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THE U.S.–SAUDI ARABIA COUNTERTERRORISM

RELATIONSHIP

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 24, 2016

Serial No. 114–162

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Tim Roemer, Ph.D. (former 9/11 Commissioner) ........................ 6

Mr. Simon Henderson, director, Gulf and Energy Policy Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ................................................................. 16

Ms. Karen Elliot House, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs .................................................................................................... 21

Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University .......................................................................... 26

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Tim Roemer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................... 10

Mr. Simon Henderson: Prepared statement .......................................................... 18

Ms. Karen Elliot House: Prepared statement ....................................................... 23

Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 28

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 50

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 51

(1)

THE U.S.–SAUDI ARABIA COUNTERTERRORISM 

RELATIONSHIP 

TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. The witnesses 

will take their seats. Without objection, all members may have 5 

days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for 

the record subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

Today, the United States and Saudi Arabia work together on 

maintaining security in the Middle East. Despite the differences 

between the two countries, we both face the same terrorist enemies 

that seek our destruction in the post 9/11 era. Our counterterrorism cooperation with Saudi Arabia has increased. According to 

the Department of Treasury, the kingdom has made improvements 

in enforcing stringent banking rules that help stem the flow of 

money to terrorist groups through Saudi financial institutions. 

Saudi Arabia is the co-chair of the Counter-ISIL Finance Group, 

and this group seeks to cut off ISIS from the international finance 

system. Saudi Arabia has launched aggressive military campaigns 

in Syria and Yemen, and while the kingdom has taken important 

steps since 9/11 to counter terrorism, it has some room to improve. 

I think we must separate the individuals that live in Saudi Arabia and what they do to support financially terrorism, and the Government of Saudi Arabia. While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 

adopted strict laws prohibiting terrorist finance, there continue to 

be press reports about Saudi charities and individual donors funding ISIS, al-Qaeda, and foreign fighters. 

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia still spends billions of dollars 

every year exporting the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam through 

its networks of building mosques and schools throughout the world 

including in the United States. Wahhabism is a fundamentalist 

form of Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the Quran. 

Its 18th century founder Abd al Wahhab in seeking to purify Islam 

taught that apostates—that is, Christians and Jews and some Muslims—should be persecuted and in some cases killed. 

So we should not be surprised that some people practice, when 

they are taught Wahhabism, violence. While not all followers of 

2

Wahhabism are terrorists, many argue that Wahhabi followers are 

more easily recruited by terrorist groups. 

ISIS openly follows this strict form of Islam and cites Wahhabi 

clerics, but it does not accept the royal Saudi family as legitimate 

authorities. Some of the Wahhabi ideology has been exposed in 

Saudi textbooks and the U.S. has pushed Saudi Arabia to address 

the problem. 

In 2006, the Ambassador at Large for International Religious 

Freedom John Hanford told Congress the Saudi Government would 

finish its comprehensive revision of textbooks by 2008. Here we are 

8 years later, and the process is still in the future. Where is the 

new book? As of 2014, high school textbooks worldwide contained 

offensive materials about Jews, Christians, and others. For example, a 12th grade textbook professes that treachery, betrayal and 

that annunciation of covenants are among the attributes of the 

Jews. Another 12th grade textbook asserts that the punishment for 

conversion away from Islam is execution. 

This is somewhat disturbing, and the Saudi Arabian Government 

needs to be more aggressive in revising these textbooks if that is 

the goal. The same can be said about sermons given by Saudi clerics as mosques behind closed doors. Researchers have cited hateful 

messages by clerics that are tantamount to incitement. 

Then of course there is the issue that has been brought up again 

regarding counterterrorism prior to 9/11. 9/11 Commission reports 

note that Saudi Arabia was long considered a primary source of alQaeda funding. There is speculation about the extent of the Saudi 

Government officials in providing help to 9/11 hijackers, 15 of the 

19 hijackers were Saudi nationals. 

Then there is the issue of the 28 missing pages in the 9/11 report. I have read the 28 missing pages that the public does not 

have access to, and I think the public should have access and be 

able to see those 28 pages. It is my understanding that the Saudi 

Arabian Government also wants those 28 pages declassified. I 

think we must make a distinction to some extent between post-9/11 

and events that occurred before 9/11. 

If a foreign country, any country, can be shown to have significantly supported a terrorist attack on the United States, the victims and their families ought to be able to sue that foreign country 

no matter who it is. Like any other issue, we should let a jury decide that issue and the damages, if any. As a former judge, I am 

a great advocate in having litigation in our courts of law to get justice. 

If our policy is between American victims and also victims from 

other parts of the world regarding 9/11 versus our priorities with 

dealing with foreign countries, I think our Government should always come down on the side of victims and their families of 9/11, 

without exception. 

There are issues dealing with foreign countries, but the 9/11 victims, their families, certainly need justice to occur. Some say that 

this occurred a long time ago and it is time to move on with our 

relationships with foreign countries. Fifteen years ago, waiting for 

justice to occur is too long under our system. 

If in fact some other government may have been involved in the 

9/11 attacks, I am not saying they were or they weren’t, but part 

3

of this hearing is to explore this issue as well. The United States 

national security interest does include working with Saudi Arabia, 

but the national security interest of the United States also must 

include making sure that the victims of 9/11 have all of the facts 

of what occurred on that day that none of us will forget. 

I will yield to the ranking member from Massachusetts for his 

opening statement. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Chairman Poe, for conducting this 

hearing, and I would also like to thank our panel of witnesses who 

bring with them years of experience and knowledge on the topic of 

today, Saudi Arabia. 

For decades, the United States has maintained strong bilateral 

relations with the kingdom. Anchored by U.S.-Saudi security cooperation and U.S. concern for global availability of Saudi energy, 

we have engaged the Saudi Government as a strategic partner to 

promote regional security and global economic stability. 

However, our relationship is deeper than just shared security 

challenges. It is in both of our countries’ interest to strengthen this 

relationship, yet for us to be mindful that over the last few years 

shifts in political and economical landscape of the region have shed 

light on the kingdom’s domestic policies. Issues such as political reform, education, human rights, and religious freedom are now more 

prominent in the U.S.-Saudi relationship than it was in years past. 

There is no doubt these sensitive issues have contributed to 

growing challenges between Washington and Riyadh. In April, 

President Obama met with Saudi officials. While the visit allayed 

concerns like making sure our shared security interests remain 

strong, still, gaps in the fence remain. 

Further complicating the relationship is America’s increasing energy independence and the recent shale oil boom that has produced 

our imports, increased imports and increased our exports when it 

comes to oil. Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members rely on American markets to refine their systems and bring to the market heavy 

sour crude oil. 

As we continue to witness the evolution of this region through 

the lens of the administration’s final year, it is important that we 

consider our own objectives. It is the responsibility of the United 

States to keep our foreign policy objectives close in mind as we assess our bilateral relations with partners and whether they promote or hinder these goals. 

Of particular concern to me is the credibility of our shared counterterrorism operations and intentions. While our two countries 

have worked successfully to address counterterrorism threats and 

the financing of those threats through intelligence sharing and 

monitoring compliance, other actions may complicate these efforts. 

