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DISMANTLING IRAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

PROGRAM: NEXT STEPS TO ACHIEVE 

A COMPREHENSIVE DEAL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

DECEMBER 3, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

David Albright, president, Institute for Science and International Security, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Graphs and annex submitted with David Albright’s prepared statement ... 63 

Hon. Bob Corker, U.S. Senator from Tennessee ................................................... 3 

Dr. Michael Doran, senior fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC ............... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20 

Hon. Robert Menendez, U.S. Senator from New Jersey ....................................... 1 

Dr. Gary Samore, executive director for research, Belfer Center for Science 

and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, MA ............................................................................................................ 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 24 

(III)

(1) 

1 [The P5+1 is made up of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 

(China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), plus Germany.] 

DISMANTLING IRAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

PROGRAM: NEXT STEPS TO ACHIEVE A 

COMPREHENSIVE DEAL 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:45 p.m, in room SD– 

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Corker, 

Risch, Johnson, Flake, Barrasso, and Paul. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order. 

First of all, let me apologize to my colleagues as well as to our 

panelists. We are still dealing with the aftermath of Superstorm 

Sandy in New Jersey and in the New Jersey-New York region, and 

we had the Administrator of FEMA in a meeting on some of the 

critical issues that seem still not to be resolved. So it just got extended a little longer than I thought. So I apologize to everybody. 

Today we have an expert panel to provide an assessment of the 

status of the P5+11 talks and the likelihood of reaching a complete 

political framework for a comprehensive deal in the next 4 months. 

I am particularly interested in your views on whether reaching a 

deal is simply a matter of time or if there has been a fundamental 

shift in Iranian thinking that makes a deal 4 months from now 

more likely than in the past 12. 

While I believe the administration’s diplomatic efforts to terminate Iran’s illicit nuclear program should be commended, I am concerned that Iran has not demonstrated a sincere interest in reaching agreement and has used these talks to chip away at our positions, beginning with the concessions on enrichment in the Joint 

Plan of Action. 

Given continued Iranian intransigence in the talks, the failure to 

conclude a final deal by November 24 falls squarely on Iran. Yet, 

for over 1 year, we remain trapped in the same fruitless, cyclical 

narrative which has us conceding our positions, transforming the 

Arak reactor rather than dismantling it, converting Fordow for 

some alternate use rather than closing it, and disconnecting cenVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Jul 22, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
2 

trifuges rather than destroying them. And perhaps more significantly, Iran is not budging on full access to questionable sites and 

the duration of the agreement. 

I understand that the P5+1 members want to put a year on the 

breakout clock, but I am not convinced a year is enough if we leave 

the majority of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in place and give up 

the only leverage we have by providing sanctions relief. The 1-year 

alarm will give us time to respond, but our only option at that 

point will likely be a military option. In my view, to suggest that 

we can quickly or easily rebuild the sanctions regime or replicate 

the economic pressure currently facing Iran is a false narrative. 

For me, this equation is simple. Iran must make up its mind 

about what is more important: its nuclear weapons program or the 

welfare of its people. And clearly for the last year, Iran has not felt 

a need to make that decision. 

Right now, we are playing right into the Iranian narrative. So 

while they have maximized their demands at the negotiating table, 

we seemed to have minimized ours with no consequences. This is 

a worst case scenario. It is extremely dangerous for global nonproliferation imperatives and for regional stability and could leave 

Iran as a nuclear threshold state. 

At the end of the day, if no deal is reached by March 24, congressional action to authorize prospective sanctions may provide the leverage we need to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons 

state. 

Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions and its continued obfuscation 

at the negotiating table have raised alarms throughout the Middle 

East and the international community. The risk of a nuclear arms 

race in the region is not hypothetical. We are seeing the repercussions of permitting Iran to retain an enrichment program resonate 

in the region, and in our 1–2–3 negotiations with other countries 

who are asking why they need to accept a no-enrichment standard 

when Iran will be allowed to enrich. 

For me, the time has come to ask whether repeated negotiation 

extensions, coupled with sanctions relief in the billions of dollars, 

will ever result in a comprehensive deal. Iran benefits from successive rounds of unfreezing of assets abroad and has not felt the need 

to make any real concessions beyond the requirements of the interim agreement. 

The assumption seems to be that another extension will result in 

a good deal, and all we have to do is continue negotiating, putting 

more time on the nuclear breakout clock. My own perspective is 

that more time will not make a difference on this. The Ayatollah 

has come to the fundamental decisions that are essential for being 

able to strike such a deal. Tehran’s desire for a nuclear program 

has not changed, and it is unlikely to change in my view under the 

present set of circumstances. Iran is negotiating because it wants 

economic relief, and it is betting that more time on the clock benefits its position. 

I know that there are those who suggest that, well, we really 

have not lifted the sanctions. The sanctions regime is largely in 

place. Well, the Iranian economy is rebounding. There is greater 

confidence. There is also a view, I think, that the Iranians have 

that there is no credible use of force threat on the table. And if you 

3 

keep coming toward my position in a negotiation as I sit there, 

then I want to sit there as long as I can because it keeps looking 

better and better to me. And that is my sense of where we are at 

today. To hear that we have some significant progress, I do not understand why it takes 7 months if we are on the threshold of making decisions that can be an acceptable deal to be brought to the 

United States and the international community. 

So what I would like to hear from the witnesses as specifically 

and directly as possible is how we change the environment surrounding the talks and have a set of circumstances and conditions 

in which Iran is felt compelled to get to a final deal. 

The bottom line is from my perspective I continue to believe that 

we have leverage in this negotiation but leverage that is unused is 

leverage that is meaningless. 

With that, I would like to recognize the distinguished ranking 

member for his comments, Senator Corker. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

you calling this timely hearing. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I know we have 

worked around some logistical issues, and it looks like it worked 

out perfectly actually. 

I would also like to say that I know that we are going to have 

a hearing tomorrow, a little meeting tomorrow afternoon, a smaller 

meeting. But we still do not have any language at all relative to 

what this extension even says. I think most of it probably is like 

it has been, but we really do not have any insight into that. And 

so, where we are is what many of us were concerned about on the 

front end, and that is it looks like we may end up with a series 

of rolling extensions. 

If you look at the history of all of this—and I think Henry Kissinger does a great job in his latest book really referring to this 

issue we are talking about today. But the longer Iran waits, things 

continue to get better and better and better for them. And I know 

our chairman outlined that today. But I will just say we have gone 

from turning Arak into a light water reactor—and by the way, this 

is based on what we understand. Again, we have not really seen 

anything in writing. But turning Arak into a light water reactor to 

allowing it to be a modified heavy water reactor, from shuttering 

Fordow to letting it continue as a research facility, from dismantling centrifuges to unplugging them, and from demanding full disclosure on possible military dimensions of their nuclear program to 

accepting only transparency at the margins. And when we have the 

IAEA having difficulty today even getting Iran to comply with information, obviously that gives great concerns. And obviously the 

issue of just their effect on the region, its effect right now on what 

we are doing in Syria—all of these things lead one to be very concerned about where we are. 

And I know that we are all going to be looking at how we might 

play a role. I know the chairman has offered some legislation. Others have looked at ways of Congress affecting the outcome here. 

4 

But I just want to close with this. As we sit back and think about 

these negotiations, I think many of us thought we would start with 

a—we would end up with a 20-year agreement where you had some 

meaningful length of time that whatever you agreed to would be 

in place and that we would understand the military dimensions before any agreement was reached—which would allow you to have 

some insight into the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] 

and what their activities have been—which obviously this agreement is not going to include. 

But when you think about it, we are talking double digits. Knowing the administration the way most of us do, that probably means 

10 years, the first double digit. Iran is talking 5 years. My guess 

is as they sit and wait, the administration may be leaning toward 

a 7- to 8-year agreement. And so when you think about it, all of 

this, this incredible regime that our chairman and so many of us 

have worked on to put in place, will be totally dissipated, the way 

the administration is now going, over to a 7- to 8-year period. They 

then will be a valid member of the NPT community, a valid member. We will lose the insights into the possible covert dimensions. 

And it really does appear we are going to a place where we really 

are not getting anything. And of course, their strategy is they are 

hopeful that this will happen and that over time they will be in a 

place—by the way, we are not dealing with any of the delivery systems in this agreement. So they have the ability during this 7- to 

8-year period to continue to develop deliver systems. We are not 

dealing with that. So from their standpoint, it puts them in a position, when we are not in the same place, to be in a stronger place 

themselves. Our position is we are hoping—hoping—that somehow 

there is a difference of viewpoint at the regime level. But when you 

think about where we are, it is really not a good place. 

And so I do hope that we as a committee, I hope that Congress 

will figure out the appropriate way to give the administration leverage to really strengthen an agreement that already has gone 

way down a path that I think is very unhealthy for our country. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing. I look forward to our 

outstanding private witnesses and to the questions that come after. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Just for the record, we did invite the administration to send us 

a witness for public purposes, and they declined saying that they 

would only send us a witness in a secured setting. I will say that 

at the end of the last round and the pursuit of an extension, we 

had Wendy Sherman here talking about the parameters of that. I 

do not know what has changed so dramatically that we could not 

have any public setting, understanding there would be elements of 

that that would only be appropriate to discuss in a secured setting, 

that we could not have a broader discussion about what we hope 

to achieve, what we are trying to achieve, where we are at in very 

broad terms. But that is the administration’s decision. Hence, we 

are only pursuing today a private but distinguished panel nonetheless. So we appreciate all of you being here. 

Let me introduce you. David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security. Mr. Albright is no 

stranger to the committee. He has been here several times, and we 

welcome you back and the insights you provide for us. Dr. Michael 

5 

Doran, who is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute; and Dr. 

Gary Samore, who is the executive director for research at the 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s 

Kennedy School. 

And with that, I will remind you all that your full statements 

will be included in the record, without objection. If you can try to 

summarize in about 5 minutes or so, we would appreciate it so we 

can enter into a dialogue with you where many of the elements of 

your statement, I am sure, will be discussed. And with that, we 

will recognize Mr. Albright first. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE 

FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, and 

other esteemed Senators, thank you for inviting me again to testify. 

I view your work here extremely valuable. 

Also, this is a very appropriate time to step back and take stock 

of the efforts to achieve a comprehensive agreement. And I think 

I should make clear from the beginning, I mean, for people like myself, the main problem, and the reason for the two extensions, is 

Iran’s refusal to make the necessary concessions to obtain a good 

deal. Many core issues remain unresolved. 

Now, as the absence of Wendy Sherman demonstrates, the ongoing negotiations for this deal are highly detailed and secret, and 

many technical provisions are being studied and proposed. And little of that has been made public. 

Despite that limitation, I would like to talk about some things 

I think can be identified. Some of this will be repetitive. So I apologize for that. 

But the primary goal of the comprehensive solution is to ensure 

that Iran’s nuclear program is indeed peaceful against a background of two decades of Iran deceiving the IAEA about its nuclear 

programs, including military nuclear programs. And this long history of deception and violation places additional burdens on achieving a verifiable, long-term agreement, including the need for any 

agreement to last for 20 years. I think if you look at the work the 

IAEA has to do, it is not going to be done after 7 to 10 years. There 

is a need for an extensive duration for this agreement. 

I think it is also accepted that a good deal should increase significantly the time needed to produce enough nuclear explosive material for a nuclear weapon, typically called the breakout timeline. 

And U.S. officials have talked often about achieving breakout times 

of 1 year. And to do that, I think we are all aware that significant 

limitations in the number of centrifuges will have to occur. Iran is 

going to need to reduce the size of its uranium, natural uranium 

and low-enriched uranium stocks, and it is going to have to limit 

its centrifuge R&D program. 

Also to get a sound deal, Iran is going to have to verifiably address the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s past and possibly ongoing 

work related to nuclear weapons, and it needs to do that before a 

deal is signed or any relief from economic or financial sanctions occurs. Now, in the latter case, a deal could be signed but it would 

be followed by an implementation period, during which Iran would 

6 

implement its key commitments, including addressing the IAEA’s 

concerns before any key economic or financial sanctions are relaxed. 

And of course, the agreement is going to have to include 

verification provisions that go beyond the additional protocol. And 

these supplementary provisions, which I have outlined more in my 

testimony, and I think you are pretty aware of, are needed if the 

agreement is to provide assurances about the absence of secret nuclear activities and facilities. One of the major worries is that in 

the future Iran will seek to build a secret gas centrifuge plant or 

other nuclear facilities. 

One condition that actually has evolved and that was not expected I think is the recognition that U.N. Security Council sanctions on proliferation-sensitive goods will need to continue through 

the duration of the deal, and they will need to be enforced rigorously while allowing verified exemptions for authorized nuclear 

programs. 

With adequate limits on Iran’s nuclear capabilities and activities, 

combined with intrusive verification, we can be guaranteed that 

whatever path to nuclear weapons Iran may pursue in the future, 

its efforts will be visible and time-consuming with little chance of 

success. However, without these limitations on Iran’s nuclear programs and expanded verification conditions, a long-term deal will 

likely fail or exasperate the threat from Iran. 

Unfortunately, I have to say that of the conditions I have stated, 

Iran has essentially rejected all of them and has not been willing 

to even come, I would say, even half way to meeting those conditions. And I must say I am not an Iran expert. I think it is almost 

anyone’s guess whether Iran will make the necessary concessions 

by March 25 to seal a good deal. And the basic problem remains 

that the sanctions have gotten Iran to the negotiating table but 

have not gotten Iran to make the necessary concessions. And their 

internal political system and their commitments to nuclear make 

you wonder whether they are actually interested in the kind of deal 

the United States feels it needs. 

Now, a risk to the United States is that the negotiations get 

drawn into proposing compromise after compromise while Iran just 

says no. Today it is more suitable for the United States to stick to 

its core demands that can ensure a good deal. 

And I think, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Corker, you 

outlined some problems, some concessions that essentially have 

been made, and I would just like to highlight the one where the 

administration, based on public statements, has gone from wanting 

1,500 IR–1 centrifuges in place in a final deal to having up to 4,000 

to 5,000 centrifuges. Now, this may be justified. Such an increase 

in the allowable centrifuges would be accompanied by Iran committing to significant reductions in its low-enriched uranium stock, 

and that would be demonstrated by shipping that material out of 

Iran. And those two steps combined, increasing centrifuges, drastically lowering the low-enriched uranium stocks, could preserve a 

1-year breakout time. But again, Iran has been unwilling to entertain either of those concessions. And I would say it is going to be 

hard for the United States, even if Iran is unwilling to entertain 

7 

those concessions, to go back to arguing that it is only going to accept 1,500 centrifuges. 

Now, I think personally the United States has developed enough 

creative compromises and discussed them with Iran. It is time to 

simply wait for Iran to make a realistic offer. The United States 

can then say yes or no. More importantly, it can start to more realistically evaluate if Iran is even willing to make a good deal. 

While waiting, one signal the United States should send is that 

it is more than willing to reimpose suspended sanctions and move 

to impose new ones if an adequate deal is not forthcoming. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID ALBRIGHT

Iran and the P5+1 group of countries (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China) have once again extended their negotiations in pursuit 

of a final, comprehensive solution on Iran’s nuclear program under the Joint Plan 

of Action (JPA). The November 2013 JPA set out a process aimed at limiting Iran’s 

nuclear program in exchange for relief from economic and financial sanctions. On 

a separate but linked negotiating track, Iran and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) have been working on a step-wise approach to address the IAEA’s 

concerns, particularly those about the alleged past and possibly on-going military 

dimensions (or so-called PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program. However, this process has 

stalled and Iran has become increasingly resistant to addressing the IAEA’s concerns. Whether and how Iran complies with the IAEA’s concerns is currently being 

played out in the context of P5+1/Iran negotiations. 

Despite some progress in the negotiations, much reportedly remains to be settled. 

The primary goal of a comprehensive solution is to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is indeed peaceful, against a background of two decades of Iran deceiving the 

IAEA about its nuclear programs, including military nuclear programs. This long 

history of deception and violations places additional burdens on achieving a 

verifiable long term agreement, including the need for any agreement to last for 

about 20 years. 

A good deal should increase significantly the time needed to produce enough nuclear explosive material for a nuclear weapon, typically known as a breakout 

timeline. The United States reportedly often talks about achieving breakout times 

of 1 year. To achieve such a breakout time, Iran will need to limit specific, existing 

nuclear capabilities, including reducing significantly the number of its centrifuges 

and the size of its uranium and low enriched uranium stocks, and limiting its centrifuge R&D programs. 

A sound deal will also require Iran to verifiably address the IAEA’s concerns 

about its past and possibly ongoing work on nuclear weapons, which means Iran 

must address those concerns in a concrete manner before a deal is finalized or any 

relief from economic or financial sanctions occurs. In the latter case, a deal could 

be signed and followed by an implementation period during which Iran would implement its key commitments, including addressing the IAEA’s concerns, before key 

economic and financial sanctions are relaxed. 

The agreement will need to include verification provisions that go beyond the 

IAEA’s Additional Protocol. These supplementary provisions will need to create a 

critical baseline of information, including how many centrifuges Iran has made, how 

much natural uranium it has produced and is producing annually, and its inventory 

of raw materials and equipment for its centrifuge program. This baseline is necessary if the agreement is to provide assurances about the absence of secret nuclear 

activities and facilities. 

United Nations Security Council sanctions on proliferation sensitive goods will 

need to continue. They will need to be enforced rigorously, while allowing verified 

exemptions for authorized nuclear programs. 

The annex to my testimony contains a more detailed discussion of key necessary 

provisions in a long-term agreement. 

Without these limitations on Iran’s nuclear programs and expanded verification 

conditions, a long-term deal will likely fail or exacerbate the threat from Iran. However, an adequate agreement is possible and within reach of the United States and 

its negotiating partners. 

8 

1 ‘‘Iran’s Current Enrichment Level Not Acceptable: US,’’ Agence France Presse. September 17, 

2014. 

ADEQUATE REACTION TIME

A key goal of the negotiations is to ensure that any deal provides adequate reaction time, namely, adequate time to respond diplomatically and internationally to 

stop Iran if it does decide to renege on its commitments and build nuclear weapons. 

According to Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, ‘‘We must be confident that 

any effort by Tehran to break out of its obligations will be so visible and timeconsuming that the attempt would have no chance of success.’’ 1 That goal must be 

at the core of any agreement. 

Obtaining adequate reaction time requires that limitations are placed on Iran’s 

sensitive nuclear programs, adequate verification is ensured, and concrete progress 

has been demonstrated that Iran will address the IAEA’s concerns about its past 

and possibly ongoing nuclear weapons efforts. Because of Iran’s long history of noncompliance with its safeguards obligations, a deal must last long enough, on order 

of 20 years, so that there is little risk of Iran seeking nuclear weapons. 

COVERING ALL BREAKOUT PATHS TO THE BOMB

If Iran were to make the political decision to produce a nuclear weapon after signing a comprehensive nuclear deal, it is not possible to guess how it may proceed. 

Iran may use its declared nuclear facilities to secretly make enough highly enriched 

uranium (HEU) or plutonium for a bomb or it may build covert sites to make the 

HEU or separate the plutonium. Given that Iran has such a long history of building 

and conducting secret nuclear activities, U.S. negotiators need to take a broad view 

and secure a deal that makes all of Iran’s paths to the bomb time consuming and 

risky. 

Some have advocated that only the covert route to nuclear weapons is likely. 

Those who favor this view often rely on the U.S. 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, ‘‘Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities.’’ It concluded, ‘‘We assess with 

moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—rather than its 

declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon.’’ 

That assessment may have been true in 2007 when Iran had few centrifuges, and 

in fact, we now know, it was building a covert centrifuge plant at Qom called the 

Fordow facility. However, that statement no longer holds true. 

At this point in time, it is not certain that Iran would rely entirely on the covert 

pathway option for fear of getting caught again as it did in building the formerly 

secret Fordow facility, and long before it has enough weapon-grade uranium or separated plutonium for nuclear weapons. The revelation about the Qom enrichment 

plant was highly damaging to Iran’s international credibility. For example, Russia 

became much more critical of Iran after this revelation, and the creation of damaging sanctions became easier. Therefore, Iran is unlikely to want to repeat that 

mistake without greater assurance of being able to successfully hide a covert program, something it likely lacks now and will not gain anytime soon if the long-term 

deal is carefully crafted by the United States and its partners. 

Iran is more likely today to choose a safe route to preserving and further developing a capability to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon. In the case of 

gas centrifuges, it is likely to seek to maintain and increase its capabilities at declared centrifuge sites, the associated centrifuge manufacturing complex, and centrifuge R&D facilities. It would view this path as the preferred one, because it can 

simply and legitimately claim that all its activities are civil in nature, even if it is 

actually hiding the goal of eventually seeking nuclear weapons. If it opts to make 

nuclear weapons in the future, its declared programs could serve as the basis for 

whatever it does next. Then, it could pursue breakout as it deems most appropriate, 

whether by misusing its declared centrifuge facilities, building covert ones, or using 

both paths together. 

Thus, the U.S. goal should be limiting sharply the number of centrifuges at 

declared sites and constraining centrifuge manufacturing and R&D activities, both 

of which could help outfit covert programs. This approach would greatly diminish 

Iran’s ability to break out to nuclear weapons. If Iran decides to build nuclear weapons in the future, it would have to start from this relatively low level of capability, 

regardless of the path it would actually select in the future. The long timeline to 

acquire enough HEU for a weapon may turn out to deter Iran from even trying. 

This strategy depends on creating a robust verification regime able to detect covert nuclear activities or a small, hidden away centrifuge plant. Iran has assuredly 

learned from its mistakes in hiding the Qom enrichment site. In fact, it has likely 

developed more sophisticated methods to hide covert nuclear activities. But robust 

9 

verification, which requires measures beyond the Additional Protocol, can provide 

assurance that Iran is not hiding centrifuge plants or other nuclear capabilities in 

the future. These additional verification measures would ensure that Iran would 

have a very hard time creating or maintaining a covert program outside of its 

declared programs after signing a long-term agreement. 

It is wiser to anticipate and block all of Iran’s potential future paths to the bomb, 

rather than guessing and choosing the wrong one. 

QUANTIFYING ADEQUATE RESPONSE TIME: THE ROLE OF BREAKOUT CALCULATIONS

One assured way to quantify the concept of adequate reaction time when discussing limitations on uranium enrichment programs is to link timely reaction time 

to breakout time. Breakout time is the amount of time Iran would need to create 

enough weapon-grade uranium for a single nuclear weapon, if it reneged or cheated 

on the agreement. Additional time would be needed to fabricate the nuclear weapon 

itself but the creation of enough fissile material (weapon-grade uranium or separated plutonium) is widely accepted as the ‘‘long pole in the tent’’ of making a nuclear weapon and the only part of this process susceptible to reliable discovery and 

subsequent pressure. Other nuclear weaponization activities, such as producing high 

explosive components, electronic components, or uranium metal parts, are notoriously difficult to detect and stop. By focusing on breakout time—as defined above— 

the agreement would grant the international community a guaranteed period of 

time to react and prevent Iran’s success. The longer the breakout time, the more 

reaction options we have. A deal that enshrines a short breakout time is risky because if Iran were to make the decision to make a weapon, military intervention 

would be the only available response. 

