F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T
A N D 2008 T O

N G A S S F O R

E S T P L A N ,

S O U T H E A S T A L

A S K A C O N S E R V A T I O N C O U N C I L ; A L A S K A W I L D E R

N E S S L E A G U E ; S I E R

R A C L U B ; N A T I O N A L A U D U B O N S O C I E T Y ; N A T U R

A L R E S O U R C E S D E F E

N S E C O U N C I L , Plaintiffs-Appellants

,

and

C A S C A D I A W I L D L

A N D S ; G R E A T E R S O U T H E A S T A L A S K A C O N S E R

V A T I O N C O M M U N I T Y ; G R

E E N P E A C E ; C E N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y ; T H E B O A T C O M P A N Y , Plaintiffs

,

v. No. 15-35232

D.C. Nos. 1 :14-cv-00013-RRB 1 :14-cv-00014-RRB 1 :14-cv-00015-RRBI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 2

U N I T E D S T A T E S F O R

E S T S E R V I C E ; U N I T E D S T A T E S D E P A R T M E N T O F A G R I C U L T U R

E ; B E T H P E N D L E T O N , in her official capacity as United States F orest Service Reg ion 10 Reg ional F o rester; F O R R E S T C O L E , in his official capacity as F orest Supervisor for the Tong ass National F orest; T H O M A S T I D W

E L L , in his official capacity

as Chief of the United States F orest Service, Defendants-Appellees

,

S T A T E O F A L

A S K A ; A L A S K A F O R E S T A S S O C I A T I O

N , I N C .; S O U T H E A S T C O N F E R

E N C E ; V I K I N G L U M B E R C O M P A

N Y , I N C .; C I T Y O F C R

A I G ; I C Y S T R A I T S L U M

B E R C O

. I

N C .; S O U T H E A S T S T E V E D O R I N G C O R P O R A T I O N ; A L

A S K A E L E C T R I C L I G H T A

N D P O W E R C O M P A N Y ; A L A S K A P O W E R & T E L E P H O N E ; A L

A S K A M A R I N E L I N E S , I N C .; A L A S K A M I N E R S A S S O C I A T I O N ; F I R S T T H I N G S F I R S T F O U

N D A T I O N ; S A M S O N T U G A

N D B A R G E C O M P A N Y , I N C .; T Y L E RI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 3

R E N T A L , I N C .; R E S O U R

C E D E V E L O P M E

N T C O U N C I L O F A L A S K A , I N C .; S O U T H E A S T R O A D B U I L D E R S , I

N C .; B O Y E R T O W I N G , I N C

. ; C I T Y O F K E T C H I K

A N ; K E T C H I K

A N G A T E W A Y B O R O U G H ; C I T Y
A N D B O R O U G H O F W R A N G E L L ; F E D E R

A L F O R E S T R E S O U R

C E C O A L I T I O N ; F I R S T B A N K ,Intervenor-DefendantsAppellees

.

I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T
A N D 2008 T O

N G A S S F O R

E S T P L A N ,

S O U T H E A S T A L

A S K A C O N S E R V A T I O N C O U N C I L ; A L A S K A W I L D E R

N E S S L E A G U E ; S I E R

R A C L U B ; N A T I O N A L A U D U B O N S O C I E T Y ; N A T U R

A L R E S O U R C E S D E F E

N S E C O U N C I L , Plaintiffs

,

and

C A S C A D I A W I L D L

A N D S ; No. 15-35233

D.C. Nos. 1 :14-cv-00013-RRB 1 :14-cv-00014-RRB 1 :14-cv-00015-RRBI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 4

G R E A T E R S O U T H E A S T A L A S K A C O N S E R

V A T I O N C O M M U N I T Y ; G R

E E N P E A C E ; C E N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y ; T H E B O A T C O M P A N Y , Plaintiffs-Appellants

,

v.

U N I T E D S T A T E S F O R

E S T S E R V I C E ; U N I T E D S T A T E S D E P A R T M E N T O F A G R I C U L T U R

E ; B E T H P E N D L E T O N , in her official capacity as United States F orest Service Reg ion 10 Reg ional F o rester; F O R R E S T C O L E , in his official capacity as F orest Supervisor for the Tong ass National F orest; T H O M A S T I D W

E L L , in his official capacity

as Chief of the United States F orest Service, Defendants-Appellees

,

S T A T E O F A L

A S K A ; A L A S K A F O R E S T A S S O C I A T I O

N , I N C .; S O U T H E A S T C O N F E R

E N C E ; V I K I N G L U M B E R C O M P A

N Y , I N C .; C I T Y O F C R

A I G ; I C Y S T R A I T S L U M

B E R C O

. I

N C .;I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 5

S O U T H E A S T S T E V E D O R I N G C O R P O R A T I O N ; A L

A S K A E L E C T R I C L I G H T A

N D P O W E R C O M P A N Y ; A L A S K A P O W E R & T E L E P H O N E ; A L

A S K A M A R I N E L I N E S , I N C .; A L A S K A M I N E R S A S S O C I A T I O N ; F I R S T T H I N G S F I R S T F O U

N D A T I O N ; S A M S O N T U G A

N D B A R G E C O M P A N Y , I N C .; T Y L E R R E N T A L , I N C .; R E S O U R

C E D E V E L O P M E

N T C O U N C I L O F A L A S K A , I N C .; S O U T H E A S T R O A D B U I L D E R S , I

N C .; B O Y E R T O W I N G , I N C

. ; C I T Y O F K E T C H I K

A N ; K E T C H I K

A N G A T E W A Y B O R O U G H ; C I T Y
A N D B O R O U G H O F W R A N G E L L ; F E D E R

A L F O R E S T R E S O U R

C E C O A L I T I O N ; F I R S T B A N K ,Intervenor-DefendantsAppellees

.I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 6

I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T
A N D 2008 T O

N G A S S F O R

E S T P L A N ,

S O U T H E A S T A L

A S K A C O N S E R V A T I O N C O U N C I L ; A L A S K A W I L D E R

N E S S L E A G U E ; S I E R

R A C L U B ; N A T U R A L R E S O U R

C E S D E F E N S E C O U

N C I L , Plaintiffs-Appellants

,

v.

