J-S45030-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ILIJA PILIC

Appellant No. 1802 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of October 14, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-21-CR-0003057-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., WECHT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 08, 2015

Ilija Pilic appeals his October 14, 2014 judgment of sentence. We 

affirm.

On August 25, 2012, around 2 a.m., Carlisle Police Officer Matthew 

Kennedy was on patrol in a marked police car near the intersection of 

Church Avenue and South Hanover Street in Carlisle. Church Avenue is a

one-lane, one-way street. At the intersection with Hanover Street, a stop 

sign is posted on the right side of the street and a sign that says all traffic 

must turn right is posted on the left side of the street. Both signs are 

visible. The all traffic must turn right sign had been posted in that location

for fourteen or fifteen years.

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Officer Kennedy saw a red BMW go straight through the intersection, 

instead of turning right onto Hanover Street as required by the posted sign. 

Officer Kennedy pulled the car over and spoke with the driver, Pilic. Pilic 

told Officer Kennedy that Pilic saw the officer and that “he went straight 

anyway.” Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 4/15/2014, at 11. Pilic had both 

alcohol and THC in his system.

Pilic was charged with driving under the influence (“DUI”) – general 

impairment, DUI – general impairment with a blood alcohol content of .08-

.10%, DUI – combination of drugs, DUI – controlled substance, and 

obedience to traffic control devices.1 On February 26, 2014, Pilic filed a 

pre-trial motion in which he asserted that, because the all traffic must turn 

right sign was illegally placed, Pilic did not violate the Motor Vehicle Code.

Therefore, Pilic argued that Officer Kennedy lacked probable cause for the 

traffic stop. Because there was no probable cause, Pilic contended that the 

stop was illegal and that all evidence derived from the stop should be 

suppressed. After a hearing on April 15, 2014, at which Officer Kennedy 

testified, the trial court denied the motion.

On August 19, 2014, Pilic proceeded to a non-jury trial. At trial, Pilic 

stipulated that he was driving the car, that he was impaired and incapable of 

safe driving, and that he was under the influence of alcohol and had 

____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), 3802(a)(2), 3802(d)(3), 

3802(d)(1)(i)(ii)(iii), and 3111(a), respectively.
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sufficient levels of THC in his blood for DUI purposes. N.T., 8/19/2014, at 3. 

The parties stipulated that the reason for the stop was that Pilic went 

straight through the intersection instead of turning right. The testimony 

from the suppression hearing was incorporated into the trial record. Id. at 

4. Following those stipulations, the trial court found Pilic guilty of the DUI 

counts, but not guilty of the obedience to traffic control devices offense.2 

Id. at 5.

On October 14, 2014, Pilic was sentenced to seventy-two hours to six 

months’ imprisonment, along with fines, costs, and drug and alcohol 

treatment. N.T., 10/14/2014, at 3. Pilic indicated his intent to appeal 

immediately. He requested bail pending appeal, which the trial court 

granted. Id. at 2. 

On October 27, 2014, Pilic filed a notice of appeal. On October 28, 

2014, the trial court ordered Pilic to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Pilic timely 

complied. On January 5, 2015, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Pilic presents one issue for our review:

____________________________________________

2 The trial court stated that its standard practice was to find a defendant 

not guilty of the associated summary offenses in cases like the instant one. 

Id. at 3-4. The trial court recognized that the summary offense was, 

however, the basis of the stop and the issue Pilic intended to appeal. Id. at 

5.
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Did the suppression court err when it denied [Pilic’s] omnibus 

pre-trial motion challenging the validity of the traffic stop which 

resulted in [Pilic’s] arrest and conviction where [Pilic] was 

stopped for violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a) even though the 

traffic-control device at issue was not properly positioned?

Pilic’s Brief at 6.

When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, our standard of 

review is as follows:

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge 

to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the factual findings are supported by the 

record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts 

are correct. Since the prosecution prevailed in the suppression 

court, we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and 

so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the 

trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if 

the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Wells, 916 A.2d 1192, 1194-95 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Pilic argues that, because the all traffic must turn right sign was on the 

left side of the street, pursuant to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 

Devices (“MUTCD”), it was placed on the wrong side of the street. Pilic 

asserts that he did not violate section 3111(a), because there is no violation 

if a traffic sign is not in a correct position. Pilic argues that, because he did 

not violate the Motor Vehicle Code, Officer Kennedy did not have probable 

cause for the traffic stop. Therefore, Pilic concludes that the evidence 

resulting from the stop should have been suppressed. Pilic’s Brief at 10-21.
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A police officer has the authority to stop a vehicle for a violation of the 

Motor Vehicle Code. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). Instantly, because Pilic’s 

alleged violation of the Motor Vehicle Code did not require further 

investigation, the traffic stop had to be supported by probable cause.

Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the 

driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant 

to the suspected violation. In such an instance, it is encumbent 

[sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by 

him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide 

probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in 

violation of some provision of the Code.

