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THE TRANSITION TO A CIVILIAN–LED U.S.

PRESENCE IN IRAQ: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 18, 2010

Serial No. 111–135

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State (Former United States Ambassador 

to Lebanon) ........................................................................................................... 8

Colin Kahl, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle 

East, U.S. Department of Defense ...................................................................... 19

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman: Prepared statement ..................................... 11

Colin Kahl, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................. 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 44

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 45

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 46

The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Prepared statement ............................................................ 48

The Honorable Joe Wilson, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of South Carolina: Prepared statement .............................................................. 50

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 51

Responses from the Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Russ Carnahan ............................................... 53

Questions for the record submitted by the Honorable Russ Carnahan to 

Colin Kahl, Ph.D. (responses not received prior to printing) ........................... 64

Questions for the record submitted by the Honorable Barbara Lee, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, to the Honorable 

Jeffrey D. Feltman and Colin Kahl, Ph.D. (responses not received prior 

to printing) ............................................................................................................ 65

(1)

THE TRANSITION TO A CIVILIAN–LED U.S. 

PRESENCE IN IRAQ: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:24 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. Of course, 

for the third day our Caucus is meeting, although I think it is 

about to end. So I hope we will be joined by some other members 

of the Caucus soon, although we are fortunate to have Mr. Klein. 

In a moment I will recognize myself and the ranking member for 

up to 7 minutes for purposes of making an opening statement. I 

will recognize the chairman and ranking member of the Middle 

East and South Asia Subcommittee for 3 minutes for opening remarks, and then all other members will have an opportunity to 

make 1-minute opening statements, if they wish to do so. Members 

may also place written statements in the record. 

Before I begin the opening statement, I would just like to say a 

few words relevant to the committee. We are coming to the end of 

this Congress. I hope, I expect, I intend for there to be one other 

hearing during this session, hopefully the first week of December, 

a hearing on the implementation of Iran sanctions. It is our intention to have such a hearing. That legislation is one of the things 

I think we can rightfully be proud of accomplishing in this past 

Congress. There are other issues as well, but I am not going to belabor all of that at this particular moment. 

I do want to say to my ranking member that I do think we have 

accomplished a number of things together, and while we haven’t 

agreed on absolutely every single issue, you have been a very good 

partner, a spirited partner. I don’t want to be presumptuous, because I know these decisions haven’t been made, but, were such a 

decision to be made, I would look forward to working with you for 

2 years in your new capacity and my new capacity, if I can afford 

to be presumptuous about my own situation. 

So we have a number of colleagues on the committee who will 

not be here again because we have a Caucus, and who will not be 

here in the next Congress. I would like to mention them, but since 

they are not here I am just going to mention one of my dear friends 

and, I think, a great member of the committee who will not be with 

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us in the next Congress, Congressman Klein, who made a tremendous contribution to the product of this committee and to the Congress. 

I think all of us, and I know this is true of the ranking member 

from our earlier conversations over the years, shares the feeling. 

We will miss having you here very much, Congressman Klein. 

[Applause.] 

Chairman BERMAN. I will now begin the opening statement. This 

hearing will delve into a subject, and I apologize to the witnesses 

for the delay, a subject that, not too long ago, was at the very top 

of our foreign policy agenda: Iraq and the U.S. role there. 

U.S. military forces currently face a December 31, 2011, deadline 

for a complete withdrawal, in accordance with the 2008 agreement 

with the Iraqis. As a result, the primarily Defense Department-led 

military campaign is being transformed into a diplomacy, assistance, and advisory effort led by the State Department and USAID. 

This transition is unprecedented in terms of its sheer complexity, 

the resources required to do it right, and the likely consequences 

of failure. 

As part of this transition, the State Department will be expected 

to manage a number of specialized security-related tasks—often 

with the use of contractors—that in the past were handled exclusively by U.S. military forces. These include operating early-warning radar systems that alert our personnel to incoming rocket fire, 

handling unexploded munitions that land inside of U.S. compounds, running unmanned aerial surveillance; and recovering 

downed vehicles. 

The State Department’s largest program in Iraq is now—and will 

continue to be—police training, but the challenges facing the department in this area will become even greater with the launch of 

a new advanced police training and reform program and with the 

handoff of some training responsibilities from DoD. 

In order to monitor political, economic, and security developments in Iraq; identify potential threats to U.S. interests before 

they emerge; and effectively engage with key political players, the 

State Department also plans a significant expansion of the U.S. 

diplomatic presence in Iraq. In addition to our Embassy in Baghdad—which is already by far the largest staff of any U.S. Embassy 

in the world—State is planning to open four other diplomatic posts: 

Consulates-general in Basra and Erbil and temporary posts, called 

‘‘embassy branch offices’’ in Mosul and Kirkuk. 

The U.S. transition is proceeding in a difficult and dangerous setting. Iraq’s failure to form a workable governing coalition promptly 

after the elections has complicated, and, at times, worsened the security environment in which State is assuming the responsibilities 

once held by Defense. 

Our diplomats and development professionals in Iraq continue to 

face significant perils, with insurgent rocket fire sometimes targeting the Embassy compound. Movements of U.S. officials outside 

their facilities often require security details of up to 20 or 25 people. And with the host country currently unable to provide the security and services routinely offered in most nations, the security 

environment may become even more treacherous after the withdrawal of U.S. forces. 

3

The transition from Defense to State in Iraq is a massive undertaking, and it won’t come cheap. But by any calculation, the costs 

associated with an increased State Department presence pale in 

comparison to the resources we have expended in Iraq through so 

many years of war and terrorism. If funding this transition will 

help preserve the hard-won progress in Iraq and provide a solid 

foundation from which the United States can support Iraq’s internal stability and foster a peaceful Iraqi role in a strategically critical region, then it is likely to be worth paying the price—even in 

these difficult economic times. 

I have a number of questions about the transition. How have 

Iraqi political problems been affecting transition plans and the security situation of our personnel on the ground? How often and 

under what circumstances will our diplomats be able to move 

around the country? What do they expect to accomplish after the 

U.S. military departs Iraq? 

How will our diplomats, civilian professionals, contractors, and 

facilities be protected if U.S. troops are not at hand? What can we 

expect from the Government of Iraq in terms of protection of our 

diplomatic establishments? How is State responding to concerns 

over shortcomings in past management and oversight of its programs in Iraq—as raised, for example, by the Special InspectorGeneral for Iraq Reconstruction—particularly as State plans to 

ramp up use of private contractors to provide both security and 

life-support services? 

And finally, the big question that I hope our witnesses from 

State and Defense will address head on: What are the consequences for U.S. national security if we shortchange the transition effort? In a world where Congress is going to have to make 

very, very difficult budgetary choices, why should funding the transition be a high priority? How will a robust civilian presence in 

Iraq after 2011 serve the larger national interest? What is the administration’s long-term vision for U.S.-Iraq relations? 

Regardless of how one feels about the origins of the Iraq war and 

U.S. policy in the last decade, these complicated issues challenge 

all of us to look ahead, in a bipartisan, manner at the kind of 

strengthened U.S. civilian presence in Iraq that can advance our 

interests and enable us to stand with the Iraqis who are fighting 

extremism and trying to develop their country. 

In a moment I will introduce our witnesses, but first to the ranking member and presumptive chair of the next Congress, Ileana 

Ros-Lehtinen, for any opening remarks that she might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Berman follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

also would like to begin my statement by thanking three departing 

members from our side from our committee, Senator elect Boozman 

of Arkansas and two gentlemen from South Carolina, Mr. Barrett 

and Mr. Inglis. We will miss them, and we thank them for the 

great service to our committee. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely hearing 

today. The U.S. mission in Iraq is in a time of transition. Embassy 

leadership has rotated twice since the committee last received testimony from both the Department of State and the Department of 

Defense. A more fundamental transition is now underway as the 

U.S. combat mission in Iraq ended in August 2010 and the U.S. 

role shifts further. 

