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94–580 PDF 2015

UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM THREATS: EXPLORING SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND MITIGATION 

TECHNOLOGIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND 

MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 18, 2015 

Serial No. 114–9 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

RYAN CONSAUL, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 

BRIAN B. TURBYFILL, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Management Efficiency: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

WITNESSES

Mr. Todd E. Humphreys, Assistant Professor, Cockrell School of Engineering, 

The University of Texas at Austin: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

Major General Frederick F. Roggero, (USAF–Ret.), President and Chief Executive Officer, Resilient Solutions, Ltd.: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17 

Mr. Richard Beary, President, International Association of Chiefs of Police: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

Mr. Gregory S. McNeal, Associate Professor, School of Law, Pepperdine University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 23 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 25 

(1) 

UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM THREATS: 

EXPLORING SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND 

MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES 

Wednesday, March 18, 2015 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry [Chairman of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Perry, Carter, Loudermilk, Watson 

Coleman, Thompson, Richmond, and Torres. 

Mr. PERRY. Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Management Efficiency will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony regarding security implications of small, unmanned aerial systems in the domestic airspace and technologies to mitigate associated threats. 

Chairman now recognizes itself for an opening statement. 

When most people think of unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, 

commonly known as drones, they may think of large aircraft used 

in overseas combat operations. However, in the coming years, the 

majority of UAS will be small—55 pounds or less—many of which 

fly less than 400 feet above the ground. Small UAS have a variety 

of potential uses such as pipeline, utility, and farm inspections, 

aerial photography, and crop-dusting, among other uses. 

Last month the Federal Aviation Administration, the FAA, released proposed rules to allow for the operation of small UAS for 

non-recreational purposes into domestic airspace. The proposed 

rules would place numerous limitations on flying small UAS: 

Flights could take place only in daylight, the area of operations 

would be limited, and only visual-line-of-sight operations would be 

permitted. These proposed rules are now open for public comment. 

Our hearing today will focus on the security implications of opening our skies to small UAS and how agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies should prepare. 

Several recent security incidents are concerning. In January, a 

small quadcopter crashed on the White House lawn. Although the 

incident seemingly was accidental, it exposed the larger issue of 

how law enforcement should respond to UAS threats and, subse-
2 

quently, the Secret Service quickly scheduled exercises in the D.C. 

area in response. 

Also, a September 2013 incident where a small UAS landed only 

inches away from German Chancellor Angela Merkel also exposed 

serious concerns and the challenge that protective services around 

the world now face. 

Last but not least, French police recently were confounded when 

several unidentified small UAS flew over key Paris landmarks, including the Eiffel Tower, as well as nuclear power plants. French 

authorities are investigating, but again, this incident showcases 

the challenges to law enforcement to respond swiftly to this new 

technology. 

Threats posed by the small UAS are nothing new. For example, 

an individual was arrested in September 2011 after a failed plot to 

attack the U.S. Capitol and Pentagon using multiple remote-controlled aircraft laden with explosives. 

But nightmare scenarios by terrorists aren’t the only concern. 

Drug smugglers could use this technology as a cheap way to smuggle illegal drugs into the United States, and spies may also use 

small drones to get into areas we would prefer hidden. 

So the question remains: How can homeland security and law enforcement prepare for these potential threats? 

In July 2012, this committee held a hearing highlighting the 

need to address the security risks associated with UAS. In the past 

3 years, the Department of Homeland Security has taken some 

steps to educate law enforcement and the public on small UAS. 

The National Protection and Programs Directorate, the NPPD, 

released a model aircraft reference aid to inform the public about 

potential illicit uses, impacts, and indicators of malicious activity. 

The Science and Technology Director has been assessing the capabilities of small UAS for State and local law enforcement and first 

responders. 

However, much more needs to be done to safeguard against malicious actors successfully using this technology for illegal means. 

The Department of Homeland Security needs a cohesive strategy to 

address these issues. 

Lone-wolf terrorists, drug smugglers, and foreign spies don’t care 

about FAA rules. The DHS must help protect against these bad actors perverting this technology for their objectives. 

Testimony from our witnesses today will help provide a roadmap 

for what homeland security and law enforcement can do to mitigate 

this risk. Specifically, we need a better understanding of the technological solutions that exist to deal with these threats and what 

law enforcement needs to better respond when a small UAS is used 

for illegal activity. 

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses on their assessment of the threats and potential solutions. 

[The statement of Chairman Perry follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SCOTT PERRY

MARCH 18, 2015 

When most people think of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), commonly known as 

‘‘drones’’, they think of large aircraft used in overseas combat operations; however, 

in the coming years, the majority of UAS will be small—55 pounds or less—some 
3 

of which fly less than 400 feet above the ground. Small UAS have a variety of potential uses, such as pipeline, utility, and farm inspections, aerial photography, and 

crop dusting, among others. Last month, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

released proposed rules to allow for operation of small UAS for non-recreational purposes into domestic airspace. The proposed rules would place numerous limitations 

on flying small UAS: Flights could take place only in daylight, the area of operations would be limited, and only visual-line-of-sight operations would be permitted. 

These proposed rules now are open for public comment. Our hearing today will focus 

on the security implications of opening our skies to small UAS and how agencies 

such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal, State, and local law 

enforcement should prepare. 

Several recent security incidents are concerning. In January, a small quadcopter 

crashed on the White House lawn. Although the incident seemingly was accidental, 

it exposed the larger issue of how law enforcement should respond to UAS threats 

and, subsequently, the Secret Service quickly scheduled exercises in the D.C. area 

in response. Next, a September 2013 incident where a small UAS landed only inches 

away from German Chancellor Angela Merkel also exposed serious concerns and the 

challenge that protective services around the world now face. Last but not least, 

French police recently were confounded when several unidentified small UAS flew 

over key Paris landmarks, including the Eiffel Tower as well as nuclear power 

plants. French authorities are investigating, but again, this incident showcases the 

challenges for law enforcement to respond swiftly to this new technology. 

Threats posed by small UAS are nothing new. For example, an individual was arrested in September 2011 after a failed plot to attack the U.S. Capitol and Pentagon 

using multiple remote controlled aircraft laden with explosives. But nightmare scenarios by terrorists aren’t the only concern. Drug smugglers could use this technology as a cheap way to smuggle illegal drugs into the United States, and spies 

may also use small drones to get into areas we would prefer hidden. 

So the question is: How can homeland security and law enforcement prepare for 

these potential threats? In July 2012, this committee held a hearing highlighting 

the need to address the security risks associated with UAS. In the past 3 years, the 

Department of Homeland Security has taken some steps to educate law enforcement 

and the public on small UAS. The National Protection and Programs Directorate 

(NPPD) released a model aircraft reference aid to inform the public about potential 

illicit uses, impacts, and indicators of malicious activity. The Science and Technology Directorate has been assessing the capabilities of small UAS for State and 

local law enforcement and first responders. However, much more needs to be done 

to safeguard against malicious actors successfully using this technology for illegal 

means. The Department of Homeland Security needs a cohesive strategy to address 

these issues. 

Lone-wolf terrorists, drug smugglers, and foreign spies don’t care about FAA 

rules. DHS must help protect against these bad actors perverting this technology 

for their objectives. Testimony from our witnesses today will help provide a roadmap 

for what homeland security and law enforcement can do to mitigate this risk. Specifically, we need a better understanding of the technological solutions that exist to 

deal with these threats and what law enforcement needs to better respond when a 

small UAS is used for illegal activity. I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses on their assessment of the threats and potential solutions. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority 

Member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New Jersey, 

Mrs. Watson Coleman, for her statement. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thank you for holding this hearing. 

I would also like to thank the panel of witnesses for appearing 

before the subcommittee today. 

I am very interested in hearing from Professor McNeal, an expert 

on the issue of drones, about the potential policy options available 

to mitigate and respond to the threats posed by the commercial 

availability of unmanned aerial systems. Additionally, I am eager 

to hear from Professor Humphreys regarding DHS’s efforts since 

his last appearance before the subcommittee to respond to the security vulnerabilities associated with drones. 
4 

I am also looking forward to hearing from Mr. Roggero, who will 

be able to better inform this subcommittee about emerging technology that can be used to increase the safety of our airspace and 

our security posture as drones become increasingly integrated into 

our National airspace. Last, I am pleased that Chief Beary, the 

president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, is appearing before this subcommittee. 

Although you are here today to testify about the use of drones 

in law enforcement, I cannot forego the opportunity to talk with 

you about an issue that is very important to me and my constituents—that is the recent report from the Department of Justice on 

policing in Ferguson, Missouri, which found that many predominantly African-American neighborhoods are targeted in an effort to 

raise revenue for financial functions. 

My question will be: Are drones possibly—can they possibly be 

mechanisms used for accountability, such as body cameras will be? 

I want to thank you for the fine job that you are doing, but this 

issue really must be addressed. 

Now, back to the specifics of drones. Commercially-available 

drones are becoming an increasingly popular purchase, with the 

drone market expected to grow $84 billion over the next 5 years. 

As the commercial drone market grows, so, too, does the threat 

that drones will be used by actors with ill intent. 

Drones can be purchased on-line with prices starting as low as $40, and they are fairly easy to assemble and learn how to operate. 

In many cases, it is easier to learn how to operate a drone than 

it is a model aircraft. 

With drones being so easily accessible, we must consider the potential they have to be used as mechanisms to conduct an attack. 

Although we have not yet witnessed such an attack, we have 

seen how individuals operating drones have gotten extraordinarily 

close to at least one head of state. During the campaign rallying 

in 2013, the drone, piloted by an opposition party supporter, landed 

at the feet of the chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, as mentioned by my Chairman. 

There have also been recent stories of mysterious drones flying 

over sensitive Government assets, including the U.S. Embassy in 

Paris, and we are all familiar with the story regarding the drone 

landing on the White House lawn in January. It does not take wild 

imagination to envision what may happen if someone with malicious intent got their hands on drones. 

This emerging threat requires a unified effort by the Department 

of Homeland Security in developing security plans for mitigation 

and response. The Department of Homeland Security must conduct 

risk assessment to accurately determine the threat posed by 

drones. 

In the absence of risk assessments and a measured approach, the 

Department will spend millions of dollars without knowing what 

the real threat is or how to defend against it. 

Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security declined 

this invitation to testify before this subcommittee to explain how 

they are working toward a Department-wide strategy and address 

the issues at hand. Even without the Department’s testimony, I am 

confident that the panel of witnesses that are here today will help 
5 

us better understand the threat posed by drones and the technologies available to address that threat. 

Although drones are not the only avenue for conducting attacks, 

it is imperative that we leave the bad guys with fewer rather than 

a whole universe of options. We will narrow the threat picture by 

dealing with the security vulnerabilities posed by commerciallyavailable drones while still recognizing the economic benefits of the 

industry. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Watson Coleman follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN

MARCH 18, 2015 

I am very interested in hearing from Professor McNeal, an expert on the issue 

of drones, about the potential policy options available to mitigate and respond to the 

threats posed by the commercial availability of Unmanned Aerial Systems. 

Additionally, I am eager to hear from Professor Humphreys regarding DHS’ efforts, since his last appearance before the subcommittee, to respond to the security 

vulnerabilities associated with drones. 

I am also looking forward to hearing from Mr. Roggero who will be able to better 

inform the subcommittee about emerging technology that can be used to increase 

the safety of our airspace and our security posture as drones become increasingly 

integrated into our National airspace. 

Lastly, I am pleased that Chief Beary, the president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, is appearing before the subcommittee. 

Although you are here to testify about the use of drones in law enforcement, I 

cannot forgo the opportunity to talk with you about an issue that is very important 

to me and my constituents. 

That is, the recent report from the Department of Justice on policing in Ferguson, 

Missouri, which found that many predominantly African American neighborhoods 

are targeted in an effort to raise revenue for municipal functions. I want to thank 

you for the fine job you are doing, but this issue must be addressed. 

Now, back to the subject of drones. Commercially-available drones are becoming 

an increasingly popular purchase, with the drone market expected to grow $84 billion over the next 5 years. 

As the commercial drone market grows, so too does the threat that drones will 

be used by actors with ill intent. Drones can be purchased on-line, with prices starting as low as $40, and they are fairly easy to assemble and learn how to operate. 

In many cases, it is easier to learn how to operate a drone than it is a model aircraft. 

With drones being so easily accessible, we must consider the potential they have 

to be used as a mechanism to conduct an attack. Although we have not yet witnessed such an attack, we have seen how individuals operating drones have gotten 

extraordinarily close to at least one Head of State. 

During a campaign rally in 2013, a drone, piloted by an opposition party supporter landed at the feet of Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel. There have also 

been recent stories of mysterious drones flying over sensitive Government assets, including the U.S. Embassy, in Paris and we are all familiar with the story regarding 

a drone landing on the White House lawn in January. 

It does not take a wild imagination to envision what may happen if someone with 

malicious intent got their hands on a drone. This emerging threat requires a unified 

effort by the Department of Homeland Security in developing security plans for 

mitigation and response. 

The Department of Homeland Security must conduct risk assessments to accurately determine the threat posed by drones. 

In the absence of risk assessments and a measured approach, the Department will 

spend millions of dollars without knowing what the real threat is or how to defend 

against it. 

Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security declined our invitation to 

testify before the subcommittee to explain how they are working towards a Department-wide strategy to address the issue at hand. Even without the Department’s 

testimony, I am confident that the panel of witnesses here today will help us better 
6 

understand the threat posed by drones and the technologies available to address 

that threat. 

Although drones are not the only avenue for conducting attacks, it is imperative 

that we leave the ‘‘bad guys’’ with fewer, rather than a whole universe of options. 

We will narrow the threat picture by dealing with the security vulnerabilities 

posed by commercially-available drones. 

Mr. PERRY. Chairman thanks the gentlelady. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full 

committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this important and timely hearing. 

On a daily basis articles are published about the suspicious use 

of commercially-available drones. In recent weeks drones have been 

observed flying over sensitive locations in Paris. According to 

French authorities, drones have flown over nuclear installations, 

the home of the French president, and the United States Embassy. 

Here in the United States, a drone recently crashed on the White 

House grounds. While the incident at the White House has been 

described by officials as nothing more than a drunken misadventure, it raises questions about the threat commercially-available 

drones may pose to individuals, infrastructure, and our aviation 

systems. 

Undoubtedly, drones have great potential. In Japan, drones have 

been used by farmers for years as an efficient and effective tool for 

crop fertilization. Projects for commercial use in the United States 

display that drones will become a common sight on farms in Pennsylvania and my home State of Mississippi in the coming years. 

In the wrong hands, however, these potentially valuable commercial tools could become dangerous instruments for attack. That is 

why it is critical that the Department of Homeland Security conduct risk assessments to determine what steps should be taken to 

mitigate the potential threat. 

To date, we have learned of components of the Department, such 

as Secret Service and the Science and Technology Directorate, conducting testing that identifies methods to address the potential 

threats drones pose. It is less clear whether there is a Departmentwide strategy to develop—to address the issue. 

Unfortunately, despite being invited, as previously commented, 

the Department of Homeland Security is not here today to explain 

why and to Members what is being done to address the security 

vulnerabilities drones expose. Despite the Department’s absence, I 

am confident that the Members will receive valuable testimony 

from this distinguished panel of witnesses assembled. 

Professor McNeal is an expert on the issues of drones and will 

add a valuable voice to our conversation about the policy solutions 

should be explored to address the security concerns surrounding 

drones. Professor Humphreys is making his second appearance before the subcommittee to discuss the issue. I look forward to the 

other witnesses’ testimony also. 

Finally, I am pleased that Chief Beary is appearing in his capacity as president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. 

We all have questions Chief Beary can address regarding how law 

enforcement utilizes drones and how they respond to drone operating in our cities. 
7 

However, before yielding back, Mr. Chairman, I am compelled to 

point out that much of what we, and now the public, know of the 

Secret Service’s testing of drones is the result of leaks. Unfortunately, it is all too common an occurrence that information provided to Members and staff in our security space to be published 

by the media in the next days and hours after the briefing. 

