China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and 

Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a SinoAmerican Military Confrontation

by Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller

China Strategic Perspectives 6

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National 

Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm.  INSS includes 

the Center for Strategic Research and Center for the Study of Chinese 

Military Affairs. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by performing research and analysis, publication, conferences, policy support, 

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The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary 

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Cover photo:“Be on Guard, 100 Times Alert” © David Pollack/Corbis
China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs

Institute for National Strategic Studies

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Series Editor: Phillip C. Saunders 

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

April 2013

by Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller

China’s Forbearance Has Limits:

Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and

Its Implications for a

Sino-American Military Confrontation
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First printing, April 2013
Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 1

Introduction........................................................................................................ 5

The Record: Beijing’s Use of Military Force.................................................... 5

China’s Crisis Decisionmaking Process and Crisis Management..............24

Signaling the Intent to Employ Military Force—

China’s Warnings Calculus..............................................................................29

Signaling Case Studies—Taiwan.....................................................................37

Analyzing Beijing’s Signals—Things to Consider........................................45

Conclusion—A Hypothetical South China Sea Signaling Scenario..........46

Appendix 1. Chronology of the 1978–1979 Sino-Vietnamese

Border Crisis......................................................................................................51

Appendix 2. Chronology of the 1961–1962 Sino-Indian

Border Crisis.....................................................................................................65

Appendix 3. PRC Signaling Over Taiwan: 1991, 1995,

1999, 2003–2004...............................................................................................69

Notes ................................................................................................................105

Acknowledgments..........................................................................................107

About the Authors..........................................................................................109

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China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Executive Summary

Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has employed military 

force in defense of China’s security and territorial integrity. In many such instances, Beijing 

implemented a calculus of threat and retaliation signals intended first to deter an adversary 

from taking actions contrary to Chinese interests by threatening the use of military force and, if 

deterrence failed, to explain and justify Beijing’s resort to military force. 

This deterrence calculus was applied in each of the major instances in which Beijing has 

resorted to military force—in Korea in 1950, in the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1961–1962, 

in the Sino-Soviet border dispute in 1968–1969, and in China’s attack on northern Vietnam 

in 1979. It was also applied in instances in which Beijing’s effort at deterrence apparently succeeded and China ultimately stopped short of using military force. Examples include China’s 

responses to the intensifying American combat effort in Vietnam in 1965–1968 and to the 1991 

debates in Taipei about delimiting the Republic of China’s sovereignty claims.

Beijing implements this deterrence calculus by a carefully calibrated hierarchy of official 

protests, authoritative press comment, and leadership statements. If the crisis persists and Beijing perceives its interests are not satisfactorily taken into account, its statements escalate in 

level and may include at first implicit and thereafter increasingly explicit warnings that it may 

use military force to achieve its goals. This approach has been employed consistently despite 

the sweeping changes in the PRC’s place in the international order, the proliferation of foreign 

policy instruments at its disposal, the more complex crisis decisionmaking process and domestic political environment, and the dramatic evolution in the Chinese media over the decades. 

Significant improvements in China’s military capabilities, particularly in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval and air arms, have enhanced Beijing’s ability to press its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. Chinese actions, often in response to challenges 

by other claimants, have raised regional tensions. Moreover, Beijing has at times hardened its 

objections to U.S. military exercises, aerial surveillance, and intelligence collection in China’s 

exclusive economic zone and in international airspace off its coasts. Aggressive maneuvers by 

Chinese military aircraft, fishing vessels, and civilian agency ships have led to serious incidents, 

including a collision between a PLA Navy (PLAN) fighter and a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft that led to the death of the PLAN pilot. 

The question for U.S. policymakers is whether improving military capabilities will lead 

Beijing to substitute sudden or surprise attack for the politically calibrated deterrence signaling it has employed prior to its past use of force. This study assesses the problem in four ways. 
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

It first reviews China’s use of force since 1949 to determine the motivations driving Beijing’s 

employment of military coercion. Second, it assesses China’s crisis decisionmaking process and 

crisis management. Third, it assesses the prospects for China’s more aggressive use of military 

coercion in Asia’s emerging security environment. Finally, Beijing’s signaling of China’s intent 

to employ military coercion is assessed in detail using a series of crisis case studies covering the 

years 1961–2004.

Although China’s military capabilities are continuing to improve and its standing and involvement in the world have changed quite dramatically, this study concludes that the traditional calculus of threat and retaliation statements remains a central tool in Beijing’s array of 

foreign policy and security instruments for responding to and managing tensions and disputes. 

The historical instances where China has used military power can be divided into those 

cases when Beijing has employed significant military force and those cases when lesser military 

coercion has been employed. As one would anticipate, the forces employed reflect the immediacy of the perceived threat, the importance of the interest being threatened, and the capabilities of the opposing military forces. 

Deterrence signaling has been more systematically and directly applied when Beijing has 

perceived a major military threat or strategic trend placing a high value interest in jeopardy. 

This includes all four of the Taiwan cases examined (in 1991, 1995–1996, 1999, and 2003–2004).

China’s recognition of the power asymmetry between itself and the United States partially explains why none of the post–Korean War crises involving the United States evolved into 

direct military conflict. Chinese and American scholars agree that one characteristic of SinoAmerican crises is China’s consistent policy of seeking to avoid a military confrontation with 

the United States even as it employed or threatened the use of military force.

This record does not, however, necessarily transfer to a potential Taiwan crisis. Here, some 

Chinese hold the view that whereas Taiwan involves a core interest for China, it is only of marginal strategic interest to the United States. Consequently, China should not be fearful of employing military force to deter Taiwan’s de jure independence because the United States could 

well decide that a war with China over Taiwan is simply too costly given the island’s low strategic value to the United States.

This view of the asymmetric importance of Taiwan to China and the United States reflects a broader Chinese perspective on past Sino-American crises. From a Chinese perspective, Sino-American crises did not occur in locales where core U.S. security interests were at 

stake. Whether in Korea, China’s offshore islands, Vietnam, or Taiwan, China’s interests were 

under greater threat because the locales were on or near China’s national boundaries. More-
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China’s Forbearance Has Limits

over, in crises over the offshore islands and Taiwan, China’s territorial integrity and national 

sovereignty were at stake. These perceived asymmetries of interest contribute to China’s view 

that U.S. policies and strategies are similar to those conducted by imperialist and hegemonic 

powers in the past. 

This same perspective of asymmetric interests applies to China’s maritime territorial 

claims in the South and East China Seas. Whereas Beijing recognizes a U.S. interest in freedom 

of navigation, any U.S. involvement in how these territorial disputes should be settled is unacceptable because the disputes do not involve U.S. strategic interests. For Beijing, these territorial 

disputes are sovereignty issues extending back to the 19th century when Japanese and Western 

imperialists began their violations of China’s sovereignty. In China’s view, they are not a matter 

where the United States has any legitimate interest. 

Despite its commitment to the restoration of its own sovereignty over islands in the South 

and East China Seas, Beijing is reluctant to employ direct military coercion when its claims 

are challenged. These disputes do not constitute a direct threat to Chinese security, and the 

political, economic, and security consequences of a military confrontation between China and 

its neighbors, including those with mutual defense treaties with the United States, are evident. 

Beijing’s resolve to avoid a military confrontation is particularly manifest with regard to the 

United States. Given the potentially grave consequences, if China does consider using military 

force, Beijing is almost certain to employ the same deterrence calculus it has maintained since 

the founding of the People’s Republic. It would do so to minimize the possibility that it will have 

to use the military force on which the deterrence calculus ultimately rests and to reduce the 

costs if force is used. 

China’s application of the deterrence calculus in a future crisis would likely have the following characteristics:

■ Systematic integration of political and diplomatic action with military preparations as 

the signaling escalates through higher levels of authority. Such preparations are often, if 

not always, overt and integrated into the political and diplomatic messages designed to 

deter the adversary from the course of action Beijing finds threatening.

■ Stating why China is justified in using military force should this prove necessary. The 

message targets both domestic and international audiences. In essence, Beijing declares 

that it confronts a serious threat to its security and interests that if not terminated will 

require the use of military force.
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

■ Asserting that the use of military force is not Beijing’s preferred resolution to the threat 

it faces, but one that will be forced upon it should the adversary not heed the deterrence 

warnings sent. In short, Beijing’s signaling strategy seeks to grant China the moral high 

ground in the emerging confrontation. Such an argument supports China’s self-identification as a uniquely peaceful country that employs military force only in defense 

and when provoked by adversaries threatening its security or sovereignty. Presumably, 

Beijing believes that asserting the moral high ground in a confrontation can ease international response to any military action China might take and thereby reduce the 

political costs of employing military force. 

■ Emphasizing that China’s forbearance and restraint should not be viewed as weakness and 

that China is prepared to employ military force should that be necessary.
5

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Introduction

Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has employed military 

force in pursuit of its national interests in security and territorial integrity. In many such instances, Beijing has deployed a calculus of threat and retaliation signals, first to deter an adversary from taking actions contrary to Beijing’s interests by threatening use of Chinese military 

force, and then, once deterrence has failed, to explain and justify Beijing’s resort to military 

force. Beijing has carefully sustained this calibrated hierarchy of official protests, authoritative 

press comment, and leadership statements despite the sweeping changes in the PRC’s place in 

the international order, the proliferation of foreign policy instruments at its disposal, and the 

dramatic evolution in the Chinese media over the decades.

This study assesses the context and motivations of the PRC’s use of military force since 

1949. It then extracts Beijing’s use of its calculus of warning statements in detail from several 

instances in which it has threatened and, in some cases, actually followed through with the use 

of military force to resolve a dispute. It offers several points to take into account in watching for 

and analyzing Beijing’s use of this warnings calculus in contemporary contexts, and it offers a 

hypothetical scenario in which this calculus might appear in the context of China’s claims in the 

South China Sea. 

The Record: Beijing’s Use of Military Force

Across the decades of the Cold War, Beijing faced dire threats to its security, first from the 

United States, then from the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 

together, and finally from the Soviet Union alone. In addition, the People’s Republic inherited 

boundaries from the Republic of China regime that it defeated on the Chinese mainland in 1949. 

Those boundaries derived from the creation of national boundaries out of what before 1911 had 

been the frontiers of an empire—the Manchu Qing empire, which established hegemony over 

a vast stretch of East and Central Asia in the 18th century that included China itself. As such, 

the PRC inherited a roster of maritime territorial disputes with many of its neighbors. In that 

respect, Beijing shares similar security concerns with other nation-states that have emerged out 

of the international relations of empires in modern times, such as India and Indonesia. 

Where China differs from most other states is a consequence of the yet-to-be-resolved 

civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Kuomintang (KMT), which established a government on Taiwan in 1949 following military defeat on the mainland. Beijing 

views Taiwan, together with any territory the government in Taipei administers, as properly 
6 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

the sovereign domain of the PRC. The Taipei government is viewed simply as “the Taiwan authorities.” Preventing the permanent separation of Taiwan from China is one of Beijing’s “core 

interests” together with retaining Tibet and Xinjiang as inalienable parts of China. Taiwan, however, differs from these two regions in four critical ways. First is the reality that while those two 

regions are integral components of the PRC, Taiwan has functioned as a de facto independent 

state since the KMT’s retreat to the island. Moreover, beginning in the late 1980s Taiwan’s political system transitioned into a flourishing democracy providing a Chinese model of democratic 

political process contrasting sharply with the CCP’s political monopoly in the People’s Republic. 

Second, Taiwan has its own defense establishment and armed forces defending an island separated from the mainland by some 100 miles of water that even today provide a protective moat 

difficult for China’s armed forces to overcome with an amphibious assault. Third, from Beijing’s 

perspective, Taiwan is a potential security threat should the island ever ally with a hostile power. 

Fourth, and perhaps most significant for Beijing, is the relationship Taiwan has with the United 

States. Beijing views the American commitment to Taipei stemming from the Taiwan Relations 

Act (TRA) of 1979, which was legislated following the U.S. shift of diplomatic recognition to the 

PRC, as totally unacceptable to China. It was this connection to the United States that provided 

the focus for China’s mid-1990s defense modernization programs that continue to this day. 

Taiwan’s unique status in Beijing’s perception of threats to its security and national interests leads us to assess China’s employment of military force from two perspectives. The first 

perspective assesses China’s use of military force in circumstances not involving Taiwan as that 

of any state seeking to defend itself and its security, sovereign territories, and political interests 

from predatory adversaries. These security and national interest issues have varied in their degree of perceived threat, with the United States and the Soviet Union providing the most severe 

confrontations. Challenges to China’s territorial claims in the East and South China seas, on 

the other hand, have become important concerns for Beijing, but these sovereignty clashes are 

not major security threats requiring the allocation of significant military resources. The second perspective takes into account Beijing’s absolute commitment to preventing the permanent 

separation of Taiwan from the mainland. Any indication that Taipei may be moving toward de 

jure independence or that U.S. policy toward Taiwan is changing is always perceived by Beijing 

as an extremely serious risk requiring the threat or application of extensive military force. Consequently, although the deterrence signaling pattern will likely not change, the intensity of Beijing’s dedication to preventing any potential move toward the de jure independence of Taiwan 

and the reasons for this commitment are distinct enough to divide China’s use of military force 

into two categories, with Taiwan occupying a significantly different category from other cases. 
7

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

The summaries and analyses below provide the contextual background and demonstrate 

the primary motivations for Beijing’s employment of military coercion since 1949. They are 

not intended to provide detailed assessments of each event. In addition to treating Taiwan as a 

distinct case, we divide China’s use of its military power into assessments of when Beijing has 

employed significant military force and when lesser military coercion has been employed. As 

one would anticipate, the forces employed reflect the immediacy of the perceived threat, the 

importance of the interest being threatened, and the capabilities of the opposing military forces. 

Deterrence signaling has been more systematically and directly applied when Beijing has perceived a major military threat or strategic trend placing a high-value interest in jeopardy.

China’s Non–Taiwan-related Use of Military Force

Deterrence has provided the primary driver for China’s application of significant military 

force since 1949. Beijing has overtly deployed major elements of its armed forces four times as a 

component of a deterrent strategy.1

 In each case, the intent of openly deploying and threatening 

the use of military force was to deter the adversary from continuing a course of action Beijing 

believed threatened high-value Chinese security and political interests. Three of these deterrent 

strategies failed and China went to war. China’s October 1950 entrance into the Korean War 

followed Beijing’s failure to deter U.S. forces from crossing the 38th parallel and entering the territory of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Beijing’s objective was to preserve 

a bordering communist ally and thereby prevent the United States, commanding the United 

Nations coalition resisting the DPRK’s invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK), from unifying 

the peninsula and subsequently having forces poised directly on a Chinese border. 

The brief 1962 border war with India was fought for more than preserving China’s territorial claims along the Sino-Indian boundaries. A central issue for China was preservation of Tibet as an integral part of China. Tibet had become a target of U.S. subversion in the early 1950s. 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations supported insurgents and contributed to the Tibetan revolt of 1959, which together with the Dalai Lama’s flight to India, Beijing saw as threatening China’s control of the region. To improve access to Tibet, China had completed a road in 

1957 from Xinjiang through the Aksai Chin border area claimed by India but designated Chinese on China’s maps. This road provided the only military transport route to Tibet. Ultimately, 

beginning in 1958, negotiations over several years failed to resolve territorial disagreements 

that extended along major sectors of the Sino-Indian border. Failed negotiations together with 

minor border clashes led to a Chinese deterrent strategy that also failed to convince New Delhi 

to retreat from its military pressures to assert claims along the border. People’s Liberation Army 
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

(PLA) attacks began on October 20, 1962. Following Beijing’s unilateral ceasefire in November, 

Chinese troops withdrew from whatever Indian territory they had entered during combat operations and returned to the positions they held prior to the war. Beijing was demonstrating that 

it sought no Indian territory but was defending Chinese territory. For Beijing, however, the core 

issue was ensuring China’s continued control of Tibet.

 The context of China’s 1965–1973 deployment of military forces into the Democratic 

Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was similar to Korea in 1950. The core objective was to preserve a bordering communist ally against a common enemy. Beijing feared that with the 

buildup of its forces to 500,000 troops the United States would invade the DRV. The intent of 

China’s overt deployment of PLA units into the DRV was to demonstrate China’s willingness 

to go to war with the United States to preserve North Vietnam. This deterrent commitment 

was reinforced by the antiaircraft artillery units deployed into the DRV suffering casualties 

while engaging attacking U.S. aircraft, by PLA construction units keeping communication 

routes open under repeated U.S. air attack, and by Chinese fighters engaging U.S. aircraft that 

strayed into China’s air space. Because the United States did not send ground forces across the 

17th parallel into the DRV, Beijing could view this aspect of its deterrent strategy as successful.

The last major commitment of non–Taiwan-related military force was China’s February 

1979 attack on Vietnam.2

 The core issue driving this attack was Beijing’s sense of growing geopolitical vulnerability. The newly unified Vietnam was viewed as functioning as a Soviet ally 

seeking to dominate Indochina even as the USSR was poised threateningly along the PRC’s extensive northern border. To this sense of strategic vulnerability must be added Beijing’s intense 

anger that North Vietnam—a communist ally that China had supported for more than two decades in its wars for independence and the unification of Vietnam—had turned against its most 

loyal benefactor. Vietnam’s invasion of China’s ally Cambodia in December 1978, after more 

than a year of escalating Sino-Vietnamese tensions, including armed provocations along their 

border, triggered what Beijing announced as a limited punitive cross-border assault, but the 

drivers were far more important than the trigger itself. If China did nothing to assist the Khmer 

Rouge, then Beijing would be viewed as rendered impotent by the emerging Vietnam-Soviet alliance. But China had no land border with Cambodia and thus chose to “punish” Vietnam. It is 

unlikely that Beijing expected Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, and Hanoi did not do so 

until September 1989. The decision to “teach Vietnam a lesson,” however, was directed as much 

to Moscow as it was to Hanoi. 

China has employed lesser military resources for what (with one exception) were less demanding political and military objectives. That exception was the two firefights between Soviet 
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China’s Forbearance Has Limits

and Chinese forces in March 1969 on a contested island known as Zhenbao to Chinese and Damansky to Russians in the Ussuri River, which forms the local Sino-Russian border.3

 Mounting 

military tension along their mutual border over the previous year, including minor border confrontations, led to Moscow’s January 1969 warning that continued provocations would lead to the 

employment of military force. The first major firefight occurred on March 2 and was initiated by 

China. Although Beijing had made clear to Moscow its willingness to defend China against any 

Soviet military attack, the March 2 action was deliberately generated by China as some 300 Chinese troops purposely ambushed a Soviet patrol on Zhenbao Island. The second clash came on 

March 15, evidently initiated by Moscow in response to the Chinese ambush. This second firefight 

was much larger than the first, perhaps inflicting as many as 1,000 casualties on both sides. Minor 

military confrontations then continued along the extensive Sino-Soviet border throughout the 

year, apparently generated by Soviet forces. Moreover, Moscow redeployed a bomber squadron 

from Eastern Europe to a Central Asian base where it conducted exercises seemingly designed 

to prepare for an attack on China’s Lanzhou nuclear facility.4

 Tensions continued to build until a 

September 1969 meeting in the Beijing airport where Premiers Kosygin and Zhou Enlai agreed 

to reopen the border talks cancelled in 1964. The driver for the Chinese ambush remains unclear. 

There are two potential explanations. First, increasing Sino-Soviet tensions joined with the buildup of Soviet forces along the border, the Soviet Union’s 1966 defense arrangement with Mongolia, 

the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the announcement of the Brezhnev doctrine, 

which led Mao Zedong to initiate a small military skirmish as a demonstration that China was 

not intimidated by the USSR’s military power—a deterrence strategy. Second, this open resistance 

to the USSR was designed to lay the groundwork for a Sino-American rapprochement. No matter which explanation is valid (and they are not mutually contradictory), Beijing could not have 

anticipated the Soviets extending the military clashes throughout the year until the two premiers 

met in September.

Confrontations over Maritime Claims

Other Chinese employments of non–Taiwan-related, small-scale military force have primarily occurred in the South China Sea where two sets of issues are involved: sovereignty and 

resources. China claims sovereignty over all South China Sea land features including the two 

major island groups contained in those waters—the Paracel and Spratly Islands—a claim paralleled by Taiwan as the Republic of China. China’s claim to the Paracels is contested only by 

Vietnam. Beijing’s Spratly claim is contested by other Southeast Asian maritime states. Vietnam 

claims the entire island group, the Philippines claims 53 of its land features, and Malaysia claims 
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

12. Brunei does not claim any of the islands, but does claim part of the South China Sea nearest 

to it as part of its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In 1984, Brunei declared 

an EEZ that includes Louisa Reef. Resource issues revolve around fisheries and energy deposits in equally contested EEZs. China has vigorously objected whenever foreign oil companies 

have acquired exploration rights to blocks in contested areas of the South China Sea, to include 

threats against these companies. 