As a result, while I respect and admire and thank our witnesses 

for their record of service to our nation, it is difficult to understand, 

Mr. Chairman, why the administration declined to send higher 

ranking officials from the State Department and the Defense Department to a full committee hearing on a matter as important as 

Iraq and future U.S. policy. 

I am concerned that such a decision reflects a broader strategic 

ambivalence in the policy and our approach to Iraq. We owe it to 

our troops who have sacrificed so much in the course of their mission in Iraq to ensure that a strategic defeat does not spring from 

their hard-fought, tactical victory. 

Unfortunately, for most of the last 2 years much of the focus has 

been on dealing with short-term considerations such as drawing 

down troop levels quickly without sufficient focus on the emergence 

of Iran as the key power broker in the country or the long-term seVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:00 Dec 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\111810\62399 HFA PsN: SHIRL

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curity applications and situations or the nature and the extent of 

the future U.S.-Iraqi relationship. 

We do have a strategic framework agreement with Iraq, but 

what is the administration’s strategy for moving this effort forward? We must be both proactive and prospective. Iraq can play a 

critical role in limiting the Iranian influence, which, as all of us 

know, has been destabilizing in the region, and Iran’s ability to 

threaten and intimidate its Gulf neighbors is well documented. 

So a stable, secure and friendly Iraq can help separate Iran and 

Syria, can provide Turkey with a key alternative to economic involvement with Iran, can demonstrate to the Gulf states that Iran 

cannot dominate the northern Gulf, nor can it expand to the south, 

and, finally, a friendly Iraq can help our key allies in the region. 

I would ask that our witnesses address this question: If they 

agree that greater U.S. leverage in Iraq can play a critical role in 

limiting Iran’s influence and Iran’s ability to threaten and intimidate its neighbors, and what specifically is the United States’ near 

and also far reaching and long-term strategy for addressing the 

Iranian threat in Iraq? Would you agree that a stable, sovereign 

and secure Iraq will show that Sunni and Shiite Muslims can cooperate and can diffuse the threat of Sunni extremism, as well as 

the kind of Shiite extremism backed by Iran? 

And going one step further, we have to recognize that Iran’s activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan are components of a broader 

threat that it poses to U.S. interests and allies in the Middle East 

and beyond. The need for a sound, comprehensive strategy has 

never been more vital as we transition our presence to an overwhelmingly diplomatic one and as Iran seeks to exploit that transition period to draw the recently formed Iraqi Government under its 

thumb. We may still be able to achieve a lasting, grand strategic 

victory, but not if we treat Iraq as if they were some sort of end 

state rather than the need for a continuing strategic focus. 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, given the need for full oversight of 

our Iraq policy, I am concerned about news that the State Department has failed to comply with repeated requests by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction for contract data on the 

Iraqi police training program. Given the troubled history of our police training efforts there, the need for oversight of this program is 

particularly important so that we do not repeat past mistakes. 

I share the concerns that were raised by Senators Grassley and 

Coburn in their October 6 letter to the Secretary of State about the 

continued failure of the Bureau to take immediate steps to address 

the lack of cooperation with the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

What guidance has been given employees of the Department of 

State in regards to responding to requests made by SIGIR to ensure that the unanswered request for information does not continue? What has been done by both State and DoD to implement 

the recommendations set forth by SIGIR? 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to express concern regarding the plight of the residents of Camp Ashraf. Mr. Chairman, 

last year you and I issued a joint statement urging the Iraqi Government to live up to its commitment to ensure the continued wellbeing of all who live in Camp Ashraf. However, reports indicate 

7

that denied medical care, including vital treatment for cancer patients, are still being denied to the residents of Ashraf. 

Secretary Feltman, I would urge the Department of State to 

please intervene more proactively to ensure that the humanitarian 

protections to which Ashraf residents are entitled and were promised are going to be upheld. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank the witnesses for their time and look forward to hearing from them about the administration’s plans going 

forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. 

Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Ms. RosLehtinen. 

We are now—I hate to tell you—going to have a series of five 

votes. As soon as the fifth vote is cast I will come back here. Talk 

among yourselves or whatever. 

I just have one thing, though, since the ranking member raised 

it. I want to reaffirm the notion that the commitments on Camp 

Ashraf that were made by the Iraqi Government and all that, I 

share the concern that those are kept and that we not forget about 

that issue. 

With that, the committee will recess until we have finished the 

votes on the House Floor. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman BERMAN. I see neither the chair nor the ranking member of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee and so does 

any member wish to—the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I won’t be able to attend the whole hearing because of a speech on the Floor of the 

House that I am working on about 1 hour from now, but, Mr. 

Chairman, I just would like to note that as we go into this phase 

where American troops are withdrawing we cannot throw those 

people who are our friends, throw them out as if they meant nothing to us. 

Those people who are currently allied with us in the war against 

radical Islam, especially the mullah regime in Iran, should not be 

taken for granted and should not be put in a very dangerous situation. I talk specifically about Camp Ashraf. These are protected 

persons by our own definition. We should not try to placate or let 

the Iraqis build some sort of cordial relationship with the mullah 

dictatorship in Iran by the sacrifice of these freedom loving people. 

Second of all, I would hope that the people in Iraq understand 

that we see it when churches are bombed. We feel it badly when, 

yes, Muslims are killing Muslims, but when Muslims there in Iraq 

start killing Christians it raises even greater alarm here in the 

United States. Just last week, 50 Christians were killed in a Syrian church as it was bombed by radical Muslims. 

We have got to make sure that the Government of Iraq knows 

that is unacceptable, all of the factions in Iraq know that is unacceptable. We need to have a consulate in Erbil to give the Kurds 

a little bit of protection so they will know that they aren’t going 

to be so victimized, and perhaps the Christians, the Syrian Christians, need a province of their own in Iraq that will give them some 

sort of safety in that type of environment. 

8

Those are issues that I think need to be put in the record, Mr. 

Chairman, at the beginning of this hearing. Thank you very much 

for giving me the opportunity to register those areas of concern. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. And 

now I think we should hear the testimony of our witnesses. 

Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman serves as the Assistant Secretary of 

State for Near Eastern Affairs. Previously he served as a U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon. He was also head of the Coalition Provisional 

Authority’s (CPA) Office in the Erbil Province of Iraq and simultaneously served as Deputy Regional Coordinator for the CPA’s 

Northern Area. Ambassador Feltman has been a career member of 

the Foreign Service since 1986, and I think he is uniquely and specially qualified to testify on this subject. 

Dr. Colin Kahl is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

the Middle East. Prior to joining the department he was a Council 

on Foreign Relations Fellow, working at the department on 

counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations. Dr. 

Kahl has also served as coordinator for the Obama campaign’s 

Iraq—Obama campaign? Was it the Obama campaign? The Obama 

campaign’s Iraq Policy Expert Group. Oh, I get it. Okay. It was. 

Well, it is good they have an expert group. And was a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Washingtonbased think tank. 

Gentlemen, we are very pleased you could be with us, and we 

look forward to your testimony. Your entire statements will be included in the record. If you choose to summarize, that will be good. 

Assistant Secretary Feltman? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON) 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member RosLehtinen, honorable members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing and for inviting Dr. Kahl and me to appear before 

you today. Thank you for agreeing to enter my entire statement 

into the record. 

The next few years will be critical for our relationship with Iraq, 

for Iraq’s relationship with its neighbors and for the relationship 

between the people of Iraq and their own government. In each of 

these relationships, the United States has a tremendous amount at 

stake. With Iraq situated strategically in the Middle East, it is profoundly in our national interest that Iraq emerge as a strategic 

partner to the United States, a sovereign, stable, self-reliant nation 

and a positive force for moderation and stability in the region. 

