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ORDER - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

JOHN L. CORRIGAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNKNOWN KING COUNTY DEPUTY # 1, et

al., 

Defendants.

No. C05-1727P

ORDER ON ADAMS COUNTY

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FOR

RULE 11 SANCTIONS

This matter comes before the Court on two motions by Defendant Adams County and its

employees Sheriff D. Barger and “Unknown County of Adams Official.” For ease of reference, these

three defendants will be referred to collectively as the “Adams County Defendants.” First, the Adams

County Defendants have moved for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 14). Second, the Adams County

Defendants have moved for Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 15). The Court, having

considered the materials submitted in support of and in opposition to these motions, hereby ORDERS

as follows: 

(1) The Court GRANTS the Adams County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

(Dkt. No. 14). All claims against Adams County, Sheriff D. Barger, and “Unknown County of Adams

Official” are DISMISSED. 

(2) The Court GRANTS IN PART the Adams County Defendants’ motion for Rule 11

sanctions. (Dkt. No. 15). The Court finds that Plaintiff violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

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ORDER - 2

by filing frivolous claims against the Adams County Defendants without reasonable inquiry. However,

the Court reserves ruling on the type or amount of sanctions to be imposed because the Court requires

additional evidence in order to made such a determination. 

(3) Within thirty days of the date of this Order, the Adams County Defendants are directed

to file a motion documenting the reasonable attorneys’ fees that they incurred as a direct result of the

Rule 11 violations. In responding to the forthcoming motion, Plaintiff may offer evidence relevant to

determining an appropriate sanction, including but not limited to his financial status and his legal

training or lack thereof.

Background

Plaintiff John Corrigan, proceeding pro se, has brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

Washington state law against Defendants Adams County, Adams County Sheriff D. Barger, and an

“unknown County of Adams official.” His complaint also raises claims against King County and

various named and unnamed King County officials. 

The events leading to this dispute began in February 2003, when Plaintiff was stopped for

speeding in Adams County. He refused to sign his notice of infraction, as required by Washington

law, and was charged with Failure to Sign Notice of Infraction. In May 2003, Plaintiff was convicted

of this offense following a trial in Adams County District Court. He was sentenced to 90 days in jail,

with 85 days suspended. Plaintiff was given 90 days from the imposition of the sentence to serve his

five days in jail. In a civil proceeding, Plaintiff was also fined for speeding. Plaintiff unsuccessfully

appealed both his criminal and civil cases. 

In July 2003, Plaintiff filed a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

Washington, bringing Section 1983 and state-law claims against the Washington State Patrol troopers

who arrested him, the Adams County District Court judge who presided over his criminal trial, the

Adams County deputy prosecuting attorney who litigated his criminal case, the Adams County Sheriff,

and Adams County. This civil action was dismissed on summary judgment in August 2004, with Rule

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ORDER - 3

11 sanctions imposed on Plaintiff for bringing claims against an Adams County District Judge. See

Corrigan v. Dale, No. CS-03-247-FVS, slip op. (E.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2004). The Ninth Circuit

affirmed the summary judgment ruling, but reversed the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions for failure to

comply with the “safe harbor” requirements of Rule 11(c)(1)(A). Corrigan v. Dale, 2006 WL 83342

(9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2006).

Plaintiff did not serve his five-day jail sentence in 2003 or 2004. On November 9, 2004,

Adams County deputy prosecuting attorney Barrett Scudder filed a motion in Adams County District

Court seeking an order to require Plaintiff to appear and show cause why he should not be required to

serve his sentence. Plaintiff does not dispute that he received notice of this hearing. Nonetheless,

Plaintiff failed to appear at the show cause hearing. On December 1, 2004, Judge Joshua Grant issued

a warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest. 

Plaintiff maintains and the Adams County Defendants do not dispute that the Adams County

Sheriff’s Office entered the warrant into a statewide database. Based on this warrant, Plaintiff was

arrested in April 2005 in King County. Following his arrest, Plaintiff served two days in King County

Jail, and then completed the remaining three days of his sentence in Adams County.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in October 2005. Plaintiff appears to allege that the Adams County

Defendants unlawfully issued the arrest warrant and improperly entered the warrant into a statewide

database. Plaintiff asserts that at the time the warrant was sought and issued, his criminal conviction

and sentence were stayed pending appeal. Defendants deny that any stay was in place.

