alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Before the Third Division,

April 3, 1963

No. 67573.

#### Swissedent International Co. and Hoyt, Shepston *&*Sciaroni v. United States,

protest 61/6721 (San Francisco).

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of candulor shade guides similar in all material respects to those the subject of *Swissedent International*and *Hoyt, Shepston & Sciaroni*v. *United States*(47 Cust. Ct. 174, C.D. 2298), the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
From: kjames121@hotmail.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 9:00:50 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Kevin Ganim

Saint Louis, MO 63125
No. 67131.

protest 58/24332 (New York).

#### Brawer Bros. Silk Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Ford, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of nylon textile similar in use to thrown silk not more advanced than singles, tram, or organzine and following the principles set forth in *United States*v. *Steinberg Bros.*(47 C.C.P.A. 47, C.A.D. 727), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
Exhibit 32.1
 
 
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 *
  In connection with the Annual Report of One XL Corp., (the “Company”), on Form 10-K for the period ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”) pursuant to the requirement set forth in Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C.§ 1350), C. Lynn White, the President, principal executive officer and principal financial officer of the Company, hereby certifies that, to the best of my knowledge:
  1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, and
  2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for the period covered by the Periodic Report.
 
 
 Date: October 12, 2010
 
 By: /s/ C. Lynn White
 C. Lynn White
  President (Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer)
  *   This certification accompanies the Report to which it relates, is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of the Report), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
#### Beth Israel Hospital North, Respondent, v Castle Oil Corporation, Appellant.

[632 NYS2d 78]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane Solomon, J.), entered August 9, 1994, which, after a jury trial, awarded plaintiff the sum of $149,314.83 and order, same court and Justice, entered September 12, 1994, which denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration seeking to reduce the amount of the judgment to reflect the jury’s apportionment of fault, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the *258prevailing party, as we must *(Baker v Turner Constr. Co.,*200 AD2d 525, 526, *Iv denied*83 NY2d 755), there was a valid line of reasoning to support the jury’s conclusion that the oil in the East River, for which plaintiff agreed to pay cleanup costs and thereafter sought indemnification from defendant, came from the over-filled oil tank located on plaintiff’s premises. The verdict was supported by the Department of Environmental Conservation investigator’s estimate of the quantity of oil spilled into the river and his testimony that oil stains were found on a sewer drain near plaintiff’s premises.

The comments made by plaintiff’s counsel were not as egregious as those in the cases relied upon by defendant *(see, e.g., Rodriguez v New York City Hous. Auth.,*209 AD2d 260; *see also, Clarke v New York City Tr. Auth.,*174 AD2d 268, 276-278) and, in any event, were either the subjects of sustained objections or prompt and effective curative instructions, and thus did not render the trial unfair.

Although the verdict apportioned fault between the parties, the trial court properly awarded plaintiff judgment for the full amount of its claim, since the broad indemnity clause clearly allowed indemnification even for damages caused, in part, by the active negligence of the indemnitee *(see, Kurek v Port Chester Hous. Auth.,*18 NY2d 450, 456-457). Nothing in our determination of a prior appeal in this action, merely affirming denial of a motion and cross motion for summary judgment (194 AD2d 499), precluded the trial court’s proper application of this legal principle.

We have considered defendant’s other arguments, and find them to be without merit. Concur—Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Asch and Mazzarelli, JJ.
H. Res. 350

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

May 2, 2007.

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 

XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 

Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 

the bill (H.R. 1868) to authorize appropriations for the National Institute of Standards and Technology for fiscal years 

2008, 2009, and 2010, and for other purposes. The first 

reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of order 

against consideration of the bill are waived except those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. General debate shall 

be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour equally 

divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 

member of the Committee on Science and Technology. After 

general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment 

under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider as 

an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the fiveminute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Science and Technology now 
2

•HRES 350 EH 

printed in the bill. The committee amendment in the nature 

of a substitute shall be considered as read. All points of order 

against the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived except those arising under clause 9 or 10 

of rule XXI. Notwithstanding clause 11 of rule XVIII, no 

amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a 

substitute shall be in order except those printed in the report 

of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution. 