Thus, time for Iran’s ability to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a bomb 

must be sufficiently long to allow the international community to prepare and implement a response able to stop it from succeeding. Typically, the U.S. negotiators 

have sought limitations on Iran’s nuclear programs that lead to breakout times of 

12 months. (ISIS has taken the position that under certain conditions 6 months 

would be adequate.) To better understand the implications of breakout, we have prepared a range of breakout calculations under a wide variety of current and posited 

centrifuge capabilities that in essence convert the reaction time; i.e., breakout time, 

into an equivalent number of centrifuges and stocks of low enriched uranium. 

One of the calculations considers an important case, namely the current, frozen 

centrifuge program under the JPA where Iran retains its existing, installed IR–1 

centrifuges and no stocks of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride. In this case, the 

breakout time is about 2 months, which is the same as public U.S. Government estimates. If the number of IR–1 centrifuges were reduced to about 10,000, breakout 

time would grow to about 3 months, according to the ISIS estimates. 

To achieve a breakout time of 12 months in the case that stocks of 3.5 percent 

LEU are not limited to relatively small quantities, calculations point to a centrifuge 

program of about 2,000 IR–1 centrifuges. If stocks of LEU are limited significantly, 

these centrifuge quantities can increase but, as is discussed below, the total number 

of allowed centrifuges would not increase that much—only to about 4,000–5,000 IR– 

1 centrifuges. A major problem is that the centrifuges would continue producing 

LEU, complicating the effective maintenance of a LEU cap. 

SOUND NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES

Beyond technical limitations, the negotiations have shown that the principles 

driving the positions of the P5+1 differ markedly from those of Iran. Any deal 

should satisfy the following principles if it is to last: 

• Sufficient response time in case of violations; • A nuclear program meeting Iran’s practical needs; • Adequate irreversibility of constraints; • Stable provisions; and • Adequate verification. 

These principles flow from the effort to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is 

peaceful and remains so. These principles also reflect long experience in negotiating 

arms control and nonproliferation agreements and a recognition of the strengths 

and weaknesses in those agreements to date. 

Iran on the other hand has emphasized the principles of cooperation and transparency. These principles are predicated on its assertion that its word should be 

trusted, namely its pronouncement that it will not build nuclear weapons. These 

principles also reflect its long-standing view that any agreement should have constrained verification conditions and minimal impact on its nuclear programs, even 

allowing for their significant growth, despite the current lack of economic or pracVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Jul 22, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
10 

tical justifications for such growth. Many of Iran’s negotiating positions have been 

rejected because they can be undone on short order, offering little practical utility 

in constraining its future abilities to build nuclear weapons. Iran on numerous occasions in the past has shown a willingness to stop cooperation with the IAEA and 

reverse agreed upon constraints, sometimes rapidly. A robust and painstakingly 

built international sanctions regime on Iran cannot be lifted in return for inadequate and reversible constraints. 

The negotiating process has shown the complexity of any agreement able to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will remain peaceful. But by sticking to the above 

sound principles, potential compromises can be better evaluated and any resulting 

deal will be more likely to last. 

SPECIFIC PROVISIONS

In the rest of my testimony, I would like to focus on several specific provisions 

or goals necessary to a successful deal. In particular, I will discuss the following: 

1. Achieve Concrete Progress in Resolving Concerns about Iran’s Past and 

Possibly Ongoing Nuclear Weapons Efforts. 

2. Maintain Domestic and International Sanctions on Proliferation Sensitive 

Goods. 

3. Render Excess Centrifuges Less Risky. 

4. Institutionalize a Minimal Centrifuge R&D Program. 

5. Keep Centrifuge Numbers Low and as a Supplementary Measure Achieve 

Lower Stocks of LEU hexafluoride and oxide. 

6. Beware the concept of ‘‘SWU’’ as a Limit. 

7. Ensure Arak Reactor’s Changes are Irreversible. 

(1) Achieve Concrete Progress in Resolving Concerns about Iran’s Past and Possibly 

Ongoing Nuclear Weapons Efforts 

Despite a great effort over the last year, the IAEA has learned little from Iran 

that has added to the inspectors’ ability to resolve their concern about Iran’s past 

nuclear weapons efforts and possibly ongoing work related to nuclear weapons. 

Recently, the IAEA has also been unable to reach agreement with Iran on how to 

tackle the remaining military nuclear issues. The IAEA has repeatedly emphasized 

that the military nuclear issues need to be addressed and solved. 

For years, the inspectors have unsuccessfully asked the Islamic Republic to address the substantial body of evidence that Iran was developing nuclear weapons 

prior to 2004 and that it may have continued some of that, or related work, afterward, even up to the present. Before a deal is implemented, concrete progress is 

needed on the central issue of whether Iran has worked on nuclear weapons and 

is maintaining a capability to revive such efforts in the future. 

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei often declares that nuclear weapons violate 

Islamic strictures. His denials are not credible. The United States, its main European allies, and most importantly the IAEA itself, assess that Iran had a sizable 

nuclear weapons program into 2003. The U.S. intelligence community in the 2007 

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) agreed: ‘‘We assess with high confidence that 

until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction 

to develop nuclear weapons.’’ The Europeans and the IAEA have made clear, the 

United States less so, that Iran’s nuclear weapons development may have continued 

after 2003, albeit in a less structured manner. In its November 2011 safeguards report, the IAEA provided evidence of Iran’s pre- and post-2003 nuclear weaponization 

efforts. The IAEA found, ‘‘There are also indications that some activities relevant 

to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that 

some may still be ongoing.’’ To reinforce this point to Iran, the United States in late 

August sanctioned Iran’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research 

(SPND), which it said is a Tehran-based entity established in early 2011 that is primarily responsible for research in the field of nuclear weapons development. Thus, 

there is widespread evidence and agreement that Iran has worked on developing nuclear weapons and that some of those activities may have continued to today. 

Addressing the IAEA’s concerns about the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear 

programs is fundamental to any long-term agreement. Although much of the debate 

about an agreement with Iran rightly focuses on Tehran’s uranium enrichment and 

plutonium production capabilities, an agreement that side steps the military issues 

would risk being unverifiable. Moreover, the world would not be so concerned if Iran 

had never conducted weaponization activities aimed at building a nuclear weapon. 

After all, Japan has enrichment activities but this program is not regarded with 

suspicion. Trust in Iran’s intentions, resting on solid verification procedures, is critical to a serious agreement. 

11 

A prerequisite for any comprehensive agreement is for the IAEA to know when 

Iran sought nuclear weapons, how far it got, what types it sought to develop, and 

how and where it did this work. Was this weapons capability just put on the shelf, 

waiting to be quickly restarted? The IAEA needs a good baseline of Iran’s military 

nuclear activities, including the manufacturing of equipment for the program and 

any weaponization related studies, equipment, and locations. The IAEA needs this 

information to design a verification regime. Moreover, to develop confidence in the 

absence of these activities—a central mission—the IAEA will need to periodically inspect these sites and interview key individuals for years to come. Without information about past military nuclear work, it cannot know where to go and who to speak 

to. 

The situation today, unless rectified, does not allow for the creation of an adequate verification regime. Moreover, the current situation risks the creation of dangerous precedents for any verification regime that would make it impossible for the 

IAEA to determine with confidence that nuclear weapons activities are not ongoing. 

Adding verification conditions to any deal is unlikely to help if the fundamental 

problem is the lack of Iranian cooperation. The IAEA already has the legal right 

to pursue these questions under the comprehensive safeguards agreement with Iran. 

Despite the IAEA’s rights under the comprehensive safeguards agreement, Iran 

has regularly denied the IAEA access to military sites, such as a site at the Parchin 

complex, a site where high-explosive experiments linked to nuclear triggers may 

have occurred. Iran has reconstructed much of this site at Parchin, making IAEA 

verification efforts all but impossible. Tehran has undertaken at this site what looks 

to most observers as a blatant effort to defeat IAEA verification. However, Parchin 

is but one of many sites the IAEA wants to inspect as part of its efforts to understand the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programs. A full Iranian declaration 

may reveal even more sites of concern. 

Iran continues to say no to IAEA requests to interview key individuals, such as 

Mohsen Fakrizadeh, the suspected military head of the nuclear weapons program 

in the early 2000s and perhaps today, and Sayyed Abbas Shahmoradi-Zavareh, 

former head of the Physics Research Center, alleged to be the central location in 

the 1990s of Iran’s militarized nuclear research. The IAEA interviewed Shahmoradi 

years ago about a limited number of his suspicious procurement activities conducted 

through Sharif University of Technology. The IAEA was not fully satisfied with his 

answers, and its dissatisfaction increased once he refused to discuss his activities 

for the Physics Research Center. Since the initial interviews, the IAEA has obtained 

far more information about Shahmoradi and the Physics Research Center’s procurement efforts. The need to interview both individuals, as well as others, remains. 

If Iran is able to successfully evade addressing the IAEA’s concerns now, when 

biting sanctions are in place, why would it address them later when these sanctions 

are lifted, regardless of anything it may pledge today? Iran’s lack of clarity on 

alleged nuclear weaponization, and its noncooperation with the IAEA, if accepted as 

part of a nuclear agreement, would create a large vulnerability in any future 

verification regime. Iran would have clear precedents to deny inspectors access to 

key facilities and individuals. There would be essentially no-go zones across the 

country for inspectors. Tehran could declare a suspect site a military base and thus 

off limits. And what better place to conduct clandestine, prohibited activities, such 

as uranium enrichment and weaponization? 

Iran would have also defeated a central tenet of IAEA inspections—the need to 

determine both the correctness and completeness of a state’s nuclear declaration. 

The history of Iran’s previous military nuclear efforts may never come to light, and 

the international community would lack confidence that these capabilities would not 

emerge in the future. Moreover, Iran’s ratification of the Additional Protocol or 

acceptance of additional verification conditions, while making the IAEA’s 

verification task easier in several important ways, would not solve the basic problem 

posed by Iran’s lack of cooperation on key, legitimate IAEA concerns. Other countries contemplating the clandestine development of nuclear weapons will certainly 

watch Tehran closely. 

With a 7-month extension, there is plenty of time for Iran to address all the 

IAEA’s outstanding concerns. Moreover, an approach can be implemented whereby 

Iran can choose to admit to having had a nuclear weapons program, or at least 

accept or not publicly dispute a credible IAEA judgment that it had one, and allow 

IAEA access to key military sites, such as Parchin, and to critical engineers and scientists linked to those efforts. If no such concrete demonstration is forthcoming during the extension, a deal should not be signed. If it is, the deal should not offer any 

significant relief from financial and economic sanctions until Iran fully addresses 

the IAEA’s concerns. 

12 

2 Aside from the IR-2m and a few other centrifuge models, little is known about Iran’s next 

generation centrifuges. Quarterly IAEA safeguards reports indicate that Iran has not successfully operated next generation centrifuges on a continuous basis or in significant numbers since 

their installation began at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. This suggests that Iran may 

be having difficulty with aspects of their design or operation. Iran’s failure to deploy next-generation centrifuges in significant quantities is one indication that sanctions were effective to 

slow or significantly raise the costs of procurement. 

(2) Maintain Sanctions on Proliferation Sensitive Goods 

A comprehensive nuclear agreement is not expected to end Iran’s illicit efforts to 

obtain goods for its missile and other military programs. Iran appears committed 

to continuing its illicit operations to obtain goods for a range of sanctioned programs. On August 30, 2014, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated on Iranian 

television: ‘‘Of course we bypass sanctions. We are proud that we bypass sanctions.’’ 

Given Iran’s sanctions-busting history, a comprehensive nuclear agreement should 

not include any provisions that would interfere in efforts of the international community to effectively sanction Iranian military programs. 

The deal must also create a basis to end, or at least detect with high probability, 

Iran’s illicit procurement of goods for its nuclear programs. Evidence suggests that 

in the last few years Iran has been conducting its illegal operations to import goods 

for its nuclear program with greater secrecy and sophistication, regardless of the 

scale of procurements in the last year or two. A long-term nuclear agreement should 

ban Iranian illicit trade in items for its nuclear programs while creating additional 

mechanisms to verify this ban. Such a verified ban is a critical part of ensuring that 

Iran is not establishing the wherewithal to: 

• Build secret nuclear sites, 

• Make secret advances in its advanced centrifuge 2 or other nuclear programs, 

or 

• Surge in capability if it left the agreement. 

These conditions argue for continuing all the UNSC and national sanctions and 

well-enforced export controls on proliferation-sensitive goods. Such goods are those 

key goods used or needed in Iran’s nuclear programs and nuclear weapon delivery 

systems, the latter typically interpreted as covering ballistic missiles. 

Sanctions should continue on the listed goods in the UNSC resolutions, many of 

them dual-use in nature, and more generally on those other dual-use goods that 

could contribute to uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, heavy water, and 

nuclear weapon delivery systems (see United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1929, par. 13). The latter is often referred to as the ‘‘catch-all’’ provision and mirrors 

many national catch-all requirements in export control laws and regulations. In the 

case of Iran, this provision is especially important. Without illicitly obtaining the 

goods covered by catch-all, Iran would be severely constrained in building or 

expanding nuclear sites. 

The P5+1 powers need to manage carefully the transition to a time when imports 

of goods to Iran are allowed for legitimate nuclear and later possibly for civilian 

uses. Many proliferation sensitive goods are dual-use goods, which have applications 

both in nuclear and nonnuclear industries and institutions. Currently, the world is 

on heightened alert about Iran’s illicit procurements for its sanctioned nuclear, missile, and military programs. Routinely, this alert has led to the thwarting of many 

illicit purchases and interdictions of banned goods. But as nations enter into expanded commercial and trade relationships with Iran, a risk is that many countries 

will effectively stand down from this heightened state of awareness and lose much 

of their motivation to stop banned sales to Iran even if U.N. sanctions remain in 

place. Despite the sanctions and vigilant efforts today, many goods now make their 

way to Iran illicitly that fall below the sanctions list thresholds but are covered by 

the catch-all condition that bans all goods that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear 

program. The volume of these sales is expected to increase after an agreement takes 

effect and many more of these goods could get through successfully. Unless carefully 

managed, a key risk is that the sanctions may not hold firm for the below threshold 

or catch-all goods. Stopping transfers of explicitly banned items may also become 

more difficult as business opportunities increase, and much of the world de-emphasizes Iran’s nuclear program as a major issue in their foreign policies and domestic 

regulations. This could be particularly true for China and middle economic powers, 

such as Turkey, which already have substantial trade with Iran and are expected 

to seek expanded ties. Other countries with weak export controls may expand trade 

as well. 

13 

Verified Procurement Channel for Authorized Nuclear Programs 

The six powers must carefully plan for these eventualities now and include in any 

agreement an architecture to mitigate and manage proliferation-related procurement risks. A priority is creating a verifiable procurement channel to route needed 

goods to Iran’s authorized nuclear programs. The agreement will need to allow for 

imports to legitimate nuclear programs, as they do now for the Bushehr nuclear 

power reactor. 

A challenge will be creating and maintaining an architecture, with a broader 

nuclear procurement channel, that permits imports of goods to Iran’s authorized 

nuclear programs and possibly later to its civilian industries, while preventing imports to military programs and banned or covert nuclear programs. The UNSC and 

its Iran sanctions committee and Panel of Experts, the IAEA, and supplier states 

will all need to play key roles in verifying the end use of exports to Iran’s authorized 

nuclear programs and ensuring that proliferation sensitive goods are not going to 

banned nuclear activities or military programs. 

The creation of the architecture should be accomplished during the negotiations 

of the long-term deal, although its implementation may need to wait. It will be important that the architecture, whether or not implemented later, be established at 

the very beginning of the implementation of the long-term agreement in order to 

adequately deal with this issue. In essence, the creation of the architecture should 

not be left to later. 

The reason for creating a verified procurement channel is that Iran’s legitimate 

nuclear activities may need imports. The ‘‘modernization’’ of the Arak reactor would 

probably involve the most imports, depending on the extent to which international 

partners are involved. A sensitive area will be any imports, whether equipment, material, or technologies, which are associated with the heavy water portion of the reactor, in the case that the reactor is not converted to light water. Another sensitive 

set of possible imports involves goods related to the separation of radionuclides from 

irradiated targets, although goods for reprocessing; i.e., separating plutonium from 

irradiated fuel or targets, would be banned since Iran is expected to commit in the 

long-term agreement not to conduct reprocessing. Nonetheless, allowed imports 

could include goods that would be close in capability to those used in reprocessing, 

since the boundary in this area between sensitive and nonsensitive equipment is 

very thin. These goods will therefore require careful monitoring. Iran’s centrifuge 

program, if reduced in scale to the levels required for U.S. acceptance of a deal, will 

result in a large excess stockpile of key goods for IR–1 centrifuges. This stock should 

last for many years, eliminating the need for most imports. Nonetheless, the centrifuge program may need certain spare parts, raw materials, or replacement equipment. If Iran continues centrifuge research and development, that program may require sensitive raw materials and equipment. Needless to say, the goods exported 

to Iran’s centrifuge programs will require careful monitoring as to their use and 

long-term fate. 

Iran’s nonnuclear civilian industries and institutions may also want to purchase 

dual-use goods covered by the sanctions, but this sector should not expect to be exempted from sanctions during the duration of the deal or at least until late in the 

deal. Iran must prove it is fully complying with the agreement and will not abuse 

a civilian sector exemption to obtain banned goods for its nuclear, missile, or other 

military programs. With renewed economic activity and as part of efforts to expand 

the high-tech civilian sector, Iranian companies and institutions engaged in civilian, 

nonnuclear activities can be expected to seek these goods, several of which would 

be covered by the catch-all condition of the resolutions. Examples of dual-use goods 

would be carbon fiber, vacuum pumps, valves, computer control equipment, raw materials, subcomponents of equipment, and other proliferation sensitive goods. Currently, these civil industries (Iran’s petrochemical and automotive industries are two 

such examples) are essentially denied many of these goods under the UNSC resolutions and related unilateral and multilateral sanctions. However, if civilian industries are to be eventually exempted from the sanctions, this exemption must be created with special care, implemented no sooner than many years into the agreement, 

and monitored especially carefully. Iran could exploit this exemption to obtain goods 

illicitly for banned activities. It could approach suppliers claiming the goods are for 

civil purposes but in fact they would be for banned nuclear or military programs. 

Such a strategy is exactly what Iran’s nuclear program has pursued illicitly for 

many years, including cases where goods were procured under false pretenses by the 

Iranian oil and gas industry for the nuclear program. There are also many examples 

of illicit Iranian procurements for its nuclear program where Iranian and other trading companies misrepresented the end use to suppliers. 

This architecture covering proliferation sensitive goods should remain in place for 

the duration of the comprehensive agreement. The six powers must carefully plan 

14 

for eventualities now and design and implement an architecture that prevents 

future Iranian illicit procurements under a comprehensive agreement. 

(3) Render Excess Centrifuges Less Risky 

If Iran accepts a sharp limit on the number of centrifuges that would enrich uranium in a comprehensive deal, what about the excess centrifuges? If the limit is 

about 4,000 IR–1 centrifuges, Iran would need to dismantle or render unusable over 

14,000 IR–1 centrifuges and over 1,000 of the more advanced IR–2m centrifuges. 

These 1,000 IR–2m centrifuges are equivalent of about 3,000–5,000 IR–1 centrifuges. Thus, Iran would need to eliminate a large fraction of its centrifuge 

program. 

The centrifuges in excess of a limit should ideally be destroyed. Otherwise, Iran 

could reinstall them, building back to its original enrichment capacity of over 20,000 

swu per year. This restoration of capacity would lead to very short breakout times, 

far less than a year. 

However, rather than focusing on negotiating the destruction of excess centrifuges, the P5+1 negotiators appear to be seeking a different solution. They have 

reportedly been focusing on the removal and monitored storage of key centrifuge 

equipment in such a way that reinstallation would be difficult and time-consuming. 

However, accomplishing build-back timeframes of 6 to 12 months can be difficult to 

achieve in practice. 

Complicating this approach and highlighting its risks, Iran’s reneging on a cap 

in centrifuges and moving to reinstall them may happen outside of any overt 

nuclear weapons breakout. Iran may argue that the United States has not delivered 

on its commitments and build back up its number of centrifuges in retaliation. By 

assuaging the international community that it is not breaking out, Iran may make 

any meaningful U.S. response difficult. 

Some analysts, including those at ISIS, have discussed imposing essentially what 

have been called in the North Korean context ‘‘disablement’’ steps, which would not 

involve the destruction of any equipment but delay the restart of installed centrifuges. However, ISIS’s attempts to define disablement steps on the centrifuge 

plants appear to be reversible in less than 6 months of diligent work. This time 

period applies to proposals to remove the centrifuge pipework from the centrifuge 

plants. 

Moreover, this estimated time for reassembling the centrifuge cascades remains 

uncertain, and it could be shorter. There is no practical experience in disabling centrifuge plants; North Korea’s centrifuge program was not subject to disablement. It 

needs to be pointed out that some U.S. policymakers had a tendency to exaggerate 

the difficulty of undoing North Korean disablement steps imposed at the Yongbyon 

nuclear center on plutonium production and separation facilities. In fact, North 

Korea was able to reverse several of these steps relatively quickly. A lesson from 

the North Korean case is that disablement steps are highly reversible and in fact 

can be reversed faster than expected. 

A sounder strategy involves including disablement steps with the destruction of 

a limited, but carefully selected set of equipment. For example, the deal could include the destruction of certain key cascade equipment, such as valves and pressure 

or flow measuring equipment. Much of this equipment was imported from abroad 

in violation of supplier country export control laws or international sanctions. 

An agreed upon fraction of centrifuges and associated cascade piping and equipment should be kept available under monitored storage away from the centrifuge 

plants as spares to replace broken centrifuges and equipment. This number would 

be derived from the current rate of breakage which Iran would need to document 

with the aid of the IAEA. However, this rate is relatively well known now, as a result of the IAEA’s monitoring of Iranian centrifuge manufacturing under the JPA. 

Iran has provided the IAEA with an inventory of centrifuge rotor assemblies used 

to replace those centrifuges that have failed, and the IAEA has confirmed that centrifuge rotor manufacturing and assembly have been consistent with Iran’s replacement program for damaged centrifuges. Armed with a reliable breakage rate, the 

negotiators can define the limited stockpile of centrifuges necessary to avoid any 

Iranian manufacturing of IR–1 centrifuges. 

(4) Institutionalize a Minimal Centrifuge R&D Program 

Another important limit on Iran’s nuclear program aims to ensure that an advanced centrifuge R&D program does not become the basis of a surge in capability 

in case a deal fails or of a covert breakout. Iran’s centrifuge research and development (R&D) program poses several risks to the verifiability of a comprehensive deal. 

Throughout the duration of a long-term comprehensive agreement, Iran’s centrifuge 

R&D program should be limited to centrifuges with capabilities comparable to the 

15 

current IR–2m centrifuge. The numbers of centrifuges spinning in development cascades should be kept to at most a few cascades, and these cascades should have limited numbers of centrifuges. 

An open-ended Iranian centrifuge R&D program aimed at developing more sophisticated centrifuges than the IR–2m makes little economic sense. Iran will not be 

able to produce enriched uranium competitive with that produced by exporting countries such as Russia or URENCO during the next several decades, if ever. Therefore, 

Iran’s investment in a large centrifuge R&D program would be a waste of time and 

resources. Moreover, the goal of a long-term agreement is to eventually integrate 

Iran into the international civilian nuclear order (even as a nonexporting producer 

of enriched uranium). This integration would render mute Iran’s claims for selfsufficiency in enriched uranium production or for continuing the program out of national pride. 

