08-4211-cr (L)

United States v. Nadirashvili (Solomonyan)

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

3 August Term, 2010

4 (Argued: February 9, 2011 Decided: August 23, 2011)

5 Docket Nos. 08-4211-cr(L), 09-0074-cr(CON), 09-0610-cr(CON), 

6 09-1493-cr(CON), 09-3266-cr(CON), 09-3801-cr(CON)

7

8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

10

11 Appellee,

12

13 v.

14

15 NIKOLAI NADIRASHVILI, also known as Nikoloz Nadirashvili, also

16 known as Nikush, LEVAN CHVELIDZE, DIMITRIY VOROBEYCHIK, IOSEB

17 KHARABADZE, also known as Soso, CHRISTIAAN DEWET SPIES, also

18 known as David, and ARTUR SOLOMONYAN, also known as Alex,

19

20 Defendants-Appellants,

21

22 JOSEPH COLPANI, also known as Joe, MICHAEL GUY DEMARE, also known

23 as Michel, ARMEN RAZMIK BARSEGHYAN, SPARTAK VAHAGN YERIBEKYAN,

24 LEVON SOLOMONYAN, ALLAH MCQUEEN, RAJAB CHAVIS, also known as

25 Jabs, also known as Keith Chavis, GAREGIN GASPARYAN, also known

26 as Garik, MICHAEL JIMENEZ, also known as Mike, NIEMAN MYLES, also

27 known as Luis, WILLIAM JESUS THOMAS, VAKHTANG MACHITIDZE, TIGRAN

28 GEVORGYAN, also known as Tiko, ARMAND ABRAMIAN, also known as

29 Armo,

30

31 Defendants. 32

33 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

34 B e f o r e: WINTER, POOLER, and HALL, Circuit Judges.

35 Appeals by six defendants from a conviction after a jury

36 trial in the United States District Court for the Southern

1
1 District of New York (Richard J. Holwell, Judge) for a variety of

2 weapons trafficking offenses. Appellants challenge, inter alia,

3 the sufficiency of the evidence underlying their convictions, the

4 constitutionality of 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii) as applied to

5 one appellant, and the district court’s Sentencing Guidelines

6 calculation for another appellant. We find that the district

7 court used the wrong standard in applying certain offense level

8 enhancements under Section 2K2.1(b) of the Federal Sentencing

9 Guidelines during one appellant’s offense level calculation. We

10 therefore vacate that appellant’s sentence and remand for

11 resentencing. We affirm in all other respects. 

12 HERALD PRICE FAHRINGER (Erica T.

13 Dubno, Nicole Neckles, on the

14 brief), Fahringer & Dubno, New

15 York, New York, for Defendant16 Appellant Nadirashvili. 17

18 Susan V. Tipograph, Thomas Eddy,

19 New York, New York, for Defendant20 Appellant Chvelidze. 21

22 KELLY J. SHARKEY, Brooklyn, New

23 York, for Defendant-Appellant

24 Vorobeychik.

25

26 JAMES E. NEUMAN, New York, New

27 York, for Defendant-Appellant

28 Kharabadze.

29

30 JOHN BURKE, Brooklyn, New York, for

31 Defendant-Appellant Spies.

32

33 SETH GINSBERG (Louis V. Fasulo,

34 Fasulo, Shalley, and DiMaggio, New

35 York, New York, on the brief), New

36 York, New York, for Defendant37 Appellant Solomonyan.

38

2
1 DAVID B. MASSEY, Assistant United

2 States Attorney (Preet Bharara,

3 United States Attorney, on the

4 brief, Matthew L. Schwartz and

5 Andrew L. Fish, of counsel), United

6 States Attorney’s Office for the

7 Southern District of New York, New

8 York, for Appellee.

9

10 WINTER, Circuit Judge: 

11 Nikolai Nadirashvili, Levan Chvelidze, Dimitriy Vorobeychik,

12 Ioseb Kharabadze, Christiaan Dewet Spies, and Artur Solomonyan

13 appeal from their convictions after a jury trial before Judge

14 Holwell. Appellants were convicted of a variety of weapons

15 trafficking offenses, described in greater detail below. These

16 appeals followed.

