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2020 IL App (5th) 170162-U 

NO. 5-17-0162 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 16-CF-403 

 ) 

RANDI JOHNSON, ) Honorable 

 ) Robert B. Haida, 

 Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 JUSTICE WHARTON delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Justices Cates and Boie concurred in the judgment. 

 

 ORDER 

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant where 

the defendant points to nothing in the record, other than the sentences 

themselves, to indicate that the court did not give adequate weight to the 

mitigating evidence, and where the record demonstrates that the court in fact 

 did consider the mitigating evidence. 

¶ 2 The defendant, Randi Johnson, appeals his 12-year sentences on two counts of 

aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2014)) and his 8-year 

sentence on one count of aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(2)). He argues 

that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing these sentences because the court failed 

to give adequate consideration to evidence in mitigation. We affirm. 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and 

may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 01/30/20. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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¶ 3 The events at issue in this appeal took place on Easter morning in 2016 at the home 

the defendant shared with his girlfriend, Sade Mason, and their three young children. A 

few days earlier, the defendant and Mason had an argument. As a result, the defendant left 

the house and stayed with his grandmother. On Easter morning, he drove to the house to 

pick up his children to take them to church and a family Easter party. When he arrived, he 

encountered Roderick Harris, a man he did not know. The confrontation between the two 

men culminated with the defendant firing multiple gunshots at Harris, none of which struck 

him. Almost immediately after the confrontation ended, the defendant fired shots into a 

vehicle driven by Terry Cox. Both Cox and his pregnant girlfriend, Jada Hall, were struck 

and injured. 

¶ 4 The defendant was charged with one count of attempt (aggravated battery) for firing 

shots at Harris, two counts of aggravated battery for shooting Terry Cox and Jada Hall, and 

one count of aggravated discharge of a firearm for firing multiple shots into Cox’s vehicle. 

At trial, he argued that he acted in self-defense. 

¶ 5 The defendant testified that he arrived at the house he shared with Mason at 

approximately 9 a.m. on Easter morning. He previously arranged to pick the children up to 

take them to church and then bring them to a family Easter party his grandmother was 

hosting later that day. When he arrived, the defendant saw a vehicle he did not recognize 

parked in the driveway. The driver pulled forward to give the defendant room to park. We 

note that another witness described the house as a duplex and explained that there was a 

shared driveway with room for multiple vehicles to park. 
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¶ 6 The defendant entered the house using his key. He testified that when he walked in, 

he saw a man he did not know standing next to Mason and his children. He thought the 

man was there to rob Mason. According to the defendant, the man pulled out a gun and 

struck the defendant with it. The gun fell to the floor, and the defendant was able to pick it 

up before the man could reach it. The defendant testified that the man then pulled out a 

second gun, so he shot at him. He testified that he fired three to five shots, none of which 

hit the man. The man turned around and started running. The defendant acknowledged that 

he “was still shooting” when the man turned and ran. However, he noted that he stopped 

shooting when the man ran across the street, explaining that he felt he was out of the “zone 

of danger” at that point. The defendant acknowledged that the man did not fire any shots 

at him. 

¶ 7 The defendant further testified that at this point he could see that the man was calling 

the police. He felt that he needed to leave the scene and call the police himself to give them 

his version of events. The defendant got into his car and backed out of the driveway. He 

testified that another vehicle drove up and stopped in the road in a catty-corner position, 

blocking both lanes. The defendant saw the window starting to open, and he shot at the car. 

He stated that he started shooting because he was afraid that someone inside the other 

vehicle was going to shoot at his car. He explained, “I didn’t know what it was. I didn’t 

know who it was because I just got a gun pulled on me, so I started shooting.” He testified 

that he fired four or five shots at the car. He acknowledged that no one inside the car 

actually fired any shots at him. 
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¶ 8 The defendant testified that he then drove away and called the police. He further 

testified that he drove to his grandmother’s house, wiped down the gun, and put it on the 

side of her shed. We note that the police searched for the gun, but they were unable to 

locate it. 

¶ 9 Roderick Harris testified that he and Mason were friends from high school. He went 

to visit her at her home the previous night, arriving sometime after midnight. Harris knew 

that the defendant was the father of three of Mason’s children, but he had not previously 

met him. Harris was aware that the defendant was planning to pick up the children Easter 

morning. 