Each such amendment may be offered only in the order 

printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided 

and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not 

be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question in the House or in the 

Committee of the Whole. All points of order against such 

amendments are waived except those arising under clause 9 

or 10 of rule XXI. At the conclusion of consideration of the 

bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the 

bill to the House with such amendments as may have been 

adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the 

House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the 

Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final 
3

•HRES 350 EH 

passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions. 

SEC. 2. During consideration in the House of H.R. 1868 

pursuant to this resolution, notwithstanding the operation of 

the previous question, the Chair may postpone further consideration of the bill to such time as may be designated by the 

Speaker. 

Attest:

Clerk.
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26 MINUTE ORDER – 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

ALEXANDER SERRA, M.D.,

Plaintiff,

v.

CENTER FOR DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING, INC.,

a Minnesota corporation; CDI MANAGEMENT

CORP., a Minnesota corporation; ONEX, INC., a

Canadian corporation; DON JACOBSEN, an

individual; TOM TOMLINSON, an individual;

and ROBERT BAUMGARTNER, an individual,

Defendants.

CASE NO. C05-0827C

MINUTE ORDER

The following Minute Order is made by direction of the Court, the Honorable John C. 

Coughenour, United States District Judge:

Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties thereto (Dkt. No. 42), this action is hereby DISMISSED

with prejudice. All parties shall bear their own costs and attorneys’ fees.

DATED this 5th day of August, 2005.

BRUCE RIFKIN, Clerk of Court

By /s/ L. Simle 

Deputy Clerk
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANI A Dept. of Environmental Protection Commonwealth News Bureau Room 308, Main Capitol Building Harrisburg PA., 17120 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEAS E 04/19/201 1 CONTACT: Katy Gresh, Department of Environmental Protectio n 412-442-4203 DEP Calls on Natural Gas Drillers to Stop Giving Treatment Facilities Wastewater Efforts in Motion to Quickly Stop Drilling Wastewater from Going to Treatment Works ‘Grandfathered’ by the Previous A dministratio n
HARRISBURG -- At the direction of Gove rnor Tom Corbett, acting Department of Environmental Protection Secretary Michael Krancer today called on all Marcellus Shale natural gas drilling operators to cease by May 19 delivering wastewate r from shale gas extraction to 15 facilities that currently accept it under special provisions of last year’s Total Dissolved Sol ids (TDS) regulations . “While the prior administration allowed certain facilities to co ntinue to take this wastewater, conditions have changed since the implementation of the TDS regulations,” Krancer said . “We now have more definitive scientific data, improved technology and increased voluntary wastewater recycling by indu stry. We used to have 27 grandfathered facilities; but ove r the last year, many have voluntarily decided to stop taking the wastewater and we are now down to only 15. More than half of those facilities are now up for permit renewal. Now is the time to take acti on to end this practice. ” The 2010 revised regulations require publicly owned treatment works and centralized waste trea tment facilities to treat new or increased discharges of TD S to more stringent standard s. Removing TDS from water also removes bromides. The previous administration, however, chose to allow facilities that had historically accepted drilling wastewater to continue to accept it, as long as they did not increase their input load of wastewater . Recent surface water sampling has found elevated levels of brom ide in rivers in the Western portion of the state, where the majority of natural gas drilling is taking place. Bromide, itse lf non-toxic, turns into a combination of potentially unsafe compounds called Total Trihalomethanes once it is combined with chlorine for disinfection at water treatment facilities . “While there are several possible sources for bromide other than shale drilling wastewater, we believe that if operators w ould stop giving wastewater to facilities that continue to accept it under the special provision, bromide concentrations w ould quickly and si gnificantly decrease,” Krancer said . For more information about DEP, visit www.depweb.state.pa.us . 

