REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND
No. 2117 September Term, 2015

______________________________________
DEON LEROY WILLIAMS

v. STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________ Eyler , Deborah S., Wright , Alpert , Paul E. ( Senior Judge , Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Alpert, J.

______________________________________ Filed : December 2, 2016Deon Leroy Williams, appellant, was convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court

for Caroline County of three counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance ( heroin, h ydrocodone, and marijuana ); three counts of possessing each of those drugs; and six counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 1 Appellant raises four questions on appeal, which we have slightly reworded:
I. Did the suppression court err in denying appellant ’ s motion to suppress the drugs and guns seized from his residence?
II. Did the trial court err when it refused to accept defen se counsel ’ s offer to stipulate to appellant ’ s prior disqualifying conviction?
III. D id the trial court err by failing to take any action when the defense informed the court that a juror had repeatedly fallen asleep ?
IV. Did the trial court err when it denied appellant ’ s motion for judgment of acquittal on all charges?
For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgments

. BACKGROUND FACTS On the evening of September 17, 2013, Sergeant Leonard Nichols 2 , an 11

- year

v eteran with the Maryland State Police , the last five years with the Caroline County Drug

1 The court sentenced appellant to a total of 30 years of imprisonment: 15 years for possession with intent to distribute heroin; 15 years for possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone; five years for possession with intent to distribute marijuana; and 15 years for each possession of a firearm conviction. All sentences are to be served con currently, except for one of appellant’s possession of a firearm convictions, which is to be served con secutively. Appellant’s remaining simple possession convictions were merged for sentencing purposes

.

2 At the time of the incident, Sergeant Nichols ’s rank was corporal. By the time of the hearing, however, he had been promoted to the rank of sergeant, and that i s how we shall refer to him.2

Task Force , executed a traffic stop of appellant for driving on a suspended and revoked driver ’ s license in the Easton area of Talbot County. The sergeant had been told earlier by a confidential informant that appellant would have drugs on him . P ursuant to a search incident to arrest, however, n o drugs were found on appellant or in his car , although he had a large sum of cash ($1,356) on his person and he was nervous . Appellant was transported to the police barracks in Easton in Talbot County where he was strip searched and a baggie was seen protruding from his anus. Pursuant to a search warrant, the baggie was removed by medical personnel . The baggie contain ed two additional baggies : one contain ed heroin, the other contain ed cocaine. The sergeant then obtained and, a bout four hours later, during the early morning hours of September 18, executed a second search warrant for appellant ’ s residence at 7188 American Corner Road in Denton , in Caroline County . From the residence , the police seized drugs (heroin, hydrocodone and marijuana) and six guns

-- three handguns and three rifles

. A ppellant was subsequently charged in Caroline County with six drug counts and six gun counts relating to the seizure of the items from his resid ence. SUPPRESSION HEARING FACTS Prior to trial on those charges, appellant sought to suppress the drugs and guns recovered pursuant to the Caroline County residential search warrant

. In his written motions, appellant argued that the events in Talbot County were illegal and poisoned the search and seizure warrant issued for his residence in Caroline County

– the traffic stop was invalid because it was pretextual, and the cavity search and the manner in which it was conducted were illeg al

. In a written response, the State argued that any issues concerning3

the initial vehicle stop and subsequent cavity search had already been heard and decided in the State ’ s favor in appellant ’ s Talbot County case. 3
At the subsequent suppression hearing, the State again raised the same argument

– that the Talbot County Circuit Court had already determined that the initial vehicular stop, arrest, and subsequent cavity search w ere valid. Defense counsel seemed to agree but also argued, indistinctly , “ something [] survived from Talbot County. ” After some discussion,

t he suppression court stated that while there was no res judicata or collateral estoppel in this case, the issue before it was “ very limited ”

-- whether the re was a substantial basis for the Caroline County magistrate to issue the warrant f or appellant ’ s residence

. The State then presented the testimony of Sergeant Nichols and admitted into evidence the 24

- page

a ffidavit in support of the residential search warrant. Appellant testified in support of his motion. Sergeant N ichols testified that around 6:3 0 p.m., on September 17, 2013, he received a telephone call from a confidential informa n t (CI#3) about appellant. During the

3 Appellant was charged with drug offense s in Talbot County based on the drugs recovered pursuant to the cavity search. Prior to trial, a ppellant moved to suppress those drugs, which after a hearing the suppression court den ied on April 29, 2015. Appellant subsequently ente red a guilty plea on June 22, 2015. He later f iled an application for leave to appeal , which was denied on October 29, 2015. Although the State’s argument has superficial appeal, it is wrong. See Scott v. State , 379 Md. 170, 183 (2004)(stating that a decision by one circuit court judge is not binding on another circuit court judge because the two judges are “‘colleague[s] of coordinate jurisdiction.’”)(quoting Stewart v. State , 319 Md. 81, 91 (1990)). Cf

. Gertz v. Anne Arundel County , 339 Md. 261, 273 (1995)(“[A]s a general principle, one judge of a trial court ruling on a matter is not bound by the prior ruling in the same case by another judge of the court; the second judge, in his discretion, may ord inarily consider the matter de novo.”)(quotation marks and citation omitted). The State does not raise this argument on appeal.4

tele phone call, t he informant told the sergeant that appella nt was attending a “ N arcotics Anonymous

. . . or some kind of meeting , ” and that when he left the meeting he would

enter a described car that was parked behind the Wal

- Mart on Teal Drive in Easton

. Appellant would leave the area in the car and make drug “ drops ”

– selling specified amounts of drugs to individuals. After the sergeant received the call, he learned and confirmed through dispatch that appellant ’ s license had been suspended and revoked. The sergeant and his partner set up a surveillance of th e area, and a short time later appellant was observed leaving the area in the described vehicle. The sergeant followed appellant ’ s car for about a 1⁄4 of mile when the sergeant , who had prior contact with appellant, believed that appellant had spotted him. Appellant pulled into a parking lot and stopped . T he sergeant pulled his car next t o appellant ’ s car and likewise stopped. The sergeant arrested appellant for driving on a suspended and revoked license. Pursuant to a search incident to arrest, the sergeant searched appellant and his car but found nothing of note, except $1,356 on appellant ’ s person. During the search, the sergeant noted that appellant was cooperative but nervous

– his chest was rapidly “ moving up and down , ” the muscles in his n eck “ were visibly contracting, ” and he was sweating, even though the temperature was a mild 75 degrees. The sergeant testified that he believed

“ criminal activity was afoot ” based on his prior contact with appellant, the information from CI#3 , the large s um of cash, and appellant ’ s nervousness . The sergeant had a ppellant transported to the Easton Barrack where he could be processed for driving on a suspended and revoked license and strip searched.5

Appellant was taken to the “ intoximeter room ”

– a multipurpose room of the Easton Barrack where DUI ’ s and fingerprints are processe d, and a “ secure ” area of the barrack where the public is not allowed

. Appellant, t he sergeant and two , possibly three , other officers were present in the room

. A ppellan t was asked to take off his clothes, turn around, bend over, and spread his buttocks apart. A ccording to the sergeant, a ppellant did as he was instructed, except he did not spread his butt ock s so t he sergeant could see appellant ’ s

anus clearly

. Nonetheless, t he sergeant did see a plastic baggie protruding from appellant ’ s rectal area. The sergeant “ tried ” to spread appellant ’ s buttoc ks apart to retrieve the baggie but could not because a ppellant “ clench [ ed ] ” his muscles. When t he sergeant tried t o handcuff appellant , a scuffle ensued between appellant and the officers. Once appellant had been handcuffed, t he sergeant told appellant what he had seen but appellant refused to retrieve the baggie himself

. The sergeant left appellant naked in the room for about an hour while he applied for and received a search warrant for medical personnel to remove the baggie from appellant ’ s anus. Appellant was then taken to a hospital where, a round 12:50 a.m., a doctor physically removed from appellant ’ s anus a plastic baggie containing what was later determined to be a baggie of heroin and a baggie of crack cocaine

. Sergeant Nichols then applied for a search warrant for appellant ’ s residence at 7188 American Corner in Denton in Caroline County. Appellant had listed that address with the Motor Vehicle Administration, the Maryland Sex Offender Registry, and during a prior traffic stop and a prior arrest. In t he application in support of the search warrant for the American Corner residence , the sergeant provided the following information :6

- Since 2002, t he Caroline County Drug Task F orce had received information t hat appellant was distributing drugs in and around Caroline County, and since 2011, information concerning his drug distribution had

“ increased substantially. ”

- In July 2011, a confidential informant made a controlled purchase of heroin from appellant in Caroline County

. Appellant was arrested and pursuant to a search warrant , no drugs were found on app ellant ’ s person. Appellant is a re gistered sex offender and his address i s listed as 7188 American Corner Road.

