BIOSURVEILLANCE

Additional Planning, 

Oversight, and 

Coordination Needed to 

Enhance National 

Capability

Statement of Chris Currie, Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice 

and 

Steve D. Morris, Director, 

Natural Resources and Environment

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. ET

Wednesday, July 8, 2015

GAO-15-664T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-15-664T, a testimony

before the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

July 8, 2015

BIOSURVEILLANCE

Additional Planning, Oversight, and Coordination

Needed to Enhance National Capability

Why GAO Did This Study

Naturally-occurring infectious disease 

or the intentional use of a biological 

agent to inflict harm could have 

catastrophic consequences. For 

example, the recent outbreak of 

naturally-occurring highly pathogenic 

avian influenza affecting wild birds and 

poultry in the Midwest and on the 

Pacific coast presents a serious threat 

to the economy and trade, and 

underscores the importance of 

maintaining effective food and 

agriculture disease surveillance 

systems. Biosurveillance aims to 

detect such events as early as possible 

and to enhance situational awareness 

related to human, animal, and plant 

health. 

Since 2010, GAO has issued a number 

of reports that discuss the importance 

of effectively conducting 

biosurveillance across the human, 

animal, and plant domains. This 

statement discusses prior GAO reports 

and the status of recommendations 

related to (1) federal, state, and local 

biosurveillance efforts, and (2) efforts 

related to food and agriculture disease 

surveillance.

This testimony is based on previous 

GAO products issued from 2010 

through 2013 related to 

biosurveillance, along with selected 

updates conducted from November 

2014 through June 2015. For these 

updates, GAO reviewed agency 

responses and documents provided in 

response to its recommendation followup efforts, such as the July 2012 

National Strategy for Biosurveillance. 

What GAO Found

In June 2010, GAO reported that there was neither a comprehensive national 

strategy nor a designated focal point with the authority and resources to guide 

development of a national biosurveillance capability. Further, in October 2011, 

GAO reported that states and local agencies faced challenges in developing and 

maintaining their biosurveillance capabilities, such as obtaining resources for an 

adequate workforce, and that the federal government had not conducted an 

assessment of state and local jurisdictions’ ability to contribute to a national 

biosurveillance capability. To help ensure the successful implementation of a 

complex, intergovernmental undertaking, GAO recommended in 2010 that the 

White House’s Homeland Security Council direct the National Security Council 

Staff to develop a national biosurveillance strategy, and further recommended in 

2011 that the strategy consider nonfederal capabilities. The White House issued 

the National Strategy for Biosurveillance in July 2012, which describes the U.S. 

government’s approach to strengthening biosurveillance. However, the strategy 

did not fully respond to the challenges GAO identified. For example, it did not 

establish a framework to prioritize resource investments or address the need to 

leverage nonfederal resources. The White House was to issue an 

implementation plan within 120 days of publishing the strategy. GAO has

reported that it is possible that the implementation plan could address issues 

previously identified, such as resource investment prioritization; however, the 

plan has not been released as of June 2015. 

In August 2011, GAO reported that there was no centralized coordination to 

oversee federal agencies’ efforts to implement Homeland Security Presidential

Directive 9 (HSPD-9) on the nation’s food and agriculture defense policy, which 

includes food and agriculture disease surveillance. GAO also found that the 

Department of Agriculture (USDA) had no department-wide strategy for 

implementing its HSPD-9 responsibilities. Therefore, GAO recommended that the 

National Security Council Staff and the Department of Homeland Security

resume their efforts to coordinate and oversee implementation, and that USDA 

develop a department-wide strategy. In response, the National Security Council 

Staff began hosting interagency working group meetings, and DHS has worked 

to develop a report on agencies’ HSPD-9 implementation efforts, which officials 

stated will be finalized by late summer 2015. As of February 2015, USDA had

conducted a gap analysis of its HSPD-9 implementation efforts but had not yet 

developed a department-wide strategy. Further, GAO reported in May 2013 that 

USDA’s Animal and Plant Inspection Service (APHIS) had broadened its 

previous disease-by-disease surveillance approach to an approach in which the 

agency monitors the overall health of livestock and poultry, but had not yet 

integrated this approach into an overall strategy aligned with the nation’s larger 

biosurveillance efforts, such as efforts called for in HSPD-9. GAO recommended 

that APHIS integrate its new approach into an overall strategy aligned with 

national homeland security efforts, and develop goals and measures for the new 

approach. In June 2015, officials stated that APHIS has begun to develop some 

measures, but noted that resource constraints limit their ability to assess their 

new approach to disease surveillance. Fully integrating its new approach into an 

overall strategy aligned with broader homeland security efforts, as GAO 

recommended, will better position APHIS to support national efforts to address 

threats to animal and human health.

