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FLYING UNDER THE RADAR: SECURING 

WASHINGTON, D.C., AIRSPACE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 29, 2015 

Serial No. 114–25 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DeSAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

JAMES ROBERTSON, Staff Director for Transportation and Public Assets Subcommittee 

MICHAEL KIKO, Professional Staff Member 

MELISSA BEAUMONT, Clerk 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 29, 2015 .............................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

The Hon. Paul D. Irving, Sergeant at Arms, U.S. House of Representatives 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 2 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 4 

Admiral William E. Gortney Commander, NORAD/USNORTHCOM 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 6 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 

Mr. Robert G. Salesses, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland 

Defense Integration and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, U.S. Department of Defense 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 11 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

The Hon. Michael P. Huerta, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 17 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19 

The Hon. Joseph P. Clancy, Director, U.S. Secret Service 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 23 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 25 

Mr. Robert D. MacLean, Chief, U.S. Park Police 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 30 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 32 

Ms. Kim C. Dine, Chief of Police, U.S. Capitol Police 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 33 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 35 

APPENDIX 

Letter from Rep. Mica to Chief Dine, USCP, submitted by Rep. Mica ............... 80 

House Sergeant at Arms email alerts the day of the incident, submitted 

by Rep. Mica ......................................................................................................... 82 

Statement for the record, submitted by Rep. Connolly ........................................ 84 


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WASHINGTON, D.C., AIRSPACE 

Wednesday, April 29, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

WASHINGTON, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz (chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Jordan, Walberg, 

Amash, Farenthold, Lummis, Massie, Meadows, Mulvaney, Walker, 

Hice, Carter, Grothman, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney, Norton, 

Lynch, Connolly, Cartwright, Kelly, Watson Coleman, DeSaulnier, 

and Lujan Grisham. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. And, without objection, the chair 

is authorized to declare a recess at any time. 

As we get going, I need to first express my thoughts and prayers 

to my colleague, Elijah Cummings, and what the people of Baltimore are going through. Our hearts and prayers and thoughts are 

with you and your neighbors and your friends and your community, 

the police officers. 

We are proud of you and the way you are conducting this and 

getting through it, and you are a true leader. I would hope the people of Baltimore, Maryland, would listen to your message, but 

know that our thoughts and prayers are with you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I want to take this moment to 

not only thank you, but thank the members of our Committee, who 

have expressed their concern about Baltimore. And you, Mr. Chairman, have a kind of unique perspective because you had a chance 

to visit Baltimore with me before you even became chairman. And 

so you had a chance to see what the issues are in our city. 

So I am looking forward to working with you and others to try 

to heal some of that pain. And I do appreciate you. And I will never 

forget your visit, and the people in my city will not forget your 

visit. Thank you for your comments. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Well, thank you. We will be conducting this 

hearing a little differently today. I am going to ask unanimous consent that we are going to change the order here, that we will recognize our panel, allow them to give their opening Statements, and 

then we will go into recess. We will reconvene. We will give our 

opening Statements and then we will get into questions. 

But given that we have the very historic presence of the Japanese Prime Minister here to address a joint session of Congress, we 


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are particularly sensitive that, for instance, one of our witnesses, 

the House Sergeant at Arms, Mr. Paul Irving, has to leave us early 

in order to fulfill his duties. And to accommodate his schedule, I 

would ask unanimous consent to forego opening Statements. For 

us, we will come back and give them later and swear in the witnesses and begin their testimony. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

We will get as far as we can and recess so Members can join the 

joint session. We will reconvene 30 minutes after the conclusion of 

the joint session to continue our hearing. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

So we will now recognize our panel of witnesses. 

First we have the Honorable Paul Irving, Sergeant at Arms at 

the U.S. House of Representatives. Mr. Irving is accompanied by 

Mr. Tim Blodgett, Deputy Sergeant at Arms, whose expertise may 

be needed during questioning. 

We also have Admiral William Gortney, Commander of NORAD/ 

USNORTHCOM; Mr. Robert—help me with the pronunciation—— 

Mr. SALESSES. ‘‘Salesses.’’ 

Chairman CHAFFETZ [continuing]. Salesses, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense Integration and Defense 

Support of Civil Authorities at the United States Department of 

Defense; the Honorable Michael Huerta, Administrator of the FAA, 

the Federal Aviation Administration; the Honorable Joseph Clancy, 

Director of the United States Secret Service; Mr. Robert MacLean, 

Chief of the United States Park Police; and Mr. Kim Dine, Chief 

of the United States Capitol Police. 

We welcome you all. 

Pursuant to Committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn before they testify. 

Mr. Blodgett you are included as well. 

We would ask that all the panel please rise and raise your right 

hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. You may be seated. 

Let the record reflect that all the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

All of your written Statements will be entered into the record. 

We would ask that you would limit your verbal comments to 5 minutes. We are going to recognize Mr. Irving first. 

At the conclusion of those remarks, we are going to excuse him 

so that he can tend to the duties of escorting the Prime Minister 

into the House of Representatives. 

Mr. Irving, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. IRVING 

Mr. IRVING. Thank you. 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings, and members of 

the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

today. 


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As Sergeant at Arms and Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the 

House of Representatives, I’m fully dedicated to ensuring the safety 

of the entire Capitol Complex, a mission performed in close partnership and cooperation with the U.S. Capitol Police Board and the 

men and women of the United States Capitol Police. 

Before I begin, though, I would like to extend my thanks to all 

the men and women of the U.S. Capitol Police for their capable and 

professional response to the indicant on April 15. U.S. Capitol Police officers and officials promptly responded to the west front and 

arrested the individual and ensured the craft was harmless. 

We are currently working closely with our partners in Federal 

law enforcement, the Departments of Defense, Transportation, and 

Homeland Security to maintain robust airspace security within the 

challenging confines of the urban environment of the national capital region, in particular, working with our partners to ensure the 

most efficient and robust early detection, tracking and warning systems, ensuring there is consistent and constant interagency communication and early warning communicated in realtime, improving and ensuring immediate and ongoing communications and 

alerts to members and staff during a security incident, and honing 

the countermeasures and policies consistent with those countermeasures. 

Since the event, I’ve ordered the Chief of the Capitol Police to 

utilize the House notification system to alert members, staff and, 

to the extent possible, visitors in as timely a manner as possible 

to alert regarding all life, safety, and potentially threatening events 

that affect the Capitol community. 

The incident on April 15 reminds us all the greatest asset of the 

Capitol, its very openness and accessibility, can, at times, be one 

of our greatest challenges. However, every incident allows us to refine our capabilities, enhance our training, and be better prepared 

for every eventuality. 

I am happy to answer questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[prepared Statement of Mr. Irving follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank you. Please be excused and tend to 

your duties. We thank you and we look forward to seeing you at 

the conclusion of that event. 

Mr. IRVING. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Admiral, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM E. GORTNEY 

Admiral GORTNEY. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished members of the Committee, I’m honored 

to be here today. From a national security perspective, I want to 

emphasize the sensitivity of these discussions in an unclassified environment. 

An open discussion of even unclassified information could be 

pieced together to pose a risk to our national security. Therefore, 

I cannot go into many of the specific details I deem sensitive in an 

unclassified environment. However, in a closed session, I’m ready 

and able to talk to you in much detail as you need. 

NORAD’s role is to provide aerospace warning and control to defend the United States and Canada, including the national capital 

region, from all potential air threats. The airspace surrounding the 

national capital region, known as the Washington, DC, special 

flight rules area, is monitored by a sophisticated integrated air defense system, which is a vast network of radars, cameras, and 

other detection warning devices. Each system is designed to detect, 

track, and monitor specific parameters. 

The integrated air defense system was implemented following 

and in direct response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has continued 

to evolve with the threat over time. We are extremely capable of 

identifying and tracking potential threats to the national capital region, anything from commercial aviation down to small single-propeller-sized aircraft like Cessnas. 

However, a small manned gyrocopter or a similar low-altitude, 

low-speed aerial vehicle, despite its assessed low threat, presents 

a technical challenge. 

This is an interagency effort that collectively understands the 

technical challenges associated with these types of threats and vehicles, and with our partners here at the table, we will continue to 

implement technical and procedural solutions to close any seams. 

I know the Committee has questions, and I look forward to talking with you today. 

[Prepared Statement of Admiral Gortney follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Appreciate it. 

Mr. SALESSES. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. SALESSES 

Mr. SALESSES. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member 

Cummings, and distinguished members of the Committee. I’d like 

to thank you for the opportunity to address the Department of Defense’s role in securing the airspace of Washington, DC. I’d like to 

acknowledge that aspects of this issue are very sensitive for the 

Department of Defense from a national security standpoint. 

I look forward to continuing this discussion in a classified setting. Because I know there’s much to discuss, I will be brief. To 

this end, there are four points I would like to emphasize today. 

No. 1, defending the United States is the Department of Defense’s highest priority. No. 2, the Department of Defense is well 

postured to defend the United States. No. 3, the Department works 

very closely with its Federal partners and law enforcement to protect the national capital airspace. And, last, the Department continually pursues opportunities to enhance our homeland defense capabilities. 

The national security strategy makes it clear that the U.S. Government has no greater responsibility than protecting the American people. Our national defense strategy make protecting and defending the homeland the Department’s first priority. 

To the men and women of the Department of Defense, military 

and civilian, these specific words are the reason they serve in the 

very core of their professional lives. Every day these fine men and 

women, whether serving here at home or some far-off location 

across the globe, dedicate themselves to protecting the American 

people and defending the United States. 

Due to the leadership of the President, the Secretary of Defense, 

and the Congress’ steadfast support, DOD is well postured with the 

authorities and capabilities necessary to defend the homeland. 

Under Admiral Gortney’s leadership and command, the men and 

women of NORAD execute Operation Noble Eagle, monitoring the 

U.S. Airspace, conducting military operations to dissuade, deter, 

and, if necessary, defeat airborne threats. 

In this effort to secure the skies over our Nation’s Capital, the 

men and women of the Department of Defense do not serve alone. 

They are joined by the counterparts at the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Transportation, the Department 

of Justice and our law enforcement partners in a whole-of-government approach to protecting the national airspace. 

Working together, we have built a network of barriers to protect 

the national airspace system against any and all threats. We have 

improved our threat detection capabilities, integrated our threat responses, and refined our procedures to optimize response effectiveness. 

We continually look for opportunities to improve our defenses. 

We understand that, no matter how good we are, the adversary remains committed and we can always be better. 

To this end, we’re dedicated to continual improvement over our 

policies, procedures, and operational capabilities. Working with our 

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fectiveness. This is what the Nation expects. We’re committed to 

meeting this expectation, and this is our obligation. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. We 

appreciate your leadership, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

Committee, and your support of the men and women of the Department of Defense. I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Salesses follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Mr. HUERTA. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL P. HUERTA 

Mr. HUERTA. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member 

Cummings, members of the Committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I’d like to address your questions about the recent gyrocopter incident by explaining the FAA’s role in airspace security and how 

we coordinate with other agencies. 

First and foremost, the FAA’s mission is aircraft and airspace 

safety. We operate the Nation’s air traffic control system in order 

to separate aircraft. Our primary focus is on getting aircraft safely 

to their destinations and managing the flow of thousands of aircraft and their passengers around the country every day. 

In addition to the FAA’s safety mission, we also work very closely 

with the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security on a 

daily basis to support their aviation security missions, particularly 

here in the capital region. As part of that support, we provide them 

a raw air traffic radar feed so they have situational awareness of 

what is happening in our national airspace system. 

To enable our controllers to safely control air traffic, the first 

thing we have to do is distinguish the aircraft that are communicating with controllers from all other objects in the air that are 

not aircraft. These other objects that the radar detects could be 

things like vehicles on nearby roadways, flocks of birds, weather 

events, or occasional kites and balloons. 

Air traffic controllers could not do their jobs if they had to work 

with an unfiltered radar feed. They would not be able to distinguish the aircraft they are charged with safely handling from other 

elements on their radar scopes. 

We require aircraft that fly in the airspace around Washington, 

DC, and other large cities across the country to use transponders 

that broadcast basic information, such as the type of aircraft, its 

speed, direction, and altitude. When radar detects those aircraft, it 

picks up the transponder information and it displays it on the air 

traffic controller’s radar scene. 

Controllers can see all the flights in the specific area along with 

the identifying information from each aircraft. Anything that 

doesn’t have a transponder shows up as an image representing a 

simple small dot on the radar screen, and there are typically many 

of them across the controller’s radar screen. 

To assist controllers in focusing on safely managing air traffic, 

we apply filters to the controller’s radar to eliminate the vast majority of those small dots. Safely managing air traffic is a controller’s mission, and they must be able to do that without distraction. 