¶ 10 Harris testified that when the defendant arrived at the house in the morning, he and 

Mason were upstairs talking. Mason went downstairs to talk to the defendant in the living 

room, while Harris waited upstairs. He testified that he could hear them arguing. He 

explained that the defendant grew angry when Mason told him to sit on the sofa and not to 

go upstairs or “through the house.” The defendant, however, did go upstairs. Harris testified 

that he hid in the closet because Mason told him earlier that she did not “want no issues” 

between the defendant and Harris. 

¶ 11 Harris testified that he had a BB gun with him that morning. He explained that he 

always carried the BB gun for protection, but he usually kept it hidden in the waistband of 

his pants. He noted that it was not functioning, but he explained that it looked enough like 

a real gun to scare anyone who threatened him. Harris took the BB gun out and held it in 

his hand while he was hiding in the closet. He explained that he did so because he could 

hear that the defendant was angry. 
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¶ 12 According to Harris, the defendant opened the closet door, saw him there, and said 

to Mason, “Is that what we doing now?” He did not indicate whether the defendant 

appeared to notice the BB gun. The defendant then left the house and drove away. Harris 

explained that he looked out the window and saw the defendant get into a white Chevy 

Impala and drive away. He then called his best friend, Terry Cox, to ask for a ride home. 

¶ 13 Harris testified that the defendant subsequently returned to Mason’s house. When 

the defendant entered the house the second time, Harris was in the living room with Mason 

and her children. According to Harris, the defendant was carrying a black handgun, 

although he was not pointing it at anyone. Harris testified that Mason grabbed hold of the 

defendant’s arm and urged him not to shoot Harris. Harris exited the house and ran across 

the street. He testified that as he ran, the defendant fired three or four shots at him, none of 

which struck him. 

¶ 14 Harris testified that Cox arrived while the defendant was shooting at him. He did 

not get into Cox’s vehicle because he did not want to endanger Cox and his girlfriend, Jada 

Hall, who was also in the car. Harris testified that Cox drove away and then came back. 

According to Harris, he heard the defendant say that he was going to shoot the car. For this 

reason, Harris yelled to Cox, telling him to leave, but Cox apparently did not hear him. The 

defendant then backed his own car out of the driveway, pulled alongside the passenger side 

of Cox’s car, and fired six or seven shots at the car. 

¶ 15 Cox testified that Harris called him asking for a ride home. He drove to Mason’s 

house with Hall and parked in the driveway. When they arrived, Cox called Harris’s cell 

phone. Mason answered the phone and told Cox that Harris was using the restroom, so Cox 
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and Hall stayed in the car and waited for him. While they waited, someone drove up in a 

white Chevy Impala. Hall told Cox to move his vehicle to allow the Impala to pull into the 

driveway. When the defendant got out of the Impala and walked towards Mason’s house, 

Cox could see the outline of a gun in his pocket. 

¶ 16 Cox testified that approximately 30 seconds to a minute after the defendant entered 

the house, both he and Harris ran out of the house. Harris ran across the street, and the 

defendant ran to the end of his driveway. The defendant was shooting at Harris. Cox 

initially testified that Harris did not have his BB gun out. Later, however, he testified that 

he did not think Harris had the BB gun out, but he could not remember for certain. 

¶ 17 Cox testified that he drove around the corner, made a U-turn, and drove back to pick 

up Harris. When he did so, the defendant pulled his vehicle next to the passenger side of 

Cox’s vehicle and started shooting. Cox ducked. As such, he explained, he could not see 

where the defendant was aiming the shots; however, he heard five or six shots. He further 

testified that the windows of his car were shattered by the shots. Cox also described his 

injuries. He testified that a bullet grazed his back and fragments of glass from the broken 

windows got into his eye. He testified that he fully recovered from these injuries. 

¶ 18 Hall’s description of events was mainly consistent with that of Cox. She testified, 

however, that although she saw Harris come running out of the house and she heard four 

or five gunshots, she did not see the individual shooting the gun. She testified that the shots 

came from the area of the porch. She further testified that when the defendant shot at Cox’s 

vehicle, she heard “several” shots, but she did not know how many. Hall described the 

position of Cox’s vehicle as “catty-corner” in an intersection. She specifically testified that 
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there was enough room for another vehicle to pass. Finally, Hall testified that a bullet struck 

her in the leg and remained lodged there. She further testified that she did not suffer any 

complications related to her pregnancy as a result of the shooting, and her baby was not 

harmed. 

¶ 19 Jennifer Washington, a neighbor of the defendant and Mason, also testified at trial. 

When the shootings took place, Washington was on her front porch smoking a cigarette. 

