T.C. Memo. 1997-449

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

INTERHOTEL COMPANY, LTD., TORREY HOTEL ENTERPRISES, INC., TAX

MATTERS PARTNER, Petitioner v

. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 13017-95. Filed September 30, 1997.

M and THEI were partners in IHCL. IHCL was formed

in 1981 to hold interests in both PGL and PLH, which were

partnerships formed for the purpose of constructing,

owning, and managing separate hotel towers of a resort

complex located adjacent to the then-unbuilt San D iego

Convention Center. IHCL's partnership agreement provided

that upon liquidation, the liquidation proceeds would be

distributed only to those partners having positive

capital accounts. IHCL's partnership agreement did not

require the partners to restore any deficits in their

capital accounts upon liquidation of the partnership.

In 1985, D agreed to invest $19.8 million in IHCL in

exchange for a 15-percent interest in IHCL, together with

a special allocation of 99 percent of IHCL's income and

losses. Upon D's entry as a partner in IHCL, M withdrew

as a partner of IHCL, and THEI's interest in IHCL was

reduced.-2-

1 In addition to the amounts at issue, respondent also

determined that Interhotel Co., Ltd., the partnership whose

(continued...) D encountered financial difficulties. In 1987, the

special allocation of gains and losses to D was

terminated. Thereafter, the gains and losses of IHCL

were allocated to THEI and D pro rata in accordance with

their partnership interests. Following this allocation,

a substantial deficit balance existed in THEI's

partnership capital account.

On June 20, 1991, M purchased D's interest in IHCL

and thereafter succeeded to D's then-positive partnership

capital account of $14.8 million. At that time, THEI had

a negative $5.9 million partnership capital account.

Upon M's reentry into IHCL, IHCL's partnership

agreement was amended to provide that IHCL's income would

be allocated fi rst to partners having negative capital

account balances and then to the partners pro rata. No

amendment was made to IHCL's partnership agreement with

respect to the allocation of losses, distrib utions of

cash-flow, or liquidating distributions.

IHCL's 1991 information return reported an

allocation of 99 percent of IHCL's income to D up to June

20, 1991, and thereafter an allocation of 100 percent to

THEI. Respondent determined that 99 percent of IHCL's

income after June 20, 1991, should be reallocated to M as

D's successor in IHCL.

Held : Respondent's reallocation of 99 percent of

IHCL's income to M for the period in issue is sustained.

See sec. 704(b), I.R.C.

J. Clancy Wilson , for petitioner.

Paul B. Burns and Gretchen A. Kindel , for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

JACO BS, Judge : Respondent issued a notice of final

partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA) on April 11, 1995. In

relevant part, 1 respondent proposed increasing by $814,296 the-3-

(...continued)

earnings are at issue here, had ordinary income from its

business activities in the amount of $404,950, not $355,745 as

reported on its Form 1065 for taxable year 1991. In addition,

respondent determined that the partnership was entitled to "Other

Deductions, Professional Fees" in the amount of $2,228, instead

of the $51,433 reported for the same year. The parties resolved

these issues by agreement prior to trial. reported distributive share of allowable ordinary income of Douglas

F. Manchester (Mr. Manchester) with respect to Interhotel Co., Ltd.

(IHCL), a California lim ited partnership, for the taxable year

1991. As a result of this proposed increase, respondent determined

that Mr. Manchester, as a partner of IHCL, should also be subject

to adjustments for alternative minimum tax and tax preference items

totaling $23,490. The issues for decision are whether IHCL's

allocation of the partnership items at issue either has substantial

economic effect or is consistent with the partners' in terests in

IHCL. For the reasons set forth herein, our responses to both

inquiries are in the negative. Therefore, we sustain respondent's

reallocation.

Unless indicated otherwise, all section references are to the

Internal Revenue Code as in effect for the year under

consideration. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of

Practice and Procedure.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The

stip ulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated

herein by this reference.-4-

Torrey Hotel Enterprises, Inc. (THEI), the tax matters partner

of IHCL and petitioner in this case, is a California corporation.

All of th e outstanding shares of stock of THEI were directly or

indirectly owned or controlled by Mr. Manchester or members of his

family.

Douglas F. Manchester, PLH, and PGL

In October 1981, Mr. Manchester and his related companies

formed Pacific Landmark Hotel, Ltd. (PLH), a California limited

part nership. PLH was formed for the purpose of constructing,

owning, and managing t he first of two hotel towers of a resort

complex located adjacent to the then-unbuilt San Diego Convention

Center. The first hotel tower was completed in April 1984.

Mr. Manchester formed another limited partnership, Pacific

Gateway, Ltd. (PGL), for the purpose of constructing, owning, and

managing the second hotel tower. In October 1985, PGL commenced

construction of the second hotel tower; it was completed in October

1987.

IHCL and THEI

Mr. Manchester formed IHCL to hold interests in PLH and PGL.

Under the Agreement of Limited Partnership of IHCL, dated October

3, 1985 (the IHCL Original Agreement), the general and tax matters

partner of IHCL was THEI, which had a .999-percent interest in IHCL

as a general partner and a 99-percent interest as a limited

partner. Mr. Manchester held the remaining .001-percent interest.-5-

2 Pursuant to the IHCL Original Agreement, THEI was

required to contribute certain letters of credit to the capital

of IHCL. THEI did not, however, receive any credit to its

capital account as a result of the issuance of any letter of

credit.

Pursuant to the IHCL Original Agreement, Mr. Manchester

was required to contribute $150 to the capital of IHCL. The

record does not indicate whether Mr. Manchester, in fact, made

such a contribution. In 1985, the Home Savings Co. (Home Savings) agreed to provide

$208 million to be used as permanent financing for the first hotel

tower and as construction financing for the second hotel tower. As

a condition for its loans, Home Savings required Mr. Manchester and

his businesses to put up a letter of credit for $16 million. THEI,

through IHCL, 2 arranged for the $16 million letter o f credit,

issued by Security Pa cific National Bank. In exchange, IHCL

received a 35.354-percent limited partnership interest in both PLH

and PGL.

Dondi

In November 1985, Dondi Properties (Dondi), which was

controlled by Vernon Savings and Loan Association (Vernon),

invested in IHCL. Dondi received a 15-percent limited partnership

interest in IHCL in exchange for its agreement to provide $19.8

million to the capital of IHCL. As a result of this transaction,

THEI's limited partnership share in IHCL was decreased from 99

percent to 84 percent. Mr. Manchester withdrew from IHCL.