Seizure of the southern Paracel (Xisha) Islands from South Vietnam in 1974 was triggered 

by Saigon’s September 1973 all-encompassing claim to the Spratly Islands, which it underscored 

by sending troops to occupy two of the Spratlys’ largest islands. Beijing responded in January 1974 by reasserting China’s claim to all South China Sea islands and threatening the use 

of military force if Saigon did not withdraw its occupying troops from the Spratlys. Although 

both governments claimed all the Paracels, China occupied the northeastern group of islands 

known as the Amphitrites while South Vietnam occupied the southwestern or Crescent Group. 

To affirm its January claim to all South China Sea islands, Chinese troops placed flags on several 

lightly defended Crescent islands in January 1974. Tensions accelerated from that point on.5

Chinese troops had occupied Duncan (Chenhang) Islet in the Crescents. Vietnamese forces 

attempting to recover the island on January 19 were thrown back, so supporting naval vessels 

began a shore bombardment. These ships were engaged by a PLA Navy (PLAN) flotilla of small 

ships that forced the Vietnamese away. On January 20, China landed some 500 troops to take 

control of remaining Crescent group islets held by the Vietnamese, thereby occupying all the 

Paracels. MiG fighters based on Hainan provided air support for the Chinese assaults. Following 

the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war, Hanoi dispatched three small gunboats to observe the 

Paracels. Chinese naval vessels interdicted and captured them. The year 1988 saw another small 

Sino-Vietnamese military engagement, this time over a contested islet in the Spratly (Nansha) 

Islands. A PLAN flotilla of three frigates was patrolling the Spratlys with the intent of chasing off 

any Vietnamese ships landing forces on the islets. On March 13, while pursuing a Vietnamese 

transport ship near Johnson (Chigua) Reef where China was building an ocean surveillance 

facility, a PLAN frigate spotted Vietnamese vessels in the area. On March 14, both Chinese and 

Vietnamese troops attempted to land on Johnson Reef. A Vietnamese transport ship providing 

fire support for the Vietnamese troops bombarded the Chinese forces. The PLAN frigates then 

sank the transport ship and an accompanying landing craft while damaging another transport 

vessel. The engagement lasted perhaps 90 minutes with some 70 Vietnamese casualties.

Beginning sometime in 1994, China started building structures on Mischief Reef in the 

Spratlys, which were also claimed by the Philippines. This was the first time China had occupied 
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China’s Forbearance Has Limits

a reef claimed by one of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member states. 

These construction activities, perhaps under the direction of China’s navy, were discovered by 

the Philippines in January 1995. Other than a possible PLAN connection with the construction, there was no direct use of military force by China. Despite the friction created by China’s 

occupation and construction on Mischief Reef, Beijing and Manila agreed to a diplomatic resolution, no matter how tentative, when on August 10, 1995, they signed “A Joint Statement on 

PRC-RP [Republic of the Philippines] Consultations on the South China Sea and other Areas of 

Cooperation.” Nonetheless, territorial and maritime disagreements with occasional confrontations have continued (including the 2012 confrontation over Scarborough Shoal).

Even as Chinese naval exercises in the South China Sea have increased over time with improving PLAN capabilities, Beijing has sought to avoid excessively provocative naval presence by 

handing responsibility for regular patrolling of politically sensitive waters and land features to vessels and aircraft from civilian agencies such as the State Oceanic Administration, its subordinate 

Marine Surveillance Force, and the Bureau of Fisheries Administration.6

 It is these civilian vessels 

that have been employed to challenge and detain fishing boats from other states operating in 

Chinese-claimed waters, to identify oil rigs Beijing claims are exploring in Chinese waters, and to 

harass non-Chinese seismic vessels searching for energy-rich locations. Charges of illegal energy 

exploration are also raised through diplomatic channels. China has employed similar methods in 

the waters surrounding uninhabited islands in the East China Sea known as the Diaoyus to China 

and the Senkakus to Japan, which administers the islands and contests Beijing’s claim.

China’s assertion of its territorial and resource claims led to ASEAN’s effort to establish 

a “code of conduct” to discourage aggressive behavior and minimize the probability of armed 

clashes among the South China Sea claimants. Established in 2002 as a political declaration, 

this nonbinding commitment has made little progress in transforming into a legally binding 

document, which is ASEAN’s intent. It should not be assumed, however, that all South China 

Sea armed clashes have been generated by China’s behavior. Vietnamese soldiers have fired on a 

Philippine fishing boat, Chinese fishing boats have been rammed and sunk by Philippine naval 

vessels, and Vietnamese have fired on a Philippine reconnaissance aircraft. Although undoubtedly primarily focused on constraining China’s behavior, the code of conduct sought would 

encompass all ASEAN members.

Harassment of U.S. Sea and Air Intelligence Missions

Beijing has frequently expressed objections to U.S. aerial reconnaissance missions off China’s 

coast and intelligence-collection ships operating in China’s EEZ, and also to U.S. Navy exercises 
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

in China’s EEZ. Meetings of the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) 

have often been used to raise objections to American surveillance operations. With equal frequency the United States has stated that U.S. reconnaissance aircraft are operating legally in international airspace and the ocean surveillance ships are equally free of legal restraint when operating in China’s EEZ, as are U.S. naval exercises. Although Beijing has selected interpretation of 

international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 

as China’s tool to challenge the U.S. position, the tension is more based on Beijing’s quest to establish greater control over what it perceives as threatening military operations close to China. From 

Beijing’s point of view, U.S. aircraft and ships conducting these missions are collecting military 

intelligence that threatens China’s security and are doing so in sea and air space critical to China’s 

defense. Indeed, the Yellow, East, and South China Seas are referred to by Beijing as China’s “near 

seas.” These two conflicting perspectives show no sign of being resolved and suggest that incidents 

such as the 2001 PLAN F-8 collision with a USN EP-3 aircraft and harassment of United States 

Naval Ship (USNS) ocean surveillance ships by aircraft and vessels of China’s civilian maritime 

agencies and fishing boats will continue.7

Nonetheless, there have been no reported incidents of confrontations between U.S. airand sea-based intelligence collectors and Chinese aircraft or ships since the 2009 incident with 

the USNS Impeccable in the South China Sea. Moreover, Beijing has evidently decided that, as 

with its patrolling of politically sensitive waters created by competing territorial claims in the 

South China Sea, it will not protest USNS intelligence-collection missions with Chinese naval 

vessels as it did in 2001 and 2002 when challenging the USNS Bowditch in the Yellow Sea. 

Since those two incidents, ships and aircraft of civilian law enforcement agencies from the State 

Oceanic Administration’s China Marine Surveillance Force and the Ministry of Agriculture’s 

Fisheries Law Enforcement Command have performed this task, suggesting Beijing seeks to 

limit the possibility of escalation even as China demonstrates its objection to U.S. intelligence 

collection. It is unclear whether Chinese commercial fishing vessels involved in harassment actions are under the direct command of these agencies when they interfere with USNS ships, but 

it is reasonable to assume that some form of direction and communication is involved. Lack of 

data does not allow any assessment of the degree of “shadowing” of U.S. aerial intelligence that 

is currently undertaken by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) or PLAN aviation.

China’s Taiwan-related Use of Force8

Following their 1949 defeat on the mainland and the transfer of the seat of the Republic 

of China’s (ROC) government to Taiwan, KMT forces continued to occupy islands close to 
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China’s Forbearance Has Limits

the PRC coastline. These islands were used as bases for harassing actions against the mainland, including coastal raids, attacks on coastal shipping, seizing fishing craft, and firing on 

and sometimes seizing foreign shipping headed for mainland ports—essentially a blockade 

strategy. Beijing’s ultimate objective was to conclude the civil war by eliminating the KMT’s 

control of Taiwan. But before an assault on Taiwan could be undertaken, the PRC had to gain 

control of the offshore islands. As the operations to seize control of the offshore islands and 

preparations for the assault on Taiwan got underway, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 

1950 put both into suspension. In 1953, even as the armistice that ended the fighting in July 

was being negotiated in Panmunjom, PLA operations to eject KMT forces from the offshore 

islands began once again. 

As the second sustained effort to gain control of the offshore islands began,9

 Beijing’s concern was that the United States was committed to the permanent separation of Taiwan from 

China. President Truman’s deployment of U.S. 7th Fleet warships into the Taiwan Strait at the 

opening of the Korean War and their basing in Taiwan was but one indicator. Beijing saw further evidence in Truman’s 1950 statement that the occupation of Taiwan by “Communist forces” 

was a direct threat to the United States and the Pacific, and in 1951 that the future status of 

Taiwan had yet to be determined. The PLA’s August–November 1954 artillery bombardment 

of Jinmen and Matzu islands off Fujian Province was in part designed to deter Taiwan and the 

United States from concluding a mutual security treaty by demonstrating Beijing’s commitment 

to the “liberation” of Taiwan in the face of American military power. It had the opposite result. 

In September the United States dispatched major elements of the 7th Fleet close to Jinmen and 

Matzu in response. 

Although neither President Eisenhower nor Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initially 

favored such a treaty, in December 1954 China’s military pressure on Jinmen and Matzu, followed 

by successful assaults on the Dachen Islands and Yijiangshan Island, led to just the mutual security 

treaty Beijing was trying to avoid. Later in 1955, the United States included in its commitment the 

threat to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Taiwan.10 The single plausible successful political 

outcome for Beijing was that the treaty did not commit the United States to defense of the offshore 

islands. KMT forces continued to use the islands it did occupy as bases to harass the nearby coast 

of Fujian Province, so in 1958 Beijing resumed the artillery bombardment of Jinmen. In essence, 

the PLA was attempting an artillery blockade of the island. Despite the deliberate limitation included in their mutual security treaty, the United States assisted Taiwan by escorting its resupply 

ships to Jinmen harbor. Chinese artillery fired on the Taiwan ships but not U.S. vessels or aircraft. 

Nor did U.S. ships and aircraft fire on Chinese targets. U.S. forces, like those of the PLA, followed 
14 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

strictly enforced rules of engagement (ROE) designed to prevent clashes. Ultimately, the artillery 

blockade of Jinmen became too burdensome for China. Beijing, however, continued a bizarre 

artillery shelling campaign of Jinmen on odd days of the month until the January 1, 1979, normalization of Sino-American relations, but with explosive ordnance usually replaced by propaganda 

leaflets. Beijing’s perspective was that the future liberation of Taiwan was far more important than 

risking war with the United States to gain control of what few offshore islands remained in KMT 

hands. Nonetheless, for the four decades and more following the Jinmen-Matzu confrontation, 

whenever China employed military force to coerce Taiwan it resulted in American military and 

political responses detrimental to Beijing.

The most dramatic Chinese demonstration of military force to influence Taiwan and the 

United States since 1958 took place in 1995 and 1996 through a series of military exercises that 

included the test firing of unarmed ballistic missiles into waters off Taiwan.11 The July–August 

and November 1995 displays of military capabilities were in response to the United States granting a visa to Taiwan’s President, Lee Teng-hui, for a private visit in June to speak at his alma 

mater, Cornell University, where his speech repeatedly praised the virtues of the “Republic of 

China on Taiwan.” Beijing had understood the visa would not be granted, but congressional 

pressure resulted in its issue. 

The March 1996 display of military strength was evidently intended to warn President 

Lee, who was expected to retain the presidency in the coming election (he did), to cease what 

Beijing perceived as political moves toward Taiwan’s independence. Both sets of exercises were 

also deterrence messages intended to warn Washington and Taipei that China was ready and 

willing to employ military force to prevent Taiwan independence with or without U.S. military 

intervention. To ensure its military exercises were not misunderstood and seen as preparations 

to invade Taiwan, on March 5 Beijing announced both the impact areas of its missile tests and 

the times and locations of the military exercises. As added insurance against such misperception of the second series of military demonstrations, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu used his 

scheduled visit to Washington in March at the invitation of the United States to assure his hosts 

that missile tests were routine exercises. Unfortunately for Vice Foreign Minister Liu, the first 

missile shots were fired the day before he arrived in Washington on March 8. As a consequence, 

he confronted a somewhat hostile audience and a particularly angry Secretary of Defense in 

William Perry.

Washington had issued only a somewhat muted response to the 1995 exercises. The USS 

Nimitz aircraft carrier battlegroup had transited the Taiwan Strait in December, but no U.S. 

statement accompanied the transit. Despite the assurances given by a high-ranking Chinese 
15

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

official, the U.S. response to the March 1996 exercises was distinctly different. The U.S. Department of State described the missile firings as “reckless and potentially dangerous,” and two 

aircraft carrier battlegroups were dispatched to the Taiwan area. Beijing had anticipated one 

battlegroup, but two were seen as an overreaction to what were declared normal exercises. 

Assessment

Over the past 62 years, certain patterns have emerged in China’s periodic employment 

of military force to achieve security and political objectives. Beijing has exhibited a consistent 

approach to threats viewed as high level and of immediate strategic importance to China’s security. China’s responses to lower level and less immediate threats have shown a different and 

not necessarily consistent pattern. Whenever Beijing has perceived immediate major threats 

to security issues of high-level importance to China, it has sought to deter the adversary by 

warning of its commitment to go to war to protect these interests. Overt deployment of military 

forces has been an integral component of this deterrent strategy. Korea 1950, India 1962, Vietnam 1965–1973, and Vietnam 1979 are the principal examples. At no time, with the possible 

exception of the 1969 border clashes with the Soviet Union, has China risked major war without 

warning the adversary of this consequence should it not cease the course of action identified 

as threatening in Beijing’s deterrence signals. Having the most militarily powerful state in the 

world poised as an adversary on China’s border, which was the situation Beijing confronted in 

1950, was a major threat to China’s security. Neither was Beijing’s concern over Tibet’s future a 

minor security issue in the 1962 border war with India. Nor was a potential U.S. invasion of the 

DRV in 1965–1968 a marginal issue, for it was seen in much the same perspective as U.S. forces 

crossing Korea’s 38th parallel. A Vietnam-Soviet alliance dominating Indochina was threatening 

to China’s security in 1979. 

Lesser threats to Chinese security and political interests have shown a systematic if not 

necessarily consistent pattern of responses. From Beijing’s perspective, China’s maritime interests and sovereignty claims have been clearly stated for many decades. What Beijing has 

perceived are challenges to these territorial claims and to associated interests in fishing and 

energy resources. In this sense, given the effort China has made to publicly assert these claims, 

such challenges are deterrence failures which require a response. Beijing has responded to each 

challenge individually and with only limited and rare military coercion. Because the challengers have been relatively weak militarily and the use of force was not expected to draw in the 

major powers, Beijing could tailor its military response to what was judged as necessary for 

the immediate challenge. Although in January 1974 Beijing did warn Saigon to withdraw its 
16 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

troops who had recently occupied the Spratly Islands or confront China’s use of military force, 

Beijing’s immediate action in seizing the Paracels can best be described as a response to a weak 

Saigon’s claim to the Spratlys. The Republic of Vietnam was facing the DRV’s military power 

alone following the withdrawal of U.S. forces 10 months earlier. Beijing probably judged the 

United States as unlikely to come to the DRV’s assistance in part because of the withdrawal and 

in part because of the Sino-American rapprochement underway since 1972. The use of military 

coercion in China’s occupation of the Spratly’s Johnson Reef in 1988 was a function of Chinese 

and Vietnamese forces clashing over control of the reef. Both were prepared to fight but neither 

had planned the confrontation. China’s 1994 occupation and construction on Mischief Reef did 

not involve the application of military force. When the construction activity was discovered in 

January 1995 by a Filipino fisherman, Manila raised strong objections but chose a diplomatic 

agreement rather than trying to eject China with military force.

China’s occupation of Johnson and Mischief reefs had definite political costs, but Beijing 

was evidently willing to accept them. Nonetheless, Beijing was sensitive to the political costs of 

being perceived as aggressive in asserting its territorial and resource claims; this sensitivity can 

be seen in the passing of responsibility to vessels and aircraft from civilian agencies for regular 

patrolling of politically sensitive waters and enforcement of Chinese jurisdiction over waters it 

claims. At times, but particularly during the years 2009–2011, these civilian agencies have aggressively asserted Chinese claims. They have detained Vietnamese fishing boats and harassed 

Vietnamese and Philippine seismic ships conducting hydrocarbon surveys in their claimed 

EEZs. However, for the past 24 years Beijing has not used its armed forces to enforce China’s 

territorial claims or eject other states from islets and other South China Sea land features they 

occupy. But even as Beijing has delegated to civilian agencies the responsibility for policing 

and upholding China’s claims, it does so under the protective shadow of China’s navy. PLAN 

exercises in the East and South China Seas, including naval aviation, are no doubt designed in 

part as a clear demonstration of China’s military capabilities and readiness. It is thus plausible 

to assess these responses to what Beijing perceives as infringements on China’s sovereignty as 

tactical reactions to an immediate incident with the possibility of military coercion present but 

not actually threatened. China’s support for ASEAN’s “code of conduct” for all parties with territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea suggests there is a diplomatic path Beijing 

is willing to pursue. Beijing’s support, however, appears dependent on perceiving the United 

States as neutral in these disputes. At this time, Beijing publicly states it doubts U.S. neutrality. 

A similar assessment can be made of Beijing’s responses to U.S. oceanic and aerial intelligence-collection missions. Although Beijing views these missions as security threats, they 
17

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

are not deemed sufficiently dangerous to warrant a military confrontation with a military as 

powerful as the capabilities deployed in the Western Pacific by the United States. Consequently, 

because the United States conducts them despite China’s protests, Beijing’s reactions are tactical responses to individual intelligence-collection missions asserting China’s continuing objections. With the possible exception of China’s reaction to aerial sorties (because we have no real 

data on them), these reactions have minimized military involvement, leaving the task primarily 

to civilian agency law enforcement vessels and aircraft joined with fishing boats, which we assume are in some way directed by the agency vessels.

Beijing’s opposition to the permanent separation of Taiwan from China is based on both 

nationalist and security grounds, with nationalism being the strongest driver. Beijing’s willingness to risk major war to prevent such a separation has been made eminently clear since the 

PRC was founded in 1949. The 1954 mutual security pact between Taiwan and United States did 

not give Beijing reason to retreat from this stance. Nor did the 1955 U.S. threat to use nuclear 

weapons in the defense of Taiwan give pause to Beijing’s commitment.12 Moreover, the United 

States post-normalization 1979 Taiwan Relations Act is viewed as an extension of the original 

security treaty and has had little if any effect on Beijing’s resolve. Beijing’s commitment to risking major war with the United States to prevent separation cannot be doubted, as the military 

exercises of 1995 and 1996 were intended to remind Taipei and Washington. Beijing is now 

most concerned with preventing or reversing any perceived trend by Taipei to seek de jure independence. 

Prospects

China’s military capabilities have increased significantly over the past 30 years to the point 

where it is now militarily the most powerful Asian state. With its strategic nuclear deterrent 

undergoing modernization together with the PLA’s conventional general purpose forces, and a 

defense industrial base becoming increasingly technologically proficient, there can be no doubt 

that China will remain Asia’s leading military power. The most difficult question is whether this 

will lead necessarily to a more aggressive use of military force than China has demonstrated 

over the past 62 years. There are, nonetheless, indicators suggesting that changes in China’s security environment have reduced rather than increased the possibilities for military confrontation with the United States. Moreover, within PLA doctrinal development, increasing capabilities are as much related to deterrence as they are to offensive operations.

China’s growing military power over these years has been accompanied by a radical change 

in its security environment—a change that has potential for considerable effect on Beijing’s use 
18 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

of military coercion. Far from the revolutionary state it was in 1949, China is now part of, even 

if not fully integrated into, the global and regional institutions of trade, commerce, and security. 

Much of China’s dramatic economic growth can be attributed to its extensive involvement in the 

global economy. China’s continued economic expansion and industrial sophistication depend 

on its continued participation in the globalized economy and the multilateral institutions that 

guide it, such as the World Trade Organization. As a permanent, veto-wielding member of the 

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), China has considerable influence on that institution’s 

decisions. China is also equally present in Asia’s multilateral regional security institutions such 

as the ASEAN Regional Forum, thereby exercising influence on their decisions. The consequence of these changes is that China’s economic future and security depend extensively on a 

continued effective working relationship with global and regional institutions. 

China’s growing dependence on the globalized economy joined with its active membership in Asia’s multilateral security organizations mean that any employment of military coercion will be assessed by the members of these institutions as an indicator of Beijing’s strategic 

intentions. Applying military coercion in the Asian region would confirm the views of those 

who see China’s growing military capabilities as leading to a more aggressive use of military 

force in the future. Such a perception would not serve China well. Should China be perceived as 

a major threat to regional security and stability, then the accommodating international environment Beijing needs to achieve its economic objectives could well fade. 

