J-S16028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STEPHEN ERIC RAUGHT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2551 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at CP-15-CR-0001583-2020

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2023

Stephen Eric Raught (Appellant) appeals pro se from the judgment of 

sentence entered after a jury convicted him of endangering the welfare of 

children (EWOC).

1

 We affirm.

Appellant was a high school teacher on March 16, 2020, when he had 

inappropriate contact with a 17 year old student. On May 8, 2020, the 

Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count each of institutional sexual 

assault, corruption of minors, unlawful contact with a minor, and EWOC. On 

October 26, 2021, a jury convicted Appellant of EWOC, and acquitted him of 

the other charges.

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a).
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On March 15, 2022, the trial court, having reviewed a pre-sentence 

investigation report (PSI), sentenced Appellant to a standard-range sentence 

of 6 - 23 months in prison followed by one year of probation. Appellant filed 

a timely post-sentence motion and notice of appeal. On July 11, 2022, this 

Court dismissed the notice of appeal because the post-sentence motion 

remained pending with the trial court. The trial court denied Appellant’s postsentence motion on July 20, 2022. 

On August 29, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se motion to reinstate his 

post-sentence motion and direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. The trial court 

denied reinstatement of the post-sentence motion, but granted Appellant 

permission to appeal nunc pro tunc. This appeal followed.2

Appellant presents the following questions for review:

1. Whether the trial court [c]ommitted an error of law, and/or 

abused its discretion by sentencing the Appellant to a term of 

incarceration when the Appellant was only convicted of an 

offense graded as a misdemeanor in the first degree; and when 

the Appellant had no prior criminal record?

2. Whether the trial court [c]ommitted an error of law, and/or 

abused its discretion by sentencing the Appellant to a term of 

incarceration at the high end of the of the standard guideline 

range when the Appellant was only convicted of an offense 

graded as a misdemeanor in the first degree; and when the 

Appellant had no prior criminal record?

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2 On January 20, 2023, this Court remanded for a hearing pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). Thereafter, the trial 

court determined that Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 

waived his right to counsel.
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3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, and/or committed 

an error of law by sentencing the Appellant to a term of 

incarceration which was fundamentally unfair under the 

particular facts and circumstances of the case, and the 

evidence introduced at the Appellant’s trial?

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, and/or committed 

an error of law by sentencing the Appellant to a term of 

incarceration which was against public policy, given the 

particular facts and circumstances of the case, and the 

evidence introduced at the Appellant’s trial?

5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, and/or committed 

an error of law by sentencing the Appellant to a term of 

incarceration when the Commonwealth failed to introduce any 

evidence at the Appellant’s trial which would establish any of 

the required elements, and therefore support a guilty verdict 

on the offense of [EWOC] alone; which clearly renders the 

jury’s verdict to be against the weight of the evidence which 

was presented at the Appellant’s trial?

6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, and/or committed 

an error of law by sentencing the Appellant to a term of 

incarceration which was based upon the trial court’s 

consideration of facts which were not in evidence at the

Appellant’s trial as aggravating factors in sentencing the 

Appellant?

7. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, and/or committed 

an error of law by sentencing the Appellant to a term of 

incarceration when doing so served to usurp the function of the 

jury as the trier of fact, by considering substantive testimony 

from the alleged victim, as well as other evidence which was 

considered and rejected, and/or found to be incredible and/or

unreliable by the jury, as aggravating factors in sentencing the 

Appellant?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-7.3

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3 Appellant presented nine issues but has withdrawn the last two. See

Appellant’s Brief at 18.
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In all but his fifth issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects 

of his sentence. There is no absolute right to challenge the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. 

Super. 2013). Before reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing claim, 

we must determine:

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved 

his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a concise 

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with 

respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether 

the concise statement raises a substantial question that the 

sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329–30 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citation omitted).

Appellant preserved his sentencing issues in a post-sentence motion and 

filed a timely appeal. However, Appellant has not included a Rule Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f) statement in his brief. “A failure to include the Rule 2119(f) statement 

does not automatically waive an appellant’s argument ... we are precluded 

from reaching the merits of the claim when the Commonwealth lodges an 

objection to the omission of the statement.” Commonwealth v. Roser, 914 

A.2d 447, 457 (Pa. Super. 2006). Because the Commonwealth has not 

objected to the absence of the 2119(f) statement, we consider whether 

Appellant has raised a substantial question.

Appellant contends the trial court improperly sentenced him to 

incarceration, “when Appellant was only convicted of an offense graded as a 

misdemeanor in the first degree; and when [he] had no prior criminal record.” 
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Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant claims the trial court “relied heavily” on the 

victim’s trial testimony and “sensational victim impact statement.” Id. at 14-

15. According to Appellant, the trial court improperly considered evidence

related to the charges of which he was acquitted. Id. at 16-17. We conclude 

these claims raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. 

Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 692 (Pa. Super. 2021) (claim that sentence was 

harsh and excessive and trial court failed to consider mitigating factors raises 

substantial question); Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064-65 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (“[A] claim that a sentence is excessive because the trial court 

relied on an impermissible factor raises a substantial question.”).

We consider the merits of Appellant’s sentencing claims mindful of the 

following:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 731 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted).

When a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, 

Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code. See Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010).

We may only vacate a sentence that is within the guidelines if the sentence is 
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“clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2). In addition, when the trial 

court has had the benefit of a PSI, we “presume that the sentencing judge 

was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” 

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988). 