This committee has a responsibility to the American people to 

make the Department of Homeland Security work and, accordingly, 

our Nation more secure. Leaking Classified information is in direct 

conflict with that responsibility. It is also in conflict with the law 

and the oath we signed to obtain access to Classified information. 

I hope and trust all Members and staff of this committee and 

those of other committees we invite to attend briefings will take 

the oath and the responsibility that comes with it to heart. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MARCH 18, 2015 

On a daily basis, articles are published about the suspicious use of commerciallyavailable drones. In recent weeks, drones have been observed flying over sensitive 

locations in Paris. According to French authorities, drones have flown over nuclear 

installations, the home of the French President, and near the United States embassy. 

Here in the United States, a drone recently crashed on the White House grounds. 

While the incident at the White House has been described by officials as nothing 

more than a drunken misadventure, it raised questions about the threat commercially available drones may pose to individuals, infrastructure, and our aviation system. 

Undoubtedly, drones have great potential. In Japan, drones have been used by 

farmers for years as an efficient and effective tool for crop fertilization. Projections 

for commercial use in the United States display that drones will become a common 

sight on farms from Pennsylvania to Mississippi in the coming years. 

In the wrong hands, these potentially valuable commercial tools could become 

dangerous instruments for attack. That is why it is critical that the Department of 

Homeland Security conduct risk assessments to determine what steps should be 

taken to mitigate the potential threat. 

To date, we have learned of components of the Department, such as the Secret 

Service and Science and Technology Directorate, conducting testing to identify 

methods to address the potential threat drones pose. It is less clear whether there 

is a Department-wide strategy being developed to address the issue. 

Unfortunately, despite being invited to testify, the Department of Homeland Security is not here today to explain to Members what is being done to address the security vulnerability drones expose. Despite the Department’s absence, I am confident 

that the Members will receive valuable testimony from the distinguished panel of 

witnesses assembled. 

Professor McNeal is an expert on the issue of drones and will add a valuable voice 

to our conversation about what policy solutions should be explored to address the 

security concerns surrounding drones. 

Professor Humphries is making his second appearance before the subcommittee 

to discuss this issue. I look forward to hearing from him regarding the progress 

DHS has made regarding drones since his appearance in 2012. 

I also look forward to hearing from Mr. Roggero regarding potential technological 

solutions to the threat posed by drones. 

Finally, I am please that Chief Beary is appearing in his capacity as president 

of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. We all have questions Chief 

Beary can address regarding how law enforcement utilizes drones and how they respond to drones operating in our cities. 

Before yielding back Mr. Chairman, I am compelled to point out that much of 

what we, and now the public, knows about the Secret Service’s testing of drones is 

the result of leaks. Unfortunately, it is an all too common occurrence for information 
8 

provided to Members and staff in our secure space to be published by the media 

in the days and hours after briefings. 

This committee has a responsibility to the American people to make the Department of Homeland Security work and accordingly our Nation more secure. 

Leaking Classified information is in direct conflict with that responsibility. It is 

also in conflict with the law and oath we signed to obtain access to Classified information. I hope, and trust, all Members and staff of this committee, and those on 

other committees we invite to attend briefings, will take the oath and the responsibility that comes with it to heart. 

Mr. PERRY. Chairman thanks the gentleman. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before 

us today on this important topic. 

Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written statement 

will appear in the record, and I will introduce each of you first and 

then recognize you for your testimony. 

Dr. Todd Humphreys is a professor at the Cockrell School of Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin. He directs their 

radio navigation laboratory at U.T. Austin, where his research focuses on defending against intentional GPS spoofing and jamming. 

Dr. Humphreys’ research has uncovered that GPS signals that 

navigate unmanned aerial systems can be hijacked and controlled. 

Dr. Humphreys obtained his doctorate from Cornell University. 

Mr. Frederick Roggero is president—got that correct, don’t I, 

General—president and CEO of Resilient Solutions. Mr. Roggero is 

an expert in commercial unmanned aerial systems. 

Previously, Mr. Roggero served as the chief of safety of the U.S. 

Air Force, where he oversaw all Air Force aviation, ground, weapons, space, and systems mishap prevention, and nuclear surety programs. Mr. Roggero is also a pilot with over 4,000 hours in 22 different type of military aircraft. Mr. Roggero retired from the Air 

Force with the rank of major general. 

Thank you for your service, sir. 

Chief Richard Beary is president of the International Association 

of Chiefs of Police. Chief Beary served for over 30 years as a law 

enforcement officer in Florida, including as chief of police for the 

University of Central Florida, the largest university in the State. 

Chief Beary was awarded the Medal of Valor twice in his career. 

Thank you for your service, sir. 

Dr. Gregory McNeal is a professor at Pepperdine University, 

where his research and teaching focus is on National security law 

and policy, criminal law and procedure, and international law. Previously he served as assistant director of the Institute for Global 

Security and codirected a transnational counterterrorism grant program at the U.S. Justice Department. Dr. McNeal obtained his doctorate from Pennsylvania State University. 

Go Lions. 

All right. Thank you all for being here today. 

Chairman now recognizes Dr. Humphreys for his testimony. 
9 

STATEMENT OF TODD E. HUMPHREYS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, COCKRELL SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING, THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson 

Coleman, and Ranking Member Thompson, last August the U.T. 

football season opener was interrupted by a drone. There were 

nearly 100,000 football fans in the stadium that day and the police 

had to stand by watching helplessly as this drone shifted around 

the stadium. 

The incident only ended when the operator decided to recall the 

drone and it landed at his feet. 

The situation turned out to be harmless. This was just a case of 

a ticketless but devoted U.T. football fan who just wanted to watch 

the game. But the police couldn’t have known that before-hand, so 

they had to treat the incident as a potential attack on the multitude of gathered spectators. 

In the years to come, this intrusion at the U.T. football stadium 

will be replayed in various forms at sites critical to the security of 

the United States. The great majority of these incidents will be 

accidently, like the flyaway drone that crashed at the White House 

in January. 

But in the early stages of a drone incursion, it is impossible to 

distinguish the accidental from the intentional, the malignant from 

the benign. The distressing truth is that even consumer-grade 

drones can be rigged to carry out potent attacks, and against these 

attacks our defenses will either be only weakly effective or so militarized as to pose themselves a threat to bystanders and the surrounding civil infrastructure. 

In thinking about how to detect and defend against rogue UAVs, 

it is useful to distinguish three categories. First are the accidental 

intrusions; second are the intentional intrusions by unsophisticated 

operators; and third are the intentional intrusions by sophisticated 

operators—these are people who know how to modify the hardware 

and software of a drone to make it do what they want. 

Detecting and safely repelling intrusions of the first two categories is not simple, but it is quite possible. Commercial UAV 

manufacturers can play a key role here by implementing GPS-enforced geo-fences within their autopilot systems. That simple fix 

would prevent accidental and unsophisticated drone intrusions into 

restricted airspace. 

So what about the third type—the sophisticated malicious attacks? These will be much more difficult to counter. The fact is that 

for any reasonable defense I can imagine, I can also imagine a 

counter to that defense, a way to circumvent that defense. 

I am not alone. Any one of my graduate students at the University of Texas, or many undergraduate students walking the halls 

of universities across the globe, or those part of the do-it-yourself 

community, hobbyists—these people have the kind of skills that 

would be required to carry out one of the sophisticated attacks I 

mentioned. The documentation is also extensive. 

So what should we do? Well, let’s start with what we shouldn’t 

do. 

It won’t help to impose stricter regulations on small UAS than 

the sensible regulations the FAA has already proposed. Likewise, 
10 

restricting open-source autopilot platforms would hardly improve 

security, but it would stifle innovation. Military-style radio link or 

GPS jamming or spoofing wouldn’t stop a sophisticated attacker, 

but would endanger commercial airliners and disrupt communications. 

In my view, the most sensible way forward is to focus on accidental and unsophisticated UAV intrusions. Let’s encourage the 

UAV manufacturers to put geo-fences in their autopilot systems. 

For especially sensitive sites like the White House, we could deploy a network of infrared cameras set up to detect and track an 

incoming drone by looking for the thermal signatures of its warm 

batteries and motors. This network of sensors could be used to 

guide an always-ready squadron of interceptor drones that could 

capture the intruder in a net can carry it off. 

But we should refrain from any more drastic measures than 

these until the threat of UAVs proves to be more of a menace than 

the recent incidents, which, while alarming, were ultimately harmless. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Humphreys follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TODD HUMPHREYS

MARCH 16, 2015 

1. SUMMARY

The nearly 100,000 football fans gathered in Texas Memorial Stadium last August 

to watch the Longhorn football season opener had trouble concentrating on the 

game. Hovering above the stadium was an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), a drone, 

with blue and red blinking lights. The University of Texas Police watched helplessly 

as the UAV shifted from one area of the stadium to another. When the UAV’s operator finally recalled the device and landed it at his feet in a nearby parking lot, the 

police immediately took both UAV and operator into custody. 

The situation turned out to be no more menacing than a devoted but ticketless 

UT football fan trying to watch the game through the video feed on his drone. But 

the police could not have known this before-hand, and so had to treat the incident 

as a potential chemical, biological, or explosive attack on the multitude of gathered 

spectators. 

As we enter an age of highly capable and increasingly autonomous UAVs purchasable for a few hundred dollars over the internet, the intrusion at the UT football 

stadium will be replayed in various forms at sites critical to the security of the 

United States. The great majority of these incidents will be accidental, such as the 

flyaway UAV that crashed on the White House grounds in January. But in the early 

stages of a UAV incursion, it will be impossible to distinguish the accidental from 

the intentional, the benign from the malicious. And the distressing truth is that 

even consumer-grade UAVs can be rigged to carry out potent attacks against which 

our defenses will either be only weakly effective or so militarized that the defenses 

themselves will pose a threat to the surrounding civil infrastructure. 

UAVs have been around for a long time. The Academy of Model Aeronautics was 

founded in 1936 and since that time a vibrant and knowledgeable community of 

radio-controlled model aircraft enthusiasts has been active in the United States and 

across the globe. What explains, then, the recent uptick in alarming UAV sightings 

near sensitive sites? The answer is clear: Never before have highly-capable UAVs 

been so inexpensive and widely available. One can buy over the internet today a 

UAV that rivals the increasingly autonomous surveillance and guidance capability 

of military UAVs. Many of these commercial UAVs can easily carry a payload of a 

couple of pounds or more. 

In thinking about how to detect and defend against UAV incursions into sensitive 

airspace, it is useful to distinguish three categories. First are the accidental intrusions, whether the UAV operators are sophisticated or not. Second are intentional 

intrusions by unsophisticated operators. Third are intentional intrusions by sophisti-
11 

cated operators—those capable of assembling a UAV from components and modifying its hardware and software. 

Detecting and safely repelling intrusions of the first two types is not simple but 

is quite possible. Commercial UAV manufacturers can play a key role here by implementing GPS-enforced geofences within their autopilot systems that prevent their 

UAVs from being flown within exclusion zones around airports, sports stadiums, 

Government buildings, and other security-sensitive sites. The sites themselves could 

be equipped with radar, acoustic, and electro-optical sensors for UAV detection, and 

with powerful and agile interceptor UAVs, possibly working as a team, that could 

capture and carry off a small number of simultaneous intruders. 

UAV intrusions of the third type will be much more difficult to counter. A sophisticated attacker could mount a kamikaze-style attack against a sensitive target 

using a fixed-wing powered glider with an explosive few-pound payload. The UAV 

glider could be launched tens of miles from the target. 

It could cut its engine on final approach to evade acoustic detectors, and could 

be built of poorly-radar-reflective material (e.g., Styrofoam) to evade radar detection. 

With only minor changes to the UAV’s autopilot software, of which highly-capable 

open-source variants exist, an attacker could readily disable geofencing and could 

configure the UAV to operate under ‘‘radio silence,’’ ignoring external radio control 

commands and emitting no radio signals of its own. The UAV would thus be difficult 

to detect and would be impervious to command link jamming or hijacking. Moreover, the attacker could configure the autopilot to ignore GPS/GNSS signals during 

the final approach to the target, relying instead on an inexpensive magnetometerdisciplined inertial navigation system. Such a modification would render GPS/GNSS 

jamming or deception (spoofing) useless during final approach. 

It is not obvious how to protect critical civil infrastructure against such a UAV, 

or—worse yet—against a swarm of such UAVs. What is more, the skills required 

of operators in this third category are not uncommon: The do-it-yourself UAV and 

autopilot development communities are large and the documentation of both hardware and software is extensive. One should also bear in mind that the threshold 

for a successful attack is low when success is measured by the ability to cause widespread panic or economic disruption. For example, explosion of a UAV anywhere on 

the White House grounds could be seen as a highly successful attack even if it 

causes only minor physical damage. 

What can be done? First, it is important to take stock of what should not be done. 

Imposing restrictions on small UAVs beyond the sensible restrictions the Federal 

Aviation Administration recently proposed would not significantly reduce the threat 

of rogue UAVs yet would shackle the emerging commercial UAV industry. In fact, 

even the FAA’s current ban on non-line-of-sight UAV control would be of little consequence to a malefactor capable of modifying an open-source autopilot. Likewise, 

restricting open-source autopilot platforms would hardly improve security but would 

stifle innovation. Powerful and persistent wide-area GPS/GNSS jamming would prevent inexpensive UAV attacks launched from miles away from reaching their targets, but this military-style defense would be disruptive to civil use of GPS over a 

wide area. Powerful GPS jamming around the White House, for example, would 

deny GPS aiding to commercial aircraft at nearby Reagan National Airport. Similarly, anti-UAV laser or electromagnetic pulse systems are a danger to nearby civil 

infrastructure and transport. 

From a strictly technological point of view, the best way forward will be to adopt 

simple measures that sharply reduce the risk of category 1 and 2 incidents, such 

as voluntary manufacturer-imposed geofencing. For especially critical sites, detection and tracking systems based on electro-optical sensors will be most effective, 

particularly those applying infrared sensor pattern recognition to distinguish a 

UAV’s warm motors and batteries from a bird’s warm body. The output of such a 

detection and tracking system could be fed to an always-ready squadron of interceptor UAVs whose job would be to catch the intruder in a net and expel it, or, as 

a last resort, to collide with it and force it down. We should refrain from any more 

drastic measures than this until the threat of UAVs proves to be more of a menace 

than the recent incidents, which were alarming but harmless. 

The following sections offer more detailed analysis of potential techniques for detecting, tracking, and repelling UAVs. 

2. DETECTION AND TRACKING

This section gives an overview of techniques that may be used to detect and track 

UAVs operating in restricted airspace. Merits and drawbacks of each technique are 

noted. 
12 

1K. Wesson, Secure Navigation And Timing Without Local Storage Of Secret Keys. PhD thesis, 

The University of Texas at Austin, May 2014. 2 J.A. Bhatti, T.E. Humphreys, and B.M. Ledvina, ‘‘Development and demonstration of a 

TDOA-based GNSS interference signal localization system,’’ in Proceedings of the IEEE/ION 

PLANS Meeting, pp. 1209–1220, April 2012. 

2.1 Conventional Surveillance: Radar and Beacon Transmitters.—Conventional aircraft surveillance techniques are based on radar and beacon transmissions from aircraft. The latter either respond to ground interrogation (as with secondary surveillance radar) or are broadcast from the aircraft without interrogation (as with ADS– 

B)1, Ch. 5). 

2.1.1 Advantages 

1. Primary surveillance radar (PSR) and secondary surveillance radar (SSR) 

systems are already installed at major airports across the United States. 

2. PSR does not assume any cooperation from the target and so is well-suited 

for detecting malicious intruders. 

3. If an incoming UAV is broadcasting ADS–B squitters, detecting and tracking 

it would be trivial. 

2.1.2 Drawbacks 

1. UAVs do not typically carry SSR beacons, and it would be wishful thinking 

to expect Category 3 UAV intruders to be equipped with functioning ADS–B 

beacons. 

