J-S29014-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MALIK ALSTON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 75 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010385-2007

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 10, 2021

Malik Alston appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County 

Court of Common Pleas on November 23, 2020, dismissing, without a hearing, 

his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. 

C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. For the reasons discussed below, we find the PCRA court 

properly denied Alston relief and affirm. 

On November 13, 2008, after a bench trial, Alston, along with a codefendant, his brother, was found guilty of first-degree murder and related 

offenses. The court sentenced Alston to a mandatory term of life 

imprisonment. We subsequently affirmed Alston’s judgment of sentence on 

direct appeal. On April 5, 2011, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Alston’s petition for allowance of appeal. Alston did not appeal to the United 

States Supreme Court. 

On May 20, 2016, Alston filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was 

appointed and filed an amended petition alleging Alston was entitled to relief 

based on newly discovered evidence. Specifically, Alston had received a letter 

from The Innocence Project, notifying him that his co-defendant was willing 

to recant his statement to police that Alston was the shooter. An affidavit 

authored by the co-defendant was attached to the amended petition, in which 

he claimed to have lied about Alston being the shooter for safety reasons. 

A hearing was held, at which the co-defendant was the only witness. 

The court denied Alston’s petition, finding the recantation testimony to be 

incredible. We affirmed the denial1 and our Supreme Court later denied 

Alston’s petition for allowance of appeal. 

On June 18, 2019, Alston filed a writ of habeas corpus in the civil trial 

division, requesting review on grounds of fraud and wrongful arrest. The 

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1 While the first PCRA petition was still pending on appeal in this Court, Alston 

filed another pro se PCRA petition, on December 21, 2017, based on another 

affidavit he received from The Innocence Project, this time authored by a 

witness to the murder who claimed Alston was not the person he saw commit 

the murder. After issuing notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court 

dismissed the petition pursuant to Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585 

(Pa. 2000) (when PCRA appeal is pending, subsequent PCRA petition cannot 

be filed until resolution of review of pending PCRA petition by highest state 

court in which review is sought, or at expiration of time for seeking such 

review). 
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petition was transferred to the PCRA court for review, where it was dismissed 

as an untimely PCRA petition. 

On January 15, 2020, Alston filed the instant pro se PCRA petition in 

which he argued he obtained new evidence of trial counsel ineffectiveness in 

the form of affidavits from his former and current wife. The PCRA court issued 

notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On November 23, 2020, the PCRA court dismissed the 

petition. This appeal followed. 

Prior to reaching the merits of Alston’s claims on appeal, we must 

consider the timeliness of his PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be 

filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of 

sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the 

three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this 

Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of 

the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness 

requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not 

address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not 

timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA 

petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised 

therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden 

of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three 

exceptions.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations 

and footnote omitted). 

Alston’s judgment of sentence became final in July 2011, ninety days 

after his petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania 
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Supreme Court, when time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the 

United States Supreme Court expired. The instant petition – filed more than 

eight years later – is patently untimely. Therefore, the PCRA court lacked 

jurisdiction to review Alston’s petition unless he was able to successfully plead 

and prove one of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time bar: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Exceptions to the time-bar must be pled in 

the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). Further, 

[a]lthough this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed 

by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special 

benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must 

comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania 

Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if 
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an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–52 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted). 

Even liberally construed, Alston has failed to plead and prove that any 

of his claims constitute a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar. In his pro se 

petition, Alston asserted he meets the requirements of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), 

i.e., the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s time-bar based on 

affidavits from his current and former wife that prove trial counsel promised 

him a third-degree murder conviction if he waived his right to a jury trial. 