## Page 1 of 2 Print

12/ 12/ 201 3 http://www.newsroom.dep.sta te.pa.us/newsroompublic/Pri nt.aspx?id=17071&typeid=1

## Page 2 of 2 Print

12/ 12/ 201 3 http://www.newsroom.dep.sta te.pa.us/newsroompublic/Pri nt.aspx?id=17071&typeid=1
Case No. 9,543a.

#### MILES v. JAMES.

[Hempst. 98.] 2

Superior Court, Territory of Arkansas.

Jan., 1831.

Appeal — Justice op Peace — Jury Denied— Error.

If a jury is required, and denied by the justice, when the sum exceeds ten dollars, it is an error for which his judgment should be set aside.

Error to Chicot circuit court.

Before JOHNSON, ESKRIDGE, and CROSS. JJ.

2

 [Reported by Samuel H. Hempstead, Esq.]

CROSS, Judge.

This cause is brought here upon a writ of error to the Chicot circuit court The record shows that a suit was commenced before a justice of the peace, by the defendant in error, against [Benjamin L.] Miles, the plaintiff, for the sum of $17.95 cts. On the day of trial, Miles produced an account against [Thomas] James, of $15.37% cts. Whereupon James asked the justice to discharge the jury, which, on the application of Miles, had been summoned without his consent, on the ground that the sum in controversy was not sufficient in amount to entitle the parties, or either of them, to a trial by jury. The justice ivent on to try the cause himself, and gave judgment against Miles for $9.52% cts. Subsequently, and within the time prescribed by law, a writ of certiorari was sued out by Miles, and the proceedings *285certified up to the circuit court, and at the November term were there confirmed. This confirmation of the proceedings of the justice, is the only error assigned. Our statutes point out the methods by which a judgment rendered before a justice of the peace may be brought up before the circuit court. One by appeal, the other by certiorari. The former it will be necessary to examine. When the certiorari is used, the statute provides, “that if the court shall set aside the proceedings of the justice for irregularity or informality appearing upon the face of them, the court shall examine into the merits of the case, and give judgment as in other cases.” Geyer, Dig. § 18, p. 391. The power of the circuit court to set aside the proceedings of the justice, is made to depend upon the irregularity or informality appearing upon their face, as certified up under the command of the certiorari. If either exist, they are to be taken for naught, and an examination of the merits permitted. On the other hand, if they be regular and formal, their confirmation must follow. Was it regular in the justice to deprive Miles of the right of trial by jury? A quotation from the statute will afford a sufficient answer to the question. It declares that “if the sum demanded exceeds ten dollars, either party shall have a right, upon application therefor, to a trial by jury.” Geyer, Dig. § 12, p. 387. Here the sum- demanded exceeded ten dollars, application was made for trial by jury, and that mode of trial refused. This refusal of the justice, we think, was sufficiently irregular for setting aside his proceedings. It was, consequently, error in the circuit court to confirm them. Judgment reversed.
Case 2:05-cv-01857-JLR Document 24 Filed 06/30/06 Page 1 of 1
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

PAGE - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

ALICIA NUNNERY, et al., )

)

Petitioners, ) CASE NO. C05-1732RSM-MJB

)

v. )

)

STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Respondents. )

____________________________________)

On October 13, 2005, petitioners Alicia Nunnery and iazQueena Nunnery submitted to this

Court for review a document entitled “Declaration And Motion For Habeas Corpus To Stop

Interference With My Visitations With My Child” together with a motion for court appointed

counsel. Petitioners explain in their pleading that iazQueena Nunnery is the daughter of Alicia

Nunnery, and that iazQueena currently resides at the Echo Glen Children’s Center. They further

explain that up until September 4, 2005, Alicia Nunnery had visited her daughter at Echo Glen

every weekend since her admittance to that facility in March 2005. Alicia Nunnery states that

because of fears for her own health and safety, and for the well-being of her daughter, she has

chosen not to return to Echo Glen. Petitioners assert that they have “been threatened by the

inappropriate, harassing, and retaliatory action of two employees” at Echo Glen and they appear to

seek a restraining order enjoining Echo Glen employees from interfering with Alicia Nunnery’s

visits which her daughter.