2. UAVs whose structure is made of poorly-radar-reflective materials (e.g., a 

fixed-wing glider made of Styrofoam) and having a wingspan less than a few 

meters would not be visible to PSR or would be hardly distinguishable from 

birds or bats. Moreover, UAVs flying at an altitude of less than 100 feet would 

be difficult to detect by PSR. 

2.2 Acoustic Sensing.—The motors of electric-powered rotorcraft and fixed-wing 

UAVs emit a characteristic whine that can be used to detect such UAVs. Gas-powered UAVs also exhibit a characteristic acoustic signature. 

2.2.1 Advantages 

1. Low cost, even when implemented as a network of sensing devices placed 

around the protection perimeter. 

2. Can be highly effective when combined with electro-optical sensing to distinguish UAVs from electric weed whackers. 

3. Forces a UAV wishing to evade detection to execute final approach as a glider 

or a free-falling rotorcraft. 

2.2.2 Drawbacks 

1. Leads to false positives due to electric weed whackers or spoofing via playback of an audio recording of a UAV if not combined with other sensing modalities such as electro-optical sensing. 

2. Incapable of detecting fixed-wing UAVs operating as gliders or rotorcraft 

UAVs in free fall. 

3. Unlikely to offer reliable detection at more than a 500-meter standoff range. 

2.3 Radio Emission Sensing.—UAVs typically send data back to their controller 

through a wireless data link. Using a directional antenna or a network of synchronized ground stations, such emissions can be detected and located.2

2.3.1 Advantages 

1. Can offer effective detection and accurate tracking of multiple UAVs with arbitrary emitted waveforms if the UAV emissions are sufficiently persistent and 

powerful. 

2.3.2 Drawbacks 

1. To be economical and offer rapid detection, the system must have some 

knowledge of the emission center frequency and bandwidth. 

2. Easily evaded by a UAV operating under radio silence, which would be trivial 

for a Category 3 attacker to implement. 

2.4 Electro-Optical Sensing.—Electro-optical (EO) sensors in the form of cameras 

that are sensitive to visible light or infrared radiation can be quite effective at detecting and tracking UAVs. 

2.4.1 Advantages 

1. An EO sensing network can be built from small, low-cost sensors with only 

mild synchronization requirements. The network could be geographically large 

(e.g., it could cover the area around the White House and the U.S. Capitol in 

Washington, DC), which would increase the chance of detecting and the accuracy of tracking an overflying UAV. 

2. Infrared EO sensors can detect the warm motors or batteries of UAVs day 

or night and, with proper pattern recognition, would likely be reliable in distinguishing UAVs from birds, bats, and insects. 
13 

3K.D. Wesson and T.E. Humphreys, ‘‘Hacking drones,’’ Scientific American, vol. 309, no. 5, 

pp. 54–59, 2013. 4 A.J. Kerns, D.P. Shepard, J.A. Bhatti, and T.E. Humphreys, ‘‘Unmanned aircraft capture 

and control via GPS spoofing,’’ Journal of Field Robotics, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 617–636, 2014. 

* See, for example, http://phantommods.info/effect-on-wifi-encryption-for-fpv-range/. 

3. A network of EO sensors can offer full three-dimensional target tracking. 

2.4.2 Drawbacks 

1. The author is not aware of a commercial networked EO system that can provide 3-D UAV tracking and distinguish UAVs from wildlife. But there do not 

appear to be any serious technological roadblocks that would prevent such a 

system from being developed and deployed. 

2. It is unclear what the effective range of an infrared sensor network could be. 

This will depend on the strength of thermal emissions from a UAV and on the 

pattern recognition algorithm tasked with distinguishing the UAV from wildlife. 

3. ELECTRONIC DEFENSES

For typical operation, UAVs capable of autonomous flight rely on two vital wireless links: The command link to the operator and the (passive) navigation signal 

link to overhead GPS/GNSS spacecraft.3 In the event of a UAV attack, a defender 

can attempt to disrupt these links or feed false signals to the UAV’s radios.4

3.1 Command Link Jamming and Appropriation.—Modern commercial UAVs are 

controlled by one or more wireless links to the operator’s control equipment. Traditional RC controllers are still used as a back-up means of control even for UAVs 

capable of a high degree of autonomy. These controllers send low-level commands 

to the autopilot system or directly to the UAV motors or to the servos that actuate 

the aircraft’s control surfaces. These transmitters typically operate in unlicensed 

bands (often 2.4GHz), but do not typically use WiFi/802.11 protocols, preferring direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) or frequency-hopped spread spectrum (FHSS) 

protocols that offer a large number of independent channels. 

For control at a higher level of abstraction, a control station may communicate 

with a UAV independent of the RC controller. Like the RC controller, this link is 

often established within unlicensed bands. For example, the popular DJI drone establishes this link in the 2.4 GHz band using a standard WiFi/802.11 protocol. This 

link facilitates video downlinking and general control functionality such as parameter setting and high-level trajectory control. 

In defending a sensitive site from UAV intrusion, a defender may attempt to jam 

or appropriate the command link. 

3.1.1 Advantages 

1. Command link jamming or appropriation is an effective means of denying a 

hostile operator the ability to execute an RC-controlled visual line-of-sight UAV 

attack or a first-person-viewer (FPV) UAV attack. 

2. Command link jamming forces an attacking UAV to operate independently 

from its human operators. 

3. Command link appropriation can enable a defender to obtain full control of 

an intruder UAV. 

3.1.2 Drawbacks 

1. Although the signals from today’s commercially-available RC controllers are 

not encrypted or authenticated, the UAV is paired with the RC controller in 

such a way that the two agree on a communications channel selected from a 

large number (e.g., 100) of possible channels. Thus, to appropriate the RC link, 

a defender would need to determine at least: (1) Which communications protocol 

is being used (e.g., DSSS or FHSS), (2) which channel within the protocol is 

being used. 

2. Although the command and data link to the control station is not typically 

encrypted or authenticated, it can be encrypted with well-established cryptographic algorithms using openly available software*, rendering appropriation 

of this link difficult at best. 

3. To avoid the effects of command link jamming or appropriation, an attacking 

UAV can simply transition to an autonomous operational mode soon after takeoff, accepting no further external commands. 

3.2 GPS/GNSS Interference.—Virtually all modern commercial UAVs capable of autonomous flight exploit navigation signals from overhead GPS satellites. The UAV’s 

satellite navigation receiver may also be capable of exploiting signals from other 

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) such as the European Galileo system 

and the Russian GLONASS system. It is well-known that civil GNSS signals are 
14 

5T.E. Humphreys, ‘‘Statement on the vulnerability of civil unmanned aerial vehicles and other 

systems to civil GPS spoofing.’’ http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/ 

Testimony-Humphreys.pdf, July 2012. 6K.D. Wesson, M.P. Rothlisberger, and T.E. Humphreys, ‘‘Practical cryptographic civil GPS 

signal authentication,’’ Navigation, Journal of the Institute of Navigation, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 177– 

193, 2012. 7 A.J. Kerns, K.D. Wesson, and T.E. Humphreys, ‘‘A blueprint for civil GPS navigation message authentication,’’ in Proceedings of the IEEE/ION PLANS Meeting, May 2014. 8 I.F. Hernandez, V. Rijmen, G.S. Granados, J. Simon, I. Rodriguez, and J.D. Calle, ‘‘Design 

drivers, solutions and robustness assessment of navigation message authentication for the 

Galileo open service,’’ in Proceedings of the ION GNSS+ Meeting, 2014. 9O. Woodman, ‘‘An introduction to inertial navigation,’’ University of Cambridge, Computer 

Laboratory, Tech. Rep. UCAMCL–TR–696, 2007. 10G. Chowdhary, E.N. Johnson, D. Magree, A. Wu, and A. Shein, ‘‘GPS-denied indoor and outdoor monocular vision aided navigation and control of unmanned aircraft,’’ Journal of Field Robotics, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 415–437, 2013. 5T.E. Humphreys, ‘‘Statement on the vulnerability of civil unmanned aerial vehicles and other 

systems to civil GPS spoofing.’’ http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/ 

Testimony-Humphreys.pdf, July 2012. 11u-Blox, Datasheet: NE0–6 GPS Module. 

weak and, to date, unencrypted and unauthenticated,5 although proposals exist to 

insert digital signatures into the broadcast GPS and Galileo navigation data 

streams.678 In the face of a deliberate UAV attack guided by GNSS signals, a defender could take advantage of the weak security of GNSS signals to confuse or commandeer the attacking UAV. 

3.2.1 Advantages 

1. Three-dimensional hostile control of a UAV via GPS deception (spoofing) is 

possible: It has been demonstrated in the laboratory and in a Government-supervised experiment at White Sands Missile Test Range.4

2. Even if the location of an incoming UAV is known only very approximately 

(e.g., it is only known that a UAV is approaching the White House grounds from 

the southwest), GPS deception can be effective at repelling an attack. If one 

sectorizes the area around the site to be protected into 4 quadrants, each quadrant covered by a directional transmission antenna, then a UAV approaching 

under GPS guidance, or a group of UAVs, can be made to believe it has overshot its target, causing the UAV to slow and eventually proceed away from the 

target site as if facing a stiff headwind. The University of Texas Radionavigation Laboratory recently demonstrated this defense in the laboratory 

against the GPS receiver used in a large number of commercial UAVs. 

3. Persistent and powerful GNSS jamming would force attackers to operate either by: (1) Line-of-sight (LOS) RC control, (2) first-person viewer (FPV) control, 

or (3) non-GNSS autonomous navigation. LOS control exposes the operator to 

visual detection and recognition. LOS and FPV control can be denied by control 

link jamming. And non-GNSS autonomous navigation in an unmapped environment is either expensive (e.g., a navigation- or tactical-grade INS initialized 

with GNSS), can only be applied accurately over short time intervals (e.g., a 

MEMS-grade magnetometer-disciplined INS),9 or still in the research stage 

(e.g., autonomous visual navigation).10

3.2.2 Drawbacks 

1. Persistent and powerful GNSS jamming would cause substantial collateral 

damage, denying the use of civil GNSS in a wide area around the protected site, 

which possibly encompasses airports.5 Powerful GPS jamming around the White 

House, for example, would deny GPS aiding to commercial aircraft at nearby 

Reagan National Airport. Such jamming would alter civil operational procedures in the area: Automobile commuters would be denied use of their in-car 

navigation systems, cell towers could no longer be synchronized by GPS, and 

approaches to airports could no longer benefit from GPS for safety and efficiency. While it is not out of the question to engage in powerful GNSS jamming 

to protect extremely sensitive sites such as the White House, it is the opinion 

of the author that this would need to be a last resort. It would need to be carefully coordinated with the DOT and DHS. 

2. Even intermittent GNSS jamming powerful enough to deny UAV use of 

GNSS would be problematic for the surrounding civil infrastructure. UAV 

GNSS receivers are typically high-sensitivity receivers capable of operating at 

carrier-to-noise ratios (CNRs) as low as 15 dB-Hz (e.g.,11). By contrast, the GPS 

receivers used in commercial aviation typically fail to track signals below a 

CNR of 29 dB-Hz. Therefore, to effectively jam a UAV located 1 km from the 

White House would require a jamming power that would also effectively deny 
15 

9O. Woodman, ‘‘An introduction to inertial navigation,’’ University of Cambridge, Computer 

Laboratory, Tech. Rep. UCAMCL–TR–696, 2007. 

GNSS to a commercial aircraft along the same line of sight more than 5 km 

from the White House. 

3. GNSS spoofing would potentially be even more damaging to surrounding civil 

systems than GNSS jamming, and thus would need to be carefully coordinated 

with the DOT and DHS. Moreover, to be absolutely reliable, a GNSS spoofer 

would have to create simulated signals for all available civil GNSS, including 

Galileo and GLONASS. 

4. An attacking UAV can simply disregard GNSS signals during the final approach to the target, relying, for example, on a low-cost magnetometer-disciplined MEMS-grade inertial navigation system, which, over a 60-second interval, may only exhibit a 5-meter drift in perceived location.9

4. KINETIC DEFENSES

Kinetic defenses encompass all techniques that involve mechanical contact with 

the UAV intruder such as interceptor UAVs, rubber bullets, shotgun shot, or nets. 

4.0.3 Advantages 

1. Net capture of UAVs by interceptor UAVs has been demonstrated (though it 

cannot yet be considered a mature technology). Net capture has the additional 

benefit of enabling eviction of the intruder UAV from the vicinity of the site to 

be protected. 

2. Commercial UAVs are, in general, fragile in the face of kinetic attacks. 

4.0.4 Drawbacks 

1. All kinetic defenses require reliable detection and accurate tracking of the 

UAV intruder. 

2. Hard-contact kinetic defenses such as collision with an interceptor UAV may 

cause an intruder UAV carrying an explosive payload to explode. 

3. Interceptor UAV technology is currently immature. 

5. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author is grateful to Mark Psiaki, Christopher Hegarty, Andrew Kerns, Nathan Green, Michael Szmuk, and Daniel Shepard for insightful conversations on 

how to protect critical civil sites from UAV intrusion. 

Mr. PERRY. Chairman thanks Dr. Humphreys. 

Chairman now recognizes Mr. Roggero for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL FREDERICK F. ROGGERO, 

(USAF–RET.), PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

RESILIENT SOLUTIONS, LTD. 

General ROGERRO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, Ranking 

Member Watson Coleman and Ranking Member Thompson, ladies 

and gentlemen. 

Aviation is undergoing a global revolution as we sit here today. 

With advances in unmanned technologies that are moving ahead at 

the speed of Moore’s Law, as you have indicated already, while associated prices are continue to fall, small, unmanned aerial systems 

have become high-tech and universally available tools. 

Coupled with advances in autopilots, telemetry, sensor and camera miniaturization, small UASs are delivering capabilities that 

were once only the purview of nation states. Now almost anyone 

can experience the advantages of thrills of aviation without ever 

having to leave the ground, taking a flight physical, or getting a 

check ride. 

As these barriers to entry continue to fall, we are witnessing the 

democratization of aviation. 

These new technologies give individuals a limited version of the 

unique characteristics of aviation—speed, range, flexibility, and al-
16 

titude—that are enjoyed by every air force in the world. It is true 

that small UASs are capable of making our lives better by helping 

us to imagine more, safer ways to do our jobs that are dangerous, 

dull, and dirty. But they are also a terrific means to enhance commerce, save lives, gain different perspectives, and even to provide 

recreation. 

But as with all revolutions, there are risks that must be dealt 

with, and the safety and security risks of small drones are no exception. However, as the risk of these types of aircraft are reviewed, we must strive to preserve and to protect the overwhelming benefits that this rapidly-expanding technology will 

bring for generations to come. 

The risks inherent in this revolution can be divided into two 

parts: Safety and security. Safety because we have a growing class 

of new operators who don’t understand that they have just become 

part of the aviation system and are flying a piece of equipment that 

is capable of operating in the same space as an airliner. But this 

type of safety risk can and should be dealt with through a public 

campaign of education, regulation, and enforcement. 

Next are those small UAS operators that know the rules but decide to violate them anyway. It is operators from this class that 

will most likely cause the first collision between an aircraft and a 

drone in the United States. But once again, public awareness; 

standard, clear regulations; firm penalties; and enforcement are the 

best remedies to slow these types of transgressions. 

At this point we move into the security risks. Tasks such as intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, attack, and mobility can all be conducted with easily available UASs at very reasonable prices. These actions could be directed at National critical 

infrastructure points, factories, VIPs, and other examples, as we 

have heard this morning. 

Much work has already been done in this area of defense by our 

NATO partners, and we should take advantage of those developed 

solutions and lessons learned. For example, the United Kingdom 

took this threat so seriously in 2012 that the Royal Air Force and 

Selex ES designed and deployed an integrated counter-small UAS 

system in London to defend the Olympic Stadium during the opening ceremonies. This system was further improved and used to defend world leaders during the 2013 G8 Summit in Ireland. 

Certainly the lessons learned from these efforts could inform our 

actions as we address these common threats. 