For example, Riyadh’s campaign in Yemen has changed our efforts 

to combat al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and domestic counterterrorism efforts have directly targeted human rights activists 

and peaceful protestors who have been tried in Saudi in terrorism 

tribunals. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses in regarding the future of the United States and Saudi in terms of their relationships 

and how we can work together to align mutual goals and promote 

a more open society. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

4

Mr. POE. I thank the ranking member. The chair will now recognize other members for a 1-minute opening statement. The chair 

recognizes Mr. Issa from California for 1 minute. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding 

this important hearing today. There are two committees that will 

be looking at the proposal that has come from the Senate, this committee and Judiciary. The Judiciary Committee has to look, quite 

frankly, at U.S. law and whether litigation against the sovereign 

nation is appropriate. We as a committee have to look at the world. 

We have to look at the bigger question. What if we do this without 

an affirmative, specific foreknowledge of wrongdoing by a representative at a high level of the Saudi Government? 

The answer is clear. If we look at it and allow discovery, a poking 

around, a typical plaintiff’s trial lawyer look-see, then in fact the 

rest of the world will likely respond. If the rest of the world likely 

responds, there is no question but that actions of U.S. persons or 

U.S. entities, including but not limited to our intelligence community, will have us in courts around the world. 

It is our responsibility both here at this committee and when 

looking at highly classified documents to reach a conclusion of 

whether or not this case should be allowed to go forward before allowing discovery outside of the U.S. Government. I thank the chairman for his yielding, and yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from California. The chair recognizes another gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, for an 

opening statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Our laws already provide an exception to sovereign immunity for those who are state sponsors of terrorism. It 

seems only a slight increase in that to say it should apply if the 

plaintiffs are able to show that the foreign government engaged in 

terrorism here in the United States. 

But as important as it is to have our judicial system work for the 

benefit of victims, it may be that it is up to the United States to 

compensate the victims as we have to some degree. And the most 

important thing is not punishing those who committed or supported this act, but preventing the next act of terrorism. 

What concerns me is the Saudi Government comes to us and 

says they are our friend and we should protect them from this statute, while funding every day the Wahhabi mullahs who not only 

preach orthodox practice of Islam but preach violent murder 

against those who they disagree with. And it is time for Saudi Arabia to come clean. They can’t say they don’t support terrorism. All 

they do is fund at the hundreds of millions of dollars a year those 

who plant the seeds of terrorism around the world. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing on the critical relationship between the United States 

and Saudi Arabia. 

For over 70 years, both countries have had a close economic partnership beginning with the establishment of the Arab American Oil 

Company, Aramco, by the Standard Oil Company in 1944. 

In recent decades, Saudi Arabia has made substantial progress 

in their counterterrorism efforts post 9/11. They have strengthened 

5

financial policies aimed at countering terrorist financing and 

worked with the United States and other countries to increase 

transparency and information sharing. They have also imposed 

harsh sentences on Saudi nationals who attempt to join foreign terror groups and have conducted military operations against the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in the region. These 

are all important steps in working toward peace and security for 

the region. 

As we work together to combat Islamic extremism, we must keep 

in mind the considerable influence that Saudi Arabia has over the 

ideologies and religious practices that will guide the Middle East 

for years to come. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on 

the future of U.S.-Saudi Arabia terrorism relationship. Again, I appreciate the leadership of our chairman, Chairman Judge Ted Poe, 

and I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for 1 minute. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for 

holding this hearing. It is long overdue. How many Americans have 

to die? How many of our innocent citizens are blown up or are murdered from a terrorist act that we are ignoring, intentionally ignoring who is financing those acts. 

I think it is clear to all of us who have been active in Washington 

over the years that the Saudis and the Saudi royal family have 

been right up to their eyeballs in terrorist activity and supporting 

the terrorist activity of radical Islamic forces in the Middle East. 

It is up to us to call the truth, to say the truth. We are not going 

to correct the situation. It won’t get better unless we are willing 

to step up and basically let the American people know who is the 

bad guy and who is the good guy in this age of terrorism. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. Without objection, all members 

may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

And without objection, all witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made part of the record. 

I ask that each witness keep your presentation to no more than 

5 minutes. I will introduce each witness. I do want to thank all 

four of you for being here early, on time before we ever started, 

supposed to start this hearing, but as you all know votes got in the 

way. So I do appreciate your patience. 

Ambassador Tim Roemer is a former Member of Congress and a 

former U.S. Ambassador to India. While he was in Congress he sat 

on the House Intelligence Committee and was a member of the 

9/11 Commission. 

Mr. Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the 

Gulf and Energy Policy Program at Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy. He has written two studies of the Saudi royal family, 

both of which were published by The Washington Institute. 

And Mrs. Karen Elliot House is currently a senior fellow at the 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s 

Kennedy School of Government. She is the author of the book on 

Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines—and Future. 

6

And Dr. Daniel Byman is a professor at Georgetown University’s 

School of Foreign Service. He has served on the 9/11 Commission 

staff and has testified numerous times before this committee. 

Ambassador Roemer, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TIM ROEMER, PH.D. 

(FORMER 9/11 COMMISSIONER) 

Mr. ROEMER. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking 

Member Keating, fellow members, I ask unanimous consent the entirety of my statement be entered into the record, and I would recognize a special guest I have here today, my son Matthew Roemer 

who just graduated from Wake Forest University. 

Mr. POE. Without objection——

Mr. ROEMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE [continuing]. Your comments will be made part of the 

record. And we do recognize your son who is a recent graduate of 

Wake Forest. 

Mr. ROEMER. Thank you, sir. 

Throughout the history of our engagement with the kingdom our 

relationship with Saudi Arabia has been strategically crucial yet a 

challenging one and at times a very demanding one. Saudi Arabia 

sits at the crossroads of so many critical issues for American foreign policy interests—terrorism, Iran, Middle East stability, energy, and human rights. 

Serving on the 9/11 Commission, we noted that the U.S.-Saudi 

relationship had been in the dark for too long. Both countries’ governments recognized the value in working closely together, but neither was willing to make the case for the relationship in public to 

argue for its merits and its shortcomings. 

The 9/11 Commission recommended over 10 years ago, ‘‘The 

problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted openly. 

It should include a shared interest in greater tolerance and cultural respect translating into a commitment to fight the violent extremists who foment hatred.’’ Ten years ago we said that. 

Today we still struggle to talk directly about our relationship 

with the kingdom. In light of this fact, I would like to thank this 

committee for holding this hearing on this subject bringing greater 

transparency and clarity to American diplomacy and to the American people. 

The Saudis pose a number of challenges for the United States 

and its foreign policy. Saudi society still continues to produce a disturbing number of recruits and supporters for terrorist groups 

around the world including in Syria. Moreover, according to a front 

page article in the New York Times just this past Sunday titled, 

‘‘How Kosovo Was Turned into a Fertile Ground for ISIS,’’ Saudi 

influence and money has transformed this once tolerant Muslim society into a ‘‘font of Islamic extremism and pipeline for jihadists.’’

Domestically, the Saudi Government still continues to have a 

poor record on human rights. The Saudis are fighting a war in 

Yemen with goals different than the United States, thus creating 

some problems for the United States in the Middle East. These are 

signs, ladies and gentlemen, that the United States and Saudi Arabia still have much work to do in this crucial partnership; and it 

is a partnership. 

7

I believe that our relationship with the kingdom is crucial to our 

interests in the Middle East. Addressing our concerns diplomatically and privately is often the appropriate path. As a former diplomat we often did this behind closed doors, however, sometimes 

we must honestly and openly confront our legitimate differences. 

Friends and allies cannot bury their disagreements. They must 

frankly address them and counterterrorism must be at the top of 

the American and the Saudi list. 