A long-term agreement should reinforce sound economic principles universally 

accepted in the world’s nuclear programs, all of which are deeply interconnected 

through an international supply chain based on reactor suppliers and enriched uranium fuel requirements. Building an agreement catering to open-ended, economically unrealistic ambitions is both unnecessary and counterproductive, and also sets 

dangerous precedents for other potential proliferant states. 

Iran’s development of more advanced centrifuges would also significantly complicate the verification of a long-term agreement. In a breakout or cheating scenario, 

Iran would need far fewer of these advanced centrifuges in a clandestine plant to 

make weapon-grade uranium than in one using IR–1 centrifuges. For example, Iran 

recently claimed it has done initial work on a centrifuge, called the IR–8, reportedly 

able to produce enriched uranium at a level 16 times greater than the IR–1 centrifuge. Such a centrifuge, if fully developed, would allow Iran to build a centrifuge 

plant with one-sixteenth as many centrifuges. Currently, Iran has about 18,000 IR– 

1 centrifuges, and in a breakout it could produce enough weapon-grade uranium for 

a nuclear weapon in about 2 months, according to both U.S. and ISIS estimates. So, 

instead of needing 18,000 IR–1 centrifuges to achieve this rapid production of weapon-grade uranium, it would need only 1,125 advanced ones to produce as much 

weapon-grade uranium in the same time. Thus, equipped with more advanced centrifuges Iran would need far fewer centrifuges than if it had to use IR–1 centrifuges, 

permitting a smaller, easier to hide centrifuge manufacturing complex and far fewer 

procurements of vital equipment overseas. If Iran made the decision to break out 

to nuclear weapons, the advanced centrifuges would greatly simplify its ability to 

build a covert centrifuge plant that would be much harder to detect in a timely 

manner allowing an international response able to stop Iran from succeeding in 

building nuclear weapons. 

Advanced centrifuges bring with them significant verification challenges that complicate the development of an adequate verification system. Even with an intrusive 

system that goes beyond the Additional Protocol, IAEA inspectors would be challenged to find such small centrifuge manufacturing sites, detect the relatively few 

secret procurements from abroad, or find a small, clandestine centrifuge plant outfitted with these advanced centrifuges. Moreover, with such a small plant needing 

to be built, Iran would also have a far easier time hiding it from Western intelligence agencies. 

(5) Keep Centrifuge Numbers Low and as a Supplementary Measure Achieve Lower 

Stocks of LEU Hexafluoride and Oxide 

Although an important goal is reducing LEU stocks, their reduction without lowering centrifuge numbers significantly is not a workable proposition. In essence, the 

priority is lowering centrifuge numbers and strengthening that goal by also reducing 

the stocks of LEU, whether or not in hexafluoride or oxide forms. Limiting the 

amount of 3.5 percent LEU to no more than the equivalent of about 500 kilograms 

(hexafluoride mass) appears manageable, as long as the number of IR–1 centrifuges 

does not exceed roughly 4,000 to 5,000. This proposition would require that tonnes 

of excess LEU in both oxide and hexafluoride form would be shipped out of Iran. 

Because the authorized centrifuges would continue producing 3.5 percent LEU, this 

LEU cap would require Iran to regularly ship LEU out of the country after a deal 

is signed. However, at any point, Iran could halt LEU shipments and build up its 

stocks of LEU. Because this type of arrangement is quickly reversible, caps on LEU 

stocks, while worthwhile, cannot replace the priority of limiting centrifuge numbers. 

As some have proposed, treating these two, reinforcing steps instead as a zerosum game is counterproductive to achieving an adequate agreement. In this scheme, 

the number of centrifuges would be raised substantially, to 7,000, 8,000 or more IR– 

1 centrifuges or equivalent number of advanced ones, while lowering the stocks of 

3.5 percent LEU toward zero. In one version of this scheme, only the amount of 3.5 

16 

percent LEU hexafluoride would be reduced toward zero via conversion into LEU 

oxide. Once in oxide form, it would somehow be considered no longer usable in a 

breakout. But this is wrong. Both chemical forms of LEU have to be considered 

since Iran can in a matter of months reconvert LEU oxide into hexafluoride form 

and then feed that material into centrifuges, significantly reducing total breakout 

time, particularly in cases where breakout times of 6–12 months are required. In 

fact, in these cases, when Iran would have to reconvert LEU oxide back to hexafluoride form, breakout timelines only grow by a matter of a few to several weeks. 

Moreover, Iran does not have a way to use large quantities of 3.5 percent LEU 

in a reactor, so irradiation cannot be counted on to render these oxide stocks unusable. This means that proposals that merely lower the quantity of LEU hexafluoride 

by converting it into oxide form or fresh fuel is an even more unstable, reversible 

idea than variants that lower total LEU stocks to zero. 

Some background is helpful. This proposal is fundamentally based on Iran not 

possessing enough 3.5 percent LEU to further enrich and obtain enough weapongrade uranium (WGU) for a nuclear weapon, taken here as 25 kilograms. If Iran 

had less than 1,000 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride, it would not have 

enough to produce 25 kilograms of WGU. Its breakout time would increase because 

it would be required to also feed natural uranium into the centrifuges. It could not 

use the three-step process, where WGU is produced in three steps, with the greatest 

number of centrifuges taking 3.5 percent to 20 percent LEU, a smaller number 

enriching from 20 to 60 percent, and a smaller number still going from 60 to 90 

percent, or WGU. Instead, Iran would need to add a fourth step at the ‘‘bottom’’ enriching from natural uranium to 3.5 percent LEU. This step would require a large 

number of centrifuges and thus fewer would be available for the other steps, lengthening breakout times. 

Figure 1 shows mean breakout times for a four-step process, where the amount 

of LEU varies from 0–1000 kilograms of 3.5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride 

and each graph represents a fixed number of IR–1 centrifuges, from 4,000 to 18,000. 

In this case, it is assumed that Iran would have no access to near 20 percent LEU 

hexafluoride, a dubious assumption (see below). In the figure, a 6-month breakout 

time is represented by the black horizontal line on the graph. Several cases are 

noteworthy. For less than 6,000 IR–1 centrifuges, all of the breakout times exceed 

6 months. For 10,000 IR–1 centrifuges, the breakout time is 6 months for stocks of 

1,000 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride and exceeds 6 months for lesser 

amounts of LEU. For 14,000 centrifuges, when the stock is below about 500 kilograms of 3.5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride, the breakout time is 6 months 

or more. For 18,000 centrifuges, a 6-month breakout time only occurs for an inventory of zero kilograms of 3.5 percent enriched uranium, a physical impossibility. 

That number of centrifuges would produce several hundred kilograms of 3.5 percent 

LEU hexafluoride every month. Much of this material would be in the product tanks 

hooked to the cascades and thus readily usable. So, cases of no LEU are not achievable. 

If instead a 1-year breakout time was selected, the numbers of centrifuges and 

LEU stocks would be significantly less. For example, in the unrealistic case of no 

available near 20 percent LEU, a breakout time of 1 year would correspond to 6,000 

IR–1 centrifuges and a stock of 500 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride. 

In fact, a major weakness in proposals to reduce LEU stocks while keeping centrifuge numbers relatively high is that the very product produced by the centrifuges, 

namely 3.5 percent LEU, would need to be regularly eliminated through some process. Obtaining this level of compliance would be challenging. Even if the LEU were 

to be shipped overseas, Iran could hold back sending it abroad, building up a large 

stock. Similarly, if it were converted into an oxide form, Iran could delay doing so, 

feigning problems in the conversion plant or delays in transporting it to the plant 

for conversion. Moreover, conversion to oxide as mentioned above can be rapidly reversed, allowing a three-step process and significantly faster breakout. 

In the unlikely case of Iran not mustering any near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride, 

a plant with 10,000 IR–1 centrifuges would correspond to a 6-month breakout limit 

if the stock did not exceed 1,000 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride. In 2 

months, however, another 500 kilograms could be produced in this number of centrifuges, with the total 3.5 percent LEU stock reaching 1,500 kilograms and allowing a three-step breakout, which could occur in a matter of a few months. Thus, in 

practice, LEU stocks would need to be maintained at levels far below 1,000 kilograms, even in the case of 10,000 IR–1 centrifuges. And keeping the stocks below 

this limit would be very challenging over the duration of a deal. If Iran kept more 

than 10,000 IR–1 centrifuges, the situation is more untenable. 

The above discussion assumes that Iran could not use near 20 percent LEU 

hexafluoride. Why is this, in fact, unlikely to be the case? Iran has stockpiled relVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Jul 22, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
17 

atively large quantities of near 20 percent LEU oxide, quantities way beyond what 

is necessary to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor. By using this stock, Iran could 

reduce breakout times considerably after reconverting the near 20 percent LEU 

oxide into hexafluoride form. Iran currently has enough near 20 percent LEU, if reconverted into hexafluoride form and further enriched, to yield enough weapongrade uranium for a nuclear weapon. The comprehensive agreement should certainly further reduce the size of the near 20 percent LEU stock; however, Iran is 

not expected to eliminate this stock, as long as Iran will fuel the Tehran Research 

Reactor (TRR). In the future, Iran could start to reconvert this material to 

hexafluoride form in a matter of months and dramatically speed up breakout. 

Figure 2 shows the impact of only 50 kilograms of near 20 percent LEU 

hexafluoride on mean breakout times, where again a four-step process is used. With 

just 50 kilograms of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride, a stock of 500 kilograms 

of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride, and 10,000 IR–1 centrifuges, breakout time would 

be 6 months. For comparison, in the case of no near 20 percent LEU discussed 

above, 10,000 IR–1 centrifuges could achieve a 6-month breakout only with a stock 

of 1,000 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride. So, 50 kilograms of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride is equivalent to roughly 500 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU 

hexafluoride. If a stock of 50 kilograms of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride is used 

in conjunction with a stock of 1,000 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride, Iran 

would have enough LEU hexafluoride to use a three-step process to break out and 

achieve breakout times of a few months. 

So, in a realistic case whereby Iran would need to accumulate only 50 kilograms 

of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride, a 6-month breakout would correspond to 

10,000 IR–1 centrifuges and a stock of 3.5 percent LEU that could not exceed 500 

kilograms. While in theory this limit could be maintained, in practice that is highly 

unlikely. Each month, such a plant would produce almost 250 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride. In 2 months, Iran could exceed the cap by 500 kilograms, 

reaching a total of 1,000 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride, or enough if 

used in combination with the near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride stock to reduce 

breakout times to about 4 months, all the while claiming that some reasonable problems prevent it from removing the excess material. 

If instead a 1-year breakout time was selected, the numbers of centrifuges and 

LEU stocks would again be significantly less. For example, a breakout time of 1 

year would correspond to 6,000 IR–1 centrifuges and a stock of about 200 kilograms 

of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride. In the case of 4,000 IR–1 centrifuges, the breakout 

time would be about 12 months with about 700 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU 

hexafluoride. If the LEU limit was set at about 500 kilograms of 3.5 percent 

hexafluoride, and given that a limit could easily be exceeded by a few hundred kilograms, the numbers of IR–1 centrifuges should not exceed 4,000–5000. 

In sum, lowering stocks in support of the fundamental goal of sharply limiting 

centrifuge numbers is a useful measure that would strengthen a deal. If stockpile 

limits are exceeded, that violation would pose minimal risk to the agreement as long 

as the centrifuge numbers are small. 

(6) Beware the Concept of ‘‘SWU’’ as a Limit 

Enrichment effort is measured in separative work units (SWU). However, setting 

limits on the annual SWU of a centrifuge plant has several problems. One is that 

determining the annual SWU of a centrifuge plant is difficult, and its average value 

can change. Iran for example suggested in the negotiations that it would be willing 

to reduce the speed of its centrifuges and the amount of natural uranium fed into 

the centrifuge cascades, while it kept the same number of centrifuges. Both of these 

measures would reduce the annual SWU of the centrifuge plants, potentially significantly, even reduce it by a third of its existing enrichment output. But in a day, 

Iran could reduce these steps and reclaim its original enrichment capability; it is 

easy to increase the speed and the feed rate. Not surprisingly, Western negotiators 

soundly rejected this proposal. 

While SWU has a role to play in determining the equivalence of different types 

of centrifuges, it should not be a limit in its own right. 

(7) Ensure the Arak Reactor’s Changes are Irreversible 

Iran appears to accept that it must limit plutonium production in the heavy water 

Arak nuclear reactor (IR–40), which is almost 90 percent complete and under a construction moratorium because of the interim nuclear deal. As presently designed, 

the reactor can be used relatively easily to make weapon-grade plutonium, at a production rate of up to about nine kilograms a year. This plutonium could later be 

separated and used in nuclear weapons. 

18 

Strategies for lowering plutonium production have been discussed publicly, where 

the reactor would use 5-percent enriched uranium fuel instead of natural uranium 

fuel and its power would be reduced by more than half, from 40 megawatts-thermal 

(MWth) to 10–20 MWth. This strategy would involve placing LEU fuel in a small 

fraction of the fuel channels in a large vessel—often called a ‘‘calandria’’—through 

which the heavy water moderator and coolant flows. The Arak calandria has about 

175 fuel and control rod channels. The LEU would be inserted into the middle section of the calandria with the majority of channels left empty. There are two problems remaining in this strategy, namely whether the calandria would be replaced 

with one sized for LEU fuel, and the heat exchangers would be downsized appropriately to those needed for a 10–20 MWth reactor. 

Although the outcomes of reduced power and enriched uranium fuel are preferred, 

leaving Iran with an unmodified Arak calandria and its original heat exchangers 

constitutes an unacceptable proposal. If the core and heat exchangers were left intact, Iran could in a straightforward manner switch back to a natural uranium core 

and 40 MWth of power, undoing this limitation on plutonium production. This reconversion could occur in the open and under IAEA safeguards where Iran creates 

some pretext. In terms of the natural uranium fuel, Iran has already made significant progress on preparing a core load of natural uranium fuel, which could be finished, or the experience used to fabricate another one. Once switched back, Iran 

could run the reactor under safeguards to produce plutonium, even weapon-grade 

plutonium. Since the reactor would be fully operational, its destruction via military 

means would be dangerous and highly risky, and on balance unlikely to occur. Then, 

at the time of its choosing, Iran could breakout, having only to separate the plutonium from the spent fuel, which could be done utilizing a covert, low technology reprocessing plant in a matter of a few months. The designs for this type of plant are 

unclassified and readily available, and such a plant would be very difficult for the 

IAEA (or intelligence agencies) to detect either during its relatively short construction or subsequent operation. 

At a minimum, Iran should remove the existing calandria and replace it with one 

sized appropriately for a core of the agreed upon number of LEU fuel assemblies. 

The existing one should be rendered unusable or removed from Iran. 

Despite the merits of modifying the Arak reactor, a more effective compromise remains upgrading the Arak reactor to a modern light water research reactor (LWR) 

which can be designed to be far more capable of making medical isotopes than the 

current Arak reactor design. It can also be designed to make plutonium production 

in targets much more difficult to accomplish than the Arak reactor or older style 

research reactors. 

A proposal to do so involves ensuring that the LWR is built irreversibly with a 

power of 10 MWth. This would require remanufacturing of the Arak reactor and 

changes to the heat exchangers and cooling system. Under this proposal, there is 

no need to produce heavy water, and the current stocks could be sold on the world 

market. Production of natural uranium oxide powder, fuel pellets, rods, and assemblies for the Arak IR–40 would be halted. Moreover, the associated process lines 

would also need to be shut down, including the production of specifically IR–40 relevant materials such as zirconium tubes. In return, the P5+1 could assist Iran in 

producing fuel for the LWR. Iran could produce the necessary LEU in its enrichment program. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The graphs and annex attachments submitted with Mr. Albright’s 

prepared statement can be found in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the 

Record’’ section at the end of this hearing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Doran. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL DORAN, SENIOR FELLOW, 

HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. DORAN. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me today to 

speak on the next steps to achieve a comprehensive deal in the negotiations with Iran. 

Please permit me to focus my remarks on the perceptions of 

America’s Middle Eastern allies: Israel, Saudi Arabia, the gulf 

sheikhdoms, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. 

19 

When one speaks to elites across the Middle East, one encounters a prevailing climate of skepticism regarding the negotiations. 

The tale that our allies tell about the thaw in relations between the 

United States and Iran is markedly different from the tale that the 

Obama administration itself is telling. 

The administration begins its story by pointing to a change of 

heart in Tehran to the supposed decision by the government of 

Hassan Rouhani to guide Iran toward reconciliation with the international community. 

Our allies, by contrast, start their story by pointing to a strategic 

shift in Washington. They perceive the Obama administration to 

have abandoned the traditional American role of containing Iran. 

They now see the United States instead in a kind of silent partnership with the Islamic Republic. 

In my prepared statement, I investigate the history of that perception. In the interest of time here, suffice it to say that the idea 

of a silent partnership was taking shape in the minds of our allies 

even before the administration signed the Joint Plan of Action, the 

JPOA, on the Iranian nuclear question. And the JPOA, in turn, 

confirmed the sense of that silent partnership. 

While many in Washington interpreted the JPOA as a sign that 

the Rouhani government was making a good faith effort to bring 

Iran into compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty, America’s 

Middle Eastern allies were more inclined to interpret it as a sign 

that the Obama administration was retreating from long-held positions without receiving reciprocal concessions from the Iranians. 

Over the last year, five major trends in American policy have 

deepened the perception of American retreat from leadership and 

a silent partnership between Washington and Tehran. 

First, our allies perceive increased coordination at the diplomatic 

level and in military operations between the United States and 

Iran and Syria. Just 2 days ago, the regional press noted that the 

Iranian Air Force was carrying out sorties in Iraq against the Islamic State. The Iranians, the press noted, could not have conducted operations in such close proximity to the Americans without 

significant levels of coordination between the two. 

Second, this increased cooperation has not produced any change 

in the malign Iranian policies that historically have deeply threatened America’s allies. To name just a few of those policies, Tehran 

continues to support Palestinian terrorist organizations, to build up 

Shiite militias in Iraq, to empower the worst element of Bashar alAssad’s murder machine, and to supply Hezbollah with missiles capable of striking all major population centers in Israel. 

Third, our allies have noted the continued American refusal to 

build up the Syrian opposition in ways that might threaten the 

Assad regime. They read that refusal as proof that the President 

regards Syria as an Iranian sphere of interest. 

Fourth, the rhetoric of the administration is frequently hostile to 

traditional friends. When Vice President Biden, at a recent talk at 

Harvard, stated that our allies are the problem,’’ and when a senior 

official in the White House denigrated the Israeli Prime Minister 

in the crudest of terms, they were merely airing publicly viewpoints that administration officials have shared privately for at 

least a year. 

20 

Fifth, and not least, the conduct of the United States in the nuclear negotiations has confirmed our allies’ perception that American resolve is flagging. When the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, 

made clear his refusal to dismantle a single centrifuge, the administration retreated from established positions. As a result, our allies are now asking if it is not the Americans and not the Iranians 

who are in need of a face-saving agreement. 

The alarm of our allies is worrying for a whole host of reasons, 

but two are particularly worth noting. 

First, their alienation from the President’s regional strategy is 

undermining his ability to build an effective coalition against the 

Islamic State. It is a hard fact of life that we cannot win the conflict without developing Sunni allies. On the ground, we need 

Sunni troops. We need trusted Sunni troops, troops that are trusted by the local population who are capable of holding the cities and 

towns from which we will drive ISIS. In the region more broadly, 

we need a committed coalition of Sunni states. However, as long as 

we are aligned with Iran and with its allies who have a well-deserved reputation for sectarian murder, we will fail to attract 

Sunnis to our banner. 

The second reason for caring about our allies’ morale relates directly to the nuclear negotiations. The demoralization of our friends 

emboldens Ali Khamenei. The five trends in American policy that 

deeply unsettle our allies have the effect of reassuring the Iranian 

leader. They indicate, among other things, that his intransigence is 

unlikely to provoke President Obama into ratcheting up economic 

sanctions, let alone contemplating military action. 

With the threat of economic pressure diminished and the military option all but nonexistent, American regional strategy 

incentivizes Iran to hold out for more concessions. If the administration does not take steps immediately to reconstitute the leverage 

that it held over Iran just a year ago, then we can be assured that 

the next round of negotiations will result in the further erosion of 

the American position. 

The first step toward regaining that leverage is for the President 

to sign a new sanctions bill that will demonstrate to the Iranians 

and to our allies in the region that our patience is not endless. 

The second step is to dispel our allies’ perception of the silent 

partnership. Such action begins but is by no means limited to 

building up an effective opposition to the Assad regime in Syria. 

I thank you again for asking me to testify. It is a great honor 

to speak before this body on such an important issue. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Doran follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. MICHAEL DORAN

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee, thank 

you for inviting me today to speak on the next steps to achieve a comprehensive 

deal in the nuclear negotiations with Iran. Please permit me to focus my remarks 

on the perceptions of America’s Middle Eastern allies—Israel, Saudi Arabia, the 

Gulf sheikhdoms, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. 

It goes without saying that no two countries are exactly the same, and that within 

each country there are significant differences of opinion. Nevertheless, when one 

speaks to elites across the Middle East one encounters a prevailing climate of skepticism regarding the nuclear negotiations. It is my intention today to discuss the 

sources of that skepticism and to analyze its impact on America’s strategic goals. 

21 

The tale that our allies tell about the thaw in relations between the United States 

and Iran is markedly different from the tale that the Obama administration itself 

is telling. The administration begins its story by pointing to a change of heart in 

Tehran—to the supposed decision by the government of Hassan Rouhani to guide 

Iran toward reconciliation with the international community. 

Our allies, by contrast, see no convincing proof that Tehran is changing course. 

What they see, instead, is a strategic shift in Washington. Their account of the 

American-Iranian thaw begins with President Obama’s decision, taken while he was 

still Senator Obama, to end wars. That goal raised an obvious question: In the absence of American troops, what new arrangements on the ground would safeguard 

American interests? At some point, our allies believe, the President decided in favor 

of a concert system, a club of powers that would band together to stabilize the 

region. But in sharp contrast with his predecessors, President Obama conceived of 

that club as including Iran. 

While one can argue about whether the President truly entertains such a vision, 

there is no disputing the fact that many of our closest allies are utterly convinced 

of this fact. They perceive the United States to be in a silent partnership with Iran 

already, and to be working daily for closer relations with it. 

This is no fleeting impression. It is a solid body of opinion, based on close observation and analysis, which began to take clear shape over 2 years ago, in 2012, 

against the backdrop of the conflict in Syria. When Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, 

intervened directly to prop up the regime of Bashar al-Assad, a number of America’s 

closest friends came to Washington and beseeched the President to organize a 

counter response. The request forced President Obama to choose between two rival 

visions of the American role in the Middle East. Was the United States dedicated 

to containing Iran, or to arriving at a modus vivendi with it? He chose the latter 

path. 

At that time, it was not clear whether President Obama was consciously choosing 

in favor of Iran, or simply seeking to avoid a costly and uncertain military adventure. But his decision, regardless of his motivations, had the effect of giving Iran 

a free hand in Syria. From the perspective of our allies, this was a matter of great 

consequence, because Syria, to them, was more than just a particularly brutal civil 

war. It was the key battleground in a struggle for a new regional order. If only inadvertently, the President had voted in favor of an Iranian regional ascendancy. 