View GAO-15-664T. For more information, 

contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or 

curriec@gao.gov and Steve D. Morris at (202) 

512-3841 and morriss@gao.gov. 
Letter

Page 1 GAO-15-664T 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the

Committee:

A catastrophic biological event, such as a naturally occurring pandemic or 

a terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction, could cause 

thousands of casualties, weaken the economy, and threaten national 

security. Biosurveillance aims to detect such events as early as possible 

and to enhance situational awareness and decision making by gathering, 

integrating, interpreting, and communicating essential information related 

to all-hazards threats or disease activity affecting human, animal, or plant 

health. The recent outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza in the 

Midwest and on the Pacific coast underscores the importance of 

maintaining effective animal and plant surveillance systems within the 

broader context of biosurveillance, as the disruption of the agriculture or 

food production systems can present a serious threat to the national 

economy, trade, and human health. Although the current strain is only 

affecting birds at this time, prior influenza strains have had devastating 

effects on humans. For example, as we reported in 2011, the Department 

of Health and Human Service (HHS) estimated that there were as many 

as 89 million U.S. cases of H1N1 influenza from April 2009 to April 2010.1

Effective preparation for, detection of, and response to a major biological 

event of natural, accidental, or intentional origin requires effective 

coordination and cooperation among different federal agencies, levels of 

government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. At 

the federal level, HHS is the federal agency with primary responsibility for 

disease surveillance in humans. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) is 

the primary federal agency with responsibility for pest and disease 

surveillance in animals and plants as well as safety of meat, poultry, and 

processed egg products.2

 

1

See GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Lessons from the H1N1 Pandemic Should Be 

Incorporated Into Future Planning, 

As the agency with lead responsibility for 

protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the nation, 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is concerned with the 

prevention of bioterrorist attacks as well as preparing the nation to 

GAO-11-632 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2011).

2

Although USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service is responsible for ensuring the 

safety of meat, poultry, and processed egg products, HHS’s Food and Drug Administration 

is responsible for ensuring the safety of virtually all other food. For more information on 

efforts needed to improve federal oversight of food safety, see GAO, High-Risk Series: An 

Update, GAO-15-290 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2015). 

Letter
Page 2 GAO-15-664T 

respond to biological events in order to minimize human and economic 

losses. The responsibility and capacity for collecting most biosurveillance 

information and carrying out most health-monitoring activities reside 

within state and local jurisdictions or with private sector entities—such as 

hospitals and other private health care providers.

Since 2010, we have issued a number of reports that discussed the 

importance of conducting biosurveillance across the human, animal, and 

plant domains. This statement describes the status of our prior 

recommendations related to (1) federal, state, and local biosurveillance 

efforts, and (2) efforts related to food and agriculture disease surveillance. 

This statement is based on GAO’s prior work issued from June 2010 

through May 2013 on various biosurveillance efforts, along with selected 

updates conducted from November 2014 through June 2015.3

The work upon which this testimony is based was conducted in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

To conduct 

our prior work, we reviewed relevant presidential directives, laws, 

regulations, policies, and strategic plans; surveyed states; and 

interviewed federal, state, and industry officials, among others. More 

information on our scope and methodology can be found in each of the 

reports cited throughout this statement. To conduct our updates, we 

reviewed agency responses and documents provided in response to our 

recommendation follow-up efforts, such as the July 2012 National 

Strategy for Biosurveillance. 

 

3

GAO, Biosurveillance: Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance Capability Need a 

National Strategy and a Designated Leader, GAO-10-645 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 

2010); Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Improve Response to Potential Terrorist 

Attacks and Natural Disasters Affecting Food and Agriculture, GAO-11-652 (Washington, 

D.C.: Aug. 19, 2011); Biosurveillance: Nonfederal Capabilities Should Be Considered in 

Creating a National Biosurveillance Strategy, GAO-12-55 (Washington, D.C.: Oct 31, 

2011); and Homeland Security: An Overall Strategy Is Needed to Strengthen Disease 

Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry, GAO-13-424 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2013.)

