IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA19-600

Filed: 31 December 2020

Wake County, No. 11 CVD 13578

JOHN EDWARD BISHOP, III, Plaintiff,

v.

SARA ELIZABETH BISHOP, Defendant.

Appeal by plaintiff from orders entered 30 April and 27 November 2018 by 

Judge Anna Worley in District Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 

4 February 2020. 

Jonathan McGirt, for plaintiff-appellant.

Manning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, for defendantappellee.

STROUD, Judge.

Father appeals from an order increasing his child support obligation. Because 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of “the estates, 

earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, the 

child care and homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of the 

particular case,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c) (2019), we affirm the trial court’s order. 

I. Background
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The parties married in 1998 and separated in 2007. They had one child during 

the marriage, Sarah.

1 An initial child custody and child support order was entered 

on 31 December 2012 in District Court, Wake County (“2012 Order”). The 2012 Order 

provided for joint legal and physical custody for Sarah and required Father to pay 

$2,064.00 per month in child support and to pay 93% unreimbursed medical expenses. 

After entry of the 2012 Order, the parties filed several motions which did not result 

in a change in child support or custody but did result in the appointment of a 

parenting coordinator. 

In February 2017, Mother filed a motion to modify child support, and the trial 

court held a hearing on this motion on 13 June 2017. On 30 April 2018, the trial court 

entered an order (“2018 Order”) increasing Father’s child support to $3,289.00 per 

month and changing the parties’ respective percentages of the responsibility for

unreimbursed medical expenses “with [Father] bearing 83% of such cost, and 

[Mother] bearing 17% of such cost.” Father moved for a new trial and other relief 

from the April 2018 Order. The trial court denied Father’s motions, and Father 

appealed from both the 2018 Order and the order denying the post-trial motions. 

II. Standard of Review

On appeal, “[c]hild support orders entered by a trial 

court are accorded substantial deference . . . and our review 

is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear 

abuse of discretion.” Under this standard of review, the 

 

1 A pseudonym is used to protect the privacy of the child. 
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Opinion of the Court

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trial court’s order will be upheld unless its “actions were 

manifestly unsupported by reason.”

Hart v. Hart, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 836 S.E.2d 244, 250 (2019) (alterations in 

original) (citations omitted). 

III. Child Support

Father argues, “[t]he trial court erred as a matter of law in modifying the prior 

child support order and abused its discretion in determining the amount of child 

support.” (Original in all caps.) Except for a portion of one finding, Father does not 

challenge the trial court’s findings of fact as unsupported by the evidence, but he 

contends these findings demonstrate mathematical errors in the calculation of the 

child support. Father does challenge Finding No. 62, “Plaintiff has had a significant 

increase in his income from the time of the 2012 Order . . . .” Father argues his income 

had actually decreased. But Father’s primary argument is that the trial court 

ordered him to pay child support in excess of the reasonable needs of the minor child, 

based upon the trial court’s findings. 

Father does not dispute the most important findings of fact, namely: (1) 

Father’s income was $44,846.29 per month; (2) Mother’s income was $7,542.00 per 

month; and (3) The child’s total reasonable needs were $7,926.23 per month, of which 

Father then incurred $5,431.18 per month, and Mother then incurred $2,495.05 per 

month. Father argues that the percentages of responsibility assigned to each party 
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Opinion of the Court

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do not appear to coincide with the findings of the parties’ incomes and the child’s 

reasonable needs. In short, he contends the trial court’s math is wrong. 

A. Father’s Income

Father’s primary argument focuses on the child’s needs, but he does contend 

the trial court erred in finding his income had significantly increased since the 2012 

Order. The hearing in 2012 was held in May, so the evidence addressed the income 

up to that point in the year. In the 2012 Order, the trial court made findings 

regarding Father’s income each year from 2007 until 2011. Over these years, his

gross income increased substantially from $162,517.00 in 2007 to $775,586 in 2011, 

when he began his employment with Cisco. Father’s adjusted gross income for 2011 

was $653,278, which would be approximately $54,440 per month. Father was a 

“founder and officer” of Inlet Technologies, Inc., where he worked from 2007 until 

2011, when Cisco Systems Inc. purchased Inlet. Due to the buyout of Inlet, Father 

received additional payments including a “cash retention bonus” of $150,000 payable 

over two years, half in 2012 and half in 2013. In 2012, his base salary at Cisco was 

$200,000 and he was eligible for performance bonuses of an additional 35% of his 

annual gross salary. 