Over the course of the following year, however, our allies came to the conclusion 

that President Obama’s bias in favor of Iran was by no means accidental. The key 

event that generated this perception was the President’s decision, in September 

2013, to seek congressional authorization for strikes against the Assad regime. This 

deference to Capitol Hill was read, in the Middle East, as a transparent decision 

not to strike. At the time, stories began to circulate in the Middle East regarding 

a secret bilateral negotiating channel between Tehran and Washington. Subsequently, those stories turned out to be true. From the point of view of our allies, 

it makes little difference whether the channel was used to discuss Syria in any 

meaningful way. Its mere existence sent a signal of broad strategic intent. 

As our allies were still absorbing the meaning of that signal, the administration 

brokered the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) on the Iranian nuclear question. While 

many in Washington interpreted the JPOA as a sign that the Rouhani government 

was making a good faith effort to bring Iran into compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, America’s Middle Eastern allies were more inclined to see it as a capitulation by the United States. In their view, the Obama administration was retreating from long-held positions without receiving reciprocal concessions from the Iranians. In short, the JPOA became another sign of American retreat. 

Since the signing of the JPOA, five major trends in American policy have deepened the perception of a silent partnership with Iran—a perception that is now set 

in stone. 

First, our allies perceive increased coordination, at the diplomatic level and in 

military operations, between the United States and Iran and Syria. When Secretary 

of State Kerry testified before this committee he explicitly denied such coordination. 

He preferred instead to speak in terms of ‘‘de-confliction.’’ This euphemism, however, is hardly influencing perceptions in the Middle East. Just 2 days ago, the 

regional press noted that the Iranian Air Force was carrying out sorties in Iraq 

against ISIS. The Iranians, the press noted, could not have conducted operations in 

such close proximity to the Americans without significant levels of coordination 

between the two. 

Second, this increased cooperation has not produced any change in the malign Iranian policies that, historically, have deeply threatened America’s allies. To name 

just a few of those policies, Tehran continues to support Palestinian terrorist organizations, to build up Shiite militias in Iraq, to empower the worst elements of Bashar 

22 

al-Assad’s murder machine, and to supply Hezbollah with missiles capable of striking all major population centers in Israel. In years past, policies of this sort provoked a counter reaction from the United States. Now, however, they barely elicit 

a peep from Washington. 

Third, our allies have noted the continued American refusal to build up the Syrian opposition in ways that might threaten the Assad regime. They read that refusal 

as proof that the President regards Syria as an Iranian sphere of interest. 

Fourth, the rhetoric of the administration is frequently hostile to traditional 

friends. When Vice President Biden, at a recent talk at Harvard, stated that ‘‘our 

allies are the problem,’’ and when a senior official in the White House denigrated 

the Israeli Prime Minister in crude terms, they were merely airing publicly viewpoints that administration officials have been sharing privately for at least a year. 

Fifth, and not least, the conduct of the United States in the nuclear negotiations 

has confirmed our allies’ perception that American resolve is flagging. When the 

Obama administration first agreed to the JPOA’s terms, it explained the renunciation of the demand for zero enrichment as a way of allowing Supreme Leader Ali 

Khamenei to save face. All he needed, so the argument went, was a symbolic level 

of enrichment. It soon became clear, however, that those who had developed this 

assessment had failed to consult the man himself. When Khamenei made clear his 

refusal to dismantle even a single centrifuge, the administration again retreated. As 

a result, our allies are now asking if it is the Americans, and not the Iranians, who 

are in need of a face-saving agreement. 

Do the bitter assessments of our allies really matter? Indeed they do. Their alarm 

is worrying for a whole host of reasons, but two are particularly noteworthy. First, 

our allies’ alienation from the President’s regional strategy is undermining his ability to build an effective coalition against ISIS. It is a hard fact of life that we cannot 

win this conflict without developing Sunni allies. On the ground we need Sunni 

troops, trusted by the local population, who are capable of holding the cities and 

towns from which we will drive ISIS. In the region more broadly, we need a committed coalition of Sunni states. However, so long as we are aligned with Iran and 

its allies, who have a well-deserved reputation for sectarian murder, we will fail to 

attract Sunnis to our banner. 

The Turkish case is instructive. In sharp contrast to Saudi Arabia and Israel, Turkey does not regard Iran as an existential threat. Nevertheless, the Turkish Government is deeply committed to toppling the Assad regime, which it correctly identifies 

as the single most destabilizing force in Syria. Thus, even with respect to Turkey, 

the Obama administration’s de-facto recognition of an Iranian sphere of interest is 

undermining its goal of building an effective anti-ISIS coalition. 

The second reason for caring about our allies’ concerns relates directly to the 

nuclear question. It is a grave mistake to assume that the Iranian position in the 

nuclear negotiations is disconnected from everything else that is happening in the 

Middle East. The demoralization of our allies emboldens Ali Khamenei. It is just 

as clear to him as it is to the Saudis and the Israelis that the Obama administration 

has prioritized the conflict with ISIS over the containment of Iran. The five trends 

in American policy that deeply unsettle our allies have the effect of providing the 

Iranian leader with reassurance. They indicate, among other things, that his intransigence is unlikely to provoke President Obama into ratcheting up economic sanctions, let alone to contemplate military action. 

With the threat of economic pressure diminished and the military option all but 

nonexistent, American regional strategy incentivizes Iran to hold out for more concessions. In doing so, that strategy has made it nearly impossible to imagine a satisfactory comprehensive agreement—one that includes restrictions on ballistic missiles and warheads, a full disclosure by Iran of the possible military dimensions of 

its program, and an effective monitoring regime. If the administration does not take 

steps immediately to reconstitute the leverage that it held over Iran just a year ago, 

then we can be assured that the next round of negotiations will result in the further 

erosion of the American position. 

The first step toward regaining that leverage is for the President to sign a new 

sanctions bill that will demonstrate to the Iranians, and to our allies in the region, 

that our patience is not endless. The second step is to dispel our allies’ perception 

of a silent partnership with Iran. That step begins with, but is by no means limited 

to, building up an effective opposition to the Assad regime in Syria. 

Thank you again for inviting me to testify. It is an honor to speak before this committee on an issue of such importance. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Samore. 

23 

STATEMENT OF DR. GARY SAMORE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

FOR RESEARCH AT THE BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF 

GOVERNMENT, CAMBRIDGE, MA 

Dr. SAMORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Corker for giving me this opportunity to testify. 

In my written statement, I go into some detail about the state 

of play in the negotiations, concessions that both sides have made. 

But the main point I want to make is that the failure to reach 

agreement on a comprehensive deal by the November 24 deadline 

is entirely Iran’s fault. Many of the academics and pundits who 

comment about the nuclear negotiations gloss over this fact in the 

interests of being objective and evenhanded, but I think it is very 

important for us to emphasize that it is the Iranians, and not the 

Americans or the P5+1, that are obstructing a deal. In fact, the 

P5+1 led by the Americans I think have made very reasonable, creative, even generous offers that would allow Iran to preserve a limited enrichment capability as part of its nuclear energy program 

and allow it to defer coming to terms with the IAEA on its past 

and possibly current weaponization activities in exchange for graduated sanctions relief. 

But the Iranians have continued to take unrealistic and extreme 

positions dictated by the Supreme Leader’s public edicts. They refused to sacrifice any of their existing 10,000 operational centrifuges. They insist on a rapid buildup of their enrichment capacity to a much larger industrial scale within a relatively short period of time. And they are demanding full and immediate sanctions 

relief. 

Now, it may be that this is just sharp bargaining tactics, as the 

chairman and ranking member have suggested. Perhaps the Iranians are just holding out to see how many concessions they can 

squeeze out of the P5+1. And now that the P5+1 have categorically 

rejected Iran’s demands in these last round of negotiations, we will 

have to wait and see whether the Supreme Leader authorizes some 

more flexibility as the negotiations resume. 

But I fear the more fundamental reason for the Iranian position 

is that Supreme Leader Khamenei just does not feel compelled to 

accept significant long-term limits on Iran’s long-standing program 

to develop a nuclear weapons capability in part because his reading 

of geopolitical developments like the tensions between the West 

and Russia over Ukraine, the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria may 

give him the conclusion that Iran is in a much stronger bargaining 

position and is much more capable to withstand pressure from the 

United States and its allies to resume sanctions. 

And in addition, as the chairman pointed out, Iran’s economy has 

at least stabilized under the Joint Plan of Action. Even though it 

is still not doing well, at least they have been able to stop the deterioration. 

Now, the chairman asked for some suggestions on what we might 

be able to do to change the situation because if we do not change 

it, I think we will be in exactly the same position we are today in 

March or in June. In a perfect world, the best diplomatic approach 

now would be for the United States to get agreement from the 

P5+1 to basically deliver an ultimatum to Iran, that either they 

24 

take it or leave it, the current offer that is on the table. But I fear 

that the Russians and the Chinese will not agree to such a position. So I think we have to recognize that our diplomatic leverage 

is limited in part because of the very poor relations between Moscow and Washington, which could very easily get worse, by the 

way, if Russia takes another military move in Ukraine which 

seems quite possible. 

Nonetheless, I do think there are some things we can do. 

First, as both of you have suggested, I think it is very important 

that the P5+1 not make any new offers or new proposals until the 

Iranians come back with a position that shows that they are serious about coming to an agreement. And my understanding is that 

the talks broke up in Vienna with Zarif understanding that the ball 

is in Iran’s court. So let us see what he comes back with when the 

negotiations resume, whether it shows any movement on these unrealistic positions that the Iranians have taken. 

Second, I think it is very important that the United States and 

its allies begin preparing for a resumption of sanctions as early as 

March if no political framework agreement is reached. And in particular, that means talking to our Asian allies, Japan, Korea, India, 

who still buy a significant amount of oil, and start working with 

them to prepare for them to reduce those purchases of oil, at the 

same time work with our Middle East allies like the Saudis and 

the Emiratis to continue high production so our allies in Asia have 

opportunities to replace Iranian oil with oil from other sources. 

And third, I hope the White House and Congress can work together to draft legislation that would identify additional sanctions 

and authorize the President to impose those sanctions in the event 

that Iran violates the Joint Plan of Action or if there is not an 

agreement or sufficient progress toward an agreement. I think the 

challenge here is crafting legislation, as Senator Corker said, that 

strengthens the United States bargaining leverage without giving 

the Iranians an excuse to renege on the Joint Plan of Action and 

blame it on the United States, which would jeopardize our ability 

to go back to a sanctions campaign. 

Now, I am not at all confident these actions will be successful. 

I think it is quite possible that Supreme Leader Khamenei is constitutionally unable to make the kind of concessions that we are 

seeking for an acceptable nuclear deal. And in that case, we are 

likely heading for a collapse of the Joint Plan of Action because I 

think it will be very difficult to continue to extend these talks without real tangible progress, if not a comprehensive agreement, then 

a partial agreement that addresses some of the key issues. And if 

we are heading for a collapse, I think our primary objective is to 

position ourselves to be in the strongest possible position to resume 

sanctions, and that means, in particular, making clear everybody 

understands that Iran is to blame for the failure to reach an agreement and therefore international pressure is justified. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Samore follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. GARY SAMORE

On November 24, Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Russia, France, U.K., Germany 

and China) agreed to extend the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) until March 1, 2015, 

to seek agreement on a political framework and until June 30, 2015, to finalize a 

25 

comprehensive nuclear agreement. Under the terms of the extension, Iran will be 

able to access $700 million a month from its oil exports, for a total of about $5 billion dollars for the entire 7-month extension. In exchange, Iran has reportedly 

agreed to additional restraints on its research and development of more advanced 

centrifuge models, to allow the IAEA additional access to centrifuge production 

facilities, and to convert more of its stockpile of nearly 20 percent enriched uranium 

oxide into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. 

On balance, the extension makes sense. The negotiators seem to be making 

progress on several key issues, such as Iranian agreement to modify the Arak heavy 

water research reactor to produce less plutonium, convert the underground Fordow 

enrichment facility to some kind of research and development facility, remove some 

portion of its stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia for fuel fabrication, 

and allow additional monitoring and verification measures beyond the IAEA Additional Protocol. Extension is obviously preferable to the P5+1 accepting a ‘‘bad deal’’ 

along the lines that Iran is demanding. 

At this point in the negotiations, extension is also preferable to allowing the JPOA 

to collapse. To the credit of the United States and its European allies, the JPOA 

is working effectively to freeze most aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, while maintaining the key elements of the sanctions regime, in particular the limits on Iran’s 

oil exports and access to revenue for oil sales. As a practical matter, Iran is unlikely 

to derive significant benefits from 7 additional months of negotiations under the 

JPOA, either in terms of sanctions relief or progress toward development of a 

nuclear weapons capability, as long as Iran continues to abide by the terms of the 

JPOA and as long as the United States and its allies continue to enforce the remaining sanctions regime. 

We should be clear that the need for an extension and the failure to reach agreement on a comprehensive nuclear deal is entirely Iran’s fault. Led by the United 

States, the P5+1 have offered Iran extremely reasonable—even generous—proposals 

for a comprehensive agreement. For example, the P5+1 are reportedly prepared to 

allow Iran to retain up to 4,500 operating IR–1 centrifuges (about half of the current 

number of operating IR–1 centrifuges) if Iran agrees to (1) disable the remaining 

centrifuges by removing cascade piping and equipment and (2) export most of its 

LEU stocks to Russia for fabrication into fuel elements for the Bushehr reactor. In 

essence, this proposal would achieve a break out time (i.e., the time required for 

Iran to produce a significant quantity of weapons grade uranium at its declared 

enrichment facilities) of about a year—compared to the current break out time of 

a few months—while allowing Iran to claim that it rejected any ‘‘dismantlement’’ of 

its existing centrifuges. Reportedly, the P5+1 are also willing to accept a phased 

easing of restrictions on Iran’s enrichment program over the proposed 15-year duration of the agreement, thus enabling Iran to say that its long-term option to develop 

an industrial scale enrichment program has been respected. 

On other issues, the P5+1 seem prepared to accept Iran’s demand that the Arak 

40 MW heavy water research reactor will not be converted to a light water research 

reactor, provided that the modifications to the reactor would reduce plutonium production capability to less than one kilogram a year and are not easily reversible. 

Finally, the P5+1 seem willing to allow Iran to defer coming to terms with the IAEA 

on its past nuclear weapons program—the so-called Possible Military Dimension 

(PMD) issue—in exchange for graduated sanctions relief. While U.S. and European 

nuclear-related sanctions would be waived or repealed at the onset of a comprehensive agreement, removal of relevant United Nations Security Council sanctions 

would be linked to satisfaction of the IAEA’s investigation. 

Iran, however, continues to take extreme and unrealistic positions. As dictated by 

Supreme Leader Khameini’s public ‘‘redlines,’’ Iran apparently refuses to accept any 

reduction of its current force of nearly 10,000 operational IR–2 centrifuges, beyond 

offering modifications in performance that are easily reversible. Iran also insists on 

expanding its enrichment program to more advanced centrifuges and industrialscale capacity by 2021, when its current contract with Russia to provide fuel for the 

Bushehr nuclear power plant expires. Finally, Iran is demanding immediate and 

total removal of all sanctions, both national and international. In essence, Iran 

wants early repeal of the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions so 

it can continue to stonewall the IAEA investigations of past and possible current 

nuclear weaponization research and development activities. 

Why has Iran rejected the P5+1 proposals? The most benign explanation is sharp 

bargaining tactics. Supreme Leader Khamenei may believe that the P5+1 will offer 

additional concessions if Iran sticks to its hard-line demands. Hopefully, now that 

the P5+1 has rejected Iran’s terms, the Supreme Leader will be persuaded to allow 

his negotiators more flexibility before the March deadline for agreement on a political framework. A more sinister possibility, however, is that Supreme Leader 

26 

Khamenei simply does not feel compelled to accept significant restrictions on Iran’s 

long-standing program to develop a nuclear weapons option. For Supreme Leader 

Khameini, acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability is a critical national objective—both to protect the Islamic Republic against the ‘‘Great Satan’’ and other enemies and to assert Iran’s dominance in the region. Whatever the views of President 

Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif, Khameini is not likely to accept limits on the 

nuclear program except under severe pressure and threat. Under the JPOA and 

President Rouhani’s more competent economic team, however, Iran’s economic deterioration has stabilized. Moreover, recent geopolitical developments, such as the tensions between Russia and Western countries over Ukraine and the rise of Islamic 

State in Syria and Iraq, may give Supreme Leader Khameini more confidence that 

Iran’s bargaining leverage has improved and that Iran can weather the collapse of 

the JPOA. 

Whatever Iran’s motivations, the negotiations will fail unless Iran is persuaded 

to show more realism and flexibility. As a first step, the P5+1 should not make any 

new offers until Iran reciprocates with a serious proposal of its own that accepts 

significant long-term constraints on its ability to produce fissile material and agrees 

that any comprehensive agreement must include graduated sanctions relief linked 

to the PMD issue. The P5+1 have already come up with creative solutions that 

would give the Iranian Government a face-saving deal it could sell at home if it 

wanted to. But, Tehran is unlikely to make the difficult decision to accept these proposals as long as it believes that the P5+1 have more concessions to offer or if it 

believes that the P5+1 are willing to live with additional extensions beyond July. 

Accordingly, the United States and its allies should begin preparing to resume the 

sanctions campaign in July if there is no comprehensive agreement or enough 

progress to justify another extension. This means persuading Iran’s major remaining oil customers, such as Japan, Korea, and India, to plan for reducing their purchases of Iranian oil and obtaining commitments from other oil producers like Saudi 

and the Emirates that they will maintain high production to fill the gap. In fact, 

the international oil market—with reduced demand, low prices and increased supply—is favorable to increasing economic pressure against Iran, although we should 

recognize that renewed sanctions are unlikely to force Iran to meet our terms in the 

near term. Finally, the White House and Congress can work together to define and 

authorize additional sanctions that the President can impose if Iran violates the 

JPOA or fails to accept a political framework by March. Such legislation would need 

to be carefully crafted to strengthen U.S. bargaining leverage without giving Iran 

a pretext to blame the United States for destroying the JPOA. 

Whether these measures will be sufficient to produce an acceptable nuclear deal 

is unclear, but they probably stand the best chance of persuading Supreme Leader 

Khameini to make difficult decisions to accept limits on Iran’s nuclear program. In 

the event that he is unwilling or unable to make those decisions, these measures 

will put us in the most favorable position to increase sanctions if no comprehensive 

agreement or another partial agreement is achieved. Most important, we need to 

keep pointing out that Iran—not the United States or the P5+1—is responsible for 

obstructing a reasonable nuclear deal and therefore additional international pressure on Iran is justified. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you all for your insights. 

Let me start with you, Dr. Samore, and where you ended. 

First of all, prior to your role here and at Harvard, you were the 

President’s White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction for 4 years I understand. Is that correct? 

Dr. SAMORE. It is. 

The CHAIRMAN. So you have been both inside the administration 

and outside of it, and I think that is important to note. 

Is the advice that you just gave or the insights you just gave 

here—if you were still working at the White House, is that the insights you would give to the President? 

Dr. SAMORE. Yes, sir, I certainly would. I mean, I supported the 

President’s efforts to try to negotiate an agreement with Iran because I think, given the alternatives, that is probably the best option that is available to us. But I have always been skeptical that 

we could negotiate an agreement because I think Iran, or at least 

the Supreme Leader, is deeply committed to acquiring a nuclear 

27 

weapons capability. Nonetheless, attempting to achieve a negotiation and being able to blame Iran for failure of a successful negotiation puts us in a much better position to mobilize pressure 

against Iran. 

The CHAIRMAN. And we are agreed on that. At least, I have always supported the—I have seen the sanctions that I have authored with the help of many members of this committee and beyond as a means to an end, an end, getting, one, a negotiation, but 

more importantly getting a solution. So I agree with that. 

But at some point, you have to decide whether or not you are 

heading to a fruitful conclusion. You, yourself, have repeatedly argued that both sides in this negotiation have an interest in keeping 

diplomacy going but that talks are unlikely to achieve a comprehensive deal, and to some degree you have reiterated that 

today. 

So when I hear that, well, let us keep negotiating, and I say, 

well, why would we keep negotiating if we do not honestly believe 

that the critical elements—some Mr. Albright listed in his testimony—are going to be agreed to and that continuing the march toward sanctions relief in the billions of dollars, which we wonder 

what the billions of dollars are being used for—is it for the Iranian 

people or is it being used to further a program here? The answer 

to that is, well, the Iranians have an interest to come to a conclusion, a successful conclusion. 

But I do not get the sense that they feel compelled to come to 

a conclusion as long as they can keep negotiating. Is that perspective wrong? If so, why? I would be interested in hearing is there 

a point that they will say, you know what, we are not getting to 

where we want to be. We are going to walk away. 

Dr. SAMORE. Well, first of all, I suspect you are right that we are 

not going to be able to reach a comprehensive agreement because 

the Iranians are being inflexible and intractable on the key issues. 

And if that is true, then eventually the Joint Plan of Action is 

going to collapse. And I think it would be better for us if it is the 

Iranians that renege or violate the agreement because that will put 

us in a much stronger position to go back to a sanctions track. 

And that is, in fact, the history of these nuclear negotiations. I 

mean, back in 2003, the Iranians reached a similar interim agreement with the Europeans that froze many of their nuclear activities, and 2 years later, the Iranians reneged on that deal. So I 

think that if we are anticipating that these negotiations are likely 

to be unsuccessful, I think we need to try to position ourselves so 

that Iran is responsible for breaking out of the negotiations instead 

of ourselves. 

The CHAIRMAN. But that raises the question at some point if you 

realistically cannot expect that diplomacy is going to run a successful course, that you have to call the question. Does it not? I mean, 

of course, kicking the ball down the road may have you escape how 

you pursue a solution to Iranian nuclear power for nuclear weapons, but it does not ultimately solve the core issue. 

Dr. SAMORE. Yes, that is correct, sir. I mean, the Iranians have 

been pursuing a nuclear weapon capability for 30 years. 

The CHAIRMAN. At some point we call the question and say we 

have tried, here is what we have done. You are going to have a 

28 

blame game at some point if you cannot succeed. So the question 

is how do you best position it so that in fact—I get concerned that 

we have gone from a position of strength and maximalist positions 

to an increasingly minimalist position. And my concern is that we 

are heading in a direction that the Iranians are induced to continue at a negotiation because it is moving in their direction, and 

they are getting relief. And, yes, it is not everything, but remember, the relief is not only the money they are getting. Under the 

sanctions as they existed, we would have required even more oil to 

be offset. That has not taken place. So there are a lot of elements 

here that are not being calibrated as to the benefit that Iran is receiving. 

I would like to ask you all in this regard. In an editorial entitled 

‘‘More Nuclear Time in Tehran,’’ the Washington Post’’ quotes the 

President as saying in ABC This Week, the interim deal has, quote, 

‘‘definitely stopped Iran’s nuclear program from advancing.’’ And 

then it goes on to say in that editorial, we wonder what they think 

of that in Tehran. According to the latest International Atomic Energy Agency quarterly report, Iran has not halted centrifuge work 

at the Natanz facility as promised and has worked to perfect more 

advanced IR–5 centrifuges to enrich uranium. That does not seem 

to me to be halting your process. Is there a view on that? 