The entry of Dondi was reflected in a "Restated and Amended

Agreement of Limited Partnership of IHCL", dated November 29, 1985-6-

(the IHCL Restated Agreement). That agreement allocated 99 percent

of the net losses of IHCL to Dondi and the other 1 percent to THEI

as the general partner. After a period of approximately 5 years,

the net losses were to be allocated to the partners on a pro rata

basis. The income of IHCL was allocated to the partners, Dondi and

THEI, in the same ratio as net losses. The allocation was to

continue until such time as IHCL's cumulative income equaled IHCL's

cumulative losses; thereafter, IHCL's income would be allocated to

the partners pro rata and in proportion to earlier distributions.

In contrast to the allocations of income, section 5 of the

IHCL Resta ted Agreement made the following provisions for actual

distributions:

5.1 D istribution of Cash Available for

Distribution

. Cash Available for Distribution, as

defined in Section 17, when distri buted from time to

time, shall be distributed to the Partners as follows:

5.1.1. First, upon the release of the

letters of credit by the lender as referred to

in subsection 4.3.5(a), then to the General

Partner up to the amount to which the General

Partner is entitled under Section 4.3.5(a).

5.1.2. Second, to the repayment of any

Special Loans, pro rata

, up to the full amount

of the total principal amount of such Special

Loans, plus accrued but unpaid interest

thereon.

5.1.3. Thereafter, any remaining sum

shall be distributed to the Partners, pro

rata

.-7-

IHCL maintained capital accounts for each of its partners in

accordance with section 4.4 of the IHCL Restated Agreement. That

provision states, in part:

4.4. Capital accounts of Partners . An individual

capital account shall be maintained for each Partner to

which shall be credited the contributions of such partner

to capital of the Partnership. * * * In the event a

Partner transfers all or any portion of its Partnership

Interest as permitted by this Agreement, the transferee

shall succeed to the individual capital account a n d

capital account balance of the transferor to the extent

that such individual capital account and capital account

balance relate to the transferred Partnership interest.

In connection with Dondi's entry into IHCL, the limited

partnership agreements of PGL and PLH were amended to allocate

90.91 percent of their losses to IHCL. At the same time, an

additional provision, section 6.5, "minimum gain chargeback", was

inserted into each of the IHCL, PLH, and PGL partnership

agreements. That provision stated, in part:

(b) To the extent that the deficit Capital Account

balances of one or more Partners attributable to

Nonrecourse Deductions and determined after applying

subparagraph (a) exceeds [sic] Minimum Gain, such

Partners shall be allocated Net Income (or items thereof)

in accordance with proposed or final Treasury regulations

promulgated under Section 704 of the Code to the extent

of and in proportion to the amounts of such differences.

The partnership agreements of IHCL, PLH, and PGL all required

that, upon liquidation, distributions to their partners were to be

made in accordance with the partners' positive capital account

balances. For example, the IHCL Restated Agreement provided that

liquidation proceeds were to be used first to pay debts and-8-

establish reserves. Thereafter, section 5.3.4 of the IHCL Restated

Agreement directed liquidation proceeds to go--

To the payment to the P artners, who have positive

capital account balances, in proportion to their positive

capital account balances, of an amount equal to the sum

of the positive balances in the Partne rs' capital

accounts as of the date of such distribution, after

giving effect to all contributions, distributions and

allocations of Net Income, Net Loss and Gain for all

periods, including the period during which such

distribution occurs.

As of December 31, 1985, THEI had a beginning capital account

value of zero. For 1986, it had a negative capital account value

or balance of $1,701,520 for both its gener al and limited

partnership interests. For the next 5 years, its negative capital

account balance consistently exceeded $5 million. During the year

at issue, THEI did not have a positive capital account balance.

By January 1986, Dondi had contributed $10.8 million to IHCL

and agreed to pay the $9 million balance in subsequent quarterly

installments. Dondi, however, encountered difficulties and failed

to make its payment due January 6, 1987. Accordingly, in April

1987, THEI gave Dondi written notice, under section 4.3.4.2(d) of

the IHCL Restated Agreement, that Dondi's allocation of 99 percent

of IHCL's losses was terminated. The IHCL Restated Agreement then

allocated the net losses of IHCL to the pa rtners pro rata in

accordance with their partne rship interests. Thereafter, 15

percent of the losses we re allocated to Dondi, reflecting its

limited partnership interest, and 85 percent of the losses were

allocated to THEI, reflecting both its general and limited-9-

partnership interests. This reallocation of losses created the

substantial deficit balance in THEI's capital account with IHCL.

Marriott Corp.

In October 1987, the Marriott Corp. became a partner in PLH

and PGL. It contributed cash and made loan guaranties to those

partnerships in exchange for a 5-percent general partnership

interest in each. Marriott also received an allocation of 95

percent of n et losses from PLH and, initially, 99 percent of net

losses from PGL. These allocations reduced the losses previously

allocated to IHCL. The allocation of income, however, remained

unchanged.

With regard to IHCL, 99 percent of that partnership's income

continued to be allocated to Dondi. At the end of 1987, THEI had

a total deficit in its capital account of $5,010,171, while Dondi

had a positive capital account of $7,763,183, as a result of these

reallocations. At the beginning of 1991, the capital accounts of

IHCL indicated a negative capital account totaling $5,920,614 for

THEI and a positive capital account of $14,879,392 for Dondi.

Transfer to FDIC and Mr. Manchester

On June 20, 1991, pursuant to ongoing settlement negotiations,

Dondi transferred its 15-percent limited partn ership interest in

IHCL to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as

receiver for Vernon. FDIC then transferred this interest in IHCL to

Mr. Manchester in exchange for his $5 million payment. A first

amendment to the IHCL Restated Agreement, dated June 20, 1991,-10-

admitted Mr. Manchester as a substitute limited partner. Dondi's

positive capital account was also transferred to FDIC and then to

Mr. Manch ester. As a result, THEI held a 1-percent interest as

general partner and an 84-percent in terest as a limited partner.

Mr. Manchester held the remaining 15 percent in limited partnership

interests.

The following day, the parties executed a second amendment to

the IHCL Res tated Agreement. The second amendment provided that

IHCL's income would be allocated first to the partners who had

negative capital account balances and, thereafter, to the partners

pro rata. The second amendment, however, made no pertinent changes

to the preexisting allocation of gain, allocation of loss,

distribution of cash-flow from operations, distribution of cash

from sale or refinancing, or liquidating distributions.

