## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS

N O . P D - 1687- 07

D A N I EL R EY , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON S TATE ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW FROM THE S EVENTH CO URT O F AP PEALS

HA LE CO UNTY J OHNS ON , J. , de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t he C our t , i n w hi c h M E YE RS , P RI CE , W OMACK , K EASLE R , H ERVEY , H OL C OM B and C OCHR AN , J J ., jo in e d . K ELL ER , P .J ., f i l e d a c onc ur r i ng o pi ni on. O P I N I O N Appellant wa s char g ed with and c onvict ed b y a j ury of aba ndoning a

child. He wa s sentenc ed to two y ea rs ’ i m p risonment, probate d for f ive y ear s, and a $3,000 f ine. Appellant appea led the convic tion. The court of appea ls rever sed the c onviction and orde red a n acquittal. The state soug ht discretionar

y re view of the judgme nt, which was g rante d by this Court. Beca

use the

c ourt of a pp e a ls impr op e rl y c on str

ue d the law, we re ve rs e tha t c ourt ’s ru lin g and

re mand thi s c a se to the court of appea ls to revie w appellant’ s leg al- a nd fac tual-suffic iency

claims under the proper2

standard. F acts Appellant wa s marrie d to Michelle Mora les. Tog ether they had a da ug hter, who w as one year old at the time of the c harg ed off ense . M o rale s also had a thr ee- y ear -old son from a pr ior

re latio ns hip . A ft e r t

he c ou ple se pa rate d in late 20 05 , th e c hil dr e n li ve d w iththei r mo th er in Plainview, while Appellant lived in Muleshoe. I n his state ment to the Plainview Police Depa rtment (state’ s exhibi t 2) , Appellant wrote that he had called Morales on Fe bruar y 23, 2006, and said that h e w as co m i n g t o v i s i t
. W h en h e a rr i v edar o u n d 1 2 : 3 0 a. m . , h e c o u l d

h ea r h i s d au gh t er

cryi n g. Throug h the window, he c ould also see his stepson, D.M., asle ep on the c ouch. He knocked on the door, and D

. M. woke up. Appe llant asked D.M. whe re his mother w as. The c hild looked for her in the apar

tment, but his mother was not home. Appellant broke the front window, opened the door , remove d both children fr om the apar tment. He stated that he l eft his stepson with the neig hbors, then took his daug hter, a

nd went bac k to Muleshoe. I n Muleshoe, he wa ited “an hour ” bef ore r eporting the unattende d children be cause he didn’t wa nt to ge t his wife in trouble fo r l ea v i ng the childre n alone. When she still was not home an hour later, he ca lled the Muleshoe police , who contac ted the Plainview police. He asser ted that he ha d not taken his stepson with h i m b ec au s e h i s wife ha d “alr eady tried to f ile char g es and [he] was af raid th[at] she would say

that [he] kidnapped him.” The neig hbor testified that a

ppellant did not le ave D.M. with him; he found D.M. alone , standing outside

ne ar t he br ok e n w ind owg la ss w ith out sh oe s o r s oc ks and “ sc re a min g fo r h is f

a the r. ” No on e e lse was pre sent when of

fice rs ar rived to investig ate. On appe al, appe llant argue d that the state’s e vidence ag ainst him was insufficient to show that he had “ custody , car e, or control,” as require d by the child-aba ndonment statute. The c ourt of3

D i d t he co urt of ap p eal s err i n graf t i ng an i n l o co p a ren t i s r equ i r eme n t on t o T EX . P E N A L C O D E § 1 22

. 04 1( b) , w h e n t h e g r a v a me n of t h e of f e n s e i s a ba n do n me n t by on e w h o h a s c a r e , c u s t od y or c on t r ol of t h e v i c t i m, and t he p roo f

of a f am i l i al rel at i o nshi p wi t h t he vi ct i m i s o nl y one po ss i b l e evi d ent i ary f act t o be co nsi d ered by t he f act f i nder i n i t s det er mi nat i on of wh et her a def