Counterterrorism. After 9/11, the news that 15 of the 19 hijackers had come from Saudi Arabia led many Americans to question 

whether the Saudis were the ally we thought them to be. They continue to be our ally, but an embattled one. Furthermore, we found 

that Saudi Arabia was fertile ground for fundraising and support 

for al-Qaeda. In the 9/11 Commission report we did not discover 

high level and direct Saudi Government involvement in the plot, 

but wrote that Saudi Arabia had been a problematic ally in the 

fight against terrorism. 

There is a glaring contrast some days and weeks and months between high level Saudi legitimate cooperation in helping the 

United States uncover plots, which is critical for us, but it often directly conflicts with the society and culture that sometimes exports 

extremism and intolerance. 

There has been recent media attention to these 28 pages that 

Judge Poe just cited, classified information actually written by 

Congress in the Joint Intelligence Committee, but was reviewed 

and investigated by the 9/11 Commission. I served on both of these 

panels. I am strongly in favor for declassifying this information as 

quickly and as soon as possible. For national security reasons the 

9/11 families deserve it, the American people deserve it, and justice 

deserves it. 

We have the right as Americans to transparency and sunlight, 

not the darkness that conspiracy theories thrive on in today’s cynical political climate. While the 28 pages are important to declassify—we need to get those out—it is crucial to understand the unclassified 9/11 Commission report, particularly Chapters 5, 7, and 

the footnotes where we talk about some of the problems that are 

ongoing today in Saudi society to export extremism, fund radical 

ideology for terrorist groups, and supply a stream of jihadists 

around the world. 

We have seen, no doubt, improvements from the kingdom. It has 

created a deradicalization program and is helping to reintegrate extremists back into society in a regular fashion. Saudi intelligence 

agencies have worked very closely with their American counterparts to share information about threats from extremist groups, 

most notably a tip-off in 2010 which reportedly led to the disruption of a plot to bomb U.S. cargo planes. 

They also briefly participated in the U.S. war, led against the Islamic State, coalition in Syria. According to the most recent State 

Department Country Reports on Terrorism, the Saudis have instituted a number of legal reforms to strengthen the prohibitions on 

supporting terrorism. 

These are crucial tools in fighting terrorism, but sometimes they 

are not sufficient strategic ones. Saudi Arabia has outlawed terrorist groups like the Islamic State and banned its citizens from 

8

providing financial support to them. Yet despite these official acts, 

studies on the background of Islamic State foreign fighters continue to show that Saudi recruits are among the most numerous 

among the group’s ranks. 

A recent West Point study confirmed that Saudi recruits were in 

the highest three groups in Syria. The threat of extremism cannot 

be countered by police, intelligence and military actions alone. The 

Saudi Government needs to address the threat of radicalization 

and extremism within its own society. 

In all of this we should be cognizant of the fact that the Saudis 

themselves are threatened by extremism and have suffered greatly 

from it. In 2003, Saudi al-Qaeda terrorists unleashed a campaign 

of attacks in that country that shocked the kingdom. The Saudis 

took immediate steps to address this. 

I want to speak for a moment, Mr. Chairman, about Iran. Iran’s 

support for terrorism is a serious threat to Middle East stability, 

American interests, and American allies in the region. In the face 

of these threats we must make sure that Saudi Arabia, the focus 

of so much of Iran’s attention and ambitions, is able to resist and 

appropriately confront Tehran’s attempts to influence the region. 

How we manage this makes vital difference to our friends and 

allies in the Middle East. We cannot allow Saudi Arabia’s justified 

fears of its neighbor to lead to deeper disagreements within and 

with the United States. While we work together to counter some 

of Iran’s nefarious efforts to stoke instability in the region, this 

must not distract from the fight against terrorist threats like alQaeda and the Islamic State. 

Mr. Chairman, I will skip through some comments on energy. I 

want to conclude on a human rights topic. Congress helped create 

the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 

in 1998 in order to promote the fundamental human rights of people to worship and observe their faith in peace. 

Since its creation, the Commission, at the urging I might add of 

Congress, has done valuable work uncovering examples of intolerance, anti-Semitism, and incitement to violence in Saudi textbooks 

provided to schools in developing countries all over the world. The 

Islamic State has even discovered and utilized this material in 

some of their textbooks to reflect their world view. One scholar has 

even noted the use of this material in schools under the Islamic 

State’s control in Raqqa, Syria. 

While the kingdom has made some progress in revising its textbooks and curtailing extremist material, and we note that and encourage that, this Commission notes that the Saudi Government 

still includes highly offensive references in their high school textbooks. 

So to conclude, members of this important subcommittee, having 

served in both the legislative and the executive branches of American Government, I have seen the important role that congressional 

oversight and your counsel plays in shaping American foreign policy. 

The U.S.-Saudi relationship is an area where Congress must continue to play an important role with the executive branch and for 

the American people. Congress should continue to hold oversight 

9

hearings, insist on better progress on counterterrorism results from 

Saudi Arabia, and discuss the human rights situation. 

The U.S. Intelligence Community gives credits to Saudi Arabia 

for developing and cooperating on counterintelligence and helping 

stop specific attacks. We are grateful for this. While this is true, 

we must see more consistent results from Saudi Arabia on preventing the export of intolerance and extremism around the world; 

we must work together to curtail the financial support for al-Qaeda 

and terrorist groups; we must see more results on reducing the 

Saudi supply of the high number of foreign fighters in Syria. 

Resetting and rebuilding this decades-long strategic partnership 

with Saudi will be a foreign policy priority for the United States 

in 2017. And I thank the chairman and ranking member and members for my testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roemer follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. Henderson. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SIMON HENDERSON, DIRECTOR, GULF 

AND ENERGY POLICY PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member 

Keating, distinguished members of the committee; it is an honor 

and privilege to appear before you today. I have written about 

Saudi Arabia, particularly the royal family known as the House of 

Saud, for more than 20 years. Arguably, I publish more about 

Saudi Arabia, ten analyses so far this year, than anyone else. I also 

have a reputation for detailed reporting which probably explains 

why I have never been to Saudi Arabia. I have never been given 

a visa to visit there although I have traveled widely in the rest of 

the Middle East. 

Saudi Arabia sees itself as the leader of the Islamic world, a 

leader if not the leader of the Arab world, and by virtue of it being 

the world’s largest oil exporter, a leader of the energy world. Of 

these leadership roles, it is the Islamic one which is from a Saudi 

perspective by far the most important. Within the kingdom are Islam’s two holiest places, Mecca and Medina. Ensuring the safety of 

Muslim pilgrims who thereby recognize Saudi leadership is a paramount concern. 

This emphasis on Islam was a feature of a memorable memo 

written by a departing British Ambassador 32 years ago. He identified three principal features of the kingdom. Islam was one of 

them, insularity was another—it is a very closed society, or was at 

that point—and he also noted that the kingdom was incompetent, 

a feature which I often ask friends who have visited the kingdom 

whether it is still valid or not and they suggest that it is. And that 

is a word which perhaps partly explains our concern about Saudi 

counterterrorism efforts. 

Apart from Islam, a major influence on Saudi thinking is history, 

particularly recent history. I would argue that the two most important events in Saudi minds both date back to 1979. In February of 

that year, the Islamic Revolution in Iran overthrew the Shah and 

brought to power a clerical regime of Shiite Muslims, the majority 

faith in Iran. As Shiites, they are historical rivals of Sunni Muslims such as Saudis. The ethnic difference of Iranians mostly being 

Persians rather than Arabs is also significant. 

