J-S15021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DEVON TROY STARR 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1424 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 30, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County 

Criminal Division at No: CP-06-CR-0000039-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 13, 2023

Appellant, Devon Troy Starr, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County on August 30, 2022, 

after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder, criminal attempt to commit 

murder, and related offenses.1 Appellant contends that the evidence was 

insufficient to support his convictions and that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. Following review, we affirm.

Appellant’s convictions arise from a shooting that killed Albert Pena-Pena

and injured Leo Larios in the City of Reading, Berks County, on the evening of 

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1 The jury found Appellant guilty, in his capacity as an accomplice or 

conspirator, of first-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a); criminal attempt 

to commit first-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.SA. §§ 901(a)-2502(a); four counts 

of aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1) and 2702(a)(4); and two 

counts of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
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August 18, 2020. Appellant was arrested and charged in relation to the 

shooting. The case against Appellant and his co-defendant, Joewel John Keita, 

proceeded to trial beginning on June 28, 2022 and concluding on July 1, 2022. 

Following the return of guilty verdicts against both men, the trial court 

sentenced both to, inter alia, life sentences without the possibility of parole 

for first-degree murder. Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which were 

denied on September 15, 2022. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant 

and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant asks this Court to consider two issues:

A. Were the facts on record [sic] legally insufficient to support an 

inference beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant 

subjectively intended to promote or facilitate a violent assault 

on the victims and that he objectively committed any overt 

act, such as aid or attempted aid, in pursuance of that assault?

B. Did Appellant’s convictions go against the weight of the 

evidence, where, inter alia, the testimony of the 

Commonwealth’s main witness was so self-contradictory, 

intuitively and demonstrably mendacious, as to be of nugatory 

evidentiary weight; the police’s inexplicable failure to 

investigate myriad alternative culprits fatally vitiated their 

arbitrarily focused case against Appellant; and the verdicts, in 

view of the three of four paltry and equivocal circumstances on 

which they were based, were truly shocking to the conscience?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (emphasis in original).

Having reviewed the trial transcript and the evidence admitted at trial, 

we find the trial court aptly summarized the facts of this case as follows:

On August 18, 2020, Leo Larios and Albert Pena-Pena were in the 

1200 block of Church Street in the City of Reading, Berks County, 

Pennsylvania. As they were loading a speaker into a red 
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Volkswagen Jetta, Mr. Larios noticed two people walking toward 

them on Church Street. One person was walking in the street, 

and the other person was walking on the sidewalk. Mr. Larios 

described the man on the sidewalk as Black and stocky, testified 

that he was wearing glasses and a hoodie, and stated that he had 

a face covering from his nose to his chin. Mr. Larios testified that 

the person in the street was wearing a hoodie, sweatpants, 

reflective shoes, and ski mask. Mr. Larios testified that he 

recognized the man on the sidewalk as Joewel Keita,[2] but that he 

did not initially tell that to any police officers because he did not 

want to be labeled as a snitch. 

After Mr. Larios and Mr. Pena-Pena finished loading the speaker 

into the vehicle, Mr. Larios got into the driver’s seat and Mr. PenaPena got into the passenger’s seat. As Mr. Larios was pulling out 

of the parking space, he heard shots fired from behind them. Mr. 

Larios was shot twice in the back of the head. Photographs of his 

injuries were admitted into evidence[.] Mr. Pena-Pena was also 

shot in the head and died as a result of his injuries.

Mr. Larios testified that he encountered Joewel Keita once or twice 

on the street and that the two of them had exchanged messages 

on Facebook. On August 20, 2020, Criminal Investigator Daniel 

Cedeno of the Reading Police Department presented two photo 

lineups to Mr. Larios. Mr. Larios testified that he recognized the 

Appellant, Devon Starr, in the lineup . . . as someone he knew, 

but that he did not see the Appellant on Church Street on the night 

of the shooting. Mr. Larios testified that he recognized Joewel 

Keita in the lineup . . . as the man who walked past him on the 

sidewalk on the night of the shooting. Mr. Larios testified that he 

initially told C.I. Cedeno that he was not sure it was Joewel Keita 

even though he was sure because he did not want to be a snitch. 