Dr. SAMORE. Sure. I think ‘‘halting’’ is not an accurate description, but I do think the Joint Plan of Action has limited, frozen, 

rolled back some elements of Iran’s program. Certainly if the Joint 

Plan of Action did not exist, they would be able to move closer toward a nuclear weapons capability, including additional research 

and development on more advanced machines. So I think we are 

getting some benefit from the Joint Plan of Action just as the Iranians are, and that is why an agreement was reached. Both sides 

gained something from it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. But is the purpose of more advanced IR 

centrifuges not the ability to shorten the time to ultimately have 

the enrichment capability to make a bomb? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes, I think I would agree with Gary. That statement is not accurate. And there is worry about their advances on 

the advanced centrifuges. I mean, when they went to enrich in the 

IR–5, the best I can make out of it—I am not a lawyer, but based 

on talking to U.S. officials, that it was inconsistent with the U.S. 

understanding of what the agreement did. Lawyers can argue if 

that is a violation. But they asked Iran to stop, and Iran did stop. 

And the interim deal confirms and reiterates what is viewed as a 

U.S. commitment to not see enrichment in the IR–5 or see significant developments happen at the pilot plant. But they cannot stop 

developments happening. It is really they are trying to stop major 

developments taking place at the pilot enrichment plant as this 

deal is extended one time after another. So I think they are making 

progress. It is slower. 

But the other part of this—and this is probably why I think one 

has to wonder if this thing can just continue to be extended—is 

Iran is not under some kind of microscope. There is a lot of Iran’s 

nuclear program that is not subject to any IAEA inspection even 

involving advanced centrifuges. And so you have to worry that 

there is something going on on the covert side where Iran is makVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Jul 22, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
29 

ing advancements. And they tend to throw that in our face in a 

way with announcements. You know, they had major breakthroughs on the IR–8 centrifuge, for example, 16 times more powerful than the IR–1. All that work is done outside of any IAEA purview. It is not being done at the pilot plant. So you do have to 

worry over time that advancements are happening that are not in 

the U.S. interest. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is a perspective that Olli Heinonen, a 

former IAEA deputy director, has stated when he said that Iran 

may be within months developing a nuclear weapon because the 

IAEA has not been able to fully inspect Iran’s uranium and centrifuge stocks. He said the international community does not have 

a, quote, complete picture of what Iran actually has in stock. He 

went on to say Iran could have up to 4,000 or 5,000 centrifuges of 

raw materials like carbon fiber for their production outside of 

Natanz and Fordow. Is that not the type of concern that we would 

have in this regard? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. I cannot remember what Olli was saying 

there. But I think one aspect is Iran said it was going to install 

3,000 IR–2m’s at the fuel enrichment plant at Natanz. It did install 

1,000 and then the JPOA froze further work there. They may have 

built all the components for those other 2,000. And right now—and 

the IAEA freely says this—it does not have the tools in hand or the 

cooperation from Iran to provide assurance they are undeclared nuclear activities or facilities. So you do have to worry about that. 

The CHAIRMAN. When we keep hearing that we have unprecedented inspections, that may be true, but those inspections are not 

as pervasive as necessary to guarantee us that they do not have 

the wherewithal outside of what is being reviewed by the IAEA to 

be able to pursue. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think I would disagree that they are that pervasive. 

The CHAIRMAN. You would disagree. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. We are being told we have the most pervasive inspections regime going on. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think the counter to that is that the 

United States is arguing to not only get the additional protocol but 

supplementary verification measures that go way beyond what is 

in place now. And so what I think you can say is that verification 

at the known declared sites is better than it was prior to the JPA. 

And there have been breakthroughs reported in the press, you 

know, at centrifuge manufacturing sites involved in making the rotors, inspections have gone from—or visits really. They are not 

really inspections, I would argue—have gone from once a month to 

twice a month, and the IAEA can do more choice of when it goes, 

in a sense pick a date when it goes, and have some element of surprise about the date it is going to pick. But that is a far cry from 

knowing really if there are centrifuges being manufactured there in 

secret when they are not there. They do not have cameras. They 

do not have short-notice inspection rights to go there that they 

would have under the additional protocol. 

So I think the inspections are not nearly what they need to be, 

but they are adequate to verify the freeze imposed in the Joint 

30 

Plan of Action but they are not sufficient to provide assurance that 

secret activities are not ongoing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. I was going to go in a different direction, but I want to follow up for just one second. 

So there, obviously, I think is concern by everybody on this panel 

about what they are doing covertly, what they are doing at their 

military installations. Dr. Samore mentioned about the fact that 

there are possible violations, but you, Mr. Albright, mentioned that 

the IAEA recently reported that Iran has not only missed deadlines 

for resolving some of the key inspections issues—these are at the 

declared sites obviously—but had fed uranium into an IR–5 centrifuge. And I would just ask this question. Is that not itself a violation of the existing agreement? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. We asked that question ourselves, and we rapidly 

relayed the information to any U.S. official we could reach. The answer we get back was one country said it was not a violation. I will 

not name it. What I heard from more the U.S. side, that it was inconsistent with their understanding. And so I think my conclusion 

from that is that there is a great hesitancy to call this a violation 

particularly since Iran quickly backed down, and then in the extension agreement agreed to impose more limitations on centrifuge 

R&D activities at the pilot plant. 

Senator CORKER. And who actually exposed this? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Who exposed it? The IAEA exposed it in their report, their safeguards report. 

You know, one could ask the question—and this, I think, also 

has—maybe it was dealt with. The IAEA did not report it promptly. They reported it in their quarterly safeguards report which is 

sent out. Essentially it is a public document that first goes out to 

member states. 

Senator CORKER. Why would that be the case? When you have 

a negotiation underway that is obviously of great importance, why 

would it be reported in such a regular fashion versus flagged so 

that people would focus on it immediately? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. I think the IAEA made a mistake. I think 

so. And hopefully they will be more alert to this because I think 

one of the other developments in this is—you know, why did this 

happen? I do not think the negotiators on the Iranian side knew 

that the IR–5 had been fed with uranium from what I understand. 

So you have a situation where maybe the nuclear people are not 

so happy with the negotiations, and they are starting to push. 

Senator CORKER. And that is the concern, is it not, that Iran, unlike our country—the way the decisionmaking is dispersed, people 

that are sitting at the table may not be at all involved in some of 

the covert activities that are taking place by IRGC and others. So 

that leads to other concerns. 

But let me ask. One of you all mentioned that the reason this 

agreement was entered into is there was something for both sides, 

and so that is why this agreement was entered into. Who benefits 

most now from extensions that continue to carry out sanctions relief as we continue to go forward? Who do you think benefits most? 

Dr. SAMORE. You know, it is a very good question. My guess is 

that the Iranians are more comfortable with rolling extensions beVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Jul 22, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
31 

cause for them the situation is not great, but it is tolerable. They 

are getting some sanctions relief. They are able to stabilize their 

economy, and they are not having to make fundamental nuclear 

concessions, which I think are very difficult in their political system to make. 

My sense is that it is more the United States and some of the 

other P5+1 countries that are not comfortable with the continuation of the extensions, and the administration has said they are 

pushing for an agreement. And I think the only way to get an 

agreement is to convince the Iranians that we are not willing to 

continue with rolling extensions without real progress or at least 

some demonstrable, tangible partial agreement that deals with 

some of the outstanding issues. 

Dr. DORAN. If I could. 

Senator CORKER. Yes, sir. 

Dr. DORAN. I think there is no doubt that we are on the losing 

end of this. Even if you just look at the JPOA without reference 

to possible secret sites, they still have this R&D loophole that allows them to perfect the technology while this is going on. So the 

major leverage that we had was the sanctions, and one of the 

strongest elements of the sanctions was the cumulative effect over 

time. We gave that up. I mean, in effect, we took our money out 

of our retirement fund and had to pay taxes on it while they continue on. 

If the JPOA was to collapse, as Dr. Samore said, we are going 

to find ourselves now in a position where they are in a position to 

jump ahead exponentially because they have improved their mastery of the technology. And if they have done work covertly, as Dr. 

Albright suggests, then they will be able to jump ahead to an extent that is going to alarm us greatly. It is very easy to imagine 

what the argument is going to be. The argument is going to be it 

is better for us to have these rollovers, as inadequate as they are, 

because the alternative is going to be to have them really rush to 

an undetectable breakout capability. 

So the way I look at it, they are at first and goal, ready to run 

the play, and we are paying them not to run the play. And while 

we are paying them, they are shifting out their line. They are putting heavier guys in, better running backs and so on, and so we are 

going to want to pay more so that they never run that play because 

we feel it is going to be so damaging. 

As a result of that, I think what we have to do is we have to 

steel ourselves up and recognize that if the thing does collapse, we 

are going to be temporarily at least in a much worse position than 

we were in a year ago when this thing started. But we cannot accept the argument that we cannot let the JPOA collapse because 

it is going to hurt us so much. 

Senator CORKER. I think many of us believe the best way to steel 

us up is for Congress to play a role in stiffening things in the event 

an agreement is not reached. 

Dr. Samore, you mentioned in your written testimony that for 

the Supreme Leader, acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability is 

a critical national objective. Now, if you could expand on that. I 

think most of us hear Secretary Kerry talking about the fatwa that 

we need to rely upon, that you know, this is never going to happen. 

32 

I do not think we have seen that in writing. You used to work with 

the administration. What would give you the sense in your written 

testimony to say that? 

Dr. SAMORE. Well, when I look at the history of the program that 

began really 30 years ago with covert purchases of centrifuge technology from Pakistan and then up through the period when they 

tried to build two large-scale covert enrichment facilities at Natanz 

and Fordow and then the weaponization program that took place 

before 2003 when at least most of it was stopped, it seems to me 

that is an unmistakable indication that the Iranian Government 

under Supreme Leader Khamenei was seeking at least a nuclear 

weapons capability, if not nuclear weapons themselves. 

Now, in terms of motivation, obviously I am not reading his 

mind, but my sense is that it is both a desire to defend the Islamic 

Republic against what Khamenei believes is a commitment by the 

United States to destroy the regime and understandably, he thinks 

having nuclear weapons was a good defense against the Great 

Satan. And furthermore, I think the Iranians believe that having 

a nuclear weapons capability or at least that option will help them 

to intimidate other countries in the region and assert Iran’s dominance. So I think this is a deeply embedded desire in his world 

view and not one that he is likely to change as long as he is in 

charge. 

At the same time, I do think the Iranians have been quite cautious, and I do not agree that if the Joint Plan of Action collapses, 

I do not believe that they are going to rush toward a nuclear weapon because they are constrained by the concern that that might 

provoke a military attack. Their approach toward acquiring nuclear 

weapons has been very patient, very cautious, very stealthy, and 

I would expect that to continue if the Joint Plan of Action collapses. 

Senator CORKER. Well, out of respect for the other people up 

here, I am going to stop. I do hope at some point Dr. Doran has 

the opportunity to talk about this effect on Syria policy right now— 

these negotiations. And maybe somebody will ask that question. 

But thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I will take the bait, Senator Corker, but first, before I ask questions, just a few comments. 

I guess I would draw issue with the fact that Iran’s economy has 

stabilized and that they are the net winners under an extension of 

the JPOA. What we know is that they were desperately arguing at 

the last OPEC summit for a reduction in output because their economy is dramatically harmed by a reduction of world oil prices 

today. This very day they are announcing a 30-percent increase in 

bread prices for sale on the street, a sign that their economy has 

not stabilized yet. 

Second, I think it is important to note that there are new provisions in this extension. They certainly do not go as far as many 

would like, but there are new provisions in this extension for more 

regular inspections, for limitations on R&D of new centrifuge technology. And if there is a JPOA or if there is not a JPOA, there is 

still always the potential for their to be a covert program. There 

is no way for us to have any degree of assurance, whether we are 

33 

in negotiations or out of negotiations, that they are not doing something that they are not telling us about. There is always going to 

be a limit to our ability to see, hear, and know all. 

And lastly, just a note on this critique that Dr. Doran raised 

about flagging American resolve in the region. And this is a common critique that by entering into these negotiations, we are somehow showing a lack of strength, a lack of resolve, a lack of influence. But American foreign policy is not built on just showing resolve and strength for the sake of the show. We are in the business 

of actually trying to get outcomes that advance American national 

security interests. 

And if there is a suggestion that there was a resolve before 2008 

that is not there today, I am not sure that in the region you can 

make the argument that it got us to a better place when it comes 

to the power and strength of Iran in the region. During a period 

of time when we were showing a lot of strength by invading a 

neighboring country, it elevated Iran’s presence and power in the 

region. During a period of time when we were, I guess, showing resolve and strength by not talking to the Iranians and just passing 

down sanctions, they went from a handful of centrifuges to thousands, such that they are only a handful of months from breakout. 

So I do not see entering into negotiations as a sign of American 

weakness. I think it is a recognition that the kind of resolve that 

we were supposedly showing prior to these negotiations was not 

getting us anywhere. In fact, it was strengthening Iran’s hand pretty rapidly and remarkably in the region. 

Now to the question that Senator Corker was suggesting, and I 

will probably ask it in a different way than he would. None of this 

happens in a vacuum. We are talking about JPOA and extension 

of it at the same time that we are engaged in an epic fight against 

a menacing terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria. Secretary 

Kerry reiterated today that we are not engaging in military coordination with the Iranians, but at the same time, we do not have a 

lot of interest in running at cross purposes with them inside Iraq. 

And ultimately we need to be on the same page with them in Syria. 

We clearly are not today, but if we want any type of negotiated political solution there, ultimately it will be the Iranians in part that 

are going to bring together the elements of that ultimate agreement or transition of power. 

And so I guess my question is this, and I will just ask it down 

the panel. Dr. Samore, you can answer and others can. If we 

walked away from negotiations, if we just said this is it, at the end 

of this JPOA, we are shutting it down, ratcheting up sanctions, 

what is the impact of our policy—of our fight against the terrorist 

threat in Iraq and in Syria? What happens if we are all of a sudden 

in a newly antagonistic relationship with Iran that may involve 

military confrontation, maybe just involves increase of sanctions? 

What does that mean to our ability to ultimately get to our goal 

right next door, which is rooting out ISIS? 

Dr. SAMORE. That is a very good question, Senator, and one well 

worth thinking about if I am right that we are heading for a collapse of the JPOA. 

The first thing to say is that I think we are not getting very 

much cooperation with Iran anyway on our strategy against ISIS. 

34 

And in particular, my sense is that the Iranians are obstructing to 

some extent our efforts to persuade the new Iraqi Prime Minister, 

al-Abati, to make some political accommodation with the Sunnis 

because Iran prefers the government in Baghdad to be weak and 

dominated by the Shia, and I think they are uncomfortable with 

our efforts to try to create a real unity government. So presumably 

even if the nuclear talks succeed, Iran is likely to continue to oppose what we are trying to do politically. 

The other concern I have is that up to now my impression is that 

the Shia militia who operate to some extent under Iran’s orders 

have instructions not to harm any of the Americans that are 

present on the ground. I can imagine if the nuclear deal collapses, 

one way the Iranians might try to retaliate is to resume attacks 

on Americans in Iraq, which of course they did throughout our entire occupation. So I could easily imagine that there would be more 

tensions between the United States and Iran over both Iraq and 

Syria if the nuclear deal falls apart or the nuclear negotiations fall 

apart. 

Dr. DORAN. I wonder if I might, Senator, address what you 

said—— 

Senator MURPHY. Sure. 

Dr. DORAN [continuing]. Your initial comments about the resolve 

and being steadfast. 

The issue is not showing resolve for the sake of resolve. The 

issue is negotiating intelligently. And I think that in my view the 

JPOA has been a ceding of leverage from the United States to the 

Iranians. That is the problem with it. It is not that we sat down 

to negotiate. It is that we had a position of strength in 2013 because of the sanctions, a tremendous position of strength, and we 

undermined our own position. 

We also had a very strong legal position. We had the six Security 

Council resolutions that called for zero enrichment, and the JPOA 

gave that away which is a permanent concession. We are never 

going to go back to that. We ceded something permanent and powerful legally in return for temporary concessions and easily reversible concessions by the Iranians. They can change their stockpiles, 

the amount of enriched material that they have in a matter of 

weeks. We are never going to go back to the zero enrichment that 

we had from those Security Council resolutions. 

I think we should have had in our mind, and we should develop 

in our mind now a notion of what reciprocal concessions are, a 

principle such as dismantle for dismantle. We will make permanent 

concessions when you up front make permanent concessions. When 

you agree to the principle that you will dismantle centrifuges, then 

we will give you something permanent. Right now, as I read it, it 

is a complete imbalance. And when you look at that, in addition to 

the other things that we are doing in the region like giving Iran 

a free hand in Syria, it amounts to a capitulation in the eyes of our 

allies. 

Senator MURPHY. My time is up. My just last quick point is that 

in the vein of my earlier comments and nothing occurs within a 

vacuum, part of the issue was that we had allies that after the 

election of Rouhani would have been difficult to keep together with 

35 

respect to increased sanctions. It was a moment in which we had 

partners that wanted to talk as well which influences that decision. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start out by saying that my view of this whole thing is 

not only less optimistic than my good friend, Senator Murphy’s, but 

it is less optimistic than all three of you guys put together. 

You talked about the JPOA headed for a collapse. It has collapsed. I mean, this last thing that we went through where the 

new things that Senator Murphy talked about that we got—this is 

de minimis in the overall scheme of things. 

I think what we need to focus on is where do we go post JPOA 

because in my judgment I think we are there. I do not know. In 

June, are we going to get a few more crumbs and go on again? 

There were a lot of us that were pessimistic about this to start 

with. That pessimism that I had at that time now appears to be 

considerably less than it should have been. I am not seeing anything here. So where do we go from here? 

This is the problem I have got. When the first agreement was announced and it was a temporary agreement, then it was a partial 

agreement, the thing that struck me is how are we ever going to 

get the genie back in the bottle. And I do not see it. Do you think 

that President Obama is going to get on the phone to Mr. Putin 

and say, hey, we need to get together and do something? I would 

like to hear that conversation because I am telling you this thing 

has deteriorated with the Russians so badly that I do not think we 

are going to get any cooperation out of it. The Chinese are not 

much better. So where do we go from here? What are we going to 

do come June? 

Even my good friend, Senator Murphy, and others say we are 

through here. We have done all we can do. I guess we are going 

to have to go in a different direction. 

What do we do? Where do we go from here? I would like to get 

all three of your ideas in that regard. 

Dr. SAMORE. Thank you, Senator. 

So obviously we will go back to the status quo ante. I mean, we 

will resume the sanctions campaign. And I think Senator Murphy 

is right that given current oil conditions, we probably have a pretty 

good chance of increasing pressure on Iran by persuading our 

Asian allies to replace oil from Iran with oil from Saudi and other 

oil producers. 

Now, the Iranians presumably will unfreeze all of the nuclear activities. And as I said earlier, I think they will cautiously try to advance their capability toward having nuclear weapons. 

Senator RISCH. Or secretly. 

Dr. SAMORE. Well, yes. 

Senator RISCH. Cautiously or secretly. 

Dr. SAMORE. Look, I think the secret threat is much more likely 

than having them try to break out from declared facilities because 

that would be detected very early. I think it would trigger a military attack. The Iranians want to avoid that. So they are much 

more likely to try to pursue secret activities. 

36 

And just on that point, I think we have to look—I mean, if a deal 

emerges, we have to look at whether or not or to what extent it 

strengthens our ability to detect covert activities. At the end of the 

day, we are going to be heavily dependent on our intelligence, 

which so far has been superb, along with that of our allies, in 

terms of detecting covert activities. But that is how to measure a 

nuclear deal. Does it enhance our intelligence? And I think some 

of the provisions I have heard of which the negotiators think the 

Iranians will agree to I think would give us a greater ability to detect covert facilities. 

Senator RISCH. Dr. Doran, your thoughts. 

Dr. DORAN. Before I answer your question, if I could just respond 

to that statement about the covert activities. I think one of the 

most important things that we need to say publicly and often is 

what Dr. Albright said about the Iranians coming clean on all of 

the possible military dimensions of their program because what we 

are going to find is, if there is an agreement or something close to 

an agreement on the table, we are going to be told that it enhances 

our intelligence capabilities, but it is going to be the kind of agreement that we have already heard about where we are given purview into a limited number of sites and not into other ones. Unless 

we have information that satisfies us about the full system that 

they had in place before these negotiations began, then we are 

never going to have the kind of inspections regime that we need 

in order to really say to ourselves honestly, intellectually honestly, 

that we are getting better intelligence as a result of the deal. So 

that has to be a principle up front. And I have noticed the administration moving away from it, and I think we have to hold fast on 

that. 

With respect to your question, I share your pessimism about 

where all this is going. And I think we have to steel ourselves up. 

We have to steel ourselves up to the fact that they are going to advance in the short term much faster than we would like, and there 

are going to be deep problems that we are going to have in the region, as Dr. Samore said, with respect to ISIS in Iraq and in Syria. 

We have to realize, though, that they have deep vulnerabilities. 

Assad is vulnerable. Hezbollah is vulnerable. Their Iraqi allies are 

vulnerable if we are willing to play the game that they are playing. 

So we have to map out what the escalation ladder is going to look 

like, and we have to make sure that we are well positioned to win 

the escalation ladder. And we are. We are absolutely capable of 

winning that if we do not tell ourselves that we are inevitably 

going to lose if it comes to a head-to-head contest. 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Albright. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I do not have too much to add. 

I mean, I think certainly I would expect sanctions to increase. I 

would tend to think that they would not race to expand their nuclear capability for fear of the repercussions, but I think they would 

build up their capabilities, and I think over time they could become 

quite formidable. In terms of if they decided to go for a weapon, 

how would they do it, I do not see it as black and white as some. 

I think it would depend on their calculation at the time, and if they 

could use declared facilities to get away with something before they 

are detected, they may do that. I mean, they may go a covert route. 

37 

There are some real risks there because they have been caught so 

many times. Or they may do both ways. So I think we have to look 

at this very broadly and map out their pathways and try to bolster 

capabilities to prevent those from developing and, more importantly, detect them. 

Now, I am a little pessimistic about the post JPA environment. 

I mean, you can see kind of an economic coalition involving Russia, 

China, and Iran aiming to break the sanctions from the West. And 

I am not sure how we would respond to that. I think in the back 

of my mind I would probably think we probably better prepare for 

some kind of cold war in the Middle East, and it could get pretty 

nasty and heated at times given the armaments in various factions’ 

hands. So I think it could be a very changed environment, very 

dangerous. 

I mean, I think we could win that war. Maybe that is kind of jingoistic in a sense. I think that Iran is not that strong ultimately 

and we are, and our allies in the Middle East are very strong. But 

I think it is not a path that we should go down lightly. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. I appreciate all three of your remarks. 

I fully concur with you, Dr. Samore, in that history teaches us. 

What we have seen over the last years and years is what we are 

going to get. It is just passive resistance. They just keep putting 

one foot in front of the other using whatever tool is there. And anybody who doubts that ought to read the passages in the book that 

President Rouhani wrote about what he did while he was sitting 

at the table negotiating and why he did it and how he did it and 

what they gained from that. I think that tells you everything you 

need to know about where they are going to go from here as opposed to something very aggressive to just simply put one foot in 

front of the other till they get to where they want to go. 

