alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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PROCESSING DIVISION §— (2/99 99/-
PUBLICATION & REGULATION EG [0341-10 SEP 02 204)
B

As of: September 02, 2011
Received: August 15, 2011
PUBLIC SUBMISSION __ fronted: September 2,201
Posted: September 02,
Tracking No. 80ee0beb
‘Comments Due: September 30, 2011
Submission Type: Web

Docket: IRS-2010-0017
Requirement for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers to Provide Coverage of

Preventive Services under the PatientProtection and Affordable Care Act

Comment On: IRS-2010-0017-0038
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services

under Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Amendment

Document: IRS-2010-0017-0176
Comment on FR Doc # 2011-19684

Yakrown 37 Submitter Information

Address:
Santa Cruz, 95065-1117
Submitter's Representative: NARAL Pro-Choice America

General Comment

I strongly support the new policy requiring health-insurance plans to cover birth control without a
copay, CMS-9992-IFC2, Thank you for this important improvement to women's health care,

I also want you to know that I am concerned that certain religious employers may be allowed to
opt out of the requirements. All women should have access to contraceptive coverage, regardless
of where they work.

This policy finally should make near-universal access to birth control
a reality for all women who use it.

Improving women's access to birth control is positive in so many ways.
A woman who can plan when to have a family is able to participate in
society more fully. Allowing women to space their pregnancies
contributes to healthy childbearing. And ultimately, fewer unintended
pregnancies can reduce the need for abortion.

Thank you for following science-based recommendations and making
women's health a priority.

http://fdms.erulemaking.net/fdms-web-agency/component/contentstreamer?objectlId=09000... 9/2/2011
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-19-00222-CV 

SANJAY JOSHI, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

SOUTHLAKE AUTOMOTIVE, LLC, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 

Tarrant County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 2016-006369-1, Honorable Don Pierson, Presiding 

 

September 30, 2019 

 

ORDER REINSTATING APPEAL 

 

Before CAMPBELL and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ. 

Appellant, Sanjay Joshi, appeals from the trial court’s take-nothing judgment. 

Appellee, Southlake Automotive, LLC has filed a cross-appeal. On June 21, 2019, we 

abated the appeal and suspended all appellate deadlines to allow the parties time to 

mediate the case. On September 26, 2019, Appellant notified the Court that the mediation 

was unsuccessful. Accordingly, we reinstate the appeal on our docket. The reporter’s 

record is due on or before October 30, 2019. TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(b), (c).

It is so ordered.

Per Curiam
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of
Brinks Home Security Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2009 (the Report), I, Robert B. Allen, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|(1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DATED this 24th day of February 2010.



/s/ Robert B. AllenRobert B. AllenPresident, Chief Executive Officer and Director


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Brinks Home Security Holdings, Inc. and will be retained by Brinks Home Security Holdings, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. The foregoing certification is being furnished
solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.
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28 MINUTE ORDER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

DAVID RICHARD ISRAEL, 

Petitioner, 

v.

KENNETH QUINN, 

Respondent.

CASE NO. C05-1714-TSZ-JPD

MINUTE ORDER 

The following Minute Order is made by direction of the Court, the Honorable James P. Donohue,

United States Magistrate Judge:

Upon review of the file in this matter, the Court finds cause for recusal. This matter is hereby

reassigned, by way of random assignment, to the Honorable Mary Alice Theiler, United States Magistrate

Judge. 

Dated this 27th day of October, 2006.

BRUCE RIFKIN, Clerk

 By /S/ Peter H. Voelker

 Deputy Clerk 

Case 2:05-cv-01714-TSZ Document 28 Filed 10/27/06 Page 1 of 1
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 317 Engrossed in House (EH)]

