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94–389PDF 2015

REGIONAL IMPACT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS

IRAQ AND SYRIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 30, 2015

Serial No. 114–33

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Seth G. Jones, Ph.D., director, International Security and Defense Policy 

Center, RAND Corporation ................................................................................. 6

General Jack Keane, USA, Retired, chairman of the board, Institute for 

the Study of War .................................................................................................. 24

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D., director, Center for Middle East Policy at 

Brookings .............................................................................................................. 38

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Seth G. Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 9

General Jack Keane, USA, Retired: Prepared statement .................................... 27

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................ 40

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 68

(1)

REGIONAL IMPACT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS 

IRAQ AND SYRIA 

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

I will first recognize Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes each 

for our opening statements. I will then recognize other members 

seeking recognition for 1 minute and thank you for my Cuban coffee. 

And there are so many subcommittees and full committees taking place right now because tomorrow, Friday, we will be on a district work period, so everybody is cramming their work in. 

So Ted Deutch is in an actual voting marathon in Judiciary but 

will come over here in a minute, and then Lois Frankel has Transportation—a committee that she has to go to. 

But we will then hear from our witnesses and without objection, 

the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the 

record. Members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

And I am going to take this a little bit out of order today because 

I know Congressman Deutch has to get back to votes in Judiciary. 

I would like to recognize him first so that you can get on with 

your business, Congressman Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

I apologize to the panel. We have votes and close votes at that. 

So I am going to be running back and forth. 

Thanks very much for providing us the opportunity to examine 

how current U.S. strategy in Iraq and Syria is impacting the rest 

of this vulnerable region and thanks to our distinguished witnesses 

for being here today. 

This is one of a dozen or so hearings that we have had on Syria, 

Iraq or ISIS in the past couple of years and each time we convene 

to address the conflict as a whole or specific aspects I am struck 

by what I am concerned is a general lack of strategy when it comes 

to ending the Syrian civil war. 

I applaud the President’s willingness to take action against ISIS 

and we are seeing some successes from that air campaign in Iraq, 

2

and I support our efforts to train and equip the moderate Syrian 

opposition. 

But I do believe that we waited too long to get that program off 

the ground in a meaningful way. The opposition has fractured over 

and over again and the Syrian people are being forced to choose to 

align with those who can simply provide them the greatest protection. 

With most of our efforts focused on ISIS’ brutality, we seem to 

have left out a very critical piece of the puzzle. This conflict will 

not end unless Assad is no longer in power. 

The suggestion that Assad is part of any solution or that he is 

a protector against ISIS is, quite frankly, ridiculous. This is a regime that has been responsible for the deaths of thousands, tens 

of thousands, hundreds of thousands of Syrians. 

This is a regime that has abandoned its people, trapping them 

in besieged areas without access to food and basic humanitarian 

needs. This is a regime that has resorted to the most barbaric torture, dropped barrel bombs on its people and used chemical weapons against its own citizens. 

And frankly, when we talk to our allies in the region, we are 

often met with confusion and frustration over, some believe, a lack 

of strategy for Syria. The chaos that has spun out from the Syrian 

conflict is having a devastating impact on the region. 

The humanitarian crisis alone is threatening the stability of critical states like Jordan and Lebanon. This conflict will change the 

makeup of the region for decades to come. 

Even if Syria was solved tomorrow it would take years before refugees and displaced persons could return to their homes and we 

have to make sure that the people of Syria know that the United 

States stands with them and that they do not believe that the coalition is acting on behalf of Assad or as Assad’s air force. 

And we can do that by continuing to support the opposition including the consideration of buffer zones. The United States must 

think holistically about what the impact of Assad remaining in 

power could have on the region. A direct consequence would be the 

emboldening of Iran. 

Assad in power preserves Iran’s lifeline to Hezbollah, and a report just this week estimated that Iran is spending $1 billion to $2 

billion a month supporting Assad and Hezbollah in Syria. 

Our efforts to combat ISIS in Iraq have resulted in moderate 

gains. The Abadi government seems to be willing to correct the 

years of weak and exclusive governance left—that left western Iraq 

susceptible to ISIS. Do our allies fear the U.S. will cooperate with 

Iran against ISIS in Iraq? 

Expanded Iranian influence in Iraq could have a devastating effect on our efforts to support the Abadi government and encourage 

inclusive governing. 

If Shi’ite militias are seen as receiving the backing of the Government of the United States, that could alienate Sunni tribes. And 

as we deal directly with Iraq and Syria we need to support our regional partners to defend their own countries against ISIS growth. 

There are extremist groups in nearly every Middle Eastern nation who have declared allegiance to ISIS. That is why I was 

pleased to join the chairman in co-sponsoring legislation that would 

3

ensure the Kingdom of Jordan receive the assistance that it needs 

to maintain security and stability. We must also push to strengthen efforts to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq. 

ISIS’ spread into North Africa, particularly in lawless Libya, has 

given the group new territory in which to train, recruit and attack 

as we, unfortunately, saw with the brutal attacks on Egyptian 

Christians. 

How long can coalition strikes against ISIS continue? Will our 

Arab partners, who are vital to efforts to send a message that this 

is not just an American fight, continue to support our efforts if they 

feel that we are jeopardizing regional security on other fronts? 

Because, not surprisingly, our allies are not just concerned about 

the spread of ISIS’ influence. Perhaps most concerning at this particular moment in time to our partners is the potential for expanded Iranian influence. 

What security guarantees can the United States provide to the 

Gulf States and to Israel? What do Iranian proxies like Hezbollah 

or even Hamas, which appears to have mended its relationship 

with the Ayatollah, look like with even greater Iranian financial 

support? 

Or what do groups that are simply in Iran’s orbit like the 

Houthis in Yemen look like with greater financial support and 

what continued action does this spur from the Saudis and other G–

16 nations to counteract this threat? 

Madam Chairman, we have been talking about ending the Syrian 

for 4 years. If there is no military solution to this conflict, how can 

we move a political solution forward, particularly without the Russians or Iranians? 

I look to our panel today to help us understand how these conflicts might play out in the coming months and years and what effect U.S. policy can have on reaching a positive outcome. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. Thank 

you and we look forward to seeing you scoot in and out. And thank 

you, Mr. Higgins, for joining us as well. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for her opening statement. In 

the Middle East, many times events in one country have a profound impact in other countries in the region. 

In 2009, President Obama failed to support the protests that had 

erupted throughout Iran, an opportunity that could have turned 

the tide in Iran and the entire landscape of the Middle East. 

In late December 2010, a Tunisian street vendor set himself on 

fire to protest abuse by State officials. This act ultimately sparked 

the Arab Spring with similar large-scale protests spreading to 

Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria in early 2011. 

In Libya and Syria, both Ghadafi and Assad resisted any calls 

for democracy or reform and in fact responded to the protest with 

violence and bloodshed. However, the U.S. responses in Syria and 

Libya were markedly different from each other. 

Whereas in Libya the U.S. responded with cutting ties with 

Ghadafi, sanctioning members of his regime and led the push for 

the U.N. to authorize military intervention in the conflict, that was 

not the case with Syria. 

4

Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called Assad ‘‘a reformer,’’ and that was rather ludicrous. The death toll is now over 

220,000 in Syria. But if this guy is who we thought would be a reformer, well, we did not really assess that situation correctly. 

The U.S. refused to take any action against Assad and even after 

Assad crossed President Obama’s chemical weapons red line, and 

has done so repeatedly, the United States did not respond with 

military force in Syria like we had done in Libya. 

The decision to not act on the red line caused a large ripple effect 

throughout the Middle East and beyond, as our adversaries saw 

that we don’t have the courage of our convictions to act and our 

allies saw that we can’t be trusted to act and question our resolve. 

Even in Libya where we did initially act, the administration 

failed to ensure stability and now Libya is fractured and has become a breeding ground for radicalism as extremists from Libya 

flock to join ISIL, al-Nusra and other terror groups. 

This mirrors the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal of our 

troops from Iraq in 2011, leaving a void that Iran was more than 

happy to fill, allowing the regime to gain more and more influence 

over Baghdad and Maliki. 

So the United States’ decision to not get involved in Syria immediately and to withdraw our troops from Iraq in 2011 played a 

large role in facilitating the rise of ISIL and the spread from Syria 

to Iraq. 

But I am not part of what Jeane Kirkpatrick called the ‘‘blame 

America first’’ crowd. The responsibility is with ISIL and all of 

these terror groups and not of the United States. 

But the rise of ISIL has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis that 

we have seen in Iraq and Syria. Millions have left. Hundreds of 

thousands have been murdered. 

Religious minorities have been targeted for extinction and nearly 

every country in the region has felt the impact of the terror of ISIL. 

