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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

OSSIE LEE SLAUGHTER, )

)

Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. C05-1693-JCC-MJB

)

v. ) REPORT AND

) RECOMMENDATION

KING COUNTY CORRECTIONAL )

FACILITY/RJC (D.A.J.D.) MEDICAL )

CENTER et al., )

)

Defendants. )

_________________________________ )

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY CONCLUSION

This action is one of three pro se civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that

Plaintiff has pending in this Court. See also Case Nos. C05-1691and C05-1692. Now

before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to receive four hours out of cell and direct phone

access to outside lines (Dkt. # 24), which this Court construes as a motion for

preliminary injunctive relief. The motion references all three of Plaintiff’s § 1983 cases

in its caption and was filed in each case. A response in opposition to the motion was

filed under C05-1691, which included the case numbers of Plaintiff’s three § 1983

actions in its caption and introductory objection, with the name of Defendants’ counsel

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John W. Cobb in the signature block. See C05-1691-JCC, Dkt. #37 (Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunction). This Court, having reviewed plaintiff’s motion, the

opposition thereto, and the balance of the record, concludes that plaintiff’s motion for

preliminary injunctive relief should be denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, alleges in his amended §1983 complaint that

Defendants caused him to contract tuberculosis (“TB”) by negligently allowing another

inmate known to be infected with TB to be in the waiting room of the RJC medical clinic

at the same time Plaintiff was waiting there for a routine visit. Dkt. #13. Plaintiff

contends that Defendants failure to protect him from that exposure to TB constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment, as well as loss of life and liberty, in violation of the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 4.

In the current motion, Plaintiff claims that during more than two years as a

pretrial detainee, he has been subjected to violations of his rights, filed numerous

grievances to no avail, and been reclassified to a higher, more restrictive custody level

(administrative segregation maximum), such that he cannot adequately and efficiently

investigate his case. Dkt. #36 at 2. 

Defendants indicate that Plaintiff has been placed in a cell in the administrative

segregation unit on numerous occasions in the last three years because of his continuous

disrupting and challenging behavior. See C05-1691-JCC, Dkt. #37 at 2 (Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunction). Defendants state that Plaintiff has been infracted a

total of 31 times and has been a part of multiple fights with other inmates. Id. They

further assert that Plaintiff has been given the opportunity to transition into the general

population from Administrative Segregation through the Transitional Behavior

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

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Management Unit (TBMU) program, a short term program which receives additional

privileges as incentive to progress to general population housing and compliance with

facility rules. Id. However, Plaintiff was returned to Administrative Segregation after

he violated his behavior contract under TBMU on May 1, 2006, by fighting with another

inmate in that inmate’s cell. Defendants contend that giving Plaintiff extra time out of

his cell would cause security problems and impact the rights of other inmates to have

time out of their cells. Id.

DISCUSSION

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must fulfill one of two standards, the

“traditional” or the “alternative.” Cassim v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The traditional equitable criteria for granting a preliminary injunction are “(1) a strong

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to the

plaintiffs if the injunctive relief is not granted; (3) a balance of hardship favoring the

plaintiffs; and (4) advancement of the public interest.” Mayweather v. Newland, 258

F.3d 930, 938 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Textile Unltd., Inc. v. ABMH & Co., Inc., 240

F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2001)). Under the alternative standard, the moving party may

meet its burden by demonstrating either (1) a combination of probable success and the

possibility of irreparable injury or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in its favor. 

The standards “are not discrete tests, but are instead ‘outer reaches of a single

continuum.’” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Chalk v. United

States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1988)). To obtain injunctive relief under

either standard the moving party must demonstrate exposure to irreparable harm absent

the requested judicial intervention. Caribbean Marine Service Co. v. Baldridge, 844

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F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury

sufficient to warrant granting preliminary relief. Id. Rather, a plaintiff must

demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive

relief. Id. (emphasis in original).

The Ninth Circuit has identified an additional factor which must be considered

where a party seeks a mandatory injunction as opposed to a prohibitory injunction. See 

Stanley v. University of Southern California, 13 F.3d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1994). In

Stanley, the court explained that “[a] mandatory injunction goes well beyond simply

maintaining the status quo pendente lite and is particularly disfavored.” Id. at 1320

(internal quotations and citations omitted). When a mandatory preliminary injunction is

requested, the district court should deny such relief unless the facts and law clearly favor

the moving party. Id.

