FM 3-24

MCWP 3-33.5

INSURGENCIES AND 

COUNTERING 

INSURGENCIES

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Marine Corps PCN: 143 000124 00 

i 

Field Manual 

No.3-24 

Headquarters 

Department of the Army 

Washington, DC 

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 

No. 3-33.5 

Headquarters 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command 

Department of the Navy 

Headquarters 

United States Marine Corps 

Washington, DC 

13 May 2014 

Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies 

Contents 

Page 

 PREFACE............................................................................................................... v

 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. vii

PART ONE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

Chapter 1 UNDERSTANDING THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT............................................ 1-1

United States’ Strategy and Policy to Counter an Insurgency ........................... 1-4

Land Forces and the Range of Military Operations ............................................ 1-6

Legitimacy and Control ....................................................................................... 1-8

Understanding Unified Action ........................................................................... 1-10

Strategic Principles ........................................................................................... 1-19

Chapter 2 UNDERSTANDING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............................... 2-1

Demographic and Urbanization Trends .............................................................. 2-1

The Operational Variables .................................................................................. 2-2

The Mission Variables and Civil Considerations .............................................. 2-10

Chapter 3 CULTURE........................................................................................................... 3-1

Understanding Culture ........................................................................................ 3-1

Assessing a Cultural Situation ............................................................................ 3-2

Organizing to Understand Culture ...................................................................... 3-4
Contents 

ii FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

PART TWO INSURGENCIES

Chapter 4 INSURGENCY PREREQUISITES AND FUNDAMENTALS .............................. 4-1

Intrastate War ...................................................................................................... 4-1

Insurgency Prerequisites .................................................................................... 4-3

Insurgency Fundamentals ................................................................................... 4-5

Other Analytical Frameworks ............................................................................ 4-22

Chapter 5 INSURGENCY THREAT CHARACTERISTICS ................................................. 5-1

Disposition and Activities .................................................................................... 5-1

Support Activities ................................................................................................ 5-3

Associated Threats ............................................................................................. 5-5

PART THREE COUNTERINSURGENCIES

Chapter 6 MISSION COMMAND AND COMMAND AND CONTROL ................................ 6-1

Command in Counterinsurgency ........................................................................ 6-1

Headquarters Use In Counterinsurgency ........................................................... 6-4

Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Synchronization .............. 6-5

Chapter 7 PLANNING FOR COUNTERING INSURGENCIES ........................................... 7-1

Conceptual Planning ........................................................................................... 7-4

Transitions ......................................................................................................... 7-10

Operational Considerations .............................................................................. 7-12

Information Operations ..................................................................................... 7-18

Chapter 8 INTELLIGENCE .................................................................................................. 8-1

Intelligence Fundamentals .................................................................................. 8-2

All-Source Intelligence ........................................................................................ 8-3

Human Intelligence ............................................................................................. 8-4

Chapter 9 DIRECT APPROACHES TO COUNTER AN INSURGENCY ............................ 9-1

Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition Framework .................................................. 9-1

Other Direct Enablers ....................................................................................... 9-11

Chapter 10 INDIRECT METHODS FOR COUNTERING INSURGENCIES........................ 10-1

Nation Assistance and Security Cooperation ................................................... 10-1

Generational Engagement ................................................................................ 10-2

Negotiation and Diplomacy ............................................................................... 10-4

Identify, Separate, Isolate, Influence, and Reintegrate ..................................... 10-6

Other Indirect Enablers ................................................................................... 10-10

Chapter 11 WORKING WITH HOST-NATION FORCES .................................................... 11-1

Assessing and Developing a Host-Nation Force .............................................. 11-2

Relationships ..................................................................................................... 11-6

Security Cooperation Planning ......................................................................... 11-8

Chapter 12 ASSESSMENTS ............................................................................................... 12-1

Assessment Frameworks .................................................................................. 12-1

Assessment Methods ........................................................................................ 12-2

Assessment Considerations ............................................................................. 12-2

Developing Measurement Criteria .................................................................... 12-3
Contents 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 iii 

Chapter 13 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................ 13-1

Authority to Assist A Foreign Government ....................................................... 13-1

Rules of Engagement ....................................................................................... 13-2

Law of War ....................................................................................................... 13-2

Non-International Armed Conflict ..................................................................... 13-7

Detention and Interrogation .............................................................................. 13-8

Enforcing Discipline of U.S. Forces ................................................................ 13-10

Training and Equipping Foreign Forces ......................................................... 13-11

Commander’s Emergency Response Program .............................................. 13-12

Claims and Solatia .......................................................................................... 13-13

Establishing the Rule of Law .......................................................................... 13-13

 SOURCE NOTES .......................................................................... Source Notes-1

 GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1

 REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1

 INDEX .......................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures 

Figure 1-1. Country team command relationships ............................................................... 1-17

Figure 4-1. Conflict resolution model ................................................................................... 4-15

Figure 4-2. Organizational elements of an insurgency ......................................................... 4-16

Figure 4-3. Networked insurgencies ..................................................................................... 4-18

Figure 4-4. Examples of dyads ............................................................................................. 4-19

Figure 4-5. Examples of dyad networks ............................................................................... 4-21

Figure 4-6. Example of changes to tactics based on density shift ....................................... 4-22

Figure 7-1. Design concept .................................................................................................... 7-5

Figure 7-2. Sample of individual lines of effort ....................................................................... 7-9

Figure 9-1. The capability spectrum of counterinsurgency conflict ........................................ 9-5

Figure 9-2. Example of a possible transition framework ...................................................... 9-11

Figure 10-1. Generational engagement ............................................................................... 10-2

Figure 10-2. Negotiation and diplomacy ............................................................................... 10-5

Figure 11-1. Host-nation security force meter ...................................................................... 11-5

Figure 11-2. Counterinsurgency command relationships ..................................................... 11-6

Figure 11-3. Country planning .............................................................................................. 11-9

Figure 11-4. Phases of building a host-nation security force ............................................. 11-11

Figure 13-1. Provisions binding high contracting parties ..................................................... 13-8

Tables 

Table 1-1. Ends, ways, means, and risk in countering an insurgency ................................... 1-5

Table 2-1. Interrelated dimensions of the information environment ....................................... 2-8
Contents 

iv FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

Table 11-1. Developing a host-nation security force ........................................................... 11-1

Table 11-2. Host-nation contributions ................................................................................ 11-13

Table 13-1. Extract of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ................................................ 13-9
13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 v 

Preface 

Field Manual (FM) 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 provides doctrine for Army 

and Marine units that are countering an insurgency. It provides a doctrinal foundation for counterinsurgency. 

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is a guide for units fighting or training for counterinsurgency operations. 

The principal audience for FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is battalion, brigade, and regimental commanders and their 

staffs. Commanders and staffs of Army and Marine Corps headquarters serving as joint task force or 

multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of 

military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army and Marine 

Corps will also use this publication. 

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States 

(U.S.), international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their 

Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.) 

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 implements standardization agreement (STANAG) 2611. 

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint, Army, and Marine Corps terms and 

definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For terms and their definitions shown in the text, the term is 

italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. 

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 applies to the United States Marine Corps, the Active Army, Army National 

Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. 

The proponent of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing 

agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send 

comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank 

Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D 

(FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to 

usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. 
Preface 

vi FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

“Al-Sahawa: An Awakening in Al Qaim.” Dr. William Knarr. The Combating Terrorism Exchange Journal. 

Copyright © 2013. Institute for Defense Analyses. Reproduced with permission of the Institute for Defense 

Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. 

“If a Tactic Works in This Province, it Might Not Work in The Next: The Case of the Dan Aw Patan District, 

Afghanistan, 2010.” Combat Studies Institute. Unpublished article. 2013. Reproduced with permission of the 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

“Intelligence and the Shining Path.” Christopher Paul. Unpublished article. 2013. RAND National Defense 

Research Institute. Reproduced with permission of the RAND Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

 “Laos, 1959-1975.” Christopher Paul. Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. Copyright © 2013. 

RAND National Defense Research Institute. Reproduced with permission of the RAND Corporation, 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

“Philippines (Huk Rebellion) 1946-1956.” Molly Dunigan. Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. 

Copyright © 2013. RAND National Defense Research Institute. Reproduced with permission of the RAND 

Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

“Regimental Command in Counterinsurgency.” Brigadier General W. Blake Crowe, United States Marine 

Corps. Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond. 2011. Marine Corps University Press. 

Reproduced with permission of the Marine Corps University Press, Quantico, Virginia. 

“Security Cooperation in El Salvador.” Christopher Paul. Unpublished article. 2013. RAND National Defense 

Research Institute. Reproduced with permission of the RAND Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

“South Vietnam, 1960-1975” Christopher Paul. Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. Copyright 

© 2013. RAND National Defense Research Institute. Reproduced with permission of the RAND Corporation, 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

“Sri Lanka, 1976-2009.” Colin P. Clarke. Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. Copyright © 

2013. RAND National Defense Research Institute. Reproduced with permission of the RAND Corporation, 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

 
13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 vii 

Introduction 

The 2006 version of FM 3-24/ MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, filled an important doctrinal gap at a 

time when U.S. forces were engaged in counterinsurgency operations. This version of 

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 builds on that important manual. This field manual provides doctrine that frames 

counterinsurgency within the context of the range of military operations and provides a framework for the 

different ways land forces could counter an insurgency. Understanding insurgencies and the operational 

environment in which they exist, the ways in which the U.S. will attempt to counter insurgencies, and how 

commanders synchronize their efforts to achieve end states is at the core of what this manual provides to 

both the Army and the Marine Corps. 

This version is organized differently than the 2006 version. The new title, Insurgencies and Countering 

Insurgencies, provides insight into the thinking behind the organization. Overall, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is 

divided into three parts. Part one provides strategic and operational context, part two provides the doctrine 

for understanding insurgencies, and part three provides doctrine for defeating an insurgency. In short, 

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is organized to provide the context of a problem, the problem, and possible 

solutions. 

Part one, the “Strategic and Operational Context,” provides a framework for understanding the environment 

where a counterinsurgency exists. Part one consists of chapters one through three. 

Part two, “Insurgencies,” provides a doctrinal framework for understanding an insurgency. Part two 

consists of chapters four and five. 

Part three, “Counterinsurgencies,” describes how to plan and execute operations to enable a host nation to 

defeat an insurgency. 

Chapter 1, “Understanding the Strategic Context,” answers the questions of how and why U.S. forces might 

get involved in a counterinsurgency. Chapter 1 highlights that there are many different ways U.S. forces 

could counter an insurgency and that there are a range of various contexts in which an insurgency can 

occur. Commanders and staffs must understand the conditions in which an insurgency occurs and the 

overall strategy for countering that insurgency so they can effectively support it. 

Chapter 2, “Understanding an Operational Environment,” provides context for an operational environment 

where an insurgency might be occurring. 

Chapter 3, “Culture,” describes the role of culture in counterinsurgency operations. Understanding culture 

is essential in any effort to support a counterinsurgency effort. Culture is of unique importance in 

understanding an operational environment. 

Chapter 4, “Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals,” provides doctrine for understanding the 

prerequisites of an insurgency and the root causes that allow an insurgency to keep and gain legitimacy. It 

than provides a framework for understanding the strategic decisions an insurgency might make and eight 

dynamics for analyzing any particular insurgency. 

Chapter 5, “Insurgency Threat Characteristics,” provides doctrine for understanding the threat 

characteristics of an insurgency. 

Chapter 6, “Command and Control and Mission Command,” provides doctrine for executing command and 

control under the philosophy of mission command. In a counterinsurgency effort, many units may perform 

many different tasks in decentralized operations. Understanding decentralized operations and ensuring 

these units are meeting the overall commander’s intent is essential for successful counterinsurgency 

operations. 

Chapter 7, “Planning and Operational Considerations,” provides guidance on how commanders and staffs 

can work from conceptual planning to detailed planning in counterinsurgency operations. It also provides 
Introduction 

viii FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

important operational considerations, such as attack the network, that are essential in counterinsurgency 

operations. 

Chapter 8, “Intelligence,” provides considerations for intelligence in counterinsurgency. Because 

understanding the environment is essential in counterinsurgency, intelligence facilities successful 

operations. 

Chapter 9, “Direct Approaches to Counter an Insurgency,” provides guidance on how the Army and the 

Marine Corps directly counter an insurgency at the operational and tactical level. The operational 

philosophy behind the direct approach is shape-clear-hold-build-transition. If tactical units are directly 

interfacing with a society, they will perform shape-clear-hold-build-transition. In addition to guiding U.S. 

forces’ actions, shape-clear-hold-build-transition also provides a framework for understanding host-nation 

actions. If U.S. forces have to be the primary counterinsurgency force until the host nation can deploy its 

forces, shape-clear-hold-build-transition provides an effective operational approach. 

Chapter 10, “Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies,” provides a framework for working with and 

through a host nation. While the U.S. may provide the primary counterinsurgent forces, it may also work 

indirectly through the host nation. There are also important indirect enablers. 

Chapter 11, “Working with Host-Nation Forces,” provides a foundation for understanding how security 

cooperation efforts are integrated into a counterinsurgency effort. Whether U.S. forces are, for a time, the 

primary counterinsurgent forces or they are working indirectly through a host nation, enabling the host 

nation through security cooperation activities is essential. 

Chapter 12, “Assessments,” provides doctrine for understanding how a counterinsurgency environment 

changes and determining if counterinsurgent actions are having an effect on achieving the desired end state. 

Continued assessments are fundamental to understanding how an environment is evolving and reframing 

the basic problems commanders and staffs are facing. 

Chapter 13, “Legal Considerations” provides some legal considerations that are important for commanders 

and staffs to consider in all counterinsurgency operations. 

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 provides doctrine on how to understand a counterinsurgency environment, 

determine the counterinsurgency problem, and plan and execute operations in that environment. It provides 

guidance to commanders and staffs facing the unique challenges of countering an insurgency. This field 

manual is one manual in a larger doctrinal library that commanders and staffs need to understand in order 

to be effective in countering an insurgency. Any effort to counter an insurgency must be built on broad 

professional competence. 

The Army uses the term intelligence preparation of the battlefield while the Marine Corps uses the term 

intelligence preparation of the battlespace. Both Services use the same definition for these terms. This 

manual uses the term intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace to align with

FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A. 
13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 1-1 

PART ONE 

Strategic and Operational Context 

When the United States (U.S.) conducts or supports counterinsurgency operations, it 

does so in a unique strategic and operational environment. While this is true for all 

operations, this is of particular importance when the U.S. is countering an 

insurgency. Tactical actions often have strategic effects in a counterinsurgency. This 

makes it essential to understand both the strategic and operational context when 

countering an insurgency. In this manual, part one provides an overview for 

commanders and staff to understand the environment and context of an insurgency 

and the decision to counter that insurgency. Chapter 1 provides the strategic context 

of a counterinsurgency. When the U.S. becomes involved in a counterinsurgency, 

policy and strategic decisions affect operations. Chapter 2 provides an overview of 

an operational environment and operational variables. In a counterinsurgency, there 

are unique considerations that operators and planners consider. Of particular 

importance in a counterinsurgency is culture. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth 

overview of culture and its relationship to counterinsurgency. 

Chapter 1 

Understanding the Strategic Context 

1-1. Any decision by the President to commit United States (U.S.) forces must be understood within the 

larger sphere of U.S. policy. Soldiers and Marines must first understand the strategic context that the U.S. 

is acting in to best plan, prepare, conduct, and assess a counterinsurgency operation to protect national 

interests. Countering an insurgency should incorporate previous or continuing security cooperation efforts 

and other activities, U.S. and host-nation objectives, and U.S. and host-nation whole-of-government efforts 

to address the root causes of the conflict. (For more information on root causes, see paragraphs 4-14 

through 4-22.) Despite its irregular nature and generally less intense level of combat, counterinsurgency 

may be just as critical to U.S. vital interests as conventional warfare. 

1-2. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence 

over the relevant population(s) (JP 1). Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ 

the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. 

Because of its irregular nature, U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgency demands a whole-of-government 

approach. Defeating an insurgency requires a blend of both civilian and military efforts that address both 

assisting the host-nation government in defeating the insurgents on the battlefield and enabling the host 

nation in addressing the root causes of the insurgency. Moreover, after large scale combat or in an 

ungoverned space, there may not be a functioning host-nation government. In those cases, U.S. forces must 

work with population groups in the area and enable them to build governmental capacity. In either case, 

U.S. civilian and military participants in counterinsurgency cannot compensate for lack of will, acceptance 

of corruption, or counterproductive behavior on the part of the supported government or the population. 

1-3. Insurgency in the most basic form is a struggle for control and influence, generally from a position of 

relative weakness, outside existing state institutions. Insurgencies can exist apart from or before, during, or 

after a conventional conflict. Elements of a population often grow dissatisfied with the status quo. When a 
Chapter 1 

1-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

population or groups in a population are willing to fight to change the conditions to their favor, using both 

violent and nonviolent means to affect a change in the prevailing authority, they often initiate an 

insurgency. An insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge 

political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself (JP 3-24). Counterinsurgency is 

comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and 

address its root causes (JP 3-24). Warfare remains a clash of interests and will between organized groups 

characterized by the use of force. In conventional warfare, there are clear determinants of victory. 

However, achieving victory for an insurgent may depend less on defeating an armed opponent and more on 

a group’s ability to garner support for its political interests (often ideologically based) and to generate 

enough violence to achieve political consequences. 

1-4. Counterinsurgency is not a substitute for strategy. When counterinsurgents attempt to defeat an 

insurgency, they perform a range of diverse methods intended to counter an insurgency. Commanders must 

effectively arrange these diverse methods in time and space to accomplish strategic objectives. The U.S. 

can use a range of methods to aid a host nation or group in defeating an insurgency. The various 

combinations of these methods with different levels of resourcing provide the U.S. with a wide range of 

strategic options to defeat an insurgency. The strategy to counter an insurgency is determined by the ends 

the U.S. wishes to achieve, the ways it wishes to achieve those ends, and the resources or means it uses to 

enable those ways. (See paragraphs 1-10 through 1-13 for more information on strategy.) 

1-5. There is a spectrum of involvement in countering an insurgency. The U.S. could enable a host nation 

by not providing forces that are directly involved in securing the population or attacking the insurgents. For 

example, the U.S. could provide training or intelligence support to a host nation. Moreover, even if the U.S. 

is directly involved in defeating the insurgency, its primary role can be only to enable a host nation. A host 

nation may be capable of providing civil control and security. The U.S. commander can integrate a force 

into the host-nation’s efforts that provides a force to perform direct action or fires provided by airpower or 

field artillery. U.S. involvement can range from a modest and supporting commitment to a major ground 

force commitment that may, for a time, take the role of primary counterinsurgent force while host-nation 

forces become better able to take on that role themselves. 

1-6. Ideally, the host nation is the primary actor in defeating an insurgency. Even in an insurgency that 

occurs in a country with a nonfunctioning central government or after a major conflict, the host nation must 

eventually provide a solution that is culturally acceptable to its society and meets U.S. policy goals. The 

conclusion of any counterinsurgency effort is primarily dependent on the host nation and the people who 

reside in that nation. Ultimately, every society has to provide solutions to its own problems. As such, one of 

the Army and Marine Corps’ primary roles in counterinsurgency is to enable the host nation. 

1-7. A counterinsurgency can occur as part of a major combat operation, but it often occurs without a 

major conflict. For example, an external threat may sponsor an insurgency, and this could be part of an 

effort to attain other strategic objectives. As such, the objectives of a counterinsurgency must be contextual 

to that insurgency. Creating objectives that are relevant to a particular insurgency is essential to defeating 

that insurgency. Effective counterinsurgency requires clearly defined and obtainable objectives that result 

in an end state acceptable to the host-nation government, the populace, and the governments providing 

forces. When the U.S. directly involves itself in a counterinsurgency, stability may be essential. Although 

all tasks executed to establish the conditions to reach a desired end state are significant, stability operations 

may be critical in a counterinsurgency. (The Army understands all operations are made up of offensive, 

defensive, and stability tasks. See ADRP 3-07 and FM 3-07 for more information on operations focused on 

stability.) 

1-8. The military role should be coordinated with the other instruments of national power that include 

diplomatic, informational, and economic parts. The Army and Marine Corps are only part of the 

instruments of national power that the U.S. can use to counter an insurgency. At times, they may be used in 

a supporting role. For example, Soldiers and Marines may be withdrawn from active counterinsurgency 

efforts while the U.S. uses other instruments of national power as the primary enablers of a host nation. In 

such cases, the Army and Marine Corps may play a supporting role by performing security cooperation 

tasks. 

1-9. The Laos insurgency highlights the unique nature of an insurgency. This insurgency took place in the 

context of Vietnam. Here, internal groups with various interests and outside groups from North Vietnam 
Understanding the Strategic Context 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 1-3 

and the U.S. created a unique context for the Laos insurgency. Moreover, the corrupt and ineffective host 

government was not able to wage its own counterinsurgency campaign effectively. To effectively counter 

the insurgency in Laos, the U.S. needed an operational approach that would work in that environment, if a 

successful operational approach were possible. Unfortunately, U.S. forces failed to create an effective 

strategy to counter the insurgency in Laos. Thus, the U.S. government failed to find the needed ways and 

means to meet the policy goal. 

The Laos Insurgency 

 Lamented as “the forgotten war,” the insurgency in Laos was heavily 

influenced (and often overshadowed) by the conflict in neighboring Vietnam. A victim 

of geography, half-hearted fighting between the different factions in Laos may well 

have worked itself out in a lasting compromise if not for pressure from North 

Vietnamese communists to control areas of Laos for the infiltration of men and 

materiel into South Vietnam (along the Ho Chi Min trail) and U.S. efforts to oppose 

communist presence and influence. 

 Beginning in earnest in 1959, fighting pitted variously rightist Royal Lao 

forces supported by Hmong guerillas against the leftist Pathet Lao (indigenous 

communists) and their North Vietnamese supporters. These participants were at 

times joined by other players, including U.S. advisors, Filipino troops, U.S. air power, 

Thai commandos and artillery formations, as well as “neutralist” Lao forces. During 

the period of conflict, Laos was underdeveloped in every way, including its 

government, its economy, and its military. The government and military were corrupt 

and ineffective and the economy was wholly dependent on outside support. 

 As the United States became more invested in Vietnam, it also increased 

support to Laos; by the end of 1955, the U.S. provided 100% of the Lao military 

budget. North Vietnamese backers of the Pathet Lao sought to grow that force, 

supporting a significant recruiting campaign and sending many of the recruits to 

North Vietnam for schooling and training. This led to greater investment by the U.S. 

in materiel and training for government forces, and included, beginning in 1957, 

efforts to arm Hmong guerillas, who would play an important role later in the conflict. 

 Vietnamese interest in Laos was primarily in securing the so called 

“panhandle” region, through which the Ho Chi Min trail allowed the North Vietnamese 

to infiltrate men and materiel into South Vietnam. A secondary consideration was the 

support of a fellow communist movement (the Pathet Lao). Once fighting began in 

1959, the Vietnamese used government chaos to their benefit, increasing attacks on 

government forces and expanding the territory under their influence or control. During 

this period, many attacks took the form of North Vietnamese Army regulars attacking 

and overwhelming a position, and then letting their Pathet Lao allies occupy the area 

and claim the victory, thus at least paying lip service to maintaining the neutralization 

of Laos. 

 These North Vietnamese Army-led attacks and several attempted 

counterattacks by Royal Laotian Forces against Pathet Lao positions revealed the 

gross incompetence of the government’s regular forces. This lack of capability 

stemmed from several sources, including a half-hearted martial tradition in general, a 

preoccupation with profiteering and political games by the senior leadership, lack of 

efforts by the French who were responsible for their training until late 1958, and a 

fundamental lack of motivation. Despite the vigorous efforts of U.S. trainers and 

millions of dollars in materiel throughout the course of the conflict, Royal Lao Forces 

would never become a consequential fighting force. In this phase, the only effective 

forces on the government side were the Hmong tribesmen, trained and provisioned 

by the Central Intelligence Agency and fighting as guerillas. 

 International pressure (from the United States as well as from China and 

Russia preferring to avoid unnecessarily provoking the United States) and support 

(from the United States and other allies) prevented the complete collapse of the 

government of Laos in 1962 and pushed for neutralization through a coalition 
Chapter 1 

1-4 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

government. The North Vietnamese were content to allow negotiations to take place, 

as they had succeeded in securing what they needed: the Ho Chi Min trail. After 

months of wrangling, 1962 finally saw another Geneva agreement, this time for a 

neutralized Laos with a coalition government representing the three major factions: 

the rightists, the leftists, and the neutralists. Part of the neutralization agreement 

included the removal of foreign forces from Laos. While U.S. and allied personnel 

who had been fighting on the side of the Royal Lao Government were withdrawn from 

the country, very few of the substantial number of North Vietnamese Army forces 

withdrew. Nor did the Central Intelligence Agency cease its work with the Hmong. 

 The new coalition government proved shaky. Turmoil again rocked the Lao 

government with continued political maneuvering by greedy generals and a string of 

coups. Military region commanders ran their zones like private fiefdoms, rarely 

dispatching their troops outside the Mekong River valley. A series of spectacular 

failures by the Royal Lao forces all but ensured those forces would never seek to 

take the initiative and act in other than a strictly defensive capacity again. Between 

1964 and 1968, the conflict was primarily between the U.S.-supported paramilitaries 

(backed by U.S. airpower), and the Pathet Lao. The cycle of dry season and wet 

season, each favoring one side or the other, saw very modest back and forth 

movement between the two primarily irregular forces, with little change from year to 

year. That all changed in 1969. The communist dry season offensive of 1968 did not 

end with the onset of the rainy season, and gains were substantial. In early 1970, the 

communists seized a provincial capital for the first time, and later that year they 

seized another. 

 In the now traditional way, Hmong guerillas counterattacked. However, after 

nearly a decade of war, the Central Intelligence Agency’s secret army was nearly 

fought out. Fighting against superior numbers of regular troops, the Hmong became 

more and more reliant on U.S. airpower and on support from Thai artillery. Bombing 

in southern Laos expanded such that by 1971, it was more extensive than bombing 

in South Vietnam and Cambodia combined. 

 The communist dry season offensive that started in December of 1971 

brought extraordinary pressure on the government. For the first time, North 

Vietnamese Army forces used significant armor, as well as large tube artillery. The 

Hmong were battered and quickly thrown back. After another year of significant 

communist gains, the Lao government and its international supporters once again 

sought a ceasefire. 

 By the time of the 1973 ceasefire and neutralization, the government of 

Laos controlled little more than the capital and the Mekong river valley, and that only 

by virtue of the Hmong and U.S. airpower. With the withdrawal of U.S. support (both 

airpower and funding) in 1973, the Hmong were demobilized and the Lao 

government was left to its fate, which was to fall relatively quickly to the communists. 

UNITED STATES’ STRATEGY AND POLICY TO COUNTER AN 

INSURGENCY 

1-10. When and how the U.S. government provides assistance to other states to counter an insurgency is a 

question of policy and strategy. Commanders and staffs should understand that the U.S. can respond with a 

range of measures, many of which do not directly involve U.S. forces securing the population or 

performing offensive operations, in a counterinsurgency. This manual provides the reader with information 

on how counterinsurgents may organize tactical tasks in time and space to reach an end state. It cannot and 

should not be the only reference to conduct counterinsurgency operations for someone who wishes to fully 

understand the policy tools available to the U.S. to aid a host nation in fighting a counterinsurgency. (See 

JP 3-24, Allied Joint Publication 3.4.4, and the U.S. Government Guide to Counterinsurgency for more 

information on counterinsurgency policy tools.) 
Understanding the Strategic Context 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 1-5 

1-11. Effective counterinsurgency operations require an understanding of the military profession. The tasks 

counterinsurgents perform in countering an insurgency are not unique. It is the organization of these tasks 

in time and space that is unique. For example, geographic combatant commanders employ theater strategy 

to align and shape efforts, resources, and tasks to support strategic goals and prepare for conflict and 

contingencies in their region. In support of this goal, theater strategies normally emphasize security 

cooperation activities, building partner capacity and force posture, and preparing for contingencies and 

other tasks those are not unique to counterinsurgency operations. For example, a unit can perform security 

cooperation tasks in support or not in support of countering an insurgency. (See FM 3-22 for more 

information on security cooperation tasks.) Those units that carry out security cooperation tasks to support 

a counterinsurgency should understand security cooperation and the tasks they are performing and 

teaching. Moreover, they should understand how these tasks are used in defeating an insurgency. Soldiers 

and Marines must start from a foundation of professional knowledge and competence to have a framework 

for understanding and aiding a host nation in defeating an insurgency. Whether a unit is directly performing 

the tasks to defeat an insurgency or indirectly supporting a host nation, this manual provides a doctrinal 

framework for counterinsurgency operations. However, to be effective, Soldiers and Marines must be 

professionally competent. This is the foundation in understanding another nation’s or group’s actions to 

defeat an insurgency and in providing aid to that nation or group. (See ADRP 1 for more information on 

professional competence.) 

1-12. Political leaders and commanders must have a dialogue to decide the optimal strategy to meet the 

security needs of the U.S and states or groups the U.S. supports. Different capabilities provide different 

choices that offer different costs and risks. U.S. strategy is defined by how it combines these capabilities 

(the ways), resources them (the means), and its willingness to accept risk in attaining its policy goals. 

Commanders inform political leaders about the prospects for victory and the different costs and risks of 

various options, and political leaders weigh these costs and risks against their importance to U.S. national 

interests. Once U.S. policymakers have determined the goals (the ends) of the U.S., the military evaluates 

operational approaches to conduct counterinsurgency efforts depending on the ends, ways, means, and 

acceptable risk. The joint force provides a range of capabilities that it integrates into the overall strategy. 

For example, in a functioning state that is facing an insurgency, the joint force may employ a range of 

security cooperation tools. Moreover, other tools fall outside of security cooperation, such as direct action 

and counter threat financing, that the U.S. can integrate into the mix of ways that it will use to defeat or 

contain an insurgency. The U.S. government integrates the various instruments of national power to create 

a range of strategic options, of which military involvement is only one part. (For a further discussion on 

strategy, see MCDP 1-1.) (See table 1-1.) 

Table 1-1. Ends, ways, means, and risk in countering an insurgency 

Ends Ways Means Risk 

Defeat or contain an 

insurgency. 

Support strategic goals 

and end state defined by 

policy makers. 

Direct methods 

(See chapter 9.) 

Indirect methods 

(See chapter 10.) 

Unified action 

• Military force. 

• Other 

governmental 

capabilities 

Determined by a 

mismatch in the 

ends, ways, and 

means. 

1-13. An operational approach is a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform 

current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 3-0). The commander may use direct or indirect 

approaches to counter threats. Commanders may find their operational approach is mainly direct, indirect, 

or a mixture of both. The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a center of gravity. 

A direct approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity or principal strength by applying combat power 

directly against it. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity by applying combat power 

against a series of decisive points that lead to the defeat of the center of gravity while avoiding the enemy 

strength. Commanders may use a single direct or indirect approach or, more likely, may employ a 

combination of approaches to counter an insurgency and its influence. Additionally, the emphasis on or 

combination of approaches may have to evolve as the security situation and insurgent networks evolve. The 

commander’s intent and the approach(es) the commander selects will drive the methods used by 

counterinsurgents. These methods may be direct or indirect. Approaches and methods must be nested and 
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1-6 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

clearly linked, since they often involve support from diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts by 

non-military forces. (See chapter 9 for more information on direct methods and chapter 10 for more 

information on indirect methods. See JP 5-0 for more information on direct and indirect approaches.) 

LAND FORCES AND THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 

1-14. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps can prevent or defeat an insurgency across the range of military 

operations. This is true if an insurgency starts in the context of a major combat operation or if it starts 

during peace. Across the range of military operations and in accordance with U.S. strategy, U.S. land forces 

take actions and set priorities to shape an environment to reduce the possibility of insurgencies. In some 

instances an operational environment and its related variables are unstable or fragile and hostile actions 

against a host-nation government begin. In this environment, the U.S. may make a decision to use some 

type of military capability. Commanders must understand the effects that the actions and priorities of the 

U.S. force have on an operational environment. When acting in this environment, commanders must have 

situational understanding of the environment and the effects of U.S. actions in that environment. This 

influences how the commander attempts to shape the environment. An insurgency can also occur in the 

context of another conflict. For example, during major combat operations, land forces must take actions to 

prevent insurgencies from occurring during operations and once the opposing conventional force is 

defeated. While an insurgency is only a possibility in a major combat operation, it could occur during major 

operations or afterwards. Commanders and staffs must assess the possibility of an insurgency in any 

operational environment and take actions to prevent one from occurring. These actions can include a range 

of stability operations and security cooperation activities. (See ADRP 3-07 for more information on 

stability operations and FM 3-22 for more information on security cooperation.) 

1-15. The circumstances of U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgency are important in understanding the 

operational and tactical actions of U.S. forces. The type and scale of involvement, whether the Army and 

Marine Corps are involved temporarily as the primary counterinsurgent forces or are providing modest 

indirect and direct support to a counterinsurgency effort, will be determined by the circumstances of U.S. 

involvement. U.S. forces participate at the direction of the President, based on national security interests. 

One example circumstance is the collapse of a fragile state in a geographically strategic area. Even if U.S. 

land forces are not in place when the government collapses, the President may deploy land forces to 

counter an insurgency and restore stability. The use of indirect capabilities in a failed state is complex 

because the commander often has to work with groups outside of the legitimately constituted government. 

Building capacity and enabling existing capabilities is difficult when a state lacks functional institutions. 

Because these areas lack state institutions to provide various governmental functions to include security 

forces, large scale direct involvement is often resource intensive. The U.S. can use smaller direct 

capabilities to support groups outside the legitimately constituted government, but this also adds to 

uncertainty and strategic risk. 

1-16. U.S. forces can participate at the request of a government that seeks to counter an insurgency in its 

country with assistance from the U.S. When a requesting government is capable and functioning, the U.S. 

can offer a wide range of capabilities. Having a capable government changes the relationship between ends, 

ways, and means. A capable government could require fewer resources to intervene, or it could only require 

indirect and direct enablers in order to be successful. However, as with any involvement to counter an 

insurgency, often unforeseen risks could lead to greater U.S. involvement. 

1-17. U.S. involvement can also occur in a country where there are ongoing security cooperation activities. 

If the U.S. is performing security cooperation activities in a country and an insurgency develops, continued 

security cooperation efforts could result in U.S. involvement in a host nation’s counterinsurgency efforts. 

Efforts to train and equip host-nation forces will likely be seen as U.S. involvement by both the insurgents 

and the international community. Moreover, U.S. forces could also transition to direct involvement in an 

insurgency. Whatever the degree of involvement, a clear policy decision should be made to include the 

development of a national strategy. 

1-18. Insurgencies could also be part of large scale combat or fueled by a regional or global adversary. In a 

protracted large scale operation, an insurgency often develops in controlled areas with populations 

sympathetic to the enemy. As such, planning for prevention of an insurgency and integrating stability 

operations into a prolonged operation is essential. If an insurgency develops, it will require resources to 
Understanding the Strategic Context 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 1-7 

defeat the insurgents. This will reduce the resources available to defeat the enemy in large-scale combat. In 

addition, an adversary can fuel an insurgency in a host nation to undermine U.S. interests. In this case, the 

insurgency is part of an adversary’s overall strategy and policy. (See FM 3-05, chapter 2, for more 

information on unconventional warfare. It provides a U.S. perspective on enabling an insurgency.) 

1-19. An insurgency can also occur at the conclusion of a large scale combat operation when an organized 

movement seeks to challenge the authority of the U.S. and its partners. The organized movement may be 

remnants of the defeated force or an opportunistic movement that seeks to obtain power using a 

political-military challenge to the existing authority. In either case, U.S. land forces, along with other 

unified action partners, must be prepared at all stages of conventional warfare to assess the capability of an 

insurgency occurring either during the conflict or after hostilities cease. Soldiers and Marines must also 

recognize that the presence of U.S. forces in the region can lead to the conditions for an insurgency. U.S. 

land forces can help to prevent an insurgency from occurring in the manner in which they conduct 

conventional warfare and in the conduct of post-conflict operations. Should prevention fail, U.S. forces will 

be exponentially more successful in countering an insurgency if they shape the environment during and 

immediately following conventional warfare for an effective transition to counterinsurgency. 

1-20. In the military operations, U.S. forces can prevent an insurgency from occurring in large scale 

combat operations by integrating stability operations. If an insurgency does begin, U.S. forces can shape its 

formation and make it easier to defeat. U.S. land forces can also prevent an insurgency from occurring in 

peacetime through security cooperation activities and other capabilities that support the host nation or other 

groups. If there is an insurgency, the U.S. can integrate a number of capabilities into an overall operational 

approach to defeat that insurgency. 

1-21. From the U.S. land forces’ perspective, insurgencies range along a spectrum depending on the scale 

of effort and resources the Army and Marine Corps must take to counter them. In a worst-case scenario, an 

extremely capable insurgency that has a significant impact on the population exists in a failed state region 

in which there is little or no host-nation government capability. The U.S. may have to commit significant 

combat power to offset the momentum of the insurgency. While the U.S. can avoid using land forces in 

direct combat, the use of other capabilities will often support groups that are not the recognized 

government. In such cases, the U.S. would be enabling one group to gain control over the state. For 

example, the U.S. could equip groups within a state and empower them to take control over an area. While 

the initial cost may be lower, this course of action is fraught with possible unintended consequences. The 

group that counterinsurgents enable, which is essentially another insurgency, may act in ways that are 

counter to U.S. interests once it gains control of the area. On the other hand, direct involvement could be 

extremely costly and provoke a wider conflict. If the U.S. operates in a failed state to defeat an insurgency, 

it must create a policy and strategy that matches its goals and the resources that it is willing to spend. 

Moreover, it must be willing to accept a large degree of uncertainty and strategic risk. 

1-22. The best-case scenario is when the host nation has the capability to defeat an insurgency and the U.S. 

plays only a supporting role in enabling the insurgencies’ defeat with equipment, training, or intelligence. 

A middle case occurs when a functional state has an insurgency in a remote area where the host-nation 

government cannot exert complete control. The existing insurgency is not a challenge to the continued 

authority of the host-nation government, but it may seek to gain control of a specific region or area. This 

type of scenario can require much fewer resources for U.S. land forces to counter the insurgency than the 

worst-case scenario. Since the capacity of the host-nation security forces exists to contain the insurgency to 

a specific region or area, the U.S. can integrate a number of capabilities into the host government’s efforts 

to increase the effectiveness and capabilities of the host nation. While every insurgency is unique, this basic 

framework offers the U.S. the opportunity to achieve policy goals while spending fewer resources and 

offering less uncertainty and risk. However, as with any conflict, unintended consequences can change the 

insurgency and increase the cost and uncertainty of U.S. involvement. 

1-23. In all cases, specific national policies govern U.S. land forces’ actions to counter an insurgency. An 

insurgency’s goals and actions are influenced by the conditions the insurgency develops in. An 

insurgency’s objectives are not exclusive to the condition of the state, but each can occur anywhere along 

the range of state conditions. However, the operational environment an insurgency develops in will affect 

how it understands its goals and will affect its actions (See chapter 2 for more information on an 
Chapter 1 

1-8 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

operational environment and section II for more information on understanding the actions of an 

insurgency). 

1-24. There may be multiple insurgencies in an operational environment. A networked insurgency may 

have conflicting goals within its organization and its actions are not controlled by a command structure. 

These insurgencies can have links to other insurgencies or criminal organizations. Networked insurgencies 

might divide or combine with groups. In such cases it is difficult to analyze an insurgency or insurgencies if 

they are treated as monolithic actors. Instead, counterinsurgents must understand the dynamics within the 

insurgency or multiple insurgencies. (See paragraphs 4-88 through 4-103 for more information on 

networked insurgencies.) 

1-25. Victory in a counterinsurgency may not be as clear as winning in a conventional conflict. U.S. 

national ends determine the criteria for success, regardless of how the U.S. land force is deployed to 

conduct counterinsurgency operations. As it applies to U.S. national objectives, success in an insurgency 

often depends on developing host-nation capacity to contain, reduce, and defeat the insurgency without 

requiring direct U.S. involvement. In a counterinsurgency, the host nation often determines the criteria for 

success. U.S. counterinsurgents should avoid judging host-nation criteria based on their own cultural 

expectations. Achieving success may depend less on defeating the armed element of the insurgency and 

more on the ability to legitimize host-nation institutions to the populace. Short and mid-term success in 

counterinsurgency may be developing a host-nation government that has sufficient capability to secure 

itself and address an insurgency on its own. This success allows the U.S. to continue to support the host 

nation through a long-term relationship that addresses that nation’s legitimacy. Success includes enabling 

the development of resiliency within the host-nation population and host-nation institutions to sustain the 

ability to counter the insurgency in the future and prevent the conditions in the area from allowing an 

insurgency to gain strength. Achieving the conditions for success may require a mix of application of force, 

information operations, cultural acceptance, and building capacity and competency within host-nation 

institutions. Counterinsurgents may either persuade the people to support the government or dissuade them 

from supporting the insurgents. What capabilities the U.S. uses to counter an insurgency is dependent on 

the context of that insurgency and U.S. national interests. 

1-26. U.S. forces should expect that the host-nation government will have its own interests that may not 

coincide with U.S. national interests. It may not be willing to undertake the political changes necessary to 

address the root causes of the insurgency. The commitment of U.S. forces may depend upon the degree to 

which U.S. policy makers consider the affected government to be receptive to assistance, advice, and 

reform. How Soldiers and Marines are employed will also require a clear determination by national 

decisionmakers as to what post-conflict commitments by military and civilian organizations will be 

required. Outside counterinsurgents, however, can never fully compensate for lack of will, incapacity, or 

counterproductive behavior on the part of the supported government. If a government is unambiguously 

committed to the defeat of insurgency, it is more likely to defeat it, regardless of the actions (or 

commitment level) of an outside supporter. 