Adams County and its employees (Sheriff Barger and “Unknown County of Adams Official”)

have now moved for summary judgment. They have also moved for sanctions against Plaintiff under

Rule 11. 

Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

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ORDER - 4

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). While “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat” a motion for

summary judgment, “disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48

(1986). Once a party has moved for summary judgment, it is the non-moving party’s burden to

provide sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could decide in their favor. Id. at 248. Because

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings liberally. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d

1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). 

1. Claims Against “Unknown Adams County Official”

In his complaint, Plaintiff has identified two defendants from Adams County by their actual

names: (1) the County itself; and (2) Sheriff D. Barger. Although Plaintiff also named an “Unknown

Adams County Official” as a defendant in his complaint, Plaintiff has not moved to substitute a named

defendant for this “unknown” official. 

Plaintiff’s complaint provides virtually no information about the “Unknown Adams County

Official.” The complaint only includes the two following paragraphs in which this “unknown” official

is specifically mentioned:

During all times mentioned in this Complaint, the defendant Unknown Adams County Official

(UACO), was a duly appointed official in the County of Adams . . . acting in their official

capacity. UACO is sued, however, only in his/her individual capacity.

* * * *

Defendants UACO, Barger, and Adams County caused a state-wide warrant be instigated

against plaintiff. Warrant was: (a) without probable cause; (b) malicious prosecution; (c)

retaliatory prosecution; (d) abuse of process; and (e) based on an unconstitutional statute. 

Further, there is every indication that this was a conspiracy between Defendants Adams

County, Sheriff Barger, UACO and possibly others in Adams County.

Complaint ¶¶ 7 and 22. 

The Ninth Circuit disfavors the practice of filing a complaint against an “unknown” or “John

Doe” defendant. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). However, a plaintiff may

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ORDER - 5

name such unknown defendants “where the identity of alleged defendants will not be known prior to

the filing of a complaint.” Id. In such cases, “the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through

discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the

identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” Id.

However, a plaintiff who seeks to file suit against “unknown” defendants “must not only allege

that the defendant is unknown, but also provide, or attempt to provide, an adequate description or

other known information so that service of process can at least be attempted.” 2 James Wm. Moore,

Moore’s Federal Practice § 10.02[2][d][i] (3d ed. 2006). In addition, it is not permissible for a

plaintiff to name an “unknown” defendant in a complaint “if the plaintiff’s ignorance of the defendant’s

true identity is the result of willful neglect or lack of reasonable inquiry.” Id. “If reasonable inquiry

would have revealed the true identity, a pleading naming John Doe defendants will be dismissed.” Id. 

Applying these principles, Plaintiff’s claims against “Unknown Adams County Official” must

be dismissed for several reasons. First, Plaintiff’s complaint provides no clue regarding the identity of

the “unknown” official. In cases where the plaintiff’s description of an “unknown” defendant is

inadequate, dismissal is appropriate because it is impossible to serve process on such a defendant. 

See, e.g., Roper v. Grayson, 81 F.3d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1996) (use of unnamed defendants permitted

“so long as the plaintiff provides an adequate description of some kind which is sufficient to identify

the person involved so process eventually can be served”); Keno v. Doe, 74 F.R.D. 587, 588 n.2

(D.N.J. 1978) (same). 

Plaintiff has also had ample opportunity to seek discovery to determine the identity of the

“unknown” Adams County official. Plaintiff filed this complaint in October 2005 and has had many

months to seek discovery to ascertain the identity of this official. When a plaintiff fails to use the

discovery process to identify an “unknown” defendant, dismissal of claims against the unknown

defendant is appropriate. See Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 770 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985). As

one court has observed, “a district court otherwise prepared to act on dispositive motions is not

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ORDER - 6

obligated to ‘wait indefinitely for [the plaintiff] to take steps to identify and serve . . . unknown

defendants.’” Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 1998).

