www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 2 1 

The first point in the preface of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) Strategic Concept reconfirms the bonds between NATO nations to defend one another under Article 5. This was a response to the requirement by some Central and Eastern European (CEE) states that reassurance of 

Article 5 remains fully operative. The fourth point in the preface commits NATO to 

the goal of creating the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons.1 This includes 

further reductions of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) deployed in Europe. It also implies mutual reductions and closer cooperative relations with Russia.

In this paper, we undertake an ambitious research effort to examine Article 

5 reassurance in creating conditions for further NSNW reductions. This research 

effort includes a series of interviews with critical leaders in Washington, DC, 

NATO capitals, and Moscow.2

The task for NATO, we argue, will be to find the right mix of reassurance for 

the Allies and reset with Russia to create the conditions for additional NSNW reductions on the part of both NATO and Russia. Measures to reassure NATO Allies 

might be seen by Russia as assertive and requiring Russian military preparation, 

including maintenance of their NSNW systems. Measures to build confidence with 

Russia and mutually reduce NSNW systems might be seen by some Allies as weakening Alliance capabilities or resolve and hence undermining Article 5 reassurance.

The Changing Nature of Nuclear Reassurance

Reassurance has been at the core of NSNW deployments in Europe since 

the mid-1950s. NSNW—ground-, air-, and sea-based—were introduced in 

Europe to offset what was seen as overwhelming Soviet/Warsaw Pact conventional force superiority, and thus to demonstrate reassurance that Europe would not 

NATO Reassurance and 

Nuclear Reductions: 

Creating the Conditions

by Hans Binnendijk and Catherine McArdle Kelleher

About the Authors

Hans Binnendijk is Vice President 

for Research and Applied 

Learning at the National Defense 

University, Theodore Roosevelt 

Chair in National Security Policy, 

and Director of the Institute 

for National Strategic Studies. 

Catherine McArdle Kelleher is 

Professor Emeritus of Strategic 

Research at the Naval War College 

and Senior Fellow in the Watson 

Institute for International Studies 

at Brown University.

Key Points

◆ The NATO Strategic Concept 

reconfirms the commitment that 

Article 5 remains fully operative. 

It also commits the Alliance to the 

goal of creating conditions for 

further reductions in nonstrategic 

nuclear weapons (NSNW). A key 

issue in making further reductions 

will be reassuring Allies that doing so can enhance the security of 

member states, including Central 

and Eastern European (CEE) Allies.

◆ Future NATO NSNW reductions 

and reassurance can be undertaken if they are carefully orchestrated, which would involve undertaking a set of balanced steps 

designed to reassure CEE states; 

continuing to promote opportunities to reset relations with Russia; 

and making those systems safe, 

secure, and sustainable.

◆ The task for NATO will be to find 

the right mix of reassurance for 

Allies and reset with Russia to create the conditions for additional 

NSNW reductions on the part of 

both NATO and Russia.

Transatlantic Current

National Defense University

January 2012

Center for Transatlantic Security Studies
2 Transatlantic Current No. 2 www.ndu.edu/inss

be left defenseless or subject to the dreaded replay of the 

occupation/liberation cycle of 1940–1945. These weapons 

were intended to be triggers of escalation. Increasingly after the 1960s, however, they were also a critical part of 

the politics of Western security and U.S. efforts to control the use and further proliferation of nuclear weapons, 

even among friends. Allies were expected to participate in 

the deployment of NSNW through designated delivery 

systems and hosted bases, with warheads still under strict 

U.S. control.3

 But through NATO institutions such as the 

Nuclear Planning Group, the Allies were also to play a 

direct role in the thinking and planning for the possible 

use of these weapons. By the early 1980s, there was a further transformation: for certain NATO Allies, NSNW 

deployments represented a subtle, more symbolic notion 

of American commitment, engagement, and willingness 

to offset Soviet nuclear and conventional intimidation.

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, 

NSNW appeared to play a less central role, both politically and operationally. The threat of conventional attack 

against Europe declined significantly as both NATO 

and Russia cut conventional forces and the Soviet Union 

and Warsaw Pact dissolved. Through a series of unilateral measures, the United States and Russia retired or 

destroyed thousands of NSNW—warheads and launchers designed for European missions. 

Currently, according to an unofficial estimate by Ian 

Anthony and Johnny Janssen, the number of NSNW 

in Europe ranges from 150 to 200, deployed in five 

countries and delivered by dual capable aircraft (DCA) 

from many European nations.4

 Some Allies argue that 

these NSNW are no longer important to European defense and that it is time for their removal. Other Allies, 

especially the newer CEE members, still see them as 

symbolic of the U.S. commitment and, as such, important to the deterrence guarantee under Article 5. At the 

heart of the problem lies an identity crisis of NATO. 

Certain members, in particular the CEE countries, 

have placed an increasing emphasis on reassurance and 

Article 5 functions of the Alliance, including the role of 

the remaining U.S. NSNW. For many other members, 

while NATO does remain important, there is no clear 

consensus on NSNW as a means of reassurance.

Reassurance and CEE States

In July 2009, 22 former leaders from CEE states, 

including Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, wrote an 

open letter to President Barack Obama stating their 

concern about Russian behavior. Within the Alliance, 

this contributed to a major debate about the need for 

reassurance that the Article 5 commitment remained 

fully valid. The immediate trigger for this concern was 

Russia’s incursion into Georgia and a cyber attack on 

Estonia, coupled with the Obama administration’s reset policy toward Russia and the fear that reset would 

come at the expense of the security of CEE states. But 

several other factors were at play, including the Medvedev doctrine5

 (which intended to lessen the ability of 

the United States to engage in unilateral action, and, de 

facto, appeared designed to weaken NATO) and energy 

cutoffs that affected Ukraine, Belarus, and other parts 

of CEE. The February 5, 2010, Russian defense doctrine also reiterated language from previous documents 

by listing NATO geographical expansion and NATO’s 

global projections as a danger to Russia.6

As NATO prepared to write its new Strategic Concept in 2010, therefore, there was concern in CEE states 

that Russia was already in the midst of an assertive campaign to use ambiguous means, such as cyber attacks, 

energy cutoffs, and local ethnic unrest, to intimidate 

and even attack its neighbors. Regarding the Alliance, 

the CEE states in particular were concerned that such 

measures would not reach the Article 5 threshold or that 

NATO decisionmaking and response would be too slow 

to be effective. 