I believe that our way should be a simultaneous two-prong solution. First, use commercial, off-the-shelf technology that has already been developed, tested, refined, and used operationally in 

this role to establish a baseline capability for us immediately. By 

using a layered defense, the threat can be neutralized and the 

physical and electronic forensic evidence be preserved for arrest 

and prosecution. 

We should pick what works best for our needs, and I will refer 

you to my submitted statement for a listing of the elements that 

I believe are required for a multiple-layered, integrated UAS defense. 

The second simultaneous track starts with interagency cooperation to draft an overarching strategy and linked policies that have 
17 

a legal and regulatory basis to deal with unmanned systems in 

general, and unmanned aerial systems in particular. 

Ranking Member Thompson, I would say that this strategy needs 

to be Government-wide and not just focused on DHS. 

This is where the departments and agencies will need to help to 

ensure that they have the legal framework necessary to respond to 

this threat. 

Furthermore, a single department should be nominated as the 

executive agent, and provided with the right resources and charged 

with leading this effort across the Government. 

In summary, my written statement provides several recommendations for consideration by the committee to tackle this 

problem, and by capitalizing on best practices and technology already applied by our international allies such as the United Kingdom, we could be ready to deal with today’s threats immediately 

while we draft the correct policies and spin up U.S. industries, universities, and laboratories to rapidly explore ways to counter tomorrow’s drones and the unique threats that they will bring in the 

next 2 to 5 years. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Roggero follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERICK F. ROGGERO

MARCH 18, 2015 

THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

Aviation is undergoing a global revolution. With advances in unmanned system 

technology that are moving at the speed of ‘‘Moore’s Law,’’ while their associated 

prices continue to fall, ‘‘Class 1’’ small, unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have become high-tech, universally available tools. Coupled with advances in autopilots, telemetry, sensor and camera miniaturization, and corresponding increases in battery 

and engine capacities, sUAS’s are delivering capabilities that were once only the 

purview of nation-states, corporations, and wealthy individuals. Now, almost anyone 

can experience the advantages and thrills of aviation without ever leaving the 

ground, taking a flight physical, spending hours and considerable funds to hone a 

skill, or complete a rigorous training and certification processes. As these barriersto-entry continue to fall, we will witness the democratization of aviation. 

This combination of new, expanding, technologies delivers a limited version of the 

unique characteristics of aviation (speed, range, flexibility, and altitude) enjoyed by 

every air force directly to individuals and groups around the globe. And, as drone 

technologies improve, airpower concepts such as ‘‘stealth’’ and ‘‘air supremacy’’ could 

even become available to more common operators. It’s true that sUAS’s are capable 

of making our lives better by helping us to imagine new, more safe, ways to do jobs 

that are dangerous, dull, and dirty. They are also a terrific means to enhance commerce, save lives, gain different perspectives, and even to provide recreation. But, 

as with all revolutions, there are risks that must be dealt with. And, the safety and 

security risks of small drones are no exemption. However, as the risk of these types 

of aircraft are reviewed, we must also strive to preserve and protect the overwhelming benefits that this rapidly expanding technology will bring for generations 

to come. 

The risk inherent in the drone revolution can be divided into two sections—safety 

and security. Although the Academy of Model Aeronautics does a terrific job of providing voluntary safety standards, the exploding growth of this market means that 

many new recreational users of small drones simply do not understand that there 

is an aviation culture of safety. The days of the remote-control flying field with noisy 

gas motors and plenty of mentors is disappearing. The new group of ‘‘park flyers’’ 

haven’t received education or training in safety, airspace, weather, air traffic control, emergency procedures, or even basic airmanship. Because of that, a few in this 

segment will eventually pose a safety hazard by unknowingly flying in areas that 

they are not allowed to operate, not out of malice, but because they simply do not 
18 

understand the rules. But this type of safety risk can, and should, be dealt with 

through education, regulation, and enforcement. 

Next on the ladder of safety risk are those drone operators that know the rules 

but decided to violate them. Perhaps they feel the need to test out the new technology, to see how high, fast, or far it can go, or to obtain video from perspectives 

not allowed, usually for good reason. It is operators from this class that will most 

likely cause the first collision between an aircraft and a drone in the United States. 

But, once again, standard, clear regulation and enforcement are the best remedies 

for these types of transgressions. 

At this point, we move into the risks to our security. This revolutionary technology can be an affordable asymmetric tool for those who want to use its capabilities for illegitimate purposes. For less than $1,000 one could purchase a system that 

would allow you to conduct traditional ‘‘air force’’ missions, at limited, but still effective, levels of success. Tasks such as intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, attack, and mobility can all be conducted with commercially-available systems. These actions could be directed at National critical infrastructure points, factories, VIPs, military bases, prisons, large public gatherings, the borders, or simply, 

a neighborhood. 

THE CHALLENGE

The U.S. Government must be able to protect its sensitive critical infrastructure, 

personnel, and citizens from the malicious use of small drones, while preserving the 

best aspects of using small sUAS’s commercially and recreationally. There will be 

a balancing act as we deter, mitigate, and defeat these types of security threats 

while preserving the benefits that sUAS’s bring. Much work has already been done 

in this area by our international partners and allies and we should take advantage 

of those developed solutions and ‘‘lessons learned.’’ 

THE THREAT

Small UAS’s are easy to make, cheap to buy, simple to fly, hard to detect, carry 

small versatile payloads, have a disruptive capability, and are evolving and proliferating quickly. ‘‘Lone Wolves,’’ activists, thieves, terrorist groups, etc. could use this 

reliable and inexpensive capability to conduct intelligence gathering or execute missions against a variety of targets using explosives, chemicals, powder, etc. to deliver 

a disruptive attack via a single aircraft, or through more sophisticated coordinated, 

or multi-platform, attacks. Since 2013 smugglers have already tried to use the mobility capability of sUAS’s to deliver 6.6 lbs. of crystal meth across the Mexico-U.S. 

border and to deliver tobacco and cell phones into a prison in Georgia and marijuana into a South Carolina prison. 

And, we are not the only country to feel this threat. A July, 2013, NATO Industrial Advisory Group, Study Group 170, ‘‘Engagement of Low, Slow and Small Aerial 

Targets by Ground Based Air Defense,’’ concludes that, ‘‘If appropriate measures are 

taken in the near future it will be possible to significantly mitigate the threat that 

LSS [low, slow, small] platforms pose to any future military conflict or from the terrorist attack of national infrastructure.’’ Other NATO study groups have jumped 

into this issue, but participation by U.S. companies and the Government in these 

on-going studies appears underrepresented. 

The United Kingdom took this threat so seriously in 2012 that the Royal Air 

Force, and Selex ES, designed and deployed an integrated counter sUAS system in 

London to defend the Olympic Stadium, particularly during the opening ceremonies. 

This system was further improved and used to defend world leaders during the 2013 

G8 Summit in Enniskillen, Scotland, and, most recently, at the 2014 NATO Summit 

in Wales. Certainly, the lessons learned from these efforts should inform our actions 

as we address this common threat. 

ROADMAP TOWARDS A U.S. SOLUTION

Technology typically outstrips policies, and this technology has certainly stretched 

the capacity of the U.S. Government’s bureaucracy to swiftly provide a counter 

drone strategy. Thus, we find ourselves behind in strategy, policy, and the technological capabilities needed to counter-sUAS’s. Hence, this two-pronged problem requires a simultaneous, two-track solution. 

First, a search should be conducted to find technology that has already been developed, tested, refined, and used operationally. By using a combination of radar, 

networked electronic support measures, infrared, electro optical cameras, and engagement solutions of electronic attack, or hard kill options, the threat can be neutralized and the physical and electronic forensic evidence can be preserved for arrest 

and prosecution. 
19 

This system should consist of an integrated network of multiple layered means 

of defense to find, fix, track, identify and classify, then engage and assess the result. 

It should also be designed for persistent, low-profile surveillance and be operational 

24/7/365. This system should also incorporate a rapid decision-making process that 

can be used to quickly prosecute a response since one of the unique abilities of 

sUAS’s is to quickly close on a target with little notice. The system must also possess a range of ‘‘soft’’ and kinetic responses, both with a high ‘‘Probability of Kill.’’ 

The counter system that is selected must also be able to capture and preserve the 

appropriate incident information that will inevitably be used for prosecuting the 

sUAS operators. 

Additionally, the system must be able to fully operate without interfering with security, law enforcement, or first responder networks and communications. Thus, the 

system must be able to comply with Federal Communication Commission rules, if 

not operating under special rules for highly sensitive areas. The system should also 

have a variant that is mobile (man-portable and air-transportable) for temporary 

setups. Of course, the system must be designed with open architecture in order to 

allow for spiral, scalable, and modular developments as drone technology continues 

to evolve (i.e., 5G LTE will almost immediately offer new capabilities to command 

and control drones). Finally, any system must be economically proportionate to the 

threat and available almost immediately. 

The second step of this two-pronged solution starts with interagency cooperation 

to draft an overarching strategy and linked policies that have a legal and regulatory 

basis to deal with drones. A single department or agency should be charged with 

leading this effort using the experiences and lessons learned from our international 

allies as they have already wrestled with these issues. In any case, it will take a 

joined effort across all Government departments since it will require navigating 

through current rules and regulations in the face of the unique capabilities of 

sUAS’s and recommending changes to those base documents. For example, even 

though drones are unmanned, they are currently considered ‘‘aircraft’’ by the FAA 

and are protected by all of the laws and rules associated with manned flight when 

they are airborne. This is just one example of where current policy could severely 

limit options in reacting to a drone attack. 

Once formalized, the overarching goals of the strategy and individual policies 

would then lead to identifying the correct supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to guide security and law enforcement personnel during their response 

to any threat. The goal, of course, is to mitigate the safety and security risks while 

steering this technology towards its positive and productive uses. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Draft a single strategy and supporting policies that clearly guide Government 

agencies in regards to Rules of Engagement and ensure that all responses are 

proportionate to the threat. 

2. Simultaneously work with allies and international partners to discover ‘‘lessons learned’’ and best practices for solutions to the counter-drone issue. 

3. Rapidly acquire proven technical solutions that can immediately provide protection to National critical infrastructure and personnel. 

4. Train and educate Federal law enforcement, and State and local law enforcement, personnel on the legal uses of drones, and potential threats. 

5. Conduct a campaign to educate the public (sUAS operators and non-operators) on the use, and potential misuse, of drones. 

6. Work closely with commercial drone manufacturers to install geo-fencing and 

traceability codes into drones of specific capabilities (i.e., size, weight, battery/ 

motor size, flight times, etc.) 

7. Draft appropriate legislation and regulations that govern the registration, licensing, etc. of any manufactured, or home-built, drone that fall above a specified weight and/or capabilities. 

8. Establish, and fund, an on-going research and development program to devise 

counters to new drone technologies before they widely appear in the marketplace. 

With last week’s announcement by the Secret Service that the White House 

grounds would be used to conduct a series of exercises involving drones, it is clear 

the United States is not fully ready to deal with the threats that could come from 

this emerging technology today. However, there is a path to success. By capitalizing 

on ‘‘best practices’’ already discovered by our international allies, such as the United 

Kingdom, we could be ready to deal with today’s threats immediately, while we 

draft the correct policies and spin up U.S. industries and laboratories to rapidly explore ways to counter tomorrow’s drones and their unique, new, threats. 
20 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Roggero. 

The Chairman now recognizes Chief Beary for your testimony, 

sir. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD BEARY, PRESIDENT, 

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE 

Chief BEARY. Good morning, Chairman Perry and Members of 

the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today on 

the potential threat posed by unmanned aerial systems. 

As president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 

commonly referred to as the IACP, and on behalf of our 23,000 

members in 98 different countries, I would like to thank you, Members of this committee, for the support you have demonstrated for 

law enforcement over the years. Our law enforcement community 

and our communities in general need your support. Thank you. 

The IACP is the world’s largest association of law enforcement 

leaders, and for over 120 years the IACP has been launching internationally-acclaimed programs, speaking out on behalf of law enforcement, and conducting ground-breaking research. We provide 

services not only in the United States but across the globe. 

I began my law enforcement career in 1977 and, as the Chairman said, I have 30 years on the municipal side, and now I have 

almost 8 years on the university side of law enforcement. The University of Central Florida is the largest university in the State of 

Florida, and we are the second-largest in the United States. 

During my career I have watched the threats to our communities 

evolve. We still deal with the problem of violent crime, drugs, prostitution, smuggling, trafficking, and gangs, but we are now tasked 

in dealing with cyber threats, violent extremism, terrorism, and 

highly organized criminals with access to specialized equipment to 

aid them in their mission and to harm others and devastate our 

communities. 

Included in that specialized equipment are unmanned aerial systems. While UAS can be a great tool, they also pose a serious 

threat to the public and law enforcement when used by the wrong 

people. 

When used responsibly, and with good policies in place, UAS 

have enhanced law enforcement’s ability to protect communities 

they serve. UAS has helped law enforcement agencies save time, 

save money, and, most importantly, save lives. 

They are ideal for dangerous or difficult situations, like executing 

high-risk warrants; responding to barricaded suspects; gaining situational awareness in difficult terrain; and enhancing officer safety 

by exposing unseen dangers; locating missing children; or responding to damage caused by emergencies such as natural disasters, 

downed power lines, or hazardous material incidents. 

Despite the undeniable benefits these systems can have, they 

also pose a grave threat to public safety. Almost anyone can obtain 

an unmanned aerial system these days. They can buy it off the 

shelf from Amazon, have it delivered in 2 days, charge the battery, 

and immediately begin flying the device. 

The fact that these devices are so readily available to the public 

is concerning. The average citizen that is purchasing these devices 

generally has no aviation experience and therefore does not think 
21 

twice about operating in controlled airspace, over the public, or 

over a crowded beach or any other gathering—mass gathering. Nor 

do they think twice about launching a UAS to ascertain what the 

police or the fire department is working on up the street. 

This is a real danger to the public. Public safety and others regarding these aircraft have to be addressed. The average citizen 

simply does not know what they are doing wrong and the potential 

damaging effects that these devices can have when operated improperly. 

Recently we have witnessed several high-profile incidents with 

UAS. Of course, we talked about the crash landing at the White 

House, flying over sensitive locations, and near-miss with aircraft 

on a regular basis. At the University of Central Florida we have 

personally experienced these aircraft flying over mass gatherings, 

including football games, in violation of airspace restrictions that 

are in place to protect the public. 

The newest version of these devices are now flown in virtual reality mode, meaning that the operator does not need to be in the 

line of sight while flying the aircraft. 

Thankfully, at this point most of the incidents involving UAS 

have not lead to horrific events, but I don’t think we are far away 

from one of those happening. The concerns are real. There is nothing to stop the criminal element from purchasing a UAS and using 

it to cause localized or catastrophic damage. 

I mentioned earlier that I am from Orlando, which is home to 

many, many theme parks. I can assure you they have major concerns about the safety of their guests, and they have numerous incidents of these devices flying over their airspace. They have a real 

fear that someone wants to harm a large amount of people who are 

attending their parks. 

Now, something as simple as a UAS were to fly into a park or 

a football stadium with something as simple as a smoke bomb 

could cause incredible panic, thus leading to major injuries for the 

people that are there. 

Again, these devices can be used to fly over restricted areas and 

to plan an attack. 

Because these devices are in their infancy, now is the time for 

the Federal Government and the Federal agencies to work with us 

and develop the guidelines so that law enforcement knows what to 

do. The Department of Homeland Security did provide my agency 

with a 2-page document on recommended UAS response procedures 

at our stadium. We got that late in the football season in November. 

While those things are nice, there is no detail in what do we do 

for the follow-up, how do we respond to these, who do we call for 

further information? We are not criticizing the Federal Government; this is our call for help. Law enforcement needs to know how 

you want us to respond to these and where we are going to go in 

the future. 