Construing Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, it is possible that Plaintiff intends the Court to regard

either the Adams County deputy prosecuting attorney or judge who were involved in issuing his arrest

warrant as the “unknown Adams County official.” Indeed, Plaintiff devotes much of his opposition

brief to complaining about the actions of these individuals, despite the fact that neither person is

named as a defendant in Plaintiff’s complaint. However, the Court cannot presume that either of these

officials is the “unknown” official named in Plaintiff’s complaint because their identities are readily

determinable: The deputy prosecuting attorney who sought Plaintiff’s warrant was Barrett Scudder

and the warrant was signed by Judge Joshua F. Grant. As noted earlier, a plaintiff will not be

permitted to name an “unknown” defendant in a complaint where the identity of the “unknown”

individual could be ascertained prior to filing the complaint through reasonable inquiry. See Moore,

supra, § 10.02[2][d][i]. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against “Unknown Adams County Official” are

dismissed.

2. Section 1983 Claims

A. Claims Against Sheriff Barger

Construing Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, it appears that his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Adams County Sheriff D. Barger are based on a theory that the Sheriff and/or his office

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by: (1) causing an arrest warrant signed by Judge Joshua Grant

to be entered into a statewide database; and (2) allegedly contacting the King County Sheriff’s Office

to seek Plaintiff’s arrest pursuant to the warrant. The Adams County Defendants argue that Sheriff

Barger is immune from these claims, either on the grounds of quasi-judicial immunity or qualified

immunity.

To support their argument for quasi-judicial immunity, the Adams County Defendants note

that courts have held that “police officers, sheriffs, and other court officers who act in reliance on a

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1

 Aside from Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion, Plaintiff offers no evidence (such as a court order)

indicating that criminal conviction and sentence had been stayed pending appeal. In any case, it appears from

the record that the Washington Supreme Court issued a final order regarding Plaintiff’s appeal of his criminal

case on November 3, 2004. On November 9, 2004, Adams County deputy prosecuting attorney Barrett Scudder

filed a motion for an order to show cause why Plaintiff should not be required to serve his sentence. Despite the

ruling from the state Supreme Court on his appeal, Plaintiff appears to believe that the Adams County District

Court could not issue a warrant for his arrest until Plaintiff received rulings on: (1) a petition for a writ of

certiorari submitted to the United States Supreme Court; and/or (2) a habeas corpus petition. Plaintiff offers no

evidence or legal authority to support this contention. 

ORDER - 7

facially valid court order are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from suit under § 1983 for damages.” 

Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1239 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Coverdell v. Dep’t of

Social & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1987) (similar). Although Plaintiff asserts in

his complaint that the warrant was “defective on its face” (Complaint ¶ 13), Plaintiff has not offered

any evidence suggesting that the warrant issued by Judge Grant on December 1, 2004 was not facially

valid. Among other things, the warrant was signed by the judge of the charging jurisdiction, specified

Plaintiff’s name and physical description, specified the offense charged, and was issued to all peace

officers of the state. See Wash. Crim. Rule for Courts of Limited Juris. 2.2. Although Plaintiff

suggests that the warrant was invalid because it was supposedly issued in violation of a stay of his

conviction and sentence pending appeal,1

 Plaintiff offers no reason why the Sheriff or his office would

have reason to question the facial validity of the warrant. As such, Sheriff Barger is entitled to quasijudicial immunity for acting in reliance on the warrant. 

In addition, Sheriff Barger would also be entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages

under Section 1983 for taking the actions alleged by Plaintiff. Determining whether a government

official is entitled to qualified immunity “requires a two-part inquiry: (1) Was the law governing the

state official’s conduct clearly established? (2) Under that law could a reasonable state official have

believed his conduct was lawful?” Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1995). Here,

Plaintiff points to no clearly established constitutional violation committed by Sheriff Barger. At most,

the evidence indicates that Sheriff Barger acted on a facially valid warrant. 

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ORDER - 8

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Sheriff Barger are dismissed.

B. Claims Against Adams County

Section 1983 claims may be brought against local government units such as a county. 

However, the Supreme Court has held:

[A] local government may not be sued under Section 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its

employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government policy or custom, whether

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under Section 1983.

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 

Here, Plaintiff has not offered evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on whether his

alleged injuries were inflicted as a result of any policy or custom of Adams County. For the most part,

Plaintiff appears to argue in his opposition brief that he was injured by an “out of control” prosecutor,

presumably deputy prosecuting attorney Barrett Scudder. However, Plaintiff offers no evidence that

Mr. Scudder had policy-making authority for Adams County. An official policy “must result from a

deliberate choice made by a policy-making official,” which “may be inferred from widespread practices

or ‘evidence of repeated constitutional violates for which the errant municipal officers were not

discharged or reprimanded.’” Naell v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 268 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir.