U N I T E D S T A T E S F O R

E S T S E R V I C E ; U N I T E D S T A T E S D E P A R T M E N T O F A G R I C U L T U R

E ; B E T H P E N D L E T O N , in her official capacity as United States F orest Service Reg ion 10 Reg ional F o rester; F O R R E S T C O L E , in his official capacity as F orest Supervisor for the Tong ass National F orest; T H O M A S T I D W

E L L , in his official capacity

as Chief of the United States F orest Service, Defendants-Appellees

, No. 15-35244

D.C. Nos. 1 :14-cv-00014-RRB 1 :14-cv-00013-RRB 1 :14-cv-00015-RRB

OPI N I ONI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 7

S T A T E O F A L

A S K A ; A L A S K A F O R E S T A S S O C I A T I O

N , I N C .; S O U T H E A S T C O N F E R

E N C E ; V I K I N G L U M B E R C O M P A

N Y , I N C .; C I T Y O F C R

A I G ; I C Y S T R A I T S L U M

B E R C O

. I

N C .; S O U T H E A S T S T E V E D O R I N G C O R P O R A T I O N ; A L

A S K A E L E C T R I C L I G H T A

N D P O W E R C O M P A N Y ; A L A S K A P O W E R & T E L E P H O N E ; A L

A S K A M A R I N E L I N E S , I N C .; A L A S K A M I N E R S A S S O C I A T I O N ; F I R S T T H I N G S F I R S T F O U

N D A T I O N ; S A M S O N T U G A

N D B A R G E C O M P A N Y , I N C .; T Y L E R R E N T A L , I N C .; R E S O U R

C E D E V E L O P M E

N T C O U N C I L O F A L A S K A , I N C .; S O U T H E A S T R O A D B U I L D E R S , I

N C .; B O Y E R T O W I N G , I N C

. ; C I T Y O F K E T C H I K

A N ; K E T C H I K

A N G A T E W A Y B O R O U G H ; C I T Y
A N D B O R O U G H O F W R A N G E L L ; F E D E R

A L F O R E S T R E S O U R

C E C O A L I T I O N ; F I R S T B A N K ,Intervenor-DefendantsAppellees

.I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 8

A ppeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska Ralph R. B eistline, Senior District J udg e, Presiding

A rg ued and Submitted F ebruary 3, 2016 Seattle, W a shing ton

F iled May

23, 2017

B efore: Alex Koz inski, Diarmuid F . O’Scannlain and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e Koz inski; Dissent by

J udg e Gould

SUMMARY *

National F orest Managem ent Act

The panel affirmed the district c ourt’s summary judg ment in favor of the United States in a n action a lleg ing that the U n i ted States F orest Service violated the National F orest Manag ement Act by approving either the B ig Thorne log g ing project or the 2008 Tong a ss F o rest Pl an under which B ig Thorne was authoriz e d

.

Plaintiffs alleg ed that the 2008 Tong ass F orest Plan unlawfully d amag es the habitat o f the indig enous Alex ander Archipelag o wolf, and that the F orest Service violated its self-

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 9

i m p o s ed oblig ation under the Plan by failing to ensure th e wolf’s sustainability

. The panel held that the Plan’s provision pertaining to sustainability was d iscretionary

. The panel h eld that because the F orest Service was o n ly oblig ated to consider sustainability “where possible,” there w as no law to apply in second-g uessing the ag e n cy

. The panel held that it was a ware of no authority compelling the ag ency t o s e t a specific standard or b enchmark for protecting the viability of a species that was neither e ndang ered nor threatened. The p a nel noted that the F orest Service’s Rec o rd of Decision specifically concluded that the F orest P l a n w ould “sustain viable populat ions of the A lex ander Archipelag o wolf,” and the panel concluded that F orest Service’s discussion of viability wasn’t arbitrary or capricious. The panel further h eld that the B ig Thorne Project was consistent with the F orest Plan.

I n a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, t h e panel also dismissed plaintiffs’ claims under the National Environmental Policy

Act.

J udg e Gould dissented from the portion of the majority ’s discussion of the issues relating to the Nationa l F orest Manag ement A ct, and c o n curred in the c ourt’s r easoning concerning the N ational Environmental Policy Act, a s presented in the concurrently filed memorandum disposition. J udg e Gould stated that the F orest Plan presently provides no mechanism to ensure w olf population viability

, and that the
ag ency ’s r a tionale and reasoning process was too summary and conclusory

. J u dg e G ould would vacate the de cision o f the F o r est Service and r emand for further proceeding s, which
at a m inimum would include both a thoroug h a ssessment

o f the viability of the A lex ander Archipelag o wolf i f t h e project proceeds, a

nd a n ex planation of its r easoningI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 10

s u fficient to satisfy Motor Vehicle M frs. Ass’n of U.S., I

n c. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

COUNSEL

Holly Anne Harris (arg

ued), Thomas S. W aldo, and Eric P. J org ensen, Ea r t hjustice, J u neau, Alaska, for PlaintiffsAppellants/Plaintiffs.