With these changes in its security environment and dependence on a globalized economy 

and its institutions, Beijing is also well aware that its growing military capabilities are viewed 

with some concern across much of the Asian region. In particular, Beijing is fully aware of apprehension in Washington that its strategic intent is to displace the United States as the leading 

military power in the Western Pacific. Moreover, it is aware that U.S. regional alliances have 

been strengthened partly as a consequence of regional concern over China’s increasing military 

power. Adding to these sources of tension, Beijing confronts the reality that the United States, 

no matter how restrained the actual transfers are, continues to serve as the primary source of 

Taiwan’s advanced military acquisitions and that the AirSea Battle (ASB) concept recently incorporated into U.S. military planning was originally devised as an operational concept to offset 

China’s military capabilities in a Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan. 

These developments are taking place even as Beijing’s relations with Taipei in recent years 

have improved to the best they have been since 1949. Trade and commerce are expanding; Taiwan citizens operate businesses and live on the mainland; communications and travel are now 

easier; cross-strait tourism is growing; academic contacts are increasing; and in all ways except 
19

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

political and military Taipei and Beijing are more accommodating to each other than at any 

time since the KMT’s defeat in the civil war. Certainly China continues to assert its right to employ military coercion against Taiwan should Beijing perceive such action necessary and China’s 

defense modernization programs continue to enhance the PLA’s capabilities to do so even in the 

event of U.S. military intervention. Nonetheless, the chances of a cross-strait military confrontation are now among the lowest they have been since 1949.

Across the Asia region, China’s continental borders are basically quiet with territorial issues either resolved or subject to mutual management, as is the case of Beijing’s territorial disputes with New Delhi.13 There can be no doubt that India views China as a very dangerous 

potential adversary, but New Delhi and Beijing have mutually accepted that diplomacy rather 

than military coercion is the most effective way of responding to their longstanding territorial 

claims. This conflict management approach is sustained even as India upgrades the capabilities of its conventional general purpose forces and strategic nuclear deterrent, and establishes a 

working relationship with the United States. Beijing must view these developments with interest 

if not concern, particularly given the attention India now receives from the United States. Nevertheless, Beijing evidently and cautiously accepts that diplomacy is the most effective approach 

to manage what otherwise could become a disruptive security relationship.

The most problematic security and sovereignty issues for Beijing other than Taiwan are 

the far-from-resolved maritime territorial and resource disputes China has with its neighbors. 

While insisting that its sovereignty claims cannot be negotiated away, Beijing’s strategy over 

the past couple of years has been to lessen military coercion even as its civilian agencies have 

become aggressive in their monitoring and enforcement of China’s maritime claims. PLAN exercises in the South and East China Seas and in the Yellow Sea and Western Pacific are designed 

at least in part as a deterrent strategy complementing the enforcement roles of civilian agency 

ships and aircraft, but they are also intended to minimize active military participation in conflicting maritime claims.

The question emerging from this set of circumstances is whether they increase or decrease the probability of a military confrontation between China and the United States. Given 

the relationship between Taipei and Beijing that has developed over the past 4 years, and 

the potential economic, political, and security costs to China of an attack on Taiwan, the 

probability of a Sino-American military confrontation over Taiwan appears slim at best. Taipei clearly has no intent of declaring Taiwan’s de jure independence and has every intent of 

sustaining the status quo. The employment of military coercion by Beijing under these circumstances, particularly an attempt to suppress Taipei’s defenses with a massive missile and 
20 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

air attack before the United States could bring sufficient forces to bear, would confirm the 

views of those who see China’s long-term strategic objective as replacing the United States 

as the Western Pacific’s leading military power. Such a perception would significantly undermine Beijing’s longstanding effort to be perceived as a constructive, responsible member of 

the international community. This in turn would certainly have undesirable consequences 

for China’s global economic and commercial links. The potential costs of being perceived as 

an active threat to regional security and stability when compared with working within the 

current Beijing-Taipei relationship reduce to a minimum the probability of a Sino-American 

military clash over Taiwan. 

A Sino-American military confrontation emerging from China’s territorial and resource 

claims in the South and East China Seas appears equally improbable. Although sovereignty is 

at stake and the resources involved in the competing claims are important, they do not reach 

the same level of significance for China as Taiwan. It is improbable that Beijing would reverse 

a strategy that has minimized the employment of military coercion for 24 years unless its 

claims are challenged with military force by another claimant. That seems extremely unlikely. 

Nor is an effort by Beijing to control the Malacca Strait in order to protect China’s ship-borne 

commerce at all probable. All of Southeast, East, and Northeast Asia are dependent on secure 

sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. Apart from piracy problems, such security exists. What incentive would China have to raise regional apprehension 

and what would be an immediate U.S. response to a freedom of navigation challenge to a 

critical international SLOC? 

A military confrontation over U.S. military exercises and surveillance in China’s EEZ and 

aerial reconnaissance missions in international air space off China’s coast also seems improbable. Beijing’s objections to these activities have been strongly and repeatedly stated. Thus far, 

however, harassment of USNS ships conducting ocean surveillance has been conducted by Chinese fishing trawlers and civilian agency patrol vessels and maritime surveillance aircraft. Chinese fighters have shadowed U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, which led to the accidental collision 

between a USN EP-3 and PLAN F-8 and the death of the Chinese pilot. This collision, however, 

was attributable to an aggressive PLAN pilot rather than a deliberate ramming. Similarly, the 

collision of a Chinese submarine with the towed array of a U.S. Navy destroyer was certainly inadvertent. No submarine commander would risk the danger to his boat and crew by conducting 

a deliberate submerged collision.14 For the past decade Beijing has not backed up its objections 

to what are essentially U.S. military intelligence missions with a systematic program of military 

harassment. Doing so would raise Sino-American tensions to a level that would not serve either 
21

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

China or the United States well. What is most noticeable is the absence since 2009 of any confrontations between USNS ships operating in China’s EEZ and either PLA navy or civilian law 

enforcement ships and aircraft.

Whether it is possible to come to an arrangement whereby both U.S. and Chinese interests 

can be accommodated is uncertain. What is clear is that China has not risked a military confrontation with the United States over the issues of aerial reconnaissance, ocean surveillance, 

and naval exercises. China’s strategy, if there is a systematic strategy behind what have thus far 

been tactical responses to specific U.S. actions, takes the following pattern:

■ Sustain the legal campaign challenging the U.S. position that international law and 

UNCLOS allow military-related freedom of navigation (FON) in a state’s EEZ. 

■ Sustain a diplomatic component where Beijing raises U.S. military-related activities in 

its EEZ as a constant source of friction in Sino-American relations, particularly the 

relationship between the two defense establishments. 

■ Maintain the threat of a tactical campaign tracking and harassing U.S. military activities in China’s EEZ and the international airspace off China’s coast. 

Assuming such a strategy is in place, the chances of a military confrontation stemming from 

a Chinese action are minimal. Other than the 2001 and 2002 incidents with the USNS Bowditch, 

harassment of USNS ocean surveillance ships has been undertaken by Chinese fishing trawlers 

and civil agency patrol vessels, not by PLAN ships. Certainly accidents such as the 2001 USN EP-3 

collision with a PLAN F-8 and the June 2009 submerged Chinese submarine collision with the 

towed sonar array of a U.S. destroyer can occur, but accidents do not necessarily lend themselves 

to shooting wars, particularly when both sides are aware that accidents can occur. Nonetheless, 

such incidents do contain the possibility of escalating into political crises neither government desires, and the 1998 MMCA has not proven to be effective in this realm. It would be prudent therefore to seek an arrangement with China similar to the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) 

that the United States arranged with the Soviet Union.15 A major purpose of such an arrangement 

would be to prevent collisions and other incidents from escalating into unwanted political crises. 

Whereas the circumstances surrounding Beijing’s security environment and the policies 

China has pursued argue against the possibility of a military confrontation, there is an underlying Sino-American mutual strategic distrust that is potentially dangerous. That danger is 
22 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

the transformation of what is now a strategic rivalry to a relationship of mutual hostility. The 

United States has been the principal figure in the Asia-Pacific security environment since the 

close of World War II with an established structure of regional alliances and security agreements throughout the region. Despite Beijing’s declarations to the contrary, Washington is apprehensive that China’s strategic intent is to replace the United States as the leading power in 

the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing fears Washington’s intent is to prevent China from assuming 

the role of the region’s principal power as its military capabilities increase. These apprehensions 

exist even as Beijing and Washington recognize the need for cooperation if Asia is to remain 

stable—a need recognized across the region. What both Washington and Beijing have yet to 

achieve is a mutual understanding and acceptance of what military capabilities each needs to 

protect its legitimate regional defense requirements. Thus whereas the current and near-term 

circumstances forming their respective security environments suggest only a minimal chance 

for China and the United States to become involved in a military confrontation, the future remains at best uncertain.

The Surprise Attack Option

Although this assessment has discussed the global and regional political and economic dynamics that lessen the probability of Beijing moving toward a more aggressive use of 

military force as its capabilities increase, one further query must be addressed: will China’s 

expanding military capabilities lead Beijing to move from a political-military signaling 

strategy designed to deter an adversary from a course of action prior to the use of force to 

a strategy seeking to exploit the military advantages of surprise attack without such prior 

warning? Before briefly exploring this question it is necessary to provide a working definition of surprise attack. In this assessment, surprise attack is defined as an attack the adversary does not anticipate or, if anticipated, that occurs at an unanticipated place or time. 

Operational surprise is a longstanding core component of the PLA’s “active defense” doctrine extending back to the 1930s. The military objective of a surprise attack is to seize the 

initiative in the opening phase of a military operation. To cite but two examples, Beijing’s 

October 1950 entrance into the Korean War following its deterrence failure was not anticipated by the United States. Chinese forces implemented a planned operational surprise 

by crossing the Yalu River at night to cover their movement. In 1979, Beijing’s signaling 

had made clear to Vietnam that an attack was imminent but not where and when it would 

take place. The PLA’s February multiple axis attack across the Sino-Vietnam border was 

designed and implemented as an operational surprise. 
23

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Surprise attack is not only a central component of PLA military doctrine, but the mobilization of military forces frequently used as an element of Beijing’s signaling strategy also serves 

this military purpose. Should Beijing conclude that its deterrence signaling is failing and military coercion will be necessary, the forces mobilized as a component of the deterrence signaling 

can provide the PLA the capability to conduct a surprise attack. The forces that crossed the Yalu 

River in October 1950 and those conducting the multiple axis assaults into Vietnam in 1979 

were overtly mobilized prior to their employment in a surprise attack. The question emerging 

from this longstanding practice is what conditions would cause Beijing to conclude that the 

military advantages provided by surprise attack exceed those sought by deterrence signaling?

This is an inherently difficult query to assess because for the 63 years since the People’s Republic of China was established Beijing has employed a deterrence signaling strategy whenever 

it perceived a major military threat to China’s security or sovereignty. Similarly, in Beijing’s maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors where China’s security does not confront a major 

threat but rather a dispute over sovereignty, Beijing has chosen to police its sovereignty claims 

with ships from civilian law enforcement agencies. Certainly the shadow of China’s navy is omnipresent, but the PLAN is not responsible for policing or enforcing China’s claims. Even the 

future of Taiwan, the PRC’s most sacrosanct sovereignty issue, is dealt with through a process 

of deterrence signaling that integrates political, diplomatic, and military actions. Beijing has 

consistently sought to convince Taipei and Washington that military coercion will be employed 

should Taiwan move toward de jure independence, but this threat provides the underpinning 

for the far more prominent political, diplomatic, and economic strategy designed to bind Taiwan closer to the mainland.

The single condition where Beijing could conceivably conclude that the military advantages of a surprise attack exceed those sought by deterrence signaling appears to be where 

military success can be swiftly achieved and the adversary politically and militarily neutralized. The only potential example of this choice is China’s seizure of the Crescent Group in the 

Paracel Islands from the Republic of Vietnam in January 1974. The withdrawal of U.S. forces 

from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in March 1973, joined with Washington’s commitment 

to the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement, left Saigon with no viable ally as it fought Hanoi’s 

invading forces. Beijing could properly conclude from these conditions that South Vietnam 

was on its way to isolation as the January clashes took place. Even in this example, however, 

it must be recalled that Beijing threatened military coercion in early January if Saigon did not 

remove its forces from the Spratly Islands it had occupied following the RVN’s September 

1973 sovereignty claim.
24 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Whereas operational and tactical surprise will remain a core component of PLA doctrine, 

it is unlikely Beijing will conclude as the PLA’s military capabilities increase that, in responding 

to threats to high-value security or sovereignty interests, the advantages of surprise attack exceed 

those sought by deterrence signaling that includes the mobilization of military forces. It is possible, for example, to develop a scenario where Beijing chooses to launch a massive surprise missile and air attack on Taiwan to crush the island’s defenses before the United States can intervene 

with forces sufficient to offset China’s military advantages. Such a scenario, however, has to ignore 

past Chinese responses to anything Beijing perceives as a move toward independence or a change 

in the U.S. policy of not supporting Taiwan independence. In each case, China has quickly if not 

immediately threatened military coercion. In each case, the United States has made clear to China 

that its policy has not changed and Taipei has ultimately backed down from the statements or actions that led to Beijing’s forceful response. Moreover, neither China nor the United States seeks 

a military confrontation over Taiwan. Both seek to avoid such a confrontation because the consequences, although not known, are potentially so severe for the security interests of both. 

The threat of surprise attack seems limited to those situations where Beijing can realistically expect a quick military success followed by the neutralization of the adversary. Any such 

attack on U.S. forces, even if it achieves initial military success, is unlikely to be followed by the 

political and military neutralization of the United States. The more probable result, as Beijing 

no doubt appreciates, is the creation of a state of war between China and the United States. That 

probable consequence is enough to convince Beijing that in an emerging potential military 

confrontation with the United States, the deterrence signaling it has practiced for decades has 

far better promise of an acceptable outcome than surprise attack.

China’s Crisis Decisionmaking Process and Crisis Management

Although defining a political-military “crisis” can become extremely complicated, this 

analysis will employ a simple definition. A crisis is defined as an unanticipated event perceived 

as threatening high-level interests of at least one set of decisionmakers while providing only a 

limited time for response.16

Dynamics Influencing Crisis Behavior

■ elite perceptions and beliefs

■ perceptions of the international environment
25

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

■ domestic politics and public opinion

■ decisionmaking structure and processes

■ information and intelligence receipt and processing

■ distinctive features that may be unique to one of the participants.17

It is entirely plausible that decisionmakers confronting a political-military crisis may have 

distinctly different perceptions and beliefs from their counterparts on the other side, and that 

these will lead to different perceptions of the international environment within which the crisis 

is evolving and the influence of domestic politics and public opinion on their decisions. That is, 

even before the crisis decisionmaking process is activated and the information and intelligence 

on the events leading to the crisis evaluated, the parties to the crisis could be approaching each 

other with distinctly different understandings of what the events entail for their interests. In 

some cases, the perceived importance of the interest will vary considerably between the two 

countries. Negotiating a resolution to the crisis therefore requires some understanding of each 

other’s beliefs about what is at stake for what particular interests.

Sino-American Asymmetries: Chinese Views18

From a Chinese perspective, Sino-American crises did not occur in locales where core 

security interests of the United States were at stake. Whether in Korea, China’s offshore islands, Vietnam, Hainan, or Taiwan, China’s interests were under greater threat because the 

locales were on or near China’s national boundaries. Moreover, in crises over the offshore 

islands and Taiwan, China’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty were at stake. The 

same was true of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. These perceived asymmetries of interest contribute to China’s view that U.S. policies and strategies are similar to 

those conducted by imperialist and hegemonic powers in the past. This gives rise to China’s 

tendency to view its position in these crises in a self-righteous manner that grants the United 

States little moral ground in Asian security issues, particularly those that involve what are 

perceived as China’s core interests.

These same crises are seen as demonstrating the asymmetry in national power between the United States and China. That is, Beijing recognized that the United States could 

apply more policy instruments to affect a crisis than could China. The United States could 
26 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

select from or integrate economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, military power, and the 

mobilization of allies, even in the United Nations. With only limited effective instruments 

of power, China had to either accept the compromises offered by the United States or use 

or threaten force even though its military capabilities were far less than those of the United 

States. Despite its overall military inferiority, China could inflict great costs on the United 

States as it did in the Korean War. From this came the belief that resolve and determination 

joined with a limited nuclear deterrent could in part compensate for military inferiority. 

Nonetheless, China’s recognition of the power asymmetry between itself and the United 

States partially explains why none of the post–Korean War crises involving the United 

States evolved into direct military conflict. Indeed, Chinese and American scholars agree 

that a characteristic of Sino-American crises is China’s consistent policy of seeking to avoid 

a military confrontation with the United States even as it employed or threatened the use 

of military force.19

This record does not, however, necessarily transfer to a potential Taiwan crisis. Here 

some Chinese hold the view that whereas Taiwan involves a core interest for China, it is only 

of marginal strategic interest to the United States. Consequently, China should not be fearful 

of employing military force to deter Taiwan’s de jure independence because the United States 

could well decide that a war with China over Taiwan is simply too costly given the island’s low 

strategic value to the United States.20

Two fundamental guidelines are seen as governing China’s confrontation with a strategic 

rival, both originating in the mind of Mao Zedong in 1930s and 1940s.21 In those years, the 

Chinese Communist Party faced much stronger adversaries in Japan and the Kuomintang. The 

first guideline is to despise the enemy strategically but take him seriously tactically. Wang and 

Xu assess this guideline as directing China to be politically principled but tactically flexible. The 

second directs China to fight on just grounds, to its advantage, and with restraint. From these 

components stem the following principles:

■ China will not attack unless it is attacked. When attacked, China will certainly counterattack.

■ China must never fight unless victory is assured through planning and preparation.

■ When the attacker is repulsed, China must bring the fight to a close. China must not be 

carried away by success.
27

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

These guidelines and associated principles were applied in the 1962 border war with India 

and the 1979 invasion of Vietnam. Both were declared to be defensive counterattacks. They 

have also been applied in confrontations where no fighting occurred. China assumed the moral 

posture in the confrontation that stemmed from the U.S. Navy’s EP-3 collision with a PLA Navy 

F8-II, arguing that the EP-3 was spying on China. Morally, therefore, China was in a defensive 

posture. A similar interpretation is applied to the negotiations following the U.S. bombing of the 

Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which Beijing could not accept as accidental.

Crises and China’s Learning Curve22

Wang and Xu discuss what they identify as a learning curve in China’s approach to SinoAmerican crises over the years since 1950, including methods of crisis management. Mao Zedong together with Zhou Enlai and other senior leaders could make authoritative decisions 

at both the strategic and tactical levels with little or no opposition. Lower level officials and 

the general public would not be informed, and the Chinese people could be easily mobilized 

because they followed official direction without much opposition. Chinese leaders today face a 

different decisionmaking environment. Political leaders at all levels are much better informed 

of state matters, nationalist sentiments have risen, and freedom of expression through the Internet is now widespread. Consequently, decisionmaking has become increasingly complicated 

as crisis management has demanded greater cooperation and coordination across the Chinese 

government.

The increasing complexity of China’s decisionmaking process reported by Chinese scholars is found also in the research conducted by Western academics.23 Whereas the always opaque 

Politburo Standing Committee remains at the apex of any foreign and security policy decision, 

the number of official actors seeking to influence the decision has dramatically multiplied. This 

expansion reflects China’s greater and expanding diplomatic, military, commercial, trade, tourist, and academic interaction with the world together with vastly expanded knowledge of world 

affairs among the general public. China’s foreign and security policy formulation now includes 

not only the apex of Chinese Communist Party organs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but 

additionally a variety of government agencies, departments of the PLA, Chinese think tanks, 

and China’s multinational corporations. To these actors it is essential to add the expansion of 

Chinese public awareness of the world beyond China and the far from passive generation of 

“netizens” willing to express their opinions over the Internet on domestic and foreign policy 

issues. Whereas it is true that Beijing can make decisions without excessive concern for public 

opinion, where the decision involves the United States, Japan, or Taiwan, China’s increasingly 
28 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

nationalistic netizens (450 million by one estimate24) will be heard from. These expressions of 

public opinion can then raise questions about the CCP’s ability to govern and potentially restrain the leaders’ freedom of action. 