For most of the past 40 years, Iraq has played a negative, a destabilizing role in the region, often allied with our adversaries and 

posing a threat to U.S. interests and those of our friends and allies. 

In the year ahead, as the military continues its drawdown in accordance with our security agreement with Iraq, our mission is 

clear. We must secure the gains our nation and our military have 

made at great cost and great sacrifice, and we must help Iraqis 

move forward in a long-term partnership with us. 

9

Even a few years ago, we might not have been able to anticipate 

having the strategic opportunity that we have today. My written 

statement describes a number of the challenges Iraqis are facing, 

including the need to establish and rebuild functioning social, economic and governing institutions. 

Iraqis have made significant strides, particularly in the security 

area. Iraq has substantial natural resources, a rich cultural history 

and resilient, diverse population, but Iraq is not yet in a position 

to resolve its challenges and make strategic progress on its own 

without continued assistance from us. Left unresolved, the problems Iraq faces have the potential to seriously affect our country’s 

national security as a weak and an unstable Iraq could provide 

sanctuary for international terrorists, become a tool of Iraq’s aggressive neighbors and destabilize the Gulf. 

Last week’s agreement on the framework to form an inclusive 

representative government was a real milestone, but none of us 

should be under the illusion that success is a foregone conclusion 

or that there won’t be significant challenges ahead. It is in our interest that we remain engaged and be a leading partner of Iraq 

through this transition and beyond. 

As you know and as my colleague here can further illuminate, 

the United States is drawing down its military presence in Iraq. 

That presence has already been reduced to below 50,000 troops and 

is slated to draw all the way down by the end of 2011. But we need 

a long-term and sustainable partnership with Iraq, and Iraq’s leaders have made it clear that they want a close, an enduring and a 

civilian-led partnership with the United States. 

The State Department, working intensively with our colleagues 

in the Defense Department, the White House and agencies all 

across the government, is determined to secure that long-term 

partnership and to get this transition right. I would like to thank 

Dr. Kahl and his colleagues at the Department of Defense in particular for their close coordination with us at State on this effort. 

What we have done is identify the areas where Iraq most needs 

our continued assistance over the next 3–5 years in order to become more stable and self-reliant. We have identified the programs 

that will have the biggest impact and the most critical areas, and 

we are implementing those programs with our Iraqi partners, 

building off the progress they and our Embassy and military colleagues have made over the last few years. 

One of the most important examples of work the State Department will be assuming is the police development program. Over the 

past 7 years, the United States has helped Iraq’s Ministry of Interior to expand its security forces up to approximately 600,000 people and train them in counterterrorism and basic police skills. 

But now we must ensure that these forces also have the management, leadership and technical tools and capabilities to provide for 

internal security, protect Iraq’s vulnerable minorities that we have 

heard already talked about and uphold the rule of law. This is a 

basic element of civil society, of more reliant economic growth and 

of respect for human rights. 

Likewise, as our military presence continues to draw down, we 

will continue robust security cooperation with Iraq through an Office of Security Cooperation. We are also implementing assistance 

10

programs aimed at ensuring that Iraq’s economy will be able to 

stand on its own feet and be truly self-reliant. Iraq isn’t there yet. 

Despite having vast oil wealth in the ground, Iraq lacks more basic 

infrastructure and will not be able to fully benefit from these resources for at least 5 more years. 

Our programs help Iraq to establish banking and regulatory 

frameworks and put in place policies for economic growth and diversification which will also help secure the investments of U.S. 

companies in Iraq. 

Outside of Baghdad, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, we plan 

to open two consulates general in Basra and Erbil and two temporary embassy branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul. Our officers 

there in these offices will engage directly with Iraqis at the regional and local levels, helping to diffuse tensions and build institution and other capacities. Tensions between Iraq’s communities are 

still significant, and we have an important role to play in helping 

Iraq’s leaders resolve these sources of friction. 

Turning to how we are transitioning from a military to civilian 

lead, let me say first that we have, as you all know, the finest military in the world, and they have done heroic work in Iraq. The 

State Department will now assume some of these roles and activities previously carried out by the military; some of these the State 

Department has never done before. Dr. Kahl may talk more about 

the excellent support that DoD is providing to us as we move forward. 

Within the State Department there are seven operational areas 

we focus on when we talk about transition: Property, facilities, security, life support, medical, aviation and contractor oversight. In 

each of these cases, we are engaged in very robust planning and 

pursuing our interests in partnership with the Iraqis. 

In summation, securing Iraq’s future as a sovereign, stable, selfreliant nation, a positive force in the region and a strategic partner 

to the United States is a massive undertaking. I see the transition 

from a military-led presence in Iraq to a civilian-led presence to be 

a defining test of the Foreign Service and of the nation’s diplomatic 

corps that I am proud to serve in. 

Our civilian effort in Iraq is a prime example of Secretary Clinton’s strong desire to create a more expeditionary workforce that 

can rise to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. It is imperative that we succeed and that we are able to seize the opportunity and make good on the enormous investments and sacrifices 

made by Americans and Iraqis over the last 7 years. 

I look forward to answering any questions the committee may 

have, and I look forward to working with this committee on achieving these goals. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Feltman follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary 

Feltman. 

And now Secretary Kahl? 

STATEMENT OF COLIN KAHL, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. KAHL. Chairman Berman, Representative Ros-Lehtinen and 

distinguished committee members, I appreciate the opportunity to 

appear before you today alongside my colleague and friend, Assistant Secretary Jeff Feltman, to discuss the issues and challenges associated with the United States’ transition from a predominantly 

military to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. 

This transition includes four key components. The first is ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces reach what we are DoD call minimum essential capabilities or MEC. The second is developing a 

State-led police development program. Third is expanding the diplomatic presence, and fourth is establishing an Office of Security 

Cooperation in Iraq or what we call OSC–I. 

These programs, implemented under the Strategic Framework 

Agreement, are the foundation for building our continued strategic 

partnership with the government and people of Iraq. This is a partnership that includes robust diplomatic, political, economic and security cooperation. 

Assistant Secretary Feltman has discussed the overall U.S. policy 

and the specific programs for our post 2011 presence, so I want to 

focus my remarks on the security situation in Iraq, which is enabling our responsible drawdown to continue as the Iraqis step forward and assume primary responsibility, as well as the support the 

Department of Defense is providing to the State Department to 

help the transition process that Assistant Secretary Feltman alluded to. 

The first thing I want to talk about is the security environment. 

I know members have concerns about the readiness of the Iraqi 

Government to provide security in Iraq as U.S. forces draw down 

between now and December of next year, particularly as extremist 

groups, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, continue to wage high profile attacks against innocent Iraqi civilians. 

Indeed, we continue to see evidence that extremist groups are capable of horrific attacks. Recent examples include the October 31 

attack on Christian church members, the bombings in Shia neighborhoods of Baghdad, followed by attacks on pilgrims in Karbala 

and Najaf in the first week of November, attacks on Christians in 

Baghdad on November 9 and 10 and recent coordinated attacks on 

Iraqi Security Forces in Diyala and Kirkuk. 

Nevertheless, it is crucial to keep in mind that these attacks 

have repeatedly failed to accomplish al-Qaeda in Iraq’s number one 

strategic objective, and that is to spark a return to widespread insurgency and communal civil war. Moreover, despite the often exaggerated media narrative that depicts an Iraq that is teetering on 

the brink of failure or just on the verge of unraveling, the underlying security situation as assessed by our commanders on the 

ground remains strong. 

