Q(mi@frii®cii 1976

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Highway Administration
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A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL-AID PROGRAM

7 HUG

^^ITES O*

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Highway Administration

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402

Stock No. 050-001-00123-3
Notice

"Wliere sources known to be covered by reo;istered copyright have been

quoted in this book, the name of the copyri<>-ht owner is inchided in the

reference. Any omissions are unintentional and do not afl'ect tlie validity

of the copyright.

The identification (in writing, in photographs, or in drawings) of items

of equipment by trademarks or by manufacturer's name is for historical

accuracy only and does not constitute an endorsement by the U.S. Government

of the equipment or the manufacturer.

II
PrefQce

This book has been written for a ^Yidely diversified

audience—those interested in the o-eneral history of our Nation's highways and those whose interest might

be more narrowly confined to matters relating to the

technical aspects of highway transportation. It has

been prepared in two parts—Part I deals with the

broad subject of higliway history from colonial days

forward to the historic highway legislation of 1956;

Part II deals separately and in some detail with the

several areas of responsibility for administration,

planning and research, design, construction and maintenance of highways and bridges, both foreign and

domestic as authorized under the Federal highway

legislation.

The reader will note the changing reference to the name of the Federal unit assig-ned responsibility for

the administration of the Federal-aid highway program—the original Office of Road Inquiry, the Bureau

of Public Roads, the Public Roads Administration,

again the Bureau of Public Roads, and finally the

Federal Highway Administration. These changes in organization title are chronicled in Chapter I, Part II which covers the program administration through

the years. Biographical information on a few key individuals

has been included at the end of Part I and in selected

chaptei-s of Pait II wliere each man's contribution is directly related. The numbers are purposely limited,

and many hundreds of dedicated and competent individuals go unrecognized.

Many former and current employees have contributed text for or reviewed this book. The manuscripts, in most instances, have been edited to make

this book a reasonable leng-th, but the original manuscripts are available in the U.S. Department of

Transportation Library for future scholars to review.

In addition to those listed below, many others assisted

in the preparation of this book, in particular Mary

Jo Burke and Verla R. Cook of the Department of

Transportation Library, to assure a history as complete

as possible.

Chauncey Aldrich

James A. Bloom

Frank L. Calhoun

Carl A. Cai'penter

William O. Comella

Howard D. Correll F. William Cron

Charles D. Curtiss

Phillip DarlingMichael De Stephanis

Martin Deuterman

Thomas O. Edick

H. Dean Fravel

Robert B. Gair

A. F. Ghiglione

Willis Grafe

E. H. Holmes

John B. Kemp

Ross W. Kruser

C. V. Kurylo

Lester P. Lamm

D. AV. Loutzenheiser

Henry H. MahieiMartin F. Maloney

E. J. Martin, Jr. Kennon Nakamura

Barbara M. Neilson

John D. O'Fallon

S. Z. Phillips

Charles W. Prisk

Joyce N. Ritter

Elizabeth Samson

Gordon B. Sharpe

C. L. Shufflebarger

C. A. Steele

Josephine C. Sweeney

E. A. Swick

A. Taragin

A. Clayson Taylor

William P. Walker

York Welbom

M. Susan Wiley

George M. Williams

B. Dianne Williford

ni
Fofeujord

The economic growth of the United States in the

200 years of its existence and the record of individual

prosperity achieved by its people in that brief period

of time are attributable to the success of the trans- portation system developed during that period—

a

system almost totally dependent on the Nation's

highways.

This book has been written to record for posterity

the story of highway development in the United

States, beginning in the early years of the new Nation

and expanding with the growing country as it moved

into the undeveloped areas west of the original colonial

States, and ultimately evolving into the Federal-aid

highway program in which the State and Federal

Governments have worked cooperatively and success- fully for the past 60 years. It is a proud story and

one that should be recorded.

The book will make available for future highwaj^

transportation officials a documentation of earlier decisions and experiences which, up to this time, have

been available only in scattered writings or in the

individual knowledge and recollections of many of

those involved directly in the Federal-aid highway

program during this period of development and

whose experiences have not previously been i-ecorded.

Our Nation will continue to grow and to progress, and our transportation system will contribute materially toward that objective.

Norbert T. Tiemann

Federal Highway Administrator

1976

IV
Content/

PQ^^ ^Jn© I The Colonial Legacy 2

2 Early Turnpike Era 8

J Early Federal Aid for Roads and Canals 16

A The Age of Steam 28

S The Good Roads Movement 36

Q Dawn of the Motor Age 54

g The Beginning of Scientific Roadbuilding 64

Q The Drive for Federal Aid 80

Planning a Highway System 90

1^5 The Highway Boom 112

1 I Roads for National Defense 142

12 Events Leading to Enactment of the 1956 Federal-Aid

Highway Act 154

V
Part Tuuo Administration of the Federal-Aid Proeram 198 i

M. Finance and Economics 238

3 Planning 264

A Research 320

K Right-of-Way and Environment 354

A Design 380

T Bridges 418

^J Construction and Maintenance 444

^3 Development of the Interstate Program 466

ILJ Construction in the Federal Domain 486

I

I International Operations 518

Epilogue—The Success Story 542

Highway Related Legislation 546

Picture Credits 548

VI Index 551

The

Colonial

Legacy

The Indian canoe.
The Wilderness Road.

Tlie young Nation that emerged from the War of

Independence had a \Yeak government and a primitive

transportation system. The rivers and the sheltered

coastal waters, such as Long Island Sound, Chesapeake

Bay and Albemarle Sound, were the principal highways for travel and commerce. Extending back from

these arteries were roads in various stages of development. A Y&vy few of these, near the largest cities, were "artificial roads." ditched and sometimes hardsurfaced with gravel or with "pounded stone." The

rest were imi:»roved only to the extent of removing

stumps and boulders and leveling the worst irregularities of the ground. Many of these roads were impassable for wheeled vehicles in winter or during the

spring thaw. Travelers crossed small streams by fording and the larger ones by ferries. Bridges were few

and far between.

On the fringes of settlement, the "roads" were really

only horsepaths, unsuitable for wheeled vehicles. The

Wilderness Road through Cumberland Gap, located

by Daniel Boone in 1775. was such a pack trail.* General Braddock's military road, constructed in 1755, was chopped out to a width of 12 feet—wide

enough to pass the train of 150 Conestoga wagons in a single file—but by 1758 it had reverted to a trace through the forest. The other main transmountain

road, the Pennsylvania Road, had been widened in

1758 during the French and Indian War to pass

General John Forbes' wagon trains, but was otherwise

unimproved.

* However, a Kentucky historian has called the Wilderness

Road "... a monument to the skill of Boone as a practical

engineer and surveyor. It required a mind of far more than

ordinary calii)er to locate through more than two hundred

miles of mountain wilderness a way of travel which, for a hundred years, has remained practically unchanged. . . ." *

3
Cable ferry over the Colorado River. In the early days, this method was frequently used to cross rivers.

X.-.

One of the first road signs in America—hieroglyphics on

Basset rock, near Washington, Utah.

Winter travel over primitive trail.
The Pennsylvania Road.

Colonial post rider.
Early Postal and Stagecoach Service

Despite the primitive condition of the roads, a land

postal service was operated by the colonial authorities

between the principal cities of the eastern seaboard.

In 1729, 4 weeks were required to send a letter from

Boston to Williamsburjr, Virginia. For the most part,

the mail was carried on foot or by post riders on

horseback who averaged about 4 miles per hour, with

no night travel. The mails were speeded up considerably during

Benjamin Franklin's long tenure as Deputy and Associate Postmaster General, from 1737 to 1757, and 1762

to 1773. Within a year after his appointment,

Franklin had so improved the service that a letter could be sent from Philadelphia to Boston and a reply

returned in 3 weeks. After 1764, Franklin made the

mails move day and night between Philadelphia and

New York, and this fast service was later extended

to Boston.^

As early as 1750, there was a regular stage-wagon*

service from Philadelphia to New York via Trenton

and Brunswick. Just before the Revolution, passengers could travel by stage from Philadelphia to the

Paulus Hook (now Jersey City) ferry in 2 days in

* A covered springless vehicle fitted with rigid wooden

benches for carrying passengers.

good weather, and public passenger stages were available for the journey from New York to Boston.^

Local Authorities Responsible for Roads

Under colonial laws patterned after those of the

mother country, roadmaking and mending were re- sponsibilities of the local governments—the towns in

New England and the counties in other colonies. In

the former, the elected town officers, among them a surveyor of highways, were charged with the upkeep

of highways, private ways, causeways and bridges ; and

were authorized to remove obstructions from the highways, to dig for stone, gravel, clay or marl in any

land not planted or enclosed, and to command the

labor, on appointed days after public notice, of all persons over 16 years of age for work on the roads.*

In Virginia, the County Court, composed of eight or more gentleman inliabitants elected by the free- holders and approved by the Governor, was responsible for the condition of the roads and bridges. The

court could contract for necessary road work or direct

that it be performed gratis by the "tithable males"

under the direction of the precinct surveyors, or fore- men. Tithable persons were local residents over 16

years of age, whether free, slave, or indentured. Owners of two or more tithables could send them as substitutes in lieu of working in pei^son.^

The Flying Machine.
Rolling tobacco to market

Model of Nantucket, Mass. fish cart. The

barrel takes place of wheel and makes trac- tion easier on sandy roads.

The other colonies had similar provisions for keeping their roads in repair, and all of them authorized

the local authorities to require compulsory road service or its equivalent in cash. This "statute labor" was

for years the principal resource available to local governments for road work in the colonies and later in

the States, but other resources, such as private subscriptions, donations by public spirited citizens, assess- ments on adjacent property, or the proceeds of public

lotteries, were occasionally available.®

There were hundreds of private ferries on the rivers. These ranged from canoes and small rowboats to flat- bottomed barges capable of carrying a wagon or sev- eral cattle. The right to operate a ferry was obtained

from the colonial legislature or the county by a grant

or contract, under which the ferry owner was allowed

to collect fixed fees in compensation for his services

and the use of his property. Ferry proprietors were

considered to be public carriers, responsible for the

life and property of their passengers.''

The English practice, begun in 1663, of permitting

the local authorities or private persons to raise money

for roadbuilding and maintenance by charging user

tolls did not spread to the colonies. Except for payment of ferrj' fees, a traveler could freely use the

roads, such as they were, from Maine to Georgia.

REFERENCES

'Address by T. H. MacDonald, Chief, Bureau of Public Roads, in Washington, D.C., October 6, 1926. 'A. Rose, Histoeic American Highways—Public Roads of THE Past (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1953) p. 32.

^Id., p. 34. 'Id., p. 62. nd., p. 64. "Id., p. 23.

'Id., p. 45.
Early

Turnpike

Era

In all of the States, a long and severe depression

followed independence. Recovery was hampered by

the wretched condition of the roads, which had be- come practically imj^assable in many places from lack

of maintenance during the war.

Postwar Recovery Generates Increased Road Traffic Business began to pick up about 1787, and with the

increase in trade came a rapid increase in road traffic,

especially near the larger cities. The feeble efforts of

the local authorities were not equal to keeping the

roads in repair under this traffic, so there was widespread agitation for State assistance to help maintain

the principal roads. The debt-burdened State governments met this challenge by appealing to private

capital for the funds to build better highways. They

chartered private turnpike* companies, conferring on them authority to build roads and charge tolls to the

public for their use. The first of these companies,

chartered by Virginia in 1785, built a turnpike road

from Alexandria, on the Potomac River, westward to the mountains near Berryville. However, the first to

* Originally, a "turnpil<e" was a long pole or pike which

barred the traveler's way at each tollgate. After he paid the required toll, the pike was turned or swung out of the traveler's

path.' "Turnpike" eventually became a synonym for any highclass, stone-surfaced road.

be completed for any considerable distance, and one

of the most successful financially, was in Pennsylvania, between Philadelphia and Lancaster.^

Transportation Plan Proposed for Pennsylvania

In February 1791, The Society for Promoting the

Improvement of Roads and Inland Navigation submitted to the Pennsylvania Legislature what may be

the earliest statewide transportation plan in U.S.

history. This plan proposed that the Legislatt;re appoint a Board of Commissioners with power to decide

the locations of the principal roads in the State and

determine which should be improved by turnpike companies and which ought to be made or repaired at public cost. The board would then have the authority

to advertise and award contracts to build and operate

the turnpikes, and also to employ persons to repair

those roads deemed unsuitable for turnpikes. Similarly, the board would have authority to contract for

the construction and operation of toll canals or to make other navigation improvements at public expense.^

An important feature of the transportation plan was the vohmtary relinquishment by the State for a

stated number of years of its right to charter parallel

competing facilities that would destroy or diminish

tlie income or re\'enue of turnpikes or toll navigations

already established.

8
""^tW^S^

Wayside inn on Lancaster Road.

The Legislature was not ready, at tliat time, to confer sncli vast ^lowers on an administrative body.

However, it did announce its readiness to subsidize

road and canal building in sparsely settled pai-ts of

the State with liberal appropriations of public money

and to incorporate companies "for the gradual and

progressive improvement of roads and waters where

the tolls would be sufficient to recompense the subscribers or stockholdei*s, and the charge woidd fall, according to justice, upon those who were to be benefitted, in pi'oportion to the use they might make of

such roads and waters." * Under this policy, the Legislature, in April 1791,

appropriated 36,160 Pennsylvania pounds to be ex- pended under the direction of the Governor and

Council for some 68 road and navigation improvements scattered all over the state.^ Later, in April

1793, the Legislature authorized the Governor to in- corporate the Conewago Canal Company to construct

a lock canal around the Conewago Falls of the Susquehanna River at public expense, to be "opened as a

public highway and for public use, forever . . . free

of toll, and any and every other charge whatsoever. . . ." ^ In September 1791, the Legislature authorized the

incorporation of the Schuylkill and Susquehanna

Company to build a toll canal between those rivers. Two other acts in April 1792 established the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Road Company and

the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation Company. Other turnpike and canal acts followed in later years, all modeled on the earlier ones. The charters granted to the turnpike and canal

companies under these acts were practically identical

in fact, both canals and turnpikes were considered to be "highways." Both were regulated transportation

monopolies granted by specific acts of the State Legislature. These acts specified the termini and general

route of the road or canal, set minimum engineering

standards and conferred the right of eminent domain

for taking necessary' right-of-way and road materials.

Inn near Brandywine, Pa., on Lancaster Road.

The companies were authorized to collect tolls at rates

specified in the acts, but these rates were subject to renegotiation at intervals. The comjDanies were re- quired to keep their facilities in good order at all times. Turnpike acts set load limits and minimmn

tire widths for vehicles using the roads to protect the

companies from destructive ov^erloading by their

patrons, especially during the spring thaw.

The Lancaster Road—Prototype Turnpike

The charter for the Philadelphia to Lancaster Road

required that it be laid out .50 feet wide between

fences, of which at least 21 feet "sliall be made an

artificial road, which shall be bedded with wood, stone,

gravel, or any other hard substance, well compacted

together, a sufficient depth to secure a solid foundation

to the same; and the said road shall be faced with

gravel, or stone pounded, or other small hard substance, in such manner as to secure a fii-m, and, as near as the materials will admit, an even surface . . ."

The gradient was limited to an angle of 4 degrees

with the horizon. (Tliis is the equivalent of a grade

of 7 percent.)

9
The Company had no trouble selling its stock to eager investors at $300 per share. "I have never seen men," an eyewitness wrote, "so wet with sweat in the

harvest field as some were in the crowd today who

subscribed to the turnpike road." * Construction began in February 1793, and was completed for the full length of 62 miles in a little under 3 years—a remarkable engineering achievement for the period. The

cost was $465,000, or an average of $7,500 per mile.^

The Company collected tolls at 13 points along the

road at rates varying from 214 cents per vehicle-mile

for stages and coaches drawn by 2 horses to 5 cents per

mile for 4-horse freight wagons with 4-inch tires. Vehicles with wider tires could travel for lower rates, and a horse and rider could travel 10 miles for 6 cents. The Lancaster Pike did not return more than 2

percent of the invested capital for the first 5 years

by the British Fleet. During the war, from 10 to 20

freight wagons arrived daily at Charleston, South

Carolina, from cities as far away as Boston.^^

The Transmountain Roads

The larger seaboard States from New York to North

Carolina had extensive areas of western lands which

they were anxious to settle and develop. Also, the

seaport cities were eager for the trade such development would produce. There was, therefore, a strong

sentiment to push good roads westward over the

Allegheny Mountain barrier. Four main transmountain roads resulted.

After completion of the Lancaster Pike to Lancaster, the Pennsylvania Legislature granted charters

for extending it westward to Pittsburgh. The State

subsidized this "Pennsylvania Road" by subscribing

to the stock of some of the companies.

Conestoga wagon "Philadelphia to Pittsburg 20 days."

after it was opened, but, as the western part of the

State developed, the profits rose until in some years

they reached 15 percent, the maximum permitted by

the charter.

Rapid Spread of Toll Roads and Canals

After 1800, most of the States adopted toll financing

for main roads and canals, while retaining the old

statute labor system for local improvements. By

1808, Connecticut had chartered 50 turnpike companies, which had completed 770 miles of roads. In

New York, 67 companies, capitalized at over $5 million, were chartered before 1807 to build 3,071 miles

of turnpike roads, and 21 companies were chartered

to build toll bridges." By 1828, Pennsylvania had

3,110 miles of turnpike roads, costing $8 million.^^

The turnpike companies at first concentrated their

efforts on the main roads between cities where traffic was heaviest, and since most of these cities were along

the Atlantic coast, the coastal highway (now U.S.

Route 1) was the first to be improved over any considerable distance. The Delaware River Bridge Company built a substantial bridge at Trenton, N. J., in

1806, and by 1812 the New York-Philadelphia road was stone-surfaced the full distance between those

cities. These, and improvements to the coastal highway in other States, came just in time to save the

country from a severe transportation crisis during the

War of 1812, when coastal shipping was blockaded

Primitive method of breaking stone on toll road.

In New York the turnpikes developed without State

subsidies, and many of the turnpike roads were controlled by large landowners who sometimes were more

interested in selling land than in providing transportation. However, by 1812 New Yoric had a welldeveloped turnpike system extending from the

Massachusetts boundary to Lake Ei'ie. Maryland chartered several turnpike companies in

the 1820's to connect Baltimore with the Cumberland

Road (the National Road), then being built by the

Federal Government with congressional appi'opria10
The Erie Canal.

tions ; and was thus prepai'ed to cash in on the Federal

investment when the Cumberland Road reached the

Ohio Eiver.

Virginia incorporated the Northwestern Turnpike

in 1831 as a State-owned enterprise, with the Governor

as president of the board of directors, to build a turn- pike road from Winchester to "some point on the

Ohio Eiver to be situated by the princi])al engineer."

The principal engineer was Captain Claudius Crozet,

formerly professor of engineering at "West Point, and

perhaps the ablest road engineer in America at tliis time. This road was completed to Parkersburg on the

Ohio River in 1838, at a cost of $400,000."

The standards and costs of the many turnpikes

varied widely. Some were graded and ditched, but

imsurfaced. Most were surfaced with gravel or pounded stone. The pounded stone surface was very

expensive because all stone had to be quarried and

broken by hand labor.* After 1846 some roads were

surfaced with wooden planks laid on heavy sills. Average construction costs for turnpikes varied between $550 per mile to as high as $14,000 per mile."

The turnpike movement eventually spread into all the States, and by 1850 there were hundreds of companies operating thousands of miles of roads and

* The first practical mechanical stone crusher was patented

by Eli Whitney Blake, in 1858.

canals. These contributed tremendously to the States' internal development by opening new lands to settle- ment, by reducing the cost of haulage from the farms

to the markets, and by stimulating the development

of industries. Indeed, the construction of these

privately financed public works was, itself, a major

industry in the early 1800's. At first, only citizens of the United States were

allowed to own road and canal stock, but this restric- tion was later waived to attract European investment

capital. Some States subsidized turnpike and canal

companies by tax exemptions and by purchasing shares

in the ventures. The charter granted by Kentucky

to the Ohio Canal Company, for example, not only

authorized the Governor to subscribe for 1,000 shares on behalf of the State, but also extended the privilege

to the United States Government and to five other

States bordering on the Ohio River.

With certain notable exceptions, such as the Erie

Canal, the profits on toll road and canal investments were modest at best. Most of the charters contained

provisions for reducing tolls when profits reached a certain level, usually 12 or 15 percent per year. The

Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation Company's

charter required that when profits exceeded 15 percent

per annum 1 percent of the same shall be reserved

"for the establishment of schools, and the encouragement of the arts and sciences. . . ." "

11
Roads and Canals Coexisted

Generally, toll roads and toll canals were not in

direct competition with each other over the same or nearby routes, and conld coexist as elements of an expanding transportation system. Because of their more restrictive grade lines, canals followed more in- direct routes and were longer than turnpikes. Pass- ing the boats through the locks was a slow and tedious

business. Consequently, average canal speeds seldom

exceeded 2 or 3 miles per hour, as compared to 4 to 6

miles per hour on stagecoaches. The coach lines,

therefore, got most of the passengers and U.S. mail

contracts, and the turnpike freighters retained the

short-haul and the fast- freight business. On the other

hand, one horse pulling a canal boat could move as much freight as eight 4-horse wagon teams on a road.*

This made for a very low toll rate, so the canals

got the heavy freight if the shipper had a choice of

carriers.

Only where a very large proportion of the total

movement was through freight and the turnpikes and

canals had common terminals did they come into di- rect and damaging competition. This happened when

the Erie Canal was opened between Albany and

Buffalo in 1825 and the Pennsylvania river-canal

navigation system was opened between Philadelphia

and Pittsburgh in 1834. In both cases, the heavy

freight to and from the Great Lakes and the Ohio

Valley switched to the canals and most of the wagon

freighters went out of business, but the stagecoach

lines continued to prosper. The toll roads consequently

suffered a drastic decrease in their total income.

Improved Engineering and Administrative Methods

The toll roads were built by contractors, or by hired

laborers supervised by trained roadbuilders. Their

construction was thus a notable departure from the

* In 1807 Robert Fulton wrote, ". . . on a road of the best

kind, four horses, and sometimes five, are necessary to trans- port only three tons. On a canal one horse will draw twentyfive tons, and thus perform the work of forty horses." "

long-established feudal custom of building roads with

inefficient statute labor directed by amateur supervisors. To meet the standards in their charters, the

turnpike companies had to hire people with some

understanding of civil engineering to lay the roads

out; and, on the whole, the turnpike roads were well

located, and well built. The earlier turnpikes were paved according to the

recommendations of J. P. M. Tresaguet, Director

General of the French roads from 1775 to 1785, with

whose work educated Americans, such as Benjamin

Franklin, were well acquainted. Tresaguet insisted on an adequate right-of-way for his roads and provided generous side ditches to carry away surface

water that might otherwise stand on the road and

soften it. On a crowned and rolled subgrade, his

roadbuilders placed a layer of heavy foundation

stones, laid on edge, with the interstices packed solidly

with smaller stones rammed in place by hammering.

Above this course, by hand, they placed successive

layers of broken stone, course by course, compacted

and filled so that the stones interlocked with each

other. The top 3 inches were of hard, specially se- lected stone, broken with hammers to walnut-size at the quarry and hauled to the road to form the wearing

course.^^ The carriageways of Tresaguet's roads were 18 feet

wide and about 10 inches thick. Most of the early

American turnpikes were at least this wide, a common

width being 20 feet. The Lancaster Pike was at least 24 feet throughout and in places even wider.

Tresaguet's greatest contribution to highway administration was his insistence on prompt and in- cessant maintenance of every mile of road by trained

and adequately paid workmen. The system of maintenance he established made France's roads the best in

the world for two generations.

After about 1820, the ideas of the Scotsman, John

L. McAdam, who was responsible for the good roads

around Bristol, England, dominated American roadbuilding. McAdam didn't believe in massive foundation courses—^he asserted that the native soil, alone.

Laying stone foundation in Massachusetts. Although macadam

roads were in use, as late as 1898 the Tresaguet roadbuilding

method could be found.

'^^'*^^
r

Rolling stone toith steam roller near Westfleld, Mass. in 1898.

was what supported the road and the traffic upon it and that the function of the road crust was only to protect the basement soil from wetting and abrasion.

His roads, 6 to 10 inches thick, were made of angular

broken stones, all passing a 2-inch ring and packed

by traffic until they interlocked into a dense mass. The first American road built according to JNIcAdam's

principles was the Boonsborough to Hagerstown

Turnpike in Maryland, completed in 1822.^^ McAdam was primarily an administrator, rather

than an engineer. Like Tresaguet, he insisted on

thorough and continuous maintenance. He also advocated payment of adequate salaries to attract good

men who would make roadbuilding a career. As might be expected, the administration of turn- pikes varied widely from company to company, depending on the quality of the management, the amount

of toll-paying traffic, and how well the roads were

originally laid out and constnicted. Many were

imderfinanced, and failures and reorganizations were

frequent. The standard of maintenance was not al- ways as high as it should have been, especially for

those roads that were not making much money. But

on the whole, the turnpikes were a vast improvement

over both the miserable I'oads and tracks that preceded

them and the equally bad local roads still under township cxjntrol.

Early Railroads Were Regarded as Public Highways

In 1808 Benjamin Latrobe, the distinguished architect and civil engineer, and one of the designers of

the U.S. Capitol, summarized the prospects of rail- roads as a national mode of transportation in these

words

:

. . . railroads are out of the question as to the carriage

of common articles. Railroads leading from the coal mines to the margin of the James River, might answer

their expense, or others from the marble quarries near

Philadelphia to the Schuylkill. But these are the only

instances, within my knowledge, in which they at present

might be employed.

There is, however, a use for railroads as a temporary means to overcome the most difficult parts of artificial navigation ; and for this they are invaluable. . . ."

Latrobe's objection to railroads concerned the specialized iron-wheeled carriages required to travel on them; these were too expensive for the average farmer

or shipper to own, and also unsuitable for operation on the common roads. Because of this restriction,

only specialized roads hauling large quantities of bulk

freight, such as coal, from a single source would be

able to collect sufficient tolls from traffic to pay out

their construction cost.

13
At this time, there were no railroads in the United

States and only a few in Europe. The carriages or wagons were pulled by horses. On a good railroad, one horse could pull four wagons of 2 tons each.^" England's first commercial railroad, opened in 1820, was originally intended to be operated with horses.

Even later when the Liverpool and Manchester Railroad was chartered in 1828, it too was intended primarily to haul freight by horse power and included

a provision in its charter that the owners could exact

toll of all persons who might put vehicles on the road

for transporting goods. However, this provision was

required of few shippers because this railroad adopted

steam propulsion a year later. About the same time in Pennsylvania, the State

built a railroad from Philadelphia to Columbia and

licensed 20 different companies to run their horsedrawn cars over it." In Indiana, the chief engineer

of the Madison and Indianapolis Railroad recom- mended in 1837 that the State furnish steam motive

power for its railroads, "leaving the cars for the con- veyance of freight and passengers to be furnished by

individuals or companies, from whom the state will exact the proper toll for the use of the road, and for

the motive power." ^^ In their early days, railroads were regarded in the same light as turnpikes and canals, to be used by and

for the benefit of the public. The theory that a rail- road was private property to be used exclusively by

the owners and with which they could do as they

pleased, prevailed for only a very short time.

Rapid Extension of Railroads in the United States In the United States, the first charters for commercial railroads were granted in 1827 to the Baltimore

and Ohio Railroad to operate in Virginia, Maryland,

and Pennsylvania, and to the Charleston and Hamburg Railroad for operation in South Carolina. Other

States followed soon afterward, issuing charters for

short railroads, few exceeding 100 miles in length.

Up to the end of 1830, only 41 miles of railroad were

constructed. This increased to 918 miles by the end

of 1835 and to 2,797 by 1840. In 1856, 18,400 miles were in operation, and by 1860 railroads were being

built at the rate of 5,000 miles per year, with 31,000

miles in operation.^^

Steadily, this multitude of short lines was consolidated into more efficient systems by financial mergers

and by standardization of gauges, so that long shipments were possible without changing railroads or

cars. Only a very few of the earliest railroads were

planned for operation by animal power. After about

1835 practically all of the American railroads were made heavy enough to support steam engines, and, to accommodate the higher speeds possible with steam

propulsion, were laid out with much less curvature

and easier gradients than was customary for turnpike

roads. At first, operating speeds were only about 8 to 10 miles per hour but these doubled by 1840.

These higher speeds, plus the ability to haul large

tonnages at low cost, gave the railroads a tremendous

competitive edge over both the turnpikes and the

canals. For topographic reasons, the railroads located

their lines parallel or close to the previously established turnpikes and canals, thus, coming into direct

competition with them for most of their length. This

competition was ruinous to the freight wagon and

stagecoach companies which eventually lost not only

their passengers and freight, but also their mail contracts to the rails.

Decline of the Turnpikes

The National Pike, or Cumberland Road, had en- tered upon an era of great prosperity when the Balti- more and Ohio Railroad reached Cumberland,

Maryland, in 1842. Eleven years later, when the rail- road reached the Ohio River at AVheeling, the horse

transportation companies went into bankruptcy. The

same blight spread to the great Pennsylvania wagon

road to the west when the Pennsylvania Railroad was

completed to Pittsburgh in 1854. Roadside businesses,

which depended on the road traffic, such as inns and

stables, shriveled and dried up. With no revenue coming in, the turnpike companies stopped mainte- nance and the proud turnpikes became so rough that

travelers refused to pay toll.^*

Milepost 10 miles west of Philadelphia on the old Lancaster

Turnpike.

14
At the eastern end of the Pennsylvania Road, the

Lancaster Turnpike, once the finest road in America,

fell steadily into decay. In 1880 the company served

notice on the township super\-isors of its intent to abandon 17 miles of road. These sections were then

"distumpiked'' and returned to public control. A

little later, the company sold 35 miles of road to other

companies for $40,000. to be used, partly at least,

for a railroad bed, and in 1899 the company sold all of its remainin<i: interest in the turn])ike for $10 a share—one-thirtieth of what it sold for 100 years before. The Lancaster Turnpike Road Company was

dissolved in February 1902.-^ AVith variation in detaih lumdreds of other turn- pikes met the same fate as the Lancaster Pike, most

of them eventually reverting to the local authorities

for maintenance.

Paradoxically, as the older through turnpikes col- lapsed, new cliartere were being issued for feeder

roads to the railroads. Thus, the number of new

charters did not diminish gi'eatly until about 1875.^" Many of the newly chartered feeders enjoyed a measure of prosperity and maintained tliemselves

until condemned or bought out by tlie States or local governments in the early 20th century.

REFERENCES

'C. BoBTH, Mankind on the Mo\'e (Automotive Safety

Foundation, Washington, D.C., ]9G9) p. S. 'A. Rose, Historic American Highways—Public Roads of THE Past (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1953) p. 37.

' A. Gallatin, Report of the Secretary of the Tkeasuet

on Roads and Canals, S. Doc. No. 2,'")0, 10th Cong., 1st Sess.,

p. 842 (1808).

* Id., p. 843.

^Id.. pp. 863, 864.

"Id., p. 851.

'Id., p. 895.

* J. W. Broolvs, A History of American Highways, Sect. 2,

p. 5 (unpul)lishe(i worlc in Department of Transportation

Library). °A. Gallatin, supra, note 3, p. 738.

'"Id., p. 737. " G. R. Chatburn, Highways and Highway Transportation (Thos. Y. Crowell, New Yorlt, 1923) p. 62.

'" A. Rose, supra, note 2, pp. 46, 47. " Id., pp. .56, 57. " A. Gallatin, supra, note 3, p. 737.

''Id., p. 8.51. 'Ud., p. 918. "A. Rose, supra, note 2, p. 40. "Id., p. 53. '"A. Gallatin, supra, note 3, p. 917.

'"Id.

'' G. R. Chatburn, supra, note 11, pp. 101, 102. 'Id., pp. 106, 107.

''Id., p. 108. " A. Rose, supra, note 2, p. 66.

'^ A. B. Hulbert, Historic Highways of America, Vol. 11 (Arthur H. Clark Co., Cleveland, 1904) pp. 91-96.

'" A. Rose, supra, note 2, p. 72.

15
GQfly

federal Pid

for

Rood/ ond Conol/

Zone's Trace—First Federally Aided Road

In March 1796, Colonel Ebenezer Zane, the founder

of Wheeling, Virginia, petitioned Congress for permission to build a post road overland through the

territory northwest of the Ohio River to the important

river port of Limestone, Kentucky (now Maysville).

Such a route, Zane said, would be 100 miles shorter

than the windings of the Ohio River, on which 15

men with their boats were then engaged in transporting the mails, and would also be immune to interrujDtion by floods, floating ice or low water. The road

would afford far faster mail service while saving at

least three-quarters of the $4,000 annual cost of operating the mail route. Furthermore, the proposed road

would provide a shorter and safer route for travelers

both to and from the West.

As his only compensation for building the road,

Zane asked that he be allowed to locate United States

military bounty land warrants totaling three square

miles where his road crossed the Muskingum, Hockhocking, and Scioto Rivers.

Colonel Zane's request was approved by Congress

in the act of May 17, 1796, with the stipulation that

Zane establish ferries ui)on the three rivers and operate them at rates of ferriage to be established by any

two judges of the Northwest Territory.^

Zane's first road was no more than a pack trail, but

as soon as it was finished, the Government established

a mail route over it from "Wheeling to IMaysville and

beyond to Lexington, Kentucky, and eventually Nashville, Tennessee. Zane's Trace played an important

part in opening southeastern Ohio to settlement. It was also used by hundreds of flatboatmen returning on foot or horseback to Pittsburgh and upriver towns

from downriver ports as far away as New Orleans.

By 1803, the road was chopped out wide enough for

wagons to pass. The portion between '\Anieeling and

Zanesville became a part of the National Road after

1825, and the rest became an important turnpike in

the 1830's. The grant to Zane appears to be the first instance

of local road subsidy by the Federal Government, but

it did not have much influence on Federal policy after- ward. Furthermore, the aid extended was not particularly generous, since, in any event, Zane had the

legal right as a Revolutionary War veteran to ex- change his warrants (and any he might buy from

other veterans) for public land. In reality, the act gave Zane only the right to locate his lands in advance

of the general public and at strategic locations where

he could later profit from their resale to settlers.

Financing Roads in New States The lack of roads, and the resources to build them, was a serious impediment to the development of the

lands north and west of the Ohio River. The United

16
The Gallatin Report.

States Government owned practically all of the un- developed land, the sale of which was its main soui'ce of revenue. "What could be more logical than to set aside a portion of the revenues fi'om the sale of public

lands for building roads and canals, thus, promoting

not only the development of the new territories, but

land sales as well?

In 1801 Secretarjf of the Treasury Albert Gallatin,

in a letter to Representative William B. Giles of

Virginia, suggested that one-tenth of the net proceeds

of public land sales be applied to the building of

roads, but only with tlie consent of the States through

which such roads might pass.- This idea was incorporated in the Ohio Statehood Enabling Act of 1802,

except that only 5 percent of the proceeds of land

sales was to be set aside for roads. Ohio's constitutional convention modified the 5-percent plan by in- sisting that three-fiftlis of the road money be spent on roads "within" the State and under the control of

the Legislature. This change was accepted by Congress in 1803 by an act wliich established a "2 percent

fund" derived from the sale of i^ublic lands to be used

under the direction of Congress for constructing roads

"to and through" Ohio.^

Following the Ohio precedent, Louisiana, Indiana,

Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, and Missouri, on their

admission to statehood, were given 3 percent grants

for roads, canals, levees, river improvements, and

schools. Congress later granted an additional 2 per- cent to these States, except Indiana and Illinois,

which, with Ohio, had already received (he equivalent

in expenditures on the National Road. The additional

2 percent funds were used by these States for rail- roads.

The remaining 24 States admitted between 1820 and

1910 received 5 percent grants, except Texas and West

Virginia, in which the Federal Government had no

lands. Of the 22 States that received grants, 9 were

authorized to use them for public roads, canals, and

internal improvements, and 13 for schools.^

The First National Transportation Plan

Secretary Gallatin, at the request of tlie U.S. Senate,

made the first national inventory of transportation

resources in 1807. Out of this study came his report on roads and canals in 1808, a remarkably comprehensive and forward-looking document which, unfortunately, had little immediate effect on U.S. transportation policy.

17
Gallatin clearly undei*stood the vital role of trans- portation for increasing the wealth of nations. As

he stated in his report

:

It is sufficiently evident that, whenever the annual ex- pense of transportation on a certain route, in its natural

state, exceeds the interest on the capital employed in improving the communication, and the annual expense

of transportation (exclusively of tolls), by the improved

route, the difference is an annual additional income to the nation. Nor does in that case the general result vary, although the tolls may not have been fixed at a rate

sufficient to pay to the undertal<ers the interest on the

capital laid out. They, indeed, when that happens, lose

;

but the community is nevertheless benefited by the undertaking. The general gain is not confined to the

difference between the expense of the transportation of those articles which had been formerly conveyed by that

route, but many which were brought to market by other channels will then find a new and more advantageous

direction ; and those which on account of their distance

or weight could not be transported in any manner whatever, will acquire a value, and become a clear addition

to the national wealth.^ Gallatin then went on to show that in developed

countries, such as France and England, there is sufficient concentration of wealth and population that

private capital will flow into undertakings, such as canals and turnpikes, offering only remote and moderate profit. By contrast, in underdeveloped countries,

such as the United States, commerce will not support

expensive roads and canals, except near a few seaport

cities. Even these facilities will not be fully productive until they become integrated into larger networks

which only the general government can finance and

carry through.

Gallatin, therefore, proposed that Congress launch

a great national program of roads, canals and inland

navigations to be completed in 10 years and which he

estimated would cost about $20 million. To finance

this program, he recommended annual appropriations

of $2 million, amounting to less than one-seventh of

the Government's annual income and less than half

of the fiscal surplus at that time. This modest investment would, he said, not only stimulate internal development, but would also enhance the value of the

yet unsold Federal lands by far more than the cost of

the program, while contributing to the national defense. Lastly and most importantly, "Good roads and

canals will shorten distances, facilitate commercial and

personal intercourse, and unite, by a still more inti- mate community of interests, the most remote quarters

of the United States. No other single operation,

within the power of the Government, can more ef- fectually tend to strengthen and perpetuate that

Union which secures external independence, domestic

peace, and internal liberty."^

The works proposed by Gallatin were, first, a series

of great canals along the Atlantic coast connecting

the natural bays and estuaries into one continuous

waterway for the carriage of heavy freight. Supplementing this waterway, there would be a light-duty

turnpike from Maine to Georgia for passengers, mail

and light goods hauling. The second part of the plan was to form communications between the four great

Atlantic rivers and the Western rivers by river improvements, short canals and four heavy-duty freight

turnpikes across the mountains. These would be supplemented by internal roads to Detroit, St. Louis and

New Orleans. The third part was to open inland

navigation between the Hudson River and the Great

Lakes and the St. Lawrence River, plus a canal around

the Niagara rapids to open the Great Lakes to sloop

navigation as far as the extremities of Lake Michigan.

The First National Plan For Financing

Internal Improvements

Gallatin's bold scheme was years ahead of its time

and, further, it was proposed at a time when Congress was already divided by the Cumberland Road debate.

It was shelved during the War of 1812. However,

the plan had many friends in and out of Congress,

chief of whom was Jolxn C. Calhoun, South Carolina.

This scene at the Fairview Inn, near Baltimore, is typical of the heavy travel on the Cumberland Road. Heavily loaded

freight wagons, herds of stock, stagecoaches, and buggies depended on the inns along the way for food and rest after long

weary hours on the road.

18
Bridge over the Monocacy River near Frederick, Maryland,

built about 1810 by Baltimore bankers on the road connecting

Baltimore with the old Cumberland Road.

In 1816 the question of chartering a second National

Bank was before Congress. Calhoun introduced a

bill providing that the bonus of $1.5 million to be

paid by the Bank for the new charter, plus the dividends on the Go\-erinnent's stock in the Bank for the

next 20 yeare, be set apart as a i)ermanent fund for

internal improvements. This fund was to be apportioned among tlie States in proi)ortion to their repre- sentation in the lower Plouse of Congress, and the

improvements were to be built by the Federal Government with the assent of the States in which they

might be located. Since the annual di\idends on the

Government's $7 million of stock were $500,000, the

bill would pi'ovide a 20-year program of nearly $13

million.

Urging adoption of this bill, Calhoun pointed to the

need for roads for defense, but primarily to encourage commerce and cement political union

:

If we look into the nature of wealth, we find that nothing can be more favorable to its growth than good

roads and canals . . . Many of the improvements con- templated are on too great a scale for the resources

of the States or individuals ; and many of such nature

that the rival jealousy of the States, if left alone, might

prevent. Let us then bind the Republic together with a perfect

.system of roads and canals. Let us conquer space. It

is thus the most distant parts of the Republic will be brought within a few days travel of the centre; it is thus a citizen of the West will read the news of Boston

still most from the press. The mail and the press are

the nerves of the body politic'

Calhoun's bill was bitterly opposed in both the

House and Senate, not only by the strict constitutionalists, but also by those who thought the money

should be applied to tax relief and retirement of the war debt. Others said the States might refuse assent

to the improvements or try to dictate their location

for political expediency and, thus, defeat the purpose

of the plan. Still others branded the bill as a scheme

to mulct the wealthy States in which adequate roads

and canals had already been built at great expense,

for the benefit of the poor and improvident States. In the end, however, the bill passed both the House

and Senate by narrow margins, to be vetoed on March

3, 1817, by President Madison, who declared it to be an improper interpretation of the constitutional power

of the General Government to regulate commerce and

provide for the national defense.* The motion to override the veto failed in the House, ending the first attempt to set up a continuing national plan for in- ternal improvements.®

The Cumberland Road

On ]\Iarch 29, 1806, President Jefferson approved an act which directed that the President, with the

advice and consent of the Senate, appoint three commissioners to lay out and build a road from the head

of navigation on the Potomac Eiver at Cumberland,

Maryland, to a point on the Ohio River." The act

set certain minimum standards for the proposed road

and appropriated $30,000 from the proceeds of Ohio

land sales to finance the location of the road and to

start construction. The debates attending the passage

of this act exposed the bitter rivalries and jealousies

19
between the eastern seaboard States over the development of the lands beyond the Ohio River.

The seaport cities in particular feared the advantage

that a Government-financed road might give in competition for the western trade. Strict constructionists

of the U.S. Constitution denied that the Federal Government had the authority to build roads at all, except

possibly in the territories. Proponents of Federal

roadbuilding on the other hand, asserted that authority to build roads was implied under the "general

welfare" clause of the Constitution.

In the end, the issue was decided by those of both

parties who felt strongly that the bonds between the

East and the West should be strengthened in the in- terest of national unity, and the act passed the House

by a narrow margin. At least one representative from

every State voted in fa\'or of the road.

President Jefferson lost no time in selecting the

three commissioners and in applying to the legisla- tures of Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania for

permission to build the road within their boundaries.

The first two States gave their assent without restric- tion, but Pennsylvania held back and conditioned its approval on the road's passing through the towns of

Uniontown and Washington.^^

It took the commissioners 4 years to select the route,

and another 8 years to push the construction through

from Cumberland to AVlieeling, Virginia, the head of

low-water navigation on the Ohio River. This road was 30 feet wide, with the central 20 feet paved by

the Tresaguet method, that is, with several layers of

small broken stone placed over a foundation of 7-inch

stones. It was cleared 66 feet wide, ditched, and provided with drains and bridges. The cost, paid out of

the Ohio 2 percent land fund, was about $1.75 million, or an average of $14,000 per mile.* ^^ From the time the first section was opened in 1813,

the Cumberland Road came under heavy traffic, so heavy in fact, that the stone surface was worn away

almost as fast as it was built. The commissioners were unable, with the funds available, to provide the

systematic and continual maintenance required by

broken stone roads; and they were without power to protect the road from the depredations of travelers

and local residents.** Consequently, the condition of

the road steadily deteriorated, despite efforts to repair

the worst damage.

To provide a regular source of funds for maintenance, Congress in 1822 passed an act authorizing the

collection of tolls from users of the road. President

* This cost included maintenance during the 8-year construction period.

** Freighters ripped up the shoulders by descending the steep

hills with locked wheels. Local inhabitants fenced in parts of the right-of-way, dug into the banks, dragged logs over the

road, and even stole broken stone from the road bed."

Old Cumberland Road at Wills Creek just west of Cumberland, Bid.

20
OM Cumherland Road approaching Chestnut Ridge Mountains in Pennsylvania about 1899.

Monroe vetoed this act on the ground that it was an unwarranted extension of the power vested in Congress to make appropriations, "under which power,

with the consent of the States through whicli the road

passes, the work was originally commenced, and has

so far been executed." ^' Collection of tolls, the President said, implied a power of jurisdiction or sover- eignty which was not granted to the Federal Government by the Constitution and could not be unilaterally

conveyed by any State without a constitutional amendment. It was one thing to make appropriations for

public imi)rovements, but an entirely ditt'erent thing

to assume jurisdiction and sovereignty over the land

whereon those improvements were made.'-' This has

been the Federal position on highway grants to the

States down to the present day.

Transfer to State Control

In the 10 years following President JMonroe's veto,

Congress made occasional and niggardly appropriations for maintaining the Cumberland Road, but these were inadequate to i^reserve it under ever-increasing

traffic* The supporters of the road linally realized

that there was little chance that a Congress bitterly

divided over tlie issue of federally-financed internal

improvements would ever make adequate provisions

for keeping it in repair. State operation as a toll road seemed to be the only solution to the dilemma,

and between 1831 and 1833, the Legislatures of Ohio,

Pennsylvania, Marjdand and Virginia agreed to ac- cept and maintain their sections of the National Road.

* For the years 1823 to 1827, a total of $55,000 was appropriated for repairs, an average of only $88 per mile per year

hardly enough to keep the ditches open.'^ An idea of the

traffic can be had from the fact tliat in 1822 one of the five commission liouses at Wheeling unloaded 1,081 wagons, aver- aging 3,500 pounds of freight each, and the annual total freight

bill from Baltimore to Wlieeling was estimated at $390,000." In addition, hundreds of stagecoaches and private vehicles used the road daily. Nineteen thousand pigs were driven over

the road in 1831, some in droves of GOO animals."

Maryland and Pennsylvania, which had the oldest and

worst-woni sections conditioned their acceptance upon

the Government's first putting the road into a good

state of repair and erecting toll gates.'"

The Government spent nearly $800,000 in 1833,

1834, and 1835 for repairing the road east of the Ohio

River, the work being done mider the supernsion of

the Anny Corps of Engineers. This work was principally rebuilding the pavement according to McAdams' method, adding broken stone to replenish the wear of traffic. As soon as each section was reconstructed, the, States assumed jurisdiction and maintenance. By the end of 1835 the National Road, from

Cumberland to the Ohio-Indiana line, was national no longer.

Westward Extension of the National Road

As soon as the Cumberland Road reached the Ohio

River, there was agitation to extend it westward

through Ohio and the newly-admitted States of

Indiana and Illinois. These States, like Ohio, had

provisions in their acts of admission for setting aside

2 percent of the income from sales of public lands for

road improvements.

In 1820 Congress appropriated $10,000 for laying

out a road between "Wlieeling and the left bank of the

Mississippi River. Howe\-er, the road did not officially

get under way until 1825, when Congress made an- other appropriation to start construction and to extend

the surveys to the permanent seat of government in

Missouri, passing through the seats of government of

Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.^" Thereafter, the Government spent slightly over $4 million to push the

road as far west as Vandalia, then the capital of

Illinois. From Wheeling to Vandalia the road was laid out

with Roman straightness in an 80-foot right-of-way,

but except in eastern Ohio, it did not approach the

high construction standard of the Cumberland Road

east of the Ohio River. This was partly because of

21
Old tollhouse on Cumberland Road near Frostburg, Md.

the scarcity of good roadbuilding stone, which had to be hauled long distances. In Indiana and Illinois the

road was only a cleared and graded dirt track.

The annual appropriation bills continued to be bit- terly opposed in Congress and passed by increasingly narrower margins. After 1832 there was sentiment

in Congress to use the money appropriated for the

National Road to build a railroad west from Columbus, Ohio, and an unsuccessful amendment to the

appropriation bill for 1836 proposed to do just that. The last regular appropriation for the Road was in

1838, but construction continued until 1840 when the

funds ran out.^^ By its act of 1831, Ohio accepted the road as fast as it was completed by the Federal engineers and put

it imder toll. The road was never finished in Indiana

and Illinois, and in 1848 Congress ceded to the former

"all the rights and privileges of every kind belonging

to the United States as connected with said road. . . ." A similar act for Illinois was passed in 1856. In

1879 Congress granted Ohio the right to make the

road free, ^^Provided, That this consent shall have no

effect in respect to creating or recognizing any duty

or liability whatever on the part of the United

States." "

The National Road never reached the Mississippi,

but petered out in the Illinois prairies. Its ultimate

demise could have been forecast in 1831 when Congress

agreed to turn the eastern sections over to the States

for operation and maintenance. The end was due not

so much to the constitutional and sectional objections

that had plagiied the road from the beginning, as to the growing feeling in the country and in Congress

that roads and canals were already obsolete for longdistance transportation. The day of die railroad was

at hand.

The Maysville Turnpike Veto

The course of highway policy in the United States was profoundly influenced by two presidential vetoes. President Monroe's veto of Federal toll collections on

the Cumberland Road has already been mentioned.

President Jackson's veto on May 27, 1830, of turnpike

stock subscriptions established national policy with

respect to internal improvements of purely local character.

In January 1827, the Kentucky Legislature petitioned Congress to provide Federal aid for an artificial road from Maysville to Lexington, Kentucky.

This would be an extension of the mail route leaWng

the National Road at Zanesville, Ohio, and following

Zane's Trace to the Ohio River. In 1828 an appropriation bill in the U.S. Congress authorizing this

road failed by only one vote in the Senate.^-^ The Legislature then incorporated the Maysville,

Washington, Paris, and Lexington Turnpike Road

Company to build the road, with the provision that

1,500 shares of stock be reserved for subscription by

the U.S. Government. In a parallel action, Congress

passed a bill authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury

to subscribe to 1,500 shares in the Compan^^ in the

name and for the use of the United States.^*

22
1830—The Maysville Turnpike.

The President vetoed this bill on the ground that

the proposed improvement was of purely local, and

not national, importance.

It has no connection with any established system of improvements ; it is exclusively within the limits of a

State, starting at a point on the Ohio River and nmning

out 60 miles to an interior town, and even as far as the State is interested conferring partial instead of general

advantages.

However, he went on. What is properly national in its character or otherwise

is an inquiry which is often extremely difficult of solu- tion . . . If it be the wish of the people that the construction

of roads and canals should be conducted by the Federal

Government, it is not only highly expedient, but indis- pensably necessary, that a previous amendment to the

Constitution, delegating the necessary power and defining

and restricting its exercise with reference to the sov- ereignty of the States, should be made. . . .^ Jackson was not personally hostile to internal improvements; in fact, less than a year before in his

first annual message to Congress he had recommended

distributing the embarrassing annual surplus Federal

revenue among the States to be used by them for

internal improvements.

The Maysville Turnpike veto not onh^ put an end

to all thought of national aid to local road improvements, but it also forestalled any efforts that might be

made to provide Federal aid to such genuinely national promotions as the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

Over 20 years would pass before Congress would i^ro- vide any significant subsidy for railroads.

The Maysville Turnpike was eventually completed

with State and private ftmds. The road had long

been a mail route, so the Government insisted it could run the mails over it without paying tolls. This

question was settled by the courts in favor of the

Turnpike Company in 1838; thereafter mail contractors paid the same fees as the general public.-"

The Michigan Road

The first settlements in Indiana were along the

Ohio River and the Wabash and White Rivers. By

1826 settlement had reached the southern limits of the

Potowatomi Indian lands, which extended from the

Wabash River to Lake ^Michigan. At this time the

only overland communication with central Indiana was along a poor dirt wagon road from Indianapolis,

the capital, to Madison on the Ohio River.

In October 1826, the U.S. Government concluded a treaty with the Potowatomi under which the Indians

ceded a large area of northern Indiana and southern

Michigan to the United States. Among other things

this treaty provided that the State of Indiana should

be given a strip of land 100 feet wide for a road com- mencing at Lake Michigan and extending to the

Wabash River, jilus a section (640 acres) of good land

contiguous to every mile of the road, and in addition, a section of land for every mile the road was extended

southward from the Wabash Ri\er. Congress, in March 1827, authorized Indiana to locate and build

this "^Michigan Road"' in accordance with the treaty,

from Lake ^Michigan to Indianapolis and southward

to IMadison. using funds from the sale of the designated Indian lands.^'

23
From 1830, when the Le^shature authorized con- struction to be^in, until 1840, the sale of the Indian

lands yielded $241,332, with several hundred acres remaining to be sold. As noted earlier, Indiana also

received grants from Congrass under its Statehood

Act from the proceeds of public land sales within the

State. For a decade, these were the two principal

sources of finids for wagon roads. When they were

exhausted, Indiana, like its neighbors, turned to private financing and chartered i)lank road and turn- pike companies to finish the job.

Land Grants to the States for Wagon Roads

The grant of Potowatomi lands to Indiana was not

the fii'st Federal land grant to a State for roads, or

the last. The first significant Federal land grant was

in February 1823 when Congress granted Ohio a 120-

foot right-of-way for a public road from the lower

rapids of the Miami River of Lake Erie to the western

boundai-y of the Western Reserve. To finance the

road, Congress gave the State all the public lands for

1 mile on each side of the road, with the proviso that

they could not be sold for less than $1.25 per acre.^* Congress subsidized a toll turnpike from Columbus

to Sandusky by another grant to Ohio in 1827. This

grant gave the State every alternate section of land

abutting the west side of the road.^^

The Maysville Turnpike veto put an end to further

wagon road subsidies, other than the National Road,

tmtil the Civil War. Between 1863 and 1869, however.

Congress made 10 separate grants of land to Michigan,

Wisconsin, and Oregon for certain "military" wagon

roads. These, with the previous grants to Indiana

and Ohio, totaled 3,560,000 acresj^" or about 5,500

square miles—an area somewhat larger than Connecticut.

Federal Land Subsidies for Canals

Prior to President Jackson's administration (1829-

1837), Federal largesse extended not only to roads,

but canal and river improvements as well. In March

1822, Congress granted Illinois a 180-foot right-ofway for a canal to connect the Illinois River and Lake

Michigan. This act authorized the State to take construction materials from adjacent public lands and,

in addition, granted Illinois one-half of the public

lands in a strip 10 miles wide centered on the canal.

In return, the State agreed that the canal would be

"a public highway for the use of the Government of

the United States, free from any toll or charge whatever, for any property of the United States, or any

persons in their service." ^^ This Illinois River-Lake Michigan Canal grant was

the first land subsidy voted by Congress for internal

improvements, and became a precedent for the subsequent granting of immense tracts of the public domain.

An act of May 24, 1828, which, as a subsidy to canals, granted Ohio 500,000 acres to be selected from

any available public lands within the State, became

the precedent for the general act of September 4, 1841,

granting 500,000 acres each to Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,

Alabama, Missouri, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Michigan and to each public land State admitted thereafter.* These grants were to be used for specified

internal improvements, such as roads, railways,

bridges, canals, river improvements, and draining of

swamps.^^

Military Roads—The Natchez Trace Until the construction of the Cumberland Road and

the Pennsylvania Road, the only outlets for the produce of the Ohio River Valley were by packhorse

trains across the mountains or downriver in flatboats

and rafts. At New Orleans the crews sold the vessels

and their cargoes and either embarked by sea for eastern ports or returned overland by foot or horseback through the lands of the friendly Choctaw and

Chickasaw Indians, to the Mero Settlements, now

Nashville, Tennessee. From here, they could find

their way to the upper valley by trails through central

Kentucky to Zane's Trace and beyond.

In 1801 the Government negotiated agreements with

the Choctaws and Chickasaws " 'to lay out, open, and

make, a convenient wagon road through their land,

between the settlements of Mero District (Nashville),

in the State of Tennessee, and those of Natchez, in the

Mississippi Territory.' " ^^ Upon conclusion of these

agreements, the Army began widening the old Indian

trails, eight companies of infantry working south from

Mero District and six companies northward from

Natchez. This military road, later called the Natchez

Trace, was completed in 1803.^* Although it served

a peaceful purpose to thousands of returning flatboat- men, this road was initially conceived with strategic

military ends in view, in the event the United States

should become embroiled with Spain over the port of

New Orleans.

The Jackson Military Road

Following the War of 1812, Congress authorized a more direct military road from Nashville to New

Orleans, which w;ould shorten the distance between

those cities by 220 miles.

The First and Eighth Infantry Regiments began

work on this road in June 1817, completing it in May

1820. Two congressional appropriations totaling

$15,000 were only a small part of the cost of this road.

Over 75,800 man-days of labor were expended on it by the troops, and the total disbursement from military funds was well over $300,000. For this, the

Army cleared a right-of-way 40 feet wide through

dense forest, graded an earth road 35 feet wide, built

20,000 feet of corduroy causeways, and over 35 substantial bridges from 60 to 200 feet long. By 1824

most of this road south of Columbus, INIississippi, was grown over and abandoned.^^

Military Roads on the Frontiers

The Army built more than 100 other military wagon

roads in the period from 1807 to 1880, most of them

in the territories. Their total length was well over

21,000 miles, and they cost at least $4 million, not

counting the labor of the troops.-^® Some were built

by the troops and some by hired labor. I

* States admitted after 1889 received cash grants for educational and penal institutions instead of acreage.

24
1809— The Natchez Trace. 1820—General Jackson's Military Road.
J P^

1 '^^^^^^^^^r^ i wM^^^^^^^M114

^^..

L V

OHBI

1

Jjl^^**•"" 1:^

IV. it

^^1

iSe^The Mullan Road.

These roads were crude—mere wagon tracks across the prairies or traces chopped through the heavy timber of Florida or Wisconsin—but in the early years

of settlement, they were often the only roads the set- tlers had. Among them were the famous Santa Fe

Trail from Kansas City to Santa Fe, New Mexico,

marked by the Army, following a route originally

beaten by traders and trappers, and Colonel Cooke's

Road from Santa Fe to San Diego, pioneered by the

Army in 1846. The Army reopened the 400-mile Old

Spanish Trail from Pensacola to St. Augustine,

Florida, in 1824-1830. Military roads radiated like

the spokes of a wheel from strategic Detroit toward

Chicago, Grand Rapids, Saginaw and Cleveland, and

in 1838 a 512-mile wagon road was made from Ft. Snelling, Minnesota Territory, to Ft. Leavenworth in

Kansas Territory.

One of the most remarkable of the military wagon

roads was located and built by Lieutenant John

Mullan in 1858 to 1862 from Fort Benton in Dakota

Territory, the head of steamboat navigation on the

Missouri River, across the Rocky Mountains to Old

Fort Walla Walla on the Columbia River. For 20

years afterward, this road was the only way open to emigrants into western Montana and northern Idaho."

In the single year 1866 there passed over the Mullan

Road 20,000 persons travelling back and forth, including

2,000 miners stampeding into Montana, 1,500 head of

horses, 5,000 head of cattle, 6,000 mules loaded with

freight, 83 wagons and $1 million in money.''

During the overland migrations of the 1850's and

1860's, the Army improved and marked most of the

pioneer wagon trails and used them to supply its garrisons. Between 1850 and 1869 some of these trails were transcontinental mail routes used by the Butterfield Overland Mail, the Pony Express, and other mail

contractors. After the Government divested itself of the National

Road, military roads were practically the only Federal

subsidies to local transportation. These were meager

indeed, compared to the largesse that ^^as distributed

by Congress to the railroads.

26
REFERENCES

*A. B. HuLBEET, Historic Highways of America, Vol. 11 (Arthur H. Clark, Co., Cleveland, 1904) pp. 157, 158. 'P. D. JoRDON, The Nationax Road (Bobbs-Merrill, In- dianapolis, 1948) pp. 71, 72. 'A. Rose, Historic American Highways—Pi-blic Roads of THE Past (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1953) p. 66.

* Office of Feder.m, Coordinator of U.S. Transportation,

Public Aids to Transportation, Aids to Railroads and Re- lated Subjects, Vol. II (GPO Washington, D.C., 1938) p. 7. 'A. Gallatin, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury

ON Roads and Canals, S. Doc. No. 250, 10th Cong., 1st Sess.,

p. 724 (1808).

*Id., p. 725. 'Annals of Congress, 14th Cong., 2d Sess. (Gales and

Seaton, Washington, D.C., 1854) pp. 851-854.

'Id., pp. 1061, 1062. 'Id. "A. Rose, supra, note 3, p. 66. "A. B. HuLBERT, Historic Highways of America, Vol. 10 (Arthur H. Clark, Co., Cleveland, 1904) p. 26. "Id., p. 54. " P. D. Jordan, svpra, note 2, p. 88. " A. B. HuLBERT. supra, note 11, pp. 58, 59. "Id., p. 59. "Id., pp. 194-197. " P. D. Jordan, supra, note 2, p. 217.

"Id., p. 238. "Id., p. 170.

'" A. B. HuLBERT, supra, note 11, p. 73. "Id., p. 90. " P. D. Jordan, supra, note 2, p. 175. " A. Rose, supra, note 8, p. 57. " Id., p. 58. "A. B. HuLBERT, supra, note 1, pp. 171, 172.

"° A. Rose, supra, note 3, p. 58. " A. C. Rose, The Michigan Road, Road Builders News,

Vol. 38, No. 7, Aug. 1938, pp. 12-17. ^ Off. of Fed. Coordinatoe, supra, note 4, p. 7.

'"Id., p. 8. ''Id. "Id., p. 9. "A. Rose, supra, note 3, pp. 44, 45.

'*Id., p. 44.

'"Id., p. 51. TM Military Roads. A Brief History of the Construction

OF Highways by the Military Establishment and a Gazetteer of the Military Roads in Continental United States

(National Highway Users Conference, Washington, D.C., 1935)

pp. 1-14. " A. Rose, supra, note 3, pp. 80, 81. " R. E. HuLT, Steamboats in the Timber ( Binfords and

Mart, Portland, 1952) App., p. 205.

27
The

Pgeof

/team

1807—Robert Fulton's CLERMONT

28
The Beginning of Steam Navigation

The revolution of mechanical propulsion affected

marine transport about a generation before it became

apparent on land. In 1787, John Fitch established

the first regular steamboat service in the United States on the Delaware River, between Philadelphia and

Bordentown, 28 miles away. His ship, a stem wheeler,

could make 8 miles per hour, but the machinery occu- pied so much space that little was left for cargoes and

the ship was commercially imsuccessfid. After limning some 2,000 miles, she was laid up in 1790 and

never used again.^

In 1807 Robert Fulton, with the backing of Robert

R. Livingston, designed a steamboat with an economic

ratio of power to capacit3^ This vessel was 133 feet long, with a beam of 13 feet, and weighed 100 tons. She was a sidewheeler, powered by an English Boulton

and Watt engine of about 20 horeepower, and could

make the 150-mile trip from New York to Albany in

about 30 hours. From her maiden voyage in August

1807, the Clei^mooit was a commercial success.- Henry Shreve had his own ideas about steamboat

construction for river navigation. He knew that the

western rivers were treacherous, filled with snags and

shifting sandbars, and subject to tremendous fluctua- tions in water level. To successfull}^ combat these

hazards, a ship should have a very shallow draft and

a very powerful engine. To implement these ideas,

Shreve built his own steamboat, laying the keel in September 1815 at Wheeling, Virginia. Essentially,

the Washington was a flatboat powered by steam, with

the engine on the main deck and the boilers on another

deck above. To get the extra power he needed, he

operated the boilers well above atmospheric pressure. The two-cylinder engine could develop over 100

horsepower driving the ship's stern paddlewheel.^

The Washington broke all previous records for speed on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, and she was in

fact the prototype for the great fleet that plied these

rivers for the next 50 years. In the spring of 1817,

Shreve took her from Louisville to New Orleans in

17 days, returning the 1,352 miles upstream against

the current in 24: days. By 1860, river steamers that

could make the upstream voyage in less than 5 days

were in regular service.*

Steam Navigation Thrives

After Fulton's successful demonstration that steam

propulsion was practical, the steamboat industry

prospered. Between 1807 and 1817, 131 vessels were

built in the United States, and by 1832 there were 474

in operation. Some of these were ferries for trans- porting passengers, carriages and wagons across large

rivers. In 1837, 158 steamboats were launched, and

by 1846, steamers were being built at a rate of 225 per

year.^ By 1859. there were more than 2,000 steamboats on the Mississippi River and its tributaries.

Steamboats were a major factor in opening the west

for settlement. River villages became busy ports and

then thriA-ing cities, such as Memphis, St. Louis.

Louis\'ille and Cincinnati. Above all, New Orleans

prospered on the river traffic, becoming the third

busiest port in the United States, and in 1860 the value

of products passing through her port exceeded $200

million.® Every overland trail to the Far AVest began

at the head of steamboat navigation on some western

river.

Federal Assistance to Navigation

Tlie fii"st Federal act for navigation improvement was passed in 1809. Thereafter, up to 1830, Congress

appropriated $2,867,000 for subscriptions to canal

stock and for such improvements as ports and piers

and removal of river obstructions—slightly more than

had been appropriated for the National Road.^ A

large part of these appropriations was spent to remove

hazards from the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.

From 1830 onward, Congress appropriated generously for river and harbor improvements, many of

them as completely within a single State as the Maysville Turnpike. In addition to improving the major

rivers, the Great Lakes and the coastal ports, many

creeks and inlets were made navigable, encouraging

not only the flow of commerce but also the flow of

Federal dollars into every congressional district.

Railroad Expansion

By 1850 the railroad had proved to the American

people, and particularly to those who had money to

invest, that it was far faster, cheaper and more adaptable to the coimtry's transportation needs than either

turnpikes or canals. As investment flowed in ever- increasing amounts into railroads, the funds available

for extending or even maintaining the old horsedrawn

facilities became less and less and finally dried up

altogether.

In the 1850's railroad building escalated into a national frenzy. "The people were crazed with the

idea of improvement; every town wanted to grow

bigger and a railroad was an absolute necessity ; scores of companies were formed with the intention of beginning construction, then deeding the improvement

to some established line to operate. Many communities subscribed stock, others voted bonds, others paid

for right-of-way by private subscription in order to secure a railroad. The result was often overbuilding,

parallel lines, too many roads attempting to occupy

the same territory, with the result that branch lines

often never paid interest on the cost of construction."*

The fever even spread to Congress, which granted

immense tracts of public land to subsidize railways.

With the possible exception of the Baltimore and

Ohio, the Pennsylvania and a few others, the early

railroads were local ventures, sometimes less than 20

miles long, each connecting a town to its neighbor or

to the nearest river, lake, or seaport. In the West and

South, many of the railroads were mere extensions of

the river navigation systems. However, by 1860 most

of the short lines were linked up into systems, a trend

that was accelerated in the North and West with the

general adoption of the 56V2-inch "standard gauge."

The First Railroad War

AVhen the Civil War began, about two-thirds of the

railroad mileage was in the North. The railroad net- works enabled both the Union and Confederate forces

to shift men and supplies with a speed previously

unknown in warfare. The North had an additional

advantage in that it controlled the sea approaches to

29
Mississippi River Steamboats

the Confederacy and much of the inland navigation

system, including Chesapeake Bay and its estuaries

and the Mississippi-Ohio River systems. Superiority

in both land and water transportation was an important factor in the ultimate victory of the Union

armies, and this advantage increased as the war went

on. The North was able not only to maintain its rail- roads to carry increased war traffic, but to extend

them as well ; while the South was barely able to keep

its railroads operating.

Important as the railroads were to the strategic

conduct of the war by botli armies, the day-to-day

military operations for the most i:)art followed the

wagon roads, and, as in earlier wars, the condition of

the roads influenced the outcome of military operations. The most famous example of this was Bumside's disastrous "mud march" of 1863, described by

a participant:

. . . thousands of the boys in blue, after horses and

mules could do no more in pulling the pontoon wagons

that must be gotten through to the Rappahannock, to build the bridge on which the army was to cross, were

put on the ropes to tug and pull, and pull and tug, hour

after hour, and way into the night ; but they were Vir- ginia roads, and it was no use ; so after days and days

of mud and rain the campaign was abandoned, and, worn

and weary, we marched back to our old camps at Fal- mouth and beyond, and in passing saw the greetings of the 'Johnnies' over the river in Fredericksburg, on a banner bearing the cheerful legend 'Bumside stuck in the mud.' . . . Yes, we have helped to build corduroy roads in war

times, when it had grown cold enough to freeze the mud

so as to bear a soldier's weight, and more than once we

have built right over the body of a horse or mule, that had gone down to rise no more." In the theater of operations, the common roads

suffered severely from heavy military traffic and

scanty maintenance. Collection of tolls was virtually

impossible on the Southern turnpikes; while surface wear, erosion, and damage to bridges and toll houses

hastened their bankruptcy.

Postwar Railroad—Steamboat Competition

During the war, a large number of steamboats were

built at inflated prices to carry troops and military

supplies on the Mississippi River and its tributaries.

When normal commerce was resumed after the war,

less than half of these vessels were able to find profitable employment.

30
The Meeting o1 the Rails

Fierce and ruinous competition ensued among the

shii:)owners. whose plight was compounded by the rail- roads because they began actively extending their

lines as soon as hostilities were over. Short lines

leading to river ports were extended inland linking

up with others, and eventually connecting with each

other to form parallel transportation systems which

were able to capture the passengers of the steam

packets and most of their profitable freight. The

unregulated railroads cut freight rates below the cost of haulage on sections where they were in direct competition with water transportation, recouping these

losses by charging higher rates on other parts of their

systems. Another weapon of the railroads was their

refusal to establish joint rail-water rates with the

steamboat companies.^"

Fighting back, the shipowners formed freight pools

and organized common carrier packet lines controlling

a number of boats. They instituted dependable scheduled service between the principal river ports. These

measures slowed the drift to disaster but were unable

to check it entirely. Water transportation on the

Mississippi system reached its peak in 1889, when over

28 million tons were carried. Thereafter, traffic declined, in spite of tremendous increases in the Nation's

population and wealth, to about 19.5 million tons in

1906, and 16 million tons in 1916. Practically all of

this was heavy bulk freight, such as coal, stone and

gravel, carried in long barge tows. The romantic

river packets were becoming things of the past."

Federal Subsidies to Railroads

Early Federal subsidies to railroads had been in the

form of surveys made at Government expense by civil engineers and officers of the U.S. Army and the re- mission of import duties on railroad iron.

The numerous turnpike and canal projects of the

early 1880's created a brisk demand for civil engineers

and surveyors, yet the supply of such individuals in

the United States was quite limited. The largest

group was employed by the U.S. Army in its Corps

of Engineers.*

In April 1824, Congress passed the General Survey

Bill (4 Stat. 22), appropriating $30,000 annually and

authorizing the President to use a limited number of

civil engineers and officers of the Corps of Engineers

to prepare the, necessary surveys, plans and estimates

for " 'such roads and canals as he may deem of national importance, in a commercial or military point

of view, or necessaiy for the transportation of the

public mail.' " The employment of Government engi- neers was not limited to surveys ordered by law or by

resolutions of Congress, but was interpreted by the

President to apply also to " 'Surveys of a national or highly interesting commercial character, applied for

by states or incorporated companies,' " and when

engineers could be conveniently spared from other

work.^^

* The first engineering .school in this country was the United

States Military Academy, founded in 1802.

31
Although railways were not specifically mentioned

in the Act, all of the 61 surveys made or proposed were for railways, and the amount spent on them was

about $75,000."

Another early and very substantial Federal aid to railroads was the remission of import duties on rail- road iron during the years 1830 to 1841. The total duties remitted in this period—almost $6 million

gave the infant railroad industry a much-needed boost

at a critical time in its history at the expense of the

infant iron industry.* " By an act approved on July 7, 1838, Congress made

all railroads "post routes" and, thus, eligible to carry

the mails. Strictly speaking, this was not a subsidy.

* The remitted duty amounted to about $2,000 pei- mile of track, or almost one-sixth of the total cost per mile.

but it opened to the railroads a valuable source of

income.

These early aids to railroads were a mere foretaste

of what was to come in later years.

The Railroad Land Grants

In the early 19th century, it was almost an article

of faith with the American peojile that national

l^rosperity depended on the settlement of the western

lands, practically all of which belonged to the Government. The Federal j)olicy was to encourage settlement

by removal of the Indians, favorable laws and cheap

land prices. A logical extension of this policy was to encourage access to the lands by building first the

National Road, and later, by subsidizing canals and

railroads.
The first Federal land grants for railroads were made to Illinois, Mississippi, and Alabama in 1850

and totaled 3,736,000 acres of land which the States

transferred to the Illinois Central Railroad and the

Mobile and Ohio Railroad. With these grants as a precedent, Congress in the period 1850 to 1871 aided some 50 other railroads by similar grants of public

land to nine other southern and western States* for

• The Government eventually received a handsome return on its grants to the railroads. One of the conditions of these grants was that the aided railroads transport Government

troops, mail, and freight at reduced rates. In later years, other railroads, although not aided by land grants, voluntarily

reduced their rates to compete for the Government business. As a result, the total savings in transporting the mails, troops

and Government property up to 1934 amounted to $168.2 million and by the end of World War II were far above that amount." Congress renounced all rate concessions in 1945.

The railway station was the meeting place for ail—greeting

arrivals, farewells to those departing, and a good place to pick up the latest gossip by those who just came to watch.

33
th(

1

Although railways wex'e not specifically mentioned

in the Act, all of the 61 surveys made or proposed were for railways,

about $75,000."

Another early an^

railroads was the r(i road iron during tl duties remitted in

gave the infant raili at a critical time in infant iron industry

By an act approve

all railroads "post i the mails. Strictly

but it opened to the railroads a valuable source of

income.

* The remitted duty

track, or almost one-si:

32
Although railways were not specifically mentioned

in the Act, all of the 61 surveys made or proposed

were for railways, and the amount spent on them was

about $75,000."

Another early and very substantial Federal aid to

railroads was the remission of import duties on railroad iron during the years 1830 to 1841. The total

duties remitted in this period—almost $6 milliongave the infant railroad industry a much-needed boost

at a critical time in its history at the expense of the

infant iron industry.* "

By an act approved on July 7, 1838, Congress made

all railroads "post routes" and, thus, eligible to carry

the mails. Strictly speakiag, tliis was not a subsidy,

•The remitted duty amounted to about $2,000 per mile of

traclc, or almost one-sixth of the total cost per mile.

but it opened to the railroads a valuable source of

income.

These early aids to railroads were a mere foretaste

of what was to come in later years.

The Railroad Land Grants

In the early 19th century, it was almost an article

of faith with the American people that national

prosperity depended on the settlement of the western

lands, practically all of which belonged to the Government. The Federal policy was to encourage settlement

by removal of the Indians, favorable laws and cheap

land prices. A logical extension of this policy was to

encourage access to the lands by building first the

National Road, and later, by subsidizing canals and

railroads.

The first Federal land grants for railroads were made to Illinois, Mississippi, and Alabama in 1850 and totaled 3,736,000 acres of land which the States

transferred to the Illinois Central Railroad and the

Mobile and Ohio Railroad. With these grants as a

precedent. Congress in the period 1850 to 1871 aided

some 50 other railroads by similar grants of public land to nme other southern and western States* for

•The Government eventually received a handsome return

on its grants to the railroads. One of the conditions of these

grants was that the aided railroads transport Government

troops, mail, and freight at reduced rates. In later years

other railroads, although not aided by land grants, voluntarily

reduced their rates to compete for the Government business.

As a result, the total savings in transporting the mails, troops and Government property up to 1934 amounted to $168.2 million and by the end of World War 11 were far above that

amount.'' Congress renounced all rate concessions in 1945

The railway station was the meeting place for all—greeting

arrivals, farewells to those departing, and a good place to

pick up the latest gossip by those who just came to watch.
Monument commerating the last spike on the joining of the Central Pacific and Union

Pacific railroads into the first transcontinental railway in this country.

a total of about 36,466,000 acres. Even larger grants were to come in connection with the Pacific railroads.

Eventually, Federal land grants to subsidize railroads

amounted to 130.3 million acres, to which should be

added 48.9 million acres of State land grants.^^

Railroads Dominate U.S. Transportation

The northern States had such tremendous productive capacity that they were able to fight the Civil

War and at the same time push a railroad across the

western plains and mountains. This railroad, liberally

aided by grants of public land and Government loans, was completed in 1869. Within the next 20 years.

four other transcontinental railroads were completed,

along with a north-south railroad through California,

Oregon, and Washington Territory, and innumerable

connectors, branches, and feeder lines all over the

country. In 1887 alone, 12,878 miles of track were

laid, and by 1900 there were 260,000 miles of railroad

in the United States.^^ These railroads opened up the country to settlement

and development as it had never been opened before.

They created the mass market that made the phenomenal industrial expansion of the 1880's, 1890's, and

early 1900's possible, and which in turn, started the

trend toward urbanization that continues to this day.

34
REFERENCES

*R. KlBBY, S. WiTHINGTON, A. DaBLING & F. KiLGOUK, ENGI- NEERING IN History (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1956) p. 250.

^Id., pp. 252, 253.

'Id., p. 255.

*Id., p. 256. °G. Chatbubn, Highways and Highway Transportation

(Thos. Y. Crowell, New York, 1923) p. 91.

*Id., p. 90.

'Id., p. 96.

»/d., p. 109.

" M. Whitehead, A Word From The National Grange, Good

Roads, Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan. 1892, pp. 82, 83. " Office of Federal Coordinator of U.S. TRiVNSPORTATioN,

Public Aids to Transportation, Public Aids to Transportation BY Water, Vol. Ill (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1939) pp. 16-18. "/d., p. 17. " L. Haney, a Congressional History of Railways in the

United States (Reprint, Augustas M. Kelly, New York, 1968)

p. 276. "Office of Federal Coordinator of U.S. Transportation,

Public Aids to Transportation, Aids to Railroads and Re- lated Subjects, Vol. II (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1938) pp.

4. 5. "Id., p. 5. "/d., p. 46.

"•/d.. pp. 11, 12, 32. " B. Weisberger, The Life History of the United States,

The Age of Steel and Steam, Vol. 7 (Time, Inc., New York,

1964) p. 31.

35
The

Good

Rood/

movement

Rural Roads in the Late 19th Century

Railroad competition drove the long-distance wagon

freighter and stagecoach companies out of business in

the 1850's and 1860's, and traffic fell off to the point

where toll road operation was unprofitable. Some of

the turnpike companies were able to sell their roads

to the counties for much less than they cost originally ; but most of them simply surrendered their charters

and ceased operation. Their facilities were then taken

over by the local authorities and maintained as com- mon roads. With the heavy through traffic gone, the more prosperous counties were able to maintain these

roads in fairly good condition for local travel.* In

the poorer counties, travel became more and more un- comfortable as the old turnpikes deteriorated from

lack of care. In the East, the old turnpikes were only a fraction

of the mileage imder county and township control.

Most of the people lived along roads that were established in the early days of settlement through con- tinued public use rather than by plan. These followed

the boundaries between farms or occupied the lands

least suited for agriculture, and, thus, were often

winding and poorly located. Over the years, they had

been improved by the county and township supervisors with what scanty funds they could raise from

taxes, and practically everywhere, except in the wealthiest counties, these roads were maintained by statute

labor.

The local road situation was somewhat different in

the "public land States"—i.e., those States that had

* The stone surfaces of the original turnpikes were generally 18 or 20 feet wide. The local supervisors generally re- plenished the stone only on the central 10 or 12 feet.'

L[>^yZ

FEDERAL AID ROUTES ON EXISTING STATE HIGHWAYS FEDERAL AlO ROUTES NOT ON EXISTING STATE HIGHWAYS A 19/(8 map of Kansas showing State highways generally located on a grid pattern, a carry over from the days when roads were built on section lines and each owner donated land for the right-of-way.

36
been formed from the public domain.* The lands in

these States had been subdivided into rectangular

townships and sections according to an ordinance of

May 29, 1785. These land lines became the boundaries

between farms and, thus, were the lines of least resist- ance for local roads. The customary right-of-way for

these roads was one chain wide, or 66 feet, each property owner donating 33 feet on his side of the section

line. As in the East, these roads were normally maintained by statute labor. In the Great Plains and the Far West, this tendency

to fix the local roads on the section lines was strengthened in July 1866 by an act in which Congress

granted a free right-of-way for public roads over unreserved public lands. A number of counties took

advantage of this act by declaring all section lines in

the county to be public roads, thus, reserving the

right-of-way before the lands became private property. The Legislature of Dakota Territory passed an

act making all section lines public roads 66 feet wide,

to the extent that it was physically possible to build

roads on these lines.- Section line roads were easy to build in level country, but in hilly country it was impossible to stay on

the section lines and preserve a reasonable gradient.**

The rectangular pattern imposed considerable indirect

traffic on those whose destination was diagonal to the

land grid. Nevertheless, hundreds of thousands of

miles of these section line roads were built as the

public land States were settled. Initially, these roads were mere wagon tracks, but over the years many of

them were graded and ditched, and some were graveled. This work was aided tremendously by the introduction of blade graders after 1878. Some of these were pulled by 6 horses and in easy country, a mile of

ditched earth road could be built in a single day.

The years between 1850 and 1900 have been called

the "dark age of the rural road," yet in this period

well over li/^ million miles of rural roads were built

in the United States. It is true that, with insignifi- cant exceptions, these roads were unimproved, or at best only ditched and graded, yet in the aggregate

they represented a mighty public effort, particularly

in the West where population was sparse and the

people poor.

The Financing of Rural Roads

Until the early 1900's, the main sources of local

road funds were taxes on property, poll taxes and

statute labor. In 1904 only 25 States had laws per- mitting counties, townships or road districts to issue

bonds for road improvement, and in these the privilege was used sparingly and usually only to finance a

particularly expensive purchase, such as a steel or concrete bridge. The total expenditures on rural roads

from bond issues were only about $3.5 million in 1904.* Property taxes levied for road support varied widely

from State to State and from county to county within

the same State. As the Office of Public Roads (OPR)

observed in 1904,

Unquestionably the bitterest controversies in counties and townships in connection with the subject of road im- provement are over proposed increases in the rates of property taxation for road purposes. It is common In many parts of the United States for uninformed though

honestly-disposed citizens, to mal^e a determined opposition to a very moderate and perfectly reasonable increase

in the tax rate.' The average tax rate of all counties reporting to the

OPR in 1904 was 25.7 cents per $100 valuation, but

this gives little idea of the tremendous variation between counties, some of which levied only 1.3 cents per

$100 valuation and some as much as $1.60 per $100

valuation." These taxes, together with poll taxes payable in cash, were by far the major source of funds for

building and maintaining the country roads, yielding some $53.8 million in 1904. While this seems like a

large sum, it amounted to very little when spread over

2.1 million miles of road.^

In 1904 11 States assessed an annual poll tax varying from $1 to $5 per person for upkeep of the roads.

This tax could be paid in labor or in cash. In addition, 25 States retained the ancient statute labor sys-

* All States except the Original Thirteen, and Maine, Ver- mont, Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia and Texas.

** In 1900 there were more roads having excessively steep

grades in Iowa than in Switzerland.'

Working out the road tax on a gravel road. Ten days labor or $5 tax was required by law in Alabama as late as 1913. tem under which all able bodied male citizens of

certain ages living along a road were required to work

on its repair a stated number of days per year or pay

the equivalent in cash.* Despite its inefficiency, the

work rendered in 1904 by statute labor was valued by

the OPR at $19.8 million, and amounted to about one- quarter of all rural road expenditures that year.*

Most of the rights-of-way for county and township

roads were donated by their owners to the local authorities, and these donations represented a very

considerable part of the original cost of these roads.

Over the years, these rights-of-way came to some 10.4 million acres of land, valued in 1904 at about $342

million.^" The roads themselves probably represented an investment of at least a billion dollars. This large investment was, however, spread so thinly

that very few rural residents enjoyed adequate road

service. In the northern States, earth roads were

quagmires during the spring thaw and became dis- tressingly soft during rains at any time of year. Deep

sand was a problem in many parts of the South.

As late as 1889 no cash poll taxes or property taxes were

levied for road purposes in Kentuclty, South Carolina, Georgia,

Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, New Mexico and Utah, and

the rural roads in these States were built and maintained

exclusively by statute labor.'

37
The Jefferson Memorial Road near

Charlottsville, Va., before improvement.

Either way—loose sand or deep mud—^the loads a farmer could haul with his teams were only a fraction

of what they would have been on a reasonably good

road, and this difference was, in effect, a tax on everything the farmer bought or sold. The following ac- count of one farmer's struggle with his local roads is typical of the era

After the war I lived 9 miles north of Charlotte. The

roads at times were so very bad that everybody was

landlocked ; the ladies could not go to church in winter

they hardly ever thought of going to tOMTi. The men

went on horseback and sometimes it took a good thor- oughbred to carry you there. . . . The first thing that impressed me with the importance of good roads occurred

in 1867. It rained almost everyday for a month ; the roads were horrible. I left home with two wagons, one with four horses and one with three, to go to Charlotte,

only 9 miles away, for .some fertilizer. I got a ton on one wagon and half a ton on the other, and when within a

mile and a half of home on the return trip we stalled, and had to take the horses out and leave the wagons

there all night. We went back after the wagons the next day and it took until nearly 11 o'clock to get them home.

The merchant from whom I got the guano paid $5 per

ton freight on it from Baltimore to Charlotte. Considering everything, it cost me over twice as much to take the guano 9 miles from Charlotte to my home as it did to bring it from Baltimore to Charlotte on the railroad."

The mud could be so sticky that a pair of oxen had difficulty getting these wheels,

without a load, free.

'm-s^^*^

38
Although, this appears to be a?i exaygeraied condition of early roads, it was a common enough occurrence that the Oood Roads

magazine in May 1892 published the following guide on "What to do When A Horse Falls":

1. Jump down and hold the animal's head, to prevent his dashing it about to his own injury.

2. Loosen the check-rein (if you are so foolish as to use one) and the parts of the harness which fasten on the vehicle.

3. Back the carriage so as to get the shafts and traces clear.

4. Steady and support the horse's head, and excite and encourage him, with hand and voice, to rise.

5. When you have got him up pat and further encourage him, and see if he is wounded or otheruHse injured.

6. Let him stand still -a short time and recover himself, and then proceed gently and with greater caution than before.

The high cost of transport from the farms was also a tax on the people of the cities who were forced to pay higher prices for locally grown food and farm

products. In 1901 fruit from California could be

shipped to Raleigh, North Carolina, by rail for less than farmers li\dng only 15 miles away could deliver

their fruit to the Raleigh markets.

You see by this that the railroads enable the fruit growers of California to compete with the fruit growers

of your own county towns. . . . The way to successfully

compete with these people is to build good roads so as to enable us to get to market at any time and carry a full load, thereby reducing cost of transportation. ... A bad

road is a relentless tax assessor and a sure collector." Transportation in the Cities According to the 1900 census, there were 161 cities of more than 25,000 inhabitants. Of these, 27 had

populations in the 100,000 to 300,000 range and 11

had more than 300,000 people.

The ability to move goods freely from place to place was absolutely necessary to the prosperity of these

cities. Industry, powered by steam, used great quantities of coal which had to be hauled over the streets from the docks and railroad yards to the factories and

mills. Similarly, the hauling of raw materials and

finished goods to and from the factories, warehouses,

docks and railroads generated a tremendous volume

of truck and dray traffic. Outside of the industrial

areas, city dwellers depended on their streets for deliveries of coal, ice and groceries.

A typical 3-horse truck of the 1890's weighed 7,000

pounds empty and could carry a 10-ton pay load, and

horsedrawn trucks and drays capable of hauling 18- ton net loads were fairly common in large cities. These vehicles ran on steel tires which pulverized all but the hardest pavement surfaces. Consequently, the

main streets of the large cities were built very heavily

and surfaced with granite blocks or hard paving

bricks.* The minor business streets and residential

streets were commonly of macadam or gravel, and in

the 1890's many of these were made dust-free by

asphalt surfacing.** ^* For the most part, city dwellers enjoyed excellent

local transportation. Even comparatively small cities had horsecar lines, some of which persisted into the

early 1900's. About 1873 cable railways were introduced in the larger cities, but in the 1890's these, as well as most of the horsecar lines, were converted to

electric propulsion. "By 1890 more than one himdred

American cities had installed or were in the process

of installing electric street railways." ^^ Small towns on the peripheries of the large cities were tied to the cities by steam railroads and after

about 1894, by electric interurban railroads as well. Frequent schedules on these railroads made it con- venient for thousands of the more prosperous city

workers to live in the suburbs and commute to work.

The Financing of Urban Roads and Streets Concentrated populations, trade and industry built a fruitful base for property taxation in the cities. These taxes, supplemented by special assessments, provided the funds for thousands of miles of improved

* Broadway in New Yorlt City was surfaced with blocks of granite 10 inches thick laid on a 6-inch concrete base ; and in Philadelphia pavements for important streets were made of 8-inch stone cubes laid on beds of gravel 15 inches deep." In

the 1890's these stone pavements were overlaid with asphalt

to reduce noise and rolling resistance and to provide better footing for the horses.

** Asphalt paving was first used in New York and Phila- delphia in 1871 and immediately l)ecame popular because of

its smoothness, silence and ea.se of cleaning. By 1897 over

27.4 million square yards of asphalt were laid in American

cities."

39
, jgS^-?*'*^**^

The Cherrelyn Horsecar was unique among horsecars of the day

for the horse only pulled the car one way and was a nonpaying

passenger on its return trip. It operated up and down the steep

hill from downtown Englewood to Cherrelyn (Colorado) , a dis- tance of almost a mile, between 1883 and 1910. The horse, sometimes wearing a straw hat, riding on the special platform on the back of the car was a popular attraction for both tourists and

residents. Today the old Cherrelyn is restored and is on display near the City Hall in Englewood.

40
Even the streets of some towns iverc nearly

as bad as the rural roads after a heavy rain.

streets,* as well as sewers, water supplies, street lights,

schools, parks and other municipal services far beyond

the reach of the rural citizens. Most city street improvements were financed by

bond issues which were amortized out of general tax

revenues. The cities for the most part avoided "payas-you-go" financing and did most of their original

construction by contract.

Broken and abandoned carriages were the eyesore of the day.

* In 1907, the first year for which reliable figures are available, there were 47,000 miles of roads and streets in cities of 30,000 or more population, of which 20,646 were improved

with some kind of surface better than dirt. These included

7,675 miles of heavy-duty pavement ; 4,161 miles with asphalt

surfaces ; 6,274 miles of macadam ; and 2,536 miles of gravel."

Practically all American cities enjoyed the right,

conferred upon them by the State legislatures, to

assess the cost of street improvements to the benefited

property. This power greatly enlarged the financial resources available to the cities for improvements.*

City dwellers were exempt from the obligation to perform statute labor. Instead of i-elying on the

obsolete and wasteful statute labor system, cities ac- complished their sti-eet maintenance with paid labor

under the super\dsion of civil engineers or, at the

least, persons with some knowledge of roadbuilding,

and paid for it out of general tax revenues. Beginning of the Good Roads Movement

The great disparity between the cities and the rural

areas in the quality of life was evident to everyone,

but few city dwellers thought they had any obligation

to do anything about it. They had taxed themselves

to build their roads and streets, let the farmers do

likewise, was the prevailing sentiment in the cities. Nevertheless, the impetus for road reform came from

the cities and primarily from civic leaders who appreciated the economic burdens laid on city dwellers

and farmers alike by the bad roads. These leaders

realized and accepted the cold hard facts that good

roads were impossible without adequate funds and

that these could be obtained only by the taxation of

urban, as well as rural, property.

In 1879 the General Assembly of North Carolina

passed the "Mecklenburg Road Law" permitting that

county to levy a road tax on all property in the county,

including that in Charlotte, the principal city. The

act was repealed the following year, but was re-enacted

in 1885, and eventually most of the counties of the

State elected to operate their roads under this law.

By 1902 Mecklenburg was acknowledged to have the

best roads in North Carolina, and its citizens were

cheerfully paying the highest road taxes in the State:

35 cents per $100 property valuation, plus $1.05 on

the poll."

The first State road convention was held in Iowa

City, Iowa, in 1883, primarily to try to bring about some improvement in the deplorable condition of the

rural roads. This convention recommended payment

of road taxes in cash instead of labor, consolidation

of road districts, letting road construction to responsible contractors, and, most importantly, authorizing

county boards to levy a property tax to create a road

fund. These recommendations were adopted by the

Iowa Legislature in an act passed in 1884, but the

reforms were made optional with the coimties rather

than mandatory.^"

Other States adopted "good road laws" similar to North Carolina's and Iowa's, but the good roads move-

* The special assessment is an institution of American

origin, first used in New York City in colonial times to finance

streets and sewers. By 1893 all States and Territories had

laws authorizing municipal corporations to assess the cost of physical improvements against benefited properties. Street railway companies were customarily assessed with the cost of paving between their tracks, and for a certain distance on each side. The right to make special assessments was rarely conferred on counties and townships, but in some States special road improvement districts were created by the legi-slature

and given the power of asse.ssment."

41
As a result of the Mecklenhurg Road Law, loads such as this could be hauled by two nvules on a macadamized road

in any weather where formerly only two hales of cotton could be hauled on an earth road in fairly good weather.

ment did not really get underway until about 1890

when the organized bicyclists launched a national

public relations campaign to whip up sentiment favorable to more and better roadbuilding.

The Wheelmen and The Roads

Bicycles became practical vehicles for personal

transportation with the introduction of the "safety"

design* in 1884 and the pneumatic tire in 1888. Almost overnight cycling became a national craze in the

United States. "A frenzy seized upon the people and

men and women of all stations were riding wheels;

ardent cyclists were found in every city, village and

hamlet." ^i The wheelmen were not content to do their riding on the relatively smooth city streets, but fanned out

into the country in all directions. They organized

cross-country rallies, road races, weekend excursions.

These activities brought the wheelmen into intimate

contact with the miserable country roads, and they

became vociferous advocates of road improvement.

All over the country, the bicyclists formed social

organizations, or "wheel clubs," to promote cycling as a sport. Leading this movement nationally was the

League of American Wheelmen, which had been or- ganized in 1880 by consolidating a number of local "ordinary" bicycle clubs. Very early in its life the

League perceived that cycling as a sport depended on good roads, and it transformed itself into a powerful

propaganda and pressure group for promoting them.

"Newspaper space was freely utilized; many papers

making special and regular features of 'good roads';

pamphlets were published and distributed broadly,

and a magazine was established." ^^ Appropriately,

this magazine was titled Good Roads., and it was

launched in 1892 under the energetic editorship of

I. B. Potter, a New York City civil engineer and

lawyer. Good Roads circulated far beyond the ranks

of the wheelmen and was very influential in molding

public opinion to accept the inevitable taxes that

would be required to create good roads. Potter heaped

ridicule on American roads by contrasting their sad

condition with the fine roads of Europe, particularly

those of France. He ran testimonials, praising good

roads where they existed in the United States. He

A leisure bicycle trip into the country about the turn of the century.

* They were called "safety" bicycles because, unlike the "ordinary" bicycle with its high front wheel, the rider was

less apt to be propelled over the handlebars if he hit an

obstacle.

