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[Senate Report 114-83]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                       Calendar No. 141
114th Congress    }                                      {      Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session      }                                      {      114-83

======================================================================

 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

                                _______
                                

                 July 16, 2015.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

         Mr. Burr, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 1705]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 1705) to authorize appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the United States Government, the Community Management 
Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
Disability, and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon 
and recommends that the bill do pass.

                Classified Annex to the Committee Report

    On February 2, 2015, acting pursuant to Section 364 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 
111-259), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) publicly 
disclosed that the President's aggregate request for the 
National Intelligence Program (NIP) for Fiscal Year 2016 is 
$53.9 billion. Other than for limited unclassified 
appropriations, primarily the Intelligence Community Management 
Account, the classified nature of United States intelligence 
activities precludes any further disclosure, including by the 
Committee, of the details of its budgetary recommendations. 
Accordingly, the Committee has prepared a classified annex to 
this report that contains a classified Schedule of 
Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is 
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the legal status 
of public law. The classified annex is made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for 
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of 
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2016 that is being reported by the Committee.

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for Fiscal Year 2016.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel 
levels by program for Fiscal Year 2016 are contained in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility 
to the DNI in managing the civilian personnel of the 
Intelligence Community (IC). Section 103 provides that the DNI 
may authorize employment of civilian personnel (expressed as 
full-time equivalent positions) in Fiscal Year 2016 in excess 
of the number of authorized positions by an amount not 
exceeding three percent of the total limit applicable to each 
IC element under Section 102. The DNI may do so only if 
necessary to the performance of important intelligence 
functions, and must notify the congressional intelligence 
committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise 
of this authority.

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI and sets the 
authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA 
for Fiscal Year 2016.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2016 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability Fund.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 302 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 303. Notification of appointment and separation of senior level 
        personnel of the intelligence community

    Section 303 requires the DNI to establish a policy to 
ensure that the head of each appropriate element of the 
Intelligence Community shall notify the appropriate 
congressional committees, quarterly, of each appointment of an 
individual to a senior level position, separation from a senior 
level position, or reassignment within the senior level 
framework, during the previous 3-month period.
    A notification of appointment shall include a summary of 
the significant previous employment and accomplishments of the 
individual, such as a career biography and any academic degrees 
earned, and any other information appropriate to demonstrate 
that the individual is well-qualified to meet the needs of the 
intelligence community and that there is no significant and 
credible information to suggest that the individual is unfit or 
unqualified for such a position.
    A notification of separation shall include the effective 
date of an individual's separation from a senior level 
position.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

             Subtitle A--Director of National Intelligence

Section 401. Appointment and confirmation of the National 
        Counterintelligence Executive

    Section 401 makes subject to Presidential appointment and 
Senate confirmation, the Executive Branch position of National 
Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), which was created by the 
2002 Counterintelligence Enhancement Act. Effective December 
2014, the NCIX was also dual-hatted as the Director of the 
National Counterintelligence and Security Center.

Section 402. Inclusion of Inspector General of the Intelligence 
        Community in Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and 
        Efficiency

    Section 402 affirms that the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community (ICIG) is a member of the Council of the 
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

Section 403. Provision of information and assistance to Inspector 
        General of the Intelligence Community

    Section 403 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
clarify the ICIG's authority to seek information and assistance 
from state and local governmental agencies or units thereof in 
addition to federal agencies.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Section 411. Analytic Objectivity Review

    The ODNI's Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) office 
was established in response to the requirement in the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA) for the designation of an entity responsible for 
ensuring that the Intelligence Community's finished 
intelligence products are timely, objective, independent of 
political considerations, based upon all sources of available 
intelligence, and demonstrative of the standards of proper 
analytic tradecraft.
    Consistent with responsibilities prescribed under IRTPA, 
Section 411 requires the DNI to assign the AIS Chief, in 
consultation with the Senior Analytic Service at the CIA, with 
conducting a review of finished intelligence products produced 
by the CIA to assess whether the reorganization of the Agency, 
announced publicly on March 6, 2015, has resulted in any loss 
of analytic objectivity. The report is due two years from the 
date that the reorganization was announced, March 6, 2017.