20

Overall levels of attacks and Iraqi civilian casualties have remained relatively constant at their lowest levels of the post 2003 

period for more than 2 years. This consistently low level of violence 

is even more remarkable considering that it has been maintained 

as the Iraqi Security Forces have assumed primary responsibility 

for security throughout the country and as our force levels have declined from roughly 144,000 troops on the ground when we took office in January 2009 to roughly 50,000 today, while those troops 

have simultaneously shifted their mission from helping to lead 

combat counterinsurgency operations to a predominantly supporting, advise and assist role. 

Since January 1, 2009, the Iraqi Security Forces have been in the 

lead on security operations, a role that they have more capably embraced with each passing month. On September 1 of this year, we 

made the official transition to Operation New Dawn and drew 

down to below 50,000 U.S. troops, fulfilling the President’s commitment made at Camp Lejeune in February 2009 and further cementing the Iraqis’ status as in the lead in the security role. 

While the United States continues to provide vital support to the 

Iraq Security Forces, including training, equipping, mentoring, advising and providing certain critical technical enablers, the Iraqis 

are very much in charge, and they simply no longer need such 

large numbers of U.S. forces to keep the violence in check. The ISF 

have also remained professional and independent of political pressure, despite the prolonged period of uncertainty associated with 

Iraq’s Government formation period. 

Beyond the increased capability of the ISF, the primary factor 

underlying the improved security situation is a viable political 

process that now exists as the enduring framework in which key 

disputes and questions related to the distribution of power and resources can be resolved. 

The vast majority of Iraq’s major parties, factions and communal 

groups, including many former militants, are now heavily invested 

in the political system. In the 6 months it took to form a government in Iraq in 2006 following the December 2005 elections, extremists exploited a security vacuum to plunge Iraq into civil war. 

In 2010, no such vacuum emerged, despite 8 months of sometimes raucous government formation negotiations, largely due to 

the activities of the ISF and a functioning caretaker government. 

That is progress. Last week, after months of heated negotiations, 

Iraqi leaders took a major step forward with the formation of a government coalition, including all the major Iraqi political blocs, as 

well as agreement on a set of political reforms addressing a series 

of divisive issues. 

As Vice President Joe Biden often remarks, ‘‘politics has broken 

out’’ in Iraq. As we all know, it is often messy, as it is even in the 

most developed democracies, but the Iraqi commitment to the political process is real. As we have witnessed in recent weeks, violence 

will continue to challenge this process, but as long as the Iraqis 

stay committed to resolving their differences through the force of 

words rather than the force of arms, we believe Iraq is unlikely to 

sink back into widespread violence. 

Iraq will continue to suffer terrorist attacks, both over the next 

year and after U.S. forces complete their drawdown, but the level 

21

of U.S. support required to assist the Iraq Security Forces in keeping violence at low levels and below a threshold that we judge 

would threaten the viability of the Iraqi state is a small fraction 

of previous years. Moreover, it is our judgment that the current 

military footprint on the ground is currently so modest compared 

to what it used to be in the past that the remaining drawdown over 

the next year is unlikely to trigger a dramatic surge in violence. 

I want to say a few words about what DoD is doing to help the 

State Department in the transition that is ongoing. As Assistant 

Secretary Feltman stated, the Department of State, the Department of Defense and other agencies and offices have undertaken 

unprecedented levels of coordination and planning for the transition in Iraq. DoD has an excellent working relationship with the 

State Department, and we are working together at all levels to 

achieve a successful transition. 

As one would expect with a transition of this scope and complexity, challenges exist. DoD is doing everything it can to help set 

up the State Department for success during this process. After a 

comprehensive review process, USF–I, that is U.S. Forces in Iraq, 

identified 1,127 essential activities that DoD performs in Iraq. The 

tasks were binned into 24 different categories, examples of which 

include intelligence, telecommunications and reconciliation efforts. 

In close coordination with Embassy Baghdad, USF–I completed 

the process of canvassing, categorizing and defining handover plans 

for these activities and functions, determining what would be 

turned over to the Iraqis, what would be turned over to U.S. civilian agencies or multilateral or private institutions or terminated 

altogether. 

The Embassy has already taken the lead on 150 of these tasks 

and will assume control of another 310 as USF–I complete its 

drawdown over the next year. Eighty-two will be transferred to 

U.S. Central Command and 36 to the Iraqi Government. Five hundred and thirty have been completed, and 22 were identified as 

nonessential and therefore will be phased out. 

In addition, we are leaning forward to provide the State Department with excess equipment and other forms of support. Recently, 

for example, the Army has identified 60 excess MRAPS and nine 

fuel trucks for transfer to the State Department for use beyond 

2011. An OSD and Joint Staff team is also working with State to 

plan for the receipt and maintenance of this equipment. We are 

working with the State Department to help them define other requirements for additional equipment and support. We have established a State-DoD Senior Ad Hoc Working Group that meets on 

a weekly basis to work through State’s requests, as well as other 

emerging requirements. 

On September 27, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved providing life support after 2011 to the State Department on a reimbursable basis, so-called LOGCAP support. Embassy Baghdad is 

receiving substantial technical support from USF–I, the Army Materiel Command and OSD staff. This is a good start, but in the 

coming year DoD will likely have to do even more to assist the 

State Department to ensure a successful transition, and we will. 

In conclusion, our continued engagement in Iraq remains vital. 

We are now at the point where the strategic dividends of our enorVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:00 Dec 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\111810\62399 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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mous sacrifice are within reach, as long we take the proper steps 

to consolidate our hard-fought gains. Building a long-term strategic 

partnership with Iraq, based on mutual interests and mutual respect, presents many advantages for the United States. 

Continued U.S. support for the Iraqi Security Forces, including 

joint training exercises and military exchanges, will also help to ensure steady improvements in Iraqi capabilities even beyond 2011 

and over time improved interoperability that will facilitate Iraq’s 

long-term cooperation with the United States and other regional 

states to address common challenges. 

Continued security assistance and cooperation through the Office 

of Security Cooperation in Iraq that we are in the process of standing up will assist in addressing concerns we share with Iraq, such 

as counterterrorism, counterproliferation, maritime security and air 

defense. 

In this context, however, reduced funding is a challenge for the 

transition. Security costs are high, and planners must base costs on 

the conditions today, not on best case assumptions of what they 

may be in 2012. As the U.S. draws down its military presence, the 

Iraqi Government must feel that it has the foundational capabilities to defend against external threats both objectively and subjectively. 

Our country has sacrificed a great deal in Iraq, and fully 

resourcing the mission to its completion is vital to ensuring that 

this enormous national investment produces enduring results. We 

are 10 yards from the goal line and need one final push. 

With that I look forward to your questions. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kahl follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank both of you very much, and I 

will now yield myself 5 minutes to begin the questioning. 

Secretary Kahl, in the forthcoming Brookings study on Iraq that 

is about to be released, the authors say the U.S.’ top priority in 

Iraq should be to prevent the outbreak of another civil war. This 

is a quote from the draft:

‘‘By far, the most important U.S. military mission now is to 

support Iraq’s internal stability by continuing to perform peace 

keeping functions, especially, but not exclusively, in Kirkuk 

and other territories disputed by Arabs and Kurds in northern 

Iraq.’’

The authors say that the U.S. troops can be a crucial substitute 

until trust is reestablished between contending Iraqi groups. Do 

you agree with that view? Do you foresee U.S. troops playing that 

role on an ongoing basis? What will the consequences be if they 

don’t? 

Mr. KAHL. Well, I have not read the draft Brookings report, although I am familiar with the arguments made by many of its authors and its general conclusions. 

I think the judgment of the Department of Defense, as well as 

other agencies and departments, to include the State Department, 

is that a return to the dark days of 2006 and 2007 where there was 

an all-out communal civil war is unlikely under most foreseeable 

circumstances, and I think it is our general assessment that the 

drawdown is completely compatible with consolidating the security 

gains that we have seen over the last 2 years. 