The crisis in Iraq and Syria is a cancer and it is quickly metastasizing and spreading throughout the region. In Jordan, the Kingdom is feeling the burden to try and take care of the Syrian refugees and to protect its own borders. 

In Lebanon, there are over 1 million registered Syrian refugees 

and the fighting between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed 

Forces has caused instability in the Golan Heights, which poses a 

security threat to the democratic Jewish State of Israel. 

In Saudi Arabia, an attack against our embassy in Riyadh was 

foiled when nearly 100 individuals were arrested this week, all alleged affiliates of ISIL. 

This is why the administration needs a drastic reassessment of 

our policies. We have got an Iran that remains unchecked in Iraq, 

in Syria, in Lebanon and in Yemen. 

We have ISIL and al-Qaeda resurgent. Assad remains in Syria 

and the sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shi’a is as bad now 

as any time in recent history. Many questions remain about the 

Syrian train and equip program, the size and the scope of the mission. 

The program isn’t even up and running yet. By the time the program finishes, it could be too late and the situation in the region 

could be worse. 

5

Many issues remain regarding the proposed authorization for use 

of military force, the AUMF, that the administration has sent to 

Congress, not least of which is the failure to address Assad, alNusra and other terror groups in Iraq and Syria. 

The administration has failed to develop a comprehensive strategy to address all of the threats in Iraq and Syria. But until we 

do, the situation is only going to get worse and we will be faced 

with even tougher decisions down the road. 

And at this time I would like to recognize our members for any 

opening statements they would like to make. Ms. Frankel, my Florida colleague. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, and Madam Chair, I just want to say 

you so enjoy—you have the—sort of the most diplomatic and 

kindest way of putting some things that I may not agree with. But 

we should learn from you. 

Look, I just—and I enjoyed listening to your remarks. I think 

that this is a very complicated situation and I think from my 

own—my constituents the big concern is just even if we just look 

at recent history is somehow we take action—our country takes action—military action. 

We are well intended but the action seems to fail. And I will go 

a little bit further back, Madam Chair, to 2003 when we sent 

troops into Iraq and we toppled Saddam Hussein and I think there 

are some who would argue that that actually helped give rise to 

Iran increasing its power in the region and perhaps the fighting or 

the new government not being inclusive may have something to do 

with giving rise to ISIL. 

I think there are factors that are a lot more complicated. So I actually will listen very intently to what you all have to say and I 

thank you for being here. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and I think I should say thank 

you—I am not quite sure. Thank you, Lois. 

Mr. Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will be brief. 

I just, you know, talk about this region of the world, it is marked 

by instability for a long time and U.S. intervention in that part of 

the world is complicated because where there is no political center 

there are only sides, and taking sides or being perceived to take a 

side has major political consequences as well. 

So when we talk about this part of the region, you know, revisionist history is not helpful because there is a lot of gray area. 

There is a lot of nuance. 

It is not black and white and to be strategic and to be smart and 

to use your resources as best you can but to also require that regional players also participate fully and don’t play the United 

States as they historically have in Iraq and in other places. 

Syria, clearly, is a mess—clearly, is a mess. And, you know, some 

people wanted us to believe that if we just supported the free Syrian army that we would be supporting the good guys against the 

bad guys. 

But, again, when you look beyond the surface it is so much more 

complicated than that with so many militias and Islamic extremists 

that even as bad as Bashir al-Assad is, the alternatives, you know, 

6

throughout that continuum could in fact be worse, given the history 

of those groups as well. 

So with that, we have a distinguished group of panelists and I 

look forward to the testimony. I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Higgins and Ms. 

Frankel. 

And so now I am pleased to introduce our distinguished panel. 

We welcome back Dr. Seth Jones. He is a director of the International Security and Defense Policy at the RAND Corporation. 

He is an adjunct professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and has served in an 

advisory capacity to several operational commands in the Department of Defense. 

Second, we welcome back General Jack Keane, who is chairman 

of the Institute for the Study of War. The general has served in the 

United States Army for 37 years, rising to the post of Army vice 

chief of staff. 

He has served as a combat veteran in Vietnam, as has my husband. Also has served in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo and 

has commanded the prestigious 18th Airborne Corps and the decorated 101st Airborne Division. 

Thank you, General, for being with us this morning and thank 

you for your distinguished service to our country. You are a true 

hero. 

And last but certainly not least, I would like to welcome Dr. Tamara Cofman Wittes. Help me out. Wittes. Wittes. Just as it—yes, 

Wittes. She is a senior fellow and the director of the Saban Center 

for Middle East policy at Brookings. 

Dr. Wittes served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Near 

Eastern affairs from November 2009 to January 2012 and we welcome you back. Thank you. 

We will begin with you, Dr. Jones. 

STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, PH.D., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND 

CORPORATION 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking 

Member Deutch and distinguished members of the committee, and 

thanks to the other members here. We have got a distinguished 

group. 

I am going to divide my comments into two sections. The first 

will provide an overview of Iraq and Syrian and the broader regional context, and the second will get into some recommendations—some preliminary recommendations. 

Let me begin with the wars as they stand right now. I think one 

of the—one of the challenges right now is both the media and some 

administration and other officials try to deal with them almost separately and in fact they are quite intertwined. And we will see in 

my comments, it is generally a mistake to treat them even sequentially. 

In Iraq right now, the United States remains engaged in a 

counter insurgency campaign against Da’ish, also referred to as 

ISIL or ISIS, and its allies. 

7

It has lost some ground recently, including in Tikrit, but it does 

still have substantial territory, particularly in the predominantly 

Sunni areas of Anbar, Salahadin and Nineveh. It also continues to 

fund itself through activities like smuggling oil, selling stolen 

goods, kidnapping, seizing bank accounts and the smuggling of antiquities. 

In Syria, the U.S. is somewhat involved in the insurgency campaign. It has provided limited support to rebels, which I will come 

back to in a little bit through the train and equip program. 

But U.S. air strikes have been insufficient to seriously degrade 

Da’ish in Syria. More recently, there has been a surge of rebel activity and I wanted to highlight with our focus so much on Da’ish 

or ISIL in Syria. 

One of the groups that has clearly benefited from the gains in 

rebel activity is the al-Qaeda affiliated Nusra Front. It probably 

has more fighters, more money and more territory than at any time 

since its creation. 

In 2011, it retains a stronghold in northwestern Syrian areas like 

in Idlib. So I want to highlight my concerns with the al-Qaeda affiliate now in Syria and the gains that it has made. 

There, obviously, are differences between Syria and Iraq but I 

think as you look at the way the wars have transpired, we have 

a range of issues. The movement of extremist groups and criminal 

networks operating on both sides of the border are moving back 

and forth. 

The role of or the use of Turkey as a—Turkish territory as a 

pipeline for groups coming into the region and then, obviously, 

Irani involvement in both wars as being just three examples of how 

intertwined those wars are. 

U.S. and allied efforts, obviously, need to consider a range of 

issues including efforts to undermine the ideology of extremist 

groups, to target key leaders, to build partner capacity, to engage 

in political dialogue including Iraq and other steps. 

But I am going to focus my remaining comments on three issues. 

The first is interdiction efforts in Turkey and other neighboring 

states. Turkey, in particular, has taken some steps to crack down 

on foreign fighter flows. 

It has added, for example, thousands of names to its banned from 

entry list into Turkey. But, in my view, these steps are still not 

sufficient. Turkey remains the most important pipeline for foreign 

extremists coming into both Iraq and Syria contexts. 

As I—as I provide more material in the written testimony, there 

are a number of useful examples since World War II of successful 

efforts to crack down on border interdiction. 

So I think there are useful lessons, again for aerial-ground maritime surveillance, strengthening capacity and resources of border 

security personnel, et cetera that are still worth pursuing in Turkey. 

The second issue is the train and equip program. In my view, the 

U.S., including Congress, should put a pause on this program. I am 

concerned for several reasons. 

First, it seems to me it makes little sense to expend U.S. financial, diplomatic, military and other resources without a long-term 

strategy and a desire to end-state in Syria. The U.S. needs to first 

8

agree on a long-term strategy and then design a train and equip 

program to achieve that end state. 

In addition, I think it is also problematic to train Syrian rebels 

to counter Da’ish, or the Islamic State, and not what virtually all 

rebels are trying to do, which is—which is to end the Assad regime 

that has used chemical weapons on its own population. 

And then, finally, it strikes me also as problematic that the train 

and equip program, the way it is set up right now, at least as I 

understand it is to train, advise and assist local security forces outside of Syria and then to not have on the ground training in Syria 

itself. 