Section 412. Authorities of the Inspector General for the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 412 amends the CIA Act of 1949 to make a technical 
correction to Section 17 and to clarify the CIA Inspector 
General's authority to seek information and assistance from 
state and local governmental agencies or units thereof, in 
addition to federal agencies, and to make technical changes to 
the Inspector General's personnel authorities in the same 
paragraph.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

                 Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia

Section 501. Notice of deployment or transfer of Club-K container 
        missile system by the Russian Federation

    Section 501 requires the DNI to submit written notice to 
the appropriate congressional committees if the Intelligence 
Community receives intelligence that the Russian Federation has 
deployed, or is about to deploy, the Club-K container missile 
system through the Russian military, or transferred or sold, or 
intends to transfer or sell, such system to another state or 
non-state actor.

Section 502. Assessment on the funding of political parties and non-
        governmental organizations by the Russian Federation

    Section 502 requires the DNI to submit an Intelligence 
Community assessment to the appropriate congressional 
committees concerning the funding of political parties and non-
governmental organizations in the former Soviet States and 
Europe by the Russian Federation and the Russian Federation 
security and intelligence services since January 1, 2006, not 
later than 180 days after the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 
Intelligence Authorization Act.

Section 503. Assessment on the use of political assassinations as a 
        form of statecraft by the Russian Federation

    Section 503 requires the DNI to submit an Intelligence 
Community assessment concerning the use of political 
assassinations as a form of statecraft by the Russian 
Federation to the appropriate congressional committees, not 
later than 180 days after the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 
Intelligence Authorization Act.

            Subtitle B--Matters Relating to Other Countries

Section 511. Report of resources and collection posture with regard to 
        the South China Sea and East China Sea

    Section 511 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees an Intelligence Community assessment 
on Intelligence Community resourcing and collection posture 
with regard to the South China Sea and East China Sea, not 
later than 180 days after the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 
Intelligence Authorization Act.

Section 512. Replacement of locally employed staff serving at United 
        States diplomatic facilities in Cuba

    Section 512 requires the Secretary of State, not later than 
one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, to ensure 
that every supervisory position at a United States diplomatic 
facility in Cuba is occupied by a citizen of the United States 
who has passed a thorough background check. Further, not later 
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
provision requires the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
other appropriate government agencies, to submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a plan to further reduce 
the reliance on locally employed staff in United States 
diplomatic facilities in Cuba. The plan shall, at a minimum, 
include cost estimates, timelines, and numbers of employees to 
be replaced.

Section 513. Inclusion of sensitive compartmented information 
        facilities in United States diplomatic facilities in Cuba

    Section 513 requires that each United States diplomatic 
facility in Cuba that is constructed, or undergoes a 
construction upgrade, be constructed to include a sensitive 
compartmented information facility.

Section 514. Report on use by Iran of funds made available through 
        sanctions relief

    Section 514 requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, to submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report assessing the monetary value 
of any direct or indirect form of sanctions relief Iran has 
received since the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) entered into 
effect, and how Iran has used funds made available through such 
sanctions relief. This report shall be submitted every 180 days 
while the JPOA is in effect, and not later than 1 year after an 
agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program takes effect, and 
annually thereafter while that agreement remains in effect.

                      TITLE VI--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 601. Intelligence oversight exception for contractual non-
        disclosure provisions

    Section 601 provides that no provision of a contract with 
an element of the Intelligence Community that prohibits the 
disclosure of information may be construed to prohibit the 
Intelligence Community from providing information to the 
congressional intelligence committees.
    The section would also preclude as a cause of action the 
provision of information pertinent to or arising from the 
contractual agreement, consistent with Congressional reporting 
obligations.

Section 602. Notification of changes to retention of call detail record 
        policies

    Section 602 requires the DNI to notify the appropriate 
congressional committees in writing not later than 15 days 
after learning that an electronic communications service 
provider that generates call detail records in the ordinary 
course of business has changed its policy on the retention of 
such call details records to result in a retention period of 
less than 18 months.