She saw both vehicles pull into the driveway. She recognized the Impala as the defendant’s 

vehicle. She then saw the defendant get out of his vehicle and walk to the house. 

Washington testified that a few minutes after the defendant entered the house, the door 

opened and a man she did not recognize came out of the house. The man was walking 

backwards. As he did so, he pulled out a gun and pointed it at the house. However, 

Washington did not see him fire the gun. Instead, the man turned around and started 

running. Washington testified that the defendant came out and started shooting. She saw 

him fire “a couple of shots.” Washington then ran inside her own house and told her 

children to get down on the floor. As a result, she did not see any more of the events outside. 

However, she testified that she heard seven to nine additional shots. 

¶ 20 Crime scene investigator Virgil Perkins testified about the evidence he found in 

Cox’s vehicle and at the scene of the shootings. Perkins recovered a total of 10 shell casings 

from the area in front of the house. In addition, he found a bullet fragment in the bed of a 

pickup truck that was parked nearby and another bullet fragment inside the house. Perkins 

found defects consistent with bullet holes in the pickup truck, the exterior of the defendant 

and Mason’s house, and the interior of the house. When Perkins processed Cox’s vehicle, 
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he noted that both front windows were shattered. He found six defects in the vehicle that 

were consistent with bullet holes. He also recovered Harris’s BB gun from the vehicle. 

¶ 21 The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the charge involving the defendant’s 

conduct towards Harris. However, it returned guilty verdicts on the three charges involving 

his conduct towards Cox and Hall. The defendant filed a posttrial motion, arguing, among 

other things, that these verdicts were inconsistent. The court denied the motion. 

¶ 22 At the sentencing hearing, several witnesses testified on the defendant’s behalf. 

Some of these witnesses testified that the defendant worked at a facility for mentally 

disabled adults, where he was an exemplary employee who often offered to take extra 

shifts. Other witnesses testified that he was a good father to his three children and that he 

was helping his sister to raise her child. In addition, the court considered the presentence 

investigation report (PSI). The PSI indicated that the defendant had only one prior criminal 

charge, a misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct for which he received supervision. 

¶ 23 The State requested that the defendant be sentenced to 18 years on each of the 

charges of aggravated battery and 10 years on the charge of aggravated discharge of a 

firearm. The prosecutor argued that two factors in aggravation were present—the need to 

deter others (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(7) (West 2016)) and the fact that the defendant’s 

conduct threatened serious harm (id. § 5-5-3.2(a)(1)). 

¶ 24 The defendant requested the minimum sentences on all three charges (six years on 

the charges of aggravated battery and four years on the charge of aggravated discharge of 

a firearm). He argued that five factors in mitigation were present. First, he argued that the 

defendant acted under strong provocation (id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(3)). In support of this argument, 
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he noted that the conduct underlying the three charges took place almost immediately after 

the defendant’s confrontation with Roderick Harris. He emphasized that the jury found that 

the defendant acted in self-defense when he shot at Harris. The defendant further argued 

that the defendant did not have a significant criminal history (id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(7)); his 

conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur (id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(8)); his 

imprisonment would cause hardship to his children and family (id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(11)); and 

the character and attitudes of the defendant indicated that he was unlikely to commit other 

crimes (id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(9)). The parties agreed that the sentences should be served 

concurrently. 

¶ 25 Before pronouncing sentence, the court asked counsel how many bullets were 

recovered. They reminded the court that 10 shell casings were recovered from the scene 

along with 2 bullet fragments. The court then allowed the defendant to make a statement 

in allocution before going on to rule from the bench. 

¶ 26 The court began by noting that the PSI reflected “one statutory factor in mitigation, 

that Mr. Johnson does not have a substantial history of criminality.” The court next 

expressly found that the defendant’s acts “were committed during a period of strong 

provocation.” The court went on to consider the testimony of the witnesses. The court 

stated that it was “significant” that so many individuals were willing to testify on the 

defendant’s behalf. However, the court also noted that it was not as certain as those 

witnesses that the defendant would never commit a similar offense in the future. 

¶ 27 The court found one factor in aggravation. Specifically, it found that the defendant’s 

conduct threatened serious harm. The court noted that the bullet that remained lodged in 
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Jada Hall’s leg constituted serious harm even though her baby was not affected, and the 

injuries sustained by Terry Cox were minor. The court emphasized that the harm could 

have been far more serious. The court told the defendant that it found sentences longer than 

the statutory minimums to be appropriate because of “those moments when you squeezed 

off how many ever shots that you squeezed off at that vehicle.” The court sentenced the 

defendant to concurrent sentences of 12 years on each count of aggravated battery and 8 

years on the charge of aggravated discharge of a firearm. 