Father argues that although the trial court made detailed findings in 2012 

regarding his income, “[u]nfortunately, the trial court did not synthesize this cascade 

of data into an actual figure for [Father’s] monthly income.” Father proposes that we 
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Opinion of the Court

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should “reverse-engineer” the 2012 Order to determine Father’s monthly income in 

2012, and based upon the order’s assignment of 93% of the responsibility for 

uninsured medical expenses to the amount of child support ordered, he contends the 

trial court tacitly found his income to be $60,888.43 per month. Father is correct that 

the trial court did not “synthesize the cascade of data” in the 2012 Order, and Father’s 

mathematical argument is quite interesting. But the 2012 Order was not appealed. 

And the trial court did make a finding regarding the monthly income it used “for the 

purposes of child support.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court found in the 2012 

Order that Father’s “gross monthly income, including base salary and bonuses, for 

the purposes of child support currently exceeds $30,000 per month.” Thus, for our 

purposes also, Father’s income in 2012, for purposes of child support, was in excess 

of $30,000 per month. 

In the order on appeal, after quoting the findings from the 2012 Order 

regarding Father’s income as of 2012, the trial court found Father “has had a 

significant increase in his income” and determined his “current ongoing monthly 

income to be $44,846.29 per month.” The trial court made detailed findings regarding 

Father’s employment history since 2012. He changed employers to Akamai 

Technologies and had a gross income in 2015 of $837,165. His gross income in 2016 

was $607.622. As of the time of trial in 2017, in mid-May, Father had “earned salary 

and bonus totaling $246,500” and was not expecting any more bonuses for the year. 
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Opinion of the Court

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His base salary was $13,281 every two weeks, and the trial court extrapolated this to 

a “total salary and bonus” for the year 2017 of $432,500, or $36,041.66 per month. 

The trial court also made findings noting that Father had “historically received 

restricted stock shares from his employer,” which “show up in his compensation and 

paystubs separate from his salary and bonus.” In 2017, he had received about 

$233,000 in restricted stock shares, but he did not intend to redeem any shares at 

that time.

Thus, Father’s income stream was complex and included elements of base 

salary, bonuses, and stock. His income varied over the years, but the overall 

trajectory was upward. In 2012, the trial court determined Father’s income “for the 

purposes of child support” was in excess of $30,000 per month. In 2017, the trial court 

found Father’s income “total salary and bonus” for the year 2017 to be $432,500, or 

$36,041.66 per month. The trial court did not err in finding Father “has had a 

significant increase in his income” since 2012. 

B. Reasonable Needs of Minor Child

Father contends the trial court erred in its calculation of the child’s reasonable 

needs. He argues that the amount of child support is greater than the child’s total 

needs based upon his mathematical analysis of the order. In the 2012 Order, the trial 

court made this finding regarding the child’s needs:

74. Defendant’s current reasonable monthly needs 

for her regular recurring expenses benefitting the minor 
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Opinion of the Court

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child and for the minor child together, are $2,345, including 

before and after school care. The reasonable monthly 

expenses of the minor child, alone, including before and 

after school care, are $1,595. 

Father argues that in the 2012 Order, “The trial court provided no explanation of the 

methodology used to derive its award of the oddly specific monthly child support 

award of $2,064 per month.” Father proposes another complex mathematical 

analysis to determine exactly how the trial court may have calculated this amount in 

the 2012 Order, but again, the 2012 Order is not on appeal. 

In the 2018 Order, the trial court found: 

23. The Court has determined the child’s total 

reasonable needs between the parties to be $7,926.23 per 

month. Out of the child’s reasonable needs, the Plaintiff 

currently incurs needs of $5,431.18 per month, and the 

Defendant currently incurs needs of $2,495.05 per month. 

The disparity in the parties’ respective reasonable needs 

for the minor child is directly related to the amount of

respective discretionary income the parties have available 

for the minor child. 

Father contends that the order on appeal did not “break out the child’s expenses into 

the categories of, for example, ‘the child’s portion of total recurring expenses at 

Plaintiff’s/Defendant’s household’ versus ‘the child’s individual monthly needs[,]’”

making a direct comparison of the changes in the child’s needs or expenses difficult. 