The lack of clear guidance and best practices has led to confusion 

among the law enforcement community when they are dealing with 

these. Almost every critical situation now, they are drones flying 

over top of law enforcement officers and interfering with our helicopter when we are trying to deal with these things. 
22 

Again, since these devices do not have a transponder or a registration, it is difficult to track down and it is impossible, in many 

cases, to figure out where they came from. 

Without law enforcement knowing the proper procedures it 

leaves us vulnerable and makes our primary job of keeping the 

public safe more challenging. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to be here. I look forward to the questions. 

Again, I bring quite a bit of law enforcement experience to the 

table, and if you want to talk about the Justice report, wherever 

you want to go I am good to go. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Chief Beary follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD BEARY

MARCH 18, 2015 

Good morning Chairman Perry and Members of the subcommittee: Thank you for 

inviting me to testify today on the potential threat posed by unmanned aerial systems. As president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), and 

on behalf of our over 23,000 members in 98 different countries, I would like to thank 

this committee and subcommittee for the support it has demonstrated over the 

years for the law enforcement field and our communities. 

The IACP is the world’s largest association of law enforcement leaders. For over 

120 years, the IACP has been launching internationally-acclaimed programs, speaking out on behalf of law enforcement, conducting ground-breaking research, and providing exemplary programs and services to the law enforcement profession around 

the globe. 

I began my law enforcement career in 1977, and I am now chief of police for the 

University of Central Florida, the largest university in the State and the second in 

the country. During my career, I have watched the threats to our communities 

evolve. We still dealing with the problem of violent crime, drugs, prostitution, smuggling/trafficking, and gangs. We are now dealing with cyber threats, violent extremism, terrorism, and highly-organized criminals with access to specialized equipment to aid them in their mission to harm others and devastate our communities. 

Included in that specialized equipment are Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). 

While UAS can be a great tool they also pose a serious threat to the public and law 

enforcement when used by the wrong people. When used responsibly, and with good 

policies in place, UAS have enhanced law enforcement’s ability to protect the communities they serve. UAS have helped law enforcement agencies save time, save 

money, and most importantly, save lives. They are ideal for dangerous or difficult 

situations like executing high-risk warrants; responding to barricaded subjects; 

gaining situational awareness in difficult terrain; enhancing officer safety by exposing unseen dangers; locating a missing child; or responding to the damage caused 

by emergencies such as natural disasters, downed power lines, or hazardous material incidents. 

Despite the undeniable benefits UAS can have, they can also pose a grave threat 

to public safety. Almost anyone can get ahold of an unmanned aerial system these 

days. You can buy an off-the-shelf product from Amazon, have it delivered in 2 days, 

charge the battery, and immediately begin flying the device. The fact that these devices are so readily available to the public is concerning. The average citizen that 

is purchasing these devices generally has no aviation experience, and therefore does 

not think twice about operating them in controlled airspaces, over the public or on 

a crowded beach. Nor do they think twice about launching a UAS to ascertain what 

the police or fire department is working on up the street. This is the real danger 

to the public, public safety, and others regarding these aircraft. The average citizen 

simply does not know what they are doing wrong and the potential damaging effects 

these devices can have if not operated properly. 

Recently we have witnessed several high-profile incidents with UAS—crash landing on the White House lawn, flying over sensitive Federal buildings or locations, 

or having near-miss incidents with an aircraft. At the University of Central Florida, 

we have experienced these aircrafts flying over mass gatherings, including football 

games, in violation of airspace restrictions. The newest version of these devices are 

flown in virtual reality mode, meaning the operator does not need to be in the line 

of sight while flying the craft. 
23 

Thankfully, at this point, most of the incidents involving UAS have not lead to 

horrific events, but I don’t think we are far away from seeing more incidents involving unmanned aerial systems that lead to tragedy. The concerns out there are real. 

There is nothing to stop the criminal element from purchasing a UAS and using it 

to cause localized or catastrophic damage. I mentioned earlier that a local theme 

park has witnessed UAS flying over the park. They have the real fear that someone 

who wants to harm a large amount of people could use a UAS to do this. If a UAS 

were to drop something as simple as a smoke bomb down on a theme park or during 

a football game, think of the panic that could ensue. These devices can also be used 

to fly over sensitive areas and gather information for a planned attack; to disperse 

a chemical/radiological agent; and to conduct an explosive attack. 

Because the use and availability of UAS in its infancy, the guidance around how 

law enforcement agencies should respond to and mitigate potential UAS threats is 

relatively nonexistent. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has issued guidance to the law enforcement community explaining the legal framework for the 

agency’s oversight of aviation safety in the United States, including UAS operations, 

how UAS can be operated legally, and the options for legal enforcement actions 

against unauthorized or unsafe UAS operators. The Department of Homeland Security did provide my agency with a 2-page document on recommended UAS response 

procedures at our stadium. The DHS guide includes recommended response to a 

UAS in a stadium and outside a stadium, potential illicit uses of a UAS, recommended pre-event measures, and a brief overview of the FAA guidelines. Other 

than those two documents, law enforcement has had little guidance on response procedures. This is not a criticism to our Federal agency partners, it is a call for help. 

The lack of clear guidance and best practices has led to confusion among the law 

enforcement community regarding about what law enforcement is allowed to do 

when they encounter a UAS. Tactical guidance needs to be provided on the proper 

measures to take. 

Since these devices do not have a transponder device, registration number, or 

other mechanism to track them, it makes them next to impossible to identify when 

they are flown or who is flying them. What steps can we take to identify UAS and 

the operators of these devices? If we see a device being flown somewhere it should 

not be, can we bring it down? These questions only scratch the surface, and many 

of my fellow law enforcement officers are asking themselves these tough questions. 

Without law enforcement knowing the proper procedures that need to occur, it 

leaves us vulnerable and makes our primary job of keeping the public safe from 

harm more challenging. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Chief Beary. 

The Chairman now recognizes Dr. McNeal for your testimony, 

sir. 

STATEMENT OF GREGORY S. MC NEAL, ASSOCIATE 

PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF LAW, PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY 

Mr. MCNEAL. Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, 

thank you for hosting this hearing and inviting me to testify. 

The emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles in domestic skies 

raises understandable concerns that may require employment of 

mitigation technologies by law enforcement or security personnel. 

However, before any funds are expended on such technologies, 

agencies should engage in comprehensive risk assessment to identify the probability of that harm, the magnitude of a potential 

harm, benefits of security measures, and the cost of those measures. We have to bear in mind that one of the significant costs is 

that the vast majority of drones will be used for economically and 

socially beneficial purposes, and we have to remain cognizant of 

that at all points in time. 

This testimony outlines four key issues that Congress should remain cognizant of when drafting legislation or overseeing the Department of Homeland Security. 
24 

First, Congress should ensure that agencies are distinguishing 

between possible threats, which we can all sit around and imagine, 

and probable threats. Congress should also ensure that agencies 

are avoiding fear-based appeals that might drive the policymaking 

process. 

Drones are an exciting topic. They capture the attention of the 

media. Oftentimes that drives agencies to feel like they need to do 

something, to look like they are responding. 

The recent attention for drones, though, oftentimes appears to be 

driven by this type of media attention. I say this because while remote control aircraft are seemingly new, they have, in fact, been 

around for decades. 

Furthermore, the small quadcopters that have been gathering so 

much attention lately due to their ease of use would also be the 

least useful to a dedicated attacker. Rather, larger, faster, and 

heavier systems exist, and these systems have existed for many 

years. Many of those systems can be home-built, and in the hands 

of a dedicated attacker they will be very difficult to stop. 

Given the complexity of the threat picture, we must ensure that 

agencies do not fall victim to the sensationalism that drives worstcase scenario-based planning. Such an approach to risk management can justify enormous expenditures no matter how unlikely 

the prospects are that the event will take place. 

We should avoid focusing only on the extreme but improbable, 

and rather, we should do the best that we can to focus on the probable and assess the magnitude of the potential harm that might 

flow from those. 

Second, Congress should ensure that agencies are assessing risk 

by not only looking at that probability of a successful attack, but 

also the magnitude of losses. Congress should ensure that every 

agency action related to an alleged homeland security risk from 

drones is preceded by a risk assessment. That is the first step in 

any managerial decision about potential threats. Across homeland 

security, any time we are looking at threats it should be preceded 

by looking at the risk before we immediately begin expending 

funds. 

A risk assessment is that first step and ensures that agencies 

make hard choices with limited resources. Every possible threat 

cannot be guarded against; therefore, agencies have to focus on the 

riskiest threats. 

Third, Congress should ensure that before any funds are spent 

agencies are also engaged in a formal cost-benefit analysis. The 

employment of mitigation technology against risk cannot take place 

in a vacuum. Rather, it requires agencies to consider the degree to 

which a security measure is likely to deter, disrupt, or protect 

against a terrorist attack. 

The reality is that implementing security measures across all— 

across the Federal Government will require aggregating the costs 

across thousands of facilities. How to allocate those scarce resources will require prioritization driven by risk assessments, and 

this brings me to my final point. 

Congress should ensure that specific individuals at the Department of Homeland Security are responsible for conducting these 

analyses and reporting their methodology. Congress may also want 
25 

to provide funds to the Centers of Excellence for an independent 

check on how agencies are conducting these assessments. 

Given the complexity of the risk assessment picture associated 

with drones and their potential to pose a homeland security threat, 

I am certain that DHS and agencies are working on this. I am sure 

many people are working on this. In fact, that might be part of the 

problem is that in every—in each stovepipe across agencies, various individuals might be working on the threat but there is not 

a single point of coordination. 

So Congress should direct that a specific individual or an office 

within DHS take the interagency lead on this. There is some precedent for this. Back in 2004 homeland security stood up an office 

known as the Counter-MANPADS System Program Office. This 

was the office that assessed whether or not there was a threat to 

commercial aviation from man-portable surface-to-air missiles. 

It was a temporary office that assessed the threat; after assessing the threat, providing some recommendations, it went away. 

We could stand up a similar office about emerging threats. Or in 

the alternative, what we could do is we could designate that the 

under secretary for National Protection and Programs Directorate 

lead a threat assessment process for drones specifically, or for 

emerging threats in general. 

The emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles in domestic skies 

raises understandable concerns, but before any funds are expended 

on such technologies—mitigation technologies, the Department 

should engage in a comprehensive risk assessment to identify the 

probability of harm, magnitude of harm, benefits of security measures, and the direct and indirect costs of those security measures. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. McNeal follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GREGORY S. MCNEAL

MARCH 18, 2015 

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles in domestic skies raises understandable concerns that may require employment of mitigation technologies. However, before any funds are expended on such technologies, the Department of Homeland Security should engage in a comprehensive risk assessment to identify the probability, 

magnitude of harm, benefits of security measures, and cost of those measures. This 

testimony outlines four key issues that Congress should remain cognizant of when 

drafting legislation and/or overseeing the activities of the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Congress should ensure that agencies are distinguishing between possible 

threats and probable threats; Congress should also ensure that agencies are avoiding 

fear-based appeals focused on worst-case scenarios: Drones are an exciting topic that 

captures the interest of journalists and the public. The popular attention associated 

with drones has the benefit of raising awareness about their potential uses, however 

it also raises the possibility that emotions and sensationalism will drive the crafting 

of public policy. 

For example, after a recreational drone crashed on the White House lawn, ‘‘security experts’’ appeared on CNN to discuss the possibility that a drone might be 

equipped with explosives or weapons of mass destruction. This is a highly unlikely 

scenario. While consumer drones are readily available, lightweight explosives and 

weapons of mass destruction are not. Even if terrorists were able to procure explosives or WMD, using a consumer drone to conduct an attack would be one of the 
26 

1Sunstein, Cass R. 2003. Terrorism and Probability Neglect. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 

(26) (2–3) March–May: 121–136. 2Schneier, Bruce. 2003. Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain 

World. New York: Copernicus. 3 Id. 4Mueller, John and Stewart, Mark G. 2011. Terror, Security, and Money. New York: Oxford 

University Press. 5 Id. 

least effective means of carrying out an attack. Nevertheless, the Secret Service and 

other agencies seem to be planning for ‘‘possible’’ worst-case scenarios. Such an approach shifts the policy debate away from probability and creates demands for substantial Governmental responses even when the risk does not warrant the response.1

Congress must ensure that agencies do not fall victim to the sensationalism that 

drives worst-case scenario-based planning. Such an approach to risk management 

can justify enormous expenditures, no matter how unlikely the prospects are that 

the dire event will take place. As security analyst Bruce Schneier has written, focusing on the worst possible outcome ‘‘substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation 

for risk analysis, and fear for reason.’’2 It substitutes ill-informed possibilistic thinking over careful, well-reasoned, probabilistic thinking, forcing us to focus on what 

we don’t know, and what we can imagine, rather than what we do know. ‘‘By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does 

a poor job at assessing outcomes.’’3

Congress should ensure that agencies are as concerned with the probability of 

harm as they are of the possibility of a worst-case scenario. This requires paying 

attention to the ‘‘spectrum of threats, not simply the worst one imaginable, in order 

to properly understand and coherently deal with the risks to people, institutions, 

and the economy.’’ While public attention to the issue of drones may create a sense 

of urgency amongst members of the public and some agency officials, this ‘‘does not 

relieve those in charge of the requirement, even the duty, to make decisions about 

the expenditures of vast quantities of public monies in a responsible manner’’ that 

is disconnected from emotions and focused on probabilities.4

(2) Congress should ensure that agencies are assessing risk by calculating both the 

probability of a successful attack and the magnitude of losses that might be sustained in a successful attack: Congress should ensure that every agency action related to an alleged homeland security risk from drones is preceded by a risk assessment. Assessing risks is the first managerial step in decision making about potential threats, and it is one that is readily subject to Congressional oversight. Forcing 

agencies to conduct a risk assessment is the first step toward ensuring that agencies 

efficiently and effectively use taxpayer funds and control costs. A risk assessment 

is also the first step toward ensuring that agencies make hard choices with limited 

resources—every possible threat cannot be guarded against, therefore agencies must 

focus on the riskiest threats. 

‘‘Risk is the expected consequences of a terrorist attack, and the accepted definition of risk as applied in the terrorism context, is Risk = (probability of a successful 

attack) × (losses sustained in the successful attack).’’5 Probability of successful attack 

in this context is the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack using a drone if the 

security measure were not in place. On the probability side of the equation, the benefits of drones are that they allow an adversary to control delivery of an attack from 

a distance, perhaps solving some operational problems (like risk of capture) that terrorists may face in planning and mounting an operation. However, they introduce 

complexity into the attackers operation that may decrease the likelihood of a successful attack. The clear advantages of drones are that they allow for: (1) Attacks 

over perimeter defenses, (2) multiple simultaneous attacks without directly risking 

attacker personnel, (3) better surveillance capabilities. However, the probability of 

a successful attack may also go down when an attacker chooses to use a drone. In 

fact, one RAND/Defense Threat Reduction Agency study found: 

‘‘[UAVs] do not appear to have major advantages over other ways of carrying out 

operations against similar targets, although they cannot be dismissed outright as 

a potential threat. Where they did appear preferable, the choice for these systems 

was driven by the actions of the defense or in place security measures—i.e., were 

alternative attack modes foreclosed by defenses or did concerns about a potentially 

compromised plan push the attacking group farther away from its desired targets? 

The price of these advantages was, however, greater complexity, technological uncertainty, and higher cost and risks associated with these platforms. Consequently, 

rather than being an attack mode likely to be widely embraced by such actors, 
27 

6 Jackson, Brian A. et.al. 2008. Evaluating Novel Threats To The Homeland, RAND. 7Mueller, John and Stewart, Mark G. 2011. Terror, Security, and Money. New York: Oxford 

University Press. 8 Id. 9 Id. 

UAVs . . . appear to represent a ‘niche threat’—potentially making some contribution to the overall asymmetric and terrorist threat... UAVs do provide some advantages to an attacker, but in most cases there are simpler alternatives that provide similar, or even superior, capabilities.’’6

Losses sustained in the successful attack in this context include the fatalities and 

other damage (both direct and indirect) that will accrue as a result of a successful 

terrorist attack employing a drone.7 This part of the calculation takes account of the 

value and vulnerability of people and infrastructure, as well as any psychological 

and political effects. Thus, agencies engaging in an analysis of risk must separate 

the probability that an attack will be successful if committed using a drone (the subject of the preceding paragraph) from the magnitude of harm that would flow from 

that particular attack if it were successful. 