IHCL's 1991 Return

Following execution of the seco nd amendment, 100 percent of

IHCL's income was allocated to THEI, in view of its negative

capital account. IHCL accordingly filed a 1991 information return,

reporting the allocation of 99 percent of net income to Dondi

through June 20, 1991, the date Dondi's interest was transferred to

Mr. Manchester. The 1991 return reflected that, after June 20,

1991, IHCL had allocated 100 percent of its income to THEI.

The FPAA

Respondent did not accept the allocation of the second

amendment to the IHCL Restated Agreement to the extent that 100-11-

percent of partnership income was allocated to THEI. Rather,

respondent deter mined that Mr. Manchester should be allocated 99

percent of IHCL's net income for the period after June 20, 1991.

Accordingly, respondent proposed that Mr. Manchester's distributive

share of IHCL's income be increased by $814,296 and that his share

of tax preference items be increased by $23,490. The reallocation

of income reflects the original allocation of income and losses to

Dondi: 1 percent to THEI and 99 percent to Mr. Manchester, as

Dondi's successor. The FPAA stated that "the adjustments in the

distributive shares are determined in accordance with the partners'

interest in the partnership as the partnership has not shown that

the allocation per the return is an allowable allocation under the

provisions of the Internal Revenue Code."

OPINION

In order to determine whether IHCL's allocation of the

partnership items at issue either has substantial economic effect

or is consistent with the partners' interests in the partnership,

we must preliminarily re view several basic principles of

partnership taxation.

I. Partnership Taxation

A. General Principles

Section 701 provides that a partnership is not liable for

Federal income taxes; instead, perso ns carrying on business as

partners are liable in their separate or individual capacities for

the income taxes arising from partners hip operations. In-12-

determining his income tax, a partner must take into account his

"distributive share" of each item of partn ership income, gain,

loss, deduction, and credit. Sec. 702. Each partner is taxed on

his di stributive share of partnership income without regard to

whether the income is actually distributed to him. Sec. 1.702-

1(a), Income Tax Regs.

Section 704(a) provides the framework for the determination of

a partner's distributive share of partnership income, gain, loss,

deductions, or credits of the partnership. In general, the

partnership agreement determines a partner's distributive share of

these items. Sec. 704(a). These provisions provide a great deal

of flexibility to taxpayers who do business in t he form of a

partnership. Partners have "great latitude in determining

themselves by their partnership agreement what their distributive

shares will be." G oldfine v. Commissioner

, 80 T.C. 843, 849-850

(1983). However, the partners' ability to make special allocations

of partnership items is not unrestrict ed. The allocation of

partnership interests must have substantial economic effect. Sec.

704(b). Moreover, "if * * * the allocation to a partner under the

agreement of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item

thereof) does not have substantial economic effect", then the

partner's distributive share of these items "shall be determined in

accordance with the partner's interest in the partner ship

(determined by taking into account all facts and circumstances)".

Sec. 704(b). Thus, in the absence of substantial economic effect,-13-

the Commissioner can reallocate partnership items in accordance

with the partners' interests in the partnership as determined under

section 1.704-1(b)(3), Income Tax Regs.

In the instant case, respondent determined that the allocation

of all of IHCL's income for the latter part of 1991 to THEI lacks

substantial economic effect and is not deemed to be in accordance

with THEI's interest in IHCL. Therefore, respondent reallocated 99

percent of IHCL's income for the period following June 20, 1991, to

Mr. Manchester. Petitioner disputes this reallocation.

B. The Section 704 Regulations

The section 704(b) regulations describe in detail not only the

circumstances in which a partnership's allocatio ns will have

"substantial economic effect" but also the manner of determining a

partner's "interest in the partnership".

1. Substantial Economic Effect

a. Basic Principles

To have substantial economic effect, the partnership

allocations must reflect the actual division of income or loss

amon g the partners when viewed from the standpoint of economic,

rather than tax, consequences. G oldfine v. Commissioner

, supra at

851-852. To this end, the regulations provide that an allocation

has substantial economic effect, if, in the event there is an

economic benefit or burden that corresponds to an allocation, the

partner receiving that allocation receives the corresponding

benefit or burden. Sec. 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) , Income Tax Regs.-14-

Additionally, the economic effect of the allocation must be

substantial; this requires "a reasonable possibility th a t the

allocation (or allocations) will affect substantially the dollar

amounts to be received by the partners f rom the partnership,

independent of tax consequences." Sec. 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)( a ),

Income Tax Regs.

b. Capital Accounts

De terminations of substantial economic effect, as well as

determinations of a partner's interest in the partnership, depend

upon an analysis of the partners' capital accounts. Generally

spea king, a partner's capital account represents the partner's

equity investment in the partnership. The capital account balance

is determined by adding (1) th e amount of money that the partner

contributes to the p artnership, (2) the fair market value of

property the partner contributes (net of liabilities to which the

property is subject or which are assumed by the partnership), and

(3) any allocations of partnership income or gain. A partner's

capital account is decreased, however, by the amount of money that

the partnership distributes to the partner, and by the amount of

any allocation to such partner of losses and deductions. The

capital account is also reduced by the fair market value of

property distributed to the partner, net of any liability that the

partner assumes, or to which the property is subject. Sec. 1.704-

1(b)(2)(iv), Income Tax Regs.-15-

Conceptually, if a partner has a positive capital account on

the date of liquidation, the partnership owes him that amount. If,

however, the partner has a negative capital account on the date of

liquidation, the partner in theory owes that amount to the

partnership--o r, as a practical matter, to those partners having

positive capital accounts.

c. The Three Tests of Economic Effect

The regulations governing the economic effect of partnership

allocations contain three tests that in a sense serve as "safe

harbors". Partnership allocations are deemed to h a ve economic

effect if they are made pursuant to a partnership agreement that

meets the requirements of any one of these tests. An understanding

of how these tests operate helps to establish the background for

the parties' contrasting arguments.

(1) The Basic Test

The basic test for economic effect is set forth in the

regulations. Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)( b ), Income Tax Regs.,

provides, in general, that an allocation will have economic effect

if the partnership agreement contains provisions that require: (1)

The determination and maintenance of the partners' capital accounts

are to be in accordance with the rules of section 1.704-

1(b)(2)(iv ), Income Tax Regs.; (2) upon liquidation of the

partnership, the proceeds of liquidation are to be distributed in

accordance with the partners' positive capit al account balances;

and (3) upon liquidation of the partnership, all partners having a-16-

deficit capital account must restore the amount of the deficit

balance to the partnership. These th ree requirements are a

distillation of earlier case law in whi ch this Court analyzed

whether partnership allocations possessed substantial economic

effect. See, e.g., Orrisch v. Commissioner , 55 T.C. 395, 403-404

(1970); Kresser v. Commissioner , 54 T.C. 1621 (1970).