Select Worldwide Disease Occurrence: 

Avian Influenza

According to the Department of Agriculture, 

since mid-December 2014, there have been 

several ongoing highly pathogenic avian 

influenza incidents along the Pacific, Central, 

and Mississippi Flyways, impacting about 50 

million wild birds and poultry. The Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention considers the 

risk to people from the current outbreak to be 

low and no human infections have been 

detected as of June 2015. However, similar 

viruses have infected people. For example, 

beginning in the early 2000s, an outbreak of 

avian influenza spread from China to nearly 

60 countries, reaching a peak in 2006. Nearly 

500 human cases were reported for this 

outbreak, with almost 300 fatalities. The 

outbreak also resulted in the death and 

destruction of millions of wild and domestic 

birds throughout Asia, Europe, Africa, and the 

Middle East.

Source: GAO, Department of Agriculture, and Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention (photo) | GAO-15-664T
Page 3 GAO-15-664T 

Homeland security presidential directives (HSPD) have called for HHS, 

USDA, DHS, and other federal agencies to take action to strengthen 

biosurveillance, including food and agriculture disease surveillance. For 

example, HSPD-9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food, issued 

in January 2004, directed HHS and USDA, among others, to develop 

robust, comprehensive, and fully coordinated biosurveillance and 

monitoring systems for animals, plants, wildlife, food, human health, and 

water.4 Further, DHS was to lead, integrate, and coordinate 

implementation efforts among federal departments and agencies to 

protect critical infrastructure, including agriculture. HSPD-10: Biodefense 

for the 21st Century, issued in April 2004, established the four pillars of 

biodefense: (1) threat awareness, (2) prevention and protection, (3) 

surveillance and detection, and (4) response and recovery.5

Pursuant to these presidential directives, as well as federal laws, many 

federal departments and agencies pursue missions and manage

programs that contribute to a national biosurveillance capability. Table 1 

describes selected federal departments and agencies with surveillancerelated responsibilities.

 

4

The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9: Defense of United States 

Agriculture and Food (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004).

5

The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10: Biodefense for the 21st 

Century (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2004).

Selected Worldwide Disease Occurrence: 

Foot-and-Mouth Disease

According to the Department of Agriculture, a 

2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in 

the United Kingdom resulted in the slaughter 

and disposal of millions of animals and 

economic losses conservatively estimated at 

$14.7 billion.

Foot-and-mouth disease is a highly 

contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed 

animals such as cattle, swine, and sheep, and 

does not have human health implications. 

Source: GAO, Department of Agriculture (photo) | GAO-15-

664T

Background
Page 4 GAO-15-664T 

Table 1: Selected Federal Departments and Components with Surveillance-Related Responsibilities

Department Component Surveillance-related responsibilities

Department of Health and 

Human Services

Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention (CDC)

CDC is the lead federal agency for human health surveillance and 

develops strategies for conducting surveillance of diseases in 

humans, including coordinating with other agencies to monitor 

zoonotic diseases, which can be transferred between animals and 

humans.

Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service (APHIS)

APHIS is responsible for implementing and conducting national 

measures to detect, control, or eradicate certain livestock and poultry 

diseases (such as diagnostic testing), including in animals at 

slaughterhouses, stockyards, or other points of concentration. APHIS 

is also responsible for emergency response to an economically 

devastating or highly contagious animal disease—for example, by 

determining the veterinary and other expertise needed to respond.

Department of Homeland 

Security 

a

Office of Health Affairs (OHA) As the lead agency for national biosurveillance coordination, OHA 

provides medical, public health, and scientific expertise in support of 

the Department of Homeland Security’s mission to prepare for, 

respond to, and recover from all threats.

Department of the Interior National Wildlife Health 

Center (NWHC)

The NWHC, a science center of the United States Geological Survey, 

was founded in 1975 to provide the technical assistance necessary to 

identify, control, and prevent wildlife losses from diseases as well as 

conduct research to understand the impact of diseases on wildlife 

populations, and devise methods to more effectively manage these 

disease threats.

Source: GAO analysis and NHWC Strategic Plan | GAO-15-664T

a

For further information, see GAO, Federal Veterinarians: Efforts Needed to Improve Workforce 

Planning, GAO-15-495 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2015).

