## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ Nos. 09-1564/1620

___________ In re: Charles Pointer, * Appeals from the United States * District Court for the Appellant. * Eastern District of Missouri.
* * [UNPUBLISHED]

___________ Submitted: August 7, 2009 Filed: August 19, 2009

___________ Before BYE, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. In these consolidated appeals, Charle s Pointer challenges an en banc order issued by the United States District Cour t for the Eastern District of Missouri requiring him to obtain leave of court to f ile complaints (No. 09-1564) and a separate order, issued by the District Court pursuant to the en banc order, denying Pointer leave to file a new complaint (No. 09-1620). Po inter also moves to add parties to his appeals. We deny Pointer’s motion, butwe vacate and remand in both appeals.

After reviewing twenty-three in forma pauperis cases that Pointer filed pro se in the Eastern District of Missouri over approximately four and one-half years, the District Court en banc determined that Poin ter had abused the judicial process and his right to file actions and proceedings, and it concluded that preventive measures were required to abate the abuse. The court then issued an order prohibiting Pointer,-2- without first obtaining leave of court, fro m filing new complaints in the Eastern District, reopening prior complaints, and tran sferring or removing suits to the Eastern District from other federal district courts or state courts. Further, the order bars Pointer from filing pleadings or other material s without leave of court, even if he is granted leave to file a complaint or to proceed pro se. Th e order prohibits the District Court clerk from accepting filings from Pointer, whether he has paid the filing fee or is proceeding in forma pauperis, unless Po inter has included a court order granting him leave to file. The court's order in structs Pointer in detail how to go about obtaining leave of court. In appeal No. 09-1564, Pointer argues, among other things, that the en banc order was issued in viol ation of his right to due process because he was not given prior notice and an opportunity to respond.

We construe the en banc order to be an injunction issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), which empowers federa l courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usag es and principles of law." We are concerned that the injunc tion may be overly broad, however, because it restricts not only Pointer’s ability to institu te suits raising the issues or naming the defendants in his prior cases, but also his ability to file any civil suit in the Eastern District of Missouri. See, e.g. , Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc. , 390 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[I]f a judge, after weighi ng the relevant factors, properly determines that a litigant’s abusive conduct merits a pr efiling injunction, the judge must ensure that the injunction is narrowly tailored to fit the specific circumstances at issue."); Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc. , 376 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that § 1651(a) codifies "the federal courts’ traditional, inherent power to protect the jurisdiction they already ha ve, derived from some other source," and allows those courts to safeguard ongoing proceedings, potential future proceedings, and previously issued orders and judgments); Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc. , 705 F.2d 1515, 1524 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting th at under § 1651(a), district courts have power to reinforce the effects of the doctrines of collateral es toppel and res judicata by "issuing an injunction against repetitive litigation"), cert. denied , 465 U.S. 1081-3- (1984). In any event, the court apparently issued the en banc order without giving Pointer notice and any opportunity to be heard. SeeCromer , 390 F.3d at 819 ("[B]efore a judge issues a prefiling injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), even a narrowly tailored one, he must afford a litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard."); Tripati v. Beaman , 878 F.2d 351, 354 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (vacating § 1651(a) restrictions on future filings and remanding because the litigant was not provided prior notice and opportunity to respond, but noting that such opportunity "does not . . . require an in-person hearing in the district court"). Accordingly, we vacate the order and remand for the District Court en banc to provide Pointer with notice and an opportunity to respond before entering a pre-fili ng injunction against him. At the same time, the court should consider whether any order it issues is narrowly tailored to address Pointer's particular abuses of the judicial process.

In appeal No. 09-1620, Pointer moved fo r leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the Eastern District of Missouri and to file a complaint naming Ida Early, Washington University, and the University’s registered agent as defendants. The District Court denied leave to file the complaint after determining that it was frivolous and similar to previously dismissed compla ints. On appeal, Pointer argues that the complaint should have been filed and c onsidered on the merits. Because we are vacating the en banc order under which the Di strict Court denied leave to file this complaint, we also vacate the order denying leave to file the complaint.

In sum, we vacate the en banc orde r in appeal No. 09-1564 and the order denying leave to file in appeal No. 09- 1620, and we remand both matters to the District Court for further proceedings consis tent with this opinion. Pointer’s motion to add parties to the appeals is denied.

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