With respect to the case before us, the parties agree that the

IHCL Restated Agreement complies with the first two requirements.

The agreement provides that the partners' capital accounts will be

properly maintained and that liq uidation proceeds will go to the

partners in proportion to their positi ve capital accounts. With

respect to the third requirement, however, neither the IHCL

Restated Agreement, nor any of its amendments, include a provision

requiring the partners to restore any def icits in their capital

accounts to the partnership upon liquidation. Accordingly, it is

undisputed that the IHCL allocation at issue does not meet the

basic test of substantial economic effect.

(2) Alternative Test of Economic Effect

The regula tions provide an alternative test of economic

effect--one which accommodates the existence of limited

partnerships. Limited partnership agreements usually provide

specific limits upon the amount the limited partners are required

to contribute to the par tnership. These limits on liability,

however, are inconsistent with the requireme nt in the basic test

that upon liquidation each partner must agree to repay any deficit-17-

in that partner's capital account. Con sequently, the alternative

test for economic effect prov ides that allocations of a limited

partnership may have economic effect even in the absence of an

unlimited deficit restoration requirement.

The al ternative test begins by incorporating the first two

parts of the basic test. As with the basic test, the partnership

agreement must provide for properl y maintained capital accounts.

It must also provide that the proce eds of liquidation are to be

dist r ibuted in accordance with the partners' positive capital

account balances. However, instead of a negative capital account

makeup req uirement, the alternative test mandates a hypothetical

reduction of the partners' capital accounts. Spe cifically, the

alternative test requires that capital accounts must be reduced for

any distributions that, as of the end of the year, "reasonably are

expected" to be made, to the extent that such distributions exceed

r easonably expected increases to the partner's capital account.

Sec. 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)( d ), Income Tax Regs. By requiring a

prospective reduction of capital accounts, the alternative test

serves to preclude a limited partner from timing the receipt of

deductible partnership expenses in a way that permits the partner

to accumulate negative capi tal accounts that the partner is not

required to repay.

Additionally, under the alternative test, the partnership

agreement must provide for a "qualified income offset" (QIO). A

QIO provision automatically allocates income, including gross-18-

income and gain, to a partner who has an unexpected negative

capital account, either as a result of partnership operations or as

a result of making the adjustment for reasonably expected

reductions. The QIO must operate "in an amount and manner

suffic ient to eliminate such deficit balance as quickly as

possible." Sec. 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)( d ), flush language, Income Tax

Regs.

In the present case, neither the IHCL Original Agreement nor

the IHCL Restated Agreement contains a provision requiring capital

account adjustments fo r reasonably expected distributions or a

"qualified income offset". To be sure, the second amendment to the

IHCL Restated Agreement does provide for a net income allocation to

pay off THEI's deficit capital account. However, the second

amendment falls short of the requirements for a QIO. The second

amendment allocates only net income, not "a pro rata portion of

each item of p artnership income", allocated "in an amount and

manner sufficient to eliminate such deficit balance as quickly as

possible." Sec. 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)( d ), Income Tax Regs. Thus, the

second amendment was not designed to provide a prompt repayment of

unforeseen negative capital accounts. Rather, the partners are

permitted to accumulate very large deficit accounts over a number

of years. Petitioner does not seriously argue otherwise.

Consequently, the IHCL partnership allocations fai l to meet the

alternative test of economic effect.-19-

(3) Economic Equivalence Test

There is another economic effect "safe harbor" (which is of

limited application), re ferred to as the "economic equivalence

test". Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)( i ), Income Tax Regs., provides

that, in the event that an allocation would produce the economic

equivalent of meeting the basic test for economic effect, it will

be deemed to have economic effect even if it does not o therwise

meet the formal requ irements of the basic test. This economic

equivalence test is likely to be met only by the least complicated

partnerships. Here, neither party maintains that the allocations

in this co mplex multitiered partnership situation would have the

equivalent economic effect of meeting the basic test. To the

contrary, the existence of large deficit capital accounts with no

obligation to repay would appear to preclude the meeting of that

test here. Thus, the IHCL partnership fails to meet this "safe

harbor" test.

2. Partners' Interests in the Partnership

The General Rule

Section 704(b) provides that an allocation of partnership

inco me, gain, loss, deductions, or credit (or item thereof) that

does not meet the requirements for substantial economic effect will

be "det ermined in accordance with the partner's interest in the

pa rtnership". This requirement, although less specific than the

test for economic effect, nevertheless requi res that partnership

allocations be analyzed on the basis of their actual economic-20-

impact. Accordingly, the regulations provide that an examination

of a partner's interest in the partnership "shall be made by taking

into account all facts and circumstances relating to the economic

arrangement of the partners." Sec. 1.704-1(b)(3)(i), Income Tax

Regs. There is, however, a specific provision in the regulations

on which pet itioner and respondent both rely to demonstrate the

correctness of their respective positions in this case. To this

provision we now turn.

3. Special Rules for Determining Partners' Interests

The "partners' interest" regulations contain a special

provision for "certain determinations" in ascertaining the

partner's interes t in the partnership. This special provision

applies only when a partnership's allocations lack economic effect

under section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs. To satisfy this

special provision, the partnership agreement must meet the first

two parts of t he basic test for economic effect. That is, the

agreement must provide both that capital accounts are to be

properly maintained and that liquidating distributions will be made

only to pa rtners with positive capital accounts. When these

conditions are met, the special provision may be applied to

determ ine whether the allocations are in accordance with

partnership interests.

Under the special provision, a partner's interest is measured

by comparing the amount the partner would receive in a hypothetical

liquidation at the end of the current year with the amount the-21-

p artner would have received in a liquidation at the end of t h e

prior year. This is referred to as the comparative liquidation

test. Specifically:

the partner's interests in the partnership with respect

to the portion of the allocation that lacks economic

effect will be d etermined by comparing the manner in

which distributions (and contributions) would be made if

all partnership property were sold at book value and the

partnership were liquidated immediately following the end

of the taxable year to which the allocation relates with

the manner in which distributions (and contributions)

would be made if all partnership property were sold at

book value and the partnership were liquidated

immediately following the end of the prior taxable year,

and adjusting the result for the items described in (4),

(5), and (6) of paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(d) of this section.