There are two White House councils that provide oversight over the 

development and implementation of policy related to biosurveillance. The 

National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 

1947 and serves as the President’s principal forum for considering 

national security and foreign policy matters with senior national security 

advisers and cabinet officials.6 The Homeland Security Council was 

established following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, by 

executive order in October 2001 to ensure coordination of the homeland 

security–related activities of executive departments and agencies, as well 

as effective development and implementation of homeland security 

 

6

50 U.S.C. § 402.
Page 5 GAO-15-664T 

policies.7

We have previously reported that in an era of rapid transit and global 

trade, the public health and agricultural industries, as well as natural 

ecosystems including native plants and wildlife, face increased threats of 

naturally occurring outbreaks of infectious disease and accidental 

exposure to biological threats.

In May 2009, the staff serving the Homeland Security Council 

and National Security Council were merged as the National Security 

Council Staff, but both councils continue to exist by statute. The 

Homeland Security Council was maintained as the principal venue for 

interagency deliberations on issues that affect the security of the 

homeland, such a biosurveillance.

8 Some diseases, such as some strains of 

influenza, are known as zoonotic diseases and can be transferred 

between animals and humans.9 Influenza pandemics occur when a new 

influenza virus emerges and spreads around the world, and most people 

do not have immunity. Although human influenza pandemics have been 

rare in the United States, they have had devastating effects. For example, 

as we reported in 2011 and 2013, HHS estimated that the 2009 H1N1 

pandemic in the U.S. led to as many as 403,000 hospitalizations and 

18,300 deaths from April 2009 to April 2010, and HHS had over $6 billion 

available for influenza pandemic activities from a 2009 supplemental 

appropriation.10

 

7

See Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 10, 2001). The establishment of 

the Homeland Security Council was subsequently codified in statute with the enactment of 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 901, 116 Stat. 2135, 2258 

(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 491).

8

GAO-10-645. 

9

For more on avian influenza, see GAO, Avian Influenza: USDA Has Taken Important 

Steps to Prepare for Outbreaks, but Better Planning Could Improve Response, 

GAO-07-652 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2007). 

10See Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859, 1882-86 (2009). The United Nations’ World 

Health Organization declared the H1N1 influenza outbreak to be a pandemic in June 

2009, which was the first such declaration in over four decades. See GAO-11-632 and 

GAO, Influenza: Progress Made in Responding to Seasonal and Pandemic Outbreaks, 

GAO-13-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2013).

Selected Worldwide Disease Occurrence: 

Salmonella, United States, 2008

In 2008, a salmonella outbreak occurred in 43 

states and the District of Columbia, with 1,500 

persons reportedly ill with the outbreak strain. 

The initial investigations identified tomatoes as 

the likely source. As the outbreak continued, 

additional investigations showed much of the 

outbreak was due to jalapeno and Serrano 

peppers grown and packed in Mexico and 

distributed in the United States. According to 

the Department of Agriculture’s Rural 

Cooperative, the tomato industry sustained an 

estimated loss of $100 million or more. 

Source: GAO | GAO-15-664T

Selected Worldwide Disease Occurrence: 

Anthrax

In 2001, anthrax was intentionally spread 

through the postal system by sending letters 

with powder containing anthrax to the U.S. 

Capitol. Of the 22 infected persons, 5 died. 

The Environmental Protection Agency spent 

$27 million for clean up of Capitol Hill and the 

U.S. Postal Service was appropriated 

hundreds of millions of dollars to clean up 

affected facilities.

Source: Environmental Protection Agency | GAO-15-664T
Page 6 GAO-15-664T 

Although the White House developed the National Strategy for 

Biosurveillance in July 2012, this strategy does not include information 

that identifies resource and investment needs as we previously 

recommended.11 In June 2010, we found that there was no integrated 

approach to help ensure an effective national biosurveillance capability 

and to provide a framework to help identify and prioritize investments. 

Without a unifying framework; structure; and an entity with the authority, 

resources, time, and responsibility for guiding its implementation, we 

concluded that it would be very difficult to create an integrated approach 

to building and sustaining a national biosurveillance capability. National 

and agency strategies note that coordination is important because a 

national biosurveillance capability relies on the ability of a complex 

interagency and intergovernmental network to work together and meet an 

ever-evolving threat. Specifically, we found there was neither a

comprehensive national strategy nor a designated focal point with the 

authority and resources to guide the effort to develop a national 

biosurveillance capability. We have previously found that developing 

effective national strategies and establishing a focal point with sufficient 

responsibility, authority, and resources can help ensure successful 

implementation of complex interagency and intergovernmental 

undertakings, such as providing a national biosurveillance capability.12

 

11GAO-10-645. 