Now, to support national and Homeland Security, the FAA 

shares a realtime unfiltered radar feed with our partners at the 

Department of Defense and several other agencies. We do that so 

they have the same information that we have and so they can 

apply the appropriate filters for their own mission to protect the 

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We also embed technical air traffic staff at a number of North 

American Aerospace Defense Command facilities around the country to provide additional operating expertise and support. 

On April 15, Mr. Hughes’ gyrocopter appeared on our radar as 

one of those small unidentified elements, indistinguishable from all 

other non-aircraft radar tracks. The National Capital Region Coordination Center called the FAA at 1:24 p.m. that afternoon to 

alert us to the flight based on information they received from the 

U.S. Capitol Police. 

After the incident, we conducted a forensic radar analysis and 

looked for an image that might match Mr. Hughes’ gyrocopter. We 

understood he had taken off from a small airport in Gettysburg, 

Pennsylvania, and we had an approximate time. 

So we looked at unfiltered radar data. A trained radar analyst 

identified a slow-moving image that traveled from Gettysburg toward the capital and vanished from radar at about the time Mr. 

Hughes landed on the west lawn. We now believe that unidentified 

radar element was Mr. Hughes’ gyrocopter. But the dot appeared 

only intermittently throughout that flight. 

When we got the call from the Capitol Police, we immediately notified our interagency partners on the Domestic Events Network, or 

DEN, a 24-hour, 7-days-a-week communication line we operate to 

support a shared situational awareness among our agency partners. 

We initiated the DEN more than a decade ago to quickly share 

information about activity in the airspace with multiple agencies. 

It now includes more than 130 Federal and local agencies as well 

as major FAA air traffic facilities around the country. The DEN 

has played a critical role in disseminating important operational 

information to other agencies as quickly as possible. 

Each agency has a responsibility to announce an airspace incident on the DEN as soon as they know about it. We’re committed 

to our safety mission at the FAA, and we’re dedicated to working 

closely with all of our airspace security partners to support protection of our airspace. 

We’re assisting the Department of Homeland Security in its ongoing interagency review, and this is in addition to our own internal review to ensure that FAA employees followed all the proper 

procedures and protocols during the event. If we need to make 

changes as a result of these efforts, we will. And I will keep the 

Committee informed. 

I would be happy to take your questions. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Huerta follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Director Clancy. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH P. CLANCY 

Mr. CLANCY. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here to discuss the Secret 

Service’s role within the broader effort to secure the airspace of the 

national capital region, or the NCR. 

The longstanding relationships between interagency partners, 

many of which are represented here today, are critical to ensuring 

the security of people in places given protection by the Secret Service and others. 

The Secret Service must be prepared to confront and defeat 

evolving threats, including those from small manned and unmanned aircraft systems. As these technologies become both more 

advanced and more widely available, the Secret Service will continue to work aggressively with our partners to address existing 

threats and anticipate those to come. 

Existing FAA flight restrictions in the NCR were enhanced following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The FAA implemented the special 

rights—I’m sorry—the special flight rules area, which includes 

within its boundaries the flight restricted zone and prohibited area, 

P–56, or Area 56. The White House, the Vice President’s residence, 

and the U.S. Capitol are located within the P–56. 

The Secret Service’s role in the administration of the restricted 

airspace is limited to issuing waivers for access to the P–56 in consultation with the Capitol Police and the Park Police. 

Airspace security for the NCR is coordinated by the interagency 

National Capital Region Coordination Center. The Center was created after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to provide 

realtime information-sharing and tactical coordination to address 

potential airborne threats in and around the Washington, DC, 

area. 

It is staffed at all times with specially trained personnel assigned 

to the Secret Service Airspace Security Branch in addition to representatives from the military, the FAA, and selected Federal civilian law enforcement agencies. 

The mission of the Secret Service Airspace Security Branch is to 

give early notification to the protective details and uniform division 

and provide realtime information to allow appropriate time to 

make informed decisions about actions to take to ensure the security of our protectees and protect its sites. 

Given the pace at which events can unfold in an air incursion, 

maximizing the time to react is critical. Presently the Airspace Security Branch combines radar feeds from a number of sources to 

create an image of the airspace. This image is monitored by the detection system specialists who have military or civilian radar backgrounds. 

With respect to the history between the Secret Service and Douglas Mark Hughes, the pilot from the April 15 incident, Hughes first 

came to the attention of the Secret Service on October 4, 2013. At 

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tended to fly a single-seat aircraft onto the grounds of the Capitol 

or the White House with no specific timeframe provided. 

That same day the Secret Service relayed the information to our 

law enforcement partners at the Capitol Police. The following day 

special agents from the Secret Service interviewed Hughes, who denied owning an aircraft or having plans to fly one to Washington, 

DC. However, subsequent corroborative interviews revealed differently. 

Further, the investigation revealed no evidence of an interest in 

persons or places protected by the Secret Service, and information 

regarding Hughes was made available to other interested law enforcement agencies in the national capital region. 

Regarding events leading up to the April 15 incident—I went to 

be clear—at no time did the Secret Service receive actionable advanced notice or any information that this event was taking place. 

While the Secret Service received telephone calls on the date of 

the incident, at no time was information provided in the calls that 

would have alerted our personnel to the fact that Hughes was piloting his aircraft to the Capitol. 

As the gyrocopter flew in the direction of the Capitol, it was observed by Secret Service personnel in the area of the White House 

complex. These individuals subsequently relayed that information 

through their chain of command. While in the process of making 

the appropriate notifications, the aircraft landed and the incident 

was acknowledged on the FAA Domestic Events Network, effectively notifying all relevant parties. 

That day and the days to follow, the Secret Service field offices 

gathered information regarding Hughes and his activities leading 

up to the event. While the Capitol Police are the lead investigative 

agency in this matter, the Secret Service stands ready to continue 

to contribute any resources necessary and to work collectively with 

our partners. 

Protection of the President, his family, and the White House is 

paramount to this agency. The partnerships represented here today 

are critical to the success of our mission as it relates to effectively 

addressing airborne threats. Continued interagency coordination is 

vital to ensuring safety and security in the airspace of the NCR. 

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and members 

of the committee, this concludes my testimony. I welcome any questions you may have. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Clancy follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the Director. 

Chief MACLEAN. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. MacLEAN 

Chief MACLEAN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, 

and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

discuss the United States Park Police involvement in the April 15, 

2015, gyrocopter incident in Washington, DC. My name is Robert 

MacLean. I am the Chief of the United States Park Police. 

United States Park Police, established in 1791, is the oldest uniformed Federal law enforcement agency in the United States. The 

Park Police, which is primarily responsible for safety and crime 

prevention in parkland administered by the National Park Service, 

has enjoyed a long history of partnership and coordination with the 

numerous public safety protection, aviation, and defense agencies 

within the national capital region. 

In the District of Columbia, the Park Police has primary jurisdiction over Federal parkland, which comprises approximately 22 percent of the District of Columbia, including the National Mall, East 

and West Potomac Parks, Rock Creek Park, Anacostia Park, 

McPherson Square, and many of the small triangle parks in the 

District. 

The Park Police officers who proudly and diligently patrol Federal parkland every day are trained to identify, report, and investigate violations of law and suspicious or unusual activity. Although the Park Police has an aviation unit that flies law enforcement, MedeVac, and search-and-rescue missions within the national capital region, the Park Police does not have primary responsibility of airspace defense over the Federal parklands. 

As such, the Park Police does not have radar detection capability 

to monitor that airspace, nor does it have the appropriate tools to 

engage or defend against an aircraft in the airspace above these 

parks. Those primary responsibilities and capabilities rest with 

other Federal agencies. 

On Wednesday, April 15, 2015, at approximately 1:20 p.m., a 

Park Police officer observed and reported an aircraft later identified as the gyrocopter operated by Mr. Doug Hughes. It was operating near the Lincoln Memorial and estimated to be approximately 100 feet off the ground and traveling eastbound toward the 

United States Capitol. 

The officer made a request to the Park Police Dispatch Center 

to contact the United States Capitol Police. The patrol supervisor 

confirmed the observation and requested the Park Police Dispatch 

Center notify the Park Police Aviation Unit, which, in turn, contacted the National Capital Region Coordination Center to report 

an aircraft in a restricted airspace. 

Another Park Police officer observed and followed the aircraft 

eastbound in his patrol vehicle to where the aircraft landed on the 

west grounds of the United States Capitol. The Park Police officer 

arrived at the Capitol Grounds and observed the U.S. Capitol Police arresting Mr. Hughes. At that point, the Park Police became 

an assisting agency to the United States Capitol Police on the 

scene and at their command post. 


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Mr. Chairman, this concludes my Statement. I would be pleased 

to respond to any questions you and other members may have. 

[Prepared Statement of Chief MacLean follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Chief Dine, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF KIM C. DINE 

Chief DINE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, members of the Committee, good morning. And thank you for the opportunity to discuss the event that occurred on Wednesday, April 15, 

and the actions taken by the United States Capitol Police. 

I will begin by providing a time line of the events and will gladly 

answer any questions that you may have. It is important to note 

that this is an ongoing criminal investigation. 

On Wednesday, April 15, at 12:59 p.m., an individual from the 

Tampa Bay Times sent an email to the U.S. Capitol Police public 

information officer, stating that a local man was planning on flying 

a gyrocopter as part of a protest and will be attempting to land on 

the west front. This individual inquired if the USCP was aware of 

the flight and if permission had been obtained. No time or date information was provided regarding this flight. 

At 1 p.m., the same individual called the USCP Command Center and Stated to an officer that he had information about a man 

who was planning to fly a drone onto the Mall and onto the west 

front of the Capitol. He Stated that he had called the U.S. Secret 

Service and they advised him to call the United States Capitol Police. 

He also Stated that this man, who he identified as Douglas 

Hughes, had received permission from the U.S. Secret Service and 

the USCP and he was calling to confirm that permission was 

granted. No time or date or actual information was provided regarding the flight during this telephone phone call either. 

The officer advised this individual she was not aware of any approvals to land a drone. They were then transferred to a sergeant 

in the Command Center, and this individual repeated what he had 

told the officer, except now he referred to the aircraft as gyrocopter. 

The sergeant advised that no approval existed for a gyrocopter to 

land on the Capitol Grounds. 

The caller advised the sergeant that Hughes’ live feed could be 

seen on Hughes’ Website, which he provided. At this point in the 

conversation, the conversation concluded, and during the conversation no mention was made that the landing was imminent. 

At 1:07 p.m., the U.S. Capitol Police public information officer responded to this email by immediately forwarding it to the Investigations Division and currently the Command Center personnel 

went into the provided Website, but did not find the live feed noted 

by the individual from the Tampa Bay Times. 

The Command Center notified the Investigations Division and 

the public information officer. As the Command Center was attempting to validate any air flight information with the USCP staff 

at the National Capital Region Coordination Center, the gyrocopter 

landed at approximately 1:23 p.m. 

At 1:21 p.m., just prior to the landing, an officer posted on the 

Pennsylvania Avenue walkway on the west front was approached 

by a reporter, who asked if he had seen a helicopter yet. The officer 

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other officer to determine if they were aware of any prohibited airspace overflights. 

During this discussion, the officers observed the inbound 

gyrocopter over Union Square, nearly atop the Grant Memorial. 

The officers immediately notified the Communications Center and 

subsequently reported the landing of the gyrocopter. This information was immediately broadcast over the radio for situational 

awareness and response. 

The USCP officers immediately assessed the threat in accordance 

with Department policy and training. USCP personnel quickly facilitated the movement of the public on the west front away from 

the gyrocopter. 

Once the gyrocopter rotor stopped, USCP officers quickly approached the subject and took him into custody. The subject did not 

resist and was compliant with police direction. 

A K–9 unit immediately approached and swept the gyrocopter 

and showed interest in the area of the engine and fuel compartment, which was expected. Incident Command was established at 

1:26 p.m., the west front was closed, and vehicular traffic was restricted on First Street between Constitution and Independence 

Avenues, along with Maryland and Pennsylvania Avenues to Third 

Street. 

As this was occurring, the Investigations Division provided the 

commanders in the Command Center with information about the 

subject from the Internet video publicizing the subject’s ownership 

of the gyrocopter, his intention to deliver a box of letters to Congress in reference to campaign finance reform, and his investigative 

history with both the USCP and the U.S. Secret Service. The Command Center notified the NCRCC of the situation. 

While the K–9 sweep was occurring, a Capitol Division commander directed a brief lockdown of the Capitol and of the CVC. 

