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i 

94–227 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–25] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2016 NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST 

FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 19, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Gortney, ADM William E., USN, Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command ............................... 4 

Mann, LTG David L., USA, Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense ................................................................. 6 

McKeon, Brian P., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 3 

Syring, VADM James, USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency .......................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces .............................................................. 33 

Gortney, ADM William E. ................................................................................ 45 

Mann, LTG David L. ........................................................................................ 85 

McKeon, Brian P. ............................................................................................. 34 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 31 

Syring, VADM James D. .................................................................................. 55 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 109 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 118 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 115 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 122 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 113 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 116 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2016 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 19, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. I would like to call this hearing on the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to order. 

We have a full morning ahead of us on an increasingly important 

subject of ballistic and missile defense. We will start with this open 

hearing and then we will adjourn and move to the HASC [House 

Armed Services Committee] SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility] for a closed session with the witnesses to finish 

discussing things that are not appropriate to talk about in open 

hearing. 

We have an esteemed panel with us today to discuss the missile 

defense threat that the U.S. has to respond to. We have Mr. Brian 

McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

from the Department of Defense. We have Admiral Bill Gortney, 

U.S. Navy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Northern Command; Vice Admiral James Syring, U.S. 

Navy, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and Lieutenant General David Mann, Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense. 

Given the packed morning, I am going to ask the witnesses to 

summarize their prepared statements in 3 minutes. Your full statements will be submitted to the record. 

I want to make a couple quick comments and then will yield to 

my good friend from Tennessee for any statement he wants to 

make. 

First, I want to thank all of you for taking the time to be here 

and putting the effort in to these prepared statements and this testimony. I know it takes time and you are all busy. And so I appreciate it. As we prepare to write the fiscal year 2016 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], your testimony will help us to 

make some very important decisions about what programs we fund 

and what policies we set in place. 
2 

Secondly, I want to state my support for many of the priorities 

in this year’s budget submission I am pleased to see. For example, 

the roughly $700-million increase for this year in the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense [GMD] system. We have only one ballistic missile defense system capable of defending the homeland. It is about 

time we properly fund it. 

Admiral Syring, you inherited a mess at GMD with that system 

when you took over MDA [Missile Defense Agency]. And I think I 

speak for all of my colleagues when I say that you have rebuilt 

trust in the system, and I can’t overstate how grateful we are for 

your service. I hope that, when you leave here to go home tonight, 

you will pass on to your family a great big thanks from this committee and the country for your service. 

Admiral Gortney, Lieutenant General Mann, the same for you 

and your families. You have our respect, appreciation, and gratitude. 

Mr. McKeon, as always, we appreciate your civil service as well. 

I have concerns with the budget as well. While this year’s budget 

is good, an improvement from recent years, I note it collapses in 

the out-years. As I plan, I am not sure I agree with the cruise and 

ballistic missile threat that the United States, our deployed forces, 

and our allies will get better in the next 5 years. 

Likewise, I was deeply troubled by the November 2014 memo to 

the Secretary of Defense, signed by the Chief of Staff of the Army 

and the Chief of Naval Operations, concerning our missile defense 

capabilities. 

This memo represents the kinds of things many of us have been 

worried about because of sequestration. Core missions, like missile 

defense, are difficult to sustain. Our Aegis ships, the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] batteries and Patriot batteries 

are expensive commitments to our regional security. We all know 

that. 

I agree with the former Secretary Hagel that our current BMD 

[ballistic missile defense] policy is sound. To the services, I say missile defense is a core mission. It is not a nice-to-have mission. It 

is a must-have mission. But we must get you budget relief so that 

this core mission and all of your other core missions are executable. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. ROGERS. And with that, I now yield to my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper, for any opening statement that 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In view of the tightness of the schedule, I will just submit my 

statement for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. I appreciate that. 

We will start, then, with Mr. McKeon. You are recognized for 3 

minutes to summarize your opening statement. 
3 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN P. McKEON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Cooper, and members of this subcommittee. Thank you for 

this opportunity to be here today to discuss the fiscal 2016 budget 

request for missile defense. I am grateful for your attention to and 

support of this critical mission of defending our homeland, our 

partners and allies, and deployed forces from a growing ballistic 

missile threat. 

The President’s budget requests $9.6 billion in fiscal year 2016, 

of which $8.1 billion is for the Missile Defense Agency to develop, 

deploy missile defense capabilities to protect the homeland and 

strengthen our regional missile defenses. 

Sequestration levels would be significantly lower and, as Secretary Carter has said, would make the Nation less secure. Even 

without sequestration, however, in these austere times, there is 

still not enough money to fund every program that we might wish 

to have and we are required to prioritize investments accordingly. 

As members of this subcommittee, you are well aware of the ballistic missile threats and trends, some of which is spelled out in detail in our opening statements. I will focus on a few key policy priorities for addressing these threats: defending the United States 

against limited long-range ballistic missile attacks, strengthening 

defense against regional missile threats, fostering defense cooperation with partners, and examining how to advance missile defense 

technology base in a cost-effective manner. 

The U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential ICBM 

[intercontinental ballistic missile] attacks from states like North 

Korea and Iran. To ensure that we stay ahead of the threat, we are 

continuing to strengthen our homeland defense posture and invest 

in technologies to better enable us to address emerging threats in 

the next decade. This requires continued improvement to the 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, including enhanced performance of the ground-based interceptors [GBIs] and deployment 

of new sensors. 

We remain on track to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska by the end of 2017. These interceptors, along with the 30 that 

are currently deployed, will provide protection against both North 

Korea and Iranian ICBM threats as they emerge and evolve. 

We have also deployed a second forward-based missile defense 

radar to Japan, which is operating today thanks to the hard work 

of MDA and the Japanese Government. This radar strengthens 

both our homeland and regional defenses. 

This year’s budget also reflects the DOD’s [Department of Defense’s] commitment to modernizing the GMD system. It will move 

us toward a more reliable and effective defense to United States. 

It includes funding for the development of a new radar that, when 

deployed in Alaska, will provide persistent sensor coverage and improve discrimination capabilities against North Korea. It also continues funding for the redesign of the kill vehicle for the GBI. 

As directed by the Congress, the MDA is also conducting environmental impact studies at four sites in the eastern part of the 
4 

United States that could host an additional GBI missile field. 

These will be completed next year. 

The cost of building an additional missile defense site in the 

United States is very high. And given that the ICBM threat from 

Iran has not yet emerged and the need to fix the current GBI kill 

vehicles, the highest priorities for the protection of the homeland 

are improving reliability and effectiveness of the GBI and improving the GMD sensor architecture. 

This current GMD system provides coverage of the entire United 

States from North Korean and potential Iranian ICBMs. And no 

decision has yet been made to deploy an additional missile field in 

the United States. 

I will conclude here, Mr. Chairman, because I see the red light 

is on. You have the rest of my statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 34.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you. 

Admiral Gortney. 

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND 

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND 

Admiral GORTNEY. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, 

and distinguished members, thanks for allowing us to come here 

today as we talk about this critical mission set. 

As I look at threats to the homeland, I look at threats from the 

most likely to the most dangerous. And right there in the middle 

of this is this critical mission set defending the homeland from ballistic missile defense, particularly the threats from North Korea 

and Iran. 

But, as I look at the threats, the most likely and the most dangerous that is getting ready to confront us, I think it is sequestration and the impacts on my ability across all of my mission sets, 

but particularly in this particular case, to defend the homeland. 

Sequestration, when it comes for the services, is the quickest way 

to hollow a force out. They have to take it out of readiness, and 

they are going to delay capability. 

And when I look at the effects of sequestration on this mission 

set, my good friend here, Jim Syring, he doesn’t have a readiness 

account that he can go to. He has to go into the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] program, which is going to delay the 

long-range discriminating radar, the improved kill vehicle that we 

need to outpace this proliferating threat. 

And so the specifics of those impacts I will leave to Jim here. But 

we look forward to your questions. And we really appreciate your 

support. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Gortney can be found in the 

Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Admiral. 

Admiral Syring, you are recognized. 
5 

STATEMENT OF VADM JAMES D. SYRING, USN, DIRECTOR, 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

Admiral SYRING. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, and 

distinguished members of this subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify in front of you today. 

Our budget request for fiscal year 2016 maintains the commitment to operate and sustain homeland defenses, including us remaining on track for 44 GBIs by 2017. We also request support for 

test requirements and continuing to enhance the Stockpile Reliability Program component agent testing to better maintain and 

understand the health of the deployed system. 

Testing plan for 2016 includes a non-intercept flight test to 

evaluate the alternate divert thrusters and support algorithm development for the important discrimination improvements for 

homeland defense. 

As was mentioned, we continue the development of the redesigned kill vehicle for improved reliability, availability, performance, and produceability. The first flight test of this will be in 2018. 

The first intercept test will be in 2019. If that goes according to 

plan, the initial deployment will begin in 2020. 

We started acquisition planning and pre-construction activity for 

the long-range discrimination radar. We anticipate contract award 

for that by the end of this fiscal year. 

Our 2016 budget request supports the deployment of Standard 

Missile-3 Block IBs and, beginning in 2018, the SM3–IIAs on ships 

and Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland. 

We plan to procure 209 SM3–IBs by the end of 2016 and then 

will request multiyear procurement authorization. We also plan to 

deliver 48 additional THAAD interceptors to the Army for 155 total 

delivered by 2016. 

And, finally, our advanced technology and development efforts 

that really ramp up this year will continue our discrimination sensor weapons technology, common kill vehicle, which includes early 

concept exploration of multi-object kill vehicles and technology maturation initiatives. 

These investments will enable us to deploy a future BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System] architecture more capable of discriminating and killing reentry vehicles with high degree of confidence. Our low-power directed energy resources research is focused on providing the forward-tracking capability. 

Mr. Chairman, MDA will continue to aggressively pursue cost reduction measures through competition, partnering, and cooperation 

as we deliver the best missile defense capabilities to protect our 

Nation, our deployed forces, and friends and allies at the lowest 

possible cost to the American taxpayer. 

Thank you. And I look forward to the questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Syring can be found in the 

Appendix on page 55.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you. 

Lieutenant General Mann, you are recognized. 
6 

STATEMENT OF LTG DAVID L. MANN, USA, COMMANDER, 

JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE 

General MANN. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and 

other members of the subcommittee, thank you for your continued 

support of our soldiers, civilians, and their families. 

This is my second appearance before this subcommittee and it is 

indeed an honor for me to testify on the importance of missile defense to our Nation and the need to maintain these capabilities in 

the face of a maturing threat and declining budgets. 

Today I want to briefly summarize some of the missions of the 

organizations that I support. First, Space Missile Defense Command, SMDC, Army Forces Strategic Command, ARSTRAT, serves 

as the missile defense force provider in support of our combatant 

commanders out there. 

Secondly, the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense [JFCC–IMD] serves and supports USSTRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] on integrating and synchronizing our global missile defense operations. 

Turning to the first organization that I mentioned, SMDC/ 

ARSTRAT, we have three core tasks. We provide trained and ready 

global missile defenders. We build the future force in terms of both 

capabilities and force structure. And we also evaluate critical technologies to help us stay ahead of the threat. JFCC–IMD, on the 

other hand, supports operational-level planning and global missile 

defense operations on behalf of USSTRATCOM. 