Christoph e r Winter (arg

ued), Ralph B loemers, and Oliver Stiefel, Crag L aw Center, Portland, Oreg on; Gabriel S c o t t, Cordova, Alaska; for Plaintiffs/Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Allen M. B rabender (arg ued )

, Emily Polachek, and David Glaz e r, Attorney s; J ohn C. Cruden, A s sistant Attorney General; Environment & Natural Resources Division, United S t ates D epartment of J ustice, W ashing ton, D.C.; J ame s Ustasiewski and Kate B a ldridg e, Office of General Counsel, United States Department o f Ag r iculture; for Defe n d an tsAppellees.

Richard Go eken ( arg ued), Smith Currie & Hancock L L P, W a shing ton, D .C.; Tho mas E. L enhart (arg ued), Senior Assistant Attorney G ener a l; Craig W

. Richards, Attorney General; Of

f i c e of the Attorney General, J uneau, Alaska; J ulie A. W eis, Hag lund Kelley L L P, Portland, Oreg on; J ames F

. Clark, L aw Offices of J ames F

. Clark, J uneau, Alaska; Steven W. Silver, Robertson Monag le and Eastaug h, Reston, Virg inia; for I

n tervenor-Defendants-Appellees.I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 11

OP INION

KOZ I NSKI , Circuit J udg e:

B ig T horne is a log g ing project in Alaska’s T o ng ass National F orest. The United States F orest Service approved the log g ing to help revive the lackluster economy o f southeastern A laska. B ut the project has been met w ith howls of protest from the p laintiffs in this c a se, who claim that B ig Thorne unlawfully damag es the habitat o f an indig e nous wolf. The district court dismissed all challen ge s, and we must no w decide whether the F orest Service violated the National F o rest Manag ement A ct (NF MA) by approving either the B ig T horne project or the 2008 Tong ass F orest Plan (F orest Plan) under which B ig Thorne was authoriz ed.

F ACTS

B ig Thorne allows timber to be harvested from Alaska’s Prince of Wales I sland. The island, wh i c h is the siz e o f Delaware, is the larg est in a chain t h a t m a k es up Alaska’s Alex a nder Archipelag o. L ike most of the archipelag o, Prince of W ales I sland is covered in old-g rowth r a i nforest. B ig Thorne a utho r i z e s log g ing on n early 6,200 acres and the construction of more than 80 miles of roads.

L og g ing and road construction will trench on the habitat of the Alex ander Archipelag o wolf. This rare wolf preys on

a species of d eer that thrives in the old-g rowth r ainforest, which provides suitable shelter and forag e during periods o f heavy snow. A smaller forest will support fewer deer, which, in turn, will support fewer wolves. T he new r o ads w i l l

c o m pound that effect by letting w olf and deer hunters rang e deeper into the forest.I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 12

Concerns about the fate of the wolf are not new. This discrete and insular c anine is c o nfined to the isla n d s of the archipe l a go and surrounding coastline, and is thus sensitive
to chang es in local habitat. I n 1993, environmental g roups petitioned to have the wolf l i sted under the Endang ered Species Ac t

. The F ish and W ildlife Service denied the petition, 1 but n onetheless helped convene a team of scientists
to prepare a “wolf conservation a ssessment.” The a ssessment recommended that the wolf b e p rotected by maintaining the deer population and limiting road density

.

The F orest Service used these recommendations in 2008

as the basis for two “standards and g uidelines” adopted in the F orest Plan. The first of these—known as the “wolf provision”—encourag es the F orest Service to “[ p] rovide, where p ossible

, sufficient deer habitat capability t o

. . . maintain sustainable wolf populations” (emphasis added). A sufficient habitat capability “is g e nerally considered to equate to

. . . 1 8 deer per square mile.” The second gu i d eline—the “road provision”—provides that “[ t] otal road densities of 0.7
to 1.0 mile per square mile or less may be ne c es sary ” to protect the wolves (emphasis added).

Even before B ig Thorne was approved, the proje ct a r ea had insufficient habitat capabili t y to support 18 deer per square mile, and road densities were above the recommended

1 In resp o n se t o sev eral ren ew ed p etitio n s, th e Fish an d W i l d l i f e Serv ice co n clu d ed in early 2 0 1 6 th at “ listin g th e A lex an d er A rch ip elag o

w o lf is n o t w arran ted at th is tim e th ro u g h o u t all o r a sig n if ican t p o rtio n of its ran g e, in clu d in g [P rin ce of W ales Islan d ].” 1 2

- Mo n th Fin d i n g o n a P etitio n T o L ist th e A lex an d e r A r c h i p elag o W o lf as an En d an g ered or T h reaten ed Sp ecies, 8 1 Fed . Reg . 4 3 5 , 4 3 5 (J an . 6 , 2 0 1 6 ).I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 13

max imum. The log g ing project will further r educe deer habitat capability

and increase road density

.