When the lockdown was announced via the radio, the Uniformed 

Services Bureau commander, who was in the Command Center, 

consulted with the incident commander. 

The USB commander then decided to lift the lockdown of the 

Capitol based on the following facts: The K–9 had not alerted to 

the body of the gyrocopter, but had shown interest only in the area 

of the engine and fuel compartment; the subject was in custody and 

compliant with directions; the size of the small package area of the 

gyrocopter was limited to two backpack-size boxes; information provided by the Investigations Division that the intent of the pilot was 

clearly expressed in his video; and the USCP had established a 

strong perimeter from the gyrocopter with distance from the Capitol. 

The exterior perimeters stayed in effect. Due to the extremely 

short timeframe between the lockdown order and the direction to 

lift the lockdown, no messages were sent to the congressional community advising of the lockdown. 

The USCP Hazardous Devices Section responded to this incident 

and at 1:36 p.m. utilized a robot to investigate the gyrocopter. 

Since the robot could not access the two boxes in the gyrocopter, 

at 2:11 p.m., the ACS section personnel donned protective gear and 

took x-rays of the boxes. 


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The gyrocopter was determined to be clear of any hazards at 2:57 

p.m. Traffic cuts were subsequently released and the west front remained closed until the crime scene could be processed and the 

gyrocopter removed. 

It is important to note that, while the USCP does not control prohibited airspace over Washington, DC, we do monitor this airspace 

24/7 and we are directly linked to other Federal agencies related 

in this controlled airspace. On April 15, this gyrocopter did not register on radar as a threat and, therefore, was not raised as a concern among our Federal partners. 

We take the monitoring of prohibited airspace very seriously, 

which is why we have a designated airspace coordinator and have 

assigned liaisons at the NCRCC to provide immediate linkage to 

critical information regarding identified airspace threats. 

Information about identified airspace threats allows us to make 

informed decisions regarding the safety of our stakeholders, the 

congressional community, and Capitol Complex. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this event that 

occurred on Wednesday, April 15, 2015. I am very proud of the professional and immediate actions taken by members of the United 

States Capitol Police in addressing this incident. I would be happy 

to answer any questions that you may have at this time. 

[Prepared Statement of Chief Dine follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

As previously announced, the committee is going to recess so that 

Members will be allowed to hear the Prime Minister of Japan as 

he addresses the joint session of Congress. We will reconvene approximately 30 minutes after the conclusion of that. We appreciate 

your patience. 

The committee is in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Committee will come to order. 

I thank you for your patience. I know you are all very busy. 

The chair would like to notify members, remind members, that 

no subcommittee will start until the full committee is finished. So 

we do have two subcommittees that plan to meet at 2. We also 

have votes that will happen on the floor in about 45 minutes. 

We will try to do this as swiftly as possible, but I wanted to note 

that for members and those that might be showing up for the 2 

hearing. That is going to occur in this meeting. 

But let’s address why we are here today, the gyrocopter incident 

that happened 2 weeks ago. The 9/11 Commission after that terrible, horrific terrorist attack wrote, ‘‘The most important failure 

was one of imagination. We do not believe leaders understood the 

gravity of the threat.’’ 

We are here today because we need to understand who saw what 

and when, who communicated what, did it work, did we learn those 

lessons of tragedies of past. On April 15 a man in a gyrocopter was 

able to fly through the highly restricted airspace of the national 

capital region and land on the west lawn of the Capitol. He started 

off in the north, came, went over the Lincoln Memorial, right past 

into the airspace surrounding the White House, right past the 

Washington Memorial, and landed on the lawn of the Capitol. Unbelievable. 

He first told the Federal authorities about this—it came on the 

radar about 2 years ago. And the national capital region is unique 

in that the Department of Defense, Transportation and Homeland 

Security, along with the Capitol Police, National Park Police, and 

the congressional Sergeant at Arms all have roles to play in protecting the airspace. 

As best I can tell, in this region there are roughly 32 law enforcement agencies that have some form of jurisdiction in the safety and 

security of the Washington, DC, area. But it is still unclear who 

on this panel was ultimately responsible for first identifying this 

object entering restricted airspace and then for responding to it. 

At this point ignorance is no longer an excuse when it comes to 

drones and small aircraft. In January, a drone crash landed on the 

White House lawn. It is becoming very common throughout the 

world. After the gyrocopter incident, a drone with radioactive material landed on the Japanese Prime Minister’s residence. Dozens of 

unaccounted drones have flown over the streets of Paris since last 

October. And a drone crashed in front of the German Chancellor 

Merkel at a rally in 2013. 

There have been several instances involving the White House, including helicopters and small aircraft, and this is a pervasive 

threat. It has been there for a long time. It isn’t going anywhere. 

And when we show this type of vulnerability, I worry that the 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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shine that it will inevitably be taken down and taken down hard 

has gone away. 

Someone should have identified that this type of threat we aren’t 

prepared to meet or that our enemies would exploit. Our defensive 

technology must be able to prevent and respond to unconventional 

and emerging threats. 

We need to have that creativity to understand that the wouldbe terrorists and those people who want to see harm to the United 

States of America will likely be creative. 

But in this gyrocopter incident, he was loud and clear what he 

was going to do. In fact, he was live-streaming it. And yet nobody 

seemed to pick that up. News outlets did. They sent staff. They 

sent reporters down on the lawn to watch it. 

The United States military has researched drones since World 

War I and for the last 13 years used them to fight against terrorists. Yet, the primary drone detection technology currently used by 

the FAA, NORAD, the Secret Service, and the Capitol Police is 

roughly 70 years old. 

This antiquated technology can’t even tell the difference between 

a bird, a drone, a gyrocopter, or just plain old weather. Even a 

mylar balloon sets things off where people are hesitant to do anything because it might just be a good old-fashioned balloon. 

I understand we will hear today about the Pentagon’s effort to 

improve our capability to identify and intercept small aerial 

threats. This is the same technology Customs and Border Patrol 

has used on the border for years, long periods of time. 

They have been dealing with this type of gyrocopters and hang 

gliders and all sorts of these types of small aircraft on the borders 

for decades. They have been dealing with this for a long time. Did 

we ever learn any of those lessons? Do we need to bring CBP in 

here to help protect the capital region? They seemed to figure it 

out. 

The stakes are higher, and our agency intelligence-sharing and 

communications coordination can never ever fail us. We must make 

sure all agencies with a role in the National security effectively 

communicate with each other. So, hopefully, we will hear today 

how the agencies represented here have effectively communicated 

about threats in their counterparts. 

Quite frankly, I didn’t learn much in your opening Statements. 

That was as bland as we could possibly have been. We are here to 

address a serious topic. We are not going to just stand here and 

say, ‘‘Well, it is classified. We can’t talk about it.’’ Because, evidently, when you have been talking about it, it hasn’t gotten done. 

I, like other Members of Congress and congressional staff and 

visitors to the Capitol, also have concerns about the communication 

breakdown in alerting the Capitol community about this incident. 

The first Capitol-wide alert came at 5:03 p.m., several hours after 

the incident was over. 

While I look forward to hearing about how the Sergeant at Arms 

and the Capitol Hill Police have updated their policies to prevent 

a breakdown like this from ever happening again, it certainly 

shouldn’t have ever happened in the first place. 

It is very disappointing that three of the agencies here—the 

FAA; the Department of Defense, NORAD; and the Park Police— 


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chose not to brief Members of Congress last week. Now, I do appreciate the Capitol Hill Police, the Sergeant at Arms, and the Secret 

Service for making themselves available. 

We had four agents, four committees, four committee chairmen, 

four ranking members, ask for your presence to have a behind-thescenes, closed-door briefing on this topic. And for whatever reason, 

the FAA, Department of Defense, and the Park Police refused to 

brief Members of Congress. 

That doesn’t give us a whole lot of confidence, folks. And we will 

yank you up here time and time again until we get answers in the 

public. We are different than the rest of the world. We are different. We are self-critical. Don’t take it so personally. 

Understand this is how we make America the greatest country 

on the face of the planet. We do this in an open and transparent 

way. But when you won’t even talk to members in a closed-door 

meeting, that is not acceptable. It is a waste of our time. It is a 

waste of the other people’s time. 

We need results because we had some yahoo in a gyrocopter land 

right over there, and it didn’t work. And I got these opening Statements from you that shed no light other than a time line and how 

big a space the Park Police protects. It didn’t work. We need candor. 

I want to again thank Director Clancy, Chief Dine, and Mr. Irving for their responsiveness to the requests. I can tell we have had 

a lot of interactions with the Secret Service that haven’t been the 

most pleasant, but I will thank that agency for being so accessible 

in their communications. 

And particularly Mr. Clancy has made himself available on the 

mobile phone and calling us and making sure that he is available 

here, and I want to publicly thank him for that, even though we 

have had our differences. 

We understand that the mission is difficult to fulfill, but you are 

here today because you have been entrusted to accomplish it. We 

want to help that. We are in the middle of our appropriations season. We can’t ever have this mission fail. So we look forward to 

hearing more about that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. With that, I will now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Cummings, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Unlike previous hearings our committee has held with the Secret 

Service and the DEA which involve misconduct by individual 

agents, today’s hearing presents a different question: How should 

our Nation deal with the relatively new and evolving threat of unmanned or small manned aerial vehicles entering the airspace over 

our Nation’s Capital? 

This is a question of technology and policy, both of which are 

rapidly evolving. In this case, I do not personally believe the answer is to condemn the Capitol Police for not shooting down the 

gyrocopter. I also do not believe we should rush to criticize Federal 

agencies charged with responding to this threat. 

Instead, I believe the best course of action is to work collaboratively with both the Capitol Police and these Federal agencies to 

understand the threat, understand it, and to strongly support their 


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ongoing efforts to enhance current technologies, many of which are 

classified. 

So I thank the chairman for calling today’s hearing on this very 

critical issue. I completely understand the frustration expressed by 

the chairman and others about this incident. And let me be clear. 

I share the frustration. 

I said in a meeting the other day so often what happens is that 

we have a tendency to tell each other that everything will be fine 

when the rubber meets the road and then, when it comes time for 

the rubber to meet the road, we discover there is no road. 

The airspace around our Nation’s Capital is supposed to be the 

most restricted in the world, yet a postal worker—hello, a postal 

worker—from Florida was able to fly his gyrocopter through 30 

miles of restricted airspace before finally landing on Capitol lawn. 

In this case, the individual was only trying to make a peaceful 

demonstration, but we might not be so fortunate in the future. It 

takes almost no effort to imagine what could have been. What if 

he had weapons? What if he were carrying a bomb. 

On the flip side, it is also my understanding, based, in part, on 

classified briefings we have received, that this individual is incredibly lucky to be alive today. The next person who tries something 

this stupid—and it was stupid—may not be so lucky. 

I would like to thank all of the witnesses for testifying here today 

on such short notice. I also want to thank you for providing briefings last week, both classified and unclassified. Your missions are 

extremely difficult, and the lives of people throughout the District 

depend on your success. I look forward to hearing from each of you 

in an effort to address this very pressing situation. 

We all agree that our paramount interest is in the continued security of the airspace over the capital and addressing any possible 

breaches as effectively and efficiently as possible. That is what we 

are aiming at. 

This is a critical moment, gentlemen, a very critical moment. By 

the way, it is wake-up-call time. We live in a dangerous world with 

complex, constantly evolving threats. So it is imperative that we 

are prepared to counter them. 

In addressing these questions today, however, the last thing we 

want to do, the last thing, is give a road map to those who want 

to harm us. I hope that you all agree on that. Don’t want to do anything that counters what you do every day, and that is trying to 

protect us. 

So, obviously, we need to treat this information responsibly, and 

we do not want to highlight security vulnerabilities to would-be 

attackers because you can guarantee your bottom dollar they are 

watching. 

Out of an abundance of caution, I want to make 100 percent sure 

that all of our witnesses understand that we do not, we do not, 

want you to discuss any sensitive information in this public forum. 

I think all of you know what I mean by ‘‘sensitive.’’ And if you 

don’t know, raise your hand now and let me know, and we will try 

to make sure you are clear on what we are talking about. And I 

am not trying to be smart either. 


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Many of you have raised concerns about holding a public hearing 

on this topic, and I understand your concerns. The chairman understands your concerns. Our committee understands. 

After discussions with the chairman and his staff—and I want to 

thank him for this—we have agreed to set up a separate cleared 

room to address any sensitive issues that may arise. The bottom 

line is that you are the experts and we will defer to you on what 

can be discussed in this public setting. 

If our questions call for sensitive information, please let us know, 

and we can reconvene in the closed setting to address those issues. 

Our sole purpose today is to help you counter the threats we face, 

not to expose our Nation’s Capital to greater danger by exposing 

operational details or security vulnerabilities. 