2001). “A plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a [local government] policy based solely on the

occurrence of a single incident or unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking employee.” Davis v.

City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1989). 

For similar reasons, Plaintiff has not offered evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact

on whether any alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights resulted from a custom of Adams

County. “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it

must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency that the conduct has

become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.

1996); see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443-44 (9th Cir. 1989)

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ORDER - 9

(“Consistent with the commonly understood meaning of custom, proof of random acts or isolated

events [is] insufficient to establish custom.”). Plaintiff offers no evidence of such a custom here.

Finally, Plaintiff appears to suggest that Adams County and/or Sheriff Barger may be held

liable under Section 1983 for failure to train or supervise employees. A local government or official

may only be held liable under Section 1983 for failure to train or supervise employees when such a

failure reflects a conscious choice by a municipality and amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights

of citizens. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Plaintiff has offered no evidence

suggesting such deliberate indifference here on the part of either Adams County or Sheriff Barger.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Adams County are dismissed.

3. Remaining Claims

In addition to federal claims under Section 1983, Plaintiff’s complaint also raises various claims

under state law. His complaint alleges:

[T]he defendants deprived the plaintiff of his rights to be free from false imprisonment, search

and seizure of his person, unreasonable force, cruel and unusual punishment, unreasonable bail,

abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. All of

these rights are secured to the plaintiff by the provisions of Washington law which are invoked

under the supplementary jurisdiction of this court.

(Complaint ¶ 28). Although it is not clear that Plaintiff intends to maintain all of these state-law

claims against each of the eight defendants named in his complaint, the Court considers each potential

claim as it relates to the Adams County Defendants.

False Arrest/False Imprisonment: Under Washington law, the existence of probable cause is

a complete defense to an action for false arrest or false imprisonment. See McBride v. Walla Walla

County, 95 Wash. App. 33, 38 (1999). Here, the Adams County Defendants plainly had probable

cause to seek Plaintiff’s arrest and to imprison him, given his 2003 conviction and the issuance of a

facially valid arrest warrant by Judge Grant.

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ORDER - 10

Search & Seizure and “Unreasonable Force” Claims: Plaintiff has alleged no facts to

support an unlawful search and seizure or “unreasonable force” against any of the Adams County

defendants. Plaintiff was arrested by officials from King County, not Adams County.

Excessive Bail: Plaintiff has no claim for excessive bail against any named defendants, given

that neither Adams County nor Sheriff Barger set Plaintiff’s bail. See, e.g. Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d

1141, 1149 (8th Cir. 1993).

Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Plaintiff provides no allegations or evidence to support a

claim for cruel or unusual punishment with respect to jail conditions in Adams County. Plaintiff may

believe that the length of his sentence (5 days) constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, a

challenge to the duration of a state prison sentence may be attacked in federal court solely through a

writ of habeas corpus. See Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Where a state

prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his confinement, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas

corpus”). 

Malicious Prosecution: Plaintiff has no basis to maintain a claim for malicious prosecution

against any Adams County Defendants. Under Washington law, it is well-settled that a malicious

prosecution action may be maintained only if the prosecution terminated in favor of the person

asserting the claim. Clark v. Baines, 150 Wn.2d 905, 911 (2004). Here, the prosecution in Adams

County did not terminate in Plaintiff’s favor. 

Abuse of Process: Plaintiff contends that numerous actions taken constitute abuse of process. 

However, Plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence to support an abuse of process claim. A claim

for abuse of process has two essential elements: (1) the existence of an ulterior purpose – to

accomplish an object not within the proper scope of the process; and (2) an act in the use of legal

process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings. Fite v. Lee, 11 Wn. App. 21, 27

(1974). “[T]he test as to whether there is an abuse of process is whether the process has been used to

accomplish some end which is without the regular purview of the process, or which compels the party