- Appellant is currently compliant with his sex offender registry, which still lists his address as 7188 American Cor ner Road. Sergeant Nichols confirmed with the officer responsible for tracking sex offenders that during s everal home visits at that address appellant had been present each time.

- At the end of May 2012, a confidential informant (C I#1) told members of the Caroline County Drug Task Force that on May 29, 2012, appellant had traveled to Annapolis to purchase heroin in a gold

- colored four

- door sedan with Maryland registration 99476Z. Sergeant Nichols had observed appellant operating a gold

- colored Mercedes Benz with that license plate during that time.

- In January 2013, Sergeant Nichols arrested a p erson for heroin distribution . The person told Sergeant Nichols that appellant suppl ied him /her with heroin a nd that appellant was “ very cautious about his business and would never meet new persons

. ” The person stated that he/she had “ never been allowed to go to [appellant ’ s] residence to meet him [

. ]” The person added that appellant got his supply of heroin fro m Annapolis, and that appellant took a different driver and car each time he went to Annapolis

.

- On February 13, 2013, the police performed a traffic stop of a vehicle occupied by appellant , By r on Drummond, and another

. Sergeant Nichols came upon the traffic stop to assist. T he police had information that the occupants were in possession of drugs . A K

- 9 scan of t h e car r esulted in a positive alert , but a manual search of the car and the occupants uncovered no drugs . Ap pellant had approximately $1,000 on his person as did the female occupant. Appellant stated during the traffic stop that his home address was the American Corner address.7

- A week later, on February 20, Sergeant Nichols arrested appellant for an

“ outstanding parole retake warrant. ” Pursuant to a s earch incident to an arrest , Sergeant Nichols recovered a straw from appellant ’ s pants pocket and a folded dollar bill from his car , each of which contain ed suspected Oxycodone residue. Appellant was cha rged with possession of paraphernalia.

- On July 23, 2013, a confidential informant (CI#2) told the Caroline County Drug Task F orce that he/she had been buying heroin from appellant , that he/ she never met appellant at his residence, and that appellant always told him/her to meet on a back road ( Clark Road ) in Denton.

- On August 6, 2013, a n anonymous confidential informant (CI#3) called Sergeant N ichols and told him that appellant was the “ largest ” heroin supplier in Caroline County ; that appellant got his heroin from Annapolis ; that Drummond sometimes drove appellant to Annapolis ; that appellant often uses different cars ; that appellant liv es at 7188 American Corner Road; and that he is usually home during the day and leaves during the night and early morning to distribute heroin

.

- On that same day, a nother confidential informant (CI#4) contacted a member of the Caroline County Drug Task Force and said that appellant was selling heroin around Caroline County , that he drove a green Ford F

150 , and that the informant had purchased heroin from appellant on a back road ( Clark Road ) in Denton.

- On August 9, 2013, an anonymous source contacted a member of the task force and said that appellant was selling “ large amounts ” of heroin in the Denton and Ri d g ely area s of Caroline County ; that he lives with his father on American Corner Road; that appellant sets up his girlfriend, Becca Hutson, in a hotel in Denton to sell heroin for him ; and that appellant drives a white Cadillac. During this time a member of the task force observed Hutson exit a Best Western Hotel in Denton and meet appellant , who was driving a white Cadillac.

- On August 15, 2013, Sergeant Nichols, who had been in daily contact by cell phone with CI # 3 , spoke to CI#3 who said t hat appellant was in the Ridgel y area , that he /she had witnessed appellant make two hand

- to

- hand transactions , and that appellant was sitting in a white Cadillac parked in front of an apartment complex . Sergeant Nichols went to the area to verify the information but by the t ime he arrived, he only observed appellant leaving the area in a white Cadillac.8

- On August 20, 2013, Sergeant Nichols was involved in the traffic stop of a car driven by Hutson in which appellant was a passenger. The car , however, did not stop immediately and a plastic bag was seen being tossed from the passen ger side of the car before the car stopped. A K

- 9 positively alerted to the car. A search of the car and the area where the bag was tossed yielded negative results. Appellan t was searched but no drugs were recovered , although appellant had over $1,000 , mostly in $20 denominations, on his person. Appellant again provided the American Corner address as his home address.

- On September 17, 2013, Sergeant Nichols received informa tion from C I #3 that appellant would be attending “ drug classes ” in a building behind the Easton Wal

- Mart, that he would be driving a purple Jetta, and that he would be in possession of drugs. Sergeant Nichols set up a surveillance of the area, saw appella nt enter a purple Jetta that the sergeant then followed. The sergeant stopped the vehicle and arrested appellant for driving on a revoked license. Appellant and his car was searched but only $1,356 was recovered from appellant ’ s person. Appellant was ta ken to the Easton Barrack for processing and strip search ed

. Appellant was told to turn around, bend over, and spread his

“ butt cheeks. ” When a ppellant did so , Sergeant Nichols observed a plastic baggie containing an off

- white brown substance protruding from appellant ’ s anus. The sergeant was unable to retrieve the baggie because appellant cle nched his buttock muscles. The sergeant obtained a search and seizure body cavity warrant, which was executed at a local hospital

. A baggie , containing two additional baggies of heroin and crack cocaine , w as removed from appellant ’ s anus. The application also stated that C I #1, #2, and #3 , who were unaware that the others were providing information to the police about appellant, ha d provided information on other unrelated subjects that ha d been true and accurate and had never provided false or misleading information. Additionally, Sergeant Nichols averred in the application that he knew , through his training and experience , that drug dealers often will not sell directly from their residence or the place they stash their supply and proceeds so as to insulate them selves from police, rival drug dealers, and customer s. T he affidavit also listed appellant ’ s criminal history: November 23, 2005 , arrest in Easton for manufacture/distribute CDS;9

November 4, 2005, arrest in Wicomico for possession of marijuana and paraphernalia ; February 27, 2003 , arrest in Denton for dis orderly conduct , and obstruct and hinder; October 9, 2001 , arrest in Eas ton for possession of marijuana and paraphernalia; and June 5, 2001 , arrest in Berlin for possession of CDS not

- marijuana , possession of paraphernalia , and handgun in a vehicle. The search warrant for appellant ’ s residence was granted at 3:25 a.m. , and executed about an hour later. The house was unoccupied and the officers made a forced entry. The sergeant testified that he believed that he had au thority to execute the warrant. Drugs and firearms were recovered from the house. Appellant testified at the suppression hearing in support of his motion. He testified about the experience of the strip search. He testified that following his arrest, he was taken
to the Easton Barrack where he was told to remove his clothes. F our other officers were in the room, and they stared at him. He testified that he did initially spread his butt cheeks when asked , but when asked to do so again , he said no. At that point, officers grabb ed his arms and “ they ” started “ digging in my buttocks. ” Appellant resisted. H e testified that the house on American Corner belonged to his father, and although it was “ technically ” his address and he “ occasionally ” stayed there , he “ normally ” stayed at his girlfriend ’ s home

. At the conclusion of the testimony, defense counsel argued, among other things, that the traffic stop turned into an impermissibl e cavity search. The State disagreed. After hearing both parties ’ arguments, the suppres sion court denied appellant ’ s motion to
suppress . The court found the sergeant ’ s testimony “ to be credible [.] ” The court f ound the stop and arrest valid. The court found the initial search of appellant and the car as a10

v alid search incident to arrest. The court then stated that as part of the processing for the arrest, a strip search was perform ed. T he court did not specifically state whether the strip search was legal but in conclusion stated that the issuing magistrate in Caroline County had a subs tantial basis to believe that items of illegality would be found at appellant ’ s residence