Virtually every successful effort that I have seen or have been involved in myself—Philippines, Colombia, a number of other 

places—have required on the ground training. It provides a way of 

giving them hands-on capacity as well as understanding how they 

are actually being used. 

So for those reasons and many others, I would—I would strongly 

urge taking a pause to this program until some of these issues get 

settled out. 

And then finally, let me just say on the AUMF, in my view, Congress should most likely pass an AUMF that is an omnibus, and 

we can talk about the details. I lay it out in the testimony. 

No geographical limitations, in a sense, but that get into issues 

of threat, a fairly broad definition of groups—happy to give you 

more specifics—specified purposes for which military forces for 

which military forces may be used, a requirement to report to Congress and then, finally, a renewal clause. 

So let me just conclude by saying the biggest issue and the biggest challenge we have in Iraq and Syria is this war is spreading. 

It is spreading into West Africa, East Africa, North Africa. 

We see Da’ish and the Islamic State rising in South Asia. We 

have seen arrests now in the Pacific Rim. If we do not begin to get 

more of a handle on it, we are going to see this spread across multiple regions, including outside of this committee’s jurisdictions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

General Keane. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK KEANE, USA, RETIRED, 

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF 

WAR 

General KEANE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Deutch, distinguished members of the committee for inviting me 

back to testify. I am honored to be with such a distinguished panel 

today. 

Attached to my written testimony are three maps that are prepared by ISW for your reference, and let me just correct something 

in your statement, Madam Chairman. I am a Vietnam but I did—

my troops served in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. 

In my judgements, it is indisputable that U.S. policy failures in 

Iraq and Syria enabled Iranian expansion in the Middle East, enabled ISIS to reemerge, establish a sanctuary in Syria, expand into 

Iraq, Egyptian Sinai, North Africa and South Asia while conducting daily acts of barbarism against humanity and civilization, 

enabled the al-Qaeda, particularly Jabhat al-Nusra, to expand significantly in Syria to include the Khorasan Group, which has committed to out-of-region attacks against the United States and Europe while expanding in north and northeast Africa, enabled Assad 

to kill over 220,000 Syrians while forcing the displacement of over 

7 million people from their homes, a humanitarian catastrophe, as 

the Syrian nation is systematically destroyed, which is an 

accelerant for jihadist groups regionally and globally. 

One cannot simply blame the underlying factors that exist in the 

region and absolve the United States of specific policy decisions 

that have unintended adverse consequences. The facts are the following on Iraq. 

By 2009, the Sunni insurgency supported by al-Qaeda and Iranian-backed Shi’a militias and others were defeated. However, beginning in 2009,the new administration begins to pull away from 

Iraq politically. Iran regains influence. 

In 2010, Maliki loses the election by one vote. But instead of 

helping his preferred opponent, Allawi, to form a new government, 

the United States inexplicably backs Maliki. 

In 2011, the U.S. pulls out all troops. The al-Qaeda in Iraq reemerges as ISIS. In Syria, the Arab Spring reaches Syria in 2011. 

Despite Assad’s obvious military advantage, the opposition is succeeding. Many predict the regime will fall as the opposition seeks 

additional ammunition and weapons to fight the regime. 

While the President calls for Assad to go, he surprisingly refuses 

the opposition request. Iran begins daily flights of supplies and ammunition plus the commitment of Quds Force advisors to include 

Qasem Soleimani. 

Iran deploys its proxies, 5,000 Hezbollah from Lebanon and at its 

peak 20,000 Iraqi Shi’a militia. The momentum shifts to Assad’s 

favor. The al-Qaeda recognizes the opportunity and moves in, and 

ISIS in 2012 deploys from Iraq to northeastern Syria to establish 

a sanctuary. 

25

To avoid a regional spillover war, which we certainly have now, 

Clinton, Panetta, Dempsey, CIA Director Petraeus make a formal 

recommendation to arm the opposition in the summer of 2012. 

The President refuses again. The killing continues. Assad, in 

2013, as you pointed out, Madam Chairman, uses CW—chemical 

weapons—and cross the U.S. red line. But still the President does 

not act. 

ISIS invades Iraq in 2014. The Maliki government requests assistance. The President refuses. Iran begins immediate assistance—Quds Force advisors, Qasem Soleimani, daily flights of supplies and ammunition. 

In 2014 Mosul falls. The Maliki government, again, requests air 

power and the President refuses. Not until August, some 8 months 

after the ISIS invasion, does the United States respond. 

Despite ISIS’ recent setbacks in Iraq, as you can see on the ISIS 

sanctuary map, it still holds considerable territory and influence in 

Iraq and remains on offense today while it has expanded its territorial control and influence in Syria. 

Moreover, it has expanded its influence in what is called the near 

abroad, as you can see on the global rings map. Its affiliates, or 

wilayats, are expanding as ISIS is rapidly becoming the new face 

of radical Islam and competing with al-Qaeda for control and influence. Those are the black stars on that map. 

What about the U.S. strategy? In Iraq, we are taking less than 

half measures to assist the Iraqi security forces, the Kurds and the 

Sunni tribes, which stretches out the time to defeat ISIS as casualties mount. 

In Syrian, there are no plans to defeat ISIS. To do so requires 

an effective ground forces supported by air power. There is none. 

U.S. policy is fundamentally inadequate to defeat ISIS. 

As to Assad, he must go. Allowing Assad to continue his genocide 

sows the seeds for generational regional disorder and empowers expansionist Iran. As to Iran, the United States has no strategy to 

stop the regional hegemonic aspirations of the Iranian regime. On 

the contrary, the U.S. is desperately and naively, in my judgment, 

moving to accommodate Iran on a nuclear deal that Iran’s aggressive behavior will change as it supposedly joins the community of 

nations. 

In conclusion, the appalling lack of a comprehensive and coherent strategy to defeat radical Islam 22 years after the first attack 

on the World Trade center and almost 14 years after 9/11 is a 

generational policy failure. 

To date, we don’t define radical Islam. We don’t explain it. We 

don’t try to understand its appeal. We don’t counter and undermine 

the ideology, which is grounded in a religious belief system. 

This is a regional problem become a global problem and the 

countries who have a vested interest in defeating radical Islam 

should join together in an alliance to develop a comprehensive 

strategy. 

The balance of power in the Middle East is shifting against the 

United States’ regional interest and against the United States’ security. 

26

There is much that can be accomplished with our allies to include a Syrian strategy but the reality is American power is considered and our credibility is at an all-time low. 

There are no simple answers or solutions. But without strong 

U.S. leadership, our adversaries will continue to be emboldened. 

Our friends, out of fear, are susceptible to poor decisions while the 

Middle East region and the world becomes a more dangerous place. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, General. 

Dr. Wittes. 

STATEMENT OF TAMARA COFMAN WITTES, PH.D., DIRECTOR, 

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY AT BROOKINGS 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, members of the committee. I appreciate the invitation. 

I must emphasize, as always, that I represent only myself. Brookings does not take any institutional positions on policy issues. 

The Middle East is disordered more today than in perhaps a half 

century and ISIS is only a symptom of this underlying breakdown 

in regional order. 

The upheaval in the region has likewise generated newly assertive regional powers like Turkey, new opportunities for longstanding troublemakers like Iran and Hezbollah, and sometimes 

bitter disputes between Arab States. 

Of course, this disorder is itself the product, the same long-building pressures that generated the Arab Spring. Iraq and Syria may 

be our focus today, but marginalizing extremist movements like 

ISIS demands attention to other weak and fragile states in the region. 

It is no accident that Syria and Libya are the most disordered 

and violent parts of the region today because these are the places 

where leaders, having failed to govern in a manner that could have 

prevented mass dissent, then sought to repress their people 

through the use of force. 

These brutal power-hungry shortsighted men broke their crumbling states to bits and drove their societies to civil war and it is 

the terrible choices of these terrible leaders more than anything 

else that created the openings that al-Qaeda, ISIS and other sectarian killers across the region now exploit. 

The roots of the region’s upending in this fraying and broken social contract remind us that ISIS is not the cause of today’s disorder and it is not the disease. 

The broken state-society relationship is what must be addressed 

if the region is to return to some form of stability. This means that 

whatever the United States does militarily in Iraq and Syria we 

must focus our strategy on the politics. 

In Iraq, the government has given non-state militias, some under 

Iranian influence, a large role in the fight in ways that have exacerbated Sunni anxieties and made the fight against ISIS harder. 

That said, the operation in Tikrit last month in which Iraniansupported militias failed and the Iraqi Government relied on American air support for victory, showed the limits of Iranian influence. 

The U.S. strategy rightly has the Iraqi Government own responsibility for its own choices in this battle for its territory and the 

hearts and minds of its people. 