There is a clear nuclear element to these demands for 

reassurance. Senior leaders in the Baltic states, Poland, and 

at the heart of the problem lies an 

identity crisis of NATO
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 2 3 

Czech Republic interviewed for this paper expressed, in 

the main, deep opposition to unilateral NATO nuclear 

reductions, although the Poles have been vocal in supporting the elimination of NSNW in exchange for matching 

reductions in Russia.7 These leaders highlighted that Russia’s NSNW in Europe outnumber U.S. NSNW systems 

deployed there by some order of magnitude. Russia’s conventional force weakness had also led to a Russian “first 

use” nuclear doctrine, not unlike NATO’s Cold War policy 

of flexible response. They also pointed to Russian military 

exercises (Lagoda and Zapad) conducted in 2009 near the 

Baltic states, which ended with a simulated nuclear attack 

on Poland.8 Moreover, when Poland made the decision to 

host 10 U.S. ground-based interceptors as part of the Bush 

administration’s Third Site missile defense program, Russian officials responded by threatening to target Poland 

with Russian nuclear systems in Kaliningrad.9

Although the views of CEE countries are not monolithic, many CEE officials believe that U.S. nuclear systems in Europe provide them with reassurance in at least 

two ways: they offset some of the weight of potential Russian nuclear intimidation, and they symbolically represent 

America’s commitment to use the full range of its military 

strength to defend all of its Allies. The old Cold War notion 

of NATO deterrence through rapid escalation and the prospect of large-scale use of NSNW are no longer valid. It is, 

however, once again being replaced for some NATO members by an important symbol of American commitment.

The various components of extended deterrence, 

including the role of strategic and NSNW, conventional forces, and missile defense, are now open issues 

in the ongoing NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). Although a consensus has yet 

to emerge, no matter how extended deterrence is dealt 

with by NATO members, it is different, albeit related to 

reassurance. If extended deterrence is seen to fail, reassurance will obviously fail as well. 

Reassurance Beyond CEE States

Outside of the CEE sphere, there are different allied 

concerns and reassurance needs. NATO Allies in Southern Europe primarily seek reassurance against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Greater 

Middle East, particularly in Iran. A nuclear-armed Iran, 

plus the potential for even greater instability in the region, could enhance the risks of further proliferation to 

Europe’s south. This may be of particular concern for 

the countries that host U.S. NSNW and that might feel 

greater insecurity if those systems were removed, in addition to losing a perceived special status within NATO 

that U.S. NSNW convey to these states.

Some NATO Allies in Western Europe take a different view of U.S. NSNW deployments. They see U.S. 

weapons in Europe as anachronistic, a source of accidental risk, a destabilizing element in popular eyes, and a 

possible terrorist security risk. During the Bush administration, U.S. NSNW were removed from Greece and 

the bilateral arrangements with the United States were 

quietly suspended.10

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle and 

other senior German officials have publicly advocated 

withdrawing the remaining NSNW from Germany—

a position adopted by the German coalition government in 2009—while accepting that NATO should 

remain a nuclear alliance. Westerwelle was joined 

in February 2010 by Foreign Ministers from Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg (Benelux), and 

Norway11 in a call to discuss nuclear arms control as 

part of the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Tallinn in April 2010.12 Certain NATO states, including 

these five countries, have been pushing to reconsider 

these issues with an eye toward changing policies. 

In a June 2010 speech in Berlin, Norwegian Foreign 

although the views of CEE countries 

are not monolithic, many CEE 

officials believe that U.S. nuclear 

systems in Europe provide them 

with reassurance
4 Transatlantic Current No. 2 www.ndu.edu/inss

Minister Jonas Gahr StØre stated that “it would make 

good sense [for NATO] to find a means of withdrawing all sub-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe 

and subsequently eliminating them.”13

All NATO members agreed in the November 

2010 Strategic Concept to work toward further reductions of NSNW. They also agreed that “any further steps must take into account the disparity with 

the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear 

weapons” and that NATO was “committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.”14 An April 15, 

2011, non-paper signed by 10 Permanent Representatives to NATO (including Germany, the Benelux 

countries, and Norway) delivered at the Berlin Foreign 

Ministers’ Meeting also stated that NSNW reductions 

“should not be pursued unilaterally or be allowed to 

weaken the transatlantic link.”15

The United Kingdom and France have not pressed 

for removing U.S. NSNW, and France in particular has 

urged that NATO retain a strong nuclear deterrent posture (in part due to concerns over the possible effect of 

U.S. NSNW withdrawal on the broader issue of nuclear 

deterrence and France’s force de frappe).16

NATO’s Current Position

At the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Tallinn, NATO ministers agreed to a five-point formula 

suggested by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. This 

formula sought to meet the concerns of all Allies. The 

five points are:

◆ As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

◆ As a nuclear alliance, sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities widely is fundamental.

◆ NATO’s broad aim is to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons.

◆ Allies must broaden deterrence against the range 

of 21st-century threats.

◆ NATO’s aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on NSNW, relocate 

weapons, and include NSNW in the next round of 

arms control.17

The NATO Group of Experts, chaired by Madeleine Albright, concluded in May 2010 that “as long as 

nuclear weapons exist, NATO should continue to maintain secure and reliable nuclear forces, with widely shared 

responsibilities for deployment and operational support, 

at the minimum level required by the prevailing security environment.”18 The NATO Group of Experts also 

called for a change in NATO declaratory policy and supported further reductions and “possible eventual elimination” of NSNW, although suggesting the retention of 

some forward-deployed U.S. NSNW on European territory “under current security conditions.” 

The NATO Group of Experts’ report and the Tallinn 

principles became the basis for the Strategic Concept’s 

nuclear formula, which was agreed by all member states in 

Lisbon in November 2010, and which “commits NATO 

to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons but reconfirms that as long as there 

are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a 

nuclear alliance.”19 To implement this aspect of the Strategic Concept, NATO has undertaken a DDPR to identify 

the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities. NATO Defense Ministers also agreed, in principle, to 

establish a new Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 

Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas 

Gahr Støre stated that “it would 

make good sense [for NATO] to find 

a means of withdrawing all substrategic nuclear weapons 

from Europe and subsequently 

eliminating them”
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 2 5 

Arms Control Committee. Members have not yet agreed 

on its task, but the committee is expected to provide arms 

control and disarmament input to the review and also to 

offer a forum for consultations among NATO members 

on nuclear and conventional arms control more generally.

