e ach	particular
action	 ac cording to	 its	 circ umstances.” Kirk p atrick ,	 1999	 ME	 73,	 ¶	 13,
728 A.2d	 1268

. We must analyze three distinct factors	 when	 assessing whether	an	individual’s	due	process	rights	have	been	violated: first,	the	private	interest	that	will	be	affected	by	the official	action; second,	 the	 risk	 of	 an	 erroneous	 deprivation	 of	 such	 interest through	 procedures	 used,	 and	 the	 probable	 value,	 if	 any,	 of additional	 or	 substitute	 procedural	 safeguar ds;	 and	 finally,	 the Government’ s	 interest,	 including	 the	 function	 involv ed	 and the fiscal	and administrative	burdens	that	the	additional	or	substitute procedural	requirement	would	entail. Mathews	v.	Eldridge ,	424	U.S.	319,	335	(1976) ; In	re	M.P .,	2015	ME	138,	¶	31, 126	A.3d	718; Hale	v.	Petit ,	438	A.2d	226,	231

- 32 (Me.	1981)

. [¶ 16] There	is	 no	 dispute	 that	 declaring	 Beal’s	 property	 a	 dangerous building	affects	an	important	private	property	interest	or	 that	 the	Town	has
an	interest	in limiting	use	of	or eliminating	dangerous	buildings. See Mathews , 424	U.S.	at	335 .		The	onl y issue	here	is	whether	Beal	was	afforded	the	process she	was	due,	including “notice	 of	 the	issues,	an	 opportunity	 to	be	heard,	 the right	 to	 introduce	 evidence	 and	 present	 witnesses,	 the	 right	 to	 respond	 to claims	 and	 evidence,	 and	 an	 impartial	 fact

- finder .” Jusseaume	 v.	 Ducatt , 2011 ME	43,	¶	12,	15 A.3d 714

.9 [¶1 7 ] Although	 the	 Board	 prohibited cross - examination	 of any witnesses at	 the	 November hearing, after	 consultation with	 the	 Town’s attorney	 the	Board re opened	 the	evidence	and	 rescinded	 this	 restriction	 for the	remaining	hearings. In	addition,	even	at	the	November	hearing, Beal had an	 opportunity to	 respond	 to	 evidence	 presented against	 her ,	 in	 two	 ways

. First,	 Beal	 could

— and	 did

— present	 rebuttal testimony	 to	 refute	 the	 CEO’s claims

. Second,	t he	Board allowed	the	submission	of	written	questions which

c ould	 then	 be	 asked	 by	 the Board and the	 presentation	 of a summation argument

. [¶1 8 ] During the	 January	 and	 April	 hearings,	 when	 Beal	 could	 have directly	 question ed witnesses,	 she	 declined	 to	 do	 so,	 and Beal	 has	 not explained how	she	was	prejudiced or what	additional	information	she	might have	 developed from cross - examining the	 CEO at	 the	 November	 hearing

. See Hale ,	 438	 A.2d	 at	 231

- 32	 (lack	 of	 opportunity	 for	 cross

- examination	 not deprivation	 of	 due	 process when	 applicant had	 opportunity	 to	 support	 its proposal,	 criticize	 competing	 application,	 and	 comment	 on	 criticism	 of	 its proposal)

. On	 this	 record, we	 see no	 re ason	 to	 disturb forty	 years	 of precedent that does	 not	 require that	 boards	 provide	 the	 opportunity for

cross - examination at every local administrative	 hearing

. See In re Me.	 Clean10 Fuels,	Inc. ,	310 A.2d	736,	745

- 48	(Me.	1973) (the	due	process	right	to	respond to	 opposing	 evidence	 does	 not	 include	 cross

- examination	 of	 opposing witnesses	in	an	administrative	hearing)

. [¶1 9 ] Persons	who	come	before	an	administrative	board	are	entitled	to a	 fair	 and	 unbiased	 hearing. Fitanides	 v .	 City	 of	 Saco ,	 2015	 ME	 32,	 ¶	 22,
113 A.3d	 1088; Gorham	 v. Town	 of Cape	 Elizabeth ,	 625	 A.2d	 898,	 902 (Me. 1993).	 	 An	 administrative	 hearing	 officer	 “enjoys	 a presumption of honesty	and	integrity,	which	is	only	rebutted	by	a	showing	of	some	substantial countervailing	reason	to	conclude	that	a	decisionmaker	is	actually	biased	with respect	 to	 factual	 issues	 being	 adjudicated.” Mr.	 &	 Mrs.	 V.	 v.	 York	 Sch.	 Dist. , 434 F.	Supp. 2d	5,	12

- 13	(D.	Me.	2006). [¶20 ] Because	Beal	did	not	move	for	a	trial	of	the	facts,	we	must	confine our	examination	of	her	bias	claim	to	the	existing	record. See	Baker’s	Table,	Inc. v.	 City	 of	 Portland ,	 200 0 ME	 7,	 ¶	 9,	 743	 A.2d	 237	 (stating	 that	 a	 part y	 may move	for	a	trial	of	the	facts	pursuant	to	M .R.	Civ.	P. 80B(d)	to	supplement	the record	on	issues	such	as	bias,	to	the	extent	necessary	to	the	appeal )