. I. Appellant argues that the suppression court erred in denying his motion to suppress the items seized pursuant to the execution of the residential search warrant . He argues that the strip search was illegal because the police did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that he had secreted drugs in his anal cavity and the manner in which the search was conducted was unreasonable . He argues that when t h e tainted strip search evidence (the drugs) is ex cluded from the residential warrant, the warrant lacks probable cause to support the search of his home. He argues that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply because “ no reason ably well

- trained police officer could have relied on the warrant [.] ” The State responds that neither the strip search nor the manner of the strip search were illegal, but even if they were, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies

. Therefore, the suppression court did not err in denying appellant ’ s motion to
suppress. A. Was the strip search legal ? To answer the question presented on appeal, we must first untangle and wade through several different legal theories

. We shall begin wit h the law regarding search warrants and work o ur way to the legality of the strip search.11

W hen confronted with whether a search warrant is legal , the question before us ordinarily is “ whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis to conclude that the warrant was supported by probable cause. ” Greenstreet v. State , 392 Md. 652, 667 (2006)(citation omitted). To determine whether the issuing judge had a “ substantial basis , ” we do not apply “ a de novo standard of review, but rather a deferential one. ” I d

. We apply a deferential standard because of the preference for search warrants. Because a search warrant provides the detached sc rutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, we have expressed a strong preference for warrants and declared that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall. Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according great deference to a magistrate ’ s determination. Id. at 668 (quoting United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 913

- 14 (1984) ) (quotation marks omitted)

. The different tasks of an issuing court and a reviewing court in this context ha ve been explained as follows: The task of the issuing judge is to reach a practical and common

- sense decision, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, as to whether there exists a fair proba bility that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular search. Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238

– 39 . . . (1983). The duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the issuing judge had a “ substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] t hat probable cause existed. ” Id.

. . . The U.S. Supreme Court explained in Gates that the purpose of this standard of review is to encourage the police to submit to the warrant process. Gates , 462 U.S. at 237 n. 10[.] Id. at 667

– 68 (some citations omitted).12

When w e review the basis of the issuing judge ’ s probable cause finding , we ordinarily apply the “ four corners rule ” and “ confine our consideration of probable cause solely to the information provided in the warrant an d its accompanying application documents. ” Id

. at 66 9 (citations omitted). There are limited circumstances w hen we deviate from the rule and look to evidence outside of the warrant and its affidavit . Those circumstances occur when a defendant makes a re quired showing for a Franks hearing 4 or where the warrant is undecipherable. Id . at 669. Additionally, “ e vidence derived as a result of a prior illegal search or seizure, or knowledge gained through such a search and seizure, cannot be used as a valid basis to justify the existence of probable cause in a subsequent application for a search and seizure warrant

. ” Everhart v. State , 274 Md. 459, 481 (1975) (citations omitted). See also Carter v. State , 274 Md. 411, 438

- 39 (1975)( any information gathered from an earlier illegality cannot be exploited and used as derivative evidence in an application for a search and seizure warrant). To do otherwise “ would permit the prosecut ion to use knowledge acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment and ‘ gained by its own wrong. ’” Id . at 439. The Everhart court explained:

The doctrine of the “ fruit of the poisonous tree ” extends the scope of the exclusionary rule to bar not only evidence directly seized, but also evidence indirectly obta ined as a result of information learned or leads obtained in the unlawful search; in its broadest sense it prohibits the prosecution from using in any manner, prejudicial to the accused, information derived from facts learned as a result of the unlawful ac ts of law enforcement agents. Once a defendant, with requisite standing, has timely and factually asserted that the challenged evidence was derived from information obtained in an unlawful search and seizure, the court must afford

4 Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154 (197 8 )(permitting the admission of extraneous evidence where a defendant shows that the aff iant has per

jured himself on a material matter).13

him an opportunity to ex plore in detail the circumstances under which the evidence was acquired; if the defendant establishes that the evidence resulted from an unlawful search and seizure such evidence cannot be used at all unless the prosecution can convince the trial court tha t it had an independent origin or that the information gained in the unlawful search did not lead directly or indirectly to the discovery of the challenged evidence. Id . at 481

– 82 (citations omitted). Having set out the law regarding search warrants, we now turn to the legality of the strip search. There are at least three categories 5 of a strip search:
A “ strip search, ” though an umbrella term, generally re fers to an in spection of a naked individual, without any scrutiny of the sub j ec t ’ s body cavi ties. A

“ vis u al body cavity search ” extends to a visual ins pection of the anal and g enital areas. A “ manual body cavity search ” incl u des some degree of touching or p r o bing of body c a v ities. Paulin o v. State , 399 Md. 341, 352 ( quotation marks and citations omitted) , cert. denied , 552 U.S. 1071 (2007)

. A visual body cavity search “ does n ot involve the police probing into such a cavity. ” State v. Harding , 196 Md. App. 384, 412 (2010), cert. denied , 418 Md. 39 8 , cert. denied , 132 S.Ct. 118 (2011). However, i f a n investigator attempts to retrieve a plastic baggy seen protruding from the anus or if an investigator attempts to spread “ the chee ks of a recalcitrant searchee ’ s buttocks [,] ” who “ stubbornly refuses to perform th at operation for himself [,] ” the search is still a visual body cavity search because the seizure is “ simply a permissible seizure under the Plain View D octrine. ” Id . at 41 2

- 14.

5 In State v. Harding , 196 Md. App. 384, 408

- 09 (2010), we suggested that the Court of Appeals in Paulino v. State , 399 Md. 341, 352, created a fourth category of strip search

– a “ reach

- in ” search. We need not address this fourth category because this is clearly not a “ reach

- in ” case.14

Cf. Paulino , 399 Md. at 353

- 54 (where officer manipulated the accused ’ s butt oc ks to allow for a better view of his anal cavity and in doing so observed a plastic bag containing drugs, the conduct amounted to a visual body cavity search)(footnotes omitted). In contrast, a manual body cavity search generally involves the intrusion of the anal or vaginal cavi ty and should be “ normally entrusted only to a gynecologist or proctologist ” because of hygienic and medical concerns. Harding , 196 Md. App. at 414

- 15. Here, a visual body cavity search occurred. When a person has been arrested for a minor traffic offense unrelated to any drugs , and a search incident to arrest balloons into a strip search , to determine whether the strip search was lega l we look to the four

- factor balancing test set forth in Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 589 (1979). Paulino , 399 Md . at 35 4

- 5 5. The four factors include : “ the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it i s conducted. ” Id. at 355 (quotation marks and citation s omitted). We take a “ flexible approach ” in balancing the four factors, “ one that takes into account the relative strength of each factor ” and “ balance[s] the need for a particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. ” Id

. (quotation marks and citations omitted). As to the first factor, we agree with appellant that a visual body cavity search by its
nature is intrusive and demeaning. See Paulino , 399 Md. at 356 ( “ searches that entail the inspection of the anal and/or geni tal areas have been accurately described as demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, embarrassing, repulsive, degrading, and15

extremely intrusive of one ’ s personal privacy ” ) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)

. We shall address toge ther the second factor (the manner in which the search was conducted) and the c losely associated fourth factor (th e place where it was conducted)

. A ppellant argues that the search was not conducted in a reasonable manner because the barrack room was not “ suitably private ” : he was forced to disrobe in front of several officers ; the officers engaged in physical force when the y grabb ed and ben t him over the

counter and d ug into his buttocks resulting in th e sergeant ’ s hand going into his anus ; and he had to s it naked for the hour it took the sergeant to obtain a warrant to have medical personnel intervene

. Although the suppression court recount ed little detail in its fact finding concerning the strip search, we defer to the suppression court ’ s fact finding that the sergeant ’ s testimony was credible and that “ [a]t a point where the officer or trooper asked the Defendant to spread his buttocks, the officer saw what he believed to be a foreign subs tance

. ” Additionally, w e note that although ther e were four officers present, the search took place in a secure area of a police barrack, not a public area. Under the circumstances presented, we beli eve that the manner and place where the search took place was reasonable

. Cf. Moore v. State , 195 Md. App. 695, 719 (2010)(upholding visual body cavity search conducted in private room at the police station in the presence of two male officers) , cert. denied , 418 Md. 192 (2011) , and Paulino , 399 Md. at 360 (invalidating visual body cavity search conducted in a well

- lit area at night near a car wash in public view)

.16

Turning to the third factor, we are persuaded that the strip search was justified

– that there was “ a particularized reasonable belief that evidence of the crime [would] be found on (or in) the body of the suspect. ” Hardin g , 196 Md. App. at 421

. See also State v. Nieves , 383 Md. 573, 595

- 96 (2004) (i n determining whether the strip search was justified, we ask whether the police had reasonable articulable suspicion to bel ieve that evidence of criminal activity would be found in the place searched )

. We shall briefly relate the law concerning reasonable articulable suspicion. We are mindful that t he concept of reasonable articulable suspicion is not governed by a particul ar test but is “ purposefully [] fluid because .