The F orest Service nevertheless put the welfare of l o c al log g e rs a nd their families above that of the wolves, a nd approved B ig Thorne. More concerned with w o l ves than jobs, plaintiffs filed three lawsuits, pressing a variety o f challeng e s i n an attempt to derail the project. The district
court consolidated the cases and g r anted Alaska’s motion to interven e. I t then g ranted summary judg ment to the defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs appeal.

D ISCUSSION

W e consider whether th e F orest Service violated the NF MA by approving the F orest Plan o r the B ig Thorne log g ing project. 2 This d

ual inquiry tracks the two tiers of the
ag ency ’s leg al oblig ations. F irst, the NF MA requires that the F orest Service develop “land and resource manag ement plans,” c ommonly called forest plans, that set broad g oals a nd
g uidelines for each national forest. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a), (e), (g ); Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.
, 341 F .3d 961, 9 66 (9th Cir. 2003). Second, a fter a forest p lan is developed

, all subsequent ag ency actions within that national forest—projects like B ig Thorne—mus t c o m p ly with both the NF MA and the relevant f orest plan

. 16 U .S.C. § 1604(i); see also Lands Council v. McNair
, 5 37 F .3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), abrogated in par t on other

2 T h e d istrict co u rt also d ism issed p lain tif f s’ claim s b ro u g h t u n d er th e N a t i o n al En v i ro n m en tal P olicy A ct. W e d isp ose o f th o se claim s, an d

sev eral o u t stan din g m o tio n s f or j u d i cial n otice, in a m em oran d u m d isp ositio n

f i led co n cu rren tly

.I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 14

grounds by W

inter v. Nat. Res. Def. C o u n c i l

, Inc.
, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).

The Administrative Procedure Act provides our standard of review. W e set aside a n ag ency ’s actions “only if they a re arbitrary

, capricious, an abuse of discretion, o r otherwise not in accordance with law.” Or. Nat. Re s

. C o uncil Fund v. Goodman

, 505 F

. 3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2007) (in ternal quotation marks omitted) (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).

A. The F orest P lan

1

. W h ile “g eneraliz ed harm” to the environment isn’t
enoug h to supply standin g , the Supreme Court has emphasiz ed that particulariz ed harm to “recreational” or even “mere esthetic interests” is sufficient. Summers v

. Earth Island Inst.
, 555 U.S. 4 88, 494 ( 2009). W e have previously held that a plaintiff has standing t o challeng e a “prog rammatic” ag ency decision (like a forest p lan) when he suffers harm that is “fairly traceable” to that p r o gr a m

. See Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U .S. Fores t S

e r v

. , 789 F .3d 1075, 1 081 ( 9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotati o n m a rks omitted).

Plaintiffs present voluminous declaration s a mply demonstratin g t h a t they are challeng ing the F orest Plan as a result of specific applications and not, as defendants claim, on its face. The declarants use sites affected by the F orest Plan for fishing

, hunting

, and to “enjoy the solitude” available only in “remote, undeveloped a rea s on the Tong ass.” U nlike the sing le individual affidavit before the Supreme C o urt in Summers
, 555 U.S. at 495—which was inadequate to establish standing

—these d eclarations are sufficient to showI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 15

that actions approved u nder t h e F orest Plan will cause particulariz ed injury

to the plaintiffs.

2. T he NF MA’s reg ulations a t the time of the F orest Plan required that n ational forests “be manag ed to maintain viable populations of ex isting native and desired n o n -native vertebrate species.” 36 C

. F. R

. § 219.19 (2000) (emphasis added). 3 This reg ulation defined a v i ab l e population as o ne with enoug h “reproductive individuals to insure its continued

ex istence is well distributed in the planning area.” Id. So our question is whether the F orest Service unlawfully concluded that its F orest Plan would safeg uard the continued and welldistributed ex istence of the Alex ander Archipelag o wolf.

Some p laintiffs argu e that this is the wrong question. They claim that the “wolf provision” of the F orest Plan in fact mandates a “sustainable” wolf p opulation, not merely a viable

one. Sustainability is the more dem a n ding standard, a nd plaintiffs claim that the F orest Service v i o lated its selfimposed oblig ation by

failing to ensure sustainability

.

The difference between sustainability and viability is not sharply defined, and is made fuz z ier still by the parties, who occasionally c onflate the two—as when they refer to

3 T h is reg u lat i o n h as b een su p ersed ed

. W e ap p ly a s u p ersed ed
reg u latio n “ o n ly to th e ex t en t” it w as in co rp o rated in to th e relev an t Fo rest P lan

. Eco lo g

y Ctr. v

. Ca sta n ed

a , 5 7 4 F.3 d 6 5 2
, 6 5 7 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ). T h e Fo rest P lan

, w

h ich h as n o t b een u

p dated s in ce 2 0 0 8
, d o es m en t io n th e

su p ersed ed reg u latio n , an d th e p arties d o n ’ t disp u te th at th e o ld reg u latio n ap p lies. Ap p l y i n g th e cu rren t reg u latio n w o u ld n o t ch an g e th e resu l t b ecau se th e n ew reg u l atio n g iv es Fo rest S erv ice o f f icials ev en m ore leew ay to “ d eterm in e w

h eth er o r n o t th e p lan co m p o n en ts

. . . m ain tain a

v iab le p o pu latio n o f each sp ecies o f co n serv atio n co n cern w ith in t h e p lan area.” 3 6 C.F.R. § 2 1 9 .9 (b ).I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 16

“sustai n i ng viable” wolf p opulations, or repeatedly (if obscurely ) ponder the forest’s abi l i t y to “sustain wolves.” W e need n ot map t h e p recise contours of these concepts, however, b ecause the F orest Plan provision that mentions sustainability

is discretionary : I t states only that the Service “[ p] rovide, where possible , sufficient deer habitat capability
to

. . . maintain sustaina b le wolf p opulations” (emphasis added). This is an aspiration, not an oblig ation. B ecause the F orest Servic e i s only o blig ated to consider sustainability “where possible,” there is no la w fo r u s to apply in secondg uessing the a g ency

. S

ee Heckler v. Chaney

, 47 0 U

. S

. 821, 832 ( 1985) (construing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). We ag ree with the district c ourt that the provision g ives the Service the kind of “flex ibility and discretion” that is consistent with its mission of balancing competing objectives.