Here, the sentencing record shows that the trial court considered the 

PSI, and heard from witnesses who testified on behalf of the Commonwealth 

and Appellant. N.T., 3/15/22, at 3, 46. Notably, the trial court observed that 

the “charge that is relevant to this court today is the sentencing for [EWOC].” 

Id. at 43. There is nothing in the record that demonstrates the trial court 

considered evidence related to Appellant’s other charges. Upon review, we 

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the 

appropriate factors and sentencing Appellant in the standard-range.

Appellant also challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. 

Appellant’s Brief at 19-33. Appellant maintains “the Commonwealth failed to 

introduce any evidence at Appellant’s trial which would establish any of the 

required elements, and therefore support a guilty verdict on the offense of 

[EWOC.]” Id. at 16. Appellant asserts the evidence “clearly renders the jury’s 

verdict to be against the weight of the evidence which was presented at 

Appellant’s trial.” Id. 

To “preserve a sufficiency claim, the Rule 1925(b) statement must 

specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.” 
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Commonwealth v. Widger, 237 A.3d 1151, 1156 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(emphasis added). If the appellant does not specify the elements, the 

sufficiency claim is waived. Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072 

(Pa. Super. 2017). 

Appellant did not specify “sufficiency of the evidence” in his Rule 

1925(b) concise statement, or articulate the elements of EWOC he was

challenging. See Concise Statement, 10/24/22, at 2 (unnumbered) (stating 

“the Commonwealth failed to introduce any evidence at trial which would 

support a guilty verdict on the charge of [EWOC] alone; which clearly renders 

the jury’s verdict ... against the weight of the evidence.”); cf. Appellant’s Brief 

at 29-30 (discussing the standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence 

claim). Thus, the trial court addressed the weight, but not sufficiency, in its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion. Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/23, at 20, 57-59 (analyzing 

Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence). We conclude that 

Appellant has waived his sufficiency claim because he failed to preserve it in 

his Rule 1925(b) statement. Roche, 153 A.3d at 1072.

Waiver notwithstanding, Appellant’s sufficiency challenge would lack 

merit.

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court 

must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn 

from the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, and we must determine if the 

evidence, thus viewed, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. This Court may not substitute its judgment for 

that of the factfinder. If the record contains support for the 
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verdict, it may not be disturbed. Moreover, a jury may believe all, 

some or none of a party’s testimony.

Commonwealth v. Burns, 765 A.2d 1144, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations 

omitted). “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence[.]” Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426, 430 

(Pa. Super. 2012).

An individual is guilty of EWOC if, when he is “supervising the welfare of 

a child under 18 years of age,” he “knowingly endangers the welfare of the 

child by violating a duty of care, protection, or support.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

4304(a). Here, Appellant either misstates the evidence or views the evidence 

in the light most favorable to him. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-13; 29, 31-32. 

Appellant also appears to claim that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent. Id.

at 29 (stating “the substance of [the victim’s] testimony was relevant only to 

the sexual offenses [and] the jury acquitted Appellant of each and every 

sexual offense; ... there was no further evidence considered by the jury which 

support a finding of [EWOC].”).

We have explained:

Inconsistent verdicts, while often perplexing, are not considered 

mistakes and do not constitute a basis for reversal. Rather, the 

rationale for allowing inconsistent verdicts is that it is the jury’s 

sole prerogative to decide on which counts to convict in order to 

provide a defendant with sufficient punishment.

Commonwealth v. Thoeun Tha, 64 A.3d 704, 711 (Pa. Super. 2013).

In this case, the victim testified that Appellant was her teacher and 

mentor. N.T., 10/25/21, at 6-7, 9. The victim relayed that she was alone 
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with Appellant when he shut the classroom door, kissed her, and performed 

oral sex on her over her clothing. Id. at 14, 41, 43-47. Appellant told her, “I 

wish I could taste you, and I wish I was inside you.” Id. at 24. This testimony 

was sufficient for the jury to convict Appellant of EWOC. Commonwealth v. 

Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 856-57 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding minor victims’ 

testimony that appellant made them do sexual “stuff” was sufficient to sustain 

a conviction of EWOC); Commonwealth v. Davis, 650 A.2d 452, 455 (Pa. 

Super. 1994) (victim’s uncorroborated testimony, if believed by the trier of 

fact, is sufficient to support a conviction even if the defense presents 

countervailing evidence). In the absence of waiver, Appellant’s sufficiency 

claim would lack merit.

Appellant also argues his conviction was against the weight of the 

evidence.4 “A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is 

sufficient to sustain the verdict but seeks a new trial on the grounds that 

the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in favor of acquittal that a guilty 

verdict shocks one’s sense of justice.” In re A.G.C., 142 A.3d 102, 109 (Pa. 

Super. 2016) (emphasis added). “Appellate review of a weight claim is a 

review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether 

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth. v. 

Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) (citation omitted).

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4 Appellant preserved this issue by raising it in his post-sentence motion. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 (challenges to the weight of the evidence).
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Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see 

the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest 

consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial 

judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination of whether the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Id. (citation omitted).

In rejecting Appellant’s weight claim, the trial court explained: 

After a thorough review of the evidence, this [c]ourt unequivocally 

determined that the guilty verdict on the charge of [EWOC] is not 

against the weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the evidence 

strongly supports the verdict. The testimony from the witnesses 

was compelling. The jury’s verdict on this charge was not so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/23, at 59. As the record supports the trial court’s 

disposition, we discern no abuse of discretion. Widmer, supra.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/20/2023