Later the same year, in November 1979, the Grand Mosque in 

Mecca was seized by Sunni militants, contesting the legitimacy of 

the House of Saud. It was 2 weeks before Saudi soldiers, with the 

embarrassingly necessary assistance of French special forces, regained control. Since then, the House of Saud has had to fight on 

two contradictory fronts: Countering regional Iranian mischief including support for the kingdom’s own minority Shiite community, 

while also dealing with Sunni extremists including potential 

jihadists, at home. 

The principal challenge for the U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism relationship is that right now there is more than the usual amount of 

differences on emphasis and direction which can apply to even 

close allies. It has to be significant that in the recent profile of 

17

President Obama in The Atlantic, Saudi Arabia was criticized more 

severely and more often than any other country, ally or not. 

A new and challenging dimension in the relationship was introduced a year ago when King Abdullah died and was replaced by 

King Salman. Three months after that the line of succession 

changed. The Crown Prince was sacked and he was replaced by the 

Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, and more significantly, the number three slot of the Deputy Crown Prince was 

taken by King Salman’s younger son Muhammad bin Salman who 

is just 30 years old. 

At the moment, we are facing an uncertain future. Washington’s 

principal partner on counterterrorism issues for the last decade or 

so, Muhammad bin Nayef, has been marginalized but the need for 

an effective counterterrorism partnership is as great as ever. Also, 

Riyadh is distrustful of Washington’s approach to what the Saudi 

sees as at least half of the terrorism problem, Iran. 

In these circumstances, the United States cannot take for granted its current counterterrorism partnership with Saudi Arabia. Despite differences and public insults, the relationship needs to adapt 

so the substance of it can be sustained during the continuing period of political uncertainty and especially within the House of 

Saud and where the real power lies. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Henderson follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Henderson. 

Ms. House. Microphone. 

STATEMENT OF MS. KAREN ELLIOT HOUSE, SENIOR FELLOW, 

BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 

Ms. HOUSE. Oh, excuse me, I am saying in my best Texas accent, 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Mr. Keating. 

Mr. POE. And I can understand you a whole lot better than I can 

Mr. Henderson, that is for sure. 

Ms. HOUSE. Yes, I knew you wouldn’t need a translator for me. 

The others may. 

I am going to focus on Saudi Arabia itself because much is 

changing in the kingdom these days. A new generation of young 

Saudi leaders is now in charge after nearly six decades of rule by 

aged and increasingly infirm sons of the founder. Also changing, 

unfortunately, is the U.S.-Saudi relationship which was built on 

the tacit understanding of Saudi oil for U.S. support and protection. 

On my latest visit there in January, the most recent of dozens 

of visits over the last 38 years—I began going as a reporter for the 

Wall Street Journal—I found Saudi royals and a lot of Saudi citizens, the number one question they wanted to ask is, is the U.S. 

policy of avoiding involvement in Middle East problems permanent 

or will a new administration, a new U.S. President again exert traditional leadership in the Middle East including support for our 

Saudi ally? 

Obviously, with the Presidential election some months away we 

don’t know what the next administration’s policy would be, but the 

point I want to make is I believe it is clear already that the future 

of Saudi Arabia with this new generation of leaders for some of the 

reasons Simon mentioned, with this new generation of leaders in 

charge is of critical importance to us. 

Despite the fact that the U.S. produces more oil than any time 

in 30 years, we are still dependent on the global oil market even 

though only 8 percent of our oil comes from Saudi Arabia. And secondly, obviously as been mentioned by the chairman and others, 

Saudi Arabia is the wellspring of this religious Wahhabi philosophy 

that motivates at least some of the jihadi hatred that seeks to destroy the Western way of life. So for those reasons, I think it is 

critically important that U.S. policymakers understand the forces 

at work in the kingdom. 

Support for Saudi stability and Israeli democracy have been two 

of the key U.S. goals in the Middle East, certainly in my whole lifetime, and in my view they must remain so. The new generation of 

leadership in Riyadh has a vision—I stress the word vision—to 

transform the Saudi economy and to some extent its society that 

will benefit, in my view, not only Saudi citizens but also potentially 

strengthen U.S.-Saudi relations if we are wise enough to seize that 

opportunity. 

It is not U.S. influence that has encouraged these changes, in my 

view, but we should welcome and support them. The new leadership, as Simon said, includes Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, 

the individual in charge of combating terrorism, and I can assure 

22

you that Saudis too focus on the need to retain Muhammad bin 

Nayef as the man that in their view has protected them from terrorism. There is not much concern about ISIS in Saudi Arabia, and 

the reason is Muhammad bin Nayef. From everything I hear cooperation with the U.S. on anti-terrorism is deemed to be good both 

on our side and theirs where he is concerned. 

And to the extent that rich Saudis give money as do other rich 

people in the Persian Gulf to help finance terrorism, this does not, 

in my view, constitute official Saudi policy but rather evades it. 

They understand, whatever the case on 9/11, they understand now 

that terrorism is a threat to them too. 

The new Deputy Crown Prince that Simon mentioned and the 

significance of both of these young men is that they are grandsons 

of the founder. So one is 55 and the Deputy Crown Prince is only 

30. He is responsible for the country’s defense, its economy, and 

Aramco. Literally, not since his grandfather Ibn Saud has a 30-

year-old prince had the amount of power that he has. Last month 

he laid out what I think is a quite remarkable vision to sharply reduce dependence on oil; to create jobs for the 70 percent of the 

Saudi population that is under 30 years of age and many of them 

unemployed; to open opportunities for, as he put it, all Saudis 

which is a code word for including women; and he even on the 

record came out for ‘‘more moderate brand of Islam.’’

I stress this is a vision and not a plan, but having met with him 

myself in January in Riyadh, I do think that he is serious and I 

am happy to answer questions about that if you have any. 

Mr. POE. Sum up your remarks, if you would, Ms. House. 

Ms. HOUSE. Pardon. So I will skip Iran. I do not believe the 

Saudis are entirely paranoid when they look at what Iran is doing 

in the region, which is antithetical to their interests and I would 

argue to ours too. 

So I will close by just saying it is not too late for a new U.S. administration to improve the relationship with Saudi Arabia, but it 

will require being honest about the fact that we don’t have the 

same values, stressing a point the Ambassador made, and we do 

have a common strategic interest and that is a stable Persian Gulf 

that is free of any other hegemonic domination. And in my view we 

should seize this opportunity to support economic reform in Saudi 

Arabia and to rebuild trust with the Saudis by being honest about 

the difference, because instability in Saudi Arabia in a Middle East 

that is already completely unstable is in no one’s interest. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. House follows:]

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Mr. POE. Dr. Byman. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. BYMAN. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and members of this distinguished subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you again and testify today. 

Saudi Arabia has made considerable progress on counterterrorism in the last 15 years, but it still has a long way to go. Before 

the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks and, really, until alQaeda began to attack the kingdom directly in May 2003, Saudi 

Arabia was often uncooperative on counterterrorism. The Khobar 

Towers investigation often encountered significant problems working with the Saudi Government; al-Qaeda-linked individuals were 

often not investigated or at least those investigations were not 

shared with U.S. officials; and more broadly, individuals in Saudi 

Arabia, some of them linked to the government, supported an array 

of causes linked to Kashmir, Afghanistan and elsewhere, causes on 

which al-Qaeda also drew. 

