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HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

ANDRE B. YOUNG,

 Plaintiff,

v.

PAUL SPIZMAN and DAVID HACKETT,

Defendants.

Case No.: C05-5652-RBL

ORDER 

I. Introduction.

This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant Paul Spizman’s Motion to Dismiss under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), [Dkt. #5], as well as the Defendant David Hackett’s Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), [Dkt. #13], the Plaintiff’s Motion to Cease and Desist

Removal to Federal Court for Want of Federal Jurisdiction, [Dkt. #6], and the Plaintiff’s Motion to Have

Defendant David Hackett Clarify Criteria for Civil Commitment Under Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09, [Dkt.

#21]. Andre B. Young (the “Plaintiff”) brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the

Defendants violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by relying

on false information to conclude that the Plaintiff is a sexually violent predator (an “SVP”) under Wash.

Rev. Code § 71.09.020(16). The Plaintiff is a civil detainee, and is presently confined at the Special

Commitment Center (the “SCC”) for SVP’s on McNeil Island, Washington. 

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II. Discussion.

A. Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Standard.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) should be

granted only if, accepting all of the allegations of material fact as true, and construed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). The

plaintiff, however, must plead factual allegations with specificity; vague and conclusory allegations of fact

fail to state a claim for relief. Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3rd Cir. 1988). 

Dismissal may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory, or the absence of sufficient facts

alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1990). 

B. Plaintiff’s Claim Must Be Brought As a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The notion that a detainee must exhaust all available state remedies before bringing any federal

action for alleged constitutional violations is reinforced by the Court’s reasoning in Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994). There, the Court expounded upon this longstanding and well-established rule and held

that “[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under §

1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the

grant of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 489. The Court further explained that “when a state prisoner

seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” 

Id. This reasoning implies that in these circumstances the challenge must be brought as a petition for writ

of habeas corpus, not as a § 1983 claim. 

Here, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant’s work on the annual forensic evaluations is tainted by

false information. This annual review is consistently relied upon by the Department of Social and Health

Services (the “DSHS”) and the state court in determining whether continued detention is appropriate. This

claim implies the invalidity of the Plaintiff’s continued confinement at the SCC. As such, the Plaintiff’s

claim properly lies in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

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Although the facts of Heck v. Humphrey involved the rights of a plaintiff who was confined in a

state prison, the reasoning is still applicable to the case civil commitment. Huftile v. L C Miccio-Fonseca,

410 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2005). The federal habeas corpus statute applies to all levels of hearings

and is commonly brought to challenge a person’s civil commitment to a state hospital, institution, or

commitment center. Indeed, in the 2001 case of Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) this very same

Plaintiff, who was being held at the SCC, utilized the petition for a writ of habeas corpus as the vehicle for

arguing that the State of Washington’s SVP statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 253. 

C. The Defendant Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity.

The Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages insofar as his

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). When following the rules under

Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09, in order to determine whether the Plaintiff was a SVP, the Defendant could

have reasonably believed that any issues regarding the reliability of information in the Plaintiff’s clinical

records would have been appropriately handled in the state court civil commitment proceedings. The

Defendant is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity under the reasoning of Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 

The Defendant Paul Spizman’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. For the same reasons, the

Court also GRANTS the Defendant David Hackett’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and the clerk

is instructed to enter judgment for the Defendants and dismiss this case. The Court strikes the Plaintiff’s

Motion to Have the Defendant David Hackett Clarify Criteria for Civil Commitment Under Wash. Rev.

Code § 71.09 as frivolous.

D. The Plaintiff’s Claim Supports Federal Question Jurisdiction.

The Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Defendants violated his

First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Consequently, this Court has

federal question jurisdiction. The Plaintiff’s Motion to Cease and Desist Removal to Federal Court for

Want of Federal Jurisdiction is therefore DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 9th day of January, 2006.

ARONALD B. LEIGHTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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