Seven Paths to Reassurance in 

Article 5

Numerous measures to help reassure CEE and Southern Allies have been taken and more are under consideration. These are discussed and evaluated below. Adopting 

reassurance measures to create the conditions for further 

NSNW reductions will involve both the conventional 

and strategic arena, including a critical role for cooperative measures in European missile defense. The underlying 

purpose, however, should be creating adequate reassurance 

to address the perceived challenges and concerns of Allies. 

All NATO members would nevertheless draw significant 

confidence and reassurance from a U.S.-Russia arms control agreement that would provide transparency, a clear 

timetable for NSNW reductions, and a set of reciprocal, 

verified levels on NSNW. The nature of those reciprocal 

measures is a key issue now before the Alliance.

This section reviews seven sets of measures designed to enhance confidence in Article 5 and assesses 

the positive contribution that they might make to create 

the conditions for further nuclear reductions. 

Building Confidence through Operational Success 

and Declaratory Statements. One of the most important ways to reassure Allies that NATO will meet its 

Article 5 obligations is a combination of success in current military operations and clear statements of intent 

regarding Article 5 (backed up by credible preparations, 

such as an improved early warning, planning, and crisis management capacity discussed below). These two 

seemingly different points have a common foundation: 

confidence that the Alliance can and will deliver on its 

commitments. NATO is currently conducting military 

operations in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force [ISAF]), providing stability deployments 

in Kosovo, flying air policing operations over the Baltic states, and operating counterpiracy and counterterrorism missions at sea. It recently completed successful 

missions in Libya and Iraq. Success, however defined, in 

these missions is critical to the health of the Alliance itself. CEE Allies understand the linkage between current 

operations and Article 5, which has prompted them to 

contribute significantly to ISAF.

Success in operations could reassure Allies further 

if they were coupled with strong statements of intent regarding Article 5. The Alliance has taken a major step to 

do this. The first substantive point in the new Strategic 

Concept is that the Alliance “reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, 

including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.”20 The first Alliance core task in the new concept 

is collective defense: “NATO members will always assist 

each other against attack; in accord with Article 5 of the 

Washington Treaty . . . the commitment remains firm 

and binding.”21 The Alliance should seek every opportunity in summit and ministerial meetings to reconfirm 

this commitment.

The success of NATO operations in Afghanistan 

remains uncertain with ongoing debates about level 

and duration. If those operations end less than successfully, that will raise questions about political will 

within the Alliance. However, as with the Bosnia conflict more than 15 years ago, the Alliance has demonstrated the ability to adapt to the changing shapes of 

political consensus. 

Enhancing Conventional Plans, Exercises, and Decisionmaking Procedures. As the Strategic Concept was 

under development, a major concern of CEE Allies was 

that NATO did not have adequate contingency plans for 

adopting reassurance measures to 

create the conditions for further 

NSNW reductions will involve both 

the conventional and strategic arena
6 Transatlantic Current No. 2 www.ndu.edu/inss

defensive operations in their territory. NATO has subsequently taken remedial steps.22 A new contingency plan 

for the defense of Poland now exists, which has recently 

been expanded to the Baltic states. These plans should be 

broad in scope, focusing on not only major tank attacks 

but also smaller scale incursions and other more ambiguous means of intimidation. Should NATO itself be 

unable to act, presumably the United States with others 

might seek a more limited coalition to mount a response. 

It may therefore also be useful to explore whether U.S. 

European Command (USEUCOM) should develop its 

own contingency plans for defending this region.

These Article 5 contingency plans need to be exercised at the usual levels—command-post exercises, tabletop play, simulations adapted to changing circumstances, 

and occasionally exercises in the field. Some European 

NATO nations have been reluctant to fully exercise Article 5 responses for fear of offending Russia. However, 

Russia’s Lagoda and Zapad exercises are perceived by 

some Allies as justification for NATO to do so if all Allies concurred.23 Another major cause for reluctance is 

cost and other more critical force constraints; commitments to ISAF, for example, have reduced the availability 

of resources and forces for such exercises. As ISAF withdrawals take place, these conditions might change, and 

such exercises could potentially increase.

Such exercises are important to certain CEE Allies. 

For example, a senior Polish official recently suggested 

live-fire exercises in Poland for the NATO Response 

Force (NRF) Article 5 mission.24 As with planning, 

however, NATO exercises should not be limited to major joint operations but should include ambiguous scenarios where more debate is needed. NATO is currently 

deciding how robust its next major exercise, Steadfast 

Jazz 2013, will be.25

Although creating contingency plans should not 

be seen as provocative by Russia, exercising these plans 

might be. Transparency and dialogue in the NATORussia Council and its working groups should therefore 

be an important first step.

There is also concern that even with proper contingency plans and exercises, NATO will not be able to 

make decisions quickly enough to respond to provocations. These do not primarily concern NSNW, although 

the nuclear bodies within NATO could benefit from updating and a greater degree of transparency about their 

planning assumptions and operational arrangements. 

Two steps can help to reassure these conventional concerns. First, NATO has already created a new strategic 

assessment capability in its international staff. This capability is intended to provide NATO with early warning of potential incidents. It currently focuses only on 

new emerging threats; however, members could consider broadening its mandate to include strengthening 

NATO’s readiness for limited conventional conflict (designed in such a way as to ensure that NATO preparations are not aimed at any particular country and cover 

all possible threats).

Second, NATO should exercise its Article 5 decisionmaking responsibilities using robust scenarios and simulations with both NATO members and its political leadership. By identifying problem areas of decisionmaking in 

advance, Allies can gain greater confidence that, if necessary, NATO would respond to provocations in a timely 

manner. Some of these reassurance goals were pursued in 

the March preparatory CMX 2011 in Tallinn.26

Strengthening Conventional Forces and the Article 

5 Mission. NATO needs to strengthen its conventional forces to fully support the Article 5 mission. 

The economic recession and reduced sense of threat 

have led most NATO nations to reduce their defense 

budgets significantly. Despite perceived and publicly 

stated concerns regarding Russia and the need for further reassurance, only a handful of European nations 

although creating contingency plans 

should not be seen as provocative 

by Russia, exercising these 

plans might be
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 2 7 

now spend more than 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, and manpower levels have decreased significantly and seemingly will continue to 

do so after withdrawals from Afghanistan.27 The U.S. 

contribution to overall NATO defense spending has 

risen, since a decade ago, from about half the total 

budget to nearly three-quarters today.