. . [it] is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. ” Holt v. State , 435 Md. 443, 459 (2013)( quotation marks and citations omitted). Reasonable articulable suspicion has been
described as “‘ a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. ’” Id . (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 128 (2000) )

. It has also been described as a “‘ common sense, nontechnical conception that considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and prudent people act. ’” Id

. at 460 (quoting Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490 , 507 ( 2009 ) ) (quotat ion marks and citation omitted). The required level of suspicion is less demanding than that for probable cause, but “ nevertheless embraces something more than an ‘ inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. ’” Id . (quotation marks and citations omitted)

. In determining whether an office r has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting illegal wrongdoing, we look to the “ totality of the circumstances ” of each case. Id

. This process involves “ two interdependent analytical techniques[.] ” Id

.17 First, the assessment must be based upon all the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective observations .

. . and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained of ficer draws inferences and makes deductions

— inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.

. . . The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept t hat the process just described must raise a suspicion tha t the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court in Terry v. Ohio , [392 U.S. 1 (1968)]

. . . , said that, “ [t]his demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court ’ s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. ” Id. at 460

- 61 (quotation marks and citations omitted). According to Holt :

We therefore assess the evidence thr ough the prism of an experienced law enforcement officer, and “ give due deference to the training and experience of the .

. . officer who engaged the stop at issue. ” Crosby , 408 Md. at 508

. . . Cartnail [ v. State ], 359 Md. [272] at 288 [(2000)] . . . (quoting [ U.S. v. ] Cortez , 449 U.S. [411] at 418, [(1981)] (noting that the evidence

“ must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement ” ). We, of course, recogniz e that the deference we afford police officers is not without limits. We do not “ rubber stamp conduct simply because [an] officer believed he had the right to engage in it ” and “ there must be an articulated logic to which this Court can defer. ” Crosby, 408 Md. at 509[.] Id

. at 461 ( some quotation marks and citations omitted). In determining whether the strip search here was justified, w e find the analysis in Harding , supra , and Nieves , supra , informative

. In Harding , Harding was strip searched following an arrest for possession of drugs. We were asked to decide on appeal whether the strip search was justified, specifically, whether there was reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that drugs would be found in or on Hardi ng ’ s person. In that case, i n September 2009, a detective in the Vice and Narcotics Section of the Baltimore County Police Department received information from a “‘ very reliable informant, ’” whom the18

police had used for five to six months and who had provided reliable information in other cases that had led to numerous CDS arrests and search warrants, that Harding was selling crack co caine from a blue Audi in the Towson area. Harding , 196 Md. App. at 436. A detective in the same unit had received a complaint t wo to t hree months earlier that Harding was selling crack at a li quor store. We noted on appeal that both complaints identified Harding as a seller not a user , a f actor in deciding whether there was reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that Harding was hiding his “ stash on or in the body. ” Id

. at 436. Eight days after the September information , the police observed Harding driving the described Audi in a Towson neighborhood , and subsequently stopped him for traveling 50 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone. Id . at 389 , 436 . As part of the routine traffic stop, a K

- 9 unit was called and twice, positively alerted to the presence of drugs in the car

. Id

. at 390. Althou gh n o drugs were found in the car or on Harding ’ s person , the police recovered $1,474 in cash from Harding ’ s pockets. Id . at 395. Based on his training and experience that persons in possession of drugs will often secrete or conceal drugs on their body , the detective had Harding transported to a police station to insure maximum privacy during the strip search. Id . at 396 , 437

. As Harding removed his pants, a baggie of crack cocaine dropped out of the pants and fell to the floor. Id

. W e found that t h e positive dog alert furnished probable cause for Harding ’ s subsequent arrest and subsequent strip search

. Id

. Accordingly, w e stated that that under the circumstances presented, “ [w]e have no difficulty in holding that the particularized suspicion standard for a strip search was satisfied in this case. ” Id . at 435. See also Fontaine v. State , 135 Md. App. 471, 475

- 82 (2000)(we held a strip search was justified and reasonable where accused, who was arrested19

for driving on a suspended license, was f idgeting and attempted to place an object in his pants during the police encounter, during a search of the vehicle trace amounts of marijuana

w ere found throughout the vehicle, and the police had prior information that the accused normally concealed contraband in his pants).
In Nieves , the Court of Appeals foun d a strip search of Nieves unreasonable following his arrest f

or a minor traffic violation ( driving without a valid driver ’ s license ) where the only particularized b elief for the strip search was that Nieves had prior drug arrests and , at the time of his arrest on the traffic violation , he was driving the truck of a missing female who had a history of drug involvement

. Nieves , 383 Md. at 596

- 98. Turning to the facts of our case, we are persuaded that Sergeant Nichols had reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the strip search

. The sergeant, who the suppression court found credible, testified that he believed criminal activity was afoot and d ecided to strip search appellant based on appell a nt ’ s nervousness, the large sum of cash found on his person , the information from the CI #3 , and his prior contact with appellant

. Evidence of appellant ’ s demeanor (sweating even though the day was temperat e, heavy breathing, and bulging neck muscles) while not sufficient in itself is but one reed on which the sergeant could rely in finding reasonable articulable suspicion

. See State v. Darden , 93 Md. App. 373, 345, cert. denied , 328 Md. 447 (1992), cert. denied , 508 U.S. 957 (1993)(evidence that the accused was “ shaking ” and “ sweating profusely ” when stopped by the police is important in a reasonable articulable suspicion analysis, but by itself is “ too slender a reed ” to support reasonable articulable sus picion for investigatory stop of accused by police). Likewise, the sergeant ’s recover y of a large sum of cash from20

appellant ’ s person pursuant to a search incident to arrest, is not sufficient by itself but one reed on which the sergeant could rel y in for ming reasonable articulable suspicion

. Although the sergeant did not testify at the suppression hearing about any s pecific prior contact he had with appellant , t he State argues that we should consider the

“ substantial information known to Sergeant Nichols at the time of the arrest ” as found in the warrant application. We agree that in the unusual circumstances presented we can rely

on the sergeant ’ s c ontact and extensive knowledge about appellant at the time he arrested
him as related in the applic ation in support of the search warrant

. This is b ecause the sergeant was the directing officer of the arrest and strip search as well as the affiant on the residential search warrant which was admitted into evidence

. We can clearly impute to the sergeant at the time of the strip search those items listed in the search warrant of which the sergeant had direct or personal knowledge . We further note that only a few hours elapsed between when the s trip search occurred and the residential search warrant was obtained , and all of the information related in the warrant application was known before the strip search occurred

. 6

6 The State goes further and suggest s that we can rely not just on the information known to the sergeant based on his personal experience, but on all the i nformation stated in the application for the residential se a rch warrant . The State does not provide any law to support its argument but presumably, the State is relying on the doctrine of “ collective knowledge .” See Ott v. State , 325 Md. 206, 215 ( “ In Ma ryland, probable cause may be based on information within the collective knowledge of the police. ” )(citations omitted) , cert. denied , 506 U.S. 904 (1992), and Johnson v. State , 238 Md. 528, 539, (1965)( “ Information placed on a look

- out prepared by a police organization, of which the arresting officer is a part, may constitute probable cause for the arrest. ” )(citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Galloway v. State , 371 Md. 379, 408

- 10 , 416 (2002). Because we are persuaded that the sergeant had re asonable articulable suspicion to order (continued)21