Case 2:05-cv-01732-RSM Document 4 Filed 10/27/05 Page 1 of 2
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

PAGE - 2

While petitioners do not state the precise basis for this Court’s jurisdiction over their

claims, they do indicate in the caption of their pleading that they are seeking relief by way of

habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus may issue only upon a finding that a prisoner is "in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §

2241(c)(3). Petitioners do not seek release from custody by way of the instant action. Thus,

habeas corpus is an improper mechanism for obtaining the relief they seek. While this Court does

have authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to entertain a civil rights action alleging unconstitutional

conduct by state employees, petitioner’s have not requested relief under § 1983 nor have they

alleged sufficient facts at this juncture to implicate federal constitutional concerns.

For these reasons, this Court recommends that petitioners’ request for federal habeas relief

be denied and that this action be dismissed with prejudice. This Court further recommends that

petitioners’ motion for appointment of counsel be stricken as moot. A proposed order

accompanies this Report and Recommendation.

Dated this 27th day of October, 2005.

AMONICA J. BENTON

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:05-cv-01732-RSM Document 4 Filed 10/27/05 Page 2 of 2
No. 60550.

#### Judson Sheldon Division and National Carloading Corporation *v.*United States,

protests 269661-K, 269662-K, and 270612-K (New York).

*427Opinion by

Lawrence, J.

There being nothing before the court tending in any way to overcome the presumption of correctness attaching to the classification by the collector, the protests were overruled.
file:///J|/INITENG/P13%20cases/p130152.eng.txt[6/4/2013 7:48:19 AM] INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT PMN: 13-0152 Focus Ready Draft 1/7/2013 ENGINEER: Arnold \ AHfile:///J|/INITENG/P13%20cases/p130152.eng.txt[6/4/2013 7:48:19 AM] SAT (concerns) (12/28/2012): Migration to groundwater: Negligible PBT rating: P3B1T1 Health: 1-2 Dermal, Inhalation Eco: 2 Water (All releases to water with a CC = 10 ppb) OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE RATING: 2-3B NOTES & KEY ASSUMPTIONS: Generated by the 06/07/2005 version of ChemSTEER.file:///J|/INITENG/P13%20cases/p130152.eng.txt[6/4/2013 7:48:19 AM] EXPOSURE -BASED REVIEW: No INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT PMN: 13-0152file:///J|/INITENG/P13%20cases/p130152.eng.txt[6/4/2013 7:48:19 AM]file:///J|/INITENG/P13%20cases/p130152.eng.txt[6/4/2013 7:48:19 AM] INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT PMN: 13-0152file:///J|/INITENG/P13%20cases/p130152.eng.txt[6/4/2013 7:48:19 AM]file:///J|/INITENG/P13%20cases/p130152.eng.txt[6/4/2013 7:48:19 AM] INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT PMN: 13-0152file:///J|/INITENG/P13%20cases/p130152.eng.txt[6/4/2013 7:48:19 AM]file:///J|/INITENG/P13%20cases/p130152.eng.txt[6/4/2013 7:48:19 AM]file:///J|/INITENG/P13%20cases/p130152.eng.txt[6/4/2013 7:48:19 AM]
No. 60521.

#### Briones & Co., Inc., et al. *v.*United States,

protests 215464-K, etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

It was stipulated that the facts and issues herein are similar in all material respects to those involved in *United States*v. *Browne Vintners Co., Inc.*(34 C. C. P. A. 112, C. A. D. 351) and that the quantities reported by the inspector as manifested, not found, were not in fact received by the importers. In accordance with stipulation of counsel and following the decision cited it was held that duty and internal revenue tax are not assessable upon such portions of *418the merchandise as were reported by the inspector as manifested, not found. The protests were sustained to this extent.