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ORDER - 11

against whom it is used to do some collateral thing which he could not legally and regularly be

compelled to do.” Batten v. Abrams, 28 Wn. App. 737, 747-48 (1981). Here, the actions taken by

the Adams County Defendants compelled Plaintiff to serve his five days in jail, as required by his

conviction and sentence in Adams County District Court. Although Plaintiff makes a number of

conclusory allegations regarding the motives of the deputy prosecuting attorney in Adams County (an

individual who is not named as a defendant in this action), Plaintiff has not offered any evidence

suggesting that the Adams County Defendants used the judicial process to compel Plaintiff to do some

collateral thing that he could not legally be compelled to do.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Under Washington law, a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress (more commonly known as the tort of “outrage”) has three elements:

(1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress; and (3)

actual result to the plaintiff of severe emotional distress. Brower v. Ackerley, 88 Wn. App. 87, 98

(1997). Only conduct that is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond

all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community” supports an outrage claim. Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wn.2d 195, 202 (1998). “[T]he

trial court must make an initial determination as to whether the conduct may reasonably be regarded as

so ‘extreme and ‘outrageous’ as to warrant a factual determination by the jury.” Jackson v. Peoples

Fed. Credit Union, 25 Wn. App. 81, 84 (1979). Here, the Court finds that the conduct of the Adams

County Defendants cannot reasonably be regarded as being so extreme and outrageous to support a

claim of outrage.

Failure to Transport Plaintiff to Adams County: In his opposition brief, Plaintiff asserts that

Adams County failed to transport Plaintiff from King County to Adams County to serve his sentence. 

Putting aside the fact that this allegation was not raised in Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff offers no

evidence to support his assertion that Adams County was obliged to transport him from King County,

nor does he offer any legal authority or argument to support a claim based on this contention.

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2

 Plaintiff responded to both the summary judgment motion and the Rule 11 motion in a single brief. 

Defendants also filed a single reply brief for both motions.

ORDER - 12

Summary

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s state-law claims against the Adams County

Defendants must be dismissed.

4. Request for Rule 11 Sanctions

By separate motion, the Adams County Defendants have moved for sanctions against Plaintiff

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2 The Adams County Defendants complied with the “safe

harbor” requirements of Rule 11(c)(1)(A) by serving a copy of their motion for sanctions on Plaintiff

at least 21 days before filing the motion with the Court, along with a letter to Plaintiff explaining that

the motion would be filed if Plaintiff did not dismiss his complaint against Adams County, Sheriff

Barger, and “Unknown Adams County Official.” 

Rule 11(b) provides, in relevant part:

By presenting the court, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating a pleading,

written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best

of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under

the circumstances, --

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause

unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law

or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing

law or the establishment of new law;

(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically

so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for

further investigation or discovery . . . . 

In turn, Rule 11(c) provides that if the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the Court

may impose an appropriate sanction on the parties that have violated the rule.

Rule 11 applies to unrepresented (“pro se”) parties. However, a court “must take into account

a plaintiff’s pro se status when it determines whether the filing was reasonable.” Warren v. Guelker,

29 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, even taking into account Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court

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3

 To the extent that Plaintiff believes that his arrest warrant was improperly issued, his complaint

would be with the deputy prosecuting attorney who sought the warrant and/or the judge who issued the warrant,

ORDER - 13

finds that Plaintiff failed to conduct an objectively reasonable inquiry before signing and filing a

complaint that included frivolous legal claims against the Adams County Defendants. 

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Barger are frivolous and that it was

objectively unreasonable for Plaintiff to bring such claims against the Sheriff. Plaintiff’s complaint

alleges that the Sheriff (along with Adams County and an unknown Adams County official) improperly

“instigated” a statewide arrest warrant against him. Plaintiff appears to base his claims against the

Sheriff on a theory that: (1) the Sheriff or his office entered a warrant signed by an Adams County

District Judge into a statewide database; and (2) the Sheriff or his office “personally” contacted the

King County Sheriff’s Office to request that Plaintiff be immediately arrested pursuant to the warrant. 

However, Plaintiff offers no legal authority that supports his contention that type of this conduct by

the Sheriff or his office violated any of his rights under the United States Constitution or under

Washington law, nor does he offer any nonfrivolous arguments for the extension, modification, or

reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law regarding the Sheriff’s liability for such

conduct under federal or state law. 