Most of these European national reductions have 

been taken unilaterally without much consultation with 

the Alliance. The effect of these reductions on NATO’s 

overall capabilities is uncertain, and within NATO, there 

is little will to take on nations that are cutting too deeply 

in critical areas because all are cutting deeply. In addition, operations in Libya demonstrated that without the 

United States, European nations have critical materiel 

and significant operational shortfalls, including communication gaps, low stocks of precision munitions, and 

difficulty in providing enabling equipment, such as refueling aircraft. These factors led former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to declare that unless these trends are 

reversed, NATO’s future is “dim if not dismal.”28

The United States initially announced in 2011 that 

it would retain three Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in 

Europe after 2015.29 Further U.S. budget pressure will 

likely reduce the total U.S. ground forces in Europe below that number. The remaining BCTs will be complemented by missile defenses on land (Poland and Romania) and Aegis ships at sea, forward-stationed special 

operations aircraft, and a long-duration small aviation 

detachment in Poland.

Recognizing the need to reassure the CEE Allies in 

particular, NATO members agreed at the 2010 Lisbon 

Summit to a Lisbon Critical Capabilities Commitment that 

included several capabilities related to Article 5 missions. 

NATO members also agreed to a new Command Structure 

Reform designed to make senior commands more deployable, including to the eastern part of the Alliance.

Overall, the relatively uncoordinated European defense cuts, including substantial cuts by CEE countries, 

and projected American manpower reductions could 

negatively affect reassurance of Allies. This could be offset 

somewhat, however, by what NATO Secretary-General 

Anders Fogh Rasmussen has called “smart defense.”30

This would include an array of measures to spend remaining defense euros and dollars wisely. Examples of 

smart defense might include establishing regional multinational forces, sharing regional equipment and facilities, 

pooling funds for enablers such as the C–17 consortium, 

creating niche capabilities and division of labor, fencing 

funding for top priority missions, ensuring that rapid 

reaction capabilities such as the NRF are automatically 

reconstituted for Article 5 missions, earmarking at least 

one U.S. BCT for the Article 5 mission and having it exercise with the NRF, and considering new roles for conventional prompt strike and other U.S.-based capabilities 

for defense in Europe. A well-constructed smart defense 

policy that is accepted by the NATO Chicago Summit 

in 2012 could have a sound reassuring effect for all Allies.

Enhancing Support for Training and Installations. 

CEE Allies have consistently called for a higher level 

of permanent NATO involvement in their region. The 

U.S. decision to locate some missile defense deployments 

in Poland and Romania, forward-deployed special operations aircraft, and a longer term aviation detachment 

(for training purposes and to assist with rotational F–16 

deployments) in Poland provides a measure of reassurance.31 A permanent U.S. Patriot missile deployment 

in Poland is now considered unnecessary. But there are 

limits to how far NATO can go with forward deployment of forces because NATO promises made in the 

context of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 

despite concerns regarding 

Russia and the need for further 

reassurance, only a handful of 

European nations now spend 

more than 2 percent of their gross 

domestic product on defense
8 Transatlantic Current No. 2 www.ndu.edu/inss

constrain both nuclear deployments and permanently 

stationing any “significant combat” forces on former 

Warsaw Pact territories.32

Several additional steps have been suggested, particularly by leaders in the Baltic states. These include extending and making the NATO Baltic air policing role 

permanent, using a second Baltic airfield for those air policing operations, restoring NATO Security Investment 

Program funding for military installations, making the 

NATO Center of Cyber Excellence in Estonia more of 

a regional command headquarters, creating new NATO 

transport and logistics centers, and enhancing port facilities for military use.33 Some of these suggestions are 

under consideration and all are intended to pull NATO 

installations and NATO “boots on the ground” in their 

direction in order to maximize their tripwire effect.

Few non-CEE allied states have taken these suggestions, and some leaders have indicated their opposition in 

private.34 Several suggestions, such as expanding NATO 

infrastructure, will be expensive, especially in an era of 

declining defense budgets. There is also some risk involved in implementing all of these suggestions. Russian 

political and military leaders have consistently expressed 

particular concern about NATO moving installations 

nearer to its borders (either because they are concerned 

over NATO military capabilities close to Russia, or they 

simply want an unfettered ability to pressure their neighbors if required). Therefore, each of these suggestions will 

need to be weighed carefully based on cost and political 

effect. The NATO-Russia Council might serve as a forum in which to discuss these measures. 

Broadening Deterrence to Meet New Challenges.

Strengthening reassurance and creating the conditions 

for further NSNW reductions may also require NATO 

responses to three new challenges: missile attacks from 

the Middle East, cyber attacks from multiple sources, 

and interruption of energy flows. Some progress has 

been made on all three.

Missile defense. The missile threat from Iran continues, and efforts to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear 

weapon may fail. At the Lisbon Summit, NATO agreed 

to embrace the Obama administration’s European Phased 

Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which relies on sea-based 

Aegis deployments and upgraded land-based Standard 

Missiles (SM–3s). The United States will finance the Aegis and SM–3 interceptors, other nations are expected to 

finance their own interceptors, and NATO will fund the 

common command and control system. Radars will be deployed and their data fused to provide common and timely 

warning. Deployments are already under way, and this step 

has provided some reassurance for Allies. The decision was 

negotiated carefully with Turkey; however, many decisions 

remain and discussions continue within NATO. 

The United States and NATO are now discussing missile defense cooperation with Russia. Russia 

has sought a single, interoperable system, whereas the 

United States and NATO have insisted on two separate 

systems. Russia has asserted the need for mutual treaty 

limits on missile defense numbers, location, interceptor velocity, and deployments. Initially, Russia proposed 

both system integration and a “sectoral approach” that 

would have given Russia responsibility for the defense 

of some NATO territory close to its borders. The Alliance has firmly rejected the sectoral approach, and it 

appears that Russia has abandoned this proposal as well. 

The United States has proposed a center or centers to 

fuse launch and other data to build a common operating 

picture in order to allow for common training in operations and other cooperative arrangements to give Russia 

a greater sense of comfort without necessitating a common system.35 The future of missile defense cooperation 

will be a major determining factor in Russia’s willingness 

to consider further NSNW reductions. 

Despite NATO’s decision to deploy EPAA, there is 

the possibility that in the future NATO members may need 

CEE Allies have consistently called 

for a higher level of permanent 

NATO involvement in their region
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 2 9 

to decide on whether additional steps are necessary to deter 

Iran from using nuclear-tipped missiles against NATO.