The warrant application provided information about the sergeant ’ s personal contact with appellant. Specifically, several months before the strip search, the sergeant arrested a person for drug

- related crimes and that person informed the sergeant that appellant supplied him with heroin, and that appellant was very cautious about his business. A month later, the sergeant was involved in a traffic stop of appellant and Drummond and another where the officers had been tipped off that occupants were in possession of drugs. Although a K

- 9 made a positive aler t for drugs, and all three occupants were nervous and had over $1,000 in cash on them each , a search incident to arrest produced no drugs. A week later, the sergeant arrested appellant on an outstanding warrant , a nd pursuant to a search incident to arrest found a straw and folded dollar bill that contained suspected Oxycodone residue on them

. Less than a month before the strip search, the sergeant caused appellant ’ s car to be stopped during which a plastic bag was thrown out of the passenger side. Again, a K

- 9 made a positive alert on the car but a search of the vehicle yielded negative results as did a search of the area where the plastic bag was thrown. Additionally, l ittle more than a month before the strip search, the sergeant was contacted by CI#3 and remained in daily contact with him up until the time of appellant ’ s arrest. CI#3 told the sergeant that appellant was “ the largest source ” of heroin supplie d in Caroline County and confirmed that Drummond was involved in appellant ’ s drug dealing activ ities. A week or so later, CI # 3 contacted the sergeant and stated that he had observed

(continued) the strip search based, in part, on the direct and personal information he had regarding appellant as found in the warrant application, we need not look to the other information included in the application.22

appellant make two hand

- to

- hand drug transactions in a described area and was now sitting in a described car. When the sergeant arrived, appellant was seen leaving the area in the described car. The facts of this case are much closer to Harding , supra , than to Nieves , supra . At the time of the arrest, appellant was nervous and had a large sum of cash on his person. The sergeant had extensive knowledge of appellant and his drug dealing: he had information from two sources that appellant sold heroin; the sergeant was involved in two recent traffic stops of appellant where a K

- 9 had given positive alerts but no drugs were found; and the sergeant had recently discovere d drug paraphernalia on appell ant’s person. Additionally, CI#3, whom the sergeant had been working with, and had daily contact with for over a month , informed the sergeant that appellant would be making drug drops upon leaving a certain area at a certain time. When we take into consideration the modes or patterns of certain kinds of drug dealings, and weighing all the information as understood by someone versed in law enforcement, we are persuaded that this is not a situation where the sergeant had an “un particularized suspicion or hunch” but where the sergeant had reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the strip search. Weighing the Bell v. Wolfish , supra , factors, three of the factors weigh in favor of the State

– the manner in which the search wa s conducted, where the search was conducted, and that the search was justified

– and only one factor

-- the intrusiveness of the search

– weighs in favor of appellant. Taking into account the relative strength of each factor and balancing the need to ferr et out crime against the invasion of personal rights, we are persuaded that the strip search here was reasonable and legal.23

B. Did the issuing magistrate for the residential search warrant have a substantial basis to believe that evidence of drug dealing wo uld

be found in appellant ’ s residence? Appellant argues that even if we hold that the strip search was legal, the search warrant for his residence failed to establish probable cause . Specifically, appellant argues
that none of the information in the search warrant application alleged that he was dealing drugs from his residence nor was there any drug activity reported at or near his residenc e. Citing Agurs v. State , 415 Md. 62 (2010), appellant argues that the warrant failed to establish a nexus between his drug dealing and his home in Denton. The State argues that with or without evidence of the drugs recovered durin g the strip search the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for issuing the residenti al warrant. Although som e jurisdictions hold that there is probable cause to believe that drug dealers keep drug s and records of their drug trade in their homes, Maryland appellate courts have “ explicitly rejected this notion ” and require some nexus “ bet ween the nature of the items sought and the place where they are to be seized. ” State v. Coley , 145 Md. App. 502,
527

- 28 n.18 (2002) (citations omitted)

. In Agurs , the Court of Appeals spoke extensively about the nexus requirement and the quantity and quality of criminal activity to support probable cause to search a home. The Court stated:

Direct evidence that contraband exists in the home is not required for a search warrant; rather, probable cause may be inferred from the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the opportunity for concealment, and reasonable inferences about where the defendant may hide the incriminating items. T he thrust of [cases stating this rule] was characterized by the court in [ United States v. Thomas , 989 F.2d 1252, 1255 (D.C.Cir.1993)], in a unanimous per curiam opinion by a panel that included now Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, that “ observations of illegal activity occurring away from the suspect ’ s residence, can support a finding of pro bable cause24

to issue a search warrant for the residence, if there is a reasonable basis to infer from the nature of the illegal activity observed, that relevant evidence will be found in the residence. ”
* * * [T]he mere observation, documentation, o r suspicion of a defendant ’ s participation in criminal activity will not necessarily suffice, by itself, to establish probable cause that inculpatory evidence will be found in the home. There must be something more that, directly or by reasonable inference , will allow a neutral magistrate to determine that the contr aband may be found in the home. Agurs , 415 Md. at 85 (quoting Holmes v. State , 368 Md. 506, 522

- 23 (2002) )

. We find the analysis in H olmes and Agurs instructive. In Holmes , the Court of Appeals upheld a search warrant and concluded that a nexus existed between Holmes ’ s alleged drug ac tiv i t y and his home be c a u se the police had observed Holmes in a drug transaction less than a block from his home ; Holmes had a history of cont rolled dangerous substance violations ; was seen f requently enter ing and exit ing his home around the time of the drug transaction ; and the police discovered drugs and money on him before they conducted the search of the house by warrant

. Holmes , 368 Md. at 523.
In Agurs , the Court of Appeals concluded that a nexus did not exist between Agu r s and his home to support the search warrant executed on his home. The search warrant included information that: multiple confidential informants advised the police that Agurs and associates were upper level crack cocaine distributors in certain described areas of Baltimore City; an informant told the police that appellant was supplying suspected cocaine around the area and told the police where appellant worked; a confidential informant made

two cont r olled buys of cocaine from someone with whom A gurs associated ; that appellant25

was seen wal k ing into a clothing store with an unknown male who left the store about a minute later with a “ bulge ” in his right pocket ; Agur s ’ s criminal history for drugs (20 year and 15 year old drug

- related convictions and some older and newer non

- drug related convictions ) ; and that appellant seemed to be living beyond his means based on the value of homes and vehic les belonging to him

. Agurs , 415 Md. at 70

- 72, 94

- 99. Mills v. State , 278 Md. 262 (1976) , and State v. Ward , 350 Md. 372 (1998) , are also instructive. In Mills , the police sought a hunting knife that had been used in several crimes the police were investigating

-- rape, armed robbery, and kidnapping. There was no evidence pointing to Mills ’ residence , for which a search warrant was obtained , as the place where the kn ife would be found . In Ward , the police were investigating a murder and the search warrant s ought the gun used in the murder from Ward ’ s v e hicle and residence. Again, there was no evidence pointing to Ward ’ s residence or vehicle as the place where the gun would be found. The Holmes Court wrote about the reasoning it applied in Mills and Ward , where it upheld the validity of the search warrants :

Mills and Ward approached the nexus issue in terms of pure deductive reasoning: a particular kind of weapon was used in the crime; there was evidence linking the defendant to the crime; the weapon was of a kind likely to be kept, and not disposed of, by the defendant; when arrested shortly after the crime, the defendant was not in direct possession of the weapo n; ergo, it was likely to be found in a place accessible to him

- his home or car. That same kind of deductive approach, based on reasonable factual assumptions, has been used by a number of courts in finding a nexus between observed or documented drug transactions and the likelihood that drugs or other evidence of drug law violations m ay be found in the defendant ’ s car or home. The reasoning, supported by both experience and logic, is that, if a person is dealing in drugs, he or she is likely to have a stash of the product, along with records and other evidence incidental to the busine ss, that those items have to be kept somewhere, that if not found on the person of the defendant, they26

are likely to be found in a place that is readily accessible to the defendant but not accessible to others, and that the defendant ’ s home is such a place