Plaintiffs arg ue that such broad discreti o n must itself be

a problem: I f the “sustainability ” p rovision merely e x presses

an aspiration, the F orest Plan must violat e t he NF MA b y failing to provide any enforceable mechani s m f or maintaining population minimu m s that comply with the viability
reg ulations. The arg ument appears to b e that the F orest Plan
must set hard viability minimums—like d e e r per square mile—below which the Service may not g o.

This arg ument is neith er v iable nor sustainable. W e’re

aware of n o a

uthority compelling the ag ency to set a specific standard or b enchmark for protecting the viability of a species that is neither endang ered nor threatened. This makes sense when we consider o ur constellation of f ederal statut es: The NF MA is fundamentally diff erent from the Endang ered Species Act, which has a s i n gl e

- minded focus on protecting species that are near ex t i n c t i o n. B ecause the Alex ander Archipelag o wolf is not entitled to such protection—despiteI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 17

the best efforts of e nvironmental g roups—its treatment is
g uided b y the less animal-friendly NF MA. The NF MA is about manag ing co m p e ting uses, none to the ex clusion o f others. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e).

A s the dissent n otes, the F orest Plan does incorporate a superseded r eg ulation requiring the a ge n cy to “maintain viable populations” o f n ative vertebrate species. See 36 C.F .R. § 219.19 (2000); see also supra note 3

. But, contrary to the dissent’s sug g es t ion, we have repeatedly a nd emphatically stressed that the S ervice is not required to iden t i f y a specific “mechanism” f o r securing viability

. W e have r ejected the idea that the Service “must a ss e s s population viability in t e r m s of actual population siz e , population trends, o r the p opulation dy namics o f other species”; even i f such methods are desirable, they are flatly “not required.” Inland Empire P u b. L a n d s Council v. U

.S. Forest Serv.
, 88 F

. 3d 754, 761 n.8 ( 9th Cir. 1996). I n d e ed

, we are “especially

” deferential “when questions of scientific methodolog y a

re involved,” like how to protect viability

. Id.
at 760. More recently

, our en b anc opinion in Lands Council

v. McNair ag ain made clear that courts ma y n o t “ require a particular ty

pe of proof that a p roject would maint a i n a species’ population.” 537 F.3d at 9 97. I nstead, an ag ency need only supply “a rational connection betw e e n the facts found and the conclusi ons made.” Or. Nat. Res. Council Fund v. B rong , 492 F .3d 1120, 1 1 31 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and q uotation m ar ks omitted). This rational connection can be supplied with studies or models or ex perts—or really any leg itimate evide n ce, so long as the ag ency describes a reasonable fit between its means and ends.

There’s no question that the ag ency u n d erstood and met this oblig ation. The Record o f D ecision specificallyI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 18

concludes that the F o r e s t P lan will “sustain viable populations of the A lex ander Archipelag o wolf.” T h e Service outlined a multi-part strateg y for protect i n g the wolf, which included “providing core habitats wit h l ow road density

, maintaining wolf harvest w ithin sustainable limits throug h reg ulations, and providing adequate deer habitat to support an ab undant and stable deer population.” T h e Service ex tensively discussed the manag ement and modeling c oncerns o f alternative forest plans, and concluded that all alternatives had between a “moderately hig h” and “very hig h” probability of p rotecting wolf viability

. The Service’s R e c o rd o f Decision specifically incorporates this discussion, along with

a long er dis c u s s i on in the 1997 F orest Plan. Could the Service’s di s c ussion have been long er, better, or different? Perhaps. B ut we decline to substitute o ur own policy wisdom for the ag ency ’s. 4

I n short, the Service met its leg al oblig ations, a nd
p l a intiffs’ remaining challeng es to the F orest Plan—a potpourri of contentions that the Service m i sinterpreted o ne thing or failed to consider another—amou n t to the sort o f quibbling that can’t overcome our deferen tial standard o f

r e view. San Luis & Delta-Mendota W ater Auth. v. Je w e l l

, 7 4 7 F. 3d 5 81, 601 (9th Cir. 2014). The F orest Service ’s discussion of viability

wasn’t arbitrary

or capricious.