Cyber attacks. Other measures can be taken to reassure Allies regarding cyber attacks. NATO has already 

created a cyber response center and a center of excellence in Tallinn, but so far NATO’s mandate for cyber security is focused primarily on defending its own 

network and infrastructure. The recent Strategic Concept has sought to broaden the Alliance mandate to 

“prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber 

attacks.”36 NATO is currently debating its role in supporting national systems that it relies on for operations. 

Greater efforts should be taken to provide individual 

NATO nations with cyber security for their defense 

establishments, to set common standards for critical 

infrastructure protection, and to coordinate national efforts. NATO cyber awareness and warning could also 

be better coordinated and integrated, responses to attacks could be better coordinated, and the center of 

excellence in Tallinn could be strengthened. These activities should take place parallel with activities within 

the European Union and Organization for Security and 

Co-operation in Europe. For example, USEUCOM 

could provide a cyber range to the Alliance to test various defensive arrangements. 

Energy security. Another area where greater reassurance can be achieved is energy security. The new 

Strategic Concept calls for greater protection of critical 

energy infrastructure and transit areas. It also calls for 

greater consultation and contingency planning among 

Allies. The concept does not directly address the question of a united NATO response to the use of energy 

cutoffs to intimidate or pressure individual Allies.37 The 

new future promised by the shale gas sources discovered 

in northern Europe is yet to be explored, as are the implications of energy dependency and increased market 

demand competition implicit in Germany’s decision to 

halt exploitation of nuclear power and to accept continued dependence on external gas and oil supplies. There 

does not appear, however, to be any active proposals for 

multilateral responses or guarantees; arrangements with 

Russia and other suppliers are almost entirely bilateral 

and market driven.

Broadening deterrence to these three categories of 

new challenges will provide a considerable degree of 

comfort to all Allies. Implementing the Lisbon missile 

defense decision and reaching agreement with Russia on 

missile defense cooperation is perhaps most important. 

Maximizing Deterrent Capabilities of Remaining 

U.S. NSNW. The conditions for further NSNW mutual 

reductions could be made more palatable if the nuclear 

systems that do remain maximize their credibility for deterrence.38 The current NSNW posture in Europe suffers 

from several deficiencies, not least that the B–61 gravity 

bombs and DCA to deliver them are aging.

Readiness level. Under current NATO nuclear policies and procedures, the overall readiness of the force is 

measured in months.39 This is due to NATO’s assessment 

of the current strategic environment. If the strategic situation deteriorates and Alliance members were prepared 

to undertake the necessary measures, this readiness level 

could be dramatically improved.

Weapons security. Some have raised issues about 

NSNW security (for example, the break-ins by protestors at the Kleine Brogel site in Belgium).40 Continued improvements will be needed to maintain a safe, 

secure, and effective system. The 2008 U.S. Air Force 

Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and 

Procedures concluded that “several European nuclear 

storage sites require additional resources to meet security standards,” including support buildings, fences, 

lighting, and security systems.41 These shortfalls do 

not necessarily pose an imminent threat of loss to a 

the future of missile defense 

cooperation will be a major 

determining factor in Russia’s 

willingness to consider further 

NSNW reductions
10 Transatlantic Current No. 2 www.ndu.edu/inss

terrorist group, but NATO urgently needs to address 

these problems.

Weapon-life extension. Another set of improvements 

relates to the remaining B–61 gravity bombs deployed 

in Europe. A life-extension program is now funded and 

under way. This issue can be managed by the United 

States alone and is on track, although in spring 2011, 

there seemed to be congressional opposition.42 Officials and nongovernmental experts in certain European 

countries have also requested a broader review about 

the longer run utility of these bombs.

Dual-capable aircraft. Perhaps the most difficult 

question relates to the DCA owned by European Allies. U.S. F–15s and F–16s are dual capable as will 

be the Joint Strike Fighter ( JSF). But the F–15 and 

F–16s are aging and only a few European nations 

have firm plans to buy the JSF (at this time, it is 

questionable whether either Belgium or the Netherlands would fund the JSF in a nuclear role). Germany 

has opted for the Eurofighter, which would require 

modifications to become dual capable and may raise 

issues associated with sharing design information 

with the United States. Moreover, Germany’s recent 

decision to opt out of civil nuclear power raises the 

question of whether, politically, Germany could approve a new military nuclear program. Germany’s aging Tornado fleet will be downsized significantly, but 

with life-extension programs, enough Tornados could 

be available to perform the DCA role for at least 

another decade.43

Alternative delivery systems. NATO has conducted a 

detailed study of eight alternative delivery systems and 

eliminated most as either too costly or politically impractical. One option that deserves more consideration is 

creating a NATO nuclear air wing, which could be consistent with the pooling and sharing arrangements that 

the Alliance is promoting as part of its smart defense 

initiative. Many European nations, however, may view 

this option as agreeing to pursue a new NATO nuclear 

program, and therefore upgrading the existing DCAs 

appears the most likely outcome. For those not purchasing the JSF, life-extension programs are a possible 

short-term solution, whereas adapting the Eurofighter to 

characteristics of the reconstituted B–61 may be a longer 

term solution.

Deployment options. Various deployment options 

are under consideration by defense analysts, including a “crisis-reconstitution” DCA posture and consolidation of sites from five to two or three. Both of 

these options carry risk. Under the first option, U.S. 

nuclear weapons would be withdrawn from Europe 

and, in accordance with continuing consultations and 

continuous planning among the Allies, reintroduced 

into agreed sites in time of need. According to this reconstitution proposal, measures such as informationsharing, nuclear consultations, common planning, and 

common execution might provide deterrence without 

a U.S. nuclear presence in Europe in the interim.44

Nuclear-sharing has merits, but the fundamental 

challenge is that the reconstitution of nuclear weapons might not be approved if they are needed, either 

by European host nations or by the United States itself. More importantly, some argue that reintroducing 

nuclear weapons into a theater in time of crisis might 

be destabilizing for crisis management. In addition, 

certain officials have argued that implementing this 

option in East Asia has reduced the degree of reassurance among U.S. Allies in that region.45

The second option—consolidating sites—runs the 

risk of creating a slippery slope. If these weapons are 

consolidated and in the process removed from Germany, 

at least two other countries would follow. The last two 

would thus be under intense political pressure to remove 

the weapons as well, and are not uniformly supported for 

some argue that reintroducing 

nuclear weapons into a theater in 

time of crisis might be destabilizing 

for crisis management
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 2 11 

this role by the Allies.46 If a consolidation agreement is 

part of an overall arms control approach with Russia, this 

slippery slope might be mitigated.