Since 2003, as others have said, there has been a tremendous 

change. Al-Qaeda brought the war home to Saudi Arabia and Saudi 

Arabia responded very strongly to the point where the 9/11 Commission declared in 2004 that the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now 

locked in mortal combat with al-Qaeda. We have seen an aggressive effort to disrupt cells and also some progress on terrorism financing. We have seen intelligence sharing and significant penetrations, Saudi Arabia has served as a drone base for operations in 

Yemen, and this is invaluable. 

The Islamic State, like al-Qaeda, is considered a top security 

threat by the Saudi regime. The Islamic State itself has declared 

Saudi Arabia to be an enemy, and its propaganda shows a black 

flag flying above Mecca. Islamic State terrorists have attacked 

mosques of Shia Muslims in the kingdom and also Saudi security 

officials, and the Saudi Government has arrested over 1,000 suspected Islamic State supporters, foiled several attacks, and is trying to take effort to stop people from traveling to fight. 

Complicating this picture, however, is that support for terrorism 

in Saudi Arabia is often difficult to distinguish between the government, important organizations within society, and individuals acting against the will of the government. The Saudi regime’s legitimacy is tied directly to the clerical establishment and since, really, 

the 1970s and perhaps before has been deeply engaged in supporting an array of Islamic causes around the world. 

It has spent tens of billions of dollars on this, and as Ambassador 

Roemer mentioned, the article in the New York Times on Bosnia 

is almost a classic example of the sort of support we see where the 

Saudi Government was supporting an array of mosques and other 

institutions that fostered extremist teachings. 

At times the regime has supported these institutions, at times it 

has deliberately ignored them, at other times it has cracked down 

so there has not been a single consistent response. And because 

these figures are often important for regime legitimacy, it is politically very difficult for them to do so. 

27

We still see support for a number of radical groups around the 

world. I would single out Pakistan in particular as a place where 

this is still commonplace. The campaign in Yemen against the 

Houthis there has indirectly aided al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula by giving them free space in which to operate. 

Now the good news is, senior Saudi preachers working with the 

government have urged individuals not to go to terrorist groups, 

not to fight in Iraq and Syria, but as has been mentioned we see 

many preachers, many religious institutions condemning other 

Muslims in particular, also being very critical of non-Muslims and 

at times quite anti-American. And much of this in the United 

States at least would be free speech, right. It is not speech I like, 

but it would be free speech. 

But nevertheless, it creates a fertile soil around the world of indoctrination and it plays directly into the narrative that the Islamic State pushes that it is defending true Islam against a host 

of enemies including many within the Muslim world. 

I will conclude simply by saying that the United States has very 

deep differences with Saudi Arabia. These involve for example 

women’s rights, homosexuality, religious freedom, freedom of 

speech—these are deep and fundamental differences. At the same 

time, Saudi Arabia is a vital partner on counterterrorism. And one 

of the difficulties in any policy is walking this line between a vital 

partner yet one who is more partner than friend. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]

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Mr. POE. I thank all of our witnesses for their testimony, and I 

recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions. I will make this comment. It is obvious that Saudi Arabia acts in its own interest. Not 

necessarily that is a bad thing, but countries should act in their 

own best interest including the United States. We should act in our 

best interest. 

Regarding the 9/11 Commission report, the 28 classified pages, I 

would like each of you just to give me a yes or no on this. Should 

those 28 pages be declassified in your opinion? Ambassador, you 

have already said. 

Mr. ROEMER. I am strongly in favor of declassifying the 28 pages 

as soon as possible, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Henderson. 

Mr. HENDERSON. Since you limit me to a yes or no answer, the 

answer is yes. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

Ms. House. 

Ms. HOUSE. As a journalist my answer is obviously yes. 

Mr. POE. And Dr. Byman. 

Mr. BYMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. As mentioned in your testimony, and many members 

have talked about JASTA and the Senate unanimously passing legislation last week, the bill doesn’t mention any governments but it 

says that the bill makes a foreign government that provides tangible support to terrorists who carry out an attack on the United 

States subject to the jurisdiction of an American courts. Do you 

think that is a good idea, Ambassador? 

Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I would put my former congressman 

hat on, but also try to talk a little about my hat as a former diplomat. I am also strongly in favor of the Senate bill. I think it is 

a bipartisan bill where Senator Cornyn, who you know well, and 

Senator Lindsey Graham have both put in their considerations and 

narrowed the scope of the bill so that it does not stretch across the 

world and create problems on sovereign immunity for other diplomatic situations. It is narrowed to this particular issue with Saudi 

Arabia. 

And Mr. Chairman, I would then say that given that we are a 

country of rules and laws and that if our court thereby finds that 

there was some activity or action by Saudi that contributed, let our 

courts prevail and let justice prevail. We should pass this bill. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. Henderson. 

Mr. HENDERSON. I agree that our courts should be allowed to 

prevail with the caveat of be careful what you wish for and taking 

such action could lead to Saudi retaliation whether it be withdrawing Treasury bills or actions against Americans in the kingdom. I don’t think that is what we are looking for. 

Mr. POE. Ms. House, what do you think, should we pass it or 

not? It is our decision that is going to come up next week. The Senate did it. What do you think? 

Ms. HOUSE. This is beyond my expertise. But as someone who 

travels abroad a lot and in Saudi Arabia, a very closed and conservative society, I worry about what Simon just said, be careful, 

and what Congressman Issa raised earlier, the risk of retaliation. 

38

I mean, I believe vengeance is mine sayeth the Lord, I shall repay; 

that perhaps there is something to be said for letting the Lord handle that part of the vengeance on the Saudis. 

Mr. POE. All right. 

Dr. Byman, can you narrow it down to a yes or no? 

Mr. BYMAN. I will say a caveated yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. We don’t get to caveat vote. It is a yea or a nay without 

an explanation. I am just—what is your opinion of the bill? 

Mr. BYMAN. My opinion of the bill is that as long as the bar is 

very high for what constitutes state support, then it is appropriate 

for the courts to decide this. 

Mr. POE. A couple of other observations, this hearing, you all 

have talked about a lot of things including Iran, and the Saudis 

have a two-front war apparently or a two-front concern in the Middle East. It is terrorism and it is also Iran. And I think as Mr. 

Henderson testified that our concern really is terrorism and not so 

much Iran. The crimes in Syria have cost millions of folks to move 

into Europe. Has the Saudi Arabian Government ever taken any 

Syrian refugees into Saudi Arabia? 

Mr. HENDERSON. My understanding is that Saudi Arabia along 

with the other Gulf states has not taken refugees in a manner that 

we would recognize; that Europe is taking refugees. I believe that 

at least some of the Gulf states, I am not sure if it applies to Saudi 

Arabia, have been generous in allowing Syrians who already live 

in their countries to bring in relatives and family members at this 

time. 

Mr. POE. All right, thank you. I think it is somewhat interesting 

that Saudi Arabia does not take Syrian refugees, which is a whole 

different issue. I am going to yield to the ranking member from 

Massachusetts for his questions. Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to see if you could comment on this. As Ambassador 

Roemer and Dr. Byman have mentioned there has been, you know, 

increases in legal reforms and efforts to really constrain financially 

the ability of people in Saudi Arabia to, you know, fund for this extremist activity. 

Now how successful has that been, and if hasn’t been as successful as it should be, then why not? Is it a lack of will or are they 

encountering difficulties just implementing this? If you could comment on that because I think it is a fundamental question of transparency. They are doing this. They are attempting to do it, how effective have they been? 