I think it is worth noting that we have pulled out almost 100,000 

forces since January 2009, and yet those security trends have 

stayed relatively positive. That included us leaving the cities in 

June 2009, handing over formal security responsibility to the Iraqis 

for the first time and then of course drawing down and changing 

our mission this past September. 

So I think we have actually seen some evidence for the fact that 

the Iraqi Security Forces, which now number more than 660,000, 

are capable of beating back the extremists and preventing the kind 

of back sliding that that report mentions. 

I will say, though, that in the next year and beyond we will continue to work with the Iraqi Security Forces to professionalize 

them, modernize them, and the State Department will be actively 

engaged precisely on some of those Arab-Kurd fault line areas that 

were mentioned in the report. 

I would defer to Assistant Secretary Feltman, but keep in mind 

that two of the embassy branch offices are in Kirkuk and Mosul for 

precisely the kind of conflict resolution and engagement efforts that 

will continue to be important in the coming years. 

Chairman BERMAN. Just to add that while there are a number 

of things for the State Department that are new in terms of security operations, they are still not going to be involved in peacekeeping operations in those areas. 

Secretary Feltman, real quickly. Sadr. He seems to have been a 

critical part of Maliki’s ability to apparently become the next prime 

minister or continue in that job. He started out after the election 

vigorously opposed to Maliki. What do you think convinced Sadr to 

31

throw his support to Maliki? To what extent will the Sadrists exert 

influence in the government that is being formed, and to what extent is the Sadrist faction a threat to U.S. interests in Iraq? A 

minute and 25 seconds. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think the question is 

even related to what you asked my colleague and friend, Colin, just 

a second ago because I think what the Iraqis have done is they 

have built an inclusive government. The Iraqis themselves have 

said they want everybody inside because they want the differences 

among them to be fought out on political grounds, through political 

means, through the constitutional organs, not on the street. 

And so, yes, the Sadrists are part of this equation, but the 

Sadrists are only one part of the equation. Everybody is inside. I 

think the little theatrics, the melodrama we saw in the Parliament 

on November 11, showed, as Vice President Biden said and as 

Colin quoted, ‘‘Politics has broken out in Iraq.’’

And so I think it is actually positive that everybody is inside. It 

may not be the most efficient way to do things, but——

Chairman BERMAN. Let me just interject only because of the 

time. Taking your line, is Alawi, as a key part of the government, 

part of that sort of getting everybody inside and in the political 

process? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Alawi himself played a critical role in 

bringing all of Iraqiya in. Alawi right now seems to be in a little 

bit of a huff off in London, but all of his Sunni leaders that are 

part of Iraqiya that are so important to Iraq’s stability, to the regional integration, have agreed that they are part of the government. 

Chairman BERMAN. My time has expired. I recognize the 

gentlelady, the ranking member, for 5 minutes and ask Ambassador Watson if she would just take the chair for a moment while 

I have a quick meeting. I will be back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Feltman, Chairman Berman and I had asked about or had 

related to you our concerns about Camp Ashraf residents, their humanitarian problems, lack of protection. If you could elaborate on 

that? That is number one. 

Number two, I wanted to ask you about the reports that we have 

been hearing about hundreds of former Sunni sectarian fighters 

who had joined the Awakening or the Sons of Iraq, reconciled with 

the government, many of whom have gained extensive knowledge 

about the U.S. military, and they appear to have rejoined al-Qaeda. 

Reports indicate that many of these Awakening fighters are still 

on the Iraqi Government’s payroll and are covertly aiding the insurgency. If you could verify that and what vetting mechanisms we 

have in place to prevent covert assistance to the insurgency by 

Awakening fighters? 

And then lastly, sirs, what is the administration’s strategy to address concerns surrounding the development fund for Iraq and the 

outstanding United Nations Security Council resolution that Iraq 

is still technically subjected to? Do you believe that we can utilize 

this leverage with the Iraqi Government as a means to hedge 

against the growing Iranian influence in the government? 

32

So if I could ask you, any of you, those three questions? Thank 

you. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Thank you, Congresswoman RosLehtinen. First of all, I think I speak for all of us that are working 

on this Iraq file. We agree with you and the chairman 100 percent 

that the Iraqi Government needs to live up to its commitments to 

protect the human rights of the residents of Camp Ashraf. We 

agree 100 percent. 

It is something that we are watching and monitoring extremely 

closely. It is not only us, there is international effort as well. The 

U.N. and others are also involved in encouraging the Iraqi Government to live up to its commitments. Basic food, basic medical supplies and basic fuel are getting in to the residents of Camp Ashraf. 

There are a lot of mutual provocations between the Iraqis and 

the residents that aren’t particularly helpful. We have told everyone to lower the rhetoric because this could quickly lead to a miscalculation and get out of control. When there have been incidents 

reported to us, we have engaged with the committee of the Iraqi 

Government that is in charge of this portfolio. 

I think that our engagement has had some success and reminded 

the Iraqis of their obligations under international humanitarian 

law to provide for the human rights of the residents of Camp 

Ashraf. So we agree with you and we need to keep watching this. 

We are glad that we have international partners that are involved. 

In terms of the Sons of Iraq, in general I would say that this has 

been a success story. By the time of the Iraqi elections in March, 

about 43 percent of the roughly 95,000 people who are part of the 

Sons of Iraq had been incorporated into security, or for the most 

part civilian positions inside the government. This was all put on 

hold during the elections and government formation, but the Iraqis 

have formed a Sons of Iraq Coordination Center in the Ministry of 

Defense to continue the programs. They are continuing the payments. 

In terms of allegations of individual members I will ask Dr. Kahl 

if he can comment, but in general this has been a success story. 

I think that the overall numbers tell us this. If you look at 2007, 

there were about 3,800 violent incidents a month in Iraq. Thirtyeight hundred. And now today there are some horrible incidents 

happening, but it is roughly 250 to 300 a month. A big difference 

from 3,800 a couple of years ago. 

On DFI, Iraq, as you know, was subject to a number of Chapter 

7 obligations under the Security Council, mostly stemming from 

the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Iraq has made some progress in moving to get out from under these Chapter 7 obligations. We want to 

see Iraq get out from under these Chapter 7 obligations as they 

meet the benchmarks that are there. They have met the requirements, for example, to get out from under the WMD-related Chapter 7 obligations and they are working to complete the Oil for Food. 

But some of these are actually things I think that even the Iraqis 

would agree are helpful. Resolution 1483 had a Chapter 7 obligation on all of us to return——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you. I am sorry. My time 

is up. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Oh, I am sorry. 

33

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. But thank you. Good answers. Thank you, 

Madam Ambassador. 

I would ask Mr. Fortenberry to take over for me. I have a few 

more appointments. 

Ms. WATSON [presiding]. Yes. I was just going to go to Mr. 

Fortenberry for questions. In the meantime, I will recognize myself 

for the next 5 minutes while he is taking the ranking member’s 

place. 

I address this to both of you. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan has been expressing concern that 

the transition has, at least in the past, proceeded too slowly and 

suffered from inadequate coordination between the State and DoD. 

What are some of the specific steps both Departments have been 

taking to improve the collaboration and clarify what needs to be 

done as military forces leave and the State inherits some of their 

responsibilities, along with what is being done in your various Departments to make certain that transition decisions can be made 

quickly and at high levels in order to avoid a bureaucratic backlog 

that may halt a successful transition? 

I will start with you, Mr. Feltman, or Mr. Kahl? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Thank you. There are a number of reports 

that we have that help us, to guide us, that show us some of the 

challenges of working in these environments so I am glad you 

brought this up. We certainly have a lot of lessons learned. 

I think the coordination right now, echoing what Dr. Kahl said 

earlier, is excellent. I will use one example, what we call LOGCAP. 

LOGCAP is Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, it means life 

support. It is the DoD contracting mechanism that provides the life 

support for people working in Iraq. We in the State Department 

have never had anything quite this complicated to deal with, and 

DoD has generously said that they will continue the LOGCAP contracting for us on a reimbursable basis. 