. Holmes , 368 Md. at 521

– 22. The deductive reasoning approach is applicable here. First, there was significant information that appellant was involved in drug dealing. T he affidavit in support of the search warrant relate d information from several confidential informants and anonymous

source s regarding appellant and his drug dealing

. See State v. Jenkins , 178 Md. App. 156,
185

- 86 (2008)(discussing the increased credibility of information from a “ known ” informant who is working with the police and f or whom the police vouch , as compared to an anonymous tipster) . Their info rmation corroborated each other , in part, and was, in part, corroborated by the police. A ppellant was found in possession of drugs a few hours before the search warrant was obtaine d. Additionally, the warrant application listed appellant ’ s several prior arrests and drug violations. See id. at 187 (a criminal record has significanc e when assessing probable cause ) ; West v. State , 137 Md. App. 314 , 350

- 51 , cert. denied , 364 Md. 536 (2001)(numerous arrest s within ten years of the issuance of the warrant are relevant to the probable cause determination); State v. Amerman , 84 Md. App. 461, 484

- 85 (1990) ( noting that United States Supreme Cou rt has made clear that prior arrests , convictio ns, and prior criminal reputation may be significant factors in a probable cause de termination)(citations omitted). Second, there was sufficient evidence of a nexus between appellant ’ s criminal activity and his residence. CI #3 told the sergeant that appellant is at the American Corner address during the day and leaves there to distribute heroin during the night/early morning27

hours. An anonymous source , corroborated by CI #2, told the sergeant that he/she has never purchased h eroin from appellant at his residence, and both CI#2 and CI#4 , independently, told the se rgeant that they met appellant , not at his house, but on the same back road to purchase heroin

. Additionally, the sergeant stated in the application that he knew, thr ough his training and experience, that drug dealers often do not sell directly from where they reside or where they keep their drug supplies to protect themselves from detection by the police, rival drug dealers, and customers. Thus, there was information offered that appellant used his home as a “stash house” where he stored, but did not sell drugs. Agur s is distinguishable from our facts for two reasons. First, unlike Agur s , the police here had direct evidence of appellant ’ s involvement in drugs

– drugs were found on appellant pursuant to the strip search just a few hours before the residential search warrant was obtained . Second, unlike Agur s , the sergeant averred in the warrant application that, based on his extensive training and experience, drug dealers often keep their stash at their residence but do not sell drugs from their house to protect their stash from the police and others. Under the circumstances presented, we are persuaded that a sufficient nexus existed to support a finding that the magistrate had a substantial basis to believe that the warrant contained probable cause. Cf. State v. Johnson , 208 Md. App. 573, 599

- 618 (2012) (discussing several nexus case s including the anti

- nexus case of Agurs and the pro

- nexus cases of Mills and Ward ). C. Good Faith Exception Even if we believed that the magistrate lacked a substantial basis for issuing the
warrant, we would find that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.28

Appellant argues that the exception sh ould not apply because “ no reasonably well

- trained police officer could have relied on the warrant that authorized the search of the home[.] ” The significant costs of th e exclusionary rule has made it applicable only “ where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. ” S tate v. S avage , 170 Md. App. 149, 202 (2006) (quot ation marks and citation omitted)

. Thus, the exclusionary rule has its limitations, for it is seen as a remedy of “ last resort, not our first impulse[.] ” Hudson v. Michigan , 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006). The United States Su preme Court has articulated the following exceptions to the exclusionary rule: 1) the independent source doctrine , which allows for the admission of evidence obtained in an unlawful search if the p olice officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source; 2) the inevitable discovery doctrine , which allows for the admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source; and 3) the attenuation doctrine , which allows for the admission of evidence when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence (either direct or derivat iv e) is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance. Williams v. State , 372 Md. 386, 409

- 1 1 (2002)( quotation marks and citations omitted).
I n United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 904 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established another limitation on the exclusionary rule

-- the good faith exception. In Leon , t he Court conclu ded “ that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion

. ” Id. at 922. The reasoning behind the good faith exception is “ [b]ecause the only purpose of the Exclusionary Rule . . . is to29

deter unreasonable police behavior . . . a mistake made by a judge in issuing a warrant should not be attributed to the police officer who e xecutes it. ” State v. Andrews , 227 Md. App. 350, 418 (2016)(quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the good faith

exc eption seeks to avoid “ [p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate ’ s er ror, rather than his own[.] ” Leon , 468 U.S. at 921 (footno te omitted )

. Leon set out only four circumstances under which the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would not apply: (1) when the judicial officer issuing the warrant was misled by an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) when the magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role; (3) when a warrant [is] based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; or (4) when the warrant is facially deficient ( e.g., failing to particularize the place to be searched). State v. Faulkner , 190 Md. App. 37, 61 (2010)(quotation marks , citations , and footnote omitted) . Appellant argues that the third circumstance applies here . We disagree. The third circumstance, which is frequently invoked but rarely applied, was “ clearly intended to deal with a purely conclusory statement in a warrant application backed up by no further supporting data ”

– a so - called “ bare

- bones ” affidavit. Jenkins , 178 Md. App. at 202

- 03. We gave the following t wo e xamples of so

- called “ bare

- bones ” affidavits:

“ A ffiant s have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe ” that
certain narcotics will be found on the described premises , and the “ [Affiant] has cause to suspect and does believe that ” certain described merchandise is contained on the described premises. Id . This is certainly not the case here. Information from several confidential infor mants and anonymous sources was related in great detail and co rroborated, in part, by30

t he police. Additionally, Sergeant Nichols related in detail his own experiences and prior contact with appellant as well as other members of the drug task force unit. Therefore, even if there was not a substantial basis for a magistrate to have issued the residential search warrant, we would apply the good faith exception, and not suppress the evidence recovered
from appellant ’ s residence , as appellant would have us do.
I I. Citing Carter v. State , 374 Md. 693 (2003), ap pellant argues that we must reverse all his convictions because the trial court erred in refusing to accept his offer to stipulate to his d isqualifying conviction for the firearm offenses

– a prior conviction for distributin g drugs. T he State concedes that under Carter the trial court should have accepted the defense ’ s offer to stipulate s o as not to disclose the nature of that conviction to the jury,
but nonetheless , the State argues reversal is unwarranted because appellant did not object when the prior conviction w as admitted later at trial. We agree with the State.
A s related above, a ppellant was charged with six counts of possession of a regulated firearm by a disqualifie d person. Appellant was alleged to be a disqualified person because of a prior drug distribution conviction. S ee Md. Code (2003, 2011 Repl. Vol., 2015 Suppl.) , Public Safety Article § 5

- 133(c)(1)(ii)

. After the testimony of Sergeant Nichols, the State moved to admit into evidence a

“ true test copy ” of appellant ’ s prior drug distribution conviction. T o avoid having the nature of his prior conviction presented to the jury, d efense counsel offered to stipulate that appellant ha d a previous conviction that prevented him from possessing firearms

. After some discussion, t he trial court refused to do so, agree ing with the State that according to31

the charging document and the law , the State was required to prove that appellant had a prior “ drug

- related conviction ” to sustain the firearm possession charge s. Defense counsel responded that it would not object to amending the charg ing document to reflect that appellant had a “ disqualifying con dition ” to possessing firearms . The co urt held to its ruling, responding that it could not make the State “ amend anything [.] ” The State then sought to introduce the prior conviction into evidence . When d efense counsel objected , the court responded: “ It will be admitted over objection. I r ealize that your objection is to the prejudicial value outweighs the probative of it, but it is an element of the last six offenses . . . the firearms charges, so it is an element that the State has introduced with a certified copy of the record. ” The court then admitted the exhibit. 7
The State rested and a ppellant took the stand in his defense. D uring cross

examination, the following colloquy occurred: [THE STATE]: Okay. You ’ re the same Deon Williams that was convicted of controlled dangerous su bstance manufacture , distribution of narcotic in April of 2006? [WITNESS]: Yep. [THE STAT E]: And you ’ re the same Deon Leroy Williams who was convicted of the failure to register as a sex offender in January of 2006? [WITNESS]: Yep. After appellant ’ s testimony, the court instructed the jury, without objection : You ’ ve heard evidence that the [d] efendant has been convicted of a crime. You may consider this evidence in deciding whether the [d] efendant is telling the truth, but for no other purpose. You must not consider the conviction as evidence that the [ d ] efendant committed the crime charged in this case. Now