42
also published educational articles on the principles

of good roadbuilding and the economic benefits of all- weather roads. He used pictures of good and bad

roads freely, thus, liolding tlie reader's attention where

words alone would have failed. Xewspapers and national magazines reprinted these articles, affording

them the widest distribution.-^

A "Good Roads Association" was formed in Missouri in 1891, followed by similar organizations in

other States.-* A national road conference, the first of its kind, was held in 1894 with representatives from

11 States. Resolutions passed at this conference urged

the State legislatures to set up limited systems of

State roads, and to create temi)orary highway commissions to recommend suitable legislation to implement good roads programs.-'^

State Aid Spreads the Financial Burden

In 1890 all the public roads in New Jersey outside

of the cities were under township control and were

built and maintained at township expense. Purely

local traffic predominated on most of these roads, but some carried traffic from neighboring townships and

even beyond, and on a few, teams could be counted

from as many as 20 townships. By actual count, the

Xew Jersey Road Improvement Association proved

that the traffic on these main roads was intercounty

rather than local, and it asserted that, in fairness, the

counties and the State should shoulder part of the

burden of building and maintaining them. The Association and the League of American "N^Hieelmen put

their support behind a State-aid bill in the Legislature which became law April 14, 1891. This law declared that "The expense of constructing permanently

improved roads may reasonably be imposed, in due

proportions, upon the State and upon the counties in

which they are located." It left the initiation, planning and supervision of State-aided projects in the

hands of the county officials, but reserved to the State,

represented by the Board of Agriculture, the right to approve projects and to accept or reject contracts. Upon completion, the cost of the improvement was to be split three ways : one-tenth to be assessed to the

property holders along the road, one-third to the

State and the remainder to the county. The act appropriated $75,000 as the State's share for the first year's operations.^**

The State-aid act was challenged in the courts and

upheld. The Board then approved petitions for

State aid to three projects in Middlesex County total- ing 10.55 miles which, when completed in December

1892, became the first roads to be improved under the

act." In 1894 the operation of the act was placed under a Commissioner of Public Roads appointed by the

Governor for a 3-year term. New Jersey, thus, be- came the second State, after Massachusetts, to establish a State highway organization. For a niunber of

years, however, the Commissioner of Public Roads had

very little real authority over State-aided roads and

none at all over other roads. Lacking the power to

initiate projects, he could not insure that State-aided

roads would link up into highways of any great con- tinuous length, and after they were completed, he

could not require that they be adequately maintained.

"The Right-of-Way"—bicyclists and horsecart vying for the road.

Nevertheless, the New Jersey State-Aid Act was a milestone in the history of highway administration in

the United States, for it clearly stated the principle

that highway improvement for the general good was

an obligation of the State and county, as well as the

people living along the highway. The act also imposed much-needed reforms in local road administration: it abolished the numerous road districts, along

with the overseer method of road improvement, and

required the township committees to adopt a systematic plan for improving the highways.

The First State Highway Department

Massachusetts approach State aid somewhat differently from New Jersey. The Legislature created a 3-man continuing commission and charged it with

the building and conti-ol of a system of main highways

connecting the municipalities of the Commonwealth.

Originally, the counties w^ere supposed to grade these

roads, after which the Highway Commission would

surface them. In 1894, the law was changed to require

the Conmiission to shoulder the entire cost of construction, charging one-quarter of the expense back to the counties.^* At the same time, the Legislature appropriated $300,000 to begin the operation of the

Commonwealth Highway Plan, an amount that was

afterward substantially increased from year to year.

43
The Massachusetts plan was a tremendous improvement over the New Jersey State-aid law. First, it concentrated the limited State funds on a small mileage of the most important roads, thus, assuring that

they could eventually be connected into a continuous

network. The power to initiate projects remained

with the local officials, but the Highway Commission

had authority to approve or reject and also to make

the surveys and plans and to award and inspect the

construction contracts, thus, retaining control over

standards. This control eventually led to establishing

statewide standards for highways of various classes and also to setting standards for materials used in

roads. Finally, the IVIassachusetts plan left the maintenance of the roads improved with State aid under

the direct control of the Highway Commission, which

could charge a part of the cost back to the local governments.^®

The State-aid principle, in various forms, spread

slowly to other States after New Jersey and Massachusetts had shown the way. In some States the aid

consisted only of advice, which might be accepted or

rejected by the local authorities ; but in New York the

State Highway Commission was given direct or in- direct supervision over every public highway in the

State. Four States helped only to the extent of putting convicts from the State penitentiary to work on

the roads, while others authorized the employment of

State and county convicts for road work and gave

cash grants in addition. Illinois conducted a large

stone-crushing operation with convicts and gave the

stone to the counties free, except for the cost of hauling. Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Washington and California required all State aid to be

spent on tnmkline road systems.^" The last States to enact some form of State aid were South Carolina,

Texas and Indiana, all in 1917.

Revival of the Federal Government's Interest in Roads

As the Good Roads Movement gained momentum,

its supporters began to put pressure on Congress to provide some kind of Federal assistance to highways.

The proposed Chicago World's Fair, planned for 1893,

seemed an auspicious occasion for a demonstration of

Federal interest. In July 1892, a Senate bill was introduced to create a National Highway Commission "for the purpose of

general inquiry into the condition of highways in the

United States, and means for their improvement, and

especially the best method of securing a proper exhibit

at the World's Columbian Exposition of approved

appliances for road making, and of providing for

public instruction in the art during the Exposition." ^^ Although introduced by Senator Charles F. Manderson of Nebraska, this bill was written by General Roy

Stone, a prominent New York civil engineer and good

roads booster.^- The Senate passed the National Highway Commission bill, but it was lost by adjournment of Congress

and failed to become law. However, in the next ses- sion. Representatives Allan C. Durburow of Illinois*

and Clarke Lewis of Mississippi introduced resolutions

* Mr. Durburow was Chairman of the Select Committee on

the Columbian Exposition.

instructing the House Committee on Agriculture to incorporate a clause in the pending agricultural appropriation bill to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to "make inquiry regarding public roads," and to "make investigations for a better system of roads."

The Agricultural Appropriation Act of 1893, as

finally approved on March 3, appropriated $10,000 to enable the Secretary "to make inquiries in regard to the systems of road management throughout the

United States ... to make investigations in regard to the best method of road-making . . . and to enable him

to assist the agricultural college and experiment sta- tions in disseminating information on this subject. . . ."

The U.S. Office of Road Inquiry

Secretary J. Sterling Morton implemented this statute on October 3, 1893, by setting up the Office of

Road Inquiry (ORI) within the Department of Agriculture. To head this office he appointed General Roy

Stone as Special Agent and Engineer for Road Inquiry, but was careful to limit Stone's authority to investigating and disseminating information. He was

specifically forbidden to seek to influence or control

road policy in the States or counties or to promote or encourage schemes to furnish work to the unemployed

or to convicts. "The Department is to furnish information, not to direct and formulate any system of

organization, however efficient or desirable it may

be." "

With characteristic energy, Stone, whose entire staff consisted of himself and one clerk, sent letters of in- quiry to the governors of the States and Territories,

and their secretaries of state, the members of Congress,

the State geologists and all the railroad presidents,

soliciting information on highway laws, the locations

of materials suitable for roadbuilding, and rail rates for hauling such materials. By the end of June 1894,

the Office of Road Inquiry had issued nine bulletins on these subjects, some of which were already in their

second printing!^*

In the following year the ORI produced nine more

bulletins, three of which were the proceedings of national good roads conventions. The promoters of

these meetings had no trouble getting able and in- fluential men on their programs as speakers, including

General Stone, and publication of their speeches at Government expense was an easy and cheap way to spread the gospel of good roads throughout the

country.

Another major ORI project begim in 1894 was a

large-scale Good Roads National Map of all the macadamized and gravel roads in the United States. For this. Stone sent a map of each county to the clerk or surveyor of that county, asking that it be returned

with the existing roads laid down upon it. By June

1895, he was able to compile statewide road maps for

Pennsylvania, Indiana and New Jersey from these

county maps, with those of other States in various

stages of compilation.^^

To round out a year of extraordinary activity, the

ORI, with the help of the Division of Statistics of

the Agriculture Department, compiled information on

the cost of hauling farm products to market in 1,160

counties in the United States. These statistics showed

that a farmer's average haul to market or shipping

44
points ranged from 6.4 miles in the East to 23.3 miles

in the Far West, with a national average of 12.1 miles.

The average load for a 2-horse team was a little over

2,000 pounds and the average cost of hauling was 25

cents per ton-mile.^® By comparison, the cost of

hauling farm products by railroad was about i/^ cent per ton-mile at this time.

The Object Lesson Road Program

As yet, General Stone had not found a satisfactory

way to assist the agricultural colleges and experiment

stations to disseminate information on roadmaking.

A solution to this problem came out of the experience

of the State Highway Commission in implementing

the Massachusetts State-aid law of 1893. The Legislature had appropriated $300,000 with the provision

that each county was to receive a "fair apportionment." The Commission decided to parcel the money

out to 37 widely scattered projects, each about 1 mile

long, on the theory that once the people had a taste of

good roads, they would put pressure on the Legislature for a bigger future appropriation. Each project was located where it would eventually form a link in a continuous system of tnmk roads between the principal cities.^^ Stone proposed to apply the Massachusetts idea nationally by building short "object lesson roads" near

or on the experimental farms of the various States. These would serve to instnict the roadmakers, to educate the visiting public and to improve the economic

administration of the farms.^* This plan was satis- factory to James Wilson, the new Secretary of Agriculture, who preferred that the OKI emphasize the

practical side of roadbuilding rather than the aca- demic. However, the total annual budget of the Office

of Road Inquiry was only $10,000 at this time, so General Stone had to scrounge most of the cost of the

first object lesson roads.

He began the scrounging by reducing his own office

staff, using the money saved to hire practical roadbuilding experts, of whom the first was General E. G.

Harrison of Asbury Park, New Jersey, a civil engineer

who enjoyed a national reputation as a builder of

macadam roads. Next, he talked the road equipment

manufacturers into providing equipment free as a good will and promotion gesture. Finally, he got the

experiment stations, the local road authorities and, in some cases, j^rivate individuals to put up the cash to pay for labor, materials, hauling and part of the wages

of the machine operators.

The OKI's share of the cost of each project consisted

only of the salary and travel expenses of the supervisory road expert, the expense of transporting the

loaned equipment to and from the project and part of

the wages of the equipment operators. However, the

design, stakeout and supervision of construction were under the complete control of the ORI supervisor,

"in order that the roads may be creditable to the

Government when done." ^^ The first object lesson road project was comparatively small, involving a cash outlay of only $321 put

up by the New Jersey Agricultural College and Experiment Station at New Brunswick. Under this

project. General Harrison, in June 1897, placed 6 inches of trap rock macadam 8 feet wide on a 660-foot

section of the main road leading from the town to the

Building the first object lesson road near the New Jersey Agricultural College and Experiment Station, New Brunswick, N.J., in 1897.

45
«5

Working the road machine on a section

of the experimental road at Oeneva, N.T.

college farm. He then moved the equipment to Geneva, New York, where he built li/^ miles of road

connecting the city to the New York Agricultural

Experiment Station. This road cost $9,046 and was

financed by contributions from the town of Greneva,

the experiment station and three private individuals.

After its completion, Harrison moved the equipment

to Kingston, Rhode Island, where he completed a road

for the Agricultural College of Rhode Island in 1898."

These roads accomplished their intended purpose.

They were a forceful demonstration of General Stone's

"seeing is believing" philosophy of selling good roads

to the public. They attracted hundreds of visitors,

including many county road officials. They also at- tracted a deluge of requests for similar object lesson

roads at other agricultural colleges which Stone was

unable to fill because his funds had run out. In

September 1897 he wrote:

The work now in hand will exhaust all the funds that can be spared from this year's appropriation, unless something additional is provided to meet the many urgent

demands of the agricultural colleges and experiment sta- tions for 'Government' roads.

If the manufacturers continue willing to furnish the machinery free, an expenditure by the Governnient of from $300 to $500 for each locality will be sufficient to

call out enough local help to build from $2,000 to $10,000

worth of road at most of the 116 agricultural colleges and

experiment stations, and any required number of outfits can be put in the field at once . . ."

Educational Work of the Office of Road Inquiry

General Stone and his deputy engineer, Maurice O.

Eldridge, were indefatigable writers and speakers.

In addition to writing or editing 20 published bulletins and 30 circulars on various aspects of the road

problem, they accepted invitations to appear on the

programs of several dozen good roads conventions and

farmer's road institutes. The invitations were, in fact,

far more numerous than the ORI could accept with

its limited budget and force. General Stone was also an acknowledged expert on good roads legislation, and

his advice was sought by several States, notably

California, New York, Connecticut and Rhode Island,

in framing their highway laws.

Following the outbreak of war with Spain, General

Stone, in August 1898, was granted leave of absence

from the ORI to serve with the Army. During the war he was a Brigadier General on the staff of General

Nelson Miles. The war over, he resumed his duties in

January 1899, but resigned October 13, 1899, to return

to New York, where he accepted the presidency of the

National League for Good Roads, an organization he

had helped to found in 1893 before his appointment

to the Office of Road Inquiry.

The Office of Public Road Inquiries

While General Stone was on military duty, the

Office of Road Inquiry was temporarily headed by

Martin Dodge of Cleveland, Ohio, formerly President

of the Ohio State Highway Commission. "Wlien Stone

resigned in October 1899, the name of the agency was

changed to the Office of Public Road Inquiries

(OPRI) and Mr. Dodge was appointed as Director.

General Stone's plan for

three great demonstration

roads—/?-o??? Portland,

Maine, to Jacksonville,

Pla., on the east coast;

i from Seattle, Wash., to San Diego, Calif., on. the west coast; and from

Washington, D.C., to San

Francisco, Calif.

46
About 1898 Martin Dodge advanced

the idea of steel track wagon roads by exhibiting sections of stcci track

at the Trans-Mississippi Exposition

at Omaha. The advantages were

that steel tr-ack was less costly to install and ynaintain, more durable,

and the power required to move a vehicle was only a small fraction of that needed over any other ki7id of road. This dcmon.'^t ration shows

an 11-ton load being hauled by one

horse on a steel track while it would take 20 horses to haul tliis load on an ordinai-y road of that

day.

For 2 years, prior to General Stone's resignation,

Congi-ess had turned a deaf ear to his entreaties for more funds to expand tlie demonstration road program. ^Y\^ien i\Ir. Dodge took office in 1899, the budget was still only $10,000 per year, and for another 2

years he had no success in getting it increased. This

resistance was due, in part at least, to fear on the part

of some people that the OPRI was the entering wedge

for national roads under Federal control. Seeking to allay this suspicion, Dodge wrote in his report for

1901:

It is proper just here to call attention to a misconception which appears to exist in the minds of some to the

effect that increased appropriations for this work may

lead to National aid. It should be distinctly understood

that the work of this Office, like that of many other

Divisions of the Department, is purely educational. In requesting an increased appropriation it was not the in- tention to shift the burden and responsibility of con- structing improved roads from the States and counties to the General Government. Such a plan is not feasible, and

even if it were, it would not be desirable, for there could be no surer way of postponing the building of good roads

than by making them dependent upon National aid. Under

such a system States and counties would wait for National

aid and little or nothing would be done."

Director Dodge's plea for more funds did not bear

fruit until 1903 when Congress increased the OPRI's

budget to $30,000. In the meantime, to better keep in touch with local developments and economize on travel

expense, Dodge divided the country into four "divisions," with a special agent in charge of each. To

head the Eastern Division, he appointed Logan W.

Page, a geologist who at the time was also Chief of

the Bureau of Chemistry's Division of Tests. Page

had been invited to Washington in 1900 to set up a materials laboratory in the Bureau of Chemistry of

the Department of Agriculture and to conduct a study

of road materials on a national scale. The other division heads were Professor J. A. Holmes of Chapel

Hill, North Carolina. J. A. Stout of INIenominee,

Wisconsin, and James W. Abbott of Denver, Colorado.

All of the division agents, except Page, were parttime employees, and their available time was fully

employed attending conventions, writing articles and

collecting information on the progress of legislation.

An idea of the duties of these agents can be gleaned

from Dodge's summai-y of Special Agent Abbott's

work for 1901. In addition to traveling more than

12,000 miles by railroad,

He attended and participated in the work of four very important conventions, at two of which he read papers. He has written several articles for publication in leading newspapers, and numerous interviews have been published

giving accounts of his movements and work. He spent some time in consultation with the road committees of the Colorado legislature and assisted in framing a carefully prepared road law. He visited many places in Colorado, Utah, and California, and gave advice where it was desired regarding specific or general road improvement. Mr. Abbott visited, practically at his own expense,

this Office and the highway departments of New York,

Massachusetts, and California. . . .

. . . He has, by personal interviews and private letters, brought the sul)ject of road improvement to the attention

of governors and other State officials, the editors of lead- ing new.spapers, professors in institutions of learning,

presidents and managers of railroads, prominent civil and

mining engineers, members of the legislatures, boards of county commissioners, road supervisors, the heads of leading industries, manufacturers of road machinery, be- sides a large number of influential private citizens." All this for $1,500 per year! Obviously, Special

Agent Abbott also had a private income to draw upon,

as did the other division heads.

Until 1903 the OPRI had only one object lesson

road construction team, which was managed by Special

Agent and Road Expert E. G. Harrison until his

death in February 1901. This team was shipped from

place to place by rail on a prearranged schedule, building eight or nine roads per year, each 14 to I14 miles

long. After a sufficient amount of road had been built

at each location, a "good roads day" would be ar- ranged, and the farmers of that and the adjacent counties would be invited to attend. Special Agent

Harrison would lead the crowd—often as many as 500

persons—along tlie new construction, lecturing on the

fundamentals of drainage, stone surfacing and road

maintenance. Harrison would arrange for the lecture

to be printed in the local newspaper. The following

is a brief quote from one of these accounts: 'We are not here to build city streets, nor boulevards.

Cities are able to pay for their expensive streets and

know how to build them. But the U.S. is interested in

47
the rural districts and wishes to help the farmers and

others to get good roads. Therefore, the Department of Agriculture has established the Office of Road Inquiry,

which is seeliing to gather all the information possible

about the construction and maintenance of good roads

and to impart it gratis to the people. The government

will not build your roads, but will place at your disposal

all the information it has gained from experts, experi- ments and other sources. . . . 'Here we have not even built the best kind of macadam

road. For that you must go to your cities and look at the boulevards. We have simply taken the material at hand and from it constructed the best road possible with

the money we have. The boulders from which the stone

is crushed were brought from the neighboring farms. They are of good quality and very hard. They consist of granite, trap, syenite, quartz, etc. This is much better than your soft limestone, or loose sandy, washed gravel.'

After 1903, with a tripled budget, the OPRI was

able to keep four demonstration teams in the field. Also, with Page's new laboratory in operation, the

Government undertook to test the materials going into

the object lesson roads without charge to the local cooperators, eliminating guesswork in this very important aspect of roadbuilding.

The Good Roads Trains

In 1893 there was only one national good roads

organization in the United States and three or four

local associations. Eight years later there were over

100 organizations promoting good roads, including six

distinctly national road associations. In 1901 the most

active and aggressive of these organizations was the

National Good Roads Association (NGRA) which

had been formed during the Chicago Good Roads

Convention of 1900, and was headed by Colonel

William H. Moore of St. Louis as president and

Colonel R. W. Richardson of Omaha as secretary.

Like many other good roads organizations, the National Good Roads Association had no permanent

membership list and depended for its support on donations from civic groups, manufacturers of road

machinery, suppliers of road materials, wealthy individuals, the public at large and even the railroads.

Colonel Moore, the guiding spirit of the NGRA, was

a skillful and persuasive promoter, with a wide ac- quaintanceship among influential people. In 1901 he

conceived the idea of a traveling good roads show that

would cover the country, educating the public on the

advantages of improved highways, very much in the manner of the circuses and the popular Chautauqua

shows. He persuaded the road machinery companies

to help with this project by donating their latest models, along with trained operators, to run them.

From the Illinois Central Railroad, he obtained the

promise of an 11 -car train free of charge, to transport

the show from place to place. Finally, he approached

Director Dodge to give Government sanction to the

idea by providing a road expert to lecture on roads

and supervise demonstrations of roadbuilding. Dodge

was unable to help because his budget was already

committed to other work; however, when the AssociaThe Southern Railway Oood Roads Train vnth some of the road experts during its fall trip in 1901.

48
tion offered to pay the expert's salary and expenses,

he agreed to participate and designated Special Agent

Charles T. Harrison of New Jersey as the OPRI's

representative.*

The Association mounted a high-powered publicity

campaign to prepare the way for the "Good Roads

Train." Advance agents organized local conventions

and lined up donations of labor and materials for

demonstration i^rojects. The train, consisting of nine

flat cars loaded with road machinery, and two sleeping cars for the operators, laborers, officials, road

experts and press representatives, pulled out of Chicago early in April 1901, under the management and

control of Colonel Richardson. Before returning in

August, it stopped at 16 cities in five States, wliere

the construction crew built sample roads of earth, stone or gravel varying in length from 14 mile to 114 miles. Director Dodge, who went along on the

first trip from Chicago to New Orleans, expressed his

enthusiasm for the project in this glowing account

:

About 20 miles of earth, stone, and gravel roads were

built and 15 large and enthusiastic conventions were

held. The numbers attending these conventions and wit- nessing the work were very large, in nearly every instance more than a thousand persons and in some cases 2,000 persons being present. Among the attendants were lead- ing citizens and officials, including governors, mayors, Congressmen, members of legislatures, judges of the county court, and road officials. This was undoubtedly

the most successful campaign ever waged for good roads,

and the expedition has been of great service to the cause, and especially to the people of the Mississippi Valley."

* Charles T. Harrison replaced E. G. Harrison who died February 6, 1901.

At this time the steam railroads were among the

strongest supporters of good roads. Secure in their

position as the backbone of the American transportation system, they were anxious to extend their tributary traffic areas and also to overcome some of the

widespread hostility engendered by their high-handed

methods of dealing with the public. The economic

aspect of the railway interest in roads was aptly ex- pressed by an official of the Southern Railroad in 1902:

. . . They [the Southern Railroad] now handle the products of from 2 to 5 miles on each side of their trades. In the winter season they can not get the products that are any farther away. If you had improved roads, they

would be able to serve the country 20 to 30 miles from

their tracks. ... If you are a shipper, you know that

at some seasons of the year it is hard to get cars ; that every railroad in the United States suffers from a lack

of cars and locomotives, and that the industries of almost

every community suffer on this account. This is because

the traffic on all railroads is so greatly congested within

a few months of the year. It is not divided over the twelve months as it ought to be. If there were good

roads leading to every railroad station in the United

States, the railroads would be able to get along with half the cars they now need. . . .'"' The Illinois Central Railroad "expedition" was so successful that Colonel Moore had little difficulty lin- ing up others. One left Chicago on the Lake Shore

and Michigan Southern Railroad for Buffalo, where

it was placed on exhibit on the grounds of the PanAmerican Exposition during the International Good

Roads Congress during September 1901.*^

The crushing plant in operation at Winston^Salem, N.C., during a macadam roadbuilding demonstration in 1901.

49
The most elaborate expedition of all was sponsored

jointly by the Southern Railroad and the NGRA and

cost the railroad over $80,000. It left Alexandria,

Virginia, on October 29, 1901, and was on the road for

5 months, traveling 4,037 miles and demonstrating at

18 good roads conventions. Welcoming this train to Lynchburg, U.S. Senator J. W. Daniel of Virginia

said:

An itinerant college on wheels has come among us. It brings its professors and its equipment with it. It is known as the 'good roads train' of the Southern Railway

system. This college does not teach out of books, nor

solely by word of mouth. It teaches by the greater power

of example. If you will just watch its operation you will see a new good road grow over an old and bad road at the magic touch of titanic machinery, and while an orator

talks of road building it will set his words to the music

of practical accomplishment.'"

When the automobile arrived, many

miles of rural road were similar to this one along Bishop Creek in California.

A steam roller in operation on a demonstration

macadam pavement near Greenville, Tenn., in 1901.

The Pere Marquette Railroad and the Michigan

Good Roads Association sponsored a Good Roads

Train for the summer of 1902—the only train which

did not have at least one of Dodge's road experts

aboard. The last of the Good Roads Trains left St. Paul on the Great Northern Railroad, September 8, 1903, for an expedition through Minnesota, the Dakotas, Montana, and beyond to the Pacific Coast.

The First National Road Inventory

One of the most ambitious tasks undertaken by the

OPRI during Director Dodge's administration was an

inventory of all the roads in the Thiited States outside

of the cities. The information for this enumeration was obtained in 1904 from questionnaires sent to the

county authorities or from "voluntary correspondents"

appointed by the OPRI. The investigators, headed

by Assistant Director M. O. Eldridge, went far beyond

merely tabulating road mileage. They investigated

taxation and sources of revenue, road laws and total

expenditures in every county of every State. Road

mileage was subdivided according to surface type.

The information was so voluminous that over 2 years were required to tabulate it and issue the report, which

did not appear until May 1907.*^ The OPRI study showed that there were 2,151,570

miles of rural public roads in the United States in

1904, plus 1,598 miles of stone-surfaced toll roads.*

Of the public roads, only 153,662 miles had any kind

of surfacing.** The expenditures on roads in 1904 were $79.77 million of which only $2.6 million was

contributed by the States in the form of State aid.^^

OfFice of Public Roads Achieves Permanent Status From its beginning in 1893 as the ORI, the Office

of Public Road Inquiries had been a temporary or- ganization set up by the Secretary of Agriculture to perform a job mandated by Congress, namely, to col- lect and disseminate information about good roads.

Apparently, Congress did not contemplate originally

that this would become a permanent function of the

Government, but the work was continued from year

to year by a short paragraph in the annual Agriculture appropriation bill. In 1903 and again in 1904

* By comparison, there were 213,904 miles of railroads in the United States in 1904.=" ** This mileage was distributed as follows

:

Surfacii[ig Type Miles)

Earth Gravel Stone Shells, etc. Total Sand-Clay

Eastern and

Southeastern

States 580,850 24,627 21,240 3,091 629,808 Texas 119,281 167 1,909 52 121,409

Public Land

States 1,297,777 83,439 15,473 3,664 1,400,853

1,997,908 108,233 38,622 6,807 2,151,570

In addition to the above, there were 1,101 miles of stone- surfaced toll roads in Pennsylvania and 497 miles of toll roads

in Maryland.^1

50
A plank road between El Centra,

Calif., and Yuma, Ariz.

51
stuck in the mud in Sacramento Cawyon.

Director Dodge recommended that his office be trans- formed into a Division of the Department "with a

statutory roll of officers and employees."

The work of this Office appears to be no longer of tentative character. Year after year it has assumed in- creased importance and wider scope, and there is now a

general demand coming up from all sections of the country that it be made a permanent feature of the work of

this Department. It appears fitting, therefore, that it be

given a more definite legal status, thereby adding dignity

and stability to this branch of the Department's work. . . .^ Congress eventually heeded this plea, and in the

Agriculture Appropriation Act, of March 3, 1905 (33

Stat. 882), it merged the Division of Tests of the

Bureau of Chemistry with the Office of Public Road

Inquiries to form the Office of Public Roads. The

new agency had a statutory roll, headed by a Director,

"who shall be a scientist and have charge of all sci- entific and technical work," at a salary of $2,500 per

year. The Act also provided for a Chief of Records, an Instrument Maker and 6 clerks, and boosted the

total annual appropriation for the office's work to $50,000.

The requirement that the Director should be a sci- entist prevented Martin Dodge, a lawyer, from suc- ceeding to the directorship of the new Office of Public

Roads, and Logan Waller Page was appointed instead.

Director Page assumed the helm of the Office of

Public Roads at a momentous time in the history of

land transportation. To his predecessors "good roads"

meant wagon roads, constructed according to the timetested methods of Tresaguet, Telford and McAdam

and designed for horsedrawn steel-tired traffic traveling 6 to 8 miles per hour. In 1905 the shape of things

to come was dimly foreshadowed by scarcely 78,000

automobiles, most of which were confined to the cities. Ten years later 2.33 million autos were raising clouds

of dust on the country roads, and by 1918 this mimber

had increased to 5.55 million. The motor age had

arrived, and with it a new kind of highway, designed

specifically for motor vehicles, would evolve. Director

Page would preside over the early stages of this

evolution.

52
REFERENCES

* J. Owen, The Controverted Questions in Road Construction,

Transactions, Vol. 28 (American Society of Civil Engineers,

New York, 1893) p. 111. '43 U.S.C. Section 218 (1964).

' M. O. Eldridge, Good Roads For Farmers, Farmers' Bulletin No. 95 (Office of Public Roads, Washington, D.C., 1900)

p. 9.

* M. O. Eldridge, Public Road Mileage, Re\'enues and

Expenditures, In the United States In 1904, Bulletin No. 32

(Office of Public Roads, Washington, D.C., 1907) p. 16.

'Id., p. 18. 'Id.

' Id., p. 16. Ud., p. 20. *Id., p. 16. "Id., p. 14. " S. Alexander, History of Good Road Making in Mecklenburg County, Proceedings of the North Carolina Good

Roads Con\-ention, Bulletin No. 24 (Bureau of Public Roads,

Washington, D.C., 1903) pp. 22, 23. "T. Parker, Good Roads and Their Relation to the Farmer,

Proceedings of the North Carolina Good Roads Convention,

Bulletin No. 24 (Bureau of Public Roads, Washington, D.C., 1903) p. 27. " W. Gillespie, A Manual of the Principles and Practice

OF Road Making (A. S. Barnes and Co., New York, 1871)

pp. 221, 227. "A. Blanchard & A. Fletcher (eds.), American Highway

Engi;s-eer's Handbook, 1st ed. (Wiley, New York, 1919) p. 467. "G. TiLLSON, Asphalt and Asphalt Pavements, Transactions, Vol. 38 (American Society of Civil Engineers, New

York, 1897) pp. 224, 234. "R. KiRBY, S. Withington, a. Darling & F. Kilgoue,

Engineering in History (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1956)

p. 396. " Office of Federal Coordinator of U.S. Transportation,

Public Aids to Transportation, Public Aids to Motor Ve- hicle Transportation, Vol. IV (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1940)

p. 6. " L. Van Ornum, Theory and Practice of Special Assess- ments, Transactions, Vol. 38 (American Seciety of Civil Engineers, New York, 1897) pp. 336-361. "J. Holmes, Roadhuilding in North Carolina, Proceedings

OF THE North Carolina Good Roads Con\-ention, Bulletin No. 24 (Bureau of Public Roads, Washington, D.C., 1903)

pp. 66, 67. '°H. Trumbower, Roads, Encyclopedia of the Social

Sciences, Vol. 13 (MacMillan, New York, 1948) pp. 406, 407. " G. Chatburn, Highways and Highway Transportation

(Thos. Y. Crowell, New York, 1923) p. 128.

"Id., pp. 128, 129. "/d., p. 129. " W. H. Moore, Respon.se to Address of Welcome, Proceedings OF THE North Carolina Good Roads Con\'ention, Bulletin No. 24 (Bureau of Public Roads, Washington, D.C., 1903)

p. 12. "H. Trumbower, supra, note 20, p. 407. " L. Page, Progress and Present Status of the Good Roads

Movement in the United States, Yearbook of The Department

OF Agriculture, 1910 (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1911) p. 270. " A. Rose, Historic American Highways—Public Roads of the Past (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1953) pp. 94, 95. " G. Chatburn, supra, note 21, pp. 150, 151. " M. Eldridge, G. Clark & A. Luedke, State Highway

Management, Control and Procedure, Public Roads, Vol. 1, No. 9, Jan. 1919, p. 60.

*' L. Page, supra, note 26, pp. 273, 274. "23 Cong. Rec. 6846 (1892).

'^ G. Chatbltin, supra, note 21, p. 133. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1893, Letter From Secretary Morton to General Roy Stone, Oct. 3, 1893,

p. 586.

'* Bltreau of Pxjblic Roads Annual Report, 1894, p. 217. '"Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1895, p. 198.

''/d., p. 197. " G. Perkins, State Highways in Massachusetts, Yearbook

of The Department of Agriculture, 1894 (GPO, Washington,

D.C., 1895) pp. 508, 509.

=* BPR, supra, note 35, p. 198.

'' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1897, p. 174.

*" U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of The Dei'artment of Agriculture, 1897 (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1898) pp. 376-379. " BPR, supra, note 39, p. 174. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1901, p. 251. "/d., p. 238. " Gen. Harrison Tells How the Road Was Built, The Road

Maker, Vol. 1, No. 3, (Port Huron, Mich.) p. 6. "BPR, supra, note 42, p. 243.

"' M. A. Hays, Interest of Railways in Road Improvement,

Proceedings of the North Carolina Good Roads Convention,

Bulletin No. 24 (Bureau of Public Roads, Washington, D.C., 1903) pp. 15, 16. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1902, p. 309.

** Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1903, p. 337.

*' M. O. Eldridge, supra, note 4, pp. 5-7.

""Id., p. 11. " Id., pp. 8, 9. "/d.

" BPR, supra, note 48, p. 347.

53
Douun

of

the

motor Pge

The Early Automobiles

In 1900 there were about 8,000 automobiles in the

United States, practically all concentrated in the major cities.^ Probably half of these were electric-motor

driven, silent and dependable, but limited by their

lead-acid batteries to an operating radius of 25 to 30

miles. Since dependable pneumatic tires did not be- come available until 1897, practically all of these

electrics ran on solid rubber tires, and most of them

were European-made.

In the late 1890's, the Stanley brothers of Newton,

Massachusetts, perfected the European steam car into a reliable American vehicle with a greater driving

range than the electric. By 1900 their steamers had

driven the European models from the American market and two factories were producing cars under the

Stanley patents.^

Karl Friedrich Benz of Mannheim, Germany, built

the first reliable internal combustion engine automobile—^a three-wheeler—in 1885. This extraordinary

vehicle had electric ignition, water cooling system, a

differential gear and surface carburetor—all Benz in- ventions. Later Benz invented the fixed front axle

with steerable stub axles and in 1899 the gear box for

changing speeds.^ In 1893 he exhibited a four-wheel

vehicle which incorporated most of these advanced

mechanical ideas at the Chicago World Fair. This

machine, which incorporated in rudimentary form,

practically all of the essential features of the modern

automobile, was the inspiration for many others produced by American inventors in the following decade.

The total production of U.S. -made automobiles for

the year 1900 was 4,192 machines, of which 1,575 were

electrics, 1,681 were steamers and 936 were gasoline

engine-driven.* ^ These, along with the European imports, were individually handcrafted and correspondingly expensive, costing from $3,000 to $12,000 each

at a time when industrial and farm laborers were paid

$1 for a 10-hour day.

Auto Manufacturers Tap Mass Market

These early automobiles were large, heavy and

clumsy, partly from a paucity of engineering knowledge on how to compute the stresses in their various

parts and partly from lack of strong light materials

for their manufacture. About 1906 vanadium alloy

steel, developed in Europe, became available in the

United States, and by using it and other alloys, Henry

Ford of Detroit, JNIichigan, was able to redesign his

big, heavy touring car into a much ligliter and smaller

54
kai

An early American automobile built around 1893.

vehicle—the famous Model T. At the same time, he

tooled up to mass-produce components for this one

vehicle and designed a mo^-ing assembly line on which

to put the components together into cars.* By thus redesigning the vehicle and standardizing

the production process, Ford was able to increase pro- duction from 1,599 units in 1905 to 8,729 units in 1906

and 14,887 units in 1907, at the same time reducing

prices. These lower prices, in turn, opened the door

to a huge mass market. As sales increased, Ford was

able to realize further economies of scale in manufacturing, and still further reductions in cost, until by

1917 he was selling cars for less than $600 apiece.

'^ As Ford's competitors adopted his methods in a rush to catch up with him, the automotive industry

turned out an ever-increasing flood of vehicles at lower

* Henry Ford did not invent mass-production, nor was he

the first to apply it to auto making. The French made inter- changeable parts for muslvct locks before 1785, and the Colt Armory at Hartford, Connecticut, was mass-producing fire- arms before the Civil War.' Ford's contribution was in or- ganizing manufacturing into a smooth coordinated process, eliminating wasted time and effort, and continuously applying

technology to increase productivity.

A 1907 Columbia built by the Electric Vehicle Co. in Hartford, Conn. However,

this is not an electric car. The auto manufacturers of that period numbered in the thousands, but often a manufacturer built no more than a dozen or so ears.

55
and lower prices.* To an increasing extent, the owners of these vehicles began using them on the country

roads, as well as the city streets, bringing about a

rural road crisis that began to be seriously felt by

about 1910.

Competitive Auto Racing Spurs Vehicle Development

Some of the pre-1900 autos were used as for-hire

cabs in the cities, but most were owned by wealthy

people who used them for personal convenience and

as pleasure vehicles. In Europe, where there were many miles of smooth macadam roads, road racing by

wealthy owner-drivere was a popular sport. Backed

by motor car manufacturers and tire makers, road

racing eventually became big business there, and con- tributed a great deal to the rapid improvement of

motor design and mechanical reliability, which, in

turn, gave Europe undisputed leadership of the motor

car industry up to the outbreak of the war in Europe

in 1914.

As the Wheelmen had done before them, the American motorists organized themselves into clubs for social

enjoyment of their hobby and to protect themselves

from restrictive legislation. The Automobile Club of

America, one of the oldest of these social clubs, or- ganized a road race, which was run on April 14, 1900,

between Springfield and Babylon, Long Island. A

5-horsepower electric car won this 50-mile event in the

surprisingly good time of 2 hours 31^ minutes, fol- lowed by a steamer (2 hours 18 minutes) and a gasoline car (2 hours 30 minutes).^ However, road racing never became popular in the United States, partly

because of hostile laws, but mostly for lack of sufficient mileage of reasonably motorable roads.*

"Toot 'n' be darned." A common problem when horsedrawn vehicles and automobiles mixed on narrow roads.

* Annual production of U.S.-made motor vehicles was 2.^,000

in 1905, 187,000 in 1910 and 969,930 in 1915." The average new motor vehicle price in the United States in 1916 was

about $605.

Harry Grant driving a 60-hp

Berliet at Lowell, Mass, Sept. 7, 1908. Grant came in second.

* In 1906 a group of racing enthusiasts, headed by William

K. Vanderbilt, Jr., organized the Long Island Motor Parkway

Company, which built a motor road on private right-of-way

as a race course for the Vanderbilt Cup. The first unit of

this parkway, opened October 10, 1908, was 11 miles long,

paved with reinforced concrete, and was one of the first roads

in the world to have superelevated or banked curves. When

completed in 1910, this road was 45 miles long, and when not used for racing, it was opened to pleasure vehicles as a toll road." " The European counterpart of the Long Island Motor Parkway was the Avus, begun in 1913 but not completed until

1919. Tbi.? was a divided highway 6 miles long laid out on an

absolutely straight line from Charlottenburg to Berlin, Ger- many, with no grade crossings and limited access to the traffic lanes." In 1909 Carl G. Fisher built a 2%-mile oval racing

speedway at Indianapolis, Indiana."

56
The Automobile Ventures Into the Country

In the early 1900's a motor trip for any considerable

distance into the country was an uncertain undertaking. To run out of fuel was disastrous and might

entail a walk of seA^eral miles to the nearest hardware

or paint store. Mechanical service was practically

unobtainable; blowouts and tire punctures were fre- quent and not easy to repair. Dust was a major nuis- ance in dry weather. Most embarrassing of all, there were no comfort stations, and tourists were dependent

on private kindness or the more secluded portions of

the right-of-way for sanitary accommodations.

The automobile, to the dismay of road officials, was

imexpectedly damaging to macadam and gravel roads.

According to Director Page

:

. . . The driving wheels of motor cars moving at high

rates of speed exert a powerful tractive force on the road

surface, which displaces the materials composing the

surface. The result is that the finer particles and dust are thrown into the air to be carried off by cross cur- rents of air. The rubber tire of the automobile does not wear any appreciable amount of dust from the rock fragments, and con.sequently, the loss of rock dust is a permanent loss to the road. Under these conditions, the road

soon ravels, making travel difficult and allowing water

to make its way to the earth subgrade or foundation."

The initial reaction to this destruction of the rural

roads was a clamor to bar automobiles from the highways or severely limit their speed. Fortunately,

calmer counsels prevailed, and some observers, such

as the editor of American Highways magazine, ac- tually viewed dusting as a blessing in disguise:

. . . However, the motors are unquestionably here to stay and are going to play an important and very useful part in the lives of coming generations, and instead of trying to bar them off the roadways or misusing their owners, highway commissioners should attack the problems they present and should solve them as they have

former problems. It is rather fortunate than otherwise

that the motors have appeared on the scene before roadbuilding in the better sense engaged public attention. Had their advent been postponed until the country had

built up a complete system of roads a tremendous expense would have been incurred for tearing up the old material

and relaying it."

It was, perhaps, inevitable that the early motorists

should come into conflict with the farmers. Desj^ite

the fact that most surfaced rural roads built after

1900 had been made possible by State aid, paid for

largely by city people or by urban support for county

bond issues, many rural residents looked upon the

motorists as intruders. This feeling was exacerbated

by a minority of the motorists who used the roads for

racing, often with mufflers cut out, frightening live- stock and teams and raising clouds of dust. Some of

the farmers countered by refusing to yield for over- taking, forcing motorists to creep along behind them

for miles. It was even alleged that some farmers

buried spikes and glass in the roads to puncture tender

tires. This division between farmers and urban motorists

affected the solidarity of the Good Roads Movement,

and was not finally resolved until the farmers themselves became motorists along with everyone else, and

motoring ceased to be regarded as a rich man's pastime. The final burying of the hatchet came with the

enactment of the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916.

The Problems of Automobile Registration and Regulatory Laws

In the early years of this century, pleasure driving was restricted by a host of State and local laws and

ordinances, as well as by the condition of the roads

and other hardships. New York was the first State

to require registration of motor vehicles, and in 1901,

the first year a fee was charged, this State collected

nearly $1,000 from its motorists." The New York

law was primarily a measure for legal control rather

than for revenue, but in later years New York and

other States collected sizable amounts of money in

registration fees.* As other States began charging registration fees,

problems of reciprocity between the States arose to plague motorists. New York, the leader in the registration movement, allowed any vehicle to use its roads,

provided that vehicle was registered in its own State,

and provided that State granted the same privilege to cars registered in New York. At this time. New York

had full reciprocity with 15 other States but not with

New Jersey. As a result, thousands of New Yorkers

who had summer homes on the Jersey coast had to

register their machines for the full year in both

States.^^ A similar relation existed with Massachusetts and 17 other States which did not grant full reciprocity.

Lack of reciprocity was a serious hindrance not

only to pleasure travel, but also to interstate commerce

which was just beginning to use the roads again after a lapse of 60 years. As the secretary of state of New

York said in 1911

:

... It seems to be a failure to recognize the importance

of the automobile, when a tourist is confronted by the

necessity of carrying with him on a tour throughout the

States the license of each State he enters. . . . The

automobile gives opportunities of seeing the country

which the people have never had to such an extent before.

It leads to many small interesting places which even the

railroad with its great facilities has not been able to make sufficiently accessible. It enables the people to know their country better. It brings people into closer

contact. Especially is this true of the commercial vehicle. Trips from New York to Philadelphia are very frequent.

It surely will not be conducive to the growth of this phase of the industry and to business generally if a merchant in Philadelphia, desiring to carry goods to New

York City, will have to have his machine registered in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York and to pay a

fee in each State. . . ." In many States, registration fees were not the only

imposts on motor vehicle owners. Some cities and

villages required the motorist to pay a "wheel tax" of

$10 to $20 per year for the privilege of driving on

their streets. A number of States collected a personal

property tax on the vehicle in addition to the registration fee. After he had solved the registration and tax problems, other hazards confronted the motorist when he

ventured beyond the limits of his own city. The individual municipalities had their own ordinances regulating speeds, parking, the use of bells, horns and

* In the first 10 months of 1911, 35 States collected a total of $.3,746,938 in registration fees and operator license fees from 516,977 owners of motor vehicles. The amounts collected ranged from $986 in Utah (442 owners and 51 operators) to $882,975 in New York (81,665 owners and 33,485 operators)."

57
I

<l

The Pasear was the name given to a combination of three highways in Cali- fornia: El Camino Real or the Royal

Highway; El Camino Sierra or the Mountain Highway; and El Camino Capital or

the Capital Highway. These roads form

a 1,500-mile scenic circuit from San Francisco to Los Angeles, to Lake Tahoe, and

back to San Francisco. In 1912 the ad- vocates of the Pasear urged that the roads be improved for motor travel in time for the Panama-Pacific Exposition

to be held at San Francisco in 1915. These scenes along the El Camino Sierra are a prelude to the rugged beauty to be found on the Pasear.

58
m^ca jm
One of the challenges of the early AAA tours.

gongs, the making of unnecessary exhaust noise and

the emission of noxious gas, smoke or steam, and they

could impose fines for violations. These regulations

varied widely from city to city and, especially in the

smaller municipalities, were often enforced in a dis- criminatory way. The operation of "speed traps" by

local peace officers was a widespread abuse in rural

communities, with the fines going into the local treas- ury or the pocket of the police justice or magistrate.*

The widespread variations in traffic regulations, and

especially in registration requirements, laid a severe burden on motorists and also on automobile manufacturers who regarded them as obstacles to vehicle ownership and the expansion of the market for automobiles. Combating restrictive legislation was a principal reason for the organization of both the

American Automobile Association in 1902** and the

* The speed trap racket was so bad in New York prior to 1910 that the Legislature passed an act that year requiring

all fines imposed for violations of the motor vehicle laws to be turned over to the State treasurer. This reduced the fines collected from motorists to a mere trickle.^" ** A numl)pr of State and local automobile clubs banded to- gether to form the American Automobile Association, which

rapidly became the national voice of the automobile owners and a powerful lobby for good roads.

National Automobile Chamber of Commerce in 1913.*

These and other organizations backed a bill in the

60th Congress that would have required Federal registration for all vehicles. They also worked diligently

to standardize the motor vehicle laws in all the States. Eventually, both goals were achieved without Federal

intervention, as shall be seen.

The Motor Pathfinders

Up to 1903 no automobile had crossed the United

States under its own power, and most people who

knew anything about American roads, especially those

of the Rocky Mountain and Great Plains States,

thought such a trip impossible. Dr. H. Nelson Jackson,

of Burlington, Vermont, thought otherwise, and he

burned with the urge to be the first person to travel

from coast to coast by motor. On May 23, 1903, he

left San Francisco, in secrecy, with his chauffei;r

Sewell K. Crocker, in a 20-horsepower Winton touring

car. Sixty-three days later, the two pathfinders rolled

into New York after averaging 90 miles per day in 44

days actual running time, despite terrible weather."

A year after Doctor Jackson's feat, a group of motor

enthusiasts conceived the idea of a mass motor tour or

* Now the Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association.

60
"pilgrimage" from the major eastern cities to the

Louisiana Purchase Centennial Exposition in St. Louis. The logistics for such an expedition at this

time were formidable. There were no through routes, no reliable road maps, no wa}- of knowing the condition of the roads in advance, no road signs or route markers. Between major cities, getting repairs for a breakdown, or even fuel, was an uncertain business.

The promoters of the tour enlisted the aid of the auto- mobile clubs along the way who agreed to select and

map the best roads in their areas and mark them with

confetti at the critical cross roads so the out-of-State

motorists wouldn't get lost. The trip was planned in

100-mile stages, and each entrant was provided with

marked maps showing the assembly points, the selected

routes, and points along the way where repairs, fuel,

lodging and meals might be obtained. Finally, the

promotei-s persuaded the American Automobile Association (AAA) to supervise the alfair through a set of committees.^^

Fifteen cars left New York City July 25, 1904. At

Albany they were joined by a contingent from New

England led by Charles J. Glidden, the most experienced motorist in America, who, with Mrs. Glidden,

had already logged 17,782 miles in 17 countries in his

English Napier. The tour continued through Buffalo,

Cleveland, Toledo, South Bend and Chicago to St. Louis, losing a few machines enroute from mechanical

failure, but picking up new entrants at the principal

cities. Of 108 machines registered for the tour, 70

reached starting points and only 58 of these reached

St. Louis. The Boston entrants covered 1,264 miles

in 17 days, an average of 70 miles per day of hard

driving.^^ Unlike Dr. Jackson, who had shunned

publicity, the St. Louis World Fair Motor Cara\Tin

carried reporters from the Nation's principal newspapers and was attended b}' enonnous ballyhoo, which

focused on the execrable condition of most of the

roads encountered by the hardy pathfinders.

Upon arrival in St. Louis, Charles Glidden an- nounced that he was presenting a trophy to the American Avitomobile Association on which would be

engraved the name of the owner-driver of the car making the best record on a carefully organized long

distance tour such as the one just completed. This

reliability contest would be an annual affair, supervised by the AAA, which would draw up the rules for

the contest and retain ownership of the trophy.

The first Glidden Tour of 34 participants left New

York City July 11, 1905, on an 870-mile junket

through New England. Thereafter, the Tour was

held annually until 1910.==*

The Ohio Mud Hen during a cross country trip in 1911 about to cross the Gila River in Arizona with the aid of a couple of mules.

61
The Pioneer Freighter bridging a swampy area on the north side of the White Mountains in Arizona.

The Jackson-Crocker transcontinental trip had been

a daring stunt, like crossing the Atlantic in a rowboat,

with no underlying purpose other than to show that

it could be done. The St. Louis tour was a similar

challenge on a larger scale. The competition for the

Glidden Cup, however, had a more serious objective

to focus national attention on the difficulty of traveling any considerable distance on the common roads

and it was remarkably effective in meeting this objective. The Glidden Tours showed conclusively that

motor cars were mechanically capable of traveling

long distances if the roads were reasonably good, and

they fueled a rising demand from motorists for motorable long-distance roads, even a coast-to-coast highway.* Many people thought the States and counties

would never be able to provide such highways, and

they seriously advocated that the Federal Government

build and operate national highways.

The Pioneer Freighter., a gasoline-powered motor

truck made by the Saurer Motor Car Company, made

two memorable cross country trips in 1911. This 37

horsepower vehicle weighed 3 tons and carried a load

of 31/^ tons of lumber for bridging creeks and soft

places, plus supplies of fuel and camp equipment. The

expedition was in the charge of A. L. Westgard of the

Touring Club of America, who had also been commissioned a Special Agent of the Office of Public Eoads

by Director Page.

The first trip of the Pioneer Freighter began March

4, 1911, at Denver, Colorado, and proceeded via Santa

Fe and Phoenix to Los Angeles. This trip traversed

1,450 miles in 66 days, of which 53 days were con- sumed in actual travel. The average speed was 3.26 miles per hour^—about as fast as a man could walk.

The machine was shipped to Pueblo, Colorado, by rail,

leaving there under its own power June 12, 1911, and

ending in New York City in July 1911. The full significance of these trips would be felt a few years

later, when the United States began mobilizing for

World War I.=^«

* In 1907 a group of promoters proposed a toll road from

New York to Boston to be built on a 150-foot fenced right-ofway with two one-way 25-foot roadways and entrances every

6 or 7 miles. They estimated that traffic would be 250 cars per day each way and planned to charge each one a toll of

5 cents per mile.'"

62

!
The Pioneer Freighter fording a river near Ft. A pache, Ariz.

REFERENCES

'1971 Automobile Facts and Figukes (Automobile Manufacturers Association, Detroit, 1971) p. 18.

' C. BoBTH, Mankind on the Move (Automotive Safety

Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1969) p. 171.

' R. KiEBT, S. Withington, a. Dabling & F. KiLGOUE, EngiNEEBiNG In History (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1956) pp. 406,

407.

* Supra, note 1, p. 3. °A. Rose, Historic American Highways—Public Roads

OF the Past (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C. 1953) p. 102. •A. BuBSTALL, A History of Mechanical Engineering

(M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1965) p. 224.

' A. Rose, supra, note 5, p. 103. 'Supra, note 1, p. 3.

• A. Rose, supra, note 5, pp. 101, 102. "Id., p. 106. "H. Kelly, Toll Roads, Pl-blic Roads, Vol. 12, No. 1, Mar.

1931, p. 4. " C. TuNN.\RD & B. Pushkaeev, Man-Made America : Chaos

OB Control? (Tale University Press, New Haven, 1963) p. 163.

"A. Rose, supra, note 5, p. 103. "L. Page, Roads, Paths and Bridges (Sturgis and Walton,

Co., New York, 1912) p. 216. "Editorial, American Highways, Vol. 2, No. 8, Jan. 1908 (American Highways Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Mich.)

p. 239. "A. Rose, supra, note 5, p. 102. "E. Lazansky, a Model State Motor Vehicle Law, Papebs,

Addresses and Resolutions Before the American Road

Congress (Richmond, Va., Nov. 1911), (Waverly Press, Balti- more, 1912) p. 151.

'' Id., pp. 153, 154. "Id.

"'Id., p. 157. " A. Rose, supra, note 5, pp. 102, 103. " C. BoRTH, supra, note 2, pp. 178-183.

''Id.

-^ A. Rose, supra, note 5, p. 103. "Plan Oreat Auto Boulevard, American Highways, Vol. 1, No. 10, Mar. 3970 (American Highways Publishing Co., Grand

Rapids, Mich.) pp. 278, 279. ^ A. Rose, supra, note 5, p. 107.

68
The

Beginning

of

/Cientific

Roodbuilding

f

The appointment of Logan Waller Page as Director

of the Office of Public Roads brought a new type of

leader—the scientifically trained civil servant—into

the highway movement. In 1893, when only 23 years

of age, Page was appointed director of the road materials laboratory of the Lawrence Scientific School

of Harvard University and also geologist and testing

engineer of the Massachusetts State Highway Commission. At this time, although standard practice in

France, the laboratory testing of road materials was unknown in the United States. Page enrolled in the

French Laboratory of Bridges and Roads where he

learned the French methods, introducing them later into his Massachusetts laboratory.^ After 7 years of

distinguished work for the Commission, Page was in- vited to Washington in 1900 to set up a road materials

laboratory in the Bureau of Chemistry of the Department of Agriculture.^ This laboratory tested thousands of specimens for the OPRI under the object

lesson road program, and Page was instrumental in

establishing testing laboratories in some of the States. In the reorganization of 1905, Page's laboratory be- came the Division of Tests of the Office of Public

Roads and eventually one of the world's famous

physical research organizations.

..'»' •

. .' .j^jmkm.-.-itiemf'

The Jefferson Highway near DeQueen, Arkansas, before improvement.

64
»> : i

'* **

-^'^f: . Vw'' ^^ ^

».t

^. l|ml^ ^mt*«^«ri i.: -r^

The Jefferson Highway after improvement as a gravel road.

Expansion of the Object Lesson Road Program

When Page became director of the Office of Public

Roads (OPR) in 1905, only 14 States had highway

departments, and 5 of these were less than 6 months

old.* The mileage of roads under State control was

v'ery small, and State expenditures, mostly in the form

of aid to the counties and townships, were only about

3 percent of total road expenditures in the United

States.**

It was as evident to Director Page as it had been to

his predecessors that the main effort for improving

the rural roads would have to be directed to the counties and townships. Up to this time, the OPR's most

popular work with tlie local governments had been

the object lesson roads, and already ample evidence of

their effectiveness was beginning to accumulate. This

evidence was summarized by Director Dodge in 1904:

Massachusetts (organized 1893), New Jersey (1894),

Connecticut (1895), Rhode Island (1896), New York (1898),

Vermont (1898), Pennsylvania (1903), Ohio (1904), Iowa

(1904), Illinois (1905), Michigan (1905), Minnesota (1905),

New Hampshire (1905), Washington (1905).'

** In 1904 total road expenditure, including the estimated

value of statute labor, was $79.77 million, of which $2.6 million was State aid."

... a section of good road built as an object lesson under the direction of the United States Government in any community has the effect of awakening much greater

interest than such a road constructed by the local authorities. That the people desire instruction by the building

of object lesson roads and are willing to bear the expense

incident thereto is fully proved by the requests received

for cooperation, the number being far more than we are

able to comply with. That the results are almost uni- formly satisfactory and frequently beyond the most

sanguine expectation is demonstrated by reference to the

letters embodied in this report from representative citi- zens in the sections where the roads were built and by

personal investigations by representatives of this Office. In some instances the object lesson resulted in the slow

but steady improvement of the common roads ; in a few

cases the results were the inauguration of extensive sys- tems of road building. In practically every instance

.some measure of progress resulted from the object lesson.

It would seem to be conservative to estimate that an

average of at least 10 miles of improved highways are

constructed as a result of the building of each of these

roads. . . .^ Page, whose budget had been increased to $50,000,

decided to expand the object lesson road program and

change its emphasis away from macadam construction

to a wider use of local materials, particularly the most

abundant of all—earth, clay and sand. As he wrote

in 1909:

65
. . . Experience has shown that our earth roads can, in general, be very much improved by proper construction and systematic maintenance at a cost well within the reach of almost any community. Furthermore, these improved earth roads serve as the best possible foundation for further improvements with a hard surface as means become available. . . .°

Post road in Lauderdale County,

Alabama. Small hump in distance is chert which will be cut and used for surfacing.

The concept of stage construction, enunciated byPage in the above quotation, became one of the guiding principles of Federal road policy for the next 50

years. During 1908, 1909 and 1910, the OPR supervised

the construction of 1,300 miles of earth roads and 440

miles of sand-clay roads.* Inevitably, object lesson

roads to demonstrate the use of local materials became, in some respects, experimental roads as well. The OPR's Road Expert, W. L. Spoon, who was

handling the object lesson road work in the southern

States, thought that clay might be made into a suit- able road surfacing material by burning or roasting

it in place on the road. A small experimental project was set up the summer of 1904 near Clarksdale,

Mississippi, in which 300 feet of clay "gumbo" road was burned by wood and bark fires until the clay was

nonplastic. The resulting surface compared favorably

to gravel and cost only one-fourth as much.*

The OPR also cooperated in the construction of

experimental sand-clay roads in Iowa, Kansas and

Nebraska to determine whether sand-clay was suitable

for areas with cold climates and deep frost penetration.

Experimental Roads Expand Knowledge of Roadbuilding

These experiments were not the first in which the

Office had been involved. In 1898, the Office of Public

Road Inquiries had built short steel trackway roads

at the Trans-Mississippi Exposition at Omaha and at Ames, Iowa, and St. Anthony Park, Minnesota. These

* Mileage based on an assumed average width of 15 feet. Sand-clay roads were ancestral to our modern soil stabiliza- tions and were first used extensively in Richland County,

South Carolina, in 1889, from where they spread through the South in the 1890's.'

Sand-clay road in San Patricio County, Texas. Smoothing

with road drag after rain. No roUer available and the road is not yet thoroughly compacted by traffic.
proved to be impractical. Another experimental trackway road, this one of bricks, was built on the Department of Agriculture grounds in Washington in 1900.

The most important of these early experiments, however, was the oil treatment of a 4r,650-foot section of

the Queens Chapel Road in the District of Columbia.

In 1900 the automobile was not a significant cause of road dusting, and road oiling was practically un- known outside of Los Angeles County, California,

where 6 miles of road were oiled in 1898 to lay the

dust "which, churned beneath the wheels of yearly

increasing travel during the long dry season in that

region, had become a most serious nuisance." " The

Queens Chapel Road had a surface of sandy clay and

loam. This was shaped up and sprinkled with oil delivered by an ordinary water-sprinkling wagon.

The ordinarj- sprinkling wagon was found quite satis- factory, especially as the weather was warm, so that the

oil ran quite fast enough to be gradually taken up by the surface and not so fast that it would flow into the side

ditches, as would have been the case had the required

amount been applied at once." The oil used for this experiment was "that which

is left of crude petroleum after such volatile substances as naptha, kerosene, benzine and gasoline have

been extracted." The results of the treatment appeared to be good, but the OPRI elected to reserve judgment on its ultimate effectiveness

This road was treated several weeks ago, and so far as we are now able to judge the new system is a success as a dust layer. We believe that where roads have so much

traffic and dust as to require the use of the sprinkling

cart in dry weather, the residue oil, or roadbed oil, as it is called by dealers, could be used very effectively and

economically. The fact that it settles the dust and kills weeds was first recognized and utilized by the West

Jersey and Seashore Railroad. It is now being applied

annually to about thirty of the leading railroads throughout the country, and its use is being gradually extended

to the ordinary country roads. It is claimed by some

that the application of crude oil will make a surface impervious to water, and con.sequently comparatively

free from frost and mud. If this be the case, oil will supersede gravel and stone in the improvement of country

roads. The test of time alone can settle this very much

disputed question."

Out of these early experiments there gradually

evolved a new program, the object of which was not

so much to demonstrate good construction practice as

to acquire new knowledge and experience.

In 1908 the OPR began a study to determine

whether blast furnace slag could be made into a suit- able road aggregate by mixing it with lime, limestone,

tar or asphaltic road oil. This investigation had an immense economic potential, since about 20 million

tons of slag were produced annually in the United

States, most of which had no commercial value.

Between 1908 and 1916, the OPR supervised or

participated in the construction of several dozen ex- perimental roads, ranging from earth-oil mixtures to Portland cement concrete and paving brick. These

were inspected periodically and their service evaluated

and correlated with the laboratory records of the materials that went into them. Eventually the OPR

engineers drew up specifications for each type of construction based on their experiences with these experimental roads and tlie numerous object lesson roads.

These specifications were published in bulletins, some

of which went into five editions, and were widely used

Electric car on steei track at the Traiis- Mississippi Exposition

at Omaha in 1898.

by counties, States and engineering colleges as references. In particular, the OPR's specifications for bi- tuminous road binders became the standards for the

industry and were adopted by most of the State highway commissions.

The Dust Nuisance and Road Preservation

The light duty macadam and gravel roads constructed during the Good Roads Movement served

their purpose very well until appreciable numbers of

automobiles began to use them.* Many engineers.

Page among them, were convinced that the solution

to this troublesome problem lay in using something

other than stone dust or clay as a binder for stone and

gravel roads. Hot-laid asphalt paving had been used on city streets in Europe and the United States since

the early 1870's, but was considered far too expensive

for country roads. However, liquid materials con- taining bitumen cement, such as petroleum, coke-oven

tar and water-gas tar, were plentiful and cheap and

seemed promising as dust layers.

An opportunity to test these materials came in 1905

when the Madison County Roads Association and the

city engineer of Jackson, Tennessee, sought the OPR's

cooperation in experiments to determine the value of

coal tar and petroleum oils for building dustless roads.

Page agreed to participate by supplying expert supervision and the facilities of the OPR laboratory. The

Tennessee experiments were moderately successful, and

3 years later, in 1908, the tar and residual petroleum

oil (asphalt) treatments were pronounced "on the

whole very satisfactory," but the crude oil treatment

had disappeared, leaving the roads as dusty as ever."

* In 1900 there were 8,000 automobiles in the United States. By 190.5 there were 77,400 autos and 1,400 trucks. By 1910 motor vehicles had multiplied six times, to 468,500, and by

1915 the total was 2,491,000."

67
The dMst rmisance.

In the summer of 1907, the OPE joined with the

Massachusetts Highway Commission to make experimental application of water-gas tar and coal tar on

the main New York to Boston highway and also co- operated with Warren County and Bowling Green,

Kentucky, to investigate the fitness of rock asphalt

as a binder for macadam.

These projects all pointed to the need for a more

systematic knowledge of bituminous products and

methods for using them. To get some of this knowledge, the OPR arranged a cooperative research project

with Cornell University at Ithaca, N.Y., to test the

relative value, under practically uniform conditions,

of different bituminous road binders applied by different methods. As its contribution to the project,

the OPR added two chemists to its laboratory staff and stepped up its testing and research on asphalts

and tars. The field tests showed that both the penetration

method and the mixing m,ethod of making bituminous

macadam surfaces gave good results. The laboratory

studies were especially fruitful

:

Through its laboratory work the Office has been able

to offer valuable advice in regard to specifications for bituminous road binders and in many instances to frame

such specifications upon the request of various public

bodies. Many worthless road preparations have been and are

at present being manufactured and sold to the public

through ignorance on the part of both producer and

consumer with regard to the requisite characteristics of such materials to meet local conditions. These materials are sold under trade names, and as a rule carry no valid guarantee of quality. Specifications for such materials are therefore needed for the protection of the public. . . . Some manufacturers have already followed the work of the Office along this line, and are either manufacturing

materials in accordance with specifications of the Office or stand ready to do so upon request."

In succeeding years the dust abatement program

was enlarged, until by 1916, the OPR was involved in

experiments on 28 roads in 11 States and the District

of Columbia. Gradually, the emphasis shifted from

"dust prevention" to "road preservation," and the

building up of tar or asphalt wearing courses over macadam, slag or gravel bases. This led to the general adoption of bituminous surfaces whei'ever auto- mobiles were an appreciable portion of the total traffic.

68
In 1909 the science of producing

Portland cemetit concrete teas in its infancy. Tliis early rotary mixer was used

at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York.

The Office of Public Roads' dust prevention and

experimental roads programs were the training

grounds for the small group of highway engineers and

physical scientists who later laid the foundations of

soil engineering and pavement design.

Dragging the Dirt Roads

Dirt roads will not stand up under traffic unless

they are shaped and kept free of ruts so that water

will shed quickly and not soak in and soften the roadbed. Even befox'e the Civil War, some townsliip

supervisors were smoothing their roads by dragging

them with "a stick of timber, shod with iron, and

attached to its tongue or neap obliquely, so that it is drawn over the road 'quartering,' and throws all obstructions to one side." ^^ About 1905, D. Ward King, of Maitland, Missouri,

improved on this simple device by splitting the timber

lengthwise and positioning the two halves, one ahead

of the other, to make a rigid platform. A typical

King drag was made from an 8-inch log split down

the middle; the two halves were held about 3 feet

Applying bitumen on a stretch of road at Cornell University in 1910.
i

-^^ «**

Coal tar and crude oil experiments.

70
71
r

^^iggj

K-S^' 'm

•^Sf* 191

<, ^1

Cool tar and crude'

70
?S^*K

Coal tar atvd crude oil experiments.

70
apart by struts and the lower edge of the front log was shod with a 14-inch steel cutting plate. A hitching chain attached to the front log could be adjusted

so that the drag would move earth to either side of

the road as the device was pulled behind a team. This

drag could be made on the farm for about $2.^^

The King split-log drag was a surprisingly effective

maintenance machine. After a little instruction and

practice, an average farmer could easily drag 6 to 8

miles of road per day and could keep a well-graded

dirt road in good shape for light traffic for as little as $8 per mile per year. The appearance of the King

drag coincided with Director Page's decision to place

greater emphasis on earth and sand-clay roads in the

object lesson road program, so Page decided to promote dragging as well. In 1906 he had King

write a manual on how to make and use the split-log

drag. This was published by the Department of

Agriculture as a Farmer's Bulletin, and thousands of

copies were distributed. The OPE, assigned experts

to deliver lectures and make demonstrations in the use of the drag. A number of States passed "King

Drag Laws" authorizing the township supervisors to contract with abutting farmers to drag the public

roads.^' This activity, in a few years, brought about a re- markable improvement in the condition of the country

dirt roads and brought home to the local supervisors,

as nothing else had before, the importance of prompt

and intelligent maintenance.

Experimental Maintenance

In 1911 the French roads were not only the best in

the world, but were also the best maintained. Maintenance was strongly centralized and closely supervised ; every road was divided into short, segments of a few kilometers, each the full-time responsibility of

a paid patrolman who lived nearby, usually within

walking distance. Page wanted to try out the French

system under American conditions, and in 1911 at his

recommendation, the Secretary of Agriculture contracted with Alexandria County, Virginia, for a 2-year

experimental maintenance project to include 8 miles

of earth roads. Under this contract, the county supervisors agreed to shape up the roads and put them in

good condition, after which the OPR hired a local farmer as a patrolman to maintain the roads under

OPR supervision. The patrolman was paid $60 per

month plus an extra $1 per day whenever he used his

team for dragging.

The roads selected for the experiment—Columbia

Pike and the Mount Vernon Road—were among the

heaviest-traveled in the county,* yet the patrolman

kept them in first-class condition most of the time at a cost of $95.77 per mile per year.^^ This, however, was far more than the average rural county was

spending to maintain its roads. In the final analysis,

this experiment demonstrated not so much the ef- ficiency of the patrol system as the desirability of more durable surfaces for all but the very lightesttrafficked roads.

The Washington-Atlanta Maintenance Demonstration

Road

The Alexandria County experiment was the beginning of a major effort by the OPR to raise mainte- nance standards in the counties. By 1912, a decade of

promotion by the good roads associations, the motorists, and the Office of Public Roads and others had

trebled the funds available annually for roadbuilding.

Hundreds of counties had issued bonds to finance road

* One section near Fort Myer carried 173 wagons and 96

cavalry horses per day, plus a few runabouts.

72
programs, and about half of the States had State-aid

programs, some of which were financed by State bond

issues.* Roads were improved with borrowed money

faster than the supervisors could arrange to take care of them, and in this emergency, the counties turned

to the OPR for advice and assistance.

To meet this demand, Page set up a Division of

Maintenance in the OPR under Edwin W. James

which embarked on an ambitious program of instruction and demonstration. James' engineers studied the

details of State maintenance in States that had effec- tive highway departments and also in selected counties, some with good maintenance programs and some

with poor ones. They also persuaded a number of

strategically located counties with new bond-financed

roads to introduce adequate maintenance on one se- lected demonstration road in each county, the work

to be xmder OPR supervision.

The capstone of the maintenance program was a mammoth demonstration road, involving 49 counties

in Virginia, the Carolinas and Georgia, the purpose

of which, in Page's words, was "conducting an object

lesson in road maintenance on a sufficient scale to atKnowing who is responsible for the condition of the road and appealing to the pride of the patrolman.

tract general attention, and at the same time render

the largest amount of assistance at the least relative cost to the Office of Public Roads . . ." ^° Under the

plan adopted for this "Washington-Atlanta Highway," a continuous route between these cities was

traced over existing county roads, the combined length

of which was 1,038 miles. The participating counties

agreed first to put the selected roads in good condition

and then to accept the supervision of an engineer

assigned by the OPR who would approve all mainte- nance expenditures.

The work began in the spring of 1914 with only 723

miles under the cooperative plan and three experienced engineers detailed by the OPR to supervise the

work. The experiment continued until 1917 when the

OPR had to withdraw its engineers for more urgent

work. The success of the maintenance plan was at-

* There were $229.44 million of local road and bridge bonds

and $115.32 million of State bonds outstanding on .January 1, 1915." Many of the roads financed by county bond issues were improved to make them eligible as free rural mail de- livery routes.

Removing the ridge with a drag after

a cultivator has loosened the material.

tested by the fact that, from March 1915 through

June 1916, a total of 876 miles of road had been under

OPR supervision and "had not been closed to traffic at any point, even in the winter months," ^^ and by

the adoption of the OPR maintenance methods by

many other counties not on the Washington-Atlanta

route. Among these last was a group of 13 counties in

North Carolina which joined with the State Highway

Commission in 1916 to petition for OPR supervision over a proposed Central Plighway from Morehead

City to Statesville, about 338 miles. The OPR as- signed two engineers to this project until the United

States' entry into the European war made it necessary

to withdraw them.

The Problems of Road Management

The OPR's four road construction demonstration

teams could fill only a fraction of the requests for

object lesson roads. However, in many cases what

was needed was not so much a demonstration road as good advice from a road expert. After 1904 Page

began detailing experienced engineers, upon request, as consultants to counties to get them started properly on their road programs. These assignments, each last- ing from 2 days to a week, covered every conceivable

aspect of road engineering and management and oc- cupied most of the time of the OPR special agents.

In time, Page and his aides came to realize that

advising the counties on specific road problems did

little to improve the overall competence of road management. Therefore, in 1908, the OPR began a more

comprehensive approach which is best described in

Page's own words

73
As an example of this work, San Joaquin County, Cal., may be mentioned. At the request of the proper authorities an engineer was detailed to make a comprehensive

study of all conditions affecting the highways of that county. About three months were required for this work,

during which time his salary was paid by the Government

and his local expenses by the community. The final re- port, besides containing a full and detailed description of the existing conditions, embodied al.so detailed recom- mendations for a system of improvements in road administration, construction, and maintenance within the reach

of the people and which they have since adopted. A

bond issue of about $1,800,000 was voted to provide the necessary revenues, and a system of roads is now under

construction which will place San Joaquin County among

the foremost counties of the State in the matter of trans- portation facilities.^

extraordinary in U.S. highway history, lasted until

December 1913. "The officials of Bennington County

were so pleased with the results of this object-lesson

supervision that they have since employed an engineer

to take charge of the road work of the cotmty." ^^

The Shortage of Highway Engineers

The Bennington County experience pointed up one

of the most serious problems of this period—the general lack of engineering expertise at the county level. Some critics asserted that, because of this lack, from

County patrolmen in New York

were responsible for 2 to 8 miles of road and were paid $3 per day in 1914.

The "model systems" program was an instant success. By assigning as many engineers as he could

spare from other work, Page in 10 years was able to

assist 144 counties in 28 States to reorganize and modernize their road operations. Most of these counties

sold bonds to finance a start, on the programs recom- mended by the OPR advisers.

Bennington County, "Vermont, carried the model

system idea one step further. In 1912, 69 of the 74

road officials of the county, with the approval of the

State Highway Commissioner, petitioned the OPR to

detail an engineer for 1 year to supervise all road

work in the county and its townships. Page assigned an engineer in 1913, who was in effect the County

Engineer, in direct charge of all road work carried on in the county. This arrangement, one of the most

one-quarter to one-third of all the money spent on the

country roads was wasted. Most of this waste came

about because the roads were originally poorly located or poorly drained, and these errors were perpetuated

when the roads were later upgraded. Repeatedly, in

its bulletins and expert advice, the OPR urged that

the old locations be revised to reduce grades and unnecessary curvature, and to improve drainage before

expensive bond-financed surfacing was undertaken.

Such improvement required engineering study and

advice.

Many, perhaps most, counties thought they were too poor to afford an engineer. Others didn't really want

one for fear he might lead them into expensive road

schemes that would raise taxes. Still others chmg to the ancient tradition of amateur supervision of in74
efficient statute labor. Those counties that wanted to hire engineers had difficulty finding them, since the

supply of civil engineers with highway training was

exceedingly small.

The shortage was so serious that Director Dodge in

1903 had recommended that Congress establish in

Washington, in connection with the Office of Public

Road Inquiries, a National School for Roadbuilding,

similar to the famous School of Bridges and Roads

which had trained French road engineers since 1747. This institution, as envisioned by Dodge, would be

"... a post-graduate school, where graduates in civil engineering from the land-grant colleges could secure a thorough course in theoretical and practical road

building. . . . The American school of road building

should include a series of lectures by experts of this

Office, and some practical work in the road-material

laboratory and in connection with tlie object-lesson

road work of the Office in different parts of the country." ^* Most of the students would be employees of

the States, counties and cities who would return to these agencies after completing their training.

This school was never established, but after he be- came Director, Page obtained Department approval

for a training program under which a limited number

of young civil engineering graduates, after taking

competitive examinations, were appointed to the position of civil engineer student in the OPR, at a salary

of $600 per year. These young men learned practical

roadbuilding in the field with the OPR's object lesson

road teams. They received instruction in testing

road materials in the laboratory and were detailed as

assistants in the OPR's other actiidties to learn by

doing. After 1 year in the training program, they were eligible for promotion to junior highway engi- neer without further examination.^^

Despite the small compensation, the OPR had no

trouble recruiting all the ci\al engineer students it needed. Over a period of 10 years, some 70 engineers were hired, of whom about 36 resigned within a year

of completing their training to accept positions with

colleges, counties and State highway departments.

Page accepted these losses philosophically

. . . the engineers after a few years' training in the

office are in great demand for State and county worlf. The practice of permitting these engineers to resign is detrimental in one sense to the service, in that the office

is constantly losing some of its best men, but the benefits derived by the various States and counties through the

distribution of trained men to all sections of the country

are so great as to be a vindication of the wisdom of this project.^

Page also realized that his ability to expand the

Federal good roads effort would depend on attracting

additional experienced engineers to his staff. His first acquisition was Arthur N. Johnson, the able highway

engineer of the Marj^land Roads Commission.* Johnson agreed to take over the supervision of the OPR's

far flung field operations. Later, Page got Edwin W.

James, who had supervised road work in the Philippines, to transfer to the OPR from the War Department. However, in the long run, the major source of

recruitment for the OPR's permanent force of engi- neers was the civil engineer student training program.

Page's foresight was forcefully demonstrated 12 years

later when the trainees he had selected for this program became the backbone of the Bureau of Public

Roads organization for administering the immense

Federal-aid appropriations.

Director Page's interest in the education and training of engineers went far beyond his own organization.

In 1909 he had the OPR survey the status of highway

engineering instruction in all the technical schools and

colleges in the United States, and he furnished advisors to help the schools set up practical courses in highway design and construction. The OPR aided a number of schools to set up first-class testing laboratories, and whenever its agents and engineers could be

spared from other work, they were detailed to lecture on highway engineering in the colleges.

Federal Roads on Federal Lands

Since the two agencies were in the same department

of the Government, it was natural for the Forest

Service to turn to the Office of Public Roads for help

with its road problems, and the OPR was furnishing

occasional advice on forest trails as early as 1905.^^ However, it was not until 1913 that a formal ar- rangement was made for the OPR to handle road

work in the national forests.* Congress in 1912 had

required that 10 percent of the revenues from the

national forests should be spent to construct roads

and trails within these forests.^* By the end of fiscal year 1912, $210,925 had accumulated in the forest road

fund, and the Forest Service found that it needed

expert advice on where and how to spend the money.

The Chief Forester asked Director Page to assign

highway engineers to inspect all the existing roads

and to recommend how these should be improved and

where others should be built. The OPR then assigned

five engineers to this work, one for each of five forest

districts. About this time, the Secretary of the Interior also

asked for assistance to help with the planning of roads

in the national parks. Page responded by placing an

engineer and a field survey party in Yosemite National

Park during the summer of 1914 and promised to begin work in five other parks as soon as he could find

the engineers.**

To handle this sudden increase in workload. Director

Page set up a Division of National Park and Forest

Roads within the OPR and assigned responsibility

for the Division to T. Warren Allen. The work in

* Johnson resigned 2 years later to become chief engineer

of the Illinois Highway Department, and he subsequently be- came one of the most distinguished American highway engi- neers and one of the founders of the science of traffic analysis.

* In 1910 the OPR, at the request of the Crater Lake Highway Commission, a private body, assigned a road expert to supervise the construction of a road through the Crater Lake

National Forest to the Crater Lake National Park and to plan

a system of roads and trails for the Park. This road was

financed by county funds and private subscriptions and was

not actually Forest Service work.^

** At this time, there was no National Park Service ; each

park superintendent reported directly to the Secretary of the

Interior and did his own road work, except for Yellowstone

where the roads were built by the Corps of Engineers. In 1914 there were 12 national parks.

75
federally owned areas built up so rapidly that, by

1916, the OPR was maintaining 160 miles of road,

constructing 170 miles and making surveys and plans

for yet another 477 miles—a total program that was

spread over 12 States and Alaska, and which exceeded

the programs of a number of State highway departments. This far-flung program would soon receive a major boost from Congress in the Federal Aid Road

Act of 1916.

Publicity Adds Momentum to the Good Roads Movement

Most of the OPR's engineers were as much at home

on the lecture platform as in the field or the laboratory. The special agents spent most of their time on

such work, and they and the Washington Office staff were in great demand as speakers at road conventions

and meetings of trade associations and professional

groups. Director Page supplied lecturers only upon

invitation and then only upon assurance that the meeting had been properly advertised and that the attend- ance would justify the expense. He was never able

to satisfy the demand, even though he doubled and

then trebled the number of men assigned to the work.

In 1906 the OPR engineers gave about 100 lectures in

14 States. By 1912, 27 lecturers were giving 1,139

lectures which were heard by 208,472 persons in 37

States.^" To reach even more people, Page, in 1907, launched an information campaign directed at the rural population. Twenty-five hundred county newspapers co- operated by publishing short practical articles on road

construction and maintenance written by the OPR

staff. Through this program. Page estimated that he

could reach up to 10 million people a year.^^ ^^ Important as it was, the OPR publicity was only a small part of a nationwide outpouring of good roads

propaganda. The magazine. Good Roads, founded by

the League of American Wheelmen, was still the

leading publication in the good roads field, but it had many competitors. In 1908 the American Automobile Association (AAA) launched the American

Motorist to speak for the rapidly increasing number

of automobile owners. Hardly a month passed without an article on good roads appearing in the influ- ential Saturday Evening Post or in Harper''s Magazine, and between 1910 and 1915, it is safe to say that no national issue received greater coverage in the

country and city newspapers.

Show Business in the Road Business

In 1908 Congress authorized a Government exhibit

at the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition and specifically provided that the Office of Public Roads should

be represented. For its part of the exhibit, the OPR

prepared a series of scale models, complete with miniature machinery, showing every aspect of roadbuilding.

These were supi^lemented with a handbook, a series of

moving pictures and stereopticon slides and a lecture on roads.

The Seattle exhibit of 1909 was so successful that

the OPR made up several others like it which were shown at national expositions and fairs in 1910. These

boosted the demand still further, so Page arranged to transfer a professional model maker from the Smithsonian Institution to augment the OPR's effort. The

models were loaned to various State fairs and expositions, which agreed to cover the cost of installation

and transportation. The exhibits were accompanied

by an OPR road expert to show the slides and give

lectures. Between 1910 and 1917, the exhibits were shown at over 100 places and were seen by some 2i/^ million people.

In 1911 the Pennsylvania Railroad offered to provide a "Road Improvement Train" to carry the OPR

exhibit throughout the State of Pennsylvania, and

arrangements were made with the State Highway

Department and the Pennsylvania State College to sponsor the tour. The train consisted of an exhibit

car, a lecture car and two flat cars carrying full-sized

crushers, rollers, graders and even split-log drags.

The train stopped at 165 places during its 2-month

tour. The crowds were so large in the larger towns

that the lectures had to be held in court houses and

opera houses. Over 53,000 people saw the exhibits and

heard the lectures.^^ Not to be outdone by the Pennsylvania Railroad,

the Southern and five other eastern and midwestem

railroads petitioned the OPR to outfit Road Improvement Trains for them, and these took to the road in

1911 and 1912, carrying the good roads gospel to some

163,000 people in 650 towns. The last Good Roads

Train in American history toured the State of Iowa

in 1916.

The American Highway Association

By 1910 there were literally scores of organizations

in the United States devoted to the promotion of good

roads. A few of these were strong, effective, and

national in scope. The American Automobile Association founded by the motorists in 1902 and the

American Road Makers, bringing together State engineers, road contractors and road machinery manufacturers, were in this category. However, many of the

good roads associations were primarily pressure groups

whose purpose was to get improved roads by influencing legislation. Most of these had no dues-paying

members but depended on commercial interests—rail- roads, materials producers, automobile manufacturers—for financial support.

The interior of the exhibit car

of the Road Improvement Train.

76
Secretary of Agriculture Wilson and L. W. Page visiting the Road Improvement Train October 4, 1911.

7T
Page continued his predecessors' policy of furnishing speakers for the annual conventions of the larger

good roads associations, but he also saw a need for a

larger, permanent umbrella-type organization to en- compass the entire Good Roads Movement. In 1910

at Page's invitation, the officials of some 30 State and

interstate organizations, including highway departments, railroads, good roads associations, and others,

niet in Washington and formed the American Association for Highway Improvement, electing Page as

its first president, along with a prestigious board of

directors.

This Association sponsored the First American Road

Congress at Richmond, Virginia, in 1911 which passed

strong resolutions recommending r^* • That Congress extend financial aid to the States

to encourage them to build and maintain good roads. • That no appropriation for road construction

should ever be made without proper provision for

maintenance afterward. • That all States provide for State supervision of

main highways through a State highway department,

and that liberal financial assistance be given through

State aid in the building and maintenance of such

roads. • That the work of construction and maintenance

of all public highways of any locality or State should

be under the direction of experienced highway engineers.

• That all the States enact laws providing for the

employment of prison labor for the improvement of

public highways. • That, for safety of the public, all vehicles be re- quired to display a lighted lamp at night, visible at

least 200 feet ahead, and a red light visible from the

rear. • That the use of the muffler cut-out and the unnecessary use of horns and bells be forbidden in

thickly settled sections. • That slow-moving traffic be required to drive to the right so that faster vehicles may pass, • That uniform speed regulations be adopted by

all States, and the local authorities in cities, villages,

and towns be prohibited from fixing local speed regulations. • That officials responsible for bridges be required

to inspect them periodically and post safe weight

limits. • That all roads be systematically placarded by

sign boards giving directions and distances to towns

and cities. These resolutions were a complete and unambiguous

statement of the principles that were to guide the

American highway movement for the next 5 years. In 1912 the Association shortened its name to American Highway Association and joined with the American Automobile Association to sponsor the Second

78
American Road Congress. The Third and Fourth

American Eoad Congresses followed in 1913 and 1914.

A number of State highway commissioners and

chief engineers assumed very active roles in the American Highway Association, but most of the State men

felt a need for an organization more specifically

tailored to their needs. Such an organization, with

membership restricted to the chief officials of the

State highway departments and their staffs, was proposed by Virginia's Commissioner of Highways,

Greorge P. Coleman, in Januarj' 1914. Page endorsed

the idea, although he had hoped the State officials would organize within the framework of the American

Highway Association, and in March 1914 he wrote to Mr. Coleman:

It has become increasingly apparent to me during the past few years that some medium should be provided for bringing the heads of the various State Highway Depart- ments and of this office into closer touch, for the consid- eration of questions of mutual interest. Some sort of organization is, to my mind, highly desirable, but I think

the best results can only be obtained by limiting the membership strictly to official heads of departments and

their immediate staff, thus making the organization

strictly official and enabling full and frank consideration

of questions, particularly those of a technical character untrammeled by commercialism or popular prejudices."

With Page's blessing, the formation of the new body was assured, and in December 1914 the American

Association of State Highway Officials was organized

"for the purpose of providing mutual cooperation and

assistance to the State highway departments and the

several States and the Federal Government, as well as for the discussion of legislative, economic and technical subjects pertaining to the administration of such

departments." ^® One of the first acts of the newly formed association was to instruct the executive committee to prepare,

for the consideration of Congress, a bill authorizing

Federal aid to highways.

A plank bridge in South Carolina

a half mile long and too narrow

for two teams of horses to pass.

REFERENCES

' L. Page, The Selection of Materials for Macadam Roads,

Proceedings of the Thipd American Road Congress (Detroit,

Mich., Sept.-Oct. 1913), (Waverly Press, Baltimore, 1914) p. 170.

' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1919, pp. 34, 35. 'AASHO

The First Fifty Years, 1914-1964 (American

Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1965) pp. 322-330.

• M. Eldridge, Public-Road Mileage, Revenues and Expenditures IN THE United States in 1904, Bulletin No. 32

(Office of Public Roads, Washington, D.C., 1907) pp. 16-18.

' BtJBEAU OF Public Roads Annual Report, 1904, pp. 442, 443.

• Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1909, p. 7.

' A. Rose, Historic American Highways—Public Roads of THE Past (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1953) p. 92.

' BiTREAU OF Public Roads Annual Report, 1905, pp. 427, 428.

• A. Rose, supra, note 7, p. 101. "Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1900, p. 287. "Id. "1971 Automobile Facts and Figures (Automobile Manufacturer's Association, Detroit, 1971) p. 18. " Office of Public Roads, Progress Reports of Experiments With Dust Preventives, Circular No. 89 (U.S. Dept.

of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 1908) p. 26. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1910, pp. 785,

786."W. Gillespie, A Manual of the Principles and Practice

of Road-Making (A. S. Barnes, New York, 1871) p. 191. " Office of Public Roads, The Road Drag and How It Is Used, Farmers' Bulletin 597 (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 1914) p. 5. "Kansas King Drag Bill, American Highways, Vol. 1, No.

10, Mar. 1907, p. 277. "Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1913, p. 9. " Office of Public Roads, Public Road Mileage and Reve- nues IN THE United States, 1914, Bulletin No. 390 (U.S. Dept.

of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., Jan. 12, 1917) p. 3. "Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1914, p. 6. ''Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1916, p. 4. ^ BPR, supra, note 6, p. 27. " BPR, supra, note 20, p. 4. "Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1903, p. 332. " BPR, supra, note 8, pp. 434, 435. "Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1911, p. 28. " BPR, supra, note 8, p. 434. " BPR, supra, note 26, pp. 25, 26. "Agricultural Appropriation Act of 1912 (37 Stat 288). '"BtTREAu of Public Roads Annual Report, 1912, pp. 33, 34. "Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1907, pp. 22, 27. "Bubeau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1908, p. 6. " BPR, supra, note 26, p. 42. " American Association for Highway Improvement, Papers,

Addresses, and Resolutions Before the American Road

Congress (Richmond, Va., Nov. 1911) (Waverly Press, Balti- more, 1912) pp. 187-190. " Supra, note 3, p. 50. "Id. p. 52.

79
The

for

Federal Pid

Rural Free Delivery of U.S. Mall—A Powerful Force for Road Improvement

It is hard for rural residents today to realize the

isolation in which most farmers lived in the 19th

century. There were then no rural mail delivery, no

telephones. One had to go to town, perhaps 4 or 5 miles away, to get a newspaper. If the roads were

bad, as they usually were in winter and spring, the

rural schools and churches might be only a third

filled, and even neighbors might have difficulty communicating with each other.

One of the strongest arguments of the good roads

advocates of the 1890's was that good roads would

reduce this isolation, and particularly, would make it practical for the Government to deliver mail to the

farms, as some European countries had been doing

for decades. In 1893, largely through the influence

of the State Granges of the Patrons of Husbandry,

Congress appropriated $10,000 for an experimental

program of rural mail delivery. After some foot

dragging by the Postmaster General, who thought the

idea impractical, the Post Office Department established the first experimental rural delivery routes from Charlestown, Halltown and Uvilla, West Virginia, on October 1, 1896, and by July 1897, 44 routes were in operation. Congress increased the appropriation to $50,000 in 1898, and thereafter the free delivery

system grew rapidly until, by 1903, there were 8,600

carriers traveling 200,000 miles per day and reaching

almost 5 million people.^

The Department made it a rule that rural delivery

would be established only along reasonably good roads

and that the carrier need not go out on his route unless the roads were in fit condition for travel. These

requirements marshaled public opinion on the side of

those who wanted better roads, and hundreds of

counties undertook substantial road improvements to get rural delivery. In Texas, for example, 100 fords were replaced by bridges in 1901 and 1902.

Under a 1906 agreement between the Postmaster

General and the Secretary of Agricultui'e, a locality

desiring a rural mail route could petition the Office

of Public Roads for an engineer inspector to examine

the route and recommend whatever was necessary to make it suitable for carrjdng the mail. It was then

up to the local officials to make the improvements, but

sometimes the inspector, if requested, might assume

temporary supervision of the work as an object lesson

in roadbuilding. Director Page, thus, hoped to greatly

extend the OPR's educational work

:

As the chief aim and purpose of this Office is to bring

about a general and uniform improvement of the country

roads throughout the United States, a cooperative plan

such as the one described above offers the best possible means of achieving positive results in furtherance of that

purpose. By this means correct methods of road building

and road maintenance will be introduced into practically every section of the United States.'^

80
Important as these efforts were, they did not satisfy

the skyrocketing demand for rural delivery service.

Congress was generous with funds to operate and ex- tend the free delivery system—in fact, it consistently

appropriated more than the Post Office Department

asked for—but the problem was really one of roads on which to carry the mails and not one of financing

the postal service. This was realized by Congressman

Walter P. Brownlow of Tennessee, who in 1903 introduced a bill that would provide $20 million annually

in Federal aid to States or counties for the building

of post roads. The grants would have to be for specific roads, and the State or county applying for aid

would have to agree to pay one-half of their costs. Plans and specifications for the aided roads would be

drawn by the Federal Government to insure adequate

standards, but the contracts for the work could be let and supervised by the State or county.^

Brownlow's bill did not become law, but thereafter,

for 13 years, bills for some form of national aid to roads were introduced in every session of Congress.

One of these, introduced in 1912 by Representative

Dorsey W. Shackleford of Missouri, would authorize

the spending of $25 million per year out of the Federal fiscal surplus to improve and maintain rural free

delivery routes. The aid would be distributed to the

counties at the rate of $15 for each mile of graded

earth road, $20 for each mile of gravel road, and $25

for each mile of macadam, provided the counties had

spent a like amount on these roads in the preceding

year.* The sliding scale would be an inducement to the local authorities to upgrade their roads.'* Shackleford argued that this aid would actually save the

Government money in the long run by reducing the

* In 1912 there were 1,200,000 miles of rural delivei-y routes

in the United States, most of them over dirt roads.

cost of rural delivery which was then losing $28

million per year.^

The Shackleford bill passed the House but was lost in the Senate. However, in the same session an ex- perimental appropriation was added to the Post Office

Department Appropriation Bill (37 Stat 551) to be

spent by the Secretary of Agriculture, in cooperation

with the Postmaster General, to improve the condition of certain selected post roads, and thereafter, to determine "the increase in the territory which could

be served by each carrier as a result of such improvement, the possible increase of the number of delivery

days in each year, the amount required in excess of

local expenditures for the pi'oper maintenance of such

roads, and the relative saving to the Government in

the operation of the Rural Delivery Service and to the local inhabitants in the transportation of their

products by reason of such improvement. . . ." The Act also required that the State or local government receiving aid should put up two-thirds of the

total cost and that the Secretary and the Postmaster

General should report back to Congress within 1 year

the results of their operation and also their recommendations, pro or con, on a general plan of national

aid for the improvement of postal roads.

This was a very large assignment for both Departments and one that was to test their negotiating skills to the utmost. Unfortunately, Congress failed to provide either agency with administrative funds to carry

out the Act, so they had to secure the necessary engi- neers and postal inspectors by cutting down on other

activities. Another more important provision of the same Act

authorized the appointment of a joint committee of

five Senators and five Representatives to make an in- quiry into the whole matter of Federal aid to highways and to report back to Congress at the earliest

possible date.

Traffic on an improved post

" 1^ road in Tennessee in 1903. ""1

81
An earth road near

Stafford, Va. that was

7-epaired with pine poles

about 1912.

The Complexities of Federal-State-County Cooperation

In order to treat all States equally, and also to get

information representative of all parts of the country,

the two Departments divided the $500,000 appropriation equally among the 48 States. They then, in a

joint letter, notified each governor of the apportionment and asked that he designate about 50 miles of

road within his State on which rural delivery was or might be established as an experimental post road.

Five governors did not even bother to reply to this

request; six refused to participate; and 28 indicated

that they were unable to comply for lack of legal

powers or because of conflicting State statutes. Two

States, Georgia and South Carolina, declined to participate because of Federal statutes requiring an 8- hour work day and the Executive Order of May 18,

1905, barring the employment of convict labor on Government work. In the end, only Alabama, Iowa,

and Oregon agreed to designate post roads and accept

the Federal subsidy.^

By this time, nearly 7 months had passed and no

projects were underway, so the two Departments tried a different approach. They decided to select from

two to eight locations representative of conditions in

various sections of the country and to concentrate the

available funds on a few roads in these localities. This plan produced the desired result, and eventually

agreements were made for 17 post road projects total- ing 457 miles, located in 13 States and 28 counties,

but not without practical and legal difficulties. One

county in Virginia figured that it could build roads more economically by doing its own work with convicts or by free labor working 10 or 11 hours per day

than by accepting the Federal subsidy, and the county

canceled its agreement. The original idea of appointing a trustee in each county to hold the funds for

each post road, subject to disbursement by a Federal

engineer, had to be dropped in some States because

of conflict with State laws. The most serious objections came from Minnesota which protested the 8-hour

clause in the agreements and appealed the matter to the Attorney General of the United States, who ruled

that the work contemplated under the post road program was, after all, not public work of the United

States, within the meaning of the statutes, and, therefore, neither the 8-hour law or the prohibition on use

of convict labor would apply.^

The Secretary of Agriculture turned the supervision

of the post road program over to the Office of Public

Roads, and Page in turn assigned responsibility to E. W. James, who detailed an engineer to each project

to lay out the road, supervise construction, and approve expenditures. Cooperation with the counties was not easy. Unlike Bennington County, Vermont,

which had petitioned the OPR to assign an engineer,

the cooperating post road counties had surrendered

their control over the joint road funds unwillingly

and only to get the Federal subsidy. The Secretary

and the Postmaster General described some of the

difficulties in these words

:

From correspondence and from the attitude of the local

officials in many places it appears that there is a disposition frequently to avoid the obvious requirements of the present act with respect to Government control over

the expenditure of joint funds. The allotments have

been looked upon not infrequently in the light of a gratuity, the idea of the post road has been lost sight of, and the question has been frequently raised in the field as to why the Government would not give the money to the counties and let them spend it. . . . Fiscal procedure in the States and counties, if possible, should be provided for in local statutes, written with

Federal aid in mind. The longest delays, the most unsatisfactory conferences, and the most troublesome routine in the execution of the present projects have arisen because the Federal aid and supervision of local funds was not thought of when the fiscal regulations of the

States and counties were made.