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). Officer Kennedy 

testified that, by observing Pilic disobey the all traffic must turn right sign, 

he had probable cause to believe that Pilic had violated the Motor Vehicle 

Code. In response, Pilic argues that, because the sign was illegally placed, 

he did not violate the Motor Vehicle Code and there was no probable cause 

to stop him.

To determine if Officer Kennedy had probable cause, we must consider 

whether Pilic violated the Motor Vehicle Code. Section 3111 states, in 

pertinent part, as follows:

(a) General rule. – Unless otherwise directed by a uniformed 

police officer or any appropriately attired person authorized to 

direct, control or regulate traffic, the driver of any vehicle shall 

obey the instructions of any applicable official traffic-control 

device placed or held in accordance with the provisions of this 

title, subject to the privileges granted the driver of an 

emergency vehicle in this title.
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* * *

(b) Proper position and legibility of device. – No provision 

of this title for which official traffic-control devices are required 

shall be enforced against an alleged violator if at the time and 

place of the alleged violation an official device is not in proper 

position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordinarily 

observant person. Whenever a particular section does not state 

that official traffic-control devices are required, the section shall 

be effective even though no devices are erected or in place.

(c) Presumption of authorized placement. – Whenever 

official traffic-control devices are placed or held in position 

approximately conforming to the requirements of this title, the 

devices shall be presumed to have been so placed by the official 

act or direction of lawful authority, unless the contrary shall be 

established by competent evidence.

* * *

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3111.

With regard to standards for traffic control devices, Pennsylvania has 

adopted the MUTCD, as published by the Federal Highway Administration. 

See 67 Pa. Code §§ 212.2, 212.1. In general, for placement of traffic 

control devices, the MUTCD offers the following guidance3:

Placement of a traffic control device should be within the road 

user’s view so that adequate visibility is provided. To aid in 

conveying the proper meaning, the traffic control device should 

be appropriately positioned with respect to the location, object, 

or situation to which it applies. The location and legibility of the 

traffic control device should be such that a road user has 

adequate time to make the proper response in both day and 

night conditions.

____________________________________________

3 Guidance is defined in the MUTCD as a recommended, but not 

mandatory, practice. § 1A.13(1)(B).
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§ 1A.04(1). For sign placement, the MUTCD states that “Standardization of 

position cannot always be attained in practice.” § 2A.16(1). As guidance, it 

says:

Signs should be located on the right-hand side of the roadway 

where they are easily recognized and understood by road users. 

Signs in other locations should be considered only as 

supplementary to signs in the normal locations, except as 

otherwise provided in this Manual.

§ 2A.16(4). It also notes that , as an option, that, in some circumstances, 

signs may be placed on the left.

4

 § 2A.16(11). In the diagrams provided to 

illustrate sign placement, none involve a one-lane, one-way road 

intersecting another road.

The statements describing sign placement are all permissive, using the 

word “should,” rather than mandatory, which is typically identified by the 

use of the word “shall.” The MUTCD makes clear that the circumstances of 

the particular road should be considered in sign placement. It is also clear 

that sign placement on the left-hand side of the road, while not preferred, is 

permissible. Although the circumstances in this case are not specifically 

mentioned in the MUTCD, it is clear that the sign placement on the left of a 

one-lane, one-way street is not illegal.

____________________________________________

4 The section provides examples of possible circumstances when a lefthand sign is necessary as when there are curves in the road or when multilanes of traffic might obstruct a sign on the right. 
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Further, section 3111 creates a presumption that the placement of the 

sign is an authorized placement. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3111(c). In a similar case, 

we analyzed whether a school zone speed limit sign that was placed 

overhead, instead of on the right-hand side of the road, was legally 

positioned. Commonwealth v. Long, 577 A.2d 899 (Pa. Super. 1990). 

There, we held that:

[T]he above regulations and their common sense application by 

this Court clearly encompass the multitude of conditions and 

diversity of our roadways which prevents the identical placement 

of every sign. Such rigidity would often negate the ameliorative 

goals of the traffic control devices themselves. For these 

reasons, we find the school zone speed limit sign in this case 

was positioned properly, as required by section 3111 of the 

Vehicle Code, and absent any competent evidence to the 

contrary, the Commonwealth is entitled to a presumption that it 

was placed in accordance with statutory and regulatory 

requirements. 

Long, 577 A.2d at 902. Pilic offered no evidence that the sign was 

positioned improperly, other than reference to the MUTCD, which does not 

conclusively support his position that placement on the left is in any way 

problematic or illegal. Therefore, Pilic has not overcome sections 3111’s

presumption. 

Here, the sign placement was in accordance with the statute and 

regulations. Therefore, Officer Kennedy had probable cause to believe that 

Pilic had violated the Motor Vehicle Code when Pilic failed to obey the all 

traffic must turn right sign. Because the traffic stop was supported by 
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probable cause, the trial court did not err in denying Pilic’s suppression 

motion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/8/2015