When viewed from the perspective of a potential Sino-American political-military 

crisis, the complexity created by the variety of forces seeking to influence the decisions as 

they evolve creates a major analytic problem. Not the least of the problems encountered is 

the inability to know or measure the degree of influence wielded by the PLA through its 

General Staff Department (GSD) or the considerations within the CCP Central Military 

Commission (CMC) headed though it is by the General Secretary of the CCP—currently 

Xi Jinping. One aspect of this analytic dilemma is clear, however. Not only do PLA authors 

now publicly debate foreign policy and security issues, but the PLA appears increasingly 

willing to demonstrate its improving capabilities no matter how much this antagonizes 

China’s neighbors and the United States. Moreover, in coming years as PLA capabilities 

continue to improve, China’s reluctance to confront the United States military that has 

marked past crises may dissipate.

Despite the number of Sino-American political-military crises of varying intensity that 

have taken place over the past 62 years, including most recently the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait 

political-military confrontation, the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the 

USN EP-3 collision with a PLA Navy fighter near Hainan Island, there is as yet no effective crisis 

management mechanism in place that has contributed to emergency communication between 

high-level officials of both countries. A “hotline” linking the presidents of the two countries 

was established during the Clinton administration, but no use of it was made during the naval 

aircraft collision. More recently, in 2008 a direct telephone link or “hotline” was established 

between China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the U.S. Secretary of Defense. The 

first and largely ceremonial conversation between China’s Minister of National Defense, General Liang Guanglie, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was held on April 10, 2008.25

These direct telephone communications between the heads of the respective governments and 

militaries will be beneficial only if they are used and there is someone in authority to talk with. 

The procedure for making a telephone link is that the side wishing to talk must notify the other 

of the time and proposed topic. If the other side agrees to talk, then the staffs of both sides 

will arrange the specific time for the call. Despite these arrangements, China has twice closed 

the military hotline in response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Following announcement of the 

October 2008 arms sale, China severed the hotline until 2009 when the Vice Chairman of the 

CMC, General Xu Caihou, visited the United States, and again in January 2010 when the United 
29

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

States announced another Taiwan arms sale.26 How well the two hotlines would serve to ease 

any political-military crisis is therefore open to question. 

Consequently, an analytic framework designed to enhance understanding and anticipation of diplomatic indications that China may be planning to employ military force in a crisis is 

limited by the absence of any certain understanding of China’s crisis decisionmaking processes. 

Judgments will have to be made based on indicators drawn from previous crises where China 

has threatened or employed military force. Given the increasing complexity of China’s crisis 

decisionmaking process, it is improbable that firm conclusions can be drawn other than in a 

crisis emerging from an effort by Taiwan to receive international recognition of its de jure independence—an extremely unlikely event.

Signaling the Intent to Employ Military Force—China’s Warnings 

Calculus

In past responses to an international crisis or dispute that directly affected Chinese interests, Beijing has deployed a hierarchy of authoritative leadership statements, official protests, and press commentary intended to assert its claims and to deter its antagonists. If the 

crisis persists and Beijing perceives its interests are not satisfactorily taken into account, its 

statements escalate in level and may include at first implicit and thereafter increasingly explicit warnings that it may use military force to achieve its goals. This was the case in each of 

the major instances in which Beijing has resorted to military force—in Korea in 1950, in the 

Sino-Indian border dispute in 1961–1962, in the Sino-Soviet border dispute in 1968–1969, 

and in China’s attack on northern Vietnam in 1979. It was also true in instances in which 

Beijing’s effort at deterrence succeeded and ultimately stopped short of using military force, 

as, for example, with respect to the American combat effort in Vietnam in 1965–1968 and to 

the debates in Taiwan in 1991 about delimiting the ROC’s sovereignty claims.

That Beijing uses such a warnings calculus should not surprise anyone. Most countries, including the United States, deploy a hierarchy of escalating statements intended to warn of use of 

force and so deter adversaries in disputes and crises. Through public statements by authoritative spokesmen from the State Department up to and including the President, Washington may 

escalate from statements that make no explicit or implicit reference to potential use of force to 

statements that advise that “no option has been taken off the table.” It may then take deterrence 

up a notch by admonishing that “all options are on the table.” From there, Washington may advise 

more explicitly that “the military option is on the table.” Finally, if its previous warnings have gone 

unheeded, Washington may declare that it may have “no other option but military force.” 
30 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Beijing’s Hierarchy of Warning Statements

The official and leadership statements and media commentary Beijing deploys in international crises and disputes fit into a hierarchy based on the relative authority of their 

origin. The authority of leadership statements reflects the relative standing of each leader 

in CCP or PRC government institutions. A statement by a provincial party chief in the 

CCP hierarchy or governor in the state hierarchy, for example, is less authoritative than 

a statement by a member of the CCP Politburo or Secretariat or State Council minister, 

respectively. The statements by the latter officials, in turn, are less authoritative than those 

uttered by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in the party hierarchy or the 

State Council premier in the state hierarchy, respectively. And all such statements are less 

authoritative than statements by the party general secretary (or chairman in Mao Zedong’s 

day) or the PRC president. 

Similarly, the authority of statements made by military leaders reflects their relative standing in the People’s Liberation Army structure. A statement uttered by, say, a military district 

commander or political commissar is outranked in authority by a statement by the commander 

or political commissar of a military region. In turn, those statements are outranked by those 

issued by the director of the General Staff or General Political Departments, which are themselves of less authority than statements by the Central Military Commission and its chairman 

or vice-chairmen.

All statements and speeches by leaders are authoritative within this hierarchy of authority. 

These include: 

■ statements by Politburo members, PRC officials, and PLA leaders in meetings with foreign guests

■ speeches by any of these leaders at welcoming banquets, press conferences, and while 

traveling abroad

■ interviews with PRC and foreign media.

Which leaders make statements on foreign policy issues normally reflects policy responsibilities and protocol. All leaders are expected to convey a unified position of foreign policy issues and so normally may be taken as reflecting the leadership’s consensus on the issue at hand.
31

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Attention must be paid, however, to the source in assessing leadership statements. Leadership statements that are publicized in PRC media, whether in Chinese or as translated into 

Beijing’s foreign-language channels, are always authoritative because they have been officially 

vetted and translated. Leadership statements reported by foreign media are authoritative but 

require caution because their rendition and translation have not been vetted by Beijing for 

publication.

The statements and protests of foreign crises and disputes issued in the name of institutions—normally the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)—also feature a deliberate inherent hierarchy of authority. The bottom rung in authority is the statements uttered by the 

MFA spokesman at his routine press conferences. Before the MFA began the practice of routine 

weekly and then daily press briefings in Beijing, such statements were ascribed simply to the 

“MFA spokesman.” Above that in authority is the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement,” the 

top level of authority in MFA utterances. All MFA statements are in turn outranked by “PRC 

Government statements,” the top of the official state utterances.

Finally, the only channel for authoritative media commentary on international disputes and 

crises is People’s Daily, which speaks in the name of the CCP Central Committee. People’s Daily

publishes a wide range of reporting (often from the Xinhua News Agency), commentary, signed 

articles, and editorial comment, and not all of such vehicles are authoritative. In this context, the 

term “authoritative” refers only to commentary that speaks for People’s Daily as an institution and, 

by extension, for the party Central Committee. Such authoritative comment fits into a deliberate 

hierarchy. The most authoritative vehicle historically has been the “editorial department article” (

本报编辑部文章). Historically, these are extremely rare and have been reserved for the most significant issues in intercommunist relations—Khrushchev’s “secret speech” and de-Stalinization in 

1956, issues in the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, the question of “joint action” with Moscow 

against the United States in Vietnam in 1965, and Albania’s critique of Mao Zedong’s “theory of 

the three worlds” in November 1977. Beneath that level, and far more common, are “editorials” (

社论) and, at the bottom rung, “commentator articles” (本报评论员文章).

In addition, there are occasional vehicles for comment that do not clearly speak for the 

People’s Daily as a whole but are clearly more significant than ordinary commentary in the 

paper and so are sometimes referred to by propaganda analysts as “quasi-authoritative.” These 

include articles under such bylines as “observer” (观察家) and “special” or “contributing commentator” (特约评论员). As discussed below, these have come and gone in People’s Daily from 

period to period and so analysts must be alert to changing patterns in media commentary 

over time. All other content in People’s Daily—including lower-level commentaries, signed 
32 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

articles, and reporting—is not considered authoritative in the sense of speaking for the regime as a whole and so is not relevant to Beijing’s hierarchy of warning statements.

Other media often feature an inherent hierarchy of commentary and often publish or 

broadcast commentary on foreign crises or disputes in which Beijing has a stake. The PLA 

newspaper Liberation Army Daily, published by the General Political Department, for example, 

publishes “editorials” and “commentator articles” which speak for the paper as an institution, as 

do other nationally circulating dailies such as the united front and intellectual affairs newspaper 

Enlightenment Daily and all provincial party newspapers, such as Shanghai’s Liberation Daily. 

The authority of such comment, however, is a step or more removed from the core authority 

of People’s Daily and so is not normally relevant to Beijing’s hierarchy of warning statements. 

Finally, commentary issued by the Xinhua News Agency, the official mouthpiece of the PRC 

State Council, is not authoritative except in instances when Xinhua transmits an issuance as an 

“authorized” comment or statement.

 The hierarchies of authoritative leadership statements, official protests, and media comment fit together in a three-tiered array. The structure of each hierarchy as deployed in the postMao period is shown in the table below.

These hierarchies also establish a ladder of increasingly authoritative responses that Beijing 

has used to convey increased urgency and weight and thus intended significance to its responses 

in an escalating crisis or dispute. At the lowest levels of statement or commentary, Beijing may 

Hierarchies of Authoritative Statements (Highest to Lowest)

Leadership Statements Official Protests People’s Daily

Commentary

Chinese Communist Party 

general secretary and 

People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) president or premier

PRC government statement Editorial

Politburo member and PRC 

vice premiers

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

(MFA) statement Commentator article

Central Committee 

department chief or PRC 

minister

MFA spokesman statement Observer article

Provincial party chief or 

governor MFA press briefing comment Quasi-authoritative commentary
33

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

simply be putting its position on record concerning the issue at hand and without connotation of a 

potential response by force. If there is such a connotation, it is usually expressed vaguely—stating, 

for example, that the opposite party “must bear responsibility for all of the consequences” that ensue. Higher level statements and commentary carry far more weight, underscoring the seriousness 

with which Beijing views the evolving situation. They need not convey an implication of a threat 

of military force, but if they do, such warnings are increasingly explicit and usually unmistakable.

When Beijing wishes to convey a potential use of force, it deploys a lexicon of threat and 

retaliation warnings. It is the presence of these warnings in authoritative statements and commentary with increasing explicitness that conveys Beijing’s readiness to use force. The following 

list presents this lexicon in roughly ascending order of threat:

■ X is “playing with fire” and may “get burned”

■ Beijing so far has “exercised the greatest restraint and forbearance” but this “should not 

be taken as weakness and submissiveness”

■ Do “not turn a deaf ear to China’s warnings”; China “cannot stand idly by”

■ “How far will you go? We shall wait and see”

■ “China’s forbearance has limits”; X is “deluding itself in thinking we are weak and can 

be bullied”

■ If X does not cease its behavior, it “will meet the punishment it deserves”

■ “Do not complain later that we did not give you clear warning in advance”

■ We have been “driven beyond forbearance” and are “forced to counterattack”; our “restraint was regarded as an invitation to bullying”; our “warnings fell on deaf ears”

■ “We will not attack if we are not attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.”

By tracking the level of authority and content of leadership statements, official protests, 

and People’s Daily comment, and taking note of the threat and retaliation warnings they contain, 
34 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

therefore, analysts may assess the intent and seriousness of Beijing’s response to an escalating 

dispute or crisis and detect any implication of potential use of military force. 

Beijing’s calculus of warnings was deployed during many of the crises it faced since 1949. 

It was deployed in rudimentary form in the summer and early fall months of 1950, preceding 

China’s intervention in the Korean War after U.S. and UN forces crossed the 38th parallel and 

moved up to the PRC-Korean frontier on the Yalu River. It was used again during the 2 years 

preceding the brief war with India over the territorial dispute. It was used in 1965 as U.S. forces 

intervened in Vietnam, presenting Beijing with a crisis that resembled in their eyes the American threat in Korea in 1950. It was deployed in sharply escalated fashion in the Sino-Soviet border crisis of 1968–1969 and again in the contest over Vietnamese regional ambitions in 1978. 

The following discussion shows how Beijing deployed this calculus of threat and retaliation in 

two of these past examples.

A Classical Example—The Sino-Vietnamese Border Crisis, 1978–1979

Beijing’s use of its hierarchies of leadership statements, official protests, and authoritative 

People’s Daily commentary is clearly visible in its escalating treatment of its border crisis with 

Vietnam beginning in July 1978, culminating in its military attack on northern Vietnam on 

February 17, 1979.27 The Sino-Vietnamese border emerged in the context of a larger Chinese 

effort, begun openly in early 1978, to blunt what it perceived to be Vietnamese efforts, abetted by the Soviet Union, to consolidate “regional hegemony” over its Indochinese neighbors 

Cambodia and Laos and, by extension, in Southeast Asia generally. In the context of escalating 

tensions between Hanoi and Phnom Penh in 1977 and early 1978, Beijing began to protest what 

it characterized as persecution of ethnic Chinese in a registration drive in southern Vietnam. In 

parallel with Chinese criticism of Hanoi’s policies toward Cambodia, Chinese leadership statements, official protests, and authoritative People’s Daily comment complained about Vietnamese 

mistreatment of ethnic Chinese. Chinese steps along the way included the dispatch of two ships 

to Vietnamese ports in mid-June to pick up “victimized Chinese nationals” (an effort that Hanoi 

blocked by not allowing the Chinese ships to dock), a total cut-off of Chinese economic and 

technical aid to Vietnam (announced in early July 1978), and the opening first of ambassadorial 

and then vice foreign ministerial talks on the issue. In this context, the Sino-Vietnamese border 

crisis emerged in July as a means to bring additional pressure on Hanoi over the larger contest 

over Cambodian and Vietnamese power.

After detailing incremental steps in Beijing’s approach to the larger issues of VietnameseCambodian tensions and Vietnamese treatment of ethnic Chinese (the Hoa people) in which 
35

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

the border crisis was embedded, appendix 1 charts Chinese leadership statements, official protests, and authoritative People’s Daily commentary in the escalating border crisis; the appendix 

tracks statements from late July 1978, when Xinhua began reporting local Yunnan and Guangxi 

officials lodging a joint protest over Hanoi’s forcing ethnic Chinese across the border into China, 

down through February 17, 1979, when PLA forces launched their “punitive” strike on northern 

Vietnam. Appendix 1 does not include corresponding statements by Vietnamese officials and 

authoritative commentary by the Vietnamese Communist Party’s newspaper, The People (Nhan 

Dan), which would be useful in analyzing the crisis overall. Only the Chinese side is needed to 

dissect Beijing’s warning signals.

Several fundamental points emerge from appendix 1’s compilation of authoritative Chinese warning statements. First, the level of authority of statements concerning the border crisis 

in each tier rises, reflecting the escalating seriousness with which Beijing portrayed the crisis. 

PRC protests began with low-level regional officials protesting border incidents on July 26 and 

29, 1978. Such incidents were then taken up by PRC Vice Foreign Minister Zhong Xidong in 

successive sessions of talks in Hanoi in August and September, supplemented in early September by statements by the State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and by the MFA’s Asia 

Department Director Shen Ping. In late October, the MFA began issuing “strong protests” in its 

own name, until a PRC Government statement declared on February 17, 1979, that Beijing was 

“forced to counterattack” Hanoi’s activities with military force.

Authoritative People’s Daily commentary shows a comparable pattern of escalation. Its first 

authoritative comment on the border crisis came on September 4. Thereafter, People’s Daily

notched up the level of its authoritative comment by publishing editorials, beginning with its 

first on November 10 and ending with its fourth on February 18, 1979, marking the launch of 

the PLA’s strike on northern Vietnam.

A second point for attention is the escalation in language used in official protests and People’s Daily’s commentary and, in particular, the introduction of higher levels of phrases intended 

to convey the potential for a military response. On November 7, 1978, the MFA’s “strong protest” over an “extremely serious bloodshed incident” on November 1 on the border noted for the 

first time that Beijing has so far “exercised the greatest restraint and forbearance,” warning that 

Hanoi should not mistake Beijing’s restraint as “weakness and submissiveness.” Thereafter, a 

People’s Daily’s editorial on November 10 warned that Hanoi’s “arrogant hostility to the Chinese 

people” had become “quite intolerable” and “sternly” warned Hanoi to pull back from Chinese 

territory and “not to turn a deaf ear to China’s warnings.” “How far will you go?” the editorial 

concluded, adding that “we will wait and see.” On December 13, another MFA “strong protest” 
36 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

over “incessant” Vietnamese encroachments and provoking “serious incidents of bloodshed” 

charged that Hanoi had “turned a deaf ear” to Beijing’s repeated protests and warned that “there 

is a limit to China’s forbearance and restraint.” On December 24, a new MFA “strong protest” 

over a December 23 Vietnamese border intrusion into Guangxi noted that local Chinese militiamen were “compelled to return fire in self defense.” And on December 25, a People’s Daily’s

editorial, entitled “Our Forbearance Is Limited,” declared that Hanoi had “gone far enough.” 

China, it stated, “will not allow itself to be bullied by others,” will “certainly counterattack if 

attacked,” and “means what it says.” If Hanoi continued its border intrusions, it would “meet 

the punishment it deserves.” “Don’t complain later that we did not give you clear warning in 

advance,” the editorial concluded.

The pattern of escalating language in the Sino-Vietnamese border crisis suggests significant turning points. Up through early November, Chinese protests and commentary had been 

vague regarding the consequences of what it was depicting as continuing Vietnamese provocations on the border. The shift to sharper warning language in the November 10 People’s Daily

editorial appears to reflect Beijing’s implicit public warning that it was prepared to use military 

force. And the statements in the December 25 People’s Daily that Hanoi had “gone far enough” 

and that Beijing had now given “clear warning” conveyed Beijing’s decision that it had now 

decided to use force. Subsequent statements by Chinese leaders—such as Deng Xiaoping’s in 

Washington—about the need to “teach Vietnam a lesson” bear this judgment out.

Finally, it is noteworthy that turning points in Beijing’s escalating statements on the border 

crisis coincide with major turning points in the larger contest that Beijing was waging against 

Vietnamese expansion in Indochina. The November 10 People’s Daily editorial on the border 

crisis immediately followed the signing in Moscow of the USSR-Vietnam security alliance, an 

event that Deng Xiaoping denounced during a visit to Bangkok as confirming Soviet-Vietnamese complicity in Hanoi’s expansionist agenda and as an event to which “we will attach 

importance.” And the People’s Daily’s December 25 editorial declaring that Hanoi had “gone 

far enough” in its border provocations coincided with the full-scale assault of Vietnam’s army 

against Cambodia. 

Another Classical Example—The Sino-Indian Border Crisis, 1961–1962

As sketched in the first section of this paper, the brief Sino-Indian border war in October–

November 1962 was rooted in Beijing’s larger concern of consolidating its claims to sovereignty 

over Tibet. Its construction of a road accessing western Tibet from Xinjiang in 1957 and the 

road’s discovery thereafter by India led to failed border negotiations over subsequent years and 
37

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

eventually to New Delhi’s “forward” policy in 1961 of advancing Indian Army sentry posts into 

the zone disputed with China. After more than a year of successive official protests and authoritative People’s Daily commentary, Beijing moved with military force on October 20, 1962. 

As the details in appendix 2 show, the protest calculus employed by the PRC’s MFA and 

People’s Daily’s hierarchy of authoritative commentary was different in the 1960s than the practices of the post-Mao period exemplified in the 1978–1979 Sino-Vietnamese border crisis 

analyzed above. In particular, following media practices of that day, People’s Daily published 

authoritative “observer” articles instead of commentator articles. But the same pattern of escalating authority and language was evident in the 1961–1962 border crisis with India.

Signaling Case Studies—Taiwan

Over the past two decades, Beijing has deployed its classical hierarchy of warning signals 

at least four times regarding Taiwan. These were:

■ in 1991, as the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) made explicit its Taiwan 

independence platform and the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) moved to convene the first 

session of the ROC National Assembly since 1946

■ in 1995, after Washington surprised Beijing by issuing ROC President Lee Teng-hui a 

visa to visit the United States

■ in 1999, when ROC President Lee Teng-hui described the relationship between Taiwan 

and the Chinese mainland as a “special state-to-state relationship” in the early months 

of campaigning for March 2000 general elections

■ in 2003–2004, when ROC President Chen Shui-bian and DPP politicians pressed 

passage of a referendum law and then put referenda on the ballot for March 2004 

general elections.

