J-S25030-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

R.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

M.S.

Appellee No. 1810 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order November 4, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County

Civil Division at No(s): F.D. 2014-198 V

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MAY 06, 2016

Appellant, R.W. (Mother), appeals from the November 4, 2015 order 

granting Appellee, M.S. (Father), primary physical custody of their minor 

son, X.S. After careful review, we affirm. 

The relevant factual and procedural history, as gleaned from the 

certified record, is as follows. X.S. was born in August 2010. While the 

details are not clear from the record, Mother and X.S. previously resided in 

Mississippi. In July 2013, Mother relocated with X.S. to Crawford County, 

Pennsylvania. Mother currently resides in Crawford County with her parents, 

her fiancé, A.F, and her daughter, P.W., who is the child of A.F.1 Father 

resides in Alabama with his wife, S.S., their daughter, and Father’s 

____________________________________________

1 Mother also has a third child, who resides in Mississippi with her father.
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stepdaughter. Father also has partial physical custody of his daughter from 

a previous marriage.

On May 30, 2014, Mother filed a petition for modification of custody in 

Crawford County.2 The trial court entered an order on December 9, 2014, 

awarding Mother primary physical custody of X.S., and awarding Father 

partial physical custody during the summer. Both parents were awarded 

shared legal custody. On April 22, 2015, Mother, acting pro se, filed a 

petition to modify the December 9, 2014 order. A custody mediation took 

place on May 22, 2015, and, on May 29, 2015, an order was entered which 

reduced Father’s partial physical custody of X.S. during the summer of 2015. 

Mother filed a third petition for modification of custody on July 9, 2015, 

which resulted in an additional custody mediation on July 30, 2015. On 

August 3, 2015, the trial court entered an order which slightly extended 

Father’s partial physical custody during that summer. On August 18, 2015, 

Father, also acting pro se, filed a request for a de novo custody hearing.

A de novo custody hearing took place on October 21, 2015, during 

which Mother was represented by counsel, and Father remained pro se. 

During the hearing, the trial court heard the testimony of Mother; Father’s 

wife, S.S.; Father; the maternal grandmother of X.S., E.W.; the maternal 

____________________________________________

2 Mother averred in her petition that a custody order had previously been 

entered on March 27, 2014, in the Chancery Court of Itawamba County, 

Mississippi, pursuant to which Mother was awarded primary physical custody 

of X.S. See Petition to Modify Custody, 5/30/2014, at ¶ 4, Exhibit 1. 
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grandfather of X.S., R.W.; and Mother’s fiancé, A.F. On November 4, 2015, 

the trial court entered the subject custody order awarding primary physical 

custody of X.S. to Father, and awarding Mother partial physical custody 

during the summer. The trial court awarded the parents shared legal 

custody. On November 13, 2015, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i).3

On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for our review. 

Did the [trial c]ourt err in awarding primary custody 

of the parties’ minor child to [Father] and only 

visitation to [Mother], based on a review of the 

custody factors and the determination of the best 

interest of the child?

Mother’s Brief at 16.

We consider this issue mindful of our well-settled standard of review.

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the 

broadest type and our standard is abuse of 

discretion. We must accept findings of the trial court 

that are supported by competent evidence of record, 

as our role does not include making independent 

factual determinations. In addition, with regard to 

issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we 

must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed 

and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we 

are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or 

inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the 

____________________________________________

3 That same day, Mother filed a motion to suspend the trial court’s 

November 4, 2015 order pending this appeal, which was denied by the trial 

court the same day. Further, on November 16, 2015, the trial court adopted 

its November 4, 2015 opinion for purposes of Rule 1925(a).
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test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are 

unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. 

We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only 

if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in 

light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

V.B. v. J.E.B., 55 A.3d 1193, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).

“When a trial court orders a form of custody, the best interest of the 

child is paramount.” S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted). The factors to be considered by a court when awarding 

custody are set forth at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding 

custody

(a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the 

court shall determine the best interest of the child by 

considering all relevant factors, giving weighted 

consideration to those factors which affect the safety 

of the child, including the following:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage 

and permit frequent and continuing contact 

between the child and another party. 

(2) The present and past abuse committed by 

a party or member of the party’s household, 

whether there is a continued risk of harm to 

the child or an abused party and which party 

can better provide adequate physical 

safeguards and supervision of the child. 

(2.1) The information set forth in section 

5329.1(a) (relating to consideration of child 

abuse and involvement with protective 

services).

(3) The parental duties performed by each 

party on behalf of the child. 
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(4) The need for stability and continuity in the 

child’s education, family life and community 

life. 