¶ 28 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentences. At a hearing on that 

motion, the court specifically stated that it found the witnesses who testified for the 

defendant at the sentencing hearing to be “compelling and significant.” The court also 

recognized the “consequences of sending [the defendant] to the penitentiary.” The court 

stated, “I minimized it as much as I felt I could under the circumstances. I did consider the 

mitigating factors. I found the mitigating evidence compelling.” 

¶ 29 In addition, the court addressed the defendant’s argument that shorter sentences 

were warranted because he believed he was acting in self-defense when he shot into Cox’s 

vehicle. The court acknowledged that the defendant saw both shootings as “all one 

transaction.” The court explained, however, that the circumstances of the two shootings 

were different. The court further explained that, due to these differences, there was reason 

to find that the defendant was justified in shooting at Harris but there was “no significant 

legal reason to minimize [the defendant’s] conduct” in shooting at Cox and Hall. The court 

therefore denied the motion. This appeal followed. 
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¶ 30 Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in determining the appropriate sentence to 

impose. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). This is because the trial judge, 

who had the opportunity to observe the defendant, is in a better position than we are to 

weigh the relevant factors. Id. at 213. We will not set aside a defendant’s sentence on appeal 

unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. People v. O’Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 300 (1988); 

People v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 20. A sentence that is within the statutory 

range for the offense is presumptively appropriate. As such, we will not overturn a sentence 

within that range unless it is “greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or 

manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 54 

(1999). Although this standard is highly deferential, the court’s discretion is not unlimited. 

Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 27. 

¶ 31 In determining an appropriate sentence, the trial court is required to consider all 

pertinent factors in mitigation and aggravation. Id. ¶ 22. The court is not required to specify 

which factors it finds relevant or how much weight it assigns to each factor. People v. 

Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d 752, 763 (2011). Although the court must consider any mitigating 

factors that are present, it is not required to weigh such factors more heavily than it weighs 

aggravating factors, such as the seriousness of the crime. See People v. Weiser, 2013 IL 

App (5th) 120055, ¶ 32. Indeed, the seriousness of the crime is the most important factor 

for the court to consider. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 28. 

¶ 32 Here, the defendant makes two arguments in support of his claim that the court did 

not give adequate weight to the mitigating evidence. First, he emphasizes that there was 

significant evidence of rehabilitative potential. Second, he argues that in finding the 
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defendant’s conduct towards Cox and Hall to be a “separate case” from his conduct towards 

Harris, the court ignored evidence that the perceived threat from Harris was still ongoing, 

which in turn led the court to overlook factors in mitigation such as the extent to which he 

was acting under strong provocation and his conduct was the result of circumstances 

unlikely to recur. We find neither argument persuasive. 

¶ 33 In support of his argument that the court failed to give adequate consideration to the 

evidence of his rehabilitative potential, the defendant highlights the evidence of his 

consistent work history and strong family ties. He also points out that he was a high school 

graduate with two years of college courses. We agree with the defendant that this evidence 

showed that he had rehabilitative potential. See, e.g., People v. Gordon, 2016 IL App (1st) 

134004, ¶ 72; People v. Juarez, 278 Ill. App. 3d 286, 295 (1996). However, we are not 

convinced that the court failed to consider this evidence or give it adequate weight. We 

presume that the court considered any mitigating evidence presented to it unless there is 

some indication to the contrary other than the sentence itself. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 

142941, ¶¶ 22-23; Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 763. In this case, the defendant points to 

nothing to indicate that the court overlooked the evidence of his rehabilitative potential 

other than the sentences themselves. Moreover, the court explicitly stated that it found this 

evidence to be significant, both at the sentencing hearing and at the hearing on the motion 

to reconsider. Thus, it is clear from the record before us that the court considered this 

evidence and gave it a fair amount of weight. 

¶ 34 As we explained earlier, however, the court was not required to give more weight 

to the defendant’s rehabilitative potential than it gave to pertinent factors in aggravation. 
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See Weiser, 2013 IL App (5th) 120055, ¶ 32. The court placed a great deal of emphasis on 

the fact that the defendant’s conduct caused serious harm to Jada Hall and that it could 

have caused far more serious harm than it did. In particular, the court focused on the 

number of shots the defendant fired into Terry Cox’s vehicle. This is a legitimate concern. 