A determination made under this paragraph (b)(3)(iii)

wi ll have no force if the economic effect of valid

allocations made in the same manner is insubstantial

under paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this section. * * *

Sec. 1.704-1(b)(3)(iii), Income Tax Regs.

Under the comparative liquidation test, if allocation of an

item of partnership loss or deduction is at issue, the regulation

requires that the loss or deduction be attributed to the partner

who wo uld be required to make up a deficit in partnership assets

upon liquidation.

Both parties maintain that this comparative liquidation test

applies to show that their allocation schemes a re in accordance

with the partners' interests. The manner in which each applies the

test, however, differs. Respondent's application of the

comparative liquidation test is somewhat less complex than

petitioner's. Accordingly, we consider respondent's contentions

first.-22-

C. Respondent's Contentions

Respondent asserts tha t the comparative liquidation test of

section 1.704-1(b)(3)(iii), Income Tax Regs., supports the

allocation of all partnership income to Mr. Manchester, as set

forth in the FPAA. First, respondent contends that if all IHCL's

assets had b een sold at the end of 1990, the net liquidation

proceeds would have been $8,958,778. This amount, using stipulated

figures, is computed as follows:

Assets :

Cash $7,955,796

Investment in Landmark (1,358,431)

Investment in Gateway 2,328,218

Unamortized organization costs 1 39,388

Total assets $8,964,971

Liabilities :

Accounts payable (6,193)

Total liabilities (6,193 )

Net proceeds 8,958,778

1 On brief, respondent eliminated the unamortized organization costs; thus, respondent's figures for total assets and

net proceeds are $39,388 less than indicated above. Without

pass ing upon the correctness of this omission, we have included

these costs in order to make respondent's and petitioner's figures

more easily comparable.

Next, respondent contends that if all the IHCL assets

had been sold at the end of 1991, the net liquidation proceeds

would have been $10,449,135. This amount is computed as follows:-23-

Assets :

Cash $9,098,388

Investment in Landmark (3,967,304)

Investment in Gateway 2,660,677

Note receivable from THEI 2,619,833

Unamortized organization costs 39,388

Total assets $10,450,982

Liabilities :

Accounts payable (1,847 )

Total liabilities (1,847 )

Net proceeds 10,449,135

Respondent asserts that, at the end of the first year (1990),

all the liquidation proceeds would have gone to Dondi, which was

the only partner to have a positive capital account. Further,

respondent claims the amount available upon liquidation is

$5,960,002 less than the capital account balance of $14,879,392 for

Dondi. Respondent points out that, because there is no provision

in the IHCL Restated Agreement for a deficit makeup, THEI would not

have been required to make up the shor tfall, although it had a

negative capital account totaling $5,920,614.

At the end of the second year (1991), the net book value of

IHCL's assets exceeded $10 million. Respondent contends that under

the IHCL Restated Agreement all of the increase in book value would

have been distributed to Mr. Manchester, as su ccessor to Dondi's

interest in IHCL, because Mr. Manchester was the only partner with

a positive capital account at the end of 1991. Respondent points

out that the amount available for distribution is approximately $5

million less than the positive balance in Mr. Manchester's capital-24-

account. Again, becaus e the IHCL Restated Agreement does not

contain a deficit makeup provision, THEI would not have been

required to make up the shortfall.

Respondent concludes that the application of the IHCL Restated

Agreement supports the determina tion made in the FPAA--that Mr.

Manchester, who, at the end of 1991, had the only positive capital

account in IHCL, would have been the only party to receive

liquidation proceeds; accordingly, all the post-June 20, 1991,

income of IHCL must be allocated to himbecause he is the sole

partner with a positive capital interest in IHCL.

D. Petitioner's Contentions

Petitioner disagrees with respondent's conclusions.

P e titioner contends that respondent has erroneously failed to

include in the deemed liquidation proceeds approximately $7 million

for both 1990 and 1991 as "minimum gain allocations". Petitioners'

argument requires further exploration of the partnership allocation

regulations, specifically as they relate to allocations of

nonrecourse deductions.

1. Partnership Minimum Gain

A nonrecourse debt is one in which the lender, upon the

debtor's default, has as its only recourse the instituti on of

foreclosure proceedings with respect to the property securing the

debt. (In a nonrecourse debt situation, the lender has agreed that

it will not maintain a collection action against the debtor

personally.) Thus, if the value of the property securing the debt-25-

3 A purchaser's basis in an asset is, initially, its

cost. Sec. 1012. The Supreme Court in Crane v. Commissioner

, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), established that the cost basis of an asset

includes nonrecourse indebtedness borrowed to purchase the asset.

See Mayerson v. Commissioner , 47 T.C. 340, 351-352 (1966). The

Internal Revenue Code provides that the basis is to be adjusted

to take into account certain factors, such as deductions for

depreciation under sec. 167(g). Sec. 1016(a) provides that such

deductions lower the amount of the purchaser's basis in the

property. falls below the amount of the debt, it is the lender, and not the

debtor, who bears the risk of loss.

Nevertheless, it is well settled that nonrecourse liabilities

incurred to acquire property will constitute a part of the debtor's

cost basis in the property it has purchased. C rane v.

Commissioner , 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947). Accordingly, the debtor may

claim deductions attributable to that debt--such as deductions for

depreciation. 3 However, when the debtor disposes of the property,

the debtor must include in its amount realized from the disposition

o f the property the amount of any nonrecourse debt to whic h the

property is subject. Thus, if the debtor has taken deductions

(such as depreciation deductions) that have lowered its cost basis

in the property to an amount less than the amount of the

nonrecourse debt, the debtor must recognize gain at least to the

extent that its basis is exceeded by the amount of debt secured by

the property. Commissioner v. Tufts , 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983).

These nonrecourse debt principles apply to partnerships. Not

surprisingly, application of these rules to partnership allocations

produces some fairly complicated situations. If a partnership has-26-

acquired properties with nonrecourse debt, the partnership's

deduction of expenses associa ted with these properties--such as

expenses for depreciation--may lead to a situation where the amount

of nonrecourse d ebt exceeds the partnership's basis in the

properties securing that debt. Such deductions--called

"nonrecourse deductions"--per se do not have economic effect. The

lack of economic effect arises from the fact that the lender, and

not the partnership or its partners, bears the economic risk of

loss with respect to the nonrecourse deductions.