We find that many States incorporate into their State road laws certain details of design and methods of con- struction which, in any general distribution of national

aid, would at once act as checks on supervision by the National Government. . . .*

82
The first post road to be completed was opened to

traffic in 1914. It was a dirt road, extending 141^

miles west from Florence, Alabama, to Waterloo. The

program, with congressional extensions, dragged on

for four more years, until the last post road, in

Dubuque County, Iowa, was opened in 1918. From

the start, this program was a very considci'able burden

on the Office of Public Roads, yet in carrying it out,

the OPR learned valuable lessons which Director Page was able to pass on a few years later to the framers

of the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916. The most

important of these recommendations was that Federal

aid should be dispensed only through the 48 States,

avoiding the complexities of dealing with the Nation's more than 3,000 counties.

It is worth noting that the post road program of

1912 to 1918 was the Office of Public Roads' first in- volvement with the Federal policy of inducing social

change in the States by means of the public works

programs. Later legislation conditioned Federal

grants for roads on State compliance with the 8-hour

law, the prohibition of convict labor, the use of hand

labor methods, the paj^ment of minimum wages, and numerous other requirements that were primarily

social.

P

APPROVES OUALIFICATIONS OF g COUNTY HIGHWAY CNSINEERS AND I

SUPERINTENDENTS

,,i^i^

PREPARES ESTIMATES FOR COUNTV ^ BOND ISSUES. ^

<^».;»:^%^;»;^j^»i^:;%%^^^^ CHART ILLUSTRATING SCOPE OF A MODEL

STATE highh:\yder\rtment

Although the date is not known, it can he assumed that Director Page made up this model of a State highway

departmetit about the time that he made his recommendation

on the 1916 Federal Aid Road Act.

The Lincoln Highway

The Glidden Tours and the exploits of the Pioneer

Freighter inspired a growing interest in motorable

long-distance roads among the rapidly increasing class of automobile owners. In 1912 Carl G. Fisher, builder

of the Indianai:)olis Speedway, conceived the idea of

a "coast-to-coast rock highway" as a way to dramatize

the need for interstate roads. He was able to get

suppoi't for this idea from some of the foremost leaders of the automotive and allied industries, and in

July 1913, Fisher and his supporters formed the

Lincoln Highway Association to carry out the scheme

and collect public subscriptions to pay for it. The

Association then selected what they considered the

most direct route across the mid-United States beginning at New York and proceeding by way of Philadelphia, Chicago, Omaha, Cheyenne, and Salt Lake

City to San Francisco, a total distance of about 3,150

miles.'' The Association recruited members in all of the

towns along the route, and, with thoroughgoing ef- ficiency, appointed able and influential local citizens as "consuls" to promote the improvement of the

various sections of the route. The result was a rich

harvest of local and national publicity and sizable

cash contributions as well. The Lincoln Highway Association collected millions

of dollars from the public, but its officers had no

illusions that they would ever be able to get enough

to build the highway from this source. Their primary purpose was to educate the public to the need

for better roads and build political support for national aid to good roads. As a vehicle for this educational campaign, they adopted Roy Stone's tried

and tested technique of object lesson roads. The

funds donated to the Association were used to finance

"seedling miles" distributed throughout the length of

the route. The first of these, begun October 1914, near the village of Malta, Illinois, was a cement concrete pavement, and many of the others were of similar high types suitable for heavy traffic. The Lincoln Highway inspired a tremendous

amount of argument both for and against longdistance roads. The rural interests generally were

against them, claiming that the Nation would be

drained of funds to build a few "peacock alleys" for

the enjoyment of wealthy tourists. Urban spokesmen

said the country had been too long in bondage to the

medieval English concept that roads were the re- sponsibility of the smallest and weakest units of government, namely, the road districts, townships, and

counties, and that the Federal Government should assume responsibility for "national routes." Among the most active of the national roads advocates was the National Highways Association, an

organization its enemies claimed was dominated by

the road machinery, road materials, and portland

cement interests. This Association published a map

showing a recommended 50,000-mile system of national roads extending from coast to coast and from

Canada to the Gulf, which it claimed should be the

responsibility of the Federal Government to build

and maintain.* " Such a system, proponents claimed.

* This idea was 30 years ahead of its time and was not

realized until the Interstate System was authorized in 1944.

83
With the spring thaiv, roads such as this one in Michigan

about 1916 annually became impassable because of the mud.

would not lay any additional expense on the States

and counties but, rather, would relieve them of the

cost of keeping up their heaviest trafficked roads,

leaving more of the local funds to spend on the local

roads.

The American Automobile Association took a strong

position in favor of Federal aid and against dissipating the Federal funds in driblets over the more than

2 million miles of local roads

:

... we advocate the main roads to be built first, and

those are the two fundamental principles that this Association is working for : that the government should aid, and that the government money should be spent only on

the main thoroughfai-es and should not be dissipated by

trying to spend it on 2,000,000 miles of road . . . we

believe that this work should not of necessity be done

by the government, but that the State highway officials, in cooperation with the government, should agree on the

roads, the plans, and the specifications, and on the various features of the contract."

The Evolution of a National Policy on Federal Aid

"WHien the Post Office Appropriation Act of 1912 was passed, it was already apparent to most Congressmen that some form of Federal aid to roads was in- evitable. The real questions before Congi-ess were how much the aid should be and the form in which it should be granted. The experimental post road appropriation and the congressional joint committee

were measures designed to get some answers to these

questions, but in the end, the inevitable Federal-aid

bill was hammered out on the anvil of political compromise.

The legislators appointed to the Joint Committee

on Federal Aid in the Construction of Post Roads

represented all shades of opinion from extreme national road advocates to local road supporters. The

Committee held hearings and drew heavily on the

files of the State Department and the Office of Public

Roads for information on the economic and social

importance of roads and how they were administered

in the United States and the advanced countries of

Europe. They learned, for example, that in the

United States the average haul for farm products to market or to the nearest railroad station was 9 miles;

and the average cost of hauling over the existing

country roads was 21 cents per ton-mile. By comparison, it cost French farmers only 8 cents per ton- mile to haul farm products over their macadam roads.

The difference, or 13 cents per ton-mile, was in effect a financial burden laid on American producers and

consumers alike by bad roads, a "mud tax" that was

costing the country $504 million annually. At 6 percent, this loss represented the interest on $8.4 billion,

which, according to some economists, might profitably

be spent annually to improve the roads instead of the

niggardly $204 million spent in 1912.^-

84
The Committee received testimony on the effect of

bad roads on the education of rural children, the

quality of rural life, and migration of young people

from the farms to the cities ; and on the value of farm

land, the labor of horses, and the wear and tear on wagons and draft gear, and the motorization of farm

transportation. They sent inquiries to people in all walks of life in all parts of the country, and of 10,000

replies, 97 percent were in favor of some form of

Federal aid. The Joint Committee's work stretched out far

longer than Congress had anticipated and was not

completed when the 63d Congress convened in 1914.

This did not discourage the proponents of Federal

aid, who poured a steady stream of bills into the

legislative hopper in the first session. In all, 10 bills were introduced in the Senate and 39 in the House.

These bills covered the whole spectrum of thinking on

the Federal-aid question. At one extreme was Alabama Senator John H. Bankhead's bill to set up a National Bureau of Highways in Washington to spend $25 million per year on a national highway

system. At the other end was a bill by Senator Hoke

Smith of Georgia to classify all the rural mail routes according to the type of surfacing and then pay each

State $60 annually for each mile of Class A (macadam) road, $30 per mile for Class B (gravel), and

$15 per mile for Class C (earth), as "rental" for the

use of the roads to carry the U.S. mail. A novel

plan offered by Senator Jonathan Bourne, Jr., of

Oregon would apportion $1 billion among the States

according to four factors. Under this complicated

plan, the Federal Government would lend part of the

money to the States at 4 percent interest and the re- mainder would be a subsidy for State roads. This was to be accomplished by the issuance of both State

and Federal Government bonds over a long period of

time.

Through this welter of different Federal-aid plans

there ran a thin thread of agreement on three matters

• The amount of Federal aid should be from $20

to $25 million annually. • The aid should be apportioned among the States

according to some formula. (The most popular

formula was one-third of the funds according to population, one-third according to geographic

area, and one-third accoi'ding to the mileage of

post roads.) • The aid should be matched by State contributions, with 50-50 the most favored ratio. Eventually the House passed a modified version of

the "ABC Rental Plan" offered by Representative

Shackleford of Missouri, but this bill was lost in the

Senate reportedly because of the opposition of the

American Automobile Association and big city interests.^^ In support of his plan to subsidize the lesser rural

roads, Shackleford used an argument that would have

repercussions for years afterward in the design of

highways. He asserted that there are two types of

roads: "touring roads" and "business roads," and that

the two are somehow incompatible in the same system

of highways. In 1913, at the Third American Road

Congress he said

It can not be doubted that an overwhelming majority

of the people want federal road legislation ; but, unfortunately, they radically differ in opinion as to what

such legislation should provide. They are divided into two general classes, which for the purposes of this dis- cussion may be designated as the 'touring-roads' class and the 'business-roads' class. The 'touring-roads' class

is marching under a banner upon which is inscribed in letters of gold : 'See America first.' The 'business-roads'

class is marshaling its forces under a flag which bears the legend ; 'Cheaper transportation and lower cost of

living.' . . .

State Highway No. 1 (note 1-25) in New Mexico in 1915 with a 6 percent grade into Nogal Canyon.

85
The 'touring-roads' class demands that the United

States shall limit its road activities to the construction and maintenance of a few 'ocean-to-ocean' and 'across- country' highways of great perfection and then leave the

rest of the people to build their own roads or do without,

as they may choose. The 'business-roads' class believes that in dealing with

roads we must keep in mind their functions and the rela- tion which they bear to the general transportation system

of the country ; that, as the harbor is the terminus of the

river and the railroad, so, for practical purposes, the railway station is the terminus for roads ; that neither

freight nor passengers will ever be carried long distances over roads as cheaply as they could be over railways,

and that it is an idle dream to imagine that auto trucks and automobiles will take the place of railways in the

long-distance movement of freight or passengers ; that the proper function of roads is not to connect antipodal oceans nor the distant capitals of far-away States, but

to make easy communication between the farms on one hand and the towns and railway stations on the other,

to the end that the farmer may market his crops at less expense and the town dweller may get farm products more easily at less cost. They therefore favor a general

system of roads radiating from the towns and railway

stations out among the farms." In later years, in a different context, and in some- what different form, Shackleford's arguments would

be used to oppose parkways, highway beautification

and long-distance freeways.

In their report of January 21, 1915, the members

agreed unanimously on the need and desirability of

Federal aid and its constitutionality, but not on any

specific policy for Congress to follow in granting

such aid. The Committee failed to come to grips

with the question of how much aid should be granted,

other than to counsel that Federal aid should be

undertaken in a large way rather than a small,

haphazard way. They warned that small contributions spread over a large mileage would create a "pork barrel" that would dissipate the Federal funds

without any permanent upgrading of the roads. The

Committee also came out against centralization of

control over the road program in Washington.

Prophetically, the Committee declared, "We believe

that permanent highways will result in very considerable adoption of auto-truck hauling in preference

to rail transportation where the distance is within a

half day's run." ^^

Federal Aid Becomes A Reality

Among the first bills introduced into the 64th Congress in January 1916 was Representative Shackleford's H.R. 7617, providing that "the Secretary of

Agriculture, on behalf of the United States, shall, in

certain cases, aid the States in the construction and

maintenance of rural post roads." This bill proposed

to appropriate $25 million annually, out of which

each State would receive at least $65,000. The re- mainder would be apportioned one-half in proportion

to population and one-half in proportion to the mileage of rural free delivery (RFD) and star post routes. The locations and standards of the aided roads were

to be agreed upon between the Secretary of Agriculture and the States, and earth, sand-clay, and other

low cost surfaces would be eligible for the subsidy, as well as higher types, and the Federal share of the

cost would be not less than 30 percent nor more than

50 percent. To receive Federal aid after 1920, each

State would have to have a State highway department

to administer the Federal funds. Finally, the construction and maintenance of the aided roads would

remain under State control.

Other good roads bills were introduced in the 64th

Congress, but Shackleford's H.R. 7617 attracted the

most support. Its author had been cochairman of the

Joint Congressional Committee, and he was now

chairman of the newly formed House Committee on

Roads. He had come to realize that compromise between the long-distance roads and local roads advocates would be necessary to pass any Federal-aid bill. His new bill had the support of the American Association of State Highway Officials, the Secretary of

Agriculture, the Postmaster General, and the Office

of Public Roads, all of whom opposed the ABC

rental plan so dear to Shackleford's heart.

When the Shackleford bill reached the floor of the

House, there was no opposition to it on constitutional

grounds, and almost everybody was satisfied that

ownership and responsibility for roads should remain

with the State and local governments. There was

also general agreement that the Government should

deal only with States through a highway department.

Debate revolved almost entirely about the formula

for apportioning the funds among the States, and the

exclusion of places of more than 2,500 population

from the benefits of the act.* Opponents of the bill claimed that the apportionment formula gave the wealthier States, which con- tributed most of the Federal revenues, less than their

fair share of the post road benefits, and they were

particularly bitter that the cities, which contributed

a very large share of the revenue in all States, got

nothing at all from the bill. The rural road advocates replied that the wealthy States and the cities had already received more than their fair share of

the national income in other forms, such as expensive

post offices and public buildings, harbor improvements,

veterans' pensions (one-third of the pensioners lived

in six eastern States, practically none in the south)

and, most of all, in shelter of their industries behind

a high protective tariff. Despite the opposition, the Shackleford Bill, with some changes, passed the House by a good margin and was carried unanimously in the Senate. It became

law July 11, 1916.

The principal changes in the bill were to reduce the

funding and change the apportionment factors to one- third according to area, one-third according to population, and one-third according to post road mileage.

The Secretary of Agriculture was allowed to take 3

percent off the top of all appropriations for administration. No Federal aid was to be apportioned to any

State until its legislature had assented to the provisions of the Act, but after that, the Secretary would

pay one-half of the actual cost of any approved

project, including the cost of bridges and culverts, up

to $10,000 per mile. After completion of the aided

road, it would be the duty of the State to properly

maintain it, and if this were not done, the Secretary

could refuse to approve further Federal aid in that

State until the road was restored to good condition.

* The debate on the Federal-aid bill comprises some 300 pages of The Congressional Record, Vol. 53, 1916.

86
Congress realized that it would take some time for

the States to enact suitable legislation assenting to the Federal Act, to raise matching funds and train

personnel for an expanded road program. The Congress, in order to provide time, allowed States with

unexpended funds at the close of the fiscal year one

additional fiscal year to obligate funds and, for those

States that did not have a State highway department,

the appropriation would be available until the close

of the third fiscal year following the fiscal year for

which it was apportioned. The legislators may also

have remembered how long it took the Secretary of

Agriculture and the Postmaster General to implement

the much smaller post road program of 1912. At any

rate, they appropriated only $5 million for fiscal year

1917, the first year of the new program, but at the same time, they provided for increasing the amount

by $5 million annually up to a maximum of $25 million in 1921.* Thus, although the amount initially

available was not large. Congress, by appropriating

for 5 years in advance, made it possible for the States

to plan ahead and build up an orderly program. This

wise policy has continued down to the present.

Launching the Federal-Aid Program

The Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 placed an im- mense additional responsibility on Logan Waller Page

and the Office of Public Roads and Rural Engineering,** to whom Secretary of Agriculture Houston

delegated the administration of the Act. First, they

had to apportion the appropriated funds among the

48 States, and this required that the Postmaster

General certify the mileage of rural delivery and star routes in each State. The apportionment was published July 21, 1916, just 10 days after President

Wilson signed the Act. Page and the Department solicitor then drafted

tentative regulations for carrying out the provisions

of the Act, and invited the heads of all the State

highway departments to a conference in Washington

to discuss them. The draft regulations did not satisfy

everyone, particularly the provisions denying Federal

participation in the cost of right-of-way and the cost of making preliminary surveys and plans. However,

most of the suggestions made by the State officials were incorporated in the final draft, and the regulations were issued September 1, 1916.

The harmonious cooperation between the Federal

and State officials in drafting these regulations was a good omen for the eventual success of the Federal-aid

program. Their work was so well done that the

regulations were not greatly changed for years afterward, even though the Act itself was very considerably amended.

* In addition to providing $75 million for Federal aid to post roads, Congress appropriated $10 million for roads and

trails in national forests to be spent at the rate of $1 million per year beginning in 1917 under the supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture.

** On July 1, 1915, the Department's work on farm drainage,

irrigation and farm architecture was merged with the work

on roads under a new Office of Public Roads and Rural Engineering (OPRRE) with Logan Waller Page as Director. The

working force under Page after the merger was 4.50 persons,

of whom 288 were from the rolls of the old OPR and 162 from other agencies."

The Act gave the State highway departments the

authority to initiate projects subject to approval of

the plans, specifications and estimates by the Secretary. To provide prompt inspection and approval of

projects. Page decentralized the OPRRE into ten

regional districts, each in charge of an experienced

highway engineer. At the same time, he had men at work, in cooperation with the States, preparing standard forms for plans and specifications, and in February 1917 he convened a conference of State testing

engineers in Washington to recommend to the States

standard specifications and methods of testing road

materials.

The OPRRE's administrative diligence was matched

by that of those States which already had adequate

highway departments. By July 1917, Page's district

engineers had received applications from 26 States for

Federal aid in the construction of 949 miles of road

estimated to cost $5.43 million, the Federal share of

which amounted to about $2.43 million, or less than

half of the funds appropriated by Congress for fiscal year 1917. Of these projects, 188 miles, with a Federal share of $846,152, had been approved.^^

Standards for Federally Aided Roads

Representative Shackleford's original bill, which

much amended eventually became the Federal Aid

Road Act, provided that Federal aid might be used

for earth and sand-clay roads, as well as for higher

types, ". . . one of the purposes of this Act being to encourage and promote the improvement of a general

system of roads leading from cities, towns and rail- way stations into the adjacent farming communities."^* This specific language was eliminated while

the bill was under consideration in Congress. Instead,

the Secretary of Agriculture was given the power to review and approve State proposals, including road

types and standards, subject to the limitation that

approved projects should be "substantial in character."

The poorer States of the South and West regarded

this limitation with considerable apprehension, fearing that the Secretary might require macadam, concrete or other high types of surfacing for Federal

approval. This apprehension may have been reinforced by the fact that the first Federal-aid project

approved was a 20-foot concrete road in California.

To allay this widespread fear, Secretary Houston, in

February 1917, issued a specific statement to the

public

'This department, which is charged with the administration of the Federal Aid Road Act, has placed absolutely no restrictions, either direct or implied, upon the kinds of highways to be constructed. States may submit

for approval any kind of road, even an earth road, and

approval will be given if the construction be substantial

in character, suitable for traffic needs, and meets the terms of the Federal act. To give State legi.slators and

highway officials the impression that this department

favors only costly types of road or discriminates in favor

of any particular material, results not only in spreading

misinformation, but in placing barriers in the way of States which wish to avail themselves of Federal aid in road construction.' "•

This announcement apparently had the desired

effect. As of January 1918, 80 percent of the 2,849

miles submitted for Federal -aid approval were for

gravel, sand-clay or graded earth roads.

87
A caution sign to drivers to preserve

the low type State highway.

The Federal-aid regulations of 1916 contained one

rather unusual provision

:

Unless otherwise specifically stipulated in the project

agreement, bridges, viaducts and under-passes shall have

clear veidth of roadway of not less than 16 feet, and

clear head room of not less than 14 feet for a width of

8 feet at the center.* This was one of the few occasions on which the

Federal Government chose to set standards for roads.

In the years following, the Government let the States

set standards by agreement among themselves through

the American Association of State Highway Officials and then made adherence to these standards a condition for receiving Federal aid. Thus, strictly speaking, there have never been "national standards" for

roads in the United States, such as were established

by the governments of France and other European

countries.

The Road Census of 1914

The Office of Public Road Inquiries made the first national road inventory in 1904, canvassing not only

road mileage, but also revenues and expenditures for

construction and maintenance. This information,

such as it was, was obtained entirely by correspondence, and before the inventory was over, some 60,000

printed forms and letters were sent out and received

by the OPRI. The information was far from complete, and some was of questionable accuracy. In some instances, the county road officials refused to supply the information unless paid for their services,

and in such cases, it became necessary to secure the

information through postmasters, attorneys, physicians or other private citizens. The roads in many counties and townships have never been measured, surveyed or recorded, and in such cases

it became necessary to secure an estimate of the mileage

from persons best informed on this subject in the counties. In some instances no permanent records appeared

to have been kept of collections or expenditures of road

funds, and in others the records are kept in such manner

as to confuse rather than enlighten one in search of information."

Tollgate in Ambrose County near Lynchburg, Ya. The sign warns that there is a fine o/ $10. for exceeding the speed limit of 6 m.p.h.
In 1909, the OPR made another inventory by mail,

canvassing only the mileage of various types of road

surfaces.

By 1914, well over half of the States had highway

departments, and Page persuaded these departments

to help with the road census by supplying "collaborators" who would collect the information in their States

and forward it to OPR. In those States that did not

supply collaborators, the OPR collected the information directly from the local authorities, or from local and State road associations, chambers of commerce,

automobile clubs, postmasters and private citizens. Apparently, in these States the quality of recordkeeping had improved but little since 1904

Highway accounting systems and methods, especially

in the local subdivisions of States, are, in general, far from satisfactory. In many places the records were

found to be so indefinite or so incomplete that the most

careful investigation failed to determine even the bare

total of what funds had been expended on roads and

bridges during the previous years. At times the memory

of some official or employee seemed a better guide than

the permanent existing records. Lack of definite data and records by the local subdivisions is even more pronounced as to road mileage.

Hundreds of instances were discovered where the local

officials could give no more than a rough estimate, as maps had not been prepared or measurement of the roads been made."

Despite these shortcomings, the census of 1914,

taken as a whole, was the most accurate and comprehensive inventory of American roads and road fi- nances made up to that time. The most striking

finding was an enormous increase in the total annual

expenditures on roads and bridges, from $79.62 million in 1904 to $240.26 million in 1914, a large part of

which was derived from the sale of bonds.*

The mileage summary showed that the country's

network of rural roads, that is, those outside incorporated cities and towns, had grown from 2,151,379

miles in 1904 to 2,445,760 miles in 1914. Roads sur- faced with sand-clay, gravel, macadam or substances

other than plain dirt had increased from 153,530

miles in 1904 to 257,291 miles in 1914 but were still only 10.5 percent of the total mileage. Of the sur- faced mileage, 32,180 miles, or 12.5 percent, were of

dust-free types, such as bituminous macadam, brick

or concrete. These, with a few thousand more miles

added in 1915 and 1916, would soon be put to the

supreme test of Avartime traffic.

* About $21.0 million of road and bridge bonds had been

issued in the 10 years preceding 1904 in five States.'' In

1914, the total of State and local bridge and road bonds out- standing was $344.76 million, distributed through 42 States. Of this amount, $115.32 million were State bonds issued by

New Yorlc ($65 million) and 10 other States."

REFERENCES

*A. Machen, Rural Free Delivery of Mails, Proceedings,

North Cabolina Good Roads Convention, Bulletin No. 24

(Office of Public Road Inquiries, Washington, D.C., 1903)

p. 51.

' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1906, p. 23.

' M. Dodge, Our National Policy, Proceedings, National

Good Roads Con\-ention Held At St. Louis, Mo., Bulletin No. 26 (Office of Public Road Inquiries, Washington, D.C., 1903) p. 20.

* Address by Hon. Wm. P. Borland, Proceedings, Third

American Road Congress, (American Highway Association,

Washington, D.C., 1914) p. 76. '64 Cong. Rec. 1353 (1916).

'Joint Report of The Progress of Post Road Improvement, H. Doc. 204, 63d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 4, 5.

' Id., pp. 19, 20. "Id., p. 13. •a. Rose, Historic American Highways—Public Roads of The Past (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1953) p. 109. "D. Shackleford, Federal Road Legislation, Proceedings,

Third American Road Congress (American Highway Association, Washington, D.C., 1914) pp. 59, 60. " Proceedings, Foltith American Road Congress (Ameri- can Highway Association, Washington, D.C, 1915) pp. 26, 27.

"Federal Aid To Good Roads, H. Doc. 1510, 63d Cong., 3d

Sess., pp. 15-17. " D. Shacklefoed, supra, note 10, p. 63. "Id., pp. 56, 57. " H. Doc, supra, note 12, p. 15. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1915, p. 1. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1917, p. 3. ''H. R. 7617, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 6, 1916. "J. Penntbacker & L. BoYKiN, Federal Aid to Highioays,

Yearbook of The Department of Agriculture, 1917 (GPO,

Washington, D.C, 1918) p. 135.

'° U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rules and Regulations OF The Secretary of Agriculture For Carrying Out

The Federal Aid Road Act, Circular No. 65 (GPO, Washington, D.C, 1916) p. 10. ''M. Eldridge, Public-Road Mileage, Revenues and Expenditures In The United States In 1904, Bulletin No. 32

(Office of Public Roads, Washington, D.C, 1907) p. 7. " Office of Public Roads and Rural Engineering, Public

Road Mileage and RE^'ENUES In The United States, 1914

A Summary, Bulletin No. 390 (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,

Washington, D.C, 1917) p. 2. " M. Eldridge, supra, note 21, p. 18. " OPRRE, supra, note 22, pp. 3, 8.

89
Planning

fl HiQhuuQy

/y/tem

The Clouds of War

The United States was only slightly prepared for

hostilities when war was declared against Germany

April 6, 1917. The total strength of the Army was

less than 200,000 men, and most of these were recent enlistments in the early stages of training. Perhaps

half a dozen regiments stationed in the Canal Zone

and on the Mexican border were at war strength; the

rest of the Regular Army was scattered all over the

country in battalion-sized garrisons. Some industries

had tooled up to produce munitions for the Allies, and

America was making large shipments of food to Europe; but these were only token efforts compared

to those that would be required to fight a full-scale war.Within a week of the Declaration of War, President

Wilson created the Council of National Defense, consisting of the Secretaries of War, the Navy, Agriculture, the Interior, Commerce, and Labor, along with an unpaid Advisory Council of industrialists, labor

leaders, financiers, and prominent citizens from all walks of life. Boards and committees functioning

under the authority of the National Council eventually

supervised every aspect of the war effort, including

regulation of the national economy.

On May 17, 1917, Congress imposed Selective

Service, and the United States set out to build an army of a million men. This national Army was to

be trained in 16 huge cantonments, each as large as a good-sized city, complete with railroad tracks and

terminals, sewers, waterworks, streets, roads, and

housing for 22,000 men. First, however, it was neces- sary to train the officers who would train the men;

and for this job the Army built 12 officer training

camps at existing military posts. All of this construction went on at such a pace that the 12 officer training camps and 9 of the 16 cantonments were

completed by June 14, 1917—just 30 days after the

program was started.^ A drastic industrial expansion paralleled the military mobilization. Steel mills were expanded. The

capacity of portland cement mills was increased to meet the spiraling demand triggered by an immense

construction program. Brand new shipyards were

built in eastern ports to build steel and concrete ships

to replace the dozens sunk each month by German

U-boats; and at Sparrows Point, Maryland, Bethlehem Steel built a city to house its ship5'ard workers,

complete with sewerage, water, and streets. Breakdown of a Lopsided Transportation System

The railroads were as unprepared for war as the

rest of the country—perhaps more so. For a decade

they had been under effective Government regulation,

and to preserve competition they had been prohibited

from pooling freight or from merging parallel competing lines, even where such mergers would have

90
resulted in more efficient systems. The years 1913

and 1914 were a period of sluggish business activity

during which the earnings of the railroads had been

low and their dividends small. They had had diffi- culty borrowing money for equipment and improvement of terminals, and some authorities estimated

that the American railroads as a whole were 5,000

locomotives short of the number needed to handle

traffic in normal times, especially during the fall harvest.

At the low point of the 1914 recession, the railroads

had about 400,000 idle cars. In 1915 traffic began to pick up under the stimulation of war orders from the

Allies, and by September 1916, cars were beginning

to be scarce. ^^Hien the United States entered the war, there was a nationwide shortage of about 148,000

cars.^ Foreseeing trouble ahead, the railway executives

met in Washington on April 11, 1917, and "voluntarily agreed to merge their 'individual and competitive

activities to produce a maximum of national trans- portation efficiency.' " ^ They created the Railroads'

War Board, a committee of five top executives, to coordinate the operations of the mainline railroads

and draw up rules for conservation of motive power,

joint use of terminals, and the use of embargoes

against shipments to areas already choked with loaded

cars. The board eliminated unnecessary or competing

passenger trains and luxury services. They organized

an educational campaign among shippers to promote

better utilization of cars* and quicker loading and

unloading. By September 1917, these efforts had re- duced the car shortage to about 34,000 cars, and the

railroads had moved 16 percent more freight than in

the corresponding period of 1916, which itself had

been a record year. Despite the efforts of the Railroads' War Board,

the transportation picture became darker as the fall harvest of 1917 approached, and creeping paralysis

began to spread over the railroad system. Coastal

ships that normally carried coal from Chesapeake

Bay ports to New England were diverted to trans- Atlantic service, throwing an extra load on the rails. Ancient locomotives that had been continued in service far beyond their normal lifespan began to break

down. Traditionally underpaid track labor left the

railroads for the warplants, and track maintenance

declined to a dangerous level. However, the major

bottlenecks appeared at the terminals, which for

dense traffic lines, fixed the ultimate limit of the traffic that could be handled. In the words of one executive,

"Its terminals are the heart of a transportation sys- tem. If the terminals are inadequate to handle the

traffic currently, then congestion follows, traffic is set

* It was estimated that in 1916 an average carload of less- tlian-carload package freight was only 7 tons, whereas the capacity of a properly loaded car was several times that amount.^

The importance of streets and highways in shipping goods was

demonstrated during the war as increasing numbers of trucks carried commercial or military supplies. Below, army trucks wait for a load of tires.

91
The poor loading of railroad cars added to the general inability of the railroad system to handle

all the transportation needs of the icar years.

off between terminals, the arteries become clogged,

and the system fails to perform its functions properly." ^ The terminal tieups came about from a variety of

causes. Due to shortage of ships, export freight ac- cumulated in the North Atlantic terminals. Contractors for cantonments and shipyards ordered

materials forwarded far in advance of their ability to receive and unload them. (At one time over 5,000

carloads of wooden piling were tied up in the Hog

Island shipyard waiting to be unloaded.) Feverish

demand for materials to keep industry going led

manufacturers to purchase raw materials from unusual markets in excessive quantities, Avith the result

that arrivals were badly bunched and unloading was

slow and difficult. In many terminals antiquated business procedures were a principal cause of congestion. Older cities such as New York had an inadequate number of team

tracks where freight could be unloaded directly from

the cars into drays and trucks. Most freight con- signed to lower Manhattan, even in carload lots, was

unloaded at freight depots and stored there until

picked up by the consignee, who was notified by mail

of the shipment's arrival. Due to congestion in the

mails, the notice might take 3 days to reach the consignee who then had 48 hours in which to pick up

the goods.

Indescribable traffic congestion prevailed around

the freight houses. Some trucks stood in line for

hours or even days to pick up a few boxes of freight.

One count at a Manhattan depot showed 100 drays

standing in line at 7 a.m. waiting for loads. Unloading from the freight cars was often haphazard, so that a truck driver might have difficulty finding his

consignment and then even more trouble getting it to the loading dock.

With freight piling up in the stations, the railroads

set off incoming cars in the freight yards, and when

these also filled up, on any available empty siding at small towns approaching the city. As these, too, be- came filled, the congestion spread outward as much

as 30 or, in extreme cases, 60 miles from the city.

Eventually, the railroads were forced to embargo

further shipments to that city until some of the con- gestion cleared up. Toward the end of the war the railroads, then

under Government operation, cleared up much of the

terminal congestion by instituting "store-door delivery." Under this system, cities were divided into

zones. Freight consigned to addresses in these zones was unloaded from the cars into specified areas on the

loading docks, where it was picked up by registered

trucks and delivered direct to the consignee without

prior notice. If the consignee was not ready to accept

the shipment, it was taken immediately to a public

warehouse and stored at the consignee's expense. By

eliminating the free storage at the depot, this system

broke the bottleneck in a few weeks. Store-door delivery also reduced the enormously inefficient waste

of trucks and labor waiting for loads at the freight

stations.

Unable to get long-haul freight into the cities, the

railroads refused to accept short-haul shipments such

as milk and produce from the surrounding country,

and the food distribution system began to suffer. A

few farmers Avho OAvned trucks began to drive them

into the city Avith loads of A^egetables instead of to the nearest railroad station. At the other end, wholesalers and even retailers began to send their own trucks

out into the country for loads of produce. The cost per mile was more than for rail shipment, but the

delay was less and terminal costs Avere eliminated at both ends, so they at least broke even on the business.

Birth of the Trucking Industry

Practically eA^erj'' large business in the cities had a few trucks for drayage and deliA'eries, and by 1917

most of these Avere poAver driA^en.* "^^Hien the city

terminals began to choke up. some consignees had

their shipments sent to outlying towns and sent their

trucks there to receive them, at the same time carrying outgoing shipments. Soon, himdreds of trucks were being used in this way, and the radius of operation was constantly increasing.

Alcron, Ohio, tied up with a package freight embargo, broke the embargo by truck hauls to 14 out- lying shipping points within a radius of 20 miles.

A New York drug firm started making weekly deliA'eries to Boston in its own trucks. Cleveland manu-

* In 1917 there were 391,000 motor trucks registered in the United States, most of them used in the cities.

92
facturers bought motor trucks and started a motor

freight service to bring castings from foundries 20 to 30 miles away. An Akron tire manufacturer found it feasible to deliver to Detroit and Boston by truck,

and a new household moving business began operating between Chicago and Milwaukee. Some shippers

used trucks for the first part of a haul that would

have required two rail carriers, avoiding the transfer

between railroads. In June 1917, nine new trucks were driven from Hartford, Wisconsin, to Baltimore

1,200 miles—under their own power because the manufacturer couldn't get railroad cars; and in Connecticut, when the railroads embargoed certain classes of

freight, truck transport made it possible to keep

factories open.^

By August 1917, car shortages and embargoes had

diverted so much traffic to trucks that the highways

began to show signs of disti-ess. Pennsylvania, New

York, Xew Jersey, and Xew England had fairly good

networks of bituminous macadam roads; but these were of light construction, seldom more than 7 or 8 inches thick, and also were in many places only 14 to 16 feet wide. At this time all trucks ran on solid

rubber tires, and since there were no laws against

overloading, many were loaded to the full capacity

of their engines. "Within a feAv months maintenance

costs began to soar, as the thin road crusts wore out

and broke through. The States and counties were

unable to get railroad cars to haul stone and bituminous material, and they increased over-the-road

hauling with their own trucks, throwing a further

load on the highways. The Connecticut Legislature

made an emergency appropriation of $6.5 million just

to keep the main highways passable for traffic. Massachusetts spent $2 million on maintenance of

State highways alone and $1.25 million for resurfacing and strengthening trunk routes. Other States were faced with similar huge expenditures at a time

of rapidly escalating costs and labor shortage.

The Plight of the Highway Contractors The large highway bond issues of 1915 and 1916,

plus the prospect of sizable road expenditures under

the 1916 Federal Aid Road Act, led many experienced

and inexperienced contractors into the road business.

With the outbreak of war, they immediately began

to encounter difficulties in getting materials, especially

steel, and in retaining labor on the job. Within a few months material costs advanced 20 to 30 percent

and wages of common labor went up to $2.50 and

even $3.00 per day. Railroad car shortages made

deliveries of stone and asphalt uncertain. Large

numbers of contractors were forced out of business,

and others, having completed their contracts, refused

to bid for new work.

The virtual collapse of the highway construction

industry created a desperate situation for States and

counties struggling to keep the roads open in the face

of ever-increasing numbers of heavy trucks and devastating losses of personnel to war industry and the

Army. What made the job particularly heartbreaking was the sentiment openly expressed in some seg- ments of the war effort hierarchy that roadbuilding was nonessential work that should be discontinued

for the duration of the emergency.

As the summer of 1917 advanced, a coal famine

began to develop in the industrial eastern States be- cause of the shortage of railway cars. Production of

munitions was beginning to be affected when the

Priority Board of the Council of National Defense

issued Priority Order No. 2, to be effective November

1, 1917, prohibiting the use of open top cars other

than flat cars for shipping supplies, other than coal,

for construction, maintenance and repair of public

and private highways, streets, and sidewalks or for

theaters and other places of amusement.'' This pe- remptory order, issued without public hearings or other advance warning, struck the States "like a bolt

from the blue," at a particularly bad time. It caught

them with many miles of new road graded but not

surfaced with winter approaching. Despite the fact

that trucking had already released thousands of cars for war purposes and the roads in the vicinity of

cantonments and ports of embarkation were being

pounded to pieces by truck traffic, the Priority Board

refused to recede from its position, and road work

At the turn of the 20th century, the Hicks Company in Rockville,

Md., loas making local deliveries of dry goods. This was a forerunner of the scene on a much larger scale during World

War I ivhcn local deliveries for all kinds of goods became

a demand with the advent of motorized delivery trucks.

93
state highway officials on inspection tour of 1917 construction project in Michigan. Such projects were soon forced to stop when involvement

in the war caused shortage of materials and manpower.

Truck assembly increased

to meet the war needs.

and road materials production that was dependent on

rail transportation ground to a stop.

As a direct result of the widespread protests over

Priority Order No. 2, the National Council set up a Highway Transport Committee in Washington to represent the highway and highway transport interests, and appointed Roy D. Chapin, President of the

Hudson Motor Company, as chairman. This Committee began its work November 29, 1917.

The National Military Truck Routes

The experience of the Allies had shown that enor- mous numbers of trucks would be needed in France

to support military operations. The War Production

Board decided to standardize truck designs to simplify parts supply and increase production, and they

induced the motor industry to design two vehicles on which to concentrate production for the duration of

the war. Class A trucks were to have a capacity of

3 tons and a speed of 14 miles per hour, while Class B

trucks would carry 5 tons at 12 miles per hour. The

Army placed an order for 30,000 of these trucks in

September 1917.

Several months before the Highway Transport

Committee was organized, Chapin advanced the idea

that trucks destined for France could be driven from

94
A caravan of trucks from Detroit headed for eastern seaports and the war.

the factories to the ports of embarkation, and he obtained the Army's approval for an experimental convoy. On November 22, 1917, a trail-blazing party

consisting of representatives of the Ohio Highway

Department, the Army, the Lincoln Highway Association, and the OPRRE left Toledo enroute to the

East Coast. The route they selected crossed Ohio via

Toledo and Akron to East Palestine, where the Pennsylvania Highway Department picked it up, continuing on to Pittsburgh and across the Allegheny

Mountains to Harrisburg, Lancaster, and Philadelphia. This became the main military truck route. Later, other truck routes were designated by Ohio,

West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland over the

Old National Road, and by Ohio, Pennsylvania, and

New York via Cleveland, Erie, Buffalo, and Albany

to New York City.

In December the Quartermaster General announced

that, in order to relieve the squeeze on railroad cars, the trucks would be driven overland to the Atlantic

Coast under their own power.^ The first Army truck

convoy left Toledo early in December 1917, at the

beginning of one of the most severe winters in recent U.S. history. Three weeks later, on January 3, 1918,

29 of the 30 vehicles that began the trip rolled into

Baltimore.® This grueling trip was testimony to the

durability of the war-model trucks and the endurance

of the drivers, but most of all, to the superb mainte- nance efforts of the Pennsylvania Highwa}' Department, which, as a result of careful preplanning, had

kept the road open over the Alleghenies in the face of

blizzards that left drifts 3 to 6 feet deep. In some

places the crews worked around the clock to keep the

road open. Teams and drags broke a track through

the drifts, followed by horsedrawn road machines and

homemade plows mounted on trucks.^" Altogether,

7 trucks and plows, 22 road machines, 20 drags, 105

teams, 3 tractors, and 200 men were thrown into this

massive and successful maintenance effort.^^ Military vehicles were not the only ones to use the

truck roads. Because they were kept free of snow

throughout the winter, they attracted large numbers

of private trucks and automobiles. In Ohio this traffic was particularly heavy

With the congested condition of the railroads and their

inability to promptly handle supplies that were needed

in almost every community, it became necessary after opening up main arteries for travel to open up the lateral

MeConnellsburg, Pa., and other similar towns and villages

ivitiiessed the industrial might of the Nation as caravans of trucks rolled through on the way "over there."

roads in order to reach the possible outlet to and from

markets and villages. The amount of traffic these highways must sustain is apparent. The truck traffic was

practically constant with all additional vehicles conceiv- able using many of the roads . . . Not only did truck and

automobile traffic greatly increase, but burdens were

placed upon them clearly in excess of what any ordinary

road would be expected to carry. This great increase in

traffic was, of necessity, confined largely to such roads

as had been prepared by the removal of snow drifts, etc." In the months following the first convoy, the Army

sent the remaining 30,000 trucks east via the truck

routes, each loaded with 3 tons or more of spare parts

and munitions. This operation released 17,250 rail- road cars for other work, but the cost per ton-mile was high, even without considering the efforts of the

States and counties to keep the roads open. From a

historical vieAvpoint, the main accomplishment of the

95
Snowplotcs played an important

role in keeping the milita7-y truck

routes open.

Trucks were steadily being built for war duty, but highway offlcials were hard pressed to get funds or materials to maintain the roads damaged by the trucks.

truck routes was to demonstrate that it was possible

to keep long stretches of highway open to traffic through a severe winter and that dependable longdistance interstate travel on the highways was desirable and even necessary.

The Highway Departments Call for a National War

Policy for Roads

When the annual meeting of the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) opened at Richmond, Virginia, December 4, 1917, the problem

uppermost in the minds of the delegates was how to carry on and keep the roads open in the face of what

many of them perceived to be a hostile policy by the

Government toward highway transportation. Priority Order Xo. 2 was only the latest action hampering

their efforts. The War Industries Board had as- sumed control over all supplies of cement, brick, steel,

stone, and gravel and was giving the highest priorities for these materials to defense installations and

the railroads. Tlie Fuel Administration controlled

the supply of fuel oil, and to make more fuel available, it restricted the production of asphalt. No bond

issues exceeding $100,000 could be made without the

assent of the Capital Issues Committee, a war organization that was particularly hostile to highways.

Clearing a project through these war agencies was a matter of weeks and even months since there was very

little cooperation between them.

To make things easier for the Government, AA.SHO

called upon all the States to designate the essential war roads and estimate the amounts of materials and

rail transportation that would be needed for their

construction and maintenance during the coming year. These programs would then clear through the Executive Committee of AASHO and in due course be

presented to the Priority Board and to the Highway

Transport Committee of the National Council, of

which Director Page of the OPRRE was a member."

The delegates also passed a resolution,

. . . That the American Association of State Highway

Officials request the United States Government to formulate and promulgate, as soon as possible, a definite policy for road and street construction and maintenance, and

that it is requested that said policy contain a statement

that freight ears shall be furnished next spring for the transportation of tlie necessary materials for the con- struction and maintenance of streets and roads of eco- nomic or military value." There was a note of urgency in tliis resolution, for

the State officials knew that the spring breakup was

96
only a few months away. Throughout the winter the

roads, once cleared of snow, could carry hea^'y trucks

because they were frozen solid, but every highway

engineer and maintenance superintendent knew what

could be expected after the spring thaw began.

The Department of Agriculture immediately en- dorsed the AASHO plan and asked all States to submit their priority programs as soon as possible.

Government Seizure of the Railroads

To avert complete paralysis, the Government seized

all the mainline steam railroads on December 26, 1917,

and set up a Federal Railroad Administration to operate them. This was not so much a reflection on

the work of the Railroads' War Board as an admission that only a Government agency could suspend

the operation of the antitrust laws and the onerous

regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission,

designed to foster competition, and force tlie various war agencies to resolve their conflicting demands for

transportation. "The government can ignore the anti- trust laws, force the various war-supply departments

to accept what transportation is given tliem, eliminate

the problems of credit and capital for future construction, and settle beyond dispute the demands of

labor." «

The Railroad Administration organized the seized

lines into three huge systems—the Eastern Railroads,

Southern Railroads, and Western Railroads, pooling

equipment and terminals. Since the Government now

had direct control over all railroad cars, the Priority

Board suspended the operation of Priority Order No.

2, and on February 6, 1918, Director General of Railroads McAdoo assured AASHO that "The United

States Railroad Administration will cooperate with

the Secretary of Agriculture by transporting materials for construction of national highways designated by it as a military or economic necessity, when

the equipment is available and not needed to move

supplies for the army, navy, shipping board, or other

governmental activities." *'"'

The Quagmires of Spring

In 1917 very few States had load limit laws to protect their highways. Michigan had just passed a law requiring reduced loads during the spring thaw.

A 1913 Pennsylvania law permitted gross vehicle

loads of 24,000 pounds, not to exceed 750 pounds per

inch width of tire, and a few eastern States had

similar laws. But these laws were not enforced

strictly and apparently not at all against military

vehicles. Prophetically, the Engineering NewsRecord warned of the coming debacle and urged

engineering societies and the press to prepare the

public for it: "The universal cry for a more complete

use of the roads in order to relieve the railroads of

their abnormal burdens will probably be utilized as an excuse to evade or even violate intentionally not

only statute law [on vehicle loading], but the law of

reason." ^^ With the arrival of spring, the predicted destruction occurred on an unprecedented scale. In Delaware

a single truck with a gross load of 11 tons broke up a

light macadam road from end to end in one trip.

In New York bituminous macadam roads that had

given good service for 5 to 10 years broke up and

became impassable under truck traffic averaging only

30 heavy vehicles per day. Roads that cost $11,000

This Fairfax County, Va., road, macadam surfaced with bituminous materials, shows the

effect of truck trafflc in 1918.

97
per mile to build in 1912 were destroyed so completely

that the State estimated it would cost $32,000 per

mile to repair them at inflated 1918 costs. In New

Jersey the "heavy truck would break through the

crust, and immediately upon being extricated would

be followed by others, until there was formed a

veritable quagmire." ^^ Supposedly higher types of pavement, such as cement concrete and brick on concrete bases, also

failed, principally because the extremely thin 4-inch

and 5 -inch slabs failed to bridge the soft spots in the

subgrade. However, in Wayne County, Michigan,

which for a number of years had been using progressively thicker concrete pavements, 8- and 9-inch slabs

stood up remarkably well under some of the heaviest

trucking in the Nation.

In normal times the States and counties would have

closed their roads to save them from destruction, but

in time of war this was unthinkable. It was also

impracticable to force the truckers to lighten their

loads enough to provide any real relief. The highway

departments handled the emergency as best they could.

Those that were able to get railroad cars hauled in

immense quantities of stone and gravel. Others, such

as Massachusetts, used nearby supplies of poor quality

gravel and soft stone rather than wait for railroad

cars to haul in better materials

:

While the roads would not wear as long, we felt that

in these times as this work could be done without closing

them so they could still be used by the traffic, and as four carloads of bitumen would be sufficient to construct a mile of road which would require 40 carloads of cement

or from 70 to 80 carloads of imported stone or gravel, that this would save rail shipments and thereby help the general traffic situation." In this emergency the States, despite the AASHO

priority road program, were still having difficulties getting railroad cars, asphalt and road materials for

maintenance. To get things moving faster, the Secretary of Agriculture, at Director Page's suggestion,

invited the Army, the War Production Board, the

Fuel Administration, the Railroad Administration,

and the Capital Issues Committee to name representatives to meet with Page in a council to coordinate the

Government's highway activities. At its first meeting

June 8, 1918, this United States Highway Council

elected Mr. Page as chairman, and thereafter until it dissolved on November 13, 1918, the Council passed on over 7,300 applications for highway financing,

railway cars or materials. By acting as a clearinghouse for the industry, the Council drastically shortened the time required for project approvals,

approving 95 percent of the asphalt applied for, 50

percent of the crushed stone, and 45 percent of the

open top cars, but only 12 percent of the steel and 15

percent of the highway financing.^"

With so much destruction occurring in such a short

time, primarily as a result of national defense needs,

it was inevitable that there should be appeals to Congress to pay for the damage. Representative John G.

Cooper of Ohio introduced a bill "to aid the States

in the maintenance, repair, and reconstruction of

roads subjected to extraordinary wear by reason of

the use of such roads by the Government of the United

States." This bill never emerged from committee,

probably because its essential purpose was accomplished by other legislation.

Amazing Growth of Truck Transportation

The production of trucks was not greatly restricted

during the war, and in fact was encouraged. Throughout 1918 the truck factories turned out about 19,000

units per month, and at the end of 1918 there were

about 525,000 nonmilitary trucks of all sizes registered

in the United States. This was an increase of 199,000 over 1917."

In spite of war restrictions on fuel and the generally poor condition of the roads, for-hire trucking

thrived in an atmosphere unclouded by Government

regulation and surcharged by intense competition.

The heavy demand for trucking was not due solely to the failure of the railroads and their embargoes

on short-haul package freight. Shippers were becoming aware that for short hauls, trucks could greatly

shorten delivery time. This was dramatically illus- trated early in the war when a disastrous fire oc- curred in Salem, Massachusetts. Using trucks to bring tents to shelter the victims, the National Guard

was able to complete the trip from Framingham, 42

miles away, in only 3 hours. Due mostly to terminal

delays, this shipment would have taken 2 days by

rail.^^ Trucking also saved drayage charges at both ends

of the shipment, and these, even in normal times, were

often more than the railroad freight charges. Also,

shippers soon found that boxing and crating could

often be omitted without increasing breakage. Thus,

although the cost of truck hauling was 12 to 25 cents per ton-mile, this was no greater than the total doorto-door cost of rail shipment for short haul trips.*

Despite the intense and unregulated competition, a number of reliable motor carriers established regular

service between the principal cities. Beginning in

November 1917, the Beam Fletcher Corporation operated twenty-two 5-ton White trucks between Philadelphia and New York carrying 400 tons per day.^'

Early in 1918 the Liberty Highway Company began

a motor express business between Toledo and Detroit

with daily runs of a 5-ton, four-wheel-drive Walter

truck pulling three 5-ton trailers. The running time was 71/^ to 9 hours one way, depending on the weather

and the condition of a 12-mile stretch of unsurfaced

dirt road on the main route between these cities. (If

the road was bad, the driver might have to pull his

trailers through the 12-mile gap one at a time.)^®

In Maryland, the Farmers' Cooperative Association

of Harford County obtained a franchise to operate a motor express on the Baltimore-Bel Air Road to haul

milk and produce to Baltimore, returning with empty

milk cans and package express for the farmers.^'

And in Alabama the Civic Association of Birmingham averted a coal famine by contracting with the

Jenkins Motor Company to haul 200 tons of coal per

day direct from the mines to consumers.^®

* In normal times the terminal charges for rail freight were 15 to 45 cents per ton, depending on the commodity and

the terminal. Once loaded on cars, mainline railroads could haul freight for only 2% mills per ton-mile, and even lowtraffic branch lines could haul for 2 or 3 cents per ton-mile. In 1916, the Pennsylvania Railroad's average system operating cost was 4.3 mills per ton-mile, including terminal

charges." Railroad men estimated that an average railroad car traveled about 25 miles per day, spending 12 hours in terminals for every hour of movement between terminals."

98
Trucks also played an impoi'tant role in civilian life by making short haul runs faster and cheaper than could the overburdened trains.

Even greater tonnages, in the aggregate, were

hauled by business and industry in company-owned

vehicles. In 1917 and 1918, the Goodyear Tire and

Rubber Company ran its trucks on schedule from

Akron to Chicago and even Boston, carrying relief drivers and running day and night. By the spring

of 1918, the "N^Tiite Motor Company of Cleveland was

sending most of its new trucks to the East under their

own power over the "Liberty Highway," a route through central New York which the White Company

drivers had pioneered to avoid the massive breakups

on the Army truck routes. After 1 year of truck

deliveries, the Otis Elevator Company found that it had saved $100,000 in the cost of boxing and crating

for truck shipments as compared to rail shipment, as well as a great deal of paper work. "\'\niere 6 days to

6 weeks had been required for rail delivery, the com- pany trucks needed only 24 hours and delivered the

goods in better condition. Because of the shorter delivery time, less capital was tied up in goods in

transit.^^ These and similar experiences by hundreds of other

shippers permanently changed the shipping habits of

American industry. In a matter of a few months,

the railroads lost millions of tons of freight business

by default—business they were destined never to

recover.

Fresh Vegetables by Mail

The Post Office Department began rural mail delivery by automobile in 1915, and by 1917 a considerable number of the 43,562 rural routes were motorized,

but of these, only 288 emanated from the 50 largest

cities.* ^° In July 1916, Congress authorized the Postmaster

General to conduct experiments in three or more communities to determine "the most practical means of

extending the operations of the parcel post in the

direction of promoting the marketing of farm products and furthering direct transactions between producers and consumers." ^^ By the time the Government established the first experimental routes, war had been declared, and the

pinch on railroad cars for short-haul shipments was

already being felt. Although the service was not

cheap (14 cent per pound for hauls averaging 50

* The dispatch of rural mail by automobile began July 1, 1915, at Quarryville, Pennsylvania. The vehicles were re- quired to be of at least 80 cubic feet capacity and able to carry 800 pounds of mail." In 1915 carriers sei-ving motor

veliicle routes that were at least 50 miles long, 6 days per week, received $1,800 per year. Carriers .serving horsedrawn

vehicle routes at least 24 miles long received $1,200 per year. All carriers were required to furnish their own transportation."
miles), it was enthusiastically received by farmers

along the routes and widely i^raised in the press. Herbert Hoover, the Federal Food Administrator,

hailed the service as a means for saving food, 50

percent of which was rotting in the field for lack of

transportation. Others pointed out that rural express

would relieve draft animals from transportation duty,

releasing land devoted to growing animal fodder for

the raising of human food. Still others envisioned

public food markets in the cities, supplied direct from

the fields by parcel post. And, of course, the service

would enable farmers to devote more time to raising

food and less time to taking it to market.^*

The Government established eight routes, mostly

in the Washington-Baltimore-Philadelphia area, and

operated them with 19 Government-owned 1-ton

trucks. The Department kept precise records of all direct and indirect expenses, including Department

overhead and depreciation on the vehicles. For the

6 months ending May 31, 1918, the Postmaster General reported to Congress that only one route, between

Philadelphia and Atlantic City, had lost money and

that the operation as a whole had grossed $152,217 in

6 months against total expenses of $29,100, for net earnings of $123,118.^5

Projecting these enormous profits on a theoretical

nationwide rural express network of 10,000 miles, the

Postmaster General estimated gross revenues of $80

million per year, with a surplus of about $40 million

per year above all operating and Departmental expenses. This surplus, he recommended, might well

be spent to improve the roads of the network to a high standard to reduce vehicle operating costs and

ensure reliable daily service. Such roads should be

of concrete or brick, at least 16 feet wide and 9 inches

thick, and would cost about $20,000 per mile, or $200

million for the network.^^

Earlier in the 2d session of the 65th Congress,

Senator Claude A. Swanson of Virginia had introduced a bill that would permit the Postmaster General

to establish a Federal network of motor express routes and to devote one-half of the gross revenues from

these routes to improve them for motor truck operation. Despite the statistical support of the Postmaster

General's optimistic report, this bill failed in committee. Congress, instead, included an item of $300,000

in the Post OiRce appropriation for fiscal year 1919

to be used by the Postmaster General for experiments

in motor truck delivery in the vicinity of large cities

". . . to promote the conservation of food products and

to facilitate the collection and delivery thereof from

producer to consumer, and the delivery of articles

necessary in the production of such food products." ^''

This was July 1918. By the time the Postmaster

General came back to Congress with his next report,

the war had ended and conditions had radically

changed. Private enterprises such as the Farmers'

Cooperative Association of Harford County had

moved into the transportation vacuum the Government hoped to fill and were doing the job for much

less than the fourtli class mail rate. The motor route

service did not materially increase new postal business, and the service was made to show a profit only

by diverting fourtli class mail to the Department's

trucks that would otherwise have gone by train.^*

Post Roads Versus Through Roads

The first impact of the war on the Office of Public

Roads and Rural Engineering was a loss of men, some in key positions, who volunteered for military

service.* When the Secretary of War requested engi- neers to plan and supervise the building of roads for

the Army cantonments. Director Page assigned 18

experienced men to this work for periods of a year or more. Page also assigned engineers to map the Army

truck routes and channeled most of his laboratory's

efforts into war work.

Wliat personnel remained after these losses and as- signments were concentrated on the Federal-aid program. Although severely crippled by manpower

shortages, the States continued to submit Federal-aid

projects for approval throughout the war. By July

1918, the OPRRE had approved 572 projects, totaling

6,249 miles in length, estimated to cost $42.28 million,

of which $16.05 million was Federal aid. However,

only five projects, totaling 17.6 miles, had actually

been completed.

The Federal x\id Road Act provided that the Federal funds could be spent only in the construction of

"rural post roads," defined as "any public road over which the United States mails now are or may hereafter be transported, excluding every street and road

in a place having a population, as shown by the latest available Federal census, of two thousand five hundred or more, except that portion of any such street or road along which the houses average more than

two hundred feet apart." The Act also provided that

the Secretary of Agriculture and the State liighway

departments "shall agree upon the roads to be con- structed and the character and method of construction."

The Secretary, acting through the OPRRE, at the

outset of the program tried to eliminate haphazard

roadbuilding by asking each State to submit an overall plan or scheme showing where the State proposed

to spend its share of the 5-year Federal appropriation. This wise requirement forced the States that

did not already have established highway systems to begin classifying their highways and setting up sys- tems. This kind of planning and the organization

and strengthening of the several State highway departments were the principal accomplishments of the

first 2 years of the Federal-aid program.^^

Very early in the program the States began to have

difficulty scheduling improvements to their major

system roads that would also follow the rural post

routes. In keeping with good system planning, the

State trunkline roads were laid out along comparatively direct lines between county seats and major

cities. The post routes, on the other hand, meandered

through the country to enable the carriers to serve the greatest nmnber of patrons with the least travel. The Attorney General held that to prove the post

road requirement would "require the submission of

evidence to show that the mails are actually carried over the road proposed to be improved or that there

is a reasonable prospect that tliis will be done."

* Of 187 male employees on the rolls when wnv was de- clared, 52 or 28 percent had entered the military service by June 1918. When the war ended, 79 were in the service.

100
The OPRRE made as liberal an interpretation as possible and ruled that the direct route could be fol- lowed as long as it also substantially followed post

routes with gaps of onl}' a mile or two in length.

Yet even with this liberalized interpretation, some

of the western States found the post road clause an

impossible hurdle to clear. In most of them, the main

highways most in need of improvement ran through

sparselj' populated prairies, deserts, and mountains

where there was no prospect of rural post routes being

needed or established for decades. Nevada, a State

as large as all of New England, had only four rural

routes. The industrialized eastern States were also denied

the full benefits of Federal aid by the provision in

the Act limiting Federal participation to 50 percent

of the cost up to a maximum of $10,000 per mile.

Many of the eastern States were beginning to build

heavier and wider pavements and these, with wartime

inflation, were costing $40,000 to $50,000 per mile.

The States expressed their dissatisfaction with these

provisions of the Act at the Richmond meeting of

AASHO in December 1917, but the Administration,

preoccupied with conducting the war, was unwilling

to ask Congress for corrective legislation.

The Riff in the Good Roads Movement

The battle for Federal aid in the 64th Congress had

been a contest between the proponents of long-distance

improved highways and those who wanted only to get

the farmer out of the mud. Neither side was really

satisfied with the compromise embodied in the 1916

Federal Aid Road Act, and neither side approved

wholly of the OPRRE's efforts to administer the Act. The post road clause was the major concession in the

law for the local roads people, and the OPRRE very

obviously was sympathetic to the State highway departments' efforts to eliminate compliance with it as a requirement for Federal aid. The long-distance highway boosters regarded the

OPRRE's efforts to get the States to designate highway systems as inadequate to ever produce a national

road system. In a number of States the systems were

so extensive that it would take decades of Federal

aid at the most optimistic rate of appropriation to bring them up to an acceptable interstate standard.

And even with the benevolent intervention of the

OPRRE, it was difficult to get the States to coordinate their systems with their neighbor States. The

States were primarily interested in State systems, not

national systems.

Before the war was over, the national road advocates decided to cut loose from Federal aid and pres- sure Congress for a national system under Federal

control. They supported the Postmaster General's

motor express route proposal as a step in the right

direction. And in October 1918, Senator George E.

Chamberlain of Oregon introduced a bill "to provide

for taking over, improvement, relocation, construction, and maintenance of a system of National highways and State highways, designed to facilitate the

movement of troops, equipment, munitions, and supplies, and to promote the general welfare of the people

of the United States." " This bill was buried in the

Committee on Military Affairs, but it showed which

way some winds were blowing.

In October 1918, the influential Engineering NewsRecord, which had formerly favored Federal aid, came out for a national highway system, declaring

that the Federal-aid projects already approved by the

OPRRE were so scattered that there was no hope

that they could ever be connected into a workable

national system.''- The editor declared that "The

Federal road administration has too long been in a subordinate capacity, lost in a department—that of

Agriculture—whose main interests are foreign to road

work," and went on to recommend that an autonomous

commission similar to the Interstate Conunerce Commission be set up to build and operate national highways."

The Postwar Highway Drive Begins

With the end of the war in sight, practically all of

the States began preparations for a postwar road

program. The highway atmosphere in late 1918 was

entirely different from what it had been before the

wai'. In Pennsylvania, where a bond issue for State

highways had been defeated by 40,000 votes in 1913, an even bigger issue for $50 million carried by 180,000

votes in November 1918.** Illinois proposed a $60

million bond issue to pay for a carefully selected

4,800-mile system of trunk highways, and it carried

by a large majority.*^

In November 1918, Secretary of Agriculture Houston warned that the unexpended balances from the

1916 Federal-aid act would be inadequate to carry on

an effective postwar road program in view of the enormous damage the country's roads had sustained

during the war, and the need for more and stronger

roads. He recommended larger appropriations from

the Federal treasury.

The postwar road program was the main theme of

the Joint Highway Congress sponsored by the American Association of State Highway Officials and the

Highway Industries Association and scheduled to be

held at Chicago, December 11 and 12, 1918.

The Congress opened under a pall of sadness cast by the sudden death of Logan Waller Page, Director

of the Bureau of Public Roads,* and the foremost

highway engineer of the United States. Page had

died of a heart attack the night of December 9, 1918,

during a meeting of the executive committee of

AASHO, to the dismay of the State highway forces

who had been counting on him to lead the drive for an expanded postwar Federal-aid program. Page

had brought to the meeting a Federal-aid bill that

had been drafted by the Administration and had the

support of AASHO. It provided for re-wording the

post road clause of the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916,

for authorizing 50 percent Federal participation in

the cost of roads with no upper limit and for increasing appropriations by a total of $450 million over a

4-year period. Those favoring the continuation of

Federal aid planned to seek the endorsement of the

Joint Highway Congress for the Page bill.

* On July 1, 1918, the Office of Public Roads and Rural

Engineering had been elevated to the status of a bureau in the Department of Agriculture.

101
On the other side, the principal spokesman for national highways was Editor E. J. Mehren of the

Engineering News-Record. He outlined a plan for a

national highway system of 50,000 miles consisting

of five east-west routes and ten north-south routes,

which would include about 2 percent of all U.S. roads.

This system would give every State at least one through north-south route and one through east-west route and would cost about $1.25 billion. With congressional appropriations of $100 million per year, it would take 12i/^ years to complete. Mehren recom- mended that Congress set up a Federal Highway

Commission to build, maintain, and operate the

system.*®

Still another plan was unveiled by James I. Blakslee, Fourth Assistant Postmaster General, for a Postal Motor Express System of 15,000 miles costing

about $450 million which, he claimed, if authorized

by Congress, would pay for itself out of surplus postal

revenues. The Joint Highway Congress, dominated by the

American Automobile Association, the National

Automobile Chamber of Commerce, representatives of

the emerging trucking industry, and other urban interests, passed a resolution favoring the Mehren plan for a national system. The outnumbered AASHO dele- gates then met in separate session, endorsed the Page

bill and went on record as having "favored the making of all expenditures under the Federal-aid plan,

the routes in the Federal system being selected by the

various states and connected at the state lines by the

Federal department in cases where connections are not

made by the adjoining states." *^

Unsuccessful Attempt in Congress to Extend Federal

Aid for 3 Years

The Page bill, sponsored by Senator Swanson of

Virginia, was one of six highway measures introduced

when Congress convened in December 1918. One of

these, also sponsored by Swanson, would authorize

the Postmaster General to set aside one-half of the

net proceeds from the operation of motor parcel post

for the improvement of a system of Federal motor

express routes. Another, by Senator Reed Smoot of

Utah, would establish a National Academy of Highway and Bridge Engineering in Washington. The

others were Federal-aid bills similar to the Page bill providing for augmentation of the funds provided in

the original Federal Aid Road Act for fiscal years

1920 and 1921 and an extension of Federal aid through

fiscal year 1924.

This last authority was important, for it would

insure the continuation of the policy of Federal as- sistance and enable the States to plan an orderly

program. It was, however, opposed by those who

were against Federal aid to highways, and they were

successful in confining the funds authorized to fiscal years 1919, 1920, and 1921 and reducing the total amount to $200 million. In addition, the rural road

advocates imposed a limit of $20,000 per mile on

Federal participation.

In this form, the road legislation was added as a

rider to tlie Post Office Appropriation Bill for 1920

(40 Stat 1252), along with anotlier provision authorizing the Secretary of War to transfer to the Secretary of Agriculture "all available war material,

equipment, and supplies not needed for the purposes

of the War Department, but suitable for use in the

improvement of highways, and that the same be dis- tributed among the highway departments of the sev- eral states to be used on roads constructed in whole

or in part by Federal aid. . . ." When this measure reached the floor of the House,

the $200 million appropriation encountered only token

resistance. Congress clearly felt some obligation to help repair the damage inflicted on the State roads

by war traffic. "The interstate character of traffic, as well as its excessive volume, render inequitable the

placing of the cost burden on individual States." *^ Also, there was consensus that public improvements

would be needed to stimulate business and provide

employment for returning veterans. Senator Swanson

urged road improvements as a weapon for gaining a

place for the United States in world markets. Good

roads he said would save American producers $700

million annually and enable them to undersell foreign

competitors.

The bill proposed that the term "rural post road"

be construed to mean "any public road a major portion of which is now used, or can be used, or forms a connecting link not to exceed ten miles in length of

any road or roads now or hereafter used for the trans- portation of the United States mails." Unexpectedly,

this clause aroused considerable opposition from the

floor, and Senator Charles S. Thomas of Colorado

declared that the bill "commits the United States to the improvement of every cattle trail, every cow path,

and every right of way in the United States." Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr., of New York said, "I

am convinced that any road that can be made suitable

for carrying mail includes any and every road in the

United States." *^ This, of course, was exactly the

effect desired by the Administration when it proposed

the amendment. The new post road definition ended

the pretense that Federal aid for highways rested even in part on Congress' constitutional power to

establish a postal system. The feeble opposition was

unable to change the bill, and it became law on February 28, 1919.

Only a few days before the passage of the Post

Office Appropriation Bill Senator Charles E. Townsend of Michigan introduced his own highway bill to establish a Federal Highway Commission of seven members, each to be paid $10,000 per year, with power

to establish a Federal highway system of not less than

two trunkline roads in each State, suitably connected

to the trunklines of adjacent States and counties.

This bill, although lost by adjournment, was an omen

of the coming battle over Federal aid in the 66th

Congress.^"

Thomas H. MacDonald Selected to Head Bureau of

Public Roads

Wlnile the Page bill was working its way through

Congress, the Secretary of Agriculture was trying to

fill the vacant position of Director of the Bureau of

Public Roads. This was not an easy task, partly be- cause of the prestige the position had acquired under

Page and partly because of the meager salary of

$4,500 Congress had allowed for the job, which was

102
With roadbuilding severely limited during the war and a slow postwar start, many roads

tcere still a quagmire each spring.

far below the compensation of many State highway

executives. The American Association of State Highway Officials had recommended Thomas H. MacDonald, Chief Engineer of the Iowa State Highway

Commission for the position, and MacDonald was

willing to accept if more adequate compensation could

be provided.

When nearly 4 months had passed without filling

the position, the highway departments began to get

restless, and some suggested that the hiatus in direction was affecting the work of the Bureau and delaying project approvals. This was denied, and on

April 1, 1919, MacDonald was appointed "engineer

in immediate charge of the work under the Federal

aid road act'' pending a reexamination by Congress

of the Director's compensation.^^ On July 1, 1919,

he was appointed to fill the vacant directorship, with

the title of Chief of Bureau, at a salary of $6,000

per year. Highway Building Gets Off to a Slow Start Less than half a million dollars of the funds au- thorized by the Federal Aid Road Act had been paid

out to the States when the war ended in November

1918. This left $29.5 million available for fiscal year

1919, to which Congress added another $50 million in

the Post Office Appropriation Bill. After deducting

3 percent for BPR Administration, about $77 million were available to the States for their 1919 programs."

Large as this sum seemed, it was only a small part

of the funds voted for roads in 1919. Besides the

$110 million already authorized in Pennsylvania and

Illinois, Michigan, California, Oregon, South Dakota,

Utah, Wyoming, and Nevada authorized another

$114.8 million worth of bonds, and bond issues carried

in dozens of counties, some for very large sums.* ^^ Without counting the cities, which were also preparing large street programs, the funds available for new

construction in 1919 were well over $400 million.'^

This was about five times the amount spent under

State supervision in 1918 for new construction.

For a variety of reasons, the States were slow getting started on their 1919 programs. Many did not

have plans ready, and in some States, the bond funds

and Federal-aid matching money did not become

available until the construction season was well advanced. Early in the year there was a shortage of

trained highway engineers.** There was also a shortage of contractors and construction equipment.

* For example, on July 1, 1919, St. Louis County, Minnesota, approved $7.5 million of road bonds by a 9 to 1 margin.

This was the largest sum ever authorized for roads in any

county of the United States up to that time. About the same

time the Dallas County, Texas, voters approved an issue of

$6.5 million for road and bridge bonds. In both of these

States, the counties were required to match Federal-aid funds

rather than the State."

** At this time about one-fifth of all the trained highway

engineers were still in the Army. The French Government

had requested the United States to reconstruct the roads worn out by American military operations, and to do this the Army l<ept the engineer troops overseas the best part of the summer of 1919.

103
By the time road construction began to gain some momentum, the annual movement of coal from the

mines to markets had begun and open top railroad

cars, which had been plentiful in the spring, became

scarce once again. This cut into the supplies of construction materials, and many contractors were unable

to complete their contracts before winter set in. "When

the season ended, no more than half of the 1919 road

program had been realized, and only $2.7 million of

the available Federal aid had been earned by the

States. The failure of the States to measure up to public

expectations was widely criticized. In defense, A. R.

Hirst, President of the American Association of State

Highway Officials, said,

Never, I believe, since the days of early railroad de- velopment have the American people been so determined

to change instantly their means of transport and not even then were they so willing to pay the cost, provided

they could get the results. What are the results they are now demanding and

what are some of the problems that grow from these demands?

They are expecting the States which had no highway

organizations three or even two years ago, which had

done no preliminary work and in some of which hardly

a mile of modern rural highway had ever been built, to create an organization full sprung from the earth (like our imaginary defensive and aggressive army was to spring) and to build instantly hundreds of miles of modern roads costing millions upon millions of dollars. In the older States in the highway game, better prepared

with organizations and contractors, and with some knowledge of materials and construction conditions, they are asking us to double, triple, or quadruple our annual out- put of roads.^

The Debacle of 1920

Shutting their eyes to the obvious impossibility of

performance, some States announced 1920 road programs that were even larger than those for 1919.

Additional bond issues, plus the Federal aid authorized for fiscal year 1920 had, according to BPR esti- mates, boosted the road funds available to the States

and counties to at least $663 million. A few sober

voices warned of trouble ahead and advised the States

to revise their programs downward to a realistic level or risk loss of public confidence.^^ Others predicted

that the highway program would put unbearable

strains on the national economy which was already

suffering from shortages of every kind. In particular,

they said the competition for labor might lead to an

agricultural disaster if the farmers could not get their

crops planted and harvested.

Despite the warnings, the States began advertising

road projects on a massive scale early in 1920, so as

to be ready for construction as soon as the weather

permitted in the spring. Very soon the market for

road contracts was saturated; and as contractors be- came loaded, bids fell off and bid prices escalated

alarmingly. High-type roads that had cost $20,000

per mile before the war, and which went for $40,000

per mile in 1919, went up to $49,000 and even higher.

In Pennsylvania bids ranged from $52,500 to $91,500

per mile for concrete roads.

In March 1919, the State Auditor of Ohio asked

the Highway Department to hold up conti*act awards

pending a readjustment of economic conditions after

13 contracts for 44 miles of highway were offered with

only two bids received. In May, the New York State

Highway Department withdrew all highway projects

not already awarded to contract "until the situation

shows a decided change for the better." Also in May,

the Minnesota Commissioner of Highways ordered

the counties to stop letting new work and concentrate on finishing projects already under contract. Bond interest rates began to rise early in 1920. In

April the City of Pittsburgh received no bids for a proposed issue of 4i/^ percent improvement bonds.

California was unable to sell its highway bonds be- cause State law fixed interest at not over 4i/^ percent

and prohibited the sale of State bonds below par. While the legislature wrestled with the problem, all construction and even advance planning came to a

stop.

With the opening of the construction season, other

troubles developed in abundance. Contractors who

had taken contracts anticipating delivery of equipment in the spring sat idle waiting for the equipment.

(The road equipment producers were themselves having labor and materials problems and were far behind on their orders.) Open top railway cars became

scarce early in the season because of construction

demand, and not enough cars were available for hauling coal, causing localized coal famines. Because of

coal shortage, some of the portland cement mills re- duced production, causing a shortage of cement, with

contractors scrambling wildly for the available supplies at soaring prices.

The cement shortage was particularly serious to the

industrial eastern and north central States, which had

suffered the most damage from heavy trucking during

the war. They were convinced that only concrete pavements or brick surfaces on concrete bases could

stand up to heavy truck traffic, and they were also

dominated by the idea that their main roads should

be of "permanent construction" that would "outlive

the bonds."

Delaware and Rhode Island, unable to get portland

cement, changed their designs to bituminous concrete

to utilize asphalt, which was still in reasonably good

supply. Wisconsin, which had planned a 400-mile

cement concrete road program, cut back to 200 miles.

To add to the States' and contractors' difficulties,

the Interstate Commerce Commission in June 1920,

gave the coal industry priority on open top cars, shutting down scores of road projects at the height of the

construction season. To keep going and to appease the public demand

for highway construction, some States resorted to methods that would never have been countenanced in

normal times. Some let contracts on a cost-pluspercentage, or cost-plus-a-fixed fee basis. Others set up force-account or day-labor organizations to do

their own work. Temporary surfaces were laid on many projects in the expectation of better conditions

in 1921 under which to do the final paving.'^^ When the construction season ended in December

1920, not more than one-quarter of the anticipated

program had been realized, and in some States, the

accomplishment was less than 20 percent. However,

it was possible to salvage some consolation from what

appeared to be a massive failure.

104
First, the Federal-aid program had done much bet- ter than in any previous year with total payments to the States of about $35.44 million as compared to only

$4.66 million in the previous 3 years.^^

Then, curtailed construction programs allowed the

States to put more engineers on preparing surveys

and plans for future work. Because of this enforced

breathing spell, the States were able to get the un- precedented number of 1,286 projects, totaling 10,826

miles, ready for contract—twice as many as in all the

previous years of the Federal-aid program. The esti- mated total cost of these projects was $197.6 million,

with a Federal sliare of $85.9 million. This, according to Chief MacDonald, was a very desirable ac- complishment : ... it has been fortunate for the future stability of the roadbuilding program that because of the limitations imposed there has been sufficient time to get the neces- sary engineering work done much more thoroughly than

would have been possible had we gone hastily into a heavy construction program.""

And finally, there was a rather general feeling that

the slowdown would benefit everyone in the long run by taking the inflationary heat off labor rates and

materials prices. The inability to get work under

contract would almost certainly allow construction

prices to stabilize so that the same funds would later buy more roads and bridges.

In the perspective of later events, the most significant development of 1919 and 1920 was a tremendous

expansion of the highway construction business and

the manufacture of road machinery. Encouraged by

the prospect of a huge postwar highway program,

literally hundreds of new contractors entered the

highway field, and the old ones that had survived the war greatly expanded their capacity. Under the

stimulus of high labor rates and acute labor shortage,

the construction industry began an astounding mechanization which not only arrested the inflation in

road prices, but in a few years brought them down to

relatively low levels.

Federal Aid In Kind—The War Surplus Equipment

At the end of the war, the United States Government was the largest owner of motor trucks in the

world, by a wide margin, and most of these vehicles were surplus to the peacetime needs of the Army.

To the motor industry, this huge surplus of vehicles was a threat hanging over the postwar truck market.

The highway people, on the other hand, looked upon

these vehicles as a possible way to replace the vehicles worn out during the war. Congress resolved the dilemma in four acts authorizing and directing the Secretary of War to transfer

to the Secretary of Agriculture all vehicles, construction equipment, and supplies not needed by the military but suitable for use in improving the highways

for distribution among the State highway depart- ments. The only conditions imposed were that the

States must request tlie equipment, pay transportation

charges from Avliere it was stored, and agree not to

resell it. In June 1919, the Bureau of Public Roads, acting

for the Secretary, allocated 20,519 motor trucks to the

This 2-ton Army ordinance truck was converted into a dump

truck for highway construction use.

States; and by the end of July, a third of these had

been delivered to them. By October 1920, a total of

22,719 surplus vehicles had been delivered. This

windfall was a tremendous boost to the maintenance

efforts of the States and counties, for it enabled them

to haul stone and gravel for repairs when railway

cars were unobtainable.

By 1921 the flow of war surplus to the States had

become a broad stream, including not only motor

trucks, "Fords," and autos, but shop equipment, spare

parts, and construction equipment of all kinds from

hand shovels to steam shovels. Over 20,000 tons of

explosives worth $10 million were distributed and en- thusiastically applied to highwaj' construction and

quarry operations. One construction superintendent

declared "The results of TXT in rock blasting are so far superior to those of any other explosive that we

105
have found that an experienced powderman who has

once used TNT can hardly be induced to use anything

else." «i The massive distribution was substantially completed in 1925 by which time equipment and supplies

worth $215 million had been given to the States and

the BPR had retained foi- its own use equipment

worth another $7.8 million.®^

The Defects of the Federal-Aid Program Exposed

The Federal-aid forces suffered serious defections

in April 1919, when a group of national road advocates formed the Federal Highway Council.^^ One

of the organizers of this group was highly respected

Henry G. Shirley, Chief Engineer of the Maryland

State Roads Commission and one of the founders of

AASHO. The avowed purpose of the Council was

to get Congress to set up a system of national highways under Federal control such as that proposed by

the Townsend bill. The backing for such a system came principally from the eastern and north central

States that had suffered the most from wartime traffic. Most of these States had well-defined, limited State

highway systems and strong highway departments;

and they had for years concentrated much of their

money on main intercity highways which were under

the direct control of and maintained by the State. In these States Federal aid had been applied to the

through routes with good effect. The situation was quite different in 17 southern,

prairie, and western States in which the counties were

still the basic political units for building and maintaining roads. These States had created weak highway departments or commissions to receive and

distribute the Federal-aid funds and had given them

some powers to approve or disapprove standards, but

these departments generally lacked the power to ini- tiate projects and so to place the funds where they were most needed. Even worse, the legislatures of some States had directed that the Federal funds must

be subapportioned among the counties according to a formula similar to the Federal-aid formula (14 ac- cording to area, % according to population, and %

according to post road mileage). This split the limited amount of the State's apportionment into fragments, each too small for a satisfactory project, a

process that, according to Henry Shirley, would re- sult in these States being "spotted with and not linked

by Federally constructed highways." "* In one south- ern State a sparsely populated county got only $4,000

of Federal aid in one year for its portion of the State

highway system. At this rate, according to Shirley,

it would take 100 years to complete one road across the county even though this road might also be an

important link between important cities in adjoining

States. Minnesota and Kansas were prohibited by their

constitutions from engaging in works of internal improvement, and sonio southern States were legally

unable to incur bonded debt. In these and a number

916 THE STATE LINE

A drawback of the 1916 Federal Air Road Act was that federally aided roads need not have been connected.

of other States, the counties were required to put up

all or part of the matching funds for Federal aid and

also to pay for maintaining the roads afterward.

This policy, according to the director of the American

Automobile Association's Good Roads Board, resulted

in giving good ". . . roads in rich counties and in

pauperizing poor counties." ®^ Another result was

that the completed roads in the poor counties were

often poorly maintained and there was little the State

highway departments could do about it other than

threaten to withhold future Federal-aid funds.

To establish eligibility for Federal aid, the Secretary of Agriculture had required all States to designate State systems of main roads on which the Federal

funds would be spent. These systems totaled 214,000

miles, or 8 percent of all U.S. roads. However, for

individual States, the system mileage varied from less than 5 percent up to as much as 15 percent of the total

existing mileage; and in some of the latter States the

systems were so diffuse that it would take years to improve them, and even then they would not provide

reasonably direct routes to important places in neighboring States.

Critics of Federal aid also liked to point out that,

according to the official reports of the Bureau of

Public Roads, three-quarters of the road mileage improved with Federal aid had low- or intermediate106
type surfaces such as earth, sand-clay, gravel, or macadam which were incapable of carrying heavy

truck traffic without excessive maintenance, and were,

therefore, unsuitable as long-distance national roads.

(However, the same reports showed that 65 percent

of the funds were spent for high-type roads such as concrete and brick.)

Chief MacDonald was well aware of these shortcomings when lie assumed office in 1919. He appreciated the need for a connected system of interstate

highways, but he did not believe that a separate national sj'stem under a Federal commission or department was the way to achieve it. Such a system, he

thought, would eventually absorb a very large part

of the funds Congress was willing to vote for roads

and, thus, weaken Federal aid to the States. MacDonald also questioned the assumption that longdistance highways were necessary for national defense,

and in June 1920, he wrote

There is no support for the assumption that long trans- continental roads will be needed for military defense, a

transcontinental road which merely crosses the continent

is of little military value. What is needed is a series of roads connecting all important depots, mobilization, and

industrial centers, which, as thus connected, may give us

a transcontinental route eventually ; l)ut the transconti- nental feature is of secondary importance."

The real need, in his mind, was to strengthen the

State highway departments by giving them full control over both the Federal-aid matching funds and the

maintenance of Federal-aid highways. In time, he

believed long-distance highways would come into

existence as the States improved their trunk highways,

provided they could be persuaded to agree on a re- stricted mileage of interstate roads on which to concentrate the Federal-aid funds. The immediate problem was to bring about such an agreement and, thus,

blunt the arguments of the national road advocates.

The BPR Begins National System Studies

MacDonald's handling of this problem was typical

of his approach to many later ones. First, he obtained the support of tlie State highway departments

by persuading Secretary Houston to set up a FederalAid Advisory Committee of six members recom- mended by the Executive Board of AASHO, of which

MacDonald himself was a member.®^ The members

of the Advisory Board were from all parts of the

country, and they all favored limited State road sys- tems under the complete control of strong highway

departments.

MacDonald then asked the War Plans Division of

the Army General Staff and the Corps of Engineers

to cooperate with the BPR to select those highways

that were of national strategic or military importance; and when the military accepted this invitation,

he supplied them with maps of all the States* on which the BPR had plotted the tentative road systems

submitted by the States and also all of the approved

Federal-aid projects.^* **

* These base maps were prepared to a scale of approximately 8 miles to the inch by the Geological Survey. When

that agency's appropriation was exhausted, MacDonald placed

five of its cartographers on the BPR payroll to finish the job.

These preparations completed, MacDonald an- nounced in March 1920, that the BPR, with support

of the Advisory Committee was going to make a nationwide survey of the roads of the country and a

classification of all highways in respect to their importance and character of service."® This was necessary, he said, because the rate of improvement of the

public roads is much slower than the public is demanding; yet.

There must come a realization that only a percentage

of the resources demanded for increasing the rate of road production can be provided for this purpose, and so the production of roads must be studied and programs

determined the same as for any large industrial undertaliing, and in order that the roads which meet the

greatest economic needs will receive first consideration." The survey, MacDonald said, would enable the

Bureau and the States to segregate the roads into

systems according to their national. State, county, or

local importance, determine their needs for improvement, and allocate the costs of improvement and

maintenance between the systems.

Meantime, the States were approaching a serious

financial situation. Under the Bankhead Act of 1916

and the Post Office Appropriation Act of 1919, Congress had provided funds for Federal aid only through

fiscal year 1921. When the 2d session of the 66th

Congress opened in January 1920, Senator Chamberlain of Oregon introduced an Administration bill backed by AASHO which would have provided $100

million per year for Federal aid in fiscal years 1921,

1922, 1923, and 1924, with the provision that the

money be concentrated on an adequate national highway system selected by the States and connected at the State lines. Senator Townsend also introduced

his proposal for a Federal highway commission and

a national highway system.

In committee, a measure known as the Sells bill, which provided funds for only fiscal year 1922, was

substituted for the Chamberlain bill and was then

passed by the House by a margin of almost 8 to 1. However, it failed narrowly in the Senate, and Congress adjourned without passing a highway bill. MacDonald warned of hardship ahead for the States

The fact that a new apportionment of funds was not made in January 1921, made it impossible for the States

to maintain an unbroken continuity of policy and administration in respect to Federal-aid work, and this condition has resulted in an unprecedented number of with- drawals, cancellations, and modifications of existing

projects as the States have endeavored to adjust their programs to a reduced rate of expenditure. This condition has emphasized the fact that in so large and im- portant a national policy as Federal aid implies, the

action of the Federal Government should as nearly as

possible be uniform, consistent, and prompt. The probable cost of administering Federal aid in the several

States will no doubt be appreciably increased, owing to the fact that the States do not yet know whether Federal

aid will be continued, under what conditions it will be

continued, or what appropriation is likely to be made,

.so that it is practically impossible for them to make any

definite plans with respect to the administration or

financing of future work or to conduct the necessary

studies preparatory to filing applications for additional

aid." ** Apparently the Post Office Department was not asked to participate in these studies even though at the time (March

1920) the Postmaster General was still engaged in experi- ments with motor parcel post and motor truck transportation

of fourth class mail.

107
A New Charter For Federal Aid

Although the appropriation for 1922 was lost, the

supporters of the Sells bill interpreted the lopsided

vote in the House as a substantial endorsement for

Federal aid. The Engineering News-Record^ recognizing the "overwhelming sentiment" in favor of

Federal aid, withdrew its support of the Townsend

bill and urged all the highway factions to get to- gether on a compromise measureJ^

The Federal-aid people, under MacDonald's leadership, were eager to compromise, and in April 1921,

the Executive Committee of AASHO met in Washington to draft a bill that would retain the essential

principles of the 1916 Federal Aid Road Act and

correct its weaknesses. To win the support of the

national highway system advocates, this bill provided

that each State must designate a State highway sys- tem, including not more than 7 percent of all roads

in the State on which all the Federal funds must be

spent. Three-sevenths of this system must be roads

"interstate in character" and up to 60 percent of the

Federal funds could be spent on this fraction. The

bill also provided that State funds must be used to match the Federal money and that all construction

and maintenance must be performed under the direct

supervision of the State highway department. The

State must agree to properly maintain all federally

aided roads, and where the Secretary of Agriculture

has found the maintenance to be inadequate, he may,

after 60 days' notice, restore the road to a proper

condition of maintenance and charge the cost to the

State's apportionment of Federal funds and also

withhold further Federal aid until the State refunds

the money so spent. The authors got Representative

Cassius Dowell of Iowa to introduce this bill when

the 67th Congress convened in April 1921.''^ Senator Townsend was also inclined to compromise,

and he rewrote his bill to provide that a "post roads

and federal highway commission" should select an

"interstate highway system," and set standards but

that the system be built, maintained, and operated by

the States with Federal aid. His bill proposed an

appropriation of $200 million for a 2-year program.''*

A few States, for one reason or another, were unable to spend all the Federal aid previously apportioned to them by the 1916 Act, and to keep them

from losing the money. Senator Lawrence C. Phipps

of Colorado introduced a bill extending the time

limit for States to use these funds by 1 additional

year for a total of 2 fiscal years beyond the fiscal year

the funds were made available. This bill passed the

Senate unanimously; but when it reached the House,

the Committee on Roads added the Dowell bill with

its limiting 7 percent system and 60 percent fund

expenditure as an amendment, and in this form it was

passed by the House with a thumping majority.

Eventually, after a long, hot summer of hearings

and conferences, the Phipps-Dowell and Townsend

bills were merged and passed with an appropriation

of $75 million as the Federal Highway Act of November 9, 1921.

This Act ended, or at least submerged, the feud

between the local and lone;-distance road advocates

by concentrating the Federal-aid funds on limited

interconnected systems and by requiring that the

paved surface of the interstate roads should be not

less than 18 feet wide. It greatly strengthened the

State highway departments, especially in their maintenance function, and it permanently laid to rest the

idea of a national highway system under Federal

control. However, much to the disappointment of the

States, the appropriation was for only 1 year (fiscal

year 1922), and, thus, it failed to provide the continuity so urgently needed for program planning.*

The Federal-Aid Highway System

The selection and approval of the "7-percent sys- tem" of roads mandated by the Federal Highway Act

was the largest and most important task ever as- signed to the Bureau of Public Roads. In anticipation of the passage of the Act, Chief MacDonald

asked each highway department to certify the total mileage of public roads in its State. These mileages

totaled 2,859,575 miles, which fixed the maximum ex- tent of the Federal-aid system at 200,170 miles.

Immediately upon passage of the Act, MacDonald

requested the States to submit tentative system recommendations. At the same time, he assigned a BPR

task force, under Edwin W. James, the job of devising an equitable method for testing the systems submitted by the States. This group obtained from the Bureau of the Census

its latest figures, by counties, for population, value of

agricultural products, value of mineral products,

value of forest products, and value of manufactured

products. Calling the State population 100, they

calculated a population index for each county. In

the same manner they calculated county indices for

the four significant production factors. Finally, by

adding all these together and dividing by five they

obtained a composite index for each county.

Then, according to James

:

We adopted squares as emblems of the indices. When

these squares, blackened in, were put into their appropriate counties on a clean map, we had a series of emblems through which diagrammetric routes could be laid

out. Routes through the heaviest emblems were routes through the generally wealthiest and all around most

important county areas. Road locations could be made

catching obvious local control points along these diagrammatic lines, and you had a selection from best to poorest

almost staring you in the face." By October 1922, tentative system maps had been

received from all but nine States. Most of the routes

in these systems followed existing roads, and they

agreed remarkably well with the BPR task force's

studies. Surprisingly, the largest deviations from

what appeared to be the best interstate routes oc- curred in States such as New York and Massachusetts

where a large percentage of the principal roads was

already improved. In these States there was "a nat- ural disposition to designate other roads of less importance as the Federal-aid highway system for the

State." ^^ These and other differences were smoothed

* Congress remedied this by appropriating a total of $190

million in Federal aid for fiscal years 1923, 1924, and 1925

in the Post Office Appropriation Act of June 19, 1922 (42

Stat 660).

108
out in conferences between the BPR and the individual States and by regional conferences between the

States to coordinate across State boundaries. The

first inter-State conference at Troy, New York, re- sulted in completely coordinated primary systems for

New England, New York, and New Jersey.

System selection and highway correlation were somewhat different in the west where population was

scattered, road distances great, and financial resources very limited. "The designation of a system of roads

in such States adequate at once to serve local requirements and at the same time correlate satisfactorily

with the roads of adjoining States demands very careful adjustments in order to keep the mileage, the re- sources, and the service value of the roads properly

balanced and economically justified." " In a few of

the larger western States, three-sevenths of the total Federal-aid mileage was insufficient to make all of the

connections to interstate roads in adjoining States,

and some of the secondary Federal-aid mileage had

to be used for this purpose.

The huge job of designating and approving all of

the 48 State systems and correlating them across State

lines was completed November 1, 1923, the work published by the Bureau of Public Roads in the form of

a national map of the Federal-Aid Highway System.

Because many States designated less than 7 percent

of their total mileage on the Federal-aid system, the

roads shown on this map totaled only 168,881 miles, or 5.9 percent of all U.S. roads. However, almost

immediately, the system began growing and it has

been growing ever since.* By July 1923, Maryland,

Delaware, and Rhode Island had completed their

original systems to a satisfactorj^ standard and had

been granted increases by the Secretary.

The Bureau of Public Roads estimated that for the

country as a whole at least 90 percent of the population resided not more than 10 miles from a Federalaid road, and in a few States, this figure was as high

as 97 or 99 percent. The BPR estimated that at least 94 percent of the cities of 5,000 or more population were directly on the system.^*

The Federal Highway Act concentrated a sizable

amount of money on a limited mileage of roads, re- sulting in the rapid improvement of interstate routes. Fiscal year 1922 was a banner year in which nearly

14,000 miles of the Federal-aid system were improved.

By July 1925, 46,486 miles, or over one-quarter of the

system, had been brought up to a reasonably travelable standard.

However, the production of motor vehicles increased

at an even more rapid rate. From 1916 to 1921 registrations increased at about 1.4 million per year. From

1921 to 1925 the rate increased to about 2.37 million

per year, and in 1925 the total number of motor vehicles of all types registered was 19.95 million.''^ ^°

* The Federal Highway Act provided that whenever a

State had finished improving its entire original 7 percent

system, the State, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture, could add additional increments. The Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 modified this to provide that increments of 1 percent of total State road

mileage could be added to the Federal-aid system whenever

90 percent of the original system plus all subsequent incre- ments had been improved.

With the increase in vehicle ownership, there came

an immense increase in travel and tourism, and cross country motoring rapidly became the major recrea- tional activity of millions of Americans.

The End of the Trails The cross country wagon trails of the prerailroad

era were a romantic episode in American history.

These trails furnished the emigrants one essential

service that outweighed all others—the assurance that

if the traveler followed the trail, he would eventually

arrive at his destination and not become lost. When the Lincoln Highway Association was or- ganized in 1913, this assurance was lacking for any- one so rash as to attempt a long overland trip, for the

roads were almost completely unsigned and there were few reliable maps. Few residents along a road could

give the traveler reliable information on the condition

of the roads in the next county or even beyond a distance of 10 miles in their own county. By select- ing and mapping the best roads over the most direct routes and by encouraging the local officials to improve them and the local auto clubs to mark them,

the Lincoln Highway Association provided services

of real value to motorists. The American Automobile

Association augmented these services by publishing

its famous "Blue Books," advising tourists of the ac- commodations to be found along the route. In 1915

Lewis Stubbs of St. Joseph, Missouri, proposed marking auto trails by painting colored bands around

utility poles, and the Automobile Club of St. Joseph

marked a considerable mileage of the Pikes Peak

Ocean-to-Ocean Highway, the "Appian Way of America," in this manner.*^

The National Old Trails Association formed in

1913 was dedicated to preserving and improving the

old Cumberland Road and the old Santa Fe Trail as a transcontinental route. In 1915 Carl Fisher was

instrumental in organizing the Dixie Highway, a net- work of parallel roads extending from the Straits of

Mackinac to Miami, Florida. Between 1914 and 1916

community boosters put together the Yellowstone

Trail, under the slogan "A good road from Plymouth

Rock to Puget Sound," with the Pikes Peak Oceanto-Ocean Highway following in 1916.®^ Because they were marked and advertised, these

pioneer auto trails became channels for the rising tide

of tourist traffic. After World War I, competing auto

trails burgeoned in scores. In the absence of an official marking system, these trails provided a useful

service to motorists, even though they were established in large part to promote the commercial interests of their sponsors. But within a few years, the

movement got out of hand as more and more trails were organized. By 1924 there were at least 250

marked trails sponsored by 100 or more separate

organizations, each with a headquarters and issuing

maps and promotional material and collecting funds.

Some of these routes were interstate in character, some of only local significance. Some routes were promoted to further roadbuilding by arousing public

opinion, some were purely scenic, and some existed

only to provide salaries for their organizers.^^

109
The trail organizations were highly competitive

and their efforts were uncoordinated, resulting in numerous overlaps. For example, 70 percent of one trail overlapped other marked routes and one trail overlapped as many as 11

others. One road carried eight different trail markers

for a considerable distance. Many trails had alternate

sections, compounding the confusion, and one had alter- nates following three separate roads, all with the same

name. Most routes followed their financial support and

it was impossible to integrate many of them into any

logical highway system.'^

The pressure of the trail associations for the improvement of their trails made sensible programing

by the State highway departments almost impossible.