Plaintiff suggests (without providing evidentiary or legal support) that the arrest warrant was

improperly issued because his conviction and sentence had supposedly been stayed in order to permit

him to pursue a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court and/or a habeas

corpus action. However, Plaintiff provides no evidence that the warrant on its face was not valid,

despite his allegation in his complaint that the warrant was “defective on its face.” In short, Plaintiff

provides no legal authority or nonfrivolous argument suggesting that a law enforcement official are

subject to suit under federal or state law for entering a facially valid warrant issued by a court into a

state database or by contacting other law enforcement officials to request action on a facially valid

warrant.3

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not with law enforcement officials who simply acted on a facially valid Court order. Neither the deputy

prosecuting attorney nor the judge are named in the complaint – perhaps in recognition of the doctrines of

prosecutorial and judicial immunity. 

ORDER - 14

 In addition, Plaintiff’s claims for malicious prosecution against the Adams County Defendants

are plainly not warranted by existing law or by any nonfrivolous argument for the extension,

modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. It is black-letter law in

Washington that a malicious prosecution action may only be maintained if the proceedings terminated

favor of the party bringing the claim. See, e.g., Clark v. Baines, 150 Wn.2d 905, 911 (2004) (noting

that a malicious prosecution claim arising from a criminal action requires the plaintiff to prove several

elements, including proof “that the proceedings terminated on the merits in favor of the plaintiff, or

were abandoned”). Even as a pro se litigant, it was objectively unreasonable for Plaintiff to raise

malicious prosecution claims in this action because he was explicitly informed of this rule in the order

granting summary judgment in his prior civil rights case in the Eastern District of Washington. See

Corrigan v. Dale, No. C03-247, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2004) (noting that “[i]n order to

prevail on his malicious-prosecution claim, Mr. Corrigan must prove the underlying criminal case was

terminated on the merits in his favor” and dismissing claim for failure to satisfy that requirement).

On the record before it, the Court also finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Adams County are

frivolous and that it was objectively unreasonable for Plaintiff to such claims. To the extent that

Plaintiff’s claims against the County are based on the actions of Sheriff Barger or his office, Plaintiff’s

claims would be frivolous because there is no legal basis to find that the Sheriff or his office violated

Plaintiff’s rights under federal or state law by entering a facially valid arrest warrant into a state

database. To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking to hold the County liable for the actions of the deputy

prosecuting attorney who sought Plaintiff’s arrest warrant and/or the actions of the judge that issued

the arrest warrant, Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous because Plaintiff has provided no competent

evidence or legal authority to suggest that the warrant was improperly sought or issued. Moreover,

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ORDER - 15

even if the warrant was improperly sought by the deputy prosecuting attorney or issued by the Adams

County District Court judge, Plaintiff has offered no evidence suggesting that such actions were taken

in accordance with a County policy or custom, as required to impose liability on the County under

Section 1983. 

Plaintiff’s position appears to be that the arrest warrant was improperly issued because his

conviction and sentence were supposedly stayed when the warrant issued. However, Plaintiff has not

produced a copy of any court order indicating that such a stay was in place. The existence of such a

stay would not alter the Court holding that Plaintiff has no valid claims against the Adams County

Defendants named in the complaint, since there is no evidence that issuing a arrest warrant while a stay

was in place could be attributable to the County, Sheriff Barger, or “Unknown County of Adams

Official.” However, if a stay was in place, there may at least be a basis to find that Plaintiff had a

reasonable belief that the arrest warrant was improperly issued.

In short, absent any competent evidence that a stay of Plaintiff’s conviction and sentence was

in place when his arrest warrant issued, the Court finds that Plaintiff had no objectively reasonable 

basis to bring claims against the County based on the “instigation” of this warrant. However, if

Plaintiff can produce competent evidence (such as a court order) demonstrating that his conviction and

sentence were in fact stayed when the arrest warrant was issued, the Court will revisit its

determination regarding the frivolousness of Plaintiff’s claims against the County. 