We execute five critical tasks in support of these responsibilities. 

We synchronize operational-level planning. We support ongoing operations. We integrate training and exercises and test activities 

globally. And we also provide recommendations on the allocation of 

missile defense resources. And, finally, we also advocate on future 

capabilities. 

Today the missile defense threat continues to grow both in terms 

of sophistication and the number of systems. We, as a nation, cannot afford a decrease in our readiness. That said, we are extremely 

concerned about sequestration that will directly impact our readiness and our ability to evaluate and test new technologies in order 

to stay ahead of the threat. 

This committee’s continued support of missile defense operations 

and the men and women who develop and employ these systems 

is essential. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our Nation’s missile defense capabilities and look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Mann can be found in the 

Appendix on page 85.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you. 

And I will recognize myself first for a series of questions. I want 

the focus of this hearing to be mainly on the implications that 

these spending caps on defense will create if we go forward with 

them. I think that the Budget Control Act [BCA] is one of the most 

irresponsible things the United States Congress has done in recent 

memory, specifically, the caps that it has hoisted on the Defense 

Department. 
7 

I would remind everybody that the year before the BCA was 

adopted, this committee had voluntarily cut over $500 billion out 

of the Defense Department just to show our recognition of the financial burden that this country was suffering. And then we had 

no idea that there would be another $600 billion coming behind it 

the very next year. Those two things together is what really has 

created this mess that we are in. 

But while the members of this committee, the full HASC as well 

as the subcommittee, I think, all are fully aware of the implications 

of these continued irresponsible cuts, I think it is important for you 

all, as the service members, to help describe for the members who 

are on this committee who will be reading about this hearing exactly what these cuts mean to your ability to continue to defend 

this country in an effective way. 

So, with that, General Mann, I will start with you. Tell us what 

you think it means to you not just in this fiscal year 2016 budget— 

because the truth is you all have done a pretty good job up until 

now dealing with these cuts and keeping a straight face. It is time 

to start telling us what it means. So I will start with you. 

General MANN. Thank you, Chairman. 

I think we have to recognize that the threat is not standing still. 

We see a threat that, like I said in my statement, is growing both 

in terms of the sophistication of their weapon systems as well as 

the numbers. 

So, in that context, the concern that we have is that a lot of our 

programs in terms of the modernization of the Patriot force, the improvements to the radar, the missile enhancement segment that we 

are trying to develop to give us that—to bridge that gap between 

the Patriot and the THAAD force, the software upgrades that are 

required—those programs, due to sequestration, could be impacted. 

They could be delayed. And, again, the threat is not standing still. 

Also, in terms of homeland defense—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Before you go further, that 12,000-foot altitude gap 

between the Patriot and the THAAD, what vulnerability does that 

create for us? What threat do we have to worry about penetrating 

that gap? 

General MANN. In terms of looking at the CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] area of operations, there are early-release munitions that could be employed within that range that could impact 

our operations as far as putting munitions on airfields, ports of 

entry. So that is a critical gap, that we need that missile enhancement to cover that gap that I talked about. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

General MANN. So, again, in terms of the regional support, the 

modernization efforts. Also, we have a lot of efforts underway to get 

after the cruise missile threat that I am sure will be discussed 

later on today. 

The indirect fire protection capability utilizing the AIM–9X missile will help us address that threat. Patriot does have a capability 

against cruise missiles, but we need to enhance that capability. So 

those efforts. 

And, most importantly, the Army’s number one air missile defense priority is the network, the air missile defense battle com-
8 

mand network that basically takes all of the assets that we have 

out there and componentizes it. 

Instead of having big units that have to deploy downrange being 

able to take those units and break them up, it is a little bit more 

of an affordable way of getting after the business of missile defense. 

And, also, making sure that we get away from stovepipe command-and-control architectures out there and have one single integrated architecture that really addresses the tactical-level and the 

operational-level systems that feeds into C2BMC [command, control, battle management, and communications]. 

So those modernization efforts will be impacted and delayed and, 

again, all in the context the fact that the threat is not stopping. 

Improvements to our homeland defense capabilities, whether it is 

the GBI reliability that Admiral Syring and his folks are getting 

after. 

Those capabilities as well as long-range discrimination that we 

need to make sure that we are as effective and as efficient as possible with the limited number of resources, because we will never 

be able to have enough missiles to address the number of threat 

vehicles that are out there. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Syring. 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, if I can, let me start back in the first round 

of sequestration back in 2013, when those cuts came down midyear 

when we were under a continuing resolution. 

Those cuts had an immediate impact in what we are doing. I 

have many, many contracts across the agency that require annual 

funding. If I didn’t want to break those contracts, I immediately 

had to go into areas that I could affect, and I went to testing and 

I deleted several tests or delayed several tests. The GAO [Government Accountability Office] has noted this. And I would say that 

is a direct result of the sequestration cuts that came down. 

In addition, I took further risk on the SM–3 IIA development 

program and essentially removed all of the development margin in 

that very important program that must deliver that missile in 2018 

to support the Poland deployment. Critical effort. 

We are now out of margin. So we are now into the projection of 

what next in terms of the hypothetical—not even hypothetical—the 

real possibility of sequestration cuts flowing down to the Missile 

Defense Agency. 

There was a number mentioned yesterday in the Appropriations 

Committee’s hearing of 18 percent, which would mean that I would 

take a reduction from $8.1 billion to $6.7 billion, over a $1.4 billion 

reduction. Again, if I maintain my commitment to 44 GBIs by 

2017, which is our top priority, and the EPAA [European Phased 

Adaptive Approach] commitments that we have made in Europe, 

there is not many places to go. 

So we would immediately go to the efforts that were started last 

year, which are the redesigned kill vehicle and the long-range discriminator radar, approximately $500 million between those efforts. 

That would immediately put those on hold or delay those. 

And, to me, now you are starting to jeopardize our future capability in terms of what we are able to say to the American people 

and our ability to defend the homeland. With the development and 
9 

testing that I see going on with North Korea very specifically and 

the pace and the progress that they are making, I am in serious 

jeopardy, without those improvements, of going to the NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] commander and advising him that 

the system is overmatched. That would be the path that we are on 

if we don’t do these improvements between now and 2020. The system will be overmatched. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Gortney. 

Admiral GORTNEY. As I said before, the biggest impact is the 

delay of capability for our ability to outpace the threats. And Admiral Syring just adequately—very well explained those particular 

impacts. So let me take another look. Let me mention this from a 

different way. 

Defending the homeland is an away game. That is where our primary focus is, to delay the away game. The way sequestration is 

going to impact the services, they are going to have to go under 

their readiness accounts in order to do that, which is the quickest 

path to a hollow force. 

That is going to drive these low-density, high-demand assets, be 

it Patriot, THAAD, or Aegis BMD ships. Their operational tempo 

is going to go up, only stressing a very, very stressed force as it 

is. 

In my last job as a force provider for the Navy, those carriers and 

air wings, Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary 

Units and ballistic missile defense ships are the highest op tempo 

that we have. And those are the forces that are going to feel that 

impact. That is going to directly affect how well we defend ourselves in the away game. 

Every commander’s first responsibility is to protect the people 

that work for them. And having lived with my family underneath 

the Iranian threat in Bahrain for a couple years, you know, I am 

very, very concerned of that ability to outpace the threat in the Pacific and in the Gulf and in the Mediterranean in order to do that 

critical mission. That is how sequestration will affect us. 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have a great deal to add to 

what my colleagues said. 

If you look at the missile defense budget—or at least the MDA budget, $6.2 billion out of the $8.1 billion is in RDT&E [research, 

development, testing, and evaluation]. So looking for the investments we need to make to stay with the threats and advance our 

capabilities, that is where the heart of his budget is. 

And we probably can’t cut the O&M [operations and maintenance] parts of the Aegis and the other systems. So he would take 

it out of the R&D [research and development] side. And, as he explained, that would be pretty devastating to our systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I certainly second your strong objection to sequestration for the 

defense budget. I just hope that we can at least reach the President’s budget levels and do that honestly. 

I regret the failure of any committee, but it was a little bit heartening last night that the Budget Committee failed to get a budget. 

And I think they are starting to listen to the members of this committee and others saying that you need to plug that defense hole 
10 

and you need to plug it with real dollars, not borrowed dollars from 

China. 

It was interesting yesterday that Senate Republicans objected to 

the way we were trying to plug the hole. And I don’t know what 

their method is, but we have got to do this honestly and not just 

rely on the Chinese to fund our needs. 

Apart from these urgent sequestration issues, I thought we 

should spend a moment on that memo from Greenert and Odierno 

to the Secretary of Defense back from November 5, 2014, because 

it uses nice bureaucratic language. 

But I think the message of this memo is pretty important and 

pretty daunting. The first sentence says, ‘‘The growing challenges 

associated with ballistic missile defense are increasingly capable 

and continue to outpace our active defense systems.’’ 

Admiral Syring just said that we will be overmatched 2020 unless we do things right. This kind of implies we are being overmatched. And harsher language would say we are kind of losing 

right now. 

Later in the memo it says, ‘‘Our present acquisition-based strategy is unsustainable in the current fiscal environment.’’ ‘‘Unsustainable’’ is a polite word for saying that we don’t have enough 

money, this isn’t fixable. And I don’t know whether they meant to 

not only fix sequestration, but go beyond that. 

But it also has a little bit of a tone here at least vis-a-vis other 

military necessities that they feel MDA is being something of a resource hog because you all are getting money that they could use 

for readiness or other needs that are not being met. 

I don’t want to read too much into this. But to have Greenert 

and Odierno write something like this is pretty astonishing because 

it is harsher criticism than the committee has ever levied. You 

throw this in with a recent GAO report talking about smaller 

issues and we have a lot of work to do. 

I worry, for example, that—you know, lots of people talk and we 

are underway in looking at four east coast sites. But will we have 

the money, the $3 or $4 billion, to do those? Because we have to 

admit to ourselves that is a lower priority for MDA than discrimination of targets and redesigning the kill vehicle and things like 

that. 

So, being straightforward here, we have got to not only fix sequestration, we have got to have a strategy that seems to work better against ballistic missile threats. And Greenert and Odierno talk 

about things like ‘‘left of launch’’ and non-kinetic means of defense, 

lots of things that are strategic decisions that we need to make 

sure we are on top of, because this same old, same old won’t necessarily fix the problem. 

So we trust you gentlemen. We hope it is working. But this is 

kind of a vote of no confidence here from two of the most important 

people in the military. 

So what do we do to best fix their concerns? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, I was in the Navy-Army staff talks that 

generated that particular lecture. And the fundamental issue from 

the services comes down to: Are we spending our money correctly? 

And what is the impact for the money that we are spending? 
11 

The primary concerns that they have is that we are relying at 

this particular point, whether it be ballistic missile defense for the 

homeland or theater ballistic missile defense, is that we are really 

emphasizing being a catcher and shooting a rocket down with a 

rocket, which is a very expensive proposition and it drives lowdensity, high-demand assets, their operational tempo, up. 

