## IN T HE C OURT OF CRIMINAL APPE ALS OF T EX AS

No. PD-1634-07
L I NDSEY ALYN CRUMPTON, Appellant

v . THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Discre tionary

Review of Ca se 05-08- 01673-CR of the F if th C ourt of Ap pe a ls, Da lla s Co unty
W O M ACK , J., delivere d the opinion of the Court, i n which J OHN S ON , K EAS L ER , H ERV EY , and C OCHRAN

, JJ., joined. H

ERV EY , J ., file d a c on c urring o

pin ion , in which K

EAS L ER and C OCHRAN

, JJ., joined. K

EL L ER , P.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in w hich P RICEand H

O L C O MB , JJ., joined. M EYERS , J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Th e iss ue is the pr op ri e ty of a de a dly-w e a

po n f ind ingin a

jud g me nt o f guil t of

the of fe ns e of criminally

neg lige nt homicide. The Court of Appe als upheld the finding
. Cru mp ton v . S tate , No. 05-06-01673- CR (Tex. App. – Dallas 2007) (not designated f or publication).( Cr um pt on - 2)

Th e on e -c ount i nd ic tme nt a lle g e d ( and the e vid e nc e sh ow e d) that th e a pp e lla nt d id “ c a us e the death of an individual ... by drivingher motor ve hicle, a de adly wea pon ... to ... strike and collide with the complainant’ s motor vehicle.” The jury ’s ver dict was, “ We, the jury [,] find the def endant guilty

of criminally

neg lige nt homicide, as include d in the indictment.” Th e jur y ’s ve rd ic t w a s a

fi nd ingthat th e de fe nd ant u se d a de a dly we a po n. On e re a so n is that the ver dict expressly

found the de fenda

nt guilty of the off ense “ as included in the indictment.” The indictment e x pressly alleg ed that the de fenda

nt committed the offense with “a deadly wea pon.” The verdic t’s ref

ere nce to the indictment ther efor e constituted a f inding that that alleg ation was true
. Another r eason is that a ve rdict of homicide ne cessa rily is a findingthat a dea dly wea pon
wa s u se d. Th e statut or

y de fi nit ion

of “ de a dly we a po n” inc lud e s “ anything

that in the manner

of its use ... is capable of ca using de ath ....” Pena l Code section 1.07(a )(17) (B ). Having f ound that the def endant wa s guilty

of homicide, the jury

nece ssarily

found that the de fenda

nt used something that in the manner of its use was ca

pable of causing– and did ca

use – death. There fore the ver dict was a n adequa te basis for the trial court’ s entry of the de adly -we apon fi nd ingin t

he jud g me nt. Today ’s dec ision is consist ent with, and wa s fore shadowe d by , our dec ision in Blount v. Sta te , 257 S.W .3d 712 (2008), in which w e held that a n alleg ation that the def

endant c ommitt ed or attempted to c ommit aggravated assault wa s adequate notice that ther e would be a n issue of his e xhibi tio n o r u se of

a de a dly we a po n s inc e e a c h ma

nn e r o f c omm itt inga g gra vate d a ssa

ult involves the use of a

deadly wea pon.( Cr um pt on - 3)

O p inio n o f K e ller , P .J ., p o st. 1 Ex part e Beck , 76 9 S.W
. 2 d 52 5 , 52 8 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 8 9 ). 2 A d iss e nti ngop ini on make s tw o p oints, ne ith e r o f whic h r e buts o ur re a so nin g . O ne is 1 that, in Ex parte Be ck, this court said in dicta that, “ha d the jury not answer ed a spe cial issue that the gun was a

deadly wea pon there would have be en no af firmative f

inding of deadly wea pon made, e ven upon the r eturn of ‘ guilty as cha rg ed in the indictment.’” But the state ment in Bec k was ba sed on a holdingthat we e x pressly reje cted just last year

in Blount . The Bec k

op ini on sa id that “ wh e re the re is n o a lle g atio n in the ind ic tme nt whic h c omp or ts w iththe de fi nit ion

of de a dly
w e a p o na s s e to uti n§ 1
. 0 7 ( a ) [ 1 7 ] ( B ) [ o f th e P e n a l C o d e ] , th e d e f

e n d anti s c l e ar l y not

put on notice that ther e will be an issue in the c ase c oncer ning use or exhibit ion of a de adly wea pon.” 2 In Blount we he ld the opposite, as we ha ve said a bove. The dissentingopinion’s other point is that a verdic t’s findingof “guilty as cha rg ed in the ind ic tme nt” (o r, in t

his c a se , “ a s in c lud e d in

the ind ic tme nt” ) m ay

no t be a fi nd ingthat a

de a dly
wea pon was used. A g ain, this reasoningis inconsistent with Blount and the e x press languag e of the dea dly -we apon statute. I f a de adly wea pon is any

thing that is ca

pable of causingdeath or
se ri ou s b od ily

inj ur y , a nd the ind ic tme nt a lle g e s th at th e de fe nd ant c a us e d d e ath o r s e ri ou s b od ily inj ur y , a nd the jur y fi nd s th e de fe nd ant guil ty a s c ha rg e d in the ind ic tme nt, the ve rd ic t is
nece ssarily

a findingthat a dea dly

wea pon was used. The only thing that today ’s dec ision adds to our holding in Blount is the decision that the jury ’s ver dict was a

n adequate basis for the trial court’ s entry of the a ffirmative findingin the( Cr um pt on - 4)

A rtic le 4 2 .1 2 o f t h e C o d e o f C rim ina l P ro c e d u re re fer s to su c h a c a se – “W h e n it is sho w n tha t a d e a d ly 3 weapon as def

i ned i n Sec t i on 1. 07 , P ena l Co de, was us ed ... dur i ng t he com mi s s i on of a f el ony of f ens e ... , an d t hat t he d ef end ant us ed
... t he d ead l y weap o n” – and s ect i o n 3g(a)(2) of t hat art i cl e say s, “ O n an af f i rma t i ve f

i nd i ng u n d e r th is su b d ivisio n , t h e trial c o u rt sh a ll e n te r th e fi n d ing in the ju d g m e n t o f t h e c o u rt.”

C o rr espo nd i ngl y , A rt i cl e 4 2
. 0 1 , s ec. 1 say s, “ T he judgm ent s hal l ref l ect : ... 21
. A f

f i rma t i ve f

i nd i ngs e n te re d p u rs u a n t t o S u b d ivisio n (2 ) o f S u b se c tio n (a ) o f S e c tio n 3 g o f A rtic le 4 2 .1 2 o f t h is c o d e .” judgme nt under the statutes which re quire such f indings. This decision follows natura lly and 3 easily from the holdingof Blount
. The diff icult question (which neither dissenting opinion addr esses) w ould be: In the fa ce of such statutory

require ments for de adly -we apon finding s, how could a jury convict a de fenda

nt of a homicide (and a

trial court e nter a

judgme nt for that off

ense) without

fi nd ingthat a

de a dly
wea pon was used? There mig ht be a possibility of an illog ical and inc onsistent act of c lemency by a jury , which mig ht have the pow er to so ac t in answeringa spec ial verdic t about the use of a deadly wea pon. But in this case the jury enter ed a ve rdict which a ffirmatively supports the trial court’s judgment that a dea dly wea pon was used. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he Court of Ap pe a ls.
Deliver ed De cembe r 9, 2009. Publis h.