The situation finally became so bad that in 1924 the

American Association of State Highway Officials approved a resolution calling on the Secretary of Agriculture to name a board of BPR and State engineers

to formulate a numbering and marking system of

interstate character for the principal highways of the

United States. In response to this resolution, the

Secretary appointed a Joint Board of 21 State highway engineers and 3 BPR engineers under the chairmanship of Chief MacDonald with E. W. James as

secretary.

Early in its work the Joint Board decided to confine the numbered routes to actual existing roads in

the Federal-aid system, but to disregard the state of

improvement of any road as a factor in putting it on

the system. The Board pointedly avoided holding

public hearings to avoid placing itself in the position

of arbiter between competing trails. The Joint Board sponsored six regional meetings

at which each highway department had an opportunity to designate its most important routes and

coordinate across State lines with its neighbors. When

these recommendations were consolidated on a single

map, they added up to a system of 81,096 miles, or

2.8 percent of the total existing road mileage. The

Board then went over the State recommendations

eliminating routes of doubtful interstate importance

and finally arrived at a "skeleton system" of 50,137

miles which it submitted to the individual States for

approval.

By this time the work of the Board had begun to attract popular attention and, to use the expression

of the president of AASHO, "the Infernal regions

began popping." Every community of any size

wanted to be on a numbered route, just as a generation earlier every town thought it a matter of life and

death to be on a railroad. Under the influence of

local pressure the skeleton system was fleshed out to 75,884 miles. This was the system that was recom- mended by the Joint Board to the Secretary of Agriculture in its final report and approved by him. The

Secretary sent the report to AASHO recommending

that the Association "take such necessary steps as might be feasible under their respective State laws

to put the plan into operation." ^^ At its annual meeting in October 1925, AASHO

delegated to its Executive Committee authority to make minor changes in the system recommended by

the Joint Board "as appeared necessary or desirable."

Immediately, requests for changes began to come in

from the States, most of them inspired by the trail associations. The Executive Board acted on 142 such

requests and approved additions which boosted the

total system mileage to 96,626 miles. This system was approved by ballot of the States on November 11,

1926, and was immediately put into effect by all the

States and marked with the familiar black and white

shield markers which for almost 50 years have guided

American motorists.

AVliat became of the private trails? They were

replaced by one or more U.S. numbered routes and, one by one, the trail associations, their work done,

went out of business. However, for years afterward

and even today, sections of road in many States con- tinued to be called "Lincoln Highway," "Yellowstone

Trail," "Dixie Highway," etc.

REFERENCES

' Engineers At Washington Rush Work On Army Oamps

But There Is Much Delay, Engineering News-Recoed, Vol.

78, No. 12, June 21, 1917, p. 619. ^C. Upham, Car Shortage and Its Relation to Highwa/y

Work, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 79, No. 24, Dec. 13, 1917, p. 1099.

' Making Existing Facilities Do The Work—The Railroads' Problem, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 80, No. 1, Jan. 3, 1918, p. 4.

* Transportation Needs—Rail, Water, Highivay, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 80, No. 16, Apr. 18, 1918, p. 779.

^ The Immediate Needs of the Railroads, Engineering

News-Record, Vol. 81, No. 4, Jul. 25, 1918, p. 166.

^ Build Roads!, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 79, No. 3, Jul. 19, 1917, p. 98.

' Priority Order to Halt Road Construction, Engineering

News-Recoed, Vol. 79, No. 18, Nov. 1, 1917, p. 855.

' Short Stretches vs. Through Routes, Engineering NewsRecoed, Vol. 79, No. 25, Dec. 20, 1917, p. 1137.

' The First Motor Truck Convoy, Engineering NewsRecord, Vol. 80, No. 1, Jan. 3, 1918, p. 3. " Pennsylvania Keeps Roads Open For Motor Truck Convoy,

Engineering News-Record, Vol. 80, No. 9, Feb. 28, 1918, p. 408. " G. Biles, Clearing Roads for Army Transport, Public

Roads, Vol. 1, No. 1, May 1918, p. 13. " C. Cowen, How Ohio Handles Important Roads Broken

Doion By Huge Trafflc, Public Roads, Vol. 1, Nos. 6-8, Dec.

1918, p. 26. "Action By The State Highway Officials, Engineering

News-Recoed, Vol. 79, No. 24, Dec. 13, 1917, p. 1087. " Secretary Houston Will Urge Vital Road Work, Engineeeing News-Recoed, Vol. 80, No. 3, Jan. 17, 1918, p. 140.

^^ Government Operation And What It Means, Engineeeing

News-Record, Vol. 80, No. 1, Jan. 3, 1918, p. 5.

^^ McAdoo Will Aid hi Transporting Road Materials, Engineeeing News-Recoed, Vol. 80, No. 8, Feb. 21, 1918, p. 381. " What Most Highway Departments Will Face In The Near

Future, Engineeeing News-Record, Vol. 80, No. 15, Apr. 11, 1918, p. 693. ''W. Thompson, New Jersey, One Of The Great Sufferers,

Plans To Meet Needs Of The Future, Public Roads, Vol. 1, No. 2, Jun. 1918, p. 21. '°W. Sohier, Massachusetts Sees The Solution In Limits

Upon Capacity And Loads Of Trucks, Public Roads, Vol. 1, No. 2, Jun. 1918, p. 13.

^'' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1919, p. 5. "Truck Facts Foe 1927 (National Automobile Chamber

of Commerce, New York, 1927) p. 10. " Carrying Tour Terminal Facilities With You, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 79, No. 24, Dec. 13, 1917, p. 1985.

''^ Motor Trucks Needed To Supplemait, Not Compete, With

Highways, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 82, No. 3, Jan. 16, 1919, p. 120. "J. Wallace, Unit Operation Of Terminal Zones Urged,

Engineering News-Record, Vol. 80, No. 16, Apr. 18, 1918,

p. 779.

110
'^Industry's Use Of Highways And Motor Trucks To Relieve Freight Congestion, Engineering News-Recokd, Vol. 79, No. 22, Nov. 29, 1917, p. 1033. '"Developing Freight Routes on Highways With Motor

Trucks and Trailers, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 81, No.

2, Jul. 11, 1918, p. 106. " Highicay Carries Tivelve Times As Much Local Freight

As Railroad, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 81, No. 5, Aug.

1, 1918, p. 224. " Contract Let For Motor-Truck Transportation Of Coal,

Engineering News-Record, Vol. 81, No. 24, Oct. 3, 1918, p. 647. " Comparison Of Short-Haul Truck And Rail Shipments,

Engineering News-Record, Vol. 82, No. 19, May 8, 1919, pp.

903, 904.

'" H. Doc. 159, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. " Editorial, American Motorist, Vol. 7, No. 4, Jul. 1915,

p. 436. "Joint Resolution Making Appropriations for the Post

Office Department for Fiscal Year 1916 (38 Stat 1227).

"39 Stat 424. "Regional Highicay Transport Directors Meet, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 81, No. 13, Sept. 26, 1918, p. 599. "Report Shows Results Of Motor Parcel Post Service,

Engineering News-Record, Vol. 81, No. 2, Jul. 11, 1918, pp. 90-91. "Id., pp. 90-92. "40 Stat 753. "Cong. Rec. 65th Cong., 3d Sess., Vol. 57, App., p. 386. "P. Wilson, Operations of Bureau of Public Roads Under

the Federal Aid Road Act, Public Roads, Vol. 1, No. 10, Feb.

1919, p. 22. " S. R. 666, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 3. "Cong. Rec. 65th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 56, pp. 11, 311. " Wanted—A Connected National Highway System, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 81, No. 14, Oct. 3, 1918, p. 608. " Post-War Highway Drive Begins, Engineering NewsRecord, Vol. 81, No. 20, Nov. 14, 1918, pp. 878, 879. " Report of The State Highway Department of Pennsylvania, 1917-1920 (J. L. L. Kuhn, Harrisburg, 1922) p. 15. " Second Administrati\'e Report of The Directors of De- partments For The Year July 1, 1918-June 30, 1919 (Illi- nois State Journal Co., Springfield, 1919) p. 204. "E. Mehren, a Suggested National Highway Policy and

Plan, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 81, No. 25, Dec. 19, 1918, p. 1115, 1116. " National Highicay System Gets Strong Backing, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 81, No. 25, Dec. 19, 1918, p. 1108. " S. R., supra, note 40, p. 10. "57 Cong. Rec. 2427 (1919).

*/<?., p. 3635. " New Roads Official Named, Public Roads, Vol. 1, No. 11, Mar. 1919, p. 3. ° BPR, supra, note 20, p. 8. °A. Anderson, State Highicay Mileages Aiid Expenditures

in the Year 1918, Pltjlic Roads, Vol. 2, No. 15, Jul. 1919, p. 3. " Largest County Bond Issue, Public Roads, Vol. 2, No. 15, Jul. 1919, p. 7.

"Authorized Road Bond Issues Total Nearly $500,000,000,

Engineering News-Record, Vol. 84, No. 4, Jan. 22, 1920, p. 202.

'"A. Hirst, The American Highway Problem, Public Roads,

Vol. 2, No. 20, Dec. 1919, p. 6. ^Curtailed Highway Construction, Shall It Be Voluntary

Or Enforced?, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 84, No. 10, Mar. 4, 1920, p. 451. ^P. Sargent, The President's Address, Public Roads, Vol.

3, No. 32, Dec. 1920, p. 6. TM Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1920, p. 5. °°T. MacDonald, Federal-Aid Accomplishments, Pxtblic Roads, Vol. 3, No. 32, Dec. 1920, p. 14. " L. Smith, TNT A Success In Road Work, Public Roads,

Vol. 3, No. 31, Nov. 1920, p. 13.

"' BtnjEAU of Public Roads Annual Report, 1925, p. 28.

"^ Federal Highway Council Formed, Engineering NewsRecord, Vol. 82, No. 16, Apr. 17, 1919, p. 790. " Why Federal Aid Will Not Build A National Highway

System, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 84, No. 7, Feb. 12, 1920, p. 336. °'M. Eldridge, Federal Highway Appropriations, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 86, No. 6, Feb. 10, 1921, p. 272. ^T. MacDonald, Four Years Of Road Building Under The

Federal-Aid Act, Public Roads, Vol. 3, No. 26, Jun. 1920, p. 13. " BPR, supra, note 20, p. 34. ^ BPR, supra, note 59, p. 7. "'Highway Classification Undertaken by Bureau of Public

Roads, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 84, No. 13, Mar. 25, 1920, p. 635.

'"Id. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1921, pp. 6, 7. " Getting Together On Highway Policy, Engineering NewsRecord, Vol. 86, No. 13, Mar. 31, 1921, p. 534. " State Officials Confer On Highway Policies, Engineering

News-Record, Vol. 86, No. 16, Apr. 21, 1921, p. 696. " Revised Townsend Road Bill Introduced, Engineering

News-Record, Vol. 86, No. 18, May 5, 1921, p. 783. "Letter from E. W. James to F. W. Cron, Feb. 21, 1967, (Original in the Department of Transportation Library,

Washington, D.C.) " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1922, p. 3. "Id.

TM Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1923, p. 3. "Motor Vehicle Registration 15,092,177, Public Roads, Vol.

5, No. 2, Apr. 1924, p. 16.

^° Motor Vehicle Registrations, Revenue And Gasoline Taxes For The Year 1925, Public Roads, Vol. 7, No. 2, Apr. 1926,

p. 50. " Ask A.A.A. Recognition for Pike's Peak Route, American

Motorist, Vol. 7, No. 4, Apr. 1915, p. 232. ^'V. Stevenson, American Highways, Vol. 1, (Winship

Publishing Co., New York, 1919) pp. 13-17.

*'E. James, Making And Unmaking A System Of Marked

Routes, American Highways, Oct. 1933, p. 16.

'* F. Cron, Touring By Numbers—Why and How, Public

Works, Feb. 1968, p. 80. *'E. James, Marking Our Highway System, American

Highways, Oct. 1931, p. 19.

Ill
The

Highujoy

Boom

". . . but each separate project [new road] is to some

community a new opportunity, a means of bettering, in some respects, the economic and social status of the community, and together they form the links which, eventually

united, will constitute a new means of transportation. . . ."

112
The Beginning of a Sustained Highway Program

The Federal Highway Act of 1921 increased the

limit of Federal participation in road costs to $20,000

per mile, a change that had been urged by the eastern and northern States to compensate for the wartime

inflation in the cost of the higher t3'pes of road pavements. "N^Hien Congress again considered the financing

of the Federal-aid program in April 1922, this limit

became a bone of contention. Rural interests wanted

the limit cut back to as low as $4,000 per mile to force

the States to use the less expensive construction types

and, thus, more rapidl}' provide some kind of improvement for the entire Federal-aid system, and particularly its less heavily traveled parts. Eventually,

a compromise was reached on a limit $16,250 per mile

for projects funded in fiscal year 1923, falling to $15,000 per mile in 1924 and thereafter.*

This was only a minor setback for Federal aid. Much more important was Congress resumption of

the desirable practice of authorizing aid funds sev- eral years in advance by authorizing appropriations

of $50 million, $65 million, and $75 million for fiscal years 1923, 1924 and 1925. Since most State legisla- tures met biennially, this advance notice of Congress

intent was of the utmost importance to the States in

planning their own matching appropriations and

budgets.

This removal of uncertainty in the Federal-aid

program coincided with a drop in wages and a lowering of price levels for construction materials. The

State highway departments, profiting from their past

mistakes and added experience, had developed much

more effective construction organizations and procedures, and these were matched by a stronger and more

efficient construction industry. The result was the

completion of 10,247 miles of construction at a cost of $189 million—314 times as much as had been ac- complished since the Federal-aid program began—in

the single fiscal year of 1922. To Chief MacDonald

the mere recital of statistics could not possibly convey an adequate idea of what was accomplished. In 1922

he wrote

But merely to say that this year has added 10,000 miles to the previously existing mileage conveys no ade- quate sense of the far-roaching effects of the work that

is being done. The 10,000 miles completed represent

something more than the equivalent of three transconti- nental roads. They are not transcontinental roads. They

are not even connected roads, though as the work con- tinues they will he connected ; but each separate project

is to some community a new opportunity, a means of

bettering, in some respects, the economic and social

.status of the community, and together they form the

links which, eventually united, will constitute a new

means of transportation, no less important to the country

as a whole than that offered by the railroads.'

Roadbuilding by Stages

The 1922 record was possible mainly because at

least two-thirds of the work was of low type, such as graded earth, sand-clay and gravel, and this in turn came about because the BPR adopted a stage construction policy in the early years of the Federal-aid

program

In many instances it lias lieen found advisable to grade

and drain a road and delay an expensive pavement until a later time. This policy will be continued under the same conditions: that is, when the volume of traffic at the time of the original construction is not large enough

to require any lietter siu'face than can 1)0 l)uilt of selected

soil, sand-clay, or gravel, when financial considerations

require that tlio expense of a pavement bo deferred, and

wlien, as in the light of past expei-ience it has often been found advisable, a delay to allow the subgrade to become

stal)le is believed to l)e necessary. In such cases the plan

will be, as it has been in the past, to so design and construct the grades and drainage structures and whatever

temporary surfacing tliat is applied, that any additions or subsequent improvements can be made without loss of prior investment." Most of the stage construction projects were in the

West, the Prairie States and the South where traffic was light and roadbuilding was least advanced. The

intention to build by stages was set forth in the

project agreement, or contract between the Government and the State, and only a portion of the Fedei-al

share of the cost of the project was paid upon completion of the first stage; the rest was held back until

the final stage was finished. As traffic increased, the

State upgraded the initial construction with better

surfaces, but these second stage projects did not be- come an appreciable part of the total Federal-aid

program until about 1926, when 11 percent of all mileage improved was second stage. By 1933, however, 55 percent of the mileage was in this category.

The basic concept of stage construction was good,

but it failed to take into account the enormous in- crease in vehicle ownership and road traffic that would

occur during the 1920's, or the rapid evolution in

highway engineering. In the 5 years or so that elapsed

between original and second stage construction, many

States changed their ideas as to what were adequate

or desirable standards. Instead of following the

original plan for the second stage, they upgraded it, and in many instances made minor relocations to eliminate sharp curves.* Thus, the stage construction, or "wait and see" approach, resulted in abandoning some of the original construction, but also avoided

premature investment in high-type work that would

later have proved inadequate.

The stage construction policy accomplished its purpose which was to give the poorest portions of the

Federal-aid system a modest improvement as soon as

possible. This philosophy was well expressed by

Chief MacDonald in his annual report for 1926

An exactly similar policy was followed l)y the builders

of the railroads, whose first object was to 'get the traffic through,' leaving until a later date the perfecting proces.ses of ballasting, l)anking of curves, etc. It is the only satisfactory method of dealing with the conditions

existing in many of the Southern, Middle Western, and Western States in which there are thousands of miles

of main road still entirely devoid of any improvement

whatever.' However, not everyone agreed with this policy, and

some influential critics asserted that the Federal aid was being frittered away in low-grade work that

would never handle the traffic. They pointed to the

original Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 which re-

* The participation limit on cost per mile was raised to $25,000 in 1930 and eliminated altogether in 1934.

* By fiscal year 1933 these minor relocations had shortened

the original locations by 237 miles or about 1.1 percent.

113
quired that "The Secretary of Agriculture shall approve only such projects as may be substantial in

character." To these critics MacDonald replied:

In interpreting the word 'substantial' the Secretary has

taken cognizance of the fact that an improvement which

is substantial for one density and kind of traffic may not be substantial for another. It has been recognized that the types of roads which it is desirable to construct in New York, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania are not suit- able or necessary for Nevada, Idaho, and the Dakotas . .

.

the decision as to the type of road which the Secretary

will approve for a given locality has been based in every

case upon the traffic which is using the existing road and

which it is estimated will use the improved road . . . The result is that the Secretary has approvel roads of

all types and widths, from graded earth roads to concrete,

brick, or bituminous concrete, narrow as well as wide;

but the essential point is that in each case the decision has been based upon the best engineering judgment of the Federal Government and the several State highway

departments, which between them employ the most

highly capable highway engineers in the country/

The 1916 Act permitted spending Federal-aid funds on practically any rural post road. Director Page

and, later, Chief MacDonald tried to focus the aid on

the main intercity and intercounty roads, but in- evitably, because of the realities of local politics, a number of roads of only local importance were improved. These failed to pass the test for inclusion in

the 7 percent system, but the States, under their contracts with the Government, were still obliged to maintain them. To relieve the States of this burden,

the Government permitted them to pay back the Federal share of the cost of these roads and then turn

them back to the counties for maintenance. This

process began in 1924 and by 1933, 1,526 miles had

been relinquished.

Stage construction was little used by the eastern and northern States. Their federal-aid mileage was

already largely improved with dustless pavement,

thousands of miles of which had been severely damaged by trucking during the war. Their problem was

to reinforce their roads to carry heavy motor trucks,

and for this they chose concrete or brick pavements,

not only because of their generally excellent service

during the war, but also because they were considered

"permanent" and, therefore, suitable for bond financing. With a few notable exceptions, these costly new

pavements were laid within the existing rights-ofway, and, thus, perpetuated the faults of poor alinement and grade that existed in the old roads.

Getting the Traffic Through and Paying the Highway

BillWithin 5 years of the debacles of 1920 and 1921, the

States had increased their capacity for roadbuilding

to the point where they were able to obligate $100

million of Federal aid per year.* By 1929 they had

improved 90 percent of the Federal-aid system, or about 170,000 miles, to some degree, at least, by adequate grading and drainage. A little less than half

of this mileage, some 79,000 miles, was improved

with Federal aid and State matching funds; the rest with State and local funds alone.^ This record was made possible not only by improved organization and management, but also by a rapid increase in the highway revenues of all the

States. The increase was accompanied by a shifting

of much of the highway tax burden from real property to the road user. In 1921 there were 10.5 million motor vehicles registered in the United States, and the owners of these

vehicles paid $122.5 million to the States in road-user

taxes.** This was about one-third of the total State

expenditures for construction. The rest came from

Federal aid and general State revenues.

* From fiscal year 1925 to fiscal year 1929, the regular

Federal-aid appropriations were $75 million per year, so this rate of obligation was possible only because of the unused

backlog of appropriations from earlier years. This backlog was used up in 1928. ** The gasoline tax, first imposed by Oregon in 1919, was

still a minor source of revenue in 1921, amounting to only

$5.4 million. By 1929 fuel taxes were $430.2 million, or 56

percent of all revenues from road users.

With more and more cars being

sold, the automotive industry

favorably affected the national

economy by requiring more materials and services for the traveler and his car.

114
By 1929 the number of vehicles had increased 21^

times, to 26.5 million, but State highway revenues had

increased over 6 times, to $763.4 million, and the per- centage of the highway burden carried by road users had risen to over 99 percent. Actually, wlien Federal

aid is considered, the road users paid about $81 million more than the cost of building and maintaining

the State highways. Some of this excess was spent

for nonhighway purposes, but most of it was dis- tributed as aid to the counties and townships."

Impact of the Motor Vehicle

The period from 1921 to 1929 was one of rising

prosperity, paced by the automobile industry which

not onl}^ increased its production astonishingly, but

also improved the vehicles while reducing prices. In

the early 1920's the industry introduced installment

sales on a large scale and strengthened the secondhand

car market. As a huge mass market for automobiles

burgeoned, sales increased from 1.6 million units in

1921 to 4.0 million in 1923 and 5.3 million in 1929,

valued at $3.4 billion. Motor vehicle manufacture

became a major industry wliich, in 1929, employed

471,000 people.

Automobiles affected the national economy in in- numerable ways. They greatly expanded the market

for steel, glass, rubber and fuel. Thousands of garages and service stations sprang up along the new

roads to care for the motorists' needs. Auto touring

had its impact on the travel business, spreading tens

of millions of dollars throughout the country. New

automobile factories, garages, tourist facilities and

the large road and street programs helped to fuel the

already imposing construction and business boom of

the twenties.

The proliferation of motor vehicles also had its dark side. As millions of new drivers took to the

roads, traffic accidents increased by leaps and bounds,

their cost reaching nearly $1.3 billion by 1929. Highway fatalities more than tripled, from 10,723 in 1918

to 31,215 in 1929.^ On the streets of the larger cities, traffic congestion

became unbearable. Police and city engineers tried

frantically to keep traffic moving by instituting one- way street schemes, by developing automatic traffic signals and by assigning the right-of-way to arterial

traffic with the innovative stop sign. One of the

simplest and most effective measures for expediting

traffic movement was by cutting back curb corners at intersections from the customary 4- or 5-foot radius

to 12 or even 15 feet. This permitted vehicles to make right turns without swinging into the adjoining

lane and greatly smoothed traffic flow. With the increase in traffic and highway-related

business, long "string towns" developed along the approaches to every city, and advertising signs by the

thousands proclaimed the virtues of innumerable

products and services to growing captive audiences.

Because of these roadside activities, new highways

became congested and dangerous within a few years

of opening, creating demands for by-passes.

Tftc increasing popularity of cars and

automotive trai'cl also had its dark side.

115
The Private Toll Bridge Menace

As interstate roads were completed and connected

with each other, the growing stream of traffic at- tracted another class of highway parasite—the private

toll bridge promoter. By 1928, private bridges were becoming a serious threat to the free use of the highways. In 1928 alone, Congress granted 75 franchises

for private toll bridges over interstate waters and

the States issued many others. Most of these were

stock promotion projects, giving favored cliques a strangle hold for years on key sites on the main highway artei'ies on terms inadequate to protect the public

interest. Chief MacDonald spoke out against this trend at the 1928 AASHO meeting

:

Private toll-bridge interests are becoming bolder and

obstructing tbe public's business. They are attempting

to defeat legislation unfavorable to themselves and are

obstructing the efforts of highway departments to carry on State projects. *****

There is much confusion in the public mind on this question. In all sincerity many have endorsed the private

toll bridge franchise on the theory that it is desirable to have bridges, and if the public funds are not sufficient or

available, rather than do without, it is better to grant a

toll franchise to private interests. This is not the is- sue . . . The real question is the very simple one of whether it is sound public policy to grant the right to

collect a private profit from the user of the highway.

The answer ought to be a vigorous and authoritative

'No.' There is no place on the public highway today for the privately owned toll bridge.** MacDonald was not against toll bridges as such,

but he thought they should be owned and operated

by the State or other public authority and freed from

toll as soon as the bonds were paid off. This type of

financing had been provided for by Congress in an

act approved March 3, 1927, which permitted Federalaid funds to be used on publicly owned toll bridges on the Federal-aid system. Such financing had also

been adopted by the Port of New York Authority for

four monumental and costly bridges, including the

immense George Washington Bridge over the Hudson

River.

Farmers in Paneytown, Ark.,

'ford stream to avoid the fee on a private toll bridge.

A toll house at the approach to a publicly owned

and operated bridge on U.S. 1 in South Carolina, 1921.

116
Chief MacDonald also warned of another threat to free highways in the possible resurgence of the private

toll road, for which the Italian autostrade were the

current models. These roads had been built in the

early 1920's on private rights-of-way, with limited

access, and were for automobiles only. The bonds were guaranteed by the Italian government. MacDonald said

The motor road on a closed right of way takes on the

characteristics of a railroad. A highway cannot be so transformed and continue to serve in a universal way. . .

If de luxe service roadways to a limited extent are

needefl on private rights of way their development should

be, undertaken by tho existing railways, not in coniiicti- tion with them. IMuch harm without componsating i)onefits will otherwise result. Once let franchises lie granted

to private interests with the necessary power of eminent

domain, and inconceivable harm would result to the

financial structure of the railways in that area."

Railroads Versus Highways

The steam railroads experienced a remarkable re- covery from the postwar doldrums in 1921.* Even

so, their net operating revenue for that year returned

them only 3 percent on their investment—not enough

to cover fixed charges.*" Some railroad executives

blamed the failure to make a better showing on truck

competition, which, they claimed was "subsidized" by

the free use of public highways paid for, in part at

least, by the railroads' own property taxes. Some

railroads moimted a publicity campaign to protest the

"unfairness" of this subsidized competition, and their

arguments were given sonie substance by President

Harding's December 1922 address to Congress in

which he said that motor haulage would be wasteful

if burdened with its proper share of the highway

cost.^* However, there were realists in the railroad industry who realized that trucks and improved highways

had come to staj' and that the railroads would have

to accommodate them. One executive said flatly that

low-volume unprofitable brancli railroads should be

replaced b}' truck lines and that trucks could help the

railroads by collecting and delivering carload freight

for long hauls.*^ In the east a number of railroads

made determined efforts to reclaim the short-haul

business from the trucks, but these efforts were onl}'

partly successful. Practically all hauls under 30 miles were gone for good, but the railroads were able to get

back a good part of the over-70-mile business, at least temporarily.

For the electric railroads, highway competition was

disastrous and eventually fatal. In the early 1920's,

few States regulated buses as common carriers, and

bus and stage lines sprang up by the hundreds, competing fiercely with each other for business.** These

* The Government returned the railroads to their owners

in 1920.

** There was a .short-lived parallel trend in the cities where

unregulated "jitneys" made huge inroads into .street railroad revenues with their flexi))le routings and cut-rate fares. The

usual fare was 5 cents, or "one jitney" in current slang, hence

the name. .litneys wei-e clearly in violation of the traction companies' charters and were eventually outlawed by most

cities, along with competing intracity buslines.

operated over most of the roads radiating out from

the cities, reaching hundreds of rural families who

were not served by the electric railroads. However,

many buses ran in direct competition with the interurban lines on parallel roads, carrying both passengers

and express. By 1923 interurban buslines were operating pneumatic-tired vehicles that would carry 30 passengers

and some even 60 passengers in relative comfort at fares of about 4 cents per mile, which closely approximated the rates charged by steam and electric rail- roads. For tlie convenience of both passengers and

buslines, the business interests in many cities, small

as well as large, organized terminal associations to provide waiting rooms and other terminal facilities for the convenience of the public." Through competition between themselves and financial mergers, the

buslines rapidly became formidable competitors of

both the steam and electric railroad lines for passenger traffic, and by 1930 most of them wei'e placed

under State regulation as common carriers.

Buses were not the only competitors for passenger

traffic. Rapidly increasing motor car ownership was

equally damaging to the railroads, and by the end of

the 1930's, most of the electric railroads were in re- ceivership. So rapid was the obsolescence and decline of this form of transportation that some of these were only 20 years old Avhen they ceased operation.

Heavy Trucks Shake the Foundations of Highway

Engineering

Up to 1917, the main problems of highway engi- neers were financial, not technological. Roadbuilding was an established art practiced essentially according

to the precepts laid down by Tresaguet, Telford and

McAdam more than a century earlier. The principal

innovation, and perhaps the earliest application of

research to roadbuilding, was the successful development of bituminous surfaces in the early 1900's to combat dusting. The roads built prior to World

War I were narrow and thin, but they were adequate

for automobiles and farm vehicles.

This feeling of technological well-being came to an

abrupt end in the spring of 1918 with the widespread

failure of roads of all types under heavy trucking.

Prevost Hubbard, the BPR's chief chemist and ex- pert on bituminous pavements described the disaster as follows:

Hundreds of miles of roads failed under the heavy

motor-truck traffic within a comparatively few weeks or months. Roads with bituminous surfaces, bituminous

macadam roads, and bituminous concrete roads all failed

alike, together with other types u.sed in State and county

work. These failures were not only sudden but complete, and almost overnight an excellent surface might

become impassable ... A very large proportion of the

failures have been characterized by an almost simul- taneous destruction of the entire road stnicture, and not merely the disintegration of the wearing course or pave- ment proper."'

Director Page made the investigation of these massive failures his first order of business for 1918. He

sent the OPRRE experts into every part of the country to investigate and report. Highway Engineer

J. L. Harrison found two kinds of failure in Illinois

117
Concrete mixer

- patching a had spot in the roadbase (asphalt top has

been removed).

and Ohio. One was failure of the base due to over- loading of a frost-softened subgrade, such as Hubbard

described, resulting in sudden and complete failure.

The other was internal failure of macadam bases due

to pressures high enough to crush the stone particles.

Harrison found failure by internal crushing in mac- adam bases as thick as 18 inches near Chicago. In

Wayne County, Michigan, he found that thin concrete pavements had broken up so badly that they had to be

resurfaced, but that those which were made 7 or 8

inches thick had withstood heavy trucking with little damage.

Albert T. Goldbeck and F. H. Jackson of the

OPRRE's Division of Tests found that brick roads on concrete bases in Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana had

stood up well except where the underlying earth

foundation had become softened due to poor soil or poor drainage.

All investigators agreed that pavements on sandy,

well-drained soils had given much better service than

those on clay soils, especially at places where drainage was poor because of inadequate ditches.

The most significant observation of all was by

Harrison who noted that hundreds of pavement fail- ures were obviously due to moisture softening clay

soils, yet the shoulders had adequate slope and drainage was excellent. Some failures were on low fills where there was no possibility that surface water

could have penetrated to the subgrade. Harrison

concluded that these failures were caused by "nongravitational water," that is, water held in the soil by

capillary attraction. Not only would such soils not

drain by gravity; they would actually take up more

water from below by capillary action due to their fine pore structure. He also declared that any theory of

design (such as McAdam's) that held that soils under

a pavement could be kept dry by an impervious cov- ering was fallacious, and therefore only soils that do

not lose their strength when wet, such as gravels and

sands, should be used there. How to Manage the Behemoth

The widespread destruction of the roads by trucking inspired angry demands for limits on the Aveight

of vehicles, and for crushing taxes on trucks to make

them "pay their fair share" of the maintenance bill. However, the more thoughtful leaders, such as Delaware's influential chief highway engineer Charles

Upham, warned that the motor truck was not just a wartime phenomenon, but would be around for years

after the war was over. ". . . the motor truck," he

said, "which has been developed during abnormal

times has shown that it has solved an economic problem, and this solution assures us that . . . the heavy

truck will be utilized for transporting freight and

express within expanding limits. Therefore, . . . we

must build and maintain in such a way that our roads

will withstand, as permanently as possible, the demands of the future heavy truck traffic." ^^ Upham's viewpoint was shared by most of the State

highway department heads, but none of them had a

clear idea of how truck traffic might develop or how

to deal with it. However, they agreed completely

that legal limits must be placed on the weight of the

vehicle and its load, and that without such limits

there would be no way to protect the rural roads from

destruction. There was a general consensus that the

5-ton capacity truck was the largest that should be

allowed on the rural roads, although about 15 percent

of the trucks then in existence were of greater ca118
— NOTICE —

No LOADS ALLOWED ON THIS ROAD

IN EXCESs:-AS follows: . WIDTH OF TIRES.

U TO li IN. 2 ,, 2i ,,. 4

j Threshing engines

roads are wet or

tion of the above

in compliance with

Ohio.

By order

County [Commissioners

No. of Lbs.

^500 LBS.

35oo , , . 5 000 , . . 6 000 . ,

prohibited when

MUDDY. Any violawill BE PROSECUTED

SEC.4904-R.S.OF

\

\'',*m

A load limit loas one

ansiccr to the problem

of heavy trucks breaking

up the road surface.

pacity than that.* A few States had already set weight limits that would permit net loads up to about

7 tons and were planning to strengthen their roads

to carry these loads.**

Spokesmen for the infant trucking industry urged

the States not to strangle trucking by imposing unrealistically low weight limits. George Pride, President of the Heavy Haulage Company of New York

City, spoke out against the 3-ton limit advocated by

several States, which, he said, would increase hauling

costs by 20 percent, as compared to hauling in 5-ton or larger trucks.

. . . either directly or indirectly, the ultimate consumer

pays the cost of all transportation of the commodities he

uses. If the cost of transportation is lessened by the motor truck, he gets the benefit of the decrease ; or, conversely, if it should be increased by unduly restrictive

legislation, he would be penalized to the extent of the added expense.''

Pride recommended that gross loads of 28,000

poimds on four wheels be permitted and also that

* For example, in 1917 there were 55,401 trucks registered

in Xew York, of which 8,895, or 14 percent, were of 6 or more tons capacity. Of these, 3,319 could carrj' 10 tons or more."

** The limit in New Jersey was 30,000 pounds gross. Maryland permitted 7-ton trucks to operate but imposed a license tax of $500 on them, compared to .$60 for a 3-ton truck. Connecticut restricted gross loads to 25,000 pounds on four

wheels.

tests be made by an impartial committee to ascertain

the real damage caused by trucks to the roads. He

also warned:

Whatever may be the immediate limit placed upon the motor truck, it is my judgment that it must not be con- sidered final. We are on the eve of vast developments,

and requirements of the future will demand greater

weights, better and different types of road beds, reduced

grades, etc." In April 1918, the Engineering News-Record declared that the economic and engineering problems

brought on by trucking should be faced squarely and

not postponed:

. . . highways have never been investigated with the thoroughness that is necessary to prove their right to rank with the railroad or the waterway as a transportation agency . . . We are faced at the outset, then with

the question whether it will pay to build better and

costlier roads than any yet contemplated ; whether it will pay to adopt the trailer idea ... or whether the pneumatic tire, now being developed by at least one company for the heaviest loads, will not in the end prove

the solution." As long as the country was at war, little could be

done on engineering and economic investigations.

HoAvever, the truck problem received a high place on

the agenda for the Joint Highway Congress held in

Chicago in December 1918. By resolution, that body

not only recommended a thorough investigation of

motor truck regulations and limitations, but also

urged the States to undertake experiments on different types of pavements to develop basic engineering knowledge. The Congress, which was dominated

119
by urban and industrial interests, also recommended

that gross loads of 14 tons be permitted on the highways provided the load per inch width of tire did not

exceed 800 pounds.*

Launching a National Highway Research Program

The matter was brought to a head in August 1919

by Thomas R. Agg, Testing Engineer of the Iowa

State Highway Commission, who wrote in an article

for Public Roads magazine:**

During the past 10 years, the transition from horse- drawn to motor traffic has been so nearly complete that horse drawn-traffic can no longer be considered a controlling factor in highway design ; yet practically all of the basic principles of highway construction were evolved

for horse-drawn traffic. These have been modified from

time to time as experience has indicated defects, but for the most part local conditions have been so large a factor

that types and designs which have been satisfactory in

* The 800-pound figure was recommended by tire manufacturers as the maximum economic loading for solid truck

tires. Heavier loads would, they said, cause crushing of the rubber and premature failure by fatigue. At this time the widest tire manufactured was 14 inches, so the maximum

load that could economically be carried by a two-wheel axle was 22,400 pounds.'"

** Public Roads was an official publication of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. It had been launched in May

1918, by Logan Waller Page as a vehicle for exchange among

the States of information on methods for financing, building,

and maintaining roads. By 1919, Public Roads was an im- portant voice for the highway engineering profession and

also, in effect, the journal of AASHO, which did not have its own publication, American Highways, until 1922.

one State have proven entirely unsatisfactory in another. . . . It seems imperative that investigation in the field of highway engineering be prosecuted with the utmost vigor

during the next few years, else it will be found that much of the money expended for highway improvement

has not secured highways of the maximum serviceability

because the design and the requirements for materials were based on unsound theories or inadequate tests." Agg then urged that the Bureau of Public Roads

take the lead in a national program of highway re- search : The bureau has already done a large amount of re- search work in this field and has trained investigators for carrying on the work and for passing on projects

submitted for action . . . But most important of all, the bureau is in close touch with the highway work in the various States and is in a position to judge as to the problems most imperative of solution and to secure the

assistance of the State highway departments in those problems requiring the actual construction of surfaces

or structures." In a companion article, A. R. Hirst, President of

AASHO, not only endorsed Agg's proposal but

pledged AASHO's support "for this very great and

necessary work."

I agree thoroughly with Mr. Agg in his statements

that the present facilities for highway engineering in- vestigations are not adequate to meet the situation, or

to develop the theories upon which the future science of highway engineering should be based.

It is to my mind certain that unless the United States Bureau of Public Roads builds up a good and extensive organization to prosecute these inquiries, that nothing

of value can or will be done by any other existing or- ganization."

Truck damage to roadways led to a coordinated national research program by 1920.

120
Agg's and Hirst's appeal set the stage for a series

of events that resulted in the forniation on November

11, 1920, of the National Advisory Board on Highway Research, under the auspices of the National

Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. This Advisory Board was conceived as a means of bringing together in a coordinated national

research program all the various agencies and organizations involved in highwa^v transportation and highway research. The organization of the Board was

completed July 1921 with the appointment of Dr. W.

K. Hatt of Purdue University as Executive Director.

As his first job. Director Hatt prepared a list of

19 "fundamental questions in highway transport,"

which, he said, could not be answered without data

that then were unavailable. A few of these questions, listed below, illustrate the extent of the current

ignorance of fundamental highway problems i^* • "Wliat is the economical highway track unit for

each of the several situations, e.g., intercity, farm

to market? • Wliat is the cost of transport arising from the

vehicle and from the road ? • "Wliat type of road paving should be selected for

a specific transport unit ? • How should the design of the road and paving

be modified to meet changing conditions of subgrade, climate, etc.? How shall subsoils be improved ? • T^-Tiat sum of money is the locating engineer

justified in spending to avoid increase in distance,

curvature, rise and fall, maximum grade, maximum curve? • What is the capacity of a road of given width as

expi'essed in vehicles per hour, ton-miles per

year, etc.? A^liat is the appropriate unit for ex- pressing traffic for various purposes ? • How can the volumetric changes in roads be overcome ? • "VATiat is the economic life of various types of

roads ? • "V^^lat police regulations should control the use

of roads? • What principles should govern the selection of a system of roads in its various parts, as influenced

by interstate, inti-astate, county or local traffic? • To what extent do social betterment, military

use, i.e., social value, and other imponderables

enter into highway policy ? • How shall safety be ensured on the roads?

Hatt posed these questions at a meeting of educators and industrial leaders held at the University

of Maryland in August 1921 and urged "a mobilization of the efforts, of research agencies in a comprehensive program," adding that the National Research

Council would be glad to coordinate the research but

would not engage in research directly.^^

At this time the Bureau of Public Roads was the

only research organization that was prepared to immediately begin work on a large-scale research program, and, in fact, it was already working on some

aspects of the program. The BPR had 13 major

studies underway in the field of physical research and

its research budget was about one-third of the total national expenditure on highway research.* Chief

MacDonald took the lead in the national program by

expanding the BPR's in-house activities and also by

entering into cooperative research agreements with

State highway departments and universities.

The Fruits of Research

Throughout the 1920's, with two notable exceptions,

the brunt of the research effort fell upon the Bureau,

primarily because it had the only large assured in- come available for the costly studies that were re- quired.**

For about 5 years, the investigators concentrated

mainly on soil and pavement research to provide immediately usable information to guide the vast paving

programs that were already underway. As a result

of these studies, all States stopped using thin, that is, 4- and 5-inch pavements and they rapidly adopted a 20-foot minimum width for main road pavements.***

One of the major fruits of the research program was

a rational method of analysis proposed in 192.5 by

Professor H. M. Westergaard of the University of

Illinois, which removed much of the guesswork from

slab design.

Out of the BPR soils investigations there came a

practical system for classifying soils into eight groups

based on physical properties that could be measured

by simple laboratory tests. This was a tremendous

step forward, for it enabled the researchers to relate

pavement performance to measurable soil properties

and, ultimately, to predict in advance of construction

the type and depth of pavement that might be re- quired for any field condition.

* In 1920, 22 State highway departments spent about

$175,000 on research and 21 colleges and universities about

$150,000. In addition, the BPR spent about $150,000.'" ** The two exceptions were the Bates Experimental Road,

financed liy the Illinois Division of Highways, and the Pitts- burg, California, Test Track built by the Columbia Steel Company with private funds. The Federal Highway Act of 1921 authorized the Secretary

of Agriculture to deduct up to 2% percent of all Federal-aid

appropriations for administering Federal aid "and for carry- ing on necessary highway research and investigational studies independently or in cooperation with the State highway de- partments and other research agencies . . ." From 1922 to 1932 the sums so set aside amounted to $1.87 million per

year, of which probably one-half went into research. By

contrast, the States were unable to use Federal-aid funds for

research, because the Government's policy was to approve

the use of these funds only for constmction.

*** The Bates and Pittsburg Tests showed that narrower pavements channeled traffic near the edges and caused ex- cessive comer and edge breakage. In 1928 the AASHO rec- ommended in its first published I'oad standards that the minimum width of one traffic lane be 10 feet. Other considerations, such as safety and freedom of maneuver at higher

speeds, also entered into this I'ecommendation. AASHO also reconunended a minimum thickness of 6 inches for concrete pavements and the strengthening of all unsupported pave- ment edges in its 1928 standards."

121
Highway Planning Begins

In 1920 the Bureau of Public Roads began a series

of "transportation surveys" in cooperation with the

States, and in a few instances, with counties and

cities as well. In all, there were 16 investigations

extending over a period of 16 years. Twenty States were involved at various times with the BPR in the

studies.

The first surveys were essentially traffic censuses to help the cooperating States select their 7-percent

Federal-aid systems. Gradually, the studies became more and more research-oriented, and by 1925 the

BPR and the States were looking into every aspect

of highway transportation : the ownership of motor

vehicles; the seasonal, monthly and daily variations

in traffic; the types of vehicles using the roads; the

origin and destination of cargoes; the size and weight

of trucks and the kinds of tires they ran on, and

whether they were overloaded. In the later studies,

they examined driver behavior—the average speeds

of drivers traveling freely on the highway and their

observance of traffic laws, such as those prohibiting

passing on hills and curves. In Maine, the researchers discovered a historical

relationship between vehicle ownership, population

and traffic. By projecting historical trends ahead,

they were able to make fair estimates of traffic 5 years

in the future. From these predictions, the investigators placed the highways in priority groups according to traffic density, the amount of future truck

traffic, and need for improvement. Finally, they suggested improving the deficient mileage to an adequate

standard for the 5-year future traffic, financing the

improvements with either a bond issue or an increase

in the gasoline tax."* Following the Maine study, this

Maryland State Roads Commission testing laboratory.

i

Gore drilling outfit taking test cores.

122
kind of analysis was applied with increasing sophistication and accuracy in other States. A major improvement was the substitution of gasoline consumption for population increase as an indicator of future

traffic growth.

The Cleveland Regional Area Traffic Survey of

1927 brought all levels of government—Federal, State,

county and city—together for the first time in a concerted study of the traffic problem in a single metropolitan region. The BPR whicli paid half of the cost of the survey, agreed to participate only on condition

that the study be areawide without respect to political

boundaries and that it lead to a general highway plan

for the region. The study actually resulted in a 10- year improvement plan costing $63 million—a budget

well within the capability of the region. The report

of the survey ended with a note of caution which was

to be a guidepost to future planners

Traffic conditions, however, are constantly changing,

and the recurrence of present conditions can be prevented

only by careful and far-sighted planning based on a

definite Icnowledge of these changing highway and traffic conditions. Proper highway planning must be a con- tinuous process, based on a continuing series of facts in order that the constantly increasing traffic demands may

be foreseen and met with improvements as required.'"

The Highway Boom Continues

A decade of unprecedented national prosperity

ended in 1929, although signs of a slowdown had appeared earlier. The building industry, which had

been in slow decline for 2 years, went into a slump

early in 1929. By late summer the building-related

industries—steel, cement, lumber—were curtailing

production. Automobile sales began falling, but the

industry, in a runaway boom, produced 5,337,087 vehicles, a record not to be equaled for 20 years.^"

After the stock market collapse of October 1929,

deflation gained momentum as factory after factory

reduced production. With a huge unsold backlog of

1929 cars hanging over the market, the auto industry

cut back to 3.36 million units in 1930, 2.38 million in

1931, and 1.33 million in 1932 and laid off thousands

of workers.^^ Nationally, unemployment increased

from 1.5 million in 1929 to 12 million in 1932 as the

gross national product dropped from its 1929 high of

$104 billion to $58.5 billion in 1932.

Throughout this massive deflation, roadbuilding

held up much better than other kinds of manufacturing. During the "Roaring Twenties," the States built

up their roadbuilding capability to the point where

they could obligate $100 million of Federal aid per

year. This rate exceeded Congress authorizations

and was possible only because of the backlog of un- expended funds from the early years of the program.

By 1928 this backlog was exhausted and the States

began to cut back their programs to fit the authorizations, which were only $75 million per year. The

slowdown became apparent in fiscal year 1929, when

the completed Federal-aid mileage that year (initial

construction plus stage construction) fell to 9,386

miles from its 1928 level of 10,174 miles, and it car- ried on into fiscal year 1930.^^ After the 1929 crash. Congress, at the President's

request, sought to bolster the sagging economy by

authorizing large sums for public works, including

highways. The authorization of April 4, 1930 (46

Stat 141) increased the regular Federal aid for fiscal year 1931 by $50 million, to a total of $125 million,

and authorized $125 million per year for 1932 and

1933. The Secretary of Agriculture apportioned the new 1931 funds immediately and also made the 1932

apportionments available for use in September 1930,

instead of December, as in the past. This action

made $175 million of Federal funds immediately

available, which was more than many States were able

to match, principally because their legislatures were

not in session to make the matching appropriations

and would not meet until January 1931, or later. Congress met this situation by appropriating $80

million to be apportioned among the States in the same manner as Federal aid and to be used to match

the regular Federal -aid apportionments. These funds were really advances to the States, not grants, and

were to be repaid by deduction from the regular

Federal-aid apportionments over a period of 5 years. Further, Congress required that all of < these emer- gency funds be obligated by September 1, 1931.*

The States responded to this stimulus with com- mendable promptness. By June 30, 1931, they obli- gated $55 million of the emergency money and by

August the entire amount, along with most of the

regular Federal aid. Completed initial and stage

construction jumped to 11,033 miles, and in 1932 it went far beyond that, to 15,997 miles.

In a small way, this highway construction helped

to stabilize employment, particularly winter employment for farmers who had been hard hit by severe drought in 1930. Chief MacDonald reported that the

early authorizations and the emergency loans had

boosted employment on Federal-aid highway projects

from 30,944 men in January 1931 to 155,466 in July

1931, while the total of all Federal and State highway

employment that month was 385,349 men.^^ However,

the stimulation was short-lived and by July 1932,

total highway employment was only 305,372 persons.^*

Diversion of Highway Revenues—A Thorny Issue In the early years of the Depression, there was a precipitous drop in the collections from income and

property taxes. Personal income was down and destitution was widespread. Millions of people lost their

life savings in the stock market crash and the wave

of bank failures that followed. Drought and low

agricultural prices wiped out tens of thousands of

farmers who lost their farms by foreclosures and tax

sales. The resulting shortfall of revenue was felt with particular acuteness by the counties and townships which had traditionally depended on property

taxation for the support of schools and local roads.

Surprisingly, road-user revenues were remarkably

stable. Motor vehicle registrations increased slightly

in 1930 as compared to 1929, reaching the peak of an

* Emergency Construction Act of December 20, 1930 (46

Stat 1030). The Hayden-Cartwright Act of June 18, 1934, converted these loans into outright grants.

123
uninterrupted rising trend extending back to the in- vention of the automobile.* To millions of owners,

the automobile was no longer a luxury but a necessity

of daily existence, and sometimes gasoline came ahead

of food and clothing in the family budget. The 1931

receipts from vehicle registrations and fees were only

6.7 percent below 1929, and in 1932 the yield dropped

another 1.9 percent. These were insignificant losses compared to the massive deficiencies in other public

revenues. The shrinkage of $26.9 million per year in revenue from registrations and fees was more than

made up by a whopping $5.5.5 million increase in the

annual yield of the fuel tax which, with registrations,

gave the States an annual highway revenue in addition to Federal aid of $807 million in 1932.3« This huge revenue was an irresistible magnet to hard-pressed legislatures. In the words of one commentator, ". . . the motor tax has become a big red

apple within easy reach, viewed with slavering lips

by every agency of government." ^^ In 1932, 16 States

"diverted" $82.8 million of road-user revenue to non- highway purposes, over one-half of this by New York.

Diversions increased to $145 million in 1933 and $164

million in 1934; and in the decade from 1930 to 1939

they totaled the huge sum of $1.25 billion.^® Diversion of highway funds to nonhighway purposes began before the Depression but did not become

a real detriment to the highway improvement program until about 1930. In 1916 six States diverted

their entire receipts from motor-vehicle fees—some

$700,000—to nonhighway purposes. When the gasoline tax became popular, diversions increased, until

by 1924 they were about $10.7 million nationwide.

By this time, motorists, the automotive industries,

and the good roads supporters began to be alarmed by

the trend. In 1928 they had enough influence in

Kansas and Missouri to push through constitutional

amendments prohibiting diversion of highway reve- nues.

Its opponents argued that diversion was unfair be- cause it saddled one class of taxpayers—the motorists—with more than their fair share of the general

expenses of government. The author of Oregon's

pioneering gasoline tax law said, "We might as well

tax sugar to build roads as to tax gasoline to run the

government." ^^ In particular, diversion penalized

lower income families, hundreds of thousands of

whom were totally dependent on automobiles and

buses to get to work and back again.**

However, the most telling argument against diversion was that it was self-defeating as a means of

fighting unemployment. In 1932 J. L. Harrison of

the BPR traced the employment generated by the

construction of reinforced concrete pavement and

found that ultimately 80 to 90 percent of the total

expenditure was laid out for labor and that only one- seventh of this labor was direct employment at the

road site. In other words, for every person employed

directly on the job, seven others were indirectly employed making cement, aggregates, and machinery

and in transporting these products through the econ- omy.*^ Dollars, therefore, were much more effective

when used to build roads than when used for direct

relief or a dole. This argument was not lost on the Congress, which

not only greatly increased authorizations for roads,

but also declared in the Hayden-Cartwright Act of

June 18, 1934:

Since it is unfair and unjust to tax motor-vehicle transportation unless the proceeds of such taxation are

applied to the construction, improvement or maintenance

of highways, after June 30, 1935, Federal aid for highway construction shall be extended only to those States that use at least the amounts now provided by law for such purposes in each State from State motor vehicle

registration fees, licenses, gasoline taxes, and other special taxes on motor-vehicle owners and operators . . . Only two States lost Federal money because of this

Act, but it put a brake on further diversions, while

the antidiversionists marshaled public opinion for a

series of constitutional amendments that, along with an improving economic climate, eventually brought

the problem under control. By 1942, 14 States had

such amendments.*

Priming the Pump

As the national economy continued to decline,

Congress applied another stimulus in the Emergency

Relief and Construction Act of July 21, 1932. This

Act appropriated $120 million for advances to the

States to match Federal-aid funds with the proviso

that the funds should be obligated before July 1, 1933. The advances were to be repaid by deduction

from regular Federal-aid apportionments over a period of 10 years.**

In a number of States, this assistance was sorely

needed. Many had over extended themselves during

the business boom by huge bond issues secured by the

State's highway revenues.*** By 1927 bond interest

and repayments were an appreciable part of the highway budget in many States, amounting to $48 million

nationwide; and by 1932 this figure had risen to $90

million.*^ As had been predicted by opponents of

bond financing, these payments became a heavy burden, cutting into the funds available for maintenance

* Registration peaked at 26,523,779 vehicles in 1930. From

1921 to 1926 registrations had increased at a rate of about

16 percent per year, but for the years 1927 to 1929, this rate dropped to about 6 percent per year. From 1931 to 1934

registrations were 24 to 25 million per year.'" ** About 1940 a study by the Department of Commercp

.showed that half of all car-owning families had a weel?ly

income of $30 or less, three-fourths had less than $40 per week and 90 percent less than $60 per week.""

* The Federal Government did not practice what it preached. Until 1956, it treated excise taxes on motor ve- hicles and fuels as general revenues not connected in any

way with grants to the States for highways. From 1918 through 1930 the Federal Government collected $1.17 billion

in excise taxes and from 1933 through 1936 another $1.08

billion." ** These advances were converted to grants by the HaydenCartwright Act of .Tune 18, 1934. *** Illinois had pioneered this method of placing the highway burden on the road users in its $60 million bond issue of 1919." In 1923, the Legislature, against the opposition of business and financial interests, approved the issue of an

additional $100 million of highway bonds."

124
and even for matching Federal aid.* State funds were further depleted by increased allocations of

highway revenues to counties to meet the charges on

their own highway bonds and to replace shriveling

property taxes, by payments to the financially be- leaguered cities and b}' diversion to nonhighway purposes, principally schools and relief. The road contracts financed with Emergency Relief

and Construction funds were the first to contain pre- determined minimum wages for skilled and unskilled

labor. Congress insisted on these determinations to protect labor from wage pressure and arrest fui^ther

deflation in wage rates. These contracts set tlic pat- tern for other road work, and in a short time, minimum wages became standard provisions in all public

works contracts. With the change of administrations in 1933, the

Government suspended regular Federal-aid authorizations and embarked on a massive program of

emergency public works. The National Industrial

Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 provided $400 million

in grants to the States without the requirement that

they be matched by State funds and instituted some

notable changes in Federal road policy. For the first time, Federal funds could be sjDent on urban streets that were extensions of the Federal-aid highway sys- tem to and through municipalities and on "secondary

and feeder roads" that were not on the Federal-aid

system.**

To spread the work, Congress limited employment

to 30 hours per week per worker, prohibited convict

labor, and required that hand labor methods be used

"wherever consistent with sound economy and public

advantage." The States were required to predetermine fair wage rates and to give employment prefer- ence to veterans. Congress continued the emergency program by appropriating $200 million for unmatched grants to the

States in the 1934 Hayden-Cartwright Act and, a year later, $200 million for highways and $200 million for eliminating hazards at railroad grade cross- ings in the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of

April 8, 1935. These grants, with the National Industrial Recovery Act grant, pumped a billion dollars

into highway construction between 1933 and 1938

enough to assure the continuation of highway building at boom levels. Altogether, the emergency funds

financed over 54.000 miles of road improvements on

the Federal-aid system, urban extensions and secondary feeder roads, plus the elimination of nearly 3,000

railroad grade crossings.*^

Of equal or greater importance in the reckoning of

the Administration, the emergency program provided

the equivalent of 162.000 full-time jobs per year at the job site during the depths of the Depression.***

Indirect employment generated by the program was

well over 480,000 full-time jobs.*

The Broadening of Federal Highway Policy

The emergency funding for 1933, 1934 and 1935

had channeled Federal money into urban areas and

into secondary farm-to-market roads not on the

Federal-aid system. These emergency measures be- came permanent Federal policy in the 1934 HaydenCartwright Act, which also abolished the limit on

Federal payment per mile of road. In this Act, Congress resumed its practice of authorizing Federal-aid

funds 2 years in advance, and also the requirement

that Federal funds be matched by the States.**

This return to established Federal -aid principles

locked the rather considerable Federal-aid authorizations into the 1936, 1937 and subse(]uent budgets and

also i)i-ovol<:ed a bitter attack on Federal aid from the

President. On November 27, 1937, President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress protesting that Congress practice of advance authorizations "ties the

hands of the Executive" and the Budget Director and

should be abandoned. The President's message seemed

merely to antagonize the Congress and strengthened

its support for Federal aid. Senator Carl Hayden,

the principal defender of Federal aid stated publicly

that tying the hands of the Executive in the use of

road funds was "exactly what the Congress intended

to do." He continued,

'Although the President transmitted with his message

the draft of a bill to change the system and repeal much

of the basic highway law, there teas not one Senator or one member of the House of Representatives who would

even introduce the bill, and the system has continued to operate just as it is now functioning.' TM

The Hayden-Cartwright Act permitted the States

to use Federal-aid funds for plans, surveys and engineering investigations for future work, and this

authority was broadened in the Agricultural Appropriations Act of June 16, 1936 to include economic

investigations as well. The States could use up to

11/^ percent of their matched Federal aid for these

activities. This money provided the stimulus and the means for statewide highway planning surveys in

every State similar to the BPR's cooperative trans- portation studies of the preceding decade. In a few

* To redeem its certificates of indebtedness, thp Louisiana

Highway Commission laid off half of its maintenance employees January 1933, replacing them with relief workers.''

** The Secretary of Agriculture channeled one-quarter of the funds into urban extensions and one-quarter of the re- mainder into feeder roads. *** Actual employment fluctuated seasonally from about

70,000 In the winter months to as high as 336,000 in summer.**

* BPR studies of a decade of highway expenditures showed

that, nationwide, 24.4 percent of the total highway cost was

for direct labor at the job site, 50.3 percent was for indirect labor for producing materials and equipment used on the job,

and the remainder reached workers in other industries stim- ulated by the highway investments. For high-type surfaces,

direct labor on the job was only 18 percent of the total cost, but for grading work, it went as high as 43 percent of the

cost. The BPR concluded, "Where hand labor is permitted

to replace modern equipment the amount of improvement

obtained with a given expenditure is materially reduced, and

the benefit to indirect or industrial labor in cities becomes

almost negligible." "

** The States were required to match the Federal funds

dollar for dollar except for those States in which more than

5 percent of the total area was nontaxable public domain or Indian lands, where the Ferleral share was larger. In Nevada, where such lands were over 80 percent of the State's

total area. Federal aid was about 90 percent of the total project cost.

125
years, all of the States developed strong planning

and research organizations which joined with the

Bureau and the universities in the first comprehensive

investigation of national highway problems. This

national study led directly to Congress authorization

in 1944 of a system of "interregional highways"

within the Federal-aid system.

In these two Acts Congress not only continued its traditional support for roads in the national forests,*

but also appropriated funds for roads in Indian

reservations, national parks, and unreserved lands of

the public domain, and for "parkways to give access

to national parks, and national monuments, or to be- come connecting sections of a national parkway

plan . . ."

Obsolescence Overtakes the Highways

After 1921 the States concentrated their efforts on improving the 7 percent Federal-aid system into a

travelable national network. As traffic became heavier in volume and faster, the States improved the

highways to keep pace. They widened pavements

first to 18 feet as required by the Federal Highway

Act of 1921 and then to 20 feet. Some States banked

the curves of old roads to make them safer and flat- tened the cut slopes for greater visibility. The highway departments of the public land States smoothed

thousands of right angle turns with flatter curves. For the most part, these improvements were accomplished by the maintenance forces or by small contracts with State funds. But in 1929, for the first time the BPR began to approve Federal aid for "re- construction" of roads previously improved with

Federal-aid funds. By June 1930, nearly 21 miles in

five States had been reconstructed, and this mileage

increased rapidly in succeeding years. The roads in the eastern and northern States, where

the Federal-aid mileage had been reinforced after

World War I with concrete or brick pavements, were

still far from worn out by 1930 but were obsolete

in alinement, grade and width, resulting in thousands

of miles being rebuilt during the 1930's. In many

cases the States made entirely new locations, relinquishing the old roads to the local authorities.

As could be expected, there was no lack of criticism

for these abandonments because when the roads were

originally paved, it is doubtful that a relocation policy

would have been possible. To begin with, in the early

1920's, property holders would have considered it ex- travagant to jettison the old road and its improvements. The crying need was for durable surfacing,

and most everyone thought the available funds should

be spent on this rather than right-of-way and new

grading. Then, too, diverting the road from its old course would have been bitterly resisted by landowners along the route, with possibly years of delay in

getting the program started. For most of them, the

roads were already good enough in alinement and

width.

Long distance travel by road had not developed and was not foreseen. For the local movements from one town to its immediate neighbors the indirection of the

old roads was not a disadvantage, but an advantage. Motor vehicles were incapable of high speed and were

legally restricted to very low speeds. The desire for the present high speed had not been born in a populace still tied to its home places and regarding 30 miles an hour

as a breakneck pace. The improved curvature obtainable by slightly cutting the corners of the existing rights-ofway was all that was believed to be needed, and all that could reasonably be foreseen as required in the future." By 1934 the Federal-aid system, including authorized additions, mostly in national forests and public

land areas, comprised 207,231 miles; and 96 percent

of it had received some kind of improvement.* But

the improved sections varied widely in adequacy for

traffic and in safety for road users. In Chief MacDonald's words.

Moreover, in the effort to extend surfaced mileage the presence of defects in alignment and the generally lower

standards of the earlier work had been tolerated. Bridges

inherited from a much earlier period had been held in service though in many cases it was necessary to post

them for limited loads and their narrow widths pro- hibited the safe passing of vehicles on them. Thousands

of railroad grade crossings had been allowed to remain,

each in some degree hazardous. All these known defects had been tolerated to advance more rapidly the first essential task of smoothing and strengthening the road

surfaces to get a growing traffic through.""

The improvements eased the worst bottlenecks

temporarily, but for many thousands of miles, it was

impossible to build a really adequate road on the

existing locations. The roads were simply too crooked

and the rights-of-way too narrow to permit upgrading

to modern standards. More and more, the States began to build new roads on new locations for high

speed traffic, relinquishing the old ones to the counties

for maintenance.

The locators of these new roads and the Bureau of

Public Roads' engineers who approved them held a philosophy of location that was best expressed in 1920

by Delaware's influential chief engineer, Charles M.

Upham

:

In giving consideration to alignment roads may be

divided into two classes, roads located within parks, and

intended as scenic roads and used mainly by sightseers

and tourists, and roads that can be considered as commercial and industrial roads, which would be located within and between business centers, towns and cities. . .

.

In considering the alignment of commercial roads, or

direct routes, it must always be remembered that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points,

and from a commercial standpoint the shortest way is not only the most direct, but with other things equal, is the most economical ; therefore, it seems to be practically conceded that ideally aligned commercial roads

are those that are laid in absolutely straight lines. Where there are costly influences entering the problem

that make it impossible or impracticable to follow the

straight line, then the alignment should approach the

straight line, and become a compromise of line, grade,

and cost of construction.^ This dogma dominated highway engineering in the

United States for half a century, leaving a legacy of

thousands of miles of absolutely straight monotonous

highway.

From 1917 through fiscal year 1933, Congress appropriated $122 million for forest highways, most of which was

administered directly by the Bureau of Public Roads.

* Of the improved mileage, almost 80,000 miles had been accomplished by the States without Federal aid.

126
tf^jM^'JSft

The first centerline on a rural State highway was painted

between Marquette and Ishpeming, Mich., in 1917.

Highway Safety Becomes a Serious National Problem

Aside from Upham's arguments, there were two

main justifications for straight highways. Having

no curves, they were thought to be less hazardous to drive and also practically immune to obsolescence,

since a straight road can be driven at the maximum

speed of wliich an automobile is capable. This last argument was important at a time when speed records were falling almost every year at the Indianapolis

Speedway and many engineers were predicting stock car speeds of 70 or even 80 miles per hour.

The safety argument was even more persuasive.

Throughout the 1920's highway fatalities kept pace

with the growth of the vehicle fleet and by 1924 had

reached almost 20,000 per year.^* Recognizing that

the problem was national in scope, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover convened the First National

Conference on Street and Highway Safety in Washington in December 1924. Here, for the first time,

representatives of State highway and motor vehicle

commissions, police, insurance companies, the steam

and electric railroads, safety councils and chambers

of commerce, labor unions, women's clubs, automobile

associations, automotive manufacturers, and truck and

bus operators met in one place to discuss means of

abating what was already a national scandal.

Committees appointed 6 months in advance reported

wide differences in traffic regulations from State to State and city to city. They found "an almost total

lack of systematic effort to secure accurate and complete data regard such [traffic] accidents, their types

127
and causes, and methods of prevention." Twenty

States made no attempt to collect accident statistics. Only 8 States required that accidents resulting in

personal injury be reported to the commissioner of

motor vehicles or similar centralized authority, and

38 required railroads and common carriers to report

highway accidents.'^

The Committee on Traffic Control reported that

high road crowns, a carryover from the earlier days

of horsedrawn traffic, caused the "currents of traffic" to hug the middle of the road instead of keeping to the right. Hand signals to warn others of the intentions of drivers were not standardized, causing con- fusion and hazard. The Committee concluded that it was impossible to fix any safe speed limit but that

traveling at a speed of over 35 miles an hour should

be considered unreasonable and evidence of reckless

driving. The Committee doubted the feasibility of

imposing minimum speed limits on heavily traveled

highways, even though failure to follow the prevailing speed was a recognized cause of accidents.^®

The Committee on Construction and Engineering

brought in a long list of inadequacies in the highways

and recommended that no paved road or street should

be less than 18 feet wide, or any bridge less than 22

feet wide. Rural highways should be provided with

emergency off-road stopping places at intervals not

exceeding 300 feet, and stopping on the traveled way

should then be prohibited. Grades for primary highways should be 6 percent or less but might go up to 9

percent in the mountains; the minimum curve radius

should be 300 feet, and a 300-foot sight distance

should be provided everywhere on main highways.

For safety, high crowns should be reduced and curves

superelevated and widened.^'^ A white centerline

stripe should be painted on the pavement to indicate

no-passing danger sections such as curves and hilltops,

and signs warning of hazards such as curves and rail- road crossings should be uniform throughout the

United States.^^ Noting that 10 percent of all fatalities were at railroad grade crossings, the Committee

recommended that a priority program be set up to eliminate the most dangerous crossings first.^^ The Committee on the Motor Vehicle reported that a vehicle speed governor would be desirable but that

as yet a practical one had not been devised. The

most urgent safety problem facing the industry was

the design of headlights that would adequately il- luminate the road ahead without blinding oncoming

drivers. Illumination engineers had worked out combinations of lenses and mirrors, but these compromises were difficult to keep in adjustment and were

far from satisfactory.* Another difficult problem was

providing adequate vision for the driver. The Committee thought that "Some device for cleaning the

windshield from rain and snow, that can be con- veniently operated by the driver should be available . . ." and also that "All windshields should be

designed so that they can be opened to allow clear

vision in case circumstances make it impossible to

* This problem was not adequately resolved until the intro- duction of sealed beam headlights about 20 years later.

keep the windshield clean." ®° This Committee also

thought that vehicles should be so designed that the

accelerator could not be easily confused with the brake

pedal and all vehicles should have brakes capable of

stopping the vehicle in 50 feet from a speed of 20

miles per hour.^^

The Conference approved and recommended the

adoption by legislative, administrative, technical and

educational bodies of a wide range of measures

"which, if carried out even in part, will effect an immediate reduction in the accident toll." It also

recommended that the States, as the sovereign politi- cal units closest to the problem, take the lead by pass- ing adequate motor vehicle laws and setting up

suitable machinery for administering them and for

policing the highways, registering vehicles and licensing drivers. To the Federal Government, the Conference assigned the role of encouragement, assembly

and distribution of information, and the development

and use of good practices, leaving the achievement of

uniformity to the voluntary action of the various

States. Under legislative principles the Conference

declared,

There is in the opinion of the Conference, a tendency

to include far too much detail in legislation. This not only divides responsibility but also hinders progress toward uniformity. Laws should be so drafted as to include only those features which must be authorized by

legislation, leaving the great mass of detailed regulations

to be prescribed by the responsible officials whose orders

should, within the limits fixed by statute, have the effect of law. There should be a minimum of restrictive laws and

regulations, for the history of transportation shows that

restrictive measures written without regard to economic

needs have always proved a failure.^^ For lack of reliable statistics, the Conference was

unable to come to any formal conclusion as to the

causes of highway accidents. However, there is little doubt that most of the delegates agreed with Secretary Hoover when he said.

It is impossible to put the whole blame for the deplor- able conditions upon any particular individuals or any

particular classes of traffic. If we were to analyze the

facts presented to the conference as to the causes of this enormous death roll (sic) and injury we would find that incompetence, carelessness, and recklessness are the largest contributors to this ghastly toll. We would find in a

lesser degree the lack of preventive measures. We would

find a considerable contribution from confusion over the regulations in force. We would find also that prevention

of accidents is in part involved in large problems of

difficult solution in the planning of our cities, the con- struction of highways, and generally the handling of these new traffic problems that have been thrown upon

cities and country wholly unplanned for such use.*'

Secretary Hoover called another conference for

March 1926. During the interim between this and

the first conference, a special committee drew up a model "Uniform Vehicle Code" covering the registration and titling of vehicles, the licensing of drivers

and the operation of vehicles on the highways, which

incorporated the best features of the numerous and

varied State laws then on the statute books. The

second conference approved this code, recommending

it to the State legislatures as the basis for uniform

motor vehicle legislation.®*

128
Highway-railroad grade crossings

such as the one at left were common

hazards for automobile traffic up

to the 1930's.

A year of study by another committee of the second

conference disclosed that ascertaining the causes of

accidents was far moi'e difficult than had once been

supposed. . It was not sufficient to ascribe most of the

accident problem to human incompetence, carelessness

and recklessness. Even if adequate accident records were available, this committee thought a sustained

program of research by a central organization, national in scope, would be needed to get to the roots of

the problem.^'

The Conference agreed, and as a result of its rec- ommendation, the HigliAvay Research Board (HRB)

organized a "Committee on Causes and Prevention of

Highway Accidents," in May 1927 to coordinate accident research nationwide.* The HRB played a major

part in subsequent efforts to reduce the accident toll.

* The first act of the Committee was to request the BPR

to compile an index of published articles on highway safety

and the allied subjects of highway design, town planning and

traffic control. The BPR librarians found that no fewer than

2,400 items on these subjec'ts had appeared in American and

European journals for the years 1923 to 1927—certain proof

of the intense worldwide concern over the problem."'

The First Large Highway Safety Program

The Bureau of Public Roads and the State highway

departments recognized that the obsolescence of the

highway system was one of the contributing causes of the high accident toll, but they were not willing to accept all or even a very large part of the responsibility : One matter that confronts highway officials which is of great present importance and which will be of much

concern in the future is the eradication of those conditions that are now or may be conducive to accident, in- jury, and death. A prominent part of the effort to be

made to correct conditions will be the elimination of highway-railroad grade crossings . . . The .separation of opposing streams of traffic on the most heavily traveled highways seems also to be essential. The greatly in- ci-eased speed of motor-vehicle travel requires a general

increase in sight distances and the elimination of ob- structions to view at Intersections. Occasional sharp

curves and steep grades on highways that, in general,

invite the driver to speed must not be tolerated. Provision for pedestrian travel separate from that portion

of the highway used by vehicles must be made wherever

the amount of pedestrian travel justifies it.

129
The need for corrective measures in these directions is definitely recognized and will be cared for as rapidly as

available funds will permit. But this alone does not give assurance of a complete solution of our highway-accident

problem, since it must be recognized that such accidents are due, in large measure, not to faults in the highways,

but to weaknesses of the drivers of vehicles." Congress response to the highway accident problem was to provide increased appropriations for highways,

and particularly for the elimination of grade cross- ings and other hazards to highway traffic. A considerable part of the $400 million granted to the States

under the National Industrial Recovery Act and the

additional $200 million of emergency grants under

the Hayden-Cartwright Act went into safety improvements. Congress provided another $200 million for a major attack on grade crossing hazards in the Emergency Relief Appropi^iation Act of 1935, and a further $190 million in the regular Federal-aid authorizations for fiscal years 1938 through 1943. All of

these funds were outright grants and did not have to be matched by the States.*

This huge safety program reached its peak in fiscal years 1937 and 1938 when the States eliminated over

1,800 grade crossings and reconstructed over 300

existing grade separation structures at crossings. In

addition, this program provided for the installation

of train-activated protective devices at grade cross- ings with a high of nearly 1,200 devices installed in

1940.

* The Federal-aid authorization of June 16, 1936 required

that grade crossings be eliminated or adequately protected on all future projects financed by Federal aid. This made

grade crossing protection a permanent part of the Federal

highway program.

However, the grade crossing campaign had its critics who claimed that far too much money was

being spent to solve a very small part of the total

problem.

Signing for Safety

Before World War I, most States were using signs

to warn road users of danger ahead, particularly

railroad crossings, and the railroads themselves were

required to post warning signs at all public road

crossings. Most States agreed that danger signs

"should be conspicuous and easily and quickly read,

and therefore concise; should specify the character

of danger to be guarded against and should be located

at such distance from the danger point as to give

ample time to be acted upon." '^^ However, agreement

ceased with these principles, and the signs themselves were of an infinite variety of shapes, sizes and colors. In 1922 the Mississippi Valley Association of State

Highway Officials recommended that its members use

distinctive standard shapes for warning signs—the

circle for railroad crossings, the octagon for stop, and

the diamond for caution. The American Association

of State Highway Officials (AASHO) adopted these

shapes in 1924 and also the standard colors yellow for

caution signs and red for stop signs, and in 1927

AASHO published the first Uniform Manual for

Highway Signs. This included not only danger and

regulatory signs, but also the famous black and white

shield for routes on the U.S.-numbered highway

system.®^

Meantime the American Engineering Council was making a survey of sign practices in all American

cities of over 50,000 population. The Council's 1929

With additional financing hy Congress, highway-railroad grade crossings were either eliminated or made safer with the addition of train activated warning systems.

130
Until 1924, there loas no national agreement as to uniform road signs;

thus, from region to region there were an infinite variety.

report was adopted by the Third National Conference on Street and Highway Safety in 1930. It was in

effect a manual of the best practices of the time, in- cludincr much of tlie practices embodied in AASHO's

manual. Recognizing that there could not be differ- ent standard practices for signing in rural and urban

areas, AASHO and the National Conference organized a Joint Committee on Uniform Traffic Control

Devices* in 1931, which in 1935 brought out a new

manual for national use. This manual, periodically

revised to keep i>ace with traffic developments, has

been a powerful force for uniformity and traffic safety in the United States.

The Consequences of Speed

In the early days of the automobile, legal speed

limits were set far below the speeds of which most

motor vehicles were capable.* Horsedrawn vehicles were numerous on tlie highways, and teams might

bolt if they were approached or passed at high speed.

High speeds aggravated the dust nuisance and ac- celerated the destruction of macadam surfaces. Roads

were narrow—generally less than 16 feet wide—and

often flanked by deep ditches so that other vehicles

could be f)assed safely only at low speed. Finally,

the vehicles, and especially their tires, were of uncertain reliability; blowouts and loss of steering control were fairly frequent, and these could be disastrous at speeds greater than 25 miles per hour.

All of these factors changed as motor vehicle ownership increased. Animal-drawn traffic decreased and

became numerically and politically unimportant.

Bituminization solved the dusting problem, and vehicles and tires became more reliable. Drivers, feel- ing safer and more comfortable, increased their speeds

and were able to exert enough political pressure to have speed limits raised also. With heavier traffic and higher speeds, it became

dangerous to drive in the middle of the road, and the

States began painting centerlines on the pavements

to channelize traffic in lanes.** At 40 miles per hour,

* The .Joint Committee now consists of members from

AASHO, the Institute of Traffic Engineers, The National

Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, The

National Association of Counties and The National League

of Cities.

* In 1918 the legal limit in South Carolina was 15 miles per hour and five States had limits of 20 m.p.h. The limit

in most States was 25 to 30 m.p.h., but in Kansas 40 m.p.h. was pei-missible. Eight States had no speed limit. In 1928, only Massachusetts still had a 20-mile per hour

limit, and in 32 States the limits were 35 to 40 miles per

hour. Four permitted 45-miIe per hour speeds.TM

** In 1920 Marquette County, Michigan, began painting

white centerlines on curves. These lines were hand-painted

with whitewash and lasted only a month on the road, but were effective for keeping drivers on their own side of the

road." About 1925 it became general practice to build concrete highways with a center joint to control longitudinal cracking.

This .joint became a visible line separating the two lanes of

traffic and served the same purpose as a painted stripe.

131
these lanes appeared uncomfortably narrow to most

motorists, especially when passing trucks. The lane

lines also caused trucks to run closer to the shoulder

where they caused increased breakage of slab edges

and corners. To provide greater safety and reduce

edge damage, the State highway departments built

wider pavements, and they also made new roads

straighter. These improvements along with mechanical advances in vehicles, such as more powerful en- gines and four-wheel brakes, in turn encouraged even

higher road speeds.

Thus, after 1918, highway design followed a spiral

of cause and effect, resulting in higher and higher

speeds and wider and wider pavements. The motivating force behind this spiral was the driving speed

preferences of the great mass of vehicle operators, and

the public authorities were never able for very long

to impose or enforce speed limits that this great mass

of operators believed to be unreasonably low.*

Balanced Design for Safety

In the 1920's and 1930's, it was good engineering

practice to locate new highways as much as possible

in long straight lines or "tangents." When it became

necessary to change direction, the locator laid out a

circular curve, the radius of which he selected to fit the ground with the least construction cost but which

could not be less than a certain minimum fixed by

department policy.** In practice, locators made the curves flatter than this minimum when it was cheaper

to do so, but with little consistency. Motorists driving these roads were expected to adjust their speeds

to the varying radii; and on the sharper curves safe

speeds might be considerably lower than the posted

speed limit. In their increasing concern for highway safety,

many highway engineers worried about this inconsistency between speed limits and safe speeds on

curves. One of these was Joseph Bamett of the BPR,

and in 1935 he proposed that all new rural roads be

designed according to an "assumed design speed."

This, he said, should be "the maximum reasonably

uniform speed which would be adopted by the faster

driving group of vehicle operators, once clear of ur- ban areas." ^* All features of geometric design—curve

radii, sight distance, superelevation, even gradients

should then be made consistent with the chosen design

speed so that a motorist traveling at that speed would

not have to slow down to round any of the curves or ascend any of the hills.*** Barnett's "balanced design" concept became a per- manent feature of American design policy with its

* In 1933, Maryland studies showed that in 40-mile per hour speed zones the average speed of all traffic was 37 m.p.h.,

and 87 percent of the drivers were traveling less than 45

miles per hour. Only a minuscule fraction were traveling as

fast as 60 m.p.h. The Maryland authorities construed these

findings as good public acceptance of the posted limit." ** In 1912, the minimum radius in New York was 200 feet, but it was considered good practice to use 300- or 400-foot

radii for curves on steep grades or at the foot of such grades."

*** This idea was developed concurrently by the German

highway engineers in their designs for the Reichsautobahnen.

adoption by the American Association of State Highway Officials in 1938. In its Policy on Highway

Classification, AASHO declared,

A principal factor affecting the choice of a design

speed is the character of the terrain. In general, rolling terrain will justify a higher design speed than mountainous country since the cost of constructing almost

every highway detail will be less. An important highway

carrying a large volume of traffic may justify a higher

design speed than a less important highway in similar topography due to the fact that the increased expenditure for right of way and construction will be offset by

the savings in vehicle operation, highway maintenance,

and other operating costs." The essential data needed to implement the balanced design concept came from a series of research

studies on driver reactions, curve dynamics and vehicle capabilities which began in the middle 1920's. By 1936 the fruits of this research were so abundantly

available that AASHO appointed a special high-level

committee of senior State design engineers to review

the available information on highway design, bring

it up to date and publish the results in usable form.

Chief MacDonald assigned a small task force of BPE.

experts to work under this committee. Between 1937

and 1944 this Special Committee on Administrative

Design Policy summarized and published all that was known about motor highway design in seven "policies." In 1954 the Committee combined these policies

into a single manual which, with later revisions, is

still the final authority in the United States on rural

highway design.''^

The Parkway—A New Idea In Highways

In 1907, the New York Legislature created the

Bronx River Commission and authorized it to pre- serve the waters of the Bronx River from the pollution of encroaching trash dumps and land fills. The

Commissioners acquired broad strips of land on both

sides of the river, then built a highway through the

resulting elongated park. They planned this parkway

as a four-lane, low-speed recreational road connecting

the public parks of northern New York City with

city reservoirs in Westchester County.

Originally Herman Merkel, the consulting landscape architect, recommended that the parkway be

planned as two widely separated one-way roads at different levels with a wide belt of undisturbed land

between them—a very advanced concept for the year

1917. He was, however, overruled by the Commission,

and only two short divided sections were built.^'^ * In practically every respect, the Bronx Parlcway was different from other highways of its time. It had

an unlimited right-of-way, and this relieved the

builders from the need to confine their construction

within a narrow band of fixed width. Furthermore,

this right-of-way was also parkland which insulated

the roadway from the adjoining street and highway

* This unfortunate result was probably caused by a popular

engineering misconception that was not dispelled until the

1930's. E. W. James, Chief of Design of the BPR, stated in 1929 that, "Two 20-foot pavements segregating traffic, with a parking between, are not adequate. Apparently two 30-foot pavements are needed to equal a single 40-foot pavement in capacity." "

132
systems and made it possible to limit access to it to a few places. All grade intersections were eliminated

and trucks were excluded.

The parkway's designers laid it out as a series of

long curves connected by short tangents—not so much

to make the road intentionally crooked as to follow

the sinuosities of the river valley, and thus reduce the

depth of the cuts and fills. They laid the grade line

to fit the ground closely and varied and rounded the

slopes with unusual freedom to blend into the adjacent land forms.*

The construction methods were no less revolutionary

than the design. Instead of clearing everything back

to the right-of-way line, the Bronx River Parkway

builders saved all trees not actually within construction limits. They saved the precious topsoil, and

later spread it over the finished slopes of the parkway

as a seedbed for grass and plants to arrest erosion.

The landscape plan was informal, blending the parkway slopes into the adjacent forest and fields.

Rapid Spread of Parkways in the New York Metropolitan Area

The Bronx River Parkway was opened to traffic in

1923. It was so popular with the people of Westchester County that they got the Legislature to set up

the Westchester County Park Commission with authority to build more parkways. This Commission

approached parkwaj^s from a somewhat different

angle. The Bronx River Parkway had been primarily an environmental cleanup project and pleasure

drive. The Westchester County Parkways, on the

other hand, were deliberately planned as suburban

commuting arteries by locating them through the cor- ridors between the existing steam and electric rail- roads that radiated out into the county from New

York City. Thus, the parkways not only moved commuters into the city, but also made additional areas of the county available for development. The conse- quent large increases in taxable values were more than

enough to finance the very considerable costs of the

parlcway program. Because of the high class resi- dential character of Westchester County, the Commissioners were careful to retain for the new parkways the high esthetic standards that had been established on the Bronx River Parkway, as well as the

wide right-of-way and access control features. Their

principal change in policy was to flatten curvature

somewhat to permit higher operating speeds.

Commuter and recreational parkways spread rapidly throughout the Xew York metropolitan area and.

to some extent, in and near Washington, D.C., but did

not become popular elsewhere.**

• At this time, other highways were designed with uniform

slopes, usually lyo or 2 horizontal to 1 vertical, for economy

of excavation and to stay within the narrow rights-of-way. Contractors prided themselves on dressing these slopes ac- curately and smoothly for a neat and workmanlike appearance. * One reason for this lack of popularity was their high

cost. The Bronx River Parkway cost $15 million for 15

miles, which included the parkland and measures to reclaim

it from blight. The Mount Temon Memorial Highway, the

first parkway in the Washington area and opened to traffic in 1932, cost $500,000 per mile.

Influence of the Parkway Concept on Highway Design

Parkways, designed and operated essentially as commuter arteries, were tangible challenges to the

dogma expressed by Upham that there arc two kinds

of highways—scenic and commercial. Here were highways that were essentially commercial, transporting workers to and from their offices, and also scenic or at least attractive. The fallacy of the old position was aptly expressed in 1932 by a distinguished committee of architects, engineers and planners:

Highways traverse varied landscapes and should differ accordingly. However, we regard as unsound the common

idea that they may be classified as scenic and commercial

and that the appearance of the latter is of minor conse- quence. Scenery does not consist only of spectacular

views. All outdoors is scenery of one kind or another. Therefore, wherever the rural character of the landscape

has not been violated, a highway is scenic. Classification according to assumed use is no more

valid. When a tourist comes to San Francisco, or a

citizen leaves and enters on a holiday, the Bay Shore

Highway is a pleasure road ; and when a resident of Eureka is called by his affairs to Crescent City, the Redwood Highway becomes a business road. Differing

localities and circumstances may suggest different kinds

of beauty, but every highway should be beautiful, with

the kind of beauty appropriate to it." The principles of parkway design—the wide parklike right-of-way, control of access, elimination of

grade crossings with other highways, fitting of the

alinement and grade to the natural contours of the

ground without using excessive cuts and fills, shaping

and rounding slopes to merge them into the adjacent

natural land forms, restoring natural vegetation to protect parkway surfaces from erosion, and preserving a high standard of architectural excellence

for bridges and other structures—were all developed

and proved out in practice before 1926. Yet these

principles were almost totally ignored by the designers of other highways, which were laid out with long

tangents and rollercoaster grade lines within narrow

rights-of-way, with little effort to protect their steep

side slopes from erosion. On these highways practically the only concession to pleasing appearance was

the occasional planting of trees on the right-of-way.*

The first application of parkway principles to ordinary highways—on a very limited scale^—came in

1933. The regulations for administering the National

Industrial Recovery Act grants made it clear that the

work done under these grants should include landscaping on a reasonably extensive mileage of roads.

The States then programed 1,500 miles of roadside

improvement projects costing about $2.22 million.

These were mostly on main highways near cities and

towns where they would provide employment and

also serve as demonstrations of what could be accomplished to beautify roads.

This program, although clumsily carried out in

many localities, was an immediate public relations

success. It inspired strong public support for landscaping and roadside improvement, something that

had been lacking up to that time. Of equal importance, it focused the attention of the State highway

*The Amendment of May 21, 1928 (45 Stat 683) authorized

the use of Federal-aid funds for planting shade trees along

highways.

133
departments on the enormous annual maintenance

cost of correcting the damage caused by the erosion of

unprotected slopes and ditches, and got them started on a long-overdue program of erosion control and

correction.

The pilot beautification program also spotlighted

the inadequacy of the prevailing 60-foot rights-ofway. For hundreds of miles of road, the State had

to purchase additional right-of-way or obtain slope

easements from property owners to provide room to repair erosion damage and to regrade the cuts and

fills with flatter slopes and wider ditches. Only then

could grass and protective vegetation be established

to prevent future erosion. This experience led to the

general adoption of wider rights-of-way for new

highways, so that by 1940, 100 feet was practically a standard for main roads.

The Secretary of Agriculture's regulations for

programing the $200 million of emergency road funds

authorized by the Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1934

required the States to use not less than 1 percent of

their apportionments for the improvement of roadsides. By 1936, 5,000 miles of roadsides had been

improved with emergency funds and with Federal

aid, and most State highway departments were incorporating improved roadside design in their new

projects. The BPR was able to report in 1936

:

Provision is being made within State highway department organizations for an improved technical approach

to the various roadside problems, and more effective methods of handling the work are being used as ex- perience is accumulated. Only a few years ago highways were completed with little thought of the appearance of the finished roadside, and attempts were made at so- called beautification under conditions already bad and

often with overemphasis on some particular kind of planting. Far better results have been produced since roadside improvement has been regarded as an integral

part of highway improvement to be provided for in planning rather than as an afterthought follovring construction.«»

In recognition of the increasing importance of the

roadsides in highway planning, the Bureau of Public

Roads established a landscape section in its Washington Office and urged the States to set up similar positions to plan and direct the roadside work.*

Congress gave a further impetus to roadside improvement in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1938

by authorizing landscaping and roadside development

with regular Federal-aid funds and also "such sanitary and other facilities as may be deemed reasonably

necessary to provide for the suitable accommodation

of the public . . ." within the right-of-way or publicly

controlled adjacent areas. This encouraged the States

to build rest areas along the main highways, a policy

that had been pioneered in the early 1930's by the

Ohio Department of Highways.

Erosion control, landscaping and rest areas brought

commercial highways and parkways much closer to- gether in the 1930's but the full merging of the design

philosophies behind them was still 30 years away.

* The landscape planning for the Mount Vernon Memorial

Highway was done in 1929 by Wilbur H. Simonson, who

came to the Bureau from the Westchester County Parkways.

Subsequently, as the BPR's chief landscape architect, Simonson played a decisive part in the movement for improved

roadsides in the United States.

Pittsylvania Wayside Rest Area built i« 19S5 on Rt. 29 near Alta Vista, Va.

134
A roadside park in Connecticut, 193S.

The Return of the Toll Road

Landscaping and erosion control were not the only

reasons for adopting wider rights-of-way. By the

mid-1920's, the main roads near and between large

cities were getting seriously congested. The easiest

way to relieve this congestion was to add another lane,

and several State highway departments did this extensively, despite a growing realization that threelane roads might increase the possibility of head-on

collisions. By the middle thirties, three-lane roads were practically obsolete, but hundreds of miles of

highways had been widened to four lanes, especially

in Cook County, Illinois, and Wayne County, Michigan.

However, these too proved to be dangerous, and

many highway administrators began to believe that

the only safe way to build multilane highways was to completeh' separate the opposing lanes of traffic, as had been done for years on city boulevards. In 1929,

Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, rebuilt a part of the

Blue Mound Road as a "split-slab highway" with

"neutral ground" between the opposing lanes of traffic, leaWng the remainder with an undivided four-lane

pavement. After this road was opened to traffic, the

commissioners were pleasantly surprised to observe

that the divided part of this highway was able to carry more traffic at 10 to 20 miles per hour greater

speed than the undivided part.*^

Despite their superior safety characteristics, accept- ance of divided or "dual" highways was slow, and by

1937 there were only 1,200 miles of nonurban divided

highway in the United States.* *^ In that year, Chief MacDonald reported:

The large volumes of traffic that now flow between

densely populated localities have created a demand for

wide, multiple-lane highways, built according to the

highest standards of grade and alinement, with opposing

traffic separated by a center parkway, bypassing all

cities, with structures separating streams of traffic at all highway and rail crossings, and with access from side roads permitted only at carefully selected points. Such

highways offer great savings in time and in vehicle- operating costs to commercial vehicles, and to the drivers

of private vehicles they offer freedom from dangers of the highway and from other vehicles as nearly complete

as it is possible to attain. That large volumes of traffic would flow constantly over such highways between densely populated localities there is no doubt—a traffic large enough to justify the high cost of such improvement with reasonable assumptions as to the value of the savings in fuel and time and

those resulting from greater safety and freedom of travel. However it is not readily apparent how any large mile- age of such highways might be financed.*""

* The prejudice against divided highways stemmed in part

from the assumption that they were not "flexible" enough to accommodate changes in the direction of traffic load. In 1922, the Lincoln Highway Association assembled a

panel of the most eminent highway engineers and professors

in the United States to recommend the "ideal section" for heavy traffic highways. This panel recommended an undi- vided four-lane concrete pavement 40 feet wide on a 100-foot right-of-way to carry 1.5,000 autos and .'5,000 trucks per 24- hour day at a speed of 35 miles per hour.*'

135
The Federal Highway Act of 1921, by concentrat- ing Federal-aid funds on a limited mileage of the

principal highways, had temporarily quieted demands

for interstate highways under Federal control.

As congestion increased in the 1930's, these demands

were renewed, and they were not long in reaching

Congress. Here, there was talk of authorizing the

collection of tolls to finance Federal "super highways"

between the principal cities—a possibility that had

been considered for some time by the BPR but had

been discouraged because of the large volumes of

traffic required to support the high cost of such facilities. Early in 1937, President Roosevelt summoned Chief

MacDonald to the "\^^lite House and handed him a map of the United States on which he had drawn

three east-west routes from coast to coast and three

routes traversing the country from north to south.

The President asked MacDonald to get started at once on a study of the feasibility of constructing the

six routes as toll roads.®^

The basic information for such a far-reaching study was already in the files of the BPR and the State

highway departments: the product of the economic

and traffic studies begun in 1920. Therefore, when

Congress ordered a similar study in the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1938, the work was already well advanced, and the BPR task force was able to finish the

report to Congress by April 1939.

From their national traffic map the BPR analysts

selected six transcontinental routes totaling 14,336

miles that would satisfy most of the demand for longdistance travel. After making estimates of traffic,

the analysts found that only 3,346 miles—those within

the influence of the major cities—would need more

than two traffic lanes, and of these, only 547 miles

would meet as much as 70 percent of their annual

cost from tolls by the year 1960. Only one section of

172 miles, from Philadelphia to New Haven, would

break even by that date.

The BPR had shown that toll financing was impractical. Nevertheless, the report pointed out, there was an urgent need for "a special, tentatively defined

system of direct interregional highways, with all nec- essary connections through and around cities, designed

to meet the requirements of the national defense in

time of war and the needs of a growing peacetime

traffic of longer range," and also a need to upgrade

the existing Federal-aid highways and the secondary

and feeder roads.*®

The Bureau selected a 26,700-mile system of main

interregional highways which would connect all of

the major population centers, and which the report

recommended should be built as free public highways

on wide rights-of-way, access controlled, and without

grade crossings. The report went on to observe that

in the past, the major obstacles to building needed

highways, especially in urban areas, had been "the

inadequac}^ of available funds and the overpowering

legal obstacles that stand in the way of obtaining

essential rights-of-way." *'' Archaic laws in most

States limited the lands that could be acquired or taken for highways to the bare essentials of present

needs without adequate allowance for future expansion and also limited tlie States' rights to deny access

to abutting property owners in order to preserve a

road's traffic capacity. These difficulties were com- pounded by the Government's policy of denying

Federal-aid participation in right-of-way costs and

the usual practice of State legislatures of providing

for land acquisition in the same acts that authorized

construction, so that the land was seldom available

when needed.

The report recommended that Congress create a Federal Land Authority to buy and hold lands for

interregional highways in advance of need in those

States without constitutional authority to do so. Such

lands would then be leased to the States when needed on terms that would repay the Government's investment in 50 years. Finally, in an appendix, the report

discussed the possibility of recovering all or a part of

the cost of interregional highways by the resale of

land acquired in excess of the amount needed for the

actual construction and protection of the highways.

This proposal was enthusiastically approved by the

President who remarked in transmitting the report to Congress

:

Under the exercise of the principle of 'excess-taking' of land, the Government, which puts up the cost of the highway, buys a wide strip on each side of the highway

itself, uses it for the rental of concessions and sells it off over a period of years to home builders and others who wish to live near a main artery of travel. Thus the Government gets the unearned increment and reimburses

itself in large part for the building of the road.^ This suggestion was condemned in and out of Congress as a socialistic scheme to transfer the cost of

providing deluxe highways from those most benefited

to the already heavily burdened landowner.

The Bureau of Public Roads' adverse report took some of the steam out of the toll road movement, but

by no means all. In December 1939, under pressure

from the toll road people, eight North Atlantic States

set up a committee of State highway engineers to make a more comprehensive study of the interregional route from Washington, D.C., to Boston which, the

BPR report had admitted, had a marginal possibility

of success as a toll road. This committee studied the

405-mile route and estimated that an adequate super

highway to handle the traffic would cost $253 million,

and recommended that some of the Federal strategic

highway funds be used for further studies.*'' This

suggestion and the report itself were buried in the

gathering mobilization for war.

The Pennsylvania Turnpike

While the BPR was working on the toll road study,

the State of Pennsylvania was perfecting its plans for a modern high-speed highway through the Alleghen^^

Mountains on the right-of-way of the abandoned

South Penn Railroad. In January 1936, the Legislature requested the State highway department to survey the old railroad route and report on the cost of converting it into a highway. A year later, the

department reported that a liighway was feasible, but

would cost $50 to $60 n^illion, nuich more than could

be financed out of the highway budget in any reasonable period.