Mr. ROEMER. I would say, Mr. Keating, I hate to sound like 

Harry Truman who talked about economists on the one hand and 

the other hand, but on the one hand you see the Saudis cooperating, helping us, cracking down on terrorism, passing national 

laws to try to restrict people from joining up with the Islamic 

State, and on the other hand as we read in the recent article in 

the New York Times, Saudi money and government financing for 

more jihadis going from Kosovo to Syria. 

We need both the Saudi hands working together with the United 

States on counterterrorism as a principal concern along with our 

other strategic objectives, which are Middle East stability, which 

are making sure that Iran cannot do us harm through terrorism, 

39

through promoting human rights and through some of the other 

key issues that we have mentioned here. 

I would also say, Mr. Keating, that our relationship with the 

Saudis, while it is difficult right now on this particular issue, we 

have had difficulties with them and they have had difficulties with 

us before. They were not in support of the U.S. invading Iraq in 

2003. They were not in favor of the U.S. negotiating President 

Obama’s nuclear deal and kicked back vociferously about that. 

They were not, you know, for Harry Truman recognizing Israel so 

quickly. So we can get through this, but I am glad that counterterrorism is front and center today. 

Mr. KEATING. Dr. Byman, just quickly. Has it been effective and 

if not why? 

Mr. BYMAN. It has been somewhat effective. We have seen 

groups in Chechnya run out of money because of a decrease in 

Saudi support. The Islamic State advised its supporters in the 

kingdom to channel money through Kuwait because the efforts in 

the kingdom were extensive enough to be disruptive. 

But a number of causes still enjoy considerable domestic legitimacy. Again, I mentioned Pakistan. And as a result, you can give 

to groups that are kind of one level out from the most radical but 

the individuals involved often cross over. Part of it is simply technically very hard, but I think part of a problem is a deep political 

will issue to go after the entirety of the problem. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. Just quickly, I think the panel has 

done a great job covering as time permits a wide array. But I want 

to ask you this question if you could just answer it briefly because 

of time, where do you see Saudi Arabia 10 years from now particularly in terms of the U.S.? 

Mr. HENDERSON. Saudi Arabia in 10 years’ time will, I think, be 

very much recognizable as the Saudi Arabia of today. I don’t anticipate any revolution, any emerging republic to replace the royal 

family. 

What I don’t know is who will be king of Saudi Arabia then, 

when the transition will occur, and under what circumstances it 

will occur. This is very different from the way our knowledge of 

Saudi Arabia looking backwards over the last 30 or 40 years where 

there was a predictability to the whole thing. With the eminence, 

the increasing prominence of the 30-year-old Muhammad bin 

Salman, previous conceptions about how Saudi Arabia is going to 

move forward have to be discarded. 

Mr. KEATING. So it is less predictable. Does anyone else quickly 

want to venture any vision? 

Ms. HOUSE. It is definitely less predictable, but I think it is likely 

not to be dramatically different. But in my view it will have inched 

forward some. Women are, I know nobody likes to hear this, but 

they are much better educated than the men and they are much 

more willing to work and they are managing to get opportunities. 

And the Saudi people, while unhappy with various things at 

home, look around at the total chaos and bloodshed in the rest of 

the Middle East and whatever they think of the Saudi royal family 

now, they prize stability over change. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Wilson, South Carolina. 

40

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Judge Poe. 

And Ms. House, Saudi Arabia has incredible influence in the Islamic world. With the status of reforms to the Saudi educational 

curriculum promised in 2008, has that been produced or not? 

Ms. HOUSE. No. I don’t think so, because as the man who was 

in charge of changing the textbooks told me when I was writing my 

book, at some level it doesn’t matter what the textbooks say. When 

you close the door, the teacher is in charge, and all too many of 

the teachers are in total agreement with the more rigid Wahhabi 

philosophy that has been ingrained. 

Mr. WILSON. And it seems illogical to me the promotion of 

jihadism would create such a level of instability that would threaten the regime in Riyadh. Is that not correct? 

Ms. HOUSE. No, they have been very successful. As I said, Muhammad bin Nayef, the Crown Prince, they have been very successful at controlling terrorism in the kingdom since the 2003, ’04, 

’05 period when they had a lot of it. And now, and people want that 

stability and if repression occurs against some human rights advocates in the context of that most Saudis are sadly willing to overlook that. As Dr. Byman said, what we would call free speech they 

punish. 

Mr. WILSON. And it just seems again counterproductive, but hope 

springs eternal. 

Ms. HOUSE. Counterproductive to do what? 

Mr. WILSON. To the existence of the kingdom. That there would 

be such an extremist ideology that just could——

Ms. HOUSE. No, as he said, it is fundamentally what gives the 

royal family their legitimacy is that we support the Wahhabis who 

are propagating the one true Islam. And they prefer that it be exported as they are doing in other places, and they control themselves, the jihadis, at home. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I just see the instability whether it be Yemen 

or you name it, or Pakistan or Libya, wherever, Kosovo. But bottom 

line, thank goodness we have good people like Ambassador Roemer 

around. 

And Ambassador, I am really grateful. From the state of South 

Carolina, the late governor John C. West served as Ambassador to 

Saudi Arabia and worked very closely to establish a warm, bipartisan relationship. Can you judge the effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s attempt to fight terrorism financing? Have we seen a noticeable impact on their financing of groups in the region? 

Mr. ROEMER. Congressman Wilson, thank you for the question. 

I would say that it is inconsistent on financial crackdowns and financial progress. We have probably seen since 2003 more progress 

from the Saudis than at any other time once they had the internal 

attacks and took this quite seriously. 

But I think as Dan Byman said, we often see this supported, ignored, and then a crackdown, and supported, ignored and a crackdown, and not consistent enough. The financial area is somewhere 

where I think the United States and the Treasury Department has 

been very successful at working with the Saudi Government in 

some areas, but I don’t think it is consistent enough and I don’t 

think it has passed through from the top levels of Saudi society 

down into the cultural and religious areas. 

41

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank goodness again that you are involved, 

and we need your guidance. 

And Mr. Byman, how would you characterize the Saudi counterterrorism campaign in Yemen? Has it been effective? 

Mr. BYMAN. Sir, for the most part the campaign has not been effective. They have gone into Yemen primarily to fight the Houthi 

movement there which they believe is backed, is tied to Iran. In my 

view the ties are real, but the Saudis overstate them considerably. 

But the Middle East, sir, as you know is a mess, and what makes 

it more confusing is the Houthis are fighting al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. So by fighting the group the Saudis believe is tied 

to Iran, they have given the al-Qaeda group more freedom of operation. Recently they have been trying to fight both, but that said, 

the big winner of the Saudi intervention has been al-Qaeda of the 

Arabian Peninsula. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, again, thank each of you for as you say a very 

complicated situation. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. The chair recognizes the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Let me just quiz you all by a show of 

hands. How many of you believe that the House of Saud will be in 

control of Saudi Arabia 15 years from now, a monarchy under the 

House of Saud? If you think so, raise your hand. 

Ms. HOUSE. 15. 

Mr. SHERMAN. 15 years. Okay, we have got four hands raised. 

That is a better odds than many governments in the Middle East 

get. 

Ms. HOUSE. People are passive. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Second, the Saudis have said they would sell $750 

billion of assets if we pass this law. I don’t think they would do it, 

but even when they say they would do it is this to avoid attachment as a litigation defense strategy, or is this to punish and scare 

the United States? Why are they claiming to do the 750? Ambassador. 