LEGITIMACY AND CONTROL 

1-27. Legitimacy, the acceptance of an authority by a society, and control are the central issues in 

insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. This is true however the U.S. enables a host nation to defeat an 

insurgency. The population of a particular society determines who has legitimacy to establish the rules and 

the government for that society. A population’s values and cultural norms will determine who that society 

perceives as a legitimate authority. Both the insurgency and the host nation attempt to control the 

population by some mixture of consent and coercion. Insurgents use all available tools, including political 

(diplomatic), informational (including appeals to religious, ethnic, historical, national, class, political, tribal 

or ideological beliefs), and social, military, and economic tools to overthrow or undermine an existing 

authority. Likewise, the host nation will use all available tools to maintain acceptance of its authority. This 

authority may be an established government or an interim governing body. It may be a generally accepted 

social order. Control of a population, however, may not be the end state desired by an insurgent. A criminal 

enterprise might seek to undermine existing political power in order to enable it to continue its criminal 

activities or insurgents could seek political power in order to impose an ideological (or religious) system on 

an unwilling population. In counterinsurgencies, if the affected government wants to end the insurgency, it 
Understanding the Strategic Context 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 1-9 

should use all instruments of its national power to prove its legitimacy, to defeat the insurgency, and to 

reduce the likelihood of another crisis emerging. 

1-28. Legitimacy is essential to understanding the political variable in an insurgency. Who a population 

accepts as legitimate is dependent on the norms and values within that particular population. Legitimacy 

can change as a society evolves and groups or individuals change their conceptualization of who they are 

and what authority they accept. Sometimes large changes, such as the American War of Independence or 

the unification of Germany in 1871, create a change in group identity and accepted authority. Sometimes 

group identity changes by slow evolution, as is the case with the European Union. However, at the core, 

who a group accepts as providing legitimate authority to govern their actions is that group’s legitimate 

authority. (See paragraphs 2-16 through 2-19 for information on the political variable.) 

1-29. Legitimacy provides willing acceptance of authority and thus requires fewer resources to enforce its 

authority than illegitimacy. Most populations are controlled through a combination of consent and coercion. 

The host-nation government generally needs some level of legitimacy among the population in order to 

retain power. This provides some level of consent. Legitimacy is an indicator of the extent to which 

systems of authority, decisions, and conduct are accepted by the local population. Political legitimacy of a 

government determines the degree to which the population will voluntarily or passively comply with the 

decisions and rules issued by a governing authority. Legitimacy determines the transaction costs of political 

and governmental power. Low legitimacy may breed contempt on the part of the population and may 

require extensive prodding and incentives by the government to secure compliance of the population; high 

legitimacy generally invites compliance by the population and therefore requires less effort by the 

government to ensure compliance. An illegitimate government’s only method of controlling its population 

is coercion, which can be resource intensive. A legitimate government has to use coercion for policing 

power, but its population, in general, sees the rules and directions of its government as intrinsically correct. 

A population will follow a legitimate government’s rules and norms passively, and those who break those 

rules or norms are disapproved of by the society. Who the population sees as a legitimate authority is a 

central issue of a counterinsurgency. 

1-30. All population groups are controlled by some combination of consent and coercion. Some 

governments may use a range of coercive methods to control the population. Coercive methods can damage 

legitimacy if the methods cannot be justified under the values and norms of the population. However, 

counterinsurgents should not think of coercion and consent as counter forces to one another. If coercive 

acts by the government or insurgency are justifiable under the norms and values of the population, those 

acts do not necessarily undermine the legitimacy of the government or host nation. Acts by both the 

government and the insurgency must be viewed from the perspective of the population experiencing those 

acts and not from an outside perspective that will bring its own bias to viewing actions of the host 

government or insurgency. 

1-31. The struggle for legitimacy with the population is typically a central issue of an insurgency. The 

insurgency will attack the legitimacy of the host-nation government while attempting to develop its own 

credibility with the population. The host-nation government should reduce the credibility of the insurgency 

while strengthening its own legitimacy. A government that is seen as legitimate magnifies the resources 

and capabilities needed to defeat an insurgency and allows the host nation to concentrate finite resources on 

targeting the insurgency. However, legitimacy is a condition perceived by the population. Who the 

population sees as legitimate will be determined by that population’s norms and values. For example, if a 

population does not see outside forces as legitimate, this can undermine the legitimacy of the host-nation 

government trying to counter an insurgency. 

1-32. The legitimacy of the host-nation government is achieved because the population accepts its 

authority and how it governs can be justified in terms of the population’s beliefs. It is not enough for the 

host-nation government to be simply seen as effective and credible. The governmental structure must be 

justifiable to the population and that justification must be based on the population’s norms and values. In 

some situations, providing effective governance may be essential to establish legitimacy among the 

population. However, this is not a uniform rule. The key is that legitimacy is ultimately decided in the 

minds of the population. Counterinsurgents must understand how the population will perceive a 

government. A host nation that is less efficient but perceived as legitimate by the population will be more 
Chapter 1 

1-10 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

effective than an efficient host-nation government that cannot be justified by the values and norms of the 

population. 

1-33. Even if a population does not see an insurgency or a government as legitimate, control can be 

established effectively by coercion. Many states and insurgencies have used domestic intelligence 

apparatus or other means to control every aspect of their populations. Illegitimate governments often use 

distrust and divisions within a population to effectively control a society. Moreover, a population is not 

monolithic. It is made up of many groups and subgroups. In many autocratic regimes, various groups 

within a population have a vested interest in continuing the current government, even if it is repressive. 

Likewise, an insurgency might receive support from elements within the population, even if it is repressive 

and uses coercive methods. Legitimacy must be seen from the different perspectives of the different groups 

within a society. 

UNDERSTANDING UNIFIED ACTION 

1-34. Once the U.S. decides to become involved in a counterinsurgency, all instruments of national power 

provide the U.S. important capabilities to defeat an insurgency. Unified action is essential for all types of 

involvement in any counterinsurgency. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or 

integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to 

achieve unity of effort (JP 1). Paragraphs 1-34 through 1-76 provide commanders and staffs with an 

understanding of how civilian agencies and military departments and forces synchronize and integrate their 

operations to achieve unity of effort. Paragraphs 1-41 through 1-48 explain both a whole-of-government 

and a comprehensive approach to defeat insurgencies and achieve U.S. and host-nation objectives. 

Paragraphs 1-59 through 1-76 also explain the roles of intergovernmental, nongovernmental, multinational 

forces, private sector organizations, and host-nation government and host-nation forces in 

counterinsurgency. 

1-35. Unified action must be integrated into the overall host-nation efforts. The focus of U.S. efforts is to 

support the host nation’s internal defense and development. Internal defense and development is the full 

range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, 

insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). Internal defense and development focuses 

on building viable institutions that respond to the needs of society. Security cooperation activities must 

work with and support a nation’s own internal defense and development programs. Within the context of 

counterinsurgency, commanders and staffs must understand and support a host nation’s internal defense 

and development strategy. In the long run, the host nation, and not the U.S., will either defeat or be 

defeated by the insurgency. Supporting a host nation’s internal defense and development plan is one of the 

more effective ways in which the U.S. enables a host nation to defeat an insurgency. (See JP 3-22 for more 

information on internal defense and development.) 

ETHICAL APPLICATION OF LANDPOWER IN UNIFIED ACTION 

1-36. Army and Marine Corps leaders should clearly understand how adherence to a professional ethic 

provides the moral basis for unified action and how it becomes a force multiplier in all operations. The 

actions of Army and Marine Corps professionals are framed by the disciplined, ethical application of force. 

This is the foundation for unified action. Effective, ethical leaders must communicate to their Soldiers and 

Marines that American values affect every aspect of how U.S. forces fight and win a counterinsurgency. 

This instills in them the concept of honorable service and builds esprit de corps, two essential 

characteristics of the military profession, while enhancing resilience and preventing or reducing moral 

injuries to Soldiers and Marines. Unified action requires the judicious use of lethal force balanced with 

restraint and tempered by professional judgment. Combat in counterinsurgency often obligates leaders, 

Soldiers, and Marines to apply force in a precise manner to accomplish the mission without causing 

unnecessary loss of life or suffering. To maintain U.S. legitimacy, to ensure international credibility, and to 

safeguard the U.S., Soldiers and Marines cannot afford to misuse the lethal power provided to them by the 

U.S. government. 

1-37. Soldiers and Marines are not permitted to use force disproportionately or indiscriminately. Typically, 

more force reduces tactical risk in the short term. But in counterinsurgency, the more force that is used, the 

less effective it can be. It is more likely that counterinsurgents will achieve an end state by protecting a 
Understanding the Strategic Context 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 1-11 

population, not the counterinsurgency force. When military forces remain in secure compounds, they lose 

touch with the situation, appear to be indifferent to the population, simplify enemy intelligence operations, 

or appear afraid to engage the insurgents. In effect, they concede the initiative to the insurgents. To be 

successful, counterinsurgency forces must work with and share risks with the host-nation forces and the 

population. Soldiers and Marines must accept some risk to minimize harm to noncombatants. Accepting 

prudent risk is an essential part of the warrior ethos and an obligation of honorable service. 

1-38. Leaders must accept ambiguity and risk, which are inherent to decentralized operations. The 

presence of a local population within which insurgents may disappear creates a high degree of ambiguity. 

Operationally adaptable leaders observe the rapidly changing situation, identify its key characteristics, 

determine what has to be done in consultation with subordinates and host-nation forces, and determine the 

best method to accomplish the mission. They must assess and accept prudent risk, and they must adjust 

rapidly as conditions change. They must be able to shift operational tasks from capacity building to combat 

and back again in days, or even hours. Alert junior leaders recognize the dynamic context of a tactical 

situation and can use their professional judgment to apply informed lethal and non-lethal force to achieve 

the commander’s intent. Any use of force generates a series of reactions. The general rule for the use of 

force for the counterinsurgents is “do not create more enemies than you eliminate with your action.” The 

more force is applied, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. There will be times when 

an overwhelming effort is necessary to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the populace. 

However, counterinsurgency forces should calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied 

and who wields it for any operation. Using force precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law 

that needs to be established in the host nation. Normally, counterinsurgency forces can use escalation of 

force procedures to minimize unnecessary loss of life or suffering. These procedures are especially 

appropriate during an operation in which the counterinsurgent security force interacts with the local 

population. All interactions between security forces and the population directly impact legitimacy. (See 

chapter 13 for legal information on the use of force). 

1-39. Who wields force is also important. If the police have a reasonable reputation for competence and 

impartiality, it may be better for them to execute urban raids than military forces because the population is 

more likely to view their application of force as legitimate. This is true even if the police are not as well 

armed or as capable as military forces. Local circumstances, however, affect this decision. For example, if 

the police are seen as part of an ethnic or sectarian group oppressing the general population, their use may 

be counterproductive. (See chapter 10 regarding the development of host-nation security forces and chapter 

12 regarding assessing counterinsurgency operations. For further discussions on use of force, see chapter 

13.) 

1-40. The environments where counterinsurgency operations exist can be much more ethically complex 

than those associated with conventional conflicts. Many leadership and ethical imperatives are prominent 

and, in some cases, unique to counterinsurgency. The dynamic and ambiguous environment of modern 

counterinsurgency places a premium on leadership at every level, from sergeant to general. Application of 

decentralized authority and decisionmaking is more prevalent in counterinsurgency than other types of 

military operations. Combat in a counterinsurgency is frequently a small-unit leader’s fight; however, 

senior leaders set the conditions and the tone for all actions by subordinates. Today’s Soldiers and Marines 

must rapidly adapt cognitively and emotionally to the perplexing challenges of counterinsurgency and 

master new competencies in dynamic contexts. Those in leadership positions must provide the moral 

compass for their subordinates as they navigate this complex environment. Underscoring these imperatives 

is the fact that exercising leadership in the midst of ambiguity requires intense, discretionary professional 

judgment. Army and Marine Corps leaders are expected to demonstrate their competence, character, and 

commitment to their professional ethic. All leaders must continually reconcile mission effectiveness, 

ethical standards, and thoughtful stewardship of the nation’s precious resources—human and material—in 

the pursuit of national aims. Leaders must link tactical actions to strategic objectives and to the host 

nation’s essential political goals. U.S. forces must use the combat multiplier of seeking and maintaining the 

moral high ground in a counterinsurgency. Doing so guarantees maintaining trust with the American people 

and upholds the ideals of the profession of arms. 
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1-12 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT EFFORT

1-41. Accomplishing U.S. policy objectives in any conflict requires government expertise and resources 

outside of the Department of Defense (DOD). Policy objectives, especially during a conflict, require a 

whole-of-government effort. A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of the 

departments and agencies of the U.S. government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A 

whole-of-government effort is vital to achieving the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that 

reinforce progress made by one of the instruments of national power while enabling success among the 

others. It relies on coordination among the agencies of the U.S. government, including DOD, to ensure that 

the full range of available capabilities are used, synchronized, and applied to a given policy objective. 

Government agencies usually agree upon relationships and authorities in a memorandum of agreement or 

understanding. Military commanders exercise only the authority outlined in these agreements and are often 

directed by another agency. The terms in these documents may form the basis for establishing some form 

of relationship between commanders and agency chiefs. When unity of command is not possible, 

commanders strive to achieve unity of effort. Often, the interpersonal relationships that commanders 

establish with their interagency partners are essential. 

1-42. A whole-of-government effort incorporates all of the capabilities of the U.S. government to achieve 

U.S. national objectives. In many counterinsurgencies, for example, political objectives include assisting 

the host nation with managing the nonmilitary aspects of the insurgency. Therefore, these political 

objectives include eliminating the root causes of the insurgency. However, counterinsurgency commanders 

and planners must understand that, in the end, societies must address their own root causes of insurgency. 

Imposing major reforms may result in unintended consequences. Enabling a host nation to address the 

insurgency’s root causes increases its chances of defeating it. In dealing with the sorts of complex 

socio-cultural problems that counterinsurgents frequently face, “host-nation good enough” is normally 

better than what the U.S. would consider perfect, if it meets U.S. objectives. 

1-43. A primary challenge for integrating civilian and military efforts into a whole-of-government effort is 

the differing capabilities, capacities, cultures, objectives, and approaches in civilian agencies compared to 

those of military forces. A successful whole-of-government effort requires that all actors— 

 Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process. 

 Share an understanding of the situation and problem to be resolved. 

 Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal. 

 Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities. 

 Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goal. 

1-44. The importance of the commander’s personal involvement in building interorganizational trust, 

understanding, mutual respect, and friendships cannot be overstated. If organizational leaders do not set the 

appropriate tone and establish the necessary climate, the best whole-of-government plan will fail. 

1-45. A clear understanding of the desired end state and national objectives should infuse all efforts, 

regardless of the agencies or individuals charged with their execution. Given the primacy of political 

considerations, military forces often support civilian efforts. However, the nature of counterinsurgency 

operations means that lead responsibility often shifts among military, civilian, and host-nation authorities. 

In other words, as the U.S. shifts its policy and strategy, different agencies take on different roles during an 

operation. Different or changing relationships with the host nation may also drive shifts in lead 

responsibility between different authorities. Military leaders prepare to assume local leadership for 

counterinsurgency efforts if civilian leadership is unavailable or cannot access the area. 

1-46. U.S. land forces conducting counterinsurgency operations must recognize the legal authority of the 

Department of State, their chief country team, and the chief of mission. The chief of mission, who is 

normally the ambassador, is the principal officer in charge of a diplomatic facility of the U.S. The country 

team is the senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body. Commanders ensure that they gain 

an understanding of the purposes, goals, and restrictions under which their interagency partners are 

operating. Without such an understanding, the military and nonmilitary efforts may frustrate and interfere 

with one another because the military and civilian organizations are functioning under separate statutory 

obligations that may lead to conflicting guidance and direction. 
Understanding the Strategic Context 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 1-13 

COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT

1-47. A comprehensive effort, at a minimum, incorporates all the capabilities of U.S and host-nation 

governments, and may include intergovernmental and regional organizations, and nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) to address the root causes of the insurgency, in conjunction with military operations 

aimed at the insurgents themselves. This is difficult because many organizations will be operating in the 

same area, some conducting combat operations and others using non-lethal methods such as education 

programs and humanitarian assistance. Each organization will have different perspectives or interests. 

Foreign area officers may be essential in ensuring these various organization work in a comprehensive 

effort. Some organizations that may be part of a comprehensive effort are— 

 Other governments’ agencies. 

 Multinational forces. 

 Multinational corporations and contractors. 

 Intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations. 

 NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres. 

 Private sector corporations. 

 Other organizations that wield diplomatic, informational, and economic power. 

1-48. These various organizations may work with, in parallel to, separately from, or counter to U.S. 

government and civilian agencies supporting counterinsurgency efforts. Those organizations whose goals 

align at least partially with U.S. government goals frequently have capabilities that, if properly 

synchronized and coordinated, can be critical to achieving success in counterinsurgency operations. 

Aligning U.S. military, NGO, and intergovernmental organization capabilities requires collaboration and 

cooperation focused toward a common goal. This can be more difficult than working with other U.S. 

government agencies. Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for 

military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort among the diverse array of actors involved in a 

counterinsurgency. Often, the legal, cultural, and operational requirements prevent direct collaboration 

between U.S. land forces and non-U.S. civilian organizations. U.S. forces may encounter NGOs not aligned 

with any insurgent faction who are providing humanitarian assistance. These organizations can be neutral 

or hostile to U.S. policy goals. Commanders should handle such groups carefully and professionally. 

Commanders work to understand the objectives and priorities of each organization. Unity of effort between 

U.S. forces and host-nation forces is particularly critical. Understanding these organizations is essential to 

understanding the operational environment and shaping effects on organizations that are hostile or neutral 

to U.S. policy goals. (See JP 3-08 for more information on NGOs.) 

UNITY OF COMMAND AND EFFORT

1-49. Unity of command is the operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the 

requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose (JP 3-0). Where 

possible, counterinsurgency leaders achieve unity of command by establishing and maintaining formal 

command or support relationships. While designated officers will exercise unity of command of military 

forces, such relationships will not usually include nonmilitary U.S. government organizations engaged in a 

counterinsurgency mission. (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on unity of command.) 

1-50. Unity of command of military forces is operationally desirable and important for the military to 

establish. However, unity of command is almost impossible to achieve among all of the various actors in a 

counterinsurgency. Differing political objectives, national caveats, the legal limitations on the use of force, 

and sensitivities about subordinating national forces to those of other states or intergovernmental 

organizations often preclude strong command relationships. While agreements that establish a 

multinational force provide a legal foundation for determining the scope and limitations on authorities, 

responsibilities, command, support, or other relationships, the reality might be less clear. Unity of 

command is one of the most sensitive and difficult to resolve issues in a counterinsurgency. 

1-51. When unity of command with part or all of the force, including nonmilitary elements, is not possible, 

commanders work to achieve unity of effort. Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward 

common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, 

which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). In a counterinsurgency operation, an example of 
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1-14 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

unity of effort could be a military commander and a civilian leader ensuring that governance and economic 

lines of effort are fully coordinated with military operations. Unity of effort among nationally, culturally, 

and organizationally distinct partners is difficult to maintain, given their different layers of command. To 

achieve unity of effort requires participants to overcome cultural barriers and set aside parochial agendas. It 

also requires that each organization understand the capabilities and limitations of the others. 

COORDINATION 

1-52. In counterinsurgency operations, coordination efforts should include key participants from the outset. 

The joint commander, through the strategic concept, works with the engaged civilian organizations to build 

an interagency coordination plan during the joint operation planning process. Subordinate joint force 

commanders and Army commanders also build civilian organization participation into their operations 

plans. This is essential in integrating other government agencies and NGOs. Within an area of 

responsibility and a joint operations area, appropriate decisionmaking structures are established at 

combatant command, joint task force headquarters, and tactical levels in order to coordinate and resolve 

military, political, and humanitarian issues. 

1-53. The complex diplomatic, informational, military, and economic context of insurgency and 

counterinsurgency precludes military leaders from exercising unity of command over civilian 

organizations—and they should not try to do so. Interagency partners, NGOs, and private organizations 

have many interests and agendas that military forces cannot control. In addition, the degree of 

independence of local institutions affects their legitimacy to the population. However, military leaders 

should make every effort to ensure that counterinsurgency actions are as well integrated as possible, taking 

into consideration the distinct mission, need for independence, and security requirements of other 

organizations. Coordination between the various actors in a counterinsurgency is essential. 

1-54. U.S. government agencies should participate in coordination meetings to ensure integration with 

military and host-nation plans. At the joint headquarters level, the commander establishes joint interagency 

coordination groups. A joint interagency coordination group provides timely, usable information and 

advice from an interagency perspective to the commander. Joint interagency coordination groups share and 

integrate information and assist with synchronization, training, and exercises. Joint interagency 

coordination groups may include representatives from other federal departments and agencies, state and 

local authorities, and liaison officers from other commands and DOD components. The interagency 

representatives and liaison officers are the subject matter experts for their respective agencies and 

commands. They provide the critical bridge between the commander and interagency organizations. (See 

JP 3-08 for more information on joint and interagency coordination.) 

1-55. Coordination between NGOs may be difficult or impossible. Direct interaction among various 

organizations may be impractical or undesirable because of various goals of NGOs and a NGO’s desire to 

be seen by the society as autonomous. The differing goals and fundamental independence of NGOs and 

local organizations usually prevent formal relationships governed by command authority. In the absence of 

such relationships, military leaders seek to cooperate with other participants to contribute to achieving 

counterinsurgency objectives. Informal or less authoritative relationships include coordination and liaison. 

Basic awareness and general information sharing may be all that is possible. Nevertheless, NGOs and other 

organizations may resist or refuse cooperation because of the appearance of cooperating with military 

forces. However, government and internal agencies offer links to the various NGOs so coordination can be 

accomplished without directly interacting with NGOs and causing potential security issues for them. 

1-56. Commanders are responsible for coordinating the activities of military forces and cooperative 

nonmilitary organizations in their areas of operations. To carry out this responsibility, military and civilian 

leaders may establish a coordinating structure, such as an area coordination center or civil-military 

operations center at each subordinate political level of the host-nation government. Area coordination 

centers and civil-military operations centers provide forums for sharing information, conducting 

coordination and liaison, and ensuring an effective and efficient division of labor. Active commander 

involvement ensures coordination, establishes liaison (formal and informal), and shares information. 

Influencing and persuading groups outside a commander’s authority requires skill and subtlety. In some 

cases, informal meetings with a civilian group at a civil-military operations center will grow to an informal 
Understanding the Strategic Context 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 1-15 

liaison that eventually leads to close cooperation. (See JP 3-22 for more information on coordinating 

structures.) 

1-57. Leaders ensure the various organizations supporting counterinsurgency operations in each area know 

which commander is responsible for the respective areas of operation. Multiple organizations operating 

within a land force commander’s area of operations—such as U.S. government, multinational forces, host 

nation, interagency organizations, and special operations forces—might increase the risk of fratricide, 

insider threats, and civilian casualties and may create tactical and operational gaps that insurgents can 

exploit. 

1-58. Entities best qualified to accomplish nonmilitary tasks may not always be available. In such cases, 

military forces may need to perform those tasks until civilian-led capabilities become available. Within the 

Army, civil affairs is the branch ideally organized, trained, and equipped to assist commanders in these 

functions. Sometimes forces already have the skills required, and at other times they learn them during 

execution. By default, U.S. and multinational military forces often possess the only readily available 

capability to meet many of the local population’s fundamental needs. As such, it is important for 

commanders to assess the capabilities of their forces and other organizations on the battlefield. 

UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS

1-59. Army and Marine forces conduct counterinsurgency with unified action partners. Unified action 

partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the 

private sector with whom Army and Marine Corps forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate 

during the conduct of operations. Unified action partners include joint forces and components, 

multinational forces, U.S. government agencies and departments, and some intergovernmental and NGOs. 

Some important unified action partners in a counterinsurgency are— 

 Host-nation government and forces. 

 Joint forces. 

 Department of State. 

 Multinational forces. 

 NGOs. 

 Other organizations. 

Host-Nation Government and Forces 

1-60. The essential unified action partner is the host nation and its own forces. The purpose of 

counterinsurgency operations, from the viewpoint of the U.S., is to support or enable the host nation to 

defeat an insurgency. In the worst case situation, this may require the U.S. becoming the primary 

counterinsurgent or working with groups inside a state to build a legitimate government. However, even in 

the worse case, the goal is still for the host nation and its forces to defeat an insurgency. 

Joint Force 

1-61. The maritime component plays a critical role in controlling the seas, which may be vital to isolating 

an insurgency, both physically and psychologically. The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime 

forces provide an advantage in areas where access is denied or limited. Maritime forces may provide direct 

support to a joint task force that does not include combat operations, to include civil-military operations, 

logistic support, intelligence, communication sharing, humanitarian relief, maritime civil affairs, and 

expeditionary medical aid and training. 

1-62. Air forces and capabilities play a vital role in the military contribution to a counterinsurgency. Air 

contributions include close air support precision strikes; personnel recovery, air interdiction, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance, communications, electronic warfare, combat support, and air mobility. 
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1-16 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

Department of State 

1-63. The U.S. Department of State is responsible for implementing U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy 

efforts and plays a key role in integrating the capabilities of the U.S. The Department of State leads. It also 

oversees U.S. government support to counterinsurgency efforts. Several functional bureaus and offices 

have substantive roles in the development and execution of counterinsurgency strategy. These offices 

include the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations; the 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor; the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and 

the Legal Advisor’s Office. The Department of State is responsible for diplomatic programs that assist a 

host nation with countering an insurgency. In many U.S. military operations—such as governance capacity 

building—the Department of State is the U.S. supported element and the military is the supporting element. 

1-64. One important capability that the State Department maintains is the civilian response corps. The 

civilian response corps maintains active members who are full time responders whose specific job is to 

train for, prepare, and staff overseas conflict prevention and stabilization operations. Active members of the 

civilian response corps can deploy on a 48-hour notice. The civilian response corps also maintains standby 

members. They are current full-time employees of the U.S. government or retirees of the U.S. Foreign 

Service. Members in the standby component must be available to deploy within 30 days, for up to 90 days, 

with the possibility to extend their deployment. The civilian response corps’ work focuses on six skill sets: 

Planning, operations, and management; security and rule of law; diplomacy and governance; essential 

services; and force protection. 

Country Team 

1-65. The country team is the senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed 

by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each 

represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic 

mission (JP 3-07.4). In a foreign country, the chief of mission is the highest U.S. civil authority. The chief 

of mission leads the country team and is responsible for integrating U.S. efforts in support of the host 

nation. The defense attaché, usually a foreign area officer, will work directly with a county team. The 

defense attaché provides important links to the country team for the commander. As permanently 

established interagency organizations, country teams represent a priceless counterinsurgency resource. 

They often provide significant local knowledge and interaction with the host-nation government and 

population. (See figure 1-1 for an illustration of country team command relationships. See JP 3-07.4 for 

more information on the country teams.) Some of the government agencies normally represented on a 

country team include— 

 The United States Agency for International Development. 

 The Department of Justice. 

 The Department of Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. 

 The Department of Homeland Security. 

 The Department of Agriculture. 
Understanding the Strategic Context 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 1-17 

 Figure 1-1. Country team command relationships 

1-66. An important enabler for ensuring unity of effort in countering an insurgency, especially when the 

U.S. is enabling a host nation with various capabilities, is foreign area officers. These officers can be an 

essential link to an embassy’s country team. By virtue of unique language proficiency and cultural and 

regional expertise, foreign area officers can be critical in helping to integrate various capabilities into the 

host nation’s ongoing efforts. While foreign area officers are often associated with security cooperation 

activities, such as foreign military sales, foreign area officers have historically provided essential strategic 

thinking and planning necessary to enable a host nation. As core members of the security cooperation 

organization and defense attaché office within the embassy country team, foreign area officers serve as key 

advisors to ambassadors and combatant commanders. Foreign area officers routinely operate in a 

whole-of-government, joint, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. They can be essential in 

integrating resources, capabilities, and activities throughout U.S. and multinational agencies to achieve 

unity of effort and accomplish national counterinsurgency objectives. 

Multinational Forces 

1-67. Soldiers and Marines normally function as part of a multinational force, for example, by supporting 

the United Nations or as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Each multinational participant 

provides capabilities and strengths that U.S. forces may not have. Many other countries’ military forces 

provide cultural backgrounds, historical experiences, and other capabilities that can be particularly valuable 

to counterinsurgency efforts. 
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1-18 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

1-68. Nations join multinational efforts for various reasons. Although the missions of multinational 

partners may appear similar to those of the U.S., rules of engagement, host-nation policies, and sensitivities 

may differ among partners. U.S. military leaders require a strong cultural and political awareness of other 

multinational military partners. Planners must be aware that multinational forces may also require 

significant U.S. enabling capabilities such as medical evaluation and logistic support. (See JP 3-16 and the 

American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) Coalitions Operations Handbook for 

more information on multinational partners.) 

Nongovernmental Organizations 

1-69. A nongovernmental organization is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to 

alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, 

environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of 

democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). There are several thousand NGOs of many different 

types. Organizational charters and their members’ motivations govern their actions. Some NGOs receive at 

least part of their funding from national governments or intergovernmental organizations. Some may 

become implementing partners according to grants or contracts. For example, the United States Agency for 

Internal Development contracts some NGOs to perform certain functions. In these cases, the funding 

organization often gains oversight and authority over how to use the funds. 

1-70. To ensure their own security and gain access to vulnerable populations in theaters of conflict, most 

NGOs maintain neutrality, impartiality, and independence from all sides in a counterinsurgency. These 

positions provide NGOs protection against claims of favoritism by the parties to armed conflict and 

enhance the credibility and security of these organizations. 

1-71. Depending on the degree to which NGOs follow these principles, NGOs may carry out their work 

with a very different frame of reference from that of the government. Rather than perceiving their 

organization as supporting the overall U.S. or multinational stabilization effort, they may view the situation 

from the perspective of the victims of conflict, regardless of their affiliation with belligerent parties. They 

may give preference to individuals and communities based on humanitarian need, rather than meeting 

operational objectives. 

1-72. While NGOs sometimes choose to coordinate their activities with the U.S. government for security, 

policy, or funding, often they are reluctant for fear of being associated with the government’s political 

goals in conflict. This creates a natural but often unavoidable tension in the relationship. Commander’s ease 

this tension through a mutual understanding of respective mandates and a clear delineation of tasks. For 

example, some organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, refuse to take armed 

escorts in conflict zones, relying instead on their wide recognition as neutral, independent, and impartial 

humanitarian actors. Commanders ensure information is available to NGOs to allow them to deconflict 

ground and air routes and provide contact information for them to coordinate safe passage in areas with 

active air or ground defense measures. At a minimum, air information should be passed through 

International Civil Aviation Organization notices to airmen and host-nation aeronautical information 

publications. 

1-73. Many NGOs may operate in conflict areas long before external military forces arrive. These NGOs 

may remain after forces depart. Depending on their mandate, they can support critical host-nation 

government functions, or can contribute to the stabilization effort. To the greatest extent possible, 

commanders attempt to complement rather than override their capabilities. Commanders strive to build a 

complementary, trust-based relationship based on mutual understanding and a clear delineation of 

objectives and tasks. 

Other Organizations 

1-74. An intergovernmental organization is an organization created by a formal agreement between two or 

more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared 

by member states (JP 3-08). Regional organizations like the Organization of American States and European 

Union or global organizations such as the United Nations may be involved in some counterinsurgency 
Understanding the Strategic Context 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 1-19 

operations. The United Nations, in particular, has many subordinate and affiliated agencies active 

worldwide. 

1-75. In the private sector, multinational corporations and other businesses often operate in a conflict 

environment. At a minimum, commanders should know which companies are present in their area of 

operations and where those companies are conducting business. Understanding the overall profit motivation 

of these business will help commanders understand their actions in the operational environment. 

1-76. When the U.S. government pays contractors, the principle of unity of command should apply. 

Commanders should influence contractors’ performance through U.S. government contract supervisors. 

Commanders should identify contractors operating in their area of operations and determine the nature of 

their contract, accountability mechanisms, and appropriate coordination relationships. (See FM 4-92 for 

more information on contractors.) 

STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES 

1-77. Whatever type of strategy and operational approach that a counterinsurgency takes, several strategic 

principles are normally relevant. Whether the U.S. is enabling a host nation with certain capabilities or 

directly using its land forces, the principles listed in paragraphs 1-78 through 1-92 are relevant to most 

counterinsurgency operations. However, these principles are not meant to be exclusive rules for every 

conflict. They are provided for the practitioner and planner as a foundation for how they think about 

planning and executing counterinsurgency operations. 

LEGITIMACY IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE 

1-78. Fostering development of effective governance by a legitimate government that can provide security 

and acts in the best interests of its people may be essential to countering an insurgency. Legitimacy can be 

seen as the willing acceptance of a government by its population. Counterinsurgency forces may achieve 

this objective by the balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means. Governments rule 

through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments that are “legitimate” normally rule with the 

consent of the governed; those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. 

Citizens of the latter tend to obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than 

because they voluntarily accept its rule. Legitimacy is a perceived condition by the population that can only 

be achieved by host-nation government actions that lead to an acceptance of its primacy by the people. (See 

paragraphs 1-27 through 1-33 for more information on legitimacy and control.) 

COUNTERINSURGENT FORCES MUST UNDERSTAND THE ENVIRONMENT

1-79. Successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations depends on thoroughly understanding the 

society and culture within which they are being conducted. In most counterinsurgency operations in which 

foreign forces participate, insurgents hold a distinct advantage in their level of local knowledge. They speak 

the language, move easily within the society, and are more likely to understand the population’s interests. 

Thus, for foreign forces participating in counterinsurgency operations, they require a greater emphasis on 

certain skills, such as language and cultural understanding. Understanding the operational environment 

allows the counterinsurgent to identify the conditions which impact the prerequisites for the insurgency and 

the root causes that are driving the population to accept the insurgency. Only through understanding the 

operational environment can the counterinsurgent plan and execute successful operations to counter the 

conditions that allow the insurgency to exist in the first place. Nevertheless, U.S. forces must never assume 

they will be welcomed by a local population. They may even be viewed as occupiers. (See chapter 2 for a 

discussion on developing an understanding of the operational environment.) 

INTELLIGENCE DRIVES OPERATIONS

1-80. Effective counterinsurgency operations are shaped by timely, relevant, tailored, predictive, accurate, 

and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout 

the force. Without accurate and predictive intelligence, it is often better to not act rather than to act. 

Gaining situational understanding before action is often essential in avoiding long term damage to mission 

objectives. In environments where commanders do not have situational understanding, the first action they 
Chapter 1 

1-20 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

should take is to use forces to gain that understanding while not creating unintended and lasting harm to the 

mission. (See chapter 11 for more information on intelligence.) 

1-81. Because of the dispersed nature of counterinsurgency operations, the actions of counterinsurgency 

forces are key generators of intelligence. In counterinsurgency operations, a cycle often develops where 

intelligence drives operations, which produces additional intelligence that facilitates subsequent operations. 

Reporting by tactical units and civilian agencies is often of greater importance than reporting by specialized 

national intelligence assets. These factors, along with the need to generate a favorable tempo (rate of 

military operations) drive the requirement to produce and disseminate intelligence at the lowest practical 

level. Commanders are responsible for driving the intelligence process. 

1-82. Understanding the operational environment extends beyond insurgent combatants and insurgent 

leaders. To truly counter an insurgency, counterinsurgents must gather, analyze, and disseminate civil 

information pertaining to the population. If legitimacy is the primary principle of counterinsurgency 

operations, then identifying what is preventing legitimacy is as important, if not more so, than intelligence 

pertaining to enemy actions. Since Army and Marine Corps forces conduct counterinsurgency with unified 

action partners, it is vital to separate intelligence and civil information. Some partners, particularly NGOs, 

may not exchange information with Army and Marine Corps forces if that information is overtly tied to 

intelligence collection. Achieving a common situational understanding with unified action partners will 

require exchanging information outside of the intelligence realm. 

SECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW IS ESSENTIAL

1-83. Whenever possible, security forces should be provided by the host nation. To establish legitimacy, 

the affected government must strive to transition security activities from military authorities to host-nation 

law enforcement authorities as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they lose public 

support. Prior to any transition to full host-nation responsibility, however, the violence level must be 

reduced enough for the host-nation counterinsurgency forces to maintain order; otherwise, the host-nation 

counterinsurgency forces will be unable to secure the population and the host nation may lose the 

legitimacy gained by the transition. U.S. counterinsurgent forces must also understand how the military and 

police are viewed by the population and not assume they are always seen as protectors. The goal of a 

change to a host-nation security force is an accountable, self-sustaining, capable, and credible force able to 

meet the security challenges faced by the host nation and seen as legitimate by the population. 

1-84. Security forces use a legal system that conforms to local culture and practices to deal with insurgents 

and criminals and that enhances the affected government’s legitimacy. To succeed in countering an 

insurgency, the host-nation government must develop its legal and conflict resolution systems, including 

police forces, judicial systems, and penal facilities. The legal use of population control measures, including 

curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and biometric census may assist in 

identifying the insurgents and protecting the population. 

COUNTERINSURGENT FORCES SHOULD PREPARE FOR A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT

1-85. Counterinsurgency operations can be protracted. Though most insurgencies are quickly defeated by 

the host nation and its military forces, U.S. involvement normally comes in insurgencies that are not 

quickly defeated. Insurgents can become extremely difficult to identify, track, and interdict if they are 

effective in acting clandestinely. Insurgencies may persist for many years after the main threat has been 

broken. Thus, counterinsurgency operations may demand considerable expenditures of time and resources. 

The population must have confidence in the staying power of both the affected government and any 

counterinsurgency forces supporting it. The population may prefer the affected government to the 

insurgents; however, people do not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the 

government has the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. Stabilizing the security situation and 

transforming a failed, failing, or ineffectual government into a functional one is an extremely difficult task 

that may take an extended period to complete. (See paragraphs 4-70 through 4-75 for information on the 

seventh dynamic, phasing and timing.) 
Understanding the Strategic Context 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 1-21 

MANAGE INFORMATION AND EXPECTATIONS

1-86. Information and expectations are related; skillful counterinsurgency forces manage both. To limit 

discontent and build support, the affected government and any counterinsurgency forces assisting it create 

and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the population, friendly military forces, and the 

international community. The key tools to accomplish this are information operations through the effective 

coordination and synchronization of information related capabilities. Effective counterinsurgency 

commanders tell the truth; they refuse to give projections; and they do not promise more than can be 

provided. Achieving steady progress toward a set of reasonable expectations can increase the population’s 

tolerance for the inevitable inconveniences of ongoing counterinsurgency operations. Where a large foreign 

force is present to help establish a regime, this progress can extend the period until foreign forces are 

perceived by the population as an army of occupation. 

1-87. Effective counterinsurgency forces must ensure that their deeds match their words and both are 

consistent with the broader narrative. They should also understand that any action has an information 

reaction. Counterinsurgency forces should carefully consider that information reaction’s impact on the 

many audiences involved in the conflict and on the sidelines. They should work actively to shape responses 

that further their ends. In particular, messages to different audiences must be consistent. In the global 

information environment, people in the area of operations can access the internet and satellite television to 

determine the messages counterinsurgency forces are sending to the international community. Any 

perceived inconsistency reduces credibility and undermines counterinsurgency efforts. 

USE THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF FORCE

1-88. Any use of force generates a series of reactions. There will be times when an overwhelming effort is 

necessary to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the population. However, counterinsurgency 

forces, whether they are land, maritime, or air, calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be 

applied and who wields it for any operation. Normally, counterinsurgency forces can use escalation of force 

procedures to minimize unnecessary loss of life or suffering. These procedures are especially appropriate 

during any operation in which the counterinsurgent security force interacts with the local population. 

1-89. All interactions between security forces and the population directly impact legitimacy, and if the 

counterinsurgent security forces show restraint in the eyes of the population, the entire counterinsurgency 

effort is further legitimized. The general rule for the use of force for the counterinsurgents is “do not create 

more enemies than you eliminate with your action.” Escalation of force does not limit the right of 

self-defense, including the use of deadly force when such force is necessary to defend against a hostile act 

or demonstrated hostile intent. However, counterinsurgency forces must be properly trained in such 

procedures and, more importantly, in methods of shaping situations so that tactical leaders have to make 

fewer split-second, life-or-death decisions. 

LEARN AND ADAPT

1-90. An effective counterinsurgency force is a learning organization. Insurgents connected with other 

organizations constantly exchange information about their enemy’s vulnerabilities—even with insurgents 

in distant theaters. However, skillful counterinsurgency forces can adapt at least as fast as insurgents. Every 

unit needs to be able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. Commanders must 

develop an effective system to circulate best practices throughout their command. Commanders might also 

need to seek new policies that authorize or resource necessary changes. Insurgents shift their locations 

looking for weak links, so widespread competence is required throughout the counterinsurgency force. 

EMPOWER THE LOWEST LEVELS

1-91. Local commanders have the best grasp of their situations, but they require access to or control of the 

resources needed to produce timely intelligence, conduct effective tactical operations, and manage 

intelligence and civil-military operations. Leaders encourage individual initiatives and facilitate the 

learning that must occur at every level. Effective counterinsurgency operations are decentralized, and 

higher commanders owe it to their subordinates to push as many capabilities as possible down to their 

levels. However, this must be balanced with ensuring that tactical leaders have the situational 
Chapter 1 

1-22 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

understanding of the wider operational and strategic consequences of their actions. While tactical missions 

are essential, commanders ensure that tactical missions support the overall objectives to defeat the 

insurgency. 

SUPPORT THE HOST NATION 

1-92. In the situation of U.S. and multinational forces committed to assisting a host-nation government 

with its counterinsurgency strategy, the long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself. In 

the end, the host nation has to win on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders 

and institutions. External assistance can help, but host-nation authorities must accept responsibilities to 

achieve real victory. Depending upon the condition of the host-nation government (failed, failing, or 

viable), a robust whole-of-government approach is critical to enabling that government to accept those 

responsibilities. In a failed or failing state, there may be no functioning government or national economy. 