12See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, 

GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C: Sept. 20, 2001), and Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of 

Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).

The White House Has 

Developed a National 

Biosurveillance 

Strategy, but More 

Action Is Needed to 

Enhance Federal and 

Nonfederal 

Capabilities

The National 

Biosurveillance Strategy 

Does Not Yet Identify 

Resource and Investment 

Needs
Page 7 GAO-15-664T 

We made two recommendations to the White House’s Homeland Security 

Council, which has taken some actions to address them, as shown in 

table 2.

Table 2: Recommendations from GAO-10-645, and Agency Actions Taken to Address Them

GAO’s recommendation Agency actions taken to address recommendation

Status of recommendation and, if 

open, what remains to be done

The Homeland Security Council 

should direct the National Security 

Council Staff to establish a focal 

point to lead the development of a 

national biosurveillance strategy.

The National Security Council Staff convened an 

interagency policy group that guided the completion of the 

National Strategy for Biosurveillance in July 2012, which 

addresses the intent of our recommendation.

Status: Closed as implemented.

The Homeland Security Council 

should direct the National Security 

Council Staff to develop a national 

biosurveillance strategy that 

clarifies roles and responsibilities, 

provides goals and performance 

measures, and identifies resource 

and investment needs, among other 

elements.

In July 2012, the White House issued the National Strategy 

for Biosurveillance. However, our review of the strategy 

determined that the strategy alone did not fully meet the 

intent of our recommendation because, among other 

things, it did not provide the mechanism we recommended 

to identify resource and investment needs, including 

investment priorities.a

Status: Open

The National Strategy for 

Biosurveillance stated that an implementation plan was to 

be completed within 120 days of the strategy’s issuance. 

However, as of June 2015, an implementation plan has not 

been released. 

To fully address this 

recommendation, the 

implementation plan would have to 

sufficiently address the need to 

help identify and prioritize resource 

and investment needs.

Sources: GAO-10-645 and GAO analysis of agency documents and information. | GAO-15-664T

a

See GAO, Biosurveillance: Observations on the Cancellation of BioWatch Gen-3 and Future 

Considerations for the Program, GAO-14-267T (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2014).

The National Strategy for Biosurveillance also does not address issues 

we raised related to state and local biosurveillance efforts, and that we

previously recommended. In October 2011, we reported that nonfederal 

capabilities should also be considered in creating a national 

biosurveillance strategy.13

 

13

Because the resources that constitute a 

national biosurveillance capability are largely owned by nonfederal 

entities, a national strategy that considers how to strengthen and leverage 

nonfederal partners could improve efforts to build and maintain a national 

biosurveillance capability. Moreover, efforts to build the capability would 

benefit from a framework that facilitates assessment of nonfederal 

jurisdictions’ baseline capabilities and critical gaps across the entire 

biosurveillance enterprise. In 2011, we found that although the federal 

government did provide some resources to help control disease in 

GAO-12-55. 

The National 

Biosurveillance Strategy 

Does Not Address Key 

Challenges for Nonfederal 

Efforts or the Need to 

Leverage Nonfederal 

Resources
Page 8 GAO-15-664T 

humans and animals in tribal and insular areas, there were no specific 

efforts to ensure that states and local agencies can contribute to the 

national biosurveillance capability. In addition, we noted that the federal 

government had not conducted a comprehensive assessment of state 

and local jurisdictions’ ability to contribute to a national biosurveillance 

capability. While the size, variability, and complexity of the biosurveillance 

enterprise makes an assessment difficult, we concluded that the federal 

government would lack key information about the baseline status, 

strengths, weaknesses, and gaps across the biosurveillance enterprise 

until it conducts an assessment of nonfederal biosurveillance capabilities.

We further reported in October 2011 that state and local officials identified 

common challenges to developing and maintaining their biosurveillance 

capabilities such as (1) state policies in response to state budget 

constraints that restricted hiring, travel, and training; (2) obtaining and 

maintaining resources, such as adequate workforce, equipment, and 

systems; and (3) the lack of strategic planning and leadership to support 

long-term investment in crosscutting core capabilities, integrated 

biosurveillance, and effective partnerships. For example, state and local 

officials we surveyed had reported facing workforce shortages among 

skilled professionals—epidemiologists, informaticians, statisticians, 

laboratory staff, animal-health staff, or animal-disease specialists. Many 

of the challenges that state and local officials identified were similar to 

issues we reported regarding biosurveillance at the federal level. We 

noted that many of the challenges facing the biosurveillance enterprise 

were complex, inherent to building capabilities that cross traditional 

boundaries, and not easily resolved.