Now, let me go back to something that the chairman said. And 

I wholeheartedly agree with him on this. Gentlemen, time is of the 

essence. Time is of the essence. And I have not come here to ask 

you. I have come here to beg you to do whatever you have to do 

to get the technology if we don’t have it, to speed up the technology 

if it is in the process, to more effectively and efficiently allow you 

to do the jobs that you are sworn to do. 

And I want to take this moment again to thank all the people 

who work with you. They are people who have come out there 

every day trying to make sure that we are safe. And I want to publicly thank them on behalf of all of us for what they do every day. 

And I want them to understand—and I know that the chairman 

agrees with me on this—although there may be criticism, it is 

about moving to a more effective and efficient system of protection 

for all of us. And so one of the best ways to do that, of course, is 

to make sure we have effective oversight. 

And, again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling the 

hearing. And, with that, I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. And it starts with a 

simple question of who is in charge. You have got a dude in a 

gyrocopter 100 feet in the air, crossing 30-plus miles of restricted 

airspace. 

Whose job is it to detect him? And whose job is it to take him 

down? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, as the commander of NORAD, that’s my 

responsibility, and I’maccountable for that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Why didn’t it happen? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Because we’re working against physics, sir. 

Our system is designed to detect, track, identify. We have a decisionmaking process to decide what to do, and then we engage. 

And that system is netted sensors, radars, cameras, and other 

capabilities that are out there. And we employ that system to the 

best of our ability, mitigate the risk to the best of our ability. 

But it’s only capable down to a particular set of characteristics 

that the platform that we want to track and defend against is emitting, based on speed and based on size. 

And I can go into further details in the classified session. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You are a spokesperson for Michael 

Cuchara in an article dated April 16 in the Baltimore Sun. You had 

launched some balloons at the Aberdeen Proving Ground called the 


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Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor 

System, otherwise known as JLENS. It was designed to help officials, ‘‘spot low-flying, slow-moving targets.’’ 

Was it working? Was it operational? 

Admiral GORTNEY. It’s not operational, sir. We put it up in Aberdeen to test it. It’s in testing today. It’s not netted into our system. 

And in the investigation we’re going to find out, while it’s in its 

test mode, was it able to detect that particular traffic. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. It wasn’t operational on that day? You 

weren’t testing at that time? 

Admiral GORTNEY. It’s not operational. It’s in a test process right 

now. We’re using it as a test platform. And it is not integrated into 

our system. Should it prove to be effective, our choice is to put it 

into our system and make it operational, but it’s not operational 

today. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol uses the 

tethered aerostat radar system, or TARS. 

Why aren’t you using that? 

Admiral GORTNEY. That’s why we’re putting—we think JLENS 

has more promise. And the reason we think JLENS has more 

promise than that is—I’ll have to defer to the next session, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Once you detect something, whose job and 

role and responsibility is it to take it down? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense. And if they’re not there, it’s my decision or to my deputies. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Whose decision is it if they see something 

visually, the Capitol Police, Chief Dine? 

Chief DINE. Mr. Chairman, as officers do every day, if they see 

something that is a threat to them or anyone else—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. When did they see it? 

Chief DINE. They saw it seconds before it landed, as it was above 

the statue at Grant Circle. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And what was the decisionmaking tree at 

that point? 

Chief DINE. They go through their training in terms of threat 

and use-of-force training. And I believe they, in this instance, made 

the appropriate decision based on the manner in which it landed, 

the compliance of the pilot, and the distance from the building. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So we did have guns trained on it? They 

decided not to fire? 

Chief DINE. They made an instantaneous decision to do what 

they did and quickly arrest him, apprehend him—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. As opposed to shooting it out? 

Chief DINE. Yes, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You say in your written Statement that the 

caller from the Tampa Bay Times, presumably here, advised the 

Sergeant that Hughes’ live feed could be seen on Hughes’ Website, 

which he provided. You later said but it did not find the live feed 

noted by the individuals from the Tampa Bay Times. 

Why weren’t you able to see it when so many others were? I 

mean, we had news organizations who were sending their reporters 

down there because they were watching it. 


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Chief DINE. Yes, sir. Clearly, the media knew about this ahead 

of time. When we got that call and that one email, we immediately 

began to investigate. And minutes later he landed. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You told me last week personally that you 

would provide to me that email. Yet, we have not been provided 

that email. 

Will you provide this committee that email? 

Chief DINE. Absolutely. Yes, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We have also asked to meet with the individuals who—I would like this committee, certainly myself, the 

ranking member, the House Administration, Candice Miller and 

her ranking member, to meet with the people who had their guns 

up ready to fire. 

Will you make those people available to us? 

Chief DINE. Absolutely. We can work through the United States 

Attorney’s Office. Obviously, as you know, this case is under prosecution. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Will the chairman yield just for a second? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. When will we get the email that the chairman 

just asked you about? When will we get that? I thought we would 

have this by now. 

Chief DINE. I can provide it to you immediately. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That means right after this hearing? 

Chief DINE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Last question before I turn it over to the 

ranking member. 

You say in your written Statement, Chief Dine, that due to the 

extremely short timeframe between the lockdown order and the direction to lift the lockdown, no messages were sent to the congressional community advising the lockdown. 

The gyrocopter landed at 1:23 p.m. You say later in your testimony the gyrocopter was determined to be clear of any hazards at 

2:57 p.m. And, yet, it was 5:03 p.m. Before any notice went out. 

Why did it take so long? 

Chief DINE. You’re absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman. We immediately fixed that. The next day I gave a directive to our people to 

put out messages to the entire community that affect the community. 

What no one got was a lockdown message. We did send some 

messages out to the Senate community based on their direction. 

But that matter has been fixed. We had an overly complex notification system, and we have immediately fixed that. And that will 

not happen again. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. To the Sergeant at Arms, Mr. Irving, welcome back. I know you have had some duties there with the Prime 

Minister. 

But why didn’t we get notification that there was a potential 

threat? 

Mr. IRVING. Mr. Chairman, frankly, there was a mix-up in the 

Command Center, lack of communication between my staff and the 

Capitol Police command staff. That will not happen again, as the 


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Chief said. We have fixed that. So we vow that that won’t happen 

again. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I mean, they are the same people. They are 

in the same room. Correct? 

Mr. IRVING. It is correct. They are all in the same room. And the 

notification should have gone out. It was an error. In most cases, 

the notifications do go out. 

We had had an incident the prior weekend. They were flawless. 

In this case, they were not. And we assure you that it will not happen again. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I will now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from 

Maryland, Mr. Cummings, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chief Dine, I wanted to ask you about the Capitol Police and 

your current policies on when to use lethal force. The chairman and 

others have suggested that you should have shot down the 

gyrocopter. But others disagree, and you seem to disagree. 

This incident was not the first time the Capitol Police have had 

to make a life-or-death judgment call in a matter of seconds. 

In 1998, a deranged individual burst through the doors of the 

Capitol and shot and killed two Capitol Police officers. That was a 

tragic event, and I am certain that it is on the minds of every single Capitol Police officer who stands guard outside these doors. 

Chief Dine, do you believe that the shooting in 1998 influenced 

how the Capitol Police handle threats of this nature today and 

when this incident happened? 

Chief DINE. Yes, sir. In fact, every threat that this agency and 

other agencies face ends up influencing the history of that agency 

and the policies that they put in place. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, can you please tell us what impact, if any, 

does that shooting in 1998 have on the policies used by the Capitol 

Police today? I mean, how did that affect it? 

Chief DINE. Well, we changed our security posture. And, of 

course, I would be glad to discuss that more in closed session. But 

we drastically changed our security posture throughout the Capitol 

in terms of methods and staffing. 

In this instance that we’re talking about today, obviously, as in 

any instance where an officer has to make a split-second decision 

to use force or not to save their lives or others’ lives, that’s what 

officers are up against every day. 

In this particular instance, given all of the ramifications, some 

of which we discussed in closed session last week, I think they 

made the appropriate decision. 

But that’s a challenge that officers face every single day, whether 

it’s on one of their checkpoints, during a traffic stop, when they’re 

stopping people around the campus, et cetera. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Without going into any classified information, 

tell me this. 

This incident that we are talking about today, has that caused 

you all to change anything about your policies with regard to shootdowns or lethal force? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Chief DINE. We have not changed anything yet, but it has caused 

us, like those other seminal moments that you referenced, to reexamine how we do business. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, about 2 years ago, in 2013, there was another incident. A woman drove onto the Capitol Grounds, fleeing 

law enforcement, and the Capitol Police shot and killed her. We 

learned later that the woman was mentally ill and that she was 

not armed and that she had a 1-year-old baby in the backseat of 

the car. 

Is that right, Chief Dine? 

Chief DINE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, while some praised the response of the 

Capitol Police, others criticized. 

Chief Dine, what impact, if any, did this incident, that is, this 

incident that I just talked about, have on your policies for using lethal force? 

Chief DINE. Ranking Member Cummings, as you know, that matter is under litigation. But I can tell you every time we face one 

of these instances it causes us to examine and re-examine how we 

do business. 

And the fact of the matter is, during every one of these instances, 

it’s that police officer on the street that has literally seconds to 

make a decision about whether their life is in danger or someone 

else’s is in danger, and they do their best to make the best judgment at that time. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, it seems clear that, in both cases, the officers had to respond almost instantly, as you said, life-or-death decisions. 

With respect to the gyrocopter incident earlier this month, some 

have suggested that the Capitol Police made a mistake by not 

shooting him out of the air. 

Keeping in mind that this is a public session, can you tell us generally what steps the Capitol Police took with respect to using lethal force against the gyrocopter pilot. 

Chief DINE. Yes, sir. Based on the circumstances of that day, literally seconds, having seen it, having observed it land, the manner 

in which it landed, the geography from the United States Capitol, 

the compliance of the pilot, and all of those kinds of things, as well 

as we discussed in closed session the ramifications which officers 

have to take into consideration as well when they’re considering 

using lethal force, and the ramifications of that force and the impact it may have on others—all of those decisions are processed literally in a matter of seconds. 

And that is what happened in this case. And I believe their actions were heroic. They quickly approached, arrested the individual. We screened the vehicle as well K–9-wise and then used additional capabilities after that to make sure everybody was safe. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just out of curiosity, is there simulation for 

these types of incidents in the training? 

Chief DINE. Well, frankly, that’s something that we’re all examining because, when airborne vehicles reach the point where they 

become a law enforcement issue versus a DOD issue—that’s a phenomenon that we’re all examining. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. CUMMINGS. So you are saying—you didn’t answer my question. 

That is not a part of simulation right now. Is that what you are 

trying to tell me? 

Chief DINE. Well, we have the capability to do what we need to 

do and take any vehicle down. I don’t know that historically police 

agencies have practiced shooting at aircrafts. 

But that’s something that is clearly under—but I want to make 

it clear we have the capabilities to do what we need to do. I do 

want to make that clear to the committee. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just two more questions. 

There seems to be a suggestion that the Capitol Police should 

have just shot him down. 

Without disclosing any sensitive information, can you tell us 

whether the Capitol Police had an opportunity to take down the 

gyrocopter and, if so, why they didn’t. 

Chief DINE. I would say in this instance the answer is no based 

on, again, the manner in which it landed. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You are saying no to what? 

Chief DINE. No, sir. They did not literally have the ability to do 

it based on height and its proximity to other people and all of the 

ramifications and how quickly it landed and then based on the 

whole decisionmaking matrix that I mentioned. But there’s often a 

split second or so where an officer has to make that decision. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And last, but not least: Why do you say that the 

Capitol Police officers made the right decision? You have reiterated 

that over and over and over again, and I just want to know why 

you feel so sure about that. 

Chief DINE. Because they, in this instance—and each instance is 

unique when a police officer faces those kinds of challenges. Each 

and every one is totally unique with a unique set of circumstances. 

But in this one, given the timing, given the lack of information 

about any credible threat, given all of the ramifications that may 

have taken place had shots been fired, I believe they acted quickly, 

bravely, and heroically. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Before the gentleman yields back, I have to 

ask you a question. 

I have asked you directly in closed doors and in here whether or 

not you had somebody with a gun trained on these people that 

could take him out of the air. And, yet, when Mr. Cummings asked 

that same question in a different way, you say no. You told me yes. 

What is it? 

Chief DINE. We clearly have officers out there with weaponry 

that are—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. In this instance, with the gyrocopter coming at the Capitol, did you—and it may have been brief. Believe 

me, I understand you didn’t get much advance warning. 

Chief DINE. Right. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But did you or did you not have guns 

trained on this gyrocopter to take him out of the air if he had continued to fly on? 