Although the Court finds that Plaintiff has violated Rule 11, the Court does not have sufficient

evidence before it to make a reasoned determination regarding the type or amount of sanctions. While

Defendants argue that they should be awarded their attorney fees as a sanction, such an award it not

automatic upon the finding of a Rule 11 violation. As the Ninth Circuit has observed, “Rule 11

‘provides for sanctions, not fee shifting. It is aimed at deterring, and, if necessary punishing improper

conduct rather than merely compensating the prevailing party.’” United States ex rel. Leno v. Summit

Constr. Co., 892 F.2d 788, 7901 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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4

 However, it appears that Plaintiff is not an inexperienced pro se litigant. Putting aside Plaintiff’s

prior civil case in the Eastern District of Washington and his pro se appeals of his criminal and civil cases from

Adams County, Plaintiff filed two other lawsuits in this Court in the fall of 2005: (1) Corrigan v. Kline, C05-

1728RSM; and (2) Corrigan v. VISA, U.S.A., C05-1622RSM. A person named John L. Corrigan also

previously filed five other civil suits in this Court between 1988 and 1996: (1) Corrigan v. USA, C88-523JCC;

(2) Corrigan v. Steere, C92-1511CRD; (3) Corrigan v. Baker, 94-1620BJR; (4) Corrigan v. Andersen, C94-

5373FDB; and (5) Corrigan v. Bargala, C95-570JCC. In addition, a John L. Corrigan is named as a plaintiff in

a number of other Washington state and federal cases in recent years, including: (1) Corrigan v. United States,

70 Fed. Cl. 665 (2006); (2) Corrigan v. Dollar, 89 Fed. Appx. 238 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2004), cert. denied, 543

U.S. 959 (2004); (3) Corrigan v. Germany, 43 Fed. Appx. 139 (9th Cir. July 22, 2002); (4) Corrigan v.

Employment Security Dept., 99 Wn. App. 1035 (2000), rev. denied, 141 Wn.2d 1022 (2000); (5) Corrigan v.

Imaginetics Inc., 2000 WL 194656 (Wn. App. Feb. 14, 2000), rev. denied, 143 Wn.2d 1010 (2001), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001); (6) Corrigan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 126 Wn.2d 1013 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.

920 (1995); (7) Corrigan v. Tompkins, 67 Wn. App. 475 (1992), rev. denied, 121 Wn.2d 1003 (1993), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 842 (1993). 

ORDER - 16

It should also be noted that the Advisory Committee notes to the 1993 amendments to Rule 11

indicate that a variety of factors may be proper considerations in determining what sanctions, if any,

should be imposed for a Rule 11 violation. This considerations include:

Whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it was part of a pattern of

activity, or an isolated event; whether it infected the entire pleading, or only one particular

count or defense; whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation;

whether it was intended to injure; what effect it had on the litigation process in time or

expense; whether the responsible person is trained in the law; what amount, given the financial

resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same

case; what amount is needed to deter similar activity by other litigants.

See also Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994) (“a court can properly consider

plaintiff’s ability to pay monetary sanctions as one factor in assessing sanctions”). Here, the Court

lacks information regarding several of these considerations. For example, the Court does not have

information regarding Plaintiff’s financial resources or his legal training.4

Therefore, the Court directs the Adams County Defendants to file a motion seeking a specific

amount of sanctions and documenting the reasonable attorneys’ fees that they incurred as a direct

result of Plaintiff’s Rule 11 violations within 30 days of the date of this order. Such a motion must be

noted for the Court’s consideration no earlier than the third Friday after filing. See Local Civil Rule

7(d)(3). In responding to this motion, Plaintiff may offer evidence relevant to determining an

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ORDER - 17

appropriate sanction, including but not limited to his financial status and his legal training or lack

thereof. Plaintiff may also offer evidence (such as a court order) to support his contention that his

criminal conviction and sentence were stayed at the time that his arrest warrant issued in December

2004.

Conclusion

The Adams County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. All claims

asserted by Plaintiff against Adams County, Sheriff D. Barger, and “Unknown County of Adams

Official” are DISMISSED. 

The Court GRANTS IN PART the Adams County Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff violated Rule 11 by filing frivolous claims against the Adams County

Defendants without reasonable inquiry. The Court reserves ruling on the type or amount of sanctions

to be imposed. Within thirty days of the date of this Order, the Adams County Defendants are

directed to file a motion documenting the reasonable attorneys’ fees that they incurred as a direct

result of the Rule 11 violations. In responding to this motion, Plaintiff may offer evidence relevant to

determining an appropriate sanction, including but not limited to his financial status and his legal

training or lack thereof.

The clerk is directed to provide copies of this order to Plaintiff and to all counsel of record.

Dated: August 2, 2006

s/Marsha J. Pechman 

Marsha J. Pechman

United States District Judge

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