Mother responds that Father did not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact 

and notes the trial court made extensive findings regarding both parties’ lifestyles, 

assets, and debts and set child support based upon all of these factors. Father 
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responds that he is “utterly mystified as to why Defendant’s supplemental ‘Statement 

of Facts,’ should venture off into a wide‐ ranging review of Plaintiff’s income, assets, 

and lifestyle. Defendant’s diversionary hand‐ waving here is completely irrelevant 

to the arguments addressed in Plaintiff‐ Appellant’s Brief.” (Citation and emphasis 

omitted.) According to Father, it’s all about the math, and the math is wrong. 

Math is important, but it is not the only thing the trial court may consider. 

North Carolina General Statute § 50-13.4 provides the standard for child support, 

and Mother’s discussion of the trial court’s findings regarding “Plaintiff’s income, 

assets, and lifestyle” is not “diversionary hand-waving.” These are some of the factors 

the trial court should consider in calculating child support. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-

13.4.

Father’s argument overlooks the trial court’s determination that the child’s 

needs are greater than the expenses stated on Mother’s financial affidavit. The trial 

court explained this when rendering its ruling denying Father’s post-trial motions,

The fact that [Father] is in fact paying a certain 

amount that was attributed specifically to the child in his 

household—I know where you’re getting your math, Mr. 

Sokol. In a pure mathematical calculation it makes sense. 

As a matter of equity in dividing up what the child herself 

should get, it doesn’t make sense. . . . 

. . . . 

And therefore, the child should be entitled to have 

similar opportunities in both households, and the only way 

to do that is to divide the child’s needs rather than trying 

to do this mathematical calculation of what I do actually 

provide for in my household. 
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Opinion of the Court

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Our cases have long recognized that the reasonable needs of a child are 

determined based upon the ability of the parents to provide:

In addition to the actual needs of the child, a father has a 

legal duty to give his children those advantages which are 

reasonable considering his financial condition and his 

position in society.

In Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa.Super. 276, 283, 150 A.2d 139, 

143, Woodside, J., observed:

“Children of wealthy parents are 

entitled to the educational advantages of 

travel, private lessons in music, drama, 

swimming, horseback riding, and other 

activities in which they show interest and 

ability. * * * It is possible that a child with 

nothing more than a house to shelter him, a 

coat to keep him warm and sufficient food to 

keep him healthy will be happier and more 

successful than a child who has all the 

‘advantages,’ but most parents strive and 

sacrifice to give their children ‘advantages’

which cost money. * * * Much of the special 

education and training which will be of value 

to people throughout life must be given them 

when they are young, or be forever lost to 

them.”

What amount is reasonable for a child’s support is to 

be determined with reference to the special circumstances 

of the particular parties. Things which might properly be 

deemed necessaries by the family of a man of large income 

would not be so regarded in the family of a man whose 

earnings were small and who had not been able to

accumulate any savings. In determining that amount 

which is reasonable, the trial judge has a wide discretion 

with which this court will not interfere in the absence of a 

manifest abuse. 
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Opinion of the Court

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Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 57-58, 134 S.E.2d 227, 234 (1964) (citations 

omitted).

The trial court gave substantial consideration to the disparity in the parties’ 

lifestyles and the parties’ accustomed standards of living. Even if Father’s income 

had decreased since the 2012 Order, as Father contends, the change in his income 

was not the relevant change. Whether Father’s income is $44,846.00 per month (2018 

Order) or over $30,000 per month (2012 Order), it is more than sufficient to cover 

Father’s individual expenses, the child’s expenses, and the amount of child support 

ordered. The issue is not Father’s ability to pay; it is the reasonable needs of the 

child. The change alleged in the motion to modify child support was the increase in 

the child’s needs. Father does not challenge the trial court’s determination that the 

child’s needs have increased since 2012, so modification is appropriate. This is a 

discretionary determination, and in an above-the-guidelines case, the trial court is 

not required to use a particular formula. See N.C. Child Support Guidelines, AOCA-162, at 2 (2015). 