So when they talk about unsustainable, it is not only in the 

terms of cost, but it is in terms of the operational tempo of the 

forces that are doing it. And so what we really need is—what they 

are asking for is a broader range, that we have a deterrence policy 

that helps keeps missiles on the rail for deterrence, we have kinetic 

and non-kinetic options to keep missiles on the rails, and then we 

start attriting the threat, once they get airborne, starting in the 

boost phase and throughout that particular flight, so that we start 

knocking down missiles in a more effective and a cost-effective 

manner. 

We are on the wrong side of the cost curve and we are on the 

wrong side of the operational tempo curve. That is what they are 

trying to drive for. 

That is why the impacts of sequestration are so critical, because 

Admiral Syring has laid in technological RDT&E money to go after 

other methods other than just the midcourse approach that will 

allow us to get on that correct side of the cost curve. 

And, with sequestration, those will be impacted, which is counter 

to what the Chief Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO] have asked for, to get on the right side of the cost 

curve and, also, free up the operational tempo of the forces that are 

executing this critical mission. 

Mr. COOPER. Chief of Staff of the Army, not the Air Force. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Correct. 

General MANN. Sir, if I could just add to that, I think that the 

Joint Staff and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] is looking 

at a more holistic way of looking at global force management. Instead of just looking at platforms, whether it is BMD ships or 

THAAD or Patriot, how can we better address the COCOMs’ [combatant commanders’] requirements in terms of capability? 

So that is where you get left of launch. That is where we need 

improvements in ISR—intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance— 

and being able to do a better job of seeing intent and taking actions 

before a launch and, also, making use of other non-kinetic, whether 

it is space control assets, whether it is maybe directed energy down 

the road, things that are more cost-affordable in terms of getting 

after this capability. 

So what we are doing is we are really raising the level of sophistication as to how we get after our global force management. 

Admiral SYRING. Mr. Cooper, I would just add two items that 

have been touched on as well. 

One is force structure with the Navy in terms of the combatant 

commanders asking the CNO to provide more and more ships, 

more and more ships, for the ship stations with EPAA, more and 

more and more, and I see that escalating over the next several 

years. 

CNO and the Navy have other things for those ships to do in 

terms of sailing with strike groups and protecting the strike 
12 

groups. I think you see the CNO saying that I don’t have the assets 

in the future to cover all of the requirements from the combatant 

commanders around the world. 

I am just asking for a new strategy in terms of how do we do 

that? How do we integrate left and right of launch? How do we 

move this into advanced technology and get on the right side of the 

cost curve, in his words? 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. The only thing I add, Mr. Cooper, is underlying 

this memo from the two officers is the tension that we see, and sequestration is also a factor in this, both the one we have already 

experienced and the one that is looming over us. 

Even though we don’t have over 100,000 forces forward-deployed 

right now, there is still stress on some of the force. The COCOMs 

still have requirements that they need to meet near-term threats 

and, balanced against that, the Secretary, the Chairman, the service chiefs, they are all trying to bring the forces back to full-spectrum readiness to get the forces healthy. 

So it is a tension that is ongoing all the time, the demand for 

forces from the COCOMs against needing to enhance readiness, 

and I think that is what underlies some of the appeal in that 

memo. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 

Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you for your gallant service to the country. 

Admiral Syring, included in the fiscal year 2016 budget request 

from the President, there was multiyear procurement authority for 

the SM–3 IB in that. 

Can you speak to that for the record as to the importance of the 

authorization? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. Given design stability of that missile 

and the successes that we have had with intercept and where the 

predicted reliability is of that missile, we are pushing a multiyear 

certification authority through the Department to send over here to 

request multiyear procurement authorization. 

We estimated there will be a 14 percent savings over annual procurements, and we view that as a good deal for the American taxpayer and the right thing to do. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, sir. 

Your FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] for fiscal year 2016 

shows approximately $191 million for an extended-range staff modernization program. I think Lieutenant General Mann was alluding 

to that. 

Why is such capability needed based on your reality, your budget 

profile? Is it affordable, in your mind? And are there some options 

that would help you to afford this? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. The money requested is not for a full 

development program. It is to explore the concept. I would like to 

defer to the classified session on the threat in terms of what that 

helps us with and helps us counter. And I can go into that. 
13 

But suffice it to say, it is necessary. The threat dictates it, in 

terms of what we are seeing with development, to move that interceptor into a higher-velocity design to help us counter the future 

threat. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McKeon, I might ask you, since looking at international cooperative development or financing would really fall under your 

purview of the policy of OSD, what would you express about such 

an opportunity? 

MR. MCKEON. Well, Mr. Franks, as you know, our regional missile defense strategy is focused in critical respects on partnerships. 

And in the example of the Japanese, we are doing a co-development 

on one of the SM blocks. 

So, we are always looking for partners. In a broad sense, it would 

depend, in particular, what the kind of arrangement we could have 

with them, what the technology releasability would be. 

So there would be a lot of questions to answer, but it is something we are always focused on. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Admiral Syring, I may come back to you. 

Last year, when you came before the committee, you said that, 

if there was one thing you needed more of, it was increased discrimination capability. 

Can you talk about and kind of express how far you have come 

and where we are headed in fiscal year 2016? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. We have a very in-depth plan that has 

laid out near-, mid- and far-term objectives that are funded in this 

year’s budget. Those deliveries will start next year to the components of the BMDS. 

A critical component that we are requesting this year is the longrange discriminating radar in Alaska, which helps us stay ahead 

of the threat and makes sure that we are not overmatched in terms 

of threat complexity that we see developing in North Korea. Critical to that problem. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, sir. 

Well, you know, we have had each of the service chiefs and Secretaries as well as the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] and Chairman before this committee this week alone. 

And one of the recurring themes has been what support does 

each of the services provide to the warfighter, the combatant commanders. I suppose it is a rather obvious question, but it would be, 

I think, worth hearing your more elaborate expression of it. 

From a missile defense perspective, what is the main thrust of 

your support that you provide to the warfighter? And I will start 

with you, Admiral Syring. And we will see what time we have after 

that. 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. Everybody is very familiar with the 

homeland defense and the operation of that by the Alaska National 

Guard in terms of protecting our homeland. 

The regional defense capability that we fielded in Patriot and 

THAAD and Aegis go around the world. Thirty-three BMD ships 

today helping with defense of Japan, helping us when we need 

them, actually, in defense of the homeland, helping us in the Mediterranean in terms of limited defense of European countries and in 
14 

the Middle East, in the Gulf there, in terms of the stations that 

we keep. Those are just the Aegis ships. 

I will let General Mann talk about the Patriot deployments on 

where we are, but we have gone around the world with that capability as well. We continue to expand Aegis, as you know, Mr. 

Franks, not just at sea, but what it will provide us in Romania and 

Poland. 

As you know, there has been billions of dollars spent on the development of that regional capability with Patriot, THAAD, and 

Aegis that is now deployed worldwide in all theaters of operation. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Mann, did—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Go ahead. 

General MANN. Sir, Admiral Syring kind of mentioned it. 

I mean, number one, we support homeland defense. The 49th 

Battalion that is up there at Fort Greely, Alaska, and also down 

in Vandenberg provide that 24/7 capability against the limited 

threat emanating from Iran and North Korea. National Guard unit 

full-time. And I am enormously proud of what they do day in and 

day out. 

As far as the Patriots, right now, 60 percent of our Patriot force 

is either forward-station and forward-deployed. In addition to the 

capabilities that they provide, they also serve a very, very important role in terms of theater engagement with our partners 

throughout the region and reassuring our allies out there. And so 

that cannot be overstated. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the service that you all provide to our country. 

And, Admiral Gortney, I hope you brought some of the great 

weather they have been having in Colorado Springs to the east 

coast here. 

Mr. MCKEON. Sir, I was there on Tuesday and it was raining. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The forecast I see for next week is in the 60s and 

sunshine. 

Admiral Gortney, we touched on the long-range discriminating 

radar. But could you amplify the importance of that for the 

warfighter. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. You know, sensors are key. If you 

can’t see, you can’t kill. And to the improvement for the long-range 

discriminating radar, our ability to better detect and discriminate 

where the threat is, and the types, will enhance the effectiveness, 

the lethality, of our kill vehicles, but we also need to enhance the 

lethality of our kill vehicles and we need to sustain them. 

So the priorities that Admiral Syring has laid out, the three priorities of the better sensors, enhanced kill vehicles, and the 

sustainment and maintaining of that which we own, have to be 

done concurrently. It is not an either-or. All of them have to be 

done concurrently. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 
15 

Admiral Syring, on the issue of space, can you discuss your current and future space architecture needs and plans. 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. We are actively pursuing a space-based 

experiment which you are familiar with, and we can talk more 

about that in the classified session. That is very encouraging to us 

in terms of what it might provide with technology demonstration 

on hit and kill assessment, which is vitally important. 

Longer term, we and the Air Force and other partners need to 

think through what is the partnership opportunities for a spacebased application in terms of the real persistence and the real discrimination capability that will come from space. 

You have heard me say, Mr. Lamborn, you can’t just do it all 

with radars. We have got to get up to space and have that constellation presence over the threat from the west and the east, and 

you are going to see more thinking from us and our partners on 

that in future budgets. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, that is very encouraging. 

But, also, let me ask you about something we have talked about 

in my office privately: directed energy. That is something—there is 

a bipartisan agreement that that has tremendous potential for the 

future and is and should be part of our asymmetrical advantage as 

a country over people on the other side. 

So what are you doing to apply the benefits of directed energy? 

Admiral SYRING. Sure. There is two applications, obviously, 

tracking in terms of what that might provide from a space-based 

solution with laser capability and the maturation of that technology. The other very important part of that technology maturation effort is what it may mean for us scaling up to a boost-phase 

intercept capability. 

Two very promising development efforts ongoing with MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] and Livermore [Lawrence 

Livermore National Labratory]. Both have advantages and disadvantages. We have gone out to industry and asked their ideas in 

terms of how can we get technology to a demonstration sooner than 

later. 

And I think you will see us pursue that path for really a downselect in the 2018 time period to single up on one technology and 

one solution for tracking—and I will just leave it at tracking in this 

forum—and boost-phase intercept. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

And, lastly, Admiral Gortney, I will finish up by asking you 

about the cruise missile threat. I know on all these things we can 

get into more of the weeds in the classified session. 

But, in general terms, what is the threat that we are looking at 

against the homeland today? 

Admiral GORTNEY. The only nation that has an effective cruise 

missile capability is Russia, from either their long-range aviation, 

their Bear H’s [bombers], from the cruise missile submarines, or 

they have an ability to put it on surface ships, both combatants 

and noncombatants. 

I haven’t been in the cruise missile business defending against 

them since I was a JG [lieutenant junior grade]. And I shot over 

1,300 of them. I know that they are very effective and they are 

very difficult to shoot down. 
16 

Our current strategy is very focused on shooting the arrows. And 

we need to expand our strategy and our capabilities to be able to 

get the archer, hold the archer at risk. 

And there is an approach, rules of engagement, that allows us to 

take the archer out and then be able to deal with the leakers that 

come through here. And that is what we are trying to get the program. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, thank you again for the work that you do. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you can imagine, defense budget spending is a major issue on 

Capitol Hill right now. By way of example, I was just notified that 

in a few minutes I am supposed to meet with the chairman and 

some other GOP HASC members about the Tom Price budget and 

the President’s budget. 