Thus the prior factor, probability of successful attack, would address the low likelihood that an attacker would be able to acquire explosives or WMD, and the decreased likelihood of success with explosives or WMD when using a drone versus 

alternative methods (like delivering from a manned aircraft, a vehicle, or carried by 

a person). Whereas the losses sustained factor assumes the scenario analyzed 

probabilistically is successful, and looks to what harms would then flow. In the context of drones, this will requiring gathering information about the payload capabilities of various systems (if assessing a threat from explosives), or the dispersal capability of various systems (if assessing a threat from WMD). What analysts will likely 

find is that the low payload capabilities of drones will reduce the direct losses sustained from an attack, however the propaganda value associated with a drone attack may increase the indirect costs (such as psychological, economic, and political 

effects) associated with their use. 

Taken together, the probability of a successful attack employing a drone multiplied by the losses sustained in the successful attack will tell agencies what the risk 

from drones is. From there agencies, guided by Congress, can determine whether 

the risk is acceptable. If the risk is unacceptable, then agencies should adopt mitigation, risk reduction, and security measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable 

level—remaining cognizant of the fact that such measures have costs (the subject 

of the next section). 

(3) Congress should ensure that before any funds are spent on security measures, 

agencies engage in risk assessment and a formal cost-benefit analysis using best 

practices: The employment of mitigation technology against risks cannot take place 

in a vacuum. Rather, it requires agencies to consider the degree to which a security 

measure is likely to deter, disrupt, or protect against a terrorist attack. Mitigation 

technologies are thus a benefit that can reduce risk (as calculated in the prior section).8 To determine the benefit of a security measure, agencies should make the 

following calculation: Benefit of a security measure = (probability of a successful attack) × (losses sustained in the successful attack) × (reduction in risk generated by 

the security measure).9

The first two factors in this equation are identical to those calculated earlier, 

while the reduction in risk factor is a degree, or percentage factor. In the context 

of drones, reductions in risk may come from greater surveillance of areas near airports where drones might pose a risk to commercial aircraft, or it may be specific 

technologies designed to jam the communication links between drones and their operators. But all of the likely risk reduction security measures will have costs, and 

sometimes those costs may be significant. Thus, the costs will need to be compared 

to the benefit of a security measure. A hypothetical will help illustrate this analytical 

process. 

Hypothetical 

FACTS: Assume that in a 10-year span of time we believe there is a chance of 

one successful attack by an explosives-laden drone against a Federal facility (a 10% 

yearly chance). Suppose further that we believe an attack will result in 1 death (valued at $10 million, an admittedly high estimate), and significant psychological and 

economic damage (valued at $50 million, an admittedly high estimate). For this hypothetical the total losses from such an attack amount to $60 million. 

RISK: The yearly risk from such an attack is thus the (probability of a successful 

attack .10) × (losses sustained in a successful attack $60 million) = $6 million. 
28 

10For an example of such mismanagement, see GAO Report, DOD Needs Strategic OutcomeRelated Goals and Visibility over Its Counter-IED Efforts available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588804.pdf. 

BENEFIT OF SECURITY: Now assume that a security system can be installed 

that cuts the probability of a successful attack by 50%. Such a system might be a 

combination of cameras, sensors, and jamming equipment that allows for detection 

of a drone and the jamming of the drone’s control link. 

The yearly benefit of the security measure is the reduction in risk associated with 

its employment, which is thus the (probability of a successful attack .10) × (losses 

sustained in a successful attack $60 million) × (reduction in risk generated by the 

security measure .50) = $3 million. 

IS THE COST OF SECURITY WORTH IT?: To determine whether the cost of 

such a security system is worth the expenditure of taxpayer dollars, we must compare the costs to the benefits. If the cost of cameras, sensors, and an interdiction 

system for drones in this hypothetical were less than $3 million, the benefits would 

outweigh the costs, and it would be a cost-effective security measure. 

Importantly, this hypothetical calculation only takes account of the security measures being implemented at one Federal facility. The reality is that implementing 

such measures across the Federal Government will require aggregating the costs 

across thousands of facilities. How to allocate those scarce resources will require 

prioritization, driven by risk assessments (as explained above), and will require the 

identification of a specific individual or office within the Department of Homeland 

Security responsible for coordinating interagency efforts to conduct risk assessments. 

(4) Congress should ensure that specific individuals at the Department of Homeland Security are responsible for conducting these analyses and reporting their methodology. Congress may also want to provide funds to the Centers of Excellence for 

an independent evaluation of threats: Given the complexity of the risk assessment 

picture associated with drones and their potential to pose a homeland security 

threat, Congress should direct that a specific individual or office within the Department of Homeland Security assume responsibility for generating threat assessments. 

There is some precedent for this type of managerial approach. In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security initiated a $100 million program to evaluate whether civilian aircraft should be equipped with countermeasures to defeat the threat of 

man-portable surface-to-air missiles. The program was directed by Congress as a 

means to evaluate whether Congress should require that some or all U.S. commercial airliners install such devices. At the time, the office within DHS was known 

as the Counter-MANPADS System Program Office. Congress could create a similar 

temporary office within DHS for the purpose of evaluating the threat posed by unmanned aircraft. In the alternative, Congress could direct the under secretary, National Protection & Programs Directorate to lead and staff a similar effort within 

DHS and make the under secretary the lead Federal official for interagency efforts. 

Additionally, Congress may want to consider requesting the support of the Department of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence. These university-based research centers can engage in terrorism risk analyses that will supplement the work 

of DHS. Such outside research may provide an independent check on the interests 

of Government agencies that may adopt or promote drone countermeasures as a 

means to ensure the continued relevance of their office or to justify increased budgetary outlays.10

CONCLUSION

The emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles in domestic skies raises understandable concerns that may require employment of mitigation technologies. However, before any funds are expended on such technologies, the Department of Homeland Security should engage in a comprehensive risk assessment to identify the probability, 

magnitude of harm, benefits of security measures, and cost of those measures. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Dr. McNeal. 

The Chairman now recognizes himself for a few questions. I will 

start out with General Roggero. 

According to a January 2015 Wall Street Journal article, counterterrorism authorities in the United States, Germany, Spain, and 

Egypt stated that six potential terrorist plots involving drones had 

been foiled since 2011. Can you describe, if you know, the types of 
29 

capabilities of the UAS that these groups were using or planning 

to use? 

General ROGERRO. Sir, I am sorry about that. 

Mr. PERRY. Sure. 

General ROGERRO. No, sir, I am not familiar with the technology 

that they used in that particular case. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. 

Anybody else on the panel, just in case? 

Yes, sir, Dr. Humphreys. 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. I do know that commercial off-the-shelf technology, when modified, is perfectly capable of carrying out those 

kind of attacks. In fact, even as we speak, in Ukraine the conflict 

is involving off-the-shelf drone hardware modified for that conflict, 

for surveillance and even weaponized drones. 

So it is probably the case that they were using an open-source 

autopilot and off-the-shelf hardware. 

Mr. PERRY. So surveillance is pretty simple. You mount a camera, or you can buy one with a camera mounted. 

Dr. Humphreys or General Roggero, can you talk to us about the 

weaponization or other potential nefarious means—to be combative 

or proactive in a militaristic style? 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. Right now surveillance is being used in 

Ukraine to guide mortar shelling. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. So it can be, you know, part of the lethal chain. 

Mr. PERRY. Sure. 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. But beyond that you can, of course, insert in 

the battery compartment some explosives. Many of these drones 

can carry a couple of pounds easily. 

Of course, if your intention is to cause panic, as was mentioned 

earlier, all you have to do is drop a smoke bomb and you can cause 

that kind of panic. 

General ROGERRO. So there are other things that you can do with 

that, as well. Mobility is one. 

For example, in Congressman Loudermilk’s State, delivering 

marijuana and cell phones into prisons has been attempted. I believe just a few weeks back there was 61⁄2 pounds of crystal meth 

being delivered across the border from the Tijuana area into San 

Ysidro. So certainly smuggling is an activity that is being seen out 

there with these particular devices. 

But certainly intelligence-gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance is the top priority and the easily done thing with these 

drones. We have also seen ISIS use it very effectively to do propaganda and broadcast after an attack, as well, to use these devices 

to gain their images that they need to put out on the web. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Thank you. 

To Professor McNeal: As we have discussed today, the UAS can 

be used for a variety of malicious purposes and therefore present 

a multitude of potential threats. The DHS will often prepare risk 

assessments in the face of threats such as these to ensure all relevant stakeholders are taking all possible steps to mitigate the 

threat. 

Which areas do you perceive the threats are most pressing and 

why, if you know? 
30 

Mr. MCNEAL. It is difficult to answer that question without a direct view of the intelligence picture, but let me answer it in a general way and—which sort of focuses on the capabilities of UAVs 

and how I think the threat assessment process should approach it. 

Really, UAVs provide three distinct advantages. They allow for 

attacks over perimeter defenses, and so when you think of the 

hardening that we did for Federal facilities after 9/11 and after the 

Oklahoma City bombings, now the enemy is able to attack beyond—over those perimeter defenses. If you have an area that is 

intended to be secure, either from observation or from personnel 

trafficking through, because you have fences, UAV obviously can 

get over that. 

Second, better surveillance capabilities, which we have already 

discussed. It gives a different vantage point. 

Then third, also allows the possibility of multiple simultaneous 

attacks or multiple disruptive attacks. So if you have a gathering— 

a crowded gathering, as Chief Beary mentioned, you might—if I 

were an attacker I might send in multiple drones with smoke 

bombs to create—to get people moved from a secure perimeter to 

outside of a secure perimeter where I might engage in an attack. 

All these things, of course, are possibilities that you could do as 

an individual on the ground. In fact, the limitation of UAVs is the 

payload. So the typical UAV might be able to carry 5 pounds of explosives. You could have one that carries more than that, but you 

are really starting to get into more sophisticated systems. 

Whereas a person can carry 20 pounds of explosives if they are— 

if they bring it in on a backpack. They don’t have to be a suicide 

bomber; they could leave it in a facility. Of course, we can mitigate 

that with security checks. 

So the security threat picture needs to balance not only the capabilities that the enemy gets by using this in an attack factor, but 

then also some of the limitations on it. That is why I say that we 

need a comprehensive process to assess each threat across each facility in each type of scenario. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. My time is expired. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mrs. Watson Coleman, for questions. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much for your testimony. One thing that you all 

have raised in my mind is that there is this sort of drone capacity 

from the tiniest to the biggest. So I need to know what I should 

be worried about. 

The drone that could possibly create a threat, whether or not it 

is, you know, disseminating some gas or some weaponization or 

whatever, what is the smallest drone, and what is the average cost 

of that type of drone? Because I am trying to figure out what don’t 

we bother ourselves with. 

I don’t even know who can answer that, but if anyone of you 

want to take a shot at it—— 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. I will jump in first. I bought a drone for my son 

for Christmas that was no bigger than my hand. I don’t think we 

have to worry about that one. 

But we do have to keep in mind that the threshold for success 

in these attacks can be very low. If anything exploded due to a 
31 

drone acting on the White House, even though it didn’t cause much 

physical damage, that would be viewed as a successful attack. You 

know, it would cause psychological and economic damage. 

So in that case, they don’t have to be much bigger than the one 

that I bought for my son for Christmas, and—— 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So then I guess my question is: How do 

we go about discerning what we should be concerned about, and 

how we should be—policy should be evolving and interagency interaction, you know, taking place so that we are prioritizing our response and our proactivity in this area, at the same time recognizing it has—these have very important economic benefits. They 

help farmers with their crops, they—certainly an industry that has 

the potential to be very, very successful, and we can certainly use 

that economy here. 

What is it that we should be doing? Are we now facing impediments because FAA has got a piece of this, DHS has a piece of this, 

Secret Service has a piece of this? You know, is anybody cooperating? 

Mr. MCNEAL. Congresswoman Coleman, I think this highlights 

the challenge that we all face, which is the spectrum of risk is from 

the smallest UAV up to extremely large 55-pound systems that 

could fly at 200 miles an hour and they are systems filled with 

fuel. But these have existed for decades. 

So for us to recognize the possible is, I think, really that first moment at which then we turn to homeland security and we say, ‘‘It 

is time for you to have a comprehensive process where you study 

this.’’ We do this all the time across Government, right? We pass 

a new bill that directs an agency to engage in scientific studies to 

figure out whether the benefits of adding a certain device to an 

automobile are worth it. 

That same type of scientific process has to be applied here. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Should that be sort-of our starting 

point? 

Mr. MCNEAL. I think that should be our starting point. I think 

we have recognized the potential and that a lot more research is 

required for us to do something. 

The best thing for us to do is to begin that process inside Government of making those studies and making informed decisions. Otherwise what I think and I fear will happen is that the next drone 

that crashes on the White House lawn has a firecracker on it and 

we say, ‘‘What if it were something worse?’’ and we make hasty decisions that aren’t informed by science. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So, Mr. Roggero—I hope I didn’t bastardize your name—you shared information with regard to our 

international partners around the world, and they are—they seem 

to be a little bit farther along than we are. So what are the lessons 

that we specifically need to learn from them as we embark on this 

year? 

General ROGERRO. Thank you very much for that. One of the 

things that they learned—they started back in 2012—their trigger 

event, if you will, was the 2012 Olympics, and that is what they 

were concerned about—was that there is no single silver bullet that 

is going to apply. As you yourself said, it is a spectrum of threat, 

and one of the first things you have to do is catalogue that threat 
32 

and identify it, and then go through the mitigation strategies that 

can be put against it. 

But one of the most important things that they discovered was 

that the defense had to be layered. It had to be a combination of 

things, as Dr. Humphreys was mentioning. It is not just electro-optical cameras and radars and thermal, but a whole slew—menu of 

things that you need to protect those vitally important parts and 

gatherings that we do have. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one 

more question, if I might? Thank you very much. 

This is, Chief Beary, you did—you illustrated the good and the 

bad of drones in law enforcement, and I was just wondering, with 

regard to what we learned in the Ferguson matter, is there any use 

for them in ensuring accountability, fairness, and protection of 

communities other than, you know, using them as revenue sources? 

Chief BEARY. Well, on the revenue source side, I am not sure 

that there is any of those that exist now. I can tell you this, being 

a person who spent 30 years in municipal government, quite frankly, the operations out there were—trying to use taxpayers to fund 

your system is wrong. 

I will tell you this as a police chief: Every police chief in this 

country works for a mayor and a city commission, or whatever the 

word is in your community, and they need to be held accountable, 

plain and simple. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Yes, they do. 

Chief BEARY. I will answer the oversight—the comical, ironic 

part of this is in the State of Florida, as an individual I can buy 

a drone and I can fly it around and I can do what I want. As a 

law enforcement officer I can’t operate one, because we have restricted them in Florida so anybody else can violate your privacy 

except the police. It is crazy, but that is what we have done because of the concern. 

So right now there is no use of accountability that I am aware 

of. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am really concerned about Orlando 

and Disney World. 

Mr. PERRY. There are a lot of things to be concerned about. 

Thank you. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full 

committee, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Excellent witnesses. You raise a lot of, I think, interesting points. 

For this committee, one of the real challenges is how do you insert the role of Government in this process? There are people who 

say, ‘‘Well, we have too much Government already.’’ 

But there are others who will say if something happens, ‘‘Why 

didn’t the Government see this coming?’’ 

So our question is—and I heard two things. Some say the role 

ought to be in DHS. 

General, you kind of talked about a broader involvement, but 

with no head. You know, you said we ought to get everybody together. 
33 

So would your message to us be there is a role for Government, 

but somebody ought to have the primary responsibility for administering that role? 