The counterinsurgent, therefore, will be forced to create institutions necessary to provide governance and 

support economic development. While it may be easier for U.S. military units to conduct operations 

themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and then assist them. Host-nation 

governments have the final responsibility to solve their own problems. Eventually all foreign armies are 

seen as interlopers or occupiers. The sooner the decisive effort can transition to host-nation institutions 

without unacceptable degradation, the better. 
13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 2-1 

Chapter 2 

Understanding an Operational Environment 

2-1. Regional and strategic conditions affect United States (U.S.) involvement in opposing an insurgency. 

How and why the U.S. becomes involved in an insurgency is important. However, some important strategic 

trends can also affect the context of an insurgency. These global trends include demographic changes, 

globalization, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, religious extremism, and failed states 

leading to an era of persistent conflict. Persistent conflict is the protracted conflict among state, non-state, 

and individual actors who are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological 

ends. These trends not only affect the likelihood of conflict, but they also affect the capabilities and action 

of friendly, threat, neutral, and nonaligned actors. 

2-2. Understanding the conditions that may affect the stability of a nation or region assists commanders as 

they focus on a specific operational environment to determine the root causes that led to an insurgency. 

Whether operating at the operational or tactical level, commanders must understand and anticipate the 

effects of their operations and how they fit into the broader mission. The U.S. may enter situations with 

long-standing conflicts and established ways of life that have implications beyond the boundaries of a 

specific area of operations. Commanders identify relationships within that area that may exert external 

influence on other governments that have their own agendas in the region. Commanders also recognize that 

in the modern, interconnected world, actions at any level may have far broader impact than intended. This, 

coupled with certain global trends, may provoke more insurgencies in the future. 

DEMOGRAPHIC AND URBANIZATION TRENDS 

2-3. In the future, the world will become more populated and urbanized. Global population will increase 

by approximately 1.2 billion people by 2025 with more than a billion new urban dwellers in that time. Most 

population growth will occur in the developing world. Population growth, urbanization, and competition 

for limited resources in the Middle East, Africa, and South Central Asia will contribute to increased 

resource scarcity and may present governance challenges. Climate change combined with increased 

population centers in or near coastal environments may challenge the ability of failing and fragile states to 

respond to natural disasters. These conditions enhance the possibility of insurgencies in highly populated 

developing countries whose governments lack the capacity to provide effective governance, including 

security and the rule of law. These trends could lead to failed states and problems that will affect regional 

and global security because of globalization. 

2-4. Urbanization is the growth of urban areas due to both a population surge and migration. In 1950, 

29 percent of the world’s population lived in urban areas; by 2050, scientists estimate that 60 percent of the 

world’s population will live in urban areas. This rapid growth of urban areas, and the accompanying 

crowded conditions with the potential for high unemployment, creates a greater potential that future 

insurgencies may arise in urban areas. 

GLOBALIZATION

2-5. Globalization is a combination of the technological, economic, social, cultural, and political forces 

that are bringing nation-states and the people of the world closer together. Globalization affects an 

insurgency by providing a freer flow of arms, information, and money to an insurgent group or insurgents 

and allows an insurgency to have a wider strategic effect than in the past. It is easy for ethnic groups or 

ideological groups to connect internationally because of globalization. Globalization provides a greater 

likelihood that insurgents will have access to outside resources, or that they will try to affect objectives 

outside of their local area. Through technology, globalization allows an insurgent to gain access to cyber 

electromagnetic tools that could be used to attack any country. It also makes ideologically or religiously 

motivated insurgencies more prevalent due to closer contact between traditional and modern societies. 
Chapter 2 

2-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS

2-6. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and precision weapons will increase the potential 

for catastrophic attacks. The threat or use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations is as 

real as it is deadly. Weapons of mass destruction present significant possibilities beyond terrorist actors. If 

an insurgent group acquires them, they can allow the insurgent group to pressure the host nation or attack a 

target that would have countrywide, regional, or global strategic affects. These weapons can provide an 

insurgent group with capabilities unmatched in the history of irregular warfare. The likelihood of an 

insurgent group obtaining these weapons has never been higher because of both globalization and the 

number of failed states. As ethnic and ideological groups enhance bonds that go beyond state boundaries, 

and insurgent groups create vast safe haven areas within failed states, the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction creates new possibilities for insurgencies. Not only will insurgents strive to obtain weapons of 

mass destruction, but the continued availability of more precise, cheaper, and more lethal conventional 

weapons will make insurgent actions more deadly than in the past. (See FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1 for more 

information on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.) 

FAILING OR FAILED STATES

2-7. Governments of nation-states face increasingly greater challenges in providing effective support to 

their growing populations. The problems of both demographic changes and the pressures of globalization, 

corruption, lack of government services, and decaying infrastructure can lead to a failed state. A failed state 

can provide insurgent groups safe havens to build their organizations, but it may also hinder their ability to 

promulgate their message and actions due to a lack of infrastructure. (See FM 3-07 for a detailed discussion 

on a failed state framework.) 

THE OPERATIONAL VARIABLES 

2-8. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that 

affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Commanders 

and staffs analyze and describe an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational 

variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. 

The operational variables are fundamental to developing a comprehensive understanding of an operational 

environment. 

2-9. When viewing an operational environment, it is important to identify friendly, neutral, and hostile 

actors. However, it is uniquely important in counterinsurgency operations that commanders and staff do not 

view these actors as static and unchanging over time. Actors can become more hostile or become less 

hostile. It is the interaction between the actors and the changes between their interactions that is important. 

The actors have many influences on their actions and those influences help determine if an actor stays the 

same, becomes friendlier, or becomes more hostile. (See JP 2-01.3 for more information on an operational 

environment.) 

2-10. In Iraq's Anbar Province, the eight interrelated operational variables created a unique operational 

environment. The al Qaim tribes had different interests, both political and economic, than both the 

Americans and al Qaeda. Religion, economic interests, culture, and other variables helped to shape the 

actions of everyone in the operational environment. The Marine Corps had to act in this environment and 

attempt to shape it. This was a process that required situational understanding and an appreciation for the 

unique environment. 

The Anbar Province Operational Environment 

 The Anbar Province’s al Qaim district became increasingly important to Abu 

Musab al-Zarqawi’s al Qaeda in Iraq after November 2004 when it lost its sanctuary 

to the American forces’ offensive in the second battle of Fallujah. The al Qaim district 

is located on Iraq’s border with Syria. Although the district represents only 10% of the 

Anbar population, the area holds strategic importance due to its location along the 

Iraqi/Syrian border as well as the Euphrates River. Al Qaim is and always has been a 

lucrative smuggling route for black market goods and served as al Qaeda in Iraq’s 
Understanding an Operational Environment 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 2-3 

lifeline to infiltrate Baghdad with foreign fighters, money, and other resources that 

fueled the insurgency. With the loss of Fallujah, al Qaim became al Qaeda in Iraq’s 

newfound sanctuary. 

 Al Qaeda in Iraq arrived with offers of partnering with al Qaim’s tribes to 

defeat and expel the Americans. They promised the indigenous population money 

and other resources for their support. As Muslims and Arabs, al Qaeda in Iraq 

members exhorted that it was their obligation, their Jihad, to fight the crusaders. After 

all, the Americans, supposedly ignorant of tribal customs, religion, and traditions, 

allegedly had disrespected and dishonored the people of al Qaim and a patriotic 

resistance had already formed in the district. The tribes of al Qaim saw the al Qaeda 

movement as the answer to their problem with the Americans. The tribes, together 

with al Qaeda in Iraq, felt that the time was ripe to rid the area of the infidel occupiers. 

 Al Qaim tribes varied in available resources and were incapable of defeating 

the American occupiers on their own. For example, the Albu-Mahal tribe, the 

strongest tribe in the area, organized and resourced the Hamza Battalion specifically 

to fight the Americans. However, it, along with the other tribal militias, lacked the 

weaponry, ammunition, and other equipment to win such a fight on their own. Al 

Qaeda in Iraq’s offer was tempting and most of the tribes accepted. 

 As time went on it became apparent that al Qaeda in Iraq’s offer was 

deceptive; this partnership was not what it seemed. Al Qaeda in Iraq provided 

weaponry and funding, but in return they demanded to lead the Jihad with the intent 

of first destroying and then transforming the social fabric of the tribes and al Qaim. Al 

Qaeda in Iraq started by taking over the smuggling routes, skimming large profits and 

killing those that resisted. They then imposed a radical form of Sharia on the 

community with fanatical punishments for transgressors. Religion was used to justify 

al Qaeda in Iraq’s actions, which included marriages to the local women, not allowing 

cigarettes, the ban of music and films, and the common intimidation tactic of 

beheading those that resisted. 

 3rd Battalion 6th Marines (3/6) executed Operation IRON FIST the first 

week of October, attacking from east to west through the town of Sadah and eastern 

Karabila, ultimately stopping at the Emerald Wadi in the center of the al Qaim region. 

They built four combat outposts, Chosin, Iwo Jima, Belleau Wood, and Khe Sahn, 

and left Marines and Iraqis in place, providing a combined, permanent, persistent, 

presence. 

 The next clearing operation was conducted the first week in November by 

3/6 and 2/1 commanded by Regimental Combat Team 2. This operation cleared the 

Husaybah, Karabilah, Sadah and Ubaydi areas of all insurgents. Immediately upon 

clearing the areas, 3/6 began constructing combat outposts in all of the cities. 

 By late November 3/6 had constructed 14 combat outposts in the areas 

from Husaybah to Ubaydi. Each combat outpost consisted of a U. S. Marine platoon 

and an Iraqi Army platoon or company. Those positions completed and reflected 

combined, permanent, persistent presence, where the Marines and Iraqi Army lived 

together and among the people. 

 The next step was to engage the people. Mission analysis led to assigning 

company areas based on the tribal distribution. The idea was to link a company with 

a tribe. This was not an exact science because the tribes were intermingled, but they 

did locate companies in areas where a majority of a tribe resided. The next step was 

a concerted drive to recruit tribesmen into the police force. The Marines solicited help 

from the Sheikhs to nominate men from their tribes, and started developing police 

stations near the combat outposts. This would allow the Marines and Iraqi Army 

forces to partner with the local police forces in those areas and further engender trust 

and confidence from the local people. 

 Moving goods across the Iraqi and Syrian border was closely connected to 

the local economy. Undermining this trade would jeopardize a fragile relationship that 

U.S. forces worked hard to develop. In fact, U.S. forces had learned from the sheikhs 
Chapter 2 

2-4 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

that disruption of trade was one of the major grievances the locals had against al 

Qaeda in Iraq. Local tribes agreed to allow U.S. forces to stop and inspect all 

vehicles coming into the country to ensure no foreign fighters, money, or weapons 

were entering Iraq. The tribes also agreed to help with the inspection. New local 

police largely conducted these inspections with the Iraqi Army (with Marines in 

overwatch.) The tribes had picked the Iraqi government’s side in the struggle against 

al Qaeda in Iraq and wanted to stop foreign fighters, money, and weapons from 

entering Iraq as much as the U.S. forces did. 

2-11. Understanding is necessary to begin planning the initial development of measures of effectiveness 

and performance. The commander must understand what has happened in an operational environment and 

determine the nature, scope, and severity of its problems. A situation is usually more complicated than it 

seems when the military force first becomes involved. Understanding an operational environment is a 

collaborative effort of the unified action partners. These partners may include U.S. government military and 

civilian personnel, international civilian and military personnel, and host-nation civilian and military 

personnel. To the maximum extent possible, the military force and unified action partners strive to have a 

common situational understanding from the beginning of an operation. If the partnering agencies do not 

have the same situational understanding, they can quickly find themselves working at odds with each other. 

Commanders will rarely have enough time to fully understand an operational environment. Understanding 

an operational environment is a continued and iterative process that will continue throughout an operation. 

2-12. An area of operations is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and 

maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). 

For land operations, an area of operations includes subordinate areas of operations as well. 

2-13. A commander’s area of operations may be relatively static, but people, weapons, commodities, and 

information continuously flow through an area of operations. An area of operations can cross physical 

structures, such as roads and rivers, and span diverse population groups. Fabricated borders that divide 

natural groupings can create problems in understanding an area of operations. For example, cross-border 

ties allow insurgents safe havens outside of a tactical unit’s area of operations. Moreover, international 

boundaries often divide population groups. The span of an insurgency may be far larger than the defined 

area of operations and areas outside the area of operations may be relevant to a commander. For example, 

areas outside a commander’s area of operations may provide a safe haven for an insurgency, or an adjacent 

state may support an insurgency. In an insurgency, an area of interest may be large. 

2-14. The area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas 

adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy 

forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0). This area also includes areas 

occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. It is the area in which 

events could have significant impact on areas of operations. An area of interest can be large relative to the 

area of operations. When defining an area of interest, commanders should consider the operational 

variables. (See JP 3-0 for more information on an area of influence.) 

2-15. Commanders analyze operational variables to understand the operational environment in which they 

are conducting operations. An operational environment is not static; it continues to evolve. Introducing 

units into an operational environment causes shifts and changes. As a result, commanders, their respective 

staffs, and all Soldiers and Marines must continuously reassess an operational environment for changing 

conditions. Moreover, in addition to understanding U.S. interests and desired end states in an environment, 

a commander must understand the environment from three additional perspectives: those of the host nation, 

the enemy, and the population. 

POLITICAL

2-16. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of 

governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers. The 

counterinsurgent seeks to understand not just the formal political system, such as political parties and 

elected officials, but also the informal systems of political influence, such as ethnic groups and other 

centers of power. There is a connection between the political variable and the social variable. For example, 
Understanding an Operational Environment 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 2-5 

a tribal grouping or a social caste may directly affect whom that group sees as a legitimate authority in an 

area. Moreover, these social groupings can affect the formal power structure. For example, in an electoral 

system, groups will often vote as blocs, giving them added political power in that formal system. (See 

ADRP 5-0 for more information on the political variable.) 

2-17. Often, informal groups such as tribes or local councils are the essential actors in the distribution of 

political power, especially at the local level. Political power is the ability to influence behavior. The biggest 

influence of behavior is often local groupings that can create a norming effect on a population. Most groups 

hold power only because the population accepts that power distribution. 

2-18. However, the opposite can also be true and the formal political system can change group identity and 

influence the actions of any social group. States can create identity in a population through education and 

information. For example, an education program that instills nationalist views in an individual from an 

early age can be a powerful tool in shaping a person’s identity and in turn whom that person sees as a 

legitimate authority. Group and individual identities are not static, nor is whom a population views as 

legitimate static. While groups have internal means to view identity, variables outside the group, including 

the host nation, also affect them. 

2-19. The commitment and motivation of a host nation to defeat an insurgency is an important motivation. 

Governments with more than one of the following traits have tended to lose historically, even when 

supported by competent and committed external forces: 

 Government sponsors or protects unpopular economic and social arrangements or cultural 

institutions. 

 Government is involved in corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule. 

 Government operates as a kleptocracy. 

 Government is controlled by elites with perverse incentives to continue conflict. 

 Government is economically dependent on external actors. 

The harsh reality for counterinsurgents is that some of these negative characteristics are usually present, 

and they are key factors in sparking insurgencies in the first place. As a result, the interests of a host-nation 

government are often at odds with what the best practices would be to solve its political problems. (See 

paragraphs 1-27 through 1-33 for more information on legitimacy and control.) 

MILITARY

2-20. The military variable explores the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, 

friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment. For many countries, the army’s predominant 

purpose is to be the military force responsible for maintaining external security. However, this is not a 

universal rule, and many militaries become involved in internal security and even governance. In some 

cases, there is a degree of military control over the government, which then blends the political and military 

variables. This can range from a military dictatorship to a praetorian guard type military that periodically 

intervenes in the governance of a society. Even in cases where a host nation appears to have complete 

objective control over its military forces, these military forces can be an important bureaucratic and 

political actor. The interaction between the military and the political structure is important to understanding 

this variable’s relationship with the political distribution of power in a society. (See ADRP 5-0 for more 

information on the military variable.) 

2-21. A host of institutions including police, paramilitary, intelligence, and other organizations can 

maintain internal security. Thus, commanders and staffs need to consider them within the military variable. 

In many autocratic societies, intelligence agencies provide an essential means of control over a society. 

Many societies maintain civil control and civil security by an accepted rule of law and a police force that 

enforces the rule of law. In a counterinsurgency, the host nation may use the military or a paramilitary to 

defeat an insurgency. 

2-22. The military variable includes all forces involved in both internal and external security. U.S. 

counterinsurgents must fully understand how the host nation maintains internal and external security. 

Moreover, they must understand both neutral and enemy military forces. Neutral military forces are 

common in a counterinsurgency, as some states or multinational corporations will employ or contract for 
Chapter 2 

2-6 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

limited forces to protect personnel, resources, or infrastructure for their own interests. A peacekeeping 

force may be maintaining a position of neutrality in the conflict. There can also be informal groupings of 

military power. For example, local gangs, armed militias, and private security agents can be a factor in 

local areas. 

2-23. Commanders and staffs should analyze friendly, neutral, and enemy forces with both qualitative and 

quantitative data. Some aspects to consider include— 

 Position of forces in national and local governmental structure. 

 General organization, training, and doctrine. 

 Economic basis (to include the appropriations system). 

 Conscription or recruitment systems. 

 Police role in the nation’s internal security. 

 Rapport with population. 

 The impact of other international forces already there or there in the recent past. 

These considerations are particularly important with regard to the insurgents. Knowing from what groups 

and sources, both within the country of conflict and outside of it, are providing what kinds of support (for 

example, financial, personnel, materiel, and provisions) and by what processes or routes is critical. 

Insurgencies that continue to meet their tangible support needs are difficult to defeat. 

2-24. One enemy force in a counterinsurgency can vary widely from another. Some may be based on 

cellular organizations while others may be more hierarchical. Moreover, there may be a wide variance in 

enemy capabilities. Some insurgencies may have capabilities to conduct large scale and well coordinated 

attacks that may rival the capability of a host nation’s military. Others may have less capability and may 

rely on small-unit tactics. (See paragraphs 4-76 through 4-103 for a discussion of the eighth dynamic, 

organizational and operational patterns, and see chapter 5 for a further discussion on enemy military 

forces.) 

ECONOMIC

2-25. The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to gaining access to, 

producing, distributing, and consuming resources. These behaviors determine incentives and disincentives 

that encourage or discourage economic decisions. The sum of these individual and group decisions may 

determine the production, distribution, and consumption of economic resources. Typically, an economy is 

conceptualized as currency, stocks, major commodities, banking, and trade controlled and monitored by the 

government. However, informal economies, trade, or economic exchange outside state-controlled or 

money-based transactions may be of equal or greater importance than formal economies in understanding 

an operational environment. While the world economy continues to grow more interdependent, local 

economies remain relatively distinct. These differences significantly influence political choices, including 

individuals’ decisions to support or subvert the existing order. When commanders and staffs analyze a local 

economy, they consider both governmental policies and the type of local economy. 

2-26. Types of economies vary widely. When looking at economic activities, commanders and staffs strive 

to understand the relative importance of the various sectors of an economy. Comparing the percentage of 

the economy in the public sector versus the private sector provides some understanding of the structure of 

the economy. Moreover, the private and public sector can potentially be divided into different sectors based 

on type of activities. Agriculture, raw materials, services, and other types of production play an important 

role in defining the economy of a local area. It is important to analyze governmental policies. Corruption, 

the rule of law, and macroeconomic policy play a role in the structure of a local economy. 

2-27. Another important factor in analyzing economic activity is the informal economy. In weak states, 

understanding the informal economy is key to providing a full understanding of an operational 

environment. The informal economy is those economic interactions and exchanges that are not recognized, 

regulated, controlled, or taxed by a state government. In this case, informal does not always equal 

illegitimate. For example, a black market is a form of informal economy based on criminal activities such 

as racketeering, money laundering, prostitution, drug trafficking, and smuggling. On the other hand, 

open-air markets and barter systems are legitimate activities that often contribute to an informal economy. 
Understanding an Operational Environment 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 2-7 

In every country there is a balance between formal and informal economies. In successful states, the 

informal economy may be relatively small. However, in failing states the informal economy may form the 

majority of all economic activities. The local population may depend on informal markets for their most 

basic needs. It is difficult but important for counterinsurgents to develop an understanding of these informal 

economies (both legitimate and illegitimate.) Because they are outside host-nation government oversight, 

insurgents can exploit even legitimate formal economies as a source of funding. The black market, on the 

other hand, will most likely be a direct enabler of an insurgency in terms of both funding and logistics. 

2-28. The counterinsurgent must consider other informal economies. Most people work, buy, and sell in 

this economy, operating outside legal frameworks but not engaging in illicit or criminal activity (except 

perhaps for taxation issues). Sensitivity to the rules of an informal economy is one piece of cultural 

sensitivity to the population and the host nation in general. Examples of the rules of an informal economy 

include the following: 

 People earn income in non-cash payments such as benefits or goods. 

 People often use land for decades (or more) through traditional usage rights granted by village 

heads and chiefs with no legal title. 

 People may work without pay (in arrangements such as the traditional divisions of household 

and farm labor). 

2-29. Economic variables also tie into other elements of a society. For example, ownership or control of 

land and debt indicate something about the power structure within a society. Many developing societies 

have highly concentrated ownership of land, which can serve as a driver for social conflict and discontent. 

Whoever owns land or controls land has the power to use it for economic profit. Maintaining this 

ownership or control during an insurgency indicates a degree of power in a society. The same is true of 

debt. The ability to collect a debt indicates a degree of power in a society. Land and debt are examples of 

how economic factors link into other social factors. 

2-30. If a population views economic conditions as unjust, a lack of economic opportunity can be a root 

cause of an insurgency. (See paragraphs 4-14 through 4-22 for more information on motives for an 

insurgency.) As part of developing an understanding of an operational environment, counterinsurgents 

assess the current economic variables, the economic opportunities available to different segments of the 

population, and the effect insurgent and counterinsurgent operations are having on the population’s ability 

to meet their most basic economic needs. Economic survival, especially in an area where an insurgency is 

occurring, is almost as important and as immediate a challenge for households as physical security. For this 

reason, leaders at all levels of the counterinsurgency operation (including platoons and companies) need to 

assess the impacts of military operations on the following simple elements of the economic welfare of 

households and communities: 

 Income (including the capacity to earn streams of income in future). 

 Assets and property (used to earn income). 

 Work (including traditional patterns of unpaid work). 

2-31. Commanders strive to understand the economic impact of the unit’s presence in an area. For better or 

worse, the presence of an Army or Marine Corps unit affects normal economic incentives and disincentives 

for individual behavior. Introducing foreign wealth can have unintended negative consequences. For this 

reason, careful thought and planning are needed for a project intended to have local economic impact. 

Commanders anticipate the economic impact of their arrival and their continued presence in the area of 

operations. Additionally, commanders and staffs carefully weigh the costs and benefits associated with all 

economic activity. Some factors to consider are— 

 Prospects of long-term sustainability. 

 Possibility of local price inflation. 

 Disrupting natural incentives (such as farmers leaving fields to work on trash pickup projects). 

SOCIAL

2-32. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational 

environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society. Understanding the society is 
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2-8 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

foundational to understanding the social variable. A society is defined as a population whose members are 

subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share a 

sense of identity. However, no society is completely homogeneous. A society usually has a dominant 

culture, but it can have secondary cultures. Different societies may share similar cultures, as Canada and 

the U.S. do. Societies are not static, but change over time. (For more information on this variable, see 

chapter 3 of this publication and ADRP 5-0.) 

INFORMATION

2-33. The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, 

organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information 

environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, 

or act on information (JP 3-13). Understanding the communications systems is important because they 

influence international, national, regional, and local audiences. Insurgents often use information and 

disinformation to gain credibility and legitimacy with the population, while simultaneously undermining 

their opponents. Understanding how people communicate and who influences them on a daily basis is 

essential. This is important at all levels. For example, identifying local gathering places is important to 

understand or influence the spread of information, rumors, and gossip. 

2-34. The information environment is made up of three dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive. 

The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decisionmaker or specific audience and is the 

dimension where people think, perceive, visualize, and decide. The informational dimension is the place 

where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected with key 

components of the content and flow of information. The physical dimension is composed of systems, 

human beings (including decisionmakers, leaders, and military forces), and supporting infrastructure that 

enable individuals and organizations to create effects conduct operations across air, land, maritime, space 

and cyberspace domains across multiple domains. (See table 2-1.) 

Table 2-1. Interrelated dimensions of the information environment 

Dimension Description 

Cognitive 

dimension 

• Exists in the minds of human beings. 

• Consists of individual and collective consciousness. 

• Where information is used to develop perceptions and make decisions. 

• Significant characteristics include values, beliefs, perceptions, awareness, 

and decisionmaking. 

Informational 

dimension 

• Created by the interaction of the physical and cognitive dimensions. 

• Where information is collected, processed, and disseminated. 

• Significant characteristics are information content and flow. 

Physical 

dimension 

• The tangible, real world. 

• Where the information environment overlaps with the physical world. 

• Consists of targetable individuals, organizations, information systems, and 

the physical networks that connect them. 

• Significant characteristics include terrain, weather, civilian information 

infrastructure, media, populace, and third party organizations. 

2-35. The technological advances in communications offer some unique considerations for insurgencies. 

For one, international communication is easier than it used to be. This allows insurgencies to communicate 

with organizations outside of their physical control. Connecting to diasporas or sympathetic groups could 

be vital to an insurgency. With the ability to communicate comes the ability to move resources and funding. 

Moreover, communications can be vital in importing weapons or other supplies to an insurgency. Global 

communications can be essential in increasing the military capabilities of an insurgency, significantly 

increasing the tempo of insurgent operations and their ability to change tactics. 

2-36. At the operational and tactical level, communications allow for effective coordination of attacks. 

Organizations can communicate by cell phones, by the internet, or a number of other rapid means. This 
Understanding an Operational Environment 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 2-9 

allows for coordinated large-scale attacks even by dispersed organizations. (For additional information on 

the information environment, see FM 3-13.) 

INFRASTRUCTURE

2-37. The infrastructure variable is composed of the facilities (buildings and equipment), personnel, and 

services needed for the functioning of a community or society. Societies have different infrastructure needs. 

For example, the expectation for hours of available electricity vary widely. Counterinsurgents try to access 

infrastructure needs to meet the expectation of the user, not their own expectations. 

2-38. Infrastructure is also interrelated with other variables. For example, the development of a highway 

system will affect the ability of people to move and interact with others. Creating a society in which 

humans can easily move based on economic needs or simple desires greatly increases the variety of groups 

a person will meet. These interactions and new relationships can change how a person views the world and 

change that person’s values. A communications system, such as a cellular network, can have the same 

effect. These systems allow for communications outside of one’s areas and allow the transmission of new 

ideas and concepts. 

2-39. Commanders and staffs conducting counterinsurgency operations must consider the relationship 

between infrastructure and the economic variable. An effective infrastructure can allow for the easy 

movement of people, goods, and ideas. Many businesses require infrastructure. While it is true that a local 

population may not expect 24 hours of electricity a day, a manufacturing plant may require it. Moreover, 

infrastructure such as schools can increase the human capital in an area and drive economic growth. 

2-40. Infrastructure also has an effect on the military variable. Host-nation forces can use a good 

transportation system, but so can an insurgency. A road system provides a means of transportation for 

everyone, not simply the population and government. Moreover, infrastructure may be important for the 

population and the government’s role in maintaining civil control and security. An attack on the 

infrastructure may undermine the government’s legitimacy in an area. However, the opposite is also true. 

An attack on infrastructure may also undermine the insurgency if the population places blame on the 

insurgency and turns towards to government. 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

2-41. The physical environment includes the geography and man-made structures, as well as the climate 

and weather, in an area of operations. The physical environment affects the tactics and operations of both 

insurgents and counterinsurgents. Extreme conditions, such as in nations in higher elevations, can make 

insurgent movements difficult in the winter. The movement and the tactics of any military force will be 

affected by the physical environment of its area of operations. A physical environment will influence 

insurgency sanctuaries, the ability of an insurgency to hide resources, and the ability of an insurgency to 

mass forces. Understanding a physical environment is essential to understanding an insurgency. (See 

chapter 4 for further discussion on how a physical environment relates to an insurgency.) 

2-42. A physical environment also relates to the other variables. A mountainous, landlocked country will 

have a difficult time building the infrastructure needed for large-scale international trade. Moreover, if the 

physical environment precludes the ability to easily produce an excess of food, it is difficult to divert much 

labor to other enterprises. This can hamper the development of a highly specialized economy. An increase 

in food production will often predate a major increase in industrial production. 

TIME

2-43. Time describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an operational 

environment, as well as how various actors in an operational environment perceive the timing and duration. 

Time also has an interrelated relationship with other variables. For example, a multinational coalition may 

see its efforts in a counterinsurgency as limited by national objectives or by the public pressure. In other 

words, outside parties can always leave a counterinsurgency. On the other hand, for the host nation, the 

insurgents and the population in the struggle are less constrained by time than a multinational coalition. An 
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2-10 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

insurgency may use the time variable to its advantage, while the time variable usually works against an 

external counterinsurgent. 

2-44. Time can also play a role in the social variable. Ongoing conflicts tax societies. Populations can 

become less interested in the nuisance of a conflict and more interested in simple peace. As time passes, a 

population may be more interested in who is likely to win an insurgency than the motivation of either side 

of the conflict. Counterinsurgents may also see time as working for or against them. (See paragraphs 4-30 

through 4-45 for more information on insurgent strategies.) 

THE MISSION VARIABLES AND CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS 

2-45. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders filter information categorized by the operational variables 

into relevant information with respect to the mission. They use the mission variables, in combination with 

the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the situation and to visualize, describe, and direct 

operations. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, 

time available, and civil considerations. (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on the mission variables). 

Within the mission variables, civil considerations are of unique importance for counterinsurgency. Civil 

considerations are the influence of man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of the 

civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military 

operations. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE: areas, 

structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. (See FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A for information on 

the use of ASCOPE.) 

2-46. The commanders’ refinement of information for their mission and their particular area of operations 

is essential. ASCOPE can play an important role in the identification of structures or events that will have 

an effect in a unit’s area of operations. As such, ASCOPE is an important tool for the unit in determining 

important civil considerations in an insurgency. Units within an insurgency use ASCOPE to identify and 

continually refine their understanding of the area of operations over time. Commanders and staffs consider 

ASCOPE from the perspective of the population, the insurgent, and the counterinsurgent. This is 

particularly important for counterinsurgency operations. (See JP 3-57, FM 3-57, MCWP 3-33.1, and ADRP 

2-0 for detailed explanations of ASCOPE.) 
13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 3-1 

Chapter 3 

Culture 

3-1. This chapter addresses culture and its role in a counterinsurgency operational environment. Culture 

forms the basis of how people interpret, understand, and respond to events and people around them. 

Cultural understanding is critical because who a society considers to be legitimate will often be determined 

by culture and norms. Additionally, counterinsurgency operations will likely be conducted as part of a 

multinational effort, and understanding the culture of allies and partners is equally critical. 

3-2. Insurgents from a local area generally understand local culture, the perspectives of the population, 

and the population’s concerns and grievances much better than any foreign military forces understand 

them. Therefore, culturally, the insurgent may have an enormous advantage over a foreign military force. 

This may not be true if the insurgents are not from the local area. If a military force is to succeed in gaining 

support of the population, it must seek to understand the local people and their culture and incorporate the 

perspectives and concerns of the population in their plans and operations as well as, if not better than, the 

insurgents incorporate them. 

3-3. There are many definitions of culture in use by the United States (U.S.) military. As a starting point, 

this publication understands culture is a web of meaning shared by members of a particular society or group 

within a society. 

UNDERSTANDING CULTURE 

3-4. To be successful in interacting with the local population to gain information on the enemy, or to 

understand their requirements, military members must do more than learn a few basic facts or “do’s and do 

nots.” They must understand the way that their actions can change the situation for the local population 

(both positively and negatively) and the resulting perceptions of the population towards those actions. To 

be successful, commanders and staffs consider four fundamental aspects of culture when planning and 

executing military operations: 

 Culture influences how people view their world. 

 Culture is holistic. 

 Culture is learned and shared. 

 Culture is created by people and can and does change. 

3-5. The way that a culture influences how people view their world is referred to as their worldview. 

Many people believe they view their world accurately, in a logical, rational, unbiased way. However, 

people filter what they see and experience according to their beliefs and worldview. Information and 

experiences that do not match what they believe to be true about the world are frequently rejected or 

distorted to fit the way they believe the world should work. More than any other factor, culture informs and 

influences that worldview. In other words, culture influences perceptions, understandings, and 

interpretations of events. Soldiers and Marines need to know that U.S. interpretations of events are often 

quite different from the perceptions of these events by other people in an area of operations. If Soldiers and 

Marines assume that the local population will perceive actions the way that they do, they are likely to 

misjudge their reactions. The U.S. military refers to this pattern of assuming others see events in the same 

way the U.S. does as mirror imaging. Mirror imaging is dangerous because it leads Soldiers and Marines 

into thinking that their assumptions about a problem and its solution are shared by the population and 

multinational partners, rather than employing perspective taking, and looking at the problem from the 

population’s perspective. 

3-6. Holism is based on the principle that all socio-cultural aspects of human life are interconnected. 

While interacting with people in other cultures, Soldiers and Marines may be tempted to say their problems 

“are all about [fill in the blank: tribalism, corruption, lack of work ethic, and so on.].” In truth, very few 
Chapter 3 

3-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

counterinsurgency challenges boil down to one simple answer. Politics affects economics. Family structure 

affects job choices. Religion affects politics. Every aspect of culture affects every other aspect in some 

way, even if indirectly. By acknowledging these interconnections, military members can better assess how 

the local population might react to their presence and actions. For instance, when Soldiers and Marines are 

not thinking holistically, they may anticipate that closing down a local market will only have an impact on 

the local economy. However, after closing the market, it may be that the local reaction seems to be about 

religion or tribal concerns instead of economics. Even if Soldiers and Marines do not understand why, they 

should be aware that their actions will have unknown second and third order effects. By understanding that 

a marketplace is more than a place to exchange goods for money, and that economic conditions may affect 

tribal power, the status of religious leaders, and other social conditions, Soldiers and Marines can see a 

culture holistically. A holistic perspective helps military members understand the complex 

interconnectedness of a culture and avoid being surprised by local reactions to military decisions. 

3-7. Culture is learned and shared. Children learn the appropriate way to act in a culture by observing 

other people; by being taught accepted values and ways of thinking about the world from their parents, 

teachers and others; and by practicing (sharing) what they have learned on a daily basis. This process of 

learning a new culture is called socialization. Culture can be learned at any age. Marines and Soldiers, for 

example, learn military culture by going through basic training or officer training in their late teens or early 

twenties. In fact, these initial training schools recognize their important role in socializing young men and 

women into core Marine and Army values. As a result, Marine Corps and Army basic training curriculums 

include not only classes on marksmanship, but also classes on ethics and core values. In counterinsurgency 

operations, understanding that culture is learned and shared can offer an important operational and tactical 

opportunity. Any Marine or Soldier can learn about the culture of the population simply by interacting with 

the local people. One of the more successful adaptations of the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan 

occurred when service members realized they could learn a lot about the local culture quickly by talking to 

and observing their interpreters. Their enhanced understanding of the cultures of their areas of operations 

enabled them to better negotiate with leaders, to conduct operations that would be successful, and in a 

number of cases (such as the al Anbar Awakening), to gain the support and assistance of the population in 

fighting an insurgency. 

3-8. One of the keys to success (and failure) in dealing with a population in a counterinsurgency operation 

is understanding that cultures are not static; they can and do change, often rapidly. During times of conflict, 

the usual methods for getting through the day may stop working for the local population, and they may try 

adopting new ideas or start highlighting traditional ways of doing things. Alternatively, they may switch 

rapidly among a range of possible behaviors. These changes can occur because of a number of factors were 

at play, but probably the greatest cause of this during conflict is a rapid decline in security. As security 

declines, the threat of attack, rape, and murder forces many changes in society. The rapid decline in the 

status and opportunities for women in these countries, therefore, was not merely due to centuries-old tribal 

beliefs, but to very real and pragmatic economic and social changes over time. As the cases of Iraq and 

Afghanistan illustrate, cultural practices and attitudes are frequently influenced by changes in very real 

physical conditions. Since the arrival of a large military, often accompanied by the destruction of physical 

property and the erosion of the local economy and security, is undoubtedly an enormous change for the 

local population, counterinsurgency planners need to recognize and plan for the impact that their operations 

will have upon the people and cultures in an area of operations. 

ASSESSING A CULTURAL SITUATION 

3-9. Although it may seem that people around the world are extraordinarily different and have little in 

common, in reality all human groups interact with their world and each other in some basic, predictable 

patterns. The particular details of these patterns may vary. But the underlying patterns will not. Thus, all 

people use, manage, and interact with their environments. All groups have some kind of economy for 

exchanging goods and services. Every group has a social structure, with differing roles and status among 

members. Political behavior can be found in the smallest community. All people have some kind of belief 

system, whether based on religion, tradition, narratives, or history. By identifying these patterns wherever 

they deploy, Marines and Soldiers will be in a better position to assess the cultural situation and the 

influence of their operations upon the local population. 
Culture 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 3-3 

3-10. All cultures have a unique and interdependent connection with their physical surroundings. The 

physical environment (including climate, terrain, and resources) influences the people living in it by 

providing a range of possibilities within which they act. People shape their environment by the choices they 

make, creating a cultural landscape which reflects their social, cultural, economic, and political attitudes. A 

careful reading, or interpretation, of the cultural landscape can provide useful information about the people 

who create it, use it, and live in it. A military presence in an area of operations will affect a local population 

and its use of the physical environment. For example, Marines and Soldiers may inadvertently divert or 

impede access to resources, such as water or food, which in turn may cause real shortages or upset the 

balance of power by allowing greater access to these resources by one group and harming another. 

Counterinsurgency planners need to anticipate how their operations will impact local populations and their 

use of their environment and recognize that since use of the environment is cultural, these impacts may 

significantly differ from what might be expected in the U.S. 

3-11. All cultures have specific systems for obtaining, producing, and distributing items people need to 

survive (for example, food, water, and shelter) or luxuries and material things. This system, which does not 

necessarily require money or a banking system, is called the economy of a culture. Frequently, insurgents 

use the informal economy to obtain funding and support for their activities. Another aspect of the economic 

system that is often overlooked is the concept of reciprocity, which is an exchange between people that 

creates a relationship. Although in Western cultures exchange usually involves the exchange of goods and 

services of equal monetary value, in other parts of the world exchange may be only partly about what 

people expect regarding goods and services and also partly about building working relationships. If 

Marines and Soldiers fail to see what the local people expect from the exchange, to include its impact on 

interpersonal relationships, it will be hard for them to understand or anticipate people’s behavior. 

3-12. In all cultures, people hold differing positions of status and power, often closely related to their roles 

in a group. In the military, for example, one’s status and power is based on rank. Depending on a person’s 

rank, a person fills different roles in an organization. The way that a group distinguishes among its 

members according to their role, status, and power is reflected in its social structure. A person’s position in 

the social structure may depend on many factors, including age, gender, class, family name, tribal 

membership, ethnicity, religious identity, and even rank. In conflict environments, differing groups (for 

example, ethnic, religious, or tribal) may each vie for power, often looking to outside militaries to support 

them. In counterinsurgency operations, it is essential that military leaders understand which social groups 

have traditionally held power in an area of operations. Otherwise, they are likely to be drawn into power 

struggles among competing groups, and possibly even unwittingly end up aiding the insurgents. A concept 

central to one’s place in society is that of identity. Identity is a broad term used to describe how people 

conceive of themselves and how they are perceived by others. Identity shapes how people view themselves 

and the world. Understanding identity is complex because people have multiple identities. In times of 

conflict, people may choose to emphasize certain group identities such as nationality or religion, while at 

other times different identities, such as one’s profession or gender, may matter more. Social structure and 

identity are extremely important concepts for counterinsurgency planners and operators to understand, as 

they affect people’s allegiances and influence how groups and individuals will interpret and respond to U.S. 

actions. 

3-13. In all cultures, people have a system that determines who leads the group and who makes decisions 

about its welfare. Although people in the U.S. use an electoral system to select their leaders, this is not the 

case in many other countries. In many places around the world, even when the official government is 

elected, the local population may not view that government as legitimate or effective. In fact, one of the 

primary motivations for people to support an insurgency is their sense that the official or formal 

government has failed to provide for their needs. Frequently, insurgents may be providing a “shadow 

government” which replaces and competes with the official government in certain parts of the country. 

Shadow governments are one example of informal leadership. In most areas of operations, Marines and 

Soldiers will find that communities or groups are influenced by a variety of leaders, most of whom are not 

part of the government. In some areas, religious leaders may have great influence. In others, people may 

look to tribal leaders or respected individuals within their ethnic group. Business leaders and warlords often 

have great power and influence too. To be successful in counterinsurgency operations, military members 

need to quickly and accurately identify the various community leaders and develop strategies to work with 
Chapter 3 

3-4 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

each of them in order to increase government legitimacy. Without support from the various power brokers 

in an area of operations, military action is unlikely to gain support from the local population. 

3-14. Cultures are characterized by a shared set of beliefs, values, norms and symbols that unite a group. 

These beliefs may come from many sources, such as a person’s background, family, education, religion or 

history. Understanding the beliefs and values of a local population is critical for effective information 

operations. Failure to respect or understand the beliefs of a local population can result in serious hostility 

towards military intervention and attacks upon military personnel. Likewise, information operations that 

assume the foreign audience shares the same jokes, history, or values that Soldiers and Marines do 

frequently fail to deliver messages effectively. To gain an understanding of belief systems, 

counterinsurgents read and monitor information available through media or books, and counterinsurgents 

talk to people in the culture. Discussing history with local people can be a window into understanding the 

way that people in that area define a problem, who they believe caused it, and who they think the heroes 

and villains are. Stories, sayings and even poetry can reveal cultural narratives, the shared explanations of 

why the world is a certain way. Frequently, advertising appeals to people by using these narratives, as do 

effective information operations. Beliefs, however, are not perfectly shared or understood within a group. 