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                        April 19, 2007.
    Resolved,  That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to 
consider in the House the bill (H.R. 1905) to provide for the treatment of the 
District of Columbia as a Congressional district for purposes of representation 
in the House of Representatives, and for other purposes. All points of order 
against the bill and against its consideration are waived except those arising 
under clause 9 of rule XXI. The bill shall be considered as read. The previous 
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill to final passage without 
intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate equally divided and controlled 
by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary; 
and (2) one motion to recommit.
    Sec. 2. Upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider in 
the House the bill (H.R. 1906) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to 
adjust the estimated tax payment safe harbor based on income for the preceding 
year in the case of individuals with adjusted gross income greater than $5 
million. All points of order against the bill and against its consideration are 
waived except those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. The bill shall be 
considered as read. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the 
bill to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate 
equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of 
the Committee on Ways and Means; and (2) one motion to recommit.
    Sec. 3. (a) If either H.R. 1905 or H.R. 1906 fails of passage or fails to 
reach the question of passage by an order of recommittal, then both such bills, 
together with H.R. 1433, shall be laid on the table.
    (b) In the engrossment of H.R. 1905, the Clerk shall--
            (1) add the text of H.R. 1906, as passed by the House, as new matter 
        at the end of H.R. 1905;
            (2) conform the title of H.R. 1905 to reflect the addition of the 
        text of H.R. 1906 to the engrossment;
            (3) assign appropriate designations to provisions within the 
        engrossment; and
            (4) conform provisions for short titles within the engrossment.
    (c) Upon the addition of the text of H.R. 1906 to the engrossment of H.R. 
1905, H.R. 1906 and H.R. 1433 shall be laid on the table.
    Sec. 4. During consideration of H.R. 1905 or H.R. 1906 pursuant to this 
resolution, notwithstanding the operation of the previous question, the Chair 
may postpone further consideration of either bill to such time as may be 
designated by the Speaker.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
ORDER EXTENDING MOTIONS CUTOFF/TRIAL - 1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 

AT SEATTLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

RAJINDER SINGH JOHAL, 

MANINDER SINGH KHATKAR, and 

DINDYAL SINGH JASWAL, 

 Defendants. 

No. CR 05-334 L 

ORDER CONTINUING MOTION 

CUTOFF DATE AND TRIAL 

THIS MATTER coming on for hearing upon motion of the Defendant by and through 

his attorney Allen M. Ressler who moved this Court for an Order extending the motions cutoff 

date of February 25, 2006 and the trial date of May 8, 2006, a minimum of thirty days and the 

Court having reviewed the records and files herein, therefore, 

The Defendant and the co-defendants have moved for a continuance of the trial 

date. As grounds therefore, the firm of Ressler & Tesh, PLLC, are newly retained counsel 

for defendant Dindyal Singh Jaswal and require time to become familiar with the case and 

Case 2:05-cr-00334-RSL Document 97 Filed 03/22/06 Page 1 of 2
ORDER EXTENDING MOTIONS CUTOFF/TRIAL - 2 

its proceedings and get up to speed. It has also been indicated that Assistant U.S. Attorney 

Sarah Vogel does not object to this continuance. 

It therefore appearing to the Court that it would be unreasonable to expect adequate 

preparation for the trial and on-going plea negotiations without a continuance, even with 

diligent and good faith efforts by counsel to prepare for trial, and it further appearing that the 

ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the interest of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial, 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the period of delay from May 8, 2006 through July 

24, 2006 is excludable time pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ' 3161(h)(8)(A), for the purpose of 

computing the time limitations imposed by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. ' 3161-3174. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the trial date in this 

matter be and hereby is continued from May 8, 2006 to the 24th day of July, 2006 and the 

motions cutoff from February 25, 2006 to the 12th day of May, 2006. 

DATED this 21st day of March, 2006.

A

Robert S. Lasnik 

United States District Judge 

 

Presented by: 

/S/ Allen M. Ressler 

_____________________________ 

Allen M. Ressler, WSBA #5330 

Attorney for Dindyal Singh Jaswal 

Case 2:05-cr-00334-RSL Document 97 Filed 03/22/06 Page 2 of 2
To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 6:45:35 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients.

If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for any organizations that

provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I strongly oppose the

government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and devices that I

oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Lorna Klefsaas

Motley, MN 56466
From: b.d.brubaker@gmail.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 8:32:53 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Brian Brubaker

, 22901-8977
No. P66/204. —

#### Soderhamn Machine Manufacturing Co. *v.*United States, protests 62/5891, etc. (Portland, Oreg.).

Ford, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise covered by the foregoing protests consists of Cambio De-barkers and parts thereof similar in all material respects to those the subject of *Soderhamn Machine Mfg. Co.*v. *United States*(54 Cust. Ct. 369, Abstract 69205), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
No. P69/87.

protests 65/7745, etc. (New York).

#### Ashear Bros., Inc., et al. *v.*United States,

Ford, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise covered by the foregoing protests consists of handkerchiefs similar in all material respects to those the subject of *Ashear Bros., Inc.*v. *United States*(55 Cust. Ct. 238, C.D. 2582), the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
From: camgrad1@sbcglobal.net

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 5:42:31 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Gene Jeffries

Springdale, AR 72764
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-K of Integrated Circuit Systems, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ending September 27,2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Hock E. Tan, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

 

(1) TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operationsof the Company. 

 

/s/ HOCK E.TAN

Hock E. Tan 

Chief Executive Officer 

November 11, 2003
Case No. 12,903.