I will start with you, Dr. Humphreys. 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. Yes, I do believe there is a proper role for Government here. This is a question of security and safety of the citizens, and it seems obvious to me that DHS should lead out on this. 

There should be an interagency effort, but DHS should lead out 

on threats to our homeland, and especially so because the Secret 

Service, which has been highlighted in recent attacks at the—or intrusions at the White House, you know, is charged with protecting 

the White House and the President. 

So having a head at DHS or standing up a committee, as Professor McNeal had recommended, I think is a good idea. They have 

got the expertise—or should have the expertise to lead this off. 

Mr. THOMPSON. General. 

General ROGERRO. Thank you very much, sir. 

I would probably split it up a little bit and say, ‘‘Department of 

Defense, you are responsible for those drones, if you will, or those 

remote-piloted aircraft that are state-sponsored.’’ So those are the 

larger ones. Those are going to be more your Predators and Reapers. 

As we talk drones, you know, it is very easy to slip into just 

thinking that they are just a quadcopter when they could be much 

more. 

DHS certainly has a role in that and in the security piece, as 

well. So perhaps DHS is the right area. 

Or do you pick an operational arm, such as in the Department 

of Energy, who has some very vital sites that they need to protect 

and could really identify the requirements and drive an effort and 

pull in all of those various bits on the defense as well as the mitigation technology and spread that throughout Government. So that 

is, perhaps, one solution as well, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Chief, you are on the ground. You talked about 

a lack of direction. 

Chief BEARY. Right. A lack of authority. If we have one that we 

deem a threat, what authority do I have to take it down? It doesn’t 

exist. 

I think that Department of Homeland Security and DOD both 

share a role, and I think that in those areas of responsibility I 

think they could come back and make great recommendations for 

State and local law enforcement on how to deal with these threats. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Doctor. 

Mr. MCNEAL. So, as I mentioned in my written testimony, I 

think DHS should be the lead on this across all agencies. Of course, 

the threats exist in a lot of different places, but DHS has the experience to work with both the Federal Government and with local 

law enforcement. 

I do have to dissent a little bit from Chief Beary’s point on—well, 

not a dissent, but a nuanced point here, which is that if we think 

about the risks that law enforcement is worried about we must also 

recognize Congresswoman Watson Coleman’s point, which is that 

drones can be a form of accountability. 
34 

What we saw in Ferguson was that local law enforcement—the 

AP got—FOIA’d these documents; local law enforcement asked for 

the grounding of drones so that the media couldn’t cover what the 

police were doing. So it was used as—the security threat or the risk 

of safety to the officers was used as a tool to keep—to remove public accountability. 

I think that type of thing is something that when we elevate the 

threat picture too high and we spread it too far across Government, 

we run the risk of allowing those types of things to happen. That 

is why I think a single point of responsibility and accountability is 

the best way we can ensure that we are not going off the rails with 

any particular policy preference from one agency or one law enforcement perspective. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Ranking Member. 

Chairman now recognizes gentleman, Mr. Loudermilk. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Appreciate the testimony here, and I think, Dr. Humphreys and 

Dr. McNeal, you kind of hit on some significant areas with risk 

analysis as we go forward. Especially, I think the two categories 

that we can really look at this is the unintentional and the intentional. 

Unintentional, we can mitigate some of the incidents with that 

via regulation, legislation, technology, et cetera. But the intentional—it is more difficult because the bad guys are going to be bad 

guys. They are going to work around that. 

I put a lot of thought into this as an aviator, and working in 

search and rescue and different areas such as that. This is a question to anyone on the panel that has the information: Have there 

been any efforts or have we classified UAS platforms based on 

their technology, sophistication, payload capabilities complexity of 

operation? 

Do we have a classification, like we do with civilian aircraft? You 

know, we have the different classifications—single engine, twin, 

land, sea-capable, et cetera. 

Mr. MCNEAL. Congressman Loudermilk, we do not currently. 

However, I and a bunch of other experts in the field and manufacturers are working with NASA to develop a system, and testing is 

beginning in August. So from drone manufacturers to drone consulting companies, we are all working with NASA to create the system to certify and basically create those categories of capabilities 

for platforms. 

The long-term vision is that once you have those categories—let’s 

say class one through class five of small, unmanned aircraft—that 

will then ultimately feed into the unmanned traffic management 

system that we are hoping to have in place 10 years down the road. 

So it might be the case that—— 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. The next-gen? 

Mr. MCNEAL [continuing]. That 10 years from now we will have 

something that is integrated with next-gen that will tell us the 

classification of aircraft. But that still won’t do anything for homebuilts that don’t want to play ball with the traffic management system. 
35 

General ROGERRO. Congressman, actually NATO is already— 

does have a classification and it is based on weight. That does go 

class one up to class four, and then it also is classed by capabilities, 

and then what their top vulnerabilities as well as their top capabilities are in there. 

So that is, once again, it is a good idea to look towards international partners instead of reinventing the wheel every time. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. General, the classifications, are you going 

from, you know, what you can buy at the kiosk at the mall, which 

are the basic indoor—a nuisance more than a threat type system, 

all the way up to the—those that require a landing strip—you 

know, take-off and landing? 

General ROGERRO. Correct. It would go by—it would take things 

into account such as size, engine capacity, fuel or battery requirements, and their ensuing capability to speeds, et cetera. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Payload? 

General ROGERRO. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. It sounds like there has been a—we are 

kind of in the same direction. 

Looking at the unintentional side, as a private pilot the concern 

is those that can go, you know, above 500 feet AGL, especially 

around an airport. We have got plenty of class G airspace in the 

Nation, which is unrestricted, but yet a lot of private pilots, sport 

pilots, ultralight pilots operate at low altitudes but still at the slow 

speeds that we are flying, as compared to our military friends. 

Still you are not going to see one of these quads or certain UAVs 

until after you have impacted it. Looking at this classification— 

model rocketry ran into this back many years ago and the industry 

kind of self-regulated itself. 

If you are familiar with model rocketry, you can go to a hobby 

store and buy the little SDs model rocket engines. They are capable 

of low-altitude flight, but there is a classification that if you get 

above I think 1,000 feet and then 10,000—they have level one, level 

two, level three—you actually have to be licensed to purchase the 

propeller. 

Has anybody looked at any type of classification that if a UAV 

is capable of a certain altitude, or outside-of-line-of-sight operation, 

then you have to be licensed? I fully think that if you are going to 

do that you need to at least have a basic ground school. Maybe not 

a medical, but at least know the area you are operating in. 

Is there any movement in that direction? 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. I will say that the challenge here is that the 

same drone that can operate up to 400 feet can easily operate 

above that, and even if we put in these geo-fences that exclude 

them from sensitive areas or from above 400 feet, an operator who 

had some knowledge of the autopilot system could override that 

sort of a geo-fence. 

So the classifications smear into one another, and it is not just 

a question of knowing how high they can fly because most of them 

can fly fairly high if their batteries will hold out. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. What about technologies such as those that are 

beyond just the small quads you get at a mall—a requirement of 

a transponder or a next-gen system to be on those? 
36 

Mr. MCNEAL. The FAA has not required this type of technology 

but the industry is evolving to create it. So I recently saw ADS– 

B small enough to fit on a small, unmanned aircraft and it would 

interface with the, obviously, with the air traffic system, and you 

would be able—presuming that you are in an aircraft where you 

are then able to know other aircraft around you, you would know 

that that aircraft was nearby. 

Of course, that doesn’t solve the small sport and ultralight category of pilots who simply are not going to see this type of aircraft 

in the National airspace. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Chairman thanks the gentleman from Georgia. 

The Chairman recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Richmond. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, to the Ranking Member of the full committee, and 

the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, and the witnesses. 

Let me just start with some very basic stuff. 

Major General Roggero, let me start with you. 

I represent the district with probably the largest petrochemical 

footprint in the United States on the Mississippi River in New Orleans, around New Orleans. Is there any technology out there right 

now that would prevent these drones from being used to do reconnaissance missions just to look at the security on these chemical 

facilities or our port or any of those very sensitive properties? 

General ROGERRO. From a technology aspect, depends on what 

equipment they are using. But for a good amount of it I would say 

yes, there is technology that could do things. 

I am not looking at policy right now or questions on technology, 

but yes, technology could get into the signal—either the video or 

the command and control of the system—and affect the navigation 

of the system so it may not be looking exactly what they want it 

to look at. So that is there. 

But there are complications with that in terms of policy, with 

FCC rules and other things that—another issue that is out there 

is that the FAA has declared that all of these are aircraft, and as 

such, their second and third order of effects—perhaps unintended 

effects—but that aircraft is given protections as if it were a 

manned aircraft, as well. So there are certain actions, according to 

policy, that you can’t take against them. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Very quickly, I mean, part of this, I think, will 

have to be some industry, some Government, and everybody uses 

some common sense. But I think back to the very simple analogy 

of, if you go to the fancy golf courses and you are in the golf cart, 

there are some places the cart will not let you drive, like close to 

the green and other places they don’t want you. 

So at some point, you know, when we start talking about high 

school football games or, well, facilities—football stadiums, and 

baseball stadiums, and all of those things, do you see a day where 

those will, either GPS or otherwise, just be off-limits in terms of 

the capability of not being able to go in that space? 

Dr. McNeal. 

Mr. MCNEAL. Congressman Richmond, I don’t necessarily see it 

as a technological solution. I think, as Dr. Humphreys pointed out, 

that is part of the equation. 
37 

In fact, the industry is already self-regulating for airports and 

other sensitive sites. There are start-up companies now that are allowing individuals to file the GPS location of their private property 

in the hopes that the manufacturers will then use those maps as 

no-fly zones. 

I think what we will eventually find is that State and local government, through their zoning authority, will begin to say that certain areas are no-fly zones. We already see this in Los Angeles, for 

example. You are not allowed to fly a model aircraft on the beach 

or in parks. The National Park Service has said the same thing. 

Then what happens is that local law enforcement can come in 

and say, ‘‘Listen, this is a place where you are not allowed to fly,’’ 

and they are able to intercept the individuals. 

What that does for us from a security perspective is then it— 

when an aircraft is in that area, law enforcement doesn’t have to 

make a judgment about whether it is nefarious or not; they can 

begin with the presumption that this person at best is someone 

who is unaware that they are violating the law in that particular 

no-fly zone, thus giving them reasonable suspicion or even probable 

cause to go talk to the operator. Then from there, that also puts— 

heightens the security picture for them. 

Of course, there is a cost associated with that in that we lose 

some of the beneficial—the benefits of the technology. That is why 

I almost think that on designating no-fly zones that are non-Federal, we want to leave that up to State and local to figure out the 

right way to balance the costs and benefits. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Chief, let me just ask you a question, because 

earlier you mentioned, you know, at some point you would have to 

make a decision whether to take a drone down or not. Let me just 

ask you the—for me, the practical part of it. How do you do that? 

Let’s assume it is over a high school football game and you can’t 

determine whether it is a amateur hobbyist or whether it is something nefarious. If you decided you wanted to take it down, what 

do you do? 

Chief BEARY. Well, therein lies the challenge. Most State and 

local law enforcement have no capability to do that. 

No. 1, we don’t have the technological capability. More importantly, we don’t have the lawful authority. 

As the general said, those are—they are aircraft. I don’t have the 

lawful authority to take down an aircraft. There is not a State and 

local law enforcement agency in this country that does. 

So right from the start we have no authority, so how am I going 

to respond? 

These are the incidents, though, that the rank-and-file watch 

commanders in our agencies across this country are dealing with 

every single day now. When you have a hostage situation or you 

have any kind of major scene, you have got drones everywhere, and 

the helicopter is calling down saying, ‘‘You have got to get these 

drones out of the airspace because I am trying to work a perimeter 

here.’’ 

So our people have just—we don’t have the resources and we 

don’t have the backing of the law to help us deal with these situations. That is why I said in my testimony this is really a call for 

help. 
38 

Mr. RICHMOND. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. 

Thank you, to the witnesses. 

Mr. PERRY. Chairman thanks the gentleman from Louisiana and 

recognizes the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Torres. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you so much, and thank you for the opportunity to discuss this very important topic. 

Just to follow up on your conversation, as a former 9–1–1 dispatcher I can tell you from personal experience that trying to get 

clearance to—as we are pursuing a vehicle, or our officers are pursuing a vehicle, trying to get clearance from an airport to follow a 

vehicle into that restricted zone, our helicopters are unable to continue that pursuit, but yet the media or, you know, folk from the 

ground can continue that pursuit through a drone. 

That poses, you know—it is a very scary environment for those 

of us who live near an executive airport, for example, where our 

homes are very close by, and the—and these executive aircraft are 

landing—their landing route is right over our home. I thought, you 

know, birds were the scariest things that, you know, could face an 

aircraft as they are beginning to land, but now we have more and 

more of these drones that are getting in that way. 

My question is really going to be to Professor Humphreys, and 

that is, in your prior testimony before the committee in 2012 you 

spoke of the use of civilian GPS and their ability to be spoofed or 

counterfeit. Can you tell me how technology has evolved? You 

know, what are the differences between then and now with older 

and newer models? 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. Well, despite the passage of 3 years and despite 

the fast-moving technology in this area, you still cannot purchase 

over-the-shelf anything that can resist a spoofing attack like the 

ones we generate in my lab. I know the DHS has established some 

contracts to study the problem, and the FAA put together a tiger 

team to look at the problem, but still, only 3 years later, the problem exists. 

In the current situation you can almost look at that weakness of 

GPS as a possible way to bring down these drones. But I would discourage that, because in transmitting false GPS signals, that will 

have unintended consequences for these executive airports, as you 

say. You don’t want to endanger commercial airliners or even passersby who are trying to use their sat nav in their car to find their 

way to their office. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Chairman thanks the gentlelady. 

We are going to go for a second round and we are going to go 

a little bit out of order. Mr. Loudermilk has to leave early. 

So, as a matter of fact, I think I am just going to turn the floor 

over to him for questioning, and then we will move through the 

regular order at that point. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. I do have a meeting to get to, but this is fascinating. It is 

of great interest to me and something that my office has been putting a lot of work and thought into. 

What percentage of the platforms are manufactured domestically 

versus internationally? Do we know that? 

Anyone? 
39 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. I know that the most popular quadcopter in the 

world is manufactured in China, and that is the most popular by 

far. But other U.S. domestic drone manufacturers—notably, the— 

robotics community, the do-it-yourself community are also large. As 

I said earlier, the knowledge is out there; the documentation is extensive. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. One of the reasons I was asking, you 

know, what level of regulatory constraint that we can put on the 

technology or, back to the police chief’s ideas of how do we bring 

down these platforms when they are operating nefariously or unintentionally? 

Is the technology there? Do we have the influence over the technology that we can—I imagine most of them use some type of R.F. 

signal to control them—to intercept the R.F. signal, to force a gohome activity, you know, fly back to the source? Is that even a conceivable idea that would be made available to law enforcement? 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. It is conceivable. It does work, but it only really 

works against the unintentional, accidental, or unsophisticated 

attackers. If I am a sophisticated attacker I can adapt the autopilot 

to simply disregard any communication from the ground and work 

on an autonomous approach. 

So it depends on what you want to protect. If it is just the accidental, incidental, yes, that can be effective. 

But again, these technologies are operating in popular communication bands—wi-fi bands, and in the future they will be operating over LTE bands. You don’t want to mess with those bands 

in a wide area. You will disrupt other people’s activities, and 

maybe safety of life activities. 

Mr. MCNEAL. Congressman, the only thing I would add there is 

that while the interdiction problem seems—it seems problematic to 

us for the moment that it is there, and I can only imagine law enforcement having that feeling of helplessness, my response would 

be, you know, wait 25 minutes because the battery is likely to run 

out on that system, and there really are not very many systems in 

the quadcopter space that can fly for longer than 25 minutes. When 

you get into the fixed-wing model aircraft, basically, you get a bit 

more—a bit longer flight time. 