There is usually a range of acceptable thoughts and behaviors. This is called variation. For example, in 

reading about Islam, Soldiers and Marines may understand that Muslims are supposed to fast during 

Ramadan. However, when deployed they might observe seemingly faithful Muslims drinking and eating 

during Ramadan. Within U.S. culture, these internal mismatches and contradictions (variations) are often 

accepted without much comment. In a cross-cultural interaction, these contradictions can seem jarring or 

confusing. Often, working with others in a foreign culture requires the ability to suspend judgment. People 

often act and work in ways that may be difficult to accept or understand. However, by recognizing that all 

people share some fundamental patterns and seeking to understand and develop military plans and 

operations that build upon these patterns, commanders and staffs can effectively work to counter an 

insurgency within an area of operations. 

3-15. Religion can be a powerful force in shaping beliefs. In many cultures religion and religious leaders 

have significant influence over local populations. Religious ideology can incite conflict, but religion can 

also be instrumental in stabilizing a culture by using universal religious concepts of justice, healing, and 

transformation. Because religion is often an integral part of the values set of a local culture, 

counterinsurgents conducting mission preparation and analysis examine the religion in an area of 

operations. Religion can also play an important role in creating peace and stability. Religion can create 

cultural instability, but in many cases it can alleviate problems in a society and be a unifying force. Many 

religions have messages and themes of pacifism and forgiveness. In many insurgencies, religious leaders 

have played an essential role in ending conflicts. The effect of a religion has to be understood within that 

religion and within that society. Counterinsurgents conducting a mission analysis may find that insurgents 

are using a radical interpretation of a religious text to incite violence. This can be countered by empowering 

indigenous religious leaders who promote a different interpretation. For example, radical Muslims may cite 

texts from the Quran that justify violence, but they may ignore the passages taught by more moderate 

Muslims that advocate compassion, peace, and human dignity. 

ORGANIZING TO UNDERSTAND CULTURE 

3-16. There are three important methods for trying to understand the cultural element of a 

counterinsurgency. First, all counterinsurgents must make every effort to experience and understand the 

local culture, including by trying local food and learning local languages and customs. Second, 

commanders can organize their staffs in order to concentrate on cultural understanding and inject this 

understanding into their unit’s plans and operations. Third, commanders can rely on an outside capability to 

allow commanders and staffs to understand the culture. Two techniques that involve organization of staffs 

or outside capabilities are— 

 Green cell and cultural advisor. 

 Human terrain systems. 
Culture 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 3-5 

GREEN CELL AND CULTURAL ADVISOR

3-17. The purpose of a green cell is to consider the population in order to promote a better understanding 

of the environment and the problem. At a minimum, the green cell provides for the independent will of the 

population. Planning teams must develop an understanding of civilian aspects of the area of operations and 

the will of the population. There are many techniques to achieve this capability, and each unit may 

approach this differently based on resources and available qualified personnel. Two techniques of note are 

the green cell and cultural advisor. (See MCWP 5-1 for more information on green cells.) 

3-18. A green cell is an ad hoc working group consisting of individuals with a diversity of education and 

experience capable of identifying and considering the perspective of the population, the host-nation 

government, and other stakeholders within an operational environment. Ideally, a green cell is composed of 

individuals with cultural expertise across all warfighting functions. If a whole-of-government approach is 

used, experts from other government agencies such as the Department of State should be included in the 

cell. The green cell cooperates closely with the other members of the planning staff so that cultural factors 

are considered throughout the range of military operations. The green cell also interfaces and coordinates 

with joint and interagency groups, drawing upon the collective knowledge and experience of the 

Department of State, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and foreign resources, such as provincial 

reconstruction teams. (See MCWP 5-1 for more information on green cell activities.) 

3-19. The commander forms the green cell during the receipt of mission and problem framing planning 

steps to add to the commander’s and the operational planning team’s cultural understanding of an 

operational environment. In order to support the operational planning team, the green cell understands the 

operational planning team’s mission and tasks and is able to translate cultural information in a way that is 

relevant to the mission. 

3-20. The cultural advisor is a concept developed and employed in Operation Enduring Freedom in 

Afghanistan. Cultural advisors are the principal subject matter experts on culture and planning related to 

their designated geographic region of expertise, serving as the cultural and language advisors to the 

commander. The cultural advisor is a special staff officer for the commander and a member of the planning 

staff. This person not only serves on the planning staff, but also deploys and serves as an ongoing advisor 

to senior leaders while they are in theater, if needed. The advantage of having a cultural advisor on staff is 

that this advisor can often help explain to the commander what the advisor sees on the ground in the area of 

operations. A foreign area officer or a civil affairs Soldier may be a good selection for a cultural advisor. 

Both can provide an understanding of the host nation and its specific regional, religious, and ethnic 

differences, and they may have foreign language skills. As a result, the commander can adjust operations in 

response to a culturally challenging environment. 

3-21. Overall, there are many options to task-organize staffs to incorporate culture into planning. While a 

green cell creates expertise in one part of the staff, those concerns are also important for other staff 

sections. It is important for commanders to create staffs that are well integrated across the warfighting 

functions. One danger of creating a cultural cell within the staff is that it will relegate cultural concerns to 

one staff element and inhibit cultural concerns being integrated into the planning process. Commanders 

ensure that the staff integrates all operational and planning concerns, including cultural concerns. 

3-22. Regardless of the particular planning configuration, commanders and planners find and use whatever 

cultural resources are available to the unit. Commanders and staffs incorporate culture into planning during 

the beginning of mission planning in order to understand an area of operations prior to developing any 

course of action. Success is recognized not by stand-alone briefs that describe the culture of an operational 

environment, but when all of the operational planning teams’ planning products reflect and have been 

informed by the cultural analysis that has been performed by subject matter experts. 

HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM 

3-23. The human terrain system provides tactical to strategic level support to commanders. The human 

terrain system conducts field research and analysis of the local population to determine the civil 

considerations in order to help commanders better understand the operational environment from the 

population’s perspective and assess how actions will potentially impact and be perceived by the local 

population. 
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3-6 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

3-24. A human terrain team typically consists of a team leader, one or two social scientists, and one 

research manager. When manning demands permit, human terrain team personnel are recruited and 

deployed to promote engagement with elements of the population that typically have restricted access. For 

example, in Afghanistan at least one woman is assigned per team to facilitate access to females within the 

local population. 

3-25. Human terrain teams, part of the human terrain system, represent a capability that traditionally falls 

outside of military expertise. These teams are an additional enabler for commanders to gain situational 

understanding of their operational environments through the socio-cultural running estimate and are an 

important tool in the military decisionmaking process. (See FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A for more information 

on human terrain teams.) 
13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 4-1 

PART TWO 

Insurgencies 

Part two provides doctrine to help understand an insurgency. While the first part 

provides the context of an insurgency, the second part provides a discussion of an 

insurgency within that context. Chapter 4 provides information about insurgency 

prerequisites and fundamentals. It helps commanders and staffs understand why an 

insurgency may form and how and why it acts. Chapter 5 then provides a description 

of an insurgency’s threat characteristics. 

Chapter 4 

Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals 

4-1. Several factors are important in analyzing any particular insurgency. Commanders and staffs must 

perform this analysis within an insurgency’s operational environment. Commanders and staffs consider 

when an insurgency could start or what the prerequisites are for a particular insurgency. Commanders and 

staffs also consider a particular insurgency’s strategy and its eight dynamics. This provides a means to 

analyze an insurgency. 

INTRASTATE WAR 

4-2. One way commanders and staffs view insurgencies is in the context of intrastate conflict. An 

intrastate conflict is as war or conflict between a constituted government and its people or representative 

factions from the people. It is a war within a state versus a war between two or more nation states. 

Intrastate conflict directly relates to insurgencies. Other types of intrastate conflicts are insurgencies that 

differ only in the amount of popular support or the amount of governmental capacity. Commanders and 

staffs should not only consider an insurgency as an intrastate conflict. Insurgent movements may operate in 

multiple countries, as their desired end state may be regional, transnational, or global. The types of 

intrastate conflicts include rebellions (also referred to as insurrections), revolutions, civil wars, and coup 

d’états. 

4-3. A rebellion (also known as an insurrection) may be fomented by a group that challenges state 

control. A rebellion is usually manifested by acts of violence when the state is unable or unwilling to 

address the group’s concerns. Another insurgency may use a rebellion if it can gain enough popular support 

to engage in large scale unrest or open conflict with the governing authority. Rebellions are forms of 

insurgency in which an organized group is leading the population, the causes of instability exist, and the 

movement enjoys some passive support among the population. Under most international laws it is a crime 

to incite, assist, or engage in violent actions against a constituted government. The Geneva Convention 

states that “Every government has a right to put down rebellion within its borders and to punish the 

insurgents in accordance with its penal laws.” (See the final record of the Diplomatic Conference of 

Geneva of 1949 vol. II section B, page 121 for more information on insurrections.) 

4-4. A revolution is a popular insurgency with plans to overthrow a government and transform its society 

and government from one form of government to another. Revolutions generally evolve from a rebellion, 

but in revolutions popular support comes in the form of a fully mobilized population, which differs from 

simply passive or active support. A fully mobilized population is a part of a revolution and it is generally 
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4-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

seeking fundamental lasting change in a society’s political, economic, or social order. A significant 

distinction between a revolution and a counterinsurgency is a requirement of the host-nation military, 

government, and civil authorities to prepare, plan, and conduct counterrevolution, and not simply 

counterinsurgency. The main difference is the need to reintegrate the mobilized population and not only 

reintegrate members of the insurgency. Although a coup d’état can resemble a revolution in that it can 

quickly overthrow a government, this overthrow is generally done rapidly and secretly during a coup d’état 

versus a rapid fully mobilization of the population during a revolution. 

4-5. Civil wars are condition-based conflicts beginning with an insurgency. Once the insurgency achieves 

certain characteristics of organization and resembles an alternate government, the conflict reaches the state 

of civil war. This is often characterized by performing tasks associated with a state and having a defined 

government. If the insurgency loses the ability to meet these criteria, the status or state of the insurgency is 

no longer that of a civil war. The insurgent movement may attempt to gain outside recognition by calling 

the conflict a civil war, as a civil war tends to afford international recognition and legal implications as a 

competing group and not an illegal movement. According to the Geneva Convention, the criteria of a civil 

war is “that the insurgents must have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a State; that 

the insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory; 

that the armed forces must act under the direction of the organized civil authority and be prepared to 

observe the ordinary laws of war; that the insurgent civil authority must agree to be bound by the 

provisions of the Convention.” (See the final record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 vol. 

II section B, page 121 for more information on civil wars.) 

4-6. Recognized antigovernment elements in a civil war may be classified as belligerents and not 

insurgencies. A belligerent, though generally a sovereign state, can be a non-sovereign state if it is 

recognized by the international community (by two or more states or organizations like the United 

Nations), organized, and is providing services to the population within its controlled areas. In the case 

where antigovernment forces meet the criteria of a state during a civil war, they achieve sufficient 

international recognition, and they may achieve belligerent status rather than insurgent status. Although 

status may change, counterinsurgency operations, by government forces, generally remain the same at the 

theater through lower tactical levels. The difference between a group being classified as an insurgency or a 

belligerent can affect the overall status of U.S. involvement, as a belligerent has international recognition. 

4-7. A faction that employs a coup d’état seeks to overthrow the governing authority by a quick decisive 

action by an internal faction within the government. Usually, this is the military or part of the security 

apparatus. A coup d’état may or may not result in an insurgency, as part of society may reject the change. 

Moreover, it is possible for an active insurgency to use a coup d’état to seize control over a government. 

With a coup d’état, a small group can kill or remove a leader and the leadership’s supporters and assume 

control of a state. The main point of a coup d’état is that it a means to change a regime by actors who are 

part of the government. 

4-8. Intrastate conflicts present different challenges than interstate wars, since they often take place 

among the population and, therefore, human rights violations and sectarian violence are more likely. 

Secondly, intrastate conflicts can spread to adjacent countries that have governments or portions of the 

population that share beliefs or goals with one side or the other. 

4-9. The nature of an intrastate conflict is a grievance between segments of a state’s population with its 

constituted government. There can be a single root cause or a variety of causes perceived as so severe that 

they impact the population’s social contract with its government. There are many likely contributors to 

intrastate conflicts, including perceived weak, illegitimate, corrupt, or overly oppressive governments, 

ethnic or racial tensions, religions conflicts, economic stresses, or a need for land reform. Often an 

intrastate conflict causes the formation and growth of insurgencies and other intrastate conflicts. 

Commanders and staffs must understand the nature of intrastate conflicts even if they are poorly defined. If 

a commander and staff misdiagnosis an intrastate conflict, they can fail to properly identify and address the 

root cause of instability and the nature of the threat. 
Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 4-3 

INSURGENCY PREREQUISITES 

4-10. The three prerequisites of an insurgency, opportunity, motive, and means, provide a framework for 

both planners and executers to plan for and prevent an insurgency. Planners and executers use the 

prerequisites for planning and execution of operations in environments where insurgencies are likely, such 

as a post-conflict environment. (See JP 3-24 for a further discussion of insurgency prerequisites.) 

OPPORTUNITY 

4-11. Opportunity refers to the emergence of significant gaps in the ability of the state or its local allies to 

control its territory and population. States must have the capacity to detect the early stages of insurgent 

organization and mobilization. This requires the cooperation of a significant portion of the population or 

the establishment of an extensive program of domestic surveillance and intelligence activities. The state 

must also be capable of suppressing the insurgency in a way that deters other potential rebels while 

avoiding contributing to the insurgent narrative and provoking wider resistance. 

4-12. For a land force, opportunity provides a means to evaluate the likelihood of an insurgency. For 

example, after a victory during a major combat operation, if the former government prevented insurgencies 

by an intelligence program, the commander and staff need to consider how likely and for how long an 

occupying force can prevent an insurgency without gaining the active support of the population or 

reestablishing intelligence programs. Understanding the opportunities for an insurgency in an area is 

essential for land forces. 

4-13. At the tactical and operational level, understanding opportunities for an insurgency provides a means 

for commanders and staffs to analyze the local conditions and the likelihood of a successful insurgency 

developing. Commanders and staffs actively make assessments on both the support of the population and 

the intelligence capability and capacity of the local area. If the population is not supportive of the host 

nation and the host nation has no means to prevent an insurgency in a hostile population, there is an 

opportunity for an insurgency in that area. (For a further discussion on why a gap in state control might 

happen, see JP 3-24.) 

MOTIVE

4-14. A population that has grievances does not necessarily cause an insurgency. Grievances are necessary, 

but not sufficient, conditions for an insurgency. Poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, inadequate 

essential services, political marginalization, and repression are commonplace. These conditions exist in 

many places where an insurgency does not. It takes established or emerging leaders to build a compelling 

narrative that links grievances to a political agenda and mobilizes the population to support a violent social 

movement. The narrative explains who is to blame for grievances, how grievances will be addressed, and 

how the population and insurgency should work together to accomplish the goal. Ideology often provides a 

coherent set of ideas that provide a compelling framework for a narrative. Where opportunity and motive 

(grievances) intersect, individuals emerge to attempt to mobilize the population. When grievances mobilize 

a population, they are a root cause of an insurgency. (See JP 3-24 for a further discussion on motive.) 

4-15. The root causes of an insurgency are real or perceived grievances that insurgents use to mobilize a 

population in support of an insurgency. Insurgents use these grievances to fuel an insurgency. Root causes 

are not static and can change over the course of an insurgency. As conditions change, insurgent leaders 

create different narratives to mobilize a population. The root causes that led to the insurgency in the first 

place may not be the same ones that are sustaining an ongoing insurgency. Commanders and staffs perform 

continued assessments and reassessments to determine what an insurgency is using as a root cause. 

4-16. A root cause can be summarized as a broad perception of injustice linked to the government that 

insurgents use to mobilize a population. If counterinsurgents take actions such as building schools and 

roads, or creating jobs, but these actions do not address the perception of injustice, then they will not reduce 

support for insurgency. Phrased differently, deprivation that is not considered unjust is much less 

destabilizing than relative prosperity which is considered unjust. It is not the thought "I'm poor" that leads 

someone to attempt to overthrow or force a change in the government; it is "I'm poor, this is not fair, and 
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4-4 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

the government is to blame." The solution to the latter thought is more complex than the solution to the 

former. 

4-17. Identity, based on cultural, religious, or other cultural groupings, can create a strong root cause. In 

cases where groups are persecuted and underrepresented, the insurgents can use a narrative that uses this 

underrepresentation or persecution as a root cause against the government. In some cases, groups are 

concentrated in certain regions where the government exercises biased controls over those groups. This 

might be an effective root cause to use for an insurgency based on a nullification of government control. 

4-18. Religion can also be an effective root cause. Religious-based movements create a perception that a 

certain type of religion should drive politics and groups should convert to that religion. Insurgents attempt 

to present their ideology as the true and only correct form of their religion. Insurgents can use religion as 

part of an identity based root cause if the government persecutes a certain religious group. However, 

insurgents can also use religion to create an ideology that everyone should be a part of, and governed by, a 

certain religion. In this case, a religious-based group could seek to overthrow its government and replace it 

with a religious based government. 

4-19. The presence of a foreign force can be the root cause of an insurgency. The presence of foreign 

military forces can also be used as a means to mobilize popular support. The presence can come after a 

major combat operation that replaces a government. As such, any major combat operation should include 

planning for stability operations to prevent an insurgency. However, this could also be a root cause if there 

are Soldiers or Marines stationed in a host nation. Insurgents can use the perception that outsiders exploit 

the host nation or that the host-nation government excessively caters to foreigners as a root cause. 

4-20. Land disputes concerning ownership, usage, and rights, especially to agrarian, mining, or other land 

based livelihoods or identities, can be used as a root cause. Land disputes often manifest themselves as an 

issue of income inequality. For example, landowners may have tenant farmers that pay the landowners’ 

rents. Insurgent groups can often use a narrative that exploits unequal land ownership as a root cause, and 

promises redistribution of land and land reform to the tenant farmers as an effective justification for the 

farmers to join the insurgency. 

4-21. Corruption of the host-nation government can be a root cause. If institutional corruption is systemic, 

ongoing, and considered unfair, insurgents can use that as an effective narrative. For example, corruption in 

government development programs can cause resentment by the aggrieved group. Corruption can lead to 

loss of host-nation legitimacy and can undermine government control of an area. 

4-22. Insurgents can use a gap between a population’s expectations and the government’s capability to 

meet those expectations as a root cause. The larger the gap, the greater the population’s perceived or real 

sense of deprivation. This allows for the development of a narrative in which the insurgents promise to 

close the gap. 

MEANS

4-23. It takes considerable resources to mount a violent challenge to the incumbent political authorities and 

the methods an insurgency uses to secure those means determines a great deal about its behavior. The 

leaders of a potential insurgency must assemble and organize personnel, funds, weapons, and systems of 

secure communications and logistics. The other prerequisites relate to the means. For example, recruiters 

can use existing social networks to find new recruits. (See JP 3-24 for a detailed discussion on means.) 

4-24. Commanders’ and staffs’ planning efforts should consider how an insurgent movement resources 

itself. An insurgency will often depend on a local population for resourcing and recruitment. In these cases, 

insurgents base an insurgency on social relationships to include, but not limited to, villages, clans, tribes, 

ethnicities, or other groups. These groups will often freely give resources, but some coercion may be used. 

In the cases where resources are freely given, the insurgency may have legitimacy. However, the use of 

local resources also restricts an insurgency. For resources to be given freely, the insurgent is constrained by 

the social norms of the groups. Moreover, because an insurgency may be seen as aligned to a certain group, 

there is a certain amount of difficulty expanding the insurgency beyond its core group. 

4-25. A local area’s insurgency and population could connect, through communications, with its diasporas 

and attain resources from around the world. If its diasporas relate to the struggle, they may freely give 
Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 4-5 

financial aid to an insurgency. In such cases, commanders and staffs need to determine possible means to 

undermine this support. For example, the use of counter threat finance may prevent this funding. On the 

other hand, resourcing can be local. Insurgencies can have access to black markets or other resources that 

they can use to buy weapons. In these cases, stopping these transactions may be an effective means of 

blocking insurgent resources. 

4-26. An insurgency with state sponsorship has important advantages and disadvantages. State sponsorship 

can offer resources, sanctuary, and training. These are important advantages for any insurgency because 

they offer an insurgent group the ability to organize and become tactically and operationally more effective. 

On the other hand, state sponsorship can undermine the support of the local population. An insurgency that 

depends on outside state support can be perceived as artificial and may not have deep support from the 

local population. While recruits may join an insurgency by increased resources, recruits attracted because 

of the possibility of wealth may be less effective. However, if an insurgency uses outside support to build a 

political base before starting military operations, insurgents mitigate these risks. For the counterinsurgent, 

understanding the nature of state support allows the commander and staff to undermine that support before 

an insurgency begins. 

4-27. A group that already has resourcing could potentially become an insurgency. Groups tied to black 

markets, such as those selling drugs, may seek to resist or nullify the government’s ability to stop their 

activities. While they may exploit the population and create a root cause, the protection of their resources is 

the essential reason for the development of their insurgency. The means for an insurgency can play an 

interrelated role with the motive and opportunity. 

4-28. When commanders and staffs desire an additional method of analysis other than opportunity, motive, 

and means, the prerequisites of an insurgency can be represented as a vulnerable population, leadership for 

direction, and a lack of government control. A population is vulnerable if the people have real or perceived 

grievances that insurgents can exploit. Moreover, there must be an insurgent leadership element that can 

direct the frustrations of a vulnerable population. The insurgency must act on real or perceived lack of 

governmental control, which can allow insurgents to operate with little or no interference from security 

forces or other agencies. This means that the government is not providing for the people. This may refer to 

inadequate services or an overly harsh and repressive government. When all three exist in an area, an 

insurgency can operate with increased freedom of movement, gain the support of the people, and become 

entrenched over time. 

INSURGENCY FUNDAMENTALS 

4-29. Few insurgencies fit neatly into a rigid classification. However, insurgencies do have common 

characteristics that can provide a basis for building a more accurate picture of an insurgency and help 

commanders understand the situation. The fundamentals of insurgencies help commanders and staffs 

analyze insurgent strategies, objectives, and tactics. Each fundamental is important independently, but 

analyzing the interactions and relationships between the fundamentals as a whole is the key to 

understanding an insurgency. The two insurgency fundamentals are— 

 Insurgent strategies. 

 Dynamics of insurgency. 

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

4-30. An insurgency’s strategy is determined by its own ends, ways, and means. There are a range of ends 

an insurgency might seek, to include replacing the state, separating from the state, changing the policy of 

the state, nullifying state control in an area of a state, and securing a place in a state’s political system. 

These basic ends will influence the ways an insurgency uses. However, that influence is not deterministic, 

and the way an insurgency fights is also influenced by its resourcing. In addition, the relationships between 

an insurgency’s ends, ways, and means is also influenced by numerous important variables. Those variables 

include but are not limited to— 

 How an insurgency gains legitimacy and controls a population. 

 Whether the insurgency is political centric, violence centric, or economic centric. 

 The relationship of the insurgency to the economy. 
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4-6 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

 Organization. 

 Sense of time. 

 Adaptability. 

Insurgent Legitimacy and Control 

4-31. How an insurgency gains legitimacy and controls a population within a society helps determine 

strategic behavior. Some insurgencies have a clear political message and bring that message to their 

society. Others may try to use economic black markets and the wealth that comes from them to make their 

population dependent on the insurgency. Others may try to use coercion to control their society. Most will 

use a combination of many different methods. However, how an insurgency controls the local population or 

tries to gain legitimacy helps determine that insurgency’s strategic behavior. 

Political, Economic, and Violence-Centered Insurgencies 

4-32. All insurgencies have a political aim which may be to change their society or simply to protect a 

black market. While all insurgencies involve violence, politics, and economics, some insurgencies are 

focused on politics, some are focused on violence, and some are focused on economics. This can change 

over time. Many insurgencies develop well defined political goals which shape their strategy and an 

infrastructure to promote and refine them. In these insurgencies, the role of violence is probably secondary 

to the role of building political support. In this case an insurgency’s aims are more likely to be changing 

policy, fighting into the state’s political system, or replacing the state. Violence is likely to be more 

organized as the political support grows for an insurgency. Other insurgencies are focused on violence, 

lacking the ability or incentive to build a political infrastructure and gain wide political support. These 

types of insurgences are more likely to develop networked organizations with connections to criminal 

organizations or other insurgent groups with similar interests. Finally, an insurgency may be focused on 

economics. These insurgencies are likely to want simply to stop state interferences with their activities. As 

such, these insurgencies may limit the use of violence, unless the state attempts to interfere with their 

economic base, whether in the legitimate economy or in black or gray markets. 

The Relationship of an Insurgency to the Economy 

4-33. Commanders and staffs must understand the relationship of the insurgency to the economy to 

understand an insurgency’s strategic behavior. An insurgency could have little dependence on the local 

economy and receive all its support from the outside. Insurgents could also gain resources from the formal 

economy in which they operate and sustain themselves through kidnapping or theft. An insurgency could 

also maintain an economic base on the black market, or it could control a war economy. In all cases, an 

insurgency’s relationship with the economy will affect its behavior. For example, if it is dependent on 

outside support, the aims of its outside support will influence the insurgency’s behavior. Moreover, outside 

support influences tactical and operational behavior. An insurgency that does not depend on the local 

population is more likely to use violence against the population. (See paragraphs 2-25 through 2-31 for 

more information the economic variable.) 

Insurgent Organizational Structure 

4-34. The organization of an insurgency is also important. Insurgent organizations can be conceptualized 

along a continuum from a formal and hierarchical structure to a networked structure. This structure affects 

organization because it affects control over actions and the scale of tactical actions. Without a hierarchical 

structure, it is difficult to control individuals or groups within an insurgency. This leads to attacks that can 

affect the legitimacy of an insurgency. Moreover, while a networked organization may use terrorist tactics, 

it is also difficult for a networked insurgency to mass combat power. It is also difficult to negotiate a 

settlement with a networked insurgency because no single person or small group is in charge. A networked 

insurgency changes the dynamics of individuals in an insurgency, as no one is likely to be essential to the 

continuation of a networked insurgency. A hierarchical insurgency may be easier to penetrate than a 

networked insurgency, as a few individuals may be essential to the insurgency and control the actions of 

members of the insurgency. (See paragraphs 4-88 through 4-103 for more information on a networked 

insurgency.) 
Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 4-7 

Sense of Time 

4-35. An insurgents’ sense of time will also affect their actions. If insurgents feel time is on their side, they 

are more likely to adopt a lower risk approach and avoid becoming decisively engaged. If they perceive 

time as being against them, that will push them towards higher risk activities. Commanders and staffs must 

determine an insurgency’s perception of time to determine its behavior. (See paragraphs 2-43 through 2-44 

for more information on the time variable.) 

Adaptability 

4-36. Adaptability is also an essential element to understanding an insurgency’s strategic behavior. 

Adaptability determines how well, how often, and how the insurgency adapts tactically, operationally, and 

strategically. This can be directly linked to the organization of an insurgency. A networked insurgency may 

be highly adaptable at the operational and tactical level, but not at the strategic level. On the other hand, the 

reverse may be true for a hierarchal insurgency. 

4-37. An insurgency's strategy is not static, and it can shift. Counterinsurgents must recognize and respond 

to shifts in strategy. As the operational environment changes, it can affect an insurgency’s resourcing, the 

ways an insurgency attempts to achieve its ends, and its calculation of what its ends should be. In a 

networked insurgency, different elements of the insurgency may evolve differently than other elements of 

the insurgency. An insurgency is not static, and it continues to evolve as conditions evolve. 

Insurgent Approaches 

4-38. An insurgency might take several approaches to achieve its objectives. In many insurgencies, 

different elements of the same insurgency or related insurgencies will have different strategic calculations. 

Commanders and staffs must understand an insurgency’s approach to develop effective programs that 

attack the root causes of that insurgency. Commanders and staffs combine their understanding of the 

insurgent’s ways to accomplish its ends, with the insurgent’s means to pursue those ends, to provide the 

most probable and dangerous course of action for all insurgencies operating in an area of operation. This 

provides an understanding of the insurgency’s approach. 

4-39. Commanders and staffs must understand the insurgent’s ends to understand the insurgent’s 

decisionmaking process, capabilities, future actions, current tactics, method of command and control, 

recruiting, propaganda, and use of the local population. Examining the ends of an insurgency and the 

insurgents’ attempts to achieve those ends through various ways, including combat actions, propaganda, 

and subversion, enable counterinsurgents to undermine the enemy’s decisionmaking process. The 

insurgents’ strategic ends may be overt and publicly championed or covert. Insurgent operations may have 

immediate consequences or delayed effects aligned with long-term objectives. For example, car bombings 

among a local population may seem counterproductive because they incite immediate anger against the 

bombings and their perpetrators. However, a sustained campaign of massive violence can have two 

long-term results, it can— 

 Weaken popular support for the government, which has failed to protect the people. 

 Make the population susceptible to insurgent intimidation. 

Whatever the insurgent’s ends, approaching the problem from the perspectives of the insurgent and the 

population can provide counterinsurgents the means to interdict the threat on a number of levels. 

4-40. Counterinsurgents are likely to face insurgents who use several different approaches to achieve their 

ends. Some common approaches at the tactical level and operational level are the urban (terrorist), military 

focused, protracted, and subversive approaches. The urban (terrorist) and military focused are considered 

basic approaches and the protracted and subversive are considered advanced approaches. Basic approaches 

refer to the insurgent capabilities needed to achieve long-term strategic objectives. Basic approaches do not 

mean insurgents are not efficient in tactics or other skills, but overall they lack the means to pursue a more 

advanced approach towards achieving their goals. In contrast, advanced approaches probably have political 

wings that govern the militant side of the movement and are focused on longer-term political goals. 

4-41. Insurgents may use different approaches at different times, applying tactics that take advantage of 

circumstances. Insurgents may also combine a number of methods that include tactics drawn from any or 
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4-8 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

all of the other approaches. In addition, different insurgent forces using different approaches may form 

loose coalitions when it serves their interests; however, these same coalitions may fight among themselves, 

even while engaging counterinsurgents. A single area of operations may have multiple competing entities, 

each seeking to maximize its survivability and influence, and this situation may be duplicated several times 

across a joint operations area. This may further complicate understanding both the insurgency and the 

counterinsurgent operations necessary for success. 

4-42. The urban (terrorist) approach is an approach in which insurgents attack government and symbolic 

targets (for example an important religious building) to cause government forces to overreact against the 

population. The insurgents want the government’s repressive measures to enrage the people so that they 

rise up and overthrow the government. Although this type of method may develop popular support against 

a government that is particularly brutal or corrupt, it may only result in shallow support for the insurgency. 

The population may only see the insurgency positively because of the brutal response, not because they 

identify with the insurgency. 

4-43. An insurgency uses the military-focused approach to achieve its policy goals by military success. In 

this approach, insurgents’ efforts focus on causing the government to lose legitimacy by military success 

and inspiring a population to join the insurgents against the government. The most important idea behind a 

military focused method is that it does not require building political support among the population. Instead, 

military success and action will gain the support of a population. 

4-44. A protracted approach is an advanced approach based on Mao Tse-Tung’s theory of protracted 

popular war. It attempts to lengthen the conflict as much as necessary to assemble the resources and forces 

necessary for success and to wear down the counterinsurgent forces and their political leadership. The 

protracted war method is based upon three distinct phases: latent and incipient, guerrilla warfare, and war 

of movement. Each phase builds upon the previous phase and continues activities from all or some of the 

previous phases. The protracted method requires both a political wing and a military wing. 

4-45. The subversive approach is another advanced approach. A subversive approach attempts to subvert 

the government from within by using its political arm to become a legitimate political party and enter the 

government. Subversive activities may occur as part of other ways, particularly the protracted war 

approach. 

DYNAMICS OF INSURGENCY

4-46. Commanders and staffs must understand the nature of an insurgency when conducting a 

counterinsurgency. This requires understanding insurgent strategy. However, to understand an insurgent’s 

strategy, commanders and staffs must understand insurgency dynamics. The dynamics of insurgency is a 

framework for understanding an insurgency. 

4-47. An operational environment may have multiple insurgent groups. These groups may be pursuing a 

wide variety of goals and interests. As such, these groups may be collaborating, fighting each other, or 

acting neutral towards each other. When commanders and staffs analyze an insurgency, they consider each 

group and provide a different analysis for each group based on the eight dynamics of insurgency. 

4-48. Eight dynamics or some combinations of these dynamics are common to most successful 

insurgencies. These dynamics provide a framework for planners to analyze insurgencies. Each of these 

dynamics can contribute to the strength of an insurgency, but each can also be used to find fracture points 

and weak points in an insurgency. Fracture points are points of internal division within the insurgency. A 

weak point is an underlying weakness, such as access to resources, of the insurgency. The eight dynamics 

are— 

 Leadership. 

 Ideology. 

 Objectives. 

 Environment and geography. 

 External support. 

 Internal support. 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 4-9 

 Phasing and timing. 

 Organizational and operational patterns. 

First Dynamic—Leadership 

4-49. A group committing random violence is not an insurgency. In an insurgency, there is a political 

rationale behind the violence. An insurgency requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, 

coordination, and organizational coherence. Leadership is required to mobilize the population by using a 

root cause. Leadership is needed organize tasks to undermine the legitimacy of the host nation and to 

establish legitimacy or acquiescence to their movement. The ability of insurgent leaders to organize and 

their willingness to distribute power across their organization is vital to the long-term success of their 

movement. Organizations dependent on key charismatic personalities to provide cohesion and motivation 

for their movement are vulnerable to disruptions if those leaders are co-opted or killed. 

4-50. The political leadership can be the same as its military leadership. However, sometimes this is not the 

case and there is well-defined political leadership. When an insurgency has well-defined political 

leadership, that leadership is called the political cadre. The political cadre may participate in the political 

system or it may be clandestine and illegal. In either case, counterinsurgents define the political cadre of an 

insurgency when there are insurgent leaders who are mainly involved in the political struggle and not the 

armed struggle. 

4-51. The political cadre are the force behind the ideology of an insurgency. They are actively engaged in 

the struggle to accomplish insurgent goals. They may also work within a political party to work within the 

political system and provide some legitimacy for the insurgency to the population. The cadre is active in 

spreading the ideology of the insurgency, if the insurgency has an ideology. Modern noncommunist 

insurgencies rarely, if ever, use the term cadre; however, these movements usually include a group that 

performs similar functions. In a movement based on religious extremism, religious leaders can play a role 

similar to political cadre. 

4-52. The leadership of an insurgency is composed of leaders from the political cadre, guerrillas, and 

auxiliaries. These may or may not be the same individuals. Moreover, they may work closely together or 

operate in a decentralized manner, depending on their need for security or other operational concerns. 

Insurgent leaders usually exercise leadership through force of personality, the power of revolutionary ideas, 

and personal charisma. In some insurgencies, they may hold their position through religious, clan, or tribal 

authority. These leaders may include supporting members, much like command and staff in a regular 

military. These supporting members may include advisors, logistics and administration personnel, 

spokespersons, and those leading operations. Insurgent leaders may attain positions within the government 

and work to undermine the government. 

4-53. Poor leadership can undermine an insurgency. Insurgent leaders who undermine their own legitimacy 

with the population, for example, will significantly hamper the success of their insurgency. An analysis of 

insurgent leadership provides information on how effective its leaders are in mobilizing the population and 

effectively using resources to undermine the host nation. 

Second Dynamic—Ideology 

4-54. The insurgents must have a problem that justifies their actions in relation to the population’s 

grievances and explains what is wrong with the status quo. Insurgents use a narrative to connect a 

population’s grievances with its actions and demands. When an insurgency uses a narrative to mobilize a 

population, these grievances become root causes. An essential part of the ability of an insurgency to 

mobilize a population is an insurgency’s ideology. An ideology is the integrated assertions, theories, and 

aims that constitute a sociopolitical program. Not all insurgencies are ideological, but an ideology provides 

an insurgency with a message of change that is normally coherent and logical, based upon the insurgency’s 

underlying assumptions. 

4-55. Ideology is a factor that unifies the many divergent interests and goals among the insurgency’s 

members and the general population. As a common set of interrelated beliefs, values, and norms, ideology 

is used to influence the behavior of individuals within the group. It explains how the world works. Ideology 
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4-10 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

can serve as a rallying call for all members of the population to join a struggle. Commanders and staffs 

answer several questions when analyzing insurgent ideology: 

 What is the problem the insurgents will fix, and how will they fix it? 

 Are there any ideological divisions within the insurgency or the population? 

 Is the ideology supported by outside groups? 

 What propaganda are the insurgents using to propagate their ideology? 

Third Dynamic—Objectives 

4-56. Insurgencies can have strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Tactical objectives most directly 

translate to actions. For example, a tactical goal of destroying a logistics convoy directly translates into an 

attack against a logistics convoy. However, these actions are normally performed to achieve an operational 

objective. In the example of the attack on the convoy, the operational objective might be to prevent logistic 

support of host-nation forces. When insurgents achieve various operational goals, they can achieve the 

strategic end state of their insurgency. 

4-57. A strategic objective is the movement’s overall political goal or desired end state. An insurgency will 

seek to— 

 Force significant political, economic, or religious change. 

 Overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power. 

 Generate resistance to outside occupiers or change within a society. 

 Nullify government control in an area. 

 Cause a region to secede. 

4-58. An insurgency’s strategic objectives will influence the type of insurgency that develops, and its 

ideology will influence an insurgency’s end state. For example, an insurgency focused on resistance against 

outside occupiers or change in a society may unify many different groups based on that shared end state. 

The strategic end state of the insurgency may be as simple as resistance to occupation or a conservative 

insurgency’s general resistance to change in a society. Groups that seek to nullify government control may 

have an objective of protecting criminal activities and black markets. These groups may be non-ideological, 

but they will still need to mobilize the population to nullify governmental control. On the other hand, 

groups that wish to force significant change in a society or overthrow an existing social order are likely to 

be ideologically driven. There is a connection between an insurgency’s strategic goal and an insurgency’s 

ideology. 

Fourth Dynamic—Environment and Geography 

4-59. The environment and geography affect insurgent actions. Insurgencies may form their base in urban 

environments, rural environments, or in a combination of both. Insurgents located in rural areas can enjoy 

the relative safety of remote terrain or safe heavens, such as jungles or mountains. These geographical 

conditions make it possible for them to form larger units and conduct larger-scale operations. However, 

there are some disadvantages to a rural based insurgency. Communications and supply lines are longer and 

slower. Insurgents can be isolated from the population, and an insurgency can be destroyed with a decisive 

military operation. 

4-60. Urban insurgencies tend to operate within ethnic ghettos or enclaves of sympathetic supporters. 

Operating in urban settings requires a high degree of compartmentalization, which makes it difficult for 

groups to train and organize for larger-scale operations. Urban insurgencies often operate in small cells. 

However, an urban setting does allow an insurgency to work within large population groups. The 

opportunity for mobilization of the population is therefore higher than in a rural insurgency. Historically, 

urban insurgencies have been easier to destroy than rural insurgencies. The lack of isolation is an advantage 

for counterinsurgents because they can apply constant pressure on the urban population to undermine the 

insurgency. 

4-61. Other factors of the area of operations may affect an insurgency. Tribal, religious, and social factors 

have relationships with insurgencies. The physical environment also effects insurgent movement and 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 4-11 

planning. Commanders and staffs must understand the connections between a physical environment and its 

effect on an insurgency. (See chapter 2 for more information on a physical environment.) 

Fifth Dynamic—External Support 

4-62. Historically, insurgencies are less likely to succeed without some form of external support. This 

support can be in the form of— 

 Moral support. 

 Political support. 

 Resources, such as money, weapons, food, advisors, training, and foreign fighters. 

 Sanctuary, such as secure training sites, operational bases over a border, or protection from 

extradition. 

4-63. Governments providing support to an insurgency normally share interests or a common ideology 

with the insurgency. Ethnic enclaves or diasporas in third-party countries can provide significant support, 

even if a country’s government is not actively supporting an insurgency. For example, global diasporas can 

provide significant resources for an insurgency, even if no government is providing active support. (See 

FM 3-05, chapter 2, for more information on unconventional warfare.) 

4-64. However, with external support comes a degree of dependency on that support. Limiting access to 

external support is a possible means of influencing or changing the actions of an insurgency. Limiting 

eternal support provides one means to affect an insurgency indirectly. External support can help to shape an 

insurgency and the outcome of an insurgency. In the case of the insurgency in Sri Lanka, external support 

was essential to the success of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Large diasporas provided the 

Liberation Tigers of Tamil sanctuary and resources. This allowed them to gain dominance over other 

insurgent groups and to wage a long and bloody insurgency against the government of Sri Lanka. 
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4-12 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

External Support for the Tamil Tigers 

 Eleven years of discrimination by the Sinhala majority against the Tamil 

minority reached a breaking point in Sri Lanka during the Black July riots of 1983. 

Soon after, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam emerged as the most capable Tamil 

insurgent group, prepared to wage a campaign of violence and terror against the Sri 

Lankan state and non-Tamil civilians. The operational environment was complex, 

with insurgents fighting insurgents while also fighting the government, as occurred 

with Sunni and Shia groups in Iraq. At various stages of the conflict, the Liberation 

Tigers of Tamil Eelam fought against the Sri Lankan state but also against other 

antigovernment insurgent groups. The most prominent of these groups was the 

Janatha Vimukthi Permuna, a Marxist-Leninist group that blended violence and 

left-wing politics before laying down its arms in the mid to late 1990s. 