This strategy ultimately stands or falls on Iraqi Prime Minister 

Abadi’s ability to move forward with the kind of political and security steps that will build the confidence of Iraq Sunnis in the Iraqi 

state. 

In Syria, as we have been discussing, U.S. efforts to equip and 

train cooperative Syrian opposition forces will take more than a 

year, perhaps more than two, to have any meaningful battlefield 

39

impact, and meanwhile a coalition of more extremist Islamist 

groups is successfully routing Syrian military forces in Idlib Province. 

So the question is what will follow the withdrawal of Assad’s 

forces—extremist rule or civil administration? 

The U.S. must urgently focus on working with its allies and with 

Syrian opposition forces on the ground to shape the situation so as 

to advance the latter. 

Let me talk about our partners in the region. The fall of Mosul 

last June brought a momentary unity between American priorities 

and those of our traditional regional partners and allowed the establishment of this anti-ISIS coalition. But it is a thin coalition and 

it has been from the start. 

Today, Saudi Arabia and others seem to prioritize the Iranian 

threat over the threat from ISIS and the military operation in 

Yemen is evidence for this. 

The reassurance that our partners are looking for is to see the 

United States demonstrate its recognition and its readiness to push 

back against Iran’s destabilizing activities around the region, and 

the primary arena in which Arab states wish to see that from the 

U.S. is in Syria. 

So efforts to help expose and push back against those Iranian behaviors should be a key element of America’s policies in the coming 

months, and I would say that is true regardless of the outcome of 

the nuclear talks because I think that Iranian behavior will continue regardless of the outcome of the nuclear talks. 

In addition, the United States must attend to the political components of its policy in Iraq and Syria to ensure that territory and 

people liberated from ISIS or from Assad find reliable security from 

a responsible civil administration, not rough justice from extremist 

militias whether Sunni or Shi’a. 

Finally, the United States must address the underlying 

vulnerabilities that produced this upheaval and gave space for ISIS 

across the region. 

We must devote greater attention to supporting governments like 

Tunisia, who are using political compromise instead of violence to 

resolve disputes. 

We should help local partners forge meaningful governance, not 

just a security presence, in ungoverned spaces like the Sinai. 

Ultimately, building resilient societies that can marginalize extremists requires governments that can win citizens’ trust and loyalty and it requires systems that can offer young people meaningful 

opportunities to fulfill their long-denied dreams so that they don’t 

place their hopes in a world after this one. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wittes follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much to all of our panelists 

and I will recognize myself for the first round of questions. 

Despite the clear and vocal calls for a comprehensive strategy, a 

U.S. policy in Iraq and in Syria, the administration continues to 

treat the conflicts as separate or at least as situations that should 

be dealt with one at a time, and this is either a fundamental misunderstanding of the issues at hand or willful ignorance due to a 

political calculation, namely, the administration’s misguided and 

naive nuclear negotiations with Iran. 

It must acknowledge that air strikes alone will not be sufficient 

to defeat ISIL in either Iraq or in Syria, that Assad must be removed from power and that Iran, even if it is the enemy of our 

enemy, is still an enemy. 

In a hearing yesterday, former Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford 

testified that if the United States allies with Iran, we are playing 

into ISIL’s narrative and helping in its recruitment. 

So I ask the panelists do you believe that we are cooperating 

with Iran directly or indirectly against ISIL and, if so, is this helpful to our national security interests? 

Dr. Jones, then General Keane—whoever wants to tackle this. 

Mr. JONES. Sure. I will start. 

Look, I think in particular in Iraq there is and there are areas 

where the U.S. has worked with Iranian-backed militia organizations in various areas. The campaign has involved a complex set 

of state governments including Iraq as well as sub-state actors, 

Kurds, but also Iranian-backed Shi’a militias. 

So I think the answer to your question is yes, the U.S. has cooperated somewhat with Iran, particular at the substrate level. 

There have been discussions as well about the political issues, 

Sunni-Shi’a issues with the—with the Iraqi Government that Iran 

has been involved in. 

I think, ultimately, the U.S. is in a very complicated position 

here but I do agree with your comments that a strong allied relationship with Iran, if that is the direction we go in, would be very 

counterproductive and would certainly walk into an anti—would 

certainly help with the ISIL narrative. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. JONES. It is exactly what they are saying. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. General? 

General KEANE. I agree with the doctor about Iraq’s level and repeat it. But in Syria, I think, really, the elephant in the room in 

Syria with the administration’s reluctance to provide assistance to 

the Free Syrian Army despite a very credible and experienced national security team that recommended that, as I pointed out in my 

testimony, I think is Iran. 

It is the elephant in the room in the sense that we have been, 

because the nuclear talks and establishing a deal, I think, is the 

unstated foreign policy major objective of the administration. 

It has handcuffed our ability to do what we should have done in 

Syria because of a potential setback from the Iranians. So de facto 

our policy decisions in Syria have certainly helped Iran bona fide 

establish a client state with Syria, contributes to their expansionist 

policies and certainly encourages them to do what they are doing 

right now in Yemen, which if they are able to achieve what they 

49

want to achieve in Yemen—political and military control in 

Yemen—then they change the strategic balance of power in the region by gaining control of a strategic waterway at the Gulf of Aden 

at the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and affect and control and leverage 

shipping that comes in and out of the Suez Canal—a major objective for the Iranians that they would not have thought of without 

the progress that they have made in Syria. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Doctor? 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you. 

You know, I think part of the challenge is that our regional partners who are absolutely necessary to any successful outcome in 

Syria have until very recently been pretty divided themselves on 

the question of what should follow Assad and what kind of political 

order they would see as a desirable end state, and in many ways 

their elevation of the Iranian threat above the threat of ISIS, above 

the threat of political Islam, is a product of just the last year or 

so. 

But up until recently, different Arab states were supporting different factions in the Syrian opposition and I think that vastly 

complicated any ability we had to forge unity among them. 

Now, there might well have been a time early in the Syrian conflict when a more forward-leaning American policy would have created that unified front. But I think we are long past that now, unfortunately. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

I have other questions but I will wait for the next round. Mr. 

Deutch, our ranking member. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

The Iranian foreign minister was on American television last 

night and was talking—when asked about Iranian influence in the 

region and the way that it is perceived pushed back against the argument that anyone could perceive what is happening now in any 

part of the region as a Shi’a-Sunni conflict—that there is absolutely 

nothing to that. 

I would like to hear from our panelists a response to that and 

if you disagree with that assertion what role, ultimately, can the 

United States play if his assertion is wrong and it is indeed perceived that way among our allies and those who are not? 

Mr. JONES. Chair, I will start. 

I think we are often prone to gross generalizations about the 

state of sectarianism. Being recently, for example, in Djibouti and 

looking closely at the situation in Yemen, one can easily gravitate 

to an argument that this is a Saudi—because they have been involved—Iran proxy war. 

But the reality when you get onto the ground into Yemen and 

look at it is there are a range of tribal politics involved. 

The Houthis have been battling Saudi Arabia for a long time. 

They are not an arm of the Iranian Government. They do get some 

assistance. 

So I would say the answer to your question is there is, clearly, 

an Iranian grand strategy for the Middle East, for North and East 

Africa and other locations that as caused them to provide assistance to some groups and not others—some governments and not 

others. 

50

But when you actually look on the ground, whether it is Syria 

or Iraq or Yemen or take your pick, I mean, I think we do have 

to understand that we are also bringing in the very localized elements of the dispute. 

So I would say that there is a combination of both local and these 

grand strategic issues that is going on in all the conflicts we are 

talking about here. 

General KEANE. I agree. I mean, one of the things that happens 

when you look at this region, because of the sectarianism that has 

been there historically, that we have a tendency to throw that out 

as the underlying cause for all the problems we are having. 

It certainly is a contributor but there has been a lot of peace between these sectarian groups as well. Iranians—I mean, I, clearly, 

think this is a geopolitical strategy of theirs to dominate the region, 

to influence and dominate Shi’a countries as well as Sunni countries and I believe that is what is driving them. 

Like other radical Islamists, they will take advantage and manipulate this sectarian divide as much as they can to their own 

geopolitical ends. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Ms. Wittes. 

Ms. WITTES. I think both sides of this regional power struggle, 

and I would agree it is a regional power struggle, have found a sectarian narrative useful. 

It helps them rally around the flag, it helps them mobilize allies 

and, unfortunately, they have fed off of one another repeatedly 

whether it is Bahrain or in Yemen or in Syria. 

Once that narrative takes hold and is advanced by one side the 

other side ups the ante, and we have seen this in the regional 

media. It has been quite vicious and nasty. 