Command and control. Additional modifications 

need to be made to command and control capabilities 

and readiness. NATO’s nuclear command and control 

need a reliable and resilient “dual” system that avoids 

“single point of failure” breakdowns. Such a system is 

available at limited cost. And the readiness of today’s deployment is in need of dramatic improvement. 

Declaratory policy. Finally, both NATO nuclear guidance and its declaratory policy could be updated to give 

them more credibility and palatability. NATO’s current 

nuclear guidance dates back to the 1990s. Although the 

United States is not ready to declare that the sole purpose 

of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack, the declaratory policy in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is close 

to that position, leaving a narrow range of other purposes 

related primarily to other WMD attacks conducted by 

states not in compliance with, or party to, the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty. Adopting the NPR language 

as NATO declaratory policy could also make remaining 

deployments more palatable to European public opinion, 

although France reportedly has continued to resist any 

change in NATO declaratory policy, even after the 2010 

Strategic Concept.

If NATO’s strategy is to negotiate with Russia for 

parallel efforts at transparency, removing NSNW from 

the NATO-Russia border areas, and some mutual reductions, then the NSNW that remain—no matter for how 

long, or under what deployment or operational configuration—will need to be safe, secure, effective, and credible. Steps have been taken and more are needed to create 

these conditions.

Modifying Russian Deployments and Doctrine. The 

Alliance’s new Strategic Concept focused on Russian 

deployments and doctrine stating that “in any future 

reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency of its nuclear weapons 

in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the 

territory of NATO’s members.” If this policy is to be 

sustained, it is hard to envision future NATO nuclear 

reductions without parallel and reciprocal Russian actions relating to transparency, location, and numbers 

of NSNW. The question is how to engage with Russia 

on NSNW.

The United States has suggested the possibility of 

a new global follow-on to the New Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (START) with comprehensive warhead ceilings, and has also proposed informal transparency measures on NSNW; however, a detailed approach and strategy have yet to be adopted.

The “Follow-on to New START” is likely to be a 

bilateral negotiation on a global ceiling for U.S. and 

Russian deployed and nondeployed strategic and nonstrategic warheads, with a common ceiling and possible 

freedom to mix within that ceiling.47 Such a negotiation would be an important step for global stability, but 

it would take considerable time to negotiate. It would 

also have significant verification issues to resolve, and it 

remains to be seen how NSNW would be specifically 

addressed if there is freedom to mix warheads under a 

common ceiling.

Further arms control steps either between the 

United States and Russia or NATO and Russia could 

include issues of relocation to specified geographical 

limits (for example, a nondeployment zone on either 

side of the NATO-Russia border), mutual or reciprocal reductions, and/or consolidating deployment or 

storage sites. Each has advantages and disadvantages. 

Relocation to Russia’s east would comfort Allies but 

could create concerns for Japan and China as well as 

undercut Moscow’s hopes for a global intermediaterange nuclear forces ban to parallel the agreement 

NATO nuclear guidance and its 

declaratory policy could be updated 

to give them more credibility 

and palatability
12 Transatlantic Current No. 2 www.ndu.edu/inss

with the United States.48 Reciprocal reductions (for 

example, 30 percent each) would lead to larger numerical cuts for Russia but would leave NATO with 

very few remaining U.S. weapons on European soil. 

Moreover, consolidating Alliance sites could lead to 

the slippery slope for NATO deployments discussed 

earlier. Russian leaders also stress the need for more 

comprehensive negotiations that include conventional 

weapons, missile defense, and space weapons, all of 

which would drastically complicate NSNW talks.

Interim steps need not be packaged in a traditional arms control treaty format; they could consist 

of more flexible reciprocal steps, building upon the 

confidence created by previous steps. They might even 

take the form of paired unilateral initiatives, similar to the U.S. and Russian pledges on shorter range 

NSNW systems of the early 1990s. A good starting 

point would be transparency measures. U.S. officials 

have called for increased NSNW transparency on a 

reciprocal and parallel basis through data exchanges 

as a first step, and verification could be added.49 Most 

European Allies appear to support the concept of implementing parallel transparency measures as a step 

toward further arms control. This has been explored 

in the recent German-Swedish “Food for Thought” 

paper, which was signed by 10 Allies,50 and also the 

April 15, 2011, non-paper that was signed by 10 European Permanent Representatives and that suggested 

a transparency process could take place in the NATO-Russia Council.51

NATO and Russia, by national decisions, 

might also exchange information on safety and security of weapons and storage sites, along the 

lines of the successful U.S.-Russia exchanges 

on strategic weapons that began in spring 2011. 

Officer exchange programs could be established, which 

focus on nuclear issues. High-level seminars similar to 

the Vienna Doctrine Seminars of the 1990s could be 

held on nuclear doctrine and strategy. Exercises could be 

held to practice responses to nuclear accidents and improve nuclear forensics. 

Developing an approach designed to address Russian NSNW would require close consultation with Allies 

and careful negotiations with Russia. But this approach, 

along with further reassurance measures discussed above, 

presents perhaps the most promising path to “create the 

conditions” for further NSNW reductions.

Conclusions

As NATO members engage in the ongoing 

DDPR, national deliberations are deepening on the 

issue of NSNW. All members remain committed to 

the compromise reached in the new NATO Strategic 

Concept on the role of nuclear weapons, and most appear willing to discuss NSNW in the context of further reductions and assess the broader effects for Alliance security, solidarity, and global nonproliferation. 

Most recently, the non-paper signed by 10 member 

states (including several host countries, “old NATO” 

members, and CEE countries—Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) stressed the need for “more 

systematic dialogue between NATO and Russia” on 

achieving greater transparency, mutual trust, and confidence relating to NSNW.52

In this context, reassurance of Allies is a core issue, as 

is NATO’s evolving relationship with Russia. A plan to 

create the conditions for future NSNW reductions could 

benefit from all seven reassurance measures discussed in 

this paper.

The first five measures all have a significant positive effect on reassuring Eastern Allies that the conventional part of the NATO Article 5 commitment 

remains valid. Moreover, declaratory statements and 

broadening deterrence to include missile defense also 

interim steps need not be packaged 

in a traditional arms control treaty 

format; they could consist of more 

flexible reciprocal steps
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 2 13 

have a relatively positive effect on reassurance with regard to nuclear deterrence.