(5) The availability of extended family. 

(6) The child’s sibling relationships. 

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, 

based on the child’s maturity and judgment. 

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child 

against the other parent, except in cases of 

domestic violence where reasonable safety 

measures are necessary to protect the child 

from harm. 

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a 

loving, stable, consistent and nurturing 

relationship with the child adequate for the 

child’s emotional needs. 

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the 

daily physical, emotional, developmental, 

educational and special needs of the child. 

(11) The proximity of the residences of the 

parties. 

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the 

child or ability to make appropriate child-care 

arrangements. 

(13) The level of conflict between the parties 

and the willingness and ability of the parties to 

cooperate with one another. A party’s effort to 

protect a child from abuse by another party is 

not evidence of unwillingness or inability to 

cooperate with that party. 

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a 

party or member of a party’s household. 
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(15) The mental and physical condition of a 

party or member of a party’s household. 

(16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

Instantly, the trial court issued a thorough opinion, discussing each of 

the Section 5328(a) factors, and explaining its decision to award primary 

physical custody of X.S. to Father. Trial Court Opinion, 11/4/15, at 2-6. 

The trial court found that Sections 5328(a)(2), (2.1), (4), (5), (7), (8), (12), 

and (14) did not weigh in favor of either parent. Id. at 3-5. The trial court 

concluded that Sections 5328(a)(1), (6), (9), (10), (11), (13), (15), and 

(16) weighed in favor of Father, and that Section 5328(a)(3) weighed in 

favor of Mother. Id. at 2-5. Further, the trial court emphasized that Mother 

has done everything in her power to make it difficult for Father to spend 

time with X.S. Id. at 2, 4-5. The trial court acknowledged that Mother 

testified during the custody hearing that she would try to be more 

cooperative in the future, but it rejected this testimony as incredible. Id. at 

3. The trial court also explained that it believed Father would be able to 

provide a more loving and stable environment for X.S. because Father 

“appears to be more level[-]headed and truthful” than Mother, and because 

Father’s wife can assist him in caring for X.S. Id. at 4-5. 

In response, Mother discusses the trial court’s analysis with respect to 

the Section 5328(a) factors, and offers her own interpretation as to how the 

trial court should have evaluated the evidence presented during the custody 
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hearing. The crux of Mother’s argument appears to be that it was improper 

to award primary physical custody to Father because X.S. has spent the 

majority of his life residing with Mother, and because Mother is not 

employed and has more time than Father to care for X.S. Mother’s Brief at 

18, 22-25. Mother insists that she did not maliciously attempt to prevent 

Father from exercising partial physical custody of X.S. Id. at 21-22, 25. 

Mother also asserts that there was little evidence presented during the 

hearing which indicated that Father’s home in Alabama is an appropriate 

place for X.S., and that there was no evidence indicating that intellectual 

limitations would prevent anyone in Mother’s home from caring for X.S. Id.

at 21-26. Mother suggests that the trial court awarded primary physical 

custody to Father because the trial court wanted to punish Mother, and that 

the trial court acted harshly by making this award when there were less 

“punitive” measures available.4 Id. at 22, 27. 

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law. During 

the custody hearing, Father testified concerning Mother’s refusal to 

____________________________________________

4 Mother also states in her brief that the trial court’s analysis of the Section 

5328(a) factors “seems to hearken back to the previous orders that had 

been rendered in this case. This would be error, based on cases such as 

M.E.V. v. F.P.W., 100 A.3d 670, [(Pa. Super. 2014)], which require a 

contemporaneous review of the circumstances.” Mother’s Brief at 20-21. 

We find no support for this claim, as our review of the trial court’s opinion 

makes clear that the trial court based its decision on the circumstances as 

they existed at the time it entered the subject custody order. 
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cooperate with Father and Mother’s efforts at preventing Father from having 

any sort of relationship with X.S. Most notably, Father described an incident 

that took place during the previous summer, when Father drove from 

Alabama to Pennsylvania to pick up X.S. for his court-ordered period of 

partial physical custody. Father explained that he and his wife, S.S., were 

driving through Kentucky when Mother sent a text message stating that she 

would not permit Father to have custody of X.S., due to X.S. having medical 

appointments. N.T., 10/21/15, at 27. Mother stated that Father and S.S. 

could visit X.S. at Mother’s home, but that they could not leave with X.S. 

Id. After arriving at Mother’s home, Father asked Mother if he could take 

X.S. to KFC for mashed potatoes, and then to Walmart to purchase a 

birthday present. Id. at 28. Father told Mother that he would bring X.S. 

back to Mother’s home afterward, and Mother consented to this plan. Id. 