4 T h e dissen t’ s f

o cu s o n p o p u latio n ch an g es o n P r i n c e o f W ales Islan d

, d i s s en t at 2 5

– 2 6
, is p u zzlin g f o r tw o reaso n s. First, th e Fo rest Serv ice’ s o b lig a t i o n i s to p ro tect v iab ility in t h e T o n g ass Fo rest as a

w h o le, n o t ev ery slice of it—in th i s case, an i slan d th at is l e s s t h a n 1 0%

o f th e to tal n atio n al f

o rest. Seco n d, t

h e ef f ects o f th e B ig T h o rn e P ro j ect tell u s n o th in g ab o u t w h eth er t h e ag en cy co m

p l ied w ith its l eg al

o b lig atio n s in

ad o p tin g th e Fo rest P lan m an y y ears earlier.I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 19

The NF MA g ives the F orest Service flex ibility becau s e the Service has many d ifferent go a l s—conservation,
commerce, recreation, and so on. See 1 6 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(2); McNair
, 537 F .3d at 993–94. The s t a t u t e reflects a cong ressional judg ment that balancing these g oals calls for
p olicy judg ments—judg ments that often require trade-offs
among worthy objectives, s u c h a s wolves and log g ing jobs. Cong r e s s left such judg ments to a politically responsive
ag ency with relevant ex pertise. See 63C Am. J ur. 2d Public L ands § 8 6 (2016) (“[ T] he proper mix of uses within an area is left to t h e d i s c retion of the F o rest Service.”). Depending

on the circumstances, lumber mi gh t be more important than

w o l ves. And even when wolves are more important than lumber, it mig ht be better to build fewer roads rather th a n allow for more deer. Courts are not well-equipped to police the substance of these judgm en t s. I nstead, we employ procedural tools: I n a nutshell, the ag e ncy must r ationa l l y

e x plain why it did w hat it did. Or. Nat. Res. Counc i l F u n d

, 492 F

. 3 d at 1 125. This isn’t the only w a y to structure a modern administrative state, and its e m p hasis on procedure will produce results that some despise. B ut we have an Administrative Procedure Act, not an Administrative Policy Act.

B. The Big Thorne P roject

Even if the F orest Servic e l a w fully implemented the F orest Plan, it must also ensu r e the B ig Thorne Project is consistent wi th that plan. 16 U .S.C. § 1604(i); M cNair
, 537 F .3d at 989.

Plaintiffs claim the Service failed to do this. B u t almost all of their arg uments proceed f rom the same false premise a s their objections to the F orest Plan—namely

, they assume thatI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 20

it’s a sustainable population that counts, rather than a viable

one. And the premise is wrong for the same r ea s o n: The sustainability provision of the F orest Plan i s discretionary

. The F orest Service mus t consider protecting sustainable populations “where p ossible.” I f the Service decides tha t a sustainable wolf population conflicts with other app r opriate forest g oals, the Service has discretion to pursue those g oals instead.

And that’s just what the F orest Service did. I t repeatedly

em p h a s i zed that it was ex panding timber supply from the Tong ass in the ser v i ce of its multiple-use mandate. The Service also pointed out that none of B ig Thorne’s proposed land met the F orest Plan’s sug g ested sustainability minimums; thus, these g oals wouldn’t have been met even in the absence of a log g ing plan. I n the end, the Service chose jobs over wolves. We h ave no authority to second-g uess that judg ment. See supra p. 16.

B ig Thorne’s environmental impact statemen t does

c o ntain scattered references to both sustainability a n d viability

. B ut plaintiffs are off-base in sug g esting that a few scattered references to sustainability —a common term that’s deploy ed incautiously throug hout the record and briefs—can transform th e S e r vice’s leg al oblig ation, which is to protect viabi lity alone. 5 To conclude that the Service intended to saddle itself with an ex tra oblig ation w ould require us to overlook the ag ency ’s numerous references to viability in the

5 On ce m o r e, th e Serv ice’ s o b lig atio n is to p ro tect v i ab ility in th e T o n g ass Natio n al Fo rest as a w h o le, n o t in e a c h i n d iv id u al T o n g ass p ro j ect area. P l a i n tif

f s’ claim s th at t

h e Serv ice f

ailed t o ex p lain h o w i t

w o u ld m ain tain w o l f v iab ility in th e B ig T h o rn e area t h u s, o n ce ag ain

, m isu n d erstan d th e Serv ice’ s o b lig atio n s.I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 21

documents approving B ig Thorne—as w hen it concluded in its impact statement that the plan was “desig ned to ensure the maintenance of v iable populatio n s of all vertebrate species [ in] the Tong ass by

means of a comprehensive approach.”

B e cause that con clusion accurately described the Service’s leg a l oblig a tions and was rationally ex plained, the judg ment below is

AF F IRMED.

GOUL D, Circuit J udg e , dissenting in part:

I dissent from the portion of the majority ’s discussion of the issues relating to the National F orest Manag eme n t A ct (NF MA), and concur in the court’s reasoning concerning the National Environmental Policy Act ( NEPA). H ence I join in f u l l b o t h the judg ment and the reasoning of the court a s presented in the memorandum disposition f iled concurrently with the published opinion. B ut I reg ret I cann o t fully join the NF MA analy sis, and hence I respectfull y dissent in part.

Addressing the N FM A issues, that statute ex plicitly serves up for ag e ncy action a catalog of potential competing

uses o f th e forest. T he ag ency administering NF MA, the United States F orest Service (F orest Service), is ex plicitly to consider manag ing the f

orests h aving in mind environmental considerations but also economic considerations. S e e Native Ecosystems Council v. W

eldon

, 697 F

. 3d 1043, 1056 ( 9th Cir. 2012) (“F orest plans a

r e desig ned to manag e forest resources by balancing the c o nsideration of environmental a nd economic factors.”); 16 U.S.C. § 1 604. O n e p u r pose of theI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 22

NF MA is to encourag e conservation of natural resources in

o u r national forests. B u t another p urpose is to support a timber industry that can p rovide much needed jobs to those living in forested areas in or near our national forests.