#### SINGER MANUF’G CO. v. MASON.

[5 Dill. 488.] 1

Circuit Court, D. Kansas.

1879.

Attachment — Bond-I- Resident Sureties — Revised Statutes, Section 915 — Amendment — New Bond.

A plaintiff in an attachment suit in the federal court must furnish security in the same manner as to amount and the qualification and residence of the sureties that the laws of the state require to be furnished if he were proceeding in the courts of the state. Rev. St. § 915.

Motion by defendant [Washington Mason] to discharge the property attached.

Ruggles, Hentig & Sperry, for the motion.

Johnson & Davis, opposed.

DILLON, Circuit Judge.

The statute of Kansas provides that no order for the atta lament of property shall be issued by the cl' ’ k until an undertaking is filed, with one or more sufficient sureties (Code, § 192), and such “surety must be a resident of the state of Kansas” (Id. § 724). An order of attachr ment was issued by the clerk of this court on an undertaking signed by a single surety, who was and is a resident of the state of Missouri. For this reason the defendant moves to discharge the attachment.

The Revised Statutes of the United States provide that the plaintiff “shall be entitled to similar remedies, by attachment or other process, against the property of the defendant provided • by the laws of the states; * * provided, that similar preliminary affidavits or proofs, and similar security, as required by such state laws, shall be first furnished by the party seeking such attachment.” Rev. St. § 915.

It is our judgment that the plaintiff seeking an attachment in this court against the property of the defendant is required by this section to furnish security in the same manner as to amount and the qualification and residence of the sureties that he would have to furnish if he were proceeding in the state court. This result is not inconsistent with the point ruled in the case referred to in Woolworth’s Reports, decided by Justice Miller. 2

The motion to discharge the property attached will be sustained, unless the plaintiff will substitute a sufficient undertaking, with resident sureties, within a reasonable time — say fifteen days. There is no statute in Kansas which prohibits such an order, and the statute of amendments, federal and state, is sufficiently liberal to warrant the making of such an order.

Ordered accordingly.

2

 [See Souter v. La Crosse R. Co., Case No. 13,180.]
#### In re: Fred L. DITTER, Sandra L. Ditter, and Fred Ditter & Associates, Debtors. Harold Greenberg, dba Law Firm of Harold Greenberg, Michael Damsky, and Rosanne M. Guagenti; Guagenti & Damsky, Appellants, v. Fred L. Ditter; Sandra L. Ditter; Fred Ditter & Associates; Michael S. Kogan, Chapter 7 Trustee, Appellees.

No. 00-55276.

BAP No. CC-98-01565-CMeB.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted July 9, 2001.

Decided July 12, 2001.

*687Before HUG, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Harold Greenberg and his law firm (Appellants) appeal from the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirming the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of Fred L. Ditter, Sandra L. Ditter, and Fred Ditter & Associates’ (Debtors) Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. We affirm.

We review for abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s grant of a voluntary motion for dismissal. *Schroeder v. Int’l Airport Inn P’ship (In re Int’l Airport Inn*P’ship), 517 F.2d 510, 511 (9th Cir.1975); *Gill v. Hall (In re Hall),*15 B.R. 913, 917 (9th Cir.BAP 1981). A voluntary dismissal is proper unless it results in “plain legal prejudice” to the creditors. *Id.*(citing *Int’l Airport,*517 F.2d at 512).

The bankruptcy court correctly determined that there was cause for dismissal, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 707(a). It found that the bankruptcy case no longer served a purpose because (1) the estate’s assets had been depleted and (2) Debtors’ Chapter 7 discharge had been revoked. Those findings are supported by the record.

Furthermore, the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that Appellants had not established that they would suffer “plain legal prejudice” as a result of the dismissal. Appellants contend that the dismissal prejudiced them in three ways. It caused them to lose “a bargained for settlement”; to lose $40,000; and to be subject to future litigation. Those factors do not establish plain legal prejudice. The settlement agreement was never approved by the bankruptcy court, so Appellants did not lose a benefit to which they had become entitled. Appellants lost the $40,000, not as a result of the dismissal, but because (for unrelated reasons) they waived their right to recover it. Indeed, Appellants have “lost” the $40,000 only if they are still before the bankruptcy court; the parties agree that Appellants will be given a credit of $40,000 against any amount awarded as a result of a state-court settlement or judgment. Finally, the fact that Appellants may face future litigation because the dismissal has left the malpractice claim unresolved does not constitute plain legal prejudice. *Westlands Water Dist. v. United States,*100 F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir.1996).

In short, cause existed for the dismissal of the case and the dismissal did not subject Appellants to plain legal prejudice. Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the case.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.