Mr. Larios testified that he grew up with the Appellant and that he 

helped him file for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance. Facebook 

messages that Mr. Larios and the Appellant exchanged were 

admitted into evidence[.] In the messages, the two men 

discussed filing for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, among 

other things. The Appellant complained multiple times about how 

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2 Mr. Larios testified that as the man on the street walked by Mr. Larios, the 

man said, “What’s up?” Mr. Larios “recognized” Joewel Keita’s unusual 

“squeaky” voice. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), Trial, 6/28/22, at 195. 
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long it was taking for him to get the money, accused Mr. Larios of 

stealing the money, and threatened Mr. Larios. Mr. Larios testified 

that the Appellant also threatened him in person at a Turkey Hill 

prior to the shooting. Mr. Larios testified that the Appellant was 

the only person he was having problems with at the time of the 

shooting, and that after the shooting, he did not hear from the 

Appellant again. 

Following the shooting, Criminal Investigator Joseph Snell of the 

Reading Police Department was dispatched to the hospital where 

Leo Larios and Albert Pena-Pena were being treated. C.I. Snell 

looked through the belongings that were collected from the two 

men. C.I. Snell observed that Leo Larios had a cell phone, a large 

sum of money,[3] and a wallet with a Social Security card that 

belonged to Brent Starr, who is the Appellant’s brother. C.I. Snell 

was familiar with Brent Starr and knew that he was incarcerated 

at the time. C.I. Snell thought that it was unusual that Brent 

Starr’s Social Security card was in the possession of Leo Larios, so 

he asked C.I. Daniel Cedeno to listen to Brent Starr’s telephone 

calls from the jail. 

One of the numbers that Brent Starr called was 610-741-4602, 

which C.I. Snell subsequently learned was Joewel Keita’s cellphone 

number. The first time Brent Starr called the number was on June 

26, 2020, and the last time Brent Starr called the number was on 

August 21, 2020, which was the date that Joewel Keita was 

arrested. There were two calls placed on August 19, 2020 that 

appeared to be related to the shooting that occurred in the 1200 

block of Church Street. C.I. Snell seized a cellphone that matched 

the number 610-741-4602 when he took Joewel Keita into 

custody.

C.I. Snell obtained video surveillance footage from 1026 Pear 

Street that was recorded on the night of August 18, 2020.

[4]

 The 

footage depicts a man wearing a t-shirt with a knit cap rolled up 

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3 C.I. Snell stated that the money was initially seized as evidence but was later 

returned to Mr. Larios “[b]ecause he had paystubs to prove that he was 

working and that was money that he got from employment.” N.T., 6/29/22, 

at 568.

4 C.I. Snell testified that the Pear Street address is approximately threequarters of a mile from the scene of the shooting. N.T., 6/30/22, at 646.
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on his head whom C.I. Snell identified as the Appellant. The 

footage also depicts a man wearing a Puma sweatshirt and glasses 

with a handgun on his right hip whom C.I. Snell identified as 

Joewel Keita. Still images of the video were admitted into 

evidence[.]

C.I. Snell also obtained video surveillance that was recorded on 

the night of August 18, 2020 that showed the same two men 

walking onto the 1200 block of Church Street.[5] C.I. Snell 

testified that he interviewed the Appellant in October of 2020 after 

Appellant had been arrested. The Appellant admitted that he was 

wearing a ski mask on the night of August 18, 2020 in the 1200 

block of Church Street and that he ran back to Pear Street after 

shots were fired. The Appellant also confirmed the Facebook 

message that he sent to Leo Larios and admitted that he 

threatened Mr. Larios in person. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/22, at 1-4 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence 

supporting his convictions. Specifically, he contends that the evidence was 

insufficient to demonstrate subjective intent to “facilitate a violent assault on 

the victims” and that he “objectively committed of any overt act” with respect 

to the assault. 