7 T he exhibit was not included in the record.32

you ’ ve heard evidence also that the [ d ] efendant has been convicted of a crime that would make illegal for him to possess certain firearms. You may consider that evidence in deciding whether he has possessed firearms with having had a disqualifying crime that is a felony. Following the initial jury instructions, the trial court supplemented its instructions, without object ion, as follows : You ’ ve also heard evidence that the [d] efendant in this case previously committed the crime of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance on April the 18 th , 2006. That is not a charge in this case. You may consider this evidence only on the question of motive, intent and as a disqualifying crime for the possession of a regulated or unregulated firearm. However, you may not consider this evidence for any other purpose, specific ally you may not consider it as evidence that the [d] efendant is in bad character or has a tendency to commit crime. The Court of Appeals in Carter , supra , held, that when an accused in a criminal

- in

possession case requests that the name or nature of the previous conviction not be disclosed to the jury, “ the trial court must accept a stipulation or admission that the defendant was convicted of a crime that qualifies under the criminal

- in

- possession statute. ” 374 Md. at 720 (footnote omitted) . The Court explained that “ the trial judge should inform the jury that the defendant admits that he or she has been convicted of a crime for which he or she is prohibi ted from possessing a regulated firearm under the law. ” Id . at 722. The Court reasoned that “ [t]he judge should not describe the previous conviction with any more particularit y or by using the categories of crimes . . . such as ‘ crime of violence ’ or ‘ fe lony ’”
because “ [a] description of the conviction by its statutory category carries with it a high potential to lure jurors ‘ into a sequence of bad character reasoning[.] ’” Id

. T he Court recognized that “ as a matter of law, the probative value of the name or nature of a previous conviction is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice[.] ” Id . at 722 n.10

.33

Md. Rule 4

- 323(a) provides: “ An objection to the admission of e vidence shall be made at the time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the grounds for objection become apparent. Otherwise, the objection is waived. ” “ [I]t is not reversible error when evidence, claimed to be inadmissible, is later admitted without objection. ” Tichnell v.
State , 287 Md. 695, 716 (1980) (citations omitted). See Williams v. State , 131 Md. App. 1, 17, cert. denied , 359 Md. 335 (2000)(evidence coming in either earlier or later without objection waives admission of evidence) , and Clark v. State , 97 Md. App. 381, 394

- 95 (1993)(even though defense objected at times to certain testimony, failure to object both before and after elicitation of the same testimony waived objection for appeal). By not objecting later when the same conviction was entered into evidence, appellant has waived any objection to the contested evidence

. III. Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court failed to take any action when he brought to the cour t ’ s attention that a juror had allegedly nodded off during trial. The State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not granting appellant ’ s requested recess, and reversal is unwarranted because appellant has failed to show any resulting prejudice from the juror ’ s alleged inattentiveness. We agree with the State

.

“ It is well

- settled that trial courts are vested with broad discretion in the conduct of trials. ” State v. Booze , 334 Md. 64, 68 (1994)(citations omitted). See also Churchfield v.
State , 137 Md. App. 668, 682, cert. denied , 364 Md. 536 (2001)(same). Md. Rule 4

– 312(g)(3) provides that in all non

- capital cases “ [a]t any time before the jury retires to34

consider its verdict, the trial judge may replace any jury member whom the trial judge finds to be unable or disqualified to perform jury service with an alternate[.] ” See also George L. Blum, Annotation, Inattention of Juror from Sleepiness or Other Cause as Ground f or Reversal or New Trial , 59 A.L.R. 5th 1 (199 8). Likewise, the substitution of an alternate juror for a regular juror “ lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge [and s]uch an exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless arbitrary and abusive in its application. ” James v. State , 14 Md. App. 689, 699 (1972). We have said that an abuse of discretion occurs where “ no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial]

court. ” Fontaine v. State , 134 Md. App. 275, 288, cert. denied , 362 Md. 188 (2000)(quotation marks and citations omitted)(brackets in original). “ Thus, where a trial

court ’ s ruling is reasonable, even if we believe it might have gone the other way, we will not disturb it on appeal. ” Id. Here, a fter the jury was sworn in and before opening statement, the trial court told the jury panel that during trial it would “ take periodic recesses. ” The trial court advised the panel: I usually take a ten minute recess about every hour. However, if anyone needs a recess, if anyone needs to take a break, raise your hand and I ’ ll declare a recess right then, even if it ’ s in the middle of somebody ’ s testimony. Don ’ t be bashful, raise your hand. I ’ ll understand. And I ’ ll declare a recess right there. Or you can tell your Forelady you want a recess and she ’ ll tell me, she ’ ll get my attention. The mind, I believe, can only absorb what the bottom can endure, so I will try to take a break every hour, but please feel free to say you need a recess or indicate tha t and I ’ ll see to it that you get a recess. After opening statement, the court took a 25 minute recess. The State then called it s only witness, Se rgeant Nichols. After 65

- pages of written transcr ipt, a bench conference35

ensued. B ecause of the need to address other unrelated matters, t he court dismissed the jury for an hour and a half, and then told t hem to report back at 5:30 p.m. At that time, court reconvened and the State continued with its direct examination of Sergeant Nichols for about 20

- pages of written transcript

. Shortly after defense counsel began its cross

- examination of Sergeant Nichols , t he parties approached the be n ch to discuss an unrelated evidentiary issue. During the bench conference, defense counsel advised t he trial court that appellant had told him that “ one of the jurors in the front row ” had twice fallen asleep. The trial court stated, “ I haven ’ t seen it [

. ] ” The court added: “ I ’ m not going to admonish him. I haven ’ t seen him nod off. ” Defense counsel stated, “ A ll right. Okay [

. ] ” Appellant then asked the court to give “ a break ” to the allegedly nodding

- off jur or . The State advised t hat Sergeant Nichols was its last witness , and the court noted that “ [w]e just got back in here. ” The court denied appellant ’ s request but advised that it would “ keep an eye on ” the juror

. Defense counsel continued cross

- examination of Sergeant Nichols for 30

- pages of transcript, the State re

- directed for about 10

- pages of typed transcript, and defense counsel

re - cro ssed for one page. At an ensuing bench conference during another unrelated evidentiary matter , defense counsel told th e court, “ [ W ] e have noticed the j uror nodding off several more times. ” The trial court replied, “ Okay. Well I ’ ve been watching him. I haven ’ t seen him no d off. ” Appellant replied, “ He ’ s been asleep the whole time. ” Defense counsel requested no relief. The parties returned to their trial tables, and the State rested. The jury was given a recess while the parties and the court dealt wi th other matters,36

including defense counsel ’ s motion for judgment of acquittal. The jury was recalled and defense counsel proceeded with its case and the “ nodding ” juror was not mentioned again

. We have found three Maryland cases dealing with sleeping jurors, and although none of them are factually on point, they do provide a context for our decision.
In Hall v. State , 223 Md. 158 (1960), Hall alleged to the trial court that three jurors appeared to be asleep and a newspaper repo rter stated that “ it appeared that one of the jurors was sleeping. ” Hall , 223 Md. at 177. In contrast were the statements from the three jurors involved, all of whom denied sleeping or being inattentive, and a statement from the
State ’ s Attorney that “ he did not notice any inattentiveness on the part of the jury. ” Id. at 178. On appeal, t he Court held that a party alleging juror misconduct is required to prove that the misconduct actually occurred and that the party was prejudiced by the misconduct.
The Court found no conclusive proof that the jurors were asleep. Additionally, appellant failed to show any prejudice , noting that “ [t]he length of time the juror was asleep is not shown, nor does it appear what testimony was introduced during that time, nor that it was of any importance or extent, nor whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused. ” Id. (quotations and citation omitted). The Court concluded: “ Without stronger evidence that the misconduct alleged actually occurred, and a showing of prejudi ce to the appellant, we cannot say that there are grounds for reversal. ” Id.
In Stokes v. State , 72 Md. App. 673 (1987), a trial court sua sponte substituted an alternate juror for a designated juror whom the court believed was sleeping. Stokes ’ s
attor ney disputed the trial court ’ s observations and strongly objected to the court ’ s action. On appeal, we held that the trial court ’ s action was in error as there was no evidence that37

the juror was unable to continue and because of the criminal justice syste m ’ s stro ng policy to keep empaneled jurie s intact. Id. at 680