2. Minimum Gain Chargeback

As applicable to the taxable year at issue, there are

temporary regulations governing the allocation of deductions

attributable to nonrecourse debt. These regulation provisions are

set forth as sections 1.704-1T(b)(4) and (5), Temporary Income Tax

Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 5 3162-53173 (Dec. 30, 1988). The regulatory

provisions involve the concepts of "minimum gain" and "minimum gain

charge backs". These provisions represent the application of the

princip le of C ommissioner v. Tufts

, supra

, in a partnership

context.

"M inimum gain" is created when a partnership claims

deductions, such as deductions for depreciation, that decrease the

partnership's basis in a given property to an amount less than the

balance of the nonrecourse debt incurred in the acquisition of that

property.-27-

4 Specifically, sec. 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)( e ), Temporary

(continued...) The event that triggers a "minimum gain chargeback" is a

decrease in partnership minimum gain. That can occur, for example,

when a partnership disposes of property in respect of which the

partnership's nonrecourse indebtedness exceeds the partnership's

basis. It is this type of event that, under T ufts

, triggers the

realization of gain by the partnership, at least to the extent the

amount of the partnership's acquis ition indebtedness exceeds the

partnership's basis in that property. For example, assume that a

partnership owed $1 million in nonrecourse debt that it used to

acquire depreciable property. If the partnership then claimed a

$200,000 depreciation deduction, which would lower its $1 million

basis in the property to $800,000, the $200,000 (the amount by

which the debt exceeds the partner ship's basis) would be the

"minimum gain". This $200,000 is the potential gain that the

partnership would realize as a "minimum gain" when the partnership

disposes of that property. Thus, if the lender foreclosed upon the

property, the partnership would realize at least a "minimum gain"

of $200,000, even though the partnership received no gain in an

economic sense.

The $200,000 "minimum gain chargeback" is the minimum gain as

allocated to the partners in proportion to the amount of their

distributive share of the nonrecourse deductions, thereby

increasing their partnership capital accounts. 4 Allocation of such-28-

4 (...continued)

Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 53163 (Dec. 30, 1988), provides:

( e ) Minimum gain chargeback--(1) In general . If

there is a net decrease in partnership minimum gain for

a partnership taxable year, the partners must be

allocated items of partnership income and gain in

accordance with this paragraph (b)(4)(iv)( e ) ("minimum

gain chargeback").

(2) Allocations required pursuant to minimum gain

chargeback . If a minimum gain chargeback is required

for a partnership taxable year, then each partner must

be allocated items of income and gain for such year

(and, if necessary, for subsequent years) in proportion

to, and to the extent of, an amount equal to the

greater of--

(i) The portion of such partner's share

of the net decrease in partnership minimum

gain during such year that is allocable to

the disposition of partnership property

subject to one or more nonrecourse

liabilities of the partnership; or

(ii) The deficit balance in such

partner's capital account at the end of such

year * * * gain to th e partners also increases the partners' exposure to

income taxation on the amounts of the gain.

3. Petitioner's Application of Minimum Gain

Provisions to a Tiered-Partnership Allocation

Petitioner maintains that the minimum gain chargeback

provisions of section 6.5 in the IHCL Restated Agreement would

require IHCL to realize approximately $7 mill ion in minimum gain

chargebacks in the deemed liquidation. Petitioner's assertion is

based on the following theory: although IHCL owned no nonrecourse

property itself, it had ownership interests in PLH and PGL, which-29-

did own such properties. Petitione r then posits that IHCL's

ownership of interests in these lower tier partnerships is, in

effect, a proportionate ownership interest in the properties of

those lower tier partnerships as well. Petitioner points to the

regulations governing allocation of nonrecourse deductions; these

expressly provide a "look-through" rule for situations i nvolving

tiered partnerships. Petitioner posits that for purposes of the

nonrecourse deductions, the "look-through" rule is designed to

produce the same consequences for the upper tier partn ership, in

this case IHCL, that would have resulted had IHCL directly held its

proportionate share of the properties owned by PGL and PLH.

Petitioner reasons that under these regulations, had PLH or PGL

incurred minimum gains on the disposition of their property, IHCL

would be required to realize its proportionate share of those

gains. Sec. 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)( j ), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53

Fed. Reg. 53166 (Dec. 30, 19 88); see T.D. 8237, 1989-1 C.B. 180,

206.

Petitioner further contends that IHCL should be tr eated as

owning its proportionate share of PLH's and PGL's assets for

purposes of the comparative liquidation test of section 1.704-

1(b)(3)(iii), Income Tax Regs. Thus, according to petitioner, a

deemed liquidation of IHCL would imply a deemed liquidation of PLH

and PGL as well; as a result, the disposition of those nonrecourse

properties (upon the liquidati ons of PLH and PGL) would trigger

minimum gain chargebacks to IHCL.-30-

In making its point, petitioner uses the same figures as

respondent. Petitioner augments those figures, however, with

substantial amounts of minimum gain chargebacks for both 1990 and

1991. First, petitioner contends that if all of IHCL's assets had

been liquidated at the end of 1990, the net liquidation proceeds

would have been $16,328,755. This amount is computed as follows:

Assets

Cash $7,955,796

Organization costs 39,388

Investment in Pacific Gateway 2,328,218

Investment in Pacific Landmark (1,358,431)

Liabilities (6,193 )

Subtotal 8,958,778

1990 Minimum gain chargeback

from Pacific Landmark 1 7,369,977

Distributable liquidation

proceeds at book value 1/1/91 16,328,755

1 Petitioner's figures include only minimum gain

c hargebacks traceable to the PLH partnership. Apparently, S.D.

Hotels, one of PGL's partners, guaranteed the payment of PGL's

obligation to Home Savings. This guaranty restricted use of PGL's

nonrecourse deductions to S.D. Hotels, which bore the economic risk

of loss on the property. See sec. 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)( h )( 2 ),

Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 53164 (Dec. 30, 1988).

Petitioner then contends that $5,920,614 of the minimum gain

chargeback would be used first to eliminate THEI's negative capital

account. The balance of the minimum gain chargeb ack, plus the

liquidation proceeds, would then be distributed pursuant to the

IHCL Restated Agreement as it was in effect during 1990. Thus,

according to petitioner, 85 percent, or $1,231,959, w ould be-31-

allocated to THEI and 15 percent, or $217,404, would be allocated

to Dondi. These allocations, when added to the previously

accumulated capital accoun ts, result in a total capital of

$16,328,755--the amount of the previously identified liquidation

proceeds.