We all understand the adverse effect the Budget Control Act of 

2011 and sequestration has had on defense capabilities. I want to 

focus on a little bit different light, the President’s budget proposal 

versus the Tom Price budget proposal and how that impacts what 

you do. 

In that vein, the President has proposed a budget, $561 billion 

for base national defense, $51 billion for overseas contingency operations—OCO—for a total of $612 billion. 

The Tom Price budget complies with the requirements of the 

Budget Control Act of 2011. Base national defense spending is at 

$523 billion, but, as a sweetener, he adds $90 billion for the OCO, 

totaling $613 billion. 

So you have got $612 billion in total defense spending, President 

Obama, $613—a little bit more—Tom Price, but then you have got 

the base difference of $38 billion more under the Obama proposal, 

OCO $39 billion more under Tom Price. 

Shifting this money from base to OCO, how does that affect your 

commands in the programs that you oversee? And if we could just 

go from my right to left, General Mann first, Admiral Syring, and 

on down. 

General MANN. Thank you, Congressman. 

I would say that what is really essential is that we have some 

predictability with our programs so that we are able to work with 

our industry partners and provide a plan or a requirement that is 

not subject to a lot of variability in terms of what the funding is 

going to be. So I would just leave it at the fact that predictability 

is key. 

Mr. BROOKS. And which provides better predictability? The base 

or the OCO? 

General MANN. I think having more in the base would provide 

that predictability. 

Mr. BROOKS. Right. Thank you. 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, we’ve never at MDA spent or received OCO. 

Obviously, in the base would be better for us, unless there was 

some rule change that allowed us to do that in an efficient manner. 

But my preference, sir, would be in base. 
17 

Mr. BROOKS. So, if I understand correctly, as OCO spending has 

been spent in the past, the additional sums going to OCO would 

have no beneficial effect for the MDA? 

Admiral SYRING. As currently structured, that is correct. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BROOKS. Admiral Gortney. 

Admiral GORTNEY. I will echo. It is the authorities that go and 

how you are allowed to spend base and how you are allowed to 

spend OCO. And for the critical investments that Admiral Syring 

needs to make, he doesn’t have the authorities in order to do it. 

Secretary Carter and General Dempsey yesterday went on the 

record that we want to be the best stewards of the American taxpayers’ dollars. And keeping the money in the base and then use 

OCO for what OCO is for allows us to do that. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Congressman, I don’t have a great deal to add to 

that. Since the beginning of the administration, we have tried to 

do an exercise to move things from OCO to base so that we don’t 

get heavily dependent on OCO. 

We haven’t entirely succeeded in that. But I think base spending 

is always preferable. But in this budget for Admiral Syring, I don’t 

believe we have any request in the OCO. 

Mr. BROOKS. Consistent with what we have stated, the adverse 

effect of money being in OCO as opposed to base, there seems to 

be an effort behind the scenes to free up OCO so that, in effect, 

we would have one massive budget of $613 billion and OCO funds 

could be used as base funds have been used in the past, understanding that this would be novel understanding, that we would 

have to get the votes from somewhere to make this change in our 

laws. 

Would that affect your answers any? 

General MANN. Again, Congressman, going back to my earlier 

point, I think predictability and the rules, the authorities, surrounding those appropriations would be key. Whatever would give 

us that predictability that would limit the amount of variability I 

think is what we are focused on. 

Admiral SYRING. No, sir. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Again, it goes back to the authorities of where 

we can make investments, where we can spend the money. We 

have always had operational costs where we called it earlier things 

before the wars 14 years ago to pay supplementals, to pay for operations around the world. 

And so it really comes to the authorities. If someone is going to 

do that, with it has to come the authorities to spend the money 

where we need to spend the money to make the best decisions for 

the American people. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has 

expired. Please forgive me. I am going to run and see what the 

chairman of Armed Services has to say. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee for 

some additional questions. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
18 

Our colleague, John Garamendi, has been called away to California for a family emergency. But he wanted these two questions 

asked; so, I will do so on his behalf. 

Number one, directed energy. How much money is needed to advance directed energy research at the most rapid pace possible? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, we are rapidly—we requested in this budget a significant increase in directed energy. We are requesting over 

$1.3 billion, both unclassified and classified, funding, which is a 

several-hundred-million-dollar increase over last year’s budget. And 

I think it is right in terms of the balance of those resources. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you. Second question is: How much progress 

is being made on improving the reliability of current antimissile 

interceptors? Do we have a reasonable chance of defending the 

United States today with the current inventory? 

Admiral SYRING. I will answer the first part and then let Admiral Gortney answer the second part. 

The budget request that I have put forward and the additional 

funding for the GMD program is focused on reliability and improving reliability of the current fleet and the future fleet. 

We believe we have the right balance between those two in terms 

of focusing on what we know about for the current fleet, improving 

the reliability of those that we are fielding, and then keeping the 

design going for the new one, which is the RKV [redesigned kill vehicle], which will be tested well before it is fielded. 

Admiral GORTNEY. I have high confidence in the current system 

against the current threats. And I have that because of the way of 

the testing program that we have as we assess the threats that are 

out there that it is designed to go against and our ability to test 

and exercise the system of systems that makes up this architecture. 

Should that change and I lose confidence, I will be the first to 

tell you that I lost confidence in the system, but I do not have that 

here. And as long as we are able to properly fund the capabilities 

that we have asked for in the budget and we are able to execute 

the testing and maintain the test schedule and we have the intel 

to see if we are pacing the threat, I am comfortable with it. But 

if it fails to do that, I will come back and tell you. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. 

Bridenstine, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Syring, thank you for spending time with me in my office just a couple of days ago. We had a number of great conversations. 

First of all, I would like to publicly congratulate you for the successful test of FTG–06b. I know that maybe some of the tests before that were not perceived as being successful, but I would attest 

that every test there are lessons learned and we gain a lot from 

that. Even though some tests are not deemed as being successful, 

we learn a lot from that. 

And my question for you is: As we prioritize going forward, are 

we going to prioritize testing for all systems beyond GMD? What 

are your priorities for testing going forward? 
19 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, we are very busy over the next 2 to—really, 

2 to 4 years, and we have 12 tests this fiscal year, for example. 

We are going up with a big—our focus is operational testing of 

capabilities such as Aegis Ashore, which we will test this summer 

before Romania is fielded in another operational test, before Poland 

is fielded. To really put it into the tactical combatant commanders’ 

scenario, to completely test an integrated scenario, that is one priority. 

The second priority is to continue to test as capability is developed. Aegis is rapidly developing increased capability with their 

Aegis weapon system baselines and their standard missile evolutions. And then what we don’t talk too much about the sea-based 

terminal defense system, which will be tested this year as well. 

THAAD, again, will be tested this summer as part of the integrated strategy of the operational tests, and I think you will continue to see us test that to prove that confidence to the warfighters. 

So we are testing on all fronts. And it is not just homeland. It is 

the regional defense systems as well. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Admiral Gortney, did you want to add anything? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I am confident that his test schedule is exactly what we need. You are striking the fine line between how 

much test—we would always love to do more testing and more live 

fire tests. Who wouldn’t? But striking that right balance gets confidence in the system, and I have confidence in the system today. 

General MANN. I would just add that I think the cadence is also 

right on track, too. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. ‘‘The cadence’’ meaning the series of tests upcoming? 

General MANN. Exactly. And the frequency of doing those tests 

and when you are able to do them. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. As far as funding, if there was more funding, 

would testing be prioritized going forward? 

Admiral SYRING. That would be one lever we would turn. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. When we think about MDA requesting $96 

million for the fiscal year 2016 technology maturation initiatives to 

build on the success of the discrimination sensors—we talked in my 

office about discrimination and targeting—this includes incorporating an advanced sensor into the MTS [multi-spectral targeting 

system] sensor. 

Has MDA considered allowing competition for these tasks to 

evaluate other proven sensors to meet the technology maturation 

initiative? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. We have gone out to industry with an 

RFI—request for information—recently and are assimilating that 

information and assessing the competitive landscape. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Excellent. 

Fort Sill is in my State of Oklahoma. We are the Fires Center 

of Excellence there at Fort Sill. And Fort Sill is the institutional 

training base for THAAD. And I can tell you that I have been down 

there. What they do is really, really amazing work. The budget request includes $464 million for THAAD procurement to include the purchase of interceptors and training devices 

used at Fort Sill. It looks like there is an increased request in 
20 

THAAD training to account for procuring a radar training device, 

a radar training device. 

Can you describe some of the devices that we are buying from 

a THAAD training standpoint. I guess this would be for General 

Mann or either—— 

Admiral SYRING. Well, let me talk about the radar training device to start with. 

That was really a good cost-based decision for us to make that 

choice. The previous path was to have a full TPY–2 radar there 

tied up for training. And, really, this training device allows us to 

do the same thing in terms of providing the soldier training on that 

device and not tie up a TPY–2 radar. As you know, Mr. 

Bridenstine, we have five TPY–2 radars forward-deployed and then 

seven which will go with the seven THAAD batteries. 

General MANN. As you know, the THAAD requirement is nine 

and right now we have the funding for the sixth. And we are working with MDA on that seventh battery. I mean, we are working the 

force structure. 

I think we have a good handle on providing the manning for 

that. But the equipment, as you well know, is extremely expensive. 

So where you are able to use a training device and not have to tie 

up a radar, that is critically important. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I am out of time. So thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ll yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from the great State of 

Virginia, Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing. 

Gentlemen, thank you. 

And I know you are wearing uniforms. I am not going to put you 

in the political quandary of these money arguments that you have 

had. But I think it would suffice it to say that, if you have the 

money plus the authority to use the money, that meets your demands, and if you don’t get money plus the authority, we are in 

kind of a crisis situation. That is the testimony we heard yesterday. 

I am not going to ask you guys to say this. But the Secretary of 

Defense embarrassed himself yesterday. He lost a lot of credibility 

when he said, even if we got the money and the authority, that he 

would turn it down unless the EPA [Environmental Protection 

Agency] and IRS [Internal Revenue Service] and every other governmental program got sequestration lifted for that. And I am just 

going to tell you that is a travesty and I hope somebody in the Pentagon changes that. 

Mr. McKeon, I want to ask you this question. 2009, the President 

announced the cancellation of his planned deployment of longrange missile defense interceptors and equipment in Poland and 

the Czech Republic and, basically, we put that on Navy ships. 

Is that a fair assertion, that gap, that we used the BMD, that 

we put it on the Navy? 

Mr. MCKEON. The European Phased Adaptive Approach has several phases which we are working through, the first phase being 

a radar in Turkey, second phase we have got some Aegis ships—— 
21 

Mr. FORBES. What additional force structure did that require of 

the Navy, based on that decision? 

Mr. MCKEON. We are forward-deploying four BMD Aegis ships to 

Spain. There are two there now. And there will be two more assigned—or will show up there this year. They have other missions 

that—— 

Mr. FORBES. But if they have that BMD on them, if they don’t 

have the upgraded software, can they do the other missions that 

the Navy would use them for? 

Mr. MCKEON. I better defer to one of the admirals to my left to 

answer that question. 

Admiral GORTNEY. They are BMD ships. They are full-up capable 

ships. The only thing from a Flight IIA capability, they don’t have 

the helicopter platform. But they are able to do the range-of-missile 

test. 