I t is obvious that o nce the a g ency makes a decision in the normal case and g ives more weig ht, for ex ample, to creating jobs than to protecting trees, the scope of review available for

a federal court will be ex tremely limited unde r the Administrati ve Procedures Act. W e are to “hold unlawful and set aside ag ency action, finding s, a nd conclusions f

ound
to be a r bitrary

, c apricious, an abuse of discretion, o r otherwise not in accordance w ith law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Our r e view under the Administrative Procedure Act of the
ag ency ’s f

inal administrative action is not g enerally a r eview of substance o r p o l icy

, but rather of procedure. As is wellstated by the majority

, “ we have an Administrative Procedure Act, not an Administrative Policy Act.”

Given that age n c y action in substance is likely to be upheld when p roper procedures are followed, it is all the

more important to look carefully a t w h e ther the d ecision o f the ag ency here is procedur a l ly sound. I conclude that it is
not.

F or one thing

, the a

pplicable reg u lation go v e rning the
content of a fores t plan, states that viable populations o f wildlife in the forests are to b e maintained. The NF MA aims
to foster diversity o f p lant and animal communities as part o f its mission to meet multiple-use objective s

. 18 U .S.C. § 1604(g )(3)(B ). The NF MA itself does not say that the wolf species must be maintained at specific numbers and a s previously stated, the statute se ts out competing potential u ses of the forest that must be balanced by the responsible federalI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 23

ag ency

. The majorit y poses the issue as a choice b etween wolves and jobs, but it is not so simple as that.

Althoug h the NF MA does n ot require viability

, the
ag ency has a duty to ensure the viability of surrounding wildlife if it incorporates 36 C.F .R. § 219.19 (2000) in t o its forest plan. See Ecology Ctr. v

. Castaneda

, 574 F

. 3 d 6 52, 657 (9th Cir. 2009). An d here, the F orest Service did incorporate the reg ulation in its forest plan by noting that it is directed “ to manag e wildlife habitat to maintain viable a nd well distributed populations to ensure continued ex istence in the p la nning area.” B y so d oing

, “ the forest plan must comply with substantive requirements of the [NFM A] desig ned to ensure continued diversity of pl an t and animal communities and the c ontinued viability o f w ildlife in the forest

. . . . ” Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Ritt e n h ouse , 305 F

. 3d 957, 961–62 ( 9th Cir. 2002). Sp e c i fically

, 3 6 C

. F. R. § 219.19 requires that “[ f ]ish and wildlife habitat shall b e manag ed to maintain viable popula t i ons of ex isting native and desired non-native vertebrate specie s i n the planning area.” O ur law is clear that an a g ency must a bide b y its own reg ulations. See Nat’l Ass’n of H o m e B uilders v

. Norton
, 3 40 F .3d 835, 852 ( 9th Cir. 2 0 0 3); see also United S t a t e s ex rel. Accardi v

. Shaughnessy

, 347 U .S. 260, 2 6 6 (1954).

Here, the majority is so p r e o c c upied with the issue whether “sustainability

” is a discretionary

term imposing no restraint on t he F orest Service, that it fails to assess ad eq u a tely whether the remaining population of the Alex a n d er A rchipelag o wolf will b e viable after the project proceeds. A viable population is “one which has t he estimated numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure its cont inued ex istence is w ellI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 24

distributed in the planning area.” 36 C.F .R. § 219.19 (2000). There is a d i f

f erence between a v iable population and a sustainable population

. The latter must contain a larg er number of wolves becau se it is a population “capable o f

s ustaining harvest.” The F orest Service has recog niz ed t h i s distinction: “[ M] inimum viable p opulations for many species
may n o t s atisfy the public need for wildlife populations depended upon to meet su b sistence and/or sport hunting uses.”

As quoted above, the lang uag e of the reg ulation states in pertinent part that a population of wildlife in the forest shall be maintained, so that is a “viable ” population. I t does not matter if the term sustainable population is hemmed in by the discretionary words “if possible.” I nstead, what is important is that there i s a non-discretionary oblig ation in the F orest Plan for the F orest Service to maintain a “viable” population of the Alex ander Archipelag o wolf. 1

Althoug h t h e Fo rest Service concluded that the F orest Plan ensured the viability of the A lex ander Archipelag o wolf and also concluded that the B ig Thorne Project w as consistent with the Plan, the F orest Plan and the B ig Thorne project do
not demonstrate that it wil l m a n a g e old g rowth habitat in a

ma nner that insures the viability of the wolf in w ell distributed population s t hroug hout the Tong ass National F orest. T he ag ency

is not oblig a ted to provide a sustainable

1 T h e m aj o rity arg u es t h a t ou r p reced en t rej ects th e id ea t h at th e Fo rest Serv ice n eed s t o id en tif y a “ m ech an ism ” to secu re v iab i l i t y , an d h as rej ected t

h e id ea th at v iab ility m

u s t b e assessed in term s o f p o p u latio n size, tren d s, o r d y

n am ics. Bu t th e p ro b l e m h e r e is n o t th at th e ag en cy d id n ’ t u se a p articu lar “ m ech an ism ” to assess v iab ility

, t h e p ro b l em is rath er t h at th e ag en cy j u s t d id n ot really g rap p le w ith assessin g w h eth er

cu rren t w o lf

p o p u latio n s are v iab l e. No r d o es th e m aj o rity

.I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 25

wolf population, but it must ensure v i a b l e wolf populations consistent with its substantive o blig ation under 36 C.F

. R. § 219.19. The F o rest Plan presently provides no mechanism to ensure wolf population viability

.