Chief DINE. They trained guns on him—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No. No. No. 

Did they have guns on him in this instance? Yes or no. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Chief DINE. As he was landing. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So he was in the air? 

Chief DINE. As he landed. I would say as he landed. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. This is why we have got to talk to the people who are actually—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. 

Reclaiming my time just very quickly, how far was he from the 

ground? Picking up on where the chairman left off, how far was he 

from the ground, if you know, when the Capitol Police had an opportunity to shoot him down? 

Chief DINE. I believe the officer first saw him when he was right 

above Grant statue, which was literally right atop Grant statue, 

which is seconds from when he landed. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Very well. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We need further clarification of that. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, for 

holding this meeting. 

What we have experienced with this incident is, again, another 

horrible communications failure of the system, and this isn’t new. 

The ranking member just cited back in October 2013 we had the 

deranged individual, a woman, who actually backed into someone 

at the White House, came across the entire distance of downtown, 

metropolitan D.C., went through the barriers, and the communications failed. 

Chief Dine, I wrote you on October 8, right after that. I said, ‘‘We 

all appreciate and commend your actions. I am contacting you to 

request your response about concerns that were highlighted in this 

tragic act.’’ 

No. 1, it is my understanding the Secret Service, Capitol Police, 

Park Service, and District of Columbia Police, and other agencies 

have interoperable communications. 

You know, when I raise this, there are other things here. We 

spent a quarter of a billion when we did the Capitol Visitor Center 

in redoing bollards and all of the things after 9/11, and that failed. 

Those communication systems failed. Now, they failed again. 

I am stunned. I am still—this is how we get a warning. OK? This 

device still has not gone off to this instance. My office is right down 

the hall here. My desk faces out. So I could look at the Capitol 

lawn. 

I am sitting there at 1:20 watching what is coming down. And 

I am on the phone, and I look and there is a police vehicle not on 

the road, not on the path, but coming up the grass. There is another officer with, I mean, a pretty powerful weapon. 

I have got pictures of it. We snapped some of the pictures of it. 

I said to the staff, ‘‘I don’t know what is going on, but something’s 

coming down.’’ Well, we never heard a thing. 

This is the first communication that I got. Let me get the exact 

communication. What is the date here? Well, actually, it wasn’t 

until 5:02. There was no notification. This is a message from the 

Sergeant at Arms. ‘‘The Capitol have cleared the police activity.’’ 

We never knew what was coming down. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
56 

Now, granted, a week before, on Saturday, the 11th, we had incredible notice. It was Saturday. Were you here, Mr. Chairman? 

No. Was anyone here? No one was here. 

It was a serious situation. Someone ended up, we found out, committing suicide. It worked very well. This thing went crazy. My annunciator went crazy. I got lots of notice. 

But it is working some of the time, not all of the time. Isn’t that 

right, Chief Dine? 

Chief DINE. It now will work all the time, sir. And your point is 

well taken. 

Mr. MICA. Well, again, I don’t think I got a response from you. 

I asked the staff, ‘‘Where is my letter to Dine from the last incident?’’ 

You know, a lot of people around here wanted to sweep this 

under the table. It was an embarrassing situation. But it can’t happen again. 

Mr. Huerta, FAA, a gyrocopter can lift how many pounds? 

Mr. HUERTA. A small gyrocopter of this—— 

Mr. MICA. 254 pounds. Right? 

Mr. HUERTA. Its weight is about 250 pounds. 

Mr. MICA. But it can lift, I think, that much. It falls into a category. 

So you can have a 200-pound individual, right, flying it, we will 

say? 

Mr. HUERTA. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. So what capacity does that leave? 50 pounds? 

Mr. HUERTA. It is a very small capacity. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Clancy, no one knew what was on that helicopter. 

You guys didn’t know, did you? Did anyone know what was on the 

helicopter? 

We were told some time ago, but nobody connects the dots. But 

we didn’t know whether it was letters to the Congressmen or we 

didn’t know whether it was, in fact, 50 pounds of plastic explosive. 

Mr. Clancy, what would 50 pounds of plastic explosive do to the 

Capitol building? It would be pretty—— 

Mr. CLANCY. It would be devastating. 

Mr. MICA. Devastating. 

Nobody knew—wait a second, too. I just heard today you said the 

FAA domestic network was notified. What time? It went up on the 

FAA domestic network. Who knows when that was? Huerta or 

Clancy? 

Mr. HUERTA. About 1:34 in the afternoon. 

Mr. MICA. That was afterwards? 

Mr. HUERTA. After it landed. 

Mr. MICA. After it landed. 

So there is something wrong there on the domestic FAA notice. 

There is something wrong with the notice with the Capitol Police. 

At 1:23 you had the guy under arrest. We never knew. I mean, 

I am not afraid. I have been here through 9/11. If they want to 

take me out, take me out. Give me a chance. Give our staff a 

chance. Give us notice. Make this thing work. OK? 

Again, I don’t think it is too much to ask that we get this thing 

right. And there is a lot at stake, not just saving Members of Congress. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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We have got new threats. And I brought up the drone before the 

drone landed on the White House, the White House. They still 

don’t have—we had another jumper, didn’t we, Mr. Clancy, just recently? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir, we did. 

Mr. MICA. How long before we get the fence increased? I told you 

I got the name of a great welder. He has welded my fence in Florida. I will get him up here. I’ve got the name of ADT. We can get 

them in here to put in systems. 

But we still don’t have the fence secure there, do we? It is not 

heightened. You can still jump over the fence. How long? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, in the summer. The attachment will be attached this summer. 

Mr. MICA. OK. 

Yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, before you do that, this letter has to 

be in the record at some point. This is my letter to Chief Dine from 

some time ago. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Ask unanimous consent to do that. Without 

objection, it is ordered. 

Mr. MICA. It is the only email I got at 5, after it was all over. 

And one more thing. Would you yield for just a second for the 

benefit of members. 

I sent you back—and I was told afterwards the staff said you 

didn’t get it. ‘‘I have searched my messages to see if an alert was 

sent out on this incident. Was one sent? Congressman John Mica.’’ 

The staff told me we can’t respond to you, that you only send these 

alerts out. 

So I sent this out the same day after the—well, the day after the 

incident, finding out if anything had been sent, and I missed it. 

But there is no way for us to contact you. We need a way to contact 

you. 

Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

We are going to recognize, I guess, the gentlewoman from the 

District of Columbia, Ms. Norton, first for 5 minutes. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

This is an important hearing. You can’t have an incident like this 

and not have a hearing. And I know that witnesses understand 

this. I certainly appreciate the work they do. 

And I think, essentially, gentlemen, the problem you are facing 

is getting ahead of risks and threats that may be unbelievable, but 

that is what the Congress and, for that matter, the public expects 

you to do. 

I mean, we are fortunate that that gyrocopter didn’t have a 

chemical or an explosive in it. And, of course, we know that you 

knew it did not. And we know—and this is why I have question 

first for Mr. Huerta. 

I believe we know that it was not possible for existing technology 

that keeps the violation of an airspace—that we can go, we can 

catch a helicopter, we can catch a small plane. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
58 

But, technically, do we have the technology to capture 

‘‘wigamadoos’’ that fly below that airspace that is more typical? 

Mr. HUERTA. Congresswoman Norton, what the FAA provides to 

the surveillance capability is radar feeds. And radar that the FAA 

uses for our purposes to separate air traffic is filtered to ensure 

that a controller is able to safely separate traffic transiting the region’s airports and the region’s airspace. 

This very small aircraft flying through is not something that a 

controller would ordinarily pick up in the course of carrying out 

their aircraft separation activities. 

Ms. NORTON. So, you see, I am not going to ask law enforcement 

on the ground to do the impossible, but I am going to ask law enforcement on the ground to tell us ahead of time what the impossible is. 

I mean, we are asking you to do Star Wars-type thinking about 

who could fly like you fly a kite. And if we don’t think about it, 

we know who will be thinking about it. So I am interested in separating out what is technically possible and what is technically not 

possible. 

And I want to know, Mr. Huerta, why Congress hasn’t been 

asked for the capability to fly below that usual airspace where, by 

the way, if anybody gets into that airspace, we send National 

Guard planes up in the air right way, instantly. 

If we don’t have the ability to do something tantamount to that, 

then the only people who really know it, who can get ahead of the 

game for us, are those of you who are on the ground who don’t 

have that capability. 

And we, therefore, have to think about risks that only law enforcement, frankly, has the capability to envision. And I want to 

know why the Congress hasn’t been asked for the means to provide 

that capability. 

Mr. HUERTA. Congresswoman Norton, what I was referring to is 

the FAA’s surveillance capability that is provided to this whole government effort. But the entire government surveillance network is 

not limited to that, and I would defer to my colleagues from DOD. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Ma’am, I’m prepared to answer that question 

for you, the investments that Congress has made, but I need to do 

that in a closed session. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. 

It would be very important for Congress to know can we do it. 

To say to people on the ground to do it, as Chief Dine says, you 

see it in a few seconds, take it down, that is not what happens if 

I try to fly a helicopter into the airspace. 

So I want to give you the same capability the same time that 

those who have tried to pierce our airspace have found they just 

can’t do it so we don’t see you having to shoot down much up there 

because you have the technology to do it. And in closed session, we 

need to know that, and we need to know it now. 

And one of the reasons we need to know it now is the first thing 

I find that officials do when they don’t have the capability is they 

keep the public out. They say, ‘‘We know how to make sure nobody 

gets hurt. Nobody gets in.’’ And I am not accusing you of doing 

that, but I have to tell you it has been often the first reflex. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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We seem to work on a case-by-case basis. Now we know probably 

that Chief Dine, that our police officers—because he said they saw 

it only a few seconds and then they had to get themselves together. 

But the case-by-case way to go at security assures us that there 

will be a terrible thing to happen and then we will take care of it. 

So what I am trying to find out is if we can get the capabilities 

before you have the obligation even to do something about it because it hasn’t occurred yet. And I will be interested in that in 

closed session. 

But I am interested in closing down the Capitol. When anthrax 

occurred, I had to go on the House floor and literally embarrass the 

police to get the Capitol open. It was closed for months because the 

Capitol Police couldn’t think of a way to keep it open. 

It was terrible to have the Capitol itself closed. And I want to 

make sure—I have seen no evidence that the Capitol is being 

closed, that those grounds are being closed, and I want assurance 

that that is not taking place. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentlewoman. 

Does anybody care to comment on that? 

Ms. NORTON. Could I have an answer at least? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Sure. 

Ms. NORTON. Can people still go where they were able to go before, Chief Dine? 

Chief DINE. Yes, ma’am. The Capitol is open right now. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Recognize the gentleman from Michigan, 

Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to the panel for being here. I think we all understand you have to be right all of the time. They have to be right 

once. And so we appreciate the fact of what you deal with. I just 

have relatively few questions that could be asked without going 

into some closed session. 

But, first of all, to Director Clancy, I am having a hard time 

wrapping my mind around the fact that Secret Service had the recognition of this gentleman and his intentions to fly here and to 

land, as I understand it, on the Capitol sometime before, in 2014, 

in fact, early 2014, and that Secret Service interviewed Mr. Hughes 

based on some information he was putting out back in August, September, and October 2013. 

So with that in mind, with that lead up to it, plus the day of the 

flight there was also phone calls made from the Tampa newspaper 

to Secret Service, my question is: Did the Secret Service share all 

the information that it should have with other relevant law enforcement agencies with responsibility for the D.C. Airspace? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, Congressman. On October 4, our Denver field 

office did get a call from an individual who knew of Mr. Hughes’ 

plan. This is October 2013. 

We relayed that information to our partners at Capitol Police, 

and that day we also—that following day we went and interviewed 

that individual to get more details. As we got more details, we realized that Mr. Hughes, the subject here, lived in Tampa Bay. 

We sent our Tampa Bay office agents down there to interview 

him. He denied any interest in any of our protectees, denied any 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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interest in the White House, and he had no indication that he 

would be flying up into the Washington, DC, area. 

We did do additional interviews with additional associates who 

corroborated the first call that we received in Denver that he did 

have some aspirations to do this. But, again, there was no indication that any of our protectees or any of our protected facilities 

were—that he had the intent to do this. But we did share the information. 

Mr. WALBERG. But you shared it with them. 

So, Chief Dine, you had that information back in early 2014, that 

there was an individual of interest, at least, that had some idea to 

fly and bring letters to Congress in a very unusual way? 

Chief DINE. Yes, sir. The Secret Service shared that information 

with us. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WALBERG. What did Capitol Police know about Mr. Hughes 

and his intentions prior to him landing on the Capitol Grounds 

subsequent to getting this information? What else came through 

that should have highlighted something happening? 