It is the type of example of coordination that we are doing now 

where DoD knows how to do this life supporting contracting, they 

know how to monitor it; they know how to make sure that there 

is proper oversight built in. They know all it takes, we are learning. So they have agreed to renew the LOGCAP on a reimbursable 

basis to make sure we get it right. That is one example. 

Police training is another one, a very key one. We will have our 

police training program in place by July 1 next year, but not actually taking responsibility for the program until October 1 next year. 

Ms. WATSON. Let me just ask. Is your police training separate 

from the training of their forces to be able to defend their own 

country? Is it a separate type of training? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. It is a separate type of training, but we 

have built in a 3-month overlap so that the transition is smooth. 

What DoD has done is they have done force generation, built up 

the Iraqi forces, built up the Iraqi security services. There were 

58,000 police in 2003, there are now over 600,000 people that work 

in the security field. That is force generation. There has been focus 

on basic training and counterterrorism operations. 

What the State Department will do is move to everything you 

need for a criminal justice and security system to work. You want 

honest cops on the——

34

Ms. WATSON. Yes. Do they have courts? Do they have people——

Ambassador FELTMAN. Yes. Our program will be integrated into 

a criminal justice program that includes Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, all——

Ms. WATSON. That is us. Do they have theirs up and running? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Theirs are there, but there is a lot of 

work that needs to be done to have an integrated system of policemen on the streets, pretrial detention, court systems for criminal 

cases and then rehabilitation and jail sentence afterwards. 

So we are doing a whole government approach that goes from the 

honest cop on the street to the fair judge in the courtroom. 

Ms. WATSON. You know, what is really frustrating me, and I 

asked this way, way back when the word came to our committee. 

It looks like we are in nation building, and it looks like we are 

going to have a long-term commitment if we still have establishment of a judiciary to do. 

You know, every time there is development of a new program in 

the process it is costing us a lot. Can we see an end in sight in 

terms of the judiciary? I mean, we are building a nation, and we 

are paying the cost of it. What confounds me is why is it taking 

the Iraqis so long to see their own people trained to fight crime and 

then to protect their own borders? What is wrong? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I am sorry. I left out a key difference between the DoD force generation security program and what we are 

doing now. We are working much more on train the trainers so 

that they themselves are doing the work. 

Ms. WATSON. That is what I wanted to hear. Train the trainers 

so we can get our people out of there in a reasonable amount of 

time. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Yes, we are talking about a transitional 

program and not doing things that the Iraqis themselves need to 

be responsible for. We are talking about how to unleash the Iraqi 

capacity so they can do it themselves. 

Ms. WATSON. Absolutely. We have been there what, 8 years now? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Yes, about 7, 8 years. 

Ms. WATSON. Yes. Slow learners I guess. You know, what did 

they do before? Did they depend on Saddam Hussein? Yes, sir? Mr. 

Kahl? 

Mr. KAHL. I would just say one of the challenges of course is it 

has been a little bit like building an airplane in flight. 

We have been generating a lot of these institutions, helping them 

build back institutions that were flattened or that were left to degrade under Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and then 20 years of 

war and sanctions and other things, as well as obviously the strife 

that inflicted the country in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion. So 

we are building institutions in an incredibly challenging environment. 

There are institutions for the rule of law. They continue to be a 

work in progress, but in fact one of the things, I think one just 

anecdote, one of the things that actually catalyzed the government 

formation coalition that we saw over the last couple weeks was a 

ruling by the Iraqi Constitutional Court that time was up and that 

the Iraqis had to go on with forming their government. 

35

The fact that the court made that ruling and that the Iraqi politicians complied I think is evidence of an evolving rule of law. 

Ms. WATSON. Yes. My time is up now, but I will just say this last 

thing before I go to Mr. Fortenberry. 

I see a long-term commitment. I mean, we have had this conversation in this committee a couple of years ago. It is still going 

on. I am wondering. It appears to me that they would like us to 

leave their country, and maybe we ought to compromise and leave 

sooner. If we have been training the trainers in the last few years, 

they are slow learners if they don’t have it now. 

And with that I will go on to Congressman Fortenberry. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. Gentlemen, 

I appreciate your willingness to come out today. I believe primarily 

my discussion will be with you, Mr. Secretary Feltman. A pleasure 

to see you again. 

As you know, I am from Nebraska. Now, when you think about 

Nebraska, you might think of corn, cattle, football, something like 

that, but it is also home to a diverse set of communities that are 

a diversity of communities of refugees, many of whom are Iraqis 

who have sought asylum and a peaceful environment out on the 

prairie. 

I want to also commend your deputy, Mr. Corbin, for coming out 

to Nebraska. We actually had a very productive town hall meeting, 

as I have shared privately with you before, with the Iraqi community and learned that there is a good continuity there, even in Nebraska, among people who perhaps in their former homeland didn’t 

necessarily have the type of interaction that you would expect in 

America, so that was a pleasant surprise. 

With that said, I think the extent to which we can judge our efforts in Iraq as a success is also dependent upon a very important 

question. To the degree that we have to help protect ethnic and religious minorities and help them fully integrate into the economic 

and political life of the emerging new country, there is a quiet diaspora going on in Iraq, and that has become heightened of late with 

the bombing of the Catholic church. Many people perhaps don’t realize that Iraq had as many as 2 million Christians at one time. 

The number may now be as low as 400,000. 

This problem that is going on not only in Iraq, but in other 

places in the Middle East, robs people of their ancient homeland. 

It is a grave injustice. It is becoming incumbent upon countries 

such as the United States to help absorb populations who have a 

right to remain in peace and security and again their ancient 

homeland. 

So again, the bombing of the church several weeks ago highlights 

the vulnerability here of that particular religious minority, but 

there are others. In my town of Lincoln we have a fairly well established Yezidi community as well, another ancient religion who has 

traditionally enjoyed some degree of insulation within the borders 

of Iraq. So it is my understanding that the Prime Minister visited 

the church that was bombed. I think that was an important signal. 

It is my understanding that they have committed to rebuild the 

church with Iraq’s funds. 

What else can we do to work in tandem particularly with the 

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ture, to demand, to cajole, to admonish that the religious minority 

populations are an essential part of Iraqi’s important cultural history in the Middle East and provide a leavening presence in that 

country? Their loss would be devastating I think to the future of 

their country. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Congressman, thank you. We share your 

horror over the church bombings and other attacks that these vulnerable minorities have suffered. It is atrocious, reprehensible. 

I would say that we in the government spend more time thinking 

and talking about the Iraqi minorities than we do the larger groups 

in Iraq, and that is because they are more vulnerable. They deserve to have more attention, more thought put toward how we 

might be of assistance. 

As you know from the anecdote that you described, our minorities coordinator, Michael Corbin, is doing a really good job of reaching out to the minority communities in the United States to hear 

from them, to get an idea from them of what their people back 

home most need, where we might most be of service. 

After that church bombing it was not only that the Prime Minister visited the church and vowed to use government funds to rebuild it—and we will hold him to that, by the way—you had condemnation from across the spectrum, including the Grand Ayatollah Sistani from Najah. I think all of the Iraqis were——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Does this shock the sensibilities of all of Iraq? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Yes. Words like shock were used in these 

condemnations, and I think they were sincere. 

Now, in terms of what is the United States doing, first of all, 

whenever there is an attack like this our forces, our military people, go to the Iraqis and say hey, how can we help? How can we 

follow up? How can we help you get to the bottom of this? We are 

not in the cities anymore, but we can help provide background. Our 

political leaders from Washington, as well as Ambassador Jeffrey, 

go to the political leadership and make similar pleas. 