My time is up. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Just one quick observation, then I will turn to 

Senator Kaine. It comes from both remarks of Senator Murphy and 

now Senator Risch. It is true that whether we have the JPOA or 

not, that we do not know about covert operations. But we do know 

that it took us years to identify Qom as a covert operation. And because we have a history of this country pursuing covert operations 

in defiance of international law and Security Council resolutions 

and achieved a great deal of what they wanted, the possible military dimensions element of this is incredibly important to know 

how far they got to understand the other dimensions of what we 

need to make sure they cannot go further. That is a fundamental 

concern. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do know who I am more optimistic or pessimistic about as I 

have listened to the discussion. I am fairly pessimistic about an ultimate deal that we would find acceptable I guess. 

I think some of you are too optimistic about Iran is doing really 

well, and in the negotiation we gave up too much, and we are on 

the ropes. I think we are overstating Iran’s strength and understating our own. I am kind of reminded of the painful Virginia example of how General McClellan kept training his troops but he 

38 

kept not wanting to fight because the South was just too strong. 

And Lincoln had to sack him and put in a general who knew how 

to fight. We have got real strengths in this situation, and they are 

not strengths that we have by accident. 

Some of the testimony—I read it, and it almost seemed to have 

a little bit of an unreality about it because it was not dealing with 

the energy price issue. The sanctions relief that has been given 

Iran under this agreement in the last year pales in comparison— 

pales in comparison—to what they have suffered as a result of energy going from $110 a barrel to $70 a barrel. I mean, read the 

press in the last couple of months about the OPEC meetings and 

about the division obviously between Saudi Arabia and Iran and 

the effect on the Iranian economy of $70 a barrel oil and the predictions of many in the industry that that is going to continue for 

a while. They have got to have $120 a barrel to meet their budgetary obligations. They are now $50 a barrel underneath meeting 

their budgetary obligations, and it is predicted to go on for a while. And it is not an accident. The $70 a barrel is caused by a number 

of factors, but a lot of it is American policy. We have imposed a 

sanctions regime on Iran via another means, and it is a fantastic 

one—by an energy policy that is producing more energy, that is 

producing more non-carbon alternative energy, that is escalating 

MPG and CAFE standards in the vehicles that we drive so we have 

to import less. By going from such an importer to now moving toward net exporter, we are doing some things that will bring them 

to their knees if we can continue to do it. 

That is why I have been a strong supporter of Senator 

Barrasso—and I can say this without Senator Markey here—of the 

exporting of LNG and other things. I think we can use the American energy economy to even push this even further, and anything 

we do in the energy space—it does not violate any term of the 

JPOA. It is not doing sanctions that would make anybody upset. 

But we are doing a number of things, and we have a number of 

strengths, and we ought to be proud of them, and we ought to play 

them. And we do not need to be too hang-dog about, oh, gosh, Iran 

is getting the edge on us in negotiations. 

Now, I do worry about an ultimate deal. I think we all agree a 

bad deal is worse than no deal. I definitely agree with that. That 

said, I am glad we are continuing to have these discussions. 

I do not know. Do any of you think that when we did not have 

a deal at the end of the year, at the end of November, we should 

have just stopped all discussions, and we should have scrapped the 

JPOA? Should that have been our policy? P5+1—we go to them and 

say let us scrap the JPOA right now. 

Dr. DORAN. I think we should have, yes. Not scrapped it. I think 

it is very important that we show a willingness to walk away from 

the table. 

Senator KAINE. So you would say we will put sanctions back. You 

go ahead and go back to 20 percent enriched. You stop all the inspections we are doing. You think that would have—— 

Dr. DORAN. No. I would not say it that way. 

Senator KAINE. But that was what the JPOA—— 

Dr. DORAN. No. I would say that we should warn them that we 

expect them to stay within the JPOA, but that we are going to 

39 

walk away from the negotiations until we get something from them 

for the reason that we are—as I said, we are showing an over-eagerness coming to them all the time with deals, new suggestions 

and new suggestions, and we suggest that we can be played. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Samore, should we have scrapped the JPOA 

at the end of November? 

Dr. SAMORE. No. I supported the extension both because I think 

enough progress has been made to justify an effort to try to come 

to an agreement and because I do not think that the Iranians are 

going to benefit tremendously from a few more months of negotiations as long as we continue to keep the remaining sanctions in 

place and as long as they continue to freeze their nuclear activities 

as called for by the JPOA. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Albright, do you think we should have 

scrapped the JPOA? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No. I supported extending it. But I think the 

question is how many extensions do you have, and I am wondering 

if this should be the last one. Again, 4 months can be a long time, 

but I think that is the key question in my mind. 

Senator KAINE. Another question. Dr. Samore, you were talking 

about—I think it was you who was talking about the fact that we 

have had pretty robust intelligence about their program. Certainly 

the reports about our work together with the Israelis in Stuxnet to 

try to slow them down suggests that the intel was pretty good. 

That intel continues. 

Now we have intel plus some additional inspections. I credit 

what the witnesses have said about the inspections have their own 

limitations. We cannot oversell what these inspections are. But the 

way I look at it is intel plus additional inspections gives us the better ability to target a military operation if we ever need to. Is that 

not the case? 

Dr. SAMORE. Yes, I agree with that. I think that we are never 

going to be able to obtain through negotiations the kind of intrusive inspection regime we imposed on Iraq after the gulf war. That 

is just not a realistic objective in these negotiations. But my understanding—and I am sure you know more than I do from the administration—of the kinds of additional access and information they 

are trying to obtain—I think it would enhance our intelligence capabilities. But I want to emphasize that at the end of the day, it 

is going to be good intelligence that is much more likely to detect 

efforts by Iran to cheat. 

Senator KAINE. It is my understanding—I wonder if you have 

heard this as well—that the U.S. bombing of Iraq in 1998 was 

more effective because of the inspections that had been imposed on 

Iraq after the end of the gulf war, that the bombing that had to 

be done—there was intel. But intel plus inspections gave you a better ability to target military operations than even good intel by 

itself. 

Dr. SAMORE. Yes, I agree with that. Of course, that was a case 

where the international inspectors really did have a truly anytime/ 

anywhere challenge inspection regime. We are not going to get that 

in these Iran negotiations. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think I would disagree slightly. The inspectors 

in a sense are the boots on the ground, and they do provide useful 

40 

information. We know about the IR–5 because of the inspectors on 

the ground not because of U.S. intelligence. They did not know 

about it. Based on their surprise in the U.S. negotiating team, they 

did not know about it. So I think the effort is to have those things 

work together as effectively as possible. But I would say it is not 

to better our military strategy. I mean, it is an extremely sensitive 

point, and we are running into problems now with Iran because 

they are using the excuse that that is the purpose, and the purpose 

is to target and assassinate their scientists. So I think it has to be 

done in the context of, yes, U.S. intelligence is going to benefit, but 

the goal is better detectability of covert facilities, greater confidence 

in that the activities of Iran truly are peaceful. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding a very enlightening hearing. It really provides some clarity. 

What I would like to do with my few minutes here is to try and 

provide even greater clarity to this issue, this discussion. 

Dr. Albright, you said in your written testimony the primary goal 

of a comprehensive solution is to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is indeed peaceful. 

Dr. Samore, was that the goal? Is that the goal of the negotiations? 

Dr. SAMORE. I think the goal of the negotiations is to prevent 

Iran from having a credible nuclear weapons option. So that is a 

similar way of saying the same thing. I would be a little more blunt 

about it because, as I said, I think we are dealing with a country 

that has a deeply rooted desire to produce nuclear weapons or at 

least have the option to produce nuclear weapons, and we are trying to achieve negotiations that constrain those options, both overt 

and covert. 

Senator JOHNSON. We have heard a number of times in testimony before this committee that the goal really is to make sure 

that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful. 

It is enormously expensive to enrich uranium. Correct, Dr. 

Albright? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I would not say it is enormously expensive. For 

a country like Iran, it is a huge investment. 

Senator JOHNSON. And not only just the direct expense of enriching it, but look at all the problems they have had in terms of sanctions and international—— 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That is right. 

Senator JOHNSON. And to have a peaceful nuclear program, you 

do not need to enrich uranium. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I agree. 

Senator JOHNSON. That is what I want to provide clarity to. 

There is only one reason for Iran to have any kind of nuclear program whatsoever and that is to weaponize it eventually. Correct? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Not necessarily. I mean, they have a research reactor. If the Arak reactor is modified to low-enriched uranium, they 

would have a need. But I think the idea is a small enrichment program, not a large one. 

41 

Senator JOHNSON. Incredibly limited. And there is plenty of research going on elsewhere in the world that says you simply do not 

need it certainly when you take into account the price they are 

paying for doing this. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I would agree. If they rejoin the international 

community, they would have more enriched uranium at very low 

costs relative to what they spend. 

Senator JOHNSON. My point being is that I am as pessimistic, if 

not more so than Senator Risch. I have done a lot of negotiating 

in my business career, and you have to first start with reality. You 

have to start with an achievable goal. I would say this negotiation 

was lost before it even started by relaxing what leverage we had 

from the standpoint of sanctions. Even though U.N. resolutions 

said Iran would have to halt enrichment, we basically said, no, you 

are going to be able to. We implied that that was going to be acceptable. What leverage do we have? We lost these negotiations before they even began. Is that largely correct? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I do not agree with that. I think there is still 

quite a bit of leverage from the sanctions. I do not think it is a lost 

cause. 

Also there was a general agreement—I would not say it is consensus, but that these negotiations have to be tried. If there is an 

opportunity where there is a belief that significant gains can be 

gotten, it needs to be done. 

Senator JOHNSON. But we significantly decreased the pressure 

that the sanctions had in terms of bringing Iran to the negotiating 

table. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I see it a little differently. I think there was not 

enough pressure to get Iran to make these concessions from the 

start. There was enough to get them to the table but not enough 

to get them to concede. With the oil prices going down, maybe the 

pressure will build. Maybe more sanctions, if that is necessary, will 

get them to concede. 

Senator JOHNSON. But beginning by implying that they could 

continue to enrich uranium, saying that the goal was to ensure a 

peaceful nuclear program, that is just delusional. That is simply 

premising this negotiation on something that was not possible. It 

was an unachievable goal. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I do not think it is delusional. I think the decision 

was made by the administration to accept a limited program under 

tremendous constraints and verification requirements in order to 

achieve the goal. It is also predicated on a very long duration, that 

you want to have, in a sense, two technical generations take place 

while the deal is there. You want at least one generation in a normal way of thinking. And then you think that you will end up in 

a much better place, and the country will not be trying to break 

out and build a large nuclear weapons capability at that point. 

Senator JOHNSON. But, Dr. Samore, again, the only reason you 

have uranium enrichment capabilities is for a weapons program, by 

and large. Okay? And Iran wants that so it can become a regional 

power. It is all about power and their role in that region. Why 

would they ever give that up, short of just really crippling sanctions that just forces them to give it up? We are not at that stage. 

When we release that pressure, how can this ever possibly succeed? 

42 

Dr. SAMORE. I think the theory the administration is operating 

on is that Iran would accept very limited enrichment as a face-saving solution. It remains to be seen whether that theory is in fact 

correct. As I have said, President Rouhani would probably take 

that deal, but he is not in charge. Supreme Leader Khamenei is in 

charge, and I have yet to see any indication that he is willing to 

accept long-term, significant constraints on Iran’s efforts to develop 

enrichment for the ultimate purpose of having a nuclear weapons 

capability. 

Senator JOHNSON. Dr. Doran, do you have anything to add to 

this? 

Dr. DORAN. Yes, just a couple things. 

Dr. Samore’s statement begs the question, why did we buy this 

theory. The theory that the administration seems to be operating 

under is that if we make concessions to Rouhani, that will 

strengthen his hand in internal contest with the Supreme Leader, 

who is the dictator, and Qasem Soleimani of the Quds Force. I 

think it is a false premise to begin with, and there is no evidence 

at all that that is how the regime is actually working. 

I think a better premise is to assume that they have consolidated 

power within the regime, and they have put Zarif and Rouhani forward as front men. They have circumscribed their authority to a 

very narrow set of issues, and they have very definitely—Rouhani 

and particularly Zarif have very definitely played their hand. And 

whenever we have put down anything that moved outside of their 

remit, they have told us, no, we cannot negotiate. And we have decided to sort of negotiate with ourselves and to narrow our own 

frame of reference down to the Zarif frame of reference within his 

system, and it has been extremely debilitating. 

If I could just say one more thing. I agree with Dr. Samore that 

we need to set ourselves up so that we are in the best position diplomatically when this thing falls apart to argue our position. One 

of the things that is wrong with what we have done by playing to 

the Zarif faction in the government is that we have muddied the 

waters greatly by continuing to come up with new proposals. And 

by doing it all secretly, we have put ourselves in a position where 

when the thing falls apart, Zarif is going to be able to go before 

the world community, and he is going to say the Americans are letting this whole thing fall apart over a disagreement about 3,000 or 

5,000 or 7,000 centrifuges. Is this a reason to lose this historic opportunity? 

We had a very reasonable position that we started with. We need 

to make that public, and we need to put the coalition together that 

agrees with it, and we need to stick to it. 

Senator JOHNSON. We need to describe and face reality, and we 

are not doing that now. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The American people have a right to be angry, angry that the administration has declined to provide a Government witness for today’s hearing. It is time for the administration to explain to Congress and to the American people the reasoning behind the newest 

extension of the so-called Joint Plan of Action. 

43 

Once again, the Iranians wanted even more time to talk, and the 

President unwisely agreed to it. So I am concerned about Iran’s 

ability to continue its deliberate pattern of delay and distraction. 

With the most recent extension of the interim agreement is gaining 

more time, gaining access to billions in additional funds held 

abroad, and gaining relief from specific sanctions. Instead of being 

limited and temporary, as President Obama promised, the sanction 

relief appears to be boundless and never-ending. 

It is crystal clear that the sanctions caused overwhelming economic pressure and it is that pressure that brought the Iranian regime to the negotiating table over its nuclear program. The administration has already admitted to the fact. Instead of a policy designed to tighten the economic pressure, this administration seems 

to be rewarding the Iranians’ continued stall tactics. 

Sanctions relief has certainly failed to get a favorable final agreement. The past 6 years of failed negotiations have shown that we 

cannot simply talk the Iranian regime out of its illicit nuclear program. Instead of endless discussion, we need security. It is clearly 

going to take tougher sanctions to get us where we need to be, and 

that is total dismantling of Iran’s illicit nuclear program. 

So while the President seems desperate to announce any sort of 

deal with the Iranians, the American people cannot afford a bad 

deal or more years of delay. Without increased pressure from 

America, Iran will continue to enjoy relief from sanctions without 

dismantling their nuclear program. 

So I would call on the President to make good on his remarks 

from the State of the Union, the 2014 State of the Union. He promised that he would, quote, ‘‘be the first to call for more sanctions 

if Iran failed to complete an agreement.’’ He can do two important 

things right now to keep his word: one, reinstate full sanctions. The 

sanctions relief the administration continues to give to Iran removes the urgency for them to complete a final deal. It is time to 

reimpose those sanctions now to renew urgency on Iran. And second, he can call on Congress to pass a bill to impose new sanctions 

to compel Iran to complete a final agreement before the end of this 

year. 

So I am ready to increase sanctions and stop Iran from building 

a nuclear weapon. 

My question to the three of you is, could you please outline—and 

nobody has asked this question—where you believe Iran’s program 

stands today and the dangers of continuing with these rolling extensions? Perhaps, Dr. Samore, we could start with you. 

Dr. SAMORE. Thank you, Senator. Let me just respond briefly. 

If the Joint Plan of Action collapses, then I think we will have 

an opportunity to increase sanctions on Iran. But I do not think we 

should kid ourselves that we are in a position to force Iran to capitulate anytime soon. We are talking about a long, drawn-out process 

which is likely to take years. And I think Iran during that time 

will continue to gradually, cautiously build up their nuclear capability. 

But to answer your specific question, I do not think Iran right 

now has a credible pathway to produce nuclear weapons. It is true 

that on paper they are a couple of months away of breakout at 

their declared facilities, but it is far too dangerous for them to try 

44 

to produce nuclear weapons at this declared facilities because it 

would be detected quickly. And I do think the United States or 

Israel would destroy those facilities before that could be achieved. 

I do not think Iran has large-scale covert facilities now because 

I believe our intelligence has exposed the last one they tried to 

build, Fordow. But I think they will try in the future. 

So I think we still have time. We are in a desperate situation in 

terms of Iran being on the cusp of being able to produce nuclear 

weapons. I think, frankly, our whole strategy over the last 30 years 

has been to delay the program through diplomacy, sabotage, export 

controls, sanctions, military threats, and we have been able to buy 

time. And I think that continues to be our fundamental strategy in 

the hopes that the next Iranian Government will place less value 

on acquiring nuclear weapons. 

Senator BARRASSO. Dr. Doran. 

Dr. DORAN. On the technical side of things, I cannot add anything more to what Dr. Samore and Mr. Albright have said. 

Senator BARRASSO. Mr. Albright. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I agree with Gary. I mean, I think we are not in 

a bad place. 

I would also like to add, though, in the fall of 2013 when the JPA 

went into effect, when we did our analysis, we were looking at Iran 

reaching a pretty bad place in about a year where they could have 

had 20,000–30,000 centrifuges, 3,000 advanced ones deployed, and 

there was a great deal of worry they were building a third centrifuge plant, which under the current rules, they do not have to 

declare to the inspectors until it is done. So I think we were heading to a bad place. 

And I think if this deal or the JPA collapses, I think there have 

to be efforts made not only to increase sanctions but to try to prevent Iran from going that route again of just full-scale deployment 

of whatever it can get. 

And I agree with Gary. I think they will try the covert route 

again, and we may not detect it. I do worry that our intelligence 

capabilities are not as great as they have been in Iran, and I think 

part of the reason is because Iran is learning. We do a lot of work 

at my institute. I hesitate to call it ISIS here, but we do a lot of 

work at my institute looking at illicit procurement. And Iran is getting better at hiding—— 

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, could you define the acronym of 

what that means in your case? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. Institute for Science and International Security. We had the name long before they did. [Laughter.] 

Senator RISCH. Did you copyright that? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, unfortunately, it is an Egyptian goddess. So 

it was not possible. There are a lot of Isises actually, including girls 

named Isis. So it is a complicated issue. 

Just to go back to this, on the illicit procurements, they are taking steps to hide that it is for a nuclear program because a lot of 

these things are dual-use goods, and they are being sought covertly. And so you see that Iran is learning to hide things better, 

and I think they are going to learn to hide things better if they do 

covert activities. 

45 

And that is also why I personally believe that the verification 

side of this deal is critically important because those rules can 

allow you to break through the gaming that Iran does. And that, 

combined with intelligence organizations, can lead to a much, much 

stronger deal. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Paul. 

Senator PAUL. Thank you and thank you to the panel. 

There has been some discussion of optimism versus pessimism. 

And I guess my question would start out to Dr. Samore. Do you 

think it is a significant step forward that Iran has reduced all of 

its 20-percent enriched uranium to a less-enriched state? 

Dr. SAMORE. I frankly do not think it is very significant. It was 

certainly an issue that Prime Minister Netanyahu raised because 

it does shorten the time that Iran would need in order to produce 

a significant quantity of weapons-grade material. 

Senator PAUL. Would it be more significant if it were not an 

oxide but all the way into fuel rods where it was less reversible? 

Dr. SAMORE. Yes, sir, because it makes it harder to reverse. And 

my understanding is that under this extension, they have agreed 

to convert an additional portion, I think 35 kilograms of the 75 or 

so they have in the form of oxide to fuel rods. 

Senator PAUL. I mean, you can look at the glass half full or half 

empty, but I think that is better than before the negotiations. 

Dr. SAMORE. Well, I agree with my colleague, David Albright, 

that if it were not for the agreed—if it were not for the Joint Plan 

of Action, the Iranian program would be more advanced. 

Senator PAUL. As a followup to that, Dr. Samore, do you believe 

that Iran is largely in compliance with the interim agreement or 

mostly in noncompliance? 

Dr. SAMORE. Oh, they are mostly in compliance. 

Senator PAUL. Once again, it is optimism versus pessimism. Everybody is alarmed at all of the noncompliance. Nobody is mentioning any compliance. And I am not here to apologize for their 

behavior, but there are some things and some signs that I think 

should be looked at in an optimistic way. 

Dr. Samore, do you think new sanctions legislation will be supported by our allies if we were to pass—this body passed new operations at this point? 

Dr. SAMORE. I think it depends on the exact language. New sanctions legislation that imposed a hard deadline and took any discretion out of the hands of the administration to impose those sanctions would not be supported by our allies. 

Senator PAUL. Currently we have a proposal that would say that 

they have to dismantle all their nuclear infrastructure. Do you 

think that would be supported by our allies? 

Dr. SAMORE. No, because I do not think they believe it is achievable. 

Senator PAUL. Do you think that if we have sanctions and we go 

forward with bare-knuckle sanctions, hard-core sanctions and we 

ratchet it up—do you think they will be effective if they are unilateral and just from the United States? 

46 

Dr. SAMORE. They will be much less effective. I mean, we do have 

the ability to take unilateral actions that other countries—if they 

are faced with a choice between business with the United States 

or business with Iran, they are obviously going to choose the 

United States in most cases. But I agree with the general thrust 

of your question that our sanctions are, obviously, going to be more 

effective if we have agreement from our allies and partners to support it. And that is why I have emphasized that we need to manipulate, as much as we can, the situation so that Iran is blamed for 

the failure of negotiations and not the United States. 

Senator PAUL. This would just be a followup to that for Dr. 

Samore. It is that many have said and some on the panel have 

said, oh, gosh, we should walk away from the negotiations. Any discussion is worse than no discussion. I think it is interesting just 

to think about—and I am not supporting this, but to think of what 

if in 5 years from now we still had an interim agreement that says 

they are not going to enrich from 5 to 20. They still have more centrifuges than we would like, and we are still watching them to see 

whether or not they are utilizing and doing more with their centrifuges than we would wish to do with them. But to my mind, that 

would be better than no negotiations. It would be better than war 

with Iran. Once we have war with Iran, there will be no more inspections. Once the first bomb drops, you will never have another 

inspection inside of Iran. 

So I do not know. I guess I see more optimism in continuing to 

negotiate than I see pessimism even with the imperfections of 

being at an interim agreement because currently while we are not 

getting rid of all enriched uranium, they have agreed in the interim agreement not to enrich—what—from 5 to 20. 

Dr. SAMORE. So I agree with you that we derive benefit from the 

Joint Plan of Action in terms of limits on Iran’s nuclear program, 

but I am skeptical that it is going to be possible, given politics both 

in the United States and in Iran, to extend this Joint Plan of Action indefinitely without some concrete progress. And I guess the 

main point I am making is if that is true that we are not actually 

able to continue to roll over this agreement, it is much better for 

us if it is Iran that loses patience first and reneges or violates the 

deal than for us to be the one. 

Senator PAUL. I think you would see a pretty unified Congress 

if they are in noncompliance with the interim agreement. If they 

begin reenriching to 20 percent again in defiance of this or add centrifuges in defiance of the agreement as well, I think there would 

be more unity of action. There would also be more international, 

I think, unity of action if it were Iranian noncompliance. So I do 

think that that is a factor that we ought to consider in moving forward. 