But I think that the problem with just looking at it through that 

lens is that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy at a certain point, 

just as we saw in the Balkans in the 1990s. 

At a certain point, when people have lost the ability to find security through the state or through the government, they are going 

to fall back on community identifies and if everybody around them 

is choosing friend or foe according to sectarian identity they will be 

forced to do that, too. 

So the reality for Syrians, sadly, today I think is a reality of sectarian conflict. It didn’t have to be that way but that is where we 

are. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And so then where should it go and, specifically, to 

your—the point you made about young people who, particularly 

those in their teens, early 20s, who have now endured 4 years of 

this, many of them displaced or refugees, what is the message from 

the United States, going forward? 

What do they need to see to counter their understandable—as 

you put it, their understandable decision in many instances to just 

fall back into tribal affiliation? 

Ms. WITTES. Yes, I think in the Iraqi case there is a fierce debate 

going on and an effort to try and demonstrate that there is space 

within Iraqi politics and the Iraqi state for all of Iraq’s people. 

I don’t know whether the angels will win that argument. I certainly hope so, and I think, by the way, that both Iran and our 

Sunni Arab partners, have important roles to play in helping to 

51

stabilize Iraq by making sure those decisions on behalf of political 

inclusion, like establishing a national guard, move forward. 

Syria, I think, is much harder because the conflict is so severe 

because half the population has been displaced. 

But as part of what we need to do, whatever the political architecture, we need to generate within society over the long term the 

ability to build dialogue, to build intercommunal dialogue, to build 

mechanisms for conflict resolution so that while those tensions will 

always be there, they don’t erupt into violence. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And now another Florida colleague, Mr. Clawson, of a great 

state. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Thank you to the gentlelady for doing this committee hearing. I think it is great to have knowledgeable folks and 

let us shed some sunlight on complicated topics, and that takes 

time and too often up here we don’t have enough time. So thank 

you, Congresswoman, for doing this. 

It seems to me that our objectives out to be—if they are not they 

ought to be, number one, protect Israel in this region, number two, 

to counterbalance I think what you call this grand—I don’t remember the exact rhetoric you just used—grand Iranian strategies. 

Is that right? And so, at least from my seat, it seems like those 

are the two things that we ought to be trying to do. 

Having said that then, I have the following observations then 

you all could react to. Number one, it feels like we are talking too 

much to the wrong people and not enough to the right people and 

not enough allegiance is going on—you know, alliances going on 

with good friends that might be able to band together and do something about this instead of talking to the bad guy. 

It just feels like strategically I don’t know who I am doing a joint 

venture with here—what is going on, number one. Number two, it 

feels like as the region gets more dangerous, that you all point out, 

why are we not giving more military assistance to Israel. It feels 

like an obvious question. 

Number three, why do we want more nukes in the region as it 

becomes less volatile, and number four, you know, I voted no on 

the Syrian involvement last year. 

It felt like if we didn’t have a grand strategy to counterbalance 

this Iranian grand strategy, as you all call it, the isolated pinpricks 

just throw gasoline on the fire. It is hard to manage from halfway 

around the world with people we don’t trust and don’t really know 

very well and it just makes the situation worse. 

So while I am all for spending more military dollars to get ready 

for a coming crisis, I don’t consider myself an isolationist because 

I don’t like, you know, these isolated actions that aren’t linked together and seem to take us nowhere. 

So I have given you four observations there. There is three of 

you. If each one of you take one, we might, you know, might get 

somewhere here. 

General KEANE. Well, I will start. It is a fact that, and I agree 

with you, we spend a lot of time talking to our enemies and not 

our friends. 

52

When you travel in the region and talk to our allies in the region, I mean, it is unmistakable that over the last several years 

they have lost confidence in us. 

We do have a credibility issue with them and it is because of our 

policy decisions that I enumerated in the oral statement as well as 

the written statement that are driving those conclusions. 

Those are very real, and in a sense it handicaps putting together 

the kind of comprehensive strategy that we do need, one, to deal 

with the Sunni-based radical Islam, which is a generational challenge we are facing, and number two, to counter the Iranians effectively. 

I am of the mind that the administration has this thought—that 

Iran, being the country it is, a powerful country itself, has a right 

to a sphere of influence in the region and as such we must work 

with that country to achieve common objectives in terms of regional 

objectives. 

It does not embrace the 30-plus year history of Iran’s barbarism 

and proxy wars that it has fought and the killing of Americans 

from 1983 all the way to 2008 and puts that aside and chooses to 

treat Iran as a country that aspires to be in the community of nations and therefore tries to influence in moving in that direction. 

I think that naiveness and sophomoric approach to a serious 

problem, to be quite frank about it, has so antagonized our allies 

in the region that it becomes their number-one issue with us because they had always believed that the United States strategically 

was a counterbalance to Iranian influence in the region. 

Mr. JONES. If I could just pick up on your first point, I would add 

one other major U.S. interest and that is to protect the homeland, 

and the concern I have, particularly on the Syrian side, is that, as 

U.S. intelligence officials have said publically, that we have two 

groups—Khorasan out of looser territory and the Islamic State 

more kind of inspired but are plotting or encouraging attacks 

against the homeland coming from Syria. 

And second, we have the highest percentage of foreign fighters 

in the history of jihadist battlefields—the recent history—coming in 

particular to Syria to fight, and we don’t have a long-term strategy 

right now. 

We have got a bit of a half measure with the train and equip program but in my view that is not tied to a long-term regional—certainly, not a Syrian strategy. 

Mr. CLAWSON. So you would—I think the general and I, you, 

then the three of us would be in agreement to go big or don’t go. 

If the problem is that serious, then either let us not mess around 

with it or let us go big and get something done with our allies. 

Mr. JONES. Just to be clear, when you say go big you mean——

Mr. CLAWSON. Big enough to make a difference—to make us 

safer. 

Ms. WITTES. Perhaps I can weigh in on that component because 

I think that—I think it is important to understand the military tool 

as one tool in the toolbox but a strategy looks at how all the tools 

fit together, right. 

And so a good strategy uses military force directly or indirectly 

as a means to an end. I think one of the hard lessons that we have 

53

learned over the last decade and a half is about the limitations of 

military force. 

It can achieve a lot but there are limits on what it can achieve, 

especially if it is not in the context of a broader political strategy. 

So as we think about how to push back on Iranian influence 

around the region, we can certainly increase—you know, talk about 

increasing assistance to our friends and partners in the region. 

I am sure that when the GCC partners come to Washington later 

this month some of them—maybe all of them—will have a shopping 

list. But I would argue that that is not the most important thing 

they are looking for in terms of reassurance and support from us. 

What they are looking for is our willingness to use all of our policy tools to push back on Iran around the region and I think in 

some ways the most important tools we have are intelligence to expose what we see and what we know about Iran’s activities and cooperation with our regional partners on the politics and diplomacy. 

If we can work diplomatically to resolve some of these conflicts 

and grievances, that gives the Iranians much less room to operate. 

The upheaval of the last 4 years has given the Iranians far more 

opportunities in far more places and we need to try to shrink that 

down. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Clawson. 

Another Florida colleague, Ms. Frankel. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I want to thank all the panelists for being here and, of course, 

General, for your service to our country. I deeply appreciate that. 

So with that said, I just wanted to say that, General, I am—I 

will try to say this as kindly as possible. I am perplexed of you laying the blame on this administration, first of all, for what is going 

on in the Middle East—first of all, without even commenting on the 

fact that another administration took us—military action into Iraq 

in the first place. 

But I want to get past that because I think to blame the United 

States of America on what is going on in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Iran, 

Yemen and every other place in this world is ridiculous. I think it 

is unfair. 

And I do have a question, though, and my question is what role 

does a corruption of these governments, the oppressiveness of these 

governments, the poverty in the country and the lack of human infrastructure to replace these governments. 

How does that affect what is going on? And this is for all of you. 

General KEANE. Well, first of all, I didn’t blame the United 

States for everything that is wrong in the Middle East. I quite 

frankly said that our policy decisions enabled these activities and 

I think that is an important distinction to make. 

We are—we are contributors to our problem. I mean, it is conventional wisdom to say that the underlying factors in the Middle 

East are the real cause of all of these problems and we should absolve the United States of any accountability or responsibility and 

those underlying factors are the ones that you are reaching out to, 

and I certainly understand that. 

The region, by and large, is run by repressive regimes. Almost 

every one of them has some degree of repression in it. The fact is 

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54

tice—reform of political and social injustice and economic opportunity. 

There is political incompetence in the region and a lack of moral 

courage to make change. There is historical sectarianism that is in 

the region. 