When we designed our strategy for Iraq for the transition period 

ahead, we picked out those places for embassy branch offices partially because of the minorities being there, so that we would be 

able to engage with the minorities on the ground, the Christian 

communities in Ninawa Province, continue the assistance programs 

that we are providing that have both short-term emergency humanitarian aspects and long-term job creation aspects. 

We need to work in partnership with the Iraqis to have a viable 

future for these communities in Iraq. We agree. The fact that there 

is now an inclusive government coming together that is proud to 

represent all of Iraq’s groups, I think we have a good partner for 

this. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Ms. WATSON. I would like now to call on Mr. Costa from California for questions. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson. Secretary Kahl, you talked about the drawdown dates. What do you 

believe the military’s presence in Iraq will look like 5 years from 

now? 

Mr. KAHL. Congressman, that is a good question. We have an 

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tration in November 2008. At the time it was referred to as the 

Status of Forces Agreement. 

Mr. COSTA. Right. 

Mr. KAHL. We call it the Security Agreement. It calls for remaining forces to be out of Iraq by 2011. The President has been clear 

that we are going to comply with the terms of the Security Agreement. 

We will have a robust Office of Security Cooperation that lingers 

beyond that, which falls under the Chief of Mission authority. That 

will be——

Mr. COSTA. But at the end of the day, it really is going to depend 

upon the Iraqis’ ability to stand on their own and what presence 

they want us to play? 

Mr. KAHL. Well, it is not completely condition dependent because 

we have an agreement. So the only conditions in which——

Mr. COSTA. I am talking beyond the agreement. 

Mr. KAHL. I understand, sir. It would require the Iraqis to request——

Mr. COSTA. Right. 

Mr. KAHL [continuing]. An additional stay and for us to——

Mr. COSTA. Agree to it. 

Mr. KAHL [continuing]. Agree to that. 

Mr. COSTA. Yes. In terms of the transition between you and the 

State Department, I think there is concern—there always has 

been—in terms of American personnel, Embassy people, USAID, to 

ensure security is there in the outlying provinces. 

Do you feel confident that that is going to be able to protect those 

American men and women and others who are assisting in getting 

the government’s feet and its economy back on track? 

Mr. KAHL. I feel confident that the State Department is planning 

against the security conditions as they are now, and since we expect the security conditions to continue to improve I think that the 

State Department will be well positioned beyond 2011 to continue 

to operate and contribute to Iraq’s progress beyond that point. 

If circumstances were to deteriorate substantially then we would 

have to re-evaluate, but we don’t anticipate that circumstances are 

going to deteriorate substantially. 

Mr. COSTA. Secretary Feltman, I am concerned about the overall 

ability of this government to try to institute these institutions of 

democracy and what still seems to me in that part of the world to 

be a situation in which corruption, if not a way of life, is endemic. 

I told that to Prime Minister Maliki when I first met him 4 years 

ago, and I am not so sure how much progress we have made there. 

Could you give us an assessment, notwithstanding the institutions’ 

performances so far, as to that level of corruption? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Congressman Costa, corruption is a problem. You put your finger on it when you talked to Prime Minister 

Maliki. It is one of the many problems that Iraq has to deal with, 

but it is a significant one. 

There is an Iraqi Commission that has been established and we 

are supporting it; they have had some successes. In 2009, they 

prosecuted and convicted the Deputy Minister of Transportation. 

They have prosecuted collaborators of the Minister of Trade and 

these people are in prison. So there has been some success. 

38

We also have rule of law advisors who are working in the provinces with provincial leaders against this. We are supporting OIGs 

in various ministries, but it needs to be more institutionalized. This 

is a real challenge. 

We ourselves have a coordinator against anticorruption measures 

in the Embassy, so we have a part of the Embassy that is working 

full-time on the very issue you have recognized because the Iraqi 

people have to see that the government is accountable. Accountability is part of having a responsible democratic government. 

Mr. COSTA. And how would you grade the ability of the government this far to demonstrate some level of credibility that it is just 

not a way of life as I described it to the Prime Minister and that 

they are making changes, that there is some people that are viewed 

or believed to be on the up and up? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. A couple thing. Maybe even partially in 

response to your meeting, Prime Minister Maliki did announce, and 

with our support, an anticorruption campaign that he himself has 

put his name and office behind so that there was a high level push. 

Again, we are supporting this in terms of institution and financing 

as well to give it some heft. 

These prosecutions that took place were high profile prosecutions 

so people can see that there is stuff taking place. A lot more needs 

to be done. 

Mr. COSTA. Yes, obviously. I want to switch tracks quickly before 

my time runs out. 

On my last visit there we went out to Anbar Province and we 

started doing some exchanges. Not only do they have a tremendous 

amount of oil resources, but it used to be the bread basket of the 

Middle East. There is tremendous agricultural opportunities with 

the Tigris and Euphrates. 

What efforts have taken place to get the agricultural economy 

going again? We have done some exchanges with some of our universities, with Fresno State in California and Anbar University. Is 

there more of that going on? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Well, a couple things. USDA in June took 

out a delegation with representatives from 17 U.S. agribusiness 

firms to try to find partnerships and opportunities with Iraqis. 

They met with over 200 Iraqi agribusiness representatives. So we 

are trying to promote some U.S. business exchanges in line with 

what you are doing on the academic side. 

Also, AID is stepping up work in the agricultural sector, because 

it is not only that that used to be a bread basket, it is a real potential for employment generation. Iraq needs jobs that are in the non 

oil sector, and this is a real potential. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you both for 

being here. 

I want to zero in on first Camp Ashraf and the situation as it 

is today and what is taking place there. I personally am concerned 

about the residents of Camp Ashraf, the 4,000 people that are in 

there. I have received information from the residents about several 

things that are taking place. Here are some photographs taken by 

39

residents of Camp Ashraf, and I will have to let these get closer 

to you all. 

Their concern is about the 112 loudspeakers that are posted 

around the entire camp that are blaring in to Camp Ashraf at all 

times of the day and night apparently comments such as we are 

going to set Ashraf on fire; Ahmadinejad is a great President, all 

of you should follow him; you will soon see how the Iraqis are going 

to attack and destroy this camp; and we will hang every one of you. 

It seems to me to be some type of psychological torture, torment, 

whatever you want to call it, to the residents of Camp Ashraf. First 

of all, I am not sure who is doing this. Is it Iranians with the permission of the Iraqis? Is it Iraqis? Is it both? Do either one of you 

know about this? Secretary Feltman? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. The residents of Camp Ashraf and their 

family and family members here have certainly told us about this. 

We are aware of this, yes. 

Mr. POE. And what is your opinion of it? Do you think that is 

the way we ought to be treating folks in Camp Ashraf? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Congressman, Camp Ashraf is under 

Iraqi sovereignty. That is just a fact. We have to accept the fact 

that it is under Iraqi sovereignty. 

Mr. POE. I understand that, but do you think these are Iranians 

or Iraqis that are blaring these loud speakers? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I don’t know who is blaring it in, but the 

commitment that we have from the Iraqis that they must live up 

to, that we will be working to make sure they live up to, is that 

they do not deport them to a country where they could be tortured 

for their political beliefs, where they could be arrested and detained for their political beliefs. 

That is a commitment that the Iraqis have given us. It is part 

of an international understanding that is with the Iraqis now. 

Mr. POE. Excuse me. I am just limited on time. Do you think 

that that is a commitment that they are going to live up to or we 

just hope they are going to live up to? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. We are watching this all the time. The 

Camp Ashraf residents are not popular in Iraq. They were part of 

the whole——

Mr. POE. I know where they came from. I know they are Iranians. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. So this is a political issue in Iraq, and 

both sides around that camp in our view have engaged in needless 

and dangerous provocations basically. 