endan t comm i t t ed t he of f ens e. T he cour t of

appeal s ha s deci ded an im p o rta n t q u e stio n o f state law tha t ha s n o t, b u t sho u ld b e se ttl e d b y the C o u rt. appea ls ag ree d, finding that appellant did not stand in loc o p ar e nti s wit h D. M .; it reverse d the conviction and r ender ed a judg ment of ac q u i t t al. Rey v. State, 238 S.W .3d 840 (Tex. App.– Amarillo, 2007). I n its petiti on, the state a

rgued that the g rava

men of the offense is abandonment by one who ha s c are , c us tod

y , o r c on tr ol o f t he vic tim , a nd the pr oo f o f a

fa mil ia l r e latio ns hip wi th t

he vic tim is only one possible evidentiar

y fac t to be considere d by the fa ct-finde r i n i t s d et ermination of whether a def endan t committed the offe nse. We g rante d the state’s g round for revie w, which

asser ted that the cour

t of appe als err ed in g raf

ting a n in loc o p ar e nti

s require ment onto T EX . P EN AL C ODE § 22.041(b). 1 Cus to dy, Ca r e , o r Co nt r ol U nde r § 2 2. 04 1( b) The ca s e b ef

o re us presents a que stion of the statutory construction of the meaningof “custody , car e, or c ontrol” in § 22.041(b). This is a que stion of l aw t h at we review de novo

. W ill iam s v . S

tate , 253 S.W .3d 673, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

. Section 1.05(a) of the Pena l Code pr ov ide s th a t pr ov isi on s are to be “ c on str ue d a c c or din g to the fa ir imp or t of the ir te rm s, to p ro mot e justice and e ffe ct the objec tives of the code .” T EX . P EN A L C ODE § 1.05(a) . Section 1.05(b) r efe rs us to the Code Construction Act, which provide s that “[w] ords and phr ase s that have a cquire d a technica l or particula

r mea ning, whether

b y l egi s l at ive def

inition or otherwise, shall be c onstrued

acc ording ly .” T EX . G OV ' T C ODE § 311.011(b). Appellant wa s char g ed with a bandoning or endang eringa child under T EX . P EN A L C ODE §4

T h e Cour t h as s ai d t h at “ Se c. 22. 041 i mpos es a du t y u pon t h os e r es pon s i bl e f or c h i l dr en t o r ef

r ai n f r om 2 un r eas onabl y s ubj ect i ng t he chi l d t o dange r . ” S c h u ltz v. S ta te , 92 3 S.W

. 2 d 1, 4 (T ex. C ri m . A p p . 19 9 6 ). 22.041(b). That subsection states that [a] person c ommits an off ense if, ha ving c ustody , car e, or c ontrol of a c hild y oung er than 15 y ear s, he i ntentionally abandons the child in any place under c ircumstance s that e xpos e the c hil d to an unr e a so na ble ri sk of ha rm . We have not pre viously

examined the phrase “custody , car e, or c ontrol” as use d in § 22.041(b). 2 Th e le g isl a tur e ha s g ive n “ c us tod y , c are , o r c on tr ol” a pa

rt ic ula r me anin g wi thi n the statut e that define s the offense of injury to a child, elder ly

individual, or disabled individual. T EX . P EN AL C ODE § 22.04(d). That subsection states that [f] or t he purpose s of an omission that cause s a condition descr ibed by Subsection (a )( 1) , ( 2) , o r ( 3) , th e a c tor ha s a ssume d c are , c us tod y , or contr ol i f h e ha s b y a c t, words, or c ourse of

conduct a cted so a s to cause a rea sonable pe rson to conclude that he has a cce pted re sponsibili ty for pr ot ec t i on, food, shelter , and medica l car e for a child . . .. T h e c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e l i s t e d s u b s e c t i o n s ar e : 1 ) s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y; 2 ) s e r i o u s m e n t a l d e f

i c i e n c y, i mp a i r m e n t , o r i n j u r y; an d 3 ) b o d i l y i n

j u r y. I n Hi c k s v . S tate , 241 S.W .3d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), we c o n sidered the issue of interpre ting the me aning of “c are , custody , or control” as used in § 22.04(d) . I n that case , the cour t of appeals had held t hat “possession” equate d to “ca re, custody , or control” as used in § 22.04(d)