Of these first five measures, enhanced exercises, 

greater installation support in the Baltic states, and 

missile defense deployments might have a negative effect on NATO-Russia relations. This could be mitigated, however, through enhanced cooperative efforts and 

confidence-building measures with Russia.

Steps pertaining to the sixth measure—maximizing the safety, security, effectiveness, and credibility of 

NSNW—are necessary to retain confidence in NATO’s 

deterrence and defense posture throughout the Alliance.

Finally, the seventh measure—involving approaches 

to achieve Russian actions relating to transparency, 

location, and numbers of NSNW—will be central to 

reassurance of Allies. 

Future NATO NSNW reductions and reassurance measures will need to be carefully orchestrated 

and involve three steps for NATO: focus on balanced 

steps designed to reassure Allies and limit negative 

Russian responses; continue to promote improved relations with Russia, including mutual and reciprocal 

steps relating to NSNW; and ensure NATO’s deterrence and defense posture, including nuclear deterrence, remains credible. 

Summary of Impact of 

Seven Measures

The table above summarizes, in an admittedly subjective analysis, the effect that each of the seven sets of measures might have on four different outcomes: conventional 

reassurance, nuclear reassurance, contributions to future 

Summary of Impact of Seven Measures by Hans Binnendijk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Importance to 

Conventional 

Reassurance

▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲

Importance to 

Nuclear Reassurance ■ ■ ▲ ▲

Contributions to Future 

Nuclear Reductions ■ ■ ▲

Negative Impact on 

U.S.-Russia Relations ▲ ▲ ■ ■

Key

▲ = high impact; ■ = medium impact; = low impact

Seven Reassurance Measures

1. Building confidence through operational success and declaratory statements

2. Enhancing conventional plans, exercises, and decisionmaking procedures

3. Strengthening conventional forces and the Article 5 mission

4. Enhancing support for training and installations

5. Broadening deterrence to meet new challenges

6. Maximizing deterrent capabilities of remaining U.S. NSNW

7. Modifying Russian deployments and doctrine
14 Transatlantic Current No. 2 www.ndu.edu/inss

nuclear reductions, and negative impact on U.S.-Russia 

relations. Each part of this matrix is rated based on the 

above analysis. It was provided by Hans Binnendijk.

Notes 1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Strategic Concept: Active Engagement, Modern Defense (November19–20, 2010), 4–5, 

available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm>.

2 Interviews conducted in Washington, DC, and Europe from 

February to May 2011, including the February 2011 Munich Security 

Conference.

3 The United Kingdom also deployed nonstrategic nuclear 

weapons (NSNW) that were committed to NATO under United 

Kingdom control.

4 Ian Anthony and Johnny Janssen, The Future of Nuclear Weapons 

in NATO (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010), available at <http://

library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07151.pdf>. 

5 Interview with the President of the Russian Federation on 

Channel One TV, in Russian, August 31, 2008, available at <www.

kreml.org/interview/190774493>. The second point of the doctrine 

states, “the world should be multipolar. Unipolarity is unacceptable. 

Domination is unacceptable. We cannot accept a world order where 

all decisions are taken by one country, even one as serious and as 

influential as the United States of America. This world is unstable and 

threatened by conflict.” 

6 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, February 5, 

2010, available at <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_

military_doctrine.pdf>. 

7 Interviews; see also “Non-paper Submitted by Poland, Norway, 

Germany, and the Netherlands on Increasing Transparency and Confidence with Regard to Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” April 

14, 2011, available at <www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nato-nonpaper041411.pdf>. 

8 See reports from August 2009, including Army Times, August 

19, 2009.

9 For example, see Sunday Times of London, August 16, 2008. 

Also see The Telegraph, August 15, 2008. General Anatoly Nogovitsyn 

was quoted: “By hosting these [U.S. missiles] Poland is making itself a 

target. This is 100 percent certain. It becomes a target for attack. Such 

targets are destroyed as a first priority.”

10 Tom Sauer and Bob van der Zwaan, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear 

Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their 

Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible,” Discussion Paper 2011-

05, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard 

Kennedy School, May 2011, available at <http://belfercenter.ksg.

harvard.edu/files/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf >. The 

authors also note one possible reason for Greece’s call for withdrawal as having to do with choosing a new fighter plane without having 

a nuclear capability.

11 Johan Bergenäs et al., Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Non-Strategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Moving Forward?

(Monterey, CA: The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation 

Studies, April 2010), available at <http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/

pdfs/reducing_tnw_april_2010.pdf>. See also Alex Valeriyovych 

Fenenko, “After the Reset: Progression of Russian-US Relations in 2010,” January 17, 2011, available at <www.ng.ru/courier/2011-01-17/9_reload.html>. 

12 An interview with an official from one of the countries involved stated that its participation was an effort to move Westerwelle 

away from a unilateralist position.

13 Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr StØre 

(Speech, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin, June 22, 2010). 

14 NATO, Strategic Concept, 7–8.

15 The April 15, 2011, non-paper to Secretary-General Rasmussen was signed by representatives from Belgium, the Czech 

Republic, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Slovenia. It stated: “The inclusion of 

NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons in any arms control process should 

be subject to consultations within the alliance. The process should 

furthermore be based on the principle of indivisibility of security 

within the alliance and on the assumption of reciprocity between 

NATO and the Russian Federation.”

16 See chapter 1 of Simon Lunn, “NATO Nuclear Policy: Reflections on Lisbon and Looking Ahead to the DDPR.” 

17 NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement (Brussels: 

NATO, May 2010), available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_63654.htm>.

18 Ibid., 11.

19 NATO, Strategic Concept, 4–5.

20 Ibid., 4.

21 Ibid., 7. 

22 Baltic Reports, January 16, 2010, and private interviews with 

NATO officials. 

23 NATO also has had exercises involving NSNW in response 

to attack; perhaps the best known, the Able Archer exercise, was 

conducted in November 1983. 

24 Interview with defense official in Washington, DC, at National Defense University, 2010. 

25 See <https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/NATOACTRes/

CY2011NATO/STEADFASTJ4>.

26 See <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71062.htm>.

27 See spring 2011 speeches by NATO Secretary-General 

Rasmussen. See also Lawrence F. Kaplan, “Open Wide: How Libya 

Revealed the Huge Gap between U.S. and European Military Might,” 

The New Republic, April 26, 2011, available at <www.tnr.com/article/

crossings/87377/libya-nato-military-power-europe-us>.