But I am also suggesting that something has fundamentally 

changed about the United States’ role in that region in the last several years compared to what it has historically been, and I tried 

to point out to you those mistakes—those policy mistakes——

Ms. FRANKEL. Excuse me. How about the—how about going into 

Iraq in the first place? Do you think that was a good decision? 

General KEANE. I think the decision to go into Iraq based on the 

information that was provided this Congress, the U.N. thought it 

was the right decision. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Was that a good decision? 

General KEANE. Yes, at the time——

Ms. FRANKEL. Oh, it was? Okay. 

General KEANE [continuing]. Based on what we did. 

Ms. FRANKEL. All right. Well——

General KEANE. Now—no, wait a second. Let me—let me—let me 

finish the answer. If, given what we know now—we justified going 

into Iraq based on WMD. Given what we know now, would I make 

that same decision? No. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Okay. So—okay. Let me ask Dr. Wittes. Could you 

comment on my question? 

Ms. WITTES. I think that we have to look at all the sides of the 

equation here. There is no question in my mind that some American decisions have exacerbated the anxieties of our partners in the 

region. 

There is no question in my mind that the invasion of Iraq did 

help to crack up this regional order. But as I said, it was breaking 

down anyway. It definitely gave it a push. 

But I think the most important point I would make is that our 

regional partners are anxious anyway because the region that they 

knew, the status quo they counted on and befitted from is gone and 

it is never coming back, and they don’t know what is going to replace it. 

They don’t have a vision themselves for what they want to replace it and so right now they are mistrustful of one another’s motives. 

They are anxious about the balance of power, which they do perceive as turning against them because of Iran’s activities around 

the region and because of the rise of political Islam. 

They are deeply worried about the degree of violence and the 

spillover and the refugees and the implications for their stability. 

And yes, they have some anxieties about the U.S. role. 

But in that context, our role is going to be incredibly complicated 

and incredibly controversial almost no matter what we do. And so 

hewing to our own interests and being very transparent with our 

partners about what we are doing, what we are not going to do and 

why seems to me that would—that would be the best way to address the problem. 

Mr. JONES. Can I briefly answer or are we over time? I will be 

brief. 

55

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Please go ahead. 

Mr. JONES. I think when you look at, particularly since the rise—

the Arab uprisings, when you look, for example, at World Bank 

data, in the region—in the region this subcommittee deals with, 

you see a categorical decline across all major governance indicators. 

One factor that has contributed to what you have outlined is 

weakening governance across the region—across North Africa, East 

Africa and the Middle East. 

In that vacuum, from Libya through Yemen up into the Middle 

East, in that vacuum we now have a range of actors that have 

pushed into that vacuum sub-state actors—the Islamic State, alQaeda in a few locations. 

We have state actors like Iran. I think because of that situation 

this then puts the United States in a very important position. With 

the collapse—weakening of governance in a range of these cases 

and actors filling in, whether they are sub-state or state, what role 

does and should the United States play in filling in? That is diplomatically, economically and militarily. 

I think that is where—and that is really the question to ask 

based on the events over the last several years. But I think the 

data on this is actually pretty clear. We have got weakened—severely weakened governments. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Frankel. 

Mr. Meadows of North Carolina. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is refreshing to 

not only hear a diversity of answers but I can honestly say I followed each one of you, reading comments and work that you have 

done and continue to do in this particular issue. 

So my request of you is the balance of diplomacy versus more 

military intervention versus credibility because I think that the 

balance of those three elements I see a lack of credibility within the 

region right now in terms of if we say something do we really mean 

it. 

Are we going to be there like we have historically or is this a 

new era? How do we start to restore that, and I will start with you, 

Doctor. 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you. It is—it is a challenging question. I 

think that in many ways the anxieties right now in the region are 

about intentions and objectives, not about means, and I think that 

if we had a stronger dialogue and clearer common ground with our 

partners on what we together are trying to achieve then we can debate the means. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Do you think we know that? I mean, because here 

I am sitting in Congress and I am not sure what we are trying to 

achieve, if we really look at it. I know we want peace and everybody wants peace and it is really easy to say that. 

But if we look at it from a strateg or a tactical point of view, I 

am confused on what our objectives are, specifically with Syria—

you know, where our intel is less than it is in other parts of the 

region. Let us put it that way. 

So, I mean, can you clearly define what our objective or do you 

know at Brookings what our objective is or should be? 

Ms. WITTES. Well, I think what we have heard from the administration is a dual objective, which is to push back ISIS in Iraq and 

56

Syria and at the same time to build up a stronger opposition force 

that can get to at least a hurting stalemate in the conflict with 

Assad so that he then is willing to negotiate. At the end of the day, 

civil wars, you know, only end in a couple of ways—either one side 

vanquishes and exterminates or expels the other or they fight to 

the point where an external power can help, sometimes impose, 

sometimes negotiate a political solution and that is guaranteed by 

outside powers. That is how civil wars typically end. 

We wouldn’t want the first outcome so we should be driving for 

the second and I think that—you know, to the extent the administration has articulated a long-term vision that is its vision. 

The question is how do we get there. And one of the reasons I 

highlighted in my testimony the importance of ensuring that where 

we push back ISIS or where the rebels push back Assad we have 

something in place to replace it that is not extremist rule is because it helps us drive toward that solution. 

For example, a number of our partners have talked about the 

idea of establishing safe zones in northern Syria and areas where 

the rebels have liberated territory. 

What is happening in Idlib right now is that the rebels pushed, 

Assad’s forces fell back and now the regime is bombing from the 

air. 

So the remaining guys who were working for the Syrian Government and could be the kernel of a civil administration are fleeing 

like every other civilian in the area and that leaves these towns to 

the rebels—the extremists. So that is what we need to try and fix. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So let me—let me go back, because Dr. Jones 

mentioned we are having more foreign, and I believe it was you, 

Dr. Jones, that was talking about we have more foreign fighters’ 

intervention. And so when they are expelled from Syria they come 

back to the United States, to Europe, to wherever because part of 

the problem we have in Syria is that we had trained fighters that 

were in a neighboring country that actually came here. 

And so we call it ISIS today. It was actually known by a different 

name just a few months ago. And so if we expel them without really having some meaningful military intervention, do we not just 

transport the extremist problem to other parts of the world? 

Mr. JONES. I think the pattern of jihadist activity we have seen 

in Iraq and Libya, in Afghanistan and Pakistan is they will either 

go back home or they will go somewhere else and bring instability, 

unless they die on the battlefield. 

The issue then on the military tools is I think I would support 

Clausewitz on this—that they—the military and the political goals 

need to be intertwined, which is where I think with programs like 

Syrian train and equip they are not exactly meshed. If we are 

going to train Syrian rebels, Syrian rebels are predominantly focused on the Assad regime. So trying to get them then to focus on 

the Islamic State, in my view, means that the military and the political goals are not intertwined directly. 

And so I think that is where I would say we have got to focus 

on bringing those two together. 

But, look, there is a war going on so the military tool is a necessity. They are fighting. We can try to work the political establishment and we should work for deals in both countries. 

57

But there is a war going on. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I am out of time and I am going to yield back to 

the chairman. General Keane, can you explain to me why we had 

more missiles that were launched into Israel from Gaza than sorties that we have actually conducted within Syria at this point and 

expect a different result? 

I call it Operation Powder Puff with what we have done so far 

in Syria. Do we need to have more meaningful military intervention? And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very good. We will allow General Keane to 

answer, if he would like. 

General KEANE. Well, the Syrian strategy, from a military perspective, is a complicated one, to say the least. I mean, just thinking through it makes your head hurt. 

But, frankly, arming 5,000 Free Syrian Army each year—new recruits, not an organization—where are they going to go? The Free 

Syrian Army is down to several brigades. 

At one time it did make sense to strengthen that organization 

when it really had some robustness to it but we passed that opportunity. 

ISIS recruits on average, according to our intelligence services, 

1,000 a month and steady—still doing that. That is 12,000 new recruits that they are getting a year. So this is a fig leaf operation 

that has no connection to anything consequential. 

I think we should listen to our allies, which have been telling us 

that, look, we are all for dealing with ISIS but we cannot deal with 

ISIS while the Assad regime is still in power and it is using its 

military force throughout that country. 

Turkey tells us that. Saudi Arabia tells us that. All the bordering 

countries tell us that. So what do they want us to do? They 

would—in conjunction with them they would like us to establish 

no-fly zones, shut down the air power and free zones—stop the killing. 

What is the reason for that? To pursue a political solution. You 

are using military force, which is always intended to do to get a 

political solution. What is the political solution? Assad is undermined. 