In none of these instances did Beijing ultimately use military force against Taipei, although 

once Beijing’s efforts to deter Lee Teng-hui from actually making his trip to the United States 

in June 1995 failed, Beijing did stage over the ensuing 9 months a series of three military exercises—including missile “test” firings into the East China Sea in August 1995 and off Taiwan in March 1996—to underscore its readiness to use military force to achieve its objectives. 

And in 1999, Beijing’s warnings about potential use of military force reached the highest levels 
38 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

of authority and sharpness. Each of these case studies therefore offers insight and clarity into 

how Beijing would respond to cross-strait tensions relevant to today. Appendix 3 offers detailed 

chronologies for each of these cases.

1991

The context for Beijing’s deployment of its classical hierarchy of warning statements in 

1991 was, first, KMT steps to revise the 1946 ROC constitution and hold elections for a new 

National Assembly; and second, escalation of public advocacy on behalf of Taiwan independence. An extraordinary session of the National Assembly in April 1991 mandated an end to the 

period of national mobilization and elections for a new National Assembly in 1991 and for the 

Legislative Yuan in 1992. The new National Assembly elections held on December 21—the first 

since November 1946—were a critical step in the evolution of ROC politics because they ended 

the 45-year tenure of mainland members who were elected in 1946 (having migrated to Taiwan 

at the end of the Chinese civil war), and installed a new membership that was overwhelmingly 

Taiwanese in origin. This transition from decrepit mainland holdovers to Taiwanese politicians 

enabled long-suppressed advocacy of Taiwan independence to move to the forefront of the 

political agenda.

Advocacy of Taiwan independence was in particular the agenda of the Democratic Progressive Party, which was founded in 1986 before the KMT lifted the longstanding ROC ban on 

political parties other than the KMT itself in 1987 and that operated under a continuing threat 

of prosecution under a statute that banned advocacy of Taiwan independence. As Taiwan’s politics liberalized, however, public agitation on behalf of independence escalated. As the KMT and 

ROC dropped enforcement of the ban, the DPP in 1991 moved to write a new party platform 

that explicitly incorporated a plank on independence. In August 1991, a DPP seminar produced 

a draft for a new state constitution that declared Taiwan a “democratic republic” and renamed 

the ROC the “Republic of Taiwan.” The following October 13, 1991, the DPP formally adopted a 

platform calling for the establishment of a “Republic of Taiwan” by popular referendum.

In the narrower cross-strait context, Taipei had begun to respond to Beijing’s decade-long 

pitch to begin cross-strait exchanges that might lead to what Beijing hoped would be a “peaceful 

unification” and resolution of the Taiwan question. After the KMT lifted the ban on Taiwanese 

tourist travel and business investment in the PRC, a million Taiwanese a year were visiting the 

mainland and Taiwanese investment on the mainland coast skyrocketed. In November 1990, 

Taipei established the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), an unofficial body that would coordinate issues arising from the growing cross-strait exchanges. The rise of the DPP and advocacy 
39

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

of Taiwan independence and the concurrent Taiwanization of ROC politics put Beijing’s longterm goals in jeopardy. 

The broader international context in which these developments in Taiwan unfolded 

included the wave of new democracies created among some of the states of the former East 

European Soviet bloc, the independence of the three Baltic states from the Soviet Union, 

the evolving collapse of the Soviet Union itself, and the relaxation of tension between the 

two Koreas, leading to the December 1991 bilateral nonaggression and denuclearization 

pacts. The PRC continued to suffer from the blackened international image it received from 

its brutal suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrations in June 1989, although the G7 

countries had already begun in 1990 to roll back the economic (but not military) sanctions 

they had imposed the year before. 

Through the early months of 1991, PRC media reported on political trends in Taiwan 

and commented only at low-level, nonauthoritative levels. Finally, on June 3, an authoritative 

People’s Daily commentator article warned that Taiwan’s politics were on “a dangerous path” and 

warned advocates that they were “playing with fire” and to “rein in at the brink of the precipice.” 

Two more commentator articles—one blasting the DPP’s draft “Republic of Taiwan” constitution and another condemning any international support for “one China one Taiwan”—followed 

over the ensuing months.

Meanwhile, speeches by top PRC leaders on important anniversaries—by CCP General 

Secretary Jiang Zemin on the CCP’s 70th founding anniversary, by Premier Li Peng on National 

Day, and by President Yang Shangkun on the 80th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution that created the Republic of China—incorporated warnings against pursuit of Taiwan independence. 

Yang Shangkun’s warnings, delivered 2 months before the National Assembly elections, were the 

sharpest, advising that Beijing would “not sit idly by” in the face of efforts to “split” China and 

urging Taiwanese not to make “a wrong appraisal.” 

Finally, in a speech marking the 60th anniversary of the 1936 Xian Incident (which formed 

a CCP-KMT coalition against Japan) and 10 days before the Taiwan elections, Jiang Zemin 

renewed calls for cross-strait talks and reiterated Yang’s warning to Taiwanese not to make a 

“wrong assessment.” Five days before the elections, Beijing announced formation of its own 

unofficial body corresponding to Taipei’s SEF, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan 

Strait (ARATS).

The December 21 elections gave KMT candidates an overwhelming majority in the new 

National Assembly, marking a signal defeat for the DPP. The PRC media immediately reported 

the election’s results as rejection of Taiwan independence by Taiwan’s electorate.
40 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

In summary, Beijing’s invocation of its warnings hierarchy was relatively restrained. There 

was no press comment above the level of People’s Daily commentator articles—the lowest rung 

of authoritative commentary—devoted specifically to Taiwan events; the sole People’s Daily editorial was not aimed specifically at Taiwan trends but rather was pegged to the 20th anniversary of the PRC’s seating in the United Nations. High-level leadership statements came only in 

broader speeches marking major anniversaries. Finally, leadership and People’s Daily warnings 

focused on political themes, advising Taipei not to go too far without raising the prospect of 

military intervention.

1995

The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis was triggered by the decision of the Clinton administration—after months of advising Beijing that it would not do so—to grant Taiwan President 

Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, where he had earned a Ph.D. in 

1968 in agricultural economics. Several of Lee’s friends in Taiwan donated money to Cornell to 

endow a Lee Teng-hui chair in agricultural economics, with the stipulation that Lee be invited 

to attend the chair’s inaugural ceremony in Ithaca, New York. Lee’s visit was thus billed as private, although it was widely expected that he would plump for greater acceptance of Taiwan in 

the international community. The Clinton administration vowed it would not issue Lee a visa 

because granting a visa to a sitting Taiwan president would violate the 1978 agreements that 

normalized U.S.-PRC relations. The administration relented, however, when first the House of 

Representatives and then the Senate passed nearly unanimous nonbinding resolutions demanding that the administration give Lee a visa. On May 22, the State Department announced that 

it would grant Lee a visa after all. Lee’s visit proceeded on June 8–12. Beijing appears to have 

regarded the Clinton decision as the last straw in a slow, incremental effort by Washington to 

upgrade ties with Taipei. In 1992, the Bush administration decided to sell 150 F-16s to Taipei. 

In 1994, the new Clinton administration completed a Taiwan policy review that upgraded the 

level of cabinet contacts with Taipei. In U.S.-PRC relations, the administration had in May 1993 

conditioned renewal of PRC most-favored-nation trading status in 1994 on performance in 

several categories of human rights improvements, a threat that the administration ultimately 

backed away from even though Beijing did little to meet Washington’s conditions.

Beijing’s initial response was immediate and authoritative, pressing Washington to reverse its decision. As the appended chronology shows, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian 

Qichen the next day delivered a “strong protest” to U.S. Ambassador Stapleton Roy, warning 

of “grave consequences” unless Washington reversed itself. A Foreign Ministry statement—the 
41

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

top level of Foreign Ministry utterances—repeated the same warning. Two days later, the Foreign Ministry announced that two ongoing visits by PRC leaders were cut short. On May 26, a 

People’s Daily commentator article, entitled “A Serious and Dangerous Retrogression,” advised 

that Beijing “absolutely would not tolerate” violation of its sovereignty. And a nonauthoritative 

editorial in the PRC-controlled Hong Kong communist newspaper Ta Kung Pao urged Washington “not to turn a deaf ear” and “miscalculate,” forcing Beijing to “react further.” 

Once Beijing’s effort to press Washington to reverse itself failed and Lee’s trip began, Beijing then moved to levy consequences in both U.S.-PRC and cross-strait relations. On June 9 

(the day after Lee’s trip began) in a meeting with President Clinton, PRC Ambassador Li Daoyu 

stated that Washington had “seriously damaged relations.” A People’s Daily commentator article 

the same day reiterated Li’s assessment and that Washington would “pay a price” for its actions. 

On May 16, a Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that Li Daoyu had been called home 

indefinitely “for consultations” and that a long-planned second session of SEF-ARATS talks 

was postponed indefinitely. In early July, Beijing announced a series of “missile tests” in the East 

China Sea, the first of a set of three military exercises that unfolded over the following 8 months. 

These included live-fire amphibious landing exercises on Dongshan Island off the Guangdong 

coast in November 1995 and a second round of “missile tests,” this time into waters immediately off Taiwan’s largest ports, Kaohsiung and Keelung, in March 1996—on the eve of Taiwan’s 

presidential election.

In summary, Beijing deployed its warnings hierarchy at a high, authoritative level in reaction to a U.S. reversal of policy that clearly surprised and embarrassed it. Its warnings were 

calculated to press Washington to reverse itself, and when that failed, it responded with political steps to express its displeasure, complemented by a prolonged series of military exercises 

intended to underscore its readiness to defend its sovereignty against further slight.

1999

Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s statement during an interview with the German news 

agency Deutsche Welle on July 9, 1999—that the relationship between Taiwan and the Chinese 

mainland was a “state-to-state, or at least special state-to-state” relationship—triggered the most 

intensive invocation of Beijing’s warning calculus. Over the ensuing 2 months, Beijing’s warnings escalated in level and clarity with regard to a potential use of military force. Tensions abated 

and Beijing’s warnings receded only in late September after repeated assurances from the Clinton administration that it continued to adhere to a “one-China” policy and after it became clear 

that Taipei’s bid for greater international recognition had failed.
42 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Several contextual factors catalyzed Beijing’s escalating response to Lee’s statement. First, Lee 

made his statement as the campaign for the March 2000 presidential election was getting under 

way. Lee himself was not running, so his remark was perhaps an effort both at shaping his political 

legacy and at shaping the politics of the election. U.S.-PRC relations had been put on an improved 

footing during the bilateral summits of October 1997, when Jiang Zemin visited the United States 

for the first time, and June 1998, when President Clinton visited China. But more recently relations were troubled first by President Clinton’s last-minute rejection of a bilateral accord on PRC 

accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) during Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to Washington in March 1999 and then in April by the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in 

Belgrade during the Kosovo war. In addition, in March Congress began debate of a Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, intended to beef up American military collaboration with Taiwan. In this 

period, the Clinton administration was also debating whether and how to extend theater missile 

defense to Taiwan. Finally, Nicaragua and a few other member states introduced a motion in the 

UN General Assembly calling for the seating of Taipei in the United Nations.

As the chronology in appendix 3 shows, Beijing’s initial response to Lee’s July 9, 1999, 

statement came in the form of a joint spokesman statement issued on July 11 by the CCP Central Committee and State Council Taiwan Affairs Offices that warned Taipei “to pull back before 

it is too late and to stop playing with fire.” On the 12th, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman 

Zhu Bangzao warned Lee Teng-hui that he “had gone too far down the dangerous road of playing with fire” and urged him to “rein in at the brink of the precipice.” Wang Daohan, chairman 

of Beijing’s unofficial cross-strait exchanges organization ARATS, declared the same day that 

Lee’s statement “undermined the foundation” necessary for continued cross-strait contacts. On 

July 14, a People’s Daily commentator article blasted Lee’s statement as exposing his “secessionist 

ambitions.”

On July 20, a report in the PRC-controlled Hong Kong communist newspaper Wen Wei Po

complemented these official warnings, citing Su Jing, deputy chief of staff of the Nanjing Military Region—the region charged with primary military responsibility over the Taiwan Strait—

on the progress of a PLA exercise on the Fujian coast and predicting that Lee Teng-hui will “ruin 

himself by playing with fire” and will “drown in an ocean of people’s war.” On July 27, Xinhua 

cited PLA Chief of the General Staff Fu Quanyou denouncing Lee as “lifting a great rock only to 

drop it onto his own feet” and declaring that the PLA has “the determination and strength” to 

defend China’s sovereignty. Defense Minister Chi Haotian similarly warned Lee “not to underestimate” the PLA’s determination. Over the same period, People’s Daily published three more 

commentator articles denouncing Lee’s statement. 
43

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

In late July and early August, SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu and Taipei’s Mainland Affairs 

Council proffered elaborations of Lee’s statement, prompting an escalation in Beijing’s response. 

On August 10, People’s Daily published an article under the byline “Observer,” a highly authoritative vehicle that had disappeared since the 1960s, calling on Taipei “to stop before the brink 

of the precipice.” On the 18th, the military newspaper Liberation Army Daily published a commentator article declaring that the PLA would rather lose a thousand men before ceding an inch 

of territory. Over the next 2 weeks, low-level reports in PRC and Honk Kong communist media 

laid out Beijing’s military options in the event of a war in the Taiwan Strait and played up China’s 

missile capabilities. On September 2, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Sun Yuxi warned 

that Lee Teng-hui’s efforts to incorporate his “two-state theory” into the KMT’s platform were 

“pushing the Taiwan people nearer to the abyss of war.”

Over the first 3 weeks of September, Beijing’s warnings of potential war sharpened further. 

In comments aired by Xinhua, CCP chief Jiang Zemin, Fu Quanyou, and Chi Haotian in succession renewed promises that the PLA stood ready to defend Chinese sovereignty. CMC Vice 

Chairman Zhang Wannian on September 10 was reportedly “keeping a close eye” on Taiwan 

developments while monitoring PLA exercises off Zhejiang and Guangdong, declaring that the 

PLA was “ready to crush” any attempt at splitting the country. On September 13, the Hong Kong 

communist newspaper Ta Kung Pao reported a CMC resolution ordering steps to mobilize for 

war over Taiwan. Between September 7 and 16, People’s Daily carried six commentator articles 

on the crisis.

As rapidly as Beijing’s warnings intensified over the weeks down through mid-September, they dropped off sharply after September 16. On that day, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

spokesman Sun Yuxi noted Beijing’s satisfaction at the defeat of the proposal to seat Taipei in 

the UN. In addition, President Clinton conveyed American assurances of a continuing “oneChina” policy to Jiang Zemin during a meeting in Auckland, New Zealand, on September 

11, an occasion that Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan praised as having produced “positive and 

constructive results.”

The level and clarity of Beijing’s warnings regarding the prospects for military confrontation 

in the 1999 crisis exceeded those attending any other in the post-Cold War era. Beijing capped the 

episode in February 2000 when it released a new white paper on the Taiwan question that added 

a new condition under which it might be forced to resort to military force. In addition to its two 

longstanding bottom lines—if Taipei were to declare independence or if foreign forces intervened 

in Taiwan to promote Taiwan independence—Beijing now added the refusal of Taipei to negotiate 

“sine die” (without a date certain) peaceful resolution of the unification question.
44 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

2003–2004

The most recent deployment of Beijing’s warning calculus was in response to the efforts 

of Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian and the DPP to push through the Legislative Yuan a referendum law that could provide the mechanism for a plebiscite on independence for Taiwan. In 

this instance, Beijing dealt with a favorable context in U.S.-PRC relations. In 2002, Washington 

explicitly reaffirmed its “one-China” policy and its opposition to Chen Shui-bian’s statement 

that “there is a country on each side” of the Taiwan Strait (一邊一國), a formulation that recalled 

Lee Teng-hui’s “state-to-state” cross-strait relationship. Throughout the referendum law debate 

in Taiwan, Washington renewed its insistence that it did not support Taiwan independence and 

reaffirmed to Beijing its “one-China” policy. 

In this context, Beijing could respond to the debate in Taipei in the summer and fall months 

of 2003 with low-level authoritative protests issued by the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office that 

branded Chen’s and the DPP’s referendum push as “a dangerous trend” and that warned Taipei 

that Beijing would not “tolerate” steps toward Taiwan independence. In November, in response 

to comments by American politicians that blurred Washington’s opposition, Beijing’s warnings 

notched up as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman began to call on the Bush administration 

“to be crystal clear” in its commitment to one China and its opposition to a referendum.

Also in late November 2003, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed a watered-down referendum 

law, and Chen Shui-bian moved to put two referenda on the agenda for national elections scheduled for March 20, 2004. Beijing’s warnings thereafter escalated as the elections approached. On 

December 25, Hu Jintao met with 200 businessmen from Taiwan and stressed common interest 

in stable cross-strait relations and warned that Beijing would not tolerate Taiwan independence. 

In early January, State Council Taiwan Affairs Office deputy Wang Zaixi warned that Beijing’s 

“restraint has a bottom line” and Beijing would not “waver or compromise” with regard to Taiwan independence. In mid-January, while visiting New York, Wang recalled that the February 

2000 PRC white paper had set a third condition under which Beijing would consider use of 

military force—if cross-strait negotiations did not begin sine die—adding that Beijing would 

have to “move up its timetable” if Taipei made the “wrong judgment.” 

High-level leadership statements on Beijing’s opposition to the referendum continued 

down to the eve of the election. Finally, on March 20, 2004, Xinhua reported the defeat of 

Chen’s and the DPP’s referenda, and a joint Central Committee and State Council Taiwan Affairs Office statement pronounced the referenda as “illegal acts that went against the will of 

the people.”
45

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Analyzing Beijing’s Signals—Things to Consider

Beijing’s traditional calculus of threat and retaliation statements remains a critical tool in 

its array of foreign policy and security instruments in responding to and managing tensions 

and disputes in which it engages. Analysts seeking to assess its use in contemporary contexts, 

however, must take into consideration several points that bear on its interpretation.

First, due account must be taken of the fact that PRC media have evolved dramatically. 

Commentary formats come and go, including those that are authoritative. People’s Daily editorial department articles—long the most authoritative format in the party’s newspaper—have 

disappeared, and “observer” articles have become exceedingly rare. Editorials and commentator 

articles remain reliable indicators of authoritative commentary in People’s Daily, but analysts 

must remain aware of the ongoing evolution in media practices.

Second, much of the vocabulary employed in China’s warnings calculus is not unique to 

authoritative commentary and may be found in low-level commentary that does not speak authoritatively for the regime, as authoritative commentary does. Warnings to “rein in before the 

brink of the precipice,” not to “turn a deaf ear,” to “make a correct assessment,” or that Beijing 

cannot “stand idly by” frequently occur in low-level, nonauthoritative comment. Such warnings 

may be regarded as low-level expressions of Beijing’s concern about a situation, but they do not 

carry the weight of the same themes expressed in authoritative commentary. It is the authority 

of the source, not the themes themselves, that merits attention.

Third, as China’s engagement with the world has advanced over the past four decades, the 

foreign and security policy institutions and the instruments available to Beijing to shape pursuit 

of its interests have proliferated. This means that the range of institutions and voices that may 

respond with some authority in any international dispute has broadened correspondingly. In the 

1950s and 1960s, when the People’s Republic was recognized by a small minority of countries in 

the international order, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an underdeveloped mechanism for engaging China’s interest through ordinary state-to-state diplomacy, while the party’s International 

Liaison Department (ILD) served as a primary mechanism in international affairs, especially with 

fraternal Soviet bloc states and foreign communist parties and revolutionary movements. Since 

Beijing’s admission to the United Nations in 1971 and as the PRC was increasingly recognized 

diplomatically, the ILD receded in significance and took on new foreign relations tasks.

In addition, as Beijing’s economic and military relationships have flourished abroad, new 

institutions and sub-bureaucracies now take part in Chinese foreign policy. The consequence 

of this proliferation of actors and instruments has been to deepen the hierarchy on institutional 
46 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

authority. It also adds to the sophistication of Beijing’s means to respond to an international 

dispute. When the National People’s Congress (NPC) Foreign Relations Committee protests a 

U.S. congressional resolution on a Taiwan issue, its statement should not be discounted, because 

the NPC is really an instrument of policy made in the party, the real seat of power. It should be 

seen instead as Beijing’s use of the corresponding institution by protocol in responding to the 

specific source on the U.S. side, and so be taken with due regard for its authority, not its actual 

power and policy influence within the Chinese system.

Conclusion—A Hypothetical South China Sea Signaling Scenario

Nothing would be more destructive of Sino-American relations and Asia’s security dynamics than a decision by China to threaten a military confrontation in order to change a U.S. course 

of action Beijing perceived as threatening its interests in the South China Sea. It would create a 

political-military crisis far exceeding those that erupted from the accidental 1999 bombing of 

China’s Belgrade embassy or the 2001 collision between two U.S. and Chinese military aircraft. 