17 We address three of the many issues raised by appellants,

18 finding, after due consideration, their remaining arguments to

19 lack merit. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support

20 all of the convictions and reject a vagueness-as-applied argument

21 raised by Kharabadze. However, the district court employed the

22 wrong standard of proof at sentencing in imposing increases to

23 Solomonyan’s base offense level under Section 2K2.1(b)(1)(E) and

24 (b)(3)(A) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. We therefore

25 vacate Solomonyan’s sentence and remand for resentencing. 

26 Otherwise, we affirm.

27 BACKGROUND

28 a) The Evidence

29 Because this is an appeal from a jury trial, we briefly

3
1 describe the evidence in the light most favorable to the

2 government. See United States v. Gomez, 580 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir.

3 2009). 

4 From February 2004 until March 2005, the government

5 conducted an investigation into a suspected weapons trafficking

6 ring with the aid of confidential source Kelly Davis. Davis

7 posed as a middleman for buyers of firearms and explosives while

8 cooperating with the government. Upon the government’s

9 direction, David resumed prior conversations with Spies about

10 Spies’ efforts to obtain something “Russian made” for Davis.

11 Spies put Davis in touch with Solomonyan, who in turn contacted

12 Kharabadze. Using court-authorized wiretaps, the government

13 recorded calls between Solomonyan and Kharabadze in which

14 Kharabadze said, “[e]verything has been put on hold" because

15 “government forces . . . relocated [to the Russian side] and

16 there’s no making a deal with them.” Solomonyan reported back to

17 Spies about the "obstacles." A few days later, however,

18 Solomonyan told Spies he was dealing with "very serious people"

19 and that the deal was "ninety-nine point nine percent."

20 In May 2004, Davis, Spies, and Solomonyan discussed how to

21 obtain and ship "grenades," "warheads," "missiles," and

22 "launchers," and Solomonyan repeatedly asked Davis to create an

23 order list. The following month, Solomonyan asked Kharabadze to

24 create a price list because he “ha[d] to show [the buyer]

25 something real.” Kharabadze agreed to create the list and told

4
1 Solomonyan he could pick it up the following morning. The next

2 day, before leaving to attend a meeting with Davis and Spies,

3 Solomonyan visited Kharabadze’s apartment building for

4 approximately an hour. At the meeting with Davis and Spies,

5 Solomonyan wrote something on a piece of paper, handed it to

6 Davis, and told him to memorize it. In addition to discussing

7 the weapons on the list, Solomonyan also told Davis that he had

8 "overstayed" his visa and asked whether Davis could help. The

9 meeting was resumed two days later, when the three discussed

10 weapons, dimensions, shipping options, and prices in some detail.

11 Later that month, Solomonyan spoke over the phone with a man

12 named Artur Barseghyan about “exercises taking place [in

13 Leninakan, Armenia]” in which "everything that Georgia owned was

14 dumped there. And it's being actively taken out of there." Six

15 months later, in December 2004, Solomonyan spoke to Armen

16 Baregamyan, who was in Azerbaijan, about "merchandise" that would

17 go from Leninakan to Georgia to the United States. In January

18 2005, Davis, at the direction of the FBI, told Solomonyan and

19 Spies that he was "under a lot of pressure" and that the "time

20 limit is two weeks." He also said that he had green cards for

21 Solomonyan and Spies, but could not deliver them until he got the

22 "products." 

23 Over the following two weeks, Solomonyan made contact with a

24 man in Armenia and managed to obtain digital photographs by email

25 of various weapons that were allegedly available, including a

5
1 mortar launcher, anti-tank gun, and several missile launchers. 

2 At a meeting in March 2005, Solomonyan showed these photos to

3 Davis, and the FBI arrested Solomonyan and Spies.

4 As the events above were unfolding, the government

5 instructed Davis to also try to obtain machine guns and

6 semi-automatic rifles already in the United States. In July

7 2004, Solomonyan and Spies spoke about buying new and used

8 "apartments," which the government contended was code for machine

9 guns. On September 11, 2004, Davis gave money to Solomonyan to

10 purchase guns. The same day, Solomonyan called Nadirashvili to

11 ask whether Nadirashvili knew where he could purchase “cars . . .