 Here, Plaintiff contends that under his administrative segregation maximum

classification, he is only allowed one (1) hour out of his cell a day, which provides only

enough time for the following: one to two (15-minute) calls on the provided phone,

which records all calls; a quick 10-minute shower; 15 minutes of exercise; and a 10-15

minute shave. Dkt. 36 at 3. He seeks relief in the form of an order compelling

defendants to give him four hours out of his cell, and direct phone access to outside lines

where he can contact witnesses to prove the merits of his case. Plaintiff argues that if he

continues to be denied the requested time out of his cell and phone access, it is

extremely possible that his civil complaints will be subjected to summary judgment in

favor of the defendants.

//

//

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Defendants respond that Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief

should be denied because Plaintiff’s motion does not sufficiently plead facts that

demonstrate there is a significant threat of irreparable injury. Additionally, Defendants

argue that: (1) no liberty interest is infringed by classifying Plaintiff in administrative

segregation, (2) Plaintiff is receiving adequate time to conduct research for his civil

cases, and 

(3) the jail has security and penological interests in prohibiting inmates classified to

administrative segregation from being out of their cells more than one hour.

 First, this Court concludes that Plaintiff is seeking a mandatory preliminary

injunction because an order compelling Defendants to give Plaintiff the requested

amount of time out of his cell and direct phone access to outside lines would not

maintain the status quo. Instead, it would force Defendants to provide relief to Plaintiff

to which they argue he is not entitled based on his current classification. Accordingly,

because he seeks mandatory preliminary relief, Plaintiff’s request is therefore subject to

a higher degree of scrutiny because such relief is disfavored under the law of this circuit. 

Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979).

Next, this Court considers whether the facts and law clearly favor granting

Plaintiff the relief requested. In his underlying § 1983 action, Plaintiff claims violation

of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments due to Defendants’ alleged failure to provide

safe and sanitary conditions in the RJC medical clinic. “[T]he Eighth Amendment’s ban

of cruel and unusual punishment prohibits conditions of confinement that pose

unreasonable threats to inmates’ health. McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1507

(9th Cir. 1991). To state a claim of cruel and unusual punishment, however, a prisoner

must demonstrate that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the allegedly

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unconstitutional prison conditions. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991). A

prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an

inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he

must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970,

128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).

Here, Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief alleges no facts tending to establish a

likelihood of success on his merits of claim. In fact, Plaintiff’s motion does not

specifically mention his underlying claim; instead, he simply states that his motion is

based on the likelihood to further investigate his case with success. Further, Plaintiff’s

amended § 1983 complaint contains no facts demonstrating that Defendants were

actually aware that the other inmate in the clinic waiting room with Plaintiff had TB, or

that the degree of exposure that occurred while the two inmates were in the waiting room

was sufficient to create an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health. Therefore, the

Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on

the merits of his claim.

 Additionally, Plaintiff’s has failed to demonstrate the possibility of irreparable

injury if his request for injunctive relief is not granted. Plaintiff argues that it is possible

that his civil complaints will be subjected to summary judgment in favor of defendants if

he is denied the requested relief. However, Plaintiff’s argument is speculative in that no

summary judgment motion has been filed this case. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument of

possible harm does not rise to the level of “immediate threatened injury” that is required

to obtain a preliminary injunction.

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//

Moreover, while pretrial detainees have a substantive due process right against

restrictions that amount to punishment, Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th

Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted), there is no constitutional infringement if

restrictions imposed on pretrial detainees are “but an incident of some other legitimate

government purpose,” Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60

L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). In such a circumstance, governmental restrictions are permissible. 

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).

Here, Defendants have shown a sufficient basis for classifying Plaintiff in

administrative segregation based on his history of disruptive behavior and fighting. 

Further, Defendants have identified the safety of officers and other inmates as a

legitimate government purpose for limiting the amount of time that inmates, classified to

administrative segregation, can be out of their cells. See e.g,, Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d

1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (jail security and rehabilitation are legitimate penological

interests); Hewitt v Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983), overruled in part by Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1985) ( safety of inmates is legitimate penological interest).

Defendants also indicate that Plaintiff has received up to two hours weekly at the

Westlaw workstation to conduct legal research that beginning June 19, 2006, Plaintiff

was given up to four hours on the Westlaw workstation, and that he has access to a

printer from which he can print the results of his research sessions. Plaintiff has offered

no arguments to refute these facts. Therefore, the undersigned concludes that the

restrictions on Plaintiff’ time outside his cell and his phone access do not constitute

punishment and do not significantly hamper his ability to investigate his case.

//

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//

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for order

to receive four hours out of cell and direct access to outside phone lines (Dkt. #24) be

denied. A proposed Order accompanies this Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 10th day of August, 2006.

AMONICA J. BENTON

United States Magistrate Judge

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