 This case illustrates the importance of non-state actors in an operational 

environment. While the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was indeed a non-state 

actor in its own right, the group relied on its global diaspora for a range of support 

activities. Following the ethnic riots of 1983, thousands of Tamil refugees fled 

overseas to India, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. This sowed the seeds 

for the Tamil diaspora and the transnational nature of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 

Eelam’s insurgency. The global diaspora was a major part of the organization’s 

fundraising and propaganda network. Furthermore, the transnational diaspora 

network provided funding and weaponry to sustain the Tigers for most of the group’s 

existence. 

 In addition to enjoying the largesse of a well-organized and entrepreneurial 

diaspora, the insurgents relied on co-ethnics in India for sanctuary, which was 

essential in the group’s early years. Since the Tamils effectively controlled the Jaffna 

peninsula in the northeast of the country, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam had a 

home base from which it could train, plan, and execute attacks against the military. 

Furthermore, across the Palk Straits in Tamil Nadu, India, the Liberation Tigers of 

Tamil Eelam was able to rely on the support—both active and passive—of thousands 

of ethnic Tamils who sympathized with the group. 

 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam took advantage of the benefits of 

globalization, developing a truly global network of contacts abroad, and soon 

engaged in weapons procurement activities throughout East and Southeast Asia, in 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ukraine, the Balkans, Lebanon, and other well-known arms 

markets. At various points throughout the insurgency, the Tigers collaborated with 

other terrorists groups as diverse as the Revolutionary Armed Forces Colombia, the 

African National Congress in South Africa, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Hezb-iIslami Gulbuddin in Afghanistan, the Japanese Red Army, and the Popular Front for 

the Liberation of Palestine. In 1996, the insurgents acquired U.S. Stinger-class 

missiles from the Kurdistan Worker’s Party and used these weapons two years later 

to shoot down a Sri Lankan civilian Lionair jet. 

 Over time, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam distinguished itself as 

perhaps the most lethal insurgent force in modern history. By the mid-late 1990s, the 

group boasted a navy, an air force, and an elite suicide commando unit used to 

assassinate several heads of state and numerous counterinsurgency force 

commanders. As a pioneer of suicide techniques, the Tamil Tigers devoted 

significant resources to two operational wings that functioned as suicide strike teams, 

the Black Tigers and the Sea Tigers. A “no-holds barred” approach to the conflict led 

the counterinsurgency force and the insurgents to routinely and systematically 

slaughter each other, while also destroying Sri Lanka’s infrastructure and displacing 

much of its civilian population. 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 4-13 

Sixth Dynamic—Internal Support 

4-65. Internal support is any support provided from within the borders of the state where the insurgency is 

active. An insurgency must have some internal support, even if it is limited. The level and type of support 

varies by insurgency and area. Counterinsurgents must understand the specific nature of the support to 

address and counter the relationship between the population and insurgents. This support may be either 

willing or based on coercion. 

4-66. A large populated area or region where insurgents can operate represents many different 

communities that provide varying levels of support for different reasons. There are two types of internal 

support: active and passive. Passive support is critical for successful insurgent operations. It provides 

freedom of movement for members of the insurgency to reside, train, plan, and conduct operations in an 

area without resistance from the local community. Passive supporters do not report insurgents to local 

counterinsurgent forces out of sympathy for the cause, antigovernment sentiment, reluctance to get 

involved due to peer pressure, threats of violence, or the benefits that the insurgency provides. 

4-67. Active supporters provide open sympathy to the insurgency, participate in insurgent operations, and 

find new recruits. Active supporters are usually central to the insurgency’s propaganda efforts. They may 

provide material, intelligence, or assistance as requested or demanded by insurgents. Active support, like 

passive support, may be volunteered or coerced. 

4-68. When analyzing the type and amount of support an insurgency has, possible indicators are: 

 Reduction in local medical supplies or personnel absent from clinics and hospitals. 

 Increased black market activities and extortion for resources. 

 Increased theft or purchase of food and gas. 

 New presence of bodyguards. 

 New areas in which the local police are growing reluctant to patrol or conduct operations. 

 New or increased interaction with local civilian leaders by insurgents. 

 Intelligence confirming the presence of insurgents in areas where people gather and 

communicate. 

 Increased assassinations of those opposing insurgents or for symbolic value to frighten locals. 

 A drop in the number of walk-ins and tips due to fear of retribution. 

 A rise in the reluctance of local civilians to be seen talking with counterinsurgent forces. 

 An increase in the absence of local reconstruction crews, police, and military or a decrease in 

their willingness to be associated with counterinsurgent forces or to leave their families. 

 Suspension of local government or community meeting and events. 

4-69. There is a relationship between internal and external support. Insurgents must have significant 

strength in at least one of these dynamics (internal or external support) or they will not be able to meet their 

tangible support needs. Both of these dynamics must be controlled and reduced in order for the 

counterinsurgent to prevail; just eliminating internal support is not enough to defeat an insurgency with 

robust external support (and vice versa). 

Seventh Dynamic—Phasing and Timing 

4-70. Successful insurgencies often progress through three phases (latent and incipient, guerrilla warfare, 

and war of movement). Not all insurgencies progress through all three phases, and progression through all 

three phases is not a requirement for success. Insurgent success can occur in any phase. In addition, 

insurgencies can revert to an earlier phase and resume development when favorable conditions return. 

4-71. Movement from one phase to another phase does not end the operational and tactical activities of 

earlier phases; it incorporates them. Therefore, it is difficult to determine when an insurgency moves from 

one phase to another. In addition, a single insurgency may be in different phases in different parts of the 

country. Advanced insurgencies can rapidly shift, split, combine, or reorganize; they are dynamic and 

adaptive. 
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4-14 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

4-72. The first phase is latent and incipient. During this phase, activities include the emergence of 

insurgent leadership, creation of initial organizational infrastructure, training, acquisition of resources, and 

political actions, such as organizing protests. A group that eventually becomes members of an insurgency 

may simply be a legitimate political group at this stage. Governmental actions and changes in society can 

transform political groups into insurgencies. 

4-73. The second phase is guerrilla warfare. In this phase, successful insurgents use small-unit tactics to 

attack security forces while continuing ongoing political efforts. Their goal is to undermine the 

government’s legitimacy and replace the government’s legitimacy with the population seeing the 

insurgency as legitimate. In this stage, insurgencies may begin performing limited governmental functions 

for the population in areas they control. 

4-74. The third phase is war of movement. During this phase, an insurgency may be trying to overthrow a 

government or trying to force the withdrawal of an occupying power. For success, an insurgency does not 

necessarily need to transform into a conventional military, but it must position itself to defeat the 

government or occupying power. However, this phase may not be needed. In some cases, all an insurgency 

must do is create a continual problem that cannot be solved and wear down the patience of the 

counterinsurgents. This is especially true when the counterinsurgents are directed by an outside power. This 

phase is characterized by increased military capability, popular support, logistics capacity, and territorial 

control. 

4-75. Many successful insurgencies go through a process similar to these three phases, but this is not a 

uniform rule. Some insurgencies, for example, form rapidly and displace a government quickly. Figure 4-1 

provides a model for understanding the possible evolution of insurgencies. This model provides a 

simplification of reality in order to understand and analyze a phenomena. A phase-like evolution of an 

insurgency tends to create a strong political and military organization with deep roots in a society. Such 

organizations are difficult to undermine. However, historically the most likely outcome of an insurgency is 

its rapid defeat. These insurgencies demonstrate little phasing beyond the beginning of violence followed 

by the quick defeat of the insurgency. (See figure 4-1.) 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 4-15 

Figure 4-1. Conflict resolution model 

Eighth Dynamic—Organizational and Operational Patterns 

4-76. Each insurgency’s organization is unique. The specific type and level of organization is an indicator 

of the insurgents’ strategy and capabilities. Understanding an insurgency’s organizational and operational 

patterns helps counterinsurgents predict the enemy’s tactics, techniques, and procedures, understand their 

capabilities, and identify potential targets. 

4-77. Insurgents may be organized into networks and require certain elements, characteristics, bonds, and 

conditions to operate and survive. A network is a series of direct and indirect ties from one entity to a 

collection of entities. There may be a central point of communication or influence (critical node) that 

provides a critical vulnerability for targeting against the network. Insurgent networking extends the range 

and variety of both insurgent military and political actions. Networks of communications, people, and 

activities exist in all populations and have a measureable impact on the organized governance of a 

population and, consequently, military operations. These networks tend to heal, adapt, and learn rapidly. 

They may be a combination of insurgent, criminal, regular, or irregular forces, and foreign government 

sanctioned forces. These networks exist within a population. Existing within a population enhances their 
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4-16 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

capabilities to sow disorder, survive, and protract the struggle, presenting particularly difficult problems for 

counterinsurgency forces. (See paragraphs 4-88 to 4-103 for more information on networked insurgencies.) 

Organizational Elements 

4-78. The basic organizational elements of an insurgency are the movement’s leadership, guerrillas, 

auxiliary forces, and underground elements. While there are almost certainly members of the insurgency 

who perform multiple functions, grouping an insurgency into these groups provides a model of 

understanding how an insurgency functions. However, commanders and staffs must avoid the trap of mirror 

imaging an insurgency against U.S. organizational structure. These groupings help the commander 

understand groups that are involved in the various functions of an insurgency, but commanders and staffs 

need to realize that insurgencies normally do not have fixed organizational structures. (See figure 4-2.) 

Figure 4-2. Organizational elements of an insurgency 

Leadership 

4-79. An essential element of any insurgency is its leadership and its leadership structure. This can vary 

greatly and is dependent on whether the insurgency is a networked insurgency or a hierarchical insurgency. 

However, because of its importance, it is covered under the first dynamic. 

Guerilla Units 

4-80. Guerrillas are used for a wide range military purposes, but their primary purpose is to achieve a 

political end. For example, attacks on host-nation forces may undermine host-nation legitimacy among a 

population and create insurgent safe heavens. Guerrilla units can conduct small-unit tactical operations and 

can mass for larger operations. Ambushes against convoys are examples of small-unit tactics an insurgent 

group may use. These tactics have the advantage of preventing an insurgent group from becoming 

decisively engaged. As an insurgency gains military power, guerilla units increase their ability to conduct 

large scale attacks. During the final insurgency stage, war of movement, guerilla units can perform actions 

meant to destroy the host-nation military force. This can be a decisive action for an insurgency. If 

successful, a war of movement can overthrow the government or allow the insurgency to reach other 

political goals. However, if the insurgency begins a war of movement too soon, the insurgency can deplete 

its military power and undermine its political power. 

Auxiliary Forces 

4-81. Auxiliary forces are the insurgency’s support elements. Anyone involved in an insurgency can 

perform logistic functions, and insurgents are probably involved in both logistics and combat. Creating this 

division, however, groups certain essential functions of an insurgency in a single category. 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 4-17 

4-82. The auxiliary includes cells and external elements. Cells include logistics, intelligence, 

counterintelligence, propaganda, population control, and recruiting elements. These are elements that 

perform tasks directly connected to an insurgency. External elements provide support for an insurgency, 

but they are not directly part of the insurgency. For example, external elements may include drug 

smugglers or external support from another state. 

4-83. Women can play an essential role in the auxiliary force. Insurgencies generally require a robust 

system of financing and supply. In many cases, a woman will have greater freedom of movement in a 

society than a man who is actively engaging government forces. For example, a wife, niece, or daughter of 

an insurgent might be able to send a message or make financial transitions much easier than the actual 

insurgent. 

4-84. Auxiliary forces also include economic support systems to fund the insurgency’s military and 

political operations. Economic support systems include— 

 Fund raising and terrorist finance networks. 

 Pillaging, looting, extorting, and enslaving a population. 

 Business operations that include both direct control, joint ventures, and taxation of enterprises in 

these industries: 

 Illicit trade in commodities and natural resources (such as oil, timber, and diamonds). 

 Criminal trafficking in narcotics, humans, and arms. 

 Sanctions busting. 

 Legal business enterprises (such as oil, shipping, motor transport, and hotels). 

 Banking and finance operations. 

Underground 

4-85. Underground cells conduct clandestine combatant and logistics operations in areas controlled by 

government forces. Combat operations can include sabotage, assassinations, and small arms attacks. 

Logistic operations can include maintaining safe houses, controlling hostages, moving weapons, and 

providing communications. Underground cells include intelligence cells, logistic cells, and combatant cells. 

4-86. The underground element includes those elements of the insurgency that conduct covert or 

clandestine activities, especially in counterinsurgent occupied areas. Movement leaders may exist within 

the underground if they are attempting to keep their affiliation or identity a secret. Insurgencies with 

effective undergrounds tend to be more compartmentalized, secretive, vetted, trained, and indoctrinated 

than insurgencies without them. For example, the underground can carry out terrorist acts, if desired, while 

the insurgency has plausible deniability for these acts. The underground may remain in an area after 

counterinsurgency clearing operations to gather information, intimidate civilians, attack members of the 

security forces or government, emplace improvised explosive devices, or perform sniper operations. The 

underground can be a major part of an insurgency. Its effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) provides 

counterinsurgent analysts with indicators of the skill, advancement, and strategy of the insurgency. An 

advanced insurgency with an effective underground is capable of operations and tactics that differ from 

those of a basic insurgency, with a less capable underground. The underground tends to be the most 

difficult element to recruit and train; therefore, its size tends to fluctuate with time and capability. 

4-87. Underground cells seek to be self-contained; they often have their own leadership, combatants, and 

auxiliary forces. However, the underground can also use members of the auxiliary to provide materials, 

intelligence, counterintelligence, and early warning. The auxiliary may also pass messages, propaganda, 

and disinformation. This use allows the underground to conduct operations in areas where the regular 

auxiliary is present, but the underground does not have a widespread presence. 

Networked Insurgencies 

4-88. While some insurgencies are hierarchical, it is also likely that an insurgency will be deeply 

networked into a society. While auxiliary, guerrillas, leadership, and underground elements are a means of 

viewing the basic functions of an insurgency, many insurgencies in the modern era are learning and 

adapting networks. An insurgency’s members will often have connections to various resourcing means, 
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4-18 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

such as the black markets or diasporas. Moreover, there are normally connections to various parts of a 

society. Many insurgencies, especially modern insurgencies, have members that perform basic functions 

but are also networked organizations that are interwoven with their societies. While it is possible for a 

hierarchical style insurgency to exist, a networked structure is more likely today because of modern 

communications. 

4-89. Networked insurgencies will have many connections to their operational environment. Networked 

insurgencies are not monolithic, and decisions are made by different elements within the insurgency. Some 

parts of the insurgency may be willing to negotiate, while other parts may decide to keep fighting. In a 

networked insurgency, the different elements of an insurgency may have overlapping functions and 

connections to other similar insurgencies. A networked insurgency adds to the complexity of an area of 

operations because they are not acting as a unified force and because of their complex set of connections to 

the rest of society and each other. (See figure 4-3 for an example of a networked insurgency.) 

Figure 4-3. Networked insurgencies 

4-90. For an insurgency, a network is not just a description of who is in the insurgent organization; it is a 

picture of the population, how it is put together and how members interact with one another. For example, a 

tribal society already has affiliated social, economic, and military networks easily adapted to warfighting. 

The ways in which insurgents works within a tribal network is an expression of inherent cultural and social 

customs. In this example, the social dynamic that sustains ongoing fighting is best understood when 

considered in tribal terms—in particular, from the perspective of a traditionally networked society. It is the 

traditional tribal network that offers insurgents a ready-made social infrastructure from which to draw. 

4-91. The full functioning of a network depends on how well, and in what ways, its members are 

personally known and connected to one another. Strong personal ties, often ones that rest on friendship and 

bonding experiences, ensure high degrees of trust and loyalty. To function well, networks may require 

higher degrees of interpersonal trust than do other approaches to organization, like hierarchies. Kinship ties 

are often a fundamental aspect of many terrorist, criminal, and gang organizations. Insurgents often form a 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 4-19 

networked organization embedded in a sympathetic population. Differentiating between insurgents, 

insurgent supporters, neutrals, and the host-nation government supporters is difficult. 

4-92. Insurgencies can be viewed from an overall organizational perspective to the perspective of an 

individual. Networked insurgencies often have a great degree of internal complexity and this makes 

understanding networked insurgencies difficult. The relationship between two individuals or two groups in 

an insurgency may be hierarchal, based on a mutual peer to peer understanding, or a cultural understanding 

based upon social norms. Understanding the relationship between groups and individuals within groups is 

essential to understanding how an insurgency works and is a part of the overall intelligence preparation of 

the area of operations and understanding mission variables. This understanding starts with an individual 

level analysis. 

4-93. Individual-level analysis characterizes members within an organization, identifies its key members, 

describes the types of connections between members, and makes assumptions about unknown members. 

Commanders and staffs can describe individuals based on their network position in relation to the network 

position of other individuals in the network. A networked insurgency consists of individuals and 

connections between them. Commanders and staffs can think of the individuals in an insurgency as actors 

or nodes. The connections between nodes are called links. This connection between two people is called a 

dyad. Understanding the various types of dyads is essential in understanding the nature of an insurgency. 

Person A could be connected to Person B through a number a various types of connections and each type of 

relationship represents an important type of dyad. (See figure 4-4 for examples of some of types of dyads.) 

Figure 4-4. Examples of dyads 

4-94. Individual connections and new connections matter to an insurgency. For example, a marriage 

between a combatant and a member of the auxiliary opens new paths in a networked insurgency. Moreover, 

the success or lack of success of the couple will now be important. In other words, in this example, both 

individuals will be vested in one another, and other insurgents’ perceptions of them will be tied together. 

The nature of the bonds between individuals and decisions on who to create new relationships with have a 

future impact on both the insurgency and the individuals in the dyad. 

4-95. Commanders and staffs must understand the role individuals play in a networked insurgency. One 

node or a very few central nodes dominate a very centralized network. If these nodes are removed or 

damaged, the network may quickly fragment into unconnected subnetworks. Hubs are nodes with high 
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4-20 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

degrees of centrality. A network centralized around a well-connected hub can fail abruptly if that hub is 

disabled or removed. A less centralized network has no single points of failure, and it has multiple 

connections between all members. It is resilient even if some nodes are removed. Many nodes or links can 

fail while still allowing the remaining nodes to reach each other over other network paths. 

4-96. Commanders and staffs can also understand how an individual fits into a network by looking at that 

individual’s degree centrality and betweenness centrality. Degree centrality describes how active an 

individual is in the network. Network activity for a node is measured using the concept of degrees—the 

number of direct connections a node has. Nodes with the most direct connections are the most active in 

their networks. Commanders and staffs determine where those connections lead and how they connect the 

otherwise unconnected. If a node has many ties, it is either prominent or influential. Betweenness centrality 

indicates the extent to which an individual lies between other individuals in the network, serving as an 

intermediary, liaison, or bridge. A node with high betweenness centrality has great influence over what 

flows in the network. Depending on position, a person with high betweenness plays a broker role in the 

network. 

4-97. Nodes on the periphery often receive very low centrality scores. However, peripheral nodes are often 

connected to networks that are not currently mapped. The outer nodes may be resource gatherers or 

individuals with their own network outside their insurgent group. These characteristics make them very 

important resources for fresh information that is not available inside their insurgent group. 

4-98. However, understanding a networked insurgency requires more than simply understanding 

relationships between individuals. Commanders and staffs must understand an insurgency at the 

organizational level. Organizational-level analysis provides insight about the insurgent organization’s form, 

efficiency, and cohesion. Commanders and staffs must understand a networked insurgency’s overall 

organization to understand the nature of the threat. An insurgency may consist of large numbers of 

subinsurgencies. As a result, each group will have a range of capacities as compared to the other groups. 

Commanders and staffs can describe organizational capacities using the concept of network density. 

4-99. Network density is a general indicator of how connected people are in a network. Network density is 

the proportion of links in a network relative to the total number of links possible. Network density within 

an insurgency indicates which groups are most capable of conducting a coordinated attack or other type of 

coordination. (See figure 4-5.) 
Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 4-21 

Figure 4-5. Examples of dyad networks 

4-100. Changes in network density can also show changes in an insurgency’s capabilities over time. A 

decrease in network density means the group is reduced and becoming fragmented. This can be in response 

to actions taken by counterinsurgents. 

4-101. Most network measures, including network density, can be mapped out to evaluate performance 

over time. Based on changes in network density over time, a commander can— 

 Monitor enemy capabilities. 

 Monitor the effects of recent operations. 

 Develop tactics to further fragment the insurgency. 

4-102. Changes in network density can also show changes in the capabilities of an insurgency over time. 

An increase in network density indicates an increased likelihood that the insurgent group can conduct 

coordinated attacks. A decrease in network density means the group is reduced and becoming fragmented. 

This can be in response to actions taken by counterinsurgents. An effective counterinsurgency may 

eventually face only low-network-density subgroups. This is because high network-density subgroups 

require only the capture of one or a few highly connected insurgents to degrade the network. So while 

high-network-density groups are the most dangerous, they are also the easiest to disrupt. (See figure 4-6 on 

page 4-22 for an example of the possible evolution of a networked insurgency.) 
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4-22 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

Figure 4-6. Example of changes to tactics based on density shift 

4-103. Individuals within a network can also shape an insurgency. If one individual or a small group of 

individuals have relationships essential to maintaining an insurgency, counterinsurgents must understand 

those relationships. One node or a very few central nodes could dominate a highly centralized network. 

These nodes are called hubs and can be essential for an insurgency. A less centralized network may have no 

single point of failure. 

OTHER ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS 

4-104. The district stability framework assists planners in identifying and mitigating sources of instability. 

Because of the uniqueness of the stability environment in each district within an area of operations, the 

district stability framework was designed to identify and mitigate sources of instability. This framework 

works as a planning assessment tool and nests into the military decisionmaking process. There are three 

steps to the district stability framework: analysis, design, and monitoring and assessment. (See ADRP 3-07 

for more details on the district stability framework.) 

4-105. The interagency conflict assessment framework is another framework used to understand conflict. 

The purpose of the interagency conflict assessment framework is to develop a commonly held 

understanding, across relevant U.S. government departments and agencies, of the dynamics driving and 

mitigating violent conflict within a country. This common understanding informs U.S. policy and planning 

decisions. It may also include steps to establish a strategic baseline against which U.S. government 

engagement can be evaluated. It is a both a process and a tool available for use by any U.S. government 

agency to supplement interagency planning. (For more information on interagency conflict assessment 

framework, see the U.S. government publication Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework.) 
13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 5-1 

Chapter 5 

Insurgency Threat Characteristics 

5-1. Threat characteristics involve the composition, disposition, activities, and tactics of an insurgency. 

The composition of an insurgency is covered under the eighth dynamic, organizational and operational 

patterns. Tactics for an insurgency include political activities, criminal actions, and military tactics. 

Counterinsurgents consider how these threat characteristics create strengths and weaknesses for an 

insurgency. 

DISPOSITION AND ACTIVITIES 

5-2. The disposition is the geographic location of insurgent elements and the way they are deployed, 

employed, or located. The dispositions of an insurgency are partially determined by an operational 

environment and the operational variables. For example, if an insurgency has connections to a black 

market, some of its dispositions will normally be to protect that market. Terrain will also affect the 

dispositions of an insurgency. Commanders and staffs must understand an operational environment to 

understand an insurgency’s dispositions. (See chapter 2 for more information on an operational 

environment.) 

5-3. Insurgents who rely solely on violence to achieve their political goals are probably ineffective. 

Instead, effective insurgents conduct a wide range of activities to achieve their goals. Many of these 

activities are not enemy or terrain oriented, but political. Insurgents use a range of activities supporting 

both military and political actions. Insurgent actions can include: 

 Political activities. 

 Population control. 

 Military tactics (including terrorist actions and conventional tactics). 

 Support activities. 

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

5-4. Insurgents may use political activities to achieve their goals and enhance their cause’s legitimacy. An 

insurgency’s actions can come from inside the government’s political system or can be used to 

communicate a message to the population. Political actions that happen within a government normally 

happen in a democracy or a semidemocracy. In these systems, an insurgency and related political parties 

can have some political power through elections. This gives groups the ability to launch official 

investigations and a platform to question government actions. This was a technique used by the Irish 

Republican Army and Sinn Fein. 

5-5. Insurgent political actions within the government are limited to an autocratic regime, unless those 

actions are secretive. An authoritarian regime can have members that are either sympathetic to or actual 

members of an insurgency. However, those individuals must remain clandestine if they are to remain inside 

the government. In these cases, insurgencies can use these individuals for intelligence and to influence 

some governmental decisions. 

5-6. The use of political activities to influence a society is another political activity of an insurgency. 

Demonstrations, propaganda, strikes, and civil disobedience can be effective means to undermine the 

legitimacy of a government and to disrupt a host nation. These actions show the level of support for the 

insurgency and transmit the insurgents’ message to the rest of society. 

5-7. Propaganda is one of the most important political tools an insurgency has. Propaganda provides the 

means for the insurgency to communicate a message, often political, to the population. It allows the 
Chapter 5 

5-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

insurgency to create a narrative of why the government’s actions are not legitimate, and how the insurgency 

can eliminate the root causes of the conflict. 

5-8. In areas of a country where an insurgency is in control, the insurgency can perform governmental 

functions. These functions replace the functions of the host-nation government. When an insurgency 

provides effective governance of a region or community, it can build local legitimacy. 

5-9. At the national level, an insurgency can promote a shadow government. A shadow government offers 

a known, tangible alternative to the present government to the population. This can be effective as a 

propaganda technique, and a shadow government can be useful in creating a successful transition for an 

insurgency. As propaganda, a shadow government allows an insurgency to identify and inform a population 

of a known alternative to the current government. In practice, a shadow government allows a governmental 

structure to quickly form in insurgent controlled areas. If an insurgency is successful, this allows for a 

transition to a coherent national government. 

POPULATION CONTROL

5-10. One of the primary goals of a local insurgency is population control. Once the government is 

displaced from an area, an insurgency can act as the functioning government. With the use of force to 

enforce local rules and norms, an insurgency can become a functioning instrument to control the 

population. In such cases, it has displaced the government, at least locally. This control can be used to gain 

legitimacy among the population. When an insurgency both controls a local population and is seen as 

legitimate by the local population, it becomes more difficult to displace. The host nation must not only 

regain control of the area, but maintain control when the population may not view the host nation as a 

legitimate authority. 

MILITARY TACTICS

5-11. Insurgents use violence to create a wide range of effects. For example, in the early phases of an 

insurgency, insurgents plan attacks to achieve the greatest political and informational impact while not 

becoming decisively engaged. During the war of movement, insurgents may try to destroy a host nation’s 

security forces or its communication channels. Commanders need to understand the wide variety of 

insurgent tactics. Insurgents may use both terrorist acts and conventional military tactics. 

Terrorist Acts 

5-12. Terrorist acts are meant to undermine the legitimacy of the government by demonstrating both the 

inability of the government to protect the population and the strength of the insurgency. The perpetrator of 

a terrorist act seeks to use the terror that the act produces among the population and the government to gain 

some political objective. Insurgents generally select targets based on their strategic, operational, and 

tactical importance and propaganda value. A terrorist attack will generally employ some deception and use 

techniques outside of accepted norms. 

5-13. The possibility of an insurgent group gaining access to weapons of mass destruction changes the 

strategic effect of terrorist actions. If an insurgency gains a nuclear capability, which is an increased 

possibility in an interconnected world, the threat of using a nuclear weapon would provide that insurgency 

leverage for political negotiations. The actual use of a nuclear weapon would have regional and global 

effects. The use of biological and chemical weapons would also have a strategic effect, but to a lesser 

degree than nuclear weapons. An insurgent’s use of weapons of mass destruction would transform the 

nature of a conflict. 

Conventional Tactics 

5-14. Insurgents use a wide range of tactics to attack counterinsurgents. The tactics insurgents use will be 

based on their capabilities. During a war of movement, insurgents may try to destroy host-nation 

government forces. However, this may expose insurgents if an attempt to destroy a host nation’s security 

force is taken too early. Insurgents must correctly judge their capabilities versus the host nation’s 
Insurgency Threat Characteristics 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 5-3 

capabilities. When the host nation has an advantage in capability, insurgents will probably use small-unit 

tactics in order to not become decisively engaged. 

5-15. Insurgents may use a wide range of conventional tactics. Insurgents often employ ambushes for 

harassment and disruption. Snipers or sharpshooters may be an effective means of engaging government 

forces without becoming decisively engaged. Insurgents may use indirect fire, such as mortar and rocket 

attacks, to harass counterinsurgents or cause them to commit forces that can then be attacked by other 

means. Weapons and munitions are frequently modified to best suit insurgent needs for a specific target or 

mission. For example, insurgents may use direct fire rockets or missiles in an indirect manner to avoid 

detection. Moreover, insurgents may have to improvise because they lack weapons. 

5-16. Improvised explosive devices are effective tools that can be integrated into many different types of 

attacks. Improvised explosive devices can be inexpensive to produce and, because of the various detonation 

techniques available, may avoid risks to the perpetrator. Also, insurgents may use suicide bombing as an 

employment method, and it can be very effective. 

5-17. Insurgents may use cyber electromagnetic attacks. Cyber electromagnetic capabilities can give an 

insurgency the ability to affect systems both within and outside the host nation. For example, a cyber 

electromagnetic attack could undermine the financial system within a state. This may be an effective way to 

undermine the legitimacy of a host nation. However, a cyber electromagnetic attack could also affect any 

state or region. For example, cyber electromagnetic capabilities provide an insurgent the ability to attack a 

country that supports the host nation. If an insurgency attains cyber electromagnetic capabilities, the nature 

of the conflict changes. 

SUPPORT ACTIVITIES 

5-18. Although noticeable, violence may be only a small part of overall insurgent activity. Insurgent 

support activities include training, logistics, and communications. These support activities sustain 

insurgencies and allow for both military and political actions. They are enabled by an insurgency’s ability 

to generate popular support. Insurgent support networks may be large, even when violence levels are low. 

These networks can include support from other nations or from population groups outside the country. The 

effectiveness of insurgent operations depends heavily on logistics. 

5-19. In some parts of the world, a lack of access to weapons may forestall insurgencies. However, there is 

widespread availability of weapons in many areas, with especially large surpluses in the most violent 

regions of the world. Explosive hazards, such as mines and improvised explosive devices, are likely to be 

common weapons in insurgencies. Insurgents can obtain weapons through legal or illegal purchases or from 

foreign sources. A common tactic is to capture them from government forces. Counterinsurgency forces 

should seek to cut off the flow of arms into an area of operations and eliminate their sources. 

5-20. Income is essential, not only for insurgents to purchase weapons, but to pay recruits and bribe 

officials. Money and supplies can be obtained through many sources. Foreign support is one possible 

source of income. Local supporters or international front organizations may provide financial support. 

Sometimes legitimate businesses are established to furnish funding. In areas controlled by insurgents, 

confiscation or taxation may be used. Another common source of funding is criminal activity. 

5-21. Funding greatly influences an insurgency’s character and vulnerabilities. The insurgents’ approach 

determines the movement’s requirements. Protracted popular war strategies that emphasize mobilization of 

the masses require considerable resources to build and maintain a counter state. In comparison, the 

military-focused approach—which emphasizes armed action—needs only the resources to sustain a 

military campaign. Counter threat finance is an important means to interdict an insurgency’s funding. (See 

ATP 3-07.20/MCRP 3-33 for more information.) 

TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION

5-22. The quality and quantity of training depends on how advanced the insurgency is and what its specific 

strategy is. Indoctrination is a part of training which seeks to maintain allegiance and to focus cells to 

conduct continuous operations without frequent communications and direction from insurgent leadership. 

The level of indoctrination can help analysts identify the strategy and sophistication of the insurgency and 
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5-4 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

includes more than just the overall objective of the insurgency. Subordinate leaders within an insurgency 

are indoctrinated because they must execute the senior leadership’s intent and vision as well as guide 

operations until redirected. With better indoctrination of intent and vision, insurgents may be more 

effective in decentralized operations and being self sufficient. 

5-23. Training also includes individual and collective training, depending on the role of the insurgent and 

the specific skills of the insurgent (such as sniper, information operations, human intelligence, raid or 

ambush, communications, logistics and caches, or bomb maker). More advanced training may include how 

insurgents conduct themselves if captured, including resistance to interrogation and operations within 

detention facilities (recruiting, clandestine communications, and maintaining control of other insurgents). 

Other states may play an essential role in training an insurgency. Training can occur at sites in the 

supporting country or covertly within the host nation. Many states maintain the ability to conduct 

unconventional warfare. (See FM 3-05 for more information on unconventional warfare.) 

COMMUNICATIONS 

5-24. Communications in an insurgency cannot depend on open and traditional means. Ensuring an 

effective network of communications is an essential support activity of an insurgency. Insurgents can 

compensate for the lack of regular and reliable communications in numerous ways, including masking their 

communications in radio, television, or Internet messages. They may also pass information in cameras, 

high frequency, short-wave, and amateur (ham radio) sets, cellular phones, the mail, computers, or memory 

storage devices transported by couriers. They may also avoid detection by use of couriers and face-to-face 

meetings. 

INSURGENT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 

5-25. Insurgents usually have several strengths. They usually have a significant knowledge of an area of 

operations. Usually they are operating in their own country and own ethnic group, making it extremely 

difficult for friendly forces to identify insurgents in the community or to identify people connected with the 

insurgency. Insurgents have intimate knowledge of the area of operations including things like the 

characteristics of the local people and their culture, daily schedules, accents, and local slangs that enable 

them to blend in with the local population, enhancing their ability to operate with secrecy. They will 

probably wear similar clothing, have like postures, mannerisms and hand gestures, body movements, 

walking speed, greetings, body motions, and maintain eye contact (or lack of) as the population of the area 

of operations. They will also probably observe local social norms of food, drink, and sleeping schedules. 

5-26. An insurgent is not usually responsible for maintaining normal governmental obligations to the local 

population. While insurgents may conduct some governmental functions and set up a shadow government, 

an insurgency does not normally have the same expectations from the population to provide governmental 

services. This normally means that insurgencies spend few resources on governmental functions, which 

frees more resources to conduct the insurgency. 

5-27. Most insurgencies have limited personnel and resources. Long periods without resupply and loss of 

key personnel can affect an insurgency’s ability to sustain a conflict. Counterinsurgents can apply pressure 

on an insurgency by conducting raids on cell members; recovering enemy caches; interdicting supply 

routes; searching or seizing resources from cars, homes, and personnel entering the area of operations; 

isolating the insurgents from access to markets, smugglers, and black-market goods; and by conducting 

offensive operations that diminish guerrilla numbers. Insurgencies usually fail when their ability to 

replenish, either through counterinsurgent action, mismanagement on their own part, or withdrawal of the 

support of an external actor, is undermined. 

5-28. Insurgent movements are vulnerable to friendly force information operations that show their danger, 

futility, privation, and numerical inferiority compared to government forces. In some cases, the fear of 

being treated as a criminal if captured, and the fear of violence to an insurgent and the insurgent’s family, 

can cause desertions and defections. In some societies, good treatment, pardons, protection, food, shelter, 

and participation in the government may be stronger incentives than the fear of criminal punishment to 

induce desertions. Other insurgent stress factors include sustained combat and a hostile environment that 

weakens insurgent resolve. 
Insurgency Threat Characteristics 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 5-5 

5-29. The decentralized nature of networked insurgencies that provides operations security can also be a 

weakness as it is resource intensive, slows responsiveness, and causes information to move slowly. The 

difficulty of insurgents receiving encouragement from superiors and members of the political wing, a lack 

of direction in the face of counterinsurgent pressures, and an inability to openly call for reinforcements and 

logistics due to their operations security plan can make insurgents feel isolated, alone, confused, and 

unsupported. Analysts need to identify these points and recommend operations to demoralize and promote 

defections among insurgents. 

ASSOCIATED THREATS 

5-30. Other threats can play interconnected roles in an insurgency. Insurgencies create change in a society 

and this can create an opportunity for some organizations. Opportunists are important actors in this type of 

operational environment. Two other groups are particularly important, criminal organizations and 

nongovernmental militias. These groups can be supportive, neutral, or opposed to an insurgency. Moreover, 

these groups can have important connections to an insurgency. 

OPPORTUNISTS 

5-31. An opportunist is one who takes advantage of any opportunity to achieve an end, often with no 

regard for principles or consequences. In the context of counterinsurgency, opportunists often take 

advantage of the conditions of instability in the pursuit of their own goals, such as smuggling contraband, 

while security forces are distracted from protecting the border due to combating an insurgency. 

Commanders and staffs identify opportunists, assess their impact on the mission and force protection, 

consider them in planning, and mitigate their impact as needed. 

5-32. There are several types of opportunists who, by nature, impede the regular and effective functions of 

government and may act contrary to the well-being of the people. Opportunists may be existing local 

people or external actors, including civilians, members of the government, or security forces. Opportunists 

can be in direct support of the insurgency or outside actors. They can be state sponsored, sponsored by a 

non-state actor, or unsponsored, all while taking advantage of unstable conditions. Opportunists understand 

and exploit the conditions of instability inherent in counterinsurgency where lawlessness, subversion, and 

insurgency are the norm. The extreme conditions of an insurgency may allow activities that are normally 

countered with effective law enforcement and governance to proceed with impunity. These conditions 

allow opportunists to pursue their political and economic interests. 

5-33. Opportunists may tend to exploit populations by conducting kidnapping for ransom; revenge killings; 

murder for hire; hijacking; extortion; black marketing; smuggling; and trafficking of drugs, humans, and 

weapons. Opportunists use the conditions of instability to conduct activities that are often illegal to further 

their interests. They may also work within the political system to further their interests. Insurgencies often 

occur in a chaotic political environment. As such, opportunists can take advantage of the chaos to gain 

political power. 

5-34. Foreign opportunists, such as mercenaries, international criminal groups, and terrorists, may be 

sponsored by an external state or non-state actor or act independently. These groups may also work in the 

environment of an insurgency. They can act in a similar manner as internal opportunists, but they pursue 

the interests of an external actor. 

5-35. Opportunists can work for an insurgency, against an insurgency, or both. How they work and who 

they work for is determined by an opportunist’s own interests. Opportunists can work both sides of a 

conflict to maximize influence and profits while avoiding retribution. An opportunist can provide safe 

passage for insurgents, while also providing intelligence to counterinsurgents. An opportunist is not bound 

by the objectives of either the counterinsurgent or insurgent. 

5-36. Reintegration initiatives, although favorable to resolve many insurgencies, can be exploited by 

opportunists due to the inclusive and reconciliatory nature of these programs. Opportunists can infiltrate 

local civilian security forces to avoid retribution, influence less secure communities, and provide 

opportunities for vigilantism. Reintegration can also offer incentives for opportunists looking for 

employment, benefits, or even amnesty from a seditious criminal, social activist, or political past. 
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5-6 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

5-37. Opportunists can be malign by design or by circumstance. Malign by design refers to the 

opportunists whose purpose by character is criminal and counterproductive to effective government and a 

population’s well-being. Malign by circumstance refers to opportunists whose purpose is not criminal by 

design but which shifts to wholly or partial illicit activities to further their interests based on obstacles to 

their original path. Groups like corporations, nongovernmental organizations, or security contractors may 

be advocates for a functioning government, but due to conditions which present opportunities for them, 

these groups or individuals may act counterproductively to counterinsurgent efforts. These opportunists are 

very difficult to identify due to their favorable position and the potentially clandestine activities employed 

to sustain their position. 

5-38. In the planning process, counterinsurgents analyze the activities of opportunists, even though their 

presence may not be apparent. The same conditions that may allow an insurgency to form and enjoy 

freedom of movement also allow opportunists to act. Opportunists will probably take advantage of the 

vulnerability of the population and exploit the lack of governmental control in pursuit of their goals. 

5-39. The presence, actions, and impact of opportunists can affect the success of the mission to defeat the 

insurgency and address the root causes of the conflict. This is especially true as opportunists may rely on 

the presence of the insurgency and unstable conditions to achieve their ends. Commanders and staffs need 

to include opportunists and their activities in understanding an area of operations and address them during 

mission planning and in attack the network operations. In the intelligence preparation of the 

battlefield/battlespace process, commanders and staffs may address opportunists within civil 

considerations, or within the threat, depending on where they are appropriate. The mission analysis must 

address identifying opportunists, understanding their impacts, and addressing or mitigating their impacts. 

5-40. The commander’s intent may need to include dealing with opportunists, depending on the level of 

interference or political nature of opportunists. Opportunists can impact the mission or force protection 

operations. This is especially true if the opportunists are from a state sponsor or a border region where an 

internal conflict can spread to another country. Overall, counterinsurgents need to understand how 

opportunists can aid an insurgency, either directly or indirectly, and how they can undermine the efforts of 

a host-nation government or a multinational effort to address the causes of instability. 

5-41. Commanders and staffs need to analyze how their units’ actions can provide opportunities for 

opportunists. Decisions concerning contracting, for example, can have various effects on giving 

opportunities to opportunists. Commanders and staffs must analyze their units’ effects on the battlefield. 

Some decisions that might seem to only effect a unit internally may also effect opportunists. Commanders 

and staffs must think holistically about how their units interact with the environment in order to minimize 

the effects of opportunist. 

CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

5-42. Insurgents commonly use criminal organizations to accomplish objectives. Common activities 

designed to gain revenue or materials include theft, drug or human trafficking, smuggling of illicit 

materials, prostitution, extortion, kidnapping, blackmail, counterfeiting, taxing of civilians, bank robbery, 

and bribery. Criminal organizations can appear as street gangs, mafias, or cartels. Criminal organizations 

may also assist insurgent groups in achieving objectives other than accumulating resources. Other 

objectives may include intimidating government employees or candidates, conducting assassinations, 

kidnapping key personnel, initiating sectarian violence, strikes, demonstrations, riots, and smuggling 

high-value leaders, advisors, or weapons. Criminal organizations may also conduct operations deemed 

unpopular with a civilian population at a distance from an insurgent movement to create deniability. 