The only other thing that I think I would raise there are the obvious civil liberties concerns and First Amendment concerns, because if you—instead of thinking of these as mere flying aircraft, 

if you think of them as flying cameras that might be operated by 

Fox News or NPR, you are immediately running into the question 

of the Government being able to turn off CNN’s cameras, and that 

could be really problematic. So I am not certain that even if were 

able to implement this mitigation technology to take control of the 

aircraft, that it would be something that we would want to do. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. That is a good point. I agree with you there. 

I also look at it from a personal privacy standpoint. What if it 

is hovering over my backyard, you know? What rights to do have 

to take it down? I have got a 12 gauge that could assist in that 

pretty readily. 

But you can’t engage that in a public area. 
40 

Chief, you brought up a challenge that you have. You have no 

right to take down any aircraft. No one in the Nation does, as far 

as local law enforcement. 

But the operator is on the ground somewhere. You do have authority over the operator, correct? 

Chief BEARY. The answer to that is ‘‘it depends.’’ If they are lawfully in a place where they are allowed to do that—here is where 

we get into the question is, how do—who do I justify to what my 

actions were? Usually it ends up being in a civil court several years 

down the road. 

That is why if we had some guidance on the front end it would 

help us write those policies for our personnel. Those are these situations we get into right now. 

It is interesting you talked about your backyard, because what 

law enforcement is receiving now, we are getting those calls from 

the people that are on their back deck and then there is a camera 

in a drone looking at them. They call law enforcement, and what 

right do I have to deal with that? 

As these systems get more sophisticated, as I talked about, with 

the flying by virtual reality, they are not—the people aren’t as easy 

to find anymore, trying to find the operator. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Right. 

Chief BEARY. So it is problematic. We are seeing more and more 

of those privacy concerns coming it from residents that walk outside and there are three of them in their backyard. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PERRY. Chairman thanks the gentleman. 

Chairman recognizes the Ranking Member, Mrs. Watson Coleman. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. 

I want to thank each and every one of you for the information 

you shared today. You have given us a lot to consider, and hopefully we come up with recommendations and considerations that 

are cost—you know, that make sense in terms of cost, make sense 

in terms of application, make sense in terms of collaboration, and 

make sense in terms of the parameters that we—that get established in dealing with this sort of wide spectrum of issues. 

My last question is to Mr. Roggero, because in your prepared testimony you recommended that on-going research and development 

program to devise counters to new drone technologies that should 

be established and funded. 

So my two-part question is, regarding that funding, what type of 

investment in counter-drone technology should Congress expect to 

make to realize the intended results? Would you suggest 

partnershipping with colleges and universities to conduct research 

and development in the areas of drone insecurity? 

General ROGERRO. Thank you very much for the question, 

ma’am. 

I certainly do agree with investing because, as we have seen, this 

hearing is different from the one that was 2 years ago, and different technologies and things are out there now. The next hearing 

that we have in a couple years is also going to change and evolve. 
41 

So the R&D needs to be spent now. We have to focus on the capability that is out there now and available and install that, put 

that in place where it makes sense for the Government to protect 

those critical infrastructure points now. But going into R&D certainly makes sense, and going into universities is great for those 

scanning of the horizons in the 5-year-plus so that we don’t find 

ourselves behind again. 

I would even go one more step. This might be a great opportunity 

for a public-private partnership with those corporations that are 

heavily dependent in their new business plans on the use of drones, 

such as Amazon, Google, and Apple, who have all professed to be 

very interested in this technology, but certainly the security and 

safety issues can hurt their business plan, quite. So they may be 

a willing partner in this R&D as well. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Well I can certainly see that they are 

a natural partner here. Do you have any estimates of what you 

think the Government’s cost associated with taking on such an endeavor would be? Just sort-of an estimate? 

General ROGERRO. Well, I will turn to the university professor 

who is more engaged with grants than—— 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. Sure. So you can do a lot of good with very little funding in this area. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. We are finding that out. 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. I would say that you do need to recognize that 

even a risk assessment, however, is a—it can be something or it 

does require funding. I mean, we were talking earlier about doing 

a risk assessment before spending any funds, but a risk assessment 

itself requires some research. 

I was involved with a DHS risk assessment in 2011 where a 

bunch of us subject-matter experts were brought into a room, asked 

questions we poorly understood, and asked to vote. It was just appalling, in my view, that this was the procedure for determining 

whether there were real risks, instead of handing us some marching orders and giving us some funding to go out and find out really 

what were the answers. 

By the way, I have friends at Google today who may be watching 

this proceeding who are interested in knowing how they could help, 

because they do have a business interest in securing drones from 

malfeasance and making sure that the drones themselves aren’t 

the bad actors. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am through. 

Mr. PERRY. Chairman thanks the gentlelady. 

I have got some questions continuing. I will start with the general. 

Given the wide range of threats the UAS can pose, the creation 

of a DHS strategy on domestic UAS will be a crucial aspect in mitigating the threat. Or maybe it is not DHS; you postulated maybe 

it would be DOD. 

I just wrote down FAA, DOD, DOE, Justice. There is no limit, 

probably, to the number of agencies that might or should be involved in a comprehensive strategy. 

But let’s just say you were going to write a strategy. You know, 

I have got 5 minutes, right, and you have got some of that, so give 
42 

me the high points, maybe, if you could, General, about what you 

think is important regarding such a strategy. 

General ROGERRO. Certainly, sir. 

I would first of all, as we discussed earlier, identify the threats, 

identify what needs to be protected, and in all cases that may not 

be a thing—it may be a reputation, it may be a brand. The White 

House is a great example. The drone was no threat kinetically, but 

to the reputation of the United States Government to protect a key 

spot, it very much is very important. 

So I would identify those priorities and then get the resources 

down right and figure out where you need to apply those resources 

today while you are doing that research and development tomorrow 

to get those capabilities moving. So it is a multi-prong. 

In the mean time, you also have to look at all of those authorities 

that law enforcement needs, make sure the rules are clear, and 

have a whole roll-out campaign, a strategic communications campaign, if you will, to get to the public, to let them know where you 

can fly, where you can’t fly, what the penalties are, and if you see 

something you need to say something. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. Continuing, just if you can, General—and 

anybody else, I will start with the general—some examples, maybe, 

of some larger UAS above 55 pounds. The availability, the payload—I am trying to determine—and—for myself and maybe anybody watching or listening what really the potential worst-case scenario could or would be. 

Then, you know, if you maybe classify that in terms—I guess we 

had a potential cyanide issue at the White House. It is in the news 

today. You put a container—a small container—of anthrax or ricin 

or something like that on even one of these small, less than 55 

pounds—I think it certainly has the ability to carry that payload. 

Can you paint a picture for us—maybe not necessarily a worstcase scenario, but an actual probable scenario or a possible scenario with somebody with that kind of malicious intent, what the 

capabilities that exist? 

General ROGERRO. Certainly. I am an R.C. hobbyist myself, and 

there are some local hobby stores not very far away from where we 

are sitting here today in the District of Columbia that if you go into 

you can have an F–16 jet that is about as long as this table that 

has a turbofan engine and has fuel which is in and of itself an explosive. This will do probably 200 to 300 miles an hour and you 

need a small runway to take it off from. It could fly from a location 

just outside of the District of Columbia into the center of the District of Columbia within minutes. 

So that is here and that is current, so don’t want to scare you 

any more than that, sir. 

Mr. PERRY. I think I can understand the potential, the possibilities. 

Dr. McNeal, you want to weigh in? 

Mr. MCNEAL. Congressman Perry, the example that the general 

pointed out actually, in preparation for the testimony, I tried to 

find the earliest example of someone on the internet talking about 

this type of thing and there was actually a researcher out of—it 

was either New Zealand or Australia who basically said—who 
43 

wanted to create remote control cruise missiles using a similar system to what the general is talking about. 

I mean, this is DIY technology and there is very little we can do 

to mitigate against that, and you are looking at a high-speed missile at a low altitude. 

With regard to the dispersal threat, we have—I think you have 

probably been in the threat briefings where people talk about the 

unmanned aircraft as a threat dispersal—as a dispersal method. It 

is almost too cute by half, though, because if you really wanted to 

have a high impact with a WMD, first we have the problem of getting the WMD. But if you have anthrax, that is not the best way 

to do it. 

Go to every Starbucks on every corner in the District of Columbia, sprinkle it into the sugar. Or put it in a sugar shaker on the 

roof of your car and drive around and you will impact a lot more 

people through that dispersal method than you would through the 

aircraft, which—right? 

Now, this, of course, assumes that the enemy is smart enough to 

think these things through, and some of the guys who have got 

caught haven’t been the brightest, you know, bulbs on the Christmas tree. But—— 

Mr. PERRY. Even if they are not, I mean, let’s say they are smart 

enough to go to a sporting event where—a large stadium and fly 

it low over the crowd, almost within arm’s reach, I mean—and 

maybe it has an impact on you or not, but which one of us wants 

to be the person that said, ‘‘Well, look, I got checked out and I was 

fine,’’ you know, over the course of thousands of people in that— 

and, you know, you already talked—the chief has talked about 

panic setting in, people running across each other and down the 

steps and falling, and little children and older folks, and so on. I 

mean, you can picture the scene, right? 

Mr. MCNEAL. Yes. Mr. Chairman, you have also highlighted the 

other challenge in our planning process, which is that the threat 

of anthrax being spread at Starbucks in the sugar is something 

that is not as tangible as the cameras picking up the drone as it 

flies in over the football stadium, and that psychological impact is 

also something that the terrorists would go for, but also that unfortunately drives policy in a way that is not probabilistic but is 

possibilistic. 

Mr. PERRY. Would any of you folks here, depending on size, classification, are any of you advocating or recommending registration 

of some type towards ownership so that the, you know, as the chief 

said, you know, the aircraft that is flying—and, you know, his officers are all standing there looking at it, they can’t do anything 

about it. Maybe they can’t at that moment, but once maybe rules 

are set into place where it is illegal to do what has just been done, 

they can actually track down the perpetrator and link those two up 

so that we know what he is doing at X house and there is justification. 

Is anybody advocating or has anybody thought about that, or 

what are the considerations—— 

General ROGERRO. The only way right now is through support 

groups such as the AMA, which pulls in modelists and has a set 

of rules and regulations that people voluntarily roll into. 
44 

I would not be opposed to registration for somebody that either 

buys or builds a certain size UAS with a certain capability. I don’t 

see where anybody would have a problem with that, and putting 

that accountability into this system where these capabilities are 

going so high so fast I think is probably a good thing and well-deserved. 

Mr. PERRY. To the chief, you know, we talked a little bit about 

law enforcement’s role or the role of UAS with law enforcement in 

the context of civil liberties, but also in the context of using the 

asset to law enforcement’s advantage for search and rescue, or 

maybe surveillance in a hostile situation, et cetera, and then juxtaposed that to State laws and the 10th Amendment. 

Can you describe, generally speaking, what do you think the— 

at this point—the role of UAS is, the legitimate role of UAS in law 

enforcement would be? Just so we have a clear understanding of 

where—you know, how we can help you and how we can assist in— 

but at the same time make sure that everybody’s privacies and civil 

liberties are maintained? 

Chief BEARY. Yes, sir. We certainly are always concerned about 

the civil liberty aspect, and I echo that concern. 

Where they would be very beneficial for law enforcement are 

those quick tactical situations where I have got—the example I 

could give you is a railroad car. We have got a derailment and I 

have got a situation. Well, it might be 20 minutes or 15 minutes 

before I can get a helicopter, but I can put up an unmanned aerial 

system in 3 minutes with a video camera with a live feed back and 

I can see where I need to immediately create my evacuation zone, 

I can—I am getting real-time data instead of waiting for the State 

police helicopter or somebody else to get there. 

So those kind of very fast incidents would be a huge help to us. 

Again, we talked—in my testimony I talked about high-risk warrant service. The same thing—instead of a loud helicopter being up 

drawing attention, I could deploy a couple of small drones with 

video feeds so that we could know that the area is secure and our— 

and the evacuation is going as planned. 

So those are just a couple of quick examples of how we could deploy this and keep the public safe and the officers safe. Reduce 

costs, by the way. Helicopter time is very expensive. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, it is unless you are the Department of Homeland Security, and I think at our last hearing they paid about 

$22,000 or $23,000 an hour for their Predator time. As a helicopter 

pilot myself, you know, there are a lot of helicopter pilots that 

would love to charge that amount of money to do surveillance and 

they would make a pretty good buck at it. 

Finally, let me conclude with this: Based on what you have heard 

today—you folks are, I think, recognized as having some expertise 

in—the field, and we are trying to craft a policy, a strategy, et 

cetera—do you have a recommendation, each one of you, regarding 

which agency—I know, you know, I have something in my mind, 

but which agency should take the lead on maybe policy formulation 

or execution, should the legislative bodies do that, and work out 

the strategy, you know, proposed strategy? 

We will start with Dr. Humphreys. 
45 

Mr. HUMPHREYS. Sure. As I said earlier, Chairman Perry, I believe the DHS has the obvious role to play here. 

But I would also say that if DHS proves to be an unwilling leader or an incapable leader then others could step in. Someone else 

mentioned the Department of Energy. I also think the FAA has 

shown itself to be quite competent in this area. They are mostly 

looking at threats to aviation, but the threats by aviation against 

our homeland could also be within their expertise, I suppose. 

But most importantly, I would like to reiterate that simply saying we are going to throw together a risk assessment isn’t free. So 

we end up needing to have a deliberate risk assessment. 

I believe DHS should lead that off, but it might need to—I would 

say it would need to involve deliberate research, perhaps funded 

research, whether by universities, Federally-funded research and 

development centers, or private groups, where they can do a deep 

dive into the problem and not just be asked questions off the cuff 

that they might be poorly prepared to answer. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. 

General. 

General ROGERRO. Yes, sir. I would say in the policy realm that 

DHS probably has the correct knowledge and background to take 

the lead on the security piece. However, it would have to be very 

closely aligned, I think, with the FAA, which, as you know, is a 

safety of flight piece. 

But by designing policy and security you could take that airborne 

asset, as we have been talking about this morning, and push that 

into an aviation safety incident. So I think that the FAA has to be 

there with their expertise of aviation on this process, as well. 

Mr. PERRY. Chief. 

Chief BEARY. Because we deal with DHS on a regular basis, most 

State and local law enforcement agencies, to me it is a natural, 

where we have those relationships built. The number of agencies 

that report to them I think make it conducive. 

I do absolutely agree with the general that the FAA needs to be 

a part of it, because it is a huge part of it. But integrating with 

State and local law enforcement, I think DHS would be the right 

vehicle to do that. 

Mr. PERRY. Dr. McNeal. 

Mr. MCNEAL. Congressman Perry, here is a four-part plan for 

how I would put it together. I would direct that the under secretary 

for National Protection and Programs Directorate be the lead individual responsible for this across the Federal Government. 

Second, I would allocate to that office funding for a program office that would have temporary personnel—probably contractors 

that report to NPPD. You would probably need $5 million to $10 

million to stand up the office with personnel and be able to do testing. 

Third, I would require that all other Government agencies have 

to play if they want to get paid. So if DOE wants to implement security measures at their facilities they better participate in the 

threat assessment process, otherwise the funding won’t be allocated 

through the under secretary down to those pieces of critical infrastructure. 
46 

Then fourth, as a check against sort of empire and bureaucracybuilding—not that that happens in the District of Columbia—I 

would allocate some funding to the homeland security centers of excellence, which are your research institutions, that could do similar 

threat assessments to check the work of the Government. I will tell 

you, if you put Dr. Humphreys and I together with, you know, a 

half-million dollar grant, we would do a lot with that money—probably more than many of the people in Government would do because we are cheaper. 

So I think that four-part plan of outside independent look, you 

have to play if you want to get paid, and then a program office supervised by the under secretary, is the most effective way to move 

this forward. It is relatively small cost. I recognize funds are limited. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. 

Thank you very much, gentlemen. I thank you for your valuable 

testimony and the Members for their questions. 

Of course, the Members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we will ask that the witnesses respond to those in writing. Pursuant to committee rule 

7(e), the hearing record will be open for 10 days. 

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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