Thank you for your time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just take a final round here. 

So, Dr. Samore, you said in your testimony that in fact—we 

agree the Ayatollah is the ultimate decider here. Is that a fair 

statement? 

Dr. SAMORE. Yes, sir. I think he has the final word. 

47 

The CHAIRMAN. He has the final word. So everything we talk 

about to Rouhani and Zarif are aspirational, but at the end of the 

day, the Ayatollah holds the final word. 

You also, I think in your testimony, either in the written or 

verbal testimony, said that for the Ayatollah, this is about regime 

preservation. Is it not? 

Dr. SAMORE. Yes, I believe so. 

The CHAIRMAN. The question of achieving a nuclear weapon is in 

his mind the preservation of the regime and the revolution and the 

Islamic republic as it exists today. Is that a fair statement? 

Dr. SAMORE. That is how I read his world view. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. And is that the way you read the world view 

when you were sitting at the White House for 4 years? 

Dr. SAMORE. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. So if it is in the Ayatollah’s final decision and if 

regime preservation is achieved by acquiring a nuclear weapon, 

what changes that for the Ayatollah? 

Dr. SAMORE. Well, I do not think he is going to fundamentally 

give up the ambition to acquire nuclear weapons. The question is 

whether we can influence his calculation of what risk to take and 

what cost to bear. And we know from history that he has been willing in the past to accept limited and temporary restrictions on the 

program when he thought the risk was great enough. I mean, that 

is the story of the agreement that he reached with the Europeans 

from 2003 to 2005. That is the story of why they have agreed to 

the Joint Plan of Action in hopes that would lessen the economic 

pressure. 

The CHAIRMAN. But again, that calculation only changed his 

mind for, one, a temporary period of time and, two, only because 

there are outside influences to try to change that calculation. Is 

that a fair statement? 

Dr. SAMORE. Yes. In my view the best that diplomacy can achieve 

is temporary constraints. He is not going to make a fundamental 

decision to give up the ultimate objective, but we are in the business of trying to buy time. We are in the business of trying to delay 

the program. 

The CHAIRMAN. So let us talk about buying time because I heard 

you say it, and I heard Senator Paul say if 5 years from now we 

are in the Joint Plan of Action, that is better than the alternative. 

However, buying time also means the Iranians make progress on 

their program. Does it not? Unless you change the nature of the 

joint agreement, you have a continuous ability because the R&D 

exception here is pretty large. So you allow them to continue to 

move forward. 

Dr. SAMORE. Yes. I think the big weakness in the Joint Plan of 

Action is that it did not have clear provisions about what the restrictions were on centrifuge research and development. My understanding—and I am sure you can get a more detailed briefing on 

this than I can—is that this most recent extension—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Do not be so sure about that. [Laughter.] 

Dr. SAMORE. This most recent extension does include clarity 

about a number of the restrictions on research and development, 

and I think that begins to close the loophole. But I agree with you 

that if the Joint Plan of Action is going to be extended for a much 

48 

longer period of time, it is going to have to include more clarity on 

these kinds of issues. Otherwise, we will not be confident that the 

Iranians are not taking advantage of that time period to improve 

their capabilities. 

But also, keep in mind, Senator, if the Joint Plan of Action collapses, there is no constraint on their program except their fear 

that they will do something that will provoke a military attack. 

The CHAIRMAN. Granted. And that was true before the Joint Plan 

of Action as well. 

But the point is buying time from my perspective—and inform 

me where I am wrong—is not endless because buying time does not 

truly freeze everything because unless you do a total freeze on the 

R&D, you have allowed them to move forward significantly in a 

moment in which if it falls apart or they choose to move forward, 

their window has closed. 

Dr. SAMORE. I agree. Buying time does not solve the problem. 

Even an agreement does not solve the problem because I do not 

have that much confidence that Iran would honor an agreement 

during whatever the lifetime is. I think we would have to be very 

wary that they would cheat, as they have in the past on all their 

nuclear agreements. So we should not kid ourselves that there is 

a permanent solution to this problem as long as the current Government in Iran is in power, whatever we do is going to be a temporary measure. 

The CHAIRMAN. And the final point I just want to raise here. You 

know, our intelligence did ultimately discover their underground 

facilities, but it was built already. It was built already, largely built 

already. 

Dr. SAMORE. Well, actually I think—we can discuss that in a different setting, but I think both Natanz and Fordow were discovered 

very early in the construction process. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Well, maybe we did not reveal it until—— 

Dr. SAMORE. That is correct, sir. We did not reveal it until—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I have a difficulty understanding how it is that— 

how a critical part of what we are trying to achieve here was put 

on the back burner and seems in these negotiations to be increasingly be placed on the back burner, which is the possible military 

dimensions of the Iranian program, because from my perspective 

that should have been one of the first things that should have been 

included in the negotiation because if you understand how far they 

got, then that is part of the equation of determining what else you 

have to consider as to what a program is. And we do not know how 

far they got. And it is one of the things that they find most intractable to pursue. And that is not just our view. That is the Security 

Council resolution view. And yet, they have not been willing to 

comply with that. And the most recent report of the IAEA reiterates that they have made no progress on that. 

Now, in addition to, of course, the concern about the Quds Force 

and the Revolutionary Guard and all of those being resistant to exposing their military dimensions, it is also problematic for the regime—is it not—to actually come forth and come clean about their 

military dimensions because it undermines the basic framework 

that the Iranians have taken to the world that, in fact, this was 

for peaceful purposes. 

49 

Dr. SAMORE. My view is that the Government in Iran cannot possibly admit the truth, which is that they were pursuing a nuclear 

weapons program before 2003. So I think that the administration 

is seeking to basically defer that issue and keep it linked to the 

continuation of U.N. Security Council sanctions in the hopes that 

once an agreement is in place, the Iranians will be willing to be 

more candid with the IAEA about what activity they carried out 

but never admitting that it was for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And deferring it to the end allowed at any 

given point in time, if this breaks through, never to have come 

forth as to the possible military dimensions or as to how far they 

got along in that process. 

Dr. SAMORE. I think very often when impossible issues are deferred, both sides—I mean, we are hoping that by deferring the 

issue, it makes it easier to solve. No doubt the Iranians are hoping 

that by deferring the issue, they will not have to solve it. But that 

is often the case in negotiations. The issues that cannot be solved 

are put off. 

The CHAIRMAN. Some of these elements remind me of some of the 

concerns I had with North Korea and where we are today. 

In any event, I know Senator Markey has now come for the first 

time. I will recognize Senator Corker and then go to Senator Markey. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. I think this has been an outstanding hearing. We thank all the witnesses for their testimony. 

At the end of the day, if we end up with an agreement—do you 

all agree, by the way, that where we are headed right now likely 

is for an agreement that is less than 10 years? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No, I do not. 

Senator CORKER. Do you think there is a possibility—— 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. For longer, yes. 

Senator CORKER. And based on the insights that you have, where 

do you think we are headed lengthwise? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think it could be significantly longer than—well, 

the U.S. position could be significantly longer—— 

Senator CORKER. I understand that. But where do you think ultimately we are going to end up? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think 15 years. That would be not desirable. I 

would have to take a second look if that is acceptable given other 

conditions in the deal. 

Dr. SAMORE. Senator, my understanding is that we are proposing 

a 15-year agreement, but after 10 years some of the restrictions on 

their enrichment program would begin to be lifted. But I do not 

know precisely what the details are. I think 15 years is a very reasonable period for us to insist on, and I hope the administration 

sticks to that. 

But as I said, whether it is 10 years or 15 years, we should not 

assume that Iran is going to honor any agreement no matter how 

long it is. 

Senator CORKER. And we are lifting the restrictions on enrichment, which has been sort of the central concern that people have 

that we went beyond the U.N. resolutions. We are lifting those and 

per discussions today after 10 years for what reason? 

50 

Dr. SAMORE. I am not sure I understand. 

Senator CORKER. We are lifting restrictions on enrichment after 

10 years for what reason? I mean, why would we begin to go backward after 10 years? 

Dr. SAMORE. Well, of course, the United States for a long time 

now, going back to the Bush administration, has said that once 

Iran satisfies concerns about its nuclear program, they will be 

treated like any other party under the NPT. And under the NPT, 

there is no restriction on them developing enrichment for peaceful 

purposes. So the idea is to, as I said in my written testimony, give 

the Iranians a way to claim that after some period of time, they 

would be free to develop an enrichment program for their nuclear 

power program, provided that it is under IAEA safeguards. As I 

said, I do not see any indication the Iranians are prepared to agree 

to that, but that was the idea of putting that notion forward. 

Senator CORKER. And they are obviously pushing for something 

that is far shorter than that. 

Dr. SAMORE. Yes. What they have said—and the Supreme Leader 

has said this publicly—they want to have a very large-scale program, 20 times more than what they currently have, by 2021 when 

their current contract with the Russians expires to provide fuel for 

the Bushehr reactor. And the Iranians are arguing, at least up to 

now—they are saying they have to begin building that bigger capacity now, otherwise it will not be ready in 2021. Frankly that is 

a ridiculous position, and as long as they continue to take that, it 

gives us a very good basis for arguing that Iran is taking positions 

that make an agreement impossible. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. I think it also is true that the United States 

has kind of been leaning forward on concessions and not getting 

much of an Iranian response, and I think that is one of the reasons 

why I have concluded that it is really necessary for the United 

States to step back because you do not want to be trapped by those 

exploratory concessions. 

And I would argue that 20 years is what you want. It may take 

the IAEA 20 years, given their experience in Iran, to do what is 

called reach a broad conclusion under the additional protocol that 

the program is indeed peaceful. It is a very laborious process, and 

I would hate to see Iran dramatically increasing its enrichment capability until the IAEA is finished with its work. And I would not 

expect that work to be done quickly at all, given the level of noncompliance in Iran and the complexity of the situation. 

Senator CORKER. And I think most of us began with the anticipation that we are only talking about a 20-year issue. I think as we 

have talked with folks, as you have all along, that period keeps 

coming back more toward a 10-year period, and we know the last 

offer by Iran was 5. 

By the way, you are beginning to look at a temporary arrangement there. We talked about a temporary arrangement under the 

JPOA, but that becomes almost a temporary nature if you were to 

achieve the full outcome. 

Let me just ask you this question. What from your perspective— 

we keep hearing from the administration that involvement by Congress will totally jeopardize the negotiations. Do you get any indication from the people that you talk with, the other countries that 

51 

we are dealing with, that Congress weighing in in some fashion on 

additional sanctions after or just congressional oversight, Congress 

wanting to approve this deal before any funds can be expended to 

implement it—do you get any indication that that is something 

that would stop negotiations or cause people to walk away from the 

table? 

Dr. SAMORE. Well, I have to be honest. I do think our allies are 

nervous about Congress acting independently of the administration 

and either bringing the talks to an end by giving Iran a pretext for 

walking away or blocking an agreement that is negotiated which 

our allies think is a reasonable compromise. So I do think there is 

some trepidation. 

I am trying to figure out or I would like to try to encourage a 

way for Congress and the White House to work together to 

strengthen the U.S. bargaining position. And I do think we are 

pursuing a common objective here, which is stop Iran from having 

nuclear weapons, and we all recognize that sanctions and the 

threat of sanctions is our most powerful instrument. Now, I do not 

know whether it is going to be possible to craft language that satisfies both Congress and the White House, but I think it is worth an 

effort to see if we cannot do that, especially because we are entering a critical moment here where either there is a breakthrough or 

this whole thing falls apart. 

Dr. DORAN. If I could. I do not entirely agree with what Dr. 

Samore said about our allies. I know from my own discussions with 

some of our partners that there is not complete happiness with the 

U.S. position. We do have partners who have been working closely 

with us who feel that we have conceded too much in these negotiations. 

Dr. SAMORE. Sorry. I should have clarified. When I said ‘‘allies,’’ 

I meant our European allies. I totally agree with Dr. Doran that 

our Middle East allies are very, very uncomfortable. 

Dr. DORAN. We have at least one European ally that also is unhappy with our position. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As is the case with many international issues, at the heart of 

this issue is energy. It happens over and over again. And to a lot 

of people, it is difficult to comprehend how much natural gas Iran 

has. So I thought I would just begin by giving you all a few numbers to think about. 

The first number is two. That is Iran’s global rank in terms of 

proven natural gas reserves. Only Russia has more natural gas 

than Iran. 

Next number, 400 billion cubic feet. That is how much natural 

gas Iran flares every year. That is enough to supply my entire 

home State of Massachusetts, 7 million people, with natural gas for 

a year. It would be worth more than $7 billion if they captured it 

and shipped it as liquefied natural gas. Instead, they simply 

produce and sell their oil and burn off as much natural gas that 

is coproduced with it. 

52 

Final number, eight. Eight is the number of nuclear power plant 

equivalents in natural gas that gets flared in Iran on a yearly 

basis. 

So this is not a question of their capacity to generate electricity 

for their people at a very inexpensive rate. This is natural gas they 

waste. If they are genuinely interested in safe, reliable, dependable, and efficient generation of electricity, they have a pretty obvious path to that. And they are the last country in the world that 

needs nuclear power to generate electricity. That is just the bottom 

line. 

So my first question to you is, do you all agree with that, that 

they do not need nuclear power in order to generate electricity for 

the rest of this century, that the proven reserves they have for the 

population that they have is more than enough to give them all 

their generating capacity? 

Dr. SAMORE. Senator, I was saying before you came in that I 

think the primary purpose of Iran’s nuclear program is really strategic, I mean, to develop a military capacity under the guise of a 

nuclear power program. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, how do we use this in our negotiations? 

How do we use the fact that they do not need nuclear-generated 

electricity? How do we use that in the negotiations given these realities? 

Dr. SAMORE. Yes. I think it is hopeless to expect that we can persuade them to give up nuclear energy. What we are trying to 

achieve in these negotiations is to limit how they exercise their nuclear energy program, and in particular, we want to constrain—— 

Senator MARKEY. But we begin, in other words, with the premise 

that they do not need it. Okay? When they say nuclear power for 

electricity, we would not be building nuclear—we do not build nuclear power plants in America where natural gas is now so cheap. 

Right? That is why we got to keep the natural gas here, and we 

have got to keep the price low because it is backing out coal and 

backing out others. 

Mr. Doran. 

Dr. DORAN. Thanks. I completely agree with what you say. One 

of the more disturbing aspects of the way the administration has 

played its hand is it has created the sense that we are on the verge 

of an agreement with Iran, created the sense that the Iranians are 

really changing strategic direction, and as Senator Menendez suggested, creating the impression that it is intransigent elements in 

the United States and allies of the United States such as Saudi 

Arabia and Israel that are the real impediment. Instead of putting 

together our own coalition and taking a very reasonable position, 

making it clear to the world, we have created an impression out 

there that we are fighting against elements on our own side, which 

is really just bad negotiating. 

Senator MARKEY. I will ask you a different question, Mr. 

Albright. We already have tight sanctions on Iran for their oil exports. They have got to keep a lot of their oil inside the country, 

and that which they can sell is limited. Now, the price of that 

which they can sell has now dropped from $110 a barrel down to 

$70 a barrel. So on top of the already tight sanctions, we have this 

additional reduction in revenues that is now going into a governVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Jul 22, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
53 

ment dependent for 80 percent of its revenues on oil revenues. So 

what role is that going to play in these negotiations? How does that 

affect how they view what additional sanctions might be put on 

them or even this additional tightening which is occurring because 

of the collapse of the price of oil with no prospect for it going up 

in the near term? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think the decreasing oil prices are certainly 

going to be more pressure on Iran to make a deal. Whether it is 

enough—— 

Senator MARKEY. How big of a deal is this, though, this collapse 

of the energy price, given that we are having them keep millions 

of barrels of oil off the market as part of these sanctions? So what 

does it mean that the oil we let them sell has collapsed in price? 

It is down 40 percent. So what is that going to mean in terms of 

their negotiating posture in your view, given the pressure that is 

going to build internally? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think it is going to be—for the U.S. side, it is 

a development that is certainly going to incentivize Iran to make 

concessions. Whether it is enough—and it is also is Iran going to 

calculate, well, in a year from now, the prices will go up and we 

will get through it. I mean, that is part of this. 

Senator MARKEY. In other words, are they immune domestically 

to this collapse in the price of oil, given the very educated population which they have? Can they ride that out for 2 or 3 years and 

have revenues just collapse in terms of the role that it is playing 

in the running of the government? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I am not an Iranian expert. So I would say that, 

yes, they can. I mean, if they really do not want to deal, they can 

control their population—— 

Senator MARKEY. Mr. Samore, you seem to have a view on that. 

Dr. SAMORE. Since 2009 when they put down a popular protest 

against the rigged elections that brought President Ahmadinejad to 

power, I think the government has been very effective in neutralizing political opposition. So again, I am not an Iran expert, but I 

agree with David that they are probably in pretty good shape to 

continue to ride out these economic difficulties. 

Senator MARKEY. Can I say this? I believe that Putin and the 

Iranians are going to come under a lot of pressure. People might 

like Putin for what he is doing in the Ukraine. When that price of 

oil is down for a year or 2, I think you are going to see a big change 

in public opinion. 

Can I ask one final, Mr. Chairman? 

The CHAIRMAN.CHAIRMAN. Of course. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

I continue to be interested in the illicit procurement of materials 

made possible by Iran. I have asked the administration officials 

about this too. As a matter of fact, in a report this past June, the 

U.N. reminded us that Iran continues to maintain wide-reaching, 

transnational illicit procurement networks. It uses front companies 

to obtain materials on the global market for its nuclear and missile 

programs under the guise of legitimate commerce. These are complex operations, and they violate existing U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 1737. 

54 

Where can we tighten controls on the global market to thwart efforts by Iran and other likeminded countries to evade sanctions 

and acquire materials for its nuclear and missile programs? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. One immediate one is it is a vital part of the negotiations with Iran, that they commit not to continue doing illicit 

nuclear procurements. And that is one of the driving reasons to 

keep the U.N. Security Council sanctions on proliferation-sensitive 

goods in place. You could create an exemption for authorized nuclear programs. Like one was created for the Bushehr reactor. But 

the sanctions stay in place because you cannot have any confidence 

in being able to prevent a covert centrifuge plant if you cannot get 

control over their illicit procurements. They are going to have to 

buy a lot of things overseas in order to build such a facility. And 

so it is an urgent priority. 

Beyond that, it is also very important to put pressure on China. 

Iran gets the dual-use goods—they could be made in America; they 

could be made in Germany—via China. So it is critical to increase 

pressure on China to enforce the sanctions and its own laws. 

Senator MARKEY. The chairman has been very generous to me. 

Would you like to say a word, Mr. Doran? 

Dr. DORAN. Yes, just quickly. That is one example of the importance of the possible military dimensions of them coming clean because it is not to have them say mea culpa, we were going for a 

bomb. It is to give us purview onto the procurement networks that 

they have, among other things. 

Senator MARKEY. And Iran historically has had one of the highest prevarication coefficients of any country in the world when it 

deals with any of these nuclear or missile programs. And we just 

have to know that in dealing with them in any of these negotiations. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

You have been very gracious with your time, and I appreciate it. 

This is an incredibly important panel. You have a lot of expertise 

both on the scientific elements, as well as policy elements. 

I do want to explore with Dr. Samore some of the lines of questions on the question of the role of Congress in sanctions. What is 

wrong with—not new sanctions. See that phrase ‘‘new sanctions’’ 

suggests we are going immediately to a whole new set of things we 

have not done, number one. But with calibrated, prospective sanctions that would be imposed, for example, possibly at the end of 

March if there is no framework that has been agreed to, that would 

say, you know what, you have no framework agreed to at the end 

of March, well, then we are going to go back to maybe the oil elements that we have basically told countries you do not have to 

meet the further reduced levels. We are going to back to that and/ 

or saying, you know, the amounts of money you are getting in relief—that is either going to be eliminated or cut in half or something like that, something that makes them understand that there 

are consequences for not coming to the conclusions that are necessary to actually make a deal that the international community 

could support and signaling to them that this is not an endless rolling negotiation which you can just game but something that you 

have to come to grips with in terms of your own answers. You may 

55 

answer no at the end of the day because you think that regime 

preservation, you know, hegemonic goals and whatnot are more important. That is fine. But the world should know that at that point 

in time. 

Dr. SAMORE. Well, it is a very good question. 

I think the issue is whether that would be effective. And my concern is that some in Iran might actually welcome such legislation 

because they could very well calculate that will put more pressure 

on the P5+1 to make additional concessions in order to get a deal 

and avoid having the old sanctions imposed and then going back 

to the previous situation. Or the Iranians might calculate that if 

they stand pat and we impose those sanctions, it gives them a good 

reason to back away from the negotiations, blame the United 

States, and make it more difficult for us to build the coalition to 

resume sanctions. So I can understand why the administration has 

a lot of questions and concern about whether that kind of approach 

is going to be effective or whether it would actually boomerang and 

play into Iran’s hands. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me go back to a question I put to you before, 

and I will open this to anybody on the panel, if the Ayatollah has 

always had the view that the regime is preserved by obtaining nuclear weapons, that the Islamic revolution in Iran is preserved by 

having nuclear weapons, that its hegemonic goals are preserved by 

having nuclear weapons, and he is the guy who has the ultimate 

decision, not Rouhani and Zarif, who we have aspirations for, but 

he is the guy who has the decision, then if you do nothing—nothing—beyond where you are at right now, how does that calculus 

ever change? It does not. You know, after 40 years of public service 

and negotiating as a school board trustee, a mayor, a State legislator, 22 years in Congress, I have never seen that something stays 

the same unless some dynamic element is introduced that changes 

the equation. And if everything stays the same, then how is it that 

you change the equation for the Ayatollah? 

Dr. SAMORE. I have tried to suggest some things that we could 

do, both the United States and our allies, to try to change that calculation. One, as I think all of us have said, is that we have put 

enough reasonable ideas on the table. It is now time for Iran to 

show that they are actually prepared to move toward us. And my 

sense is that the negotiations broke up in Vienna with the ball very 

clearly in Zarif’s court. So let us see whether he can get some additional flexibility from the Supreme Leader. I am skeptical but I am 

willing to wait and see whether or not. 

Secondly, as I said, we need to make the threat of additional 

sanctions very credible and tangible to the Iranians by visibly 

working with our allies to prepare for further reductions in Iranian 

oil exports. 

And third, I hope that there is some way that Congress and the 

White House could work together positively to come up with legislation that makes the threat of additional sanctions more credible 

for the Iranians. 

But, you know, look, I agree with you, Senator, that it may very 

well be that nothing we do will convince Khamenei to fundamentally change his position. I think that is quite likely. And in that 

case, we are talking about how do we put ourselves in the best poVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Jul 22, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
56 

sition after the collapse of the Joint Plan of Action to increase the 

sanctions. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I actually would strongly endorse what Gary said, 

that there is a need for Congress and the administration to work 

together, because ultimately it is as simple as coming up with a 

plan B. If you think the deal is going to fall apart, you do not want 

to start your planning the day it falls apart. And so I think there 

is a critical need to think these things through now, and I think 

Congress has an essential role to play in that, particularly as the 

world recognizes they are the ones who came up with the sanctions 

that have gotten Iran to the negotiating table. 