5-43. Many insurgencies degenerate into criminality. This occurs as the primary movements disintegrate 

and the remaining elements become isolated, or the root cause is addressed. Insurgent disintegration is 

desirable; it replaces a dangerous, often ideologically inspired body of disaffiliated individuals with a less 

dangerous but more diverse body, normally of uneven character. The first is a security threat; the second is 

a law-and-order concern. This should not be interpreted as denigrating the armed capacity of a 

law-and-order threat. Successful counterinsurgents are prepared to address this disintegration. They 

recognize that the ideal approach eliminates both the insurgency and any criminal threats the insurgency’s 

elimination produces. 
Insurgency Threat Characteristics 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 5-7 

5-44. However, criminal groups can develop into insurgencies. In the case of localities that depend on 

black markets for their general welfare, the local population may depend on criminal activities. This creates 

a closely interlocked relationship between the criminal element (running the black market) and the 

insurgents (linked to the black market). In some cases, this relationship feeds into the causes of an 

insurgency. For example, a local population may support the insurgents because they want to stop 

interference with their economic livelihood. An insurgency based on a black market generally has ties to 

other black markets and resources through globalization. At its core, a black market requires trade and 

contact with others. This can create a well-funded, trained, and equipped commercial insurgency. 

5-45. An insurgency can begin with a political aim and then develop into a commercial insurgency because 

of connections to a market. For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia started as a 

communist insurgent group in 1964. However, through its involvement in the drug trade, it has become the 

richest self-sustaining insurgent group in history. In the parts of Columbia that it controls, it is closely 

linked to the population because the population depends on the drug trade for its economic well-being. 

NONGOVERNMENT MILITIAS

5-46. As the host-nation government weakens and violence increases, people look for ways to protect 

themselves. If the government cannot provide protection, people may organize into armed militias to 

protect themselves. Moreover, some social structures, such as tribes, may have a militia structure. 

Examples of militias include the following: 

 Loyalist militias formed in Northern Ireland. 

 Right-wing paramilitary organizations formed in Colombia to counter the Revolutionary Armed 

Forces of Colombia. 

 Militias of various ethnic and political groups formed in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

5-47. If militias are outside the host-nation government’s control, they can often be obstacles to ending an 

insurgency. Militias may become more powerful than the host-nation government, particularly at the local 

level. They may also fuel the insurgency and precipitate a downward spiral into a full-scale civil war. 

However, they can also play a constructive role and provide local security. While this can undermine the 

host nation’s government, it can also be a building block to help build legitimacy at the local level. 

5-48. A militia can also shift into becoming an active insurgency and an insurgency can sometimes shift 

into becoming a militia. A militia may not actively oppose the government and may be working within the 

system. However, it represents a capability to challenge the host nation. Militias may become insurgencies. 

An insurgency may also be integrated by a government and become a militia. 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 6-1 

PART THREE 

Counterinsurgencies 

Part three provides doctrine for how to counter an insurgency. How commanders and 

staffs counter an insurgency is dependent on the strategic and operational context 

(part one) and the type of insurgency (part two). Chapter 6 discusses command and 

control and mission command. Chapter 7 discusses planning and operational 

considerations. Planning is essential in framing the problem and the possible 

solutions. Chapter 8 covers intelligence. Intelligence is fundamental in gaining 

situational understanding. Chapter 9 discusses direct methods and chapter 10 

discusses indirect methods to counter insurgency. These chapters provide a 

framework to help commanders and staffs develop an overall operational approach 

to counter an insurgency. Chapter 11 discusses working with host-nation forces. 

Chapter 12 discusses assessments, which provide information on effectively using 

measures of performance and measures of effectiveness in counterinsurgency. 

Finally, part three discusses legal considerations in chapter 13. 

Chapter 6 

Mission Command and Command and Control 

6-1. The operations process is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and 

uses the mission command or command and control process to ensure appropriate actions are taken. 

Sometimes this recognition takes the form of a conscious command decision, as in deciding on a concept of 

operations. Sometimes it takes the form of a rules-based procedure, as in the guiding of an aircraft on final 

approach. Other forms may require a degree of judgment and intuition so that they can only be performed 

by skilled, experienced people, as in devising tactics, operations, and strategies. (See ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0, 

and MCDP 6 for more information on mission command and command and control.) 

COMMAND IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 

6-2. Command in counterinsurgency often involves a large geographic area and control over multiple 

units performing different types of operations. In Western Iraq, Brigadier General W. Blake Crowe 

commanded a large area that began along the Syrian border and extended to the Jordanian border. He 

executed command over multiple units, performing multiple tasks in different areas. The vignette 

“Command in Counterinsurgency” provides an insight into Brigadier General Crowe’s command during 

the Iraqi War in 2006. 
Chapter 6 

6-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

Command in Counterinsurgency 

 Our area of operations began along the Syrian border and extended down 

to the Jordanian border. We were also responsible for the Marine expeditionary force 

security area, which extended to Saudi Arabia. This was a large area, and it was not 

possible to be everywhere. This situation forced us to work with the locals and to 

work and play well with other units operating in the region, such as the special 

operations forces (SOF). But there in 2006, we were the surrogate government. We 

did not have mayors at the time. The provincial governor was in Ramadi, and he 

stayed there. Twice we were able to get him out to western al-Anbar in the year I was 

there, and it took a regimental-sized operation to get him out to cities such as 

Baghdadi, Haditha, and al-Qa’im. We spent nearly thirty days’ worth of planning to 

get him out there because for us he was more important than the President of the 

United States. I think Marines here would understand that. 

 Our first mayor came in six months into my deployment in al-Qa’im. 

Lieutenant Colonel Dale Alford, commander of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, was 

involved in setting the conditions for that success. We didn’t have a mayor in Haditha 

because we had to arrest him. He was an insurgent. We didn’t have a mayor in Hit 

because the previous ones had been killed. So until December 2006, we were the 

surrogate local government. We learned very quickly that if we allowed the Iraqis to 

fail to build and provision their security forces, then we would have failed as well. So, 

we had to step in and fill that surrogate role. 

 There is a debate concerning these operations and whether or not they are 

counterinsurgencies, hybrid operations, or distributed operations. We did them all. In 

al-Qa’im, we conducted what I would call a pure counterinsurgency (COIN) operation 

because the conditions had been set by the previous regiment. We were still having 

major manned gun, tank rounds, and combined arms in downtown Hit with more than 

one hundred insurgents surging on twelve- to fifteen-man positions. Phasing, 

synchronizing, supporting, and enabling formed what I thought was my primary role 

there. 

 Every battalion commander wants to be the main effort. Every regimental or 

brigade commander wants to be the main effort. We weren’t the main effort in Iraq. 

And every battalion could not be the main effort, and that’s the hard thing for people 

to reconcile. How come I’m not getting all these assets? 

 When I was in Afghanistan, I received everything. We were one Marine 

battalion attached to the Army and we were given everything. In Iraq, I had five 

battalions in my command and one reduced force reconnaissance company 

commanded by six lieutenant colonels. At least one unit is not going to get what they 

want in a timely fashion. The battalions, companies, and platoons had autonomy, but 

autonomy doesn’t mean that they operated independently. That’s where 

synchronizing comes in. It means going out and working very closely to the battalions 

and blurring the borders between zones of responsibility and forcing commanders to 

get together and have a cup of coffee. Just as we needed to have tea with the local 

nationals, we also needed to do that among ourselves. We did that very well with the 

SOF through liaisons. We established an ad-hoc tactical fusion center at the 

regimental level. 

 [W]e raised close to 4,000 police officers. I waited a year and was told the 

police stations are coming. They never did. So we created expeditionary forward 

operating bases, because that way I could use Marine Corps money. I could put 

police in them, although they could not be designated official Iraqi Police stations. If it 

was designated as such, you would get reported because it would not be official. So, 

there are things that you have to do. It’s not selective disobedience of orders, but 

rather a creative way of getting the mission accomplished. 

 We had two force protection measures: the American standard and what 

was acceptable to the Iraqis. Casualties were unacceptable to me as a commander. 
Mission Command and Command and Control 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 6-3 

The first time you go to a scene where you’ve lost a soldier, it does not matter what 

uniform he’s wearing. He is one of ours. He was brought in to serve with us, and I 

don’t care what nationality he is. We needed to build it to one standard: checkpoints, 

force protection, food, weapons, ammunition, all the way down. They fight with us 

and we’re going to treat them to our standard. That’s just nonnegotiable. 

Note: For Army users, JP 1 defines command as the authority that a commander in the armed 

forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes 

the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the 

employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the 

accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, 

and discipline of assigned personnel. ADP 6-0 defines control as the regulation of forces and 

warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. 

6-3. Many actions contribute to successful mission command, including planning, training, and education. 

Moreover, a well understood commander’s intent is essential for mission command. In a 

counterinsurgency, the operational environment is changing and real-time guidance or direction will need 

to change. Planning, whether hasty or deliberate, provides a foundation of shared understanding. Effective 

training and education, which make it more likely that subordinates will take the proper actions in combat, 

help ensure the success of mission command. A commander's intent, expressed clearly before an operation 

begins, is an essential element of mission command. Likewise, analysis after the operation, which 

ascertains the results and lessons of the action and so informs future actions, contributes to mission 

command. 

Note: For Marine Corps users, mission command does not replace command and control as a 

warfighting function. Mission command is a type of command and control that promotes 

innovation and requires the strong relationships of trust and mutual understanding necessary for 

decentralized decisionmaking necessary to seize the initiative, degrade enemy cohesion, and 

strengthen friendly cohesive relationships that are critical elements to any counterinsurgency. 

Based on leader character and subordinate initiative, mission command offers no checklist for 

success, but instead challenges the services to cultivate a bias for taking appropriate action and 

accentuate the senior leadership virtues of trust, moral courage, and restraint. The mission 

command philosophy asserts that people are the basis of all military organizations, and military 

operations occur as human interactions. Commanders use the philosophy of mission command to 

exploit and enhance uniquely human skills. Commanders implement mission command though 

leadership, providing direction and guidance as part of command and understanding that 

subordinates contribute to control. The other types of command and control are command by 

direction and command by planning. For the Army, the philosophy of mission command is the 

exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined 

initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of 

unified land operations. (For more information, see MCDP 6 and ADP 6-0). 

6-4. Due to the nature of counterinsurgency operations, the inculcation of the mission command 

philosophy is beneficial in dealing with the local environment. Soldiers and Marines interact with a society 

at the platoon, squad, and individual level. Tactical leaders must have the ability, within the commander’s 

intent, to have freedom of action to work with a local society. As such, tactical leaders should act with a 

conceptual understanding of an operational environment and how their action’s fit into that operational 

environment. 

6-5. A counterinsurgency involves simultaneous activities at every echelon. Platoons within a company 

could be doing different tasks, and companies within a battalion could be doing different tasks, all in 

support of a battalion’s method of counterinsurgency. Every task involves potential decisions that can have 

an immediate impact on success or failure. Moreover, these tasks are interrelated. This means that junior 

leaders will make decisions at the point of effort, relying on mission type orders. This applies to any 

operational approach taken to defeat an insurgency. For example, if the commander integrates a direct 
Chapter 6 

6-4 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

action force into a host nation’s counterinsurgency effort, that force will have to understand the operational 

environment and the commander’s intent. Any mission can have unintended consequences, and this 

includes missions with clear objectives. For example, a direct action mission taken with faulty intelligence 

could result in the deaths of civilians. All commanders have to be empowered to make decisions that 

positively impact mission accomplishment. Whatever operational approach the commander takes and 

however the host nation is supported, mission command is essential. 

6-6. When squads, platoons and companies are distributed over wide areas, they must frequently make 

decisions, and their understanding of the environment is generally better than that of their higher 

headquarters. In an effective counterinsurgency, there is a need for decentralization that puts a premium on 

the higher headquarters establishing a clear commander's intent and providing subordinates with vision and 

guidance particular to an insurgency and a host nation. In a counterinsurgency, commanders must 

effectively execute the art of command, which is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through 

timely decisionmaking and leadership. These decisions often have to be made in a time constrained 

environment. As such, decentralized decisionmaking is essential, and it provides control over the 

operations and activities inherent in a counterinsurgency. 

HEADQUARTERS USE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 

6-7. While mission command allows for multiple actions to simultaneously occur at every echelon, every 

echelon has an important role in ensuring that the various actions meet the desired end state. Control 

requires a shared understanding of an operational environment and operational approach in a 

counterinsurgency. A lack of effective control over these activities can create gaps that insurgents can 

exploit. For example, if different brigades or different divisions set different prices for weapons buyback 

programs or have different policies on wages, this sometimes creates situations that hamper the overall 

policy. A lack of understanding of the economic variables within a country can produce policies that 

undermine a weapons buyback program or distort the labor market. On the other hand, there might be cases 

in counterinsurgents want to allow a local commander more flexibility in setting such policies. The balance 

between local control and coordination of overall policy is one of the primary challenges facing the 

commanders and staffs of brigades, battalions, and regiments. 

6-8. A commander bases the level of flexibility and coordination of activities and policies on an 

operational environment and a superior commander’s intent. Moreover, the type and experience level of a 

unit may play a role in determining the level of flexibility and coordination. Conditions vary within a 

country or region and the cities and towns within it. For example, while different policies on wages could 

produce a disjointed overall policy, it is also possible that different wages are justified by the economic 

environment in different areas in the country. One city could have low unemployment, while another city 

could have high unemployment. The different conditions in the labor market is something commanders 

should take into account when designing a policy on economic development and hiring local workers. Also, 

an inexperienced unit or a unit that is not performing its traditional mission might have less flexibility than 

an experienced unit performing its traditional mission. 

6-9. In a counterinsurgency, operations are interrelated, and they must support the overall commander’s 

intent. The various activities that different units perform must also work within the operational approach of 

the joint commander. The joint commander is responsible for designing the overall operational approach of 

the counterinsurgency campaign. The joint commander has to ensure that that various activities being 

performed will meet stated United States (U.S.) policy goals. Subordinate commanders ensure that their 

operational approaches and activities fit within the overall operational approach. The combination of 

tactical actions must produce a strategic result, and every echelon of command shares a responsibility for 

ensuring that this occurs. Commanders must understand the end state and the ramifications of their actions 

in meeting that end state. The commander drives the operations process. The commander’s staff must 

ensure that the commander understands the operational environment and can visualize the 

battlefield/battlespace. This is accomplished through staff action during mission analysis. However, 

because a counterinsurgency environment is complex, situational understanding is continually developing. 

Understanding what counterinsurgents should do is more important than doing tasks that may be 

counterproductive. Also, constant engagement of key leaders with the population is essential to enhancing 
Mission Command and Command and Control 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 6-5 

understanding of the population and understanding of the counterinsurgency. Understanding the problem 

and having key leaders engage the population may be more important than having a large number of troops. 

6-10. Headquarters elements may be essential in coordination with the host nation, other government 

agencies, or other unified action partners. Counterinsurgents tailor headquarters units to the requirements to 

coordinate and enable subordinate units to be effective. A larger number of headquarters or a more robust 

headquarters may provide a further ability to work with interagency and host-nation organizations. 

Interagency organizations can integrate their capabilities more effectively if there is a robust headquarters 

element to work with. The analysis and intelligence capabilities of a division or corps headquarters may be 

essential in integrating interagency organizations’ capabilities. These division and corps capabilities 

provide brigades the needed span of control to operate and integrate interagency organizations and their 

capabilities. Using multiple headquarters provides a robust capability for working with host-nation 

organizations, both military and civilian. Many programs meant to build capacity within a host nation are 

national level programs. A robust headquarters element will help to ensure that these programs are 

integrated and resourced to maximize the benefit to the counterinsurgency effort. This is needed to ensure 

that these programs are effective at the local level. 

6-11. A headquarters can also serve as a coordination center. A coordination center can provide a means to 

unify multiple governmental, military, police, and civilian partners to gather and share information, provide 

support to priority projects, conduct meetings with local leaders, promote a whole of government and 

unified effort approach, and lend added credibility to the government. Coordination centers provide needed 

flexibility to control and coordinate host nation and multinational actions. Coordination centers can also act 

as joint tactical command posts and integrate various joint capabilities, such as air support. 

6-12. An operational environment does not normally dramatically change at a unit boundary. It is essential 

in a counterinsurgency to understand the actual economic, political, and social boundaries of an operational 

environment and not use unit boundaries as the only planning consideration for operations. The 

relationships between units that are adjacent is essential. While the conditions in their operational 

environment may be different, commanders should understand their adjacent unit’s problem frame and 

operational approach. They should also understand how their actions may affect the operational 

environment of other units. This is of particular importance when integrating information-related 

capabilities. Commanders at every echelon ensure adjacent units have relationships that allow for the 

completion of the overall mission. 

6-13. The same is true of forces operating in another unit’s area of operations, such as special operations 

forces (SOF). While missions to capture an insurgent leader may be essential to the overall mission, 

commanders must coordinate with other commanders and units to mitigate negative consequences of these 

types of actions with effective information operations. Commanders and staffs at all levels must ensure that 

the units under their command have productive relationships with other units. Establishing command and 

support relationships helps create channels that streamline information dissemination by ensuring the right 

information passes promptly to the right people. The three common channels for information dissemination 

are known as command, staff, and technical channels. (See ADRP 6-0 for more information on command 

channels.) 

6-14. The effective link between planning and assessing the effects of operations in a counterinsurgency is 

the foundation for establishing effective mission command. Success in a counterinsurgency is largely 

dependent on making lasting changes to an operational environment. This requires that commanders and 

staff continue to evolve in their situational understanding. A continuous assessment process is essential for 

planning in counterinsurgency operations. (See chapter 12 for more information on assessments.) 

CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 

SYNCHRONIZATION 

6-15. Counterinsurgency requires the integration of all capabilities of the U.S. and often requires this 

integration for long periods of time. However, the integration of SOF capabilities into the effort to counter 

an insurgency is of particular importance to both Army and Marine commanders. FM 6-05/MCWP 3-36.1 

provides a doctrinal foundation for conventional force and special operating force integration. Also, 
Chapter 6 

6-6 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

JP 3-05 provides an overview of special operations. The synchronization of conventional forces and SOF 

have special considerations in counterinsurgency. 

6-16. Conventional forces and SOF depend on each other. SOF lack long term sustainability without 

conventional support. More importantly, if SOF are conducting direct action missions, it becomes vital that 

conventional forces and SOF coordinate so that they do not produce negative effects on the operational 

environment. However, SOF can provide conventional forces with important cultural and advising 

capabilities. They also provide important offensive capabilities. SOF capable of conducting direct action 

might be able to conduct raids and gain intelligence that conventional forces cannot. 

6-17. Typically, SOF control a joint special operations area either long term or temporarily. A joint special 

operations area is simply an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to conduct 

special operations. This is a means to manage SOF, which tend to operate in small teams, separately from 

conventional forces, which are larger in size and capabilities. Creating a joint special operations area is a 

means to synchronize actions towards a common goal, prevent conventional forces and SOF from 

interfering with one another, and prevent fratricide. 

6-18. In some counterinsurgency operations involving a large direct approach and conventional forces that 

are likely, at least for a time, to be the primary counterinsurgents, the land forces area of operations will 

typically encompass any area where SOF may operate. Unlike other operations, where the joint commander 

can separate forces by time and space, a counterinsurgency can involve large scale and long term 

involvement by land forces. Joint commanders typically set up joint special operations areas, but joint 

special operations areas are normally temporary, and these areas return to the control of the ground 

commander once the special operations mission is completed. 

6-19. In a long term and large scale counterinsurgency effort, SOF operations, if not coordinated, could 

create problems. SOF actions, such as direct action missions, could be highly disruptive to a conventional 

unit’s ongoing efforts to build the legitimacy of the host-nation government if not coordinated. For 

example, a direct action mission that is not coordinated with information operations can alienate a local 

population. In some cases, a direct action mission can undermine a unit’s progress in an area, even if 

counterinsurgents attempt to mitigate the negative effects to the conventional unit’s missions. Commanders 

and staffs must ensure synchronization of both conventional forces and SOF can to ensure neither force 

undermines the overall effort. This synchronization can include decisions on how to perform missions and 

decisions on whether or not to perform missions. Both conventional forces and SOF should support the 

joint commander’s intent. 

6-20. SOF and conventional forces complement each other’s capabilities. When SOF are operating on 

short duration missions, if not coordinated, they might not be aware of some of the local knowledge of the 

area. Commanders and staffs must share information to ensure progress. Combined operations can enhance 

the effectiveness of both SOF and conventional forces. The ground commander will have the daily 

experiences in an area and will understand the local population. On the other hand, a successful mission by 

the SOF commander could have strategic effects throughout the country. Coordination with SOF by the 

ground commander benefits both the SOF and conventional forces, who have to continue the longer term 

mission in an area of operation. 

6-21. Both the SOF and conventional commanders share responsibility for ensuring an effective 

relationship. However, the joint force commander has overall responsibility for effective integration. 

FM 6-05/MCWP 3-36.1 offers some important tools, such as the use of liaison officers, to ensure an 

effective relationship. Ultimately, the joint force commander has overall responsibility for synchronization. 

Both SOF and conventional forces’ commanders and staffs ensure their actions meet the joint forces 

commander’s intent. The joint force commander ensures that the mechanisms for effective synchronization 

are in place. 
13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 7-1 

Chapter 7 

Planning and Operational Considerations 

7-1. Planning is important for gaining understanding. Military planning processes provide a way to 

understand an operational environment and understand the commanders’ intent within that operational 

environment. Planning is often conducted simultaneously with other activities, such as execution and 

assessment, and both informs, and is informed by, those activities. Planning as understanding, continually 

refined and questioned through assessments, helps commanders maintain situational understanding in the 

ever changing environment of counterinsurgency. This continued conceptualization of the operational 

environment and problem is essential for the use of mission command. However, before commanders and 

staffs can conceptualize the problem, they need to understand certain paradoxes of counterinsurgency. 

COUNTERINSURGENCY PARADOXES

7-2. A commander planning a counterinsurgency requires a specific mindset before that commander can 

plan or execute operations, and that mindset is the foundation for understanding how to counter an 

insurgency. When the United States (U.S.) acts, even temporarily, as the primary counterinsurgent, 

commanders operate carefully between fighting for a population and being seen as fighting against a 

population. When acting indirectly to enable a host nation, these paradoxes provide a framework for 

understanding and enabling the host nation. Throughout conceptual and detailed planning, the 

counterinsurgency paradoxes described in paragraphs 7-4 through 7-12 provide a set of apparent 

contradictions that aid commanders and staffs in developing a counterinsurgency mindset that helps 

commanders and staffs operate effectively. These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit 

it. The applicability of the these paradoxes depends on the local situation and, in particular, the state of the 

insurgency. For example, the statement that “sometimes, the more force used, the less effective it is”, does 

not apply when the enemy is breaching the perimeter; however, that thought is applicable when effective 

security has already been achieved in an area. In short, commanders and staffs should not reduce these 

paradoxes to a checklist; they should be used with considerable thought. 

7-3. The commander must be conscious of the problem of the observer effect, where the act of engaging 

the population, itself, makes changes in the operational environment. Any action on the environment 

generates a reaction, thereby altering the environment. This means the environment changes with every 

interaction with a society. In other words, the very act of interactions with a society changes the operational 

environment. Commanders must understand this reality and constantly consider its effects on their 

assessment and planning processes. Moreover, this fact is at the heart of many of the paradoxes that follow. 

Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be 

7-4. Ultimate success in counterinsurgency operations is normally gained by protecting the population, 

not the counterinsurgency force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the 

people, appear to be running scared, and give the initiative to the insurgents. A possible path to success 

could include an increase in outreach programs that focus on protecting the population. Commanders weigh 

the effectiveness of establishing patrol bases and operational support bases against the security of using 

larger unit bases. Establishing patrol bases ensures access to the intelligence needed to facilitate operations. 

Sharing risks with the population reinforces the connections with them that help establish legitimacy. 

Sometimes, the More Force is Used, the Less Effective It Is 

7-5. Any use of force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. Using substantial force 

also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In 

contrast, using force precisely and discriminately could strengthen the rule of law that needs to be 

established. The key to successful counterinsurgency operations is knowing when more force is needed, 
Chapter 7 

7-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

and when it might be counterproductive. This judgment involves constant assessment of the security 

situation and a sense of timing regarding insurgents’ actions. 

The More Successful the Counterinsurgency is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk 

Must Be Accepted 

7-6. This paradox is really a corollary to the paradox described in paragraph 7-5. As the level of insurgent 

violence drops, expectations of the population may lead to a reduction in direct military actions by 

counterinsurgents. More reliance is placed on police work, rules of engagement may be tightened, and 

troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more risk to 

maintain involvement with the people. 

Doing Nothing is Sometimes the Best Action 

7-7. Often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of enticing 

counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit. For example, 

counterinsurgents opening fire on a crowd or executing a clearing operation may create more enemies than 

it removes from the streets. If an assessment of the effects of a course of action determines that more 

negative than positive effects may result, an alternative should be considered, potentially including not 

acting. 

Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot 

7-8. Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and 

legitimacy for the host-nation government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents (although 

killing clearly will often be necessary). Arguably, the decisive effort is to isolate the insurgents by denying 

the local population as a base of support. This establishes the need for synchronizing information 

operations across the various lines of effort in order to generate operational advantages for the commander 

conducting counterinsurgency operations. Every action, including the use of force, must be supported by 

adequate information. While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory 

may come from a vibrant economy and political participation that restore hope. Particularly after security 

has been achieved, dollars and ballots may have more important effects than bombs and bullets. This is 

dependent on the context of a particular insurgency and the strategy to counter that insurgency. As with the 

other paradoxes, counterinsurgents cannot treat this as a uniform rule. However, a thriving economy may 

be more important than ammunition. Depending on the state of the insurgency, therefore, Soldiers and 

Marines should prepare to accomplish many nonmilitary missions to support counterinsurgency efforts. All 

unified action partners have a role in supporting efforts to enable governance to counter an insurgency, not 

just Department of State and civil affairs personnel. 

The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably is Normally Better Than Us Doing it Well 

7-9. It is just as important for counterinsurgents to consider who performs an operation as to assess how 

well it is done. Where the U.S. is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires supporting viable 

host-nation leaders and institutions that are legitimate and capable. The longer that process takes, the more 

U.S. public support will wane and the more the local population will question the legitimacy of their own 

forces and government. However, if the host nation cannot perform tolerably, the counterinsurgents 

supporting it may have to act. Experience, knowledge of the area of operations, and cultural sensitivity are 

essential in deciding when such action is necessary. 

If a Tactic Works This Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If It Works In This Province, It 

Might Not Work In The Next 

7-10. Competent insurgents are adaptive. They are often part of a widespread network that communicates 

constantly and instantly. Insurgents quickly adjust to successful counterinsurgency practices and rapidly 

disseminate information throughout an insurgency. Indeed, the more effective a counterinsurgency tactic is, 

the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need to counter it. Effective leaders 
Planning and Operational Considerations 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 7-3 

at all levels avoid complacency and are at least as adaptive as their enemies. There is no single prescribed 

set of counterinsurgency procedures. Commanders and staffs must constantly develop new practices. 

7-11. The environment of an insurgency is not static and different factors may influence various areas. An 

operation or a tactic that works well in one area may not work well in another because of different factors 

in the environment. Village stability operations in Afghanistan demonstrate this. Soldiers had success in 

one area but did not have success in another. The reason was that the operational environments and the 

population’s responses to these environments were vastly different. Commanders and staffs must 

understand the local area and not assume that the same methods will work in other areas, even in an 

adjacent town. 

If a Tactic Works in This Province, it Might Not Work in The Next: 

The Case of the Dan Aw Patan District, Afghanistan, 2010 

 In the fall of 2010, U.S. Army units comprised of special forces teams and 

infantry squads from the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment introduced village 

stability operations in the Dan Aw Patan district of Paktia Province in southeastern 

Afghanistan and along the Pakistan border. Village stability operations were an effort 

to empower Afghan villagers to defend themselves from insurgents. The primary U.S. 

Army mission was to recruit Afghan men in each village to serve in the local police 

that would provide physical security for their community and thereby decrease the 

power of the Taliban. In the course of the next year Soldiers regularly visited the 

villages of the district, meeting with local leaders and equipping and training 

members of the local police. 

 Village stability operations in Dan Aw Patan enjoyed only partial success. In 

the north and central areas of the district, U.S. units were able to form and train 

squads of local police. The villagers generally supported these efforts, participated in 

sustainment training, and provided useful intelligence. More importantly, the Soldiers 

never felt they might be in imminent danger while working with the local Afghans. In 

the southern part of the district, however, village stability operations failed. U.S. 

Soldiers in this region never enjoyed the security their counterparts enjoyed further 

north. Moreover, the police units that were established in these villages were far less 

interested in conducting patrols than in receiving pay. Despite lengthy negotiations 

with village leaders in which the Soldiers offered incentives such as medical 

assistance and funds for new schools, bridges, and other infrastructure, these local 

police squads never became the means of countering insurgent influence in the 

district. 

 Why did village stability operations work in the northern and central villages 

but not in those to the south? The answer was not obvious. The distances between 

the central and southern villages were minimal, less than 10 miles in most cases. The 

demographics in each region were essentially identical in terms of size, economics, 

Pashtun ethnicity, religion, and culture. The U.S. approach was consistent in its 

methods and leadership. In fact, the same Soldiers who led the successful efforts in 

the north and central regions also worked with the southern villages. 

 The lack of full success in the southern villages resulted from less visible 

factors. The southern area saw much more fighting during the Soviet occupation, and 

the local people viewed any foreign troops as “Soviets.” More important was the 

existence of insurgent “rat lines” in this part of the district. From the Teri Mangel arms 

bazaar, located just across the border in Pakistan, historic smuggling routes crossed 

the Afghan border into Paktia Province toward the provincial capital of Gardez. 

Because of the routes’ importance to the insurgent campaign, the Taliban exerted 

pressure on the southern villages to resist American efforts to deny freedom of 

movement to the insurgents and keep the routes open. Village stability operations 

were designed to counter exactly this type of influence. Yet because of Taliban 

pressure that succeeded despite the U.S. presence, the southern villages never 

accepted the program fully. U.S. units were not resourced to collect sufficient 

intelligence to discover the extent of Taliban influence, and the newly-hired local 
Chapter 7 

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police proved unreliable but in a passive-aggressive manner, demonstrating little 

initiative except in the collection of their salaries. 

 The case of Dan Aw Patan displays the importance of local conditions in the 

counterinsurgent’s choice of tactics. In general, village stability operations 

represented an innovative approach to the challenge of securing the Afghan 

population at the village level. In this case, however, the counterinsurgent learned 

that what worked in one village did not work in a neighboring village only a few miles 

distant. 

Many Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals 

7-12. Successful counterinsurgency operations require competence and judgment by Soldiers and Marines 

at all levels. Indeed, young leaders often make decisions at the tactical level that have strategic 

consequences. Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and clear 

guidance; they then trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Preparation for tactical-level leaders 

requires more than just mastering Service doctrine; they must also be trained and educated to adapt to their 

local situations, understand the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and 

sound judgment in accordance with their senior commander’s intent. 

CONCEPTUAL PLANNING 

7-13. The complexity of insurgencies presents problems that have incomplete, contradictory, and changing 

requirements. The solutions to these challenging problems are often difficult to recognize because of 

interdependencies of the relationships of an operational environment. While attempting to solve these 

problems, the solution to one problem may reveal or create another, even more complex, problem. 

Operational design employs various elements to develop and refine the commander’s operational approach. 

Operational design involves conceptual planning. Conceptual planning establishes aims, objectives, and 

intentions, and it also involves developing broad concepts for action. It generally corresponds to the art of 

war. The commander’s activities of understanding and visualization are key aspects of conceptual planning. 

(See MCDP 5 for more information on the art of war and ADRP 5-0 for more information on 

understanding and visualization). 

7-14. Design is the conception and articulation of a framework for solving a problem, and it is critical to 

conceptual planning. The purpose of design is to achieve a greater understanding of the environment and 

the nature of the problem in order to identify an appropriate conceptual solution. While not prescriptive, 

design is based on critical thinking, conceptual planning, visualization, emergence of a hypothesis, and 

continuous activity. Design is the primary way to develop an operational approach. First, design helps 

commanders and staffs create a shared understanding of the current operational environment and visualize 

what the environment should look like. Understanding an operational environment is an essential 

foundation of counterinsurgency. Second, design enables the collaborative, conceptual planning necessary 

to understand a problem and develop broad approaches to solving it. From there, commanders can visualize 

their operational approach and describe to staffs and subordinate commanders how to move the 

environment from the current state to the desired end state. From an operational approach, the commander 

conducts detailed planning. (See figure 7-1.) (See JP 5-0 for more information on design. See ADP 5-0 for 

more information on Army design methodology and MCWP 5-1 for more information on Marine Corps 

design. See chapter 2 for an understanding of an operational environment.) 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 7-5 

Figure 7-1. Design concept 

7-15. By definition, design is iterative, and reframing the problem as necessary is essential. Reframing the 

problem involves revisiting earlier hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current 

operational approach. Reframing can lead to a new problem statement and operational approach, resulting 

in an entirely new plan. By their nature, counterinsurgency efforts require repeated assessments from 

different perspectives to see the various factors and relationships required for adequate understanding. 

Assessment and learning enable incremental improvements to the operational approach. The goal is to 

understand the problem, to construct a reasonable explanation of observed events, and to subsequently 

construct a framework within which to solve the problem. The essence of this is determining the 

mechanism or combination of mechanisms necessary to achieve success. These mechanisms may not be 

military activities, or they may involve military actions in support of nonmilitary activities. Once 

commanders understand the problem and what needs to be accomplished to succeed, they identify the 

means to assess effectiveness and the related information requirements that support assessment. This 

feedback becomes the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent reframing. (See ADRP 5-0 and 

MCWP 5-1 for more information on design and reframing.) 

7-16. In an ideal world, a commander engaged in counterinsurgency operations would enjoy clear and 

well-defined goals for the campaign from the beginning. However, the reality is that many goals emerge 

only as the mission develops and goals can change as a result of interacting with an environment. For these 

reasons, counterinsurgents usually seek to achieve a combination of defined and emerging goals. Likewise, 

the complex problems encountered during counterinsurgency operations can be so difficult to understand 

that a clear operational approach cannot initially be developed and some assumptions must be made during 

problem framing. Often, the best choice is to create iterative solutions (also known as discovery learning) 

to better understand the problem. The use of design and the planning process allow commanders and staffs 

to learn and achieve greater understanding as they interact with the environment. As this interaction with 
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the population and insurgents occurs, it will reveal the validity of planning assumptions, test the strengths 

and weaknesses of designs, inform the operational approach, and provide guidance to further planning and 

engagement. Other considerations include: 

 Systems thinking. 

 Continuous assessment. 

 Structured learning. 

7-17. Systems thinking involves understanding a problem in terms of systems and how they relate to, and 

influence, each other. For counterinsurgents this includes not only how the various systems in an 

insurgency interact, but how they interact and affect the various systems in the operational environment. 

Additionally, systems thinking should drive commanders and staffs to develop an understanding of how 

their lines of operations and lines of effort relate and influence each other. (See paragraphs 4-88 through 

4-103 for more information on networked insurgencies.) 

7-18. Continuous assessment is essential to learning and adapting within the inherent complexity of 

counterinsurgency operations. No design or model completely matches reality, and reasonable and feasible 

solutions at one moment can become ineffective at the next moment due to changes in the situation. The 

object of continuous assessment is to identify where and how the actions and activities of the 

counterinsurgent are working or failing and to consider adjustments to design and the operational approach. 

(See chapter 12 for more information on assessments.) 

7-19. The objective of structured learning is to develop a reasonable initial design and then learn, adapt, 

and iteratively and continuously improve the initial plan as more about the dynamics of the 

counterinsurgency problem become evident. The operational approach and framing of the problem can be 

thought of as models. In counterinsurgency, these models must always be tested to determine how well 

they match reality. In other words, counterinsurgents may believe they have an understanding and general 

idea of how to solve a problem, but they review that belief to ensure it is still valid at any given time. 

Counterinsurgents must understand the actual problem to ensure that tactical actions have an effect on the 

environment. 

CENTER OF GRAVITY

7-20. An important element of conceptual planning is center of gravity analysis. The center of gravity is 

important in understanding both the environment and the enemy. A center of gravity is the source of power 

that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). A center of gravity 

construct is useful as an analytical tool to help counterinsurgency forces analyze the insurgency’s sources 

of strength as well as its weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Centers of gravity may change over time, they 

may be different at the operational and strategic level, and they could be different from location to location. 

(See JP 2-01.3 for more information on centers of gravity.) 

7-21. In an insurgency, the population is not necessarily the center of gravity for an insurgent. A center of 

gravity could be external support from another country, it could be a group of core leadership or believers, 

or it could be a host of other factors or vital functions. Center of gravity analysis begins with the 

understanding that every environment is unique, and a center of gravity analysis must not begin with a 

preconceived center of gravity. 

7-22. Counterinsurgents must understand their own center of gravity and that of the host nation. In many 

cases, political support is the strategic center of gravity for the U.S. Some tactical actions, such as war 

crimes, can undermine political support for the counterinsurgency. Host nations may also have a wide 

range of centers of gravity. Operational and tactical leaders must plan and execute operations that do not 

undermine the host nation’s center of gravity. 

LINES OF OPERATION AND EFFORT

7-23. Lines of operation and effort are important planning tools to move conceptual planning into detailed 

planning. These planning tools help describe how a military force will turn a commander’s understanding 

of the current situation into a desired end state. An end state is the set of required conditions that defines 

achievement of the commander’s objectives (JP 3-0). The primary source for any commander’s end state is 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 7-7 

the mission the commander received. The use of conceptual planning helps commanders visualize how to 

generate the conditions that achieve that end state. Conceptual planning also allows commanders to 

determine if the dictated end state is achievable, if additional resources are necessary, what level of risk 

must be accepted, and if modification of the mission and expectations is required. The end state may 

change as the situation changes. Lines of operations and effort help provide the detail necessary to turn the 

commander’s visualization and the operational approach (how to move from the current situation to the 

desired end state) into a detailed plan. 

7-24. A line of operation is a line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to 

the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an 

objective(s) (JP 5-0). Lines of operation are normally associated with the spatial aspects of a tactical 

problem. Lines of operation are useful, especially when addressing the physical aspects of 

counterinsurgency, such as infrastructure protection, control of movement, and locating and engaging 

insurgent forces. Lines of operation and lines of effort can be used separately or in combination. 

In Service-level doctrine, United States Marine Corps doctrine does not make a distinction 

between lines of effort and lines of operation. MCDP 1-0 states that, “A line of operations helps 

define the orientation of the force. In conventional operations, lines of operations connect 

actions related in time and space to an objective. During counterinsurgency or other irregular 

warfare operations, lines of operations, for example, could focus on major stability-related 

objectives, such as security, restoration of essential services, and training host-nation military 

and police forces. In either case, lines of operations reinforce the idea of the single battle, since 

success or failure in any line of operations will have an impact on the other lines of operations.” 

7-25. A line of effort is, in the context of joint operation planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to 

focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions 

(JP 5-0). Because counterinsurgencies are often more oriented towards an intended outcome or purpose 

than an enemy force, counterinsurgency operations generally use lines of effort. If a line of operation is 

spatially oriented, then that line of effort is purpose oriented and is appropriate when positional references 

to an enemy or adversary are not the determining factor in friendly action. Because counterinsurgency 

operations involve many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may form a way to link tasks, effects, 

conditions, and the desired end state. Lines of effort help commanders visualize how to integrate their 

military capabilities into the efforts of the rest of the unified action community. (See JP 5-0 for more 

information on lines of effort.) 

7-26. Lines effort are important tools to link conceptual planning to detailed planning. They are an 

essential means that commanders can use to arrange tactical events in time, space, and purpose. The 

benefits of using this type of framework include— 

 Aiding the commander in visualizing, describing, and directing operations toward a definitive 

end state. 

 Unifying the efforts of joint, interagency, multinational, host-nation government, and host-nation 

security forces toward a common purpose. 

 Allowing commanders and staffs to synchronize activities along all lines of operation and effort 

to gain unity of effort. 

 Ensuring all efforts converge on a well-defined, commonly understood end state. 

 Combining the effects of long-term operations with short-, mid-, and long-term goals. 

 Helping commanders identify missions, assign tasks, allocate resources, and assess operations. 

 Enhancing mutual support between echelons and adjacent organizations. 

7-27. Lines of effort depict how the actions of a counterinsurgent, over time, achieve the end state 

visualized by the commander. In a counterinsurgency, lines of effort must also be nested into the actions 

and activities of the host nation. From the tactical level to the strategic level, the goal of the 

counterinsurgent may be to support the host nation, depending on the operational design of the 

counterinsurgency. While that may require some tactical actions that do not involve host-nation forces, the 

overall effort must be to support the host nation’s efforts at all levels. The counterinsurgent forces support 

and integrate their efforts with the efforts of the host nation’s strategic and operational approaches. 
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7-8 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

7-28. Commanders and staffs must consistently question and evaluate lines of effort as part of the 

operations process. As assessment indicates changes to the situation (sudden opportunities to exploit, 

failure of certain activities, new actors, and an actual change to the end state) the tasks and objectives of 

various lines of operation and effort may no longer be relevant or appropriate. Worse, they can trap the 

commander into a preconceived notion that accomplishment of various tasks will result in a successful 

completion. Lines of operation and effort are useful means to help plan activities, but they are not measures 

of mission success. All leaders must guard against the assumption that their actions are relevant because 

they support any particular line of operation or effort. The underlying assumptions behind the tasks and 

objectives of any detailed plan must be constantly questioned and evaluated. Just because counterinsurgents 

take an action, that does not make that action relevant. 

7-29. The effects of actions in one line of effort are not contained to only that line. For example, the 

commander could have a line of effort to support the rule of law and a line of effort to support economic 

development. However, a working legal system has a direct effect on the economic system. A system in 

which contract law is enforced, for example, will have a much wider range of economic activity than a 

system where contract law is not enforced. In this example, progress in the support economic development 

line of effort may be hindered by struggles within the support rule of law line of effort. The use of systems 

thinking allows commanders and staffs to use lines of operation and effort not only for planning and 

conceptualization, but also for visualization of how they relate and influence each other. 