Section 603. Requirement to report terrorist activities and the 
        unlawful distribution of information relating to explosives

    Section 603 requires companies providing an interstate 
electronic communication service or remote computing service to 
the public to report to appropriate authorities as determined 
by the Attorney General when they know their technology is 
being used to carry out a potential terrorist attack, similar 
to the process required by existing federal law in cases of 
child pornography.

Section 604. Broadening the scope of Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence tradecraft review

    As required by IRTPA, ODNI's AIS office conducts a regular, 
detailed review of finished intelligence products, aimed at 
continually monitoring the quality of the Intelligence 
Community's analytic work product.
    Section 604 amends section 1019 of IRTPA by broadening 
reviews of finished intelligence products conducted by AIS to 
include an explanation of how substantially similar, 
contemporaneous intelligence products are distinct in terms of 
source material, timeframe, methodology, or other 
distinguishing analytic characteristic.

Section 605. Strategy for comprehensive interagency review of the 
        United States national security overhead satellite architecture

    Section 605 requires the DNI, in collaboration with the 
Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, to develop a strategy, with milestones and benchmarks, 
to ensure that there is a comprehensive interagency review of 
policies and practices for planning and acquiring national 
security satellite systems and architectures, including the 
capabilities of commercial systems and partner countries, 
consistent with the National Space Policy issued on June 28, 
2010. Where applicable, this strategy shall account for the 
unique missions and authorities vested in the Department of 
Defense and the Intelligence Community.

Section 606. Unauthorized dealings in special nuclear material

    Section 606 includes the DNI among the senior government 
officials with whom the Secretary of Energy must consult, prior 
to issuing authorization to directly or indirectly engage or 
participate in the development or production of any special 
nuclear material outside the United States, by amending the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077).

Section 607. Enhancing government personnel security programs

    Section 607 directs the DNI to develop and implement a plan 
for eliminating the backlog of overdue periodic investigations, 
and further requires the DNI to direct each agency to implement 
a program to provide enhanced security review to individuals 
determined eligible for access to classified information or 
eligible to hold a sensitive position.
    These enhanced personnel security programs, which will 
integrate information relevant to suitability for access to 
classified information, and be conducted at least 2 times every 
5 years, are to commence not later than 5 years after the date 
of enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization 
Act, or the elimination of the backlog of overdue periodic 
investigations, whichever occurs first.

Section 608. Technical amendments relating to pay under title 5, United 
        States Code

    Section 608 amends 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5102(a)(1) to expressly 
exclude the ODNI from the provisions of chapter 51 of title 5, 
relating to position classification, pay, and allowances for 
General Schedule employees, which do not apply to ODNI by 
virtue of the National Security Act. Section 102A(m) of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3024) provides 
that the DNI may ``exercise with respect to the personnel of 
the ODNI any authority of the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency . . . under the Central Intelligence Agency 
Act of 1949 . . . and other applicable provisions of law, as of 
December 17, 2004.'' As the exclusion of the CIA from the 
definition of an agency in chapter 51 was in effect as of that 
date, the ODNI is also excluded from chapter 51 by section 
102A(m) of the National Security Act. This proposal would have 
no substantive effect except to align the two statutes.

                           Committee Comments

Declassification review of video of the 2012 Benghazi Terrorist Attacks

    Numerous investigations have been conducted regarding the 
2012 terrorist attack against U.S. facilities in Benghazi. This 
Committee produced one of the first declassified Congressional 
reports and continues to believe that the public should have 
access to information about the attacks, so long as it does not 
jeopardize intelligence sources and methods.
    The closed circuit television videos from the Temporary 
Mission Facility (TMF) captured some of the activity that took 
place at the State Department facility on September 11, 2012, 
and their release would contribute to the public's 
understanding of the event without compromising sources or 
methods.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, or the 
appropriate federal official, to conduct a declassification 
review and to facilitate the release to the public of the 
declassified closed-circuit television videos of the September 
11, 2012 terrorist attack on the TMF in Benghazi, Libya, 
consistent with the protection of sources and methods, not 
later than 120 days after the enactment of this Act.