Mr. ROEMER. Congressman, I don’t think they would do it. They 

didn’t buy those securities in American bonds to do us a charitable 

work. They did it to make money. They are not going to sell it if 

it loses them a lot of money——

Mr. SHERMAN. On the other hand you could——

Mr. ROEMER [continuing]. Opening that threat to us. I don’t 

think——

Mr. SHERMAN. You could say that a U.S. bond is four basis points 

better than investing in a euro bond, and then if there is a genuine 

risk that a lawsuit will lead to the attachment of those assets, because if there is a lawsuit I don’t know whether the damages are 

only $1 billion. Maybe they are $10 billion. Maybe with punitives 

they are $750 billion. So I don’t think they would do it to punish 

us. I wonder whether it is a litigation strategy. 

Just some commentary, I mean, Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, so 

by definition you don’t have the right of the people to control the 

government. So you can’t have free speech because a lot of speakers 

would say that the people should control the government. And their 

human rights toward women, LGBT, and religious freedom is zero. 

Now we accept that. I mean, a Mormon missionary in Riyadh is, 

42

I assume, a dead Mormon missionary or just an imprisoned Mormon missionary. I don’t know which. 

But, so I focus on, okay, we know that all about them. The question is are they exporting terrorism? Two ways that they can export terrorism, one is to the finance the people that actually blow 

things up. Here is the money today, blow something up tomorrow. 

9/11 support, of course. That is the focus of the 28 pages. But the 

other is to finance a propaganda education machine designed to 

teach millions of people that blowing things up is a good idea. 

The House of Saud and the Wahhabis have an alliance that goes 

back to the 1700s. I can’t fault them if they finance efforts to say, 

hey, you should strictly follow Islam. Pray five times a day; don’t 

slough off and do four. But we are not talking about just orthodox 

practice. We are talking about are they teaching people. 

How much money is Saudi Arabia spending out of government 

money or royal money to spread Wahhabi Islam, and is there a 

form of Wahhabi Islam they can spread that is orthodox but not 

violent? 

Mr. ROEMER. The answer to your first question is it doesn’t matter much how much they are spending because it doesn’t cost 

much. We found on the 9/11 Commission that the entire operation 

against the United States to pull off——

Mr. SHERMAN. Oh, yes. If they were financing the people that 

blow things up you do that for small amounts of money. But if your 

goal is to change popular opinion from Rubat to Jakarta and to create millions of people who think that killing non-Muslims is a good 

idea that can be expensive. And I know that others have talked 

about did they finance this or that terrorist attack. My focus is, are 

they financing a well designed propaganda effort to create millions 

of pro-terrorist thinkers? Does anybody have an idea how much 

they are spending to finance Wahhabism, and can you draw distinction between violent and non-violent Wahhabism or is there 

just one Wahhabism? 

Ms. HOUSE. There are lots of Saudis who would argue that you 

can draw a distinction between violent and non-violent 

Wahhabism. The late King Abdullah fired some of the senior religious scholars who in essence the supreme court of what is the 

right Islam. King Salman has restored one of them. So there are 

a lot of people in Saudi Arabia who do not believe in killing other 

people. 

But I think your point is well taken that it is more, in my view 

it is less the direct financing than the indirect promotion of a form 

of religion that we obviously would regard as intolerant. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would go beyond intolerant. I mean those who 

are just orthodox——

Ms. HOUSE. Intolerant and violent. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. And say bad things, who teach that 

if you have, you know, you are going to hell if you have a ham 

sandwich, that is a certain intolerance. It is when you start advocating blowing things up that I draw the line. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. To my good friend from California, according to a Senate Judiciary Committee testimony, Saudi 

43

Arabia spends $4 billion a year on mosques, madrassa preachers, 

students, and textbooks to spread the Wahhabi creed, if that helps 

out at all. 

If I could turn to Mr. Henderson, do you think that the kingdom, 

the House of Saud, can survive without its affiliation to 

Wahhabism? Can it survive? 

Mr. HENDERSON. Could you just repeat the question? 

Mr. PERRY. Can the kingdom, can the House of Saud survive 

without its affiliation to Wahhabism? 

Mr. HENDERSON. It would be a very different kingdom. Historically, it is a partnership between the House of Saud and the religious leadership. 

Mr. PERRY. So is that a tepid yes? Is it, I mean so you are saying 

there is a chance? What is that? 

Mr. HENDERSON. I don’t think—it is a hypothetical which I——

Mr. PERRY. Well, I guess——

Mr. HENDERSON [continuing]. Never thought of it before and because I don’t think it is within the range of realistic possibility. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay, so it is not realistic. Because it seems to me 

the House of Saud, the Saudis have said we are now an unreliable 

partner, so to speak, because we are not able to protect their monarchy. 

But I would say that they have been duplicitous and unreliable 

because they have spent $4 billion a year or something to that effect to spread Wahhabism around the globe, including North America, et cetera. I mean, I have got all the stats here of the thousands 

of mosques and centers and colleges and, you know, 80 percent of 

the mosques, 1,200 mosques operating in the U.S. were constructed 

after 2001, mostly with Saudi financing. And it just goes on and 

on from there whether you go to Europe or wherever you go. 

That having been said, at some point as an ally, who we are engaged in this war on terrorism whether we like it or not because 

the war has come to our doorstep, is it too much to ask, I guess 

that is the question. Is it too much to ask for them to stop that? 

To stop it. 

Mr. HENDERSON. I think what you are describing is a very valid 

question. I did not recognize comments of your colleague Mr. Sherman in terms of defining what is journalistically known as 

Wahhabism as being necessarily violent. I think it is intolerant and 

it is a conservative and strict Islam which is——

Mr. PERRY. I would rather you not use the term ‘‘conservative’’ 

as opposed to fundamentalist. Thank you very kindly. 

Mr. HENDERSON. Sorry, it is the British-ness in me. I am sorry. 

Mr. PERRY. I appreciate that but it means something here. 

Mr. HENDERSON. Forgive me. 

Mr. SHERMAN. With a personal approvance, I would prefer you 

go back to the original phraseology. 

Mr. PERRY. Reclaiming my time and then some, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HENDERSON. Okay. I think there is a concern amongst leaders of Muslim communities in other parts of the world that Saudi 

Arabia spends a lot of money bringing mosques and bringing teachers to their countries and introducing a stricter form of Islam 

to——

44

Mr. PERRY. But do they not make the connection that when they 

bring the mosques and the teachers and the teaching they are 

bringing terrorism, an ideology of terrorism and death? 

Mr. HENDERSON. I don’t think Wahhabism has an ideology of terrorism. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay, I appreciate your opinion. 

Ms. House, you talked about our relationship with the Saudis 

and Israel and how important it is to maintain that stability in the 

Middle East, but does that mean that the United States should accept the circumstances of what many Americans, myself included, 

see as Saudi Arabia support, material support, through the construction of mosques and the ideology around the world including 

their own neighborhood, should we accept that for the stability, as 

you put it, in our relationship with Israel and Saudi Arabia? 

Ms. HOUSE. Well, I think we ought to, and hopefully we do, continuously try to underscore to them that it is not in——

Mr. PERRY. Ma’am, with all due respect this has been going on 

for decades. At what point do we require action on their part? Talking is one thing, but there are terrorists running around the 

globe——

Ms. HOUSE. Well, what kind of action can you require? 

Mr. PERRY. Well, we can request that they no longer fund this; 

that they change the teaching; that they get in the game on this 

like we have to be. Is that too much to ask? And is it worth the 

stability? 

Ms. HOUSE. It is not too much to ask, but I don’t know that it 

will result in a change. 

Mr. PERRY. Is it too much to demand for the sake of our relationship? 

Ms. HOUSE. Well, what is the rest of the demand? If not, we are 

not going to protect our interest in the Persian Gulf anymore? 

Mr. PERRY. What about our interest in our schools and our 

neighborhoods here where people are going to blow us up? What 

about those interests, or are they not important? Because they are 

coming here, they are here now. 

Ms. HOUSE. They are. 

Mr. PERRY. So at what point, what is the tipping point, if you 

know? 

Ms. HOUSE. I just think—I didn’t get to talk about Iran. I think 

that you are focused on Saudi Arabia today for obvious reasons, but 

they are not the only people propagating terrorism in the Middle 

East. Iran is too. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay, I agree with that. But for their part, let’s just 

talk their part and our relationship. Do we just continue to accept 

it without any—there is no benchmark. We don’t see any milestones at all from my standpoint. 

Mr. POE. The witness can answer that question. 

Ms. HOUSE. I think it is my personal view that the regime could 

do more. In history, when the old man was founding the country 

and the religious nuts, his Ikhwan, wanted to invade Iraq and he 

knew that the British did not want him to and would cut off his 

money he kept them from doing that. He in essence waged a war 

on his own troops and won. When the royal family chooses to lay 

down a marker I think they can. 

45

And so I believe that is why I am intrigued with what the young 

guy is doing when he talks about, and I know talk is cheap, but 

talks about moderate Islam. The young people in Saudi Arabia 

these days are not just dependent on Saudi TV. You can now get 

90 channels of TV. You can watch anything in Saudi Arabia. And 

they are all on the internet and they all do have a much greater 

idea about what goes on in the rest of the world. 

So there is some change in the society, and I remind you again 

70 percent of the people are under 30 years of age. It could be a 

quite different Saudi Arabia not liberal like this country, but it 

could be a quite different place in 10 years if the society cut off 

from its ability to be passive and dependent on the government 

through spending oil to give everybody a job and buy their loyalty 

which they can’t afford anymore, if people become self-reliant 

which they are urging them to do—we have to see if this transpires—it will be, I think, a somewhat different society. 

Mr. POE. I thank the witness. Mr. Rohrabacher from California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. We were talking 

about words, a little back and forth on words. Let me just note, 

sometimes it is discouraging to hear people use certain words or 

the inability of certain people to use words. At a time when radical 

Islamic terrorism threatens to murder tens of thousands, if not 

more, Americans, it is quite disconcerting that our own President 

can’t use the term ‘‘radical Islamic terrorism.’’ And that needs to 

be looked at closely. 

In terms of the Saudis, I will have to suggest that Ms. House 

that I like your optimism, but there is a thing called irrational optimism. And that is when someone gets beaten in the head a number 

of times and think they can do the same exact thing without getting beat in the head. The Saudis have been financing terrorism 

now for 20 years at least, at least. I mean they are, Saudis were 

behind the Taliban. Saudis financed Pakistan and they still do, and 

the Taliban were financed by that money. 

Just what, 2 days ago there was a drone attack where we took 

out the new leader of the Taliban, and where was he? He was in 

Pakistan. And who do you think is paying his bills in Pakistan, the 

Pakistanis? They are broke. They get their money from Saudi Arabia. So the Saudis have been financing this mayhem. 

I mean, it is not just the fact that 15 of 19 of the terrorists that 

murdered 3,000 Americans on 9/11 that they were Saudis, but it 

is what the government has actually done. And let me ask, how 

many of you there believe that the royal family of Saudi Arabia did 

not know and was unaware that there was a terrorist plot being 

implemented that would result in an historic terrorist attack in the 

United States in the lead up to 9/11? Do you believe that the Saudi 

royal family did not know? Raise your hand if you think that. 

Oh, okay. Let me just suggest this, that—okay. We have two and 

two, I think. So you guys believe that the Saudi royal family may 

well have known there was a major terrorist attack coming. 

Mr. ROEMER. Mr.——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead. 

Mr. ROEMER [continuing]. Congressman, you and I go way back 

from our time together when I served up here. That is just too difVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:47 Jun 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\052416\20256 SHIRL
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ficult of a question for somebody to raise their hand or put their 

hand down to——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, it is not for me. I will raise my hand 

right here. And let me tell you something——

Mr. ROEMER. Have you read the 28 pages? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. That within 4 months before 

9/11, I was tipped off by a very high ranking Taliban who happened to work with me in Afghanistan when we were fighting the 

Soviets that there was going to be, there is a plot going on and 

what do you think about this ongoing plot? And I might say, the 

Warren Commission didn’t seem to—when I sent that information 

over that I had been tipped off, they did not follow through on it. 

I wonder, why? 

And so what we have here is a high level ranking member of the 

Taliban knows about this, but we don’t think that the high ranking 

people in Saudi Arabia who are financing the whole thing didn’t 

know about it? This is clear that the Saudis have been intentionally involved in the mass slaughter of Americans and other 

people in the world in a terrorist way. 

We know that they are, number one, we know that they are currently financing madrassa schools and they teach, what do they 

teach these kids at school? When they come out of them they can, 

yes, they can be radical Islamic terrorists, but they can’t do anything else in the modern economy. They finance mosques that are 

preaching the worst kind of hatred. And we are hearing about this 

all the time in the Balkans where they are financing the worst 

kind of—and we have of course the direct finance of terrorism that 

we have seen directly into Saudi Arabia. 

And we are being told by you today that we really don’t know 

if the Saudi royal family is involved in this. Well, even if they are 

aware of this they are responsible. After 9/11—they didn’t want to 

kill 3,000 Americans on 9/11. They wanted to kill 50,000 Americans 

on 9/11. 50,000. That is what they thought. When those buildings 

were going to come down, they didn’t know that we could get all 

the people out. They were there for a mass slaughter of Americans. 

And we have just managed to just sort of, well, let’s give them 

the benefit of the doubt whether or not the royal family knew about 

this or not. I say that the Saudi royal family has made itself clear 

that they do not deserve the benefit of the doubt because of all of 

their actions they have been involved in. 

And whether or not the young Saudi royal family members that 

are watching TV now are going to have an epiphany that 

Wahhabism isn’t really, doesn’t demand them to go out and attack 

the West, whether or not that is going to happen or not I don’t 

think we can rely on that. Especially when you find that all of 

these young Islamic terrorists are springing up in different parts 

of the world including in San Bernardino, including at the Boston 

Marathon, you have these people who have been exposed to Western society but they have also been treated to a very high dose of 

Wahhabi radical Islamic philosophy that leads them to commit 

these terrorist acts. 

It is either we are going to face reality or there is going to be 

more and more of our people slaughtered. And I think how we deal 

47

with Saudi Arabia it has either got to be realistic or our people are 

going to suffer the consequences. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from California. I thank all of 

the witnesses for being here. I want to thank the guests in the gallery as well, and also want to recognize some of the folks from the 

families of 9/11 that are here today as well. 

Thank you once again, and there may be other questions we 

have. You know the routine. We put them in writing, we send them 

to you, and we expect an answer in 10 days. The subcommittee is 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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