Mr. FORBES. But, basically, Admiral, when you use them for 

BMD, the Navy can’t use them with the flexibility it would have 

used them for other—— 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. The naval component there would be 

constrained to, if it is for a BMD mission, he has to do the BMD 

mission. 

Mr. FORBES. Did the Navy get any additional monies or resources to do that? 

Admiral GORTNEY. We received—I am out of my lane here just 

a little bit. We received the money from MDA to make the necessary upgrades, but we were given no additional platforms to put 

them on. 

Mr. FORBES. So what I am worried about is that—we are worried 

about the number of platforms that the Navy has. And I am just 

looking—in fiscal year 2012 to 2014, I know there were 44 ships 

that the combatant commanders needed based on their BMD requirements. But I am looking at fiscal year 2016. It is bumping up 

to 77. That is a huge jump. 

Can you tell us what is driving that increased demand. And if 

we removed five cruisers from our fleet, how would that impact the 

BMD capabilities that we have, the five with BMD capabilities 

only? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Well, in my previous force provider role, sir, 

the reason for the demand signal going up is the proliferation of 

the theater ballistic missile threat that—the BMD-equipped Aegis 

are a piece of the system of systems to defend that area for. So it 

is because of the proliferation of the threat and the global nature 

of it that demand signal from the COCOMs has gone up. 

The ability to—CNO had to take five BMD upgrades out of the 

budget. The money wasn’t there in order to do it. The downside of 

that is delaying the capability and the op tempo on the forces—the 

operational tempo of those forces that are manned, trained, and 

equipped do that mission today. 

The forward-going to Rota really helped in that regard. When we 

can forward base forces, it reduces that rotational demand signal. 

When they get fully up, that is going to reduce the strain significantly for the east coast force. But it is just the reality and supports the memo that the Chief Staff of the Army and the CNO put 

out on going after the op tempo and going after the cost group. 
22 

Mr. FORBES. So the forward-deployed—the four that we are talking about that went to Rota and then you look at—the destroyers 

were the ones that we did the upgrades on. Is that correct? 

But what about the cruisers? If we took five cruisers out of the 

fleet, would that impede the capability that they have on them? 

How would that impact the deficit that we would have? 

Admiral SYRING. It would impact delivered BMD capability and 

it has been accounted for, Mr. Forbes, in the 43 ships that would 

be delivered by the end of 2020, now given the Navy’s plan to reduce five more. But there is an impact to BMD. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

We are going to be called for votes in just a few minutes, but I 

want to try to get a few more things on the record while we are 

still in open session. 

Mr. McKeon, when you first testified before this committee last 

December, among the responses to Russia’s violation of the INF 

treaty were some ‘‘defensive options.’’ 

Can you tell me, is modification of our Aegis Ashore site—and I 

am thinking specifically in Deveselu, Romania—to provide it with 

some sort of AAW [anti-air warfare] capability that is intrinsic to 

it on our ships—would that be among those options that you are 

considering? 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, I am hesitating because I am not 

at liberty to get into the details on some of the options that we are 

still working through. If I could, I would like to talk to you about 

this a little bit more in the closed session. 

Mr. ROGERS. I will state to you that I proposed this yesterday to 

Secretary Carter in open session because I think it is a very important signal to send, that we intend to protect that site and that 

there are consequences to the aggressive behavior that we have 

seen recently and the capabilities of those missiles that they are illegally testing. 

But, anyway, Admiral Syring, when I asked you about this option last year, you responded it would be essentially a minor hardware and software modification to make this happen. Is that right? 

Admiral SYRING. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. How does the cost and capability compare to other 

options we could deploy, such as the Patriot battery? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, I am not in a position to make that judgment. I am in a position to say that modifications are the same 

that are fielded today on ships at sea, and we are not—the baseline 

is the same, but we have not enabled that capability because it has 

never been about defense of that site from—— 

Mr. ROGERS. I would like to request that, if you could in the next 

couple of weeks, kind of get me some information about what you 

think it would cost to make those modifications to that site. 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. General Mann, do we have any spare Patriot batteries laying around? 

General MANN. No, Congressman. 
23 

Mr. ROGERS. Would you please also get back to me in the next 

couple of weeks as to how much you think it would cost if we were 

to take one of our Patriot batteries which is currently being utilized 

and move it to Deveselu. 

General MANN. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 109.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral Syring, as you know, Chairman Thornberry and Ranking Member Smith are actively engaged across the whole committee with looking at how to reform the acquisition process in 

DOD, which we all agree is broken. 

Tell me why is MDA’s unique acquisition authority still important. 

Admiral SYRING. Well, as you know, Mr. Chairman, it dates back 

to 2002. And the authorities given to MDA were to rapidly develop 

capability and field to the warfighter based on the urgent need not 

just with the homeland defense system, but the regional defense 

systems. 

As you know, the homeland defense system was fielded rapidly 

under those authorities and it was to put a stopgap measure in 

place for the escalation that we were seeing with North Korea, and 

it served its purpose. 

Now we are back increasing the reliability and increasing the capability of that system, but it allowed us to rapidly field that system. It has also allowed us to rapidly field and test THAAD, which 

has been fielded and fielded in numbers and I think greatly helped 

the warfighter in giving them options for deployment to the future. 

I would like to say, sir, we are under a tailored 5000 process. So 

it is not without oversight. We go through a very rigorous process 

in terms of boards leading up to the quarterly Missile Defense Executive Board at the Mr. Kendall level. The programs are under 

strict baseline control that I report every year to Congress. So that 

accountability is there. 

The other part of the authority serves in the JCIDS [Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System] process. And, technically, we are not under—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Under the what process? 

Admiral SYRING. The JCIDS process, the requirements process. 

And that said, we are not completely oblivious to that process. 

We have integrated priorities that are validated by the combatant 

commanders, NORTHCOM in particular and then STRATCOM at 

the higher level, that integrates those priorities. 

And then the last piece would be—but when we need an integrated requirement with Joint Staff sort of buy-in, we are not hesitant to go do that. And we did that with the homeland defense requirement. As I was starting the radar development, as I was 

starting the kill vehicle development, we felt it is imperative that 

we get an overarching requirement from the Joint Staff, and we did 

that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Does anybody else feel like they need to offer anything else on that? Great. 

All right. There goes the votes. Let me try to get something else 

in. 
24 

Last November the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of 

Naval Operations wrote Secretary Hagel detailing their concerns 

about their ability to meet combatant commander requirements for 

missile defense capabilities. 

The Secretary, on the other hand, responded that he concluded 

our strategy is sound and that services should provide viable missile defense capability. 

Admiral Gortney—well, this would be for any one of you. Do you 

share the services, the Navy and Army accept—do your services, 

the Navy and Army, accept the missile defense as a core mission? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. I do view missile defense as a core 

mission. And it is missile defense from the range of capabilities 

that are out there, whether it is a homeland defense mission or 

whether or not it is defending the defended asset list, a shore facility or on a float facility that is out there. It is key. We train to it. 

It is an integrated process. 

General MANN. Sir, it is a core capability for the Army. 

Mr. ROGERS. I want to get back to that initial threshold question 

I started with when I opened this hearing. 

Do you believe that you are going to be able to continue to responsibly maintain that core capability at current sequestration 

spending trend lines? 

General MANN. We are going to be challenged. There is no doubt 

about that. I can tell you that the leadership of the Army closely 

monitors, almost on a weekly basis, the op tempo that we are going 

under. And I think what we are really concerned about is the balance between readiness and science and technology investments. 

And so we talked about the threat evolving and the fact that we 

need to make upgrades to our systems and leverage technology. 

That is at risk under sequestration because we have got to make 

sure that readiness is there to deploy folks downrange. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah. I guess the thing I am trying to get at is: One 

thing we know about the military. You all do a lot of planning, and 

it is the responsible thing to do. You all see what the future holds 

under the BCA defense spending caps in the out-years going forward. 

I am curious to know: Is there a point in 2019, 2020, 2021, whatever, that you say, ‘‘At that point, I have an unfortunately high degree of confidence we will no longer be able to maintain in a responsible fashion that core mission or sustain it’’? And that would 

be for any one of you. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Our ability to predict the future is not very 

good. Just 3 short years ago, when we predicted the international 

security environment that we are in today, we didn’t exactly get 

that right. That is the challenge. 

And so the impacts of the implementation of sequestration is the 

quickest way to hollow the force out. And that hollowness isn’t linear. It is exponential. And it is the way the services have to go 

after readiness in order to do it. But it is not predictive in nature. 

We won’t be able to execute the range of missions that we are supposed to do out there. 

And what further complicates that, if we predict the threats capability wrong and it comes left, now we are in a very, very untenable position. So making the necessary investments and making 
25 

the investments in current readiness, which is investments in future readiness, is absolutely critical. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman from Tennessee wants to ask something. 

Mr. COOPER. This week is so crucial because what we are really 

talking here is fixing a problem that will otherwise plague us for 

the next 7 years. So if we can get a better outcome now, we could 

be saving you gentlemen and your successors a 7-year nightmare 

here. So these talks like Mr. Brooks was talking about with the 

chairman is a very important time for the military to weigh in, 

very clearly. 

Mr. ROGERS. Before we leave, let me ask one more thing. And 

this would be for any one of the three of you. 

Sorry, Mr. McKeon. 

To the extent the Army and Navy are concerned about changing 

the current acquisition approach for missile defense, where are 

their alternatives? And where do you see them in the 2016 FYDP? 

Admiral SYRING. Mr. Chairman, I see opportunity in terms of the 

discussion that is going on within the building in terms of integration of left- and right-of-launch capability. 

In terms of missile defense, can’t be the only measure in terms 

of how we defeat the threat. We are part of a solution that must 

be integrated into an overall combatant commander strategy for defense of the homeland and our regional partners. 

General MANN. Congressman, the only thing that I would add to 

that is I think it is critically important that we really leverage 

partner capabilities. And we know that a lot of countries around 

the world are buying a lot of technologies and are developing a capability. And so we have different exercises, like Nimble Titan, 

where we work with NATO and other partners in the GCC [Gulf 

Cooperation Council] and, also, in Korea and Japan. 

And this has to be more than just a U.S. solution to global missile defense. We have to move out and really take our game to another level in terms of partnering with our allies, in terms of foreign disclosure, in terms of information-sharing, so that it is more 

than just the U.S. addressing this global issue. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. With that, we will recess for about 30 minutes. I think we will then be able to get back in 2337. 