For cases falling within the N.C. Child Support Guidelines, calculation of child 

support and review of orders is normally straightforward. Once the trial court has 

determined the numbers to put into the formula, math provides the answer. But in 

cases above the child support guidelines, the trial court must make a discretionary 
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determination based upon the factors set out in North Carolina General Statute § 50-

13.4(c):

Payments ordered for the support of a minor child shall be 

in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child 

for health, education, and maintenance, having due regard 

to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard 

of living of the child and the parties, the child care and 

homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of 

the particular case.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c) (2019).

The judge’s consideration of the interplay of these factors is not dictated by a 

“magic formula.” Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 69, 326 S.E.2d 863, 867 (1985).

To comply with G.S. 50–13.4(c), the order for child 

support must be premised upon the interplay of the trial 

court’s conclusions of law as to the amount of support 

necessary “to meet the reasonable needs of the child” and 

the relative ability of the parties to provide that amount.

To support these conclusions of law, the court must also 

make specific findings of fact so that an appellate court can 

ascertain whether the judge below gave “due regard to the 

estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of 

living of the child and the parties, the child care and 

homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of 

the particular case.” Such findings are necessary to an 

appellate court’s determination of whether the judge’s 

order is sufficiently supported by competent evidence. If 

the record discloses sufficient evidence to support the 

findings, it is not this Court’s task to determine de novo the 

weight and credibility to be given the evidence contained in 

the record on appeal.

The judge’s consideration of the above factors 

contained in G.S. 50–13.4(c) is not guided by any magic 

formula. Computing the amount of child support is 

normally an exercise of sound judicial discretion, requiring 
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the judge to review all of the evidence before him. Absent 

a clear abuse of discretion, a judge’s determination of what 

is a proper amount of support will not be disturbed on 

appeal.

Id. at 68-69, 326 S.E.2d at 867-68 (citations omitted). 

Even in a case falling outside the child support guidelines, the trial court may 

consider using a formula to guide its determination of child support, and if the court 

uses a formula, the calculations should be mathematically correct. See id. at 79, 326 

S.E.2d at 873 (“Although the use of such a formula does serve as a convenient 

guideline in assisting the trial judge in fairly calculating child support awards, the 

formula used cannot be applied without some degree of mathematical accuracy.”). 

Father contends the trial court used a “formula,” of sorts, but did not do the math 

accurately. He argues the 2018 Order is “incoherent” and “that a child support award 

that is almost 110% of the child’s total reasonable needs is demonstrably 

unsupportable.” If the trial court were required to use a precise mathematical 

formula to establish child support, Father may be right. But the trial court’s findings 

demonstrate that instead of using a formula to set the exact amount of support, it 

considered the parties’ incomes and expenses but also gave “due regard to the estates, 

earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, the 

child care and homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of the 

particular case.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c); see also N.C. Child Support Guidelines, 

at 2. The trial court’s findings emphasized its consideration of the parties “estates,
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Opinion of the Court

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earnings, conditions, [and] accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties.” 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c).

Here, the trial court found 

19. [Mother’s] expenses for herself and the minor 

child are skewed by a number of factors. For example, 

[Mother] currently drives a vehicle which is 10 years old 

and which has over 172,000 miles on it. It is not reasonable 

to assume that [Mother] will be able to continue to drive 

this vehicle without purchasing a new vehicle in the near 

future. [Mother] previously owned a 2014 Toyota 

Highlander she purchased new which had monthly 

payments of $570. [Mother] sold this vehicle after owning 

it for several years to alleviate herself of the car expense in 

order to fit her budget. [Father] on the other hand

currently lists two automobile expense payments between 

himself and his wife in the amount of over $1,500 per 

month. The Plaintiff’s vehicles were purchased within the 

last several years. 

20. In a similar fashion [Mother’s] vacation 

expenses are a fraction of what [Father] spends for 

vacations. For example, [Mother] last year incurred an 

expense of approximately $4,000 for her and the minor 

child to visit Costa Rica. This was an atypical vacation for 

the Defendant and the minor child. Typically [Mother] and 

[Sarah] go to the North Carolina oceanfront for vacation 

and incur an expense which is a fraction of the Costa Rica 

expense. [Father] by comparison within the past year or so

has taken the minor child on a ski trip to Utah, a Disney 

Cruise, a trip to Disney World and a trip to New York City. 

All of these trips had attendant expenses for air fare, 

meals, shows, etc. where the vacation expenses for [Father]

and the minor child totaled thousands of dollars. 