To address these issues, and building on our June 2010 recommendation 

to develop a national biosurveillance strategy, we called for such a 

strategy to also address the key challenges we identified in nonfederal 

biosurveillance, as shown in table 3.
Page 9 GAO-15-664T 

Table 3: Recommendations from GAO-12-55, and Agency Actions Taken to Address Them

GAO recommendation

Agency actions taken to address 

recommendation

Status of recommendation and, if 

open, what remains to be done

The Homeland Security Council should 

direct the National Security Council 

Staff to, as a part of its development of 

a national biosurveillance strategy, 

ensure that the strategy (1) incorporates 

a means to leverage existing efforts that 

support nonfederal biosurveillance 

capabilities, (2) considers challenges 

that nonfederal jurisdictions face, and 

(3) includes a framework to develop a 

baseline and gap assessment of

nonfederal jurisdictions’ capabilities. 

In July 2012, the White House released the National 

Strategy for Biosurveillance and was also to complete 

a strategic implementation plan within 120 days of the 

strategy’s issuance. However, from our review of the 

strategy, we determined that this strategy did not 

address the issues we raised related to state and 

local biosurveillance and did not meaningfully 

address the need to leverage nonfederal resources. 

As of June 2015, the implementation plan has not 

been released 

Status: Open

As with the issues we raised related 

to federal biosurveillance, it is 

possible that the implementation 

plan, when released, will meet the 

intent of our recommendation.

However, until this plan is released, 

this recommendation remains not 

fully implemented.

Sources: GAO-12-55 and GAO analysis of agency documents and information. | GAO 15-664T

As part of the national biosurveillance capability, the maintenance of 

effective animal and plant surveillance systems is critical to detecting and 

enhancing the situational awareness of biological events that might 

disrupt agriculture and food production systems, such as highly 

pathogenic avian influenza. Although DHS, the White House’s Homeland 

Security Council, and USDA have made efforts to improve the 

coordination and implementation of federal food and agriculture defense 

policy, additional actions are needed. In August 2011, we found that there 

was no centralized coordination to oversee the federal government’s 

overall progress implementing HSPD-9 on the nation’s food and 

More Oversight and 

Coordination Are 

Needed to Ensure 

That Federal Food 

and Agriculture 

Surveillance Efforts 

Align with National 

Policy

Federal Oversight and 

Coordination of the 

Nation’s Food and 

Agriculture Defense Policy 

Could Be Enhanced
Page 10 GAO-15-664T 

agriculture defense policy, responsibilities for which are distributed across 

several agencies.14

Per HSPD-9, DHS is responsible for coordinating agencies’ overall 

HSPD-9 implementation efforts. In addition, the White House’s Homeland 

Security Council was established by executive order in 2001 to ensure 

the effective development and implementation of homeland security 

policies, including HSPD-9. Because there was no centralized 

coordination to oversee agencies’ HSPD-9 implementation progress at 

the time of our 2011 review, it was unclear how effectively or efficiently 

agencies were using resources in implementing the nation’s food and 

agriculture defense policy, including surveillance efforts. We concluded 

that without coordinated activities to oversee agencies’ implementation 

efforts, the nation may not be assured that crosscutting agency efforts to 

protect agriculture and the food supply are well designed and effectively 

implemented in order to reduce vulnerability to, and the impact of, terrorist 

attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

As we reported in 2011, these federal responsibilities 

include the development of surveillance and monitoring systems for 

animal, plant, and wildlife disease, food, public health, and water quality, 

as well as other responsibilities related to awareness and warning, 

vulnerability assessment, mitigation strategies, response and recovery, 

and research and development. Prior to 2011, the White House’s 

Homeland Security Council had conducted some coordinated activities to 

oversee federal agencies’ HSPD-9 implementation by gathering 

information from agencies about their progress. DHS supported these 

activities by coordinating agencies’ responses to the White House on their 

progress. However, at the time of our 2011 review, the White House and 

DHS had discontinued their efforts.