With that, stand in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 10:14 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 19, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 19, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 19, 2015 

(109) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

General MANN. As noted in the Fiscal Year 2016 Army posture statement, demand for Patriot assets ‘‘exceeds our capacity, significantly limiting options in 

emerging crises, and exceed[s] the Army’s ability to meet Department of Defense deployment-to-dwell rotation goals.’’ A deployment of a Patriot Battery to Romania 

would require an adjustment to the current worldwide posture and could delay critical modernization of Patriot equipment. However, if directed by the Department, 

the Army would explore several possible options to provide a Patriot Battery capability to the Deveselu, Romania region. The most cost effective option is a nonpermanent, deployment of a battery from the Continental U.S. to Deveselu. Based 

on very preliminary analysis, the estimated annual tactical movement and operational sustainment costs for a battery is approximately $7,000,000. This estimate 

assumes that current Patriot hardware (missiles, launches, fire control, and radar) 

would be transported to Deveselu and that the battery’s manning would be sourced 

from current Army Patriot force structure. The estimate does not provide for military construction of any personnel quality of life facilities but we expect that, at a 

minimum, items such as physical fitness equipment, laundering facilities, and some 

morale, welfare, and recreational assets would be required. Likely force protection 

infrastructure, such as fencing and personnel for perimeter security, is not included 

in the estimate. Finally, as with all other Patriot locations, there could be other 

operational requirements to provide the desired capability. [See page 23.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 19, 2015 

(113) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. There has been quite a bit of media reporting on the possibility of 

deploying missile defense assets to South Korea and Japan and China’s objections 

to this. Could you speak to these systems? What kind of protection would they provide our allies in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Mr. MCKEON. The Department of Defense maintains a robust set of missile defense capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, including PATRIOT units deployed in 

the Republic of Korea and Japan as well as forward-deployed ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis ships at Yokosuka, Japan. In time of crisis, the Department also 

maintains the ability to surge additional ballistic missile defense capabilities into 

the region in times of crisis in defense of forward-deployed U.S. forces and our allies 

and partners. Although I cannot comment on specific internal deliberations regarding the current and future disposition of these systems, I can say that the Department continually evaluates the global positioning of U.S. ballistic missile defense 

forces in order to meet Combatant Commander requirements, including forces assigned and/or allocated to the defense of U.S. interests on the Korean Peninsula and 

in Japan. 

Mr. ROGERS. Japan already has Aegis ships for the defense of its territory from 

North Korea ballistic missiles. Can you tell me what value you think Aegis Ashore 

could have for Japan? 

Mr. MCKEON. The Aegis Ashore weapon system is currently not available for purchase through the Foreign Military Sales program. Should the U.S. Government decide to make this system available to our allies and partners as an upper-tier capability, it would provide a valuable contribution to a layered ballistic missile defense 

architecture. In the case of Japan, Aegis Ashore would complement the Japanese 

Air and Maritime Self-Defense Force’s existing PATRIOT and sea-based Aegis ballistic missile defense platforms. 

Mr. ROGERS. The intelligence community has remained consistent over the years 

that the Iranians may have an ICBM capability by 2015. Are we still operating 

under that threat analyses? What more can we do to be adequately prepared to defend against this threat? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Iran may attempt to orbit a satellite this year using the 

Simorgh space launch vehicle, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-class 

booster. However, we have no evidence to suggest Iran has developed a reentry vehicle or warhead for the Simorgh, and we assess Iran will not be able to deploy an 

operational ICBM until later this decade at the earliest. Operationally, we are 

ahead of the threat today, but to remain out in front of 2020 adversaries we need 

to continue investments which improve our existing capabilities, such as improving 

our sensor architecture, enhancing the lethality of our kill vehicles, and sustaining/ 

testing the ballistic missile defense system. 

Mr. ROGERS. At the SASC hearing last week, you stated: ‘‘we want every one of 

our kill vehicles to be as effective and as lethal as possible, and as well as the 

means to develop other ways that we can get more kill—kill vehicles into space.’’ 

It sounds like you’re describing the old ‘‘Multiple Kill Vehicle’’ or current ‘‘Multiple 

Object Kill Vehicle.’’ Is that right? Can you please describe how valuable you think 

this capability could be? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I was referring to the need to continue funding high payoff 

technologies that afford us the opportunity to reduce the cost per engagement. The 

Multiple Object Kill Vehicle could be one such program; other programs potentially 

include the rail gun and use of directed energy. In addition, the Redesigned Kill Vehicle will provide improvements in both effectiveness and reliability. Collectively, 

these systems have the potential to provide a layered defense with more overall 

lethality than today’s ballistic missile defense system. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe your strategy for procurement of the CE–2 block 1 

kill vehicle and planned flight tests of that kill vehicle? Is it low risk? Is it consistent with the ‘‘fly before you buy’’ approach to acquisition? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) strategy for procurement 

of the CE–II Block 1 kill vehicle is to deliver 11 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) 

(one test article for Flight Test GBI (FTG)-15 and 10 operational GBIs) on the De-
114 

velopment and Sustainment Contract. This acquisition strategy supports the Secretary of Defense mandate to field and emplace 44 GBIs by the end of 2017. 

The MDA strategy for flight testing the CE–II Block 1 kill vehicles consists of two 

flight tests in advance of fielding the remaining interceptors. The initial flight test, 

Control Test Vehicle (CTV)-02+, scheduled for December 2015, is a non-intercept 

flight test of a CE–II kill vehicle, using alternate divert thrusters. The CE–II kill 

vehicle was successfully demonstrated in Flight Test GBI (FTG)-06b. The second 

event, an intercept test of a fully configured CE–II Block I interceptor (FTG–15), 

is scheduled in December 2016. 

The MDA considers this strategy low risk for several reasons. First, robust ground 

testing of all new CE–II Block I components will ensure they meet space vehicle 

specifications. MDA Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) plans to spend $5.9M 

for boost vehicle electronics reliability testing in fiscal year (FY) 2016 to support this 

effort. Second, the commonality between the existing CE–II kill vehicle and the Configuration I Integrated Boost Vehicle lowers risk by utilizing previously qualified 

flight hardware. GMD plans to spend $3M in FY 2015 and $11.7M in FY 2016 for 

this effort as part of the Stockpile Reliability Program. Third, MDA’s incremental 

approach to flight testing lowers risk by testing the kill vehicle’s alternate divert 

thrusters in an operational environment (CTV–02+) and validating a fully configured CE–II Block 1 (FTG–15) prior to missile field emplacement. 

The intercept flight test in FY 2016 (FTG–15) precedes delivery of the GBIs to 

the warfighter. All components used in the CE–II Block I kill vehicle and boost vehicle will complete space qualification testing prior to procuring the parts used for 

manufacturing. 

Mr. ROGERS. There has been quite a bit of media reporting on the possibility of 

deploying missile defense assets to South Korea and Japan and China’s objections 

to this. Could you speak to these systems? What kind of protection would they provide our allies in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) defers questions regarding 

deployments of missile defense assets in East Asia to the United States Pacific Command. The United States developed the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and the Phased Array Tracking 

Radar to Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) missile defense system. These regional systems have demonstrated the ability to provide protection against short-, mediumand intermediate-range ballistic missiles. South Korea and Japan have purchased 

PATRIOT systems and Japan has Aegis BMD capable ships with Standard Missile 

(SM)-3 Block IAs in addition to a United States-Japan cooperative effort to develop 

the Aegis SM–3 Block IIA. 

Mr. ROGERS. The intelligence community has remained consistent over the years 

that the Iranians may have an ICBM capability by 2015. Are we still operating 

under that threat analyses? What more can we do to be adequately prepared to defend against this threat? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the way ahead on M–O–K–V? How important do you think 

it is and can we move faster on this program? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency plans to award several contracts in 

fiscal year 2016 to define Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV). In parallel, we will reduce technical risk in several critical areas. For example, by 2017, we will develop 

and test command and control strategies in both digital and Hardware-in-the-Loop 

venues to prove we can manage the engagement of several targets using multiple 

kill vehicles from a single interceptor. 

We will also invest in communication architectures and guidance technology that 

support this game-changing approach. Ultimately, this capability will revolutionize 

our missile defense architecture by substantially improving interceptor inventory 

management in raid scenarios against an evolving and more capable threat to the 

homeland. We believe MOKV is an essential element in our defense against advanced threats and that it can also decrease cost-per-kill by reducing the number 

of interceptors required to destroy an incoming reentry vehicle. 

Based upon lessons learned from past development efforts, we are employing a 

disciplined, structured approach to developing this capability. Our plan allows the 

Agency to first understand the feasibility of potential concepts and ensures we mitigate key technology risks before making a decision to develop the MOKV system. 

Mr. ROGERS. Japan already has Aegis ships for the defense of its territory from 

North Korea ballistic missiles. Can you tell me what value you think Aegis Ashore 

could have for Japan? 

Admiral SYRING. Deployment of Aegis Ashore (AA) provides a dedicated system 

that would provide a continuous missile defense capability. Any future Japanese 
115 

purchase and deployment of AA in Japan could free some Japanese Aegis ships to 

support other Aegis missions (e.g. air defense, cruise missile defense, surface defense and undersea defense) or provide redundancy and capacity when facing a raid 

of theater-class missiles. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral, what role, if any, do you see for Aegis Ashore for Homeland 

Defense? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. There has been quite a bit of media reporting on the possibility of 

deploying missile defense assets to South Korea and Japan and China’s objections 

to this. Could you speak to these systems? What kind of protection would they provide our allies in the Asia-Pacific region? 

General MANN. While no agreement currently exists, deployment of the Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system would increase missile defense coverage of both U.S. and allied forces against North Korean’s short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles. A potential THAAD in South Korea, in addition to the existing Patriot Advance Capability–3 (PAC–3) systems, the Army Navy/Transportable 

(AN/TPY–2) Radars, and the THAAD currently deployed to Guam, provides expanded defense in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Mr. ROGERS. The intelligence community has remained consistent over the years 

that the Iranians may have an ICBM capability by 2015. Are we still operating 

under that threat analyses? What more can we do to be adequately prepared to defend against this threat? 

General MANN. The missile defense community concurs with the accuracy of the 

Intelligence Community assessment regarding the possibility of Iran possessing an 

ICBM by 2015. We must continue the Department’s ballistic missile defense modernization efforts, to include the long range discrimination radar and the enhanced 

kill vehicle design. Clarifying details can be provided in the appropriate environment. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. Where do reliability and improving shot doctrine rank in your priorities? Why? 

Mr. MCKEON. Improving Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) reliability and lethality 

is a top priority in the Department of Defense. The planned improvements to the 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system will enable Commander, U.S. 

Northern Command to consider changing the current shot doctrine to make more 

efficient use of the limited number of deployed GBIs. The Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA) is working on GBI reliability and lethality. I defer to MDA to provide the 

details on how MDA is addressing this challenge. 

Mr. COOPER. Where do reliability and improving shot doctrine rank in your priorities? Why? 

Admiral GORTNEY. My top three concurrent priorities are: (1) improve our sensors, 

(2) enhance the lethality of our kill vehicles, and (3) sustain/test the ballistic missile 

defense system. When realized, these priorities will improve ground-based interceptor reliability and may influence my shot doctrine. 

Mr. COOPER. What are the risks of not conducting a flight test before producing 

the SM3–IB interceptors? How much would a flight test cost, versus a ground test? 

Admiral SYRING. While ground testing simulates flight test conditions with high 

confidence, not all flight vibration and shock environments can be replicated exactly 

in ground testing. Therefore, the risk of not conducting a flight test before producing 

the SM–3 Block IB would be not being able to identify a potential unique anomaly, 

which occurs only in flight. However, MDA considers the risk of such a unique 

anomaly occurring in flight to be low due to comprehensive ground test parameters 

that are often more stressing than flight conditions. 

The total cost per flight test is estimated to be $28M. A ground test of a single 

TSRM motor at simulated altitude costs approximately $500K. 

Mr. COOPER. Where do reliability and improving shot doctrine rank in your priorities? Why? 