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5 Surveillance video obtained from 1239 Church Street showed the individual 

who was wearing the Puma sweatshirt fire shots at the Volkswagen Jetta 

before running south on Church Street. It also showed the individual wearing 

the ski mask run in the same direction after the shots were fired. N.T., 

6/29/22, at 388-89, 392-93. Surveillance video and still shots taken from the 

video obtained from Pear Street depicted the same two individuals leaving 

from 1026 Pear Street at approximately 10:20 p.m. and returning there at 

approximately 11:00 p.m. N.T., 6/30/22, at 641-45. The affidavit of probable 

cause reflects that police responded at 22:54, i.e., 10:54 p.m., to a report of 

shots fired in the 1200 block of Church Street. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 

Commonwealth Exhibit 17, p.2., N.T., 6/30/22, at 970. 
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When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, which 

presents a question of law, we are guided by the following well-settled 

standard of review. 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

This standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is 

circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the 

evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Although a conviction must be based on more than mere 

suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need not establish 

guilt to a mathematical certainty.

Commonwealth v. Brockman, 167 A.3d 29, 38 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(quotations and citations omitted)). 

We first note that surveillance footage presented to the jury established 

that Joewel Keita, not Appellant, fired the shots that injured Larios and killed 

Pena-Pena. Although Appellant did not fire the shots, he was convicted based 
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on his role as Keita’s accomplice. “An ‘accomplice’ is an individual who 

‘knowingly and voluntarily cooperates with or aids another in the commission 

of a crime.’” Commonwealth v. Hall, 867 A.2d 619, 630 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Carey, 439 A.2d 151, 158 (Pa. Super 1981)). 

See also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(c)(1) (“A person is an accomplice of another 

person in the commission of an offense if . . . with the intent of promoting or 

facilitating the commission of the offense, he: (i) solicits such other person to 

commit it; or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in 

planning or committing it[.]”).

The fact that Joewel Keita fired the shots and was convicted of firstdegree murder and attempted murder does not bar the conviction of Appellant 

as an accomplice for those crimes or for aggravated assault. “An accomplice 

is equally criminally liable for the acts of another if he acts with the intent of 

promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense and agrees, aids, or 

attempts to aid such other person in either planning or committing that 

offense.” Commonwealth v. Schoff, 911 A.2d 147, 161 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

The crimes of which Appellant was convicted included first-degree 

murder and attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and 

conspiracy. The trial court began its analysis of Appellant’s sufficiency of 

evidence challenge by providing the statutory definitions for first-degree 

murder, aggravated assault, and conspiracy. 
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With respect to first-degree murder, by statute, “[a] criminal homicide 

constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional 

killing.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/22, at 8 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a)). 

“To find a defendant guilty of first-degree murder a jury must find that the 

Commonwealth has proven that he or she unlawfully killed a human being and 

did so in an intentional, deliberate and premeditated manner.” Id. (quoting 

Schoff, 911 A.2d at 159). “The mens rea required for first-degree murder, 

specific intent to kill, may be established solely from circumstantial evidence.” 

Id. (quoting Schoff, 911 A.2d at 160). Further, “[s]pecific intent to kill can 

be established through circumstantial evidence, such as the use of a deadly 

weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth 

v. Montalvo, 956 A.2d 926, 932 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1186 

(2009)).6 

“A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: (1) attempts to cause 

serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly 

or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 

value of human life; [or] (4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly 

causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2702(a)(1) and (4). “Because direct evidence of intent is often unavailable, 

intent to cause serious bodily injury may be shown by the circumstances 

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6 While it likely goes without saying, the head is a vital part of the body. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Mattison, 82 A.3d 386, 392 (Pa. 2013).
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surrounding the attack.” Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. 

Super. 2007) (citation omitted). “In determining whether intent was proven 

from such circumstances, the fact finder is free to conclude ‘the accused 

intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions to result 

therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Rosado, 684 A.2d 605, 608 

(Pa. Super. 1996)). 

Finally, with regard to criminal conspiracy, 

A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to 

commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its 

commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or 

one or more of them will engage in conduct which 

constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to 

commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the 

planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a). “Circumstantial evidence may provide proof of the 

conspiracy. The conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding 

such conduct may create a web of evidence linking the accused to the alleged 

conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schoff, 911 A.2d at 160 (citation 

omitted). Further, 

[a]n agreement can be inferred from a variety of circumstances 

including, but not limited to, the relation between the parties, 

knowledge of and participation in the crime, and the 

circumstances and conduct of the parties surrounding the criminal 

episode. These factors may coalesce to establish a conspiratorial 

agreement beyond a reasonable doubt where one factor alone 

might fail.