The Legislature then created the Pennsylvania

Turnpike Conunission and authorized it to acquire

136
the South Penn right-of-way and build on it a toll road to which adjoining property would have no

rights of access. The Legislature was careful to stipulate that the bonds issued by the Commission

would not be backed by the credit of the State. This

stipulation made the bonds practically unsaleable in

the depressed securities market. The project came to a standstill until the summer of 1938, when tlie Public

Works Administration, to stimulate employment,

made an outright grant of $26.1 million to the State,

with the proviso that construction be completed by

June 1940—an almost impossible deadline. At the same time, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation

purchased $35 million of the Commission's bonds to complete the turnpike financing.

The Commission let the first grading contracts in

November 1938, and thereafter pushed the construction at top speed, day and night with 155 contractors and thousands of men and machines. The 160-mile

turnpike was opened to traffic without fanfare on October 1, 1940.

The Pennsylvania Turnpike was the prototype of

the modern high-speed heavy-duty Interstate highway. It incorporated the most advanced practice of

German and American design engineers on highway

grades and curvature and was hailed by many as the

safest highway in the world. It had 12-foot traffic lanes, two in each direction, separated by a 10-foot

median strip. The right-of-way was 200 feet wide.

The steepest grade was 3 percent, as compared to 8

and 9 percent on the nearby Lincoln Highway, and

the total climb going over the mountains was only

one-third as much as on the Lincoln Highway. For

trucks the saving in transit time between Philadelphia

and Pittsburgh was 5 to 6 hours, a saving sufficient to insure the financial success of the turnpike.

Toll Parkways

While the Pennsylvania Turnpike was under construction, the Connecticut highway department was

completing a modern landscaped parkway connecting

with Westchester County's Hutchinson River Parkway at the New York State boundary and extending

37 miles to the Housatonic River. This road was

planned partly to serve commuters and partly to ease

traffic pressure on the congested Boston Post Road.

From its opening in June 1938, the Merritt Parkway

attracted large volumes of traffic, and within a year,

it was carrying 18,800 passenger cars per day. (Commercial traffic was excluded.) Searching for a source

of funds with which to extend the parkway northward to Hartford, the Legislature decided to tap this

huge flow of traffic, and in June 1939, it imposed a

toll for use of the road. The Parkway was amazingly

profitable to the State. In its first 35 weeks of operation, 3.4 million motorists, most of whom could have

used the Boston Post Road free, cheerfully paid a

10-cent toll to use the parkway's uncongested deluxe

facilities. In its first 6 months, the Merritt Parkway

grossed $320,644, for a net operating revenue of

$280,000.8''

Westchester County, heavily in debt for its own

parkways and suffering from tax shrinkages, was not

slow to notice the revenue pouring into the Connecticut toll booth at Greenwich, just east of the State

line. In August 1939, the County Board of Supervisors imposed a 10-cent toll on the Hutchinson River

Parkway which in 6 months grossed $279,000. However, the bonanza was of short duration, for an order

from the New York Court of Appeals forced the

county to stop collecting the toll and refund what

had already been collected. The court held that, al- though built entirely with county fimds, the Westchester parkways had by use and custom become

arteries of the State highway system on which by

State law the collection of tolls was prohibited.^'

The Federal Highways

In most of the western States, national forest highways occupied a strategic position in the State road

system. In 1920 the Bureau of Public Roads re- ported : Due to the fact that the forest areas lie alonj; the mountain summits, they eontain the passes through which

the important tnmk highways must cross the mountain

ranges, and as a consequence many forest road projects are links in important State and national highways.

Within the forests are ] 5,000 miles of roads which form

connecting links for State and county highway systems."'

In 1912, Congress set aside 10 percent of the re- ceipts from the national forests as a "10-percent fund"

for financing forest highways, and with this money,

the Forest Service and the Office of Public Roads

made a feeble beginning on the enormous task of

building the most urgently needed highway connections.* This work received a much-needed boost from

the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 which appropriated $10 million for forest roads for the years 1917 to 1926; and further financial support from the Post

Office Appropriation Act of 1919 which provided $3

million each for fiscal years 1919, 1920 and 1921.

To spend these funds, the Bureau of Public Roads

rapidly built up an engineering and construction

organization equivalent to that of an average State

highway department, but scattered over hundreds of

thousands of square miles of forests. The roads it built in the early twenties were narrow and steep but

reasonably adequate for the traffic.** Much of the

construction, especially in the solid rock sections, was

done by station contracts under which a "station

gang" of cooperative laborers contracted to excavate

a 100-foot section of road

These men attack the ledge in various ways. Sometimes they use the deep 'coyote hole,' burrowing 30 feet

into the rock with a tunnel large enough to permit a

stooping man to enter with a wheelbarrow. Sometimes

the hole is smaller, 8 or 10 feet in depth and less than a

foot in diameter. Such a hole is known as a 'boot jack.'

One 'coyote hole' on the Cook.s-Collins Road in Washington brought down 2,000 yards of rock with 1,700 pounds

of black powder."

The BPR also used modem construction equipment

such as steam shovels and trucks, much of it war sur- plus from Army stocks, as well as millions of pounds

of surplus TNT explosive in building these early

forest highways.

* From 1912 to 1920 the 10-percent fund provided .$2,322,225 for forest roads."' ** The typical forest highway of this period had a 12-foot gravel surface and an overall graded width of 16 feet.

137
When the States selected the 7 percent systems re- quired by the Federal Highway Act of 1921, they

included over 8,000 miles of forest highways. These

roads were either entirely within the national forests or were necessary to the surrounding communities for

access to and use of the forests. There were also

about 5,400 miles of public roads within the national

forests, but not on the Federal-aid system. These last and the roads on the Federal-aid routes the Secretary

of Agriculture grouped into a forest highway system on which one-half of the forest highway appropriations were to be spent.* The Secretary concentrated

70 percent of these funds on approximately 1,000

miles of main Federal-aid routes lying entirely within

the forests in order to keep pace with the improvement by the States of the adjoining portions of these

routes.^" This policy complemented the policy of stage construction that was being followed by most of the

western and southern States. To insure early completion of some kind of improvement on the principal

primary routes, the Government coordinated not only

the scheduling of improvements with the adjoining

States, but also adopted comparable construction

standards. As traffic increased, these standards were upgraded

:

Meanwhile, as the traffic increases standards of construction are being constantly raised. Grades and curvature are being reduced and widths increased, and projects constructed originally as unsurfaced earth roads are being

surfaced." Through the 1920's and 1930's, Congress authorized about one-tenth as much for forest highways

as for Federal aid to the States.** This was applied

where it was most needed to keep up with traffic,

mostly for second- and third-stage construction or re- construction, so that by 1939, two-thirds of the annual

program was rebuilding or upgrading previous work.

Even this did not keep up with demand, and a number of States and even counties supplied "cooperative

funds" to supplement the Federal apportionments for

roads of particular interest to them. Some State

highway departments spent their own funds to blacktop forest highways carrying heavy through traffic. Eventually the main highways through the national

forests were taken over by the States, rebuilt, and

incorporated into their own highway systems.

Roads in the National Parks

Before the creation of the National Park Service

in 1916, each national park superintendent reported

directly to the Secretary of the Interior; each had his

* The original forest highway system as finally approved

by the Secretary in 1926 comprised 13,459 miles of which

11,271 miles were in Alaska and 11 western States and 2,188 miles in 17 eastern and southern States."" In addition, there were thousands of miles of trails and logging roads not in the

forest highway system, but necessary for the protection and

use of the forests. One-half of the forest highway appropriations went to these "forest development roads."

** Forest highway appropriations for fiscal years 1917 to 1941 were .$108.5 million. Federal aid in the same period was

$1.1 billion. Forest highways al.so received a share of the emergency relief funds provided by Congress during the New Deal.

own road budget, and made his own arrangements

for laying out and maintaining roads.* There was

no overall plan for developing the national parks and

making them accessible to the public, but in the an- nual appropriations to the Interior Department,

Congress might include amounts for specific roads in

certain parks, generally those with strong local politi- cal support.

In 1924 Congress gave the Secretary of the Interior

general authorization to construct, reconstruct and

improve roads and trails in the national parks and

appropriated $2.5 million each for fiscal years 1924,

1925, 1926 and 1927 for such roads. In the same Act,

Congress directed the Secretary of Agriculture to turn over 5 percent of the war-surplus road equipment and supplies to the Secretary of the Interior for use in park road construction.^^

This act gave the Secretary the means to plan

ahead, and in 1925 he had the National Park Service

(NPS) prepare a 5-year plan of road improvements

in 17 national parks and monuments, totaling some

1,510 miles. Since the NPS had a very small engineering staff. Director Stephen Mather arranged with

Chief MacDonald, in 1926, for the BPK to handle the

engineering and construction for this program on a reimburseable basis.**

Under this agreement, which, with some changes

is still in effect, the NPS and the BPR built some of

the most scenic and spectacular highways in North

America, one of which was described thus by Chief

MacDonald in his annual report for 1927:

One of the most interesting of the national-park projects

is the work on the Transmountain Highway in Glacier

National Park. Here is a road in which practically every

conceivable obstacle has been met and overcome. The

16-foot roadway is being literally hewn out of the solid rock of the Garden Wall in order to reach and cross the Continental Divide.TM

By 1931 only one-fifth of the 5-year program was

finished, yet already some roads were in need of re- building to higher standards. Furthermore, the National Park Service had acquired the Colonial

National Historical Park and the Shenandoah and

Great Smoky Mountains Parks in the East and had

begun road programs in all of them that were ulti- mately to run into the millions of dollars. In January

1931, Congress authorized (46 Stat 1053) the Secretary of the Interior to build approach roads, not

exceeding 60 miles long from the park gateway of

isolated national parks to the "nearest convenient 7 percentum road" and required that $1.5 million of the

annual park road authorizations be spent on such

roads. And in 1933 President Roosevelt, by executive

order, transferred to the NPS 64 military parks,

national cemeteries, historical areas and national

monuments that had formerly been in the charge of

the War Department or the Department of Agriculture. Most of these areas had roads in need of modernizing.

* However, for many years roadwork in Yellowstone National Park was handled by the Army Corps of Engineers.

** This informal arrangement was legitimized by Congress

in the Agricultural Appropriation Act of 1928 which authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to perform engineering

services for other agencies of the Government in connection

with roads.

138
To meet all these demands, the NPS in effect jettisoned its original 5-year plan and embarked on a

looser, but much larger, road program tailored to larger authorizations. Between 1930 and 1933, Congress tripled the annual park road authorizations.

In 1934 and 1935, the Administration allocated $18.3

million of emergenc}' relief funds for park roads and

parkways."" * With these funds the NPS and BPR

greatly expanded their efforts, and in the single year

of 1936, they completed 204 miles of park roads and

142 miles of approach roads."^ By 1941, when the war put an end to roadwork in the parks, 1,781 miles

of park roads and 255 miles of access roads had been

completed at a cost of about $87 million."^

To some extent, roads in the national parks were

demonstration roads for the embryonic State highway

landscaping and erosion control programs of the

1930's. For years before environmental design be- came popular, the National Park Service had employed landscape architects, naturalists and foresters

to advise on the location and construction of its roads.

Because of this advice, damage to the landscape from

roadbuilding was much less in the parks than on

State highways or even on roads in the adjacent national forests constructed by the BPR. Furthermore,

the park roads were highly visible models of what

could be accomplished by good slope grading and

landscaping to blend a highway into its natural sur- roundings and control erosion damage.

The National Parkways

In May 1928 Congress instructed the Secretary of

Agriculture to build a highway from Washington to Mount Vernon as a memorial to President Washington and to have it finished in time for the bicentennial

of the first president's birth in 1932. The BPR, act- ing for the Secretary, selected a scenic location along

the shore of the Potomac River and designed a landscaped four-lane undivided highway in the style of

the Westchester County parkways. No effort was

spared to make this the most modern and beautiful

highway in the United States

Every possible effort is being put forth ... to make this road one of the most attractive in North America. The

alignment as designed is a succession of long, easy

curves : the grades rise and fall gently with the natural

roll of the hills ; the cut and fill banks will be cut to flat slopes and rounded so as to merge with the natural topograph ; and the bridges . . . will be graceful flat arches faced with native stone."" The BPR finished the Mount Vernon Memorial

Highway on schedule, at a cost considerably above

the $4.5 million originally provided by Congress. In

1930 it became the first unit of the George Washington Memorial Parkway authorized by the CapperCramton Act (46 Stat 482).

The George Washington and other later Federal

parkways in the Washington metropolitan area be- came commuter arteries in the same manner as the

Westchester County parkways. The Blue Ridge and

Natchez Trace Parkways, however, developed along

quite different lines and much closer to the original

Bronx River recreational road concept.

These parkways were begun as emergency relief

projects without specific authorization by Congress.

After they were well started. Congress recognized

them as national parkways in acts providing for their

administration and maintenance by the National Park

Service, '\\nien originally planned in the 1930's, these

parkways were conceived as modern motor roads with

extremely wide rights-of-way—actually elongated

parks sited to provide scenic views for the motorists

and i-ecreational opportunities at selected places along

the way.* Thus they became not merely cross-country

highways, but recreational destinations in themselves

similar to the national parks and monuments.

The BPR as construction agent foi- the NPS let the

first contract for the Blue Ridge Parkway in February 1936, and by the end of 1939, 305 miles were

completed or in various stages of construction and

140 miles of continuous paved parkway were open to

traffic, attracting 300,000 visitors that year.^"* The

Natchez Trace Parkway developed much more slowly

and by 1939 only 36 miles were completed.

Most of the Federal highways were in the national

forests, the national parks or the national parkways,

but there were others. In the West, considerable

mileages of local roads in Indian reservations re- mained under Federal control after the States took

over the main primaries and secondaries. Some of

the larger military reservations contained well over

100 miles of roads maintained by the Army or Navy.**

Over the years, the Government added steadily to its road inventory so that now almost 7 percent of the

rural road mileage is under Federal control.***

The First Foreign-Aid Program

A land route connecting the countries of the Americas has been a dream of visionaries going back to Spanish times. These early schemes did not involve

the United States until May 1928 when Congress, by

joint resolution, requested the President to explore the

possibility of an international highway at the forthcoming Pan American Highway Congress scheduled

to meet in Rio de Janeiro in August 1929. f In

March 1929, Congress authorized the appropriation

of $50,000 to enable the Secretary of State to coop-

* .$16.0 million from the National Industrial Recovery Act and i$2.3 million from the Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1934. In addition the Civilian Conservation Corps spent tens of millions in the national parks improving minor roads and

trails.

The rights-of-way, including all access rights, were pur- chased by the States and transferred to the Federal Government. They averaged 125 acres per mile, but varied in width

from 400 feet in tight places to as much as % mile at special

park sites. ** In World War II an average cantonment for 30,000 men

required 18 miles of primary roads, 7 miles of secondaries

and 3 miles of local roads."' *** In 1973, 21.5,747 miles of rural road were under Federal

control as compared to a total national rural mileage of

3,175,654 miles.'<"

t Congress was responding to a previous re.solution of the Sixth International Conference of American States calling for

the construction of a highway connecting North, Central and

South America."'

139
erate with other governments of the Pan American

Union in reconnaissance surveys to develop the facts. These surveys began in June 1930 in cooperation

with the governments of Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala under the general

direction of E. W. James of the BPR. In the course of the next 3 years, the engineers of the BPR. and of

the Central American republics covered 900 miles on

foot or horseback through dense jungles and rugged

mountains to make the ground reconnaissance. They

were greatly aided by aerial photographs of the most

promising routes made by the U.S. Army Air Corps

from its bases in the Canal Zone—one of the earliest

extensive uses of aerial photographic methods for

highway location in unexplored country.

In January 1934, the Bureau of Public Roads re- ported to the Secretary of State that of the 3,250

miles of the route froni the U.S. border to Panama

City, 1,265 miles were already passable for motor

vehicles the year round and 1,000 more were passable

in the dry season and that it was entirely practicable

to build a motor road over the remainder.^"^

Congress appropriated $1,075 million in June 1934

to start construction of the Inter-American Highway

in cooperation with tlie countries through which it would pass. The BPR then worked out cooperative

agreements with Panama, Honduras and Guatemala

to build three large bridges. Under these agreements,

the United States furnished the plans and engineering supervision, the steel and cement, and some of the

heavy equipment, while the cooperating countries

supplied labor and local materials.^"^

The assistance provided by Congress was little more

than seed money to induce the Central American re- publics to improve their highway organizations and

to step up their own construction efforts. This purpose was largely accomplished. On work for which

the United States provided $680,000 up to 1938, the

cooperating countries provided $710,000.^^°

More importantly, the BPR made a determined

effort to train engineers to carry on the work:

In each country where cooperative work has been con- ducted, a Bureau engineer has been placed in charge as

resident engineer. All other positions have been filled with local engineers, most of whom have been trained in the United States. It has been the policy to aid each

country in developing its own highway engineers capable

of carrying on future highway programs according to the most modern standards."' In 1938 Congress authorized the President to provide technical assistance to countries of the Pan

American Union for planning and building roads.

Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador requested such as- sistance, whereupon BPR engineers were assigned as advisers to those countries in 1939. And in May 1939

the Export-Import Bank requested the Secretary of

Agriculture to assign highway engineers to assist the

Bank in evaluating applications for highway loans

in Central and South America. This request was

filled by assigning experienced BPR engineers to the

Bank. These small tentative efforts provided valuable

experience for the huge foreign highway-aid pi'ogram

carried on by the BPR after World War II. Throughout the 1930's, woi'k pi'oceeded in a rather

leisurely manner on the Inter-American Highway,

limited largely by the financial abilities of the cooperating countries. It required the stimulus of war to get the program really moving—a stimulus that was

soon to be applied.

REFERENCES

' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1922, pp. 4, 5. ^Id., p. 7.

' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1926, p. 2.

* T. MacDonald, Four Years of Road Building Under the Federal-Aid Act, Public Roads, Vol. 3, No. 26, June 1920,

pp. 10-12.

" Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1929, p. 3. "Office of Federal Coordinator For U.S. Transportation,

Public Aids To Transportation, Public Aids To Motor

Vehicle Transportation, Vol. IV (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1940) pp. 9, 67, 76. 'Accident Facts, 1934 (National Safety Council, Chicago,

1934) p. 32.

' T. MacDonald, The Freedom of the Road, A^ierican

Highways, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Jan. 1929, pp. 6, 7.

' Id., pp. 7, 8. ^"Railroad Revival, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 88, No.

1, Jan. 5, 1922, p. 4.

^^ An Industrial Message to Congress, Engineering NewsRecord, Vol. 89, No. 24, Dec. 14, 1922, p. 1006. "W. Lyford, Urges Co-operation Between Railroads and

Motor Trucks, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 89, No. 22, Nov. 30, 1922, p. 933. " G. Chatburn, Highways and Highway Transportation

(Thomas Crowell Co., New York, 1923) pp. 429-432. " P. Hubbard, Efflcicncy of Bituminous Surfaces And Pave- ments Under Motor TruAilc Traffic, Public Roads, Vol. 1, No.

10, Feb. 1919, p. 25. " C. Upham, Solution of the Growing Problem May be Found in Cooperative Action, Public Roads, Vol. 1, No. 2, Jun. 1918, p. 16. "E. DuFFEY, New York Advocates Placing Reasonable

Limit Upon Total Load of Motor Trucks, Public Roads, Vol.

1, No. 2, Jun. 1918, p. 7. " G. Pride, Limitations To Be Placed On Trucks From

User's Viewpoint, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 81, No. 22, Nov. 28, 1918, p. 969.

"/(Z., p. 970. ^'Highway Transportation Problem Needs Study, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 80, No. 17, Apr. 25, 1918, pp. 798,

799." Ideas and Actions : A History of The Highway Re- search Board, 1920-1970, (Highway Research Board, Washington, D.C., 1970) p. 7. " T. Agg, Compreheyisive Investigations In Highway Engineering Needed, Public Roads, Vol. 2, Nos. 16-17, Aug.-Sept.

1919, p. 35.

^^Id., p. 36. ''Id.

^' Ideas and Actions, supra, note 20, pp. 185, 186.

''Id.

'^Id., pp. 9, 181.

^' Standards Approved by the American Association Of State Highivay Officials During the Year 1928, American Highways,

Vol. 7, No. 4, Oct. 1928, p. 21. ^J. McKay, The Maine Transportation Survey, Public

Roads, Vol. 6, No. 3, May 1925, pp. 45-18, 67, 68. ^A Study of Highway Traffic in the Cleveland Regional

Area, Public Roads, Vol. 9, No. 7, Sept. 1928, p. 152. ^"1971 Automobile Facts and Figures (Automobile Manufacturer's Association, Detroit, 1971) p. 3.

'^ Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1930, p. 4. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1932, p. 2. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1933, p. 3. ''Motor Vehicle Registrations and Receipts, Public Roads,

Vol. 12, No. 1, Mar. 1931, p. 19; Vol. 13, No. 2, Apr. 1932,

p. 39; Vol. 14, No. 3, May 1933, p. 54; Vol. 15, No. 7, Sept.

19.34, p. 178; Vol. 10, No. 5, Jul. 1935, pp. 90, 91. ''Id.

140
"DivEESioN

An Analysis of the Practtce of Applying

Motor Vehicle Impost Collections To Other Than Highway Purposes (National Highway Users Conference, Washington, D.C., Jan. 1936) p. 10. ''Id., p. 22. "Id., p. 8.

*° Dedication of Special Highway Re\'enltes To Highway

Purposes (National Highway Users Conference, Washington,

D.C., Aug. 1941) p. 9. "J. Harrison, Where The Highicay Dollar Goes, Public

Roads, Vol. 13, No. 2, Apr. 1932, p. 21.

** Off. of Fedeiuvl Coordinator, supra, note G, pp. 53, 54. " G. Chatburn, supra, note 13, p. 330. " Road Location by Legislature, Engineering News-Record,

Vol. 90, No. 25, Jun. 21, 1923, p. 1070. " Supra, note 35.

'* Louisiana Highway Forces To Be Cut on Jan. 1, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 109, No. 19, Nov. 10, 1932, p. 572. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Reports, 1934-1944.

** BuTiEAU OF Public Roads Annual Report, 1936, p. 6. "/d., p. 63. " Savt: The Feder.\l Aid Highway Principle-—The Story

OF What It Is, How It Operates and The Attacks Against

It (National Highway Users Conference, Washington, D.C., Mar. 1942) p. 31. "Toll Roads and Free Roads, H. Doc. 272, 76th Cong., 1st

Sess., p. 107. "T. MacDonald, Federal Aid From The National Viewpoint, The History and Accomplishments of Twenty-Fr-e

Years of Feder^vl Aid For Highways (American Association

of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 1944)

p. 29.

'" C. Upham, The Alignment, Orade, Width, And Thickness In Design Of Road Surfaces, Pl^blic Roads, Vol. 2, Nos. 21-

22, Jan.-Feb. 1920, p. 25. "Accident Facts, 1927 (National Safety Council, Chicago,

1928) p. 6. "Report of The Committee On Statistics (National Conference on Street and Highway Safety, Washington, D.C., Nov. 3, 1924) pp. 7, 21, 26, 27. "Report of The Committee On Tr^vffic Control (National

Conference on Street and Highway Safety, Washington, D.C., Nov. 3, 1924) pp. 9, 10, 14. " Report of The Committee On Construction and Engineering (National Conference on Street and Highway Safety,

Wa.shington, D.C., Nov. 3, 1924 ) pp. 5-7, 12.

""Id., p. 23. "Id., p. 15. "Report of The Committee On Motor Vehicles (National

Conference on Street and Highway Safety, Washington, D.C., Nov. 3, 1924) pp. 9, 14. "'Id., p. 12. _ " Report of The First National Conference On Street AND Highway Safety, Washington, D.C., Dec. 15-16, 1924,

p. 15. "Id., pp. 9, 10.

** Report of The Second National Conference On Street AND Highway Safety, Washington, D.C., Mar. 23-25, 1926,

p. 15. "/d., pp. 19. "A. Fletcher, Report of the Committee on Cause and Prevention of Highicay Accidents, Proceedings, 7th Annual

Meeting, Vol. 7, (Highway Research Board, Washington, D.C., 1928) pp. 43, 44. "BPR, supra, note 48, p. 10. " Mark Brooke, Sidetcalks, Curbs, Gutters and Highway

Signs, American Highway Engineer's Handbook, A. H.

Blanchard, ed. (Wiley, New York, 1919) p. 1393. "A. E. Johnson, A Story of Road Signing, AASHO

The

First Fifty Years, 1914-1964, (American Association of State Highway Officials, W^ashington, D.C., 1965) pp. 130, 131.

'"A. Bruce, Effect of Increased Speed of Vehicles on the Design of Hightcays, Public Roads, Vol. 10, No. 1, Mar. 1929,

p. 11. " K. Sawyer, Line Controls Country Roads Traffic, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 85, No. 18, Oct. 28, 1920, p. 833.

" A. Johnson, Notes on Traffic Speeds, Proceedings, 13th Annual Meeting (Highway Research Board, Washington, D.C., 1934) p. 353. " W. Hargeu & E. Bonney, Handbook For Highway Engi- neers (McGraw-Hill, New Yorlc, 1919) p. 33. "J. Barnett, Safe Side Friction Factors and Superelevation

Design, Proceedings, 16th Annual Mooting, Vol. 16 (Highway

Resoarch Board, Washington, D.C, 1936) p. 75. "A Policy on Highicay Classification, Approved September

16, 1938. Policies On Geometric Design (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C, 1950)

p. 8. "A Policy On Geometric Design of Rural Highways

(American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C, 1954). " G. D. Clarke, The Parkicay Idea, The Highway and

The Landscape, W. B. Snow, ed. (Rutgers Univ. Press, New

Brunswick, N.J., 1959) pp. 39, 40. "E. James, Parkway Features of Interest to the Highway

Engince); Pltblic Roads, Vol. 10, No. 2, Apr. 1929, p. 22. "I. F. Morrow, Report of the Section on Architecture of the Commonicealth Club of California, The Commonwealth,

Vol. 8, No. 46, Nov. 15, 1932, p. 245.

*» BPR, supra, note 48, p. 11. " Editorial, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 103, No. 20, Nov. 14, 1929, p. 757. * B. Marsh, Discussion on Design Research, Proceedings,

17th Annual Meeting, Vol. 17 (Highway Research Board,

Washington, D.C, 1938) p. 253. " W. Thompson, Design Features of Lincoln Highway

"Ideal Section," Engineering News-Record, Vol. 88, No. 24, Jun. 15, 1922, p. 982. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1937, p. 4. ''As related in January 1974 by E. H. Holmes of the BPR,

a memhor of the task force that prepared the Interregional

Highway Report.

*' H. Doc. 272, supra, note 51, p. 4. "/d., p. 114.

''Id., pp. VII, VIII. ''Boston-Washington Super Highicay, Engineering NewsRecord, Vol. 126, Apr. 10, 1941, pp. 550, 524.

°° Tolls on Merrltt Parkway Paid By 3% Million Cars, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 124, No. 11, Mar. 14, 1940,

p. 360.

*" Toll Collection Void on Western Parkicay, Engineering

News-Record, Vol. 124, No. 10, Mar. 7, 1940, p. 353.

'^ Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1920, p. 20. " L. Hewes, Federal Road Building in the National Forests

of the West, Public Roads, Vol. 3, No. 26, Jun. 1920, pp. 15,

25, 26. ^Id., p. 26.

"' BPR, supra, note 3, p. 30. '"Id. " Id., p. 31. "^Authorization of Road Construction in National Parks

(43 Stat 90). " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1927, p. 32.

"'' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1935, p. 51.

"' BPR, supra, note 48, pp. 58, 61.

"^ Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1941, pp. 71, 72.

''^ BPR, supra, note 5, p. 42.

'"* History of the Blue Ridge Parkway Project, Typescript

of unknown authorship, dated April 2, 1940, in the files of the National Park Service, Denver, Colorado.

'"^ Road Builders Annual Meeting Centers on War Restrictions, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 128, No. 11, Mar. 12, 1942, p. .893.

'"" Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, 1973 (Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C, 1974)

p. 210.

"" BPR, supra, note 5, pp. 42, 43.

'TM Proposed Inter-American Highway—Report Prepared

By The Department of Agricultltie Transmitted To The

Secretary of State, S. Doc. 224, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 13.

'"" Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1934, p. 53.

"° Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1938, p. 63.

'" Id.

141
Rood/

for

notionol

Defen/e

The Pershing Map

Shortly before the passage of the Federal Highway

Act of 1921, Chief MacDonald asked the War Plans

Division of the Army General Staff to designate the

most important roads for national defense, and he

supplied maps on which to show these roads. In 1922

the Army produced the "Pershing Map," showing for

the first time the main roads of prime importance in

time of war. For the most part, these coincided with

the principal roads selected by the States for their 7

percent systems, and, in fact, the War Department's

general position was that a system of highways that was adequate to serve the industrial and commercial

demands of the Nation would adequately serve the

military requirements also.* All of the routes on the

Pershing Map were incorporated into the Federal-aid

system.

In 1935 the BPR and the War Department restudied

the military highway needs to establish priorities for

improvement. These priorities were then passed on

to the States for use in planning their own highway

programs. These needs were a principal factor in

selecting the 26,700-mile system of interregional highways recommended by the BPR in its 1939 report.

Toll Roads and Free Roads.

In the postwar years, the United States had allowed

its military forces to sink into the same unprepared

condition that had prevailed before World War I. The rude awakening came in 1939 when the Germans

seized Czechoslovakia and prepared to invade Poland.

In August 1939, Congress hastily appropriated $2

billion for defense, and the country began rearming.

The War Department again reviewed its strategic

highway map, adding more routes which brought the

total up to some 74,600 miles, of which 29,000 miles were considered of immediate importance to the defense effort. The Public Roads Administration

(PRA) (successor to the BPR in a governmental

reorganization plan) and the State highway departments immediately began an inventory of the strategic

network roads which disclosed that thousands of miles

of the network failed to meet adequate standards for

either military or civilian traffic. Worst of all, the

survey revealed that there were 2,400 bridges that were unable to safely sustain the H-15 loading of the

American Association of State Highway Officials,

which was then the standard for bridges on the

Federal-aid system.*

* In 1921 General Pershing had testified before Congress

that what the United States needed for defense was not wide

transcontinental superhighways, but a network of good roads

blanketing the country.

* Since 1935 the Army had designed militarj' equipment to stay within the limits of AASHO bridge loadings. Bridges

designed for H-15 loading would readily carry all classes of military equipment except 50-ton tanks. These could safely pass under special speed and spacing restrictions.

142
The 1922 "Pershing Map."

The PRA estimated that it would cost $202 million

to remedy these deficiencies, yet Congress had made

no appropriations specifically for public roads outside

of Federal reservations as a part of the defense buildup. However, the need for such roads increased rapidly as the Army and Navy began enlarging existing

posts and laying out new camps and airfields, many

of them in areas served only by county and local

roads. The Government placed some defense establishments, such as powder works, in remote areas almost devoid of roads. And mobilization placed abnormal strains on the State highway systems to move men and materials to new or enlarged factories.

The stalemate in the European war ended in April

1940 with the German invasion of Denmark, and by

the end of June, the Germans were in firm control of

Western Europe. Frantically, the United States began mobilizing for war. Between June and September

1940, Congress appropriated $11.55 billion for military

housing, armaments, munitions, shipyards and a twoocean na\^'. On September 16, 1940, Congress enacted

the first peacetime draft.

The Administration asked the States and counties

to step up work on the strategic network and on access roads to defense installations, but with little success. Many of the defense access roads were not on the

Federal-aid or State highway systems and were thus

ineligible for improvement with Federal or State

funds. The counties were impoverished and imable

to take on the added burden of providing for vastly

increased volumes of defense traffic. The Federal-aid

secondary and feeder road fimds for fiscal years 1940

Ml^l**^

With WW II approaching, access roads had to be built for new military posts being

established. This fleet of trucks carrying tent platforms was going to Camp Shelby, Miss., where a tent

city was built to quarter 50,000 recruits.

143
and 1941, drastically cut by Congress, were hopelessly

inadequate for the job.

The only agency with sizable Federal funds that

could be used quickly to build access roads was the

Work Projects Administration, which was still getting

about $65 million per month for unemployment work

relief. "Wherever possible the WPA's efforts were

channeled into defense projects. The i-equirement that

sponsors contribute 25 percent of the project cost was

waived and the nonlabor cost limit on projects was

raised from $20,000 to $100,000 to permit the purchase

of more materials and the use of machinery.^ For

about 5 critical months in the summer and fall of

1940 the WPA kept traffic moving and averted paralysis at dozens of defense installations. These roads were mostly upgraded local roads and not really

planned to meet installation needs, but they filled the

gap until Congress provided funds for more adequate

roads.

Meanwhile Commissioner MacDonald tried to per- suade the States to concentrate their funds on the

most urgent needs of the strategic highway system.

He had no direct legislative authority to do this but

relied on his powers of persuasion and the authority

conferred in the original Federal Aid Road Act of

1916 to approve or disapprove projects. In August

1940 MacDonald rejected the Oklahoma highway department's entire $5 million Federal-aid program be- cause it was scattered throughout the State with little regard for strategic needs.^ A month later Congress,

in the Federal Highway Act of 1940, gave the Commissioner of Public Roads specific authority to give

priority to defense highways in approving Federalaid projects. In an even more drastic departure from

traditional Federal-aid policies, Congress also au- thorized the Federal Works Administrator to initiate

defense projects urgently requested by the Secretary

of War or Secretary of the Navy and to charge the

cost of these projects to the Federal-aid apportionments of the States in which they were situated.

This Act was not popular with the States, who

viewed it as an attempt to make them pay for road

costs that were primarily the responsibility of the

national government. It provided no money for

urgently needed access roads to defense establishments

and, in the face of increasing civilian highway needs,

actually reduced the Federal aid authorized for fiscal years 1942 and 1943. Nevertheless, most of them voluntarily concentrated a large part of their funds and

other resources on the strategic network and such

access roads as were on the Federal-aid system, and

they also provided engineering assistance to counties

for access roads not on the Federal-aid system. By

October 1941, the combined Federal-aid programs of

the States totaled 11,271 miles, of which 2,884 miles were on the strategic network and 197 miles were

access roads. Over 40 percent of the total funds

programed were directed particularly to meeting defense needs.^

The PRA Report on Defense Highway Needs

On June 21, 1940, President Roosevelt requested

John M. Carmody, the Federal Works Administrator,

to have the Public Roads Administration . . . mal<e a survey of our highway facilities from the viewpoint of

national defense and advise me as to any steps that appear necessary.

I suggest that particular attention be paid to the strength of bridges, the width of strategic roads, adequacy

of ingress and egress from urban centers, and the servic- ing of existing and proposed Army, Navy and Air bases." * The PRA's report of February 1, 1941, Highways

For the National Defense, disclosed an urgent need

for the improvement or construction of 1,500 miles of

roads entirely within military reservations and 2,830

miles of access roads to serve 192 military establishments. The estimated cost of the access roads was

$220 million. The report noted that there were 2,436

substandard bridges in the strategic network and

14,000 miles of surfaces incapable of supporting 9,000-

pound wheel loads in all weather. To eliminate these

deficiencies would cost $458 million. The PRA recom- mended immediate appropriation of $150 million for

access roads and at least $100 million to remedy criti- cal deficiencies in the strategic network, the latter to be apportioned according to the traditional Federalaid formula.

There was no immediate action on the PRA report,

and it was not until June 2, 1941, that the President

asked Congress to provide funds for defense highways.

After extensive hearings in both Houses, Congress

passed a defense highway bill which provided $150

million for access roads and $125 million to correct

critical deficiencies in the strategic network to be apportioned among the States according to the Federalaid formula.

The President vetoed this bill because of the mandatory apportionment of the strategic highway funds

among the States, which, he said prevented the Administration from placing the funds where they were most needed. The veto did not escape criticism. The

Engineering Neics-Record observed that the President

had in the past made repeated attacks on the apportionment of Federal-aid funds among the States. The

veto, it declared, "is a step toward complete Federal

control over Federal contributions to state highway

work, which appears to be the President's objective." ^ Congress bent a little but did not entirely accede to the President's wishes. Three months after the veto,

it passed a practically identical bill, with the strategic

highway funds scaled down to $50 million of which

half were to be apportioned according to the Federalaid formula and half could be allocated anywhere on

the network at the discretion of the Federal Works

Administrator. The matching ratio on these funds was to be 75 Federal to 25 State. The $150 million

of access road funds in the bill did not have to be

matched, but initiation of projects was left to the

Government rather than the States.* The President

signed this bill November 19, 1941.

War Traffic Pounds the Highways

The Defense Highway Act cleared the way for a tremendous highway effort. In October 1941, the

PRA began construction of a vast network of express

highways in Arling-ton County, Virginia, to funnel

50,000 workers into the huge Pentagon Building under

* Congress authorized the appropriation of an additional $100 million for defense access roads in 1942 and a further $25 million in 1944.

144
This bridge on U.S. Route 30

in Pennsylvania could carry only

infrequent loads such as the 152,000-

pound tank transporter and tank.

constniction by the War Department. In 1942 alone,

the PRA approved 600 access road projects costing over $200 million. Some of these projects were very

large indeed. In Michigan the highway department

began work on a $12 million limited access expressway

connecting Detroit to the River Rouge defense industry complex and the Ford Willow Run bomber plant.

After the official entry of the United States into the war in December 1941, packs of German submarines

began preying on the coastal sealanes, and by May

1942, they were sinking oil tankers at such a rate as

to cause acute fuel shortages in the east. The Office

of Defense Transportation diverted railroad tank cars normally used to serve inland States to East Coast

destinations, hoping that the trucking industry would

fill the transportation gap. However, this plan ran

into a stubborn obstacle—the size and weight laws of

the States. For years organizations such as the National Highway Users Conference, the trucking associations, and

the automobile manufacturers had been trying to get

the States to enact uniform size and weight laws so that trucks could pass readily across State lines. Before World War I there had been bills in Congress

proposing national registration of vehicles and Federal size and weight laws, but in the end the Government left this field of I'egulation to the States. The

result was diversity, not to say chaos. In 1941 five States still limited wheel loads according to the width

of tire—a holdover from the days of solid rubber

tires, which had long since disappeared from the highways. Texas and Louisiana imposed the absurd limit

of 7,000 pounds on "payloads." In Kentucky the

gross load limit of a four-wheel vehicle on pneumatic

tires was 18,000 pounds and in six other States, it was

20,000 pounds. At the same time, other States permitted gross loads as high as 36,000 pounds on four

wheels. In the neighboring States of North and

South Dakota the difference in permissible gross loading was 12,000 pounds. The permissible gross load on

one axle—a more significant measure of stresses imposed on roads—varied from 12,000 pounds in Alabama and Mississippi to 22,400 pounds in Rhode Island

and New York, and even 24,640 pounds in the District

of Columbia.*

In January 1942 a bill was introduced in Congress

giving the Interstate Commerce Commission the power

to set uniform truck weights and sizes as a war measure.'' Thereafter, a number of States raised their load

limits. The PRA and AASHO drew up a provisional

Uniform Code of Weights, Heights and Lengths of

Motor Vehicles which permitted axle loads of 18,000

pounds and gross loads on four wheels of 30,000

pounds, and up to 40,000 pounds on trucks of three or more axles. This code was put into effect in all States in May 1942, in some by the legislature and in

others by proclamation of the Governor, under the

auspices of the Council of State Governments.

Despite the liberal limits, widespread violations of

the code began almost immediately. When some

States began enforcing the new limit, the truckers

appealed to the legislature or the governors or even congressmen to suspend the penalties for overloading.

Appeals to the Office of Defense Transportation

(ODT) to stop overloading at the source fell on deaf

ears. The controversy came to a head in Colorado

when Charles D. Vail, who was State Highway Engineer and also head of the State Patrol began cracking

down on the overloaders, most of whom were petroleum haulers. He had two reasons for this. One was

to enforce the law and prevent wholesale damage to the State's highways. The other was fear that if the

145
Because of the necessity to transport war materials, commercial and military trucks were allowed to carry overloaded cargo at the expense of the Nation's roads.

With materials ratioved, only minor

maintenance, such as patching the cracks

in the surface, was performed.

law were not enforced the overloads would become

the plateau for a new round of weight-increase demands by the truckers after the war that would lead

to the eventual rebuilding of the entire State highway

system.^

In March 1943, ODT complained to the Governor

that Colorado's rigid enforcement was causing bottle- necks in motor freight movements throughout the

Rocky Mountain area and was making it impossible

for operators to use their most efficient equipment.*

ODT suggested that Colorado issue free overload

permits to allow the truckers to run regularly with

overloads for the duration of the emergency. Vail

countered with a plan to issue permits for a nominal

fee for small overloads, but with fees increasing

steeply for serious overloads. This, Vail said, would

permit nominal overloads up to a certain point but

would make it unprofitable to operate with dangerously destructive overloads.

The Defense Transportation Coordinator then appealed directly to Governor Vivian to "liberalize"

Colorado's enforcement of the Uniform Code, and in

September 1943, the Governor by proclamation and

executive order set aside the State's regulatory laws

as they might apply to the transportation of materials

necessary for the war effort and specifically authorized

the continued operation of overlength and ovei'weight

equipment without payment of any fees.

* By this time, the truck manufacturing industry, which was going full force to keep up with wartime demands, was

producing trucks in quantity which, when fully loaded, con- siderably exceeded the 18,000-pound axle load of the emer- gency code.

146
This victory for the truckers was widely publicized,

and it seriouslj' crippled enforcement of the code in

other States. In the words of the PRA, "On high

military authority, roads were pronounced expendable." « Although the highway administrators, including

Commissioner MacDonald, were deeply worried about

overloading, the rest of the country was more con- cerned about critical shortages of fuel, rubber, manpower and vehicles, and overloading was widely

tolerated as a way to conserve all four. One highway

administrator commented, "Unwise publicity has con- ditioned public opinion to the point where even arrests made of the most flagrant violators of trucking

codes are considered obstructive of interstate war

transportation plans." ^''

The End of the Highway Boom

The great highway boom that began in 1921 and

continued unabated through the Great Depression, came to an end in the complexities and frustrations

of mobilization and war. Fiscal year 1941 was the

peak year for the Federal-aid program with 12,936

miles of roads of all classes completed; thereafter

completed mileage fell to 10,178 miles in fiscal year

1942, and 8,445 miles in 1943.^^ After 1942 practically

all new work related directly to national defense.

The diminishing Federal-aid funds were used to solve

traffic problems in areas congested by war activities.* The forest highway funds went into mineral access and timber access roads to provide raw materials for

the war effort. The highway departments were feeling the pinch

of scarcities even before Pearl Harbor. In June 1941,

the Office of Defense Mobilization imposed materials

priorities for all kinds of construction, ranging from

A-1 for access roads to military installations and

defense plants to A-10 on materials needed for maintenance repairs to Federal-aid highways. Materials

for bridges, tunnels and shoulders for roads on the

strategic network rated an A-2 priority if on primary

highways or A-7 if on secondaries. By April 1942,

it required a priority of A-3 or better to get steel of

any kind, and at least A-1 to get track-laying tractors or other construction machinery. Only 15 percent of

the total U.S. production of construction equipment was going to the domestic market—the rest went to equip Army and Xavy engineer troops or as lendlease to European allies.^- In April 1942, the Petroleum Coordinator for War

limited the use of asphalt and tar in the 17 Atlantic

Seaboard States to projects certified by the PRA as necessary to the successful prosecution of the war. This order was extended to the Rocky Mountains in

July. The PRA channeled most of the available

asphalt and tar into maintenance "since it is important

that the condition of war transport arteries not be

allowed to deteriorate." " To get around the steel shortage, the States changed

their designs. Ohio began using wooden bridges on

secondary highways. Arch culverts requiring no steel

were substituted for reinforced concrete box culverts;

steel reinforcing was omitted from concrete pavements.

Acute manpower shortages began to appear in cer- tain categories of employees. In Michigan 40 percent

of the draftsmen left the State highway department

for the Army or other employment, along with 25

percent of the designers and 27 percent of the inspectors. The Pennsylvania highway department's engineering staff dropped from 2,728 persons to 2,069 in

8 months.^'* Utah experienced such a serious loss of

mechanics that it became difficult to keep its equipment running.

Contractors became scarce as bid prices advanced.

In Kansas some contractors asked to be released from

their road contracts in order to bid on defense work.

In the face of these difficulties, the States curtailed

operations drastically. In April 1942, the War Production Board issued an order stopping all construction not essential to the war effort. Pennsylvania

canceled its $50 million construction program. In- diana rescinded all bridge contracts and North Carolina abandoned all contracts already let except

$3,145,000 of high priority defense access projects.

By the end of 1943, State work was down to bare

bones maintenance and a diminishing number of defense access projects.

The maintenance was actually insufficient to keep

up with the increasing needs. Periodic resurfacing

and strengthening, so necessary to preserve the integrity of pavements, was greatly reduced and reconstruction practically eliminated. The result was the

rapid advance of decrepitude accompanied by soaring

maintenance outlays as the State highway departments struggled to keep the ever-weakening highway

plant in operation.

Rationing Highway Service

After the outbreak of war, the Government prohibited the manufacture of automobiles and the auto

manufacturers converted their plants to arsenals for

the production of tanks, aircraft engines and ord- nance. The number of new cars produced dropped

from 3,779,682 in 1941 to 222,862 in 1942 and only 139

and 610 in 1943 and 1944.^^ The few new cars available in 1942 were strictly rationed.

An acute shortage of rubber developed very early

in the war and continued until the United States

created its own supplies of synthetic rubber. The

War Production Board rationed tires and recapping

rubber to extend the dwindling supplies, but this did

nothing to conserve the huge inventory of tires on the

national fleet of 34.4 million vehicles. In July 1942,

the President asked the States to reduce highway

speed limits to 35 miles per hour, primarily to conserve rubber, but also to save fuel and engine wear.*

Subsequent speed studies by the PRA in 15 States

disclosed fairly good public acceptance of the reduced

* There were no regular Federal-aid authorizations for

fiscal years 1944 and 1945.

* It had been common knowledge for 20 years that high

speed operation greatly shortened tire life. In 1942 and 1943, investigations by the PRA and the Iowa Engineering Experiment Station demonstrated that the life expectancy of tires driven on concrete pavements at 65 miles per hour was only

18,700 miles, liut that if the speed were held to 35 miles per hour or less, identical tires had a life of 56,500 miles."

147
limit. The observers noted average speeds of 37 miles

per hour for cars and 36 miles per hour for trucks,

but 23 percent of the drivers continued to drive over 40 miles per hour.^^

By April 1942, fuel shortages were so severe in the

eastern States that the Government imposed gasoline

rationing, and by November 1942, rationing was imposed nationwide. This greatly diminished "nonessential" travel, but the volume of essential travel was still huge.

The mobilization of 1940-41 had shown in a startling

way how dependent the United States had become on

its highways for its very existence. Studies in Michigan showed that 13 percent of the defense plants

received all of their materials by highway. Most of

the remaining plants received at least 50 percent of

their materials by highway and more than half of

their outgoing products left that way. In February

1942, Commissioner MacDonald announced that only

a small fraction of the 10 million workers required to man the defense plants could possibly be accommodated by the existing rail and bus transit facilities,

and all the rest would have to move in private automobiles.^* Another study in Kansas showed that 81

percent of the employees of a large aircraft factory

lived more than 5 miles from the plant and 17 percent more than 10 miles away. Only 5 percent of the

plant workers used public transportation; 93 percent

depended on private automobiles.^^

In the early years of the defense effort, it was generally understood that it would take time to build

new highways or enlarge the old ones and that in the

meantime it would be necessary to greatly improve

the utilization of the existing highway and mass

transit plants. To promote this utilization, the Secretary of War, in December 1940, appointed a Highway

Traffic Advisory Committee composed of Commissioner MacDonald of the PEA and the presidents of

AASHO, the International Association of Chiefs of

Police and the American Association of Motor Vehicle

Administrators. The Secretary also asked that each

State Governor appoint a State Highway Traffic Advisory Committee, and this was done early in 1941.

The several committees then concentrated on local

action plans to organize transportation at warplants

so as to eliminate the need for costly road improvements.

Widespread staggered working hour programs re- duced traffic peaks by 10 to 15 percent and also increased the utilization of buses and streetcars. In

Atlanta a staggered hour plan had the effect of adding

90 buses to the city's fleet of 455. Intense group riding campaigns resulted in hundreds of carpools and

increased average car occupancy from two or less to

3.8, and in some cases even 4.2 occupants per car. Walking to work was encouraged as patriotic exercise, but the committees found that few workmen

would walk if the one-way distance was more than 2

miles.^"

Shrinkage of Highway Revenues

Rationing reduced not only nonessential travel, but

highway revenues as well. Although nearly three

million trucks and buses were produced during the 4 war years, total vehicle registration dropped by over

1.4 million as wear and tear took their normal toll, and thousands of owners laid up their cars for the

duration.

The eastern States were the first to feel the financial

pinch. By August 1942, Maryland gas tax collections were running $250,000 per month behind 1941. Iowa

revenues dropped 33 percent in June 1942 as compared

to the same month in 1941. The Public Roads Administration reported that following nationwide gasoline rationing, highway traffic dropped 35 to 40 percent

below corresponding levels for 1941.

In some States this loss of revenue was not particularly serious since there were no capital improvement programs underway requiring large expenditures. The diminished revenues were sufficient to take

JL

^

Even with the rationing of gas and

automotive parts, workers at the Willow

Run bomber plant in Michigan depended

on private cars to go to and from icork.

148
By October 1943, the Alaska Highway was ready to serve as an overland route, maintaining the U.S. link with Alaska.

care of bond service and maintenance. But other

States, particularly those that had become accustomed

to diverting large amounts of highway revenue to nonhighway purposes, underwent severe financial embarrassment. Highway officials and road user organizations that had preached for yeare against diversion

\dewed the predicament of these States with considerable relish, best express by the Engineering NewsRecord, a long-time foe of the diversionists.

Where reserved for highway purposes these declining

funds are still relatively proportionate to requirements.

But in those States where legislatures have made diver- sions to the general fund, relief, the school system or

oyster propagation, the present decline in revenues has

brought retribution that is harsh as it is just. The legis- latures that avoided finding money for relief or for their school systems must now find money to keep their roads

from going to pieces."

Amidst the gloom of war, the shortages of everything and the wartime restrictions there was one

piece of cheerful news. Motor vehicle traffic accidents

dropped materially in 1942, not only in number but

in the rate per 100 million vehicle miles of travel.* This was due to a combination of factors—reduced

exposure, lower speeds and, probably, greater emphasis on safety as a contribution to the war effort.

Defense Road to Alaska

After the Pacific Fleet was crippled at Pearl Harbor, it seemed possible that the United States might

be cut off from Alaska except by air. The U.S.-

*The fatalities in 1941 were 39,969 with a rate of 12.0

fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles. In 1942, deaths dropped to 28,309 total, or 10.6 per 100 million vehicle miles. Fatalities remained below the 1941 level until 1957."

Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense recom- mended that a military road be built through Canada

to Alaska, and the United States offered to build it. By mid-March 1942, the two countries agreed that

Canada would supply the right-of-way and waive

customs duties and the United States would build and

maintain the road during the war and for 6 months

afterward. The 1,400-mile plus route from Dawson

Creek, British Columbia, to Big Delta, Alaska, was

intended primarily to connect and supply a chain of

strategic military airfields and provide an all-weather

overland supply route to Alaska. As soon as the

agreement with Canada was negotiated, the War

Department requested the help of the PRA for locat- ing and building the road.

Within a week of the agreement, U.S. engineer

troops began cutting a pioneer road through the

Canadian wilderness. During the season of 1942, the

Army placed seven regiments on the project and, with

the assistance of PRA location engineers and contractors, pushed the pioneer road through the entire

distance to Big Delta. Meanwhile, the PRA was

working as rapidly as possible on reconnaissance,

survey, and plan preparation for the proposed all- weather road. In addition the PRA was busy mobilizing engineers, contractors and equipment for the

huge job.

Time did not permit the usual procedure of preparing plans and specifications, advertising for bids and

letting contracts. Instead, the PRA engaged four

engineering firms as management contractors. These

firms recruited American and Canadian construction

contractors for the work, and by the summer of 1942,

in a period of only 3 or 4 months, 52 contractors and

7,000 construction workers were mobilized in working

149
camps along the route, widening, surfacing and building sections of the Army's pioneer road.^^ On November 20, 1942, 7 months and 17 days from start of

work, a crude but motorable road was opened to truck

traffic the entire distance to Big Delta.^*

By the summer of 1943 the PRA had doubled the

construction force and concentrated on further widening and improving the pioneer road as well as building new sections and some permanent bridges. At the

peak of operations in September 1943, there were

1,850 PRA employees and 14,100 civilian employees

of 81 contractors working with over 11,000 pieces of

construction equipment on the job. As with the

pioneer road, the bulk of the construction of the 1,420

miles of final highway was largely completed in a 4-month period at a final cost of $130.6 million.^'^ On October 31, 1943, the PRA phased out its work

on the all-weather truck route and turned the project over to the Army for maintenance.^"

The Trans-Isthmian Highway

For years after completion of the Panama Canal,

the only land link between the Atlantic and Pacific

ends of the Canal was the efficient Panama Railroad,

wholly owned by the United States Government. In

1939 the Army, concerned about the possibility of the

railroad's being knocked out by bombing or sabotage,

recommended construction of a modern truck highway

across the isthmus, and the State Department then

negotiated a treaty under which the United States

agreed to build the road from Colon across Panamanian territory to Madden Dam, and Panama agreed

to supply the right-of-way.* Construction of the

highway was assigned to the Public Roads Administration and the grading work was largely completed

during the 1941 dry season. When war was declared in December 1941, the

Army urgently requested the PRA to finish the paving on a crash schedule extending into the wet season and also to accelerate work on a section of the Inter- American Highway extending from Chorrera to the

strategic Rio Hato airfield. For both jobs the War

Production Board assigned A-1 priorities. Despite

the wettest dry season in years, the PRA and the

Panamanian Government completed the 72 miles of

concrete pavement and 42 bridges and opened both

projects by July 1, 1942.

War Work on the Inter-American Highway

In December 1941, Congress authorized appropriations of $20 million as aid to the six Central American

republics for the construction of the Inter-American

Highway from the Mexico-Guatemala border to the

Canal Zone. To be eligible for the aid, each country

agreed to complete its part of the highway and to pay

one-third of the cost. These assurances were received

from the six countries by April 1942, and each with

the help of the PRA developed a 4-year construction

plan to push the road to completion.

As shipping losses to submarines mounted in early

1942, the Army became apprehensive that the United

States might be cut off from the Panama Canal, and

the General Staff decided to open a pioneer road

through the remaining gaps in the Inter-American

Highway, using military funds. The standards

adopted by the Army for the pioneer road were much

inferior to those agreed upon between PRA and the

cooperating countries, but the Army agreed to follow

the route chosen for the Inter-American Highway as

closely as possible.

By mid-July 1942, the Chief of Engineers had as- signed a staff to proceed with the pioneer road project.

Contracts were made with the governments of Guatemala and El Salvador to complete the pioneer road

in their respective countries using U.S. furnished

equipment and with three American road contractors

for the remainder. The PRA continued its work in

Costa Rica and Panama and maintained engineering

advisors to other countries where PRA assistance was

requested.

The work began in Guatemala in November 1942,

but ran into trouble almost immediately. The General

Staff gave the Inter-American project a very low

priority in its global schedule. Equipment and supplies essential for military operations elsewhere were

grudgingly and sparingly committed to the pioneer

road project. Stringent shipping restrictions also

delayed the arrival of essential supplies. Finally, in

October 1943, the Army decided the pioneer road was

no longer strategically significant, withdrew the staff to other duties, and closed the project. The PRA

continued construction on the project in Costa Rica.

A short time later the PRA engineers returned to their technical assistance efforts in the countries working on their 4-year construction programs.

Postwar Planning

The Defense Highway Act of 1941 provided a small

sum, $10 million, for postwar planning, and MacDonald was able to channel most of this, with the State

matching funds, into projects on the interregional

system proposed in the BPR's toll road report of

1939.* However, actual planning proceeded rather

slowly due to scarcity of engineers and planners, even though some States took extraordinary measures to overcome the manpower shortage by hiring high

school students and older men and women for routine

work. Urban expressways, such as the Bayshore

Freeway in San Francisco and the WashingtonBaltimore Expressway, predominated in most of this

planning, but New York began studies for a superhighway system that would traverse the entire State

from the New Jersey border to Lake Erie. Indiana

made plans for rebuilding 60 percent of its antiquated

State highway system on which the pavements were

less than 20 feet wide.

The Pennsylvania Turnpike, opened late in 1940,

had grossed $2.6 million in its first 11 months of

operation—enough to pay all expenses with a good

* There was already a heavy duty highway from Madden

Dam to the city of Panama built by the United States in 1931 as a construction access road to Madden Dam.

* Congress provided another $50 million for planning in the Act of July 13, 1943 (57 Stat 560).

150
margin for bond payment.* " Undoubtedly, the suc- cessful experience of this toll road had much to do

with 1941 legislation in Florida, Illinois, Maine,

Maryland and New York creating independent authorities to sell bonds and build toll roads. Similar

bills in Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Wisconsin were defeated by narrow margins.^^

The Pennsylvania experience seemed to prove that

the motoring public wanted wide, high-speed highways at a much faster rate than they were being provided by the States and was willing to pay a stiff extra charge to obtain them. Nevertheless, the Government persisted in its opposition to toll roads, and

on April 14, 1941, President Roosevelt appointed a National Interregional Highway Committee of prominent highway engineers and planners, "to investigate

the need for a limited system of national highways

to improve the facilities now available for interregional transportation, and to advise the Federal

Works Administrator as to the desirable character of

such improvements, and the possibility of utilizing some of the manpower and industrial capacity ex- pected to be available at the end of the war." ^° Commissioner MacDonald of the PRA, who was also

chairman of the new committee, provided it with a working staff of the men who had been most closely

identified with traffic research during the two previous

decades.

Meanwhile, schemes for national superhighways

wei'e being proposed in and out of Congress. In

October 1941, the chairman of the Missouri Highway

Commission called for a comprehensive plan for a system of postwar limited access highways. The

plans for these, he said, should be prepared immediately so that they would be ready when normal

times returned." A bill introduced into Congress in

October 1942, would authorize a 25,000-mile network

of 14 strategic routes costing $10 billion.^^ Finally,

in July 1943, Congress instructed the Commissioner

of Public Roads "to make a survey of the need for a system of express highways throughout the United

States" and report his findings to the President and

Congress within 6 months.

The Interregional Highway Report

Much of the work for the report on express highways requested by Congress had already been done by

the PRA and the President's National Interregional

Highway Committee. The PRA task force of experts

assigned to work with the Committee analyzed at

least six possible combinations of interregional routes

to arrive at the recommended "optimum" system of

33,920 miles. This system included 4,470 miles within

cities and 29,450 miles of rural highways. It comprised a little over 1 percent of the total street and

* While the financial experience of the turnpike was good,

its accident experience was bad—worse than that of the Pennsylvania higliway system as a whole. In less than a

year after opening, the Commission imposed a 60 mile per hour speed limit to curb reckless speeding.^

The experience of the Pennsylvania

Turnpike seemed to indicate that people wanted high-speed highways

and were willing to pay extra for them.

151
highway mileage of the United States, yet the experts

estimated that it would carry 20 percent of all vehicle

miles of travel. It would directly connect all cities of 300,000 population and reach 59 of the 62 cities of

100,000 to 300,000 population.

The Committee found, as had the BPR in its 1939

report Toll Roads and Free Roads, that very little of

the estimated traffic on the optimum system would be

long-distance interregional traffic. Most of the traffic,

and all of the high-density traffic, would occur within

"zones of influence" around the cities, varying in

radius from 35 miles for the largest cities to 6 miles

for the small ones. Of the recommended system, 8,141

miles would fall within these zones of influence, and

this mileage would include practically all of the highways and city streets expected to carry more than

10,000 vehicles per day. Of the remaining 25,779

miles, 20,300 would probably carry less than 3,000

vehicles per day, and thus require only 2-lane pavements.^^

Because most of the traffic was shown by the State

and PRA traffic studies to have origins or destinations

within the cities, particularly their central business

districts, the Committee concluded that there was

little need for bj^passes.* The interregional routes,

therefore, would have to penetrate into the cities,

where they would exert a tremendous influence in

shaping city growth. They should, therefore, be

planned in close cooperation with the city governments

and planning authorities:

The immediate inference ... is that the creation of such ample and efficacious traffic facilities as the improvement of the interregional routes would supply, will exert a powerful force tending to shape the future development

of the city. It is highly important that this force be so applied as

to promote a desirable urban development. If designed

to do this, the new facilities will speed such a development and grow in usefulness with the passage of time.^ The Committee recommended standards for the

interregional highways but declined to estimate the

probable total cost of the system. "Moreover," they

went on to say, "the usefulness and validity of an

estimate of the total cost of a construction program

that must inevitably extend over a period of perhaps

20 years and be affected by unpredictable changes in

the general economy, in the habits and desires of

the people, in the character of vehicles, and in other

circumstances, would still be highly questionable." ^* However, the Committee did recommend that construction of the system be prosecuted at a rate of

about $500 million per year in the rural sections and

$250 million per year in the urban sections—a rate that would provide about 145,100 man-years of direct

employment, and 323,400 man-years of indirect employment per year. One of President Roosevelt's strongly held convictions was that some of the increase in land values

created by new highways should be recouped by the

Government and used to pay for the highways. The

Interregional Plighway Committee avoided this tick-

* The studios showed that only 4 to 6 percent of traffic entering the largest cities was hypassable and only 20 percent

for the smaller cities and 50 percent for the smallest villages."^

lish matter in their report, but the President brought

it up in his message transmitting the report to Congress, as he had in his message on the 1939 toll road

report. "After all," he wrote, "why should the hazard

of engineering give one private citizen an enormous

profit? If there is to be an unearned profit, why

should it not accrue to the Government—State, Federal or both?" 37

The New Highway Charter

There were already a number of postwar highway

proposals before the 78th Congress when it received

the interregional highway report. One of these bills would set up a Rural Local Roads Administration

independent of the PRA through which the counties

could receive Federal aid without going through the

States. The bill would give this agency $1,125 billion to begin operations.^* Senate Bill No. 971, backed by

AASHO, would provide $1 billion annually for 3

years divided equally between the Federal-aid system,

urban extensions, and secondary feeder roads and

would increase the Federal share of the cost to 75

percent. This bill would also create an interregional

highway system.^^ The perennial toll road bill, with added features,

would establish an independent commission with

authority to issue $10 billion in U.S. bonds to pay for

a toll system of 8-lane military superhighways and

for airports, with dams and powerplants to furnish

light for the entire system.*"

Another proposal would authorize an 18,000-mile

system of free superhighways—three east-west from

coast to coast and six north-south from border to border—with a system of airports, each 2 miles square,

at the 18 intersections. Still another would authorize

a defense highway across the United States to connect

the Alcan Highway with the Inter-American Highway.

Fantastic as some of them were, these bills showed

that there was still an insistent demand from an important segment of the public for long-distance

through highways. This demand was coupled with a

rising insistence that more attention be given to the

strictly rural roads and an awakening interest in civil aviation.

The postwar highway bill that was finally enacted

in 1944 after 9 months of congressional wrangling

fell below the expectations of the Administration and

the States, but was still the largest in history. It authorized Federal aid at the rate of $500 million per

year for the three first postwar years, divided $225

million to the Federal-aid highway system, $125 million for urban extensions and $150 million for the

principal secondary and feeder roads. These last were

required to be spent on a secondary highway system

selected by the State highwa}'' departments in cooperation with the local road officials and the PRA, but

without any mileage or percentage limits. Congress

authorized participation with Federal funds up to one-third of the cost of right-of-wa)^ but specifically

rejected the President's suggestion for taking excess right-of-way for purpose of recoupment. Finally,

the Act authorized a 40,000-mile National System of

Interstate Highways but provided no funds specifically for its construction.

152
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 preserved

all of the essential features of the Federal-State rela- tionship that had been built up over the preceding

years, while liberalizing Federal assistance in some

areas, notably right-of-way. In passing it, Congress

again beat off efforts by the toll road and superhighway extremists to impose a national system of trunk

highways under Federal control on the country. The

National System of Interstate Highways was intended

to satisfy the demand for long-distance highways, but

without strong funding, it could not possibly achieve

this purpose in any reasonable time, as events in the

next 12 years would demonstrate.

REFERENCES

* WPA Mobilization For Defense Starts, Engineering NewsRecord, Vol. 124, No. 24, Jun. 13, 1940, p. 829.

' PRA Demands Defense Priority For Federal-Aid Work,

Engineering News-Record, Vol. 125, No. 10, Sept. 5, 1940,

p. 307.

' Highway Needs of the National Defense, H. Doc. 249, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 66. *Id., p. 56. ^Editorial, Engineering News-Recokd, Vol. 127, No. 23, Dec. 4, 1941, p. 785. "H. H. Kelly, The Problem of Motor Vehicle Regulation,

PxjBLic Roads, Vol. 13, No. 10, Dec. 1932, pp. 167, 168.

' Legislation to Raise Truck Weight Protested, Engineering

News-Record, Vol. 128, No. 4, Jan. 22, 1942, p. 155. 'C. VAIL, Regulation of Truck Transportation—A Challenge

to Highway Departments, Convention Group Meetings—

Papers and Discussions (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1943) pp. 10-15. •H. Doc, supra, note 3, p. 63. 'T. N. Barker, The Development of Uniformity in State Regulations of Size and Weight of Vehicles, Conx'Ention

Group Meetings—Papers and Discussions (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1943)

p. 128. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1943, p. 25. " Construction Machinery Purchases to be Placed on A-1

Priority Basis by WPB, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 128, No. 16, Apr. 16, 1942, p. 581. "Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1942, p. 43. " War Cuts Into Personnel of Highway Departments, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 129, Sept. 10, 1942, p. 339. " 1971 AuTOMOTn'E Facts and Figures (Automobile Manufacturer's Association, Inc., Detroit, 1973) p. 3.

" Tire Wear and Costs, Public Roads, Vol. 24, No. 9, JulySept., 1946, p. 248. " J. T. Thompson, Wai'time Highioay Transportation Problems, Convention Group Meetings, ST. Louis, Mo., Dec. 7, 8,

9, 1942 (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1943) pp. 114-124. " Transport in War Period Dominates Atlantic States Highway Meeting, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 128, No. 10, Mar. 5, 1942, p. 368. " Thompson, supra, note 17, pp. 114-124.

""Id. ^^Oas Tax Diversion Backfires, Engineering News-Record,

Vol. 129, No. 13, Sept. 24, 1942, p. 410. "Accident Facts—1973 (National Safety Council, Chicago,

1973) p. 59.

"^ BPR, supra, note 11, pp. 29, 30. " Alcan Highioay Officially Opened—Trucks Go North,

Engineering News-Record, Vol. 129, No. 22, Nov. 26, 1942,

p. 740. " R. E. Royall, Construction of the Alaska Highway

(Public Roads Administration, Washington, D.C., 1945) pp.

69, 77. '"The Alaska Highway, H. Rept. 1705, 79th Cong., 2d

Sess., p. 26. ^''Pennsylvania Turnpike Earns $2,600,000, Engineering

News-Record, Vol. 127, No. 12, Sept. 18, 1941, p. 398. ^ Transport in War Period Dominates Atlantic States Highioay Meeting, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 128, No. 10, Mar. 5, 1942, p. 369. '"Brief News, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 127, No. 14, Oct. 2, 1941, p. 464.

"* Interregional Highways, H. Doc. 379, 78th Con., 2d Sess.,

p. IIL '^Programming Highway Construction to Meet Post-Defense

Needs, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 127, No. 19, Nov. 6, 1941, p. 649.

'^ Nation's Highway Departments Make Plans to Meet Present, Post War Needs, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 129, No. 15, Oct. 8, 1942, p. 465. " H. Doc, supra, note 30, pp. 43-45.

'*Id., p. 60.

''Id., p. 55.

''Id., p. 114. "Id., p. V.

'^ New Local Highway Agency Proposed in Congress, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 131, No. 21, Nov. 18, 1943, p. 727.

'" Three Billion Dollars Asked For Postwar Highway Projects, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 131, No. 5, Jul. 29, 1943,

p. 179.

*" Several Laws of Engineering Interest Enacted by 2d

Session, 78th Congress, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 133, No. 1, Jul. 6, 1944, p. 3.

153
Event/ Leoding

to the

Enactment

of the 1956

Federol-Pid Highujoy Pet

Rapid Recovery of Motor Traffic to Prewar Levels

After the surrender of Japan, the American econ- omy shifted from war to peace with remarkable speed.

Huge wartime savings, some $44 billion, created an

insatiable market for housing and for all kinds of

goods, including new automobiles to replace the decrepit vehicles that had survived the war. Automobile production jumped from a mere 69,532 in 1945

to over 2.1 million in 1946, 3.5 million in 1947 and

3.9 million in 1948.^ Reflecting this vast increase in vehicle production,

registrations increased 22 percent, from the wartime

low of 30.6 million vehicles to 37.4 million vehicles in

1947. (In this period trucks increased by 34 percent.)

With the end of rationing and emergency speed controls, highway travel reached its prewar peak in 1946

and began a steady climb of about 6 percent per year

that was to continue for decades.-

The Nation's highways were in poor shape to re- ceive this traffic. Most of, the deficiencies disclosed in

the 1941 survey of the strategic network still existed

in 1946. Under wartime restrictions, the States could

do little to remedy them, and, in fact, because of widespread operation of overloaded trucks and reduced

maintenance, the State highway systems were in worse

shape structurally after the war than before.

The Urban Traffic Problem

In and near the cities, hundreds of miles of highways were functionally obsolete because of narrow

pavements, ribbon development and insufficient ca- pacity. In the 1920's and 1930's, migration of the more affluent inhabitants to outlying suburban areas created expansive thinly spread residential communities surrounding the major cities. This movement to the suburbs, which began in the days of the steam and

electric railroads, was greatly accelerated by the

private automobile. As the street and highway net- works expanded, more and more peox^le found it con- venient to live in the suburbs and drive to and from

work, but the convenience decreased rapidly as the

highways became congested with ever-increasing

volumes of vehicles.

The city, county and State highwa}^ authorities

tried to keep up with the traffic increase, first by widening streets and highways and then by providing

special high-capacity roads such as parkways and

expressways, commonly financed by bond issues.*

These special facilities expanded the radius of su- burban development and attracted so much more

traffic that they too became seriously congested.

* In the prewar period, the outstanding examples of such deluxe facilities were the Westchester County Parkways and

the Long Island State Tarkway System. The latter, begun

in 1925, by 1947 had expanded into a 158-mile network of commuter arteries tying western Long Island to downtown

New York.' In the west, the Arroyo Seco Parkway between Los Angeles and Pasadena, opened in 1940, was a dramatic

demonstration of what could be done to move large volumes

of traffic to and from the suburbs.

154
With the postwar availaMlity of VA housing and new automobiles, people began to move from the city to outlying suburban areas. Highway authorities tried to keep pace with the commuters, but the day was at hand for the rush-hour traffic jam.

155
An "origin-and-destination" survey.

Before the war was over, many of the State highway departments became involved with the large

cities and urban counties in the planning of costly

schemes for expanding highway capacities. Most of

the Federal aid provided by Congress for postwar

planning went into urban highways.

Federal Aid for Urban Highways

In its early days, the Federal-aid program applied

strictly to rural roads, "excluding every street and

road in a place having a population, as shown by the

latest available Federal census, of two thousand five hundred or more, ..." * This exclusion was suspended

in the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932

and the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,

and abolished altogether in the Hayden-Cartwright

Act of 1934. Thereafter, the States enlarged their

Federal-aid systems to include extensions of Federalaid routes into and through municipalities and even new routes wholly within urban areas, but the main

interest of the State highway departments was in the

rural highway systems outside the cities. Congress changed all this in 1944 by specifically

earmarking $125 million annually for the first 3 post- war years for roads in urban areas. These funds were to be apportioned to the States in the ratio that

their urban populations (cities of 5,000 or more in- habitants) bore to the national urban population. In

the same Act, Congress established the National System of Interstate Highways and required that its routes should be selected by the States within the

cities as well as between them. Thus, the FederalAid Highway Act of 1944 brought the State highway

departments, and also the Public Roads Administration (PRA) , actively into the field of city and regional

transportation planning beside the city and county

officials.* Urban Traffic Studies

Before they could designate the urban Interstate System arteries with confidence, the planners needed

to know a great deal more than they already knew

about the movements of traffic within cities and between cities and their suburbs

:

Traffic within an urban area is more complex than on

rural roads. Traffic volumes are larger, and arteries are much more numerous. Parallel streets offer many alter- nate routes of travel, and it is not possible to tell from

observing traffic volumes alone where the drivers really

want to go. Drivers often travel considerable distances out of their way to use exceptionally attractive routes, or to avoid congested or unattractive routes. Examples

of this have been noted in numerous cities and originand-destination surveys have shown that the facts were

sometimes quite different from assumptions made by engi- neers with long familiarity with the local situation.' The old techniques that had been developed in

previous years during the cooperative State-BPR

traffic surveys and the statewide highway planning

surveys, such as driver interviews and postcard questionnaires, were too costly, too cumbersome or not

sufficiently accurate. The planners needed a better

The Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) had pioneered in urban traffic studies in the Cook County Transportation Sur- vey of 1924, the first comprehensive study of traffic in an urban region including a large city" and in the Cleveland Regional Area Traffic Survey of 1927. The latter was the

first concerted study by all levels of government of the traffic problems of a single metropolitan region."

156
method of estimating future traffic flows, and they

found it in the "origin-and-destination survey," a sampling technique developed in 1944 by the PRA

with the help of the Bureau of the Census.* The

origin-destination surveys were made by interviewing

a sample of the urban population at their homes and

obtaining from each family in the sample detailed

information on the travel habits of its members.

Samples varied from as small as 1 dwelling unit in

30 to as high as 1 in 3, but averaged about 1 in 10. During 1944 and 1945 the State highway departments and local officials, with the help of the PRA,

analyzed the needs of 30 large metropolitan areas and

135 cities of 50,000 or less population.

By providing the means to estimate the traffic volumes

that will use any specific route, these studies serve to evaluate the merits of proposals advanced by different groups within an urban area, and to bring together the various local agencies in the support of a single plan.

Availability of the facts often permits harmonizing the views of differing factions, each of whose proposals, in the absence of facts, is of necessity based on opinions.'

A Larger Share of the Highway Dollar for Non-FederalAid System Roads

As statewide traffic increased, so did gasoline tax

revenues, and inevitably there was political pressure

to distribute some of this revenue to the counties as State aid for their roads. In many States a considerable part of the State-collected road-user revenues was redistributed to the counties, and often in greater

amounts than was generated within a specific county.*

As the State contributions increased, most counties

reduced their own support for local roads (the reve- nues being derived mostly from property taxation) so that by 1947 local governments were carrying only

about 40 percent of the cost of construction and maintenance where 20 years before they had carried over

80 percent." ** The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and

the Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1934 had provided

emergency funds that could be spent on "secondary

or feeder" roads off the Federal-aid system "to be

agreed upon by the State highway departments and

the Secretary of Agriculture." Although not required

by the legislation, the Secretary, through the Bureau

of Public Roads, insisted that these funds be spent on

connected road systems in each State as a condition

for his agreement." The States then, in selecting

systems, for the most part, selected the roads carrying

the most traffic, but not necessarily those most desired

by the local officials. These systems totaled about

138,500 miles, and on them about $245 million of

emergency relief and regular Federal-aid funds were

spent by the States in the period from 1934 to 1943.

Nevertheless, there was widespread dissatisfaction

with the county roads among rural residents, accompanied by an unwillingness to increase taxes to im-

* In 1944 it was estimated that nationally, about 61 percent

of road-user revenues was going to the State highway departments, about 26 percent to the counties and cities for their roads and streets, and the re.st to nonhighway uses."

** In Delaware, North Carolina, West Virginia and Virginia

(except for two counties), the highway departments are re- sponsible for all roads outside of municipalities because the

local governments succeeded in shifting the entire road burden

to the State.

prove them. This feeling led to increased political

pressure on the State governments for a larger share

of road-user taxes and also pressure on Congress for

dii-ect Federal aid to the counties. In 1943 Senator

A. T. Stewart of Tennessee introduced a bill to set up

a Rural Local Roads Administration with $1.1 billion

in Federal funds to be distributed among the counties

without going through the State highway departments.^^ This bill never emerged from committee,

but its supporters were able to include a very generous measure of assistance for local rural roads in the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944.

The Federal-Aid Secondary Road System

The 1944 Act authorized the appropriation of $150

million in each of the first 3 postwar years for projects on the "principal secondary and feeder roads" but

required that the funds be spent on "a system of such

roads selected by the State highway departments in

cooperation with the county supervisors, county commissioners, or other appropriate local road officials,

and the Commissioner of Public Roads." The money

was to be apportioned to the States one-third according to State area, one-third according to rural population and one-third according to the mileage of rural

mail delivery and star routes, and the Federal share

of any project was limited to 50 percent.

Congress imposed no mileage or percentage limits on the secondary system, and it soon became apparent

to the State highway departments that their previously

selected secondary systems were not nearly large

enough to satisfy the local authorities. However, the

PRA arbitrarily set guidelines for selecting routes which had the effect of limiting the mileage. First,

these guidelines required that the State Federal-Aid

Primary System and the selected Secondary System

be integrated to form continuous networks. Second,

the PRA limited the mileage it would approve to a system not larger than could be constructed and maintained with the funds that "might reasonably be ex- pected to be provided" according to past performance

in the area.*

The system approved by the Commissioner of Public Roads in June 1946 totaled 217,073 miles, but this was just a beginning, as tens of thousands of miles of

additional routes were then still under review. According to the PRA, "No route is approved without

first assessing its importance by reference to the rec- ords made in the planning surveys showing locations

of farms, schools, churches, and business establishments, type of existing road improvement, general

population distribution, and the amount of traffic." ^* By June 1947 the Secondary System had increased to 350,809 miles and by 1948 to 377,622 miles. It reached

502,676 miles in 1955.

The States Select Interstate System Routes

By the 1944 Act, Congress had limited the National

System of Interstate Highways to 40,000 miles and

had also provided that the routes should be selected

* Planning for the Federal-Aid Secondary Systems had the

beneficial effect of forcing the States to reexamine and update

their Primary Systems. Nationwide, about 40 percent of the Federal-aid secondary routes were already under State control or were immediately taken over by the States. The rest remained under local control.

157
by joint action of the State highway departments of

each State and the adjoining States. All routes so

selected were automatically to become part of the

Federal-Aid Primary System without regard to pre- vious mileage limits on that System.*

In February 1945 the PRA requested each State to submit recommendations for the Interstate System

routes within its boundaries. When these recom- mendations were all in, they totaled 45,070 miles

considerably over the legal limit and far above the

33,920 miles recommended by the Interregional Highway Committee." Two thousand miles were circumferential or distributing routes around the large cities. The PRA decided to defer consideration of these to a

later date and concentrate on getting the States to agree on the main routes between the cities. After weeding out the routes with the weakest

justifications and adding a small mileage requested

by the War Department, the PRA came up with a

total of 37,324 miles for the main routes. In March

1946 the PRA sent each of the States a map showing

this tentative integrated system and asked for their concurrence. The first State to concur was Nebraska,

and by June 1946 acceptances had been received from

37 States.^^

It required a year for the PRA and the remaining

11 States to iron out their differences, but agreement

was finally reached on a 37,681-mile System, including

2,882 miles of urban thoroughfares. Some 2,319 miles were reserved for urban circumferential and distributing routes, to be selected later. The Federal Works

Administrator approved this System on August 2, 1947.^«

Interstate System Standards Adopted

"N^Hiile the States were selecting the Interstate routes,

the PRA asked the American Association of State

Highway Officials to propose standards to control the

location and design of the Interstate highways. "There was no thought of requiring that every mile of the

system be built according to a rigid pattern but it was

believed essential that there be a high degree of uniformity where conditions as to traffic, population

density, topography, and other factors are similar." ^^ AASHO's Committee on Planning and Design

Policies had been formed in 1937 to review and evaluate the immense amount of research and operational

information on highways that had accumulated since

the 1920's.* Between 1938 and 1944 the Committee

summarized the existing knowledge of geometric design and good design practice in seven "Policies"

which were adopted by the Association and became,

in effect, the national design policies for highways.

Because of this prior work, the Committee was able

The Federal-aid system (later the Primary System) was

limited to 7 percent of each State's total highway mileage by

the 1921 Act. Congress, in 1932, allowed 1 percent increments

to be added as a State improved 90 percent of the entire Federal-aid system in that State."

* Thomas H. MacDonald was chairman of this powerful

committee from its inception until 1944. The Committee's

working staff of design experts was supplied by the BPR

(and PRA) and functioned under Joseph Barnett, who was

also secretary of the Committee.

The projected routes of the Interstate System as approved by the Federal Works Administrator, 19^.1.

MCOMHtmCO

NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS

SELECTED BY JOINT ACTION OF THE SEVERAL STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENTS

AS MODIFIED AND APPROVED

BY THE ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL WORKS AGENCY

AUGUST 2, 1947

158
to recommend standards for the Interstate System by

June 1945, and these were adopted by AASHO and

approved by the Federal Works Administrator in

August 1945.*

Of necessity, the Interstate standards were a compromise. A few States thought they were inadequate,

pointing to the provision permitting three-lane highways for traffic volumes intermediate between those

requiring a two-lane highway and those requiring a four-lane divided highway. Some criticized the weak

provisions permitting grade crossings with railroads

and other highways for low-traffic sections of the

Interstate System. In these respects, the standards

fell far below those for existing parkways and turnpikes which had been held up to the public by many

people as the ideal for the Interstate System.

To get wide acceptance of the standards, the Committee equivocated on other elements of design by

setting up "minimum" and "desirable" levels of design. Thus, for level country, a State could elect to

* When the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act specifically called for adoption of uniform design standards for the Inter- state System, these earlier standards were the l)asis for the new standards, permitting completion of the work in 2 to 3 months.

use either a 60- or 70-mile per hour design speed.

For right-of-way, the "desirable" width for divided

highways was 250 feet, but in a pinch the State could

get by with the "minimum" of 150 feet.

Control of Access Recommended but Not Required for Interstate System

The most important deficiency in the standards

concerned a matter over which AASHO had no control and little influence with the States. This was the

control of access to the highway from abutting property. Two decades of experience had shown that new

highways invariably attracted ribbon development by

commercial enterprises catering to the traffic on the

highway. Movements to and from these businesses

disrupted the traffic stream on the highway and

greatly increased accidents. Eventually, the ability

of the highway to carry traffic was reduced far below

its original capacity by the roadside activity. At the same time the cost of future widening was made prohibitive. Gradually, highway administrators began

to realize that the only way to protect the capacity of

the highway was to deny or restrict access to the road

from the adjacent private property. This growing

realization ran counter to the most deeply ingrained

The lack of access control prevented free-flowing movement on this four-lane, undivided bypass of U.S. 101 in California.

159
traditions of English common law and also most

American statute law, which granted to abutters the

very rights highway administrators now sought to take away.

The Bronx River Parkway Commission acquired a broad expanse of parkland along each side of the

parlcway road. This practice effectively controlled

access to the road while avoiding the question of the

loss of access rights to abutting property owners. However, there was some doubt as to whether this was really sufficient, and the Westchester County

Parkway Commission made it their practice to purchase access rights and specifically mention them in

the deeds.^° The Pennsylvania Legislature in the act creating the Turnpike Commission gave the Commission the power to acquire access rights, by eminent

domain, if necessary. However, very few State legislatures conferred such rights on their highway commissions. By 1945 only 17 States had laws permitting

the control of access to State highways.

The Committee on Planning and Design Policies

skirted this ticklish question by saying,

Where State laws permit, control of access shall be

obtained on all new locations and on all old locations wherever economically possible. . . In those States which

do not have legal permission to acquire control of access, additional right-of-way should be obtained adequate for the building of frontage roads connecting with controlled access points, if and when necessary."

Slow Start of the Postwar Highway Program

When the war ended, the States were well prepared

with plans for the largest highway program in history. On the shelf ready to go were plans for $590

million worth of road improvements, and plans for

another $2.5 billion worth of work were well advanced.

A total of about $624 million in Federal aid was available from prewar and postwar authorizations, and

most of the States had ample matching funds saved

up during the war.^^ Most highway departments

anticipated some difficulty in obtaining trained engi- neers and building contractors, but this did not seem

at first to be a great obstacle.

On October 2, 1945, Congress, by concurrent resolution, declared that the war emergency had been

relieved to such an extent that the postwar road program authorized by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of

1944 could proceed. About the same time most of the

wartime restrictions on road building were lifted. Eager to launch the postwar program as soon as possible, and urged on by the PRA, the State highway

departments advertised hundreds of jobs during the

winter of 1945^6, some of them for very large bridges

or urban expressways.

The result was, in some respects, a repetition of the

1920 experience. During World War II the inflation

in road construction prices had been held to about 6

percent per year by price controls, and after 1943, by

scarcity of work. A number of contractors had gone

out of business, and those remaining were short of

serviceable equipment and labor. The increased offer- ings of the State highway departments in 1945 and

1946 quickly saturated the available capacity of the

construction industry and prices began to rise. At

the same time materials scarcities developed, particularly in steel and lumber, which were in great

demand for housing. The general uncertainty in

prices and supplies resulted in higher bids, and by the

end of 1946, the prices of highway structures had

risen 24 percent over the 1945 level. Concrete pavement was up 12 percent.^^

The States began rejecting the low bids that were

far above preliminary estimates in an attempt to stem the tide of advancing prices. By the end of

fiscal year 1946, only 1,958 contracts for $298 million

of construction had been awarded—less than a third

of earlier expectations. Twenty-two percent of all low bids received had been rejected as too high.^* In some States, rejections ran as high as 30 percent of

the low bids received.

This policy of rejecting low bids was ineffective,

largely because the country was in the early stages of

a building boom fueled not only by the State road

programs, but also by large city expressway schemes,

a huge increase in housing, and construction for in- dustrial reconversion.

In August 1946, the Director of War Mobilization

and Reconversion restricted highway construction to ease competition with the housing program for scarce

materials. This restriction was lifted in October ex- cept for structural steel, but it had its effect along

with rising prices in reducing State contract awards.

Prices in 1947 reached a level 45 percent above 1945

prices and nearly double the prewar level. Unwilling

to admit that prices had risen permanently to a new

plateau, the States rejected 18 percent of all low bids

received in fiscal year 1947.

Despite these difficulties, the States made a much

better showing in 1947 than 1946, awarding contracts for 47,163 miles of road estimated to cost $817.7 million. Most of these were for rural primary or rural

secondary roads and for simple projects such as re- paving which did not require right-of-way or expensive plans.

The situation was quite different in the urban areas where most of the projects were arterial street widenings, new expressways or large bridges. Some of

these schemes were very large indeed and required the

acquisition and demolition of hundreds of buildings

and the relocation of many families at a time when

it was almost impossible to find other housing for

them.

The State highway departments, usually in cooperation with the large cities or urban counties, started over a score of expensive expressway projects in 1947,

each expected to cost in the millions. New York

began clearing the way for the $34 million CrossBronx Expressway and the equally expensive Brooklyn-Queens Expressway. Massachusetts began the

Northern Circumferential Highway around the Boston

metropolitan area, while Michigan launched the John

C. Lodge Expressway and the Edsel Ford Expressway

in Detroit, each expected to cost over $6 million per

mile. In Chicago work began on the Congress Street

Expressway, an eight-lane depressed freeway designed

to accommodate 4,000 vehicles per hour in each direction, and estimated to cost $69 million. Expressways

in Denver, Dallas, Fort Worth, Los Angeles, Oakland,

Jacksonville, Miami, Cleveland, San Francisco, and

Pittsburgh added to the huge total. The shortages of contractors, labor, materials and

equipment persisted through 1947, 1948, and into 1949.

160
The Bronx River Parkway with, controlled access and extensive parkland along each side.

In addition, a severe shortage of highway engineers

developed in 1946 and became worse as the highway

departments expanded their programs. Most States

had failed to raise their pay scales to keep in step

with the inflation, and as a result, many engineers

did not return to State service after the war or left for other employment in industry.

Struggling against these handicaps and the continuing high prices, the States were able to obligate only

36 percent of their Federal-aid authorizations in fiscal year 1946, 62 percent in 1947, and 79 percent in 1948.

It was necessary for Congress to extend the availability of the postwar authorizations by 1 year, and

the unused backlog was so large that Congress made

no authorization for fiscal year 1949 and reduced the

authorizations for 1950 and 1951.

The Local Rural Road Problem

Although slow, there was improvement, and in 1949

the annual mileage of completed roads had reached

the 1937 level of 21,000 miles, including about 14,000

miles of farm-to-market roads. But this did not sat- isfy the extreme rural road advocates.

The dissatisfaction in the coimties found expression

in two bills before Congress which would set up a

Rural Roads Division in the Public Roads Administration with authority to dispense $100 to $200

million annually to the counties and local political subdivisions without going through the State highway

departments.^^ There was also some rural sentiment

for doing away with all system restrictions on rural

roads so that their benefits could be more widely dis- tributed among the rural population.

In testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Roads on these bills, Commissioner MacDonald as- serted that the proposed legislation would entail a

"vast amount of costly supervision" on the part of the

PRA to insure that the aided roads received proper

maintenance. Rural roads, he said, were necessarily

of light construction and required efficient and con- tinuous maintenance to preserve their integrity. Past

experience had shown that maintenance was the very

aspect of road management in which the counties were

weakest. Approval of the bills, according to MacDonald, would greatly dilute and weaken the fundamentally sound rural road program already in

operation.^® In May 1949, the Subcommittee requested

Commissioner MacDonald to make a study of the

rural road problem and report back to the Subcommittee by January 1950.

161
This rural road was widened but

is still too narrow for 1953 trafflc.

The PRA's study, made with the help of the Board

of County Consultants* and the State highway departments, did little to assuage the feelings of the

extreme ruralists. The survey disclosed that of the

2.5 million miles of local roads in the United States

in 1949, 323,000 miles were already on the FederalAid Secondary System. Another 100,000 miles carrying at least 100 vehicles per day could and should be

transferred to the Federal-Aid Secondary System."

Another 400,000 miles was described as "wholly nonessential." To bring the remaining 1.8 million miles

up to acceptable standards and provide adequate maintenance over a 20-year period would cost the local

governments about $894 million per year. Since the

local units were already spending $835 million per

year on roads, the PRA concluded "It is apparent that a relatively small addition, with efficient management,

applied to a planned program would be sufficient to accomplish the satisfactory improvement of local roads in a period of 20 years." ^^ The report concluded that what local roads needed was not so much more money as improved administration. Federal cooperation and participation, the

PRA thought, could best be achieved through coordination at the State level.

1

* In 1946 the Federal Works Administrator appointed a Board of County Consultants consisting of 10 county officials from the PRA's 10 geographical administrative areas to advise the PRA on the secondary road program.

BPR "Driver Behavior" studies to measure speed, spacing, and lateral vehicle placement on the road, 1945.

162
Highway Needs Versus Financial Resources

In the early 1920's some economists and even engi- neers predicted that the market for motor cars would

become saturated. As the number of motor vehicles

stabilized, road mileage and the need for road improvement would also stabilize. Eventually, the highway system would reach a state of "maturity" at which time there would be a diminishing need for

capital expenditures, and most of the highway reve- nues would be used for maintenance.

This prediction was never realized. Instead, as national income increased, the automobile market ex- panded even more. The manufacturers were able to spend large sums on research, and they greatly improved the performance and reliability of motor vehicles. After World War I, motor trucks, which

pre\aously had operated only in cities, took to the

highways and rapidly increased in numbers, size and

speed.

As already noted, the highway administrators re- sponded to this ever-increasing and continually

changing vehicle population first, by upgrading the

old wagon roads, and then by building improved new

roads tailored to the motor vehicle. Finally, they

invented new types of roads such as parkways and

expressways to move huge volumes of traffic at high

speeds. As the roads improved, the annual usage per

vehicle increased, so that highway traffic built up

faster than vehicle registrations in a self-reinforcing

spiral. The highway system never reached maturity.

The need for capital expenditures did not diminish,

but increased enormously.

By the middle 1940's, most States had accepted as a virtual certainty that their road systems would

never be completed. They realized that they would

have to plan highway improvements far into the

future and establish a policy that would recognize

future needs and provide for them

Establishment of a highway policy that will result in adequate highway service in the future requires determination of the proper size and cost of systems of the

different classes of highways needed. There must be an

equitable plan for distribution of costs among highway

users and general taxpayers, allocation of authority and

financial responsibility among levels of government, and

regulation of highway use to protect users and to obtain maximum service. Each element is so interrelated with

others that complete facts on present conditions and

most up-to-date results of transportation research are

essential to develop an over-all analysis of highway needs

to serve the interests of all in an equitable manner.'* In 1947, the California Legislature created a joint

fact-finding committee from both houses to study the

highway needs of the State "and to recommend a

policy and means of putting that policy into action." ^° The Michigan Good Roads Federation undertook a

similar statewide needs analysis. Other States fol- lowed, and by 1950, 13 had published needs reports,

and others were working on the complex studies for

such reports.

The legislative and other fact-finding committees

depended on their State highway departments, as- sisted by the BPR, to supply the factual information

for their studies. Most of this factual material came

from the tremendous bank of economic and traffic data assembled by the statewide planning surveys begun in the middle 1930's. There was also a large

amount of research information on driver behavior

and the vehicle-carrying capacity of urban streets and

rural roads that had been assembled before and after

the war by the BPR, the States and the Highway

Research Board's Committee on Highway Capacity.

The compilation of future needs was simple in

principle, but laborious in practice. First, the analysts

had to forecast the traffic that might be expected in a

future year and then assign the future traffic to the

various roads in the several systems. Then, knowing

the present condition of these roads and the desirable

standards to handle the forecasted traffic, they could

compile a list of "deficiencies." Finally, they would

compute the future cost of the construction needed to overcome these deficiencies. The sum of these costs was the estimate of needs for the particular year

studied.

These predictions of future needs were necessarily

painted with a broad brush. First, they depended on

the continuation of past population, economic, vehicle registration, and traffic trends. And then there was considerable difference of opinion among the

States as to what the standards should be to accom- modate the future traffic. Nevertheless, there was a broad general agreement that the past trends would

continue or even be exceeded and that the AASHO

standards would be adequate or at least tolerable. The needs estimates were widely accepted as being

well within the accuracy required for long-range

financial plans and also for arousing popular support

for the increased taxes and highway imposts that

would be required to realize those plans.

It is safe to say that most of the State legislatures were astounded and dismayed by the size of the backlog of needs as shown by the needs studies. The

California legislative committee found that it would

cost $1.7 billion over a 10-year period to bring the

State's roads up to a reasonable standard. The cost

in Washington was estimated at $509 million and in

Oregon at $468 million.^^ The Michigan committee

found needs that would cost $1.75 billion to remedy.^^

Connecticut, one of the smallest States in area, found

needs exceeding $400 million, and in Massachusetts

the needs exceeded $700 million.^^

In 1950 AASHO made its own needs study and

asserted that what was needed nationally to catch up

with highway needs was a $4 billion annual program

for 15 years ($1 billion for maintenance, $2.5 billion

for construction and $500 million for interest, amortization and administration).^* About the same time

the Congressional Joint Committee on the Economic

Report set the immediate national road needs at $41

billion.^^ The reaction to the disclosure of these massive needs

varied from State to State. The California Legislature immediately increased the gasoline tax by IV^

cents per gallon and radically amended the highway

laws to speed up right-of-way acquisition and permit

acquisition of land in advance of actual need to forestall speculative increases in land prices. Michigan

raised its 3-cent gasoline tax to 5 cents per gallon and

added 2 cents to the diesel fuel tax which, along with

a hefty increase in the truck weight tax, raised an

additional $135 million annually.^* Other States

looked to Congress to make up the difference between

163
what they needed and what they could raise without

pain with their current tax policies. Still others

thought the solution was to get the Federal Government to withdraw from the taxing of fuel so that the

States, without lowering the total tax, could use the

Federal 2 cents per gallon for their own needs.