Admiral SYRING. Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) reliability is one of the Missile 

Defense Agency’s (MDA’s) top priorities. The U.S. Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM) commander determines the appropriate shot doctrine for homeland defense based on the fielded Ballistic Missile Defense System’s capabilities. 

USNORTHCOM fires multiple GBIs at each threat to ensure high defense effectiveness. Firing multiple GBIs at each threat ensures defense even if GBIs have lower 

than expected reliability or target the wrong object. 
116 

MDA is improving both the GBI reliability and sensor/kill vehicle discrimination 

to provide the warfighter with confidence of meeting mission requirements with 

fewer GBIs allocated to each threat. MDA completed a GBI Fleet Assessment last 

year that pointed out the need for improvements in reliability of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, booster, and ground systems. MDA has introduced an enhanced 

Stockpile Reliability Program to better understand the service life and reliability of 

the fielded fleet and is conducting design and reliability analysis on the fielded Capability Enhancement-II GBIs to identify design changes to improve performance. 

The Redesigned Kill Vehicle program will substantially improve reliability for initial 

deployment in 2020. The Long Range Discrimination Radar and discrimination improvements for Homeland Defense will provide higher confidence in the GBI selecting the threat warhead. As reliability and discrimination improve, USNORTHCOM 

can consider changes to shot doctrine which could lead to a lower number of interceptors required to ensure engagement success. 

Mr. COOPER. How do you plan beyond 2020? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) develops the Ballistic Missile 

Defense System (BMDS) out-year plan in collaboration with the Warfighters. Outyear plans are informed by BMD-focused reviews and Analysis of Alternative studies. 

More specifically, the U.S. Strategic Command leads the Warfighter Involvement 

Process, which generates the Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL). MDA, in turn, responds with an Achievable Capabilities List (ACL). BMDS system-level technical 

specifications are derived from this Warfighter-initiated set of requirements. 

Mr. COOPER. Are we on track for deployment of the Aegis Ashore site in Poland 

in 2018? What are the risks of accelerating this deployment to 2017? Are you able 

to accelerate the schedule for operational availability at this point and would you 

recommend acceleration? And would you then need additional SM3–IB interceptors? 

What would the cost be? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is on schedule to deliver 

Aegis Ashore in Poland in 2018 to support the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

Phase 3. At this time, no opportunities exist to accelerate the deployment of Aegis 

Ashore into 2017. The military construction acquisition is progressing, with planned 

construction to begin in Poland in early 2016 and completion in late 2017. Due to 

the critical dependency on completion of military construction, the installation and 

test of the Aegis Ashore system will begin in late 2017 with a planned 2018 completion. Consequently, there are no requirements for additional SM–3 Block IBs in 

2017. 

Mr. COOPER. Where do reliability and improving shot doctrine rank in your priorities? Why? 

General MANN. Operational reliability is my top priority. It provides the 

Warfighter confidence to execute the mission. We continue to support the Missile 

Defense Agency’s investments to the existing ground-based interceptor (GBI) inventory and the development of new GBI capabilities. 

I defer to NORTHCOM regarding the potential impact of improved reliability on 

any modifications to the current shot doctrine. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Understanding an East Coast missile defense site will cost $4 billion (not counting manning and other Army costs), should we begin construction on 

such a site? What are your priorities to strengthen defense of the East Coast? 

Mr. MCKEON. The Department of Defense has made no decision to proceed with 

an additional Continental Interceptor Site (CIS) in the continental United States at 

this time. The current Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) sites at Fort Greely, Alaska, 

and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, provide the capability required to protect the U.S. homeland against current and projected North Korean Intercontinental 

Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threats, as well as the future Iranian ICBM threat, should 

it emerge. Upgrading the kill vehicle on the GBI and enhancing the homeland defense sensor network are the priorities for improving protection against limited 

ICBM attack. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What improvements can and should be made left-of-launch? 

Mr. MCKEON. The Department of Defense continues to explore a wide range of 

technologies to defeat missiles in all phases of flight and ‘‘left of launch.’’ Ballistic 

missile defense systems will remain a vital component of protecting our territory 

and forces from ballistic missile attack, and we will continue to pursue technologies 

to enhance our capabilities to defend against such threats. 
117 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Can you successfully execute the increase in FY16 funding for 

GMD? 

Mr. MCKEON. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President’s Budget request for GroundBased Mid-Course Defense (GMD) has been carefully prepared to reflect the Administration’s priorities for maintaining and improving the nation’s homeland Ballistic 

Missile Defense (BMD) system. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to provide the detailed assessment of how the MDA would execute increased funding. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are we ahead of the threat now? Will we be ahead of the threat 

in 2020? And in 2025? 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes. The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is currently 

ahead of the assessed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat. Planned upgrades to the BMDS, including the Long-Range Discrimination Radar, the Redesigned Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, and sensor discrimination enhancements, will 

enable the BMDS to continue to pace the threat in the 2020 and 2025 timeframe. 

We regularly receive updated intelligence assessments on the development of the 

threat, and we make changes in our programs to keep ahead of the threat, as evidence by the changes to the program announced in March 2013. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Understanding an East Coast missile defense site will cost $4 billion (not counting manning and other Army costs), should we begin construction on 

such a site? What are your priorities to strengthen defense of the East Coast? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I believe that before a decision is made to build a third groundbased interceptor site, we must ensure that our top three concurrent priorities are 

fully realized: (1) improve our sensors, (2) enhance the lethality of our kill vehicles, 

and (3) sustain/test the ballistic missile defense system. In addition, I believe that 

any decision about an East Coast missile defense site should be based upon the 

threat, which currently does not support the need at this time. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What improvements can and should be made left-of-launch? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I believe it is extremely important to invest in left of launch 

capabilities so that attack operations support the full spectrum of offense/defense integration and remain a vital pillar of Integrated Air and Missile Defense. To this 

end, these efforts should focus on making our intelligence and warning capabilities 

more robust against the threat, as well as developing and integrating new technologies into our Integrated Air and Missile Defense portfolio. Finally, these capabilities need to be operationalized across the combatant commands. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Can you successfully execute the increase in FY16 funding for 

GMD? 

Admiral GORTNEY. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is responsible for the execution of funding for the ballistic missile defense programs. As the warfighter, I am 

not the authority on MDA’s programmatic planning. I recommend contacting VADM 

Syring to get the full details on FY16 budget execution. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are we ahead of the threat now? Will we be ahead of the threat 

in 2020? And in 2025? 

Admiral GORTNEY. We are ahead of the threat today, and to remain out in front 

of 2020 and 2025 adversaries, we need to continue investments that expand our existing capabilities, such as improving our sensor architecture, enhancing the 

lethality of our kill vehicles, sustaining/testing of the ballistic missile defense system, investing in advanced technologies to lower the cost per kill, and developing 

a kill assessment capability. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Understanding an East Coast missile defense site will cost $4 billion (not counting manning and other Army costs), should we begin construction on 

such a site? What are your priorities to strengthen defense of the East Coast? 

Admiral SYRING. The Department of Defense has made no decision to proceed 

with an additional CONUS Interceptor Site (CIS) at this time. The current Ground 

Based Interceptor (GBI) sites at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, California, provide the capability necessary to protect the U.S. homeland 

against present and projected North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

(ICBM) threats as well as the future Iranian ICBM threat, should it emerge. Upgrading the kill vehicle on the GBI and enhancing the homeland defense sensor network are the priorities for improving protection against limited ICBM attack. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What improvements can and should be made left-of-launch? 

Admiral SYRING. MDA’s current mission focus is right-of-launch (i.e., active missile defense). Potential left-of-launch questions should be addressed to Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics). 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Can you successfully execute the increase in FY16 funding for 

GMD? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes. The GMD program supports the President’s Budget. The 

GMD program has an acquisition and contracting strategy to fully execute the increase in FY16 funding. Increased activity began in FY15 with the addition of $159 
118 

million in FY14 Above Threshold Reprogramming funds for work to be performed 

in FY15. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are we ahead of the threat now? Will we be ahead of the threat 

in 2020? And in 2025? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, we are staying ahead of the threat. The Ballistic Missile 

Defense System (BMDS) is keeping pace with the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

threat. Upgrades to the BMDS include the Long Range Discriminations Radar, the 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Redesigned Kill Vehicle and discrimination improvements that will allow the BMDS to continue to address threat capabilities in 

the 2020 and 2025 timeframes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Understanding an East Coast missile defense site will cost $4 billion (not counting manning and other Army costs), should we begin construction on 

such a site? What are your priorities to strengthen defense of the East Coast? 

General MANN. We support the Missile Defense Agency’s ongoing efforts to complete the environmental impact studies. These studies are a work in progress designed to streamline implementation should a decision occur in the future. While 

an East Coast site may increase capacity, battlespace, and geographic dispersion, 

the Warfighter’s priority remains sensor architecture and ground-based interceptor 

reliability improvement. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What improvements can and should be made left-of-launch? 

General MANN. It is my view that defeating tomorrow’s threat will require the 

ability to combine active, passive, defensive, and offensive capabilities in a coherent 

strategy. Advancing our ability to strike left-of-launch is essential to outpacing the 

threat. Engaging the ‘‘archer’’ will require improved and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. We must also continue to pursue 

technological development efforts related to non-kinetic defensive capabilities, such 

as cyber warfare and directed energy. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Can you successfully execute the increase in FY16 funding for 

GMD? 

General MANN. With input from the Warfighter, the Missile Defense Agency is responsible for executing the research, development, procurement, and fielding of the 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency to 

respond regarding execution of Fiscal Year 2016 funding. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are we ahead of the threat now? Will we be ahead of the threat 

in 2020? And in 2025? 

General MANN. The Ballistic Missile Defense System is currently ahead of the 

threat and provides the capability to defend the homeland against a limited ballistic 

missile attack from either North Korea or Iran. We continue to partner with the 

Missile Defense Agency, the Combatant Commands, and the Services to ensure we 

address, in a fiscally responsible manner, future ballistic missile threats. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What studies are underway in response to the General Odierno/Admiral Greenert memo, what do they include, what are the timelines for the studies, 

do they cover costs and value provided, and do they cover all the questions posed 

in the memo? 

General MANN. Late last year, the Chief of Staff Army and the Chief of Naval 

Operations sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) suggesting 

a more holistic approach to the nation’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) strategy. 

In his response, the SECDEF outlined several ongoing studies, to include the Strategic Portfolio and the Patriot Global Posture Reviews, which will shape future requirements and inform out-year budget submissions. In addition to these reviews, 

an update to the Joint Capability Mix (JCM) Study is currently underway. Led by 

the Joint Staff, JCM IV will update previous capacity and capability missile defense 

balance assessments within the various combatant command theaters. JCM IV is 

scheduled to conclude later this year. These studies, along with continuous collaboration amongst the Joint Staff and the Services, will outline a refined approach that 

is operationally more effective than the current method of matching specific active 

defense platforms against the various ballistic missile threats. They will address 

cost aspects, outline enhanced capabilities, and set the Department and the Services 

on a joint path to achieve the most efficient and effective mix of homeland and regional missile defense priorities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. Please provide your vision or road map of what enhancements/improvements you believe need to be made to the Ground based Missile Defense 

(GMD) system, including the ground based Interceptors, the sensors, the battle 
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management and the ground support systems, to meet future threats and also insure that the GMD system is reliable and viable into the 2030 time frame? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. How has GMD’s changing funding and support over the years affected the program? In what ways would it help to have your general plan for the 

future of the GMD program formally endorsed by the Congress? 