- 84. In Wright v. State , 24 Md. App . 309, 313 (1975), we held the trial court did not err in not granting Wright ’ s motion for a new trial where there was no evidence of prejudice when the foreman that had dozed off was awake ned immediately upon dozing and had been attentive both before and after the incident. Here, appellant believed that a juror was nodding off and brought this to the trial

court ’ s attention. The trial court disagreed , stating that it had not seen the juror nod off but advising that it would keep an eye on the juror

. Defense counsel responded, “ Okay

. ” We are aware of no law, and appellant directs us to none, that requires a trial court to sua sponte inquire into whether a juror had been sleeping when the trial court ’ s own observations are to the contrary

. Even if the evidence supported the conclusion that the juror was inattentive or sleeping, appellant did not show that he was prejudiced. There wa s no evidence about the length of time that the j uror w as asleep, what testimony was being introduced during that time, or whether such testimony was of any importance or favorable or unfavorable to appellant. Without such evidence, as in Hall , we find no error . IV. Appellant was convicted of three counts of possession with intent to distribute CDS (heroin, hydrocodone, and marijuana); three counts of possessing each of those drugs; and six counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State “ utterly failed to prove that [appellant] possessed any of the drugs or guns [.] ” To support his argument,38

a ppellant downplays the significance of the “ single piece of mail ” addressed to him and found in the bedroom where the drugs and guns were recovered . He also e mphasizes his testimony that his deceased brother used th at bedroom and that several others lived in the home with appellant. The State responds th at the evidence was more than sufficient to

s upport a rational inference that appellant was in possession of the drugs and guns found at the residence. We agree with the State. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our task is to determine “‘ whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ’” Hobby v. State , 4 3 6 Md. 52 6 , 537

- 38 (2014 )(quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) ) (emphasis in Jackson ). This standard applies regardless of whether the verdict

re sts upon circumstantial or direct evidence “ since, generally, proof of guilt based in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence is no different from proof of guilt based on direct eyewitness accounts. ” State v. Suddith , 379 Md. 425, 430 (2004)(quotation marks and citation omitted). “ [R]esolving conflicts in the evidence , and weighing the credibi l ity of wit nesses, is properly reserved for the fact finder. ” Longshore v. State , 399 Md. 486, 499

- 500 (2007)(cit ations omitted). A jury is given the responsibility to “ choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factu al situation and [a reviewing court] must give deference to all reasonable inferences the fact

- finder draws, regardless of whether we would have chosen a different reasonable inference. ” Suddith , 379 Md. at 430 (quotation marks and citations omitted).39

For purposes of drugs offenses, “ possess ” is defined by statute as the “ exercise [of] actual or constructive dominion or control over a thing by one or more persons. ” Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law § 5

- 101(v). “ Control ” is defined as “ t he exercise of a rest raining or directing influence over the thing allegedly possessed. ” Handy v. State , 175 Md. App. 538, 563 (quotation marks and citations omitted) , cert. denied , 402 Md. 353 (2007). Control may be actual or constructive, joint or individual

. Id

. “ [K]now ledge of the presence of an object is generally a prerequisite to the exercise of dominion and control. ” Id . (citation omitted). Th e definition and contours of possession in drug cases applies equally to firearm possession cases . Id

. at 564. At trial, t he State ’ s only witness was Sergeant Nichols with the Maryland State Police, currently assigned to the Caroline County Drug Task Force . He was admitted as an expert in the field of narcotics evaluation, identification, and detection, particularly as

to heroin, opiates, sy nthetic opiates, and marijuana. Appellant , his father, his mother, and his brother testified for the defense. Sergeant Nichols testified similar to his suppression hearing testimony regarding the arrest of appellant and subsequent sea rch of his person and his car , adding that the police recovered $1, 3 56 and two cell phones from appellant ’ s person and three cell phones from appellant ’ s car . The sergeant also testified that after his arrest, a ppellant was transported to the Maryland State Police Barrack in Easton where he was strip searched

. A plastic baggie corner, tied at the top and contain ing CDS , was removed from appellant ’ s

anus. The sergeant further testified that the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration listed40

appellant ’ s a ddress as 7188 American Corner Road, Denton, Maryland, 21629 , and that appellant gave that address in his daughter ’ s child support case

. Pursuant to the execution of a search and seizure warrant for 7188 American Corner Road , the police recovered guns and drugs from the back bedroom of the residence

. Specifically, the police found i nside the closet t wo handguns an d three handgun magazines. On top of the bed under the sheets was a third handgun. Of the three .22 caliber long rifles recovered , two were found in a gun case behind the closet door and the third was found on the floor behind the bed. A plastic baggie containing buprenorphine and five loose hydrocodone pills were f ound on the dresser. At the foot of the bed, the police recovered a plastic baggie of marijuana

. From that spot, the police also recovered a letter postdated July 31, 2013, from the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene addressed to appellant at the address

. Adul t male clothing and hats , several boxes of ammunition , and $488 in $5 and $1 denominations were also found in the back bedroom. The police also recovered n umerous plastic baggies with both corners missing , and the corners of plastic bag gies on the back porch and in a container in the dining room . These baggies were similar in nature to the one removed from appellant ’ s anus. Sergeant Nichols testified that after the search and seizure of the residence, he obtained a search and seizure warra nt for the two cell phones seized from appellant ’ s
person . Several texts from th ose cell phones were admitted into evidence. Specifically,

o n August 13, 2013, an unknown caller texted appellant: “ C ould you please help me out with those subs we talked ab out

. I really wan t to kick but I get so s i ck I wan t to die. OMG.
I can ’ t be in bed ill like that

. I need to take care of my family and work

. P lease my phone41

messed up , but you can call me on my daughter phone

. T hanks. ” The sergeant explained that “ subs ” mean t Suboxone, an opiate blocker that is used by a person to stop an opiate addiction. On Sept e mber 10, 2013, an unknown caller twice texted appellant : “ [C] all me bro nd a huge favor ” and “ My peoples nd a g and a half [.] ” The sergeant explained that “ a g and a half

” meant a gram and a half of a controlled dangerous substance. Appellant ’ s father testified t hat he has rented the American Corner residence since 2000, and that appellant and others stay ed at the house

. He testified that appellant

s ometimes stayed at the house , and when he did, he slept on the couch in the living room. Appellant ’ s mother testified that appellant stayed at the house in Se ptember 2013, but that he slept in the living room or another bedroom

. She testified that appell ant did not stay in the back bedroom where the drugs and guns were found but that “ [e]verybody, random people ” stayed in that bedroom. Appellant ’ s brother, w ith whom appellant was currently housed in the same cell and correctional facility for a 2015 conviction for possession of CDS with the intent to distribute , testified that in September 2013, their oldest brother,
Ve rnel, w ho had died earlier that year, routinely used the bedroom where the guns and drugs were found. The State , h o wever, admitted evidence that V e rnel lived elsewhere at the time

. Appellant testified in his defense. He testified that although the American Corner
Road address was his legal address , he spent most of his time at his daughter ’ s mother ’ s residence

. H e testified that when he stayed at the American Corner house he never slept in the back bedroom , but instead slept either on the couch in the living room or in the middle room

. He testified that he had never seen the plastic baggies in the living room or42

ba ck porch. Appellant admitted to two convictions in 2006 : distribution of a controlled dangerous substance and failure to register as a sex offender. As stated above, t he jury wa s free to believe some or all of the testimony and to choose inferences from the differen t facts presented . We are persuaded that a rationa l juror could conclude from the facts presented t hat appellant lived at the American Corner residence , that he was involved in drug dealing, and that he possess ed , either individually or j ointly, directly or constructively, the guns and drugs found in the bedroom and living

room. Cf. State v. Gutierrez , 446 Md. 221, 237 (2016) (citing personal papers belonging to the defendants as evidence that they possessed drugs and gun found in apartment);
Kamara v. State , 205 Md. App. 607, 633 (2012)(holding that jury could infer from the
pr e senc e of male clothing and several items of mail that Kamara possessed the marijuana
found in the bedroom).

JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.