We also reported in August 2011 that USDA’s component agencies had 

taken steps to implement the department’s HSPD-9 responsibilities, but 

USDA did not have a department-wide strategy for implementing its 

numerous HSPD-9 responsibilities. For example, component agencies 

had taken steps to implement the four HSPD-9 response and recovery 

efforts for which USDA has lead responsibility, such as APHIS’s 

development of the National Veterinary Stockpile. However, according to 

USDA officials, the department assigned HSPD-9 responsibilities to its 

component agencies based on their statutory authority and expertise and 

 

14GAO-11-652.
Page 11 GAO-15-664T 

allowed individual agencies to determine their implementation and budget 

priorities.

To address these issues, we made four recommendations to DHS, the 

White House’s Homeland Security Council, and USDA, and each agency 

generally concurred with its respective recommendations. Since we made 

these recommendations, in August 2011, these entities have taken some 

actions to address them, as shown in table 4.

Table 4: Select Recommendations From GAO-11-652, and Agency Actions Taken to Address Them

GAO recommendation Agency actions taken to address recommendation

Status of recommendation and, if 

open, what remains to be done

The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) should resume its 

efforts to coordinate agencies’ 

overall Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive (HSPD)-9 

implementation efforts.

DHS officials stated in May 2015 that DHS is in the process 

of finalizing a report on agencies’ efforts to implement 

HSPD-9. Officials indicated that the report is going through 

an interagency review process and will likely be finalized by 

late summer 2015. Further, officials added that there are 

several DHS interagency working groups that meet 

regularly and discuss topics related to HSPD-9. Although 

participation in these groups helps to keep DHS aware of 

related efforts, they do not comprehensively coordinate 

agencies’ overall HSPD-9 implementation efforts. 

Status: Open

To fully address this 

recommendation, DHS should 

finalize its report on agencies’ efforts 

to implement HSPD-9, which we 

believe will provide federal decision 

makers with critical information 

needed to assess how well the 

nation is prepared for major 

emergencies.

The Homeland Security Council 

should direct the National Security 

Council Staff to establish an 

interagency process that would 

provide oversight of agencies’ 

implementation of HSPD-9.

National Security Council Staff officials stated in December 

2013 that they, along with the White House’s Office of 

Science and Technology Policy, have cohosted meetings 

of an interagency working group that is chaired by DHS. 

The officials stated that they plan to continue to oversee 

agencies’ implementation of HSPD-9 through this working 

group. These actions address the intent of our 

recommendation. 

Status: Closed as implemented.

The Homeland Security Council 

should direct the National Security 

Council Staff to encourage 

agencies to participate in and 

contribute information to DHS’s 

efforts to coordinate agencies’ 

implementation of HSPD-9.

National Security Council Staff officials stated that they also 

used the interagency working group to encourage agencies 

to participate in and contribute information to DHS’s efforts. 

DHS officials stated in November 2013 that, throughout the 

previous 18 months, the National Security Council Staff 

had invested effort and expressed interest in the 

interagency working group and have been involved in 

discussions about DHS’s assessment of agencies’ 

implementation of HSPD-9. These actions address the 

intent of our recommendation.

Status: Closed as implemented.
Page 12 GAO-15-664T 

GAO recommendation Agency actions taken to address recommendation

Status of recommendation and, if 

open, what remains to be done

The Department of Agriculture 

(USDA) should develop a 

department-wide strategy for 

implementing its HSPD-9 

responsibilities. Such a strategy 

would include an overarching 

framework for setting priorities, as 

well as allocating resources.

USDA officials stated in 2012 that the department intended 

to develop a comprehensive homeland security strategy to 

oversee its agencies’ implementation of homeland security 

activities, including responsibilities outlined in HSPD-9. 

However, USDA officials told us in November 2013 that, 

because of limited staffing and resources and competing 

priorities, they were not able to develop a strategy in 2013. 

In February 2015, USDA officials stated that they had 

conducted a gap analysis with USDA’s component 

agencies to determine USDA’s successes and challenges 

with HSPD-9 implementation. 

Status: Open

We continue to believe that until it 

completes a department-wide 

strategy for implementing its HSPD9 responsibilities, USDA cannot be 

reasonably assured that its 

agencies’ efforts align with 

departmental priorities, that it has 

effectively allocated resources, and 

it is fulfilling its HSPD-9 

responsibilities.