Such a crisis would stem from two conditions. The United States would view such a threat as 

the first Chinese effort to challenge American military supremacy in Asia’s maritime periphery. 

Second, all of Asia would perceive the potential military confrontation as possibly determining the future security dynamics of the region. Beijing’s decisionmakers would recognize the 

probable strategic implications of such a decision. Conceiving of events that could lead to such 

a perilous decision is in itself confounding. Consequently, the suggested scenario will focus 

on a low level of coercive diplomacy that goes beyond the harassment which U.S. intelligencecollection missions have faced over the past decade, but which is far less threatening than an 

outright military confrontation.

The Scenario

The core of this scenario is based upon the proposition that Beijing perceives closer 

military ties among the United States, the Republic of the Philippines (RP), and the Socialist 

Republic of Vietnam (SRV) as a threatening strategic trend much as it did Hanoi’s November 

1978 security treaty with Moscow. It is a trend Beijing identifies as originating in U.S. Secretary of State Clinton’s firm position on U.S. South China Sea interests at the Hanoi-hosted 

ASEAN meetings of July 2010. Whereas Beijing saw the Hanoi-Moscow treaty as confirming 

its perception that Vietnam and the USSR were colluding to establish “regional hegemony” 

over Hanoi’s Indochina neighbors and possibly over all Southeast Asia, the closer links it sees 

emerging among Washington, Hanoi, and Manila are viewed in this scenario as potentially 
47

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

presenting a military coalition designed to offset China’s growing military presence in the 

South China Sea. The existing U.S. mutual defense treaty with Manila is seen as providing 

expanding access to RP military bases and, Beijing fears, presumably allowing a buildup of 

logistic support for American regional military operations. U.S. port visits and closer political links with the SRV are suggesting a level of cooperation that would include improving 

combined operational capabilities between Vietnamese and U.S. forces. These developments 

could possibly lead to the United States gaining access to SRV military facilities, including its 

air bases, even as Hanoi improves its own military capabilities with acquisitions of advanced 

submarines and fighter aircraft from Russia. China’s signaling is designed to indicate the seriousness with which Beijing views this strategic trend.

The United States finds its position in this scenario problematic for several reasons. It is not 

seeking to build a regional alliance against China. As part of its strategic “rebalancing” toward 

Asia, however, Washington seeks to assure regional friends and allies that the United States will 

maintain a strong regional military presence. An aspect of this strategy is to guarantee freedom 

of navigation through the South China Sea. In support of this objective, at the time Beijing initiates signaling China’s concerns, the USS George Washington carrier strike group (CSG) has been 

scheduled to conduct a FON exercise in the South China Sea. As part of U.S. regional assurance 

policy, Vietnamese political and military officials have been invited aboard for a couple of days to 

observe flight operations. A long-planned, combined exercise between U.S. and Philippine marines is also about to get underway. For the purpose of illustrating the full range of Chinese signaling behavior, we postulate disagreements among U.S. policymakers about whether to cancel 

or postpone these activities in response to Chinese concerns or whether such actions would be 

interpreted as signals of weakness that would damage the U.S. reputation in Beijing and in the region. In the scenario, these policy disagreements delay clear substantive U.S. response to Chinese 

signals, prompting policymakers in Beijing to move up the signaling ladder.

Beijing’s signaling begins at the lower level of authority with a commentary by a PLAN 

political commissar at the South Sea Fleet Yulin naval base on Hainan Island. His commentary 

includes a military assessment of developments in the South China Sea stressing the increasing military cooperation between the United States and the naval forces of the Philippines and 

Vietnam. He details the port calls made by U.S. naval ships to Vietnam and the Philippines as 

part of his assessment. This review is paralleled by a Liberation Army Daily article on the same 

topic stressing China’s commitment to cooperation and stability in the South China Sea even as 

it safeguards its national maritime rights. During a visit by the commander of the U.S. Pacific 

Command (USPACOM) to PLAN headquarters, China’s naval commander makes similar points 
48 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

in his discussion stressing the need for cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese navies and with 

their regional counterparts. This first step is signaling the United States that China’s maritime 

interests, particularly in the South China Sea, are a matter of importance requiring discussion 

between the two defense establishments.

Failing to receive a U.S. response in a week, China takes the next step upward by including 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in the signaling process. At a weekly press conference, 

an MFA spokesperson includes a comment about the importance of China’s national maritime 

rights in terms of sovereignty and access to maritime resources. Sovereignty and resources are 

the core of these remarks, not security or defense issues. Liberation Army Daily carries a signed 

article discussing what was said to be a regular PLAN exercise in the South China Sea and the 

importance of a powerful navy in defending China’s maritime interests. Less emphasis is placed 

on the need for regional cooperation to ensure maritime security.

 Not receiving any positive U.S. response, the next step up is taken by Beijing. An MFA 

statement and a People’s Daily commentator article focus on China’s maritime interests and the 

need to avoid military tensions through diplomacy and discussion to ensure that each party’s 

interests are understood. To this end, where military tensions emerge the parties should agree 

to high-level discussions designed to ease if not eliminate the tensions.

With no definite U.S. response to the suggestion that a meeting should be held at a high 

enough level where Beijing can express its concerns directly, China’s signaling escalates with more 

direct language. A vice foreign minister expresses China’s intent to defend its sovereignty and 

maritime interests against any threats. This statement is paralleled by a People’s Daily contributing 

editor article assessing U.S. strategy in the South China Sea. The article emphasizes what it sees 

as U.S. efforts opposing China’s maritime rights and sovereignty by providing support, including 

military support, to Vietnam and the Republic of the Philippines. Both are declared to be pressing 

unwarranted and illegal claims against China’s well-established and legal sovereignty rights in the 

South China Sea. This strategy is declared as undermining the tranquility of the South China Sea 

and creating unnecessary regional military tensions. Moreover, the United States is defined as an 

outside power creating regional tensions to serve its own hegemonic objectives through power 

politics. Unless the United States agrees to a high-level meeting with China to resolve their differences, it will have to accept the consequences of its ill-conceived strategy.

Just as the United States resolves its dilemmas and is about to propose a meeting at the 

Under Secretary of State and Under Secretary of Defense level, China takes the next escalatory 

step in its signaling strategy. The Minister of Foreign Affairs calls a press conference where 

he first declares that China’s exercise of restraint in the face of U.S. provocative actions in the 
49

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

South China Sea should not be viewed as weakness. China’s forbearance should be recognized 

as demonstrating its commitment to building and sustaining a tranquil regional security environment. However, there is a limit to China’s forbearance and restraint in the face of U.S. power 

politics seeking to maintain its hegemonic position. China has already urged the United States 

to agree to a senior-level meeting where their respective interests and policies can be discussed 

and differences resolved. Failure to schedule such a meeting will leave China no choice but to 

reinforce its military deployments in the region and the South China Sea to counter U.S. power 

politics and military strategy. This is not China’s preferred choice, but a just response against 

U.S. bullying and power politics. Shortly after the Minister of Foreign Affairs makes his statement, China’s most senior general, a vice-chairman of the CMC and a member of the Politburo, 

makes his own statement. He declares that the PLA is dedicated and prepared to defend China’s 

sovereignty and national interests against all adversaries.

Comment

The signaling employed in this scenario reflects a basic pattern Beijing has demonstrated 

since its first signaling exercise in 1950 when China sought to deter U.S. forces from crossing 

the 38th parallel into North Korean territory. The core of these signaling patterns consists of the 

following:

■ Systematic integration of political and diplomatic action with military preparations as 

the signaling escalates through higher levels of authority. Such preparations are often, if 

not always, overt and integrated into the political and diplomatic messages designed to 

deter the adversary from the course of action Beijing finds threatening.

■ Stating why China is justified in using military force should this prove necessary. The message targets both domestic and international audiences. In essence, Beijing declares that 

China confronts a serious threat to its security and interests that if not terminated will 

require the use of military force.

■ Asserting that the use of military force is not Beijing’s preferred resolution to the threat 

China faces, but one that will be forced upon it should the adversary not heed the deterrence warnings sent. In short, Beijing’s signaling strategy seeks to grant China the moral 

high ground in the emerging confrontation. Such argument supports China’s self-identification as a uniquely peaceful country that employs military force only in defense 
50 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

when provoked by adversaries threatening China’s security or sovereignty. Presumably, 

Beijing believes that asserting the moral high ground in a confrontation can ease the 

international response to any military action China might take and thereby reduce the 

political costs of employing military force. 

■ Emphasizing that China’s forbearance and restraint should not be viewed as weakness and 

that China is prepared to employ military force should that be necessary.
51

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Appendix 1. Chronology of the 1978–1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border Crisis

Note: Beijing’s calculus of warnings regarding the Sino-Vietnamese border that culminated in the PRC’s “punitive” 

attack in February–March 1979 was embedded among Beijing’s protests and statements over other issues in the broader 

Sino-Vietnamese tangle over regional power. The border warnings are therefore indicated in bold type in the following 

chronology (appendix 1 only) to distinguish them from Beijing’s protests over other issues.

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1977

12/31 Xinhua reports 

contending 

Vietnamese and 

Cambodian 

government 

statements on 

border clashes—

first PRC media 

attention to 

escalating SRV 

(Socialist Republic 

of Vietnam)-DK 

(Democratic 

Kampuchea) 

dispute

1978

4/30 Liao Chengzhi 

statement: first 

PRC public 

reference to 

SRV treatment 

of Hoa people 

6/9 FOREIGN 

MINISTRY 

STATEMENT on 

SRV expulsion of 

Hoa (Chinese) 

people; responds 

to May 27 SRV 

Foreign Ministry 

statement
52 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1978

6/10 People’s Daily

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE on Hanoi 

provoking SRVCambodia border 

crisis

6/15 PRC ships Minghua

and Changli depart 

Guangzhou to pick 

up “victimized 

Chinese nationals” 

from Hanoi and Ho 

Chi Minh City

7/3 PRC 

GOVERNMENT 

NOTE to 

Hanoi suspends 

economic and 

technical aid to 

SRV

7/11 People’s Daily 

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE links 

SRV “persecution” 

of Hoa people and 

SRV instigation of 

Viet-Cambodian 

border tensions to 

Hanoi’s “expansionist” 

ambitions

Joint GuangxiYunnan 

communiqué 

protests SRV 

driving Hoa 

people across 

border, establishes 

regulations for 

entry of Hoa 

people into PRC 

along SRV border

7/15 PRC chargé at 

Hanoi embassy 

says talks over 

Hoa people 

deadlocked in 

16th session
53

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1978

7/16 People’s Daily 

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE on Hanoi 

stirring up anti-China 

fever

7/19 Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs 

(MFA) note to 

Hanoi proposes 

vice foreign ministerial talks on 

Hoa people issue

7/22 People’s Daily 

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE on SRV 

ingratitude for PRC aid

7/25 PRC Embassy 

“strong protest” 

over SRV slander 

of embassy

7/26 and 

7/29

PRC border officials in Guangxi 

and Yunnan protest continuing 

SRV pushing Hoa 

people across border

8/1 Red Flag 

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE attacks 

Soviet complicity 

in SRV’s anti-China 

activities

8/8 1st session 

of PRC-SRV 

vice foreign 

ministerial talks 

open in Hanoi

Guangxi border 

officials protest 

Peilun Bridge 

incident
54 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1978

8/9 PRC Hanoi 

chargé “strong 

protest” rejects 

SRV protest over 

August 8 border 

incident

8/14 PRC FOREIGN 

MINISTRY Asia 

Department 

delivers “strong 

protest” over August 10 border 

incident: “infringed” Chinese 

sovereignty

8/19 PRC Vice Foreign Minister 

Zhong Xidong 

puts forward 

four-point proposal at 3rd session of Hanoi 

talks

8/25 PRC Vice Foreign Minister 

Zhang Haifeng delivers a 

“strong protest” 

to SRV envoy 

on August 25 

“provocative incident” at Youyi 

Pass, an “extremely serious 

step” and “new 

crime” in effort 

to sabotage ongoing Sino-Viet 

talks in Hanoi
55

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1978

8/25 

(cont.)

PRC vice foreign 

minister Zhong 

Xidong protests 

same at 4th

session of Hanoi 

talks

8/29 PRC chargé in 

Hanoi issues 

“strong protest” 

over August 12 

Guangxi border 

incident

9/4 PRC State 

Council Overseas Chinese 

Office statement denounces 

SRV’s “engineering” August 

25 Youyi Pass 

incident

People’s Daily 

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE on SRV’s 

escalating anti-China 

activities 

9/5 FOREIGN 

MINISTRY Asia 

Department 

Director Shen 

Ping delivers 

“strong protest” 

over SRV 

suspending rail 

traffic at Yunnan 

border

9/7 Vice Foreign 

Minister 

Zhong Xidong 

complains about 

lack of progress 

at 5th session of 

Hanoi talks
56 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1978

9/12 Vice Foreign 

Minister Zhong 

Xidong puts 

forward new 

proposals at 6th

session of Hanoi 

talks

9/19 Vice Foreign 

Minister 

Zhong Xidong 

complains of 

SRV bad faith 

at 7th session of 

Hanoi talks

9/26 Vice Foreign 

Minister Zhong 

Xidong suspends 

talks at 8th

session of Hanoi 

talks; departs for 

Beijing on 27th

10/20 Xinhua reports Le 

Duan inspecting 

SRV-Cambodia 

border zone

10/26 FOREIGN 

MINISTRY 

“strong protest” 

over repeated 

SRV border 

incidents in 

September and 

October
57

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1978

11/3 Soviet Union-SRV 

security treaty 

signed;

Xinhua reports SRV 

preparing “largescale aggression” 

against Cambodia

11/7 PRC FOREIGN 

MINISTRY 

“strong protest” 

over November 

1 “extremely 

serious bloodshed incident” 

on border; notes 

Beijing has so 

far “exercised 

the greatest 

restraint and 

forbearance”; 

and warns that 

Hanoi should 

not mistake Beijing’s restraint as 

“weakness and 

submissiveness”

11/8 DENG 

XIAOPING 

in Bangkok 

denounces 

USSR-SRV 

treaty and 

Soviet global 

and SRV 

regional 

hegemonism; 

“we will attach 

importance” 

to this event
58 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1978

11/10 People’s Daily

EDITORIAL 

entitled “What are 

the Vietnamese 

Authorities up 

to?” warns that 

November 1 incident 

shows that Hanoi’s 

“arrogant hostility 

to the Chinese 

people” has become 

“quite intolerable”; 

links Vietnamese 

border provocations 

to Soviet support 

for Vietnamese 

aggression in 

Cambodia and 

signing of SovietVietnamese alliance; 

and “sternly” warns 

Hanoi to pull back 

from Chinese 

territory and “not 

to turn a deaf ear to 

China’s warnings.” 

“How far will you go? 

We will wait and see”

Xinhua reports 

continuing SRV 

border intrusions

12/6 Xinhua reports 

Hanoi setting 

up Cambodian 

liberation front 

body

12/10 Xinhua reports 

new SRV border 

intrusions
59

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1978

12/11 Guangxi CCP 

chief Zhao 

Xiaoguang 

speech at 

Nanning rally 

denounces 

continuing 

SRV border 

intrusions; 

warns that 

China will 

“certainly 

counterattack” any 

enemy’s encroachment

12/13 Vice Premier 

Li Xiannian 

tells Thai 

delegation 

that “China’s 

forbearance 

has limits 

and the 

Vietnamese 

authorities 

are deluding 

themselves by 

thinking that 

we are weak 

and can be 

bullied”

FOREIGN MINISTRY “strong 

protest” over 

“incessant” 

Vietnamese encroachments and 

provoking “serious incidents 

of bloodshed”; 

charges that Hanoi has “turned 

a deaf ear” to 

Beijing’s repeated 

protests; warns 

that “there is a 

limit to China’s 

forbearance and 

restraint” and 

Hanoi must bear 

responsibility for 

the consequences 

if provocations 

continue
60 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1978

12/16 People’s Daily EDITORIAL on USSR-SRV 

collusion in planned 

aggression in Cambodia, Southeast Asia

12/20 Xinhua reviews 

SRV border intrusions in Guangxi 

since August; 

notes PLA “did 

not return fire” 

even when SRV 

troops opened fire

12/24 FOREIGN MINISTRY “strong 

protest” over 

December 23 

SRV border 

intrusion in 

Guangxi, notes 

Chinese militia 

“compelled to 

return fire in 

self defense”; 

FOREIGN MINISTRY “strong 

protest” over 

December 10–16 

Guangxi border 

intrusions

Xinhua reports 

repeated 

September–

December SRV 

border intrusions, 

firing at people in 

Yunnan

12/25 People’s Daily

EDITORIAL entitled 

“Our Forbearance 

is Limited” reviews 

SRV aggression 

against China and 

states that Hanoi 

“has gone far 

enough”; (cont.)
61

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1978

12/25 

(cont.)

China “will not allow 

itself to be bullied by 

others,” will “certainly 

counterattack if attacked,” and “means 

what it says”; if Hanoi 

continues, it “will 

meet the punishment 

it deserves”; “don’t 

complain later that we 

did not give you clear 

warning in advance”

SRV invasion of 

Cambodia begins

12/28 LI XIANNIAN 

at overseas 

Chinese affairs 

conference 

warns that 

SRV provocations have become “intolerable” and that 

if Hanoi does 

not cease, it 

“will meet the 

punishment it 

deserves”

1979

1/5 DENG 

XIAOPING in 

meeting with 

U.S. journalists denounces 

SRV invasion 

of Cambodia, 

pledges “various forms of 

material assistance” to 

Phnom Penh
62 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1979

1/7 PRC 

GOVERNMENT 

STATEMENT 

denounces 

SRV invasion 

of Cambodia, 

pledges support 

to Phnom Penh

1/12 Xinhua report 

reviews SRV 

border intrusions 

in early January, 

firing on Chinese 

people

1/14 PRC 

GOVERNMENT 

STATEMENT 

denounces SRV 

continuing 

invasion of 

Cambodia; 

China “will do 

its utmost” to 

support Phnom 

Penh

1/19 PRC FOREIGN 

MINISTRY 

note denounces 

SRV stoppage 

of border rail 

traffic

1/20 Xinhua reports 

new SRV border 

intrusions in 

Guangxi
63

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1979

1/31 DENG 

XIAOPING 

at Washington press 

conference 

declares that 

“we mean 

what we say” 

and that Hanoi must be 

taught “some 

necessary lessons”

2/1 Xinhua reports 

new SRV border 

intrusions, 

Chinese border 

guards “firing 

back in self 

defense and 

giving the 

intruders due 

punishment”; says 

SRV actions have 

“aroused the deep 

indignation of the 

Chinese army and 

people”

2/11 LI 

XIANNIAN 

in talks with 

Pakistani 

defense 

minister 

warns Hanoi 

“not to turn 

a deaf ear to 

what China 

has said”
64 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Commentary

Other

1979

2/17 PRC GOVERNMENT 

STATEMENT 

declares PRC 

forces have been 

“driven beyond 

forbearance” 

and “forced to 

counterattack”; 

PRC does not 

want “an inch” 

of SRV territory but neither 

will it tolerate 

“wanton incursions”; pledges 

to reopen negotiations if Hanoi 

ceases provocations; attack on 

northern SRV 

begins

2/18 People’s Daily 

EDITORIAL 

entitled “Rise in 

Counterattack in 

Defense of Frontiers” 

declares that in 

Hanoi “restraint 

and forbearance 

were regarded 

as invitations to 

bullying” and “advice 

and warnings fell on 

deaf ears”; calls PRC 

counterattack a “just 

action in defense of 

our frontier”
65

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Appendix 2. Chronology of the 1961–1962 Sino-Indian Border Crisis

Date Official Statements Authoritative Commentary

1961

8/12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 

protests repeated Indian encroachments 

on border since May 19

10/7 MFA protests repeated Indian 

encroachments on border

11/2 Two MFA “strong protests” of new encroachments and violation of airspace; 

New Delhi should not take Beijing’s “restraint and tolerance as weakness”

11/30 MFA note urges New Delhi to cease 

“unlawful actions,” otherwise it must be 

“held responsible for new tensions”

12/6 MFA note discloses several previous 

protests; says Beijing has “exercised self 

restraint” in face of Indian “war clamor”

12/7 People’s Daily EDITORIAL advises 

that New Delhi will be held responsible for new border tensions

1962

1/24 MFA “serious protest” against new 

Indian air intrusions; New Delhi 

“mistaken if it thinks it can profit from 

unscrupulous provocations” against 

Chinese border posts

2/26 MFA note renews call for negotiation of 

boundary dispute

3/22 MFA note again calls for negotiation of 

boundary dispute

4/21 MFA “serious protest” on new Indian 

border intrusion

4/30 MFA “strongest protest” over Indian 

troops establishing posts on PRC 

territory; warns that if they are not 

withdrawn, PRC border guards would 

be “compelled to defend themselves”
66 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Official Statements Authoritative Commentary

