J-S20021-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

BRIAN BANTUM, 

 Appellant No. 1123 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered on June 10, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County 

Criminal Division at No.: CP-07-CR-0000331-2013 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and WECHT, JJ. 

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J. FILED JULY 14, 2015 

 The learned Majority holds that the initial interaction between Officer 

Thomas Venios and Brian Bantum on November 4, 2012, was supported by 

reasonable suspicion. In reaching that conclusion, the Majority appropriately 

recites the well-established principle espoused by our Supreme Court: a 

police officer must be able to point to specific facts and reasonable

inferences drawn from those facts in light of the officer’s experience, in order 

to demonstrate reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 

673, 677 (Pa. 1999). Officer Venios articulated many facts, including 

Bantum’s presence in a high-crime area, which the learned Majority relies 

upon to support its finding of reasonable suspicion. However, those facts, 

and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, were insufficient to support 

Officer Venios’ belief that criminal activity was afoot. Because Officer Venios 
J-S20021-15 

- 2 - 

could not proffer any reasonable inference to support his belief of criminal 

activity, I respectfully dissent. 

 As a preliminary matter, I agree with the Majority’s choice to analyze 

the initial interaction between Officer Venios and Bantum as an investigative 

detention. However, I do not, as the Majority did, need to assume this 

classification. See Maj. Mem. at 6. Clearly, the initial interaction between 

Officer Venios and Bantum on November 4, 2012, was an investigative 

detention. The relevant inquiry in distinguishing between a mere encounter 

and an investigatory detention is “whether a reasonable person would have 

believed that [he] was free to leave, and to this end the inquiry must focus 

on whether the police officer, either by physical force or by show of 

authority, has restricted the defendant’s movement in some way.” 

Commonwealth v. Caben, 60 A.3d 120, 128 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

Officer Venios testified that he noticed Bantum standing in front of a 

church located in a high-crime area, which caused him to drive towards 

Bantum to investigate. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 10/11/2013, at 19, 24. 

At approximately 1:17 a.m., Officer Venios stopped his car “in the opposite 

lane of travel” approximately five to ten feet from Bantum, turned his 

spotlight on, directed the spotlight at Bantum, exited his vehicle, and 

approached Bantum. Id. at 22, 24-25. Officer Venios was driving a marked

car and in full uniform that evening. Id. at 3-4. Bantum did not attempt to 

move or flee at any point during this encounter. Id. at 23, 35. 
J-S20021-15 

- 3 - 

In viewing all of the surrounding circumstances, it is clear that a 

reasonable person standing in Bantum’s shoes would not have felt that he or 

she was free to depart.1 Officer Venios did not use any physical force to 

restrain Bantum during this initial interaction; however, his display of 

authority and the location and timing of the interaction clearly demonstrate 

that Officer Venios effectuated an investigative detention when he initially 

approached Bantum on November 4, 2012. 

As previously mentioned, an investigative detention must be supported 

by reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 995 A.2d A.2d 1253, 

1256 (Pa. Super. 2010). The inquiry into whether a police officer had 

reasonable suspicion to stop a defendant is a dual one, which requires us to 

determine whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and 

whether it was reasonably related in scope of the circumstances that 

____________________________________________ 

1

 This Court, in Commonwealth v. Lyles, 54 A.3d 76 (Pa. Super 

2012), highlighted the inherent difficulty in attempting to objectively analyze 

an individual’s subjective perception of restraint. Lyles, 54 A.3d at 84. In 

an interesting but non-binding concurring opinion, Judge Strassburger 

attempted to reconcile this difficulty by pointing out an undeniable 

perception of police authority: 

When a police officer initiates an encounter, an individual as a 

practical matter never feels free to leave. The police officer has 

a weapon. The police officer’s testimony is almost always 

believed in court. No responsible person would walk away from 

an encounter with a police officer. 

Id. (emphasis in the original). 
J-S20021-15 

- 4 - 

justified the interference in the first place. Commonwealth v. Guzman, 44 

A.3d 688, 692-93 (Pa. Super. 2012). Accordingly, a review of Officer 

Venios’ investigative detention of Bantum is, in part, temporal in nature. 

Concluding that Officer Venios effectuated an investigative detention when 

he initially approached Bantum, he must at that moment be able to, as the 

Majority notes, point to specific facts and reasonable inferences drawn from 

those facts in light of his experience, in order to demonstrate reasonable 

suspicion. See Cook, 735 A.2d at 677. 