Id. (citation omitted).
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As the trial court appreciated:

An explicit or formal agreement to commit crimes can seldom, if 

ever, be proved and it need not be, for proof of a criminal 

partnership is almost invariably extracted from the circumstances 

that attend its activities. Thus, a conspiracy may be inferred 

where it is demonstrated that the relation, conduct, or 

circumstances of the parties, and the overt acts of the coconspirators sufficiently prove the formation of a criminal 

confederation. The conduct of the parties and the circumstances 

surrounding their conduct may create a web of evidence linking 

the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/22, at 7 (quoting Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 

A.3d 1, 43 (Pa. Super. 2014) (additional citation omitted)). 

Viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to 

the verdict winner, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 

find every element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt. As the trial 

court cogently observed, “Appellant’s threats to Leo Larios, the video 

surveillance footage, and the fact [Appellant] was present at the scene of the 

shooting wearing a ski mask in the middle of August, and his admissions to 

C.I. Snell were all indicative of his guilt.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/22, at 9. 

Appellant’s sufficiency argument fails.

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the verdicts were against the 

weight of the evidence. This issue was properly preserved in Appellant’s postsentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3) (“A claim that the verdict was 

against the weight of the evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a 

motion for a new trial . . . in a post-sentence motion.”). “A motion for new 
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trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, 

concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.” 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000).7 

As this Court reiterated in Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077 

(Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc):

The law pertaining to weight of the evidence is well settled:

The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the 

finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. 

A new trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in 

the testimony and must have a stronger foundation than a 

reassessment of the credibility of witnesses. Rather, the 

role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding 

all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight 

that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the 

facts is to deny justice. On appeal, our purview is extremely 

limited and is confined to whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not shock its 

conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim 

consists of a review of the trial court's exercise of discretion, 

not a review of the underlying question of whether the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence. An appellate 

court may not reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to 

the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Id. at 1090 (quoting Commonwealth v Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (citations omitted)). 

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7

In his brief, Appellant suggests that a weight of evidence argument concedes 

that “there might have been legally sufficient evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at 

54 (citing Commonwealth v. Hunter, 768 A.2d 1136, 1143 (Pa. Super. 

2001)). However, Hunter does not suggest that there might have been

sufficient evidence. In fact, Hunter quotes the above language from Widmer 

stating that a weight challenge concedes that there is sufficient evidence to 

sustain a conviction. 
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The thrust of Appellant’s weight challenge relates to the credibility of 

Mr. Larios and to what Appellant considers the “slipshod nature” of the 

investigation. However, as this Court has recognized:

“The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, 

who is free to believe all, none[,] or some of the evidence and to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v.

Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation marks 

and quotation omitted). Resolving contradictory testimony and 

questions of credibility are matters for the finder of fact. 

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 917 (Pa. Super.

2000). It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment 

for that of the trier of fact. Talbert, supra.

Moreover, appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying the weight challenge 

raised in the lower court; this Court does not review the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence. See id.

Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and 

see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the 

gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced 

by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s 

determination that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting 

or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that 

the verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the 

interest of justice.

Id. at 546 (quotation omitted). Furthermore, “[i]n order for a 

defendant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, 

the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the 

verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” Id. (quotation marks 

and quotation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 311 (Pa. Super. 2023) 

(alterations in original). 
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With respect to both the credibility of Mr. Larios and the investigation 

conducted following the shooting, counsel—and especially counsel for 

Appellant’s co-defendant—conducted a thorough and effective crossexamination of the Commonwealth’s witnesses, challenging not only the 

credibility of Mr. Larios but also the criminal investigators’ purported failure to 

consider other “culprits,” collect evidence, and order DNA testing on cigarette 

butts and other items observed near the scene of the shooting. Nevertheless, 

the trial court rejected Appellant’s weight of the evidence challenge and 

concluded that

while no eyewitness placed the Appellant at the scene of the 

shooting, the evidence [as summarized in the court’s analysis of 

the sufficiency of evidence issue], including the Appellant’s 

admission, was more than enough for the jury to conclude that 

the Appellant was guilty of crimes that were charged. There was 

nothing shocking about the jury’s verdict. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/22, at 10. 

We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting 

Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim. Because the verdict was not “so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice,” we shall not 

disturb the court’s ruling. 
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/13/2023