. Id . at 544. The de finition of “possession” wa s taken f rom § 1.07(a) (39) of

the Penal Code. Ho we v er , t h i s C o u rt , ci t i n g Bo y k in v . S tate , 818 S.W. 2d 78 2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ), re ite rate d th a t, wh e n s tatut e s are c le ar a

nd un ambi g uo us , the ir pla in me anin g s mus t be g ive n e ff e c t un le ss i t w ou ld lead to an a

bsurd re sult that the L eg islature could not possibly have intende d. Hicks , 241 S.W .3d at 545-46. Subsec t i o n 2 2

. 04(d)’ s definition of “c are , custody , or control” was “ clea rly and5

unambig uo u s l y

set out,” and “ [b] eca

use the languag e of Sec tion 22.04(d) is clea r, the c ourt of appea ls should have applied the pla in lang uag e of subsection (d) and refra ined from looking beyond the text of the statute in interpretingit.” Id . at 546. The purpose of both § 22.04 and § 22.041 is protec tion of vul nera ble individuals. W e may

re a so na bly c on c lud e that th e c le ar, un ambi g uo us langua g e that de fi ne s “ c are , c us tod y , and c on tr ol” in § 22.04 is equally applicable to the same phrase in § 22.041, the immediately following statute. We h old that the pr op e r me anin g of the ph ra se “ c us tod y , ca re , or co ntr ol” in § 22 .0 41 (b ) i s th e same

as th a t o f § 2 2

. 0 4 ( d ) : “ th e a c to r h a s a s s u me d c ar e , c u s to dy , o r c o n tr o l if h e h a s b y a c t, w o r d s , or

course of conduc t acted so a s to c au s e a rea sonable pe rson to conclude that he has a cce pted responsibility

for pr otection, food, shelter , and medica l car e for a child . . ..” Ana lys is The state a

rgues that the lowe r cour

t’s opinion gr afte d an in loc o p ar e nti s re qu ir e me nt o nto § 22.041(b). The court of appeals acknowledg ed that “the duty [under § 22.041(b)] does not have to be one imposed under the Family Code to fall within the penal provision[.] ” Rey , 238 S.W .3d at 84 1. Ne ve rt

he le ss, the c ourt of a

pp e a ls dis c us se d the natur e of a pp e lla nt’ s re latio ns hip wi th t

he c hil d using a n in loc o p ar e nti

s ana ly sis

. Simpl y put, the rec ord is bere ft of any evidenc e illustrating that appellant ac cepte d the re sponsibili ty

to protect, shelter , fee d and ca re for the three -y ear -old. This is of import be cause the status of steppare nt a lone does not obligate the steppar ent to car e for h is s te p c h il d

. Rath e r , th e s te p p ar e n t mu s t “ r e c e iv e ” th e c h il d in to th e f amily or acc ept the child as a

family member be fore such oblig ations arise. .

. . When that oc c ur s, the pa

re nt s tand s in loc o p ar e nti s tow ard s th e c hil d, and

the re latio ns hip wi th i t s a c c o mp an yi n g d

u t i e s c o n t i nu e s a s l o n g a s t h e c h i l d r e m a i n s p arto f

t h e f a m i l y. Id

. a t 8 4 2

. T h e c o u rt o f a p p e a ls ’ s d is c u s s io n a

p p e ar s to make a n in loc o p ar e nti s re latio ns hip deter min a tiv e of

“ c us tod y , c are , o r c on tr ol” a s to a ste pp are nt r e latio ns hip rathe r t ha n th e pla in6

lang uag e of the statute. In loc o p ar e nti

s means “ in the place of the pa rent” and re fer s to a person who assumes the d u ti e s o f a parent. Sc hr im

pf v . S e tte ga st , 3 6 T e x. 29 6, 30 2- 03 (1 87 1- 18 72 ); Coons-Andersen v

. Andersen , 104 S.W .3d 630, 634-35 (Te x . App.–Dallas 2003) . A per son in loc o p ar e nti s to a c hil d has the same rig hts, duties, and liabilities as the child’s par ents. Id . at 635. These rig hts, duties, and l i ab i l i t i es i n cl u d e, am o n g o t h er t h i n gs , p h y s i ca l p o s s es s i o n o f th e c h i l d , m o ra l an d re l i gi o u s t ra i n i n g, choice of the re sid en ce of the c hild, protection and re asonable discipline, support of the child, (i nc lud ing pr ov idi ng the c hil d wi th c lot hin g , fo od , sh e lte r, me dic a l and de nta l c are ), the ri g ht to make de cisions conce rning the child' s education, and “any other rig ht or duty

exis ting be tween a pare nt a nd child by virtue of law.” T EX . F AM . C ODE § 151 .0 01 (a ). As c an be se e n f ro m th e F a mil y Code’s def

inition of the rights a

nd duties of par ents, a pe rson in loc o p ar e nti s ha s g re a t r e sp on sib ili ty

an d b r o a d a u t h o r i t y. When we compa

re that list of duties and responsibilities to § 22.04(d)’s definition of “c are , cu s t o dy , o r c o n t ro l , ” i ti s o b v i o u s t h at b ei n g in loc o p ar e nti s n o to n l y i n c l u d e s “a cc ep t [ i n g]

re sp on sib ili ty

for pro tec ti on , f

oo d, sh e lte r, and

me dic a l c are fo r a

c hil d, ” but g re a tly

e xce e ds it. Thus , o ne wh o s tand s in loc o p ar e nti s has, by its very definition, “ca

re, c ustody , or control” of the

c h i l d u n d e r § 2 2

. 0 4 ( d ) , b u t a p e r s o n , s u c ha s a b a b y- s i t t e r , w h o h a s a tl e a s tt e mp o r ar y “ c ar e , c u s t o dy,

or c on tr ol, ” is n ot in loc o p ar e nti s . The court of appea ls e rre d in f raming the question as whethe r appe llant, beca use of his status as steppar ent of the c hild, became a per son in loc o p ar e nti s t o t h e c h i l d

an d t h e r e f o r e h a d “ c u s t o dy,

car e, or control.” Proper framing ke eps the que stion withi n § 22.04(d)’ s definition: whether appellant “ by

act, wor ds, or cour se of c onduct ac ted so as to c ause a re asonable person to conc lude7

that he has a cce pted re sponsibili ty for pr otection, food, shelter , and medica l car e for a child . . ..” The state a

rgues cor rec tly that the cour

t of appe als err ed in g raf ting a n in loc o p ar e nti

s require ment onto § 22.041(b), but it also argues for a definition of “c ustody , car e, or c ontrol” that dif fe rs fr om t

he de fi nit ion

fo un d in § 2 2. 04 (d ); the state argue s th a t “ c us tod y , c are , o r c on tr ol” should be consider ed disjunctively . Thus, a per son could have only car e of the child or only control of the c hild. The state’s cases in support of t his conclusion, Iowa v. Johnson , 528 N.W.2d 638 (I owa 1995), and Iowa v. Friend , 630 N.W.2d 843 (I owa App.–2001) , are unavailing

. Bo y k in demands

a dh e re nc e to the te xt of

the statut e . I f, an d o n l y

i f, t h e l an gu age i s am b i gu o u s o r t h e p l ai nl an gu age

wo uld le a d to a bs ur d r e su lts are we pe rm itt e d to c on su lt r e so ur c e s o uts ide of the statut e . We he ld in Hicks t h at “c ar e, cu s t o dy , o r co n t ro l ” i n§ 2 2

. 0 4 (d ) i s n o tam b i gu o u s , t h u s t h er e i s n o n ee d t o go outside the plain languag e in that subsection. Conclusion We conclude that the court of a pp ea l s er re d in making the appellant’ s lack of a n in loco pa re nti s re latio ns hip wi th D .M . d e te rm inativ e . T he pr op e r d e fi nit ion of “ c us tod y , c are , o r c on tr ol”

un de r § 22 .0 41 (b ) i s th e same a s th a t of § 2 2. 04 (d ): wh e the r an a c c us e d, “ by a c t, w or ds , o r c ours e of c on du c t ac te d so as to ca us e a re a so na

ble pe rs on to co nc lud e that he ha s a c c e pte d r e sp on sib ili ty for pr otection, food, shelter , and medica l car e . . ..” We t he re fo re re mand

thi s c a se to t

he c ourt of a pp e a ls t o r e vie w a

pp e lla nt’ s le g a l- and

fa c tua lsufficie ncy

claims using this standard for establishing when a n actor has assumed “ car e, custody , or control” of

a child. Deliver ed: April 1, 2009 Pub lis h