Mr. POE. Well, do you think that setting up 112 loudspeakers 

that are going off all day and night saying all kinds of propaganda 

things against the Camp Ashraf residents is something that should 

be a concern to the United States, or we should just forget this because now it is not our problem? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. No. I think all of these basically dangerous versions of name calling, provocations, et cetera, should all 

be stopped because you don’t know when things are going to get 

out of control. You don’t know when someone is going to cross a 

line that leads to violence. 

Mr. POE. I agree. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. It has happened before. 

40

Mr. POE. So what are we doing about this, these loudspeakers? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. We are in constant touch with the Iraqis 

on this. The U.N. is in constant touch with the Iraqis on this. 

There have been some incidents that have taken place lately that 

we have played a facilitating role in calming things down. 

Mr. POE. Are we trying to get these loudspeakers down, or are 

we just talking about it? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. We are telling people you need to lower 

the temperature on both sides. 

Mr. POE. So if they don’t, what do we do? I am just concerned 

about when we are finally gone what happens to these residents in 

Camp Ashraf? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. We support an international solution for 

this whole problem. We need to have an international resolution for 

the whole problem of the residents of Camp Ashraf. You can’t predict when there might be one of these provocations that crosses the 

line and leads to violence. 

Mr. POE. Exactly. Are you concerned as a representative of the 

United States about the Iranian influence in not only Camp 

Ashraf, but Iraq as well? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Yes, of course. We are concerned about 

Iranian influence across the region. I am the Assistant Secretary 

for NEA. We see Iran’s bad behavior in a lot of different places, but 

what we see happening——

Mr. POE. Has it stabilized? Is it getting worse? Is it about the 

same? Is it getting better? I mean, kind of give me a thermometer 

of what your opinion is of the Iranian influence in Iraq. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. It is there, but I think that the Iraqis 

have shown time and time again that they are making decisions 

based on Iraqi considerations. 

You know, whether that is talking about government formation, 

how to conduct elections, how to do their alliances, whether to go 

against the Iranian backed Shia militias, time and time again the 

Iraqis have acted like Iraqis. 

Mr. POE. One more question if I may. The Christians that have 

been murdered in Iraq. Our position as a nation. Who is responsible for that? Al-Qaeda claims responsibility. Do you agree that alQaeda is responsible for that or somebody else? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Yes, and specifically a group called the Islamic State of Iraq, which is an al-Qaeda affiliate, has taken credit. 

We think it is credible. 

I think it shows how awful these people are that they are doing 

this sort of thing, but it also shows their desperation, that they are 

having to go after these vulnerable minorities because they have 

failed to reignite the Sunni-Shia clashes that I think they had 

hoped to ignite. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. WATSON. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from 

Texas, Sheila Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Chair, it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to be yielded by such a distinguished diplomat as yourself. Let me thank Congresswoman Watson for her own service in 

the cause of diplomacy and peace and human rights. I thank ChairVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:00 Dec 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\111810\62399 HFA PsN: SHIRL
41

man Berman for yielding the chair to the congresswoman and 

thank the chairman for this hearing. 

If I have had a moment of pleasure on this committee, it is because of the very fine staff and diplomats of the United States Department of State, so I want to take this opportunity to personally 

thank you and the Secretary of State and the numbers of individuals that I have engaged with in a number of opportunities to represent the United States in faraway places. 

We, I believe, have the moral compass of right. This is not a 

hearing about Haiti, but am I outraged about the failing government in Haiti, the suffering people with cholera? I am. Am I concerned about the Sudanese and the elections coming up? I am. And 

the hot spot that Pakistan has become, Burma and others? Yes, I 

am. 

And I raise those particular countries because at one point or another we have stuck our nose in there, rightly so. I hope we will 

be sticking our nose back in Haiti because I believe that we are in 

a complete collapse there, but this is not a hearing on Haiti. 

But we have taken up the cause of human rights, and I want Mr. 

Feltman and your esteemed colleague here to comment on Iraq 

from this perspective. Let me give my bias. We went into Iraq looking for weapons of mass destruction, and all we did is destroy and 

make worse to a certain extent. I am not a fan of the present government. I am not a fan of Maliki, a Shiite, and al-Alawi, who is 

a Sunni, whose name I may not have pronounced correctly, but I 

know him when I see him. 

It is a constant, continuous contact sport of who can have the 

upper hand, who can fill their pockets even more. So we have less 

troops there, but I don’t think the United States can abandon its 

responsibility concerning human rights. 

So let me pointedly ask a question about the people in Camp 

Ashraf. Not only do they have loud noises and torture and afraid 

for their life and the people in this country, Iranian-Americans 

whose families were left behind or whose families went to be able 

to save the lives of other family members living in utter fear. 

Can you tell me what humanitarian act is it to let sick and dying 

people die because they have no access to medical care? Elham, 

Mehdi, both suffering massively from cancer, being denied the opportunity, one with thyroid cancer, one with acute kidney cancer in 

a critical state, already lost one of their kidneys, and they need to 

undergo an operation and they can’t seem to get into a hospital. 

Where is our stance on human rights? We are continuing to plow 

investment into Iraq. Let me be very clear. I hope we have a pathway of economic opportunity. I hope there is a pathway for businesses in the United States. After all, look at the enormous measure of blood that we shed in that place. And what do we have to 

show for it? 

I believe if we do not leave behind a civilized society that in their 

own way—they don’t have to follow the American way. They don’t 

have to have the Harris County Public Health System. But in their 

own way cannot treat people in a humanitarian way. If they cannot 

form a government in less than 100 years, which it appears to be, 

that still is not stable and still we have not agreed to then we have 

failed. 

42

If we keep continuing to say they are a sovereign nation, sovereign about what? They are not a sovereign nation. They are a collapsed government. There is nothing positive going on there other 

than the massive new embassy that we have and the hard working 

State Department employees that ground out their lives there 

every single day. Thank them for their service. 

Mr. Feltman, I can’t let you leave this room without telling me 

what are you going to do in our State Department about the conditions in Camp Ashraf? I come here every time there is a hearing 

and say the same thing. What we understand is the Iraqi soldiers 

are the ones that are intimidating these people. Now, if you can 

prove that they are spies then it is something else. 

May I yield 1 additional minute? Let me yield for him to answer 

the question, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN [presiding]. Yes. Unanimous consent to 1 additional minute to answer. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. If they are spies, Mr. Feltman, let 

us know that because that is a sovereign issue, but I want the 

State Department to act. Thank you. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. We will have to look into the individual 

cases you raise. I as Jeff Feltman am not familiar with the individual cases you raise. I will tell you that every time I have gone 

to Iraq, and I was going to Iraq on a fairly regular basis—a week 

a month—for a long time I go to see the Minister of Human Rights. 

I go to see the Minister of Human Rights because I care about the 

same values that you have described and because it is part of our 

policy to be promoting universal standards and adherence to 

human rights, and so it is an important part of our dialogue to 

keep in touch with the Minister of Human Rights. 

Yes, we talk about Camp Ashraf with the Minister of Human 

Rights. We talk about the prisons. Iraq has a long way to go. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What are we going to do? We need to go to 

Camp Ashraf. We can’t listen to the human rights director. He is 

not telling the truth. What can we do, the U.S.? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I think that she, the Human Rights Minister, who is a woman, has actually been very effective in working 

with us on some of the issues dealing with Camp Ashraf, and I 

think she has also been a very good advocate for the very values 

that you are describing. She is working in extremely difficult circumstances. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. I need a report in writing because my 

time is up. A report in writing not on these cases, but the conditions in Camp Ashraf and what the United States and she, the director, the Secretary of Human Rights, is actually doing regarding 

the ceasing of torture of these people in Camp Ashraf. She is doing 

nothing. 

And I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

I thank both of you. I apologize for the delayed start, the 45 

minute intermission. I appreciate very much your being here, and 

with that this committee hearing is adjourned. Thank you. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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