Right now, his Alawite and Druze power is not what it used to 

be. There is no guarantee that this would happen but it is so far 

better than the status quo and the genocide that is taking place 

that it is worth a try. And then you get to some kind of coalition 

sharing. 

Are we concerned about post-Assad? Of course. Are we concerned 

about, as the doctor mentioned, Jabhat al-Nusra and the strength 

that it has gained in the last year? Of course, we are. 

All of that in some kind of political compromise and coalition 

sharing is a far better political answer than what we have now and 

you use limited military power or, in this case, the threat of it to 

get you moving in that direction. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Just a couple of things. You know, General Keane, you had 

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tion policy that has resulted in some of the instability that exist 

in Iraq and Syria. 

But it is not just exclusive to this administration. I think if you 

look back in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the de-Ba’athification 

order and the dissolution of the Iraqi army basically said to 

100,000 Sunni Iraqis that there is no place for you in Iraqi society 

and that formed the basis for the insurgency that we dealt with for 

most of the time that we were there, and I would argue that it was 

also the genesis of ISIS. 

The second issue is the panel seemed to be somewhat dismissive 

of the sectarian nature of the conflict in Iraq and in Syria, and I 

don’t think it can be dismissed at all. I mean, it amazes me and, 

General, you had made reference to Qasem Soleimani, who heads 

to Quds Forces in Iraq. 

I mean, he is not only a tangential player in what is going on 

in Iraq today and Syria—he is there physically. He is on the 

ground directing Shi’a militias to prop up the Shi’a government in 

Iraq and they are not doing that, you know, as a good will measure. 

They are doing that to impose their influence to ensure that in 

the aftermath of ISIS that Iraq remains Shi’a. And one could argue 

that ISIS basically wants their country back. They want to reestablish Sunni dominance in Iraq. 

And, you know, someone had said here, you know, it is a fair assertion that we should talk less to our enemies and more to our 

friends. We don’t really have friends in that part of the world. 

You know, there is the discussion when Americans are in the 

room and the discussion when Americans are not in the room. And 

typically, we count our friends as people whose interests are 

aligned with ours at any given time. 

But they are not really helping us, and it just seems that given 

everything that Americans have invested toward peace in Iraq—

$25 billion to build up—to help them build up an Iraqi army, a security force—$25 billion—in their first test they ran. 

They ran from a fighting force of less than 31,000. The Iraqi 

army at that time was estimated to be anywhere between 180,000 

and 240,000 fighters. And then we depend on our allies who have 

proven to be helpful to us, the peshmerga—good fighters, experienced fighters, pro-Western, helped us on the early stages of the 

Iraq war, 190 fighters—and Shi’a militias, who are controlled directly by Qasem Soleimani, an Iraqi. 

And, you know, we tried to do one thing and I think we could 

only expect to do one thing in Iraq and that is through our military 

involvement to create a place, a breathing space, within which 

Sunni, Shi’a and Kurds could develop a political contract, and they 

failed miserably. 

And the guy that we put in there, Nouri al-Maliki, we put him 

in there first—Iran put him in there the second time—you know, 

basically created another sectarian divide. So, you know, at least 

when Saddam Hussein was in there, there was an 8-year war between Iraq and Iran and they fought to a standstill. 

Khomeini had said that when the Revolutionary Guard came to 

him and said—and Mousavi came to him and said, we can’t win 

this thing, he basically stopped the war. 

59

But he said it was like drinking poison from a chalice. At least 

they were preoccupied with each other and expending the resources 

so that they weren’t directed toward us. 

Look, a lot of questions there. I apologize for it, but a lot of 

things have been said here. So I throw that out to you—all of you. 

General KEANE. Briefly, you know, I agree with a lot of what you 

just said. I would go further. This isn’t about politics for me—a 

Democratic administration, Republican administration. I am interested in policy. 

The White House policy dealing with Afghanistan and not building an effective security force after we deposed the regime was a 

policy mistake that led to the reemergence of the Taliban. 

As you pointed out, the decision to disband the army and not pull 

it back and use it as security and stability when looting led to general lawlessness was a mistake. However, having Saddam Hussein 

in our jail houses, and other generals, we know now that the regime began that insurgency. 

They planned it 6 months before execution and they conceptualized it actually 2 years prior. So they were going to do that regardless of what we did with the military. But nonetheless, it still was 

a policy mistake. 

The sectarian nature of the conflict, yes. I am not dismissive of 

it but this much I know. ISIS’ own stated objectives in their 400-

page document in color designs a caliphate in the region and they 

intend to dominate those countries. 

Most of those countries are in fact Sunnis, as they are. So they 

intend to dominate the countries in the region to establish their caliphate, not only Shi’a countries where they have begun but also 

Sunni countries, which means they would depose governments and 

kill people in support of those governments. 

I am not—and they take huge advantage of the sectarian conflict 

and manipulate it, you know, to their ends. And Qasem Soleimani, 

certainly an instrument of the Supreme Leader. Doesn’t work for 

anybody else but the Supreme Leader. He is carrying out his regional objectives, which are largely geopolitical. 

What they want in Iraq, in my judgment, is a weak government 

but stable, aligned with Iran and not aligned with the United 

States. 

That is their objective and I think they are working toward that 

end, and I know we are sort of out of time here. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Higgins. 

I am just going to ask a few more questions, if I might. Mr. 

Jones, in your testimony both written and oral you said that we 

should consider pausing the Syria and Iran train program until we 

get a clear explanation of our strategy and long-term goals. 

The administration has said that it wants the program to only 

be for defensive purposes against ISIL. Yet, these forces consider 

Assad to be their number-one enemy, and I will ask the panelists 

or just Dr. Jones, what do you believe should be the mission of the 

train and equip and program both in Syria and in Iraq? 

Should they be offensive? Should they be defensive? How can we 

use these programs to help bring stability to the region? 

Mr. JONES. That is an excellent question, or excellent series of 

questions. My own experience in being involved in training proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:17 Jun 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\043015\94389 SHIRL
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grams overseas is that one can’t train only for offensive or defensive purposes. 

You can’t control, like joysticks, fighters when they go into the 

field. So if they are trained for primarily defensive purposes, when 

they actually go into combat they are going to use both skill set—

the skill sets for offensive and defensive purposes. 

I think that is the general reality. My primary focus on the train 

and equip program, though, is to meld together a training program 

with a political end state in Syria and so if we are going to train 

Syrian rebels, if that is—if that makes political sense and then 

they have to be designed toward dealing with the biggest political 

problem in Syria right now, which is the Assad regime. 

But if you are going to train then they have to be trained sufficiently, integrated with other states in the region including the Jordanians to pursue operations on the ground in—with the long-term 

goal of a political end goal and I think that is the end of the Assad 

regime. 

So what I would like to see is the matching of those and, again, 

I would just highlight, you know, there are at least two other challenges I think there are with the program. 

One is there is no follow-on force once these people hit the 

ground. It makes it very difficult to see what they are doing, to impact what they are doing on the ground. 

The second issue is that in general they—that it makes it very 

difficult—if you are not there it makes it difficult to assess what 

they are doing, how they are doing. You really need people on the 

ground to be about to assess that and, again, this really is special 

operations skill set or an intelligence one with organizations like 

the CIA. 

So I think if we are to do this, those are the kinds of forces I 

would strongly consider. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. General Keane. 

General KEANE. The training program in Syria makes no sense 

to me whatsoever and I don’t think we should be doing it. It is a 

fig leaf because 5,000 new recruits this year are not consequential 

to dealing with ISIS and that is the stated purpose of doing it. 

They are supposed to join a Free Syrian Army, which is in fact 

fighting the regime and not fighting ISIS. The only time the training program will make any sense is when we have a political solution in Syria and ISIS is still there and we have to deal with it. 

Then it makes some sense now to put together a training force. 

Now we would train not—and we would put—I think it would be 

advisable to put some advisors on the ground as well. That makes 

sense because now you have got a stable political situation. The regime is not pounding its people anymore or the opposition force. 

In Iraq, the problem with the train and assist mission it is just—

Madam Chairman, it is just so extraordinarily inadequate. 

We have an 18-division force in Iraq that we began with. We are 

training nine Iraqi brigades and three peshmerga brigades. No advisors will go forward with those units to fight, no forward air controllers forward with those units. We need a few thousand advisors 

training considerably more people, compress the time frame and 

then let some of those trainers as advisors go forward and follow 

with the unit. 

61

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And that was going to be general——

General KEANE. So it is inadequate. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. My follow-up question, which was what is 

your assessment of the Iraqi security forces capability. But you just 

answered that. 

But you had testified that we are taking less than half measures 

to assist the Iraqi security forces, that we are providing insufficient 

arms to the Kurds and we have no credible plan to defeat ISIL. 