Chief DINE. Subsequent to that case being essentially closed or 

suspended by us and the Secret Service, nothing up until minutes 

before he landed. As I had mentioned earlier, we got a fairly cryptic 

email and a phone call that was not date-or time-specific, talking 

about whether or not—were we aware of this and whether or not 

he had a permit. That was literally minutes before he landed. 

Mr. WALBERG. But April 15, as I am seeing a time line here, an 

individual made a call to Secret Service’s Tampa field office to 

warn of Hughes’ plan. 

Was that information shared with you? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, on October 15, we received a call from an individual who did not give any time or date or specifics regarding—— 

Mr. WALBERG. This was April 15 that I have here. 

Mr. CLANCY. April 15. Yes, sir. 

Just an individual had called our Tampa Bay office and asked 

specifically for a specific agent, and we said the agent is no longer 

assigned to the office. And this individual said, ‘‘Well, just let him 

know I called.’’ There was no specifics to Mr. Hughes or to this 

flight. 

Mr. WALBERG. So the Tampa Bay Times, then, reporter called 

Secret Service on April 15 at 1. 

Mr. CLANCY. That’s correct, sir. 

Mr. WALBERG. He landed at 1:23. So we have got 23 minutes 

still. 

Let me ask Chief MacLean to join in here as well. 

Was there any notification of all the entities that someone, indeed, is starting this flight, is on his way, he is live-streaming it, 

he may be coming over your territory? Is there any action that can 

be taken even with the Park Service in stopping someone flying 

low? 

Chief MACLEAN. To answer the first part of your question, the 

United States Park Police did not have any actionable information—let me correct that—no information regarding Mr. Hughes 

coming to this area prior to our officer patrolling witnessing the 

aircraft. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. WALBERG. Well, Mr. Chairman, I guess it leaves me with 

great concern that, when information is given, crackpot or otherwise, and then the day that the event takes place we had information that is given and still this person is able to make it all those 

miles and, more importantly, across the restricted airspace, coming 

across our monument area, leading up to our Capitol itself and 

then lands, and nothing happens until this person is on the ground. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank the ranking member. 

This is not good. I mean, this is on top of a lot of other incidents 

that we have been talking about at the White House as well. 

You know, I get the feeling that, just as before 9/11, if you visited 

an airport in the United States, we had very little security going 

on. Yet, if you visited Ben Gurion Airport or Leonardo da Vinci Airport or Heathrow, those countries had dealt with terrorism before 

us and they were all tooled up. They were ready. They had heavy 

weapons. They had metal detectors. 

And, yet, we were lulled into a false sense of security. I get the 

sense that we are behind the curve again. You know, you visit any 

of these—the committee’s involved in hardening our facilities overseas. And you go into any major capital in Europe or the Middle 

East or Africa and they are taking precautions that we are not. 

And I know there is a balance between public access and security, but we have gotten to the point where I am worried about the 

President. I am worried about his family. I am worried about the 

security on the grounds here at the Capitol. I am worried about the 

Supreme Court across the street. 

And I just have to say that we had advanced notice, albeit you 

had to connect the dots and you had to talk to each other. This was 

not good, that a fellow was able to fly in here and land a gyrocopter 

on the lawn. It is not good. And I know we have got a bunch of 

reasons why it happened, and it seems like we have got some excuses. But that is just not good enough. 

And I have a lot of respect for the panel individually. And I don’t 

know if it is a lack of communication between departments, but we 

have got to do better. Dear God, we have got to do better. 

Since this guy landed the gyrocopter on the lawn, is there anything that we have done that we would do differently if that were 

to happen today and someone with nefarious intent, a terrorist, 

were to do the same damn thing? Anybody? OK. 

So we are doing basically the same thing that we were doing 

when this guy did his thing. We need change. We need change. 

And I don’t know—you know, Mr. Clancy, I have got enormous 

respect for you and the job that you do. I really do. 

But can you tell me what you need to make the White House 

safe, the Capitol safe, the Supreme Court safe, with respect to the 

airspace that you are charged to guard. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. Before I address that, I would just like to 

say, in this particular incident, we believe—and this is a team effort, certainly among the members here on the panel, but certainly 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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among the American people, too. And the Department of Homeland 

Security has this initiative for see something, say something. And 

we feel very strongly that Americans need to—— 

Mr. LYNCH. But people said something. People said something. A 

few people said something. And we all saw something. And some 

of your colleagues saw things or their employees saw things. And 

this still went forward, right to the door of the Capitol. 

That is what gets me. And there were a lot of the public that 

were, you know, exposed to potential danger, people bringing their 

families here. So it is not just, you know, self-preservation here 

among Members of Congress. We are worried about the general 

public as well. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. And you’re exactly right, sir. 

I think if, for example, the Tampa Bay Times had informed us 

prior to departure of this aircraft, we could have had a response 

team at Gettysburg or law enforcement would have. Or if we were 

notified a day in advance, days in advance, we could have had law 

enforcement down in Florida. So I think that’s part of that team 

effort. 

But in terms of your second question, sir—I’m sorry. 

Mr. LYNCH. Well, look, if your officers are on the ground or your 

agents are on the ground and they see—what are the orders—just 

at a very basic level, what are the orders for a Capitol Police officer 

or a Secret Service agent that there is an object flying toward the 

Capitol? Are we still stand and watch? Are we still passive or are 

they under orders to do something? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, for the Secret Service, I’ll just say that, first, 

it’s communication and then we take a defensive posture. 

We rely on the radar that we see and the communication to take 

a defensive posture if we need to move any of our protectees or any 

of the guests by our protected facilities. So that’s our first move, 

cover and evacuate. 

Mr. LYNCH. That doesn’t work very well with a suicide bomber 

or something like that, though. I mean, obviously, you shelter in 

place to the degree you can, but—— 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LYNCH. I don’t know. I just think maybe we have got to talk 

about this more in a classified briefing. But this cannot stand. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. LYNCH. Sure. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

I have got to ask you this. This is getting to be very painful. 

Mr. Clancy, you said that it is a team effort. I agree. But the 

gentleman just asked a question, and the silence was chilling. 

He asked a question—and I am talking to all of you now—are 

we doing—and I just—if it is classified information, tell us, and we 

will deal with it. But I do need to know a yes or no. 

Have we done things now that put us in a better position than 

where we were on the day of this offense? And I don’t want silence. 

It is not good enough. 

Chief DINE. Sir, the answer is yes. And I would be glad to discuss that in a closed session. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And has that been a team effort? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Chief DINE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Very well. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from North 

Carolina, Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So let me pick up on this team environment. Prior to this incident, how many times have all of you met as an agency to discuss 

new technology that may be a threat to the Capitol or the White 

House or to other assets? How many times have you all met together prior to this incident to discuss that? 

Mr. SALESSES. Congressman, if I can take that, individually, I 

can’t say that we have all met frequently at all. But there is a lot 

of working done among the Federal departments. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So it is not frequent. So how often? How many 

times have you done it, where all of you have gotten together? You 

are the team. You talk about the team. Now, we know a lot about 

teams. The Bad News Bears were a team, too, and they didn’t do 

real well. 

Mr. SALESSES. But, Congressman, if I could, our staffs work together. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So have your staffs all been in a room to discuss 

that prior to this incident? And, if so, how many times? 

Mr. SALESSES. Sir, first of all—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Do you know how many times? 

Mr. MEADOWS. Do you know how many times? 

Mr. SALESSES. Yes, sir. That is twice-a-month meetings with our 

staff. 

Mr. MEADOWS. To discuss the technology and what is different? 

Mr. SALESSES. Yes, sir. And, if I could, I’d like to just take a little—what has been going on, Congressman, is there is a national 

effort. The National Security Staff has been leading an effort over 

the last year to look at UAVs in particular, what we refer to as 

nontraditional aircraft, whether they are gyrocopters, UAVs or—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So you just haven’t come up with an answer? 

Mr. SALESSES. No. No, sir. I want to—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. But we can put a man on the moon. We can fly 

a rover to Mars. 

Can’t we figure out how to stop a postal worker with a gyrocopter 

coming in to the grounds? 

Mr. SALESSES. Sir, the work that is being done between the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the 

Department of Transportation, and recently the National Science 

and Technology Council fast-track looking at technologies that 

could help. Again—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So when will we have a plan? Admiral, when will 

we have a plan? You said you are the guy in charge. When will we 

have a plan to make sure that this doesn’t happen in case there 

is 50 pounds of plastic explosives? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, when we go to closed session, I will show 

you what we have, what we are testing, and when we will—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. I am not asking what the plan is. I said when will 

we have it. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, I need to do that in a closed session. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So let me ask you a different question. 

Because the silence a deafening. 

So if you get together twice a month, your staff, how many times 

have most of you or all of you gotten together to discuss your responses to this hearing? Did you meet as a group to discuss your 

responses to this hearing? 

Mr. SALESSES. Yes, sir, we did. Yesterday. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So what you are saying is you all got together to 

discuss your response to this hearing, but, yet, you all don’t get together necessarily individually, your staffs do, to discuss the protection of assets here? 

Mr. SALESSES. Congressman, we also—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes or no? 

Mr. SALESSES. No, sir. We do at the White House. We have deputy-level meetings and—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So all of you got together to discuss your responses to this hearing? When did you do that? 

Mr. SALESSES. Yesterday, sir. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Why would you do that? If you were just wanting 

to be transparent, why would you try to coordinate your answers 

to this hearing? Are you more afraid of the Government oversight 

than you are of protecting the people? 

Mr. SALESSES. No, sir, we are not. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So why would you have gotten together to discuss 

you responses if they were individual responses there? 

Mr. SALESSES. To talk about some of the lessons we learned, sir. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Talk about the lessons before you testify? Is that 

what you were doing—— 

Mr. SALESSES. No, sir. 

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. Preparing your testimony? 

Mr. SALESSES. No, sir. We were talking—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So none of you prepared your testimony. 

Mr. Clancy, is that your sworn testimony today, that you didn’t 

talk about how you would testify before this hearing? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, we did talk about what we could talk about in 

the open hearing as opposed to a closed hearing, and we wanted 

to make sure—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So was there any strategy to those discussions on 

what you would say and what you wouldn’t say in terms of how 

you would look, Mr. Clancy, before this hearing? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, the discussion was, again, what could be talked 

about in the open hearing and what could not be talked about in 

the open hearing. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, my understanding is that it was a lot more 

strategic than that. 

Am I wrong, Mr. Huerta? You and I have a good relationship, an 

honest relationship. Was that discussed in terms of what you would 

say and what you would not say in terms of response to the questions? 

Mr. HUERTA. No, it was not. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So what was discussed? 

Mr. HUERTA. I think, as you’ve heard from these other two gentlemen, it was simply a discussion of what could be said in open 

versus—— 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. MEADOWS. What I find very concerning, Mr. Chairman— 

what I find very concerning is all of you are willing to get together 

to discuss your testimony before coming here to be honest and, yet, 

the American people expect just honesty and, yet, what we have is 

a coordinated effort to be a stone wall. That is concerning, Mr. 

Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I need to add—and I said it in my opening—when we asked you 

all to come privately brief four committees of Congress, more than 

half of you said no. I don’t understand that. I really don’t understand that. 

You can sit here in public testimony and say, ‘‘We are doing everything we can.’’ This is the way our system works. It is inexcusable to me that you would refuse to come to Congress a week after 

the attack and give us a brief. Three of you did, but four of you 

didn’t. And that is why you get questions like that, because the 

time you did get together, nobody was in the room. 

Sounds like you all coordinated on how to message this and you 

spent more time doing that than you did briefing Congress, being 

candid with us. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Cartwright, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank also my colleague from Massachusetts, and I wish to associate myself with his remarks. 

He talked about that this is not a question of self-preservation 

for Members of Congress. We think about not only ourselves, but 

we think about the people who come to visit us from our districts. 

We think about the young people who help enable us to do the 

work that we do. We are talking about thousands and thousands 

of young people, interns and fellows and employees on Capitol Hill 

here, and we feel responsible to them and their families and their 

parents to keep them safe. 

All of these people are within the special flight rules area, the 

SFRA, that you have discussed. They are all within the national 

capital region flight area that you have been talking about. And, 

more than that, the visitors who come and visit our national memorials, the World War II Memorial, the Jefferson Memorial. 

We just had the National Cherry Blossom Festival a couple of 

weeks ago. There had to be well over 100,000 Americans visiting. 

All of those areas and the Tidal Basin are within the special flight 

rules area; are they not? That is correct. An area that was traversed by this knucklehead with a gyrocopter who could easily 

have been a terrorist. 