7-30. Figure 7-2 illustrates one example of lines of effort in a counterinsurgency. However, while this is an 

example that may apply well to a counterinsurgency after large-scale combat operations, it may not apply 

well to other counterinsurgency operations. The U.S. could be providing only enablers for a 

counterinsurgency effort. For example, U.S. forces might be combining capabilities such as counter threat 

finance, signals intelligence, and a direct action force to enable the host nation by stopping the insurgency 

from attaining the means to fight, providing intelligence on an insurgency’s communications, and providing 

a means to neutralize insurgent leadership. The host nation may have the capability to handle basic 

functions such as governance. When designing lines of effort for a counterinsurgency, the context the 

counterinsurgent is operating in is not important. If commanders and staffs reduce lines of effort to some 

standard solution set, they are no longer using the tool, but they are being used by the tool. This illustrates 

that complex problems in counterinsurgency require critical thinking and defy solution by checklist and 

battle drill methodologies. When commanders and staffs use them properly, and when they are tied to 

operational and strategic purposes, lines of operation and effort are means to help commanders and staffs 

perform successful counterinsurgency operations. Figure 7-2 provides examples of possible tasks on each 

line of effort. However, commanders and staffs must remember that these are sample lines of effort and 

sample tasks on the lines of effort. Just as the individual lines of effort must meet the situation commanders 

and staffs find themselves in, tasks on a lines of effort must fit an operational environment and its desired 

end states. (See figure 7-2.) 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 7-9 

Figure 7-2. Sample of individual lines of effort 
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7-10 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

DEVELOP SIMPLE, FLEXIBLE PLANS THROUGH MISSION ORDERS

7-31. Effective plans and orders are simple and direct. During insurgency and counterinsurgency 

operations, not all participates will understand military language and terms. Staffs must be careful to 

prepare clear, concise orders that communicate to all organizations involved a clear understanding of the 

operation using operational terms and symbols that are understood by all or enabling understanding through 

liaisons or other coordination means. 

7-32. Flexible plans help participates adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Commanders and planners 

build opportunities for initiative into plans by anticipating events. This allows them to operate inside of the 

enemy’s decision cycle or to react promptly to deteriorating situations. Identifying decision points and 

designing branches ahead of time—combined with a clear commander’s intent—help create flexible plans. 

7-33. Commanders stress the importance of using mission orders as a way of building simple, flexible 

plans. Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they 

are to achieve them (ADP 6-0). Mission orders clearly convey the unit’s mission and the commander’s 

intent. Mission orders provide subordinates information on what to do and the purpose of doing it, without 

prescribing exactly how to do it. 

7-34. Commanders must also give guidance concerning risk when they issue mission orders. It is the 

responsibility of commanders and staff to asses tactical and operational risk. Moreover, they should ensure 

their forces are using techniques that take safety into account. That said, tactical initiative that supports 

mission accomplishment should never be sacrificed because of safety. An over focus on safety undermines 

the needed aggressive behavior to attack the enemy and take the needed risk to maintain contact with the 

population. However, informing decisionmakers of hazards, recommended controls (resources), and 

residual risk allows responsible individuals to weigh benefit against risk, direct resources to best mitigate 

the risk, and employ forces in the most efficient manner. (See ATP 5-19 for details on the risk management 

process and processes for integrating the process in both deliberate planning and under real-time 

constraints.) 

TRANSITIONS 

7-35. Transitions are fundamental to the planning and execution of any line of operation or effort. 

Transitions may occur as a result of both success and failure in terms of friendly actions, host-nation 

actions, and adversary actions. There are four types of transitions in counterinsurgency operations: 

 Transitions between changes in the environment. 

 Transitions between phases. 

 Transitions between units in an area of operations. 

 Transitions of responsibilities to host nation or other agencies. 

7-36. Transitions are critical events. They are critical because they represent significant changes to the 

situation and because a failure to properly execute them can stall or even negate progress. Whatever their 

nature, transitions are milestones that require reassessment. Even if a transition is a result of success, such 

as moving forward in phases, it is a cause to assess whether the basic assumptions and plans associated 

with the next phase are still appropriate and relevant. In counterinsurgency, in addition to possible 

transitions due to enemy actions, the commander and staff base transitions on changes in the population’s 

perception of legitimacy. 

7-37. Because transitions are based on the conditions of an operational environment, they must be a part of 

both the planning process and based on assessments of an operational environment. Transitions in 

counterinsurgency are essential because they generally measure progress towards the desired end state. 

However, the commander must link transitions to an assessment process that allows that commander to 

attain situational understanding. A transition to another phase or a transition to the host nation not linked to 

the assessment process can undermine the achievement of the end state. For example, a transition to a 

host-nation agency before that host-nation agency is ready to assume responsibility may ultimately have the 

effect of undermining the legitimacy of the host nation as the host nation fails to meet the basic 

expectations of the population. 
Planning and Operational Considerations 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 7-11 

7-38. Transitions and assessments should be planned and executed from the beginning of any 

counterinsurgency. Commanders can build legitimacy by ensuring that the host nation takes responsibility 

for basic functions when it can. Therefore, building towards and executing that transition to the host nation 

is fundamental to the commander’s planning and operations. Transitions to other units or other agencies 

maintain a coherent and logical progression towards an ultimate transition to the host nation. The 

commander avoids allowing any U.S. element to transition with another U.S. or multinational element in a 

way that sets back the mission. This is also true for transitions between phases. A transition to another 

phase before the operational environment allows can have disastrous consequences. 

7-39. Effective counterinsurgency is about effectively linking tasks to a purpose and achieving that 

purpose. This is what makes lines of effort effective planning tools for a counterinsurgency. Whether 

commanders and staffs are using direct or indirect methods, they must link those methods to an end state. 

However, linking both assessments and transitions into each line of effort is just as essential. The end state 

of every line of effort is the creation of the conditions that satisfy the requirements of mission 

accomplishment. (See figure 7-2 on page 7-9.) In counterinsurgency, ultimate success comes when a 

society maintains its own legitimate government and defeats its insurgency using its own resources, not 

through outside enablers. Transitioning to that point requires a well planned effort that evaluates progress 

and executes all transitions in a way that does not undermine the objective of the line of effort. (See chapter 

12 for a further discussion on assessments.) 

7-40. A transition is a sequence of actions required to reorient on a changed situation, change to the next 

phase of action, or shift responsibility from one organization to another, not a specific point in time. 

Transitions require adequate time to allow for all transitional tasks to be completed. Thinking of a transition 

as a general series of actions rather than a point in time better aids commanders and staffs in recognizing 

transitions, planning for them, and executing them seamlessly. 

7-41. When transitions occur between organizations, whether between military units or from a military unit 

to a civilian agency, all involved organizations must clearly understand the tasks and responsibilities being 

transferred and the time expected for completion. Commanders and staffs enable coordination between 

units, agencies, and organizations to reduce the friction normally associated with a transition. Commanders 

identify a collaborative transition planning team early in the process. 

7-42. Commanders and staffs identify the criteria and conditions that must be met prior to executing a 

transition. For example, transitioning a strongpoint to host-nation control may require the host nation to 

allocate specialized personnel to replace the specialized personnel previously provided by other forces. 

Additionally, host-nation manning may need to be increased to offset the departure of transitioning forces. 

Commanders identify criteria for all parties involved or gaps will develop in execution. One criteria is the 

minimum sustainable effort of the host nation prior to transition. Getting the host nation’s minimum 

sustainable effort right with the proper balance for sustained effectiveness and long-term maintenance may 

reflect a less than optimal solution from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, but any higher level of 

effort by the host nation may actually jeopardize the legitimacy of the host nation in the long term by being 

too heavy-handed or too costly. 

7-43. Counterinsurgents must understand that transitions occur at varying times and locations based on the 

situation in a given area. A transition may be linear at the local level, but transitions may occur at multiple 

levels in the aggregate. For example, one battalion or brigade may have three village clusters in a build 

phase, one that has transitioned, and two that are in a clear phase without any geographic context. One 

host-nation security unit may be more advanced in training and equipping than another. As a result, 

counterinsurgent forces may have to tailor their approach on a daily basis depending on the area, village, or 

unit where they are operating. Success in counterinsurgency operations requires small-unit leaders agile 

enough to transition among many types of missions and able to adapt to change. (See chapter 9 for more 

information on the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework.) 

7-44. Maintaining unity of effort is particularly important during transitions, especially between 

organizations of different capabilities and capacities. Relationships tend to break down during transitions. 

A poorly executed transition affects the success of the mission and places the new unit at risk. Ego and 

unhealthy competition are often the greatest impediments to achieving an effective transition, and they 

increase unnecessary risks to Soldiers, Marines, and the mission. Commanders must set the tone for their 

forces to accomplish effective physical and contextual transitions. 
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7-12 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

7-45. A successful transition is achieved when it is executed properly and in synchronization with all the 

relevant organizations, entities, and agencies. Planning for transitions is more than the identification of the 

events that govern phases and branches for planning. It requires a holistic framing to develop the full 

appreciation of the tasks, time, and resources required to execute effectively and efficiently in a 

counterinsurgency environment. Well-planned transitions require proactive analysis and continuous 

assessment during execution. Assessment of qualitative and quantitative criteria, supported by expert 

opinion, should inform the decision to transition. 

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 

7-46. There are certain operational considerations that have important consequences for planning and 

executing counterinsurgency operations. Currently, insurgencies are likely to be networked. This makes 

attack the network an essential operational consideration in understanding an insurgency and planning and 

executing a counterinsurgency. Other considerations include remote area considerations, border 

considerations, and basing. Counterinsurgency operations normally integrate information related 

capabilities with other capabilities, and information operations are essential to most operational approaches. 

This makes information operations uniquely important to counterinsurgents. (See paragraphs 4-88 through 

4-103 for more information on networked insurgencies.) 

ATTACK THE NETWORK

7-47. Attack the network operations can be essential in planning and an essential consideration for every 

step in the operations process. When an insurgency is deeply networked into a society, it is important that 

attack the network operations are integrated into planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. 

Networked insurgencies must be understood and attacked. 

7-48. Attack the network operations provide the primary means to attack an insurgent network or enable a 

host-nation force to defeat a networked insurgency. As such, they must be integrated and used when 

counterinsurgents are facing a networked insurgency. (See paragraphs 4-88 through 4-103 for more 

information on networked insurgencies.) 

7-49. Attack the network operations consist of activities that employ lethal and nonlethal means to support 

friendly networks, influence neutral networks, and neutralize threat networks. Attack the network 

operations are conducted continuously and simultaneously at multiple levels (tactical, operational, and 

strategic) throughout the whole of government. Attack the network operations are constructed around six 

fundamentals: 

 Understand the mission. 

 Understand the operational environment. 

 Understand the networks. (See paragraphs 4-88 through 4-103 for more information on networked 

insurgencies.) 

 Organize for the fight. 

 Engage the network. 

 Assess. 

7-50. While listed sequentially, these actions occur continuously and simultaneously and are designed as 

an enhancement to planning processes and intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace. Effective 

attack the network operations occur when operations and intelligence efforts are synchronized. Failure to 

synchronize efforts may hamper a unit’s ability to plan and operate in an efficient manner. 

7-51. Attack the network operations predominantly support problem framing and mission analysis within 

planning. During the initial stages of planning, intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace must 

include an analysis and graphical (geospatial) representation of an operational environment as a series of 

interconnected networks (friendly, neutral, and threat) in addition to weather, terrain, and civil 

considerations. Threats to mission accomplishment can be presented by any network, not solely threat 

networks. 
Planning and Operational Considerations 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 7-13 

7-52. Attack the network operations enable greater understanding of the human networks and those 

variables critical to insurgent and threat networks. Network mapping, charting, and social network analysis 

are intelligence products that can aid in refined analysis and course of action developments, bridge 

conceptual planning and detailed planning by visually depicting time sensitive intelligence and mission 

requirements, and provide a shared understanding of the operational environment and design. Additionally, 

these network analysis products assist commanders and staffs in recognizing dynamic and static network 

relationships for targeting to support mission accomplishment. The evaluation and measurement of 

targeting effects continually aid in refined understanding and provide potential follow-on targets to degrade 

threat and insurgent networks. 

7-53. Attack the network operations require that commanders and staffs understand social networks. A 

social network analysis is a tool for understanding the organizational dynamics of an insurgency and how 

best to attack or exploit them. A social network analysis allows analysts to identify and portray the details 

of a network structure. It shows how an insurgency’s networked organization behaves and how that 

connectivity affects its behavior. A social network analysis allows analysts to assess the network’s design, 

how its members may or may not act autonomously, where the leadership resides, how leadership is 

distributed among members, and how hierarchical dynamics may mix or not mix with network dynamics. 

7-54. Attack the network operations provide a construct to identify, define, and engage any network, 

regardless of its design. The framework for attack the network operations can be applied against any type 

or combination of adaptive networks. It allows leaders to effectively engage neutral and threat networks 

with the appropriate lethal or nonlethal targeting, once a network has been defined through information 

collection and analysis. It also provides a means to protect friendly networks. Assessments of targeting and 

the measurement of the effects on networks (friendly, neutral, and threat) in an operational environment 

assist the staff in providing further targeting recommendations in sustainment of lethal or nonlethal 

activities. 

7-55. Attack the network operations are tactical, operational, and strategic operations that capitalize on or 

create vulnerabilities to neutralize the threat network’s ability to function and enable success of the 

operation. Adaptive networked threats present an enduring challenge to all military operations. Neutralizing 

them may require an attack the network approach that includes the following activities: 

 Support friendly networks. 

 Influence neutral networks. 

 Neutralize threat networks. 

Support Friendly Networks 

7-56. Friendly network actions are intended to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for 

friendly networks to function effectively and increase capability. These operations also have indirect effects 

on threat networks, driving down their capabilities and altering the environmental conditions those 

networks require to survive and operate. Actions supporting friendly networks are intended to establish, 

reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the host nation or civil authorities to function effectively, add 

capability, and increase capacity. 

7-57. Commanders and staffs use all resources available, both Department of Defense (DOD) and 

non-DOD, in an area of operations to ensure a comprehensive approach to supporting and enabling friendly 

networks. Host-nation networks such as government agencies, local business or religious organizations, 

tribal or cultural communities, and educational institutions all have an impact on a population and can alter 

its perceptions. Commanders can affect these organizations positively, thus altering public perceptions in 

favor of supporting those organizations. This results in increased cooperation, support, and even active 

rebuttal of threat networks. (See paragraphs 1-47 and 1-48 for more information on comprehensive effort.) 

Influence Neutral Networks 

7-58. Influence neutral networks activities include operations intended to alter the opinions and attitudes of 

a population segment through information, influence, presence, and conduct. These activities reflect the 

ability of friendly forces to operate within the cultural and societal norms of the local population while 
Chapter 7 

7-14 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

accomplishing the mission. They require legitimacy. Developing legitimacy requires time, patience, and 

coordinated, cooperative efforts across the operational area. Influencing neutral networks to be more 

favorably disposed to U.S. and host-nation objectives has indirect effects on threat networks by making the 

operational environment in which threat networks operate less hospitable to their formation, growth, and 

sustainment. 

Neutralize Threat Networks 

7-59. Threat networks are typically the immediate concern for any unit arriving in an area of operations. 

These networks must be neutralized in order to protect friendly forces and populations while creating time 

and space for other attack the network operations. While local friendly networks are being bolstered, there 

is a period when host-nation capabilities are insufficient to address the threat. U.S. forces and multinational 

partners must take direct actions against threats, reducing their functionality and impact, in order to set 

conditions for supporting friendly networks and influencing neutral networks. The goal is to change the 

perceptions and behaviors of neutral audiences to support the achievement of U.S., multinational, and 

host-nation objectives. 

7-60. A solid understanding of threat networks helps commanders engage those networks to achieve their 

desired end state. Knowledge of numerous characteristics of networks can assist in the engagement process. 

Conditions for network formation can help commanders and staffs understand the cognitive domain of 

networks. Knowing the strengths and types of links can help commanders determine whether or not they 

want to target or engage key nodes within networks or all known and potential nodes and actors of a 

network. 

7-61. Attack the network operations require that commanders understand and integrate specific staffing 

requirements. Commanders and staffs integrate organic capabilities with enablers including, but not limited 

to, other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations, 

law enforcement professionals, and theater-specific joint task force explosive ordnance disposal elements to 

conduct attack the network operations. 

OTHER OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

7-62. Operations that occur in three additional types of environments have important considerations for 

counterinsurgency. They include— 

 Remote area considerations. 

 Border considerations. 

 Basing. 

Remote Area Considerations 

7-63. Operations in remote areas may be conducted in rural areas where a decentralized array of forces can 

be most effective. Operations in remote areas are generally conducted in insurgent-controlled or contested 

areas to establish pockets of popular support for the host-nation government and deny support to 

insurgents. These operations may be conducted to establish bases in unpopulated areas where insurgent 

forces have established staging areas, training areas, rest areas, logistic facilities, or command posts. Units 

operate in remote areas to interdict insurgent activity, destroy insurgent base areas, and demonstrate that the 

host-nation government has not ceded control to the insurgents. 

7-64. Operations in remote areas are usually conducted in areas that are either under insurgent control or 

are contested. In these areas, ground or water modes of entry are often used, but air assault or parachute 

operations can be employed. These operations may use offensive tactics such as raids, reconnaissance in 

force, cordon and searches, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuit (or combinations of these tactics). Their 

purpose may be to— 

 Harass insurgents to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistic resources. 

 Isolate insurgents from their support. 

 Demonstrate support for the government and for the populace in the local area. 
Planning and Operational Considerations 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 7-15 

 Expand controlled areas. 

 Destroy the insurgent force and its base complexes. 

7-65. To the extent possible, the counterinsurgency force should include personnel indigenous to the 

operational area. The type of force employed, along with its host-nation counterpart (regular forces or 

paramilitary) depends on the objectives, characteristics of the area, attitude of the local population, political 

considerations, and the equipment and logistic support available. The size and composition of the 

host-nation unit is, in part, determined by the insurgent’s influence over the population and the 

government’s ability to recruit and develop an adequate local force. When the unit is recruited from local 

inhabitants, local leaders should be used even though their military ability may be limited. By using local 

leaders, assisted by advisors, better control and motivation are possible. Training, indoctrinating, and 

incorporating the local force into the governmental structure is facilitated by using local leaders. 

7-66. Understanding the host nation’s population’s issues from their perspectives enables 

counterinsurgents to address the prerequisites of the insurgency and obtain local support for remote area 

operations. Success is more likely if— 

 A significant segment of the local population supports the program. 

 The host nation recruits local personnel for its remote area paramilitary or irregular force. 

 Host-nation forces conduct remote area operations to interdict infiltration routes in areas nearly 

devoid of people. In this case, U.S. and multinational elements and host-nation forces operate in 

a manner similar to that of the insurgents, but with access to superior sustainment resources. 

7-67. In a rural environment, insurgents rely on friendly elements within the population to provide supplies 

and intelligence. Rural insurgents prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment, 

such as heavily forested and mountainous areas that hinder a counterinsurgency force from gaining access 

to them. Often operating from their own home or village, rural insurgents often move to camps if security 

does not permit them to remain at home. Insurgent camps are chosen with a view toward easy access to the 

target population, access to a friendly or neutral border, prepared escape routes, and good observation of a 

counterinsurgency force’s approach routes. When counterinsurgency operations force the insurgents from 

their preferred base camps, insurgents tend to establish camps in rugged inhospitable areas that are not 

easily penetrated. Like counterinsurgency in urban areas, remote counterinsurgency operations must focus 

on both locating and eliminating insurgents and on severing the supportive element of the population from 

providing supplies and intelligence to them. 

7-68. Operations in remote areas typically call for use of combat outposts that are linked to the local 

population. Commanders and staffs consider three perspectives (the population, insurgents, and 

counterinsurgents) when choosing combat outpost locations. Establishing an outpost close to the local 

population does not serve to advance the counterinsurgency’s goals without certain factors. These 

include— 

 Gaining acceptance of the local civilian leadership. 

 Maintaining a constant presence in the community. 

 Maintaining constant communications with the local community to provide immediate 

emergency assistance. 

 Maintaining situational understanding and an awareness of any changes in the population’s 

patterns of life. This includes movement of outsiders (such as visitors, merchants, nomads, or 

seasonal labor). 

7-69. Operations in remote areas may include civil affairs, defense support of civil authorities, intelligence, 

population and resources control, and advisory assistance operations. Most remote operations are long term 

and continuous. They are initially directed at disrupting the insurgent’s operations and then destroying the 

insurgent armed forces. Counterinsurgents destroy the insurgent infrastructure as quickly as possible. 

7-70. Initially, strong combat and sustainment forces establish secure operational bases. Counterinsurgents 

may conduct remote area operations in areas with little or no population to interdict infiltration routes. 

Counterinsurgents make maximum use of special equipment to provide continuous coverage of suspected 

areas and routes. Firepower and combat forces, with air assault capabilities, should be prepared to quickly 

attack identified targets. Because remote area operations can stress the capability of land forces to make 
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rapid responses, commanders can mitigate risk by coordinating with joint enablers for close air support, 

tactical airdrops, information collection, communications relays, and personnel recovery forces. 

Border Considerations 

7-71. In a counterinsurgency environment, armed forces may be responsible for border security, and they 

may have to help other security forces with immigration, customs, and internal security operations. The 

specific threat level, however, may require combat-type border operations, particularly in remote areas. The 

threat level may require units or advisor teams to advise and assist host-nation forces assigned to prevent or 

interdict the infiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries. This method is 

a terrain-centric approach to combating an insurgency. The commander’s intent is to isolate insurgent 

forces from their external support and sanctuaries. Secondary purposes include locating and interdicting 

insurgent land infiltration routes, destroying insurgent forces and bases in areas adjacent to the border, and 

collecting and reporting information on insurgent capabilities and intentions. Border operations normally 

require restrictive control measures for populations and resources that are particularly annoying to tribal 

and ethnic border groups who do not recognize the international boundary. The host-nation government 

must make a continuing effort to physically and psychologically gain and maintain the loyalty of the 

affected population. 

7-72. Designated border forces may be composed of border police and guards and may include 

paramilitary forces and regular armed forces with supporting or direct responsibility for portions of the 

national border or key internal routes to access other regions. Border operations are planned, conducted, 

and supervised from the national level, to the regional level, and finally through commanders at the local 

level. Border task forces are tailored units designed to meet requirements in their assigned areas. They 

should contain sufficient sustainment warfighting function and sustainment elements to support civil 

authorities’ operations for extended periods. 

7-73. Tasks that may be performed in controlling the border include the following: 

 Security of populated areas. 

 Intelligence and counterintelligence operations. 

 Operation of authorized points of entry. 

 Refugee and internally displaced person control. 

 Enforcement of movement and travel restrictions. 

 Military information support operations. 

 Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. 

 Attacks against insurgent forces. 

 Destruction of insurgent base areas. 

 Barrier and denial operations. 

7-74. In a phase I insurgency, operations in border areas are normally a function of police, customs, and 

other government organizations. Armed and paramilitary forces may assist these organizations, particularly 

in remote areas. In phases II and III, denial of external support for the insurgency may require combat 

operations in border areas. These operations require close coordination and cooperation between the armed 

forces, paramilitary forces, and all government agencies involved. Attempts by insurgents to infiltrate can 

be mitigated through the use of biometrics to identify subversive activities and limit or disrupt insurgent 

mobility. (See paragraphs 4-70 through 4-75 for a discussion on the insurgency phases.) 

7-75. Physically sealing a border may not be possible, since it could require the commitment of more 

government forces and materiel than overall resources permit. Intelligence must be gathered by all means 

available to determine the locations and extent of insurgent activities in border areas. 

7-76. Commanders determine infiltration and exfiltration routes, support sites, frequency and volume of 

traffic, type of transportation, number and type of personnel, amount and type of materiel, terrain and 

traffic conditions, and the probable location of base areas and sanctuaries. Units conduct continuous and 

detailed surveillance of these areas. Since placing forces and barriers at all possible crossings or entry sites 

may be impossible, commanders establish priorities. Counterinsurgents use natural barriers wherever 

possible. Using patrols, sensors, and obstacles in selected areas increase the effectiveness of natural 
Planning and Operational Considerations 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 7-17 

barriers. Herbicides, if approved for the area of operations, may be used to enhance visibility in vegetated 

areas. 

7-77. A restricted zone is a carefully selected area, of varied width, that is contiguous to the border. 

Counterinsurgents give public notice that all unauthorized individuals or groups encountered in the 

restricted zone will be dealt with as infiltrators or insurgents. A friendly population buffer zone is an area in 

which civilians living within the area of operations are limited to those believed to be loyal to the 

government. Persons whose loyalty cannot be established are monitored. This concept offers a good 

potential for establishing information nets and using loyal citizens in self-defense border units. It denies 

insurgents potential civilian contacts and base areas for border-crossing activities. Commanders and staffs 

direct a continuing military information support operation effort toward maintaining the morale and loyalty 

of the population. 

7-78. Counterinsurgents may employ aerial reconnaissance, unattended ground sensors, and ground 

reconnaissance patrols to ensure adequate reconnaissance and surveillance of remote areas. Surveillance 

and control of extensive coastal areas normally require the use of coordinated ground patrols on the 

shoreline, coordinated offshore patrols, aerial surveillance, strategically located observation posts, and an 

effective system of licensing and identifying friendly, military, and civilian watercraft. 

7-79. Commanders and staffs must consider the population of the host nation’s neighbor country. 

Counterinsurgent actions will be viewed and interpreted by local populations in neighboring countries. 

Counterinsurgents must consider the impact their actions have on these populations. If the neighboring 

local populations sympathize with host-nation insurgents or believe that counterinsurgent programs are 

counterproductive to their individual goals, then negative perceptions can lead to increased foreign fighters, 

weapons, and resource trafficking to support an insurgency. Counterinsurgents lack the physical means to 

influence this population, but they can mitigate risk by performing effective information operations that 

explain counterinsurgent programs and their benefits. 

Basing 

7-80. Counterinsurgency forces operate within a host country and must have a base from which to operate. 

A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0). All bases must be securable 

and defendable. Bases vary according to the size and missions of the units occupying a base. All types of 

bases require clear command relationships. In counterinsurgency operations, forward operating bases and 

combat outposts are important. 

7-81. Normally, when U.S. forces are the primary counterinsurgents, at least one forward operating base 

exists in an area of operations. The size of the area, its physical characteristics, and the number and size of 

the units operating within the area often require additional operating bases. The forward operating bases 

established by a brigade or battalion are often semipermanent and provide deployed units with command, 

control, and communications facilities; sustainment; personnel systems support; staging areas; and 

intelligence activities. They provide units with relatively secure locations from which to plan and prepare 

for operations. During counterinsurgency operations, they aid in limiting insurgent mobility nearby and in 

providing some security and contact to the local population. 

7-82. There are a few differences between brigade and battalion forward operating bases. Brigade forward 

operating bases are larger than battalion forward operating bases and provide a secure location for 

nondeployed elements of the deployed battalions, such as battalion forward support companies. A battalion 

forward operating base is normally staffed with the minimum personnel needed to operate and provide 

security. Other assets are normally positioned in a brigade operational base. A battalion forward operating 

base should maintain two methods for sustainment: by road and either air or water. 

7-83. A combat outpost is a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations 

(FM 3-90-2). In counterinsurgency operations, combat outposts are often company and platoon-sized bases 

inside of insurgent influenced territory. When U.S. forces are acting as the primary counterinsurgents, 

combat outposts represent a cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations. Located in strategically 

important areas, a combat outpost provides security in its immediate area and direct contact with the local 

population not possible from remote bases. Although this method carries with it potential downsides in 
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7-18 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

terms of increased proportion of forces used for force protection, thus limiting combat power available, 

combat outposts provide an increase in security for the population. 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS 

7-84. Information operations is the integrated employment, during military operations, of 

information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or 

usurp the decisionmaking of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13). For 

the Army, information operations integrates information related capabilities into the overall operational 

approach. The joint and multinational communities continue to use the term information operations. The 

joint construct for conducting information operations is the information-influence relational framework. 

The framework describes the application, integration, and synchronization of information-related 

capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decisionmaking of target audiences to create a 

desired effect to support achievement of an objective. An information-related capability is a tool, 

technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to 

create effects and operationally desirable conditions (JP 3-13). (See Army doctrine for more information on 

integrating information-related capabilities.) 

7-85. A target audience is an individual or group selected for influence (JP 3-13). Information operations 

seek to generate effects against the decisionmaking of individuals, a group, or perhaps elements of a 

population. In general, the integration of information-related capabilities is most effective when employed 

against precisely selected targets to achieve clearly defined objectives. 

7-86. Information-related capabilities generate effects that support achievement of the commander’s 

objectives. There are many military capabilities that contribute to operations, and commanders and staffs 

should consider them during the planning process. Some of these capabilities are: 

 Soldier and key leader engagement. 

 Civil-military operations. 

 Cyberspace operations. 

 Military deception. 

 Electronic warfare. 

 Operations security. 

 Military information. 

 Physical attack. 

 Physical security. 

 Counterintelligence. 

 Public affairs. 

 Combat camera. 

 Defense support to public diplomacy. 

 Space operations. 

 Special technical operations. 

 Intelligence. 

 Joint electromagnetic spectrum operations. 

 Information assurance. 

7-87. A commander can use many other capabilities to enhance and reinforce the shaping of the area of 

operations and the accomplishment of mission objectives in the information environment. (See JP 3-13 for 

additional information on the use of information-related capabilities.) 

7-88. Information-related capabilities, whether applied in shaping the operational environment to deter 

conflict or in enabling decisive maneuver, must be recognized as an essential enabling activity that 

facilitates development of an operational advantage for the commander. In current and future operational 

environments, the integrated employment of information-related capabilities into operations is critical to 

mission success. (See the Marine Corps operating concept for information operations for more information 

on information-related capabilities.) 
Planning and Operational Considerations 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 7-19 

7-89. The actions of Soldiers and Marines in an area of operations are the most powerful influence on 

credibility of their commanders’ message. All audiences (including local, regional, and threat) compare the 

friendly force’s message with its actions. Consistency contributes to the success of friendly operations by 

building trust and credibility. Conversely, if actions and messages are inconsistent, friendly forces lose 

credibility. Loss of credibility makes land forces vulnerable to threat counter propaganda and information 

warfare and places Army and Marine forces at a disadvantage. (See FM 3-13 for more information on 

messaging.) 

7-90. Commanders, staffs, and unified action partners construct a narrative to help understand and explain 

an operational environment, its problem, and solutions. Narratives are tied to actions in an operational 

environment. A narrative is a brief description of a commander’s story used to visualize the effects the 

commander wants to achieve in an information environment to support and shape an operational 

environment. 

7-91. The key to successful information operations during an insurgency is the commander’s intent. The 

commander’s intent provides a focus for the coordination and synchronization of information-related 

capabilities. Staffs and information operations planners must balance the use of different 

information-related capabilities, such as civil affairs operations, physical attack, and cyberspace operations, 

in order to communicate the intended message to the target audience with an understanding of possible 

second and third order effects on the rest of the global population. 

7-92. When commanders and staffs use the various types of information capabilities, there is a tension 

between a broad message and engaging the population to achieve a two way understanding. The U.S. is 

generally involved in counterinsurgencies to aid host nations. As such, commanders and staffs integrate 

information capabilities with the host nation’s message to tell the population the reason for U.S. 

involvement. Commanders and staffs have to establish relationships, seek two-way understanding, and 

listen to what others think. Effective counterinsurgency normally requires an effective broad message and 

engaging the population in a dialogue. Commanders and staffs must find the right balance between using 

information capabilities to give a broad message versus creating a dialogue. 

7-93. Commanders and staffs balance between controlling the message and allowing for complete freedom 

of messaging. Having a perfectly controlled message does not allow for real, timely communication with a 

population. Leaders must have some ability to actually engage a population and create a shared 

understanding. However, if representatives of a command have total freedom of message, the population is 

bombarded with contradictions and inconsistencies. Commanders and staffs must find the right balance to 

allow real communication, but also to ensure that the command has a coherent message. 

7-94. Public affairs and information operations are separate but related functions. Public affairs are those 

public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward both the 

external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense (JP 3-61). External publics include 

allies, neutrals, and threats. When addressing external publics, opportunities for information overlap exist 

between public affairs and information operations. 

7-95. Information operations and public affairs personnel must maintain a common awareness of each 

other’s support to operations to preclude the potential for information conflict. The information operations 

cell provides an excellent place to coordinate and deconflict information operations and public affairs 

activities that could result in information fratricide. Information fratricide is the result of employing 

information-related capabilities in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the 

conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces (FM 3-13). Final coordination of public 

affairs and information operations must occur within the operations process. 

7-96. In a counterinsurgency, the insurgent often targets the U.S. population with themes and messages 

concerning the insurgency. There are legal and professional reasons why the armed forces cannot attempt 

to influence American public opinion; to do so would undermine civil control over the military. However, 

the military has a responsibly to provide information to the U.S. public. Transparency and truthful 

information allows policy decisions to be debated between decisionmakers and the public. Although 

providing that information during an insurgency is a responsibility of the military, trying to influence the 

actual debate is unethical and damages the military’s relationship with the society. 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 8-1 

Chapter 8 

Intelligence 

8-1. Intelligence must drive operations in a counterinsurgency. Commanders and staffs must understand 

the area of operations in a counterinsurgency. The insurgency in Peru demonstrates that intelligence 

capabilities can be integrated with information operations and integrated monetary shaping operations to 

successfully undermine an insurgency. The Peruvian government was eventually successful in using 

economic development and an information campaign to weaken the Shining Path insurgency. With the 

gradual development of an effective military, Peru was able to continue its success. Intelligence, resulting 

in the capture of the Shining Path’s leader, changed the nature of the insurgency and significantly reduced 

the threat of the Shining Path to Peru. 

Intelligence and the Shining Path 

 Peru suffered an unprecedented economic downturn in the 1970s and 

1980s. The Peruvian government, though democratic, was characteristically 

ineffective and unable to stem the worsening crisis. This opened the door for an 

insurgent organization, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), and its establishment 

of alternative governance structures in the economically devastated Peruvian 

highlands. Sendero Luminoso leaders purged local officials and established their own 

authority in the villages, beating back control efforts by the Peruvian police. 

 In the first few years of the insurgency, the government did not take the 

threat seriously. Opposition to the insurgents (such as it was) was organized by local 

police, and the government made no effort to improve the desperate socioeconomic 

conditions in the highlands or to define a clear mission for regional security forces. 

With its superior organization and a lack of effective response by the government, 

Sendero Luminoso made significant progress. Its operations and propaganda were 

coordinated to create the perception that the group was a “winner” and was meeting 

its Maoist strategic goals, in sharp contrast to the largely ineffective government. 

 Still plagued by a lack of internal unity both in the government and in the 

military, the state moved forward with two competing counterinsurgency strategies: 

one focused on development and the other focused on ideology and military force. 

First proposed in 1984, the developmental approach finally got its turn in 1985. The 

state recognized that the highlands were particularly hard hit by the economic crisis 

and were the heartland of the insurgency, so its goal was to increase development 

and job opportunities in these regions. Public investment in Ayacucho (a region in the 

southern highlands) quadrupled between 1985 and 1986. Unfortunately, the 

insurgents actively resisted this development, or co-opted it, forcing government 

teachers to include Sendero Luminoso materials in their curricula. The government 

did not provide the security necessary for development to have any effect. 

Subsequent to 1986, development funding fell off, and embezzlement became 

common. As a result, this initial push of development and investment fell far short of 

meeting the needs of the economically disadvantaged population in the highlands. 

 The election of Alberto Fujimori in June 1990 raised new hopes of resolving 

the conflicts within the government and making greater headway against the 

insurgents. Fujimori promised a better human rights record and a new commitment to 

development. In addition to renewed government legitimacy, the Fujimori 

administration also brought two significant improvements to Peru’s approach to 

counterinsurgency: first, the use of the police and the national intelligence service to 

track the movements of Sendero Luminoso sympathizers and attempt to infiltrate the 

group and, second, the arming of rondas, peasant civil-defense militias. These 
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8-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

rondas were possible only because the insurgents’ treatment of villagers in its areas 

of operation had become so harsh that the locals were finally pushed to stand up for 

themselves. Improved intelligence and an end to internal divisions within the military 

allowed effective engagement of insurgent forces and effective (and rapid) support to 

threatened rondas. For the first time in the conflict, the government, police, and 

military made effective use of what would now be called strategic communication, 

with a greater emphasis on government credibility, consistency between actions and 

messages, and significant efforts to woo the population in the highlands away from 

the insurgents (efforts of which the rondas were an integral part). 

 In 1992 good intelligence led to Abimael Guzmán’s (the leader of Sendro 

Luminoso) capture. The capture of Guzman changed the ongoing insurgency and 

significantly undermined insurgent efforts. At the time of his capture, the police seized 

Guzmán's computer, in which they found a very detailed roster of his armed forces 

and the weapons each formation had in each region of the country. His authoritarian 

management of Sendero Luminoso had proven very effective when he was at large, 

but when he was captured, it provided a wealth of information. This information was 

used for further operations. 

INTELLIGENCE FUNDAMENTALS 

8-2. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, 

and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces 

or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations (JP 2-0). Intelligence can be broken down into seven 

disciplines, and it is an enabler of any counterinsurgency effort. Each discipline provides a means for the 

counterinsurgent to gain a higher level of situational understanding. These disciplines include 

counterintelligence, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, 

open-source intelligence, signals intelligence, and technical intelligence. The intelligence disciplines are 

integrated to ensure a multi-disciplined approach to intelligence analysis. Ultimately all-source intelligence 

facilitates situational understanding and supports decisionmaking. All intelligence disciplines are important 

in counterinsurgency. However, this chapter will focus on elements of intelligence that have unique 

considerations in counterinsurgency. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on intelligence.) 

8-3. An essential part of understanding the operational environment is the process of intelligence 

preparation of the battlefield/battlespace. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace is a 

systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of threat/adversary, 

terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. By 

applying intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace, commanders gain the information necessary 

to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space 

(FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A). (See FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A for more information on intelligence preparation 

of the battlefield/battlespace.) In a counterinsurgency environment, intelligence preparation of the 

battlefield/battlespace must take into account operational environment considerations. (See chapter 2 for 

considerations about the operational environment and chapter 4 for considerations on analyzing an 

insurgency.) 

8-4. Culture is an element of the operational environment and, like the physical terrain, creates both 

opportunities and challenges for Soldiers and Marines. A nation’s culture is a set of complex, 

ever-changing, and interconnected social, historical, political, and environmental factors that shape the 

perceptions, motives, and behaviors of its population. Cultural intelligence is the analysis and 

understanding of groups of people and the reasons they do certain things. Cultural intelligence includes 

gaining an understanding of the mindset of a local population to support the commander’s decisionmaking 

and help drive operations. (See chapter 3 for more information on culture.) 

8-5. The counterinsurgency force must understand the cultural foundations of the operational 

environment in order to transform seemingly random and irrational activity into describable and 

semipredictable acts. Commanders and staffs must devote as much effort to understand the local population 

being supported as they do to understand the insurgents. Cultural intelligence requires historical perspective 

as well as collection and analysis of current information, because cultures and cultural factors are 
Intelligence 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 8-3 

consistently shifting. Periods of warfare, instability, and natural disasters increase the rate of cultural 

change within a society. 

8-6. Also, cyberspace is an essential domain for the gathering of intelligence in a counterinsurgency. 

Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent 

network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, 

telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 1-02). The 

commander and senior intelligence officer must be highly aware of the intelligence oversight implications 

of collecting against United States (U.S.) persons, as the distinction of citizenship is difficult to assess in 

cyberspace. The distinction is required because intelligence collection is enabled by and must comply with 

all applicable U.S. laws and policy. However, cyberspace is used by insurgents and cannot be ignored by 

counterinsurgents. Cyberspace and the technologies that enable it allow people of every nationality, race, 

faith, and point of view to communicate, cooperate, and prosper like never before. Some adversaries clearly 

understand the power of cyberspace. Terrorists employ the Internet for recruiting, training, motivating, and 

synchronizing their followers. Adversaries frequently operate in cyberspace unrestrained, and they exploit 

its potential. To be effective in defeating an insurgency, commanders and staffs must gather intelligence on 

how an insurgency is using cyberspace. 

ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE 

8-7. The Army defines all-source intelligence as the integration of intelligence and information from all 

relevant sources to analyze situations or conditions that impact operations. (See ADRP 2-0.) The joint force 

defines all-source intelligence as intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate 

all sources of information in the production of finished intelligence (JP 2-0). All-source intelligence is used 

to develop the intelligence products necessary to aid situational understanding, support the development of 

plans and orders, and answer information requirements. Although all-source intelligence normally takes 

longer to produce, it is more reliable and less susceptible to deception than single-source intelligence. 

Intelligence organizations fuse data and information into all-source intelligence products to support 

counterinsurgency operations. Analysis for counterinsurgency operations is challenging, due in part to 

the— 

 Need to understand perceptions and culture. 

 Need to track hundreds or thousands of personalities. 

 Local nature of insurgencies. 

 Tendency of insurgencies to change over relatively short periods of time. 

8-8. Commanders and staffs need data to analyze and synthesize insurgent activities and personalities. 

Intelligence staffs should create a common searchable combatant command database of insurgent actions 

and personnel, and another database(s) that provides discoverable, accessible, and retrievable data on 

insurgent actions and personnel, and provide similar access to all intelligence reporting. This data should be 

accessible by analysts both in and out of the theater as well as conventional, special operations forces, and 

multinational units. 