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires the petitioner to allege and prove that 

there were facts that were unknown to him and that he could not have 

ascertained those facts by the exercise of due diligence. See Commonwealth 

v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270-72 (Pa. 2007). “The focus of the exception 

is on [the] newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing 

source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 

714, 720 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. AbuJamal, 941 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 2008) (holding an affidavit alleging perjury did 

not bring a petitioner's claim of fabricated testimony within the scope of

section 9545(b)(1)(ii) because the only “new” aspect of the claim was that a 

new witness had come forward to testify regarding the previously raised 

claim).
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First, Alston provides a letter and affidavit from his current wife, Tyreeka 

Turner, in which she claims she only recently discovered a letter from trial 

counsel while cleaning out her house during remodeling. The affidavit indicates 

that the letter was sent from trial counsel to Alston and can prove that trial 

counsel “promised” Alston and his family a third-degree murder conviction for 

choosing a bench trial over a jury trial. A copy of the letter from counsel was 

included with the petition and states, 

As I advised you and your family previously, the only way I am 

able to accomplish the third-degree murder conviction, is if you 

take a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial. Your trial will be held 

in front of the Hon. Sheila Woods-Skipper, who’s fair in judgment 

considering the facts of your case. 

PCRA Petition, 1/15/2020, at Exhibit “B”. 

However, even if we assume that this letter constitutes a promise of a 

conviction for third degree murder, this is not a “newly discovered fact.” It is 

clear Alston has held this belief since before trial and could have raised the 

issue sooner, either at sentencing or in a previous PCRA petition. In fact, 

Alston admits he has known about this claim all along, but did not raise it 

sooner because he wanted another source for the information. See Appellant’s 

Brief, at 15-16. Again, the “fact” that another witness was willing to testify to 

previously known facts does not satisfy the newly discovered fact exception 

to the PCRA’s time-bar. 

Further, Appellant states it is notable that the letter was addressed to 

Appellant but was mailed to Turner, concluding there “is no evidence that the 
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Appellant received and/or saw the letter or even knew of its’ existence.” 

Appellant’s Brief, at 16. If this is the case, this “new evidence” would not even 

be relevant. Either counsel promised Appellant a third-degree murder 

conviction or he did not. If Appellant never saw this letter, or knew of its 

existence, then it is not proof that Appellant knew of the alleged promise from 

trial counsel, and there would be no proof of reliance on that promise. 

Next, Alston attempts to invoke the newly-discovered fact exception 

based on a letter and affidavit from his ex-wife, Remy Wimbro. In the affidavit, 

Wimbro claims she appeared in court to testify as an alibi witness on Alston’s 

behalf, but trial counsel informed her prior to trial that she would not be 

needed for the proceedings anymore because “some type of deal [was] being 

made with the Judge” on Alston’s behalf. PCRA Petition, 1/15/2020, at Exhibit 

“A”. 

Notably, Alston makes it clear the Wimbro affidavit was not offered to 

prove there was an alibi witness who was willing to testify, and that trial 

counsel failed to call the witness. See Appellant’s Brief, at 20. Rather, the 

affidavit was solely offered to establish that trial counsel told Wimbro that he 

had a “plan.” Id. Appellant goes on to state what, in his belief, that “plan” did 

not include. Id. at 20-21. This is simply not a new fact. Without more, proof 

that an attorney had a plan is just proof that an attorney is doing their job. 

Further, as this affidavit was also offered to prove the “fact” that trial counsel 

allegedly planned and/or promised a third-degree murder conviction in 
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exchange for Appellant waiving his right to a jury trial, Wimbro would just be 

another witness willing to testify to previously known “fact:” that counsel 

allegedly promised Appellant a third-degree murder conviction if he waived 

his right to a jury trial. As previously discussed, this does not satisfy the newly 

discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. 

Finally, Alston boldly claims he has been seeking this evidence ever 

since he was convicted. However, he does not explain why he could not have 

learned of this information sooner. As they were married at the time of trial, 

it is unclear why Alston could not have asked Wimbro at that time why she 

ended up not testifying on his behalf. 

As the PCRA court properly concluded Alston’s PCRA petition was 

untimely and does not fall under an exception to the PCRA time bar, we affirm 

the PCRA court’s order dismissing the petition. 

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/10/2021