1962

5/11 MFA “serious protest” of new intrusion 

and “provocative firing” by Indian 

troops in eastern sector; notes that PRC 

forces “firmly maintained a coolheaded 

attitude of self restraint”; situation on 

border “very grave”

6/18 PRC Government “strong protest” of 

“atrocity” in which Indian troops shot 

four Tibetans; demands compensation 

and end to such incidents

6/28 PRC Government “serious” protest of 

59 Indian air intrusions in May

7/8 PRC “strongest” protest of “serious 

intrusion” of Indian troops into 

Xinjiang; commends PRC forces’ selfrestraint but warns that China “will 

never yield to deeper advances by India, 

nor will China give up its right to self 

defense when attacked”

7/9 People’s Daily EDITORIAL, 

entitled “The Indian Government 

Should Rein in at the Brink of the 

Precipice,” warns that China will 

exercise right of self-defense in the 

face of unprovoked attacks

7/13 MFA “strongest protest” says New 

Delhi “turning a deaf ear” to past 

protests; warns that PRC has exercised 

forbearance and self-restraint but will 

be compelled to defend itself if Indian 

forces provoke an armed clash

7/21 People’s Daily observer article, 

entitled “The Indian Authorities 

Should Not Miscalculate,” warns 

that if India continues to provoke 

armed clashes and compels Chinese forces to defend themselves, 

it will be “lifting a great stone only 

to drop it on its own foot”
67

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Official Statements Authoritative Commentary

1962

7/22 MFA “strongest protest” over clash in 

Xinjiang in which PRC forces were 

compelled to defend themselves; 

while China has exercised “greatest 

forbearance and restraint,” it could not 

“sit idly by”

8/4 MFA note calls for border talks as soon 

as possible

9/7 People’s Daily EDITORIAL 

calls on New Delhi to cease 

border provocations and enter 

negotiations

9/13 MFA note proposes opening border 

talks on October 15; notes that New 

Delhi has rejected Beijing’s August 4 

call for talks

9/21 PRC Government “most serious and 

strongest” protest on new Indian border 

clashes

9/22 People’s Daily EDITORIAL entitled 

“Is This Tolerable?” warns that 

“Beijing’s patience is limited” and 

that Beijing will be forced to “take 

necessary measures” to protect 

its border guards if New Delhi 

does not cease its provocations; 

New Delhi “cannot now say that 

warning has not been given in 

advance”

10/3 MFA note reiterates call for border 

talks to open on October 15; notes 

continuing clashes

10/6 MFA note protests new “incidents of 

bloodshed” in the eastern sector, says 

New Delhi “continuing to play with fire”
68 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Official Statements Authoritative Commentary

1962

10/11 MFA “strongest and most serious 

protest” over October 9 clash, killing 

several PRC troops; warns that if 

Indian forces do not cease, Chinese 

troops “will surely act in self defense”; 

second “strongest and most serious” 

protest over new Indian attacks in 

Tibet; warns that if New Delhi “does 

not rein in before the precipice and 

continues to spread the flames of war,” 

it will bear all the consequences

10/13 MFA “strong protest” over new 

intrusions; notes Indian side moving 

more troops “in preparation for war”

10/14 People’s Daily EDITORIAL 

entitled “Mr. Nehru! It’s Time to 

Pull Back from the Brink of the 

Precipice!”

10/17 Two MFA “serious” protests over 

continuing intrusions

10/20 MFA “most urgent, most serious 

and strongest” note declares that 

New Delhi has refused to negotiate 

and launched broad attacks on PRC 

territory and so China has “no choice 

but to rebuff these frenzied attacks 

resolutely”; Ministry of National 

Defense spokesman states that “all-out 

attacks” by Indian forces compelled 

PRC forces to “strike back” and 

“recover territory occupied by Indian 

troops”
69

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Appendix 3. PRC Signaling Over Taiwan: 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003–2004

1991: Taiwan Debate Preceding National Assembly Elections

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1991

5/6 Long Liaowang 

article describes 

rising Taiwan 

independence 

(TI) issue in 

Taiwan’s politics

6/3 People’s Daily

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE warns 

TI is “a dangerous 

path”; warns 

advocates to “rein 

in at the brink of 

the precipice” and 

by “playing with 

fire” one will “get 

burned”

7/1 JIANG ZEMIN 

Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP) 

anniversary speech 

notes that rise of 

TI “calls for special 

attention and 

vigilance”
70 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1991

7/9 State Council 

(SC) Taiwan 

Affairs 

Office (TAO) 

spokesman 

TANG SHUBEI 

denounces 

Legislative Yuan 

(LY) proposal 

to join United 

Nations as 

Republic of 

China (ROC), 

notes some 

Kuomintang 

(KMT) legislators 

support; requires 

“high vigilance”

8/25 Democratic 

Progressive 

Party (DPP) 

meeting on 

constitutional 

revision to 

change name of 

ROC to Taiwan

9/7 People’s Daily

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE 

blasts DPP draft 

constitution

9/12 MFA spokesman 

at weekly briefing 

denounces 

TI advocates, 

Ramsey Clark 

remarks 

as “foreign 

interference”
71

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1991

9/30 LI PENG national day 

toast says PRC “will 

never tolerate” Taiwan 

independence

10/7 Wen Wei Po

EDITORIAL 

chides KMT 

leaders for 

accommodating 

DPP TI 

demands; warns 

Beijing will 

not “stand idly 

by and remain 

indifferent”

10/9 PRC President YANG 

SHANGKUN warns 

those seeking to split 

China: Beijing “will 

not stand idly by”; 

should not make 

“wrong appraisal”; 

“those who play with 

fire will perish by 

fire”

10/10 People’s Daily

EDITORIAL on 

PRC national day 

warns Beijing 

“will not tolerate” 

TI advocates 

colluding with 

“foreign powers”

10/13 Zhongguo 

Xinwenshe 

reports DPP 

adopting TI 

plank in party 

constitution
72 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1991

10/15 SC TAO 

spokesman 

TANG SHUBEI 

statement 

condemning 

DPP 

constitution 

plank on TI: 

“If they turn 

a deaf ear” to 

PRC warnings, 

Beijing “will not 

stand idly by”

10/17 People’s Daily

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE on 20th

anniversary of 

PRC entry into 

UN: “we resolutely 

oppose any 

attempt to create 

‘two Chinas’ or 

‘one China and 

one Taiwan’”

11/6‒7 Vice President WU 

XUEQIAN meets 

Straits Exchange 

Foundation (SEF) 

delegation in Beijing, 

calls for talks

12/11 JIANG ZEMIN 

speech on 55th

anniversary of Xian 

Incident: renews 

proposal for talks; 

urges TI advocates 

“not to make a 

mistaken assessment,” 

turn back
73

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1991

12/16 Vice President WU 

XUEQIAN at ARATS 

(Association for Relations Across the Taiwan 

Strait) founding meeting applauds some Taipei officials for taking 

stronger stand against 

TI, acts to speed up 

cross-strait ties

Xinhua reports 

founding of 

ARATS

12/22 Zhongguo 

Tongxunshe 

reports KMT 

dominance, TI 

rejection in National Assembly 

elections

1995: Lee Teng-hui U.S. Visit

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1995

5/22 Xinhua reports 

U.S. decision to 

grant Lee Tenghui (LTH) a visa

5/23 VP/MFA Qian Qichen 

lodges “strong protest” 

with Ambassador 

Roy; will result in 

“grave consequences” 

unless U.S. reverses 

decision

MFA 

STATEMENT 

warns relations 

may “retrogress” 

and cause “severe 

damage” to 

relations 
74 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1995

5/24 National 

People’s 

Congress (NPC) 

Foreign Affairs 

Committee 

statement: 

U.S. entirely 

responsible for 

consequences; 

Chinese People’s 

Political 

Consultative 

Conference 

(CPPCC) 

Foreign Affairs 

Committee 

statement

5/25 MFA spokesman 

Shen Guofang 

says SC Li 

Guixian, PLA 

Air Force Deputy 

Commander Yu 

Zhenwu cutting 

U.S. visits short

May 25–30: 

Taiwan forces 

hold antiamphibious 

landing exercises 

on Taiwan coast

5/26 MFA spokesman 

Shen Guofang 

says Minister of 

National Defense 

(MinND) Chi 

Haotian U.S. visit 

postponed

People’s Daily

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE, “Serious 

and Dangerous 

Retrogression,” 

says PRC 

“absolutely will 

not tolerate” 

U.S. violating 

sovereignty, “will 

resolutely defend” 

its national 

interests

Xinhua reports 

ARATS Vice 

President 

Tang Shubei 

departing for 

Taipei to set 2nd

summit between 

SEF and ARATS; 

says Wang-Koo 

talks to be in 

mid- or late July
75

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1995

5/28 MFA spokesman 

Shen Guofang 

announces 

postponement 

of Missile 

Technology 

Control Regime 

(MTCR) talks 

and visit by 

U.S. Arms 

Control and 

Disarmament 

Agency chief

5/29 Wen Wei Po

(Hong Kong) 

EDITORIAL 

notes PRC 

responses so far 

in diplomatic 

arena; other 

areas could 

be affected; 

in Taipei, 

Tang Shubei 

announces 

agreement on 

Wang-Koo talks 

for July 20

6/1 MFA spokesman 

Chen Jian 

warns “serious 

damage” to 

PRC-U.S. 

relations if U.S. 

does not reverse 

Lee Teng-hui 

visa
76 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1995

6/2 Winston Lord 

announces 

Clinton 

administration’s 

renewal of 

“most favored 

nation” status 

for PRC

6/3 Ta Kung Pao

(Hong Kong) 

editorial 

urges U.S. 

Government 

“not to 

miscalculate” 

and “turn a deaf 

ear” or PRC will 

“react further”

6/6 MFA spokesman 

Shen Guofang 

calls U.S. visa 

for Lee a “grave 

affair,” says 

PRC will “react 

further” if not 

reversed

6/8–12 Lee Teng-hui 

visit to Los 

Angeles, Ithaca, 

Anchorage

6/8 Xinhua 

publishes “Ai 

Zhonghua” 

article stating 

PRC will “adopt 

all necessary 

measures” 

to defend 

sovereignty
77

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1995

6/9 PRC 

Ambassador 

Li Daoyu 

meets Clinton: 

U.S. action 

has “seriously 

damaged” 

relations

People’s Daily

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE 

says U.S. has 

“brought serious 

consequences” to 

relations and will 

“pay a price”

6/10 People’s Daily

“Bu Wen” 

article entitled 

“U.S. Is Playing 

with Fire,” says 

Taiwan issue 

is a “powder 

keg”—“be 

careful!”

6/16 MFA spokesman 

Shen Guofang 

announces 

Ambassador Li 

Daoyu called 

home “for 

consultations”; 

SC Taiwan 

Affairs Office 

spokesman 

announces 2nd

Wang-Koo talks 

postponed

6/17 Xinhua 

commentary 

says PRC-U.S. 

relations “at a 

crossroad,” and 

“we will wait 

and see” which 

way U.S. wants 

to go
78 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership 

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1995

7/21 PRC begins missile firings into 

East China Sea

7/31 Minister of National 

Defense CHI HAOTIAN Army Day toast 

says PRC will “not 

give up use of force” or 

“stand idly by” in face 

of foreign interference 

in Taiwan issue

1999: Lee Teng-hui on Cross-strait Exchanges as “Special State-to-State Relations”

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

7/9 Lee Teng-hui 

says cross-strait 

ties a “special 

state-to-state” 

relationship in 

Deutsche Welle

interview

7/11 Central Committee (CC)/State 

Council (SC) 

Taiwan Affairs 

Office spokesman on Lee 

statement: “We 

solemnly warn 

Taiwan splittist 

forces to pull 

back before it is 

too late and stop 

playing with fire”
79

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

7/12 MFA 

spokesman 

Zhu Bangzao 

urges Lee Tenghui to “size up 

the situation 

soberly, rein in 

at the brink of 

the precipice” 

and cease all 

separatist 

activities; 

has “gone too 

far on the 

dangerous road 

of playing with 

fire”; ARATS 

President Wang 

Daohan says 

Lee Teng-hui’s 

statement 

“undermines 

the foundation” 

of cross-strait 

exchanges

7/13 ARATS VicePresident 

Tang Shubei 

elaborates on 

Lee Teng-hui 

undermining 

basis for crossstrait exchanges
80 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

7/14 People’s Daily 

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE 

denounces 

Lee Teng-hui’s 

“secessionist 

ambition”; expresses 

confidence in 

people’s support for 

unification

Zhongguo Xinwenshe interview 

with Institute of 

Taiwan Studies 

researcher Li Jiaquan: Lee Tenghui’s statement 

“a declaration 

of war against 

peaceful unification and pushes 

cross-strait 

relations to the 

brink of war”

7/15 MFA spokesman 

Zhang Qiyue 

urges Taiwan authorities to “size 

up the situation 

soberly, rein in 

at the brink of 

the precipice,” 

and cease splittist 

activities; CC/SC 

Taiwan Affairs 

Office Director 

CHEN YUNLIN: 

Lee Teng-hui’s remarks “destroyed 

the foundation” 

of the one-China 

principle

7/17 Xinhua long 

article by “GUO 

TAIWEN” on 

meaning of Lee 

Teng-hui’s “twostate” theory
81

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

7/18 CPPCC Hong 

Kong/Macao/

Taiwan/Overseas 

Chinese (OC) 

Committee 

statement: Lee 

Teng-hui “should 

stop playing with 

fire”

7/20 Wen Wei Po

cites Nanjing 

Military Region 

Deputy Chief 

of Staff Su Jing 

comments on 

Fujian military 

exercise, says 

Lee Teng-hui 

will “ruin 

himself by 

playing with 

fire” and will 

“drown in the 

ocean of people’s 

war”

7/21 Xinhua reports 

ARATS forum 

denouncing Lee 

Teng-hui for 

destroying basis 

for cross-strait 

exchanges

People’s Daily

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE on 

upholding “oneChina principle”

Xinhua 

Commentator 

on Lee Tenghui “doomed 

to be pinned 

on the pole of 

humiliation in 

history”
82 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

7/25 Xinhua reports 

Foreign Minister 

TANG JIAXUAN 

denouncing Lee 

Teng-hui “splittism” 

in Singapore talks 

with U.S. Secretary of 

State Albright; stresses 

U.S. abiding by three 

communiques critical 

to stability in the 

Taiwan Strait

Xinhua 

Commentator 

on Lee Tenghui’s “sophistry”; 

must “rein 

in before the 

brink of the 

precipice and 

cease all splittist 

activities”

7/26 People’s Daily

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE on Lee 

Teng-hui’s removal 

of basis for crossstrait exchanges

7/27 PLA Chief of General 

Staff FU QUANYOU 

says Lee Teng-hui 

“lifting a great rock 

only to drop it on his 

own feet”; PLA has 

“determination and 

strength” to defend 

China’s sovereignty

7/29 People’s Daily 

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE warns 

Taipei to “rein in 

at the brink of the 

precipice,” restore 

basis for cross-strait 

ties
83

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

7/30 Xinhua reports 

ARATS 

rejecting Koo 

Chen-fu letter 

responding 

to WANG 

DAOHAN call 

on SEF to clarify 

its position

7/31 Minister of Defense 

CHI HAOTIAN 

warns Taipei “not to 

under-estimate” PLA 

resolution to defend 

China’s sovereignty

Wen Wei Po

(Hong Kong) 

says Wang 

Daohan will 

not visit Taipei 

until it retracts 

Lee Teng-hui 

position

8/1 People’s Daily and 

Xinhua SPECIAL 

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE blasts 

Koo Chen-fu 

speech “clarifying” 

Lee Teng-hui view; 

Seeking Truth

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE calls on 

Lee Teng-hui to 

“ward off disaster 

at the critical 

moment”

Wen Wei Po

(Hong Kong) 

article by Li 

Jiaquan dissects 

Koo Chen-fu 

response on 

“clarifying” 

Lee Teng-hui 

position

8/2 Xinhua 

Commentator 

blasts Koo 

Chen-fu speech 

responding to 

Wang Daohan 

demand for 

clarification
84 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

8/3 Ta Kung Pao 

(Hong Kong) 

cites PLA 

sources that 

Fujian PLA 

forces on alert; 

3-stage military 

exercises like 

1995–1996 

“likely”

8/4 CC & SC TAO 

director’s speech 

rebutting 1 

Aug Taiwan 

Mainland Affairs 

Council (MAC) 

explanation 

of “two-state” 

theory

8/9 Wen Wei Po 

(Hong Kong) 

editorial raises 

possibility of 

blockade

8/10 Long People’s 

Daily OBSERVER 

ARTICLE on Lee 

Teng-hui’s two-state 

theory; blasts July 

30 Koo Chen-fu 

speech, August 1 

MAC explanations 

as showing Lee 

Teng-hui not 

willing to “stop 

before the brink of 

the precipice”

Ta Kung Pao

(Hong Kong) 

editorial notes 

warnings of CHI 

HAOTIAN, 

ZHANG 

WANNIAN, sees 

prospect of war
85

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

8/16 Xinhua reports 

various PLA 

elements 

denounce Lee 

Teng-hui’s 

two-state view; 

pledge “not 

to sit idly by” 

to preserve 

territorial 

integrity

8/18 Xinhua repots 

TAO office directors meeting reiterating readiness 

to open talks if 

Taipei retreats 

from two-state 

position

Jiefangjun Bao 

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE blasts 

two-state theory; 

says PLA would 

rather lose 1,000 

men than an inch of 

territory

8/19 UN representative 

QIN HUASUN 

meets UN deputy 

secretary-general 

on Nicaraguan 

proposal to seat 

Taipei; Amb. LI 

ZHAOXING 

blasts “some 

U.S. politicians” 

urging that U.S. 

protect Taiwan 

by force

Jiefangjun Bao

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE #2 on Lee 

Teng-hui’s two-state 

theory
86 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

8/20 MFA spokesman 

ZHU 

BANGZAO calls 

for the U.S. “to 

make a clear 

commitment 

to not supply 

TMD” to Taiwan 

so as “not to 

undermine 

peace and 

stability” in the 

Taiwan Strait

8/21 Wen Wei Po

(Hong Kong) 

article by NDU 

professor on 

likely military 

alternatives 

in event of 

Taiwan Strait 

war; Zhongguo 

Tongxunshe 

report on 

accuracy of PRC 

cruise missiles, 

other capabilities 

in Taiwan 

conflict; “The 

PLA will teach 

Taiwan a lesson” 

and “cause heavy 

losses”

8/23 Liaowang 

commentator 

article warns Lee 

Teng-hui “not to 

turn a deaf ear”
87

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

8/26 Zhongguo 

Xinwenshe 

interview with 

2nd Artillery 

engineer on 

PLA readiness 

to defend PRC 

sovereignty

8/27 People’s Daily

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE attacks 

new Lee Teng-hui 

remarks; notes 

Lee Teng-hui finds 

himself increasingly 

isolated 

internationally

8/28 VP QIAN QICHEN 

warns Taipei “not to 

underestimate the 

firm determination” 

of PRC to uphold 

sovereignty; do not 

“lift a stone only to 

drop it on one’s foot”

8/31 CC TAO 

statement blasts 

KMT resolution 

endorsing Lee 

Teng-hui’s twostate theory

9/1 People’s Daily 

runs long Li 

Jiaquan article 

on Taiwanization 

of KMT
88 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

9/2 MFA spokesman 

Sun Yuxi blasts 

Lee Teng-hui 

pressing twostate theory in 

KMT platform, 

“pushing the 

Taiwan people 

nearer to the 

abyss of war,” 

“playing with 

fire”

AFP reports 

PLA exercises off 

Xiamen

9/3 Chief of General 

Staff FU QUANYOU 

tells Uruguay guest 

PLA “will foil any 

conspiracy to split the 

mainland”

Xinhua reports 

PRC missile 

experts blast 

Lee Teng-hui, 

boast of new 

generation of 

missiles

9/4 JIANG ZEMIN in 

Bangkok calls Lee 

Teng-hui’s two-state 

view “a dangerous 

step,” reiterates 

PRC as “firm in its 

determination” to 

defend sovereignty

9/5 Guangzhou 

Daily notes 

upcoming PLA 

exercises off 

Guangdong 

to “deflate Lee 

Teng-hui’s 

arrogance”
89

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

9/6 Chief of General 

Staff FU QUANYOU 

tells Czech army 

leader PLA backs 

PRC government 

stance on Lee Tenghui’s two-state 

theory, has “strong 

determination 

and sufficient 

strength” to defend 

sovereignty

9/7 Minister of Defense 

CHI HAOTIAN 

tells Czech army 

leader Beijing will 

not give up use of 

force against Taiwan 

splittists

MFA spokesman 

Sun Yuxi urges 

U.S. officials not 

to say things 

that encourage 

Lee Teng-hui’s 

“arrogance”