But most States decided on some form of credit

financing to close at least a part of the gap. The

Massachusetts Legislature authorized a $100 million

bond issue backed by road-user revenues to improve

the main highways and began looking into toll financing for some highways.^^ By a two-to-one vote, the

voters of North Carolina approved a $200 million

bond issue for rural roads. The bonds, backed by the

faith and credit of the State, sold to yield an effective

interest rate of only 1.52 percent.^® *

* By comparison North Carolina sold its road bonds in 1920

to produce an effective interest rate of 5 percent.

Traffic was concentrated around the cities, hut the need to upgrade rural roads also demaiided

that limited funds be spread across the State, resulting in pavement loidening projects such as this.

164
In New York, Governor Thomas E. Dewey, despairing of ever completing the Thruway System from

diversion-depleted current revenues, authorized a study of revenue bond financing backed by tolls. When this study showed that tolls alone would not

carry the project, the Legislature created the New

York Thruway Authority and empowered it to sell $500 million in bonds backed by the State's credit.^^ Some State legislatures decided to wring as much

as possible of the needed revenue from road usei-s in the form of tolls on the theory that "every dollar

that can be obtained from private sources to extend

existing toll highways will mean a dollar of regular

highway income released to match federal aid for

highway building in some other part of the state." *" Other States, notably New Jersey, switched from payas-you-go financing to revenue bonds backed by tolls to build their most expensive and heavily traveled

arteries. Between 1950 and 1954, the legislatures of

19 States created independent toll road authorities or authorized their State highway departments to build

toll roads.

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1950 permitted

the States to borrow funds in the bond market against

future Federal-aid apportionments. However, this authority did not make any new money available to the

States or enhance their credit or change their own

constitutional debt limits; and further. Congress care- fully disclaimed any obligation to provide the future

Federal-aid funds that might be used to redeem the

bonds. Consequently, only a few States availed themselves of the privilege, and these for comparatively

small amounts.

The Financial Dilemma of the State Highway Departments

The prices bid for highway construction peaked in

late 1948 and then stabilized at about twice the prewar

level. Highway maintenance costs also doubled be- cause of the war and postwar inflation. This put the

State highway departments in a double price squeeze

at a time when highway traffic, and particularly

truck traffic, was increasing alarmingly.* As the

States put increasingly more of their income into

maintenance, the money left for new construction,

including Federal-aid matching, became less. The

purchasing power of this remainder was only half

that of the prewar period, yet the increased traffic demanded much heavier, wider and costlier roads than

the prewar models.

Traffic growth was not uniform but was concentrated most heavily in the industrial States and, to a

large extent, on a very small mileage near and between the large cities. Yet it was politically impossible for the highway departments to concentrate their

funds on this small mileage. Their programs were

designed to distribute highway work rather evenly

over their States, and in a situation where all roads

needed some improvement, it was not possible to deny

* In the 4 years from 1947 to 1950, registrations of privately

owned vehicles increased by 11.2 million units—to a total of

48.60 million." Annual vehicle miles of travel by passenger

automobiles increased by 21 percent and by trucks 37 percent. In 1950, about 48 percent of the travel was in urban places, the rest on the rural roads."

some areas in order to build a few miles of costly

superhighways near the cities. Practically all of the States agreed that the most

troublesome congestion was on the selected Interstate System routes. These had long been the most important traffic arteries and were now the oldest and

most obsolete. Most of the highway departments

made a determined effort to upgrade these old roads,

and through fiscal year 1948 they channeled about 22

percent of their postwar primary and urban Federal

aid and matching money, amounting to $384 million,

into interstate projects. These totaled over 2,000

miles, including 800 bridges and grade separations,

but this was a mere drop in the bucket compared to the obvious needs.

Congress Orders Reevaluation of Defense Highway

Needs

As the States struggled to keep up with continual

traffic increases, Western Europe was approaching

economic collapse, and relations with the Soviet Union

were deteriorating to a state of "cold war." In 1947

Congress acted to provide massive military and eco- nomic aid for Turkey and Greece to help them resist Communist aggression. In April 1948 Congress approved the $17 billion Marshall Plan to rebuild

Europe. In June 1948 the Soviets blockaded Berlin,

and the United States responded with a massive airlift to break the blockade.

In the tense atmosphere of these events. Congress

became more conscious of the growing inadequacy of

the country's highways, and particularly the Interstate System to sustain a possible remobilization. It added a provision to the Federal-Aid Highway Act

of 1948 requiring the Commissioner of Public Roads

to study the needs or potential needs of the Interstate System for national defense in cooperation with the

Secretary of Defense, the State highway departments

and the National Security Resources Board and report

back to Congress not later than April 1, 1949.

The study began with a detailed inventory which

disclosed an amazing diversity of geometric standards,

widths and types of pavements, and dimensions and

strengths of bridges among the 37,800 miles of existing roads in the System. The average age of the road

surfaces was 12 years and 13 percent were more than

20 years old and nearing the end of their useful lives. In the rural sections, 6,000 miles had surfaces less than 20 feet wide and only 4,147 miles had more than

two lanes. On 6,273 miles, the shoulders were less than 4 feet wide. There were 1,262 grade crossings

with main line railroads and another 785 with branch

lines and spur tracks. Of the 12,048 bridges on the

System, only 677 were found to be below AASHO's

H 15 capacity, but there were many more of inadequate width, including 52 one-way bridges less than

18 feet wide. Of the existing bridges, 1,245, aggregating 29 miles in length, were of wooden construction.*^ The PRA and the States measured the traffic using

each section of the System and estimated the cost of

upgrading each section to handle this traffic according

to the standards proposed by AASHO for Interstate highways. They found that many sections would

have to be completely relocated to meet the design

speed, sight distance and gradient requirements and

165
that the relocations would shorten the total length of

the system by about 641 miles. All together, the in- vestigators found that it would take an investment of

$11.3 billion at 1948 prices to bring the Interstate System up to an acceptable standard to handle 1948

traffic. To meet this need in a 20-year period would

require an investment of at least $500 million per

year, according to the PRA's report.

However, the report stated that the needs of the

national defense would require a "substantially more

rapid improvement," and it pointed out that tre- mendous benefits to the civilian economy would flow

from a faster rate of modernization. Rather than

stretch out the work over 20 years, the PRA suggested credit financing with appropriations sufficient to amortize the bonds in 20 years. To this end, the

report recommended that Congress consider permitting the States to borrow capital now to complete

their sections of the Interstate System and use their

future Federal-aid apportionments to repay the borrowings. To further promote rapid completion, the

report suggested that Congress increase the Federal

share of the cost of Interstate projects and also ear- mark funds specifically for the Interstate System.

These earmarked funds should be apportioned so that

the improvement of the System would proceed at about the same rate in all the States.** In March 1950 Representative William M. Whittington of Mississippi introduced a bill to increase

Federal aid for fiscal years 1952 and 1953 to $570

million per year, of which $70 million would be ear- marked for the Interstate System, to be matched 75

percent Federal to 25 percent State. Whittington's

bill would also increase Federal participation in rightof-way costs to 50 percent and permit the States to use future Interstate apportionments to repay loans

incurred to finance Interstate projects. This bill had

the support of AASHO, except that AASHO had

asked for $210 million for the Interstate instead of

the paltry $70 million.*^

Not all the State highway people were behind

AASHO in this support. Led by the influential chief

engineer of the Pennsylvania State highway department, the Association of Highway Officials of the

North Atlantic States (AHONAS) passed a resolution opposing any further increase in Federal aid to the States, any further earmarking of funds for particular Federal-aid systems and any increase in the

Federal share of projects. Increase in the Federal

share would, AHONAS asserted, lead inevitably to more Federal control and intervention in State affairs.*® Other bills in the 2d session of the 81st Congress

would have boosted Federal aid to $870 million an- nually with $100 million going directly to counties

and townships. In the end, despite the continued

unsettled conditions in Europe and the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950, Congress left the road

program substantially unchanged except for an in- crease of $50 million to restore the 1946-48 level of

$500 million per year. There was no increase in the

Federal matching share or any earmarking of funds

for the Interstate System. The only important

changes were raising Federal participation in rightof-way costs to 50 percent and the granting of per- mission for the States to use future Federal-aid

apportionments to retire the principal of bonds issued

to finance improvements on the Primary System, in- cluding the Interstate System.

Nearly 2 years passed before Congress took any

further action on the PRA recommendations. The

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1952 increased Federal

support for the Primary and Secondary Systems to $550 million each for fiscal years 1954 and 1955 and

also authorized $25 million for each of these years

for the Interstate System. This token amount was

to be apportioned according to the original Federalaid formula and matched 50-50 by State funds.

Two years later in the Federal-Aid Highway Act

of 1954, Congress increased the whole Federal-aid

program to $875 million per year, earmarking $175

million in fiscal years 1956 and 1957 for the Interstate System and increasing the Federal share to 60 percent on Interstate projects.

The reluctance of Congress to provide adequate

funding for the Interstate System can be explained

in part by a rising sentiment against the principle of

Federal aid, and voiced by the 1953 Governors Conference which recommended that there be no further

increases in aid, and that the Federal Government

withdraw from the taxation of motor fuel.*^ However, the best excuse for congressional inaction was a strong indication from a number of States that they were well on the way to removing their worst traffic bottlenecks by building roads without Federal assist- ance. The Second Toll Road Era The Pennsylvania Turnpike operated at a loss during the war years despite increased traffic. In 1944,

1.04 million vehicles used the turnpike and paid $1.78

million in tolls, yet the Authority lost $500,000 and

had to draw on the reserve built up in 1940, 1941 and

1942.*« After the war, traffic increased rapidly, and this,

with increased toll rates, quickly restored profitable

operation. By 1948 the turnpike's net operating reve- nue was $5.6 million per year. With the financial

security of its original investment assured, the Pennsylvania Legislature authorized the Turnpike Commission to extend the turnpike 100 miles east to Philadelphia at an estimated construction cost of $75

million and 60 miles west to the Ohio State line for

about $55 million.*^ The Commission had no trouble

selling its bonds to eager investors.

Meanwhile Maine was pushing plans for a toll road

to be built a few miles inland from U.S. Route 1 between the New Hampshire border and Portland. This

road was expected to attract most of the summer

traffic bound from New York and New England to the Maine resorts and thus take some of the pressure

off congested Route 1. The Legislature thought this

traffic would not mind paying a sinall toll to avoid

the congestion on the old road.

As soon as wartime restrictions were lifted, the

Maine Turnpike Authority sold $15 million of reve- nue bonds to finance the 47-mile road and began construction. Although the bonds were secured only by

the future earnings of the turnpike, they sold readily

at a net interest rate of only 2.64 percent. "\^niien the

turnpike was opened in 1947, traffic exceeded estimates,

and after some initial difficulties, the road operated in

the black on a toll of about li/^ cents per mile.^"

166
Building the New Jersey Turnpike.

With the completion by Massachusetts of a free

expressway to the New Hampshire line and the opening of the Maine Turnpike, traffic congestion became

intolerable on New Hampshire's 15-mile portion of

U.S. Route 1. Unable to obtain an increase in the

gas tax from the Legislature to finance major improvements for the old winding road, the Highway

Commission asked for authority to build a toll road

financed by State bonds. The bonds, backed by the

faith and credit of the State, sold for a net interest rate of only 1.58 percent. The toll road, built in only

1 year, opened to traffic in 1950 and was enormously

profitable from the outset—so much so that the Legislature decided to build two more toll roads in other

parts of the State. In 1945 the New Jersey Legislature authorized a system of free expressways and parkways to relieve

congestion in the densely settled New York-Philadelphia corridor. The system was started in 1946,

but in a few years it became evident that highway

revenues were insufficient to complete the system in

any reasonable time. The Legislature then set up the

New Jersey Turnpike Authority in 1949 to build the

principal artery between the George Washington

Bridge and the Delaware River, a distance of 117

miles. By-passing the New York bond houses, the

Authority sold its revenue bonds to a consortium of

53 insurance companies in February 1950. It then

embarked on a round-the-clock construction program

that finished the $285 million toll road in less than 3 years. From the opening of the first section in 1952, the

turnpike was a resounding success and by 1953 was

I'eturning six times the operating expenses for a net operating revenue of $18.2 million per year. Traffic

was 22 million vehicles during 1953 of which only

about 12 percent were trucks and buses.

In 1947 the New York Legislature authorized

Westchester County to collect a 10-cent toll on the

Hutchinson River and Sawmill River Parkways provided the county reimbursed the Federal Government

for the $2.15 million of Federal-aid funds spent on

these parkways.*

The Toll Road Bandwagon Begins to Roll The Pennsylvania, Maine, New Hampshire and New

Jersey Turnpikes showed rather conclusively that the

public was impatient with obsolete, congested highways and was willing to pay handsomely for modern

freeways.** Other States, equally short of capital

funds, began to consider credit financing schemes

backed by tolls. Oklahoma in 1953 completed the

88-mile Turner Turnpike between Oklahoma City and

Tulsa. New York, which had started its thruway as a free expressway, switched to toll financing in 1954

to accelerate construction. And West Virginia completed a 2-lane toll road from Charleston to Princeton

in 1954. Colorado built the 17-mile Denver-Boulder

Turnpike in 1952.

* The Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1934 authorized the ex- penditure of Federal-aid funds on "such main parkways as may be designated by the State and approved by the Secretary

of Agriculture as part of the Federal-aid highway system."

** In 1953 the average State gasoline tax was about 5 to 6

cents per gallon, and the Federal tax was 2 cents per gallon.

Thus, the States and the Government were collecting % cent per mile for providing and maintaining the public highways.

On top of this the toll roads collected about 1% cents per

mile in tolls so turnpikes cost their users about four times as much as free roads. There were, of course, offsetting econo- mies in time, operating costs, and distance savings which

made the turnpikes attractive.

167
New Jersey's Garden State Parkway, one of the early examples of excellent design for high-speed, access-controlled roads.

Toll road authorities were created in Connecticut,

Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Kansas, Kentucky, Florida,

Georgia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, North

Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas and Virginia. By the

end of 1954, these authorities had 1,382 miles of toll roads under construction at costs estimated to total $2.3 billion, and they were making plans and studies

for 3,314 additional miles estimated to cost $3.75 bil- lion. The 1,239 miles of toll roads already completed

as of January 1955 represented an investment of $1.55

billion.^^ With few exceptions, these toll roads followed the

routes selected by the PRA and the States for the

Interstate System, and they represented the heaviest

trafficked portions of that System outside the cities. At the height of the toll road boom, the turnpike

authorities were investing their funds in interstate

highways at about three times the rate of the State

highway departments.

It is not an exaggeration to say that most of the

motoring public first learned the safety and comfort

of driving on access controlled roads on the turnpikes.

The toll roads provided the example that later led to mandatory control of access on the Interstate System.

The toll roads were high-speed divided highways

with wide rights-of-way. Their geometric standards

equaled or bettered AASHO's "desirable" standards

for the Interstate System. In addition, the turnpike

authorities spent considerable sums to provide amenities for their users—rest areas, landscaping, built-in

safety features. A few, notably New Jersey's Garden

State Parkway and portions of the New York Thruway, were planned with the two roadways totally

independent of and largely concealed from each

other—an advanced technique of highway design

pioneered by the PRA and the National Park Service on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway. Most toll roads, however, were built in the monotonous tradition of long tangents that had dominated highway

engineering for decades. Nevertheless, the toll roads,

as a class, set a high standard of excellence that was

hard for the State highway departments with their

limited budgets to match. They provided highly

visible yardsticks by which to measure the glaring

inadequacies of the public highways and whetted the

public appetite for better free roads.

168
With the great success of many of the early turnpikes, their excess

capital was used to build and

support less profitable roads,

appearing to establish a never- ending requirement for tolls.

Tolls Forever The feasibility of the original Pennsylvania Turnpike was assured by Federal grants of $29.5 million

which greatly reduced the part of its cost that would

have to be financed by revenue bonds and recovered

in tolls from the road users. The success of the turn- pike convinced many proponents of toll roads in and

out of Congress that the much-needed improvement

of the main interstate highways could be achieved by

Federal subsidy of toll roads, especially those with

marginal revenue potential, or even by a system of

federally owned toll roads. A bill was introduced in

the 80th Congress to permit the use of Federal funds on toll roads, along with the perennial bill to authorize

transcontinental Federal toll expressways.^^

These proposals were opposed by the PRA and a long list of organizations representing highway users. The PRA's argument was that toll roads were wasteful and solved only a part of the problem. To reduce

the cost of collecting tolls, the access points had to be

spaced far apart, denying the use of the road to local

and short haul traffic* The States or counties would

have to build duplicating parallel free roads to handle

this local traffic at greater total expense than it would

take to build a free expressway originally.

By 1948 business was so good on the Pennsylvania

Turnpike that toll collections were running far ahead

of the requirements for retiring the bonds. When the

Legislature authorized the 100-mile extension east to the Delaware River, the Turnpike Commission merged

the financing of this extension with that of the original

toll road by floating new bonds, part of which were

used to pay off the original bond issue. Later other

extensions were all financially tied together so that revenue from the profitable sections of the system

supported the weaker sections.

This pattern of financing, long used by the Port of

New York Authority,** was copied in other States.

* On the Maine Turnpike tlie distance between access points

averaged 11 miles.

** Tolls on the Port of New York Authority's enormously

profltable Holland Tunnel were set at a rate far higher than was necessary to retire the bonds, and the extra income was

used to finance other undertakings.

Connecticut placed the income from the Merritt and

Wilbur Cross Parkways and the Charter Oak Bridge

in a revolving fund to support the bonds for a new

toll expressway from Greenwich to Killingly. Maine

applied the income from its first turnpike to finance a northern extension to Augusta.

This trend alarmed many State highway administrators who foresaw a situation of perpetual tolls on

their main highways. In 1950 the Deputy Director

of the New York Department of Public Works warned

that the proliferation of toll roads would stifle free

transportation and injure the national welfare.^^ The

Engineering News-Record cautioned against the danger that toll authorities would perpetuate themselves

long after the original excuse for their existance

(shortage of funds) has passed. "As a result, the

publicly owned toll highway of today can become just as pernicious an evil as the privately owned toll road

of a century or more ago." ^*

Congress Sets National Policy on Toll Roads

In 1954 the New York Thruway Authority and the

New Jersey Highway Authority agreed to connect

the thruway and the Garden State Parkway at the

State line. However, trucks were prohibited on the

parkway, which meant that southbound trucks on the

thruway would have to exit at the State line and continue their journey on the public roads. Critics of

toll roads pointed to this decision as one of many

examples of uncoordinated regional planning by the

toll authorities. The connection, they said, should

have been made to the New Jersey Turnpike instead

of the parkway, and the decision as to where to con- nect should have been made by the State highway

authorities in Albany and Trenton rather than by the

toll road authorities.^^

There was also widespread criticism of allowing

the toll roads to preempt the Interstate highway

locations and thus condemn the free roads in those

locations to a generation of inadequacy.

The Bureau of Public Roads had played a decisive

role in coordinating the regional planning of the

Federal-aid system by the States. However, the BPR

had no influence with the toll authorities since they

had not received any Federal ftinds. One of the

169
reasons advanced by proponents of Federal aid for

toll roads was that such aid would give the Government some control over them—at least to the extent

of requiring that the roads be freed of tolls after the

bonds were paid off. The 83d Congress (1953-1954) considered the

thorny problem of Federal aid for toll roads but left

it unsettled by directing the Secretary of Commerce

to make a study and report his recommendations to the next Congress. This report, Progress and Feasihility of Toll Roads and Their Relation to the Federal-Aid Program submitted to the 84th Congress in

1955, showed that on January 1, 1955, there were

1,239 miles of completed "arterial toll roads" in the

United States, plus 1,382 miles under construction

and an additional 3,314 miles authorized.^® Many

hundreds of miles in the third category had not been

studied, and their possibilities for revenue bond financing were unknown.

The BPR analyzed all highways, toll or free, that were not already adequately improved for future

traffic up to the year 1984 or definitely scheduled for

such improvement. The analysts found that about

6,900 miles of heavy-traffic roads were feasible for revenue bond financing, and of these, 6,700 miles were

on the Interstate System routes." Whether there

could be additional self-supporting toll roads, therefore, would depend upon the policies of the Federal

Government and the States in the use of public funds

to improve the Interstate System. "Assurance of

public funds to provide reasonably early completion

of the system would soon spell the end of revenue-bond

financing of roads in the system. Continuation of the

present inadequate allocation of funds to this system,

however, can only serve to increase the mileage that

would be potentially feasible as tool roads." ^^ The report then went on to describe the inadequate

local service given by toll roads and the resulting

need for parallel free highways. "Thus, even though

a toll road may be readily self-liquidating, it can

never relieve some public agency from the responsibility of continuing to provide local service . . . On

the other hand, a properly located and designed free

road can serve both the through and local traffic." ^^ The Secretary recommended that there be no Federal support or encouragement of new toll roads but

that Congress permit the integration of existing toll roads into the System where they followed Interstate routes and met Interstate standards and where there were available reasonably satisfactory alternate free

roads. No toll roads should be permitted on any other

Federal-aid system.

Congress incorporated these recommendations in

the new law, and also authorized the use of Federal

funds on approach roads connecting acceptable toll roads to the free portions of the Interstate System.

This last was conditioned on the State's agreement to

free the benefited section of toll road after retirement

of the original bonds.

New Leadership for the Bureau of Public Roads

When Commissioner MacDonald reached the statu- tory retirement age in 1951, only a handful of the

oldest employees could remember a time when he had

not been in charge of the Bureau of Public Roads.

The Bureau's budget had increased from $69 million

in fiscal year 1919, when he assumed control over what was then a minor bureau in the Department of

Agriculture, to $485 million in 1951—about half of the

Commerce Department's total budget. In those 32

years, MacDonald had supervised the spending of over

$6.6 billion of Federal aid and forest highway funds

without a hint of impropriety, although not without

controversy at times. He had served under six Presidents and up to that time had the longest continuous

tenure of any important policymaking officer of the

Government.

Under "the Chief," as he was known for most of his

career, the Bureau of Public Roads had grown from

a small but capable and dedicated group of road ex- perts to the most prestigious highway organization in

the world.

When the Korean emergency developed into a national crisis. President Truman recognized the confidence MacDonald enjoyed with the Congress and with

the State highway departments by persuading MacDonald to continue as Commissioner for the remainder

of his Administration.

Commissioner MacDonald retired in March 1953.

In his farewell remarks to the press, he emphasized

the importance of continuing the traditional FederalState partnership:

'first, it is a workable plan to accomplish a continuing

program that involves both local and national services

;

second, it sets a pattern in harmony with the concepts of federal government.'

The original Federal Highway Act of 1916, he said, 'recognized the sovereignty of the states and the authority

retained by the states to initiate projects. All through

the legislation since then, the same mechanism of checks and balances has been maintained evenly so that the states and the federal government both have to agree before they can accomplish a positive program.' °°

Freed from the inhibitions of his office, MacDonald

went on to state that the Federal gasoline tax revenue should be returned to the States as Federal aid, and

that "it is time to give serious consideration to a charge

for use of what we may call extra facilities such as controlled access express highways."

President Eisenhower appointed Francis V. duPont

as Commissioner in April 1953. A civil engineer,

duPont had been chairman of the Delaware Highway

Commission for 23 years and was thoroughly familiar

with Federal and State road policies. In announcing

his appointment. Secretary of Commerce Sinclair

Weeks made a point of also declaring that the administration had no intention of recommending that the

Government retire from the taxation of gasoline as had been so loudly demanded by the 1953 Governors

Conference. He also said that there were no plans to make any serious changes in the Bureau of Public

Roads or its functions.

Mr. duPont assumed control over the Bureau with

the expressed intention of making changes slowly,

and then only after a complete review of its operations. In his first appearance before the House Subcommittee on Roads he suggested few changes in

national policy. Toll roads, he said, were economically

feasible at only a very few locations and would not

solve the overall road finance problem. Congress, he

recommended, should accelerate a solution to the vex- ing truck size and weight problem not by threats, but

170
by hints that Congress would act if the States and

industry did not. He thought the Federal-aid apportionment formula should be changed to give greater

weight to the population factor.^^

The Drive for More Federal Aid

The Korean emergency coupled with the continuing

steady increase in vehicle registrations imposed new

strains on the highways. Freight carried by highways

increased by one-third in a single year, from 107 bil- lion ton-miles in 1949 to 142 billion ton-miles in 1950."^^ The traffic increases affected all classes of highways

but were felt most acutely on the Interstate System,

a number of sections of which were carrying over

50,000 vehicles per day.

Contractors were plentiful, and construction prices

reasonably stable; still, the States were barely able to keep up with traffic, especially in the cities. Some

States, with BPR approval, adopted a stage construction policy for urban expressways, building them in

little pieces to "provide immediate relief at the most

seriouslj^ congested points, with a view to subsequent

construction of an entire facility.^^

The real problem with all the States was a shortage

of funds. Nearly all of them had increased their

gasoline taxes and registration fees, but these increases

barely offset the inflation in maintenance and construction costs. In their straitened circumstances, State

resentment focused on the Federal gasoline tax which

had originally been imposed by Congress as an emer- gency revenue measure but had been continued after

the war and which was yielding about $1 billion annually. Some State governors also pointed to the

Federal excise taxes on automobiles, trucks, tires, oils and greases which yielded another billion dollars to the Government. Since Federal aid to the States was

currently only half a billion dollars, this in the eyes

of the governors was diversion of road-user funds on

a massive scale—the very practice penalized by the

1934 Hayden-Cartwright Act when indulged in by

the States.

The congressional road committees held exhaustive

hearings in 1953 in preparation for the 83d Congress

biennial highway bill. The legislation that emerged in 1954, without ac- knowledging any tie between Federal-aid appropriations and the Federal gasoline tax, boosted the

appropriations 50 percent above any previous level, to $875 million for fiscal years 1956 and 1957, including $175 million specifically earmarked for the Interstate System and increased the Federal share on

Interstate projects to 60 percent. Congress also re- quested a comprehensive study of the costs of completing the several systems of highways in the States

to be completed along with a new toll road study.

The House Subcommittee on Roads had argued the

jnerits of toll financing, but in the end, Congress

avoided the toll road problem in drafting the final version of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1954 ex- cept to ask for a study and to allow Connecticut the

right to charge tolls on its proposed expressway from

Greenwich to Killingly after repayment of the Federal funds previously expended on the road.

In the 1954 Act, Congress, for the first time, relaxed some of the Government's tight control over the spending of Federal-aid funds. For secondary road projects

under the Secondary Road Plan, as it came to be

known, the BPR was required to approve only system

changes and programing of funds and to inspect and

accept completed projects. By agreement between the

State and the BPR, all other details of planning, con- tracting and building secondary roads could be handled

by the State without detailed Federal supervision.

This relieved the BPR of much tedious detail and en- abled it to concentrate available personnel on primary

and Interstate projects.

The Grand Plan

Before the Secretary could prepare either the toll road study or the highway cost study requested by

Congress, President Eisenhower announced his own

plan for bridging the gap between highway construction and highway needs. Choosing the annual conferInflation and, shortage of funds during the Korean

emergency made even simple

maintenance difficult for

the States.

171
ence of State Governors as his forum, the President

asked the governors for their cooperation and help to work out the details of " '. . . a grand plan for a properly articulated system that solves the problems of

speedy, safe, transcontinental travel—intercity communication—access highways—and farm-to-market

movement — metropolitan area congestion —bottle- necks—and parking.' " ^* To overcome the accumulated deficiencies, he called for spending $5 billion

per year for 10 years, in addition to normal expenditures.^^ * The President's bold plan was well received. The

conference appointed a Governors Highway Committee to advise the President, particularly in the matter

of financing the program. The conference also re- frained from further attempts to get the Federal

Government to retire from gasoline taxation.

At this time, the President did not have a detailed

blueprint for his Grand Plan, and he realized that a

great deal of study would be needed before a definite

plan could be presented to Congress for action. He

appointed a Federal Interagency Committee to study

highway policy within the Government and also asked

General Lucius D. Clay, who had served as military

governor of Germany, to head up an advisory committee of prominent citizens to determine the needs and

recommend a financing plan. The Clay Committee,

as it was thereafter known, held hearings and enlisted

the help of AASHO and outstanding experts from

public agencies, the highway industry and highway

user groups.

The best estimate of needs came from AASHO

which, with the help of the BPR, had updated its estimate of the needs of the Federal-aid systems in

1953. That estimate was $35 billion to make the

673,137-mile Federal-aid system adequate for 1953

traffic. Projecting the needs ahead to 1964 and adding an allowance for other roads not on any Federalaid system, AASHO and the Committee arrived at a

figure of $101 billion for the total capital needs that

would have to be met by 1964.** The Committee esti- mated that the existing sources of revenue would produce only $47 billion to meet these needs, leaving a

financial gap of about $54 billion.®* The Clay Committee Report

In December 1954 the Governors Conference Special Highway Committee*** submitted a report recom- mending that the Government assume the entire

financial responsibility for the Interstate System and

that Congress continue its 50-50 support for the re- maining Federal-aid systems so long as the Govern-

* In calendar year 1953, these normal expenditures amounted

to $3.5 billion for State-administered highways, $1.2 billion for local roads and $1.2 billion for urban highways and

streets—a total of $5.9 billion.^ ** The BPR's study ordered by Congress in 1954 showed that the total of the needs to reach adequacy of all highways by

1964 was $126.1 billion ($100.8 billion for construction, $19.4

billion for maintenance and $5.9 billion for administration)."

*** This Committee was composed of Governor Walter J. Kohler, Jr., of Wisconsin, Chairman, and Governors Frank J. Lausche (Ohio), Howard Pyle (Arizona), .Tohn Lodge (Connecticut), Lawrence W. Wetherby (Kentucky), Paul Patterson (Oregon), Allan Shivers (Texas), and Robert F. Kennon of Louisiana, Chairman of the 1954 Governors Conference, ex

officio."

ment continued to levy excise taxes on motor fuels,

lubricants and motor vehicles. The States and local

governments, the report continued, should pay for the

remaining costs, amounting to about 70 percent of the

total program.^"

The Clay Committee agreed substantially with the

governors in this division of the financial burden, but

recommended that the States pay 5 percent of the cost of the Interstate System. To finance the Federal

share, which they estimated at $31 billion,* the Committee recommended that Congress create a Federal

Highway Corporation with authority to issue $20

billion in 32-year bonds, paying the interest and

amortization charges out of the future income from

the Federal taxes on fuel and lubricants. The Committee estimated that the cost of the Interstate System

financed by this method plus the cost of the regular

Federal-aid authorizations continued at the current

rate would about equal the yield of the fuel and lubricating oil taxes, projected without increase in rates

to 1987."

President Eisenhower received the Clay Committee

report, A 10-Tear National Highway Program, in

January 1955. A few months earlier he had asked

for and received from Congress a $6 billion increase

in the national debt limit to cover deficits incurred in

the Administration's antirecession program. The

President, therefore, welcomed the Clay proposal to finance most of the road program outside the budget,

and he included it as a major feature of the Administration's highway bill which he sent to Congress in

March 1955.

Meanwhile, Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee,

Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Roads, was

holding hearings on his own highway bill—an ex- panded version of the traditional biennial Federal-aid

authorization providing $1.6 billion annually of Federal funds which the States would be required to match with $1.27 billion. Both the President's bill and the Gore bill came

under strong attack in the committee hearings. For- mer Commissioner duPont testified that the old payas-you-go system was too little, too late to meet present

needs: that it would take 32 years to complete the

Interstate System at the rate proposed by Senator

Gore.'^ ** The new Commissioner of Public Roads,

Charles D. Curtiss, said that according to a poll of

the State highway departments, only 19 States would

be able to match the Federal funds proposed in the

Gore bill, but 43 would be able to match the smaller

amount in the Administration's bill.''* Senator Harry

F. Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, chairman of the powerful

Senate Finance Committee denounced the Administration's plan as a scheme to evade the debt limit and

remove the highway program from the control of

* This total was divided as follows : $25 billion for the

Interstate System, including essential urlian arterial connections ; $3.15 billion for the remainder of the Primary System

;

$750 million for the Federal-aid Urban System, $2.10 billion for the Federal-Aid Secondary System and $225 million for

forest highways."

** Mr. duPont resigned as Commissioner of Public Roads in December 1954 in order to give his full attention to promoting

the President's highway program. Charles D. Curtiss, a longtime career engineer who had served 11 years as deputy

commissioner, was appointed to the vacancy January 14, 1955.

172
Congress. Asserting that it would cost $12 billion in

bond interest, Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico

called the Administration's bill a "bankers bill" rather

than a road bill. Rural interests branded the Administration's proposal to pledge all Federal gasoline tax revenue above $622 million per year to back the Federal Highway Corporation's bonds as a 32-year strait- jacket for rural highways.

The Engineering News-Record came out strongly

for the Administration bill, and particularly for the

10-year limit on completion of the Interstate System.

"The real crux of the matter rests in the fact that we

need a whole new system of highways just as soon as we can get it, and no adequate pay-as-you-go plan

has yet been seriously proposed to assure that re- sult."" Proponents of pay-as-you-go financing, the

article continued prophetically, were gambling that

there would be no inflation in the 30 years or more it would take to build the Interstate System from cur- rent revenues. Defeat of the President's Plan

Tossing the President's Grand Plan aside, the Senate passed the Gore bill, somewhat modified, by 60

votes to 31. As passed, the bill provided $13.2 billion

of Federal aid over a 5-year period, financed in part

by a 1-cent boost in the Federal gasoline tax. State

matching would be $4.8 billion in the 5-year period, or $960 million per year. The House Subcommittee on Roads chaired by

Congressman George H. Fallon brought out a measure

that was somewhere between the Gore bill and the

Administration bill. It provided $24 billion of Federal aid over a 12-year period, with increases in

Federal fuel and rubber taxes to provide the additional revenue. The Fallon bill and the Administration bill came before the House in the last days of the

session, but both went down to defeat—a stunning

setback for the supporters of the President's Grand

Plan.

A New Highway Bill Although the President's plan had been defeated,

there was still tremendous popular support for an

accelerated highway program when the 84th Congress

returned for the 2d session. The Administration jettisoned the Federal Highway Corporation and en- dorsed the pay-as-you-go principle. The House

Subcommittee on Roads then undertook to put to- gether a new road bill, while the Ways and Means

Committee studied the financial aspects of the program. Eventually, the Senate Subcommittee on Roads

and the Senate Finance Committee also became in- volved with the highway bill. The legislation drafted

by these four committees contained some notable departures from previous highway policy.

The most radical innovation was the earmarking of

Federal highway-user revenues for Federal highway

aid. Congress accomplished this by creating a Highway Trust Fimd and appropriating into it the proceeds of all Federal taxes on motor fuel, tires and

tread rubber and a portion of certain other excise taxes such as those on automobiles, trucks and buses.

Another innovation, sought by organized labor, was

a provision that the Davis-Bacon Act of 1935 should

apply to all contracts for the Interstate System. This

Act, passed during the Depression, required that the

Secretary of Labor determine the prevailing wage

rates paid for similar work in the area where the

proposed Federal project was to be built. These rates were then set forth in the contract and became the

minimum rates for that job. The purpose of the Act

when originally passed was to give local workers a chance to compete for jobs on Federal projects without lowering their wages to match those of cheap

imported labor. However, its detractors said the Act

was applied during the Roosevelt Administration to force prevailing wages in outlying rural areas up to the level of those won by unions in the big cities. Heretofore, the Davis-Bacon Act had applied only

to the Federal Government's own contracts. Those

contracts entered into by the States for Federal-aid

work were subject only to the regulations the BPR

had made pursuant to the original Federal Aid Road

Act of 1916. These left the predetermination of job

labor rates up to the States, whose labor laws, according to the Engineering News-Record^ were "as heterogeneous as their liquor laws." ^® Introduction of Federal wage-fixing into the Federal-aid program was bitterly resisted by AASHO,

the Associated General Contractors and the American

Roadbuilders' Association who claimed that the DavisBacon Act had the potential of boosting highway

construction costs 15 to 40 percent. Inevitably, they

said, contracts for other Federal-aid and State work,

not covered by the Davis-Bacon Act, would be drawn

into its orbit, and there would be a general inflation

of wages in the highway construction industry.

Spokesmen for labor asserted that since the proposed

matching rate for the Interstate System was 90 per- cent Federal and 10 percent State funds, the real

employer was the Federal Government, and, therefore,

its laws should apply. In the end, the Davis-Bacon

Act became the price for labor's support of the highway program, and it was incorporated in the final bill. The third innovation proposed by the legislators was to treat the Interstate System as a single huge

project, comparable to an irrigation or flood control

scheme, and provide in one authorization for its in- ception and completion. Previously, Congress had

viewed Federal aid as an open-ended program of

assistance to the States that would continue forever

at a pace determined from time to time as circumstances might dictate. In hard times highway construction was stepped up to "prime the pump," and

at other times cut back to balance the budget. Now

the committees proposed that a limited national sys- tem of special highways be built within a fixed time

period of 13 years. In concept, this scheme was practically identical to that of the Pacific Railroads 100

years previously, and for its time, was on about the same scale. This single huge project concept affected the apportionment of the Federal funds among the States. When Congress earmarked funds for the Interstate System in 1954, it changed the apportionment factor

to give more of the money to the more populous

States.* The framers of the new bill provided that

* According to this formula, half of the funds were to be apportioned in the ratio of each State's population to the

total national population ; the other half was to be divided

according to the classic Federal-aid formula of 1916.

173
this formula should be continued for fiscal years 1957,

1958, and 1959, but that thereafter the apportionments

should be made according to the relative "need" of

each State to assure completing the entire Interstate System at the same time. Needs would be determined

by a series of cost estimates to be submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Commerce and the States

at dates set forth in legislation. The first of these

estimates was due not later than January 12, 1958,

and would be used for apportioning authorizations

for fiscal years 1960, 1961, and 1962. The total

amount authorized for the Interstate System was $25

billion through fiscal year 1969.

The compromise bill developed by these committees

contained other departures from previous highway

policy, as well as features from both the 1955 Gore

bill and the Administration's original proposal. The

compromise bill, the Federal-Aid Highway Act and

the Highway Revenue Act of 1956 was passed over- whelmingly by both the Senate and the House and was signed into law by President Eisenhower on June 29, 1956.

174
REFERENCES

'1970 AuTOMOBix-E Facts and Figures (Automobile Manufacturers Association, Detroit, 1970) p. 3. ^Bureau of Public Roads, Highway Statistics, 1951 (U.S.

Dep't. of Commerce, Wasliington, D.C., 1953) p. 29.

' S. M. Shapiro, The Long Island State Parkway System,

Convention Group Meetings, New York City, September

24-26, 1947 (AASHO, Wasliington, D.C, 1947) pp. 112-117. MO Stat 1200.

''J. G. McKay, The Cook County Transportation Survey,

Public Roads, Vol. 7, No. 1, Mar. 1926, pp. 1-6. 'A Stitdy of Highway Traffic in the Cleveland Regional

Area, Public Roads, Vol. 9, No. 7, Sept. 1928, pp. 129-138.

' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1946, p. 34.

' J. T. Lynch, Traffic Planning Studies in American Cities, Public Roads, Vol. 24, No. 6, Oct., Nov., Dec. 1945, pp. 168,

169.•Bureau of Public Roads Anni^al Report, 1945, p. 12. "Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics

Summary To 1965, (U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Washington, D.C, 1967) p. 85. " Bureau of Public Roads, The Local Rural Road Prob- lem (Dep't. of Commerce, Washington, D.C, 1950) p. 31. "BPR, supra, note 9, p. 9. " Neio Local Higlnoay Agency Proposed in Congress, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 131, No. 21, Nov. 18, 1943, p. 727. " BPR, supra, note 7, p. 13. "Title 23, U.S. Code, "Highways," Report of the Committee ON Public Works, H. Doc. 1938, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 15, 16. " BPR, supra, note 7, p. 9. " BPR, supra, note 7, p. 11. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1947, pp. 5, 7. " BPR, supra, note 9, p. 8. "4 History of the Interstate System, AASHO

The First

Fifty Years, 1914-1964 (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C, 1965) p. 184. "A Policy on Design Standards for the National System of Interstate Highways, Policies on Geometric Highway Design

(American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C, 1950) pp. 1, 2.

^' BPR, supra, note 7, p. 4. ^Bureau of Public Roads, Highway Statistics, 1949 (U.S.

Dep't. of Commerce, Washington, D.C, 1951) p. 112. " BPR, supra, note 7, p. 5. "Federal Aid to Local Roads Opposed at Senate Hearing,

Engineering News-Record, Vol. 142, No. 19, May 12, 1949,

p. 51. "Editorial, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 142, No. 23, Jun. 9, 1949, p. 47. " BPR, supra, note 11, pp. 5, 6, 24. "Id., p. 30.

'° BPR, supra, note 18, p. 41. '°Id. "C Shain, State Highway Needs and Finances, Committee

Proceedings, Cox\-ention Group Meetings, Papers and Discussions (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C. 1948) pp. 84, 85. "H. Ward, The Financial Aspects of the Engineering Analysis, 'Highway Needs of Michigan', Committee Proceedings,

Con\'ention Group Meetings, Papers and Discussions,

(American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C, 1948) p. 63. " Study Toll Roads, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 142, No. 11, Mar. 17, 1949, p. 65. "Money, Aggressiveness, Legislation Needed For Road

Progress, AREA Told, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 144, No. 11, Mar. 16, 1950, p. 25. " Transportation—Roadbuilding Lags, Engineering NewsRecord, Vol. 144, No. 12, Mar. 23, 1950, p. 108. " States Seek Methods to Raise Funds for Highway Construction and Repair, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 146, No.

20, May 17, 1951, p. 27.

''^Massachusetts Roads Scheduled Swiftly, Engineering

News-Record, Vol. 144, No. 4, Jan. 26, 1950, p. 21. ^Bright Spot for Roads, Engineering News-Record, Vol.

144, No. 15, Apr. 13, 1950, p. 17. "^New York OK's Thruivay Authority, Engineering NewsRecord, Vol. 144, No. 13, Mar. 30, 1950, p. 19.

"' V. Boughton, Toll Ilighioay Constriiction to Reach Peak in

195Jf, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 152, No. 1, Jan. 7, 1954,

p. 31. "1955 Automobile Facts and Figures (Automobile Manufacturers Association, Detroit, 1955) p. 21.

*• Bureau of Public Roads, Highway Statistics Summary,

1955 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Washington, D.C, 1957) p. 72. " Highway Needs of The National Defense, H. Doc. 249, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 10-23. " Id., pp. 3, 4.

*" Road-Aid Bill Contains New Item For Interstate System,

Engineering News-Record, Vol. 144, No. 10, Mar. 9, 1950,

p. 17.

*'^ Road Officials Hit Federal-Aid Boost, Engineering NewsRecord, Vol. 144, No. 10, Mar. 9, 1950, p. 21. " AASHO, supra, note 20, p. 185. ^^Pennsylvania Turnpike Continues at a Loss, Engineering

News-Record, Vol. 134, No. 8, Feb. 22, 1945, p. 53. "^Announce Extension Route of Pennsylvania Turnpike,

Engineering News-Record, Vol. 142, No. 3, Jan. 20, 1949,

p. 63.

*" Progress and Feasibility of Toll Roads and Their Relation To The Federal-Aid Program, H. Doc. 139, 84th Cong.,

1st Sess., pp. 6-8.

''Id., pp. 11-14. ^'Perspective—Controversy Over Toll Roads, Engineering

News-Record, Vol. 138, No. 17, Apr. 24, 1947, p. 10. " Supra, note 46, p. 21. " Toll Road Policy Needs Restudy, Engineering NewsRecord, Vol. 144, No. 13, Mar. 30, 1950, p. 26.

'^ Editorial, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 153, No. 1, Jul.

1, 1954, p. 96. ^ H. Doc, supra, note 50, p. 14.

"'Id., p. 23.

"^Id., p. 24. " Id., p. 26.

°° MacDonald Retires as Commissioner of Public Roads, F. V. duPont Takes Over, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 150, No.

14, Apr. 2, 1953, pp. 52-54.

"' Changes in Federal Highway Policies to Await Administration's Studies, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 150, No. 17, Apr. 23, 1953, pp. 21, 22.

°' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1951, p. 1. ^'Id., p. 7. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1954, p. 3. ^"President Starts Ball Rolling for Bigger Highway Pro- gram, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 153, No. 4, Jul. 22, 1954,

pp. 21, 88. ^Bureau of Public Roads, Highway Statistics, 1953 (U.S.

Dep't of Commerce, Washington, D.C, 1954) pp. 61, 90, 94.

*' Needs of The Highway Systems, 1955-84, H. Doc. 120, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 19. ^Highway Problem is How to Raise $50 Billion, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 153, No. 16, Oct. 14, 1954, p. 21.

'' AASHO, supra, note 20, p. 185. '"'President Gets Governors' Highway Report, Engineering

News-Record, Vol. 153, No. 24, Dec. 9, 1954, p. 23. " H. Doc, supra, note 67, p. 21. " AASHO, supra, note 20, p. 186.

''^Battle Joined Over Rival Highway Plans, Engineering

News-Record, Vol. 154, No. 8, Feb. 24, 1955, p. 23.

''* Highway Hopes Dim, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 154, No. 16, Apr. 21, 1955, p. 26. ''^Editorial, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 154, No. 9, Mar.

3, 1955, p. 84. " The Davis-Bacon Highway Compromise, Engineering

News-Record, Vol. 157, No. 1, Jul. 5, 1956, pp. 180-182.

175
Thomas Harris MacDonald

"Rugged integrity" . . . "Honesty" . . . "Fairness" . . . "Inspirational"

. . . "Sound, far-sighted leadership" . . . "Dedicated public servant" and more were the expressions used by many who knew Thomas Harris

MacDonald at the time of his retirement as Commissioner, Bureau of

Public Roads. He had been head of the Bureau from 1919 to 1953, and

during these years of his leadership, this Nation expanded its roadways

from a scant i^ of a million miles, of which very little was hard sur- faced, to 31/^ million miles of hard-surfaced, efficient, interstate roads;

the Federal-State partnership in roadbuilding was developed and re- fined; the Alaska Highway was built and the Pan American Highway

was well underway; and many of his staff worked with other countries

in developing their roads and further training their engineers. Under

MacDonald, the Bureau of Public Roads grew to become a center of

highway research with worldwide influence.

Mr. MacDonald was born in Leadville, Colorado, on July 23, 1881,

and moved with his family to Iowa in 1884. He studied at Iowa State

College and I'eceived his bachelor's degree in civil engineering in 1904.

While at Iowa State, he developed an interest in highway engineering

and, under the supervision of Dean Anson Marston, an early good

roads proponent, did his undergTaduate thesis on the highway needs of

farmers and the force required to pull a wagon over different types

of roads.

In 1904, the year MacDonald graduated, the Iowa Legislature designated the State College as a Commission to perform studies on highways

and methods for their improvement. He took a position as an Assistant

Professor of Civil Engineering and was placed in charge of road investigations. By 1907, at the age of 26, he was appointed State Highway Engineer, and in 1913, with the creation of a three-man State

Highway Commission, he was appointed chief engineer. During his

tenure with the Iowa State Highway Commission, Iowa became one of

the first States in the Midwest to have a statewide system of main roads,

with about one-third of the designated 6,400-mile network permanently

graded, drained, and provided with bridges. MacDonald also developed

plans for the hard surfacing of the roads. His success in improving

the difficult Iowa roads attracted national attention among highway,

officials and the fledgling automobile industry. He became a leader

among the highway officials of the 'teens and took an active part with

the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) in

their efforts to secure Federal-aid highway legislation. This strong tie with AASHO and the various State highway officials was to remain

constant throughout his professional life. Then in 1919, Thomas MacDonald was called to Washington to serve

as Chief of the Bureau of Public Roads, a position he was to hold

through seven different presidents. President Wilson made his selection

based upon the unanimous recommendations of the American Association of State Highway Officials. Though MacDonald's title changed

over the course of the years, this original designation of "Chief" became

synonymous with the man. It ceased to be just a title, but rather be- came a personal designation, applied with affection and admiration by

an ever-widening circle of people around the world that included every- one with even the slightest interest in roads.

When the Chief took office, the 1916 Federal-Aid Road Act had been

passed, but a program had not had a chance to get underway. Meanwhile, the first World War had ended, and the roads lay devastated by

the effect of traffic, particularly that of heavy trucks and the inability to provide sufficient maintenance during the war effort. In addition,

cooperation between BPR, the States, and Congress was needed to pre- pare the 1921 Federal Highway Act, which was intended to strengthen

the 1916 Act. In general, in 1919, man's maximum range of daily move- ment was still only 10 miles, and much work needed to be done.

176
By March 1953 when the Chief retired, millions of miles of hardsurfaced, efficient, connected roads were built, and the buildino; of the

National System of Interstate and Defense Highways was about to begin. But the real importance of his work, as one of his close friends

and associates, Pyke Johnson, former President of the Automotive

Safety Foimdation, expressed in 1957, was that it alloAved ". . . the vast transportation revolution" to take "place in the lives of all of us. . . . It is enough to note, perhaps, that as of today all but 22 million of our

people live in urban or metropolitan areas. Isolation no longer is an

important factor in our lives." In the 34 years that the Chief served, a list of his career milestones

reads like the history of the movement for better roads in this country

and around the world. A list of only a very few of these would include

• Sponsored the organization of the Highway and Highway Transport Education Committee (later to become a pait of the Highway

Research Board), 1920. • Led in defeating the "Townsend Plan" which called for a very

limited system of national highways to be built and maintained by

the Federal Government and instead argued for the continuation

of the Federal-aid plan but restricted to a larger Federal-aid highway system to be selected by the States, themselves. This became

the Federal Highway Act of 1921.

Chairman, Joint Board of Interstate Highways, 1924.

Sponsored the organization of the Pan American Highway Congress, 1924.

Sponsored first President's Highway Safety Conference, 1945.

Sponsored creation of the official U.S. Interregional HighAvay Commission, 1946. • Served as a member of the Official Commission on the Alaska Highway. Later, he was charged with the responsibility of building

this road. • Throughout his term of office, he served as a member of the Executive Committee, American Association of State Highway Officials and took an active part in all of its deliberations on the part of the

Federal Government.

For his work, he received most of the honors that can be bestowed by

individuals, associations, and organizations interested in highway work

within the United States. He was awarded an honorary degree in

engineering from Iowa State College in 1929, and received the Marston

Medal for Achievement in Engineering in 1939. He received the Medal

of Merit for outstanding service during World War II. He received

the George Bartlett Award in 1931, was designated an honorary member of the American Society of Civil Engineers in the late 1940's, and

received the Award of Merit of the Highway Research Board in 1950.

These are but a few of the honors conferred upon the Chief in his own

country. In the international field, his advice was sought, and given,

all over the world. He was awarded the Cross of the Legion

of Honor from the French Government, the honor of Knight of the

First Class, Order of St. Olav, given by the King of Norway, as well

as numei'ous other important recognitions by foreign governments. All

of these and the many more awards he received attest to his excellent

work and the respect held for him by those interested in the betterment

of the highways.

The Chief's 49 years of active sei"vice in the betterment of our highways, first for Iowa and then for the Nation, were motivated by a belief

in the importance of sound transportation and the role of highways in

the overall picture. Herbert S. Fairbank, a close friend and a great

name in the roads effort in his own right, discussed MacDonald's views

of transportation

as something much more than the 'service' it is generally held to be, more

even than the essential link between supply and demand, or production and

consumption, and actually as, in itself, one of the most potent of the creative forces that have shaped and will continue to shape this and all otlier countries

in almost every aspect—in their economy, of course, but also in the spread

and concentrations of their population and industry, the location, size, form

and character of their cities, and the degree of development of their every

natural resource.

177
In discussing the effect of roads as a part of this creative force,

MacDonald believed, according to Fairbank, that roads allowed

the population to disperse throughout the country and away from the

rivers and main rail lines. It served as a great unifying force between

the "hayseed" and the "city slicker" with "freer and more frequent

contacts of the two which the automobile and good roads facilitated."

There was a greater urban orientation produced in this country as the

small towns, "long the centers of their tiny rural areas promptly be- came the mere satellites of larger nearby cities. . . ." The cities were

also able to reach out more as people were able to move further from

downtown and finally to the suburbs as the principal roads radiating

out of the city were improved. Good roads were an important link in

the creative force that is transportation that started from the waterways, to the railways, to roadways, and on to the airways.

A continuing theme throughout the Chief's years with the Bureau

of Public Roads was the importance of the principle of Federal-State

cooperation in the framework of our form of government. Pyke Johnson describes this belief as "the continued achievement of an engineering

job of the magnitude of our highway program [that] must rest upon the

essential premise that here we are dealing with the lives of people. That

being so, the people finally must make their choice. The Federal Government cannot successfully dictate to the States. It must continue to act in cooperation with them and initiation of undertakings must remain

with the States." MacDonald was able to achieve the essential close cooperation with

the States because he never forgot his first position as a State highway

engineer and because of his active participation in AASHO. Thus, he was and remained fully acquainted with the views and sensitivities of

State highway officials in respect to the Federal legislation and the

Bureau. But he was also aware of the shortcomings of the various

State highway departments. According to Fairbank, MacDonald

interpreted literally the requirement of the Federal-Aid Act that each State must have 'a highway department adequate in the opinion of the Secretary . .

.

to cooperate with the Federal Bureau.' He was unceasing, though Avithout fanfare, in his efforts to bring about an elevation of the standards of engineering and administrative proficiency of all the State highway departments. This was done as occasion offered, through letters to our division and district

offices or directly to the highway departments concerned. But he made effec- tive use of personal contacts with the State highway officials at meetings of the AASHO and other gatherings. He made it a point to become personally ac- quainted as quickly as possible with the heads and principal officers of the departments of all the States when they took office after each political turnover, the frequency of which he deeply deplored.

In recognition of the sensitivity of State officials, if he could, he pre- ferred working through the AASHO committees in developing standards and thereby avoiding the appearance of a Bureau crusade.

In developing standards, the Chief felt that research and factfinding

must play a very important role, but the research that he stressed had

to be of a nature calculated to yield results promptly applicable in the

Bureau's administrative or engineering practice. Thus, he strongly

supported the undertaking of soil studies, pioneered by the Bureau, and

the impact and circular track studies done to test the wear on pavements

by wheels equipped with various kinds of tires. He gave enthusiastic

support of statewide traffic studies that were carried out in cooperation

with various State highway departments and which were later expanded

and augmented by economic and financial studies. When research ex- penditures occasionally came under question by Congress or the senior

Executive Department, he Avas able to ward off this challenge by pointing to the important results derived fi'om this aspect of the Bureau's

work.

To many, MacDonald was the embodiment of official rectitude, and a

stout defender of the independence of the State highway departments,

as well as the Bureau, from political interference. For the sake of this

independence, he was quite willing to have the Bui-eau remain a subordinate branch of an Executive Department. He believed that this

system would sufficiently intei'pose a screen between executive action

178
and the pressures of self-seeking- interests. However, at the same time,

as Fairbank wrote, "He was quick to oppose and resent any tendency of

the superior administrative agency to interfere in the executive or administrative policies of the Bureau." For the most part, because of the

respect he commanded froni all the Department heads under whom he

served, he was remarkably free of any such interference.

In the actual day-to-day administration of the Bureau, the Chief

could not be considered one of the great loaders of management science.

He directed the Bureau mainly througli individual conferences with a

relatively few men in whoni he reposed confidence and through memos

often produced as a result of these individual conferences. Fairbank

mentioned MacDonald's administrative style

Conferences with all the division heads jointly were rare almost to the point of total absence of occurrence. In his last years in Washington lie may

have been persuaded that the idea of regular 'staff' meetings might be worthy

of trial, but after a few such 'trials,' his interest in the idea (never very keen) simply evaporated. . . . Mr. MacDonald was averse to the employment

of most of the devices now so highly esteemed by so-called 'management consultants.' He had no interest in 'Suggestion Boxes,' or the offering of pecu- niary rewards for employee suggestions. If there was overlapping of the

responsibilities of the several divisions of the organization or laclc of clarifi- cation of the definition of individual or organic duties, he didn't worry much

about it. As he seemed to have little or no concern about his own salary, he

expected a similar avoidance of anything like a request for a raise on the part of every employee. Nothing would more certainly result in the consignment of any member of the organization to the MacDonald doghouse than to be caught agitating for an increase in pay. To paraphrase Lord Nelson's famous order the simple rule was : The Bureau expects that every man this day will do his duty. And by and large, by golly, they did. The Bureau

enjoyed an e.sprit de corps that many a 'scientifically managed' organization

of these days couldn't purchase with all the so-called incentives and rewards

that the ingenuity of the doctors of management science can devise. As head of the Bureau, Mr. MacDonald was called upon to participate

as a speaker on many occasions, be it at a congressional hearing, a seminar, or an after dinner speech. Yet in 34 years of public speaking, the

Chief never developed a reputation for an eloquent style, and it seems

for good reason. Yet at all these occasions, though his style was not

eloquent, it was, more importantly, effective. Again, as Mr. Fairbank

commented,

His public speeches, especially those before the AASHO were so heavily

factual and dry as to impose a serious burden upon the attentiveness of the

audience. These speeches he almost always wrote himself ; and he often turned from his written text to interpolate remarks which seemed unnecessary and which usually caused both the speaker and the audience to lose the thread

of what he had been saying. But when all this has been said the fact remains

that he somehow left his hearers in both public and private audiences with a

sense of his mastery of whatever the matter was that was under discussion. He was outstandingly effective in his relations with Congressional Committees

and individual Congressmen and Senators, often by patient repetition of his recommendations and views converting to their support those who initially

opposed or even ridiculed them. The Chief retired from the Bureau of Public Roads in July 1951, but

at the request of President Truman stayed on as interim head until

March 31, 1953, when Francis V. duPont assumed the position. In his

retirement, however, the Chief continued to work for better roads and

general transportation improvement from his new j)osition as distinguished research engineer of the Transportation Institute of Texas

A & M College. He saw new challenges in filling the gaps that existed

in the knowledge about transportation. Then, on April 7, 1957, the

Chief quietly passed away.

His old friend, Pyke Johnson, gave a close, personal look at the man,

Thomas H. MacDonald, in an article he wrote at the time of the Chief's

death.

A quiet and modest man, a man of few intimates, a man who found solace

in Bertrand Russell, Dr. Toynbee, Erie Stanley Gardner, and A. Conan Doyle,

with few writers in between ; a Imsband, a father, a clief, a photographer, a

top engineer and administrator, a statesman who built an enduring monument

to himself not so much in roads and bridges as in the lives of people.

Few knew him. But those few knew him as one of the men of history,

who with their associates, have profoundly affected the course of modern life. Thomas H. MacDonald—The Chief.

179
Herbert Sinclair Fairbank

Shortly after Francis V. duPont succeeded Thomas H. MacDonald as Commissioner of Public Eoads in 1953, he called on Deputy Commissioner for Research Fairbank to describe the Bureau's research

program. Fairbank assembled his Division Chiefs to meet the new

Commissioner and to permit each to explain his part in the research

effort. Each Division Chief, bavins: ^own up in the Bureau during

the 34-year tenure of Mr. MacDonald, must have approached this meeting with the new Commissioner with considerable trepidation, and so perhaps did Fairbank. But the tension initially felt in the atmosphere

as the meeting convened was soon broken when duPont asked "Mr.

Fairbank, does the Bureau engage in fundamental or practical re- search?" and Fairbank replied, "Oh, practical research—^by all means,

practical research," and duPont responded, "That's good to hear, for

there's no point in doing research if the results can't be applied."

In reality the Bureau's research program went far beyond the usual narrow definition of practical research. Fairbank was constantly looking ahead and exploring how best to meet the needs of the future as he

and his associates envisioned them. Yet he constantly demanded that

the product of this exploratory work be suitable for practical application. If any program ever faced the need to anticipate and prepare for

practical problems resulting from rapidly changing conditions, it was

the highway program. And more than anyone else, it was Fairbank

whose clear vision and firm hand produced the basic facts needed to guide the policies and determine the programs and methods to keep

abreast or ahead of new and changing demands that others did not

foresee. While the research was practical, the application of the results was fundamental to the success of the program.

Fairbank's career spanned virtually the entire development of the

modern highway system, from the earliest days of the sand-clay road

to the authorization of the Interstate System, and in all stages he took a personal hand. Graduating with a civil engineering degree from

Cornell University in 1910, he joined the staff of the then-Office of

Public Roads as a student engineer, one of the earliest of the Bureau's

trainees, and was assigned to the Road Improvement Train.

Carrying road construction equipment on flat cars and exhibits and

lectures in the coaches, the purpose of the train was to encourage the use of local materials and labor to improve access from farms to the

freight stations. The road was conceived as a benefit to the farmer and

the railroad alike. So in this period Fairbank became a "lecturer," and

as he said, could deliver his lecture in his sleep as the train stopped at one small town after another through the south and west. As the next step in his training, Fairbank built object lesson roads

to demonstrate rather than just to describe the roadbuilding technique.

One assignment was on Martha's Vineyard, where the technique involved

mixing appropriate amounts of sand and clay, a process later achieving

wide acceptance in other sections of the country. By virtue of his innate

reserve and dignity, Fairbank was not one to whom a nickname would

ordinarily be applied, but here he had one. The young engineer and

the road he was constructing attracted much interest among a colony

of deaf-mutes on the island, who identified him by pointing with a

forefinger three times in quick succession, the second and third pointings

each being some six inches below the one that preceded. His name in

sign language was "3 Buttons," reflective of a fashionable blue blazer

with large pearl buttons he wore when not on duty.

Following his early training and engineering assignments and service as an officer in the Chemical Warfare Service in 1918 and 1919, he was named Editor of Public Roads, the Bureau's Journal of Highway Research. This was a particularly fitting assignment, for in those days

and for many years thereafter, the editor was expected to be not only a competent handler of the language but also an able appraiser of the

technical soundness of the reports submitted for publication. Since at

180
that time research was virtually all related to physical research, and

largely to soils, and since Fairbank was far and away the finest writer

in the Bureau's history, he was eminently qualified on both counts. "Wliether the breadth and depth of his ability were recognized by Chief

MacDonald at the time or whether these qualities emerged as he gained

experience, Fairbank was nonetheless steadily accepting broader responsibilities and became increasingly valuable to the Chief in the policy

area. The expanded responsibilities were formally recognized in 1927

when he was made Chief of the new Division of Information, a position

he held until 1943 when he was named Deputy Commissioner for Research, another new position and the one he held until his retirement.

In each case, the title reflected the expanding responsibilities that had

been given him by Chief MacDonald, and, in effect, simply provided a formal definition of his area of concern. In these positions Fairbank's influence was broad indeed, though

seldom was his contribiition to knowledge and practice identifiable as

his. He consistently urged othei's to carry on investigative work and saw to it that resources necessary to its conduct were provided. He

insisted on thoroughness and accuracy in experiment, in analysis and in

writing. An excellent writer himself, an ability no doubt developed

through extensive reading, he demanded high quality on the part of

others in all forms of writing. Careful indeed must be the drafter of a

letter for his signature, for the words not only must mean exactly what

was intended, but could not be construed to mean anything else. A

well-worn eraser and an equally well-worn dictionaiy were always on

his desk—two items, incidentally, that his successor preserved as graphic

reminders to himself and others of what it takes to be a good writer.

It was in his perception of the needs of the future and his organization of research to prepare to meet them that he made his outstanding,

though generally anonymous, contributions. "V^liile he built roads to link the farm and the railroad, he early foresaw the linkage of roads

themselves into systems. "While roads were being designed for static wheel loads, and much research was being carried on to this end, he was

urging and organizing investigations to study the effect of impact and

dynamic loading. While the geometries of the road were being designed

for the characteristics of individual vehicles, he was supporting research

in the geometry of mixed traffic. In the area of economics, even before

benefit-cost comparisons of specific projects were generally accepted, he

had encouraged investigation of how economic analysis might be applied to the design of systems. And even before that idea became ac- cepted, he was writing that social, environmental and land use factors

might assume more importance than user costs and benefits. Wliile

intercity and rural highway problems still occupied nearly the full attention of highway officials, it was Fairbank who foresaw the problems of highways in urban areas, problems that have since developed

but could have been avoided had his early warnings been heeded. In

short, when an idea's time finally came, when it became generally ac- cepted, the Bureau, thanks to Fairbank, generally was ready.

Certain areas were distinctly identifiable as Fairbank's, however.

The Bureau library, one of the most complete highway transportation

libraries in the world, bore his stamp. Likewise, an exhibit section to which he gave his personal touch produced many instructive and promotional exhibits for display throughout the country. A series of

paintings depicting "Highways of History" were produced in the 1930's,

and they were reassembled for a Bicentennial exhibit. A well-equipped

photo laboratory, staffed with skilled photographers, produced slides and

movies describing the results of research. Unfortunately, in the name

of good administration and economy, these functions were lost to the

Bureau as they were taken over by one or another "pai'ent" organization

as the Bureau moved from one to another in successive reorganizations,

and their effectiveness as an arm of research was largely lost. Of the many areas of his broad interest, the one most distinctly identifiable as Fairbank's was the highway planning surveys. The breadth

and depth of this activity is described elsewhere, so suffice it to say that

for perhaps a year before the first field work was started in 1935,

Fairbank had personally overseen the preparation of forms and manuals

181
of instruction for every phase of the program. So clearly did he perceive not only the need for data, but the detail in which they should be

collected and recorded, that only minimal changes were required as the

procedures were introduced into field operations. Of course, as new

equipment came on the scene, as mapmaking and reproduction processes

advanced and statistical science developed, the early manuals and procedures were correspondingly updated, but the basic format never was

changed.

"\¥hile the facts assembled in the surveys eventually formed the base

of planning and programing of all State highway departments, no use

of the data was more effective or significant than their use, under

Fairbank's direction and guidance, in forming national highway policy.

As the author, again anonymously, of Toll Roads and Free Roads and

Interregional Highioays and subsequently in directing the organization

of planning data for the Clay Committee and the Committees of Congress, Fairbank saw the realization of his 1934 vision in the authorization of the National System of Interstate Highways in 1944 and the

start of its construction under the 1956 Act. He himself must have

regarded the conception, birth and maturity of highway planning as

his prime contribution, for in his own words appearing in Who''s Who

in America he accorded that function more prominence than any other

of the many national and international contributions he listed. Two other areas distinctly bore Fairbank's mark. One was research

in highway economics and finance, an area in which it was particularly

difficult to interest State highway officials and administrators. He

pushed hard to develop research programs in this area, setting up a new

division in his Office of Research for the purpose, and organizing and

serving as Chairman of the Department of Economics, Finance, and

Administration of the Highway Research Board.

Another area to which Fairbank gave personal and identifiable atten- tion was the broad problem of deterioration of road surfaces brought

about by the great increase in heavy axle loads. He early believed that

failure of road surfaces was caused as much by the high frequency of

heavy loads still within the legal limits as by the illegal loads. He

believed that frequently repeated load applications caused fatigue and

failure in concrete and organized university research projects to test and eventually to substantiate this concept.

To discover the effect of fatigue was one thing, but to convince others

of its importance was another. As an illustration, Fairbank resorted

to the eraser on his desk. While he would describe the research and

portray the results before a group, he would show them he could bend

the eraser double without its cracking. But, as he continued to talk, he

would continue to flex the eraser not to a 180-degree bend, but only

perhaps 45 to 60 degrees, and before long a crack would appear and

soon the eraser would break in half, indeed a graphic analogy even if perhaps not convincing to a highway engineer that the phenomenon

would apply to a concrete slab. Incidentally, Fairbank would later use each half of the eraser for its intended purpose—revising the first drafts

of his writings.

Acceptance of the theory was of little value, however, unless the

phenomenon could be quantified, and here the Highway Transport

Committee of the American Association of State Highway Officials

entered the picture, organizing, through the Highway Research Board,

the first of a series of full-scale road tests, using an existing recently

constructed concrete road in Maryland. As chairman of the Committee

and as head of research in Public Roads, Fairbank entered strenuously

into the conduct of that test and the analysis of its results, the details

of which are described elsewhere in this history. Peculiarities in the

rate of deterioration of different sections of the test road led to the

discovery of a serious lack of uniformity of the specified subbase and,

in turn, led Fairbank to insist on trenching both sides of the road for

its entire length in an effort to explain the variations in performance, an example of his thoroughness as a researcher. Finally, while the

next in the series of tests was being prepared, he personally' oversaw

the development of motion picture and exhibit material to be shown

182
before State legislatures and other groups to promote the concept of

coordination between highway design and traffic regulation and the

need for strict adherences to load limits. The series of tests culminated in the AASHO Road Test in Illinois

where the statistically designed experiment produced the data that per- mitted the development of performance equations that showed, with

great precision, the effect of frequency of application as well as the

magnitude of axle loads. Thus, his concept was completely validated

and, after his departure from the scene, quantified to permit its application in highway design. It was the product of i^ractical research of

fundamental importance, however it may have been defined.

Fairbank accepted the almost invariable success of his efforts with

modesty, almost as though he had but a small part in them, so it was

unfortunate that he took so deeply to heart what he regarded as a fail- ure, one which in his mind overshadowed all his contributions. As he saw it, he failed to stop the pi'oliferation of toll roads in the early

1950's. Along with Chief MacDonald, he opposed the toll road not

simply as a matter of Federal-aid law and policy, but on principle.

He wrote and spoke against toll financing, emphasizing that the toll roads with their widely spaced access points offered only limited and

specialized service and that the short trips, overwhelming in number,

must still be accommodated on the existing or expanded systems. He

saw duplication of facilities in individual corridors to accommodate

both long and short trips, dual charges for toll road users and revenues going to interest payments rather than to mileage or maintenance of

road.

Never wavering on principle, he could not accept the political reality

that the quality of road—the freeway—that he had so long and strongly

advocated could not then be produced by "conventional" financing. As

he saw it, he went down fighting. But it is ironic that it probably was

the rapid proliferation of the toll roads more than any other single

factor that convinced the American public that it wanted, and could

have, the very thing Fairbank had so long advocated. He did not live to see the near completion of the Interstate System, so he could not

know that the battle he thought he'd lost was but a temporary setback,

that the magnificent system he had envisioned as much as 40 years

earlier would become a reality, and in the minds of many, his monument.

Along the way he received many awards. Almost automatically he

received the Bartlett Award and the Crum Award, and when the

MacDonald Award was established by AASHO, Fairbank, then in re- tirement, became the first recipient.

The recognition he would have most appreciated, however, came after

his death when the research laboratory at Langley, Virginia, was named

in his honor the Herbert S. Fairbank Research Station. It can be hoped

that within its bounds there will always be the talent, resources, and

time to carry on research with the thoroughness he always imposed on

himself in his own work.

An educated man, Fairbank was a lover of literature, a scholar, an

engineer, totally honest, dignified, modest, retiring, friendly—all these

terms fit. Never married, he lived in Baltimore, in later years with his

sister to whom he was devoted, and commuted daily the 40 miles each

way to Washington.

He was a genuinely friendly man, but he had few close friends, and

he found it difficult to get on casual or familiar terms with his associates. Much as did the British, he referred to people generally by

their surnames, and one whom he eventually called by his first name

felt honored indeed. Likewise, he was always referred to as Fairbank

or Mr. Fairbank, and relatively few felt comfortable in referring to him as Fairbank in his presence. To a few friends outside the Bureau,

mostly in Baltimore, he was known as Herb. Yet despite this reserve, he was a better friend to some in need than perhaps they realized.

Totally dedicated to the organization and to his profession, he had

few outside interests. Each year he took his vacation (he, like the

British, called it his holiday) with his sister, often spending time in

Vermont's Green Mountains and occasionally taking a trip abroad. It

183
was on their last holiday in Italy that he contracted an illness that was

never diagnosed and from which he never fully recovered, and ulti- mately it led to his retirement.

His leadership was by example, and none who worked with him could

fail to try to follow. He encouraged the younger members of his staff to take the initiative and gave them responsibility as rapidly as they

could accept it. He saw to it that their contributions were recognized

and, to the extent possible, rewarded. He never thought of his subordinates as working for him, but with him, and referred to them as

his colleagues. But his closest colleagues would probably be more ac- curately defined as disciples.

What kind of man was he? He was a gentleman, in the truest sense of the word. He was a man for his time.

184
Francis Cutler Turner

Francis Cutler Turner, "Frank" to his many fi'iends and associates,

Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration from February

24, 1969, to June 30, 1972, is the only Chief Executive of the organization and its predecessor, the Bureau of Public Roads, who spent his

entire professional career in that organization. Turner graduated in

1929 from the Texas Agricultural & Mechanical College, now Texas

A & M University, and joined the Division of Management of the

Bureau of Public Roads as a junior highway engineer immediately

upon graduation. He was assigned to field service in the Bureau's

research program in what was then called the Division of Management.

He was one of a small group of college graduates selected each year to enter a training program involving the field study of construction

methods (time and motion study work) designed to reduce the costs of

highway construction. From this small group of young engineers were

to come an astonishing number of future leaders of the Bureau of

Public Roads. The nature of their work taught them to question construction procedures then current, to be innovative, resourceful, to re- spond to change, and to make every effort to obtain moi'e road for less cost by expanding production, for it must be remembered that highway

engineering as we know it now was in its infancy in 1929.

Turner was transferred in 1933 from this type of work to what is now the Arkansas Division office at Little Rock, where he was an area engineer responsible for the Federal-aid highway program in a portion

of that State. Here he became interested in the performance of maintenance operations and wrote a thesis on maintenance of highways as

affected by the type and physical characteristics of base and subgrade

soils, which was accepted by Texas A & M as the basis for a graduate

Civil Engineering degree in 1940.

In that same year. Turner was transferred to the Division of Construction (now Office of Engineering) in the Washington, D.C., office and a year later was reassigned to what is now the Region 3 office, then

located in Washington, D.C. Here he worked on construction and

maintenance and the many wartime special projects dealing with defense

access roads, flight strips, materials allocations, the inventory of trucks

and buses, and many other new and special activities related to the war

effort. In 1943, his expertise in maintenance and his initiative and

leadership were recognized, and he was sent to the Alaska highway

project as an expediter by Commissioner Thomas H. MacDonald. During his Alaska assignment he pioneered highway location, using aerial

reconnaissance. When the Alaska highway was completed, Mr. MacDonald assigned him to stay on the project and work first with the

War Department and later with the Canadian and Territorial Governments to organize maintenance activities and procedures. He did not

return to the United States until the latter part of 1946, the last man

to leave the Alaska highway project, and then on his return to Washington, he was met with the news that he had been selected to head a mission to the Philippines to restore the war-damaged roads and bridges

and to organize and train a highway organization in that country, a program authorized by the Congress under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946.

Turner went to Manila in December 1946 and found an almost hopeless mission confronting him. Public Roads engineers, whom he needed

to staff the project, for the most part had only recently returned from

the war and had no desire for further foreign service. Furthermore,

there were no living accommodations in Manila suitable for families,

and unless their families could go, the engineers were not interested.

Upon arrival in Manila, Turner attacked this staffing problem with his

customary zeal and enthusiasm. Eight other U.S. Government agencies

had missions in Manila with similar complications, and by common

consent, Turner became spokesman for the group and eventually was

designated by the American Embassy in Manila to solve the problem.

185
This involved a return to Washington, consultations with the Department of State and the Office of the President, and the final result of

Turner's efforts was the assignment of the Naval Headquarters com- pound in Manila, the Sea Frontier, to the agencies for housing and

headquarters offices. Once staffed. Turner turned his attention to procuring steel and equipment, employing a Filipino staff for training, and

preparing plans for the bridge replacement program. As rapidly as the Philippine Bureau of Public Works could be staffed and reorganized

to accept responsibility for the work, it was shifted to them. Once

again he demonstrated innovation and ingenuity by refitting a naval

landing craft, an LCI, first as a survey ship to reach remote islands and

later as a floating school for training Filipino engineers in highway

techniques throughout the archipelago. In 1949, he was transferred,

temporarily, to the American Embassy to coordinate all the rehabilitation programs of the nine U.S. Government agencies. His thoughtfulness, his courtesy, his consideration for others, and the high regard in

which he was held by the Philippine Government made the assignment

a highly successful one. His contribution to the Philippines was recognized by that Government's making him a member of the Legion of

Honor (Officer Grade) in 1951.

Turner returned to the United States in 1950 to become assistant to the Commissioner, Thomas H. MacDonald. In this capacity he coordinated the work on the Inter-American Highway and the many foreign

missions engaged in highway activities in Ethiopia, Turkey, the Philippines, Liberia and many others, as well as taking on many special as- signments. Here he brought into play his tremendous capacity for

work—a 14- to 18-hour day was not unusual for him—and his extra- ordinary memory for detail. He had the ability to retain in his mind

everything that he read and recall it months later. In 1954, President Eisenhower appointed the President's Advisory

Committee on the National Highway Program, and Turner was appointed Executive Secretary for the Committee. At that time, the

highway program was at a crossroads with many influential voices

seeking to establish a National System of Toll Highways. One of the

responsibilities of this Committee was to recommend whether to make

the system, so obviously needed, toll or free. Turner worked unceas- ingly to place before the Committee all aspects of the problem, and it was largely due to his influence upon the Committee members that the

decision was to recommend a National System of Interstate and Defense

Highways to be financed in part by Federal excise taxes on automotive

equipment, parts and fuel set up in a Trust Fund and in part by matching funds supplied by the States. Upon conclusion of the Committee

report. Turner worked in liaison with the several congressional committees to convince them of the soundness of the recommendations and

the need for the program. More than any other single individual, he

may be said to be the "Father" of the Interstate Highway System.

During his contacts with these committees, he again exhibited endless

patience, sound reasoning and disregard of personal acclaim that had

always distinguished his career. About this time, a highly placed departmental official came into office who obviously had been directed to liquidate the highway oi'ganization or to severely diminish its activities and influence. As he worked closely

with Turner, it became obvious also that his viewpoint was changing,

and he became one of the strongest advocates of the organization and

its responsibilities. Later he told one of his staff, "I decided that if an

organization could pi'oduce a man like Frank Turner, there had to be some good in it, and I'd better take a real close look at it before I made

any changes."

From 1957 to 1967, Turner served as Deputy Commissioner and Chief

Engineer for Public Roads, and upon his shoulders fell the major re- sponsibility for implementation of the legislation that had established

the Interstate Highway System and provided for its funding. The

difficulties and complexities of this challenge ai'e discussed in other

places in this liistory but tlie experience that he had gained in drafting

the original legislation that had established the program stood in good

186
stead in discussing the problems that arose as the program proo^essed

with the interested congressional committees and leaders and in resolving individual problems as they presented themselves.

Turner never lost his interest in and enthusiasm for the role of the

United States in technical assistance in highways for foreign countries.

He was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the 5th Pan-American

Highway Conference in Lima, Peru, in 1951, to the Extraordinary

Session in Mexico City in 1952, and to the 6th Conference in Caracas,

Venezuela, in 1954. He was the Chief of the U.S. Delegation at the

10th Pan-American Highway Congress in Montevideo, Uruguay, iu 1967, the 11th Pan-American Highway Congress in Quito. Ecuador, in

1971, and Chief of the U.S. Highway Exchange Delegation to the

Soviet Union in 1961. His contributions and his leadership in the field of transportation wei'e attested by silver and gold meritorious awards

by the Department of Commerce in 1954 and 1956; by the Thomas H.

MacDonald Award of the American Association of State Highway

Officials in 1962; by the George S. Bartlett Award of the American

Eoad Builders' Association in 1965; by the Gold Medal Award for

Outstanding Achievement from the Department of Transportation in

1970; by the Special Secretarial Medal and Award in 1972; by the Koy

W. Crum Award of the Highway Research Board in 1969; by the Neil

J. Curry Award for Leadership in Highway Transportation in 1970

of the Highway Users Federation ; and by the James Laurie prize for

leadership in highway transportation of the American Society of Civil

Engineers in 1971. He received recognition from the Engineering

Neics-Record as the Construction Man of the Year in 1967 and 1970,

and the World Highway Man of the Year by the International Road

Federation, presented by Emperor Haile Selassie in Addis Ababa in

1969. Of unusual interest is the fact that he was selected as a Distinguished Alumnus by two universities—Texas A & M University where

he was graduated in 1929, and the University of Texas at Arlington

where he took his first 2 years when it was a Junior College. In 1974,

he was elected an Honorary Life Member of the American Society of

Civil Engineers.

On February 27, 1967, his appointment as Director of Public Roads was confirmed by the United States Senate and he served in that ca- pacity until February 24, 1969, when he was confirmed by unanimous

consent by the Senate as Federal Highway Administrator. He served

with distinction in this capacity until his retirement on June 30, 1972.

Frank Turner's entire career was marked by his professional ability,

his sincerity, integrity, modesty, charm and love of his fellow man. During the most pressing technical problems, he could and did take

time out to concern himself with whether the wife of a member of his

staff had enough doors in her newly assigned house to make her happy.

His calmness under pressure was remarkable; no one ever saw him

excited, flustered or angry. Although basically a serious man, he possesses a puckish wit that springs forth when least expected. From a

rather monotonous, hesitant public speaker in his younger days, he

became an urbane, accomplished and witty after dinner speaker. His

world has been centered around his family, his work, and his church.

The American people owe an undying vote of gratitude to Francis

Cutler Turner for his lifetime of dedicated public service, his strong

unerring leadership, and his determination to obtain a dollar's worth

of road for every dollar of tax money spent.

187
Joseph Barnett

The belief that highways should be pleasing to the eye and compatible

with the environment was a new idea when a foresighted engineer

named Joseph Barnett joined the Bureau of Public Roads in 1933. By

the time he retired 33 years later as Deputy Director for Engineering,

Barnett had made good visual design a hallmark of American highways. His dedication to his work, his forceful pursuit of engineering

principles and his extensive and lucid technical publications played a key role in the development of today's highway policies. He was a pioneer in the standardization of geometric design—design of the visible

features of a road; he advocated, long before it was fashionable, a balanced transportation system to eliminate urban traffic congestion; and

he developed the principles of controlled access in modern highway

construction.

Barnett was born January 1, 1897, on the lower east side of Manhattan

and attended public schools. At the age of 16 he received a scholarship

to Cooper Union Institute and graduated with a B.S. in civil engineering at 19. After serving a year as an ensign in the U.S. Navy, he

worked for consulting firms in the field of structural design and building construction and with the city of New York in the area of city

transit design.

In 1925 he went to work for the Westchester County Park Commission, taking part in the pioneering development of the first parkways

and expressways in the New York metropolitan area. He moved from

squad leader in structural design to chief of the Engineering Design

Division. In these assignments he obtained unique experience in highway flowing alinement, parkway amenities, free traffic operation and

controlled highway access which were to become the key features of

Interstate highway design in years to come. Barnett joined the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) as Senior Highway Engineer, Division of Design, where his engineering experience was put to use in a series of special assignments. During the first 2

years, he directed the design of the George Washington Memorial

Parkway on the Virginia side of the Potomac River from Memorial

Bridge to Great Falls.

Barnett is remembered by his colleagues as having a tremendous

sense of purpose and a terrific power of concentration. By the mid1930's he was applying himself to a new idea in highway construction

standardization of design.

He first brought order into the design of guardrail types then available and set standards for adequacy and use of the types subsequently

developed. He then organized a countrywide study of speed-radiussuperelevation on existing highway curves. Analysis of the data led to a new standard for superelevation design in relation to vehicle speed

and the friction factors.

Knowing that better highway designs resulted from spiral or transition curves, Barnett worked out a set of practical spiral curve design

tables that could be used by field survey engineers with calculations no more involved than those required for simple radii curves. His curve

design manual. Transition Curves for Highways, was first published in

1938. It has been reprinted several times, translated into Spanish, re- computed to the metric system, and is still used extensively both here

and abroad by highway design professionals.

Barnett was named Secretary of the Committee on Planning and

Design Policies of the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) from its inception in 1937 until his retirement at the end

of 1966. This Committee profoundly influenced the design of safe and

efficient highways. The scope of the series of AASHO standards, policies, and guides developed by the Committee attest to Barnett's leadership and unique qualifications for the innovative development work.

Collectively these writings showed his attributes in several forms:

analyses of the subject item to derive major design principles; details

188
and values in a form for direct iise by designers; clear, simply-worded

texts; sound judgment in practical control and guide values; and advice

for flexible, thoughtful applications to produce better designs. As each

separate subject was completed, it was adopted and published by

AASHO and accepted by BPR for use on Federal-aid highway projects.

The first seven subject brochures established the concepts of highway

design and were combined into one publication in 1950 entitled Policies on Geometric Highioay Design. Subsequent expansions in 1954 and

1965 entitled A Policy on Geometric Design of Rural Highivays, popularly Icnown as "The Blue Book," have been put into iise on highway

programs of all agencies, including those in foreign countries. A second

major work produced by the Committee was A Policy on Ar'terial

Highways in Urhan Areas, published in 1957 and known as "The Red

Book." The advent of the Interstate System opened other new areas, and the 1956 Interstate standards were prepared based on the Committee's earlier work. These policies on highway design matters have been

widely accepted by engineers in governmental and private practice.

Between 1941 and 1943, Barnett headed a special BPR design team

that rapidly developed contract plans for the main roads, interchanges

and highway structures made necessary by the construction of the

Pentagon building in Arlington, Virginia. The roads and bridges

around the Pentagon were designed and constructed in less than 2 years. This interconnected system of freeways provided flexible connections

to the building, the three Potomac River bridges and several Virginia

arterials. They served through and local traffic needs well until the

steadily increasing traffic volume of the 1960's overtaxed them.

On February 14, 1950, Barnett was presented the Commerce Department's Silver Medal Award for outstanding contributions to the development of urban roads, including the design of the Pentagon road

network.

After completing this task, Barnett, always a hard worker, was given

the responsibility of establishing an Urban Roads Branch to administer

highway construction in urban areas under provisions of the 1944

Federal-Aid Highway Act. This was a new, open field inasmuch as most State highway departments only had rural programs. Barnett

spearheaded the Federal assistance to establish State urban divisions

and to advise them on the planning, location and design of urban ex- pressways and other arterials. In this context, he addressed engineering

groups, joined in conferences on specific route problems, prepared

papers, and directed the development of design policies and guides.

In his key Federal position, Barnett was also busy at this time developing and applying the principles of controlled access which he had

absorbed during his Westchester County experience. The early parkways demonstrated the multiple advantages of controlled access, not

only in the safety and efficiency of traffic operations, but also in the

opportunities for developing esthetic facilities well-fitted to their sur- roundings. Barnett stressed controlled access as a practical tool to relieve urban congestion at a time when rush hour traffic jams were becoming a common city experience.

In 1954 Barnett was assigned broader administrative responsibilities as Assistant Deputy Commissioner for the Division of Engineering.

He was sent to Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey, to advise that country on

the feasibility of a bridge across the Bosporus and an arterial highway

system for Istanbul.

In 1961 he was made Deputy Director for Engineering, a principal

decisionmaker on Federal-aid policy relating to engineering matters

(which included the eligibility of proposed Avork for Federal-aid funds),

the policy application on special problems, and conclusions on specific

highway section design features. He received the Gold Medal for Distinguished Federal Service in 1963 from the Department of Commerce.

At the request of the International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (World Bank), he headed a mission to Japan to study

and report on the feasibility of extending the Tokyo Expressway from

Haneda to Yokohama.

189
Barnett was a sensitive man with a dry wit who "liked to call a spade

a spade."

Even after retirement in December 1966, Barnett remained active as a consultant on urban highways. He joined in the general debate on mass transit development in iirban areas. His 1970 paper on "Express

Bus Mass Ti'ansit" presented a review of the various forms of transit

and outlined a practical concept for improving service through ex- panded facilities. He belonged to the Tau Beta Pi honorary engineering society and was

an active member of the American Society for Civil Engineers. He

received the ASCE Arthur M. Wellington Prize in 1949. Upon his

retirement he was awarded a citation by AASHO.

Until his death in Eoslyn, New York, on September 30, 1973, he believed that better highways can and should be produced through the

design process. His philosophy was that clear principles and guides

should be formulated; however, their application should not be by rote, but by thoughtful adaptation to the specific conditions.

"A complete highway incorporates not only safety, utility and econ- omy," he once wrote, "but beauty as well."

190
HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATORS

General Roy Stone 1893-1899

On October 3, 1893, Secretary of Ajjriciilture J. Sterling- Morton

instituted the Office of Road Inquiry and appointed General Roy Stone,

formerly secretary for the National League of Good Roads, as Special

Agent and Engineer for Road Inquiry.

Earlier in 1893, the Office had been authorized by a statute enacted

by the 52d Congress and approved March 3, 1893, by President Benjamin

Harrison.

The statute read in part:

To enable the Sccivtary of Agriculture to make inquiries in regard to the systems of road management throughout the United States, to malce investi- gations in regard to the l)est methods of road-making, and to enal)le him to assist tlie agricultural college and experiment stations in disseminating infor- mation on this subject.

General Stone was a professional civil and mechanical engineer; a military hero who distinguished himself in the Civil War and again in

the Spanish-American War; an astute organizer; and the architect of

many State-aid laws for U.S. roads.

He proposed the first parcel post, the first rural free delivery service

and postal savings banks.

V

. ^' <f** -^

Martin Dodge 1899-1905

Martin Dodge was appointed Interim Director of the Office of Road

Inquiry in August 1898 when his predecessor, General Roy Stone, va- cated the office to serve in the Spanish-American AA^ar. General Stone

resumed his duties as Director on January 31, 1899. He resigned on

October 23, 1899, and Martin Dodge was reappointed and served until

1905.

Mr. Dodge was a zealous roadbuilder and an advocate of free roads

in the United States. As a member of the Ohio State Roads Commission, he was the leading exponent of the first brick surfaced rural road

in this country.

The road was laid on the Wooster Pike near Cleveland. Four nailes of brick pavement were built in the fall of 1893 at a cost of $16,000

per mile.

During Mr. Dodge's tenure, he established an information office to furnish advice about roadbuilding techniques to State and local officials and recommended a postgraduate school for civil engineer graduates to receive advance roadbuilding training, which became a reality in 1905.

Logan Waller Page 1905-1918

Logan AValler Page in 1905 became the first Director of the newly

created Office of Public Roads. The Congress had passed an act that

consolidated the Office of Public Road Inquiries and the Division of

Tests of the Bureau of Chemistry.

Five years earlier, Mr. Page, a renowned geologist with the Massachusetts State Highway Commission, accepted the position of Chief of

the Division of Tests in Washington.

As Laboratory Chief, his responsibilities included a study of roadbuilding on a national scale. As a geologist in Massachusetts he had

conducted the first extensive investigation of roadbuilding materials

in America.

Then as the Director of the Office of Public Roads, he began a scries of

investigations which won international acclaim for the laboratories he

directed.

191
Mr. Page introduced a scientific movement in roadbuilding that won

enthusiastic national public support. He initiated "a petrographic

study" of roadbuilding materials; wrote the first comprehensive report on the elements of roadbuilding rocks; and improved French rocktesting machines whereby physical tests of roadbuilding rocks became a routine procedure.

Thomas H. MacDonald 1919-1953

The good roads and highways Americans travel and enjoy today are a monument to Thomas H. MacDonald who for 34 years served as Chief

of the Bureau of Public Roads and Commissioner of the Public Roads

Administration.

Affectionately he was loiown as "Chief" by all who kncAv and worked

with him.

When Chief MacDonald came to Washington in 1919, the office he was to head was still in its infancy. The Bureau had direct supervision over highway engineering activities and expenditures of Federal-aid

funds.

The country had scarcely a quarter million miles of public roads

when Chief MacDonald took office—and very little of that mileage was

hard-surfaced. Few bridges were adequate to carry heavy truck traffic. Chief MacDonald in 34 years put together an integrated system of 3i/^ million miles of hard-surfaced highways which crisscrossed America.

Chief MacDonald personally directed the major steps in construction

of the Alaska Highway. He also supervised fund expenditures to aid

the countries of Central America in building the Inter-American Highway.

Francis V. du Pont 1953-1955

Francis V. duPont was connected with the development of highways

in America since the early twenties.

He was appointed Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Roads in

1953 and while serving as Commissioner, advanced a highway program

that led to legislation under which the Interstate Highway System was

constructed.

Mr. duPont was the son of T. Coleman duPont who was the president

of the giant chemical firm that bears that name in Wilmington, Dela- ware. From 1922 through 1949, he was a member of the Delaware State

Highway Commission. He also served as chairman of the Commission.

Mr. duPont played a major role in the development of the financing,

engineering and the initial construction of the Delaware Memorial

Bridge. When it was opened to traffic on July 1, 1951, it was the fifth longest suspension span in the world.

He had major accomplishments in the private. State and Federal

sectors. Mr. duPont resigned his Federal post on January 1, 1956. During

his tenure as Commissioner, he was credited with stimulating interest

in and getting the Interstate System underway.

192
Charles Dwight (Cap) Curtiss 1956

Charles Dwight (Cap) Curtiss grew up with the Bureau of Public

Roads and the American highway system.

The name "Cap" came from Mr. Curtiss' service as a captain witli

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers during World War I in France.

Following the war, Cap Curtiss joined the Bureau of Public Koads

and began a 38-year public service career. Along with others in the Bureau who were destined to give this Nation a new concept in transportation at both the State and national

levels, Cap Curtiss aided materially in the formulation of the policies

and procedures of the amendments and expansions of the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1916.

^Vlien he became Commissioner in 19.56, plans for an enlai'ged and

greatly expanded highway program reached out to eveiy corner of tlie Nation.

With the signing of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 by President Eisenhower, it became Cap Curtiss' responsibility to put into

immediate operation the authorization of the largest public works program ever undertaken on a State-Federal cooperative basis.

John Anthony Voipe 1956-1957

John Anthony Volpe, who was to become the Nation's second Secretary of Transportation, agreed to serve as interim Federal Highway

Administrator from October 1956 to February 1957, pending confirmation by the U.S. Senate of Bertram D. Tallamy as Administrator.

Prior to his appointment as Administrator, Mr. Volpe had served

nearly 4 years as the Massachusetts Commissioner of Public Works.

His personal history reflects the success story of the self-made man.

In 1933 he cashed a $300 insurance policy and borrowed $500 to begin

a construction firm that was parlayed into a multimillion dollar organization.

The Volpe firm established a national reputation for construction

excellence.

Mr. Volpe was elected Governor of Massachusetts in 1960, lost in

1962, and won a second term in 1964. He then was reelected in 1966

for the first 4-year term in the State's history.

He was serving his third term when President Nixon swore him in on January 20, 1969, as the second Secretary of Transportation.

In 1973 John Volpe was appointed Ambassador to Italy, realizing

his lifelong ambition.

Bertram D. Tallamy 1957-1961

Bertram D. Tallamy was an advocate of esthetic design in the Interstate System.

In administering the Interstate System, Mr. Tallamy wanted it fashioned after the New York Tliruway, which in 1957 was generally

regarded as one of the most magnificent highways ever constructed.

He wanted motorists to see the country, to enjoy the scenery, and

above all to avoid monotony. All these things, he said, could be accomplished with an added safety factor without adding to the cost. Mr. Tallamy also was in favor of regulated outdoor advertising along

the Interstate System.

The first Senate-confirmed Federal Highway Administrator vras born

and bred to the engineering and construction fields. Both his father

and grandfather were general contractors.

193
His early construction training was with a firm that specialized in

the fields of watei'works, dams, sewage treatment plants, roads and

bridges.

From the early thirties, he progressed through various posts to where

he was appointed Superintendent of Public Woi'ks for New York State

in October 1948.

In 1950 he became Chairman of the Xew York State Thruway Authority. Overall construction costs for New York State in 1954 reached

$928.5 million.

Rex Marion Whitton 1961-1966

When Eex Marion Wliitton retired as Federal Highway Administrator on December 30, 1966, he left behind a career of public service

that almost spanned the entire history of modern highway constniction

in the United States. He had completed more than 46 years of continuous highway work,

of which 40 were spent in his native State of Missouri.

Mr. Whitton rose through the ranks, from a member of a highway

survey crew in 1920 to Chief Engineer for the State of Missouri in 1951.

Other posts held by Mr. Whitton included that of assistant resident

engineer, resident engineer, chief of survey party, plans designer, as- sistant district engineer, district engineer, and engineer of maintenance.

During his tenure as Federal Highway Administrator, the Bureau of

Public Roads was revised to inci'ease operational efficiency and instill new confidence.

In 1960 he was named one of the top 10 public works men of the year

by the American Public Works Association in cooperation with Kiwanis

International.