21. [Mother] had debts for multiple credit cards 

listed upon her affidavit in 2012. These debts did not 

appear on her affidavit filed in 2016. [Mother] used a 
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portion of her settlement from the parties’ divorce to pay 

these debts off. [Mother] has approximately $9,000 

remaining from the divorce settlement. [Mother] also 

saves for retirement through a 401(k) plan through her 

employer. She has no significant equity in stocks, 

brokerage accounts, etc. like [Father] has. 

22. [Mother’s] expenses for herself and [Sarah]

are a fraction of what [Father] incurs, because [Mother] 

budgets her funds and only pays for the expenses that she 

is able to incur for [Sarah]. The standard of living [Mother]

is currently maintaining for herself and [Sarah] is 

significantly less than what the parties and the minor child 

enjoyed at the time of the parties’ separation and what 

[Father] has historically and currently enjoys after 

separation. She would incur greater expenses for [Sarah] 

if she had the means to do so. These increased expenses if 

incurred would still only be a percentage of the expenses 

[Father] incurs with respect to [Sarah] each month. 

23. The Court has determined the child’s total 

reasonable needs between the parties to be $7,926.23 per 

month. Out of the child’s reasonable needs, [Father]

currently incurs needs of $5,431.18 per month, and 

[Mother] currently incurs needs of $2,495.05 per month. 

The disparity in the parties respective reasonable needs for 

the minor child is directly related to the amount of

respective discretionary income the parties have available 

for the minor child.

(Emphasis added.)

These findings are not challenged as unsupported by the evidence, so they are 

binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) 

(“Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is 
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Opinion of the Court

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presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.”). The 

trial court’s findings focus on the disparity in the parties’ estates:

9. [Father] also has a brokerage account with 

Charles Schwab which had an end of year value in 2016 of 

$655,071. By the end of April, 2017, the value of the 

brokerage account had grown to $821,606. The growth in 

[Father’s] brokerage account reflects in part the deposit of 

the RSUs referenced in Finding of Fact #8 above. This 

growth had occurred despite cash withdrawals that 

[Father] occasionally makes from the account to maintain 

his standard of living. 

10. [Father] has been married for several years. 

His wife does not work outside of the home and does not 

earn a salary. The Plaintiff and his wife within the past 

two years purchased a home in Raleigh with an 

approximate purchase price of $1.2 million. 

11. [Father] has no ongoing indebtedness other 

than the mortgage on his home, the mortgage on another 

residence he owns in Lee County, and obligations for 

vehicle purchases. [Father] runs his ongoing expenses 

primarily through his Citi Advantage credit card. [Father] 

incurs charges on this credit card anywhere from between 

$15,000 - $35,000 per month and pays the card off each 

month. [Father] through the time period from October, 

2016 through May, 2017 averaged purchases for wine, trips 

to vineyards, etc. in the approximate amount of $6,400 per 

month. He also purchased a birthday present for his wife 

in the amount of $8,000 and a piece of fine art in the 

amount of $3,105 during this time period. 

. . . . 

16. Since the entry of this Court’s 2012 Order, 

[Mother] has purchased a home in the amount of $262,000. 

[Mother] used a portion of her settlement from the parties’ 

divorce to fund the down purchase for this house. 
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Opinion of the Court

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. . . .

21. [Mother] had debts for multiple credit cards 

listed upon her affidavit in 2012. These debts did not 

appear on her affidavit filed in 2016. [Mother] used a 

portion of her settlement from the parties’ divorce to pay 

these debts off. [Mother] has approximately $9,000 

remaining from the divorce settlement. [ Mother] also 

saves for retirement through a 401(k) plan through her 

employer. She has no significant equity in stocks, 

brokerage accounts, etc. like [Father] has. 

22. [Mother’s] expenses for herself and [Sarah] 

are a fraction of what [Father] incurs, because [Mother] 

budgets her funds and only pays for the expenses that she 

is able to incur for [Sarah]. The standard of living [Mother] 

is currently maintaining for herself and [Sarah] is 

significantly less than what the parties and the minor child 

enjoyed at the time of the parties’ separation and what 

[Father] has historically and currently enjoys after 

separation. She would incur greater expenses for [Sarah] 

if she had the means to do so. These increased expenses if 

incurred would still only be a percentage of the expenses 

[Father] incurs with respect to [Sarah] each month. 