And so we take seriously a hearing like this. It isn’t about ourselves. It is about the huge number of Americans who are in this 

special flight rules area and the national capital region. And it is 

not just about gyrocopters either. It is about drone as well. We 

have heard a lot in the past months about drones and the threat 

they could cause to our national security. 

You know, Admiral Gortney, your testimony was—you said this: 

What we now understand is that the gyrocopter was detected by 

several of the integrated sensors as it approached and transited 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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through the SFRA, the special flight rules area. However, the aircraft’s flight parameters fell below the threshold necessary to differentiate aircraft from weather, terrain, birds, and other slow-flying objects so as to ensure that the systems and those operating 

them focus on that which poses the greatest threat. 

You said: We are in the early stages of conducting a thorough reconstruction and analysis of all aspects of this incident, including 

time lines, communication, and sensor data. 

And you said: Identifying low-altitude and slow-speed aerial vehicles from other objects is a technical and operational challenge. 

Have I read that correctly, Admiral? 

Admiral GORTNEY. That is correct, sir. And I can go into greater 

detail in answering some of those questions in closed session. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Well, here is my problem. Like my colleagues 

up here on the dais and the public, I find the lack of planning on 

how to respond to gyrocopters and drones surprising and disappointing. These things are hardly new. The British Army flew a 

drone as early as 1917. And here we are nearly 100 years later and 

we are just starting to tackle the problem. 

I want to invite Mr. Huerta—your attention to this question: 

When did the FAA first begin to think that drones may be a security concern? 

Mr. HUERTA. Well, the FAA has specific direction from Congress 

to swiftly integrate unmanned aircraft into the national airspace 

system. That was included in the FAA Authorization Act of 2012. 

Since then, we have published a road map for their integration 

and we have embarked upon a stage integration process to find 

ways to integrate these into the national airspace system. 

But we do cooperate with our interagency partners on the larger 

question of what they may pose as a security threat. Our mandate 

and our direction is to find a way to integrate them so that they 

don’t pose a safety of flight issue. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Well, back to you, Admiral Gortney. 

You said: Identifying these vehicles is a technical and operational 

challenge. ‘‘Challenge’’ is a nice word for ‘‘problem,’’ something that 

we are really having a hard time with. 

So the question is: How long have you known this was a challenge, Admiral? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, we’ve been working against the low-radar 

cross-section target for probably over 25 years. I’ve been in the 

aviation business for over 38. So we understand the problem. We 

understand the technical challenges. 

And if we go to closed session, we can show you the solutions 

that we have in place and we are currently testing, but I can’t do 

it in an open session. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. On a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the most urgent, 

how urgent is this, gentlemen? 

Mr. SALESSES. Very. 

Admiral GORTNEY. In the protection of the United States and 

Canada and the homeland defense and my role as the NORAD 

commander, it is my primary responsibility. On a scale of 1 to 10, 

it’s on about a 50. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. I look forward to the closed session. Thank 

you. 


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I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. 

Mulvaney, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to go about this a little bit differently, a little bit 

more straightforward. 

At any time did we have the ability to interdict and to shoot this 

guy down? Mr. Gortney? Admiral? 

Admiral GORTNEY. No, sir. We did not because we did not have 

a detection, our ability to track it or positively identify it to queue 

our sensors. If we had—I can’t go any farther. 

Mr. MULVANEY. That is fine. That is fine. I obviously don’t want 

to know anything that we can’t do in public session. I am just curious. 

Admiral GORTNEY. But I have that answer for you. 

Mr. MULVANEY. We hear around here that we had the ability, 

but chose not to. 

But you telling me that is not accurate? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I need to go to closed session. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thanks very much. 

So, then, I guess the same answer regarding, if the gentleman 

had wanted to, he could have crashed this into the Capitol building. Correct? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MULVANEY. And the same is true for the White House or the 

museums? 

Admiral GORTNEY. If there was an intent, yes, sir. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Would it have been different if it was a small 

single-seat airplane? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. A small single-seat airplane, the size 

of a Cessna or smaller, we’d probably be able to track that. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Got you. 

Admiral GORTNEY. We would—we do it every—we track them 

and we have two incidents a month where we actually launch our 

helicopters on those sorts of things. 

Mr. MULVANEY. OK. A similar result had it been a drone or 

something smaller than a gyrocopter? 

Admiral GORTNEY. That’s correct. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Who saw it first? 

Mr. MACLEAN. An officer with the United States Park Police saw 

it first. 

Mr. MULVANEY. And it is fair to say that you were the only one 

at the table who didn’t know about this guy in advance. Right? 

Admiral GORTNEY. We did not. 

Mr. CLANCY. The Secret Service did not. 

Mr. HUERTA. We did not. 

Mr. MULVANEY. NORAD didn’t? 

Admiral GORTNEY. We did not. 

Mr. MULVANEY. OK. So the Secret Service knew. 

Who else knew about this guy in advance, then? Park, Capitol 

Police. But the Park Police did know about the guy. OK. 

Let me figure out why he left from Gettysburg. Given that any 

thought? Why would a guy drive from Florida to Pennsylvania to 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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do this? Does anybody have any thoughts on that? Does that make 

sense to anybody? There is a lot of private airports, small airports, 

between Florida and Gettysburg. 

Admiral GORTNEY. I think with an ongoing investigation, both 

legal and technical, it is difficult for us to answer that question. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Fair enough. All right. 

Here is my last question, then. Because it sounds like most of the 

stuff I want to know we will have to deal with in closed setting. 

Admiral Gortney, were you advised not to come here today? Did 

anybody suggest to you not to come here today? 

Admiral GORTNEY. No, sir. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Did anybody suggest that you not come to the 

briefing a couple weeks ago? 

Admiral GORTNEY. We were seeking permission and did not receive the permission. Why that happened I’m not sure, sir. 

Mr. MULVANEY. From whom do you seek permission for that, sir? 

Admiral GORTNEY. We go through the Department of Defense. 

Mr. MULVANEY. And who would the next person up the ladder 

from you be in that—— 

Admiral GORTNEY. My chain of command goes from myself to the 

Secretary of Defense to the President. 

Mr. MULVANEY. OK. Mr. Salesses, the same question. 

Mr. SALESSES. Sir, I don’t have a good answer for why we didn’t 

show. And I apologize for not showing. Because that’s not something the Department normally does. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Did you seek permission to show and just—— 

Mr. SALESSES. I was not aware that you were trying to have— 

me personally, I was not aware of it. 

Mr. MULVANEY. OK. Mr. Huerta? 

Mr. HUERTA. We were—I understood it to be a scheduling issue. 

We had offered an alternative time the following afternoon, and we 

did not hear back. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Mr. Clancy, I think you were one of the ones 

who did agree to come. Right? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MULVANEY. With that, I will yield my time to the chairman. 

I guess we ask Mr. MacLean and Chief Dine the same question, 

but I assume I know the answer there. 

So go ahead, sir. 

Chief MACLEAN. Yes, sir. I’m an employee of the United States 

Department of the Interior. And they were planning to schedule a 

properly—a proper witness to come and attend, and I did attend 

the following day. 

Mr. MULVANEY. OK. Chief Dine? 

Chief DINE. Yes, sir. I was here last week. And, of course, I am 

glad to be here today. 

Mr. MULVANEY. I yield the balance of my time to the chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Walker, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to look at the time line again and make sure that I am 

clear on it. But let me back up just for a second. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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How many different agencies or departments were contacted at 

some point past or during the week of by the Tampa Bay Times 

reporter? Just by a show of hands, who did he reach out to at any 

point? Secret Service? OK. 

Chief Dine, when did you first get contacted by the Tampa Bay 

Times? 

Chief DINE. That same day, a few minutes before he landed. 

Mr. WALKER. When you say ‘‘a few minutes before,’’ is that the 

1 p.m. Timeframe again? 

Chief DINE. Well, 12:59. Yes, sir. And then at 1 p.m. 

Mr. WALKER. 12:59. And he lands at 1:24, 1:22? 

Chief DINE. 1:23-ish. 

Mr. WALKER. 1:23. 

So can you walk me through what you did in those 22, 23 minutes. Can you sort of give me a time line. What is your first call? 

Just for my own education here. 

Chief DINE. Yes, sir. 12:59 was the email. That email was quickly 

sent to our Investigative Division, who began to try to pull up information. Then a minute later he called our Command Center. 

They talked to him a little bit. And then that information was provided to our investigators as well. 

Mr. WALKER. When you say provided to your investigators, 

what—when you have somebody that is approaching the Capitol in 

this unidentified flying object, for lack of a better expression, what 

do you do when you hear that information, that this is something 

that could be encroaching into the airspace? What happens? What 

is your next step? 

Chief DINE. Well, what happened in this case was there was no 

information that this was happening as they spoke or that it was 

imminent. There was no time or day provided. 

What they did do was do some research into the individual himself and, also, check to see—one of the questions was was there a 

waiver provided. So we have a system to access that as well. 

Mr. WALKER. So are any of these agencies that you contact once 

you hear that this is a possible situation—is there any communication between the different departments or agencies that this is a 

concern? 

Chief DINE. In this instance, we contacted the NCRCC once it 

came to fruition. 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Clancy, you said you got information on this 

as well? Is that correct? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, Tampa Bay Times called our Tampa Bay office 

on April 13, but there was no specification regarding Mr. Hughes, 

the gyrocopter. 

The question was simply would we be involved in civil disobedience displays by individuals, and we said we would be if it involved our protectee or one of our protected facilities. There was 

nothing specific. 

Mr. WALKER. One of the opening remarks—and I am trying to 

remember specifically who talked about this—talked about on the 

radar, distinguishable versus undistinguishable. 

Can someone speak to that as far as—help me understand that. 

Mr. HUERTA. An unfiltered radar feed picks up everything. It is 

cluttered with—in addition to aircraft, will include things such as 


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traffic on the streets. It will include birds, anything that is moving 

around. 

And so, for our purposes at the FAA, we filter it for what our 

primary function is, which is to safely separate aircraft, and that 

means we filter out small things that might be a distraction to a 

controller. 

Now, what our forensic analysis showed was that the radar did 

indicate something after the fact that we were able to piece together as most likely the flight of the gyrocopter. 

Mr. WALKER. But would you agree that after the fact may not 

be a good scenario? 

Mr. HUERTA. No. I would agree with that. But the point being 

an air traffic controller can’t do his job with a very cluttered 

screen. And so what we are very focused on is how can we ensure 

that a controller is able to safely separate air traffic in our case. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, if I could—— 

Mr. WALKER. Yes. I will come to the Admiral in just a second. 

Can you answer your own question there? How can that be more 

safety conscious as far as being able to get through the clutter on 

his own screen? 

Mr. HUERTA. What we do is—because the things that we are filtering out are things like birds or weather systems or small things 

that do not pose a threat to aviation safety. 

Now, we do provide the unfiltered radar to our partners across 

the Government, and each of the individual participants filters it 

for their own purposes. 

Mr. WALKER. And I want to have time for the Admiral here. But 

help me understand this. 

Is there not—and you would know this, being the expert. If 

someone is flying a gyrocopter, isn’t that a different pattern than 

what birds or other things may be flying around on a radar or an 

FAA system? 

Mr. HUERTA. As I testified to earlier, it appeared and disappeared. It actually had much more in common with a weather 

system. 

Mr. WALKER. OK. Admiral? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, the characteristics on radar of an aircraft 

of this size, flying the speed and the altitude—it has the same 

characteristics of birds—of flocks of birds. It can appear the same 

way. 

And so we adjust. We take the feeds from the FAA as well as 

our own sensors, and then we adjust those filters based on the 

environmentals that would give us the highest probability to pick 

up the smallest possible target that’s a real target. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Admiral. My time has expired. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I recognize the gentleman from Georgia, 

Mr. Carter, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you for being here. We appreciate the work that you 

do. I have just three very quick questions for you or maybe comments. 

First of all, Mr. Clancy, thank you for being here. I believe you 

were hear a couple of weeks ago and I closed my comments with 


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saying that I hoped I didn’t see you anytime soon. Here we are 

again. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. Chief Dine, I want to ask you—we had an incident 

in Cannon—I believe it was last week—where there was a suspicious powder that was found. I know that my staff had four 

emails sent to them during that time. Yet, in this situation with 

the gyrocopter, we only had one email sent to us, and that was 

after the fact. 

Why the difference there? What different scenario lead us to that 

situation? 

Chief DINE. The answer is that the systems we had in place 

failed and we immediately fixed them. And I certainly understand 

your concern. 

So messages will be sent immediately now. And I appreciate the 

fact that you acknowledge that we sent them in those other instances. 

Mr. CARTER. We sent them in those other instances, but we 

didn’t with the gyrocopter? 