He also was president of the American Association of State Highway

Officials (AASHO) 1955-56.

Lowell K. Bridwell 1967-1969

Lowell K. Bridwell, former journalist, acquired a reputation through

the years as an authority on highway transportation.

Mr. Bridwell made his first impact on the highway program as a

journalist.

A correspondent for the Associated Press and the Ohio State Journal

from 1946 to 1950, he became associated with Scripps-Howard Newspapers in 1950. He joined the Washington Bureau of Scripps-Howard

in 1958 as their top writer on highways.

Fi'om this vantage point he set up close liaison witli both government

and industry. He became well-known as an individual who was exceptionally well versed in the technical aspects of highway administration,

finance and construction.

As a representative for Scripps-Howard, Mr. Bridwell participated

in many local and national highway meetings. These included numerous conclaves of State highway officials as well as leading trade associations.

He assumed the helm of an expanded and reoriented Federal Highway Administration in 1967 in the new U.S. Department of Transportation.

Mr. Bridwell was responsible for administering a $4.4 billion highway

program. This figure dwarfed everything else in the Department of

Transportation's $6.6 billion budget.

194
Francis C. Turner 1969-1972

Francis C. Turner, during his lifelong career with the Bureau of

Public Roads, won national and international acclaim for his contributions to both national and international highway programs.

He joined the Bureau of Public Roads in 1929 as a junior highway

engineer and began a steady rise thiough the ranks.

Fourteen years later he had acquired such stature that he was detailed (1943-1946) to Alaska as adviser on maintenance of the Alaska

Highway.

In the next 4 years (1946-1950) he served with distinction as coor- dinator of the entire Philippine Rehabilitation Program.

Subsequent to this assignment, he held several top positions with the

Bureau of Public Roads: Deputy Commissioner, Chief Engineer, Assistant Federal Highway Administrator, and Director of the Bureau

of Public Roads. Furthermore, he was a member of the task force that

set up the Department of Transportation.

He was named Federal Highway Administrator on February 24, 1969.

During his tenure as Federal Highway Administrator, new attention was given to the environment, accelerated concern was focused on highway safety, and increased emphasis was placed on the quality of life for people affected by highway construction.

Norbert T. Tiemann 1973—

Norbert T. Tiemann, former Governor of Nebraska, is the current

Federal Highway Administrator.

Governor Tiemann's term as Nebraska's Chief Executive, from 1967

to 1971, included several major accomplishments on behalf of his State. Among these were

• First broad reorganization of the Department of Roads. • First revenue bonds for highway construction. • Closing of the Omaha Gap on Interstate 80. • Established the first 20-year plan for construction of a comprehensive expressway-freeway system. • First mandatory driver examination. • First motor-vehicle inspection program.

After completing his term as Governor, he served as Vice President

for Corporate Finance of First Mid-America, Inc., an investment banking firm in Lincoln.

In his position as Administrator, he was involved in the obligation

of $7.8 billion in Federal-aid highway funds in fiscal year 1975—the

largest amount in the history of the Federal-State highway program.

Other accomplishments have included the close planning liaison between FHWA and the Urban Mass Transportation Administration and

the conclusion of an agreement with Iran for FHU^A personnel to advise and assist that country in building a modem highway network.

195
EditOfV note

In Part I of the history of the Federal interest in

the Nation's highways, the period from the colonial

days to enactment of the Federal-Aid Highway Act

of 1956 has been developed in a broad chronological

format of events. As a result, there is a mixing of

diverse elements, such as financial support, construction practices, research and many others that con- tributed to the continuity of highway development

as we know it today. The advent of the 1956 FederalAid Highway Act was a turning point in highway

financing, program magnitude, and administration

complexity. For this reason. Part I stops at the 1956

Federal-Aid Highway Act. During the years since the Federal Aid Road Act

of 1916, specialized knowledge and skills were required

to cope with the expanding program. The prograna

became more complex with each piece of highway

legislation in response to tlie need for broader measures in transportation, the desires of the public it serves, and the interaction of the highway program

with other programs to serve the needs of a growing

Nation. Technology became so sophisticated that, to keep pace with the demands, the program developed

special areas of concern. In recognition of this sit- uation. Part II has been assembled according to each

major specialization and its contribution to the overall program.

The chapters of Part II cover separately one particular aspect of the program, including a chapter

devoted to the development of the Interstate System.

The authors for these chapters are recognized authorities, and their decisions as to what has proven significant in their individual fields of expertise has been

left largely unchanged.

196

Rdmini/tfQtion

of the

FederQl-flid

Program

Early Federal Government Interest in Roads

The first Federal financial aid specifically for the

construction of roads in the States was incorporated

into the Ohio Statehood Enabling Act in 1802 which

provided that 5 percent of the proceeds of the sale of

public (Federal) lands in Ohio was to be set aside for

roads. Upon the insistence of the State of Ohio, the

Act Avas amended in 1803 to provide that 3 percent

of the funds would be available for roads within the

State and 2 percent of the funds would be used under

the direction of Congress for constructing roads to and through Ohio.^

This form of Federal assistance Avas later extended

to all the States that had public lands when they were admitted to statehood, but the purposes for

which the funds could be used were broadened to include canals, levees, river improvements, and schools.

In 1806 an act authorized the Federal Government

to lay out and build the famous Cumberland Road

from the head of navigation on the Potomac River

at Cumberland, Maryland, to a point on the Ohio

River—provided that permission should first be se- cured from the Legislatures of Maryland, Virginia,

and Pennsylvania to build the road within their

boundaries. Funding was to be from the Ohio 2 per- cent fund.

The debate in Congress before the Cumberland

Road Act Avas approved, centered on the constitutional

issue of AA'hetlier or not the Federal Government had

the authority to build roads at all, except possibly in

the territories. The Act was finally passed Avithout

resolving the constitutional issue.

Because the Cumberland Road deteriorated badly

as a result of heavy traffic and lack of funds for maintenance, Congress, in 1822, passed a bill authorizing

the Federal GoA^ernment to collect tolls to be used for

maintenance. This bill was vetoed by President

Monroe on the constitutional grounds that it was an

unAvarranted extension of the poAver vested in Congress to make ai^propriations. Collection of tolls, the

President said, implied a power of jurisdiction or sovereignty Avhich was not granted to the Federal

Government by the Constitution and could not be

unilaterally conA^eyed by any State Avithout a constitional amendment. He felt ". . . that it Avas one

thing to make appropriations for public improvements,

but an entirely different thing to assume jurisdiction

and sovereignty OA^er the land Avhereon those improA^ement were made."^ President Monroe's position has

continued to be the Federal position on higliAvay

matters to the present day.

During the next 9 years, the Cumberland Road con- tinued to deteriorate despite a fcAv meager Fedei'al

appropriations for maintenance, and it was finally

recognized that the only solution Avas State operation

as a toll road.^ In 1831 and 1832 the Legislatures of

Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia agreed to accept and maintain their sections of the Cumberland

Road.*

The Federal Government attempted to extend the

Cumberland ( National ) Road AvestAvard to the

^Mississippi River. In 1820 Congress appropriated

$10,000 to locate the I'oad, and subsequent periodic

appropriations Avere made for construction Avhich ulti- mately totaled about $5 million. The Ohio Legisla198
.-i section of 1-70 in Spotted Wolf Canyon between Rattlesnake Bend and Saleraters west of Green River, Utah.

ture, in 1831, passed an act which authorized the State

to take jurisdiction of its portion of the road and

place it under toll as each section was completed,'' but

the road was never fully completed in either Indiana

or Illinois. Congress finally ceded all the Federal

interests in the road to Indiana and Illinois in 1848

and 1856, respectively.''

From the early 1800's through the 1860's, a separate

form of federally funded road construction existed

in the building of primitive military wagon roads,

most of them in the territories. They consisted mainly

of little more than trails built by troops, but they did

play a big part in opening up the "West. Late in this

Junction of the old National Road (right) and the

relocated U.S. JfO (left) near Piney Grove, Md.

period, the Army improved some of the more important wagon trails to the point that they were used

for transcontinental mail routes. The last form of Federal road assistance or subsidy in the 19th century was the granting of a free

right-of-way for public roads over unreserved public

lands. A number of States and counties took advantage of this by declaring all section lines in those

counties to be public roads, and, thus, they reserved

the right-of-way before the lands might become pri- vate property.''

No reasonably accurate determination can be made

of the total amount of Federal funds that were ex- pended directly and indirectly for roads during the

period from 1776 to about 1890 because the programs

had been so very diffuse. However, in terms of actual

appropriations by Congress, the Yearbook of the

Department of Agriculture^ 1899 mentions that from

1806 to 1838 a total of about $7 million was appropriated by Congress for the Cumberland Eoad and

$1.6 million was appropriated for ". . . twelve other

great national highways . . . making what was then

regarded a complete system of roads. ..." Large

Government expenditures were then curtailed because

of a monetary crisis, but from 1854 until the Civil

War, over $1.6 million was appropriated for roads

chiefly in the Territories.^

There was little further Federal interest or recognition of responsibility concerning roads until the Good

Roads Movement began to reach national proportions

about 1890. This movement had a profound influence on the States in their initiation of State aid for roads

199
and tlie creation of liighway departments and commissions. It also began to put pressure on Congress

to provide some form of Federal assistance for highways.

The first State to actually create a State Highway

Commission was Massachusetts in 1892. The Commission was given the authority to establish a State

road system, and beginning in 1894, the Legislature

appi'opriated the first funds for actual construction.

The need for State aid in financing road construction

had been recognized as earl}' as 1891 when New Jersey

enacted the first State-aid road program in the Nation.

However, it was designed simply to help the counties

finance their programs, and its administration was

placed under the State's Department of Agriculture.

It wasn't imtil 1894 that New Jersey placed the program under a Commission of Highways.

The Office of Road inquiry is Created

In 1892, the Senate passed a bill entitled the

National Highway Commission Law, but Congress

adjourned before it was enacted into law. Then, in

the Agriculture Appropriation Act for 1894, enacted

March 3, 1893, an item for $10,000 was included to enable the Secretary "to make inquiries in regard to the systems of road management throughout the United

States ... to make investigations in regard to the

best method of roadmaking . . . and to enable him

to assist the agricultural college and experiment sta- tions in disseminating information on this subject. . . ." To carry out the work directed by Congress, the Secretary created the Office of Eoad Inquiry, the small

beginning from which the world's largest highway

program was to develop.

Allien the Federal interest in roads was reinstituted

in 1893, the appropriation was made to the Department of Agriculture because the recognized problem was in the rural areas—there were not enough adequate roads for the farmers to get their produce to the railroad terminals and even nearby towns. The

cities and larger towns were considered to be adequately satisfying their own internal road needs.

The creation of the Office did not represent the

reinitiation of Federal financial assistance for the construction of roads in the States, since Congress provided only $10,000 for each of the first 3 years and

then dropped the appropriation to $8,000 for each of

the next 4 years. Rather, it was distinctly an educational and promotional effort, but it did represent a renewal of Federal recognition of the importance of

highways in the Nation's economic and social future.

For several years the work of the Office of Road

Inquiry consisted almost wholly of collecting and dis- seminating road information through publications,

lectures, and consultations. In 1896, a new program was administratively added. Short stretches of road were constructed as object lesson roads through con- tributed labor and materials and borrowed equipment.

The only Federal cost was usually the salai-y and

expenses of a road expert from the Office of Road

Inquiry who designed and supervised the work.

Despite efforts to get increased appropriations to expand the object lesson roads, additional funds were

not provided—probably because of some congressional concern that construction of roads by the Office of

Road Inquiry might be the opening wedge for reinstitution of national roads under Federal control. It was not until 1901 that the appropriation level was

increased. From then on, additional increases followed

almost every year, until 1912 when the appropriation was over $160,000.

During the years between 1897 and 1912, the Office

broadened its activities to include experimental use of new materials in the construction of short sections of

experimental roads; free tests of I'oad materials sent

in by private citizens from all over the country; provision of onsite assistance to State and county highway authorities, ranging from solving specific problems

in construction or maintenance to encouraging enact- ment of road laws and helping in the organization

of highway commissions or departments; institution

of a training program for student highway engineers;

provision of specialized assistance in problems con- cerning bridges, culverts and drainage in general ; and

of considerable significance, in 1909, launching into

the area of economic research and statistical investigations,^ the forenmner to the sophisticated and ex- tensive programs of today.

Some accomplishments had been achieved by 1912

through the joint efforts of the States, counties and

townships combined with the leadership of the Office

of Public Roads and the many good roads associations

and similar special interest groups. In 1912 the ex- penditures by the States for road work totaled approximately $43 million, and it was estimated another

$100 million was spent by counties and townships.^"

A new need was gaining recognition—interconnecting roads at the local, State and national level. Few

States had either the authority or the necessary funds

to plan an interconnected system witliin their own

boundaries, and each operated independently of its neighboring States. A road location in one State

which was advantageous to that State for topographic,

economic, or geographic reasons might not fit the situ- ation just across the State line, so there was no assur- ance that a road would not simply end at the State

line or some local terminus.

The landscaped median on 1-19 provides a pleasant exit from, Tucson, Ariz., and an effective headlight screen on the curve.

200
Federal Aid for the Construction of Rural Post Roads

The enonnity of the road problems and their

national character gradually developed a recognition

that Federal aid was the only solution. Groups, such

as the National Good Roads Association, the American

Road Builders, and the American Highway Association, were leaders in efforts to secure necessary legis- lation. As a result, during the first 6 months of the

session of Congress which began in December 1911, over 60 bills were introduced providing for some form

of direct aid by the national government." This

concern led to the inclusion in the Post Office Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1913 of an appropriation

of $500,000 to be expended by the Secretary of Agriculture, in cooperation with the Postmaster General,

to aid in the improvement of post roads (roads which

would be used by the Post Office in the delivery of

mail) in rural areas. It provided "That the State or

the local subdivision thereof in which such improvement is made under this provision shall furnish doiible

the amount of money for the improvement of the

be made under the supervision of the Secreary of

road or roads so selected. Such improvement shall Agriculture." The Act also provided for a Joint

Congressional Committee ". . . to make inquiry into

the subject of Federal aid in the construction of post

roads and report at the earliest practicable date. . . ." Among its other provisions, the 1913 Act also specifically directed the Joint Committee to consider the

problem of maintenance of the roads constructed, no

doubt remembering the disastrous experiences of the

past Federal efforts, and particularly the National

Road.

The significant features of the Act were: • It was a direct appropriation with authorization

to proceed. There was no authorization in ad- vance of an appropriation. • The Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture

and the Postmaster General to determine where

the funds should be used. It did not specify how

the funds were to be spread among the States.

• The matching principle was established by pre- scribing that project costs be financed on a twothirds State, one-third Federal basis. • The funds were available until expended.

No specific portion of the funds was made available

for the costs of administering the program by the

Office of Public Roads.

In the administration of the program launched by

the 1913 appropriation the principle of "apportionment" was born. The $500,000 was allocated by making available $10,000 to each State (to be matched

by at least $20,000 State and local funds) , and $20,000 was reserved by the Office of Public Roads to supervise and administer the program.^^ However, only

13 States and 28 counties participated, and approximately 455 miles of road were built." "

While the Federal financial interest in other than

demonstration and experimental roads was i-ekindled

by this measure, the appropriation was made to the

Post Office Department even though the work was to be administered by the Department of Agriculture.

Congress was still concerned with the constitutional

issue of Federal money going into construction of

roads wholly within individual States. The national

character of mail delivery provided a satisfactory

rationalization, hence, the appropriation was made to the Post Office Department.

The Joint Committee made its final report on Federal aid in the construction of post roads on January

21, 1915. The report offered no particular plan for

Federal aid in the cost of constructing roads but did

strongly recommend such aid. Furthermore, it pointed

out that a Federal-aid highway program would ac- complish several objectives of the Constitution, namely,

to establish post roads, regulate commerce, provide

for the common defense, and promote the general

welfare.^^ During the congressional hearings which followed

the submission of the report, there was much debate

but not too much opposition to the principle of approFederal involvement in roadbuilding was justified in 1912 because of the national character of rural free delivery of the mail.

201
priating Federal funds for the development of highways. The main issue was how such funds should

be administered, and there were three viewpoints:

(1) Those who favored total Federal funding and

control—a system of national highways built, owned

and operated by the Federal Government (which

again brought up the constitutional issue) ; (2) those

who favored that the Federal money be turned over

to the States or directly to some 3,000 counties in the

country to spend as they saw fit (at the time there were still 17 States which had no State agencies with

highway responsibilities; and (3) those who favored

a cooperative Federal-State relationship, with the

States retaining jurisdiction over the highways and

having responsibility for carrying out the work under

general Federal approval.

The concept of a cooperative Federal-State program was finally adopted in the enactment of the Federal

Aid Road'Act of 1916.

The Evolution of the Federal-Aid Program

The 4-page Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 was a simple document entitled "An Act To provide that

the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post roads, and for other purposes."

From this basic concept of building rural post roads,

as the IS'ation has grown and prospered, so too the

concept of roadbuilding has grown in terms of responsibilities to the economy, social and cultural needs,

protection of the environment and national resources, and even to international relations.

The State highway officials had already joined to- gether in 1914 to form the American Association of

State Highway Officials (AASHO) to provide mutual

cooperation and assistance to the Federal Government

on legislative, economic and technical subjects relat- ing to highways. First on the organization's agenda was to direct the executive committee to draft a bill authorizing Federal participation in the construction

of highways. Logan Waller Page, the Director of

the Office of Public Roads and Rural Engineering,

worked directly with AASHO on the draft, drawing

considerably, no doubt, on the experience gained during the construction of the rural post roads a few

years before. The cooperative spirit was already evident when the Federal Aid Road Act was signed into

law on July 11, 1916.

The Federal Aid Road Act of 1916

The basic philosophies of the Federal-State rela- tionship in the administration of the Federal-aid program were established by the 1916 Act, and they have

remained intact to the present time. These included: • Participation of any State in the program is pennissive, not mandatory. • If a State elects to participate, it must satisfy

the requirements and comply with the provisions

of the legislation and its implementing rules and

regulations. • The authority and responsibility for initiation of

proposed projects, their character, and method of

construction is resei'ved to the States; Federal

participation is dependent upon project approval

by the Federal authority.

• The State highway department, or its equivalent,

with proper legal authority to carry out its functions shall represent the State in its administration of the program in cooperation with the

Federal Government (as distinguished from the

individual local governmental subdivisions). • A^Hiile not specifically stated in the legislation,

the absence of any provisions to the contrary made

it abundantly clear that the States retain full and absolute ownership of the roads constructed or improved with participation of Federal-aid

funds. The States also retain responsibility for

their use and operation, with the proviso that

they must be free from tolls of all kinds.

This philosophy was to be sustained in the 1973

Federal-Aid Highway Act which restated the intent

of Congress as follows

:

The authorization of the appropriation of Federal funds

or their availability for expenditure under this chapter

shall in no way infringe on the sovereign rights of the

States to determine which projects shall be federally

financed. The provisions of this chapter provide for a

federally assisted State program. The 1916 Act appropriated the following sum for

Federal participation in the construction of rural post

roads

:

Fiscal Year Amount

1917 $ 5 million

1918 10 million

1919 15 million

1920 20 million

1921 25 million

In addition, the Act appropriated $10 million for

construction of roads and trails within or partly

within national forests for the fiscal years 1917 through

1926 at the rate of $1 million per year. This action

established the basic policy for providing for the development of main roads serving federally owned

lands, reservations or areas. Regrettably, the Act per- mitted a wide dispersion of Federal funds, with the

result that there was no assurance that a connected

system of major roads would ever be achieved.

The Act also established principles upon which fol- lowing legislation would build. These were: • Multiyear authorizations • Leadtime apportionment of funds • Apportionment by a fixed formula • Extended availability of funds for expenditure

(1 year after the year for which funds were

appropriated) • Definition of type of roads for which funds could

be used • A limitation on funds that could be used by the

States for engineering and contingencies • Permanent responsibility was placed with the

States for adequate maintenance of completed

projects (the penalty being that the State had

4 months to repair the road or lose all further

road project approvals in the State until the road was repaired)

Urinnrsota S!fate highicaij 61 alono tJic rockii slwrrline of iMkc Superior. The view from the hiphivai/ allows

the traveler to experience the heautii of the lake and the Superior National Forest.

202
w
• The costs of Federal administration of the program were provided for by reservation of 3 percent

of the appropriated funds for this purpose

The legislators used foresight, too, in establishing

in the Act the basic roles of the States and the Federal Government in project procedures. The Act first defined the term "construction" and then outlined

these procedures: • When proposed projects were approved by the

Federal agency, the State highway department was responsible for the preparation of plans,

specifications and estimates (PS&E) for review

and approval by the Federal agency. • Upon Federal approval of the plans, specifications and estimates, the applicable Federal funds were "obligated" and reserved for future payment

to the State. • The construction work and labor in each State was to be done in accordance with its laws and

under the direct supervision of the State highway

department, subject to the inspection and approval

of the Federal agency and in accordance with the

rules and regulations established under the authority of the legislation. • Reimbursements to the States for the Federal

share of State expenditures for projects could be

made as work progressed subject to its approval

by the Federal agency. • Upon completion of any project in compliance

with the plans and specifications, final reimbursement of the Federal share of the project costs was

to be made upon approval of the Federal agency.

Other provisions of the 1916 Act included: • Funds were appropriated with authorization to proceed. • The matching ratio of State funds to Federal

funds was 50 percent.

Most of the basic philosophies, principles, policies,

procedures, and controls established in the 1916 Act

still exist today.

Before work could be started under the 1916 Act,

many problems had to be resolved to establish the

radically new Federal- State partnership. Eleven

States did not have highway departments within the

meaning of the law and required legislation to create them. In many others, some legislation was necessary. In some States, the highway departments could not

exercise the necessary direct supervision. In others,

State and local funds were not available to match the

Federal funds, nor could adequate maintenance assur- ance be given. All the States had to assent to the

provisions of the 1916 Act through their legislatures or temporarily through their Governors if they wished

to participate. In spite of all these problems, by

June 30, 1917, all States but one* had a highway

department and had agreed to the requirements and

terms of the Act.^"

Recognizing that some States would not have agencies empowered to carry out the provisions of the Act,

Congress provided that the availability of the Federal

funds to those particular States could be extended for an additional 2 years. This gave those States not having a State highway department both the incentive

and the time to take the necessary legislative or administrative action to establish one. A "forfeiture"

feature provided that any funds not expended by the

end of their availability would be reapportioned among

all the States. Obviously, it was advantageous for the

States to create State highway departments if they

did not already have them.

The rules and regulations for carrying out the Federal Aid Road Act were issued by the Secretary of

Agriculture on September 1, 1916. "In them he designated the Office of Public Roads and Rural Engineering as his representative in the administration of all [sections] of the act except Section 8, which applied

to roads in national forests." Section 8 was assigned

to the Forest Service for apportionment of funds and

the selection of projects, although surveying and construction work on the forest roads was to be performed

under the supervision of the Office of Public Roads

and Rural Engineering (OPRRE).^*

Implementation of the 1916 Act had just gotten well

underway when the United States entered World War

I in April 1917. The war curtailed road construction

but did not bring it to a complete halt. Efforts were made to limit construction of roads to those needed

for military purposes or war industry.

By the end of the war, roads had deteriorated from

inadequate maintenance and heavy traffic, and an ac- celerated program was necessary. It was also believed

that there would be extensive unemployment as a re- sult of demobilization of the Armed Forces and war

industry. Congress responded by including in the

Post Office Appropriation Act for 1920 an appropriation of $200 million for additional Federal aid under

the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916. Of this amount,

$50 million was available immediately for fiscal year

1919 and $75 million for each of the fiscal years 1920

and 1927. The Act also provided an additional $9

million for forest roads at the rate of $3 million for

each of the fiscal years 1919, 1920 and 1921. An additional Federal subsidy to the road program was in- cluded by the transfer of surplus war materials and

Hoist and dump body, built by the Washiiigton State Highway

Department, are mounted on a ly^-ton Kelly Springfield truck which was WW I Army surplus. Equipment

such as this aided the accelerated postwar highway program.

* Indiana's lii^liway commission later was challonffed on its constitutionality which postponed its participation until 1919."

204
equipment to the Secretary of Agriculture for dis- tribution to the State hio-]iway departments for use on Federal-aid roads. The Secretary Avas authorized

to retain 10 percent of the material for the Department's use. The value of the surplus materials turned

over to the States totaled $139 million by July 1, 1922,

when the distribution was essentially completed."

The transfer of surplus war equipment played a major role in lamiching- the postwar construction.

Many States were able to continue highway construction and maintenance durino- that time only because

they I'eceived the surplus equipment.-"

The Federal Highway Act of 1921

The appropriations for Federal aid for roads ex- tended only through fiscal year 1921. Consequently,

Congress, in 1921, had to make a decision whether or not to continue the program, and this provided a chance to reevaluate the entire concept. There was

considerable debate as to whether the Federal Government should construct a system of national highways

directly or continue with the Federal-State cooperative plan. Again, the constitutional issue was raised.

Controversy also developed about what type of

roads should be built with Federal -aid funds. One

position was that the funds should be used for inter- state highways which would serve as main lines for

the State and county road networks. The other position was that the most important roads for the welfare

of the country were the local roads connecting the

farmer with his market and that, therefore, those

should be built before the interstate roads which

seemed to serve mostly the tourists. These issues were decided in the 1921 Act. The

Federal aid concept in a Federal-State cooperative

program was reaffirmed.

The "character of road" issue was resolved by a most important new i*equirement—that Federal-aid

fimds should be expended only upon a federally approved, State selected s^'stem of main connecting

interstate (primary) and intercounty (secondary)

rural roads, limited to 7 percent of a State's total road

mileage. The 7 percent limitation was based on a concept that the system should be limted to a mileage

which could be constructed in a reasonable period of

time. Once the State had provided for the construction and maintenance of highways equal to 7 percent,

then mileage could be added to either system as funds

became available and with the approval of the Secre- tary of Agriculture. The Act further provided that

not more than three-sevenths of the total mileage

could be used for the primary system, thus, a balanced

program was assured. Xo more than 60 percent of

any State's Federal-aid apportionment could be spent on the primar\^ system, except with the appi'oval of

the Secretary, thus, establishing the principle of cate- gorical funding (using Federal-aid funds only for

specific purposes or programs).

Another new requirement in the 1921 Act was that

when the States were preparing their design standards

and specifications for higliway projects, they should

take into consideration the durability of the type of

surface and kinds of materials that would best suit

each locality and that would adequately meet the

existing and the "probable character and extent of the

Section of Missouri route 79 south of Hannibal in "Mark

Twain" country. The gorge had become a dump but was

reclaimed for the new road site. Scenic turnouts allow

the traveler to enjoy the rustic beauty of the area.

future traffic," subject to the approval of the Federal

agency. This was apparently addressed, in part to those States that had been concerned about the meaning of a provision of the 1916 Act that "... the

Secretary of Agriculture shall approve only such

projects as may be substantial in character. . . ." The 1921 Act strengthened several other provisions

of the 1916 Act by

• Broadening the requirement for a State highway

department, or equivalent, to require that such

organization be suitably equipped and organized

to administer the program to the satisfaction of

the Federal agency. • Providing that the State must have already

made provisions for the State's share of funds

required each year for construction, reconstruction and maintenance of all Federal-aid highways

within the State and that these funds must be

under the direct control of the State highway department before any project submitted by a State

could be approved by the Secretary. • Liberalizing the 50 percent Federal-State matching funds by increasing the Federal share of

project costs, on a sliding scale computed by

formula, in those States having large Federal

public land areas. • Amending the availability of funds for expenditure to provide that funds would be available for

expenditure until the end of the second fiscal

205
year following the fiscal year for which they were

appropriated. • Authorizing the Secretary of Agriciilture to proceed to place any road in a proper state of maintenance if any State failed to do so within 90

days after having been notified to do it and to charge the costs of such work against the Federal

funds allotted to that State. Furthermore, it stipulated that no other propects would be approved until the State reimbursed the Federal

Government for the costs of the repairs and that

the money paid would be reapportioned among

all the States for construction of roads. The

Secretary, then, could approve further projects

submitted by that State. • Providing that funds deducted for costs of administration could be used for highway research

and investigational studies independently or in

cooperation with the State highway departments

and other agencies.

The Federal Highway Act of 1921, as it amended

and supplemented the 1916 Act, constituted the re- mainder of the basic philosophies, principles, policies,

procedures and controls which still exist for the program.

The appropriations in the 1921 Act provided funds

for forest roads and trails in the amount of $5 million

for fiscal year 1922 and $10 million for fiscal year

1923, but it appropriated Federal-aid system funds

only for fiscal year 1922 in the amount of $75 million.

Contract Authority

However, when the Post Office Appropriation Act

for 1923 was approved June 19, 1922, it contained

provisions amending the Federal Aid Road Act of

1916 to provide for the continuance of the highway

program through fiscal years 1923, 1924, and 1925.

Important new language was used in the Act—instead

of providing appropriations for the 3 years, it stated

"... there is hereby authorized to be appropriated,

. . . the following additional sums. . . ." This language meant that it was still necessary to go through the appropriation process by further legislation. The actual funding of the authorization then

became a matter for consideration later by the appropriations committees. In this instance the "authorized

to be appropriated" language was used in an Appropriation Act—however, the following additional provision was included regarding the funds for fiscal year 1923:

Provided, That the Secretary of Agriculture shall act upon projects submitted to him under his apportionment

of this authorization and his approval of any such project

shall be deemed a contractual obligation of the Federal

Government for the payment of its proportional contri- bution thereto. The principle thus established is commonly called

"contract authority," which meant that the full sum

of money authorized in the Act could Ix^ obligated

hefore any legislation had been passed to provide

liquidating cash to pay the amounts claimed by the

States.

The impact of this change in the method of au- thorizing and funding the Federal-aid highway program was vast because: • It was essential that the States be provided ample

time to prepare to participate in the program.

• It was not reasonable to expect the States to proceed with preparatory work and costs without

assurance from the Federal Government that the

apportionments would be fimded. • It was essential that Federal funds be available

for prompt payment of State claims for reimbursement. • It was not efficient money management to appropriate the full program funds for a 2- or 3-year

I^eriod awaiting annual api^ortionment and an

additional 5 or more years before a given fiscal year's need for actual reimbursement. Under this

system, large sums would be tied up awaiting

eventual disbursement. • It was assurance of the continuity of the program

because the program was then dependent only

upon obtaining future authorizations.

The Federal-State Relationship

A^nhien Federal assistance for the development of

highways was first considered, there was no "model

program" to copy. AVliile Congress must be given

the final credit, many of the pioneer leaders in the

emerging State highway departments, highway in- dustries and associations, and the Office of Public

Roads in the Department of Agriculture all played a major part in developing the legislation. Among all major Federal assistance programs, the Federal-aid

highway program has been one of the most successful

in its effectiveness, efficiency and its cooperative administration by the Federal Government and the

States. The very limited role of the Office of Road Inquiry,

when it was created in 1893, was strictly spelled out

in Secretary of Agriculture J. Sterling Morton's letter appointing General Roy Stone, a prominent New

York civil engineer and Secretary of the League of

National Roads, to the position of Special Agent and

Engineer for Road Inquiry. The Secretary cautioned

"The Department is to furnish information, not to direct and fonnulate any system of organization, however efficient or desirable it may be. Any such effort on its part would soon make it subject to hostile criti- cism. . . ." ^^

^Vliile the role of the Federal Government was to be greatly strengthened and broadened both by legislation and the personal policy of future highway administrators, the underlying philosophy behind the

original directive has survived.

Of great significance in the shaping of the FederalState relationship in the administration of the Federalaid highway program was the appointment of Thomas

H. MacDonald as the Chief of the Bureau of Public

Roads on May 3, 1919. At the time of his appointment, Mr. MacDonald was the Chief Engineer of the

Iowa State Highway Commission and had been a member (since 1915) of the Executive Committee of

AASHO which was created late in 1914. It was

on the recommendation of State highway officials that

Mr. MacDonald was selected to succeed Logan Waller

Page who died unexpectedly in December 1918.

206
Mr. MacDoiiald, known tliron<ihout liis oaroer with

the Bureau as "tlie Chief," was hir<>-oly responsible

for tlie (levelopinont and success of llie Federal-aid

higlnvay pro<irani and, so important to that success, the buildino; of a cooperative Federal-State relationship founded on mutual respect. The American Association of State IIi<>hway Oilicials (AASIIO) declared

in 1964 its view of Mr. MacDonald's role as follows:

There were spokosmpii for botli plans* and they were

articulate. It \vas in no small part due to Mr. MacDonald's

efforts that the Federal-aid program was the one that was adopted. It was his contention that such a program

would encourage development of highway technolosy and

the creation of a great networlc of highways throughout

the Nation, instead of a few Federal routes and some

spiderweb highway systems within the individual States. The results prove that contention was correct. He felt that without the encouragement and stabilizing influence of Federal-aid, some of the States would have a

difficult time developing adequate and competent Highway

Departments and effective highway programs.

It was his belief that the States must retain the initia- tive in administering the Federal-aid highway programs, and that the Bureau of Public Roads should make such

checks as necessary to protect the Federal interest." During his entire administration of the Bureau

(1919-1953), Mr. MacDonald. clearly ran the oro-aniza-

* "National" highways vs. federally assisted, State administered progi-am.

Wasliiugton, D.C., ivas as popular icith tourists at the

turn of the century as it is today.

w

IMAfiouND WashinoiohAuiD Co."

.Stiuliwi lUlliI ll\l>.i.A\V.NW. i

tion. There was never any (piestion who was "Chief."

He did not believe in staff meetings or internal group

decisionnudving. lie discussed policies and problems

nornuilly on a oiuvto-one basis with a very small

group of his most trusted assistants, but in the end,

he made the policy and he made the decisions.

In his external relationshii)s, Mr. MacDonald was a strong believer in committee or group action. He did

everything possible to strengthen the policynuiking

role of the American Association of State Highway

Officials and its numerous technical committees. Similarly, he suppoi-ted the organization, cooperation and

interaction of other special interest and professional

groups who were interested in or affected by the Nation's highway program.*

There was no paradox in Mr. IMacDonald's diametrically different approach to internal and external

administration of the highway program. He could

control the Federal internal policies—and this ex- tended beyond him through the Federal department

level to the pertinent congressional couuiiittees. On

the other hand, the external elements of the total highway industiy and interests were so widespread

and diverse that independent and singular views could

well lead to chaos, inaction and conflict. His solution was organized group policy and decisionmaking, intercommunication, interaction, compromise, all toward

common goals.

Mr. MacDonald's administrative skill, his strong

sense of direction, his dedication, and his long tenure

in office—spanning 34 years—permitted the basic

Federal-State working relations to become fully established and to demonstrate their worth. During his

tenure, agency personnel were well-trained in the

MacDonald philosophy that the Bureau should maintain as low a pi'ofile as possible while quietly maintaining a role of encouragement, leadership and protection

of the national interest. Reflecting on the pioneers on the State side of the

Federal-State relationship, major personal contributions were made by many individuals over the years. G. P. Coleman, HigliAvay Commissioner for the State

of Virginia, was perhaps the individual who played

the most important part in the actual creation of

AASHO in 1914.

Mr. Coleman, in turn, singled out A. G. Batchelder,

Executive Secretary to the American Automobile Association, for special credit. Mr. Coleman also gave

much credit to the assistance of some 16 other heads

of State highway departments or commissions for the

creation of AASHO. In any event, the creation of

the American Association of State Highway Officials w^as a "cornerstone" upon which the successful FederalState relationship was to be built. Over the years there have been a great many out- standing and influential heads of the various State

highway departments and commissions who played

* These included, but were not limited to : The American

Road Builders' Association, Associated General Contractors,

Automotive Safety Foundation, National Highway Users Conference, National Safety Council, American Trucking Association, National Association of County Engineers, American

Public Works Association, American Municipal Association,

Institute of TraflSc Engineers, and the Highway Research

Board which played a very special role in highway develop- ment.

207
major roles in strengthening^ AASHO and in shaping

the Federal-aid highway program. These men are too numerous to cite individually, but collectively, much

of the success of the Federal-State relationship must

be attributed to their wisdom and leadership.

The Interaction of AASHO and BPR

Since the framers of the 1916 Act agreed that the

key to a successful Federal-State relationship in the

administration of the Fedei'al-aid highway program

at the policy level, at least, was interaction and co- operation of the Federal Government with a "federation" of the States, the appropriate instrument to accomplish this was the American Association of State

HighAvay Officials. The Bureau of Public Roads became a "member

department" of AASHO in 1919 and, through Mr.

MacDonald, a member of the Executive Committee.

By the terms of the AASHO revised Constitution,

the Federal Highway Administrator became an ex

officio member of the Executive Committee in 1957.* ^^ During this long period of time, cooperative effort toward common goals has been the basis of the re- lationship between the Federal agency and AASHO

with each organization fully respecting the right of

the other to hold individual viewpoints.

The fact that in 1923 AASHO located its headquarters office in Washington in the charge of an Executive

Secretary, who traditionally has been a strong and

capable representative of all the States, provided both

BPR and AASHO with the opportunity for effective

day-to-day communication.

The principal interaction between AASHO and the

Bureau at the Washington level has been in the areas of proposed legislation; interpretation of the effects of legislation on the States and plans for its implementation; assurance of a viable AASHO committee

structure; the agenda for the annual AASHO and

regional AASHO meetings; joint consideration of re- lationships with the many other national associations

that have been involved in, or have an interest in, the

highway program; and other subjects of mutual in- terest that are best handled on a national basis rather

than Avith the individual States. Following the extensive hearings which preceded

enactment of the 1944 Federal-Aid Highway Act, congressional highway leaders requested that in the future

the States develop their policy statements on highway

legislation jointly through the AASHO mechanism

as a basis for testimony by an AASHO spokesman

rather than appear individually to present State viewpoints. This policy continues, though upon rare occasions a State has asked permission from a congressional

committee to appear individually.^*

A very extensive and highly important area of in- teraction and cooperation between AASHO and the

Bureau has been in the establishment and activities

of the various committees of AASHO. At the top

of the AASHO committee structure, as defined in the

1914 Constitution, was the Executive Committee which

* To carry out the broader requirements of new leRislation and the impetus of changed social values, AASHO officially changed its name to tlie American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) in 1973. The

reconstitution of AASHO resulted in the Secretary of Transportation's designation as the Federal member.

was responsible for legislative matters of a national

character. In addition, the Constitution provided for

a Finance Committee, a Committee on Tests and Investigations for evaluating various kinds of materials,

and a Committee on Standards for establishing

methods of construction and maintenance. Eventually,

as circumstances required, other standing committees were formed, some with working subcommittees. Special committees and joint committees have been established whenever the need for such committees became

apparent.

The AASHO committee system, supported by BPR

personnel, has been a strong factor in the successful

and invaluable contributions made to improving highway administrative and engineering technology. For

many years, BPR staff members chaired many of the

AASHO committees and served as secretaries on many

others. Later the policy was changed to name State

officials as chainnen and BPR officials as secretaries

when such practice was mutually beneficial to the

highway program.

Through refinement of the state-of-the-art in all aspects of highway engineering and administration

which, in turn, insured continual improvement in the

quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of program implementation—the committee activities of AASHO have

proven to be the Association's greatest strength.

BPR and the Highway Research Board

The need for a national program of highway re- search was recognized in 1919. It was envisioned as a national program of highway research that would

be coordinated by the National Research Council (of

the National Academy of Sciences) with participation

by such organizations as AASHO, BPR, the engineering colleges and experiment stations, municipal testing

laboratories, manufacturers' research departments and

associations, commercial laboratories, technical societies, and consulting engineers.^'^ "Wlien the National

Advisory Board on HigliAvay Research* was established in 1920, its purpose was "To prepare a comprehensive national program for highway research; to

assist existing organizations to coordinate their activities therein; and to collect and distribute information of completed and current research." ^^ From the very beginning, the Board was organized

into a series of committees headed by an Executive

Director. Under the Board's bylaws, ex officio members were designated from the Bureau of Public Roads

and the National Research Council Division of Engineering. In 1945 the Executive Secretary of

AASHO was also made an ex officio member of the

Highway Research Board (HRB).

During the early years, the Board was supported

largely by the BPR, both in terms of dollars and in

staff effort. During the first year, BPR, through a contractual agreement, supplied $12,000 of the total $14,500 budget and continued financial support aver- aging about 62 percent of the total operational budget

for the first 24 years. Many of the States had no

legal authority to make funds available to the HRB

unless the funds were to be used for research projects

within their own States.-' Gradually this problem

* Tlie name of the organization was changed to the Highway

Researcli Board in .January 192.'") and to Transportation Research Board in March 1974.

208
was resolved, and since 1945 the BPR's support of

the HRB's operational budget has averaged about 14

percent and that from the State liighway departments

about 60 percent. The balance has come from in- dustry and cooperating organizations and associations. ^^ Incidentally, the operational budget of the

HUB does not include the cost of the actual research

activities the HRB may administer—such funds are provided separately for specific projects by the BPR,

the States, and, as appropirate, private industry on

a project-by-pi'oject basis. Among the various regular ongoiiig programs of

HRB, the committee activities have been the most

important. Committees have been organized within

subject matter areas and can be created or terminated

as needs dictate. The membership of the committees

have always included technical specialists from BPR

and the States; often these specialists have been se- lected to serve as either the committee chairman or

secretar}'. Membership on the committees has also

included specialists from universities and colleges,

technical and professional associations, and the pri- vate sector in the wide scope of tlie liighway industry.

By 1926 six committees had been formed on economic

theory of highway improvement, structural design of

roads, character and use of road materials, highway

traffic analj'sis, highway finance, and maintenance.

Since 1922 the Board has held annual meetings.

These meetings have provided a forum for the pres- entation of technical and administrative research

papers and have presented an invaluable opportunity

to all segments of the industry interested in highway

reseai'ch to assemble and exchange information on the

latest research developments. Attendance at the annual meetings has shown an almost continuous increase

from the 30 who attended the first meeting in 1922

to a level that approaclies 3,500 today. From the

beginning until 1962, the technical papers presented

at the HRB annual meetings were published in the

IIRB Proceedings. Other HRB publications have

served over the yeai'S to distribute research information. A highway Research Information Service (HRIS)

was instituted in 1930 for a broader means of re- search exchange. At one point the Director of HRB,

Roy W. Crum (1928-1951), said he had always felt that HRB was an educational institution and that

"The end product of our work is usable technical in- formation, but it will be of no value to anyone unless

it is learned and put to use by the technical man." ^^ In addition, HRB has produced Ilighioay Research

Absti-acts, IIRB Bihliography^ Annual Report., and

many other publications on highway and transportation research, which effectively carries out its mission

"to collect and distribute information."

In 1945, the HRB inaugurated the Highway Research Correlation Service (HRCS) which greatly

strengthened its role in implementing the concept

upon which it was created. The method of operation

of the HRCS was "for a staff of competent engineers

and other technologists who can work in the various

areas of interest, travel about the country, and find

out the things we need to know about facilities, personnel, and needed information. They will carry in- formation from one State to another, or to other

research agencies. In the progress of this work they

will gather for dissemination much valuable and

A typical "trumpet" interchange providing service to and from 1-80 (approaching irom left) and local route 111 nearDes Moines, Iowa.

209
usable information.^" Meanwhile, it had been determined that the States could use a portion of their

114 percent Federal-aid planning apportionments for

participation in the HRCS so long as State matching

funds were also provided. The timing of the creation

of the HRCS coincided with the initiation of the

greatly expanded postwar Federal-aid highway program. This permitted the growth of HRB at a time

when it was needed most to keep pace with the needs

of the highway program.

In 1962 the National Cooperative Highway Reseai'ch Program (NCHRP) was established through

which a national program of highway research could

be developed jointly by the States (through AASHO),

the BPR and the HRB, under a plan of pooled fi- nancing by the States and BPR. This program came

soon after the initiation of the Interstate program

when many new problems were beginning to emerge.

Between 1964 and 1967, the HRB initiated an automated Highway Research Information Service

(HRIS). Items selected for HRIS processing fell into two general categories, research-in-progress re- ports and abstracts of published research articles or re- ports. The program was extended to include foreign

research-in-progress and foreign language research

reports through cooperative exchange agreements ar- ranged with international organizations and other

nations. Presently, from computer storage, HRIS

provides abstracts of published works and summaries

of ongoing i-esearch projects in response to specific

inquiries.

A research library was initiated in 1946. Today,

it plays a very important role in not only providing

the specialized professional library services the TRB

requires for its activities, but it also maintains an

awareness of the subject content of other libraries and

other institutions that may possess material of TRB

interest. Copies of all TRB publications are also

maintained by the library.

Current Status of the Federal-State Relationship

The unique Federal-State partnership in the Federal-aid highway program still exists despite the constrictions placed upon it by the changing climate in

which the highway program must be administered.

^Vhen one speaks today about the Federal side of

the Federal-State relationship in the administration

of the Federal-aid highway program, actually the

Federal Highway Administration is no longer the

only Federal agency involved. Many other Federal

agencies are now legally involved in the program, e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency; the Departments of the Interior, Commerce, Labor, Housing and

Urban Development, and Justice; the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration; the Office of Economic Opportunity; the Urban Mass Transportation

Administration ; the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration ; the Corps of Engineers ; and a number of Federal councils, commissions, and boards.

Somewhat the same situation exists when one speaks

about the State side of the Federal-State relationship.

Many of the provisions of recent Federal (and some

State) legislation require the States to coordinate with

their local subdivisions and State and regional planning groups and commissions. In some program

categories, project initiation is vested with the local

subdivisions.

The increasing complexity of Federal highway legislation and other interrelated and interacting Federal

legislation obviously have had an inevitable impact on

the administration of the Federal-aid program. The

early procedures were strikingly simple by comparison

with today's requirements. The problem then was the

extensive centralization of final authority at the Federal level in Washington. Over the years this pi'oblem was gradually corrected by decentralization, but in- tricate programs and project processing requirements were substituted by other important, but sometimes

conflicting, programs, making accomplishments tediously slow.

Lansing, Mich., street scene about 1930. Note the brick pavement, railroad warning device and the municipal bus.

Legislative Developments*

Many additions and changes in the Federal-aid

highway program evolved through continuing Federal

legislation after 1921. Most of these have increased

the effectiveness of the program but have resulted in more complex procedures for administering the program.

During the Depression years larger regular authorizations and special appropriations were made to provide employment opportunities, and special regulations were necessary to insure that this purpose was

achieved. For the first time, Federal-aid funds were made available for extensions to the Federal-aid sys- tem into and through municipalities and also for

secondary feeder roads.

In 1934, 11/^ percent of apportioned funds were made eligible for surveys, planning, and engineering

investigations. Later this was broadened to include

highway research and statewide highway plannmg

surveys. Special funds were provided for the elimination of hazardous railroad grade crossings.

In 1944 the Federal-aid system was expanded to include a secondary system of farm-to-market roads

and an urban program of extensions of primary routes

in urban areas of 5,000 population or more. In addition a 40,000-mile National System of Interstate

* This section is a very lirief summary of the legislation

to identify major trends. Many of these points are discussed

in more detail later in this and other chapters.

210
The 1965 Higlncarj Bcautification Act gave neio emphasis to programs of landscaping and scenic enhancement on Federal-aid highways.

Highvi-ays was called for but no funds were pro^dded

for its construction. The 1944 legislation also per- mitted the use of Federal-aid funds for acquiring

highway' rights-of-way.

By 1950 highwa3's were being planned or built on more new locations. To allay fears of community

economic depressions, legislation was enacted which

required States to hold local public hearings with re- spect to any proposed project that would bypass any

city or town.

The Interstate System routes in each State were approved in 1947, but it Avas not until the 1952 legislation that specific funding was authorized for Interstate construction, and then, only in token amounts.

Congress provided substantial long-term funding in

1956 to complete the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. The funding authorizations

in the 1956 Act were increased from $175 million to $2.2 billion per year for fiscal year 1957 with additional sums for other years. To finance the program,

Congress established the Highway Trust Fund. The

1956 Act planned for the completion of the Interstate System in 16 years, thus, accelerating construction

work in all States. It increased administrative re- quirements by pi-oviding for utility relocations, establishing vehicle size and weight limits on Interstate highways, providing for archaeological and paleontological salvage, and applying the provisions of the

Davis-Bacon Act of prevailing wage rates to Interstate construction projects.

The tremendous expansion of the Federal-aid highway program by the 1956 Act, together with its new

provisions and added complexity, made necessai'y an

intensive efl'ort by the Bureau of Public Roads and

the States (through AASHO) to simplify, standardize, and expedite procedures. Of most importance was a complete reorganization by Public Roads, to- gether with an increased decentralization of responsibility and authority to its field offices. The basic

separate Federal-State roles were not changed by the

1956 Act, but additional and more complex project

steps had to be inti'oduced to satisfy the new legislative provisions.

The highway acts and other interacting legislation

after 1956 provided fui*ther program expansion, particularly for the basic Federal-aid systems, and in- jected mox'e refinements, additions, and controls into

the px'ogram which complicated the Federal-State re- lationship and introduced new procedures. One such

requirement in 1962 was the continuing, comprehensive,

cooperative transportation planning process (known

as the 3C process) that required States and local communities to develop cooperatively long-range highway plans and programs in urban areas of more than

50,000 population and to properly coordinate them

with the programs for other forms of transportation.

Another requirement in the 1962 Federal-Aid Highway Act was that the State highway departments

furnish satisfactoi-y assurance that advisory assistance was provided for families displaced by Federal-aid

highway consti*uction. It also provided that limited

amounts of Federal-aid funds could be used to defray

the costs of relocating families and businesses. This

program was broadened later and culminated in the

Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property

Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 making relocation

assistance applicable in all federal assisted programs.

In 1965 an amendment to the 1956 Highway Act

prescribed measures to be taken to slow the rate of

traffic accidents. These endeavors led ultimately to the enactment of the Highway Safety Act of 1966

and the TOPICS program (Traffic Operations Program to Increase Capacity and Safety) in 1968. The

Highway Bcautification Act of 1965 established two new programs on control of junkyards and landscaping

and scenic enhancement and expanded the scope of

the outdoor advertising control program.

Equal employment oppoi'tunity provisions were re- quired to be included in the advertised specifications

for contracts on Federal-aid projects in 1968.

Legislation in 1970 established a program for eco- nomic growth centers designed to revitalize rural and

small urban areas, a new iirban highway system, and

a bridge replacement program for safety improvements to bridges considered structually deficient and

functionally obsolete. In addition, there were new

requirements for construction of replacement housing,

noise standards to be developed and requirements

resulting from the Clear Air Act. By 1973 the requirements of highway legislation

and other legislation liaving a direct bearing on the

highway program were so complex that establishing

procedures to be sure the requirements were being

carried out was a monstrous task. Many new programs often had separate funding which meant sep211
^

irl5 .

JMSf

\

'iiSSK.
arate budgeting procedures, as well as separate

reporting and accounting procedures. The States

and the FHWA were inundated with statistics. But in 1973 major highway legislation was enacted

Avhich established more new programs: (1) Safety

construction—a separate program for safer roads,

roadside obstacles, high-hazard locations, and pavemen markings; (2) priority primary routes—high

traffic routes on the Primary S_ystem which connected

to the Interstate System; and (3) urban high density—high traffic routes in urbanized areas which con- nected to Interstate routes. Furthermore, highway

projects on Interstate and Urban Systems could be

traded for transit projects. In addition, bicycle and

pedestrian pa'ths could be constructed along highways,

curb ramps for the handicapped were required, and

special provisions were included to encourage car- pooling.

In 197-1: requirements for transporting the elderly

and handicapi^ed were enacted, along with enforced

higher limitations on sizes and weights of trucks

and buses and a national speed limit of 55 m.p.h.

Funding was also permitted for road impi'ovements

not on a Federal-aid system for the first time since

1921.

It would normally be expected that such a large

and complex program would require a large and complex organization to manage the program. This is not the case in the highway program, primarily for

three reasons. The first is the unique Federal-State

partnership which has already' been discussed. The

second reason is that as the program has grown, more

responsibilities and authority have been decentralized

to the FH'WA field offices which work closely with

the State highway departments. The third reason is that, since 1893, the Federal agency responsible for

administering the highway program has had a strong

interest in training and initiated its first formal training program in 1905. Since then, the organization has

kept pace with the program by revising and updating

its training program as new requirements arose.

Management of the Federal-Aid Program

The Federal Agency

To compi-ehend the management of such a large

Fedei'al-aid program, it is necessary first to understand the Federal agency charged with the responsibility for administering the Federal interest in the

Nation's principal highway programs for more than

80 years. The original agency was established in the Department of Agriculture in October 1893 by Secretary

J. Sterling Morton as a result of the $10,000 appropriation in the Depax-tment's Appropriation Act. It

is believed that the original Office of Road Inquiry

consisted of the Special Agent and Engineer for Road

Inquiry, General Roy Stone, and one secretary.

The Agriculture Appropriation Act for fiscal year

1897 added authority to investigate the l:»est kinds of

Coticern for -lafpty chnmcicrizea tocJay's Federal-did prof/rams.

This new section of U.S. 25 replaces a steep, loinrling tioo-lane route built in 1920 near Greenville, f?.C. Xoio the highway

ha^s a maximum of 6 percent grade and concrete median

barriers between opposing traffic lanes where necessary.

roadmaking materials in the several States. Through

cooperation with the Division of Tests in the Bureau

of Chemistry (Department of Agriculture), a laboratory was established by the Office of Public Road Inquiries in 1900 where any citizen interested in the

construction of public highways cotdd have road materials tested free of charge. The Appropriation Act

for 1902 put this testing work directly under the

Office of Public Road Inquiries by giving it an appropriation for the investigation of the chemical and

physical character of road materials. Furthermore,

by 1901 the idea of field representation had been

established with the country divided into four seg- ments with a part-time special agent for each division.

This field representation over the years has been of

great benefit by supporting the Federal-State rela- tionship, and as the Federal-aid program expanded,

the necessary interaction at the operational level was

greatly enhanced.

In 1905 the agency's name changed again to the

Office of Public Roads and, by laAv, it was permitted

to retain 10 employees. To carry out its major functions, the work was organized into three divisions:

HigliAvays, Laboratory Tests and Investigations, and

Information. It is significant that a program of

hiring student engineers (at $600 per year) was ini- tiated in 1905 with the express purpose of training

them for career highway engineer positions in the

Office of Public Roads and in the State highway

departments.

During 1911 part-time Special Agents were appointed for each State to improve the collection and

reporting of information.

By then the Federal agency had already undergone three name changes and there were others to come. Since the identity of the Federal agency re- sponsible for the Federal-aid highway program be- comes rather obscure when the program becomes so complex and interrelated with other Federal agencies,

the following table is a chronological listing

Title of Date of Organization Parent Top

Creation Title Organization Executive

Oct. 3, 1893 Office of Road Dept. of Special

Inquiry Agriculture Agent and

Engineer

(1897

became

Director)

FY 1899 Office of Dept. of Director

Public Road Agriculture

Inquiries

July 1, 1905 Office of Dept. of Director

Public Agriculture

Roads

July 1, 1915 Office of Dept. of Director

Public Agriculture

Roads and

Rural

Engineering

July 1, 1918 Bureau of Dept. of Director

Pul)lic Agriculture (1919

Roads became

Chief)

July 1, 1939 Pul)lic Roads Federal Works CommisAdministra- Agency sioner

tion

213
Date of Creation

Organization

Title Parent

Organization

Title of Top

Executii^e

July 1, 1949

Aug. 20, 1949

Bureau of Public

Roads

Bureau of Public

Roads

General

Services Administration Dept. of Commerce

Apr. 1, 1967 Federal Highway Administration

Dept. of Transportation

Commissioner

Commissioner (1956

became

Federal

Highway

Administrator* ) Administrator

*Tliis was a new position above the Commissioner's position on a level with an Assistant Secretai-y of Commerce. The

position of Commissioner was retained until 1961.

Following the enactment of the Federal Aid Road

Act on July 11, 1916, with its initiation of the cooperative Federal-aid higliAvay prograna, the Office of Public

Roads and Rural Engineering (OPRRE) created a formal field organization. The field work was or- ganized into 10 districts, each headed by a District

Engineer. At the Washington headquarters level, all of the existing divisions Avere grouped into two

branches—the Engineering Branch and the Management and Economics Branch—headed by a Chief Engineer and a Chief of Management, respectively. In

addition, two General Inspectors, independent of the

branches, reported directly to the Director of OPRRE.

This reorganization in fiscal year 1917 established the

firist formal field structure of the OPRRE with dele- gated operating responsibility and authority.

Because of the large amount of forest road work in

the West and the passage of the 1921 Federal Highway Act enlarging the Federal-aid program, a Avestern regional office under a Depvity Chief Engineer, Dr.

L. I. Hewes, was created in 1921 to supervise the work

in the 11 western States and to dispose of a large

number of routine matters Avithout reference to Washington. In effect, the Western Headquarters, as it was

called, was an extension of the Washington Office lo- cated in San Francisco. This permitted more efficient communication on matters needing the Secretary's approval and reduced travel costs. Another organizational change made in 1921 to help

meet the demands of the accelerating program, Avas to divide the Engineering Branch in Washington into a Division of Design to handle all applications and

steps preliminary to the execution of the Project

Agreement, including the review and approval of the

plans, specifications and estimates (PS&E), and a Division of Construction to monitor the construction

Avork in progress, to check construction estimates (reimbursement claims) submitted by the States, and to monitor the maintenance of roads after construction.

A Division of Control was also established to include

all program and project accounting, budget activities,

fiscal accounting, payrolling, purchasing, and e(|uipment and supplies. By June 30, 1922, the staff of

BPR had reached a total of 784, representing 297 in

Wasliiiiirton and 487 in the field.

In fiscal year 1925 an office Avas established in Hawaii

under the jurisdiction of the Western Headquarters

and in fiscal year 1930, because of the reconnaissance

survey proposed for the Inter-American HigliAvay, an

office Avas set up in Panama. Later diA'ision offices Avere established in each of the Central American

countries. As of April 1930, the BPR had a total permanent staff of 976 persons, of Avhom 461 Avere engineers. ^^ An Eastern Parks and Forests District Avas created

in January 1934 to handle all forest and park Avork

east of the Rocky Mountains together with miscella- neous direct Federal construction Avork in the East for

other Federal agencies.

The Federal-Aid HigliAvay Act of 1944 authorized

a greatly expanded postAvar highway program providing authorizations for fiscal years 1946, 1947 and

1948 at the unprecedented level of $500 million per

year, plus $25 million per year for forest highways.

Recognizing that a considerably larger staff and ex- tensive decentralization Avould be necessary in the field, a major reorganization of the Public Roads Administration was initiated July 1, 1945.

In July 1953 a further decentralization move Avas taken to delegate approval authority to the lowest

practicable level, thereby eliminating or reducing the

duplication of checking and revicAving project documents at the successive layers of organization. This

delegation Avent to the BPR District Engineer in each

State for final approval of plans, specifications and

estimates.

The Inter-American Highway lohich today is complete

except for the segment in the Darien Gap

between Panama and Colombia.

214
Maurice Owen Eldridge

It wasn't idle flattery when the EngineeHng Neios-Recwd referred

to Maurice Owen P^ldridge as an "engineer and road expert" in an- nouncing his death on April 28, 1951, at age 77. The announcement

further stated Mr. Eldridge, who was called "M,0." had retired in 1946

after 52 years as a roadbuilder.

"Road expert" was the official title given to key staff members of the

Office of Road inquir}' in its early days. Few were as well-qualified to hold it as M.O. Eldridge.

He was proficient in many fields: roadbuilding, road research, highway economics, highway finance and taxation, highway safety, promotion of good roads, and program administration. He was a well-known

lecturer, an author and editor of reports, articles, and technical papers.

Eldridge was a man of broad vision, strong convictions, great zeal,

dedication, and dogged determination. These good qualities sometimes

got him into trouble Avith his superiors, but subsequent events nearly

always vindicated him.

His dream of good roads was based on good common sense and sound

economics. He not only lived to see it come true, but was an active

participant in its fulfillment.

Basically, his dream was that the Federal Government and the States

would join together in a cooperative program of road improvement.

This dream became a reality with the enactment of the Federal Aid

Road Act on July 11, 1916.

Eldridge was an active participant in developing rules and regulations for implementing the new program and in preparing much of the

background information which eventually led to the passage of the

Federal Highway Act of 1921.

M.O. Eldridge was born July 3, 1873, on a farm near Lenoir, Tenn.

Many anecdotes are told about Eldridge, some verifiable, some not. He went to a log schoolhouse where the seats were made by splitting

logs in two and the flat sides were used as seats and backs. His teacher was a Baptist preacher named Pope who believed that, in addition to being taught such classical subjects as Greek and geometry, his students

should be taught manual dexterity. He showed them how to make

their own compasses and to use poke and other berries from the nearby

woods to color designs they had traced. Eldridge's interest in drawing

and drafting got him his first job in 1894 with the Office of Road In- quiry in "Washington, D.C.

"\\1iile attending the University of Tennessee, Eldridge's talents came

to the attention of University President Charles W. Dabney who shortly

became the Secretary of Agriculture. The Department of Agricultiire was a small organization and when a man was wanted to draw some

maps. Secretary Dabney knew the right individual to get and that is how M.O. Eldridge began his roadbuilding career at a princely salary

of $60 a month.

Returning to Washington from a trip to Tennessee, M.O. was looking

pensively out the train window at the drab, sodden countryside on a rainy November day in 1902, when the train stopped at Jonesboro in eastern Tennessee. He saw an acquaintance. Congressman W. P. Brownlow, board the train. They got into a conversation with another passenger. District Judge Hal Haines, who joined them on the train at

Bristol.

The subject of conversation turned to the deplorable condition of the

roads; inspiration was the view outside the train windows.

"What could be done to improve them? Eldridge pointed out that

most rural and small-town residents took such paralyzing road conditions for granted, not knowing hoAv to go about improving them. But,

said Eldridge, improvement was possible, and, in his opinion, the Fedei'al Government should not only take the initiative in showing the

people how to build good roads, it should cooperate Avith them in doing

it.

215
He cited as an example an operation in New Jersey under which the

State cooperated with counties and local units in financing and building

"mainline" intercity roads.

Both Representative Brownlow and Judge Haines agreed with

Eldridge's position. The Congressman then directed Eldridge to draft a bill that would incorporate his ideas and Representative Brownlow

would introduce it. So M.O. Eldridge went back to his Government desk, outlined the

plan to his chief, Martin Dodge, who approved. They i-ewrote the

New Jersey law to fit the national situation. Mr. Brownlow introduced

the bill and thus was sown the idea of Federal-aid roads.

The speech was made in January 1903 and was printed in the Congressional Record. It attracted a lot of attention and found supporters,

but not in the Administration. The leaders in the Congress were against

it. The Administration was against it. James Wilson, then Secretary

of Agriculture, was against it. Then one day a telegram was delivered to the Roads Office for

Eldridge. It was signed by A. R. Shattuck who requested Eldridge

to come to New York to see him.

Shattuck was an executive of an organization that had just come into

existence—a forerunner of the American Automobile Association. This

organization believed in the idea of Federal aid for good roads. And

it wanted to help the idea along. What could it do ? Eldridge suggested the greatest need was to educate the public.

Eldridge was provided $10,000 a year for publicity. He said he couldn't

do anything through the Roads Office but something might be accomplished outside.

The arrangement was made. Eldridge hired an office, a publicity

man and a stenograjDher.

The major promotion campaign was to have a million copies of the

Brownlow speech printed at cost by the Government Printing Office, as can be done in such cases. These were mailed out under Government

frank by friendly congressmen to a million people. On a single day a

solid carload of mail went out of Washington.

It was a thorough campaign. The people responded and Congressmen

were showered with questions on good roads from their constituents.

Questions arose on who was responsible for this campaign.

Finally, it was found out that M.O. Eldridge was responsible. He

was called in on the carpet and summarily dismissed from service.

He was a sacrifice for this early advocacy of a policy that a dozen

years later became a national enthusiasm in the passage of the 1916 Act. Eldridge's friends in Congress went to bat for him and they succeeded

in getting him reinstated—at a reduced salary and loss of his rank as second in command in the office. Eldridge might have directed the office, but he had pushed a right

idea before its time.

Wlien the United States entered World War I, Eldridge and the

entire staff of the Office of Public Roads and Rural Engineering were

diverted from peacetime activities to supporting the Avar effort. For example, he and Prevost Hubbard of the Office staff served as Public Roads representatives on a subcommittee of the United States

Highway Council which reviewed 7,307 applications for approval of

road construction projects between June 18 and December 31, 1918.

M.O. received many commendations for the work he did.

One of his assignments with the Office of Public Road Inquiries was

to construct experimental and demonstration roads, using locally available materials. Ernest F. Acheson, member of Congress from Pennsylvania, wrote on February 1, 1901, concerning a demonstration road

built under Eldridge's direction in Washington County, Pennsylvania:

... I wish to say that the experiments niarlt> . . . last fall under the direc- tion of Mr. Eldridge awakened a deej) interest anions the farmers, and has

done a great deal to promote the cause of good roads. . . .

216
In 1919 he joined the Washington staff of the American Avitoniobile

Association. He served in many capacities, inchiding editor of the

Association magazine, American Motorist; Director of Roads, AAA

Good Roads Board; and subsequently, Executive Chairman of the

Association.

Leaving the AAA in 1925, Eldridge joined the staff of the District of

Cohimbia government to become the first Director of Traffic for the

City of Washington. At the time of his retirement on December 31,

1946, he was the Assistant Director of the D.C. Department of Vehicles

and Traffic. Eldridge was a prolific writer. Mention of only a few of his efforts will indicate the breadth of his interests in highway matters. For the 1899 Year-hook of the U.S. Department of Agriculture he

wrote on the "Progress of Road Building in the United States." To

Hhtoric Highxoays of America, volume 15, entitled "The Future of

Road-Making in America, A Symposium by Archer Butler Hulbert and

Others," published in 1905, he contributed Chapter III on "Good Roads

for Farmers."

He provided two articles for the Third Annual Edition (1922) of

the Ilightcays Green Book, published by the American Automobile

Association. These related to "Highway Financing and Taxation" and

"Accident Prevention Suggestions." Part II of the 1925 Proceedings

of the National Safety Council contains a paper by him on "Traffic

Control Systems." Also, the 1935-36 Convention Proceedings of the

American Road Association includes a paper he prepared on "Should

Pedestrian Traffic Be Regulated?"

217
The Edward M. Gatliff Memorial Bridge is on Kentucky route 90 at Cumberland Falls, Ky. It was completed inl95^ to replace a, ferry crossing operation. The stone facing was obtained from a local quarry.

Early in 1955 it seemed apparent that Congress

would soon enact legislation which would provide

funding authorizations for the construction of the Interstate System which had been designated in 1947.

The contemplated workload and manpower needs for

such a program were staggering. Since an adequate

supply of qualified engineers was not then available

to administer the program, a task force was appointed

to study the problem and develop recommendations.

As a result of the studies, the field structure again was reorganized and further redelegation of responsibilities and authorities was given to the field offices. This decentralization to the field was the most important and beneficial change made by BPR in its administration of the highway program since the crea- tion of the first operating field offices in 1917. The

total BPR employment as of June 30, 1966, totaled

3,646, a reduction from the postwar peak of 4,239 as of June 30, 1949.

In June 1957 a very important functional addition was made in the Washington headquarters by the

creation of a Project Examination Division in the

Office of Administration. The new division initiated a broad internal and external management audit program in BPR designed to ensure compliance with

program policies and procedures as well as to monitor

program effectiveness and integrity at both the Federal and State levels. In December 1961, as a result of a consultant's study

of the progi'am's management and operations undertaken in 1960, an Office of Planning was established

as a separate unit. Previously this function was combined Avith research. The separate office greatly

strengthened the planning function in BPR and

speeded the implementation of the 3C planning process

when it became a requirement in the 1962 Federal-Aid

Highway Act. By now the total full-time employment of BPR was 4,521, including 206 temporary

employees and 188 stationed in foreign countries.

During the next several years broadening program

responsibilities and functions were to make rather

frequent reorganizations of the Washington headquarters necessary. For example, a reorganization in

1962 created an Office of Right-of-Way and Location

to assume functions formerly a responsibility of the

engineering staff. A very significant change in terms

of pi'Ogram development was the creation of an Office

of Audits and Investigations by transferring the

Project Examination Division and the external audit

functions of the Finance Division from the Office of

Administration.

It became necessary to add certain specialists to the

organization over the years as the requirements of

the various highway acts and other legislation affect- ing the highway program were enacted by Congress,

and the Bureau became something more than just an

engineering organization to oversee the construction

of highways. These specialists included economists,

landscape architects, real estate appraisers, behavioral

scientists, planners, historians, ecologists, contract

specialists, safety experts, and civil rights specialists.

By December 31, 1966, total employment was 4,839,

including temporary employees and 157 persons in

foreign countries.

The Department of Transportation Act enacted

October 15, 1966, consolidated more than 30 transportation agenices or functions that had been scattered

throughout the Government. At its inception, the Department encompassed more than 90,000 emploj-ees

and an annual budget of approximately $6 billion,

218
the bulk of it being $4 billion of highway programs.^^

The purpose of the Act was:

The Congress therefore finds that the establishment of a Department of Transportation is necessary in the public

interest and to assure the coordinated, effective administration of the transportation programs of the Federal

Government ; to facilitate the development and improvement of coordinated transportation service. . . . On April 1, 1967, the Bureau of Public Roads be- came a bureau within the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in the new Department. Other

functions transferred to FHWA were the regulatory

motor carrier safety functions from the Interstate Commerce Commission and the highwaj- safety and

the traffic and motor vehicle safety functions created

by congressional legislation in 1966 from the Department of Commerce. The other organizational ele- ments of the new Department of Transportation

(DOT) were the Federal Aviation Administration,

Federal Railroad Administration. U.S. Coast Guard,

and the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. The Urban INIass Transportation Administration was transferred to the Department from the

Department of Housing and Urban Development on

July 1, 1968.

As of December 31. 1967, the end of the first calendar year following creation of the new FHWA,

its employment (including the three bureaus—Public

Roads, Motor Carrier Safety, and the Xational Highway Safety Bureau) totaled 5,366, including temporary employees and 140 i>ersons in foreign countries.

In March 1970 the Xational Highway Safety

Bureau was separated from the Federal Highway Administration to become the seventh DOT operating

administration and was renamed the Xational Highway Traffic Safety Administration. All of the Safety

Bureau's functions went with it except that responsibility for specified highway-oriented safety standards

assigned to the Federal Highway Administration.

With the separation of the Xational Highway

Safety Bureau, FHWA again was reorganized. The

reorganization that became effective August 10, 1970,

abolished the "Bureau of Public Roads" as an identifiable separate organizational component of FHTWA.

Instead of the former bureau structure, FHWA was

divided into six new components made up of Planning,

Research and Development. Right-of-Way and Environment, Engineering and Traffic Operations, Motor

Carrier and Highway Safet)', and Administration,

each to be headed by an Associate Administrator.

Staff offices directly responsible to the Administrator were the Offices of Chief Counsel, Program Review

and Investigations, Public Affairs, and Civil Rights,

each headed by a Director. In 1971, the National

Highway Institute was added as the fifth staff office. From August 1970 to March 1975, there were continual minor organizational changes in the Federal

Highway Administration to keep abreast of the ever- broadening scope of FHWA's programs and responsibilities. However, the total employment of FHWA

as of December 31. 1974, was 5,134, including temporary employees and 39 persons in foreign countries

and 28 persons in territories of the United States. Comparing the 1974 employment level with the 784

employees in Jinie 1922 when the Federal-aid highway

pi'Ogram was just getting underway and the growth

of a program from $80 million at that time to over

$6 billion in 1974, the current level of staffing is re- markable in terms of efficient program administration.

The Operational System

In order to proceed with the implementation of the

program provided by the Federal Aid Road Act of

1916, much had to be done at both the State and Federal levels. As mentioned earlier, the States had to enact legislation to satisfy the administrative requirements of organization, authorities, methods of fi- nancing the new Federal-aid matching requirements

and future maintenance responsibilities, and the administrative and financial relationships with the States'

local governmental subdivisions.

At the Federal level, the small Office of Public

Roads and Rural Engineering (OPRRE) had to develop the implementing rules and regulations required

by the Act and develop the necessary plan and organization for its role in administering the program, not

only in the Washington Headquarters, but also at the

field level in all the States. The initial project procedures that were established

under the Federal rules and regulations for the administration of the Federal-aid program were i^ela- tively simple and direct. These procedures included: • A Project Statement or application was submitted to the OPRRE District Engineer describing the location, nature and estimated cost of the

work. Upon review and an onsite inspection by

the District Engineer, he forwarded the Project

Statement with his recommendations to Washington for review by the Engineering Branch of the

OPRRE and the approval by the Secretary of

Agriculture. • Upon approval, the State was authorized to proceed with the preparation of detailed plans, specifications and estimates (PS&E). The District

Engineer reviewed the PS&E and made another

onsite inspection with "plans in hand," and for- warded everything with his recommendations to Washington for final review and approval. • A Project Agreement was prepared for signature,

first by the authorized State official and then by

the Secretary of Agriculture, which represented

the contractual agreement betAveen the State and

Federal Government. The Project Agreement

established the maximum amount of the Federal

participation and the State's responsibility for

adequate maintenance of the completed project.

When this document was executed, the State was

free to proceed with construction. • Direct supervision of the construction was the

responsibility of the State. However, a staff member of the OPRRE District Office made

monthly inspections and reported his evaluation

of the work to Washington. These reports were

used as the basis for approval of requests for

progress payments to the State. Progress payments could not exceed the Federal share of the

cost of the work and materials actually put in

place in accordance with the plans and specifications. • Upon completion of the project, the OPRRE

District Engineer made a final onsite inspection

219
and prepared a detailed final inspection report

for the AVashino;ton office. The final payment of

the remainino; Federal share of the project costs was continjrent iipon the final acceptance of the

work by the District Engineer. • jNIaintenance, the State's responsibility with no

Federal fxinding, was monitored by the ORPPE

District Enjjineer's staff through annual inspections and reports to the "Washington office. At

the local level, deficiencies were discussed and

corrective action was normally initiated promptly

by the State. The project costs not eligible for Federal participation were: • Administrative costs of maintaining the State

highway department and its staff, except those

direct costs involved in providing the engineering

supervision of the work after construction was

initiated by contract or the actual costs of construction by force account (costs of labor, equipment, materials and overhead). • Cost of surveys and preparing the plans, specifications and estimates. • Costs of advertising projects for construction ty

contract. • Costs of necessary right-of-way related damage

costs. • Costs incurred as a result of acceptance of other

than the lowest bid unless the acceptance of a higher bid Avas justified and concurred in by the

Federal agency. • Costs of work not included in the approved PS&E

or changes that were not approved by the Federal

agency. • Engineering inspection and contingency costs in excess of 10 percent of project estimate. • Costs in excess of the amount provided for in the

Project Agreement.

After enactment of the Federal Highway Act of

1921, two significant changes were made in the rules

and regulations : ( 1

) Because the States were required

in 1921 to designate a limited State highway system

of main roads. Project Statements submitted by a State for proposed construction thereafter were limited to routes or sections of routes that were a part

of the approved system and (2) when the PS&E for an approved project was recommended for approval

by the local Federal District Engineer, the State was

authorized to proceed immediately with initiating the

steps leading to construction.

In addition to selecting their Federal-aid systems,

each State was required to prepare an annual program

of those specific highway improvements it wished to undertake with available Federal assistance during the

year and their costs. This measiire was required to assure an orderly development of projects.

Another step not mentioned in the foregoing was

the requirement that if a project Avas to be built on a new location, rather than an improvement of an exist- ing road, the State would have to study alternative

locations to decide the best route and the most eco- nomical type of road to construct. In the early days

of the program, this step did not come up too often

because the major portion of the work was the improvement of existing roads. However, the location

of a new road was another item needing Federal

approval before the project could be designed. The

project design might also have several alternative designs in order that the most economical and serviceable

product could be obtained.

These procedures were relatively simple and re- mained so until the 1950's. The separate roles of the

States and the Federal Government in the step-by-step

project procedures that were thus established set the

basic pattern for the cooperative administration of the

Federal-aid program. For many years thereafter an

evolutionary period existed during which the States

and Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) were continuously

developing methods and ways to improve, simplify

and expedite the movement of projects through the

various steps. Some of the more important efforts and

actions taken were: • The authority of the States to proceed with construction upon recommendation of the District Engineer was extended to include subsequent major

revision of the plans, even when the changes

would require additional Federal-aid funds. • Arrangements for "sectionalizing" projects were

developed to give the States wide latitude in placing work under contract by sections and completing sections independently of each other. At

the same time, the number of Project Statements

and Project Agreements was substantially reduced. • Project Agreements were prepared in Washington

for the signature of the Secretary before they were sent to the State for signature to expedite

subsequent Federal payments. • A separate division was established in the BPR

Washington office to handle the review and approval of Federal-aid payment vouchers; a minimum voucher amount of $1,000 was established;

and, to avoid sending vouchers back to the States

for correction of small errors, a practice was

adopted using a 5 percent retent or withholding

to cover as many of these errors as possible. • The principle of using stage construction on

Federal-aid construction was adopted, e.g., approval of a project for grading and drainage only,

with deferral of paving until a later time when

justified.

To assure uniform quality of the roads and to speed

up the detailed work, both at the State level and the

Federal level, some standardization was needed

• Standard specifications and format were developed

by most States, eliminating the need for the development and submission of individual specifications for each project. • Standards were developed jointly between State

and BPR engineers for uniform methods of sampling, testing and reporting on road materials,

and the standards were published in a department

bulletin. • Through AASHO committee action, minimum design standards were developed for various classes of roads and structures. • Standard forms of various types were developed

and approved for use, such as bid forms incor220
BPR officials examining a traffic counter in the late JQ^O's. Traffic volume is often a factor in determining highivag needs.

poratino- re(]uired oenoral provisions, contract

fornas, performance and payment bonds, contractor

qualification forms, Project Agreement forms, etc.

"\^liile the basic principle of State initiation and

Federal review and approval I'emained intact, the

continuing enactment over tlie years of new highway

legislation with new programs and new provisions

inevitably led to increasingly complex step-by-step

project procedures to a degree that never could have

been imagined in 1921.

"With the passage of the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway

Act came new procedural requirements which were

inserted into their logical sequence of project steps to obtain Federal approvals.

The first of these was the requirement to hold public

hearings, originally called for in the 1950 Federal-Aid

Highwaj' Act for liighway projects bypassing a city or town, but later extended to all Federal-aid projects

to be responsive to the goals and objectives of the local community. The term "public hearings" is always

used in the plural because, although at first it was

required only at the corridor or location stage, for

many years it was administratively determined that a second public hearing was necessary at the design

stage. In recent years a more flexible approach per- mits the requirement for public participation to be

met in whatever way is considered most suitable in a

specific situation.

Another procedural change resulted from a provision in the 1956 Highway Act that permitted Federal

reimbursement for costs of relocating public or private

utilities. Accommodation of utilities within the riffht- of-way IS permitted as long as they do not hamper

the safe flow of traffic. The 1956 Act also required that the Davis-Bacon

Act of 1935 would apply to Interstate projects. This

involved the preparation and Federal approval of

minimum labor wage rates to be paid to contractor

construction employees on an individual project basis. The minimum rate is established by the U.S. Department of Labor and varies by geographic area. Later,

the 1968 Act required extension of the Davis-Bacon

coverage to all Federal-aid highway projects.

By 1962 highway projects in cities were numerous

and concern for the integration of the highway with

other modes of ti'ansportation, with the growtli of the

cities, and the potential needs of the future came to the fore. Federal assistance for planning had been

available since 1934, but in 1962, legislation required

that after July 1965 all Federal-aid highway projects

within urban areas of more than 60,000 population

nuist be based on the results of a continuing, compi-ehensive, cooperative transportation planning process. Planning was extended further in 1968 by the Inter- governmental Cooperation Act which, as implementxid

by the Bureau of the Budget BOB,* in Circular A-95,

Notification Procedure, required that all proposed

highway projects be submitted to State and areawide

clearinghouse agencies for review and comments. The

aim was to insure that all Federal and federally

assisted projects were coordinated with the development plans of other public agencies. Thus, two general

procedures were added to the already growing re- quirements before any physical work could begin on a highway project.

Another emerging social concern in 1962 was the

plight of those persons required to move because of

highway construction. At first the States were re- quired to provide counseling for those whose property

or dwelling place was taken, but in 1968 limited fi- nancial reimbursement was authorized. In 1970 the

Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property

Acquisition Policies Act was passed to protect the dis- placed people, and Federal review and approval were

required before right-of-way could be taken on any

Federal-aid project.

Over the years concern had been developing for

preserving our social, cultural and historical heritage.

As early as 1956, Federal funds could be used for

archeological paleontological salvage. However, in

1966 the Department of Transportation Act mandated

protection of parklands, historic sites and other public

conservation lands. Although this provision doe^ not

apply in the vast majority of highway projects, where

taking these types of lands is contemplated, it results

in considerable extension of preconstruction planning

and review time.

Since about 1965 not only the number of categorical

highway programs have increased, but also the highway-related considerations involved in carrying out

highway programs. As a direct consequence of the

Nation's changing social values and quality of life standards, Congress enacted legislation responsive to the increasing demands of those adversely affected by

highway locations. Much of this legislation necessarily

had an impact upon the highway program and the

complexity of its administration. Some of the per- tinent legislation included

Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968

Highway Beautification Act of 1965

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property

Acquisition Policies Act of 1970

Clean Air and Noise Control Acts of 1970

Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972

* Now known as the Office of Management and Budget

(0MB).

221
The Casselman River Bridge, built in 1813 on the National Road near Orantsville, Md.,

has been preserved us a historic site.

"Wlien the 1964 Civil Eights Act was passed, it prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race, color,

creed or national origin under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance. (In 1973 the

Highway Act added, for the first time, prohibition of

sex discrimination.) The 1964 Civil Rights Act and

Executive Order 11246, promulgated in 1965, led to the eventual establishment of a formal civil rights

and equal employment opportunity (EEO) program

within FHWA. The development of this program

was slowed by the fragmentation of internal and ex- ternal concerns. In the beginning, the internal con- cerns were assigned to the Office of Administration

and the external concerns to the Office of Audits and

Investigations.

Two important factors contributed to the advancement of the agency's civil I'ights and equal opportunity program. Congress enacted, as part of the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, the requirement

that States submit assurances that employment and

training in connection with proposed Federal-aid

projects would be provided without regard to race, creed, or national origin. This legislation was fol- lowed in January 1969 by civil rights and equal opportunity hearings held by the Subconunittee on Roads

of the Public Works Cormnittee of the Senate. As a

result of these hearings, the Senate Subcommittee

made several recommendations. Foremost among

these recommendations was that the Federal Highway

Administration should assume leadership in showing

to all levels of the agency and the States the importance attached to equal employment opportunity

efforts. In response, FHWA took three important steps.

First, the Administrator appointed a Special Assistant

for Equal Opportunity in March 1969. Second, he

created the Office of Civil Rights in June with responsibility for both internal and external concerns. Third,

he elevated the former Special Assistant to Director

of the new Office of Civil Rights.

The newly established Office began monitoring

FHWA's own internal employment practices and

established and maintained minority group statistics. The initial operations of the Office were strengthened

by the issuance of Executive Order 11478 in 1971

which served as the basis for the development of

affirmative action plans and procedures for processing

discrimination complaints and EEO counseling activities. This led to the formation in 1972 of an Internal Division with a system for self-evaluation.

222
To study the bcluiviur uf asphalt in service, an FIIWA analyst

is usiiiy a i-acuuni distillntioii tcchniii'uc to remove the bulk

of the solvent from solutions of asphalts extracted from pavements.

The FHWA Federal Women's Proorani was established in 1971. In the eai'ly part of 1974, the SpanishSpeaking Program was established to deal with the

emplovment concerns and problems of Hispanics employed by the FHWA.

Meanwhile two major changes in the EEO civil rights program took place. First, the 1970 FederalAid Highway Act gave the agency authority to add

on-the-job training aimed at furthering equal employment opportunity. Goals were set for specified numbers of persons to receive training on selected construction projects, and supportive services for on-the-job

training were provided the following year. Second,

the Department of Transportation published rules

and regulations in 1970 to implement Title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting discrimination

based on race, color, or national origin in federally

assisted programs.

Because of FHWA's highly decentralized organizational approach, inost of FHWA's EEO responsibilities are carried out at the field level. The

Headquarters develops overall policy and monitors

the results through review of reports of Title VI and

Title VIII (Fair Housing) activities, contract compliance, special programs (minority business enterprise, summer youth opportunity program, on-the-job

training, and supportive services), and the internal

employment practices of FHWA offices. The FHWA

Headquarters and field EEO staffs also make onsite

Federal-aid project reviews and onsite reviews of State

highway agencies.

In FHWA's direct construction program, directives were issued specifj'ing that a clause be included in all contracts requiring contractors to take affirmative ac- tion to recniit and employ the disadvantaged, including

minorities and women, and to achieve positive equal

employment opportunity results on constiniction projects. These directives were followed by additional

procedures for monitoring and evaluating the contractors' compliance with EEO.

In June 1973, a directive to implement the Minority

Business Enterprise Program was issued. This di- rective requires that, where feasible, dii-ect Federal

projects shall be set aside for contract negotiation and

subsequent award to a minority-owned firm under the

requirements of section 8(a) of the Small Business

Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-536). The FHWA field and

Headquarters offices have taken the initiative to implement this pi'ogram to develop minority contractors with the capability to perform highway construction or perform highway I'esearch studies.

Since 1899 when the River and Harbor Act was

passed requiring permits to build bridges over navigable waters, coordination, considtation or I'eceipt of

permits froni other agencies has been required for

highway projects as the result of various legislation.

In 1958 the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act was

passed, in 1966 the Historic Preservation Act, and in

1968 the Wild and Scenic River Act. Since then many

new acts and requirements have emerged, such as: Federal Water Pollution Control Amendment of

1972

Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972

Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries

1972

Endangered Species Act of 1973

Archeological and Historic Preservation Act of

1974

As their titles imply, these requirements protect

navigable waterways, marine and animal wildlife, the

physical environment, air and water pollution impacts,

floodplains, etc. This is not a complete list, but it does

indicate the extent of Federal safeguards against undesirable impacts. Compliance with these new legislative requirements is very time consuming and may take

up to 18 months to accomplish. This is one of the reasons why it takes much longer now from conception

of a highway project until it is completed and open to

traffic. It should be pointed out that all of these

specific coordination and permit requirements are in

addition to the basic environmental impact evaluations

required for all highway projects since 1970.

As may be presumed, the Federal-aid highway program has not been without its legal complications

which ultimately have wound up in courts of law.

For example, a legal issue arose out of the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act of 1972. Section 404

of the Act provided that permits from the Army

Corps of Engineers would be required for dredge and

fill activities in navigable waters. A District Court

order in March 1975 interpreted the term "navigable

waters" as meaning all waters of the United States

and thus subject to the Corps of Engineers jurisdiction

in regard to the need for section 404 permits. Since

almost all highway projects touch some body of water

in the expanded sense, this could conceivably include a need for a permit for a highway crossing wetlands

or even a stream. Congressional hearings have been

held to alleviate this problem, but to date no satis- factory solution has emerged.

As a result of the enactment in 1969 of the National

Environmental Policy Act and related provisions con- tained in the 1970 Highway Act, each proposed highway project must be evaluated to determine its impact on the environment. The States were first required

to develop and use an approved process to assure that

223
x^tiiii'-J

W W""
adequate consideration was being given to possible

social, economic and environmental effects of proposed

highway projects. Guidelines were issued by FHWA,

and the States developed Action Plans that document

the process for assessing the en\ironmental impacts.

The Action Plan explains how social, economic, and

environmental factors are identified and studied, how

the assistance of a wide range of professional skills

is obtained and utilized, and how interested groups

and citizens are involved or can participate in the

highway development process. As an integral part of the location study process, the State highway department, in consultation with

the FHWA Division Engineer, nuist first determine

whether the highway project will be a major action

requiring an evaluation of its potential environmental

impact. For those projects found to be major under

established criteria, a study will be conducted to see if the environmental impact is significant. If it is determined that a significant impact may occur, then a draft environmental impact statement (EIS) is pre- pared prior to corridor public hearings. The draft

is distributed for comments to interested State and

Federal agencies. After comments from the reviewing

agencies and from the public hearings are available, a final version of the EIS is prepared and made available to the general public. The final statement insures

that appropriate consideration has been given to the

views expressed and to the anticipated effects. Only

after the final EIS is approved can the route locations

be approved. If it is found during the environmental

evaluation that there is no significant impact, a negative declaration is prepared to document this conclusion.

In the beginning a major issue arose as to whether

or not the States could prepare environmental impact

statements under Federal supervision. At first the

Second Circuit Court of Appeals said no, that it was

the responsibility of the Federal Highway Adminstration to prepare the EIS's. Later this was changed

by act of Congress to permit the States to prepare the

EIS's under the guidance and supervision of the in- volved Federal agency.

Highway system statutory management requirements

that do not involve Federal funding have expanded

also since 1956. Initially, as already mentioned,

the States were only required to properly maintain

federally assisted projects. Since 1956 the States are

also required to enforce maximum weight and width

limits for vehicles opei-ating on the Interstate System

and to certify annually to FHWA that they are doing

so. In January 1975 a provision was added to highway law effecting a nationwide maximum speed limit

of 55 m.p.h. for all public highways, and the States

must certify annually that they are enforcing this

speed limit. In addition, all States are required to have an approved highway safety program designed

to reduce the frequency and severity of traffic accidents

A tranquil spot for fishing—one of over 100 lakes in the "Chain

Lakes" alonf/ ISO in Xehrnska. These lakes resulted from

borrow pits, used during the highicni/ construction. They

have sitice been developed into water oriented

recreation areas and icildlife sanctuaries.

and which must meet certain Federal performance

criteria. Inventories of accident locations, bridge

structural conditions and railroad-highway crossings

ai-e required to assure funding of highway priority

needs. Each State must have a schedule for updating

ti-affic signs, signals and pavement mai'kings to meet

uniform standards.

As the Federal Highway Administration turned its attention to the administration of the foregoing re- quirements, the States progressively assumed effective

design and construction responsibility without close

Federal supervision. This is the significant result of

the successful Federal-State partnership.

The Secondary Road Plan

Legislation enacted in 1954 permitted the first major

change since 1916 in the basic Federal-State roles in

project procedures through the initiation of The Secondary Road Plan. Under the Plan, any State could

request the Bureau of Public Roads to relinquish most

of its engineering and administrative review and approval responsibilities for secondary road system

projects by accepting a certification by the State that

the projects had been designed and constructed in

accordance with State standards and procedures established for general application to all projects on the

Secondary System. To qualify for this procedure, a State had to submit its Secondary Road Plan for re- view and approval by BPR. The BPR review and

concurrence actions under the Plan were limited to system changes, programs of proposed projects, program changes, project agreement, a final inspection,

and a fiscal review and audit of voucher claims. All

the States adopted this greatly simplified plan, al- though one State has since dropped it. The philosophy beliind the Secondary Road Plan was to let the States assume more independent re- sponsibility and to permit the BPR staff to devote its principal efforts to the more nationally significant

Primary System, including the National System of

Interstate Highways which, it was anticipated, would

soon be authorized funds. Secondary projects ac- counted for 30 percent of all Federal-aid projects administered by the BPR in 1954 prior to enactment

of legislation permitting the Secondary Road Plan.

Certification Acceptance

The Secondary Road Plan not withstanding, by the

1970's a growing sentiment was developing among the

State highway administrators, FHWA officials, and

the involved congressional committees that something

had to be done to reduce the complexity and red tape

that was rapidly growing in the administration of

the Federal-aid highway program. At the same time,

however, support for the protection of social values was becoming stronger and much more vocal. As it gained momentum, considerable anti-highway senti- ment arose. The many additional controls, requirements, considerations and clearances added to the

administration of the highway program in response

to the public demands were inescapable.

Congress reflected its definite awareness of the problems by including in the 1973 Highway Act a new

procedure called Certification Acceptance, an effort

225
yl secondary road project through the mountains of northwestern Montana.

to reduce FHWA monitoring of projects by extending

the Secondary Road Plan concept to all projects on

Federal-aid systems except the Interstate System.

The Certification Acceptance procedures superseded

the highly successful Secondary Road Plan, but unfortunately, it did not succeed very well. The success of the Secondary Road Plan lay in the fact that the

State was certifying that ". . . the plans, design, and

construction for such projects are in accord with the

standards and procedures of such State applicable to projects in this category . . ." [italics supplied] which

the Federal Government (Secretary of Commerce) had

approved. The Certification Acceptance procedure

required the State to certify that ". . . such projects

will be carried out in accordance with State Jaws,

regulations, directives, and standards establishing re- quirements at least equivalent to those contained in, or

issued pursuant to, [title 23]." [Italics supplied.]

Thus, Federal program demands and complexities still governed. It also presciibed that the new optional

pi'ocedure would not affect or discharge any responsibility or obligation of the FHWA imder any Federal

law outside of title 23, U.S. Code, such as the environjnental impact statements, right-of-way acquisition

methods, relocation assistance, minimum wage rates,

etc. None of the complexities were eliminated since

the States had to have requirements equivalent to Federal laws. Because the secondary road system

now came under the Certification Acceptance procedure, more work actually was generated. As a result. States did not elect to use Certification Acceptance

procedures.

Congress then took another look at the situation,

and in the 1976 Highway Act, the Certification Acceptance section of title 23, U.S. Code, was amended

by striking out ". . . establishing requirements at

least equivalent to those contained in, or issued pursuant to, this title" and substituting ". . . which will

accomplish the policies and objectives contained in or

issued pursuant to this title." In addition, the Act

reinstated the Secondary Road Plan.

It is too soon to know just how or to what extent the

amended Certification Acceptance procedure will be

accepted by the States. Ilowevei-, the States and

FHWA are continuing to work together to reduce

paperwork, needless duplication, and unnecessary delays in administering tlie highway i)rogram. giving

fiUl recognition to the capabilities of State organiza226
tions and the limited need for detailed Federal

involvement.

The operational system or technical administration

of the physical program is only half of the story of

the management of the Federal-aid highway program.

Since the Federal agency is responsible for protecting

the Federal Govemment's investment in the highway

program, the other half is concerned with tlio financial

management of funds and the accounting for ex- penditures. This, too, involves very complex procedures that are not independent of the operational

system procedures.

Financial Management

The sj^stem that has evolved over the years for authorizations, apportionments among the States, and

the overall funding of the Federal-aid highway program has been prescribed largely by the Federal legislation. "WHiile it was developmental in the sense that

its concepts were developed in bits and pieces, the

basic rules or principles were established early in the

history of Federal-aid legislation. The one major new element was the creation of the Highway Trust

Fund in 1956.

The ground rules used in the legislative and financial administration of the program comprise the steps,

principles, authorities, and limitations that must be

followed in administering, or managing, the Federalaid highway funds that are made available by congressional legislation. The system is integrally related

to the operational system ; i.e., the technical administration of the physical progx'am.

The system for the financial administration of the

Fedei"al-aid highway program is unique in relation to CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES

(SIMPLIFIED, TYPICAL PROCESS

)

HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES

PUBLIC HEARINGS

TESTIMONY BY THE EXECLTHVE BRANCH, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, INTERESTED ORGANIZATIONS, ETC., BEFORE THE

APPROPRIATE SUBCOMMITTIES

SENATE

PUBLIC HEARINGS

SURFACE I TRANSPORTATION ISUBCOMMITTEE

TBANSPORTATION | SUBCOMMITTEE

MARK-UP SESSION SUBCOMMITTEE BILL)

COMMITTEE BIU

FLOOR ACTION

SUBCOMMITTEE DISCUSSION - PREPARATION Of BILL

SUBCOMMnTEE BIU DISCUSSED. AMENDED, AND VOTED ON BY FULL COMMITTEE - SENT TO THE FLOOR OF EACH HOUSE OF CONGRESS

DEBATE. AMENDMENT. PASSAGE

MARK-UP SESSION (SUBCOMMITTEE BILL)

COMMITTEE BIU

FLOOR ACTION

HOUSE BILL SENATE BILL

OVERRIDE VETO FLOOR ACTION

MEMBERS

SELECTED BY CHAIRMEN OF

FULL COMMITTEE

COMPROMISE

ARRIVED AT BY CONFEREES

BOTH HOUSES

DEBATE, PASS

CONFERENCE BIU

- AMENDMENTS

NOT PERMITTED

most other Federal assistance programs in that it has

recognized that the States must know what to expect

from the Federal Government with a substantial leadtime to provide for their own adequate legal, fiancial,

and administrative planning.

