[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-9100.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of De cisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O . 2017-O HIO -9100
D ISCIPLINARY C OUNSEL v. W ILLIAMS . [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-9100.] Judges—Misconduct—Jud.Cond.R. 1.3— Abusing prestige of judicial office to advance personal interests

― Asserting status as magi strate to avoid arrest during traffic stop—Public reprimand. (No. 2017-0796—Submitted August 29, 2017—Decided December 19, 2017.)
O N C ERTIFIED R EPORT by the Board of Professi onal Conduct of the Supreme Court, No. 2016-070.

_______________________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Respondent, Cynthia Ann Williams, of Hillsboro, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0055541, was admitted to th e practice of law in Ohio in 1991. {¶ 2} In a December 6, 2016 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged that Williams abused the prestige of her judicial office to advance herS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 personal interests in viola tion of Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 by asserting her status as a magistrate in an attempt to avoid arrest during a traffic stop. Based on the parties’ stipulations and Williams’s hearing testimony, a panel of the Board of Professional
Conduct found that Williams committed the charged violation and recommended that she be publicly reprimanded for her misconduct. The board adopted the panel’s findings and recommended sanction. {¶ 3} We agree that Williams abused the prestige of her judicial office to advance her personal intere sts and publicly reprima nd her for her misconduct.
Misconduct {¶ 4} Williams was appointed as a magist rate of the Highland County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, on July 14, 1997, and on April 1, 2015, she was appointed as a magistrate of that court’s probate and juvenile divisions. {¶ 5} The parties stipulate that on July 9, 2016, at approximately 3:30 a.m., an Ohio State Highway Patrol trooper st opped Williams on State Route 32 in Union Township, Clermont County, Ohio, after obser ving her vehicle drift to the left of the solid white fog line. The trooper asked Williams to step out of her vehicle and inquired about how much she had had to dri nk; she stated that she had two beers. When the trooper began to administer the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Williams stated, “I’m a magistrate.” In response, the trooper asked Williams where she was a magistrate, and she replied, “Highland C ounty.” Then, the trooper told her that
he had to make sure that she was not driving while intoxicated. {¶ 6} Minutes later, when the trooper wa s instructing Williams on the walkand- turn field sobriety test, she told him, “I’m a judge. My son’s a Secret Service officer. I would not be driving drunk.” After the trooper handcuffed her and informed her that she did not pass the field sobriety test, she said, “Please! I’m a judge. Don’t do this to me. I did not flunk this. I didn’t flunk it!” Seconds later, when Williams was in the back seat of the trooper’s cruiser, she said, “Sir, I’m going to lose my job! Please let me speak to my attorney. Officer! Officer, listenJanuary Term, 2017

3 to me! I may lose my job. Would you plea se let me speak to my attorney in the car? Please?” She then repeated, “I’m a judge. My son’s a Secret Service officer.” {¶ 7} At no time did the trooper solic it information about Williams’s judicial status or ask her to provide info rmation that would disclose her judicial status. And the parties stipulate that if the trooper had provi ded sworn testimony about the incident, he would have testified that he believed that Williams mentioned her judicial status in orde r to avoid being arrested. {¶ 8} Williams pled no contest to reckless operation in violation of R.C. 4511.20, a third-degree misdemeanor. The court found her guilty and sentenced her to 30 days in jail, with 27 days su spended; imposed two years of communitycontrol sanctions, including three days at a residential driver’s intervention program; and fined her $200 pl us court costs. In add ition, the court suspended her driver’s license for six months but also granted her limited driving privileges. {¶ 9} The parties stipulated and the boa rd found that by mentioning her position as a magistrate of the Highland County Court of Common Pleas during her traffic stop, Williams violated Prof.Cond.R . 1.3 (prohibiting a judge from abusing the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge).
Sanction {¶ 10} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider several relevant factors, including the ethical duties the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), any other relevant factors, and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. {¶ 11} Here, the parties stipulated that no aggravating factors are present.
See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B). {¶ 12} In mitigation, the parties stipulated and the board found that Williams did not have a prior disciplinary record, demonstrated a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proce ss, and presented evidence of her goodS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 character and reputation. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (4), and (5). The parties also stipulated and the board found that other penalties and sanctions had been imposed for Williams’s misconduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(6). In addition to the criminal sanctions for her offense, the board noted that she lost her appointment as probate and juvenile magi strate. She also served a two-week suspension without pay from her job as a general-division ma gistrate, was placed on indefinite probation, and had her salary frozen throug h at least the end of 2017—resulting in a salary loss of approximately two percent in 2017. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (4), (5), and (6). {¶ 13} The parties stipulated that the appropriate sanction for Williams’s misconduct is a public reprimand. The board ag reed and noted that that sanction is
commensurate with the sanctions we have imposed on judges who have engaged in comparable misconduct. For example, in Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid , we publicly reprimanded a judge who, among other things , violated Canon 2(A) of the former Code of Judicial Conduct (requiring a judg e to conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary) by appearing before a city planning commission to support a zoning variance that would benefit a partnership in which he had an ownership interest. 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 329, 708 N.E.2d 193 (1999). We found that because other partners could have presented testimony regarding the zoning request, the judge’s testimony was not required but was instead intended to lend the prestige of his office to
advance his interests and thos e of his business partners. Id. at 330. And in In re Complaint Against Resnick , a panel of appella te-court judges adopt ed the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement and publicly reprimanded a justice of this court for
conduct that led to her arre st for and subsequent convi ction of driving a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alc ohol—conduct that violated Canon 2 of the
former Code of Judicial C onduct (requiring a judge to respect and comply with the
law and act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrityJanuary Term, 2017

5 and impartiality of the judiciary). 108 Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio-6800, 842 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 3-4, 7. {¶ 14} After independently reviewing the record, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and agree th at a public reprimand is the appropriate
sanction for Williams’s misconduct. {¶ 15} Accordingly, we publicly reprimand Cynthia Ann Williams. Costs
are taxed to Williams. Judgment accordingly.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and O’D ONNELL , K ENNEDY , F RENCH , O’N EILL , F ISCHER , and D E W INE , JJ., concur.

_________________ Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, Joseph M. Caligiuri, Chief Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and Audrey E. Varw ig, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for
relator. Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter Co., L.P.A ., and Jonathan E. Coughlan, for respondent.

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