I also think that the administration has gotten itself into some 

perplexing boxes. The PMD issue is one to me where if you, in a 

sense, throw the IAEA under the bus by deferring the PMD in a 

sense indefinitely, you have just weakened the credibility and the 

ability of the verification entity to verify the very deal that they are 

negotiating. And you are creating precedents. Yes, it is okay, Iran. 

You do not have to let the IAEA go to military sites. Yes, you do 

not have to let them have access to experts that were involved in 

these alleged covert activities. So you are jeopardizing the very 

verifiability of the agreement. And so I think there is the need for 

action to break the administration out of these—I do not know 

what to call it—a dueler well. That is a very old term from computer days. They are just caught spinning around and around. 

And I would argue that the sanctions issue in the debate between Congress and the administration is another one, that it has 

been reduced to rhetoric and threats. And yet, there is an incredibly important role that both play in creating the threat of sanctions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I agree with you. I do not disagree from my 

perspective. I speak only for myself. Personally I am more than 

willing to work with the administration. As a matter of fact, we 

have done that in the past. The problem is that what you hear 

from the administration at this point is do not worry about that. 

The Iranians know that if it does not move forward, there will be 

more sanctions coming, that Congress will be happy to do that. I 

do not think that that is real enough, crystallized enough for the 

Iranians, or tangible enough to know, well, what is it that is coming because if I am in the midst of, let us say, an election, I want 

to have a pretty good idea of what is coming, and I will calculate 

based upon that of what I will have to do. Oh, there will be more 

sanctions. Well, how severe? Is it only what I was able to survive? 

Is it more significant than that? You know, I think that just the 

waiting and suggesting that, well, when and if we get there, they 

know that the Congress is more than willing to pursue sanctions 

has no real meaningfulness to it. 

And I think that the other part—and I may be wrong about this, 

but my sense is that the Iranians have a view that there is no credible military threat on the table at least at this point, that maybe 

there will be at some point in the future if they move forward. But 

I do not think that they feel that there is a present credible military threat which in the back of their mind would have to be a consequence. Maybe you are right, Dr. Samore, that if it all breaks 

down and they start moving rapidly forward, that the West, either 

57 

the United States and whoever else, might strike them. But right 

now, they do not believe there is a credible military threat. 

And right now, my perspective is that they do not really believe 

that we are going to reimpose any sanctions or produce any new 

sanctions because what they see is the administration fending off, 

which is a different signal than I think what you are talking about, 

saying, no, do not do anything. Just stay out of our way. Versus, 

well, let us do something and let them know that in fact there are 

some real consequences here. And it is that dynamic that is, I 

think, inopportune in terms of strengthening our hands in the negotiations at the end of the day. 

Dr. SAMORE. Can I say, sir, I think that it is clear that if the 

talks fail and the JPOA collapses, the Iranians and others will try 

to blame Congress as being the main culprit here? And I think it 

is very important that we take steps that take that argument away 

from them. And so that is why I think—I completely agree with 

you—that an approach between the administration and Congress 

that defines and specifies the magnitude of the sanctions and yet 

leaves enough discretion so that the administration can accept it is 

the most effective way to show that we are acting in a united way 

and really deny the Iranians the ability to blame Congress for 

blowing up these negotiations. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure they blame us for putting them in a 

position that already puts them at the negotiations. 

And I heard so often—I have to be honest with you, which is one 

of my own personal senses of calibrating this. Unfortunately, at 

every turn that the Congress led on the question of sanctions, administration witnesses consistently came before this committee and 

said that would be a grave mistake, that that would break apart 

the comity that we had with the European Union and with other 

allies, that it would be a, disaster. Well, I have to be honest with 

you. Those apocalyptic views never ultimately materialized, and if 

anything, it was the congressional insistence that got us to the 

point where the Iranians felt compelled to be at the table. 

So I think that is part of the equation here as well. When you 

get stiff-armed and you are told that in fact your view at the end 

of the day, which history—at least short-term history—has proven 

to be that we were right and others who took that view were 

wrong, that moving forward, you would hope that there would be 

a more constructive role to embrace the opportunity to strengthen 

the hand of negotiators at the end of the day. I just do not think 

that that is there. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

Dr. Samore, you threw out the notion that if we were to pass 

sanctions that would kick in in the event that a deal was not 

reached, it could hasten our side to make a bad deal. Now, is that 

something you just threw out or is that something that has been 

discussed, that some of our partners, if you will, who are negotiating are concerned that if Congress acted in that manner, it could 

in fact—while we have some allies who already think we have overgiven, it might prompt them to do even more. Is that something 

you just threw out at this meeting, or has that been discussed by 

others? 

58 

Dr. SAMORE. No one has expressed that concern to me. But what 

I worry about is that is how the Iranians will see it, whether it is 

true or not, and that might make them even more intransigent because, you know, look, if the Iranians have a pessimistic view 

about the outcome of these negotiations, which is what the Supreme Leader says over and over again publicly—he says I do not 

mind if these negotiations go out, but I do not think they will succeed because I do not think the Americans will accept our nuclear 

program. And I agree with him. We are not going to accept their 

nuclear program. So if both sides anticipate the very likelihood that 

the talks will collapse, and they will fail, and the Joint Plan of Action will fall apart, then both sides are going to be maneuvering 

in order to cast as much blame as possible on the other side. And 

what I worry is that the Iranians may think that if they are patient and they just keep the talks going with little concessions here 

and there, sooner or later, Congress will take steps that will end 

the talks over the President’s objection, and it will give them a 

greater ability to avoid additional sanctions once the process ends. 

Senator CORKER. From the other groups that we are associated 

with. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think the concern—this has been discussed. I 

think Gary would agree, I guess I will call them trigger sanctions 

that come into effect in a mandatory way, he would agree that that 

is perceived by the Iranians as putting a gun to their head. That 

leads them to put together what I would call trigger advancements 

in their nuclear program. They did this last December and January; the parliament said they would pass a law that required Iran 

to produce 60 percent enriched uranium if new sanctions were imposed. So there is worry about that, that the trigger sanctions 

could backfire. 

And then there is also the worry that in that environment the 

Iranians would start resisting in the negotiations. And so I think 

that that is a concern that has to be addressed. 

I think what I am talking about, though, is sanctions discussions 

and plans that are not necessarily required to take effect but would 

give the President the authority to use those sanctions at least 

through this period where there is uncertainty about the future of 

the JPA. 

Senator CORKER. Of course, he has a lot of leeway in that regard 

without us doing that. So I understand it is a tilt. But again, he 

can put a lot of sanctions in place without us being involved in any 

way. 

Let me ask you this. What would be your perceived response, 

without having a great deal of time to think about it, if we pass 

legislation that said that the implementation of this agreement 

could not be—the money would be withdrawn to implement it unless Congress approved it? So we are not saying what sanctions 

would be put in place down the road, but we are saying that unless 

Congress approves this deal, it cannot be implemented. What do 

you think the impact would be on the negotiations if something like 

that were to pass both the House and Senate? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think it would be negative on the Iranian side 

because they already do not trust the United States to take away 

the sanctions. 

59 

But I must say I am torn because I think more congressional 

oversight on this problem is urgent. We are struggling to know 

what is even being discussed and you are Members of Congress. So 

I think the oversight is necessary, and whether it is the Congress 

approving or the Senate approving the deal or not, I think that 

something has to happen. 

And I think this is a mistake the administration is making. I did 

work a lot on first opposing the agreed framework and then being 

convinced to support it. The fact that the Congress was not on 

board was a severely corrosive factor. And so I think it is important 

the administration work with Congress to make sure this is a 

united effort and a deal that is supported. 

Dr. SAMORE. I just want to say I think one of the big obstacles 

to the White House and Congress reaching agreement on language 

of legislation is what would exactly constitute an acceptable deal 

because right now my sense from letters from Congress and legislation and so forth it is setting out terms and conditions for an agreement which the administration does not think they can achieve 

through this negotiation. And without saying who is right or who 

is wrong, I think as long as there is such a divergence in terms of 

what would constitute an acceptable deal, I think it is difficult to 

come to an agreement on whether Congress should put itself in the 

position of approving an agreement. 

Of course, the fact is if the administration comes forward with 

a bad deal that accepts anything close to having Iran with a significant enrichment capability, I would expect Congress to overrule 

that deal. I mean, Congress would pass legislation that would 

make it impossible for the President to waive sanctions. And I 

think that is a real constraint on what the administration thinks 

it has to negotiate in order to pass political muster in this town. 

Senator CORKER. But having it put in place in advance of completing negotiations that Congress had to approve the deal you believe would have a negative effect on negotiations. 

Dr. SAMORE. I am not sure if it would have a negative effect on 

negotiations, but I think the administration would be reluctant to 

accept such legislation when there is such a divergence between 

what they think a deal is going to look like and what Congress has 

expressed as the essential elements of a deal, including all the 

things we are talking about, that there be a dismantlement of 

Iran’s illicit nuclear program, the question of a possible military dimension has to be resolved in its entirety. I mean, those are not 

things that are likely to be in the deal that is currently being negotiated. 

Senator CORKER. I would say from their perspective, though, 

then people in the Senate and House would be firing with real bullets as far as whether they approved the deal or not. And I would 

say that while people can be bellicose and sometimes over the top, 

that people sitting there and actually deciding yea or nay whether 

this whole thing falls apart could cause people—looking at it from 

the administration’s perspective if they wanted to actually view 

Congress this way, could cause people to be more responsible than 

they think. Do you understand what I am saying? From their perspective. I think responsible is getting a deal that does not lead to 

60 

them having nuclear capabilities, but I do not think it would go 

just in one direction. 

Let me just ask one last question. What are the economic drivers 

that—over time people worry about this sanctions regime falling 

apart. What are the biggest elements that are driving some of the 

other countries to want to go ahead and let this dissipate so they 

can continue to do business? Is it the oil itself that comes from 

Iran? Is that the biggest driver? What do you think is the biggest 

issue for China and Russia and some of the other countries? 

Dr. SAMORE. Well, I think it is both oil but also it is the Iranian 

market. I mean, when the Joint Plan of Action was originally 

agreed, there was a real question about whether limited sanctions 

relief would lead to a much broader erosion of the sanctions that 

are in place. And the Iranians certainly tried as hard as they could 

to lure companies to Tehran and offer them all kinds of deals. And 

so far, I think to the credit of the United States and its allies, the 

governments have been able to restrain companies from breaking 

the remaining sanctions, including limits on oil purchases, with the 

one exception of China where we have seen some important slippage especially in purchases of condensate. And I think that is an 

important issue for the administration to demonstrate that it can 

get China back in the box. But the other big oil customers have all 

continued to keep their purchases from Iran at the levels they were 

at when the Joint Plan of Action went into effect. 

So we have been able to demonstrate so far that the Joint Plan 

of Action has not eroded the overall regime. And of course, the Iranians will keep trying and companies will still be tempted, and we 

will have to continue to jawbone and apply sanctions in order to 

make sure that that does not happen. 

Senator CORKER. And I will stop with this. I know the chairman 

needs to go and I do too. You all do too. 

We have companies here in our own Nation that would love to 

export condensate—right—and are prohibited from doing that 

today. Just on that element, condensate, let us face it, is a byproduct of exploration. We wish it would have been part of more closely—you know, we did not pay enough attention—our Nation did— 

when we were negotiating the deal with Iran in the first place. But 

what if we supplanted that condensate need for countries like 

China and other places? Would that have an effect on us being able 

to keep the regime together? 

Dr. SAMORE. I am strongly in favor of the United States exporting energy to not only China but also our Asian allies. If we are 

asking countries to shift their purchases, even if there are other oil 

and other products from the Saudis and others, I think it is very 

important that the U.S. export its energy, both oil and gas. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you direct exports? It is a global market. 

Can we take and say we are going to only want these to be sold 

to our allies, whether they be Asia or anybody else? 

Dr. SAMORE. Well, I mean, my understanding from talking to 

people who have recently been in China, also Korea and Japan is 

that they would love to buy more energy from the United States 

because they see it not only as price competitive but also a much 

more secure and reliable source than most of the Middle East counVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Jul 22, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
61 

tries. So I think the market would take care of it if we made it 

available. 

The CHAIRMAN. You think the market would take care of it, that 

it would not go just to the highest bidder. You mean the businesses 

would now move to a different philosophy of what is the very essentials of the economics debut, which is they extract, do the processing, that cost them X number of dollars. And normally they 

want to go and sell it to the highest in the marketplace. 

Dr. SAMORE. I think U.S. companies would be able to sell at a 

profit U.S. energy resources to Asia, yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but would that be the highest marketplace? What if China is willing to pay $10 per barrel more than Japan or 

South Korea? Do you really think that the energy companies will 

say, well, we are going to forego the extra $10 per barrel to sell 

it to Japan and South Korea? 

Dr. SAMORE. No, I do not expect them to do that. But if there 

is a price bidding process, then I think the Japanese and the Koreans might look to match the Chinese price. 

The CHAIRMAN. Under those circumstances, yes, I could see it. 

But this is part of the problem. I do not know. Maybe if you extract it from Federal lands or waters, you could put a condition 

that it has to be sold to certain allies, certain regions. But that is 

one of my concerns about—I do not have an ideological opposition 

to using energy as long as you can use selling domestic energy 

internationally, but the question is in an international market, it 

goes to the highest bidder. That is our big challenge. So how does 

one direct it for your strategic purposes at the end of the day, 

whether that be Asia or Ukraine, for example? 

Dr. SAMORE. Well, of course, we do have a very large strategic 

petroleum reserve, and I think that I would be in favor of using 

that for foreign policy purposes. I cannot say whether this is the 

right one, but I think we should think about using—— 

The CHAIRMAN. That is a little different than just commercial extraction. 

One last thing. I am exploring your idea. I am not in opposition 

to it. I am trying to figure out how you get to where you want to 

be. 

Go ahead. 

Senator CORKER. Well, if I could, just on this one issue of condensate. It is my understanding—and I could be way off base—that 

the way this actually works is that they enter into long-term contracts for the delivery between companies and China. And I think 

it is not quite like the petroleum market as it relates to this. It is 

a little different in that this is used in petrochemicals and other 

kinds of development. And I think there maybe is a little bit better 

way of having an impact on China in this particular regard than 

maybe with some of the other things we talked about with LNG 

and others. 

The CHAIRMAN. If we are talking only about condensates, Commerce has allowed some condensates to be sold, and they seem to 

be pretty reluctant towards limiting any further condensates. See, 

I thought we were talking about much more than condensates. But 

in any event, I am sure that the soon-to-be chairman is going to 

explore that as we move forward. 

62 

Thank you all for your testimony and incredible sharing of time. 

As you can see, there is a real interest by the ranking member and 

myself, as well as other members, to go to the depth of trying to 

understand the dynamics here. 

My final comment is—well, one is that this record will remain 

open until the close of business on Friday. 

And secondly is this is a traditional challenge between the role 

of the executive branch and the legislative branch. I am sure the 

executive branch would never want the legislative branch to necessarily involve themselves with authorizations of use of military 

force. Some of us believe that that is an appropriate and needed 

action by the Congress when we are engaging our sons and daughters to be sent abroad. And by the same token, on this question it 

was Congress’ failure to get engaged that led us end up having to 

face the challenges of a nuclear-armed North Korea. So there is a 

balance here at the end of the day, and we have got to figure out 

how we get that balance right for what I do believe is our collective 

vision of not having Iran have nuclear weapons but about how that 

is frameworked in a way that makes it less likely than more likely 

is a concern many of us. 

But with the thanks of the committee for all of your insights, this 

hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

63 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

GRAPHS AND ANNEX SUBMITTED WITH DAVID ALBRIGHT’S PREPARED STATEMENT

64 

ANNEX: PROVISIONS IN A LONG TERM, COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT

The negotiations for a long-term deal are highly detailed and secret. Many technical provisions are being studied and proposed by the P5+1 negotiators, particularly U.S. officials. Iran has resisted many of these proposals and rejected most proposals that would lead to significantly lengthened breakout times. It is unclear if 

the differences can be bridged over the next several months. 

Nonetheless, it makes sense to review a set of provisions that can form the basis 

of a comprehensive solution able to protect adequately U.S. national security interests. This list has been developed based on a range of information and attempts to 

65 

incorporate information about the provisions being discussed during the negotiations. However, there is no attempt to represent the U.S. or its allies’ positions. For 

more detail about the provisions presented here, the reader is referred to the ISIS 

Web sites. 

This list of provisions is an update from lists prepared by ISIS in December 2013 

and January 2014. The changes from those early lists reflect known concessions 

made by the parties to the negotiations, new developments not foreseen a year ago, 

or efforts to seek compromises. In addition, many of the provisions work together, 

such as limiting the number of IR–1 centrifuges, leaving only a small number of 

advanced centrifuges, mandating significantly reduced stocks of LEU, and removing 

or destroying centrifuges and associated equipment. As such, while specific limits 

can be set individually as below, when key provisions are considered in their 

entirety, these provisions may each differ from the cases stated below. However, the 

goal of a one year breakout would still be obtained. 

The provisions are organized in two broad categories, those without duration and 

those with a duration of 20 years. The latter could be subject to a phasing, such 

as after a fraction of the 20 years has passed, that would lead to gradual relaxation 

of the conditions or replacement by others. However, phasing is not included in this 

list. 

CONDITIONS WITHOUT A DEFINED DURATION

• The Arak reactor complex will be modified to use enriched uranium fuel and 

a smaller core structure, or calandria. The reactor’s power will be reduced from 

the level currently planned; i.e., 40 megawatts-thermal, and the reactor’s heat 

removal system will be modified to fit that lower power rating. 

• Iran will not reprocess any irradiated fuel or build a facility capable of reprocessing. 

• Iran will not enrich above 5 percent in the isotope uranium 235, and will not 

produce stocks of enriched uranium that exceed in quantity the needs of its 

civilian program, noting that it has long term LEU fuel delivery agreements 

with Russia and would be expected to have additional ones with foreign reactor 

vendors after the conclusion of a comprehensive solution. 

• Iran will commit not to procure goods for its nuclear programs abroad in a manner that is considered illicit (‘‘illicit nuclear commodity trafficking or trade’’). 

CONDITIONS AND PARAMETERS WITH A DEFINED DURATION OF 20 YEARS

• Iran will have only one enrichment site, the one at Natanz, and it will utilize 

IR–1 centrifuges. The number installed will be consistent with a one year 

breakout timeframe. Considering significant reductions in LEU stocks, the number of allowed centrifuges could reach 4,000–5,000 IR–1 centrifuges. 

• The Fordow enrichment site will be shut down or converted into a noncentrifuge-related site. 

• Centrifuge research and development will be limited to centrifuges equivalent 

to the IR–2m centrifuge. The number of centrifuge cascades will be limited in 

number, and no cascade will have more than a few tens of centrifuges. In all 

cases, the number of advanced centrifuges in a cascade would be far lower than 

the amount to be used in a production-scale cascade. 

• Major centrifuge component manufacturing and storage locations will be limited 

in number and identified. 

• Centrifuge assembly will occur only at the Natanz enrichment site. 

• In the case of the IR–1 centrifuges, centrifuge manufacturing would be limited 

to the replacement of broken centrifuges, if no spares exist. For example, in the 

case of IR–1 centrifuges, a stock of many thousands of uninstalled centrifuges 

would be stored and then drawn upon to replace broken ones. Thus, Iran would 

agree not to build any IR–1 centrifuges until this stock is exhausted.1

• When the long-term agreement takes effect, centrifuges and all associated cascade equipment in excess of the cap would be turned off, so that no centrifuges 

are operating and the cascades are not under vacuum. Centrifuges would be 

turned off in a controlled manner so as to limit centrifuge damage. Excess centrifuges and the cascades containing them would be disabled in a manner so 

as to require 6 to 12 months to restart disabled cascades. Based on public information about the negotiations, excess centrifuges would not be destroyed but 

rather equipment from the cascades and centrifuges would be removed from the 

centrifuge plants making restart very time-consuming. To ensure adequate 

build-back times, certain centrifuge or cascade equipment would be selectively 

destroyed. Any storage of equipment or uninstalled centrifuges would be subject 

to rigorous IAEA monitoring. 

66 

• Iran will not build any conversion lines that can convert enriched uranium 

oxide into hexafluoride form. 

• LEU stocks will be limited, based on a realistic civil justification. 

Æ With regard to near 20 percent LEU, Iran will not possess any such LEU 

in hexafluoride form and its total stock in unirradiated oxide form, including in fresh fuel elements and assemblies and scrap and waste, will be less 

than the equivalent of 100 kg of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride. During 

the life of the agreement, this unirradiated stock will be further reduced 

to below the equivalent of 50 kg of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride. 

Æ Iran will not possess more than the equivalent of 500 kilograms of 

unirradiated, less than 5 percent LEU hexafluoride. Iran’s practical needs 

for LEU, such as in the modified Arak reactor, would require the use of 

a certain amount of LEU in a fuel fabrication pipeline. This amount would 

be determined as part of the agreement. Excess LEU will be shipped out 

of Iran. 

• Uranium mining, milling, and conversion facilities will be limited in throughput 

to the actual need for enrichment or other mutually agreed upon use. 

• Iran would ratify the Additional Protocol and accept a range of supplementary 

verification measures, including but not limited to, 

Æ More detailed declarations of and greater access to uranium supplies and 

sources; 

Æ Detailed declarations of the number of centrifuges made in total, its total 

used and accumulated stocks of raw materials and equipment needed to 

build and operate centrifuges. 

• Prior to the relaxation of major economic or financial sanctions, Iran will 

address the IAEA’s concerns about past and possibly ongoing nuclear weapons 

or nuclear weapons-related work. 

• United Nations Security Council sanctions on proliferation sensitive goods will 

continue throughout the duration of the agreement. At the beginning of the 

period of the comprehensive solution, a verified procurement channel will be 

established for items needed in Iran’s nuclear programs. The list of items will 

be established by mutual agreement and will include major nuclear facilities, 

nuclear components, nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods, and other sensitive items such as those on watch lists. Procurements of listed items outside 

this channel will be banned and considered illicit nuclear trade. 

• Iran will not export or otherwise transfer nuclear materials, reactors, centrifuges, reprocessing equipment, other nuclear facilities or equipment, or the 

means to make such equipment or facilities to any state, company, or other 

entity.2

• By the end of the period in which the comprehensive solution will be in force, 

Iran will implement an export control system in line with the requirements of 

the four main export control regimes (lists and guidance) and submit a comprehensive report to the 1540 Committee on Iran’s implementation of the resolution. Iran will also commit not to export or otherwise transfer reprocessing 

or enrichment technologies or goods to any state or non-state actor after the 

comprehensive solution period ends. 

———————— 

Notes 

1 Broken centrifuges will be replaced with centrifuges of the same type. This should mean, 

for example, that an installed IR–1 centrifuge would be replaced with an IR–1 centrifuge of the 

same design and enrichment capability as the one removed. A broken centrifuge is defined as 

one that has a rotor assembly incapable of spinning under power and cannot be repaired. 2 A model condition developed by ISIS: The state of concern agrees not to transfer to any state 

or entity whatsoever, or in any way help a state or entity obtain, nuclear weapons or explosive 

devices, or components of such weapons; nuclear material; nuclear know-how or technology; or 

equipment, material, goods, technology designed for, prepared for, or that can contribute to the 

processing, use, or production of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons or in sanctioned nuclear 

programs. 

Æ