Sources: GAO-11-652 and GAO analysis of agency documents and information. | GAO 15-664T

We reported in May 2013 that APHIS had developed a new approach for 

its livestock and poultry surveillance activities, but had not yet integrated 

these efforts into an overall strategy with goals and performance 

measures aligned with the nation’s larger biosurveillance policy.15

Although APHIS had a vision for its new approach, we found that it had 

not yet integrated that vision into an overall strategy with associated goals 

and performance measures aligned with the nation’s larger 

biosurveillance efforts. At the time of our 2013 review, APHIS had 

developed a number of planning documents related to the agency’s 

Under 

its prior approach, APHIS focused its disease surveillance programs on 

preventing the introduction of certain foreign animal diseases and 

monitoring, detecting, and eradicating other reportable diseases already 

present in domestic herds. Under this previous approach, information 

about nonreportable diseases, including those that are new or 

reemerging, was not always captured by the agency’s disease 

surveillance efforts. We reported in 2013 that under its new approach 

APHIS had begun to broaden its approach by monitoring the overall 

health of livestock and poultry and using additional sources and types of 

data to better detect and control new or reemerging diseases. For 

example, APHIS has been monitoring for the presence of pseudorabies—

a viral swine disease that may cause respiratory illness and death—at 

slaughter facilities, but under the new approach, it has proposed 

monitoring these facilities for a range of other diseases as well.

 

15GAO-13-424. 

APHIS Developed a New 

Approach for Livestock 

and Poultry Surveillance, 

but Has Not Integrated 

These Efforts into an 

Overall Strategy with 

Performance Measures
Page 13 GAO-15-664T 

capabilities for disease surveillance in livestock and poultry, but these 

documents did not specifically address outcomes the agency seeks to 

accomplish or have associated performance measures. Moreover, none 

of APHIS’s surveillance plans indicated how they individually or 

collectively supported national homeland security efforts called for in 

HSPD-9 or other national policies to defend the nation’s food and 

agricultural systems against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 

emergencies. We concluded that without integrating its new approach to 

livestock and poultry surveillance activities into an overall strategy with 

goals and measures aligned with broader national homeland security 

efforts to detect biological threats, APHIS may not be ideally positioned to 

support national efforts to address the next threat to animal and human 

health. To address this issue, we made a recommendation to APHIS, with 

which APHIS concurred and is taking action to address, as described in 

table 5.

Table 5: Recommendations from GAO-13-424, and Agency Actions Taken to Address Them

GAO recommendation Agency actions taken to address recommendation

Status of recommendations and, 

if open, what remains to be done

As the Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service (APHIS) 

develops goals and measures 

for its new approach to disease 

surveillance in livestock and 

poultry, the agency should 

integrate the agency’s vision 

into an overall strategy that 

guides how its new approach 

will support national homeland 

security efforts to enhance the 

detection of biological threats.

APHIS has begun to develop measures to assess surveillance 

efforts for critical diseases affecting food, animals, and 

agriculture, and has begun to integrate surveillance activities 

with other national biosurveillance efforts. For example, 

officials stated in June 2015 that APHIS has begun to integrate 

agency efforts with those of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and 

Inspection Service, and the National Animal Health Laboratory 

Network, a consortium of state-funded testing and diagnostic 

veterinary laboratories. Activities include sharing personnel, 

jointly carrying out pilot projects, and signing collaboration 

agreements. However, officials also reported that resource 

constraints obstruct APHIS’s efforts to electronically integrate 

various sources of surveillance information and that 

constrained funding would further limit APHIS’s ability to 

assess its new approach to animal disease surveillance. 

Status: Open

We continue to believe that 

integrating its new approach to 

livestock and poultry surveillance 

activities into an overall strategy 

aligned with broader national 

homeland security efforts will better 

position APHIS to support national 

efforts to address threats to animal 

and human health.

Sources: GAO-13-424 and GAO analysis of agency documents and information. | GAO 15-664T

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and members of the 

committee, this completes our prepared statement. We would be pleased 

to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Page 14 GAO-15-664T 

For questions about this statement, please contact Chris Currie at (404) 

679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov and Steve D. Morris at (202) 512-3841 or 

morriss@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include 

Kathryn Godfrey and Mary Denigan-Macauley (Assistant Directors), 

Lorraine Ettaro, Elias Harpst, Tracey King, Amanda Kolling, Jan 

Montgomery, Erin O’Brien, Virginia Vanderlinde, John Vocino, and Brian 

Wanlass. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is 

based on are listed in each product.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

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