Chief DINE. We sent some out, but clearly it was not comprehensive enough. Yes, sir. You’re correct. 

Mr. CARTER. Gentlemen, it just appears to me that we are not 

keeping up with the times. I have been sitting here and I hear 

what you say, that this needs to be discussed in a confidential 

hearing, and I get that. But I am still not confident—and I think 

the people want to be confident—that we are keeping up with the 

times. 

Drones aren’t anything new. They have been around. And, yet, 

all of a sudden we are having all these incidents. We read about 

the incident in Japan with the Prime Minister and the radioactive 

material that was sent there. That is scary. It is scary for me and 

scary for everyone. 

Are you comfortable and confident—and I want you to assure the 

American people that you are—that we have got this under control? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, we can assure the American people that 

all of us at this table and the whole of Government is working their 

very best to protect this Nation and its citizens against the many 

threats that happen to be out there. In closed session, I’ll tell you 

what we’re doing about this particular threat. 

Mr. CARTER. Does that mean it is not going to happen again? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I can never say it is not going to happen 

again, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. I understand, that. 

The last thing is the communication particularly among all of 

you. You know, look, I am a freshman rep. I have been up here for 

4 months. But I have been in business for many years, and I know 

that communication is the key and you have to surround yourself 

with good people and you have to make sure everybody is talking 

to each other. 

But I am just not getting that warm and fuzzy feeling here today 

after listening to all of this that that is happening with you all. 

And I just want you to assure me, if that has not been the case 

up to this point, that it will be the case in the future. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, on the morning of 9/11, a network, a telephone line, went into effect, and it has never been hung up since. 

And it includes—we call it the DEN—it includes over 200 mission 

partners that protect the American people for this particular 

threat—for the air threat. It is called the DEN. 

And it is exercised and it operates every single day. Twice a day 

just for the national capital region every one of those 200 mission 

partners are dealing with a penetration to our special flight—the 

SFR. Twice a day it occurs. And once a week we actually launch 

the Coast Guard helicopters in order to do it. So not only is it operating, it is exercised, it is utilized, every single day. 

Mr. SALESSES. Congressman, if I could, too, there is an effort underway by the White House and the National Security Council to 

bring all the Federal departments together to look at these issues, 

in particular, technologies that are currently available, technologies 

that are being in development, and looking at possible procedural 

changes when we encounter these kinds of situations. 

Mr. CARTER. Again, gentlemen, I want to thank you for the work 

that you do and encourage you. Please, this is extremely important 

and we really need you. So thank you for being on top of your 

game. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I recognize the ranking member. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

I want to thank all of you for being here. But I just have three 

issues that I want to raise, and Mr. Carter mentioned one of them. 

You know, as I sit here, I cannot help but be concerned about the 

communication situation here. 

Mr. Salesses, you said that you didn’t even know that the ranking—the chairman and ranking member, four committees, wanted 

you to be here the other day? 

Mr. SALESSES. Sir, I did not personally know. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. There is something wrong with that picture. 

There is something wrong with that picture. And let me tell you 

what I tell my staff. When something goes wrong and I find out 

about it, I wonder what I don’t know about. And so, if you recall, 

at the beginning of the hearing, I said people talk about when the 

rubber meets the road and then we discover there is no road. So 

communication is basic stuff. 

And then I want to just—and this is directly connected. You 

know, one of the things that we have noticed in a lot of committees—not just this committee, but other committees—is that folks 

seem to operate and want to operate in silos, silos. You are doing 

something over here. I am doing something over here. I have got 

my turf. You have got your turf. And it works against effectiveness 

and efficiency. And I just want to make sure that you all assure 

us that you truly are working together. I just think we—this is of 

such urgency. 

And my final point. I know you said that your staffs get together, 

top-level staff. I guess that is what you all are saying. You all need 

to get together, and it should not be just to prepare—to get your 

notes together for a hearing. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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I mean, you all are—I mean, you are there. You are paid to do 

a certain job. And, I mean, this is with all the respect that I have 

for you, and it is tremendous respect. But it is not about your deputy or whatever. It is you all. We look to you all. You are the experts. You are the ones who give your blood, sweat, and tears, and 

you all are the brilliant minds that we rely on every day to keep 

us safe. 

And I think you all need to be meeting. I know somebody said 

that the White House is trying to put something together where 

folks get together. I mean, that is just—I mean, that just comes 

from you, you, particularly after we have an incident like the one 

that happened here. 

And so, you know, I am anxiously looking forward, Mr. Chairman, to the closed session. And I know you are going to talk about 

that in a minute so that we can get some answers. 

And if there are things that you could not answer—I hope you 

all took notes about the things that you said that we have to discuss in closed session, and then we’ll do that. But, again, I want 

to thank you for being here today. And we are going to press forward. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank you. 

And this has been a good, productive hearing, but we will go to 

a closed hearing at another date. We have two other subcommittee 

hearings. We got backed up with the Prime Minister. We appreciate your patience. You all have important jobs to do as well. So 

we will work together at another time. 

I do have a few more questions. The Tampa Bay Times published 

stories prior to this incident. The guy in the gyrocopter was livefeeding a stream. I have heard a story from one of the major networks where they were watching it in New York, called down to 

the Capitol, and had staff reporters and producers go down on the 

grass to watch it happen. 

Do you all not monitor social media? Is Twitter like a new thing 

for you? I mean, this stuff is out there. Try Google Alerts. It is 

there. If it is not showing up on the radar, it was showing up on 

the media’s radar. And I don’t understand why you aren’t able to 

pick up that sort of signal. 

Because if you say that there is never any exposure in advance, 

we have got to become more technically savvy, if you can truly 

have somebody read a story online, get it to the appropriate person 

in New York, send a producer, she walks down on the grass and 

watches this land, and you all have billions of dollars, billions, and 

you don’t see a dude in a gyrocopter flying over. 

We deal with this on the border every single day. If I get Customs and Border Patrol up here, they would tell you about how 

they are detecting these. They will tell you how the incursions are 

working. They have got special things that I can’t talk about right 

here. I have been in them. I have seen them. They are very candid 

and open. 

And they are in the same Department. That is why we had 

Homeland Security. After 9/11, we formed Homeland Security to 

communicate, to coordinate. And the only time you all seven can 


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get together is when you get called to the Oversight and Government Reform Committee. That is in excusable. 

If the major networks can watch it live on television, I expect you 

to watch it on live television and do something about it. And I still 

have huge questions about what you would actually do. I want the 

men and women who are out there on the front line that have their 

hands on those triggers to know we have got their back. 

We don’t know if the person has mental capacity. I am going to 

assume they do. But you cannot come into the capital region. You 

are not going to go on that Lincoln Memorial. You are not coming 

to the White House. You are not coming into the United States 

Capitol unimpeded. We are going to take you down. That is the 

prevailing attitude. 

We can get all these sob stories about how nice we want to be. 

But until we project force, until we let people know that, ‘‘If you 

come here, you are going to go down. Then we will figure out your 

disposition,’’ then we are sending all the wrong signals. We are 

sending all the wrong signals. 

And so every time we have an incursion and they are not taken 

down fast and hard, some other-job is going to get an idea and terrorists are going to get more ideas. Figure it out. We pay you a lot 

of money, billions of dollars, and it has been a long time since 9/ 

11. Figure it out. 

To the men and women who are doing this, God bless them. I 

cannot thank them enough. They do amazing things. 

Two more questions and then I will be done. I would like after 

this hearing to get your comments or your reaction, if you are allowed, on the charges that were brought against this. 

One of the things I hope I can work with the ranking member 

and others on—this gentleman was charged with a misdemeanor. 

This is a misdemeanor offense. The more stringent offense was his 

flying of a gyrocopter. But an incursion into the airspace, we have 

to look at that as a Congress. 

Finally, I have got to ask you, Mr. Clancy: Is A.T. Smith still on 

the Secret Service payroll? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. He’s a detailee to another Homeland department. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Where does he work? What is his title? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, I am not aware of his title, but he works for 

the CBP. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Is he your Chief of Staff? 

Mr. CLANCY. No, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. He doesn’t hold the title of Chief of Staff? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, he’s not—I don’t know what his title is. He has 

not been—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Does he work in the Secret Service building? 

Mr. CLANCY. No, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Does he have a Secret Service vehicle? 

Mr. CLANCY. Not that I am aware of. No, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You will get back to me on that and confirm that? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Whose decision was it—yours or Secretary 

Johnson’s—to detail Smith rather than transfer him out of the 

agency? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, it was my decision. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So why do you keep him in the Secret Service? You sent out a press release that says he accepted a position 

within the Department of Homeland Security effective Tuesday, 

February 10, 2015, but he still works for the Secret Service. 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, he’s detailed to—he is on our payroll. Yes, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Why? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You told me, you told the ranking member, 

you told the world—you all sent out a press release saying he was 

being transferred. But he still works for the Secret Service, doesn’t 

he? He still gets a Secret Service—— 

Mr. CLANCY. He gets a Secret Service paycheck. Yes, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. How long is he detailed for? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, it has not been defined, the time limit. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. It has been since February. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Ranking Member Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Does the chairman yield? 

Mr. Clancy, just following up on that, so is he actually working— 

I mean, I know he gets a Secret Service paycheck. 

But is he actually working for the Secret Service in his detailed 

type of position? 

Mr. CLANCY. No, sir. I have no contact with Mr. Smith. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. None? 

Mr. CLANCY. None, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And we have details up here, too. So they have 

a limited time that they are with us. 

Can you tell us what the limitations are, wherever he is, and can 

you get that information to us? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, I’ll have to get back to you on that. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You have done, Mr. Clancy, a very good job 

of building trust and confidence. It is flushed down the toilet when 

I read and hear about these things. 

You said to us, to me personally, multiple times, the White 

House did, Homeland Security did, Secretary Johnson did, Mr. 

Mayorkas did, that you are implementing fundamental changes. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And this guy is still on the payroll. You 

sent out a press release touting that he was going to another department and agency and he does no work for the Secret Service, 

and, yet, he is on your payroll. 

Don’t ever come back here to Congress and tell me that you have 

a financial problem when you have got A.T. Smith on your payroll 

and you say you don’t have enough money. You shouldn’t have to 

pay for that out of your budget. He is a very, very senior person. 

You personally promised that he was being moved and transferred out of the Department, and he hasn’t. I am not buying this 

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fling around, and every one of your employees knows it. How do 

you think I know it? I don’t go to work there. Your employees know 

it. And you lose their trust and confidence that you are actually implementing the change that you say you are going to. 

There was no consequence to all these things we have talked 

about if he can keep his job, have a great title, get the same paycheck, you know, get a detailee, when waters calm down, then we 

will sort things out. 

With that, the committee stands adjourned. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, 1 second. I just want to ask one 

more question. Because the things you just said concern me, and 

I just wanted Mr. Clancy to have an opportunity to respond to that. 

If you want to. You may not want to. Those were some strong 

accusations, and I am just wondering, do you have a response? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, Mr. Chairman, all I can say is that I was looking for a fresh perspective in our leadership team, and we thought 

this was one opportunity to do that. 

And I am very pleased with the team that we have in place 

today. We have not gone back to those individuals who have taken 

these detailee positions. So I didn’t have any other comment, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Is it unusual for you to detail people—I mean, 

the Secret Service to detail people? 

Mr. CLANCY. No, sir. We have detailees certainly up here in Congress. We are the beneficiary of detailees as well. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Reclaiming my time, one more time, I have 

got to tell you, you tried to tell the men and women of the Secret 

Service, you tried to tell Congress, you tried to tell the world, that 

you were making changes. And everybody can look this up. It is 

public knowledge. But here is $183,000 that comes out of your budget that could 

have gone to somebody else. Hire a new, fresh person. Promote 

somebody within the agency. Do whatever you might. But then you 

are going to come crawling back to Congress, saying, ‘‘I need more 

money. I need more money.’’ 

The four assistant directors that you also released, that were 

transferred away, are they also detailees or are they still on the Secret Service payroll? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, there is one—one is a detailee on our payroll. 

Yes, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And where is he detailed to? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, he is also with—he is with ICE, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What do they do at ICE? 

Mr. CLANCY. And they can correct me if I’m wrong here. 

I believe he’s in a training position. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Will you provide to this committee by the 

week’s end the disposition of each of the people that you supposedly—you know, you were cleaning house. You were making 

changes. You were touting that. You were telling the committee 

that. 

Tell us exactly with each and every one of them where they are, 

how long the detail it, how much they make, all the relevant details that our staff asked for. 

Is that fair enough? Can you do that by the end of the week? 


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Mr. CLANCY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

We now stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:11 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 


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