                            Committee Action

    On June 24, 2015, a quorum being present, the Committee met 
to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the 
following actions:

Votes on amendments to committee bill, this report, and the classified 
        annex

    By unanimous consent, the Committee moved to consideration 
of the Chairman and Vice Chairman Mark and the classified 
annex.
    The Committee moved to consideration en bloc of four 
amendments by Senator Burr and Senator Feinstein that made 
changes to the classified annex, an amendment by Senator Rubio 
that made changes to the classified annex, and five amendments 
by Senator Warner that made changes to the classified annex. By 
voice vote, the Committee agreed en bloc to the amendments.
    The Committee moved to consideration en bloc of an 
amendment by Senator Rubio that requires a report on the use by 
Iran of funds made available through sanctions relief, an 
amendment by Senator Collins that enhances government personnel 
security programs, and an amendment by Senator Cotton that 
requires that the DNI be consulted before the Department of 
Energy issues authorization to directly or indirectly engage or 
participate in the development or production of any special 
nuclear material outside the United States. By voice vote, the 
Committee agreed en bloc to the amendments.
    The Committee moved to consideration of an amendment by 
Senator Feinstein that requires the DNI to establish a policy 
to ensure the appropriate congressional committees are 
notified, quarterly, of each appointment of an individual to or 
separation from a senior level position in the IC during the 
previous 3-month period. The amendment, as modified by Senator 
Feinstein and Senator Collins, was adopted by voice vote.
    The Committee moved to consideration of an amendment by 
Senator Cotton that made changes to the classified annex. The 
amendment, as modified by Senator Cotton, was adopted by voice 
vote.
    The Committee moved to consideration of an amendment by 
Senator Warner that made changes to the classified annex. The 
amendment, as modified by Senator Warner, was adopted by voice 
vote.
    The Committee authorized the staff to make technical and 
conforming changes in the bill, report, and classified annex, 
following the completion of the mark-up.

Vote to report the committee bill

    The Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a 
vote of 15 ayes to 0 noes. The votes in person or by proxy were 
as follows: Chairman Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator 
Coats--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator 
Blunt--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Vice 
Chairman Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Mikulski--
aye; Senator Warner--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--
aye; and Senator Hirono--aye.

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

    Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires 
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed 
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff 
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the Committee report 
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the 
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the 
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of 
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule also 
contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On June 26, 
2015, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional 
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred 
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

        ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WYDEN, HEINRICH, AND HIRONO

    We appreciate the bipartisan work that our colleagues have 
put into assembling this bill. We look forward to further 
discussion as it moves forward, especially on those provisions 
that have not yet been subject to public debate. We are 
particularly interested to hear from Internet and 
communications companies regarding Section 603, which would 
require these companies to notify authorities if they become 
aware of terrorist activity. Since this provision expressly 
does not require these companies to monitor their users, it 
appears to us that this would not actually change the current 
practices of these companies, and we will confirm that point 
with those companies before the full Senate considers this 
legislation on the floor.
    We are disappointed that an amendment that we filed to 
expand the mandate and responsibilities of the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) was not accepted, but 
we look forward to future opportunities to strengthen oversight 
of intelligence activities. We certainly do not look favorably 
on a provision in the House-passed FY 2016 Intelligence 
Authorization Act (H.R. 2596) that would restrict PCLOB's 
mandate.
    Additionally, there are certain provisions in the 
classified annex accompanying the bill that do not precisely 
reflect our positions, and we have addressed those provisions 
in more detailed classified additional views filed with that 
annex.

                                   Ron Wyden.
                                   Martin Heinrich.
                                   Mazie K. Hirono.

 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WARNER, KING, RUBIO, HIRONO, AND MIKULSKI