Petitioner maintains that a liquidation of all of IHCL's

assets at the end of 1991 would yield proceeds of $17,887,056.

This amount is computed as follows:

12-31-91 Deemed Liquidation

Cash $9,098,388

Organization costs 39,388

Note receivable from THEI 2,619,833

Investment in Pacific Gateway 2,660,677

Investment in Pacific Landmark (3,967,304)

Liabilities (1,847 )

Subtotal 10,449,135

1991 Minimum gain chargeback

from Pacific Landmark 7,437,891

Distributable liquidation

proceeds at book value 12-31-91 17,887,026

This $17,887,026 amount is $1,558,301 more than that for the

pre vious year (1990), consisting of an additional $67,914 in

minimum gain chargebacks, plus partnership income for 1991 of

$1,490,387. The total liquidation p roceeds, as determined by

petitioner, would again eliminate THEI's negative capital account.

These allocations, when added to the previously accumulated capital

accounts, result in a total capital of $17,887,056--the amount of-32-

the previously identified liquidation proceeds available for 1991.

Distributions wo uld be made in accordance with the IHCL Restated

Agreement as it read at the end of 1991. Petitioner asserts that

because the second amendment precluded Mr. Manchester from

receiving any net income for 1991, THEI, the only other partner in

IHCL, would be allocated 100 percent of such income.

E. Does the Comparative Liqu idation Test Contemplate a

Liquidation of the Lower Tier Partnerships?

The difference between respondent's and petitioner's theories

of the comparative liquidations arises from petitioner's contention

that a deemed liquidation of IHCL must also involve a deemed

liquidation of PLH and PGL (the lower tier partnerships) and the

resulting minimum gain chargebacks.

Under the facts of this case, however, we do not believe that

the comparative liquidation test permits a deemed liquidation of

IHCL to include a deemed liquidation of PLH and PGL.

Section 704 provides that we must determine the interests of

the par tners in accordance with all relevant facts and

circumstances. IHCL had a 35.354-percent interest in each of the

lower tier partnerships. As a limited partner with only a minority

interest in each of the lower tier partnerships, IHCL could not

control the lower tier partnerships. Thus, it co uld not force

partnership m inimum gain chargebacks by requiring PLH and PGL to

dissolve or to dispose of their property in a way that caused a-33-

decrease in partnership minimum gain--and resulting chargebacks to

IHCL.

Sections 11 and 15 of the IHCL Restated Agreement provide that

no partner has the right to sell sub stantially all the assets or

cause a dissolution of PLH. Rather, under those provisions of the

IHCL Restated Agreement, an effective election to sell the assets

of the partnership, or to dissolve it, could come about only with

the concurrence of the majority of the limit ed partners, the

permission of the general partner, the permission of the San Diego

public authorities, and the permission of any lender who had the

right to approve such a dissolution.

The statutory framew ork of the California Corporations Code

permits a partner to dissolve its partnership only in similarly

limited circumstances. Section 15681 of the California

Corporations Code (West 1991) provides in pertinent part:

Section 15681. Nonjudicial dissolution

.

A limited partnership is dissolved and its affairs

shall be wound up upon the happening of the first to

occur of the following:

(a) At the time or upon th e happening of

events specified in the partnership agreement.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in the

partnership agreement, written consent of all

general partners and a majority in interest of

the limited partners.

Likewise, section 708(b) of the Internal Revenue Code

provides for a termination of a partnership if within a 12-month

period the re is a sale or exchange of 5 0 percent or more of the-34-

total interest in the partnership capital or p rofits. Sec.

708(b)(1)(B); cf. Rev. Rul. 87-50, 1987-1 C.B. 157; Rev. Rul. 87-

51, 1987-1 C.B. 158.

If IHCL were to liquidate, it woul d not have the power to

compel PLH or PGL to dissolve. Nor could IHCL otherwise require

PLH or PGL to transfer its assets, either directly or indirectly.

Those properties would remain under the control of PLH and PGL.

Upon liqu idation IHCL could distribute only its partnership

interests in PLH or PGL. The d istinction between a partner's

interest in a partnership and the partner's lack of interest in

part nership property is basic. California law follows general

partnership law in providing that "An interest in a limited

partnership is personal property and a partner has no interest in

specific partnership property." Cal. Corp. Code sec. 15671 (West

1991 & Supp. 1995). Federal tax law makes a similar distinction

between interests in partnerships and the holdings of partnerships.

As some commentators have explained, for purposes of the Internal

Revenue Code:

The transferred interest is treated as a separate

intangible asset, detached from the assets of the

partnership. Accordingly, the various Code provisions

governing the amount and character of gain or loss,

basis, and holding period operate with respe ct to the

transferred partnership interest, rather than the

underlying partnership assets. * * *

McKee et al., Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners, par.

15.01, at 15-3 (3d ed. 1997).-35-

5 In this case, we expressly do not decide whether the

comparative liquidation test in sec. 1.704-1(b)(3)(iii), Income

Tax Regs., would take into account the dissolution of lower tier

partnerships when the upper tier partnership (whose allocations

are at issue) can compel such a dissolution. We believe that because IHCL could not force PLH and PGL to

dispose of the property that generated the nonrecourse deductions,

petitioner's argument fails. There would be no decrease in PLH's

or PGL 's minimum gain upon a deemed liquidation of IHCL. Sec.

1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)( d ), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg.

53163 (Dec. 30, 1988). Thus, there would be no minimum gain

chargeback to IHCL. Sec. 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)( f ), Temporary Income

Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 53163 (Dec. 30, 1988). Correspondingly,

there would not be, as petitioner contends, an increase in the

partners' capital acco unts sufficient both to eliminate THEI's

deficit account and to pay the positive capital account of Mr.

Manchester. To the contrary, petitioner has failed to refute

respondent's position that Mr. Manchester alone would be eligible

to receive any gain upon liquidation of the partnership under the

IHCL R estated Agreement. (That agreement mandates that, upon

liquidation, distributions a re to be made in accordance with the

partners' positive capital account balances.) Accordingly, we

reject petitioner's argument that allocation of partnership income

to THEI is in accordance with the comparative liquidation test of

section 1.704-1(b)(3)(iii), Income Tax Regs. 5-36-

F. The Facts and Circumstances Regulations

Both parties have made alternative arguments dependent upon

other factors listed in th e regulations as appropriate for

consideration in resolving issues of partners' interests. The four

factors to be considered are: (1) The partners ' relative

contributions; (2) the partners' interests in economic profits and

losses; (3) the partners' interests in cash- flow and other

nonliquidating distributions; and (4) the partners' rights to

distributions of capital upon liquidation. Sec. 1.704-1(b)(3)(ii),

Income Tax Regs.