F or another thing

, the ag ency ’s rationale and r easoning
process is too summary and conclusory

, and fails to deal with the e ntire problem before it. W hen the a g ency opts to protect jobs rather than wolves, it w ould normally be allowed to make that choice. B u t the Supreme Court in State Farm elaborated on when we should consider an ag ency ’s action to be arbitrary and capricious. The Court stated that “the ag ency must ex a mine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory

ex p lanation for its action including a ‘ rational connecti on between the facts f

o u n d a nd the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n o

f U.S., I nc. v. State Farm M

ut. Auto. Ins. Co.
, 4 63 U.S. 29, 43 ( 1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States , 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).

That problem is presented h ere. The ag ency ’s a ssessment of the p lig ht o f the wolves in the Tong a ss National F orest is in my view inadequate. 2 I n the mid 1990s, 250–350 wolves

were thoug h t to inhabit the Alex a nder Archipelag o. The B ig Thorne project area, locate d on the Prince of W ales I sland, had sufficient habitat to support 45–50 wolves, making up three separate packs a n d a p o rtion of a fourth pack. A project, funded primarily by the F orest Service, estimated that by fall 2012, only about 29 w olves and only two remaining

2 T h e m aj o rity criticizes m y sp ecif ic discu ssio n o f th e P rin ce o f W ales Islan d

, b ecau se i t o n ly co v ers less th an 1 0% of th e T o n g ass Natio n al Fo rest. I d o so b ecau se th e islan d i n clu d es u n iq u e, tem p erate o ld

- g ro w

th rain f o rest h ab ita t , a n d b ecau se d eer p o p u latio n s d ep en d o n a su f f icien t q u an tity , d istrib u tio n , an d q u ality o f w i n ter o ld

- g ro w

th h ab itat.I N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 26

packs r emained in the B ig Thorne project area. B y spring o f 2013, researchers could only account for a mere six to seven wolves left in the project area. A nother researcher observed that “numbers seem to indicate that the population of wolves in the central p ortion o f Prince of W ales I sland is approaching

z ero.”

The A lex ander Archipelag o wolf an d the Sitka blacktailed deer, as the F o rest S er v i c e ex p lained, are closely interrelated. Survival of the w olves depends on survival o f the deer o n which the wolves feed, which in turn depends on maintenance of the o ld g rowth f orest h abitat on which the deer d epends. Deer populations depend on a sufficient quantity

, distribution, a n d quality of winter old-g r owth habitat. I t is inescapable that log gi n g r e duces this habitat. The F orest Service, aware that w olves depend on deer for
t h e ir survival, and that those deer to survive depend o n o l d
g rowth forest habitat, has stressed that maintaining sufficient deer h a bitat capability

, and thus g r eater number o f deer, was “the most important factor” in sustaining wolf viability in the Tong ass N ational F orest. I n fact, th e d e s truction o f deer habitat capability is, as the ag e n cy has e x plained, “the most important factor limiting wolf v iability .” Yet the F orest Plan does not support deer habitat c a pability numbers, and nothing in the record supports t h e Forest Service’s contention that viable wolf populations will remain rely ing on the other two prong s of habitat reserves and wolf mortality manag ement.

Perhaps it cannot b e said that the ag e n c y could never conclude on the limited evidence that a g roup of animals will

or will not survive as a consequence of f orest activities. B ut here the record is too sparse for definiti v e conclusion, a nd what evid e nce ex ists in the r ecord shows drastically decreasing wolf population over the past dec ades and aI N R E B I G T H O R

N E P R O J E C T 27

project that d iminishes d eer habitat capa bility

, f urther threatening the wolves.

I would remand for mor e p r o ceeding s before the district
court in which the F orest Service could better e x plai n i ts reasoning a

nd position relating to threatened habita t n e e d ed by the wolves that will be l o s t i f the pending project is approved. I urge t h e majority to reassess its conclusions, remand for more d evelopment of the r ecord and p e r tinent

c o n clusions, and also g ive g uidance (1) as to t h e interpretation of the term “ v i a b l e ” in its contex t; and also (2) on when a

nd under w hat circumstances the ag ency would be fr ee to modify its restrictive reg ulation on viable populations.

Hence I r espectfully dissent in p ar t

. I would vacate the decision of the F orest Service and r e mand for its f urther proceeding s, which at a minimum need to i nclude both a thor o u g h assessment of viability of the Alex ander Archipelag o wolf if the project proceeds, and an ex planation of its reasoning sufficient to satisfy State Farm

. Perhaps the
ag ency can satisfactorily ex plain itself. B ut ex plain it must do for the decision to be procedurally correct. An d w ho knows, perhaps in g oing throug h the rig orous ex planation o f whether the Alex a n der A rchipelag o wolf will continue to

ex ist in viable numbers, the ag ency may learn m o r e, which could lead it to take some different a ction more favorable to wolf and human communities. At a minimum, the ag ency , b y

ex p laining itself, will help to f ully inform the public about the issues presented in balancing wolf survival, adequacy of deer habitat, and impact on jobs and pertinent communities c aused by the final ag e ncy

action.