In the instant case, Officer Venios and numerous other police officers 

from the Altoona Police Department responded to a disturbance call at a 

local bar on November 4, 2012, at approximately 1 a.m.. N.T., 10/11/2013, 

at 2-4. Upon arrival, Officer Venios and the other police officers defused the 

situation and dispersed the patrons from the bar. Id. After dispersing the 

patrons from the bar, Officer Venios returned to his patrol car and “started 

circling around the area just to make sure that the people were moving 

along.” Id. at 4. 

At approximately 1:17 a.m., Officer Venios observed Bantum standing 

in front of a church approximately one block away from the bar.2 Id. at 6. 

____________________________________________ 

2

 It is unclear precisely how much time passed between Officer Venios’ 

response to the bar and Bantum’s arrest. Officer Venios testified that he 

responded to the bar disturbance at approximately 1:15 or 1:17 a.m. and 

that he arrested Bantum at 1:17 a.m.. N.T., 10/11/2013, at 3, 28. 

Notwithstanding this minor discrepancy, it is reasonable to conclude that 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
J-S20021-15 

- 5 - 

Officer Venios testified that the church was located in a high-crime area. Id.

at 5-6. Bantum, Officer Venios testified, was standing under a dark recess 

near a set of stairs connected to the church and appeared to be speaking on 

a cell phone. Id. 6-7, 17, 24. Officer Venios also testified that Bantum’s 

presence in front of the church was suspicious because the church was 

closed at the time. Id. at 7. Specifically, Officer Venios testified, “I couldn’t 

tell if it was somebody who was not dispersing from the area[,] which is 

what I was looking for[,] or if it was someone who [was] trying to break into 

the church.” Id. Upon arriving at the church, Officer Venios illuminated his 

spotlight towards Bantum, exited his vehicle, and immediately approached 

Bantum. Id. At some point during his approach, Officer Venios recognized 

Bantum as an individual who was present in front of the local bar that he 

had just departed. Id. 14-15. 

Officer Venios’ suspicion that Bantum was involved in some criminal 

activity was not a reasonable inference to draw from the totality of these 

facts. At the onset of Officer Venios’ investigative detention of Bantum, 

Officer Venios did not observe any illegal or unusual activity. Id. at 25-26. 

In fact, Officer Venios witnessed no signs of Bantum attempting to break 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

Officer Venios’ response to the bar and Bantum’s arrest all occurred between 

1:00 a.m. and 1:17 a.m.. 
J-S20021-15 

- 6 - 

into the church. Id. at 26. Officer Venios merely observed Bantum standing 

in front of the church while, perhaps, speaking on a cell phone. Id. at 24. 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Officer Venios did not 

have reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot. Officer 

Venios sighted Bantum minutes after dispersing the many patrons from the 

local bar. The church where Bantum was standing was located only a block 

away from that bar. At some point while approaching Bantum, Officer 

Venios recognized Bantum as a patron present at the bar that night. Officer 

Venios maintains that he wanted to ensure that Bantum was not breaking 

into the church; however, a police officer’s determination of reasonable 

suspicion must be based upon common sense and inferences about human 

behavior. In re M.D., 781 A.2d 192, 199 (Pa. Super. 2001). Neither 

Bantum’s geographic proximity to the bar nor the closeness in time between 

Officer Venios’ response to the bar and Bantum’s arrest precluded Bantum 

from engaging in criminal activity. However, considering the totality of 

these circumstances, common sense can yield no reasonable inference to 

support a belief of criminal activity. The impetus behind Officer Venios’ 

suspicion was Bantum’s presence in a high-crime area, which by itself does 

not form the basis for reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v. 

Leonard, 951 A.2d 393, 396 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that presence in a 

high-crime area alone does not form the basis for reasonable suspicion). 

Consequently, Officer Venios effectuated an investigative detention of 

Bantum, which was not supported by reasonable suspicion. 
J-S20021-15 

- 7 - 

For the foregoing reasons, I would find that the totality of the 

circumstances do not give rise to specific and articulable facts supporting 

reasonable suspicion that Bantum was engaged in or about to engage in 

criminal activity, and that the investigative detention, therefore, was 

unconstitutional. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order denying 

Bantum’s motion to suppress. The Majority having concluded otherwise, I 

respectfully dissent.