8-9. Because all echelons collect and use intelligence, all staffs are heavily involved in analysis. Units are 

simultaneously intelligence producers and consumers. Intelligence capabilities are normally greater at 

higher echelons of command. For example, battalion staffs have fewer personnel than brigade staffs to 

collect patrol debriefs, analyze incoming information from multiple sources, produce finished intelligence 

products, and disseminate products to appropriate consumers. In many cases, brigade intelligence sections 

may be inadequately staffed to handle the vast amounts of information necessary to conduct operations in a 

counterinsurgency environment. 

8-10. Counterinsurgency requirements may require pushing analysts to battalion and brigade staffs to give 

those echelons the required analytical support. Often analysts can be beneficial at the company level. In 

these cases, developing company intelligence support teams may be useful. Many maneuver company 

commanders organize small intelligence support teams from within their units to provide tailored 

intelligence products to the company leadership. They may receive augmentation from the brigade military 

intelligence company or other intelligence Soldiers and Marines to form the nucleus of a company 

intelligence support team. The company intelligence support team combines information gained from 
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8-4 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

company operations with intelligence received from adjacent and higher units. The team analyzes and 

reports information collected by the company while receiving, parsing, and reporting intelligence collected 

by other organizations. The battalion intelligence cell is responsible for integrating the various company 

reports into intelligence products. This is particularly useful when a maneuver company must collect large 

amounts of information on the local population and insurgents. A company intelligence support team can 

help focus collection, process information collected, and develop a common operational picture of an area 

of operations. Pushing analysts to brigades and lower echelons places analysts closer to collectors, 

improves the common operational picture, and helps higher echelon staffs receive answers to the 

commander’s priority intelligence requirements. Commanders may need to be creative in developing 

analytical capabilities within their units. Though it is not ideal, commanders can assign non-intelligence 

personnel to work in the intelligence section. (See TC 2-19.63 for more information on company 

intelligence support teams). 

8-11. In a counterinsurgency, a bottom-up flow of intelligence is important. Battalions and brigades 

develop intelligence for their area of operations. Higher echelons fuse it into intelligence of the insurgency 

throughout the combatant command. Higher echelons can also integrate the human intelligence that 

battalions and brigades receive with the other intelligence disciplines. Comprehensive insurgency analysis 

focuses on the people in the area of operations. It develops information about relationships among them and 

the ideas and beliefs driving their actions. Comprehensive insurgency analysis brings together all other 

forms of analysis. 

FUSION CENTERS

8-12. A fusion center is an ad hoc collaborative effort between several units, organizations, or agencies that 

provides resources, expertise, information, and intelligence to a center with the goal of supporting the rapid 

execution of operations by contributing members. Fusion centers are primarily designed to focus collection 

and promote information sharing across multiple participants within a specific geographic area or mission 

type. These centers are not operations centers. Commanders at various echelons create fusion centers to 

manage the flow of information and intelligence, focus information collection to satisfy information 

requirements, and to process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate the resulting collection. Fusion centers are 

most effective if they have participation from all the key elements in an area of operations and 

representatives from all the warfighting functions. When possible, fusion centers include unified action 

partners. The intelligence portion of a fusion center typically comprises intelligence representatives from 

different tactical echelons, interagency partners, multinational organizations, host-nation organizations, and 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the area of operations. (See ADRP 2-0 for more 

information on fusion centers.) 

8-13. In a counterinsurgency, commanders and staffs must create shared situational understanding. Fusion 

cells are important in creating this understanding. The mixture of personnel and expertise allows for the 

integration of information and analysis. This is an effective means of understanding the operational 

environment from multiple perspectives. Fusion cells aid in understanding intelligence and informing 

operations to avoid unintended consequences. 

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 

8-14. Human intelligence is the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information 

from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, 

equipment, and capabilities (FM 2-22.3). For the joint force, human intelligence is defined as a category of 

intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources (JP 2-0). Because 

insurgency and counterinsurgency are struggles for legitimacy, human intelligence plays a vital role in 

determining legitimacy. Human intelligence uses human sources for information collection and uses a 

variety of collection methods, both passive and active, to collect information to meet intelligence 

requirements and inform other intelligence disciplines. Interrogation is one of the human intelligence tasks, 

along with screening, debriefing, liaison, and conducting controlled source operations in support of Army 

operations. During counterinsurgency operations, a great deal of intelligence is based on information 

gathered from people. However, military source intelligence operations are only conducted by human 

intelligence collectors. A human intelligence collector is a person who is trained to collect information 
Intelligence 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 8-5 

from individuals for the purpose of answering requirements. (See FM 2-22.3 for more information on 

human intelligence.) 

8-15. Operational reporting may have information of intelligence value that originates from a local 

population. People may approach Soldiers and Marines during the course of their day-to-day operations and 

offer information. Soldiers and Marines record information and report it to the intelligence section. This 

allows for verification of information and establishes a means for human intelligence collectors to contact 

individuals offering information of value. 

8-16. People offering information on insurgents are often in danger as insurgents continuously try to defeat 

collection operations. Commanders ensure that the appropriate personnel are trained in handling human 

sources in accordance with Army, Marine Corps, and Department of Defense (DOD) standards and 

policies. Human intelligence collectors are trained in procedures that limit risks to sources and handlers. 

Counterinsurgents should not expect people to willingly provide information if insurgents have the ability 

to violently intimidate sources. Human intelligence reporting increases if counterinsurgents protect the 

population from insurgents and people begin to believe the insurgency is defeated. 

8-17. People often provide inaccurate and conflicting information to counterinsurgents. They may spread 

rumors or provide inaccurate information for their own reasons. For example, people may give inaccurate 

information to settle tribal, ethnic, or business disputes. The accuracy of information obtained by Soldiers 

and Marines is verified before using it to support operations. This means that information reported to 

patrols should be verified with all-source intelligence. Improved accuracy will come from collecting 

intelligence from the whole population. Information must be seen as part of a whole picture and parts or 

segments of information cannot override the whole picture. An important part of gaining access from the 

whole population is gaining access to restricted populations. These populations often include women, but 

they can include any element that the counterinsurgent cannot access because of cultural considerations. 

Restricted access teams may be helpful in ensuring that information is attained from the whole population, 

including women. 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

8-18. Counterintelligence also uses human sources to assist in collection of information on foreign 

intelligence, international terrorist, or insider threat activities that may threaten the counterinsurgency. 

Counterintelligence efforts may be directed toward assisting commanders in detecting and neutralizing the 

insider threat by ensuring that counterinsurgency operations are not compromised by adversaries operating 

inside a base. Counterintelligence operations, including the use of humans as sources, must be 

accomplished by trained counterintelligence special agents. 

INFORMATION COLLECTION AND INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

8-19. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of 

sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of 

current and future operations. The deputy chief of staff, (G-2 [S-2]) and assistant chief of staff, operations 

(G-3 [S-3]) staffs collaborate to collect, process, and analyze information the commander requires 

concerning threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that affect operations. The information 

collection tasks are— 

 Plan requirements and assess collection. 

 Task and direct collection. 

 Execute collection. 

(See FM 3-55 for more information on information collection and planning requirements and assessing 

collection.) 

8-20. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance provides commanders with detailed and timely 

intelligence. This intelligence helps commanders gain situational understanding of a threat and an 

operational environment. This is accomplished by answering requirements focused in time and space and 

identifying any threats to mission accomplishment. The intelligence staff provides commanders with 

predictive assessments of threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. These assessments also 
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8-6 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

provide commanders with a running estimate regarding the degree of confidence the staff places in each 

analytic assessment. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to 

determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future 

operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). 

INTELLIGENCE-RELATED CAPABILITIES

8-21. Commanders and staffs consider several capabilities for intelligence in a counterinsurgency. They 

include— 

 Biometrics and biometric-enabled intelligence. 

 Forensics and forensic-enabled intelligence. 

 Site exploitation. 

Biometric-Enabled Intelligence 

8-22. Understanding biometrics-enabled intelligence requires knowledge of biometrics and its contribution 

to Army and Marine Corps missions. The term biometric describes both a characteristic (biometric) and a 

process (biometrics): 

 A biometric is a measurable physical characteristic or personal behavior trait used to recognize 

the identity or verify the claimed identity of an individual. 

 Biometrics is the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, 

physiological, and behavioral characteristics (JP 2-0). 

8-23. The Army and Marine Corps employ automated biometric systems to deny threat forces any freedom 

of movement within the population and to positively identify known threats, threat forces, friendly 

populations, local nationals, and third-country nationals throughout their areas of operation to separate 

insurgents and foreign fighters from the general population. Biometric systems collect biometric data, such 

as iris images, fingerprints, and facial images, and combine them with contextual and biographic data to 

produce an electronic dossier on an individual. Automated biometric systems may support the following 

tasks: 

 Positively identify high-value targets. 

 Screen and badge personnel. 

 Manage the population. 

 Perform force protection (local access). 

 Conduct detention operations. 

8-24. Biometrics are important assets in any counterinsurgency operation. These tools allow the 

counterinsurgent to gain both civil security and control. Through positive identification, biometrics allow 

the counterinsurgent to effectively execute offensive operations against the insurgency while at the same 

time protecting the civilian population by not detaining innocent civilians. If used correctly, biometrics 

allow the counterinsurgent to effectively execute offensive operations against the insurgency and protect 

the population. Moreover, the host nation can be enabled with these capabilities. Biometric abilities can be 

essential in building legitimacy among the population. (For more information on biometrics, see 

FM 2-22.3, ATTP 2-91.6, TC 2-33.4, and TC 2-22.82.) 

Forensic-Enabled Intelligence 

8-25. Although not an intelligence discipline, police intelligence operations can support the overall 

intelligence effort through the analysis, production, and dissemination of information collected from police 

activities. Information gathered from military police operations may contribute to a commander’s critical 

information requirement and focusing police forces on maintaining order. Criminal acts such as robberies, 

kidnappings, terrorism, and extortion may be linked to insurgent psychological or money-gathering 

activities. Police information, police intelligence, and criminal intelligence are subtasks of police 

intelligence operations. (See ATTP 3-39.20 for additional information on law enforcement.) 
Intelligence 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 8-7 

8-26. Forensics involves methodically gathering and analyzing evidence to establish facts that can be 

presented in a legal proceeding. It applies multidisciplinary scientific processes to establish facts. Forensics 

operations, to include site and document exploitation, further aid the positive identification efforts of a 

counterinsurgent and help to separate insurgents from the general population, thus contributing to overall 

situational understanding. Commanders and staffs should make every effort to operate within status of 

forces agreements and combatant command requirements. (See ATTP 2-91.6 for more information on 

forensics.) 

8-27. For example, latent fingerprints discovered on pieces of improvised explosive devices provide 

critical information that analysts need to link individuals, insurgent organizations, their capabilities, and 

their activities. Forensics that includes site exploitation and forensic documents is of great benefit to 

substantiating information if detainees are insurgents. The methods of forensics allow the counterinsurgent 

to work towards situational understanding. 

Site Exploitation 

8-28. Site exploitation is a series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze 

information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of operations (JP 3-31). When countering 

an insurgency, site exploitation of an insurgent location is essential. Computers, cell phones, and other 

means of communication and storing information are vital to understanding the insurgent structure. 

8-29. Site exploitation uses the full range of resources at the commander’s disposal, starting with the 

Soldier’s basic cognitive skills to sophisticated analytical processes conducted by joint, interagency, and 

intergovernmental organizations. Exploitation operations provide answers to the commander’s information 

requirements regardless of whether the information was gained by a squad on patrol or through external 

sensor platform outputs. 

8-30. Site exploitation may require additional technical expertise not resident within the theater to process 

the collected information, material, and personnel to maintain their unique physical or forensic attributes. 

Detailed technical exploitation of collected items can divulge actionable information or intelligence that 

can be used to positively identify any unique threat characteristics or threat networks for follow-on actions. 

8-31. Knowledge management enables the effective dissemination of actionable information and 

intelligence to units for their integration into the intelligence, targeting, and operations processes. This 

facilitates follow-on operations and enhances commanders’ and staffs’understanding. 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 9-1 

Chapter 9 

Direct Methods for Countering Insurgencies 

9-1. The direct method of using United States (U.S.) land, maritime, and air forces in a decisive action 

role is resource intensive when done on a large scale, but it is often necessary to fully support a 

counterinsurgency effort. A direct method may be used, for example, when the success of a host nation’s 

counterinsurgency efforts is critical to U.S. interests. The U.S. can use a direct method after or during a 

major conflict or when U.S. interests necessitate stability in a failed or failing state. Leaders can also 

integrate land forces into a host nation’s ongoing effort. Unfortunately, unintended consequences, such as 

increased tensions among segments of society or resistance to U.S. involvement, often accompany a direct 

approach. Leaders must carefully plan and execute operations before and during a direct response to avoid 

negative consequences. However, using direct capabilities remains a valid option and an important 

capability that the Army and Marine Corps provide the joint force. 

9-2. The level of direct U.S. involvement can vary. In many cases, a host nation will be fully capable of 

providing security for its population. However, integration of fires or a direct action force could enable a 

host nation’s counterinsurgency efforts. The Army and Marine Corps bring many capabilities that can be 

integrated into a counterinsurgency effort. When counterinsurgents consider direct involvement, they 

should consider a wide spectrum of activities that range from a modest force conducting limited missions to 

a large force that could be, at least for a time, the primary counterinsurgency force. 

9-3. The U.S. has a wide range of capabilities that it can use to create many different operational 

approaches to counter an insurgency. Direct involvement by U.S. forces can take place along a spectrum, 

from little direct U.S. involvement to U.S. forces acting as the primary counterinsurgents. If U.S. forces are 

acting temporarily as the primary counterinsurgents, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework forms 

a tactical and operational background for battalion and brigade operations. While the shape-clear-holdbuild-transition framework must be enabled with other capabilities, such as security force assistance, the 

shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework provides a framework for how Army and Marine forces will 

defeat an insurgency at the tactical level. Moreover, this tactical background also creates a frame of 

reference for understanding actions by the host nation to defeat an insurgency. This understanding is 

essential in integrating U.S. capabilities into a host-nation effort. 

9-4. Counterinsurgents should not think that all counterinsurgencies end the same way. The shape-clearhold-build-transition framework provides a good framework for a protracted struggle. Counterinsurgencies 

are conducted using a wide range of different approaches. For example, the insurgency in Sri Lanka was 

fought using conventional tactics and ended in a traditional offensive operation. It ended in something that 

looked much more like a conventional offensive operation then an application of the shape-clear-holdbuild-transition framework. In some cases, the government or insurgents can impose their impose their will 

and control the population. While counterinsurgents should remember that specific insurgencies are unique, 

for many insurgencies, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is a starting point for understanding 

host-nation actions and then enabling those actions. 

SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION FRAMEWORK 

9-5. For a tactical and operational ground commander acting as the primary counterinsurgent commander, 

the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework provides a foundation for detailed planning. Moreover, the 

shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is well-suited to those commanders and staffs engaged in 

training, advising, or integrating capabilities into a host-nation effort. If a host nation is performing 

operations, whatever the U.S. role in the counterinsurgency, Soldiers and Marines must have a framework 

for understanding that host nation’s actions. Commanders and staffs cannot evaluate, advise, or train 

another force unless they have a base of knowledge on the operations being conducted. In many 

counterinsurgency efforts, a state will try to defeat insurgencies by performing a general operational 
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9-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

approach that is similar to the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework at the tactical level. While this 

is certainly not a uniform rule, having some framework in understanding another counterinsurgent’s actions 

provides a point of reference for understanding. Commanders and staffs must have an understanding of 

how to solve a particular problem before they advise or assist another commander solve that problem. 

Understanding the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is a fundamental framework for 

understanding what units are trying to accomplish in a counterinsurgency. This framework applies to all 

units involved in the counterinsurgency, including, for example, an infantry battalion directly performing 

actions, a member of a special forces team advising a host nation, or a member of a combatant command 

integrating and evaluating various security cooperation capabilities. 

9-6. Whether U.S. forces are executing the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework or another state 

is executing it, it can be very effective in defeating an insurgency. For example, in the Philippines, the 

government was successful in using the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, even if it was not 

called shape-clear-hold-build-transition by the counterinsurgents at the time. Commanders and staffs must 

understand the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework to understand what a host nation is trying to 

achieve in its counterinsurgency efforts. This framework is used by U.S. and foreign forces. 

Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition: The Huks 

 The Hukbalahap, or “Huks,” were one of several guerilla organizations that 

appeared in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation of World War II. By the 

time of the country’s liberation from the Japanese occupation, the Huks were 

well-armed with weapons taken from the Japanese or shipped to them from the U.S. 

 The Philippines gained independence from the U.S. on July 4, 1946, and 

held its first national election in November 1946. The Huks participated in the 

elections, and the head of the wartime Huk movement, Luis Taruc, won a seat in the 

Philippine Congress. However, the newly elected President, Manuel Roxas, refused 

to seat Mr. Taruc or his allies in Congress, leading many Filipino peasants to join the 

Huk movement. 

 By late 1946, there was open fighting between the Huks and the forces of 

the newly independent Republic of the Philippines. The insurgency was motivated by 

vast economic inequality during the country’s transition to an export-led capitalist 

economy, with abject poverty affecting 90 percent of the population. 

 The Huks’ primary tactics in the beginning of the conflict included bank, 

payroll office, and train robberies, as well as small hit-and-run raids and ambushes 

that allowed them to avoid contact with large government formations. During these 

first few years, the Huks numbered 5,000 active insurgents, 10,000 lightly armed 

reserves, and 35,000 other supporters. The Huks also enjoyed incredible levels of 

internal support, with an estimated 250,000 peasants actively supporting them during 

the early years of the insurgency. 

 The counterinsurgency force was unable to control the insurgency in the 

early years. Shortly after the country was granted independence, the Philippine Army 

was reduced from 132,000 to 37,000 men. Approximately 24,000 of these men were 

in the Military Police Command, which was tasked with combating the insurgency. 

However, the Military Police Command was poorly led and poorly equipped, and 

pursued tactics that accomplished little beyond alienating the population between 

1946 and 1948. In 1948, President Roxas reorganized the Military Police Command 

into the Philippine Constabulary, which remained neither well-trained nor 

well-equipped. It mainly practiced encirclement and sweeps, both of which were 

easily evaded by the Huks, and systematically committed abuses against civilians: 

raiding villages, stealing possessions, and treating the population worse than the 

Huks did. 

 The Huks then began making strategic and operational errors, failing to 

reach out to other disaffected groups to form a broad front, and employing many 

common criminals in their ranks, causing peasants to fear the group. Probably most 

catastrophic to the group’s public image was the assassination of Mrs. Aurora 

Quezon, the well-liked and popular wife of the late former President, Manuel Quezon. 
Direct Methods for Countering Insurgencies 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 9-3 

As a result of Mrs. Quezon’s murder, President Quirino appointed then-Congressman 

Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense in 1950. 

 After this, the Huk Rebellion became a good example of successful 

shape-clear-hold operations, with Magsaysay immediately instituting a 

shape-clear-hold approach. Shaping operations focused on efforts to win popular 

support for the counterinsurgency effort in preparation for future operations to clear 

insurgent areas. These operations included putting a stop to the abuses of civilians 

by the Constabulary and Army, firing many high-level military officers, placing the 

Constabulary under Magsaysay’s personal control, suppressing troop brutality 

towards the population, and increasing pay for enlisted troops to remove their 

incentives for looting. They also involved the establishment of a civil affairs office 

through which troops became involved in civic action projects (including digging wells 

and building bridges) and the Army’s provision of medical assistance to villagers. 

Additionally, Magsaysay pursued a population engagement strategy, even going so 

far as to set up a telegraph system that provided a direct line to the Defense Ministry 

for any villager on Luzon to use. 

9-7. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework describes an operational approach that moves 

through each of its phases to destroy insurgent capacity and empower host-nation capacity. The phases of 

this method are not mutually exclusive, but the phases represent a general progression of operations. The 

shape phase refers to making changes to the environment, through information operations or other methods, 

that create the conditions for success of the other phases. The population needs to understand that there will 

be an increase in security and initially local leaders should be contacted. The clear phase is an effort to 

remove the open insurgent presence in an area. The hold phase is defined by providing security for the 

population in an area so an open insurgent presence cannot return. The build phase entails efforts to 

increase security and governmental capacity so that government and local forces can control the area and 

prevent the return of insurgents. The transition phase is the transition of security to local and government 

forces. 

9-8. The commitment of resources, to include time, troops, money, development programs, and other 

enablers depends entirely on the capacity of the insurgency, the capacity of the host nation’s institutions, 

the capacity of the host nation’s security forces, and the capacity of the host nation’s population. The 

capacity requirement for the external counterinsurgent is that capacity which overcomes the capacity 

differential between the insurgents and the host nation’s systems. As the framework is predicated on the 

conditions on the ground, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is based on understanding areas 

of operation and understanding the comprehensive threat. To transition between the clear, the hold, and the 

build, a unit must be able to measure the conditions on the ground and how those conditions are achieving 

the commander’s end state. This ties the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework to assessments. 

9-9. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework can be used as a method for constructing specific 

tactical operations, planning short-range operations for a specific area, or developing a mid- to long-range 

operational framework for a unit’s plan for countering an insurgency. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition 

framework can be used as a campaign framework, guiding planning from the introduction of foreign forces 

to conflict resolution. It can be used as campaign design to be executed by multiple units on a rotational 

basis. The imperatives, structure, considerations, and conditions listed here apply no matter how the 

shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is applied. 

9-10. Counterinsurgents must be aware that the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is not a phase 

by phase linear process. The phase that a unit performs is determined by the environment in an area of 

operations and each area must be assessed. Different villages, cities, or regions can be in varying degrees of 

insurgent control to host-nation control. Moreover, different areas in one city or different towns in one 

region might be along a spectrum of insurgent to host-nation control. Areas can reverse progress during a 

counterinsurgency. While the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework can be a phased operation in 

each area, the environment must dictate its progress. The counterinsurgent uses the framework as the way 

to synchronize subordinate unit actions, prioritize efforts, allocate resources, and direct specific effects to 

achieve end state criteria in an ever-changing environment. The overall objective of using the shape-clearhold-build-transition framework is to transition responsibility for countering the insurgency to the host 
Chapter 9 

9-4 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

nation’s institutions. The commander must understand that conditions associated with the clear, the hold, 

and the build phases may be present at any time in different areas. U.S. ground forces can expect to carry 

out a range of tasks simultaneously in varying combinations and varying intensity throughout the entirety 

of shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. 

9-11. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition method has imperatives that help counterinsurgents turn the 

method from theory into practical application. The imperatives are— 

 The conditions are assessed across several variables and cannot be taken in isolation. 

 The phase that the environment is in dictates the decisive operation, priorities, and resourcing. 

 In the clear, hold, and build phases, counterinsurgents must simultaneously conduct offensive, 

defensive, and stability tasks. 

 Each area requires its own assessment and assessments change over time. 

 The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is not a straightforward path, as the operational 

environment can change and cause the counterinsurgent to lose progress. However, the 

methodology is meant to be progressive. Improving conditions in the environment allows for 

progression from one phase to the next. In essence, the operational framework is determined by 

the operational environment. Changes in the capacity of any element in the environment can 

change the conditions on the ground and, therefore, change the priorities and actions of the 

counterinsurgent, including the host-nation forces. 

 The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is only reactive if the unit on the ground 

responds to conditions. The framework can be proactive if the counterinsurgents dictate the 

conditions they want to establish and provide the resources and emphasis necessary to achieve 

them. 

 Although an area is in a certain phase, this does not preclude operations associated with other 

phases. For example, although a unit is in the build phase, that does not preclude that unit from 

performing offensive operations against underground cells. 

9-12. Executing operations in the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework requires counterinsurgents 

to continually address the root causes of the insurgency. Actions taken in the clear, hold, and build phases 

are not executed in isolation. Instead, elements of each phase must be conducted simultaneously. The 

shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework does not require phasing or stages of operations, but a 

commander may create phases or stages of operations corresponding generally to shape-clear-hold-buildtransition phases in order to synchronize actions and priorities effectively. 

9-13. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is driven by the conditions in an area of operations. 

To facilitate discussion of these conditions, figure 9-1 depicts the generic spectrum of counterinsurgency 

conflict. The graph portrays the relationship of capacity between insurgents, the host-nation government, 

the host-nation security forces, the host-nation population, and external counterinsurgents. Capacity 

represents the ability to change the conditions in the environment towards insurgents or counterinsurgents. 

As counterinsurgents are able to impact these conditions, the capability spectrum changes. The left hand 

side of the graph depicts the worst-case scenario in which insurgents possess increased capacity compared 

to the host nation. The right hand side of the graph depicts the best-case scenario in which the host-nation 

capacity is sufficient to counter the insurgent capability without assistance from external counterinsurgents. 

The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework describes the process counterinsurgents take to progress 

from the left of the graph to the right. (See figure 9-1.) 
Direct Methods for Countering Insurgencies 

13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 9-5 

Figure 9-1. The capability spectrum of counterinsurgency conflict 

9-14. As part of developing understanding, counterinsurgents must identify the conditions that exist in 

particular regions that lead to instability or allow the insurgency to impact the environment. Commanders 

must decide where to focus actions and priorities to impact the conditions in a designated area for tactical 

or operational reasons. In many instances, commanders specify a preparation phase or shape phase of the 

shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework which clarifies the period of time, series of tasks, and effects 

to be achieved before counterinsurgents begin taking deliberate action against insurgents. Whether phasing 

is used or not, preparation of the environment is an absolute requirement to achieve conditions to progress 

along the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. 

SHAPE

9-15. Shaping operations involve identifying which areas in an operational environment exhibit conditions 

that counterinsurgents can impact to change the capability differential between insurgents and 

counterinsurgents. Commanders choose where to execute operations in the shape-clear-hold-buildtransition framework based on a host nation’s ability (and unified action partners’ abilities if the host 

nation’s capabilities are still being built) to impact the root causes of the insurgency, alter or eliminate the 

conditions which allow the insurgency to exist in that area, or isolate the insurgents from the population. 

During preparation, commanders and staffs execute include information collection on the components of an 

insurgency. An initial census in towns or cities using biometrics data collection devices is the most 

effective tool to establish initial accountability for everyone. Additional information collection includes the 

specific root cause or causes in the particular area, the expectations of the host-nation population, and the 

capability of host-nation institutions such as government, security, and rule of law. Commanders and staffs 

conduct disruption operations to impact an insurgency’s ability to influence an operational environment. 

Counterinsurgents may conduct deception operations while preparing for shape-clear-hold-build-transition 

framework operations to force the insurgency to alter its course of action. While preparing to execute the 

shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, counterinsurgents (and whenever possible the unified action 

and host-nation partners) conduct information operations. Counterinsurgents conduct information 

operations aimed at the insurgency, the insurgency’s support mechanisms (both internal and external to the 

country), the host-nation population, and host-nation institutions such as governance and security functions. 

9-16. U.S. ground forces do not prepare for the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework in isolation. 

Elements of the unified action partners are essential in shaping the area, the population, and the insurgency 

for future operations. In some instances, the area indicated for shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework 

operations may not be suitable for some partners to directly operate in, but other unified action partners 
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may have the capability to shape the environment in areas of limited access. U.S. special operations forces 

(SOF) can conduct reconnaissance, information collection, and precision targeting. The United States 

Agency for International Development has the capability to introduce implementing partners who have 

access to initiate governance or development programs. The Department of State has the ability to 

influence the diplomatic process to generate initial governmental structures prior to the introduction of U.S. 

ground forces. Soldiers and Marines must recognize the potential that unified action partners have in 

shaping an operational environment prior to shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework operations. 

CLEAR

9-17. Once counterinsurgents have effectively shaped the environment, including host-nation partners and 

enablers, and prepared all elements of the unified action partners appropriately, decided on where to focus 

the counterinsurgent effort, and has developed the plan to progress through to transition to host-nation 

responsibility, the force begins executing tasks associated with clear. Clear is as a tactical mission task that 

requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned 

area (FM 3-90-1). When used in this context, the term clear is considered the desired effect by U.S. ground 

forces: to eliminate the insurgency’s combatants to enable the host nation to develop the capability to 

address the insurgency’s root cause and eliminate the conditions that allow it to exist. While attempting to 

achieve the clear, the insurgency’s underground and auxiliary elements probably remain in the area of 

operations. While the counterinsurgent can target them along with the insurgency’s combatants, it is 

unlikely that the counterinsurgent will be successful in removing all of the underground or auxiliary 

elements. 

9-18. During the clear phase, counterinsurgents should be actively securing the population. 

Counterinsurgents must displace insurgents and enable basic governmental functions in their area. 

Moreover, the population must have the confidence that counterinsurgents will remain and insurgents will 

not control the area. During this period, the population may face intimidation, threats, and assassinations 

from insurgent forces. To gain legitimacy during this period, counterinsurgents must focus on securing the 

population. 

9-19. Operations and tasks associated with achieving the clear begin by controlling access to an area and 

then by controlling key points within that area. Security and influence can then spread out from this area. 

Commanders and staffs should consider the following points for operations in the clear: 

 Create a secure physical and psychological environment. 

 Provide continuous security for the local populace. 

 Eliminate the insurgent combatants. 

 Reinforce culturally appropriate political primacy within the context of host-nation systems. 

 Enforce the rule of law. 

9-20. Security tasks associated with the clear include— 

 Implement the provisions of a cease fire and control, capture, and disarm belligerents. 

 Provide territorial security until the host-nation national army can defend itself. 

 Protect the population—provide immediate law and order and humanitarian assistance. 

 Protect key individuals and sites—civilian government agencies, infrastructure, and institutions. 

9-21. During the clear, counterinsurgents must execute offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Offensive 

operations are the priority for counterinsurgents. In most cases, the measure of effectiveness (MOE) 

associated directly with impacting the insurgency’s combatants (for example, isolate insurgents from the 

population) is the decisive operation. Offensive operations conducted during the clear include raid, 

deliberate attack, cordon and search, seize key terrain, and movement to contact. Counterinsurgents execute 

defensive operations as well, to include block access routes, establish and secure combat outposts, conduct 

sniper operations, and secure the population. To set the conditions to progress through the framework, 

counterinsurgents must execute stability tasks and operations at this point. Stability tasks include 

identifying potential government or security leaders, identifying civic capacity requirements from the 

population, establishing a local security force (in the context of host-nation systems) and beginning a 

training program (if necessary), and identifying the root causes for that area. Throughout these operations, 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 9-7 

the commander must consider securing the population and building host-nation capability. Actions taken 

while achieving the effects necessary for clear should not alienate the population. The messages of 

information operations are important while performing clear. Responsible use of force is essential. 

9-22. Counterinsurgents conduct information operations to achieve the effects of the clear component. The 

focus for information operations during the clear is the insurgency’s combatants, the underground and 

auxiliary elements, and the host-nation population. Counterinsurgents’ information operations should 

facilitate operations which eliminate the combatants from an area, facilitate effective information collection 

on the combatants, and build a sense of security among the population. 

HOLD

9-23. Counterinsurgents do not execute tasks associated with the clear component unless they have 

developed the capability to execute tasks in the hold. Beginning shape-clear-hold-build-transition 

framework operations requires resources in the form of manpower, time, money, and development 

programs (but this framework is based on capacity, not resources). For this reason, these type of operations 

cannot be conducted everywhere and must be prioritized. To meet the imperatives listed above, the 

counterinsurgent must progress along the framework to continue to improve conditions in the environment. 

Therefore, units should not clear an area that they cannot hold. Until those conditions exist, the 

counterinsurgent may choose to continue to prepare or shape the environment for future 

shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework operations. 

9-24. As the capability of the insurgency decreases in an area based on counterinsurgency operations, the 

capacity of the host-nation government and security force must increase. As the conditions improve to the 

point that offensive operations aimed at eliminating the insurgency’s combatants are no longer the priority 

and the host-nation population has freedom of movement, counterinsurgents can begin to execute tasks and 

operations associated with hold. The hold involves disrupting insurgent activities in an area and providing a 

good security environment for the population. The objective of the hold is to set the conditions for the 

host-nation security apparatus to provide security for the population. For this reason, the hold lasts as long 

as it takes to— 

 Develop the capability of the host-nation security forces. 

 Reduce the enemy strength in the area to the point that the host-nation security forces can take 

lead responsibility for security. 

9-25. Lead responsibility means that the host-nation security forces are the decision authority for allocation 

of resources, priority of tasks and operations, and tactical decisions during operations. Counterinsurgents 

continue to eliminate the insurgency’s leadership and infrastructure. However, perhaps more importantly, 

counterinsurgents should focus on securing the population. During this period, proper basing of 

counterinsurgent forces is essential. If an area is supportive of an insurgency, then a base of 

counterinsurgent forces may sever the relationship between insurgents and the population. If the area is 

neutral or has pockets of support for the government, then the base should be established where it can best 

help in developing the area. 

9-26. Contact with the population should be continuous, predominantly with host-nation entities (security 

forces, law and order officials, and government representatives) leading and U.S. counterinsurgents in 

support. Information operation activities provide opportunities for contact with the population. From the 

start of operations, Soldier and Marine actions in these areas, if culturally astute, can build bonds with the 

local population and in many cases change the attitudes of the people. Ultimately, the goal of this contact is 

twofold: to gain a better picture of the actual situation and to turn the population’s support toward the 

government. 

9-27. Counterinsurgents must also secure key physical infrastructure. Because resources are always 

limited, parts of the infrastructure vital for stability and vulnerable to attack must receive the priority of 

protection, specifically the protection of capable host-nation security forces (if possible). This can be 

accomplished by analyzing the risk and likelihood of attack on various sites in the area of operations. 

9-28. Much like the clear, achieving the hold requires counterinsurgents execute offense, defense, and 

stability tasks. While achieving the hold, defensive tasks and operations are the priority. However, to meet 

the objectives of the hold, the line of effort associated with development of the host-nation security forces 
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9-8 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

is the decisive operation. Examples of stability tasks include manning, equipping, and training the 

host-nation security forces, establishing local governance functions, and establishing culturally appropriate 

rule of law systems within the host nation’s plan. Examples of some defensive tasks during the hold include 

counter cache operations, area denial, combined security at fixed sites, block infiltration routes, 

countermobility, and securing the population. Counterinsurgents must execute offensive tasks to attack the 

insurgency’s underground and auxiliaries. Examples of offensive operations in the hold include raids 

against insurgent leaders, ambushes, and disruption operations to impact support structures and local 

sanctuaries. The amount and scope of stability tasks and operations increase during the hold. 

9-29. Security operations to achieve the hold are dominated by developing the host-nation security forces 

and then transitioning security responsibilities to them. Examples of security focus during the hold 

include— 

 Reform of local security institutions—reestablish military and police forces which may include 

the entire rebuilding of the enduring institution including recruiting, educating, training, 

manning, equipping, sustaining and leader development for the Army, police, rule of law, 

detention capacity, and court systems. 

 Develop the host-nation military to provide security and external defense of the nation; develop 

the capacity to become self-sufficient in the development and conduct of their own enduring 

training programs at individual and collective levels. 

9-30. Counterinsurgents conduct information operations to achieve the hold as well, but the focus and 

message changes as conditions improve. The focus for information operations during the hold is on the 

remaining underground and auxiliary, the host-nation population, the host-nation security forces, and 

host-nation governance institutions. Counterinsurgent information operations should facilitate operations 

that improve the perception of security among the population, legitimize the host-nation security forces, 

dissuade the underground and auxiliaries from continuing insurgent activities, and promote effective 

host-nation governance solutions. During the hold, it is critical that the host nation becomes an integral part 

of information operations. 

BUILD

9-31. When the conditions in an operational environment allow the host-nation security forces to take lead 

responsibility for security, counterinsurgents transition to the build. The build comprises carrying out 

programs designed to remove the conditions that allow the insurgency to exist, specifically addressing the 

root causes, tying inhabitants to host-nation security institutions, governing and rule of law, and 

strengthening the host nation’s ability to provide legitimate and effective governance. Stability tasks 

predominately build, with many important activities being conducted by nonmilitary agencies. Progress in 

building support for the host-nation government requires protecting the local population. People who do not 

believe they are secure from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals do not risk overtly supporting 

host-nation efforts. 

9-32. Counterinsurgents execute offense, defense, and stability tasks in the build as well. The priority for 

tasks and operations during the build is on the stability tasks. The line of effort that addresses increasing the 

host-nation government capacity becomes the decisive operation during the build. Examples of stability 

tasks in the build include advising and assisting the host-nation security forces, developing professional 

development programs (including professional education) for host-nation security and governance 

individuals, facilitating host-nation governance activities, support to local and national demilitarization, 

demobilization, and reintegration programs, and development of host-nation rule of law and conflict 

resolution mechanisms. However, U.S. forces execute offensive operations during the build. Examples of 

offensive operations in the build include providing a quick reaction force for the host-nation security 

forces, conducting tactical overwatch for specific host-nation security forces operations, conducting follow 

and assume or follow and support for host-nation security forces operations, or conducting precision strike 

operations in support of host-nation or U.S. objectives. Counterinsurgents execute defensive operations and 

tasks as well, to include protecting the population, combined action with the host-nation security forces to 

secure combined positions, and sanctuary denial and disruption operations. 

9-33. U.S. counterinsurgents conduct information operations as part of the build in support of host-nation 

programs. The focus of information operations during the build is on the host-nation population, the 
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13 May 2014 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 9-9 

host-nation security forces, and host-nation governance institutions. U.S. counterinsurgents conduct 

information operations during build operations to facilitate host-nation leaders’ messaging and to 

emphasize success in generating the conditions that further the connection between the population and the 

host-nation institutions. U.S. ground force information operations reinforce the host nation’s ability to 

counter an insurgency without the direct involvement of U.S. ground forces. Host-nation information 

operations should focus on increasing the perception of security, increasing the legitimacy of the 

host-nation government and security forces, and promoting the host nation’s ability to address root causes. 

TRANSITION

9-34. Transition allows the counterinsurgent to delineate tasks associated with development of host-nation 

institutions (governance, rule of law, security, and economic) with those tasks associated with transitioning 

to host-nation lead of operations. To make transition effective, U.S. commanders incorporate planning and 

execution of transition as part of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. 

9-35. This transition is not a onetime event. Counterinsurgents transition responsibility to host-nation 

agencies when they are capable of taking over a function. This may mean multiple transitions to multiple 

host-nation agencies at different times during a counterinsurgency. Transition is a continued process in 

which the host nation assumes any responsibility that an external counterinsurgency may temporarily have. 

9-36. Security tasks associated with transition represent the U.S. forces’ transition to security cooperation 

tasks. During this phase, the U.S. ground force, under the combatant command and in conjunction with the 

American embassy, helps generate and then implement theater engagement plans and programs. 

9-37. The end goal of shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is to create the conditions necessary for 

the host nation to counter an insurgency independently. However, creating these conditions may not 

eliminate the presence of external counterinsurgents. U.S. counterinsurgents may remain in an area during 

and beyond transition to help train host-nation security forces or institutions, provide enablers, or begin 

security cooperation tasks at the request of the host-nation government. (See FM 3-22 for more information 

on security cooperation tasks.) 

9-38. To better facilitate the integration of all components of the unified action environment into the 

shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, counterinsurgents may establish an area coordination center. 

An area coordination center controls, manages, and coordinates shape-clear-hold-build-transition 

framework operations. Commanders and staffs can establish area coordination centers and subordinate area 

coordination center civil-military task forces from the tactical to the strategic level. An area coordination 

center’s membership includes representatives of all multinational forces and host-nation agencies (military, 

police, intelligence, political, and civil administration) operating at the regional and local level. To be truly 

effective, Department of State representatives (including United States Agency for International 

Development personnel) should lead an area coordination center. As an area coordination center 

coordinates all efforts that affect the ability to transition to host-nation control, the area coordination center 

is responsible for generating host-nation capability beyond just the security realm. For that reason, 

diplomatic and governmental leaders should run an area coordination center with the goal of turning over 

decisionmaking and coordination authority to the host nation at the earliest opportunity. In the absence of 

Department of State personnel, the military force assigned an area of operations should initiate and manage 

an area coordination center until a government representative can take control. An area coordination center 

coordinates the allocation of material and personnel resources, methods of policy implementation, and 

evaluation of intelligence in the area within which it is organized. 

9-39. The area coordination center consists of civilian and military elements necessary to plan the political, 

economic, social, psychological, security, intelligence, and tactical operations within that area. 

Commanders and staffs base operation plans on an integrated civil-military approach, and unity of effort is 

essential. The leadership must have authority to control the allotted resources of all agencies and activities 

operating within its respective area of responsibility. In those instances where U.S. or multinational forces 

are operating in support of host-nation forces, an exceptionally high degree of cooperation must exist and 

advisory efforts are critically important for success. All armed civilian defense forces and civilian 

organizations normally remain under operational command of their respective area coordination center task 

force chiefs: however, in cases where civilian administration is ineffective, military forces may provide 
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9-10 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 

civil administration until civilian programs have taken effect. A composite view of the shape-clear-holdbuild-transition framework is provided in figure 9-2. 

9-40. Transitions can also occur within the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. Soldiers and 

Marines will have different tasks when an operational environment changes. For example, a unit must 

understand when it transitions from eliminating the combatants in an area to creating an environment for 

host-nation control. Units will change their mix of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. More 

importantly, they will have to change their mindsets. Figure 9-2 provides the changes of capacity over time, 

the changes in the mix of tasks units could perform, and finally when a transition may occur. This graph 

provides a snapshot of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. In it, counterinsurgents are moving 

from clearing, to holding, and then to building. During this movement, the local population is becoming 

more supportive of the counterinsurgency, and the insurgency is losing capabilities and moving from being 

in a possible war of movement back to being in phrase I. As insurgent capacity decreases and 

counterinsurgent capabilities increase, several transitions take place that involve a different mindset and 

performing different tactical tasks. This is in addition to the final transition to the host-nation lead, which is 

the end point for the U.S. when it acts as the primary counterinsurgent. (See figure 9-2.) (See chapter 4 for 

more information on the phases of an insurgency and chapter 7 for more information on transitions.)