In this case, petitioner has fai led to establish that these

four factors support its position that THEI rather than Mr.

Manchester should be allocated substantially all (99 percent) of

IHCL's income for the period after June 20, 1991.

As to the first factor, i.e., contributions, neither THEI nor

Mr. Manchester (except for a possible $150 contribution) made any

contributions to IHCL. To be sure, THEI participated in some manner

in acquiring a loan guaranty for IHCL, but THEI was given no credit

in its capital account for such an endeavor. Mr. Manchester

invested $5 million, but he did so to acquire Dondi's interest in

IHCL; he did not invest in IHCL himself.

In regard to the second factor, i.e., the partners' interests

in economic profits and losses, although the second amendment to

the IHCL Restated Agreement allocated all net income to THEI,-37-

petitioner has failed to refute respondent's dete rmination that

this allocation did not comport with the partners' interests.

The third factor, i.e., dealing with cash-flow, is addressed

in paragraph 5.1 of the Second Amendment to the IHCL Restated

Agreement. It provides that partnership cash will be distributed

first to pay off any special loans (there apparently were none),

then to the partners to the extent of capital contributed, and then

to the partners pro rata. Here, THEI has made no capital

contribution. Nor has THEI received any cash. And its potential

pro rata receipt of cash from the partnership is too attenuated for

us to consider.

We have already seen that the fourth factor, i.e., the right

to capital on distribution, favors Mr. Manchester, who had the only

positive capital account.

In summary, this analy sis of the "facts and circumstances"

factors does not support petitioner's position that 99 percent of

IHCL's net income for the period at issue is properly allocated to

THEI.

II. Vecchio v. Commissioner

Petitioner asserts that this Court has specifically approved

the alloca tion of partnership income to repay negative capital

accounts in Vecchio v. Commissioner

, 103 T.C. 170 (1994). But

Vecchio is not a blanket approval of allocations to offset any

negative capital account. The present case materially differs from

Vecchio

. Here, THEI was always subject to the provision in the-38-

6 Petitioner has attached to its reply brief several

Schedules C, derived from exhibits admitted at trial. Petitioner

makes reference to these schedules in an attempt to demonstrate

(continued...) IHCL Restated Agreement that liquidating distributions would go to

the partners with positive capital accounts. In contrast, the

partnership agreement in Vecchio provided that, upon sale of the

real property or liquidation, the li mited partner was to receive

a retur n of its investment as well as payment of its negative

capital account balance before distributions could be made to the

other partners. We therein approved an allocation of income to

restore a negative capital account.

A number of other facts and circumstances underscore the

differences between Vecchio and the situation here. In V ecchio

,

the limited partner invested $776,000 in the partnership. It did

so as an independe nt investor. In the instant case, THEI never

made an affirmative investment in IHCL. THEI, in fact, appears to

be no more than an accommodation entity, established and controlled

by its partner, Mr. Manchester, to serve his interests.

Additionally, in this case there is no specific cash, like the

$1,986,913 at issue in Vecchio

, available to pay both THEI for its

negative capital account and Mr. Manchester for his positive

capital account. To the contrary, as demonstrated above, it would

appear impossible for IHCL to obtain a sufficient amount of money

because IHCL lacked the power to force the liquidation of the lower

tier partnerships. 6-39-

(...continued)

that a liquidation of PGL and PLH would provide adequate cash to

pay off THEI's negative capital account, repay Mr. Manchester's

positive capital account, and leave a surplus of cash to be

allocated pursuant to the 85-to-15 ratio specified in the IHCL

Restated Agreement. These schedules leave us with many

unanswered questions, especially with regard to the extremely

large negative capital account balances of PGL and PLH.

Petitioner's presentation of this argument has failed to convince

us that upon liquidation of IHCL, THEI would have completely

restored its negative capital account. Under these circumstances, we conclude that petitioner's

reliance upon Vecchio is misplaced.

III. Respondent's Prior Activities Do Not Require a Different

Result

Petitioner argues that respondent accepted its partnership

allocations and capital account entries prior to 1991. Petitioner

asserts that this acqui escence underscores the strength of its

argument that THEI should be allocated all the net income for the

period following June 20, 1991. We disagree. In general, the fact

that a taxpayer's treatment of an item on a tax return in a prior

year is accepted by the Commissioner's agents in audits of the

taxpayer's prior re turn does not preclude or estop the

Commissioner, in a later year, from determining that an item should

be treated differently. See H awkins v. Commissioner

, 713 F.2d 347,

351-352 (8th Cir. 1983), affg. T.C. Me mo. 1982-451; E aster v.

Commissioner , 338 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1964), affg. per curiam T.C.

Memo. 1964-58; Estate of Emerson v. Commissioner

, 67 T.C. 612, 617-

618 (1977); Coors v. Commissioner , 60 T.C. 368, 406 (1973), affd.

519 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1975).-40-

Petitioner further argues that, in some instances,

representations made by respondent's counsel to th e Court

precluded petitioner from presenting evidence regarding certain

issues respondent raised on brief. We have reviewed those

instances. Most of those representations pertain to collateral

issues that we have found it unnecessary to address. Instead, we

have decided t his case on the basis of the issues presented at

trial and fully brie f ed thereafter, including the comparative

liquidation test of section 1.704-1(b)(3)(iii), Income Tax Regs.,

the "facts and circumstances" test of section 704 (b), and the

applicability of Vecchio

.

The issues raised by the pleadings place upon the taxpayer the

burden of showing every necessary requirement to sustain its burden

of proof

. Axelrod v. Commissioner , 56 T.C. 248, 255 (1971). In

the instant case, the FPAA, as well as the applicable sections of

the Internal Revenue Code and regulations, adequately set forth the

matter s petitioner was required to demonstrate in order to carry

its burden of proof. Petitioner has failed to carry its burden of

showing that respondent's reallocation of partnership income to Mr.

Manchester was erroneous.

To reflect the foregoing and the parties' concessions,

Decision will be entered

under Rule 155

.