The weight assigned to each factor mentioned in North Carolina General 

Statute § 50-13.4(c) is in the trial court’s discretion. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. at 69, 326 

S.E.2d at 867-68. The trial court set forth specific findings and gave due regard to 

the factors required by North Carolina General Statute § 50-13.4(c). Kleoudis v. 

Kleoudis, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 843 S.E.2d 277, 283 (2020) (“Giving ‘due regard’ to 

the estates of the parties does not require detailed findings as to the value of each 

individual asset but requires only that the trial court consider the evidence and make 
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Opinion of the Court

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sufficient findings addressing its determination regarding the estates to allow 

appellate review.”). Based upon those findings, we discern no abuse of discretion. 

IV. Post-trial Motions

Because we have concluded the trial court did not err in modifying Father’s 

child support obligation, we also conclude the trial court did not err by denying 

Father’s post-trial motions. This argument is overruled. 

V. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s 2018 Order and the order denying the posttrial 

motions.

AFFIRMED.

Judge COLLINS concurs.

Judge BERGER dissents with separate opinion.
No. COA19-600 – Bishop v. Bishop 

BERGER, Judge, dissenting in separate opinion.

“The determination of child support must be done in such way to result in 

fairness to all parties.” Walker v. Walker, 38 N.C. App. 226, 228, 247 S.E.2d 615, 616 

(1978) (citation omitted). Because the trial court’s child support order is more than 

100% of the minor child’s reasonable needs, I respectfully dissent.

Payments ordered for the support of a minor child 

shall be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of 

the child for health, education, and maintenance, having 

due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed 

standard of living of the child and the parties, the child care 

and homemaker contributions of each party, and other 

facts of the particular case. 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c) (2019).

The statute is clear and unambiguous: child support payments “shall be in such 

amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c). 

Here, the trial court determined that the “total reasonable needs” of the minor child 

was $7,926.23 per month based upon a finding that “Plaintiff currently incurs needs 

of $5,431.18 per month, and [ ] Defendant currently incurs needs of $2,495.05 per 

month.” The trial court also found as fact that “[Defendant] would incur greater 

expenses for [the minor child] if she had the means to do so.” 

The trial court then concluded as a matter of law that increases in the parties’ 

incomes and “an increase in the minor child’s reasonable needs” constituted a 

substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of the prior support 

order. In ordering Plaintiff to pay $3,289.00 per month in child support, the trial 
BISHOP V. BISHOP

Berger, J., dissenting

2

court imposed a child support obligation on Plaintiff that was 110% of “the total 

reasonable needs” of the minor child. 

There is no support in the record for the amount awarded by the trial court. 

The majority is correct, “[m]ath is important,” and parties should have some 

assurance that a child support order is based on objective criteria; not guesswork, 

flawed processes, or even a judge’s implicit bias against wealth and wealth creators. 

However, the majority opinion allows trial courts to impose random, arbitrary child 

support obligations that it deems subjectively fair, thus, taxing parents of means in 

an effort to create emotional equality. 

Child support payments are not intended, as the trial court found in finding of 

fact 24, to meet Defendant’s needs. Child support is not spousal support. However, 

the trial court appears to have considered a new car as one of the expenses Defendant 

would incur “if she had the means to do so.” The trial court addressed the age and 

mileage of Defendant’s vehicle, and determined that “[i]t is not reasonable to assume 

that [ ] Defendant will be able to continue to drive this vehicle without purchasing a 

new vehicle in the future.” Even if we assume that Plaintiff should be solely 

responsible for purchasing Defendant’s new car as part of his child support obligation, 

the trial court improperly considered this unsubstantiated future expense. See 

Witherow v. Witherow, 99 N.C. App 61, 65, 392 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1990) (“[A]n award 

which takes into consideration an unsubstantiated expense rather than a current 
BISHOP V. BISHOP

Berger, J., dissenting

3

expense is an abuse of the court’s discretion.”). See generally Thomas v. Burgett, 265 

N.C. App. 364 (2019).2

I would remand this matter to the trial court for entry of an order that limits 

Plaintiff’s child support obligation to the minor child’s reasonable needs in accordance 

with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c).

 

2 Because the South Eastern Reporter incorrectly lists Thomas v. Burgett as an unpublished 

case, we only include a citation to the North Carolina Appellate Reporter.