28 Robert M. Gates, “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future 

of NATO),” Brussels, June 10, 2011), available at <www.defense.gov/

speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581>. During this speech, he also 

declared, “I’ve worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered 

alliance: Between members who specialize in ‘soft’ humanitarian, 

development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting 

the ‘hard’ combat missions.”

29 NATO Source (Alliance News blog), January 11, 2011, available at <www.acus.org/natosource>. 

30 “NATO Secretary General Calls for ‘Smart Defense’ at Munich Conference,” February 4, 2011, available at <www.nato.int/cps/

en/natolive/news_70327.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

31 See also Marcin Sobczyk and Carol E. Lee, “Obama to 

Announce Permanent Stationing of U.S. Air Force Detachment in 

Poland,” The Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2011, available at <www.

blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2011/05/28/obama-to-announcepermanent-stationing-of-u-s-air-force-detachment-in-poland/>.

32 For the details and conditions of these promises, see James M. 

Goldgeier, Not Whether But When (Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution, 1999), chapter V. In 2010, Russia claimed multiple infractions. 

See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, The Facts of Violation by the United States of its Obligations in the Sphere of Nonproliferation of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Arms Control (Moscow: Information and 

Press Department, August 7, 2010). The 1997 statement states: “NATO 

reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the 

Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring 
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 2 15 

the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement 

rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat 

forces. The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, 

no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new 

members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture 

or nuclear policy—and do not foresee any future need to do so.” This also 

parallels the promise made in the German unification treaties that no 

nuclear deployments will ever be made on former East German territory.

33 Based on interviews in Washington, DC, with senior Baltic 

officials. 

34 Based on interviews in Brussels, April and May 2011.

35 See NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, speech 

at the RUSI Missile Defense Conference, London, June 15, 2011, 

available at <www.rusi.org/events/ref:E4CF77C90E3362/info:public/

infoID:E4DF8CB5F15F42/>. In the speech, the Secretary-General 

stated, “We could envisage setting up a joint centre where we could 

look at the ballistic missile threat together, share early warning data, 

exchange information and share assessments. We could also envisage 

setting up a joint centre where we could coordinate our responses.” 

36 NATO, Strategic Concept, 16–17.

37 Ibid., 17.

38 See Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD 

Nuclear Weapons Management—Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear 

Mission (Arlington, VA: n.p., December 2008), 1417 (otherwise 

known as the Schlesinger Report).

39 NATO, “NATO’s Nuclear Forces in the New Security 

Environment,” January 24, 2008, accessed at <www.nato.int/issues/

nuclear/sec-environment.html>. “In 2002, in a second step, the readiness requirements for these aircraft were further reduced and are now 

being measured in months.” 

40 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Tactical 

Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, 

no. 1 (December 2010), 64–73. See also Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. 

Nuclear Weapons Site in Europe Breached,” February 4, 2010, available at <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/02/kleinebrogel.php>.

41 U.S. Air Force, 2008 USAF Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear 

Weapons Policies and Procedures, February 12, 2008, available at <www.

airforce-magazine.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/TheDocumentFile/

Current%20Operations/BRR020808ExecSummary.pdf>. See also 

“Panel Urges Air Force to Unify Nuclear Command,” The New York 

Times, September 12, 2008, available at <www.nytimes.com/2008/09/13/

washington/13military.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>.

42 Tom Z. Collina, “Pentagon to Revise Nuclear Guidance,” Arms 

Control Today, June 2011, available at <www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_06/

NuclearGuidance>.

43 Based on interviews with European analysts. 

44 Karl Heinz Kamp, NATO’s Nuclear Posture Review: Nuclear 

Sharing Instead of Nuclear Stationing, Research Paper no. 68 (Rome: 

NATO Defense College, May 30, 2011). 

45 Meetings with Korean and Japanese officials in recent months 

revealed concern about U.S. defense commitments in the face of 

Chinese assertiveness. See Michito Tsuruoka, The German Marshall 

Fund (GMF) of the United States Policy Brief, Why the NATO 

Nuclear Debate Is Relevant to Japan and Vice Versa (Washington, DC: 

GMF, October 8, 2010), in which he argues that a Nuclear Planning 

Group approach would strengthen extended deterrence for Japan. 46 Interviews in Brussels, May 2011.

47 See National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director Gary 

Samore, speech, Czech Republic, April 12, 2011, 4.

48 Russia and the United States issued a statement in 2007 

reaffirming their support for the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces Treaty and calling upon other governments to renounce and 

eliminate their ground-launched missiles with ranges banned by the 

treaty. The statement declared U.S. and Russian intentions to “work 

with all interested countries” and “discuss the possibility of imparting 

a global character to this important regime.” This may be a harder case 

to make, in particular to China, if Russian nonstrategic nuclear forces 

are moved closer to China’s borders.

49 On March 29, 2011, NSC Advisor Thomas Donilon spoke at 

the Carnegie Endowment stating, “In advance of a new treaty limiting 

tactical nuclear weapons, we also plan to consult with our Allies on 

reciprocal actions . . . as a first step, we would like to increase transparency on a reciprocal basis concerning the numbers, locations and types 

of nonstrategic forces in Europe.” 

50 Background paper for Foreign Affairs Council, Defense 

Ministers, and Development Ministers, Brussels, December 8, 2010. 

The paper advocated “enhanced cooperation, with a view to spending 

resources in Europe more efficiently and to maintain a broad array of 

military capabilities to ensure national objectives as well as Europe’s 

ability act credibly in crises.”

51 See “Non-paper,” proposals 1, 2.

52 Ibid.

The text only of this Transatlantic Current: © 2011 

Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). The text of this 

Transatlantic Current is included as chapter five in the 

report Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework 

for Action (Washington, DC: NTI, 2011), available 

at <www.nti.org>. The report focuses primarily on 

nuclear policy and force structure options open to 

NATO members.

The Center for Transatlantic Security Studies within the 

Institute for National Strategic Studies provides research 

and policy advice to senior Department of Defense and 

other U.S. Government leaders through studies, research 

projects, and outreach and education programs. CTSS 

draws on its unique interface with U.S. and international 

governments and research institutions to provide timely 

and relevant policy recommendations.

The Transatlantic Current series presents original research by members of the CTSS resident scholars as 

well as nonresident subject matter experts. The opinions, 

conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense Department or 

any other agency of the Federal Government. Visit NDU 

Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Ambassador Robert Hunter

Director

Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

Francis G. Hoffman

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS
16 Transatlantic Current No. 2 www.ndu.edu/inss

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