12 with automatic transmission[s].” Solomonyan explained that he

13 had “been talking to a dealer for a week now” and that a "man

14 came today, gave me the money," but that the dealer had vanished

15 at the last minute. Nadirashvili said, "I understand what you

16 are talking about," and told Solomonyan he would call Chvelidze

17 to see if he could arrange anything. Nadirashvili immediately

18 called Chvelidze. After some initial confusion during which time

19 Chvelidze thought Nadirashvili was talking about actual cars,

20 Chvelidze caught on and told Nadirashvili that he could not get

21 them that day, but to "[t]ell me if you want to place an order or

22 something." Nadirashvili relayed this information to Solomonyan. 

23 Solomonyan called Chvelidze the following day to verify that

24 Nadirashvili "told [Chvelidze] about the cars." Chvelidze

25 confirmed this, and said he would try to help. Solomonyan also

6
1 spoke to Nadirashvili again, who said he would "walk around

2 Brighton" to "see if there's anything there." Neither

3 Nadirashvili nor Chvelidze ultimately obtained any firearms for

4 Solomonyan. 

5 Solomonyan also spoke with Vorobeychik on September 12. 

6 Vorobeychik informed Solomonyan that he had told a third party,

7 "[Solomonyan] will call you. Don't be afraid of what he's going

8 to talk to you about." Solomonyan said, “I'll call him now," and

9 immediately placed a phone call to Allah McQueen. There was some

10 confusion while Solomonyan tried to get McQueen to understand

11 what he meant by "big trucks with . . . fully automatic

12 transmission." However, after Solomonyan said, "Listen, of

13 course I am not talking about vehicles," McQueen said he

14 understood what they were talking about. Over the next week,

15 Solomonyan and McQueen had a number of phone conversations in

16 which they spoke about setting up a deal involving "dogs,"

17 "puppies," an "AK," "dog food," and "an Israeli," which the

18 government argued was code. On September 30, Vorobeychik asked

19 Solomonyan, "[c]an they really get it?" and Solomonyan responded,

20 "Well, I only need two pieces." Vorobeychik later told law

21 enforcement agents that "they" referred to McQueen. In a

22 conversation in October, Vorobeychik and Solomonyan discussed the

23 possibility of "build[ing] the empire" by dealing directly with

24 McQueen. McQueen ultimately provided Solomonyan and Spies with

25 three firearms. Solomonyan and Spies also obtained five

7
1 additional firearms, apparently without Vorobeychik's assistance.

2 b) The Verdict and Sentencing

3 The jury convicted Solomonyan, Spies, and Kharabadze of

4 engaging in a conspiracy to traffic in foreign defense articles,

5 in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (c) and 18

6 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4), and of trafficking in foreign defense

7 articles (or aiding and abetting thereof), in violation of 22

8 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (c). Solomonyan, Spies,

9 Vorobeychik, Nadirashvili, and Chvelidze were convicted of

10 engaging in a domestic firearms trafficking conspiracy, in

11 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and (o), of firearms

12 trafficking (or aiding and abetting thereof), in violation of 18

13 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and of interstate firearms trafficking (or

14 aiding and abetting thereof), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(n). 

15 Solomonyan and Spies were also convicted of illegal transfer and

16 possession of a machine gun (or aiding and abetting thereof), in

17 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), and being illegal aliens in

18 possession of a firearm (or aiding and abetting thereof), in

19 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). The district court sentenced

20 appellants as follows: Nadirashvili to 41 months’ imprisonment;

21 Chvelidze to 34 months’ imprisonment; Vorobeychik to 33 months’

22 imprisonment; Kharabadze to 108 months’ imprisonment; Spies to

23 240 months’ imprisonment; and Solomonyan to 264 months’

24 imprisonment. In calculating Solomonyan’s base offense level,

25 the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that two

8
1 offense level increases applied pursuant to Section 2K2.1(b) of

2 the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: a 15-point increase for a

3 conspiracy involving a destructive device, and a 10-point

4 increase for a conspiracy involving at least 200 firearms.

5 DISCUSSION

6 Appellants raise a variety of issues on appeal. We

7 expressly address only three of these arguments. 

8 a) Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Domestic Firearms

9 Trafficking

10 Appellants Nadirashvili, Chvelidze, and Vorobeychik

11 challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying their

12 convictions for aiding and abetting domestic firearms trafficking

13 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2)(A). Vorobeychik argues

14 that although he put Solomonyan in touch with McQueen, through

15 whom Solomonyan ultimately obtained three firearms, he did not

16 knowingly assist in firearms trafficking because he did not know

17 why Solomonyan wanted an introduction to McQueen. Nadirashvili

18 and Chvelidze both argue that although they knew Solomonyan was

19 trying to engage in one specific weapons transaction, they were

20 unaware that he was engaged in a business of dealing in firearms

21 as required under the statute. They also argue that the evidence

22 did not demonstrate their intent to assist Solomonyan in

23 obtaining weapons. Solomonyan and Spies join in the sufficiency

24 challenges without making individualized arguments. 

25 1) Firearms Trafficking Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A)

9
1 Section 922(a)(1)(A) makes it illegal for "any person . . .

2 except a . . . licensed dealer, to engage in the business of 

3 . . . dealing in firearms, or in the course of such business to

4 ship, transport, or receive any firearm in interstate or foreign

5 commerce." A person is "engaged in the business" of dealing in

6 firearms when he "devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing

7 in firearms as a regular course of trade or business with the

8 principal objective of livelihood and profit through the

9 repetitive purchase and resale of firearms, but such term shall

10 not include a person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or

11 purchases of firearms for the enhancement of a personal

12 collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part of his

13 personal collection of firearms." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C). We

14 have held that: 

15 [t]he government need not prove that dealing

16 in firearms was the defendant's primary

17 business. Nor is there a ‘magic number’ of

18 sales that need be specifically proven. 

19 Rather, the statute reaches those who hold

20 themselves out as a source of firearms. 

21 Consequently, the government need only prove

22 that the defendant has guns on hand or is

23 ready and able to procure them for the

24 purpose of selling them from [time] to time

25 to such persons as might be accepted as

26 customers.

27

28 United States v. Carter, 801 F.2d 78, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1986)

29 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

30 2) Application

31 “Although we review a claim of insufficient evidence de

10
1 novo, a defendant challenging his verdict on sufficiency grounds

2 bears a heavy burden. We must uphold the jury's verdict if we

3 find that any rational trier of fact could have found the

4 essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

5 United States v. Hardwick, 523 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2008)

6 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (emphasis in

7 original). We “view the evidence, whether direct or

8 circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the government”

9 and “may not substitute our own determinations of credibility or

10 relative weight of the evidence for that of the jury.” Id.

11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

12 The sufficiency challenges brought by Solomonyan and Spies

13 may be quickly resolved. There was evidence that they not only

14 corresponded with each other, as well as with numerous contacts,

15 in their attempts to obtain firearms for Davis, but also

16 succeeded in procuring eight guns. This evidence was easily

17 sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

18 Solomonyan and Spies violated Section 922(a)(1)(A) by unlawfully

19 engaging in the business of dealing in firearms. 

20 Vorobeychik’s challenge is also unfounded. Although he

21 claims to have been in the dark as to Solomonyan’s true

22 intentions, the government presented ample evidence to allow the

23 jury to conclude that Vorobeychik knowingly aided and abetted

24 Solomonyan in engaging in a business of dealing in firearms. 

25 Transcripts of recorded telephone conversations reveal that

11
1 Vorobeychik put Solomonyan in touch with McQueen after reassuring

2 Solomonyan that McQueen had been warned not to “be afraid of what

3 [Solomonyan’s] going to talk to [him] about.” Just a few minutes

4 later, Solomonyan told McQueen that he wanted “[t]rucks with

5 fully automatic transmission or small sport’s [sic] cars but

6 still with fully automatic transmissions” and clarified that “of

7 course I am not talking about vehicles.” Vorobeychik called

8 Solomonyan two weeks later to ask whether McQueen could “really

9 get it,” to which Solomonyan replied, “I only need two pieces.” 

10 The following month, Vorobeychik and Solomonyan discussed a plan

11 to make “large income” by working directly with McQueen. Within

12 one month of this conversation, Solomonyan obtained three

13 firearms from McQueen. Viewing this evidence in its totality,

14 there were ample grounds for the jury to conclude that

15 Vorobeychik knowingly assisted Solomonyan in his firearms

16 trafficking scheme. The jury was certainly not bound as a matter

17 of law to believe that Vorobeychik and Solomonyan were talking

18 about two completely different things over the course of time. 

19 The evidence was, therefore, sufficient to support Vorobeychik’s

20 conviction. 

21 The evidence against Nadirashvili and Chvelidze was

22 sufficient to support their convictions as well. They argue

23 that, although they were aware Solomonyan was engaged in a single

24 gun transaction, the evidence did not show that they knew he was

25 engaged in the business of trafficking in firearms. The statute

12
1 does suggest that Nadirashvili and Chvelidze had to know that

2 Solomonyan was engaged in more than just a single sale of

3 weapons, as it defines a person “engaged in the business” of

4 dealing in firearms as one who engages in “repetitive purchase

5 and resale of firearms.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C) (emphasis

6 added). However, the government’s burden under Section

7 922(a)(1)(A) is to “prove that the defendant ‘has guns on hand or

8 is ready and able to procure them for the purpose of selling them

9 from [time] to time to such persons as might be accepted as

10 customers.’” Carter, 801 F.2d at 82 (quoting United States v.

11 Berry, 644 F.2d 1034, 1037 (5th Cir. 1981)). Thus, the

12 government did not need to prove that Nadirashvili and Chvelidze

13 were aware that Solomonyan was actually engaged in multiple

14 transactions, but rather that they knew Solomonyan had held

15 himself “out as a source of firearms” and was ready to procure

16 them for his customers. Id. 

17 Applying this standard, there was sufficient evidence for

18 the jury to find that Nadirashvili and Chvelidze aided and

19 abetted Solomonyan in engaging in the business of dealing in

20 firearms. In their first recorded conversation, Solomonyan told

21 Nadirashvili that he had already received money from a customer

22 in exchange for his promise to deliver automatic weapons. 

23 Moreover, Solomonyan explained to Nadirashvili that he had been

24 negotiating with a dealer and needed Nadirashvili’s help only

25 because the dealer disappeared at the last minute. Nadirashvili

13
1 immediately relayed all the pertinent information to Chvelidze,

2 who said he could fill the order within several days, and invited

3 Nadirashvili to “place an order.” Nadirashvili and Chvelidze

4 each told Solomonyan directly that they would try to procure

5 firearms for him. Perhaps not every rational trier of fact would

6 conclude that Nadirashvili and Chvelidze knew Solomonyan was

7 engaged in anything more than a one-time transaction. However,

8 the applicable standard of review requires only that “any

9 rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

10 the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hardwick, 523 F.3d at 100

11 (emphasis in original). Solomonyan’s statements to Nadirashvili

12 and Chvelidze demonstrated a familiarity with firearms and a

13 fluency in the coded language used to discuss them over the

14 phone. Solomonyan also suggested that he had contacts with a

15 dealer who actually had firearms in his possession. It would not

16 be unreasonable for a trier of fact to infer from these facts

17 that Nadirashvili and Chvelidze knew Solomonyan was not simply

18 filling a one-time order but was in fact holding himself out more

19 generally as a source of firearms. We therefore affirm their

20 convictions. 

21 b) As-Applied Vagueness Challenge to 22 U.S.C. §

22 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii)

23 Kharabadze was convicted under Section 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii) of

24 conspiring to broker in foreign defense articles and aiding and

25 abetting Solomonyan and Spies in their commission of the

14
1 substantive brokering offense. Section 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii) makes

2 it illegal to “engage[] in the business of brokering activities

3 with respect to the manufacture, export, import, or transfer of

4 any defense article.” The regulations define “broker” as “any

5 person who acts as an agent for others in negotiating or

6 arranging contracts, purchases, sales or transfers of defense

7 articles or defense services in return for a fee, commission, or

8 other consideration.” 22 C.F.R. § 129.2(a). “Brokering

9 activities” are defined to include “the financing,

10 transportation, freight forwarding, or taking of any other action

11 that facilitates the manufacture, export, or import [of] a

12 defense article.” Id. § 129.2(b). The regulations also specify

13 that “engaging in the business of brokering activities requires

14 only one action as described above.” Id. 

15 Kharabadze contends that his conviction should be vacated

16 because the phrase “the business of brokering activities” is

17 unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Specifically, he

18 claims that the word “facilitates” is ambiguous and argues that

19 he could not have known that "merely . . . providing information

20 about the availability and prices of foreign defense articles"

21 fell within the statute. Kharabadze Br. at 28 (emphasis

22 omitted). 

23 "‘[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal

24 statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness

25 that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited

15
1 and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and

2 discriminatory enforcement.'" United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d

3 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.

4 352, 357 (1983)). In an as-applied challenge, "one whose conduct

5 is clearly proscribed by the statute cannot successfully

6 challenge it for vagueness." United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d

7 548, 550 (2d Cir. 1993). Regardless of whether there is

8 ambiguity at the outer reaches of Section 2778, Kharabadze’s

9 conduct falls clearly within its intended scope. He provided

10 Solomonyan with a list of estimated prices based on his knowledge

11 of the Russian market for military weapons, knowing that

12 Solomonyan needed the price list in order to negotiate with

13 purchasers who wanted to see "something real" or at least

14 "approximately real." Applying the usual meaning of the word,

15 this conduct unquestionably “facilitate[d]” Solomonyan’s import

16 of defense articles. We therefore reject Kharabadze’s

17 constitutional challenge to his conviction under Section 2778. 

18 c) Offense Level Enhancements Under Section 2K2.1(b) of the

19 Sentencing Guidelines

20 Solomonyan argues that the district court's imposition of

21 two offense level increases -- one for conspiracy involving more

22 than 200 weapons pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(E) and the

23 other for conspiracy involving a destructive device pursuant to

24 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3)(A) -- was erroneous because the court

25 found the requisite facts only by a preponderance of the evidence

16
1 rather than with reasonable certainty. We agree. 

2 Section 2X1.1(a) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines states

3 that where a conspiracy is not covered by a specific offense

4 guideline, the base offense level is "[t]he base offense level

5 from the guideline for the substantive offense, plus any

6 adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense conduct

7 that can be established with reasonable certainty." (emphasis

8 added). Consequently, the district court correctly looked to

9 Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) to set the base offense level at 20

10 because the offense involved possession and transport of a

11 machine gun and was committed while Solomonyan was an illegal

12 alien. However, the offense level adjustments listed in Section

13 2K2.1(b) make no mention of a conspiracy. The district court,

14 therefore, should have reverted to the reasonable certainty

15 standard described in Section 2X1.1(a) when it applied the two

16 offense level increases under Section 2K2.1(b)(1)(E) and

17 (b)(3)(A). See United States v. Savarese, 404 F.3d 651, 655-56

18 (2d Cir. 2005). We therefore vacate Solomonyan’s sentence and

19 remand for the district court to make that determination in the

20 first instance. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) (“If the court

21 of appeals determines that . . . the sentence was imposed in

22 violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect

23 application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand

24 the case for further sentencing proceedings with such

25 instructions as the court considers appropriate.”). On remand,

17
1 the district court is instructed to recalculate Solomonyan’s

2 offense level for the conspiracy convictions, applying the

3 reasonable certainty standard to any facts underlying the offense

4 level adjustments listed in Section 2K2.1(b). 

5 CONCLUSION

6 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Solomonyan’s sentence

7 and remand to the district court for resentencing in accordance

8 with this opinion. We have considered all the arguments advanced

9 by appellants that are not expressly discussed in this opinion

10 and find them meritless. We affirm the remainder of the

11 convictions and sentences. 

18