People’s Daily

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE blasts 

Lee Teng-hui’s 

efforts over the 

decade to pursue 

two-state idea

9/8 JIANG ZEMIN 

in Canberra says 

PRC will not give 

up use of force in 

event of Taiwan 

independence or 

foreign intervention 

in Taiwan issue

People’s Daily 2nd

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE attacks 

Lee Teng-hui 

claim that public 

supports his twostate theory
90 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

9/9 FM TANG JIAXUAN 

meets Secretary of 

State ALBRIGHT in 

Canberra, calls on U.S. 

not to encourage Lee 

Teng-hui’s “arrogance,” 

nor supply theater 

missile defense 

(TMD) 

Zhongguo 

Xinwenshe 

reports Academy 

of Military 

Science (AMS) 

researcher Wang 

Baoqing stating 

that “there is a 

limit to Beijing’s 

patience” on 

unification; PRC 

has military 

superiority 

because of 

missiles; U.S. 

may intervene 

but will 

ultimately retreat 

 9/10 Reports ZHANG 

WANNIAN observing 

PLA “joint landing” 

exercises off Zhejiang 

and Guangdong in 

early September; PLA 

keeping a “close eye” 

on developments, 

“ready to crush” 

separatist acts

9/11 JIANG ZEMIN in 

Auckland reiterates 

Beijing will not 

renounce use of force 

to defend sovereignty

People’s Daily 3rd

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE blasts Lee 

Teng-hui’s two-state 

theory

Liberation 

Army Daily

commentary on 

why PRC will 

not renounce 

use of force; 

Wen Wei Po

(Hong Kong) 

on significance 

of recent joint 

exercises
91

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

 9/13 Ta Kung Pao reports 

CMC RESOLUTION 

on mobilizing for 

war

9/14 People’s Daily

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE, “Lee 

Teng-hui Is 

Pushing Taiwan 

to Disaster,” 

says cross-strait 

relations “at a 

vitally important 

moment”; PRC will 

not renounce use of 

force; prospect of 

peaceful unification 

“in danger of 

being wiped out”; 

“Chinese people 

keep their word” 

and Lee Teng-hui 

will suffer “fatal 

attacks”

9/15 ARATS Vice 

Chairman 

TANG SHUBEI 

in Los Angeles 

warns “a small 

number of antiChina forces in 

the U.S. not “to 

be drawn into 

. . . a head-on 

collision with 

China” over 

Lee Teng-hui’s 

splittism

People’s Daily 4th

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE on Lee 

Teng-hui’s two-state 

theory
92 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

9/16 MFA spokesman 

Sun Yuxi notes 

United Nations 

General Assembly 

rejection of effort 

by “a small number of countries” 

to seat Taiwan

People’s Daily 5th

COMMENTATOR 

ARTICLE on 

Lee Teng-hui’s 

two-state theory’s 

“trouble-making” 

in the international 

community

9/20 Wen Wei Po

(Hong Kong) 

article on PLA 

preparations 

for war against 

Taiwan

9/23 Foreign Minister 

TANG JIAXUAN tells 

Secretary ALBRIGHT 

that JIANG-CLINTON 

meeting in Auckland 

produced “positive and 

constructive results”; 

now need “concrete 

actions”

 9/30 Premier ZHU RONGJI 

national day toast 

notes campaign against 

Lee Teng-hui’s twostate theory; pledges 

aid to Taiwan earthquake victims

 10/15 SEF Chairman 

Koo Chen-fu 

renews invitation to ARATS 

Chairman 

WANG DAOHAN to visit 

Taipei
93

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

1999

10/16 ARATS deputy 

ZHANG 

JINCHENG 

rejects Koo 

invitation as 

“insincere” 

in absence of 

retraction of Lee 

Teng-hui twostate view

10/25 JIANG ZEMIN 

interview with Le 

Figaro says PRC 

“will not sit idly by” 

at attempts to split 

China; but renews 

Beijing interest in 

peaceful approach

2003–2004 Taiwan Referendum Law

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

2003

3/26 SC TAO 

spokesman 

Zhang Mingqing 

blasts Legislative 

Yuan push 

to adopt 

referendum law

7/18 SC TAO deputy 

director WANG 

ZAIXI says push 

for referendum 

law “a very 

dangerous trend”
94 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

2003

8/7 State Councilor (SClr) 

TANG JIAXUAN 

tells Taiwan media 

delegation Beijing 

“opposes people using 

a ‘referendum’ to split 

the country”

8/26 SC TAO deputy 

director WANG 

ZAIXI again 

says push for 

referendum law 

“a dangerous 

trend”

9/28 DPP and Chen 

Shui-bian (CSB) 

call for new 

constitution and 

2006 referendum

10/2 Xinhua reports 

People’s 

University 

professor 

denouncing 

CSB’s call 

for new 

constitution, 

referendum a 

“provocative 

move” that 

is “extremely 

dangerous”

10/9 SC TAO 

STATEMENT 

blasts CSB’s 

September 28 

“provocative” 

remarks favoring 

TI referendum
95

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

2003

10/13 People’s Daily

article by Sun 

Shengliang 

attacks CSB’s 

push for TI 

referendum

10/24 HU JINTAO in 

Canberra says Beijing 

“will not tolerate” 

Taiwan independence

10/28 SClr TANG JIAXUAN 

says PRC “will not 

tolerate” TI promotion 

“by any party or 

person in Taiwan”

10/29 SC TAO 

spokesman 

Zhang Mingqing 

“firmly opposes” 

TI referendum; 

“Chinese nation 

will not tolerate” 

TI “in any form”

10/30 Ta Kung Pao

(Hong Kong) 

attacks CSB, 

mass rally 

promoting 

referendum on 

new constitution; 

notes U.S. 

“concern” 

about CSB 

abandonment 

of “4 nos.,” 

reviewing 

Taiwan policy
96 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

2003

11/4 Ta Kung Pao

(Hong Kong) 

reviews CSB’s 

push for TI referendum, warns 

it will lead to an 

“extremely perilous situation and 

a catastrophe” 

for the Taiwan 

people

11/12 SC TAO spokesman Li Weiyi 

warns CSB is 

moving “closer 

and close to the 

brink of TI,” will 

bring a “huge 

disaster”

11/17 SC TAO spokesman says CSB and 

DPP efforts to 

push TI referenda 

“a very dangerous 

splittist act,” calls 

on them to “rein 

in before the precipice”; otherwise, 

face a “head-on 

blow by 1.3 billion 

Chinese people”

11/18 ARATS Chairman WANG 

DAOHAN says 

TI advocates 

pushing “situation in the Taiwan Strait to a 

dangerous brink”
97

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

2003

11/19 SC TAO 

deputy WANG 

ZAIXI blasts 

referendum as 

“an extremely 

dangerous 

move”; if TI 

declared, 

“armed force 

will be hard 

to avoid”; “TI 

means war”

Zhongguo 

Xinwenshe 

reports AMS 

research 

director LUO 

YUAN says 

changing ROC 

constitution is a 

“bottom line for 

the mainland to 

resort to force”; 

urges CSB to 

“think twice”

11/20 Ta Kung Pao

(Hong Kong) 

EDITORIAL 

notes remarks 

in recent days 

by TAO leaders 

“most strongly 

worded since 

CSB came to 

power; Taipei 

should “not 

misinterpret 

Beijing’s words”; 

TI will lead 

to “war and 

disaster”

11/21 MFA spokesman 

Liu Jianchao 

calls on U.S. 

to honor 

commitments; 

“send no more 

wrong signals” 

regarding TI
98 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

2003

11/23 Premier WEN JIABAO 

tells Washington Post

editor PRC “will not sit 

idly by and do nothing” 

in face of referendum 

and TI efforts; urges 

U.S. side “to be crystal 

clear” in opposition to 

the referendum” and 

other CSB tactics

11/26 SC TAO spokesman Zhang 

Mingqing states 

Beijing “will not 

stand idly by” in 

event of TI

11/27 ROC Legislative 

Yuan passes 

watered-down 

version of 

referendum law

12/2 MFA spokesman 

Liu Jianchao 

notes recent 

U.S. statements 

affirming oneChina principle, 

opposing 

referendum

12/9 Premier WEN 

JIABAO meets BUSH 

in Washington, DC: 

affirms Beijing’s 

“determination” 

to uphold national 

unity; notes Bush’s 

commitment to oneChina principle and 

opposition to TI
99

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

2003

12/11 MFA 

spokesman 

Liu Jianchao 

reiterates 

November 11 

Wen Jiabao, 

Bush statements

12/17 SC TAO 

spokesman 

Li Weiyi calls 

CSB’s call for 

a “defensive 

referendum” 

along with the 

March elections 

a “serious 

provocation” 

against Taiwan 

Strait peace

12/25 HU JINTAO 

meets 200 Taiwan 

businessmen; affirms 

interest in crossstrait exchanges but 

says will not tolerate 

TI

12/30 MFA spokesman 

Liu Jianchao 

applauds Tokyo 

statement 

against 

referendum, TI

12/31 SC TAO 

spokesman 

Zhang Mingqing 

blasts CSB for 

stirring up antiChina feelings

Reports 

CSB signing 

referendum law
100 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

2004

1/3 SC TAO deputy 

WANG ZAIXI 

in Canberra says 

CSB’s referendum 

vote, new constitution in 2006 

means it seeks TI 

by 2008; PRC’s 

“restraint has a 

bottom line”; will 

not “waver or 

compromise”

1/14 CMC Vice Chairman 

CAO GANGCHUAN 

tells U.S. Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

MYERS that “clearcut 

stand and resolution 

opposition” needed 

in face of TI activities; 

hopes U.S. “will play 

an active part in this”

SC TAO spokesman Li Weiyi: 

PRC “has firm 

resolve and 

necessary preparations” and 

“determination 

and confidence” 

to defend sovereignty

1/15 SC TAO deputy 

WANG ZAIXI 

in New York tells 

400 overseas 

Chinese three 

conditions under 

which PRC will 

use force (from 

February 2000 

White Paper), 

adds that process cannot be 

set precisely; if 

Taipei makes 

“wrong judgment,” timetable 

will be moved up
101

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

2004

1/19 SClr TANG JIAXUAN 

at forum calls 

referendum “can only 

cause confrontation 

and animosity” and 

lead to “the brink of 

danger”

Long 

Renminwang

article by Peng 

Weixue on 

CSB’s March 20 

referendum as a 

stepping-stone 

to TI

1/20 MFA spokesman 

KONG QUAN 

urges U.S. to 

keep its promise 

to oppose TI

1/26 HU JINTAO in Paris 

reiterates PRC “will 

by no means allow 

anyone to separate 

Taiwan”

1/30 WEN JIABAO 

meets U.S. Deputy 

Secretary of State 

ARMITAGE in 

Beijing, says Taiwan 

situation “very 

sensitive,” hopes U.S. 

will explicitly oppose 

CSB referendum; 

Armitage affirms 

Bush statements

2/4 Long 

Renminwang

article by Peng 

Weixue says 

CSB seriously 

misjudges PRC 

stake in TI issue
102 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

2004

2/11 SC TAO 

spokesman 

Zhang Mingqing 

urges Taiwan 

people, 

international 

community 

to recognize 

“dangers 

caused by the 

adventurist 

activities of TI 

advocates”

2/17 CMC VC CAO 

GANGCHUAN 

reiterates “willingness 

and strength” 

to “guarantee 

unification”

2/25 SC TAO 

spokesman 

Li Weiyi calls 

referendum “very 

harmful,” Beijing 

“watching 

developments 

closely”

2/27 NPC spokesman 

Jiang Enzhu 

blasts 

referendum as 

“immoral” CSB 

campaign tactic

Singapore press 

says Fujian 

PLA “on high 

alert” because 

of February 

28 rebellion 

anniversary 

demonstration 

led by Lee Tenghui
103

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

2004

3/6 FM LI ZHAOXING NPC press 

conference reiterates 

Beijing will “not 

allow Taiwan 

separation by any 

means”

Wen Wei Po 

(Hong Kong) 

says Fujian 

PLA holiday 

leave cancelled, 

preparing for 

war

3/11 JIA QINGLIN in 

talks with Taiwanese 

NPC delegates 

reiterates Beijing will 

not “allow Taiwan 

separation by any 

means”

3/12 SC TAO deputy 

WANG ZAIXI 

tells Taiwan 

media reps 

Beijing ready 

for any election 

outcome, “has 

already drafted 

2 separate 

statements”

3/14 WEN JIABAO 

in NPC press 

conference 

reiterates Beijing 

will never allow 

Taiwan separation, 

appreciates 

international 

community and U.S. 

rejecting referendum
104 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Date Leadership

Statements

Official 

Statements

Authoritative 

Press Comment

Other

2004

3/20 CC and SC TAO 

STATEMENT 

says failure of 

referendum 

“proves” it 

was “an illegal 

act that went 

against the will 

of the people”; 

any effort 

toward Taiwan 

independence “is 

doomed to fail”

Xinhua reports 

failure of CSB 

referendum 

in March 20 

election
105

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Notes 1 The now classic study of China’s deterrence strategy for Beijing’s intervention in the Korean 

War is Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (RAND Corporation, 1960). Whiting’s assessment has been updated through newly released documents by Thomas 

J. Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), chapter 2. Whiting’s study of China’s deterrence strategy 

for the 1962 border conflict with India and involvement in the Indochina war was originally published 

in 1975 and has been reprinted with a new foreword. In his foreword, Whiting reflects upon the implications for his earlier assessments of China’s deterrence strategy by later publications exploiting sources 

not available to him. His reflections include the Korean War case and Beijing’s 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait 

military exercises. See Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann 

Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 2001).

2 See Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapter 6, for a very interesting assessment of China’s 

motivation for attacking Vietnam.

3 For details, see Thomas Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts of 1969: New Evidence 

Three Decades Later,” in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David 

M. Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitts, 198–216 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).

4 Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution

(London: Keegan Paul International, 1998), 88. 

5 For details, see David G. Muller, Jr., China As a Maritime Power (Boulder, CO: Westview 

Press, 1983), 152–154.

6 For a useful view of China’s civilian maritime enforcement agencies, see Lyle Goldstein, Five 

Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime Enforcement 

Capabilities (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, April 2010).

7 For a recent look at these issues, see Mark E. Redden and Phillip C. Saunders, Managing 

Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach, China Strategic 

Perspectives, no. 5 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2012).

8 For a detailed and insightful assessment of Sino-American relations and the Taiwan dilemma, 

see Alan D. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-

PRC Relations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003). 

9 For details of these operations see Xiaobing Li, “PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations 

During the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-55 and 1958,” in Chinese Warfighting, 143–172.

10 See Chalmers M. Roberts, “Dulles Sees General Use of A-Arms,” The Washington Post, March 

16, 1955, 1; and the discussion in Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (Armonk, 

NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985), 89–90.

11 For a useful assessment of China’s deterrence strategy and the PLA’s military exercises, see 

Scobell, chapter 8. For a detailed assessment of the exercises and the U.S. responses, see Robert L. 

Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US-China Relations 1989‒2000 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), chapter 6.
106 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

12 Roberts, 1; and Stolper, 89–90.

13 See Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial 

Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

14 We are grateful to Professor Bernard Cole of the National War College for bringing this reality to our attention.

15 For a detailed assessment of this arrangement and its applicability to potential U.S.-China 

incidents, see Redden and Saunders.

16 Adapted from Robert L. Suettinger, “U.S. ‘Management’ of Three Taiwan Strait ‘Crises,’” in 

Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis, ed. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, 

251 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). 

17 Adapted from Michael D. Swaine, “Understanding the Historical Record,” in Managing SinoAmerican Crises, 37–64.

18 Draws from the discussion in Wang Jisi and Xu Hui, “Pattern of Sino-American Crises: A 

Chinese Perspective,” in Managing Sino-American Crises, 137–146.

19 See, for example, Allen S. Whiting, “U.S. Crisis Management Vis-à-vis China: Korea and 

Vietnam,” in Managing Sino-American Crises, 215–249; and Niu Jun, “Chinese Decision Making in 

Three Military Actions Across the Taiwan Strait,” in Managing Sino-American Crises, 293–326. 

20 It must be noted here that a primary driver for China’s military modernization programs 

is in fact preparation for a military confrontation with the United States over Taiwan. Some Chinese 

undoubtedly do hold the views expressed by these authors, but caution leads Beijing and China’s armed 

forces to prepare for the worst plausible case scenario. 

21 The following discussion is taken from Wang and Xu, 140–141.

22 Ibid., 145–146.

23 To cite but two sources among many, see David M. Lampton, “Testimony before the U.S.-

China Economic and Security Review Commission,” Hearing on China’s Narratives Regarding National 

Security Policy, March 10, 2011; and Linda Jacobson and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in 

China, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 26 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 2010). Much of this discussion is drawn from these sources.

24 Lampton, 5.

25 Jiefangjun Bao, April 15, 2008.

26 Hu Yinan, “Military Hot Line Smooths Rocky Relationship,” China Daily Online, November 

12, 2011.

27 The following case study analyses of the 1978–1979 Sino-Vietnamese war, the 1960–1961 

Sino-Indian border war, and Taiwan Strait confrontations from 1991 through 2004, as well as the appended chronologies, derive from relevant Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports and 

from the Chinese Communist Party’s newspaper People’s Daily.
107

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to recognize the assistance of Dori Enderle of the Institute for National 

Strategic Studies in the early stages of their research and to express their gratitude to Dr. Phillip 

C. Saunders and Dr. Christopher D. Yung for their comments and suggestions on an earlier 

draft of this paper. They also wish to thank George C. Maerz and Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman of 

NDU Press for their editing and production of this paper.

109

China’s Forbearance Has Limits

About the Authors

Paul H.B. Godwin retired as Professor of International Affairs at the National War College 

in Washington, DC, in the summer of 1998. In the fall of 1987, he was a Visiting Professor at the 

Chinese National Defense University. His teaching and research specialties focus on Chinese defense and security policies. Professor Godwin’s most recent publications include “Security Policy 

and China’s Defense Modernization: A Sixty–Year Perspective,” in New Frontiers in China’s Foreign 

Relations, ed. Allen Carlson and Ren Xiao (Lexington Books, 2011); “Asia’s Dangerous Security 

Dilemma,” Current History 109, no. 728 (September 2010); “The People’s Liberation Army and the 

Changing Global Security Landscape,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational 

Capabilities of the PLA, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (U.S. Army War 

College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010); “The Cradle of Generals: Strategists, Commanders and 

the PLA National Defense University,” in The “People” in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner (U.S. Army 

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008); and “China’s Emerging Military Doctrine: A Role 

for Nuclear Submarines,” in China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, ed. Andrew S. Erickson et 

al. (Naval Institute Press, 2007). He graduated from Dartmouth College with a degree in International Relations, and received his doctorate in Political Science from the University of Minnesota. 

Professor Godwin resides in Chico, California, and is now a consultant and serves as a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.

Alice L. Miller is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the 

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. She is a Research Fellow at the Hoover 

Institution, where she serves as editor of and contributor to the China Leadership Monitor, and 

also teaches in the Departments of History and Political Science at Stanford University. She has 

published two books: Science and Dissent in Post-Mao China: The Politics of Knowledge (University of Washington Press, 1996), and, with Richard Wich, Becoming Asia: Change and Continuity 

in Asian International Relations Since World War II (Stanford University Press, 2011). Prior to 

coming to Monterey and Stanford in 1999, Dr. Miller taught in the School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University from 1980–2000. From 1974–1990, Dr. Miller 

worked in the Central Intelligence Agency as a Senior Analyst in Chinese foreign policy and 

domestic politics, and as branch and division chief, supervising analysis on China, North Korea, 

Indochina, and Soviet policy in East Asia. Dr. Miller graduated from Princeton University in 

1966, receiving a B.A. in Oriental Studies. She earned an M.A. and a Ph.D. in history from The 

George Washington University in 1969 and 1974, respectively. 

Col kris bauman, USAF

Senior Military Fellow

Ms. M. Elaine Bunn

Distinguished Research Fellow

Mr. John A. Cope

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Rozlyn C. Engel

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. T.X. Hammes

Distinguished Research Fellow

Mr. Frank G. Hoffman

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Dr. Christopher J. Lamb

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Dr. Andre Le Sage

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Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III

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Mr. Leo G. Michel

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Dr. James J. Przystup

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Dr. Nicholas Rostow

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Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

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Dr. Judith S. Yaphe

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Dr. Christopher D. Yung

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