Admiral SYRING. GMD’s changing funding and support over the years, especially 

the increase from fiscal year (FY) 2015 to FY 2016, has allowed the Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA) to meet its program objectives. Approval of MDA’s President’s Budget 2016 request is sufficient to improve our ability to provide additional capabilities 

to the warfighter for homeland defense. 

The MDA’s FY 2016 budget request will allow us to grow the number of currently 

deployed Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) fleet to 44 by the end of 2017, continue 

flight and system ground testing, and continue Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) development. We will enhance the Stockpile Reliability Program, modify the current 

booster to increase survivability and hardness to support RKV integration, and expand the battle space to enable later GBI engagements. Additionally, MDA will upgrade the GMD ground system, and deploy upgraded GMD fire control software to 

enhance our ability to use land-based sensor discrimination data. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Currently MDA is on a path towards the emplacement of 44 

Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) by the end of 2017 to fulfill current OSD policy 

to meet the growing threat from ballistic missile attack against the Homeland. 

Could you provide an update on where your agency is on meeting this requirement? 

Would additional funding be helpful to meeting this deadline? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency is on schedule to fulfill the requirement of 44 GBIs by 2017. Full support of the MDA’s Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request in 2016 and 2017 is required to meet the 44 GBIs by the 2017 timeframe. 

Mr. COFFMAN. How would an East Coast based sensor enhance the capabilities 

of the GMD system? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Currently the majority of the sensors that support the Ground 

based Missile Defense (GMD) system are ground based radars with the addition of 

the Sea Based X-Band Radar (SBX). What are the natural limitations of sea and 

ground-based sensors? What kinds of tracking and discrimination benefits would a 

space based sensor provide GMD? 

Admiral SYRING. The range of surface-based microwave radars is limited by the 

curvature of the Earth to approximately 800 km for launch warning. The range of 

surface-based optical sensors is determined by the presence or absence of clouds. 

Surface-based radars provide timely and accurate tracks of threat missiles when 

they have a direct line of sight to the objects they are tracking. A more distant target must be further above the Earth for a fixed surface sensor to maintain its track. 

Therefore, surface sensors (either maritime or terrestrial) must be within approximately 800 km of a threat launch to track a substantial portion of its boost phase 

(needed for warning), and within 1500–2500 km of the launch to provide weapon 

guidance for timely intercepts. Access to neutral or friendly bases within detection 

range of potential launch locations may not always be possible, and even where 

available will always be subject to host nation basing restrictions. Ship-based radars 

may require advance notice for pre-positioning. 

Optical sensors offer greatly improved precision and accuracy relative to microwave radars. Unfortunately, optical sensors cannot see through clouds, which makes 

them impractical for viewing long range targets from surface locations in most parts 

of the world. 

Space-based sensors can cover much more of the Earth’s surface than terrestrial 

or maritime sensors. Operating above the weather also allows them to use optical 

sensors that expand the set of measurements available, increasing the reliability of 

threat warhead identification. 

As potential adversaries develop increasingly complex threats it becomes necessary to view the target throughout its flight. The elevation of space platforms enables on-demand global coverage. Obtaining equivalent coverage of the U.S. from 

surface sensors would require substantially more sensors. 

The assessment of space-based sensors to provide tracking and discrimination 

benefits to the Ballistic Missile Defense System, as well as a broad range of other 

alternatives, is being considered in the ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense Sensor Architecture Analysis of Alternatives. 
120 

Mr. COFFMAN. The committee understands that your agency has conducted some 

early work on lasers and airborne platforms for them. Can you share your general 

approach on such a system? 

Admiral SYRING. • Our vision is to shift the calculus of our potential adversaries by introducing 

directed energy into the BMDS architecture. • Our long term goal is to use megawatt-class lasers on high altitude, long endurance UAV platforms to destroy ICBMs in the boost phase at long standoff 

ranges. To achieve this vision we must prove three key elements: laser power 

scaling to megawatt-class with high efficiency and excellent beam quality; demonstrating laser beam pointing stabilization much better than previous airborne 

lasers; and demonstration of a high altitude, long endurance aircraft to carry 

the laser and its beam pointing and control system. • Our PB16 budget funds a structured plan that includes laser power scaling in 

the laboratory in parallel with reducing the risk of integrating a laser system 

onto an airborne platform and testing it in the field. • In the 2025 time frame, our goal is to integrate a compact, efficient, high power 

laser into an unmanned aircraft capable of carrying that laser and destroying 

targets in the boost phase. 

Mr. COFFMAN. What would be the benefits of such a system to our overall Homeland Defense system? 

Admiral SYRING. The benefit of the additional layer of a Directed Energy system 

would potentially reduce the number of threat missiles in a raid from a known 

launch point. 

Mr. COFFMAN. How quickly do you think that such a system could be ready for 

fielding? 

Admiral SYRING. Fielding of an operational system depends on the combination 

of laser scaling success and availability of a sensible operational platform. MDA is 

pursuing the laser scaling effort which could produce an initial viable capability in 

the 2025 time frame. MDA will work with the Services to identify a suitable operational platform. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Do you need additional funds to accomplish the implementation of 

such a system? 

Admiral SYRING. MDA’s PB16 request is adequate for the next phase of Directed 

Energy development. Funding for an operational system would be beyond the current FYDP. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I am especially concerned about North Korea’s progress on longrange missile development. Today, do you see any realistic alternative to fully 

leveraging and improving the GMD system for homeland defense against ICBM 

threats? Are you comfortable with the pace of GMD’s improvements given the real 

threat to the U.S. homeland? 

Admiral SYRING. Improving the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system 

remains the most feasible, near-term alternative for defending the homeland against 

threats from North Korea. With the President’s Budget (PB) for fiscal year 2016, 

we maintain our commitment to expand our inventory to 44 Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) by the end of 2017, continue flight and system ground testing, develop 

the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), enhance the Stockpile Reliability Program, modify the current booster to increase survivability and hardness, expand the battle 

space to enable later engagements, upgrade the ground system, and deploy fire control software that enhances our ability to use discrimination data. 

Our overall vision is to shift the calculus of our potential adversaries by introducing directed energy into the Ballistic Missile Defense System architecture for 

boost phase defense, while also increasing GBI capability, capacity and ability to defeat advanced countermeasures using Multi-object Kill Vehicles. The agency is investing in laser and kill vehicle technologies to achieve this vision. 

Our PB 2016 GMD programs and initiatives enable us to keep pace against the 

North Korean threat to the U.S. homeland. 

Mr. COFFMAN. MDA’s budget justification material regarding the Redesigned Kill 

Vehicle (RKV) program states that, in FY16, MDA will expend funds to ‘‘Initiate robust subsystem Design Verification Testing to include Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3), temperature, vibration and shock environments and Highly Accelerated Lifecycle testing to ensure increased reliability and producibility’’. Does 

MDA plan to use current year (FY15) funds to initiate these activities during FY15 

or instead wait until FY16 to begin these activities? By beginning these activities 

in FY15, would MDA have greater overall confidence in the RKV design and reliability? Does MDA itself plan to conduct these subsystem Design Verification Testing measures or will MDA issue guidance to its suppliers requiring the implementation of such rigorous testing methodologies? 
121 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, MDA is using current year (FY15) funds to initiate RKV 

development and to purchase critical components to support design verification testing. These critical components will be delivered in FY16, and will include E3, temperature, vibration and shock environment testing. We will use FY16 funding to 

conduct highly accelerated lifecycle testing. 

Beginning these activities in FY15, with the purchase of critical components, increases the overall confidence in RKV design and reliability. These activities are required to maintain the program’s schedule. 

While some unique government facilities will be used to conduct specialized subassembly and payload testing, the majority of our verification activities will be conducted by the Contractor in contractor owned and operated facilities. MDA will 

issue guidance to the suppliers requiring them to implement rigorous testing methodologies. 

Mr. COFFMAN. The MDA Report to Congress entitled ‘‘HALT/HASS Testing of Ballistic Missile Defense Systems and Components’’, dated March 24, 2014, asserted 

that several on-going or planned missile defense programs, to include the AN/TPY– 

2 radar CUE CCA redesign, the Long-Range Discrimination Radar, and the GMD 

GBI EKV, would benefit from additional HALT/HASS work if funds were made 

available to do so. What is the status of MDA’s plans to incorporate HALT and/or 

HASS testing on these programs? Does MDA plan to expend funds in FY15 or FY16 

for these activities? If so, please provide a detailed breakout of where and how such 

funds will be allocated for this purpose (by year and by PE). If MDA has no such 

plans, please explain why this is the case in light of the statements included in the 

March 24, 2014 report regarding the potential value of implementing HALT/HASS 

on these programs. 

Admiral SYRING. In November 2014, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) implemented a highly accelerated life test (HALT) and highly accelerated stress screen 

(HASS) policy for all MDA programs. The policy applies to qualification of all new 

development efforts and to redesign efforts that require a delta qualification for an 

existing product baseline. 

MDA will initiate HALT testing in the GMD program in FY15, using FY15 funds. 

GMD plans to spend $5.9 million (M) for Configuration 2 (C2) Boost Vehicle Electronics Reliability Demonstration testing in FY16, which includes the purchase of 

hardware and test planning activities. After the reliability demonstration, MDA can 

reuse the C2 components for HALT activities in FY17. 

In addition, as part of the Stockpile Reliability Program, MDA is pulling a Capability Enhancement-II (CE–II)/Configuration-I GBI from the fleet in FY15. GMD 

plans to spend $3M in FY15 and $11.7M in FY16 to support this effort, which includes reverse flow testing, reliability demonstration and HALT activities on the vehicle’s electronic components. The table below provides the funds allocation breakout 

(by year and program element) for MDA’s efforts to incorporate HALT/HASS testing. 

Also, HALT is included as a requirement in the statement of work for the GMD 

RKV, the Long Range Discrimination Radar, and the AN/TPY–2 radar AEU T1 

Transformer contract request for proposal packages. HALT will be assessed for appropriateness as part of their contract negotiations. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Has MDA considered the potential benefits of implementing HALT 

and/or HASS on possible future MDA programs, for example, the Space-based Kill 

Assessment project or the THAAD Follow-on Program? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) considered the potential 

benefits of implementing the highly accelerated life test and highly accelerated 

stress screen (HALT/HASS) on possible future MDA programs. MDA Policy Memorandum #77, (November 12, 2014), requires evaluation of HALT/HASS for new development and redesign efforts. For potential new programs such as a Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) follow-on effort, a cost/benefit effort will be 

performed for the implementation of HALT. It will be assessed for appropriateness 

as part of contract negotiations. The Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA) project 

started six months before MDA’s HALT/HASS policy was established, so contractual 

documentation did not specifically include HALT/HASS. However, vigorous screening and testing similar to the objectives of HALT/HASS were conducted on SKA as 

part of the space flight qualification requirements. SKA is hosted on a commercial 

spacecraft and was qualified against European Space Agency and National Aeronautics and Space Administration stress and parts screening standards. 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What is the reliability of the GBIs now? And projected for 2020 

and 2025? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How confident are you in the reliability of the CE–I? And in the 

CE–II? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

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