Instead, Father and S.S. drove back to Alabama with X.S. Id.

During her direct examination, Mother denied sending Father a text 

message stating that he would not be permitted to exercise his period of 

partial physical custody. Id. at 50. Mother stated, “I didn’t say I was going 

to cancel [the period of partial physical custody]. I asked him if he wanted 

to work with me around his appointment time, like, if I can get him today for 

his appointment, or if I have to cancel his appointment.” Id. Mother 

insisted that she intended to allow Father to take X.S. that day. Id. at 51. 

Mother testified that Father told her he would bring X.S. back to her home 
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after taking him to KFC and Walmart. Id. Instead, Father departed for 

Alabama without taking any of the clothing that Mother had packed for X.S., 

or his medications. Id. at 51-52. 

On cross-examination, Father confronted Mother with the text 

message in question. According to Father, the message contained the 

following content. 

[T]hey told me at the courthouse I do not have to 

give him to you and that you can take me for 

contempt of court, but as long as I have proof that 

he had to be in Wexford in two weeks, the Judge will 

not do anything.... I talked to the courthouse 

themselves. I cannot afford them hospitals out of 

state and his insurance does not cover down there, 

so he cannot go with you because he has to be in 

Wexford in two weeks. I am sorry, [Father]. You 

can come visit him while you’re up here, but you’re 

not taking him. He is staying here. I am taking it 

back to court.

Id. at 54-55. Mother admitted that she sent the text message as described 

by Father. Id. at 55. However, Mother continued to claim that she did not 

refuse to allow Father to exercise his period of partial physical custody. Id.

at 57.

Additionally, Father cross-examined Mother concerning alleged 

criminal activity. Father asked Mother if she had any recent “run-ins” with 

the police, and Mother denied that this was the case. Id. at 11. Father 

attempted to impeach Mother using a copy of a police report, but the trial 

court sustained the objection of Mother’s counsel, reasoning that the report 

was hearsay. Id. at 11-12. Later, the trial court asked Mother if she had 
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been convicted of any crimes, and Mother replied that she had. Id. at 71. 

When asked what crime she was convicted of, Mother replied, “I was 

supposed to throw a pot at [A.F.] and hit him in the face.” Id. at 72. Upon 

further questioning by the trial court, Mother stated that she believed she 

was convicted of simple assault.5 Id.

Thus, the record supports the trial court’s decision to award primary 

physical custody to Father. While it is true that Mother has cared for X.S. for 

the majority of his life, and that Mother has more time to care for X.S. 

because she is unemployed, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude 

that these considerations were outweighed by other evidence presented 

during the custody hearing. Awarding primary physical custody of X.S. to 

Father will allow X.S. to establish a relationship with Father, while also 

allowing X.S. to maintain his existing relationship with Mother. In contrast, 

allowing Mother to maintain primary physical custody of X.S. would be 

potentially disastrous, as Mother has demonstrated that she is unwilling to 

permit a healthy relationship between X.S. and Father.

In reaching this conclusion, the trial court emphasized the following.

[W]e note that when the Order was entered on 

December 8, 2014 we found that [M]other was not 

particularly cooperative in providing [F]ather with 

custodial time with [X.S.] At that time it was a very 

close call as to who should have primary physical 

____________________________________________

5 A.F. testified that Mother was mistaken, and that she actually pled guilty to 

disorderly conduct. N.T., 10/21/15, at 94.
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custody of [X.S.] and we granted [M]other primary 

physical custody, mainly because [X.S.] had been 

with her during his lifetime leading up to that 

hearing.

It is obvious from the many aspects of the 

[October 21, 2014] testimony at [the] De Novo 

hearing that [M]other has continued to make it 

difficult for [F]ather to have custody with [X.S.] and 

to communicate with [X.S.] and we did not find 

[M]other’s testimony to be particularly credible. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/4/15, at 2.

In light of the foregoing reasoning, as well as the trial court’s 

discussion of the custody factors, it is abundantly clear why the trial court 

concluded that Father will be able to provide a more loving and stable 

environment for X.S. Mother’s testimony during the custody hearing was 

confusing and inconsistent, which supports the trial court’s determination 

that Father is “more level[-]headed and truthful” than Mother, and Mother’s 

relationship with A.F. appears to be unstable and possibly violent given her 

recent criminal conviction. While Mother contends that the trial court 

awarded primary physical custody to Father because the court wanted to 

punish Mother, our review of the record belies this assertion, and confirms 

that the court based its decision on the best interests of X.S.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion or commit an error of law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s 

November 4, 2015 order.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/6/2016