    This legislation includes an amendment we supported to 
require a comprehensive approach to the overhead satellite 
architecture that supports U.S. intelligence and defense 
programs.
    We believe this bill sends a strong message that we need a 
strategy for our space architecture that safeguards our 
national security by taking advantage of cutting-edge 
technology. The U.S. is in danger of losing our technological 
edge due to our current overreliance on a big-government 
acquisition model. Our current approach to overhead satellites 
is increasingly unsustainable due to growing costs, long design 
time, lack of competition, and an inability to take advantage 
of rapid innovation in the private sector. Given the cost of 
maintaining our satellite infrastructure and the dangers and 
constraints imposed by the threat of anti-satellite weapons, 
our space infrastructure will be stronger and more efficient if 
it integrates commercial capabilities into government 
solutions.
    On September 23, 1971, National Security Adviser Henry 
Kissinger issued a short memo regarding President Nixon's 
decision to pursue the first electro-optical imaging (EOI) 
satellite, to be undertaken ``under a realistic funding 
program, with a view toward achieving an operational capability 
in 1976.'' It took almost exactly five years to design and 
launch the first KH-11 satellite into orbit on December 19, 
1976. The United States needs to get back to this kind of 
timeline in designing and launching overhead reconnaissance 
satellites. We cannot afford to wait a decade or more from 
design to launch of a satellite if the United States is to 
maintain its technological edge.
    Our amendment also recognizes that space is no longer an 
uncontested environment, as it once was, and that the U.S. 
government must be open to innovative solutions such as 
distributed, disaggregated architectures that could allow for 
better resiliency against the space threat, and also allow for 
ready reconstitution, constant replenishment, and frequent 
technological refresh. Moreover, the current cost-constrained 
budget environment dictates that the U.S. must more seriously 
consider the costs of space systems and be open to potentially 
less expensive alternatives that include commercial solutions.
    In April 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that 
the United States needed to reform acquisition practices across 
the Department of Defense, that the costs of the ``exquisite 
solution'' were making defense unaffordable, and that ``we 
needed to shift away from the 99-percent exquisite service-
centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they 
take forever to build and only then in very limited quantities. 
With the pace of technological and geopolitical change and the 
range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80-
percent multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on 
budget and in significant numbers.''
    In line with Secretary Gates's thinking about the ``80-
percent solution,'' the U.S. National Space Policy issued on 
June 28, 2010, already states that to the maximum extent 
possible, the U.S. government should use commercial space 
capabilities when these are available, and develop 
``exquisite'' governmental space systems ``only when it is in 
the national interest and there is no suitable, cost-effective 
United States commercial or, as appropriate, foreign commercial 
service or system that is or will be available.''
    Therefore, consistent with the National Space Policy, we 
believe the U.S. government should make maximum use of mature 
commercial space capabilities and acquisition practices for 
national security systems where the required performance can be 
met with commodity technology to reduce acquisition timelines 
and costs, promote competition, capitalize on the pace of 
commercial technology advances, and avoid unnecessary 
government-unique investments. National Intelligence and 
Department of Defense investments in technology development 
utilizing a unique, dedicated industrial base should only be 
reserved for cases where commercial commodity technology does 
not exist or where revolutionary technology is judged to be 
achievable and worth the attendant risk, cost, and time to 
acquire.
    Satellite systems and architectures should also be designed 
in such a way that a number of elements common to multiple 
spacecraft could be standardized, to reduce costs, simplify 
execution and preserve a competitive industrial base; and the 
entire overhead satellite architecture of the United States, 
including programs funded by the Department of Defense or by an 
element of the intelligence community, commercial providers, 
and foreign partners, should be viewed and treated as an 
integrated whole, not simply as a series of independent and 
unrelated satellite systems.
    Given the importance of space systems to the national 
security and their huge costs, we believe that the current 
state of the U.S. space systems architecture, and planning for 
the future architecture, should receive priority attention from 
the President, his senior national security and scientific 
advisors, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary 
of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Our amendment therefore requires the Director of National 
Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs to develop a strategy--with milestones and 
benchmarks--to ensure that the nation's satellite architecture 
meets the nation's needs in peace- and war-time; responsibly 
stewards the taxpayers' dollars; accurately takes into account 
cost- and performance tradeoffs of the architecture; meets 
realistic requirements; produces and fosters excellence, 
innovation and competition; produces innovative satellite 
systems in under five years that can leverage common, 
standardized design elements and commercially-available 
technologies; takes advantage of rapid advances in commercial 
technology, innovation and commercial-like acquisition 
practices; and fosters competition and a robust industrial 
base.

                                   Mark R. Warner.
                                   Angus S. King.
                                   Marco Rubio.
                                   Mazie K. Hirono.
                                   Barbara A. Mikulski.

                                  [all]
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