¶ 35 In this regard, we find this case to be analogous to the supreme court’s decision in

Alexander. There, the defendant was a high school student who fired multiple shots at a 

fellow student after a confrontation. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 208. The other student made 

threats to the defendant during that confrontation. Id. at 213-14. The defendant fired 

multiple shots at him in a crowded hallway while students and teachers were changing 

classes. Id. at 208. The trial court imposed a sentence near the upper end of the statutory 

sentence range, emphasizing that by firing five shots in a crowded hallway, the defendant 

acted “with total disregard for the potential harm to others.” Id. at 213-14. 

¶ 36 The appellate court found the defendant’s sentence to be excessive due to the 

presence of mitigating evidence. It therefore reduced his sentence to the statutory 

minimum. Id. at 212. The supreme court reversed that decision, finding that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion. Id. at 215. In reaching that conclusion, the court emphasized 

that by firing multiple shots in a crowded hallway, the defendant “endangered not only [the 

student who threatened him] but also innocent bystanders.” Id. at 214. The supreme court 

explained that the trial court was not required to give more weight to the defendant’s 

rehabilitative potential than it gave to the evidence that his conduct endangered multiple 

people. Id. The court therefore found no abuse of discretion and reinstated the original 

sentence. Id. at 215. 
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¶ 37 Here, too, the defendant fired multiple gunshots, thereby endangering innocent 

bystanders. The court had the discretion to place greater weight on this factor than it placed 

on the evidence of the defendant’s rehabilitative potential. 

¶ 38 The defendant also argues that by treating the defendant’s act of shooting into Cox’s 

vehicle as a “separate case” from his act of shooting at Harris, the court overlooked the 

evidence that the perceived threat from Harris was ongoing and ignored additional factors 

in mitigation. Specifically, he contends that the court ignored evidence that he acted under 

strong provocation (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(3) (West 2016)) and evidence that his conduct 

was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur (id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(8)). We disagree. 

¶ 39 Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the court expressly found that the defendant 

was acting under strong provocation when he fired shots into Cox’s vehicle. At the 

sentencing hearing, the court made this finding, but did not indicate how much weight it 

gave to this factor. At the hearing on the defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence, 

however, the court stated that there was “no significant legal reason to minimize [his] 

conduct,” thus indicating that it did not give significant weight to this mitigating factor. 

We believe this was a reasonable decision. While the defendant testified that his adrenaline 

was high due to his confrontation with Harris, there was virtually no evidence that he had 

any reason to fear Cox and Hall. Although the defendant testified that Cox’s vehicle 

blocked his path, both Cox and Hall testified that there was room to pass, and the defendant 

himself acknowledged that he was able to back up. Moreover, by the time the defendant 

shot into the vehicle, he had already stopped shooting at Harris because, by his own 
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admission, he no longer felt like he was in the “zone of danger” from Harris. The court did 

not abuse its discretion by giving little weight to this factor. 

¶ 40 It is not clear from the record whether the court found that the defendant’s conduct 

was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur at all, let alone how much weight it gave 

this factor if it did find it to be applicable. We note that the court was not required to find 

this factor to be applicable. Although the precise sequence of events that preceded the 

offense seems highly unlikely to recur, there was evidence that Sade Mason was concerned 

about trouble arising between the defendant and Harris. There was also evidence that the

defendant and Mason had a relationship that was sometimes troubled. The defendant 

testified that he left the house after arguing with Mason because he knew that she would 

call the Department of Children and Family Services if he did not leave. At the sentencing 

hearing, the trial judge told the defendant that he wished he could be certain that the 

defendant would not commit a similar offense in the future. In any case, however, even 

assuming that the court did find that the offense resulted from circumstances unlikely to 

recur, the court was not required to give more weight to this factor than it gave the 

seriousness of the offense or the fact that the defendant’s conduct threatened serious harm.

¶ 41 Finally, it is worth noting that none of the defendant’s sentences are close to the 

upper end of the statutory sentencing ranges for the offenses. Aggravated battery with a 

firearm is a Class X offense. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(h) (West 2016). It therefore carries a 

sentencing range of 6 to 30 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2016). Aggravated 

discharge of a firearm is a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(b) (West 2016)) with a 

sentencing range of 4 to 15 years (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2016)). The defendant’s 
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sentences are all closer to the lower ends of these ranges than to the upper ends. As such, 

we cannot agree with the defendant that these sentences are excessive. See People v. 

Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d 796, 802 (2007) (finding this to be a relevant consideration). We 

therefore find no abuse of discretion. 

¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s sentences. 

¶ 43 Affirmed.