. [¶21 ] To	support	her	claim	of	bias, Beal relies on a	letter sent	to	her	by the	CEO	on August	20, 2014 , in	which	he	states	that “[he]	and	the	Selectboard agreed	 that	 a	 complete	 list	 of	 items	 that	 need	 remediation	 .	 .	 .	 shall	 be11 required”	prior	to	the	signing	of	the	consent	agreement	between	Beal	and	the Town	on	September	4,	2014. In	addition,	Beal	rel ies	on	statements	made	at the	 Se ptember	 4	 public	 meeting	 by members	 of	 the	 Board	 who were responding to	 a	 citizen’s	 question	 about	Beal’s	 property. All	 the	 statements were	made	prior	to	the	initiation	of	the	dangerous	building	proceedings. [¶ 2 2 ] The statement made	 by	 the	 CEO,	 who	 is	 not	 a	 member	 of	 the Board,	do es not	demonstrate	denial	of	due	process. See	Gorham ,	625 A.2d at 902

. The	 statements made	 by the	 Board	 members	 must	 be	 considered	 in

context. Although	 one	member	 of	 the	Board	 stated	 that	 he	 thought	 that	 the house “ should	 be	 condemned,” he	 and	 the	 other	 Board	 member also stated several	times that	there	is	a	process	that	must	be	followed,	that	t he	property owner	has	rights , and that	the	Board	has an	obligation	to	do	things	correctly. [¶23 ] At	the	time that those	statements	were	made,	the Board

— acting
in	 its executive/administrative capacity

— was anticipating	 an	 informal resolution	of	 the	matter

. It	was	not	until	several	weeks	later	 that	 t he	Board decided to	proceed	with	a	 formal hearing

. W hen	Beal	presented her	motion for	 re cusal, the	 Boar d members

— now	 acting	 in	 an adjudicatory	 capacity

— affirmatively	 stated on	 the	 record that they had	 not	 p rejudged	 the	 case	 and that their decision	 would be	 based	 upon	 the	 testimony and	 evidence12 presented	at	the	hearings. The Board members listened	and	asked	questions over	 the	 course	 of	 several months before	 rendering their final	 decision.
See Lane	 Constr.	 Corp.	 v.	 Town	 of	 Wash. ,	 20 08 ME 45,	 ¶ 30, 942 A.2d	 1202 ; Gorham ,	625	A.2d	at 902

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. Beal	has	not rebut ted the	presumption	that	the Board members acted	with	honesty	and	integrity when they ceased informal negotiations and	instead	conducted the formal	hearing. [¶24 ]	 	On	 her	 appeal, Beal has	 not	 demonstrated	 that	 she	was	 denied due	 process	 or	 that	 she	 was	 subjected	 to	 a	 decision	 by	 a	 biased	 decision

maker.
C. Substantial	Evidence [¶25 ] Beal	 contends	 that	 the	 Board’s	 decision	 was	 not	 supported	 by substantial	evidence	in	the	record. Beal	argues	that	the building’s deficiencies do	 not	 meet	 the	 statutory	 definition	 of	 dangerous	 building,	 and	 the	 Town failed	to	meet	its	burden. [¶26 ] “ Substantial	evidence exists	when	a	reasonable	mind	would	rely on	 that	 evidence	 as	 sufficient	 support for	 a	 conclusion.” Osprey Family Trust v . Town	 of	 Owls	 Head ,	 2016 ME 89,	 ¶	 9,	 141	 A.3d 1114 .	 	 When reviewing	 administrative	 findings	 of	 fact, we “examine	 the	 entire	 record	 to determine	whether,	on	the	basis	of all	the	testimony	and	exhibits	before	it,	the13 [Board]	could	fairly	and	reasonably	find	the	facts	as	it	did.” Friends	of	Lincoln Lakes ,	 2010	ME	 18,	¶	 13,	 989	A.2d	 1128. We must	affirm	 findings	 of	 fact	if they	 are	 supported	 by	 any	 competent	 evidence	 in	 th e	 record	 “even	 if	 the record	 contains	 inconsistent	 evidence	 or	 evidence	 contrary	 to	 the	 result reached	by	the [Board] .” Id. ¶¶	13

- 14. [¶27 ] Here, the CEO	provided	detailed	testimony	about	the	interior	and exterior	 condition s of	 the	 house

— including	 major structural	 deficiencies, plumbing	issues,	and	fire	hazards

— and	presented	photographs	to	support	his observations. Although Beal	 provided	 some	 testimony	 to	 the	 contrary,	 the Board	 was	 not	 obligated	 to	 accept	 it.	 	 Therefore,	 there	 was	 substantial evidence	 on	 the	 record	 to	 support	 the	 Board’s	 findings	 of	 fact	 and	 ultimate determination	 that	 Beal’s	 property	 constituted	 a	 dangerou s	 building	 within the	meaning	of 17	M.R.S.	§ 2851. The	entry	is: Judgment affirmed.14
Aaron	 Fethke,	 Esq.	 (orally),	 Law	 Office	 of	 Aaron	 Fethke,	 Searsport,	 for appellant	Hollie	A.	Beal Erik	M.	Stumpfel,	Esq.	 (orally),	Rudman	Winchell,	Bangor,	 for appellee	Town of	Stockton	Springs

Waldo County Superior	Court	docket	number	AP

- 2015

- 5 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY