COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Annunziata 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

MILTON NORMAN WOODSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0140-98-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 MARCH 2, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Robert W. Duling, Judge 

 I. Scott Pickus (Jackson, Pickus & Associates, 

P.C., on briefs), for appellant. 

 Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Lisa R. 

McKeel, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Milton Norman Woodson (appellant) appeals from his bench 

trial conviction for felony child neglect under Code 

§ 18.2-371.1(B). On appeal, he contends the evidence was 

insufficient to support his conviction because it failed to prove 

(1) that he was a "parent, guardian or other person responsible 

for the care of [the] child" he was convicted of neglecting and 

(2) that his acts were so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a 

reckless disregard for human life. For the reasons that follow, 

we disagree and affirm the conviction. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 
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therefrom. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 

S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The judgment of a trial court, sitting 

without a jury, is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict 

and will be disturbed only if plainly wrong or without evidence 

to support it. See id. The credibility of a witness, the weight 

accorded the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from 

proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder's 

determination. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 

379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). 

 Code § 18.2-371.1(B) provides as follows: 

 Any parent, guardian, or other person 

responsible for the care of a child under the 

age of eighteen whose willful act or omission 

in the care of such child was so gross, 

wanton and culpable as to show a reckless 

disregard for human life shall be guilty of a 

Class 6 felony. 

A. 

APPELLANT'S STATUS AS PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR VICTIM'S CARE 

 Appellant contends on appeal that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove he was a "person responsible," within the 

meaning of Code § 18.2-371.1(B), for the care of Alan, the child 

he was convicted of neglecting. Appellant contends on brief that 

he adequately preserved this issue for appeal when he twice moved 

to strike the Commonwealth's evidence and contends that, even if 

he did not, the ends of justice mandate this Court's 

consideration of that issue on appeal. 

 Rule 5A:18 provides that "[n]o ruling of the trial court 

. . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the 
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objection was stated with the grounds therefor at the time of the 

ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of 

Appeals to attain the ends of justice." Under this Rule, a 

motion to strike the evidence offered to prove one element of an 

offense is insufficient to preserve for appeal a challenge to 

another element of that same offense. See Redman v. 

Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 220, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997). 

Here, appellant's motion to strike and brief closing argument 

covered only the credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency 

of the evidence to prove that appellant's acts or omissions 

showed a reckless disregard for human life. Appellant never 

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to prove his status as 

a "person responsible" within the meaning of the statute. 

 Nor does the ends of justice exception require us to 

consider this issue on appeal. To invoke the ends of justice 

exception, an appellant must show "more than that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove an element of the offense. . . . 

[T]he appellant must demonstrate that he or she was convicted for 

conduct that was not a criminal offense[,] or the record must 

affirmatively prove that an element of the offense did not 

occur." Id. at 221-22, 487 S.E.2d at 272-73. 

 Here, the evidence does not disprove the challenged element 

of the offense--appellant's status as a parent, guardian or 

person responsible for Alan's care; in fact, it tends to prove 

that appellant may have been a person responsible for Alan's care 
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within the meaning of the statute.1 Appellant was married to 

Alan's adult sister, Mia Woodson (Woodson), and allowed Alan and 

Ivy, Alan's and Woodson's sister, to live in their home. 

Appellant admitted that he and Woodson jointly provided food, 

shelter and medical treatment for Alan, Ivy and appellant's and 

Woodson's son, Marvin. Appellant also testified that he (1) went 

to Alan's school when Alan exhibited some behavior problems, 

(2) "spank[ed]" Alan on November 8, 1996, (3) often told Woodson 

how to discipline Alan, (4) restricted Alan's activities in 

Woodson's absence, and (5) made sure that Alan completed his 

chores. Finally, Woodson testified that both Ivy and Alan 

disliked appellant because he "establishe[d] authority" and set 

rules for the children. Because the evidence, viewed in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, failed to establish 

that appellant was not a responsible person within the meaning of 

 1We assume without deciding that one may become a person 

responsible for the care of a minor, as described in the statute, 

voluntarily through a course of conduct and without court order 

or other legal documentation. See Krampen v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (Feb. 9, 1999) (holding that legal 

custody of child is not required for conviction under Code 

§ 18.2-370.1, which refers to "[a]ny person eighteen years of age 

or older who maintains a custodial or supervisory relationship 

over a child under the age of eighteen" and that statute applies 

to any person in a "temporary, custodial relationship with the 

child," including person whom parent gave permission to drive 

child home from church). 
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the statute, the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18 does not 

require us to consider the merits of this issue on appeal.2

 B. 

PROOF OF APPELLANT'S ACTS 

 Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient as a matter 

of law to prove that his acts were so gross, wanton and culpable 

as to show a reckless disregard for human life. He contends that 

the photographs of Alan's injuries, even coupled with Alan's 

testimony, were insufficient to meet the statutory standard 

because no medical or other evidence permitted the court to 

ascertain whether the injuries were "life-threatening in 

severity." Therefore, he contends, the trial court must 

improperly have taken judicial notice, from the photographs, of 

the severity of the injuries. We reject appellant's contentions. 

 First, nothing in Code § 18.2-371.1(B) requires that the 

Commonwealth prove any injuries inflicted by appellant were 

life-threatening. In fact subsection (B) of the statute contains 

no requirement that the child suffer any injury at all. 

Subsection (A), by contrast, provides for the heightened 

punishment of an offender who "causes or permits serious injury

. . . [which] shall include but not be limited to (i) 

disfigurement, (ii) a fracture, (iii) a severe burn or 

laceration, (iv) mutilation, (v) maiming, (vi) forced ingestion 

 

 2Therefore, we do not decide whether the evidence was 

sufficient to prove appellant was a responsible person under the 

statute. 
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of dangerous substances, or (vii) life-threatening internal 

injuries." Code § 18.2-371.1(A) (emphasis added). Comparison of 

subsection (B) to subsection (A) makes clear that subsection (B) 

does not contain the requirement appellant seeks to impose. 

Rather, as the trial judge correctly observed, it requires proof 

only that appellant acted with reckless disregard for human life, 

not that his acts or omissions actually threatened that life. 

 Second, the evidence, including the photographs, viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supported the trial 

court's finding that appellant's acts and omissions were "so 

gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for 

human life," which is all that is required under Code 

§ 18.2-371.1(B). Although Alan's testimony alone would have been 

sufficient to support appellant's conviction, the additional 

testimony of Ivy and the photographs of the injuries, whether 

temporary or permanent, that appellant inflicted on Alan provided 

ample evidence to support appellant's conviction. The 

photographs, introduced without objection from appellant, 

corroborated Alan's testimony that appellant frequently beat him. 

The evidence also established that appellant routinely confined 

Alan to the basement, without regard for Alan's health, physical 

comfort or nutrition. Alan spent long periods of time in the 

basement, even overnight. Appellant's responses to Alan's 

requests for food were cruel and malicious. Appellant eventually 

ordered Alan, a twelve-year-old child, to leave the house 
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permanently without making any alternative arrangements for 

Alan's care. 

 Viewing all the facts and circumstances in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant's actions toward 

Alan exhibited a reckless disregard for the child's life. 

Therefore, the trial judge did not err in finding appellant 

guilty of the charged offense. 

 For these reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction. 

Affirmed.