2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-12-2010

John Hyland v. Amer Intl Grp

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 08-4203

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Recommended Citation

"John Hyland v. Amer Intl Grp" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 2077.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 08-4203

 

 

JOHN HYLAND,

Appellant

v.

AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP;

AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE COMPANIES, LLC

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District New Jersey

(D.C. Civ. No. 06-6155)

Honorable Anne E. Thompson, District Judge

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 18, 2009

 

BEFORE: SLOVITER, JORDAN, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 12, 2010)

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

This matter comes on before the Court on an appeal brought by John Hyland in this action

that Hyland brought against his former employer, American General Life Companies,
2

L.L.C., a wholly-owned subsidiary of American International Group, Inc. In his

complaint Hyland charged that American General terminated his employment by reason

of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et

seq., and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1 et seq.

(West 2002). The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1367. After discovery American General moved for summary judgment and the District

Court granted the motion by an opinion and order dated September 12, 2008, entered

September 17, 2008. Hyland then appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We exercise plenary review on this appeal and thus can affirm only “if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

[American General] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

see Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2009).

The basic facts in this case in an overview sense are not in dispute. Hyland is an attorney

at law whom American General or its predecessor employed in a legal position from

1989, when he graduated from law school, until August 2005 when American General

terminated his employment when he was 56 years old by eliminating his position at the

time of a reorganization of its employment structure. Though Hyland indicates that he

“was terminated as part of an overall reorganization and/or reduction in force,” he

contends that “this so-called reorganization was actually an attempt to get rid of one older
3

employee,” i.e., him. Appellant’s br. at 19.

Hyland contends that American General replaced him with Timothy Bolden who is about

nine years younger than he is. In Duffy v. Paper Magic Group, Inc., 265 F.3d 163, 167

(3d Cir. 2001), we indicated that one of the elements of a prima facie case in an age

discrimination action predicated on indirect evidence is that the person ultimately

replacing the plaintiff be sufficiently younger than the plaintiff so that an inference of age

discrimination can be drawn from the replacement. The difference in age between

Hyland and Bolden satisfies that criterion.

Notwithstanding the difference in ages between Hyland and Bolden, the District Court

held that a reasonable fact finder could not conclude that Bolden had replaced Hyland and

thus Hyland did not make out a prima facie case of discrimination. In this regard, the

record shows that Hyland served in the position of Senior Attorney but that American

General appointed Bolden to fill a new position as Associate General Counsel. Of

course, an employer does not ensure that one position will be considered to have replaced

another simply by changing the title of the original position. Here, however, as Associate

General Counsel Bolden performed functions that Hyland had not performed but did not

perform duties that Hyland had performed. Though there was some overlap between

Hyland’s and Bolden’s duties the difference between their positions was so significant

that a reasonable trier of the fact cannot say that the differences in their positions was

simply cosmetic. In considering the two positions it is highly significant that Bolden’s
4

gross salary was almost $55,000 higher than Hyland’s, making it very difficult to

conclude that Bolden replaced Hyland. See Monaco v. American General Assurance Co.,

359 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 2004). In fact, after American General terminated Hyland it

divided his responsibilities among various employees, some older and some younger than

Hyland. In the circumstances, we agree with the District Court that Hyland did not

establish a prima facie case and thus his case had to fail.

We realize that at a November or December 2004, staff meeting Marc Herling, Hyland’s

direct supervisor and the prime mover in the reorganization that resulted in Hyland’s

termination referred to Hyland as the “old man” of the operation. But the District Court

believed that this stray remark made ten months before Hyland’s termination could not

support an inference of age discrimination underlying Hyland’s termination and we agree. 

See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 767 (3d Cir. 1994). We do not think that a single

remark that might reflect the declarant’s recognition of an employee’s age in a context

unrelated to the employee’s termination is sufficient evidence to support a prima facie

case of age discrimination based on direct evidence at the time that the employer later

terminates the employee. After all, whether or not a supervisor makes reference to an

employee’s age it is likely that he will have some concept of it. In any event, it would be

unfortunate if the courts forced the adoption of an employment culture that required

everyone in the structure to be careful so that every remark made every day passes the

employment equivalent of being politically correct lest it be used later against the
5

employer in litigation. 

We can understand why Hyland believes that American General treated him unfairly

though we, of course, express no view on that possibility. Nevertheless, it is necessary to

remember that the age discrimination laws are not intended to remedy all of the possible

wrongful adverse employment decisions by an employer and the law surely should not be

used to impede an employer’s effort to organize its business as it deems fit so long as the

employer in doing so does not violate employment age discrimination restrictions. See

Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1083 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he ADEA is a

discrimination statute and is not intended to handcuff the management and owners of

businesses to the status quo.”).

For the foregoing reasons as well as for the reasons that District Court set forth in its

opinion dated September 12, 2008, we will affirm the order for summary judgment dated

September 12, 2008, entered September 17, 2008.