I will ask you, do you believe that the current government in 

Baghdad, that is certainly a breath of fresh air compared to the 

previous one, can work cooperatively with the Kurds and provide 

them military hardware? 

General KEANE. Yes, and that is a great question and you—I 

think you probably know the answer here. It is pretty frustrating 

what is unfolding. We want to assist the Sunni tribes, we want to 

assist the Kurds and the Iraqi Government is constipating that 

process. And I know there is a thought that we should find a mechanism to go around the government. 

Look, this government is an improvement and much of the success in Iraq is dependent on their ability to politically be inclusive, 

particularly with the Sunni tribes and with the Kurds. 

The advisors and the training program and the Sunni tribes is 

inadequate. It is not going to get us there. The arms program is 

inadequate because they are not reaching them. 

The same thing with the Kurds. The Kurds have skill and they 

have will, but they need better weapons and that is not getting 

there either. 

More pressure needs to be put on—I would rather go through the 

government and make that happen than go around the government 

and find another program to do it. We have got to move the government in the right direction to do that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General Keane, if the train and equip mission is just a fig leaf, 

if it is not going to accomplish what needs to be done in Syria, 

which is, I think what you just said—you just described the problems in Iraq—so what is—how do we—how do we accomplish it? 

It would start with Syria, and if in Syria ultimately the real solution involves Assad’s departure then, for you and Dr. Wittes, how 

do we—how does that happen? 

Who can put pressure on Assad if at this point it is not us and, 

obviously, it is not—it appears that it is not the Russians? 

General KEANE. Well, what I have suggested is that, clearly, we 

can use the military instrument here to try to get a political solution. 

We should take the counsel of our allies in the region—Turkey, 

Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan—and what their objective is, clearly, 

they recognize ISIS as a major threat to them. 

But they understand that to pursue ISIS while the Assad regime 

has all of its military power and is pounding opposition forces and 

killing its own people makes no sense. We have got to get Assad 

out of there. 

62

The way to do that—and there is no perfect solution here. But 

the status quo, I think, is unacceptable, given the genocide that is 

taking place. 

So what you do is you put in, and this is what our allies would 

like to do and I agree with them, no-fly zones—if Assad contested 

then we would shut his air power down and we have the capability 

to do that, I don’t think he would—and buffer zones to stop the 

genocide. 

The Alawites and the Druze right now have less support for 

Assad than they have had through these 4 years. I think some kind 

of political solution with Assad gone is in the offing. 

The opposition will not entertain anything with Assad there. So 

I would focus on that political solution and modest introduction of 

military threat and possible capability to do that. That allows you 

then to focus on ISIS. 

ISIS cannot be driven out of Syria, Congressman Deutch, without 

an effective ground force. Where is that going to come from? It is 

not going to be the 5,000 recruits that we are training. 

It has to be largely provided by the nations in the region. They 

have to step up and do that. They will not do that with Assad 

there. 

So once we get a political solution then we can put together some 

kind of an effective ground force to deal with ISIS. Otherwise, the 

policy we have now is ISIS just continues. 

Mr. DEUTCH. All right. Great. 

So, Dr. Wittes, how do we get that political solution? 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you. Well, I think what General Keane is 

suggesting is that, in essence, we need to reverse the sequencing 

that the administration has put forward. 

They have said ISIS is the first priority and Assad is the second, 

and the General would have it the other way around. I actually 

think that the problem right now on the ground is that those who 

are gaining influence and power are gaining it because of battlefield success. 

They are not gaining it because they are protecting people. They 

are not gaining it because they are providing services. They are not 

gaining it because they are providing justice. 

And ISIS is saying that it is offering a governing model but what 

it is really offering is, we can win, and the extremist rebels on the 

ground that are doing the business in Idlib right now are gaining 

strength because they are showing that they can win. 

What we want to do is reverse that dynamic. We want to show 

that if you can demonstrate the ability to hold territory, to govern 

people, to provide security and justice that that brings benefits. 

And in order to do that, I think safe zones are a piece of the puzzle definitely worth considering, and our allies are pushing that, 

but it would require a commitment that we so far have been unwilling to make. 

Now, our allies have just been conducting air operations over 

Yemen and they have, you know, been part of the anti-ISIS campaign in there as well. 

So I think it is worth asking the question whether policing those 

safe zones is something they might be willing to take on or at least 

be the lead on in terms of threatened use of force. 

63

But we have also got to ensure that resources flow to these rebelheld areas in a way that keeps civilians there instead of having 

them flee and worsen the refugee problem and allows rebel forces 

who actually want to help govern Syria to begin to govern and protect Syrian people. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Madam Chair, can I ask one last question? 

So we know—we know that the American people will be supportive of efforts to push back ISIS. The horrific beheadings, I 

think, shine a light on the awful brutality of what they do and the 

killing of Americans is, I think, a moment of awakening for Americans. We understand that. 

I think there is broad awareness of the threats that—the concerns that we have about Iran and the Iranian threat and their 

support of not just propping up Assad but the way that they meddle and disrupt in the region and their support of terror. 

But I would just like—before we go I would just like to ask this 

question. With now a quarter of a million or so Syrians having 

died, do we—is there a place in our foreign policy for human rights 

anymore? Do we care? Do you think the American people care? 

General KEANE. I definitely think so. I mean, I think the problem 

we have had here—you know, over at the Institute for the Study 

of War we get—we keep track of the genocide. We have got just 

these unbelievably graphic pictures of the results of starvation 

campaigns, attacking bakeries, 62 percent of the hospitals being 

destroyed, close to 70 percent of the ambulances—a systematic 

methodology that the Assad regime has used on killing his people. 

It is just—it is outrageous. But very little of that is in the domain of the American people. I will tell you that—and I have to 

protect confidentiality here—I have dealt with some relatively senior people in the administration who had no level of detail of what 

this really was until I put photographs in front of them and showed 

them this systematic methodological campaign to do this. 

It is much more than just barrel bombing. And so I think that 

is part of it. I mean, there is—I think the American people in general have the sense something bad is going on in Syria and people 

are being killed but they don’t have a sense of what that really is. 

I will—I always believe fundamentally that this country has and 

will continue to have an interest in human suffering in the world. 

Doesn’t mean we can solve all of it. I am not suggesting that. 

But I do believe that that is—and it is part of the President’s policy dealing with ISIS—it is one of his tenets of it is humanitarian 

assistance. 

Mr. DEUTCH. General Keane, I believe you are right. And Madam 

Chairman, we had a witness here at one of our previous hearings, 

if you recall, who was a physician—a Syrian-American physician—

who came—went to provide medical assistance in Syria and came 

here and told us about not—he didn’t have the evidence of systematic killing. 

All he could tell us about was standing out in a school yard and 

looking up and seeing a black dot in the sky and knowing that it 

was a helicopter, and then seeing two more black dots come out 

and knowing that they were barrel bombs and knowing that they 

were being dropped and having no idea where they were going to 

land but the sole purpose of those dots as they fell and grew larger 

64

and ultimately hit the ground was to kill as many people as possible. 

General Keane, I believe you. I believe that we still think that 

human rights matter and that a regime that brutally kills over 

200,000 people cannot be allowed to stand, and I think it is an important reminder. I am heartened by what you said. 

And I hate to end this hearing on that note. Your testimony has 

been—the three of you—has been really helpful to us. But I was 

at a meeting with our U.N. ambassador, who raised a term—this 

was a while ago, actually—who raised the term, a professional 

term, that I never heard before called psychic numbing. 

We can’t afford, as a country, to allow psychic numbing to overcome the way we view the tragic deaths of thousands and thousands of people at the hands of a brutal dictator. We can’t allow 

it. It is not who we are and I appreciate speaking here. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Amen. Thank you. Yes, I remember the use 

of that phrase tragic numbing and it is a tragedy. 

Mr. Connolly, thank you so much for being kind enough to give 

up your time. But I wanted to recognize you so that you could say 

a few words before we break, and I know that we have votes on 

the floor. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Forgive me for being late—been a harried morning. Obviously, a 

lot more to go into in terms of this subject area. I was informed 

that General Keane perhaps made the suggestion that we were deliberately holding back in support of Syria freedom fighters or insurgents somehow to perhaps please Iran. 

I have never seen any evidence of that. I think we are holding 

back because we are not entirely sure which side to support and 

there isn’t a great secular middle that is out there fighting the 

Assad regime. 

But that is worthy of further examination and, certainly, I will 

study your testimony very closely. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. 

Deutch. 

I thank the panelists for your excellent testimony. You have 

given us a lot to chew on, a lot to ponder on, a lot to worry about. 

Thank you so much, and with that the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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