The legislative process has not changed nuich over

the years. The Administration submits its proposed

program to Congress and individual members of Congress may also submit bills. Extensive committee

hearings are held, and eventually the House and

Senate committees develop and report out proposed

bills for consideration by the whole Congress. Differ- ences are resolved by conference committee made up

of members of both Houses. After final approval by

both the House and the Senate, the bill is sent to the

President for signature which constitutes enactment.

Traditionally, the Administration has submitted its proposed highway legislation to Congress shortly

after the first of each even-numbered year. This was

an endeavor on the part of Congress to assist the

States in their planning for participation in the program, since most State legislatures convene on a bi- ennial basis in the odd-numbered years. Thus the

coming availability of Federal funds to the States was known in advance so that the State legislatures

could provide their highway moneys, including the

State matching funds and the advance funds which

the States needed to first pay highway contractors and which would be later reimbursed from the Federal

Government.

The committee hearings usually have been initiated

in Congress in the spring, and the highway act is usually enacted any time from early summer to the

end of the year. Over the years, there have been

exceptions to this timing, but the pattern has been

fairly consistent.

"When the 1916 and 1921 Highway Acts were passed,

they appropriated funds for the new highway program. This appropriated money had specific limitations as to amount, purpose, and duration. In addition,

these Acts specified that a percentage of the appropriation was to be set aside for administering the program

and for research. It also specified how the money was

to be apportioned, or divided, among the States based on a prescribed formula in the law. By appropriating

the funds, Congress provided budget authority which

allowed the Bureau to incur obligations (a commitment by the Bureau to pay out the money).

After a State received its certificate of apportionment from BPR telling it how much money the Federal Government was committing for its use, the State was free to go ahead with obligations for work to be

performed. AVTien the Project Agreement had been

executed and signed by the Secret aiy of Agriculture,

the Secretary notified the Treasury Department, and

the money was thus reserved for payment of the

State's voucher when received and approved by the

Bureau of Public Roads.

The Post Office Appropriation Act for fiscal year

1923 did not appropriate any funds directly because

it only "authorized [sums] to be appropriated." This was the beginning of contract authority for the Federal-aid highway program which permitted obligations

of the full authorized amounts before any legislation

had been passed to provide liquidating cash to pay the

227
amounts on the vouchers, "\\naen the appropriations

committees met to consider the estimated total of

funds that would be I'equired during the coming year

to pay the claims submitted by the States, they had

simply to evaluate the accuracy of the estimate and

provide the monej' in the legislation that the Federal

Government had already made a legal commitment to pay.

Subsequent to 1923, the Federal-aid highway legislation generally contained some or all of the following: (1) Permission to start new or to revise existing

pi'Ograms; (2) permission for specific project demonstrations or requests for reports; and (3) funding for

the highway operations programs.

The dollar amounts in these acts have always been

provided for specific fiscal years. These amounts

were usually a^jportioned or divided among the States

by a formula established by law. The apportionments

had to be made at least 6 months before the fiscal year for which they were authorized and were available for obligation for a period of 2 years after the

end of the fiscal year for which authorized, at which

time they lapsed. Therefore, sums apportioned were

usually available for obligation for a minimum of

3I/2 years. What had been authorized, apportioned,

and made available was the authority to incur obligations on behalf of the U.S. Government. No cash had

yet exchanged hands.

Not all funds were apportioned, however. Some

funds are not governed by a legislatively mandated

apportionment formula. In these cases, the sums are divided among the States at the discretion of the

Secretary of the department or, as in the case of

emergency relief moneys, sums of money are triggered

by events. These discretionary or administrative divisions are called allocations, as compared to the statu- tory formula divisions or apportionments.

Although funds were authorized for specific Federalaid systems and programs, it was recognized that the

apportionment formulas, equitable as they may be,

would not always provide funds in the relative proportions that States required them. Therefore, Congress

provided flexibility in the use of apportionments by

permitting transfers between funding categories.

From 1923 to 1956 there were no significant changes

in the basic system of legal and financial administration of the program. Some new categories of funds were created and special apportionment formulas were

prescribed for specific funds, but the basic system re- mained intact.

AMien the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act was

passed, it became title I of a two-part, piece of legislation, the second part, title II, being the Highway

Revenue Act of 1956. Title II created the Highway

Trust Fund from which Federal-aid highway appropriations were to be drawn as well as the BPR administrative and research funding. The Highway

Revenue Act also provided for the revenue sources to support the Fund.

Prior to the 1956 Act, all appropriations for the

Federal-aid highway program came from the General

Fund of the Treasury. Although Federal taxes on motor fuels and automotive products were in existence,

there was no relationship between the level of I'evenues

obtained from these excises and the level of funding

for the highway program. The Highway Revenue

Act increased some of the previously existing highway

user taxes, established a number of new ones, and

provided that most of the revenues would, be credited

to the Highway Trust Fund and dedicated solely to the financing of the Federal-aid highway program.

The change in the method of financing the Federalaid highway program was dictated primarily by the

legislative decision contained in title I to provide authorizations for the completion of the National System

of Interstate and Defense Highways by June 30, 1972.

Title I provided Interstate authorizations for fiscal years 1956 through 1969 totaling almost $25 billion. In addition, the Act greatly increased the level of

authorizations for the regular primary, secondary and

urban programs. The creation of the Highway Trust

Fund made it possible for the public to accept the

increased and new highway user taxes by placing the

program on a wholly user-supported, pay-as-you-go

basis. Other significant changes made by the 1956 Act in

the system of financial administration applicable only

to the Interstate System were: • The Federal share of the cost was 90 percent plus

a computed increase for the public lands States

to a total not to exceed 95 percent. • The apportionments of authorizations to the

States, beginning with fiscal year 1960, were to be made "... on a date as far in advance of the

beginning of the fiscal year for which authorized

as practicable but in no case more than eighteen

months prior to the beginning of the fiscal year

for which authorized." • Beginning with the authorization for fiscal year

1960, the apportionment to the States was pre- scribed to be ". . . in the ratio which the esti- mated cost of completing the Interstate System

in each State . . . bears to the sum of the estimated

cost of completing the Interstate System in all of the States." The cost estimates were to be

prepared at frequent intervals to assure that no

State was given more than was required to complete the System within that State and ideally

to assure the completion of the System in all States at an approximately uniform rate. • The States were authorized to proceed with the

construction and completion of Interstate projects

beyond the total of their currently available Federal apportionments, but they could not expect

reimbursement for the Federal share of costs of

these projects until the State was apportioned

additional Interstate funds. • If the Interstate apportionments were unobligated at the end of the second fiscal year after the

fiscal year for which they were authorized, the

apportionments would be reappoi*tioned to all the

other States and become a part of the new obli- gational authority for that particular year with

the same availability.

In addition to the creation of the Highway Trust

Fund and its sources of revenue, tlie Highway Revenue

Act of 1956 also prescribed how the Fund should be

228
A charming relic of another age. Although an orthotropic steel deck for structural safety is concealed by careful design,

this covered bridge at West Cornwalk, Conn., makes the motorist a bit nostalgic.

manaj^ed by the Secretary of tlie Treasury. The most

significant features were: • Repayable advances from tlie General Fund to the Highway Trust Fund were authorized to be

made as might be needed to meet expenditure demands on the Trust Fund in excess of available

balances during a fiscal year. However, this

feature was suspended by the next one. • Before the apportionment of the Interstate au- thorizations for any fiscal year, the Secretary of

the Treasury had to determine that anticipated revenues to be credited to the Trust Fund by the

end of the fiscal year would be adequate to meet

the expenditure requirements. If deficits were

projected, then the Interstate apportionment had

to be reduced to meet anticipated revenues. This

feature placed the program on a "pay-as-you-go"

basis by permitting apportionments to be made

only to the extent that revenues would be available to reimbiirse obligations and by prohibiting

the Trust Fund from entering into a deficit condition.

The provision in the 1956 Act for short-term loan

provisions froni the General Fund of the Treasury was in effect nullified by the pay-as-you-go requirement added to the Act before final passage.

However, in 1958 the United States found itself in

the grip of an extended economic recession, and one way to hasten recovery' seemed to be through an ac- celeration of the Federal-aid liighway program. For

this and other reasons, the 1958 HigliAvay Act in- creased the annual Interstate authorizations. It also

set aside the pay-as-you-go provision of the 1956 Act

for 2 years and directed apportionment to the States

of the full amounts, but these provisions were not

matched by a commensurate provision for the neces- sary additional revenue. The effect of the 1958 Act was that the Federal-aid

program annual expenditures exceeded annual Trust

Fund revenue, making it necessary for the BPR to

institute reimbursement planning. This was a new

procedure establishing a limitation on the total dollar

amount of Federal-aid project obligations that could

be incurred in a given year, regardless of the unobligated balance of apportionments that were available

to the States. This new program control was to insure

that obligations incurred by the States did not exceed

the amounts that could be subsequently paid from

currently available Highway Trust Fund revenues when work was done and the States claimed reimbursement for the Federal share.

In 1961 the pay-as-you-go principle was reinstated.

The Highway Trust Fund is not a physical depository in which its dedicated revenues are actually

deposited. It exists only in the accounting records

of the U.S. Treasury. Estimated Trust Fund reve- nues are transferred by an accounting transaction

from the General Fund to the Trust Fund early in

each month and then adjusted later on the basis of

the actual tax receipts. It is important to recognize that even though the

Highway Trust Fund was created specifically to fi- nance the Federal-aid highway program, the revenues

that accrue to the Trust Fund cannot be used to pay

any of the costs of the highway program until they

are made available for expenditure by enactment of

appropriations acts by Congress as was the case befoi-e the creation of the Trust Fund. The budget

229
estimates for appropriations from the Highway Trust

Fund must be confined to the estimated availability

by the end of the fiscal year of sufficient revenues in

the Fund to finance the appropriations.

With a few exceptions, the Federal Government

does not pay for the entire cost of Federal-aid highway projects. Originally the States were required

to match the Federal funds on a 50/50 basis, except

in States with large areas of public lands where there

have been statutoi\y increases in the Federal share.

In 1973 the matching basis was revised for most

projects, other than Interstate, to be funded on a 70

percent Federal/30 percent State basis. The Interstate System has been funded 90/10 since the 1956

Act, again with an increased Federal share in public

lands States. Although the Federal share of a project's cost was

established by law, there were periods when this provision was waived or temporarily suspended. In 1932, to aid in fighting the Depression, Congress authorized

$120 million which could be used to provide the State

share of a project's cost. This advance of funds, or suspension of the matching requirements, was to be

repaid over a 10-year period beginning with fiscal year 1938 by deductions from regular apportionments.

There were several other acts authorizing additional

funds during the Depression.

In 1958, again to fight a recession, additional authorizations for the Primary and Secondary Systems

and their urban extensions were enacted. The Federal

share for these supplemental funds was raised but a

separate authorization was also made to assist the

States in providing matching funds. The amounts

used to increase the Federal share had to be repaid

from future apportionments.

The latest example of increasing the Federal share

occurred in 1975, and a recession was again the reason

for it. In this instance, all matching was waived for a 6-month period in 1975 with the proviso that the

State share be repaid by January 1, 1977. This re- payment provision was extended by the 1976 Act to provide for a staggered repayment to be completed

by January 1, 1979.

The Office of Management and Budget (0MB) of

the Executive Office of the President has authority to establish obligational limitations for the highway program and to specify the maximum amount of obligations to be incurred in a given fiscal year. The 0MB

limitation also may specify the rate at which obligations can be pennitted to be incurred.

The 0MB limitation on obligations does not apply

to any particular fiscal year's apportionment, but

rather applies to the sum of all obligations within a

particular fiscal year. Because of the multiyear availability of funds, if funds for a fiscal year are not

obligated in that fiscal year, they are still available

until they lapse according to the law.

The highway program, like other Federal programs,

is subject to overriding national concerns, such as the

rising i-ate of inflation which has led to controls being

placed on highway spending. From fiscal year 1966

through fiscal year 1975, the Office of Management

and Budget, thi'ough authority delegated to it by the

President, regulated the rate at Avhich Federal-aid

highway funds were obligated in a given time period.

It must be stressed that limitation on obligations, or impoundment, of highway program funds is some- what different from impoundments for other Federal

programs since there is no refusal to spend funds,

only a slowing down in the rate at which funds may

be spent.

The appropriations acts usually contain the wording

"not otherwise provided" because not all of the highway programs are reimbursed from the Highway

Trust Fund. For example, until the 1970 Highway

Act, the forest highways and public lands highway

programs were not funded from the Trust Fund, but

had separate funding authorizations irom the General

Fund. There are still numerous safety and other

highway-related programs with separate funding ac- counts, some with contract authority and some that

must await each annual appropriations act for budget

authority to spend money. Thus, the appropriations

acts provide liquidating cash with which to reimburse

the States under the normal Federal-aid highway

programs, provide budget authority for certain other

programs, and may provide limitations on obligations

equivalent to previous Executive Branch impoundments for specific programs.

Although most Federal-aid highway programs obtain their budget authority in the form of contract authority rather than through appropriations acts, in recent years Congress has made several major changes.

The one that may have the most impact on the highway program was enactment of the Congressional

Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Public

Law 93-344) which was an effort to gain budgetary

control over "backdoor spending," spending not subject to year-to-year congressional or executive scrutiny.

The contract authority exercised by the Federal Highway Administration is considered a form of "backdoor

spending." The Budget Act requires that future

Federal-aid highway acts contain provisions limiting

new budget authority to the estimated amount provided in appropriations acts, and this was first done

in the 1976 Federal-Aid Highway Act. This requirement would seem to negate all contract

authority, but Congress, recognizing that some programs require advance knowledge of the size of future

Federal funding commitments, permitted several ex- ceptions. One of these exceptions relates to progTams

whose new budget authority is derived from trust funds, 90 percent or more of whose receipts are user

related taxes.^^ The Highway Trust Fund, which is wholly supported by user taxes, meets the requirement,

but its life term has been limited by law since 1956. Its term has been extended nmnerous times, the latest, in

1976, extended the Fund to September 30, 1979.

Should the Trust Fund be terminated, or its uses or revenue altered so that it no longer meets the exception

requirements, the highway program would have to obtain its budget authority through appropriations

acts as other Federal agencies do. Of course, the

appropriations acts could provide for nuiltiyear funding, but this would be in opposition to the principle

of annual review of expenditures.

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1976 has made

other changes in the legal and financial juanagement

230
of the highway program. Some of the more important

points are: • Apportionments and allocations are now available

for obligation for a total of 4 years. Interstate apportionments are made 1 year in advance of

the beginning of the fiscal year for which they are authorized and remain available until 2 years

after that fiscal year ends. Non-Interstate apportionments are made on the first day of the fiscal year for which authorized and remain available

until 3 yeai*s after that fiscal year ends. • In the future there will be greater flexibility in

the expenditure of highway funds, such as substitution of programs and transfer of funds. • Some highway programs were consolidated, but

instead of reducing the number of separate funding accounts, several new ones were added.

In summary, the legal and financial management

cycle can be considered to begin with the authorizing

legislation. These acts set the ujiper limits on Federal

commitments which can be incurred for Federal-aid

highways. Deductions from the authorized levels are then made for administration of the program and

urban transportation planning, with additional

amounts earmarked for other planning and research

activities. These normally amount to about 4 or 5 percent of the authorizations.

The remaining amounts are then apportioned or

allocated (divided) aniong the States. Apportionments and allocations are considered "new obligational

authority" and, when added to the unobligated balances

of previous apportionments and allocations, constitute

the total amount of obligational authority available to

the States. This is not money, but authority to incur

obligations.

Apportionments are available for obligation for a

total period of 4 years. The States may obligate funds subject to the availability of apportionments and allocations and to any

limitations on obligations which may have been imposed for that fiscal year. These liuiitations regulate

the rate of obligations by imposing a maximum

amount on obligations which can be incurred during

a given fiscal year. Once funds are obligated and a project is underway,

pi'ogress payments may be made to the States for

completed work. This liquidating cash is appropriated annually by Congress aiul is derived from

revenues accruing to the Highway Trust Fund.

The final step in the legal and financial administration of the Federal -aid highway program is reimbursement to the States for the Federal share of the cost of approved pi'ojects or programs.

Initially the States, or their local governmental

subdivisions, finance the costs of Federal-aid projects.

After authorization by the Division Administrator,

work can proceed on a Federal-aid project. Once the

Project Agreement has been executed between the

State and FHWA, the State can submit progress

vouchers claiming reimbursement for the Federal share

of costs of work satisfactorily completed and for materials stockpiled for use on the project.

After the project has been completed and final FHWA acceptance has been issued by the Division

Administrator, the State submits a final voucher for

the project. The final voucher summarizes the final

FINANCIAL PROCEDURES

HIGHWAY ACT

AUTHORIZATIONS

UP TO 3V. PERCENT OF THE AUTHORIZATIONS

FOR ADMINISTERING THE PROGRAM PLUS AN

ADDITIONAL V, PERCENT FOR URBAN

TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

DEDUCTIONS

BEGINNING OF FISCAL YEAR

APPORTIONMENTS &

ALLOCATIONS

DIVISION OF THE REMAINING SUMS AMONG THE STATES: APPORTIONMENTS

BY LEGISLATIVE FORMULA ALLOCATIONS

ADMINISTRATIVELY DETERMINED

HAVE ANY FUNDS

LAPSED?

NEW OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY

ARE THEY

INTERSTATE" FUNDS?

AUTHORITY TO OBLIGATE THE FUNDS IS WITHDRAWN POOFI

FUNDS ARE

REAPPORTIONED TO OTHER STATES

AUTWORrTY TO

OBLIGATE THE LAPSED FUNDS

IS GIVEN TO THE NON-LAPSING STATES

UNOBLIGATED BALANCE

OF

PRIOR APPORTIONMENTS AND ALLOCATIONS

•WTIBSTATE COMPLETED " FUNDS [Z3 USC 104 Ibl 151 IaT];

TOTAL AVAILABLE OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY

PLUS THE UNUSED

PORTIONS OF PRIOR APPORTIONMENTS AND AUOCATIONS

EQUALS THE NEW

AMOUNT AVAILABLE FOR OBLIGATION DURING THE FISCAL YEAR

TOTAL AVAILABLE OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY

CEILING ON HIGHWAY PROGRAM - SPECIFIES I T

THE MAXIMUM I * I AMOUNT WHICH CAN ' LIMITATION H"

BE OBUGATED DURING I I THE PRESENT ' • FISCAL YEAR

HAS UMITATION

BEEN REACHED 7

_YES__J_ YES r

I NO ADDITIONAL I lOBLIGATIONS THISJ

i RSCALYEAR I

NO

OBLIGATION

FROM HIGHWAY

USER TAXES REVENUES

1

DEPOSITORY FOR REVENUES HIGHWAY

TRUST FUND

PROVIDES CASH

NECESSARY TO

REIMBURSE ESTIMATED VOUCHER SUBMITTALS

DURING RSCAL YEAR

APPROPRIATION ACT

VOUCHER

SUBMITTAL

PAYMENT

COMMITMENT BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO

REIMBURSE STATE FOR

FEDERAL SHARE OF TOTAL PROJECT COST

BEGIN PROJECT

STATE REQUESTS REIMBURSEMENT FROM

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT - PROGRESS PAYMENTS MAY BE MADE PRIOR TO

PROJECT COMPLETION

STATE IS REIMBURSED

FOR FEDERAL SHARE OF WORK COMPtrrED

• UMITATION MAY BE INITIATEO BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OR THE CONGRESS

231
project costs in accordance with the contract, change

orders, extra work orders and the project agreement.

Final vouchers are subject to a complete fiscal and

engineering and right-of-way review. A number of

projects are subjected to in-depth engineering and

fiscal audit by FHWA to insure the integrity of the

State's project administration and documentation.

In 1921 when Cliief MacDonald was organizing the

Bureaii for the basic Federal-aid highway program,

he included a Division of Control responsible for program and project accounting, budget activities, fiscal accounting, payroll, purchasing, and equipment and

supplies.

The accounting activity was the only functional ele- ment that was specifically created by law. Until 1921

the Bureau had kept program and fiscal records, but

the function was fragmented and treated as a routine

clerical operation. Congress, recognizing that administration of the Federal-aid highway program would

require detailed accounting records, directed in the

1921 Act that an accounting division be established.

This later was to become the Finance Division and the

Program Analysis Division in the Bureau. Over the

years, the function has progressed from a routine

bookkeeping operation to a very professional financial

management organization.

Because of the need to maintain very detailed financial and project records, a records section was established in 1921 with the primitive data processing

equipment of the day—a tabulating machine, a key

punch and a sorter. As the data processing technology

and equipment developed and became more sophisticated, the increased data processing capability became

one of the primary tools in the administration of the

highway program and made it possible to cope with

the program without a corresponding growth in the

staffing requirements.

The finance function in the Bureau extended beyond

the Bureau's internal financial management operations

to the development of the financial management operation in the States. The American Association of State

Highway Officials created a Subcommittee on Uniform

Accounting in 1926 to assist the States in developing

a uniform system of highway accounting, but little progress was made because of the diversity among the

States. By 1936 BPR had joined in this effort, but no formal procedures were established before World

War II suspended operations of the AASHO Subcommittee.

It was not until 1955 that the AASHO Executive

Committee directed that work resume on a uniform

accounting system and that a uniform accounting

manual be developed. Between 1957 and 1960 a uniform accounting manual was developed, and today

virtually all the States have adopted the principles

of this manual.

After the passage of the 1956 Highway Act, it be- came evident that the State highway departments

would need assistance in modernizing their accoimting

systems and the Bureau of Public Roads would have

to improve its own internal accounting system. In

1959, a special stafll' was created to develop and implement a cooperative financial management improvement pi-ogram with the States and to strengthen the

Bureau's accounting operations.

The cooperative financial management improvement

program with the States focused its immediate atten- tion on the modernization of the State highway departments' accounting systems, particularly in the areas of establishing reimbursement claims and substantiating them, and in providing advice to the States. This program was called "current billing." Current

billing is a concept whereby the States were encouraged

to centralize their financial operations and relate all highway construction costs to i^rojects through project

cost accounting techniques. To achieve this, it was

necessary to revise their accounting procedures, install

sophisticated data processing systems, and make some

organizational changes. An important feature of cur- rent billing was the computer-produced tabulation of

costs supporting the billing voucher to the Bureau for

reimbursement of the Federal share. All 50 States,

Puerto Eico, and the District of Columbia have implemented current billing procedures.

The adoption of current billing enabled the Bureau

auditors to change their audit techniques. Formerly,

it was necessary to audit the transactions of each

project due to the lack of adequate centralized cost accounting techniques. This resulted in portions of

claims being prepared from other than the States' accounting records, costs being omitted, variations in

cost methods and controls from project to project, and

similar peculiarities in the States' accounting systems.

As a result of the impi'ovements made under the cur- rent billing concept, the auditors were able to concentrate their reviews on the States' procedures and

controls, thus substantially eliminating the time-consuming examination of project documentation.

Under the authority and direction of the Budget

and Accounting Act of 1950, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), an administrative support tool of

the Congress, initiated comprehensive managementtype audits of the departments and agencies in the

Executive Branch. These audits were designed to evaluate for Congress the administration and effective- ness of agency operations and programs. The provisions of the Act also encouraged the agencies and

departments to initiate their own internal audit or review programs. As a result of these review efforts,

the GAO approved FHWA's accounting systems and

procedures in 1967, one of the few to receive GAO's

approval up to that time.

Of course, the financial operation includes cost ac- counting, but the information necessary for this function is so complex that early in the highway program,

a special division was created to maintain the data on project obligations on a nationwide project-byproject basis. Program analysis is the continuous maintenance of

the official records of the current status of all Federalaid and other FHWA program authorizations to- gether with the current status, cost, and physical

characteristics of each project authorized for financing.

Over and beyond this generalization, it also includes

the determination of the apportionments of authorizations (and obligational limitations) which are made

available to the individual States; the control and

maintenance of the record of transfers of funds between apportionments; the determination of the maximum percentage of Federal participation on Federal

aid, emergency relief and other special categories of

232
funds; the monitorship of the interrelationship of

obligations and disbursements and the development

of data to control the rate of obligations within the

limit of funds available in the Highway Trust Fund

the maintenance of the official project obligation rec- ords; and the management, at all levels, with interpretations and evaluations, of progi-am progress by

States, by funds, by limitations, by highway systems,

by classes of projects, etc. The records for the program analysis function are maintained by computer. Before the days of the elec- tronic and digital computers, tlie scope of the information for each project was necessarily quite limited in

comparison with the current data that is maintained.

However, because of the sophistication and flexibility

of modern computers, a vast amount of data is col- lected, stored in the computer and used on a day-to-day

basis to monitor the progress of the program and in- sure compliance with all legal and administrative

requirements.

The total program is implemented through individual projects tln-ougliout the 50 States, the District

of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the American territories. There are nearly 40 categories of funds or programs for which records must be kept separately.

The total number of active projects at any given time

is approximately 30,000. For each project the physical

characteristics and fiscal data must be maintained on

a current basis. This record information is not one-time data

rather, much of it is "fluid" and changes to reflect current status as the projects progress through the

project steps from initial authorization to final completion.

An innovative feature of the system is the method

used to obtain the computer input data. A "shuttle

form" is used. "When a project first enters the system

at the obligation stage, a form is completed by the

FHTWA field division office reporting all the currently

available project data, and it is sent to Washington.

The data is recorded in the system and a printout

confirming form is sent back to the field, reflecting

the data which has been recorded. The field office holds the form imtil the next action, change or addition takes place at which time the form is pulled,

the changes or additions are indicated on the form,

and it is again sent to AVashington. The new data is recorded and another printout is sent back to the field for verification and storage until the next change in status occurs. This "shuttle system" continues until

the project is finally completed. Each month a sum- mary printout reflecting the basic project data for all projects in the State is sent to each FHWA division

office. This system eliminates the need for duplicate

project records.

The program analysis work and the mass of detail

stored in the computer are vital to the effective administration of the highway program. A case in point is the need for the operating records for l)udget purposes. The FHWA budget office not only serves FHWA, but sei'ves indirectly as a ])udget office for

all the States since it must accurately provide the

budget estimates for liquidating cash for all Fedei-alaid highway programs. This is a unique budget

responsibility, especially in view of the complex procedures used for the financial administration of the

Federal-aid highway program.

The key to the economic and eii'ective opei-ation of

FHWA's budget office is the use of program, fiscal and personnel i-ecords which must be maintained by

other offices. Following World War II, the budget

process, content and format prescribed by the Bureau

of the Budget became more detailed and sophisticated.

The preparation of the various budget schedules,

especially for "personal services," became very timeconsmning and required extensive compilation and

analysis. At the time, the Public Roads Administration was already using automatic data processing

(ADP) equipment to pi-epare its payroll and to maintain its employment and personnel records. Since the

bulk of the source data required for budget purposes

already existed in the ADP records in raw form, the

budget office decided in 1947 to develop an ADP

system which would use the same records, but supplemented with the additional data required for budget

purposes. The system proved to be i-emarkably effec- tive and provided practically any data or personal

services which might be requii-ed with accurate statistics to support the budget statements and schedules.

Significantly, no additional staffing was required in

the operating offices to do the minimal amoimt of

additional coding that was required, and the budget

office today, although responsible for an annual

budget of over $6 billion, operates with a total staff of 11 people.

Auditing

Within the Federal Highway Administration, ex- ternal audit is concerned with the means and methods

used by the States to administer the Federal assistance

program. The ultimate objective is to ensure FHWA

management that (1) financial operations of the States

are properly conducted; (2) that financial reports and

claims are presented fairly; and (3) that the States

are othei-wise complying with applicable law, regulations and administrative requirements.

Internal audit is concerned with an intensive per- formance-compliance-effectiveness program audit of an

organizational unit of FHWA or, perhaps, of a functional program phase through all levels of the or- ganization. The internal audit is a management-type

activity designed to evaluate operational effectiveness,

and it normally involves review of some State records

and files and discussions with State officials as a neces- sary part of the evaluation of FPIWA's own program

administration.

A third functional area, investigations and special

inquiry, became a part of the audit complex in more

recent years and is concerned with investigations of

allegations of irregularities, fraud, bribery, collusion,

impropriety, etc., involving employees of FHWA, the

States, their political subdivisions, contractors or others

dealing with funds for FPIWA administered programs.

From the inception of the Federal-aid program until

1953, the audit activities of the Bureau were confined

to the external audit of State claims for reimbursement, normally at the final voucher stage. These

audits were made after the engineering staff (and

later also, the right-of-way specialist) had reviewed

the physical aspects of the work and accepted the

completed project as having been built in accordance

233
with the approved plans and specifications. Following the passa<>:e of the 1956 Highway Act, financial

audit was also made of the costs of any railroad or

utility changes that were involved in the project. This

audit was made at the accounting offices of the rail- road and utility companies.

As the size of the Federal-aid program, and the

resulting audit workload, increased over the years, the

organizational arrangement for accomplishing the

audit necessarily changed. Originally all external

audit was performed by auditors attached to the

AVashing-ton headquarters, and they traveled out of

"Washington to make the audits. In the next evolutionary stage, the very small group of auditors were

headquartered at various geographically strategic lo- cations in the field to reduce travel costs—however,

they still reported to the Washington headquarters.

At the next stage, at least one auditor was placed in

each regional office. At the end of World War II, as a part of the major reorganization for the greatly

expanded postwar highway program, the audit function was decentralized to the district offices which were

established in each State. During this evolutionary

period, there was no significant change in the concept

or form of the audit.

The external financial audit program experienced

many progressive changes over the years to keep the

Bureau's audit program consistent iwth the latest and

most sophisticated audit concepts and procedures as they were developed.

It was not until 1954 that the Reodonal Enigneers,

for the first time, were delegated authority to approve

payment of final construction vouchers, and those only

if they did not include any costs for rights-of-way or

railroad or utility work. This was a significant step

because it involved making the final evaluation and

decision on audit findings.

In 1961 the current billing and concurrent audit

procedure was developed and authorized. This con- cept permitted those States using electronic data

processing equipment to make a single consolidated

monthly claim for reimbursement of the Federal share

of all project earnings. Under this procedure, BPR

auditors utilized a "system audit" or concurrent audit

concept in lieu of a voucher and record audit. It constituted an audit of the State's total accounting system,

including the flow of source data and the State's own

auditing processes rather than an audit of individual

projects. Under the new system, the final audit was

essentially complete when the final voucher was re- ceived and only a minimum of additional review was

required.

In 1968 operational auditing was initiated to further supplant the traditional audit procedures. Operational auditing is a continuing and comprehensive

audit of the administrative, accounting, and operational procedures and controls employed by the State

in the administration of the Federal-aid jH'ogram. It allowed the auditor to express an opinion on costs claimed as representations of the system rather than

having to use claims as the medium through which

audits were conducted.

In 1971 a single audit concept was authorized where

the State agi-eed to perform an independent audit of

the Federal ])rogram. Tlie FITWA auditors reviewed

and accepted the State-perfoimed audits.

In 1974, as a condition of receiving funds, the States were asked to perform an internal financial audit of

all Federal-related activities at least biennially. If the

reports and work papers were available for review,

if audit standards under which the work was done were adequate, and if they otherwise met Federal re- quirements, FHWA auditors were directed to use and

rely on it in lieu of Federal audits.

The professional development and continuous improvement of the external financial audit activities

of FHWA were possible only because the States' fi- nancial jnanagement and audit activities kept pace

with FHWA's objectives. This required a great deal

of Federal-State cooperation and responsive professional leadership on both sides. As mentioned earlier, the Budget and Accounting

Act of 1950 encouraged the establishment of internal

audit programs in the agencies and departments. Accordingly, in 1953 BPR established an internal review

office in the Audits and Accounts Division of the

Washington headquarters.

At first the new internal review activities were mainly confined to the administrative areas of program management, but the office provided a staff capability to evaluate and recommend action on the General

Accounting Office comprehensive audit reports of ele- ments of the highway program.

Following enactment of the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act, the internal review program was broadened

and a project examination office was created in 1957,

which included the internal review functions.

The new project examination office was given broad

and independent responsibility to review program and

project administration at all levels of the Bureau and

in the State highway departments. The reviews were

to be made by four-man teams consisting of a professional investigator who was in charge of the team, an engineer, a right-of-way specialist, and a fiscal or administrative auditor. An intensive and highly se- lective recruiting effort was put forth to obtain wellqualified professional civil and criminal investigators, a skill until then not utilized in BPR. The emphasis

on investigative talent was two fold: (1) It was anticipated that the large sums of money that would be

involved in the construction of the Interstate System,

in combination with the greatly expanded highway

program in general, would require close vigilance to preA'ent scattered incidents of irregularities, collusion,

bribery, etc. ; and (2) it was believed that professional

investigators would be particularly skilled in the planning and conduct of investigative reviews, while the

subject matter specialists would provide the required

program evaluation and compliance expertise.

The creation of the project examination office proved

most timely. Problems of irregularities involving

highway department employees, contractors, and others

did in fact develop and, in many instances, were first identified by the project examination reviews. Unfavorable publicity which followed these incidents re- sulted in congressional interest and the creation in

1959 of a Special Investigative Subconunittee on the

Federal-Aid Hi.<i:hway Program under the House

Public AVorks Committee. The Subcommittee was

under the chairmanship of the Honorable John A.

Blatnik of IMinnesota and became commonly known

as the Blatnik Conunittee. A well-qualified and ex234
Interstate 10 thioiif/h the ruf/c/ed Texas hill country icest of KrrrriUr blouJs iritli the terrain because care has been takoi to preserve the natural vegetation and to make the highicay and interchange dcsig)i compatible ivith their surroundings.

perienced investigative staff was employed by the

Blatnik Committee. In the ensuino- months and years, the Committee became very active in terms of both

investigations and public hearings.

To augment the limited resources of the project

examination office and the efforts of the Blatnik Committee staff, an active effort of encouragement, per- suasion and professional guidance was initiated by

the Bureau to get the States to initiate their own programs of internal review and investigation. The

leadership in AASHO actively supported this effort with the result that many States instituted their own

internal review processes. In 1962, as an administrative action designed to strengthen the independence of BPR's internal and

external audit and investigative programs, a new

office was established with its Director reporting di- rectly to the Federal Highway Administrator. This

change separated the audit and accounting functions

which had been organizationally combined since the

creation of an accounting section. The responsibility

for the financial audit of State reimbursement vouchers

remained at the field level while the headquarters office provided technical direction, leadership, and guidance

in all financial audit activities. In 1971 the internal

audit function was absorbed into a centralized departmental internal audit office.

Training

A key to the successful administration of the Federal-aid highway program has been the outstanding

people in most of the top positions in the organization

and a strong supporting staff with a remarkably low

employee turnover rate—recently running at an annual

rate of 11 percent, about half that of the Federal

Government as a whole.^^ Part of the reason for this was that the program itself attracted bright young

engineers but also because the Bureau offered specialized training.

A strong interest in training dates back to 1893

when the Office of Road Inquiry was estaV)lished. One

of the primary purposes of that organization was

education, but mainly in the external sense. This in- cluded encouraging the colleges and imiversities to teach highway engineering since, at that time, there were few academically trained highway engineers.

In the Annual Report for fiscal year 1903, Director

Martin Dodge recommended the establishment in the

Office of Public Road Inquiries of a post-graduate

national school of roadbuilding similar to the L'Ecole

Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees that was established

in Paris in 1747. No action was taken on this recor.i- mendation, although the idea resurfaced many times

in later years. In 1905 the Office of Public Roads (OPR) initiated

its first formal internal training progi'am. Graduates

of engineering colleges were appointed after a competitive civil service examination to the position of

civil engineering student at a salary of $600 per year. A course of instruction included experience in the construction of object lesson or experimental roads, in- struction in the office routine, laboratory work and

theoretical instruction through lectures and reading

assignments. After completing the year's training, the

students were promoted to the position of jimior highway engineer in OPR at $900 per year. This px-ogram

continued until 1916 with the number of appointees

ranging from 4 to 10 per year.^' During the period

of this first engineer training program, a total of 78

students were appointed.^'^

In 1921 the engineer training program was reinstituted. The emphasis in this program was quality

recruitment. Most students were recruited dui'ing

their junior year of college and placed on a production

cost study. They were evaluated for future employment and, if they met the desired standards, were

appointed to a junior engineer position after graduation. They were then given a 2- to 3-year period of

training throughout the country in production cost

studies, equipment development and design, and eco- nomic studies. The program was gradually phased

out by 1936 because of economic conditions. Dui'ing

the span of this second training program, approximately 150 college graduates were appointed." A

high percentage of these men ultimately moved into

key positions in the Bureau, the most notable of whom

was Francis C. Turner who became the Federal HighAvay Administrator in 1969.

At the end of World Was II, the Junior Engineer

Training Program was reactivated and administered

by a professional training officer. For the first time,

235
Public Roads had a specific organizational unit re- sponsible for training.

The new Junior Engineer Training Program was

planned to provide 3 years' training in rotational

assignments in different parts of the country and to give the trainees the best possible foundation for a career in Public Roads. Subject to satisfactory per- formance, the trainees received a scheduled promotion

during training and a promotion upon gi-aduation

and a regular assignment. Recruiting was directed

toward graduating senioi's in colleges and universities,

bi;t highway engineers within Public Roads could be

selected for entry into the program.

The Highway Engineer Training Program (HETP)

as it is now called, has continued without interruption

since 1946. Recruitment started modestly with an

annual quota of approximately 15 ; from 1949 through

1956, the anniial recruitment averaged about 33 per

year. Following enactment of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 with its greatly expanded program,

76 individuals were enrolled in 1957 and 170 in 1958.

In 1961 a master's 18-month training program was

added to provide a training vehicle for approximately

10 candidates with master's degrees per year. This

prograni was directed toward development of a quality source of individuals for positions in research, planning and structures. From 1961 to 1972, the recruitment for both programs avei'aged about 75 new

trainees per year. Since then the average has been

about 60 trainees per year in both programs.

From 1946 through 1974, a total of approximately

1,600 individuals have entered the Highway Engineer

Training Program. Approximately 85 percent of all graduates have remained with the organization. A

number of these graduates have reached key positions

in the FHWA organization : six of nine Regional

Administrators are HETP graduates; two of six

Associate Administrators; and 33 of 52 Division Administrators. The FHWA Executive Director, Lester

P. Lamm, was a 1960 graduate.

To insure that the program would continue to be

responsive to the needs of the Bureau and the career development of its engineers, there have been periodic

searching reviews of the entire program. Two other

major management efforts have contributed to the

effectiveness of the HETP in providing engineering

inanpower consistent with the Bureau's projected needs.

The first of these occurred in 1961 when a task force was named to conduct a manpower utilization study on field engineers. Engineering manpower needs

numbers and skills—were projected 10 years into the

future. In 1974 a similar task force conducted a complete manpower utilization study of the entire organization and projected FHWA's personnel needs and

skills over the next 10 to 15 years. The anniial re- cruiting quotas for the HETP have been based largely on the two studies.

Until 1953 formal inservice training was limited to the Highway Engineer Training Program. In that

year, inservice ti-aining was formalized and greatly

expanded. Field enigneers were encouraged to attend

courses and conferences held in the Washington headquarters. Tlien in 1955 an annual comprehensive in- service and outservice agencywide training program was initiated to assess training needs on a priority

basis.

With enactment of the Government Employees

Training Act of 1958, an active outservice training

program began. The Act not only authorized the use

of agency funds for training in Government and non- Government facilities, but it prescribed that all agencies must establish, operate and maintain a program

and plans for the training of their employees. The

two major new areas of training which were opened

up as a result of this Act wei-e: (1) Full-time or parttime enrollment in colleges and universities; and (2)

attendance at meetings, conferences, seminars, etc., that would contribute to improved performance of the

employees' duties and responsibilities.

The Bureau immediately initiated an extensive

Full-Time Graduate Study Program. Over a period

of approximately 18 years, 240 employees have enrolled in full-time graduate study.

As the program has grown both in size and into

disciplines other than engineering, the Bureau has

added several other professional career intern programs structured basically on the format established

for the successful Highway Engineer Training Program. The procedures were the same, that is, to employ outstanding college and university graduates

and to provide rotational training assignments during

a formal training curriculum. Other employee career development programs have also been instituted for

employees in all grade levels. These programs have included formal curriculums

for management specialists (1960), right-of-way

officers (1962), auditors (1964), civil rights specialists

(1969), and a national upward mobility program for

administrative and professional type positions (1974).

Other areas of career development have included ex- ecutive development, environmental specialists, and

motor carrier safety investigators. As a part of

FHWA's equal employment opportunity action plan, an upward mobility education program was begun in

1973 to assist lower grade employees to attend courses

so that they may be qualified to compete for better

positions.

Obviously, the strong emphasis on training within

FHWA has influenced the economical staffing of the

Federal agency that administers the Federal-aid highway program. CongTess saw the validity of this

philosophy and, in the 1970 Highway Act, authorized

the creation of a National Highway Institute (NHI)

with the express purpose to ". . . develop and administer, in cooperation with the State highwaj' departments, training programs of instruction for Federal Highway Administration and State and local highway department employees engaged or to be en- gaged in Federal-aid highway work."

The XHI is not a physical facility, such as a school

with classrooms, but is an administrative organizational element. Its operating costs are funded from

FHWA's regular appropriation for administrative

expenses, which tends to limit the amount of direct

training that the Institute can undertake.

The Institute has established itself as a significant source of training in the highway field. During fiscal year 1974, the NHI sponsored 10 separate courses and

workshops at various locations throughout the United

States, involving about 5,500 State, local, and FHWA

236
personnel. In most instances, the workshops and

courses were developed and conducted by universities

and training consultants under contracts funded and

supervised by the NHI.

Under the terms of the 1970 Act, the States may

use up to 14 percent of their appoi'tionod Federal

funds for highway purposes (except Interstate funds)

for education and training of State and local highway

department employees witli two conditions: (1) The

States may not pay more than TO percent of the costs of tuition and direct educational expenses from tliis fund, which leaves the States to provide at least 30

percent of the costs; and (2) no Federal funds can

be used for travel, subsistence, or salaries of the employees being trained.

One of the major efforts of the Institute has been

to encourage tlie States to take advantage of this

optional program to broaden their own training programs. Since this Federal financial assistance is not an independent source of fmids—it is highway construction funds being used for training purposes—the

States have been slow to take advantage of this opportunity. Presently, approximately 20 States are programing a portion of their eligible Federal funds for

training and educational activities. However, the XHI program for fellowsliip and

scholarship awards to FHWA, State, and local employees has been very successful. Currently, the

Institute is awarding approximately 40 annual fellowships in highway transportation research and education and 40 in highway safety at $5,000 each, and

about 50 scholarships are awarded annually in highway technology at $2,500 each.

At the time the Institute was established, it was

assigned the responsibility for administering FH"\VA's

ongoing orientation and training pi-ograms for foreign

highway officials and engineei^s, which had been handled by the Foreigii Projects Division along with its foreign constmction program. The activities arranged

by the Institute for the foreign groups range in duration and depth from a 1-day meeting with selected

officials to a year or more of academic study at a university offering the type of highway-related curriculum

desired. In fiscal year 1974, the XHI arranged programs for a total of 763 foreign officials and engineers

from 56 different countries.

The XHI also serves as a clearinghouse of useful

information related to training and education of highway employees. It seeks to assist the States in identifying particular types of training and maintains a

referral service of training aids. To give direction to the extensive training effort of

FHWA, the Administrator has moved lately toward

establishing national training goals, or areas of training emphasis, for managers throughout the FHWA.

While these national training goals are pointed toward

the development of FIHVA employees, they also liave

implications for State liighwa}' and transportation

officials in two ways. In one instance, the FHWA

employees will be using their new knowledges and

skills to assist the States with their liigliway and

transportation missions. In the other instance, the

State officials will be invited to make use of courses developed to achieve the FHWA's national training

goals.

Training has been one of the key elements to the

successful administration of the Federal-aid highway

program tlirougliout the years. It will most likely

continue to be a main support of the gi'eatest public

works program in the world.

REFERENCES

'A. HULBEKT, IIlSTOlUC HIGHWAYS OF AitERICA, ThE CliMHEKi,ANi) KoAi), Vol. 10 (Artliur H. Clark Co., Cleveland, 1!)04)

p. 19.

"•Id., PI). 57-61.

' Id., p. 64. *Id., p. 199.

' Id., pp. 73, 86, 92. "P. JoKDAN, The National Road ( Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1948) p. 175. '43U.S.C., Sec. 218 (1964).

^ M. O. Eldridge, Proffrcsti of Road Building in the United

Stairs, Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture, 1899 (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1900) pp. 374, 375.

° W. Holt, Service Monographs of the United States

(iOVERNMENT, ThE BUREAU OF PlTBLIC ROADS, No. 26 (.ToIUlS Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1923) pp. 7-13. " Id., p. 13. "Hearing on S.J. Res. 10G Before the Comm. on Agriculture

and Forestry United States Senate, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5 (1912). " Joint Report of the Progress of Post-Road Improvement,

H. Doc. 204, 63d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3. "Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1914, p. 4. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1916, p. 2 "Federal Aid to Good Roads, H. Doc. 1510, 63d Cong., 3d

Sess., p. 14. " W. Holt, supra, note 9, pp. 19, 20. "AASHO—The First Fifty Years, 1914-1964 (American

Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1965)

p. 239. " W. Holt, supra, note 9, p. 19.

'' Id., pp. 22-24.

""C. Borth, Mankind On the Move (Automotive Safety

Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1969) p. 199.

^' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1893, p. 586.

"^ A. E. Johnson, History of the Origin, Development and

Operation of the American Association of State Highway

Officials, AASHO—The First Fifty Years, 1914-1964 (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1965) pp. 52, 53.

^^ Supra, note 17, pp. 5, 6. "A. Johnson, supra, note 22, p. 56. " Ideas and Actions : A History of the Highway Research

Board, 1920-1970 (Highway Research Board, Washington, D.C., 1971) p. 133.

'° Id., p. 105. " Id., pp. 25, 135.

"^Id., p. 136.

^^ Id., p. 53.

^"Id., pp. .57, 58. " P. Wilson, Organization of the Bureau of Public Roads

(file copy of article prepared for U.S. Daily, Apr. 1930).

^^ Dept. of Transportation, The United States Department

OF Transportation—Its Organization and Functions (GPO,

Washington, D.C., 1967) p. 1.

''' P.L. 93-344, Sec. 401 (d)(3)(B)).

^* Federal Highway Administration, Manpower Utilization

Study—1974 (Dept. of Transportation, Washington, D.C., 1974)

p. VI-4. " W. Holt, supra, note 9, p. 12. ^ Bureau of Public Roads, Report On the Junior Engineer

Training Program—July 1, 1946 to October 1, 19.55 (Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1955) p. 1. "Id.

237
Finance

and

Economic/

During the early days of the Republic, road management was amateur in most rural areas, and little money changed hands. The "statutory labor system"

prevailed in most States. Under this arrangement, a "poll" or per-capita tax was usually levied. The

rural citizen could pay it in cash or work it out either

by laboring on the road himself or by hiring a substitute. If he provided a team and wagon, his credit for

work done went up. On the other hand, the average town or city dweller was not his own boss. Unlike the farmer, he could

not arrange to set his own work aside to work a specified number of days on the road. Consequently, in

most municipalities, the residents were taxed for the

improvement, maintenance, and management of streets through property taxes, poll levies, or some other form

of local tax. In the downtown areas of some of the

larger places, businesses were taxed or they contributed voluntarily to the more highly improved streets. During most of the 19th century, the chief source

of funds for financing city and town streets was some form of real estate tax, which fell into three major

classes

• Property taxes levied against all real property

for general purposes, the proceeds going into the

general funds, from which appropriations were made for highway and other j)urposes. • Property taxes levied against all real property

specifically for street purposes. • Special assessments of many kinds levied against

specific parcels of real property for street purposes. In many places, taxes were also imposed on various

types of personal propei'ty, a portion or all of the

proceeds being applietl to street purposes.

The level of total annual expenditures on rural

roads by all governniental agencies seldom, if ever, exceeded $75 million before 1904. By far the largest

portion of this money came from property taxes, al- though a considerable amount also came from poll

and "labor" taxes. The so-called labor taxes were those imposts adopted

to replace the requirement of a labor contribution.

Actual labor contributions remained important in the

building and upkeep of rural roads in some sections

of the country for a long time. In 1914, 18 States

reported considerable use of statutory labor. Although only four States, all in the South, reported

the use of convict labor, it is known to have been more prevalent than this. The practice is still in use

in a few areas today, but the cost of such labor is not

eligible for Federal-aid reimbursement, although it can be used in the case of emergency construction

following a disaster without disqualifying the entire

project.

At the beginning of the automobile era, the street networks of the incorporated places in the United

States were in a much higher state of development

than were the rural roads. It has been estimated that

in 1906, when annual expenditures on rural roads were at the $75 million level, expenditures on city

and village streets were averaging about $300 million

per year. Borrowing to finance large construction

projects of all kinds, seldom resorted to in rural areas

at that time, was a connnon practice in cities, es- pecially in the larger ones. For highway purposes, borrowing in anticipation

of future tax revenue was a local practice at first, but

in 1893 Massachusetts became the first State government to contract debt to finance highways, although

the territory of Idaho issued wagon road bonds as

238
The gas station represents the major source of highway financial income today. Will it he able to support future highway

construction and maintenance?

early as 1890. Other States, notably New York, California, Maryland, and Connecticut, soon followed the

lead of Massachusetts, and State borrowing began a long period of steady increase.

Before 1914, county and local road bonds were con- centrated in a relatively few States, exceeding $10

million in only seven: Ohio, Texas, Pennsylvania,

Indiana, California, New Jersey, and Tennessee.

State Aid for Roadbuilding

State participation in the financing of road construction was an accomplished fact before the motor

vehicle became a practical means of transportation.

It began with a law enacted in New Jersey in 1891

providing for the appointment of Township Committees to inspect the roads in their townships annually

and to develop a systematic improvement plan for

them. The committees were empowered to employ

engineers or other competent persons as consultants

and to i^repare plans and estimates. The financing

plan obligated the State to pay one-third of the cost of improvements; adjacent property owners, one- tenth; and the county in which the improvement was

made, the remaining 57 percent. To the county belonged the responsibility for road maintenance.

Middlesex County, the first to take advantage of

the new plan, borrowed some $50,000 to $60,000 to pay

the cost of three projects totaling nearly 11 miles.

On December 27, 1892, the State paid its share of the

construction cost, almost $21,000, "the first money

paid by the State of New Jersey for improved roadways." ^ The State aid idea caught on rapidly, and, by the

close of 1917, all 48 States had enacted such laws,

though the patterns of aid varied widely from State

to State, some at first providing only advice to the

localities. With the spread of State aid came the development

of State highway systems. The first such system was

established in Massachusetts in 1893 and the last in

Mississippi in 1924. In the early days. State laws

granted varying degrees of State control over these

systems: Some States had none at all; others had full responsibility for them.

The highway-user tax, which was to become the

great provider for large-scale highway development

in this country, appeared inconspicuously, first in

New York in 1901 with a registration fee of $1.00 per

vehicle for regulatory purposes. In 1906, New Jersey

established an annual license fee classified on the

basis of vehicle horsepower. The rate was $3.00 for

vehicles of less than 30 HP and $5.00 for those of 30

or more. The next year, Connecticut provided for a more steeply graduated scale of charges.

Thus, the user charge was in existence at the beginning of this century but not exploited as a source of significant amounts of revenue for highways. Its role as part of a system of motor-vehicle imposts

dedicated to furnishing a consistent, dependable flow

of revenue for long-term highway financing was not

foreseen at this stage of highway development.

239
The highway-user tax derived from the registration of vehicles, in this case a 1905 cadillac. The Federal effort to improve rural post roads was rather

disappointing since only IS States participated in the project.

An Experiment in Federal Aid

The growing demand for highway improvement was reflected in the more than 60 bills introduced in

the Congress in 1912 providing for some form of

Federal aid for this purpose.^ Activities leading

toward development of a plan for nationwide Federal

aid for highways first bore fruit in 1912, when Congress, in passing the Post Office Appropriations Act,

took two steps: (1) It created an investigating committee to study the feasibility of providing Federal aid

for improving rural post roads, and (2) it appropriated $500,000 to aid the immediate building of such

roads.

The Postmaster General and the Secretary of Agriculture were to administer the program jointly, and

they were directed to select and improve certain roads

for mail delivery. The States and their subdivisions were to pay two-thirds of the cost of the improvements and the Federal Government, one-third. The

$500,000 in Federal funds for immediate construction was supplemented with $1.3 million of State and local funds.

Although the funds were provided through the

Post Office Appropriation Act, direct responsibility

for operating the program was assigned to the Office

of Public Roads. For want of a better basis, the

funds were apportioned equally among the States,

Early use of trucks was limited to local industry because of poor road conditions and few interconnecting roads.

about $10,000 to each. This approach failed miserably. Some States refused outright to participate, some were unable to do so because of constitutional

and other limitations, and others simply did not re- spond to the offer. The Public Roads officials, together with cooperative State and local officials, then selected projects

that they believed to be representative in such characteristics as topography, soil condition, and climate.

The first project to be built under this Act extended

for about 30 miles from Florence to Waterloo in

Lauderdale County, Alabama. A total of 455 miles

of road located in the 13 States that elected to take

advantage of the program were improved under this

arrangement, successfully demonstrating the possibilities of a Federal-State cooperative road improvement program.

The Federal Aid Road Act of 1916

Two years before the landmark Federal Aid Road

Act of 1916, revenue for rural roads and bridges had

risen from $80 million in 1904 to $240 million, a threefold increase.* The number of motor vehicles

* In 1904 the Office of Public Roads began a policy of ob- taining road mileage and revenue data at 5-year intervals. In 1904 the data were published in Bulletin No. 32 of the

U.S. Department of Agriculture. The data for the third such

investigation (1914) are presented in HIGHWAY STATISTICS: SUMMARY TO 1965, issued by the Bureau of Public

Roads in 1967, which is the general source of the financial and motor vehicle data in this chapter.

240
registered had increased from 55,000 in 1904 to nearly

2 million in 1914.^ But this increase is not as great

as it appears to be, since it represents a larger number

of States requiring vehicle registration in the later year—47 as compared with only 13 in 1904. Imposts

on motor vehicles, rapidly growing in importance as a source of State income for highways, provided $12

million of the $75 million spent by the States for that

purpose.

Of the almost 2.5 million miles of rural roads in 1914, only 257,000 were surfaced and a mere 14,000

miles had a high type of surface

Bituminous 10,500 miles

Brick 1,600 miles

Concrete 2,300 miles

By 1916, 3.4 million autos were registered and 1 truck for every 14 autos. Roads were not equipped

to meet the needs of this growing vehicle population.

Probably because of the poor condition of most rural

roads and their discontinuity, the use of trucks was

limited almost entirely to cities and their close-in

suburbs. Although trucks were beginning to be used

for intercity transportation, this use was not yet

economically significant and was largely restricted to the household moving industry.

Yet the potential of trucking was recognized ; and

farmei"s, railroads, and others joined the ranks of the

auto owners and wheelmen (bicyclists) who were dissatisfied with the progress being made and who were

pressing for better roads. One of their loudest complaints was about the lack of completed intercounty

and interstate improved routes. County and local authorities tended to improve

those roads that were the objects of the greatest local pressure or were best suited to the needs of the local

economy in nari'ow terms, with little regard for the

requirements of the traffic going to and from other

jurisdictions. Nor did the States usually make a

serious effort to gear their road improvements to those of adjoining States. A step forward in progress toward connected road

systems, the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 contained some of the most important principles still in effect today. The Act reserved to the States the right to

initiate projects and determine their characteristics

and to perform the work dix'ectly or by contract. Completed projects were to be federally inspected and

approved for reimbursement to the extent of 50 per- cent of the funds expended, not to exceed $10,000 a

mile. The policy of the United States Government

favoring a tax-supported highway system was ex- pressed in a provision that "All roads constructed

under the provision of this Act shall be free from

tolls of all kinds."

While the Act itself did not require that Federal

aid be spent upon designated-system routes, the

Bureau of Public Roads requested that each State

highway department designate a limited system to which it would confine its Federal aid. Maintenance was made a State and local responsibility.

In recognition of the longer time span required for

financing large capital improvements, funds were appropriated for a 5-year program and wei'e apportioned

among the States according to a formula based on

area, population, and post road mileage. Thus, the

eligibility of roads for improvement with Federal-aid

money, adopted from the earlier post road Act, car- ried forward the justification of Federal aid on the

basis of the use of roads for carrying, the mail, al- though the provision Avas so broad as to enable almost

any rural road to qualify.

World War I and Its Aftermath

At the end of 1917, all 48 States had formed highway departments adequate to meet the I'equirements

of "the 1916 Act, and 26 States had submitted for

approval 92 projects involving 948 miles of road, ex- pected to cost about $5 million. With United States' participation late in World War I came general eco- nomic dislocations because of the draining of manpower and materials to the war effort. By the 1918

fiscal year, all Federal-aid work was limited to projects essential to that effort. Even so, the required

projects were such that the amonut of P'ederal-aid construction completed and under agreement continued to grow.

Following the Armistice on November 11, 1918, the

public began to clamor for a speedup in the regular

Fedei"al-aid program. In 1919, Congress increased

the appropriation for the period 1916-1921 from $75

million to $200 million. In spite of the handicaps of

shortages and high costs of materials and labor,

strikes, and unrest, the work accomplished during

fiscal year 1920 exceeded by 25 percent all work done

previously under the Federal Aid Road Act. During the year, a survey was launched to obtain

data needed to establish a classified system of highways. At the same time. Federal officials were co- operating with the War Department in selecting a system of highways of military importance.

Before the First World War, the military establishment exhibited little interest in trucks and truck

transi^ortation. In 1911 the Army began experimenting with their use. In 1912 it tried out trucks

of 11 different makes in a cross-country operation

from AVashington, D.C., to Atlanta, Georgia, and

thence to a camp near Sparta, Wisconsin. Only one

vehicle, an all-wheel drive truck, finished the journey.

The resulting Army report approved the use of trucks

for field and supply purposes, but nothing came of it. By this time, the Office of Public Roads had be- come interested in the possibilities of overland truck

transportation. In 1911, the agency participated in

the first coast-to-coast journey made by a truck by

designating the driver as a special agent of the Office

of Public Roads. Although the trip was accomplished

in two entirely separate operations, it reached both

coasts and demonstrated that trucks could negotiate

the nearly impassable roads and rugged terrain.

World War I was the first "motorized" war, and

thousands of trucks were built by American factories

for military use. In 1919 a convoy of 20 Army trucks was sent from Washington, D.C., to San Francisco to further demonstrate the capability of such vehicles

for wartime transportation. It took 56 days to complete the trip. One of the officers making the journey was Captain Dwight D. Eisenhower, who became

greatly impressed wuth the possibilities of highway

transportation.

241
One of the significant roles of highways in freight

movement has been to serve "as extenders and connectors for other transportation modes." One highway extension of rail service, now called "piggyback,"

began in a primitive form in the 19th century when

circus wagons and wagons carrying farm produce and

livestock were transported on flatcars, starting and

finishing their journeys on their own wheels.

As now used, the term piggyback service means

transporting cargo by both rail and highway, in or on highway trailers and principally in van-sized containers. Beginning in the 1920's and extending into the

1930's, extensive experimenting with piggyback service was carried on in an effort to increase the use of

motor vehicles in moving freight by overcoming the

limitations imposed by poor roads in disconnected

systems. Conditions of the time did not support the

effort, and it was left to the future.

Uncertainty and Crisis in the States Failure of the Congress to enact a new highway

bill before January 1921 precipitated a major financial crisis in most States. Having no assurance that

a Federal-aid highway bill would be passed, the States

had to cut back severely on work underway and con- templated. Contracts in progress were modified or

canceled. Requests for bid proposals were withdrawn. Clearly a capital program of this magnitude

required the regular commitment of funds over the

relatively long period from planning to the completion of construction.

The States, seeking new ways to bolster their reve- nues, had begun to look to the motor vehicle as a

potentially productive source. As motor vehicles be- came more numerous on the highways and their damaging effects on lightly constructed road surfaces

became evident during the war period of 1917-1918,

the practice of graduating registration fees with the

weight or capacity of the vehicle grew until it had

spread to all States. By 1917 all States required

motor vehicles to be registered at fees averaging a

little jnore than $7.00 per vehicle.

In 1919 the State of Oregon levied the first tax on

the sale of fuel for motor vehicles. The tax was

adopted by other States because it proved at least a rough measure of highway use, was relatively painless to the taxpayer, and easy for the State to administer. But in 1921 this tax, which later became the

prime revenue producer for highways, brought in

only $5 million, compared with $116 million for registration fees. AASHO Recommendations

Shortcomings of the 1916 Act began to be evident

by 1919, and the annual report of the Bureau of

Public Roads for the 1920 fiscal year contained rec- ommendations made by the American Association of

State Highway Officials for modifying some of the

financial provisions of the law

• Federal appropriations should be at least $100

million a year in order to carry out the program. • The Federal-State 50-50 matching ratio should

be modified to increase the Federal share in States

where more than 10 percent of the area was

public lands. • The application of Federal aid should be re- stricted to those roads that would expedite completion of a national highway system. • Federal appropriations for forest roads should

be continued for 10 years at the level of $10

million a year. The Federal Highway Act of 1921 provided for

only a 1-year continuation of the cooperative FederalState financing plan by appropriating $75 million for

the 1922 fiscal year. But the next year, Congress

began the practice of authorizing Federal aid for suc- ceeding periods of 2 or 3 years. These funds were

then apportioned to the States in accordance with

The corner of Dearborn and Randolph Streets in Chicago, 1910.

IIIWIP!

242
the previously existing formula with two modifications : one for small States and the other for the large

public land States. For small States, which were receiving virtually

meaningless amounts of aid (for example, less than

$25,000 apiece for Delaware, Xew Hampshire, Rhode

Island, and Vermont in 1917), a floor of at least one- half of 1 percent of the total apportionment was

established. For the large western States, whose ex- tensive areas of untaxable federally owned land put

them at a serious disadvantage, the remedy was to increase the Federal share of highway funds above

50 percent in proportion to the ratio of public lands

to the total area of the State. The areas within national forests, parks, and monuments were excluded

from the calculation.

To insure that Federal funds would be spent on

roads of more than strictly local importance, the Act

required that all Federal-aid funds be expended on a primary system of highways limited to 7 percent of

the State's total highway mileage on November 9, 1921. This interconnected system included two classes of highways: (1) Primary or interstate highways,

comprising % of the system, and (2) secondary or

intercounty highways, comprising the remainder. No

more than 60 percent of the funds apportioned were

to be expended on the primary or interstate highways.

City residents began to benefit from the highway

improvement program long before the expenditure of

Federal-aid highway funds on municipal streets was

authorized. By focusing attention upon the improvement of intercity and interstate routes, the creation

of the Federal-aid primary system under the 1921

Act stimulated more travel over greater distancesthan had been possible before.

Urban automobile owners began to venture beyond

the city limits on "joy rides," and commercial and

intercity trucking developed. On the other hand, al- though farm-to-market truckino' of ajrricultural commodities became common in many areas, the horse

and wagon was still an important factor in such

movements.

Highways a Local Program

The highway program was still essentially a local one in 1921, financed largely from property taxes and

general-fund revenues and concentrated on county and

local roads. If the work-relief expenditures of the

thirties are excluded, the estimated capital outlay of

$337 million for county and local roads in 1921 was

not equaled until the early fifties. At the same time,

almost three-fourths ($771 million) of the more than

$1 billion of total current revenue (i.e., exclusive of

bond proceeds) available for road and street purposes was obtained from county and local sources. The

Federal and State governments furnished the remaining $285 million, of which $123 million (43 percent) came from State imposts on motor vehicles.

Bond proceeds of $353 million increased the current

(exclusive of bond receipts) highway funds available

by about one-third. The county and rural local governments borrowed about 57 percent of this sum ($202

million) and the States the remainder. Borrowing

by municipalities was not reported.

Increasing Role of Credit Financing

It was conunon practice to issue highway bonds

secured by a general pledge of the taxing power of

the issuing authority. These general obligation or

full faith bonds are still predominant among the

obligations issued to finance toll-free capital projects.

As the revenue potential of highway-user taxes came to be realized, the practice of issuing State

highway bonds gathered momentum. Those highway

administrators who advocated credit financing con- tended, with much justification, that the savings to highway users brought about by acceleration of the

road-improvement program would more than compensate for the interest charges on the bond issues.

The same corner in 1966.

248
liiHaaaiEi

A 1922 deluxe coach manufactured by the Superior Motor

Coach Body Company.

During the period from 1921 to 1930, bond proceeds

contributed from 25 to 40 percent of all State construction funds. This was the first great period of

accelerated bond financing. Illinois, for example,

authorized bond issues totaling $160 million ; Missouri,

$135 million; and North Carolina, $115 million. In

these States, and others with similar programs, bond

issues formed the bulk of highway construction funds

during the decade.

A number of States that did not or, because of

constitutional limitations, could not issue bonds did

not hesitate to make use of the borrowing power of

the counties, townships, and road districts. These

units in numerous States either borrowed to build

roads that later became State highways or supplied

bond proceeds to the State highway departments.

Beginning in the 1920's, many States undertook to reimburse the counties for these contributions to State

highway systems. These obligations usually took one

of two forms: (1) An agreement between the State

and its local governments whereby the State would

reimburse the local governments in annual amounts

for costs incurred initially in building roads that

later become part of the State systems or (2) an agreement whereby the State would pay to its counties an

annual amount equal to the interest and principal on

local highway bonds issued for such purposes. The

security for this type of obligation was somewhat

obscure except when the State had funded or refunded

the obligation from the proceeds of its own bond

issues. The practice of transferring funds between levels of government complicates the pattern of highway

finance in other ways. The States not only provide

financial aid to counties and cities, but they spend

money directly on county roads and city streets. There are also arrangements whereby one unit of

government performs certain services (maintenance,

for example) for another and is reimbursed for the

cost of the services.

Most of the Federal expenditures for highways in

1921 were, of course, in the form of aid to the States,

amounting to $78 million. The States also received

$33 million from county and local rural governments

and transferred $22 million to them—a net increase

of $11 million in State funds and a corresponding

decrease in the county and local funds available for

expenditure on roads.

The Federal Highway Act of 1921 confirmed the

Federal Government's policy against tolls on federally

aided facilities expressed in the 1916 Act. But large

bridges and other crossing facilities, because of their

semi-monopoly position and their costliness, had long

been widely accepted as suitable for toll-revenue

financing. The use of revenue bonds payable solely

from the earnings of the facility (tolls) began with

the Port of New York Authority bond issues in 1926.

In 1927 Federal policy with respect to tolls was

modified by the Oldfield Act (now 23 U.S.C. 129(a)),

which allowed the States or their instrumentalities to use Federal funds to construct or acquire toll bridges,

provided that net revenues would be applied to the

capital costs of the facility or the retirement of its debt and provided that the facility would be toll free

upon retirement of its outstanding indebtedness. This

Act had the effect of discouraging the construction of

privately owned facilities and did not lead to any

significant amount of toll bridge construction.

From War to Depression

The period following passage of the Federal Highway Act of 1921 was one of considerable accomplishment, as improvements on the designated Federal-aid

system moved forward. Annual Federal authorizations remained at $75 million through 1930 and the onset of the Great Depression.

Total expenditure for highways by all levels of

government grew rapidly, reaching $2.5 billion by

1930. State income for highway purposes had risen

steadily since 1920. The yield of State motor fuel

244
taxes constituted only 3 percent of State and local imposts on motor vehicles in 1921. By 1926 they

totaled $188 million, which was 40 percent of user-tax

collections, though still well below the $258 million

received from registration fees. In 1929, the fii'st year in which all the States and

the District of Columbia levied the motor fuel tax,

its yield exceeded that of registration fees. By 1931

it produced $538 million, nearly three times tlie 1926

yield and close to twice the income from registration

fees of $298 million.

In 1923, when 37 States imposed a motor fuel tax,

the average rate was under 2 cents a gallon. In 1929

it averaged approximately 3.7 cents. A new fee was added to the user-tax family in the

twenties. Vehicle-operator and chauffeur licensing

began in most States in the early part of the decade.

In 1925 the States obtained nearly $10 million from

this fee, which is not considered a prime source of revenue for road purposes.

As the decade of the thirties opened, the Depression

triggered by the 1929 stock market crash was beginning to be felt in liighway financing, but there was a delayed response to economic conditions so that, for a time, the pattern of highway finance continued very

much as it had before. The Federal-aid program had

been moving forward at a rapid rate. Federal aid

for highways of $273 million in 1931 was nearly three

times the 1921 figure. Together, Federal and State

funds were providing half of all current income available for roads and streets. The equivalent of most of

the Federal-aid funds received by the States was

passed on to the counties and local governments. Only

$50 million of these funds was spent by the States

themselves.

State taxes on motor vehicles and their use were now a major element in the tax structure. Totaling

$848 million in 1931, they were 93 percent of all State revenue for highways obtained from State sources. They provided nearly seven times their 1921 yield

and constituted about 36 percent of the total of $2.3

billion available in that year for highway and street expenditure by all levels of government. State bond

proceeds added another $351 million to the available

State funds.

On the expenditure side, the total by all levels of

government began to decline sharply in 1930 until it reached a low level of about $1.7 billion in 1933.

Although declining, State current expenditures (excluding debt retirement) of $1 billion in 1931 were

still more than 2i/^ times their 1921 level. On the

income side, on the other hand, average State registration fees and related imposts began to decline only

slightly after 1931, largely because of the adoption of

graduated fee schedules lowering the rates for certain

types of vehicles, notably passenger cars and light

trucks.

For county and local roads, expenditures from

regular highway funds had reached $700 million in

1930, nearly $100 million more than they were in 1921.

Expenditures for city and village streets showed much

greater growth, rising from $337 million to a high

point (if Federal work-relief expenditures are omitted) of about $800 million. Taken together, these

1930 expenditures by the counties and localities, rural

and urban, weie more than 11/^ times their 1921 level. During the 10-year period since 1921, a change in

emphasis had taken place in the financing of local

I'oads and streets. In 1930 the counties and local rural units of government were spending more to maintain and administer their roads and to pay in- terest on the debt incuri'ed for highways than they were spending for new construction. Expenditure for

construction by the urban governments exceeded those

of the rural governments by close to $200 million, a

foretaste of the effects of the great population move- ment to the cities.

Failure of the Property Tax

Motor vehicle imposts were relatively unaffected by

the Depression. The major problem in highway

finance arose from the failure of the property tax to

fulfill its customary role in support of the highway

function, which had been a major recipient of property tax income in most States. The municipalities were almost totally dependent on the property tax

for road and street funds, and the counties and local

rural governments only a little less so. As income from farming and other sources declined,

unemployment soared, and prices (especially farm

prices)" skidded downward, taxpayers began to default on their mortgage and tax payments. Delinquency rates rose rapidly, and mortgage foreclosures

and tax sales became common.

State laws were enacted providing for increased

leniency toward tax delinquents. Limits were placed on tax rates, the levy of taxes on propei'ty for certain

purposes was sometimes forbidden, and homeowner

and other exemptions were introduced.

Laying a new stone block surface at East 23d and Broadway

in New York City in the late 1920's.

245
Much automobile travel loas evident in the 1930's despite the Depression, thus, the need for new autos to replace old ones.

In 1931, the States faced difficulty in matching

their Federal-aid apportionments. To ease the effects of the Depression, annual Federal highway authorizations were increased to $205 million in 1931, reduced

somewhat to $125 million in 1932, and increased again

to $229 million in 1933. But the lack of matching

funds was only partly the result of these large in- creases above the $75 million a year previously

authorized. Nor did it arise from declining State revenues from motor vehicle imposts, since these reve- nues declined very little at any time during the Depression. Eather, it stemmed from the large sums

used by the States to replace local revenues from

property taxes in financing local roads and city and

village streets. Moreover, substantial amounts were

diverted from highways to meet the rising demand

for expenditures for other purposes.

Many States took action to provide tax relief by

reducing or eliminating property taxes as a source of revenue for highways. In four States (Delaware,

North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia), re- sponsibility for administering and financing all county

and local rural roads was transferred to the States,

except that in Virginia the counties were allowed the

option of retaining control of their highways. Following the transfers, local property taxes for highways

were customarily reserved for servicing debt already

outstanding and sometimes for bridge construction.

Indiana was representative of States that left sec- ondary and local roads under local control but provided for the transfer of State motor-vehicle user

taxes to the local jurisdictions for the support of

roads. In these States, imposition of property taxes

for highways was usually forbidden except for bond

service. Most of the remaining States adopted a middle course, transferring some roads from local to State responsibility or providing increased State aid

for secondary or local roads.

Emergency Federal Aid

In an act passed on December 30, 1930, Congress

advanced $80 million to the States for matching regular Federal-aid apportionments. As conditions worsened, the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of

1932 made a further advance of $120 million. It also

provided for 1 -percent additions to the Federal-aid

highway systems that were originally limited by the

Federal Highway Act of 1921 to 7 percent of total State highway mileage, as these systems were completed according to standards acceptable to the Bureau

of Public Roads.

Unemployment grew to crisis proportions, and Congress was forced to turn from the regular Federalaid program to other types of financing, emphasizing

projects that would provide for as much direct labor

as possible. Thus, the regular Federal-aid authorizations were replaced with emergency appropriations.

The Federal Government made available a total of

$1 billion of such funds for the fiscal years 1934^1936,

far more than ever before for a like period of time.

The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,

while not primarily a highway bill, included several

provisions affecting the financing of highways. The

President was authorized to make grants of not less than $400 million to State highway departments to provide for the emergency construction of highways.

The use of these funds did not carry with it the

customary restrictions on the use of Federal-aid highway funds. The funds were to be available without

matching by the States. They could be used for

projects on the urban extensions of Federal-aid sys- tem routes; for paying as much as 100 percent of the

costs of preliminary engineering; for projects asso- ciated with highway safety, such as building footpaths or eliminating highway-railroad grade cross- ings; and for construction on secondary and feeder

roads off the Federal-aid system.

246
Seven-eighths of these emergency funds were to be

apportioned according to the regular Federal-aid

formula and the remainder on the basis of population

alone. The Act did not specify how the funds were

to be allocated to the highway systems. An administrative decision was made to allocate about 50 percent

to the rural Federal-aid system, 25 percent to its urban extensions, and 25 percent to secondary and

feeder roads.

Some $95 million of the authorized $400 uiillion went to highway projects on secondary or feeder

roads not then on the approved systeui of Federal-aid

highways but which were either part of State highway systems or important local highways leading to shipping points on roads that would permit the ex- tension of existing transportation facilities. This was

the first major Federal action directed towards sec- ondary or farm-to-market roads.^

The Hayden-Cart wright Act of 1934 authorized a highway appropriation of $200 million to be apportioned to the States immediately according to the

revised fonnula of the National Industrial Recovery

Act. No less than 25 percent of the apportionment

to an}' State was to be applied to secondary or feeder

roads.

The States were relieved from repayment through

deductions from future Federal-aid apportionments

previously advanced for emergency unemployment

relief. Matching by the States was not required, and

the money could be used to pay for such preconstruction expenses as surveys and the preparation of plans.

The effect of the 1934 Act was to incorporate as a matter of continuing Federal-aid highway policy the

provisions for using Federal funds to improve sec- ondary and feeder roads and to eliminate such traffic hazards as railroad-highway grade crossings. The

Act also provided for withholding sums up to one- third of their subsequent Federal-aid highway apportionments from States using motor-vehicle revenue

for nonhighway purposes, except in those instances

provided for by State laws in force at the time the

Hayden-Cartwright Act was passed. This was the

genesis of many State so-called "antidiversion" amendments.

State governments have often dedicated income

from particular sources to particular purposes. This

practice, which is embodied in State constitutions and

statutes, has the effect of removing "earmarked" reve- nues from the regular annual or biennial review of

the legislature. Carried to an extreme, it allows no

flexibility in applying income to the governmental

services determined to be necessary at any given time,

so that a case could be—and was—made for the point

of view that the special commitment of funds to highway purposes had no valid significance—that all governmental revenues should be general revenues and

all expenses should be defrayed out of general funds.

AAHiile it was generally acknowledged that the non- highway purposes to which highway-user revenues had been directed were, for the most part, essential

functions for which money must be obtained from

some source, nevertheless the antidiversionists pointed

to the fact that the State highway-user tax schedules

had been predicated on the concept that in paying

these taxes the highway user was contributing his

due share to the support of the highway system.

Highway-user taxes being measured by the requirements for highway expenditures, the product of these

taxes, it was argued, should be used for the purpose

that determines their magnitude.

Historically, the highway function in this country

had always partaken of the nature of a public utility,

with aspects both of a private-enterprise and a governmental activity. Before the coming of the motor

vehicle, local taxpayers could not meet the demand

for land transportation over long distances, and it was left to private capital to provide these facilities. For a while, the pricing mechanism was tolls, and the

user-tax principle was partially developed during the

period of the early toll roads. These roads were soon put out of business by the railroads, roads once more

becoming a local governmental function. Highwayuser taxes, then, could with justification be linked to the benefits received from the service to which they were dedicated, inasmuch as they provided an indi- rect pricing of the benefits of highway use. With the development of the road-user tax struc- ture and its growing importance as a source of highway funds during the 1930's, a number of States

followed the lead of New Mexico, the first State to

issue general obligation bonds secured by a specific

pledge of road-user tax revenue. Bonds backed by

this type of security proved to be a more attractive

investment than bonds secured by the general taxing

power of the State. Although no regular Federal-aid authorizations were made for the fiscal years 1934 or 1935, Federal

funds continued to be authorized for forest highways

(begun in 1917) and public lands highways (begun

in 1931). Other highway funds not administered by

the Bureau of Public Roads were made available

through the National Park Service, the Forest Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Allocations

for Indian reservation roads were made for the first time in 1933.

Although 1934 was a mid-Depression year, the in- dicators of highway use were on the upswing. Motor

vehicle registrations were already close to full re- covery.

Present patterns of automobile use were fairly well

established at that time. More automobile trips were made for earning a living than for any other purpose,

and most auto trips were within a radius of less than

10 miles from home. Average annual automobile

travel was generally least in the rural agricultural areas and highest in middle-sized cities. As motor vehicle ownership increased and private

automobile travel became more convenient and dependable, other available passenger service began to dwindle and, in some cases, essentially disaj)pear.

Among the casualties—mainly after 1930—were the

electric interurbans, local railroad passenger service,

and local comnmter bus and trolley service. By the

late 1930's, many connnunities were left with no public passenger transportation service at all.

247
Moving people and goods: the trolley line, the highway, the

canal, and the railroad. By late 1930's, the trolley lines and the canals had become casualties of the transport war

between highways and railroads.

The transportation of goods by highway, on the

other hand, was becoming increasingly important

economically, so much so that by the late 1930's the

railroads, beginning to view intercity truck transportation as a competitive threat, called for a study of

truck taxation. In 1936, the first year such calculations wei'e attempted by the Bureau of Public Roads,

the average truck was estimated to have been driven

about 10,000 miles a year, and total travel of all trucks was estimated at 41 billion vehicle-miles.

Special fees and taxes had begun to be levied in

connection with registration fees on for-hire carriers

of persons and property. By the mid-thirties, such

imposts were in effect generally in the States, although

they were not great revenue producers. Their importance lay in their usefulness as a means of regulation and of applying concepts of equity to the tax

schedules.

The 1933 low point of $1.7 billion in total expenditures for highways was followed by an erratic in- crease, which peaked at almost $2.7 billion in 1938.

Then the Federal emergency funds began to run out. But the expenditures from funds normally available

for highways continued a gradual upward trend until

World War II stringencies began to force a reduction.

Federal work-relief expenditures, although continued

through 1942, reached a maximum in 1938, when the

amount spent on covmty and local rural roads reached

$389 million and on city and village streets, $367

million.

The late 1930's saw what may be said to be the

beginning of the modern toll road movement with the

construction of the Pennsylvania Turnpike from 1937

to 1939. The State turned to this method of financing

because of insufficient funds to improve existing roads

to adequate standards. But the turnpike was not

financed as a wholly self-supporting facility. Federal

Public Works Administration grants totaling $295

million were supplemented by $40.8 million of bonds

sold to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The

turnpike suffered badly because of wartime restric- tions in the 1940's, and it operated at a loss most of

the time until the end of the war. Although the total governmental debt for highways

included such large revenue bond issues as those for

the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the San Francisco Bay

Bridge, and the Port of New York Authority's bridge

and tunnel program, the period of the 1930's produced

slightly diminished State highway borrowing. The

dominance of Federal-aid funds during this period

of depression and recovery reduced the relative contribution of bond proceeds to about 20 percent of the

funds used to finance highways. But the reliance on borrowing shifted from the local governments to the

State. In 1926 State highway bond issues exceeded

those of county and rural local governments for the

fii'st time and, with several exceptions, have annually

dominated the highway bond market.

The Federal Government's anti-toll policy was once again written into the statutes with the passage in

1937 of a law authorizing Federal-aid funds to be

used for freeing toll bridges on the Federal-aid sys- tem. It authorized the payment of Federal money

up to 50 percent of the cost of labor and materials

actually used in the construction of any toll bridge

built after 1927 on the Federal-aid system. In return,

the recipients had to agree to reuiove the tolls. At the close of the 1930's, highways had not fully

recovered from the eft'ects of the Depression. World

War II was raging, and the possibility of an end to United States neutrality was on the horizon.

248
Highway Development During World War I! The Federal Hijrhway Act of 1940 became law more

than a year before the Pearl Harbor incident made

the United States an active belligerent. The Act

provided that, on request of the Secretaries of War

and Navy or the head of any other official national

defense agency and by order of the Federal Works

Administrator, Federal-aid highway funds previously

authorized could be used, without matching, to pay

for preliminary engineering and for supervising the

construction of projects essential to the national

defense.

The decade of the 1940's was marked by two contrasting developments: (1) The cessation of normal

highway construction during World War II folloAved

by (2) accelerated construction expenditure accompanied by an increase in borrowing for highway

purposes after the war. At the outset, the Nation was entering a period of wartime economic boom that

hastened what might otherwise have been a long, slow

pull out of the Depression. But the boom foimd

materials, equipment, and labor for normal civilian

purposes in short supply.

In 1941, 78,000 miles of highway were designated

as the strategic network developed in cooperation

with the War Department and used in selecting highpriority projects for construction. Approximately 20

percent of the mileage in this network was found to be seriously inadequate, and the proportion was found

to be even higher on other essential roads, such as those providing access to war industries, ammunition

depots, and military establishments.

The Defense Highway Act of 1941 appropriated

funds for construction on the strategic network, to be

apportioned according to the standard formula but

with State participation limited to not more than 25

percent of the project cost. Funds were authorized,

without apportionment, for projects on access roads,

these funds to be available with or without State

matching and usable for purchasing right-of-way and

for ofi-stx'eet parking.

Policy for the conservation of critical materials

called for (1) deferring all nonessential highway

construction that would consume large amounts of

such materials; (2) substituting less critical materials,

where possible; and (3) deferring construction

through maintenance operations. These practices

plus the inability of govei'nments to stretch the available resources in materials and manpower to cover

routine maintenance added to the large volume of

unmet highway needs that had been accumulating

since the early 1930's. Highway expenditures, which had not yet returned

to their pre-Depression level, again began to decline.

County and local governments, both rural and urban, were receiving from 45 to 47 percent less from their

own sources than they had in 1930. Though in 1941

State-collected highway revenues were 36 percent

above their 1931 level and the States had stepped up

their aid to rural local governments, still the funds

available for local roads were substantially below the

1931 figure. Construction expenditures for county

and rural local roads reached a low i^oint of $72 million in 1944.

In 1943 and 1944, total expenditures on city and

village streets reached their lowest level ($321 million)

since 1920. The principal cause was the war-imposed

curtailment of construction, which totaled only $71

million in 1943. Expenditures at the Federal and

State levels also declined until the close of World

War 11. The 1943 Highway Act amending the Defense

Highway Act of 1941 served as a bridge between

wartime and postwar programs. It extended the

emergency funding programs of the 1941 Act and

amended the definition of construction in order to continue the use of Federal-aid highway funds for

the purchase of right-of-way. It also broadened the

provisions related to reimbursing the States and other

governments for road damage resulting from national

defense and other war-related activities. Executive Order 8989 of December 18, 1941, created

the Office of Defense Transport (ODT) as a wartime

agency to assure continued essential operations and

maximum use of domestic transport facilities for the

successful prosecution of the war. The ODT's Highway Transport Division, supervising motor transportation, pursued the objective of the order through

issuance of orders governing full loading, delivery

schedules, and interchange of freight. It also pressed

for allocations of fuel, tires, and other critical items

in short supply to enable domestic truck transportation to perform its service.

Postwar Problems

When the war ended in 1945, highway agencies

entered the postwar period under conditions of great

difficulty. It had become apparent that during the

period j)receding the war, insufficient effort was put

into the construction and maintenance of roads and

streets to insure that the quality and condition of the

highway plant would keep pace with the demands of

traffic. The agencies were therefore faced with the

necessity of a widespread modernization and reconditioning of highway facilities, both rural and urban.

The problem was complicated by the fact that construction and maintenance costs, which rose very materially during the war period, become inflated with

the general rise in prices that followed.

The Federal Government's grand plan of attack on postwar highway problems was embodied in the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944, which added some

important new provisions: • A new National System of Interstate Highways,

not to exceed 40,000 miles in length, was

authorized. • A specific system of secondary Federal-aid highways, not limited in size, was provided for. • Recognition was given for the first time to a system of urban extensions of rural Federal-aid

highways. • Authorizations were made by systems in a 45-30-

25 ratio for primary, secondary, and urban

(ABC) systems for each of 3 successive years. No funds were specifically authorized for the

Interstate System.

The apportionment formula adopted for the Primary

System was continued, giving equal weight to the

249
three factors of population, area, and post road mileage. The formula adopted for the Secondary System was the same except that rural instead of total population was used. The urban apportionment was based on the sole factor of population of municipalities and

other urban areas of 5,000 or more. The Act added to the law a provision authorizing

the States to use 10 percent of apportioned Federal

funds without matching to eliminate hazards of highway-railway crossings on the Federal-aid systems.

The railroads were to contribute 10 percent of the

construction cost of those projects benefiting them.

Postwar TaxaHon for Highways

During the 1940's, the States strove to improve

their revenue positions by increasing the tax rates on motor fuel. In 1947, 8 States raised their rates, and

the average rate for all States rose from 4.16 to 4.25 cents a gallon. During 1949, 13 States increased their

rates, bringing the average State rate to 4.52 cents. Regardless of what originally precipitated the

adoption of user taxes, no carefully worked out theory

preceded their adoption. The theoretical foundation was built after the tax framework was erected. The

structure of highway taxes was an evolution brought

about over a long time by balancing the demands of

conflicting interests with the necessities for the development and support of highways.

The Rio Grande Gorge Bridge, located near Taos, N. Mex.

carries the highway over the Rio Grande 650 feet beloiv. Originally, Federal aid was limited to $10,000 per mile for

bridges under 20 feet and 50 percent of the cost for bridges over 20 feet. Because bridges are so costly to build, many

are financed through bonds or as toll facilities.

Part of the pressure that led to the development of

a more organized body of highway tax theory during

this period was produced by a changed attitude on

the part of the railroad industry. The industry had

been a supporter of highway development in the beginning, viewing road improvements as a means of

providing better feeders to their lines. At that time

they paid taxes without complaint. But as highways

encouraged long-distance freight movement by truck,

they began to realize that they were facing serious

competition. Fearful of the results of growing di- version of traffic, they became active critics of both

the operating and the business practices of highway

carriers and of the extent to which such carriers paid

taxes to support the government expenditures made

in their behalf, i.e., the extent of the public subsidy

of the motor carrier industry.

The framework of highway tax theory is founded on the principle that taxation for the support of

highways should be assessed in proportion to benefits

received. There had been nearly universal acceptance

250
of the concept that the provision of highway facilities serves three major interests finding a parallel in three

principal sources of highway revenue : • The interest of access to land and improvements,

a service indispensable to personal, family, and

business activity (taxes on land). • The f)ublic interest or general welfare, represented

by the use of roads in such public activities as national defense, police and fire protection, access

to schools, and conservation of natural resources (appropriations from general funds). • The interest of the motor-vehicle user in providing facilities upon which the private automobile

may be used in recreational, social, and personal

business activities and the commercial vehicle

ma}' be operated in gainful pursuits (motorvehicle user taxes).

The fact that the owners and occupants of adjacent

and nearby property received special benefits from

highway improvements had long been recognized by

the common practice of imposing special assessments

for such improvement. Benefits to property throughout a given area were recognized in taxes upon property in general, and the general property tax was

also recognized as representing community benefits as well as those directly assignable to the land.

The fact that the benefit principle was firmly imbedded in the earlier period of highway financing

probably paved the way for the adoption of motorvehicle registration fees and gasoline taxes as means

of taxing the motor-vehicle owner for benefits re- ceived. Thus, the gasoline tax, during the period

when it was being eagerly adopted by State after

State, was commonly described as a "metered tax,"

and one State, New Hampshire, continued to call its gasoline tax the "road toll." The further fact that the rapidly developing use of

motor vehicles was bringing about the necessity for

greater and greater highway expenditures was also a very potent factor in popularizing the imposition of

After WW II it teas evident that greater highway expenditures

would he needed to cope with the volume of traffic. Highway

taxation had to he determined on an equitable assignment

of tax responsihility among beneficiary groups in proportion

to the benefits received.

user taxes. Thus the concepts that underlie the later investigations of the highway tax problem had a

natural evolution in the history of highway development.

The central problem of highway taxation was one

of determining an equitable assignment of tax re- sponsibility among various beneficiary groups in proportion to the benefits received or highway costs occasioned by each of these groups. The problem

divided itself into two parts: (1) The allocation of

the highway tax burden among the major classes of

beneficiaries of highway expenditures and (2) once

the equitable portion assignable to motor-vehicle users was determined, the allocation of the motor-vehicle

user share among vehicles of different sizes, weights,

and classes of use. A number of methods with supporting concepts were devised for making these determinations and were used by many States for

revising their tax schedules.

Vehicle Registrations and Fuel Consumption

Largely because of the effects of motor fuel rationing, motor vehicle registrations declined only 13 per- cent during World War II, compared with decreases

of 37 and 33 percent, respectively, in travel and fuel

consumption. Until the 1940's the rate of growth in

fuel consumption per vehicle closely paralleled the

rate in total fuel consumption. But after 1946, the

rate per vehicle rose more slowly than that of total consumption, because of the growing density of motor

vehicle ownership. While ownership of more than

one car increases the total miles of driving, the in- crease is not proportionate to the number of vehicles

owned. Thus, a household with one car averaging

12,000 miles of driving annually does not double that

mileage by buying a second car but may increase it to perhaps 15,000 or 18,000 miles. Fuel consumption in

1946 averaged about 746 gallons per vehicle per year.^

New Directions in Borrowing

The venerable custom of borrowing money and

paying interest on it has its motivation in the simple

economic fact that money in hand always has more

value than an equal amount in prospect. The exist- ence of a net advantage to be derived from the use of

funds now rather than in the future is the criterion

justifying public borrowing.

251
The most favorable condition for credit financing

is that of a truly accelerated program contemplating

a relatively short period of abnormally high capital

outlay, during which the highway plant progresses

rapidly toward a condition of adequacy. A subsequent lull in consti'uction activity, during which the

need for replacements accumulates very slowly, provides the opportunity for retirement of the bonds.

Conditions following the end of the war wei'e ripe

for such a program. The need for greatly increased

expenditures to permit reaching a standard of adequacy was recognized in most States. The demands

for highway capital funds for financing particular

urgently needed facilities or statewide "catch-up"

programs encouraged the circumvention of constitutional barriers to State-created debt, either by the more direct but less frequent method of amendment

or referendum or by the speedier and, hence, more

popular device of the nonguaranteed bond that does

not have recourse to the full taxing power of the

issuing government and does not require approval of

the electorate. Because they command higher interest rates, non- guaranteed bonds almost always carry with them a higher cost to the public. But the additional cost may be a justifiable premium to pay for avoiding the

consequences and delays of seeking voter approval.

During the 5-year period 1946-1950, the States, in- cluding special State authorities and commissions,

issued over $1 billion in highway bonds (not including refunding issues) ; the counties and other rural

local units issued $429 million; and the cities and

other incorporated places issued $635 million. The

combined total was $2.2 billion of a total outstanding

debt at the end of 1950 of about $4.5 billion. The debt issued during this period tended to be

concentrated along the Eastern Seaboard, where so much of the population, industry, and heavy traffic volume were also concentrated. These States ac- counted for 80 pei'cent of the total. The toll road movement was the most dramatic

development in highway financing, particularly in

credit financing, in the years immediately following

World War II. The success of the Pennsylvania

Turnpike with the public, despite its war-induced

financial difficulties, stimulated a boom in toll road

construction. These roads proved to be feasible where

the traffic potential was high and where the parallel

free roads were either in poor condition as to grades,

curves, or surfaces or where they were inadequate to serve the traffic in the corridor.

The growth in toll road bond financing in the

period 1946-1951 was striking. To the $54 million of

toll road bonds outstanding at the beginning of the

period, issues totaling $449 million were added. Redemptions during the period were a slim $12 million,

leaving $491 million outstanding at the end of 1951.

The postwar period was one of variety and experimentation in the credit financing of highways, and

by no means all of the toll roads were financed by the

issue of revenue bonds payable solely from the earn- ings of the facility. The first fully self-supporting

issue of toll road revenue bonds was marketed in

1946 by the Maine Turnpike Authority. Elsewhere,

general obligation bonds were sometimes issued, and

the building of the 15-mile New Hampshire Turnpike was financed from the proceeds of 90-day renewable

notes purchased by Boston banks. By this device of

short-term financing, not extensively employed by the

States in financing highway capital expenditures, the

State of New Hampshire was able to save in interest

expense by drawing down funds only as needed.

Bridge Tolls In general, the Federal Government continued to look upon toll financing with disfavor. In the late

1940's, a Federal statute was enacted to encourage the

removal of bridge tolls. The General Bridge Act of

1946 required that, within 20 years of construction or

acquisition, tolls be removed from all bridges subject

to the Act (i.e., interstate bridges). Bridges wholly

inside a State or those between the United States and

foreign countries were not covered by this legislation.

In 1948 the Act was amended to extend the period

for removing tolls to 30 years. Meantime, the 1937

law authorizing the use of Federal funds to free toll bridges on the Federal-aid system expired. During

the time it was in force (1937-1947), nearly $9 million had been spent to free 30 bridges in five States. While the number of toll facilities owned by counties and local governments is relatively small, in the

1940's toll charges provided a greater portion of the

income from county and local imposts upon highway

users than any other single impost. Most of the in- come derived from these toll charges was spent for

highway purposes, chiefly maintenance and operation

of the facilities and retirement of the debt incurred

when they were built. The Federal Role in Borrowing

In the wake of the rapid development of toll roads,

the Federal Government had not abandoned its belief

in toll-free highways. Accordingly, a section of the

Federal Aid Highway Act of 1950 (section 122, title 23, U.S. Code) provided that any State or local government that issued bonds and used the proceeds to accelerate construction of toll-free facilities on the

Federal-aid Interstate or Primary Systems or on ex- tensions of Federal-aid systems within urban areas might apply authorized Federal funds to retire such

bonds. Federal funds might not be claimed for the

Federal-Aid Secondary System, either in reimbui*sement of interest payments or for bond proceeds ex- pended on that system.

The Act made the following stipulations: • The proceeds of the bonds qualifying under the

law must have actually been expended in the construction of Federal-aid systems. • The construction must have been completed in

accordance with plans and specifications approved

in advance by the Bureau of Public Roads. • Payments could not exceed the pro rata Federal

share specified by law. • Payments must be made from funds authorized

by the Congress.

That this provision was useful to the States in ac- celerating highway programs was shown by tlie fact

that at the end of December 1961 bond-financed programs totaled nearly $395 million, of which the

Federal-fund share was more than $253 million.

252
This bridge was designed and built with the emphasis on con- cern for the natural environment. The task was accomplished by using prestressed concrete and minor disturbance

to the rock outcroppings and boulders, thus producing an

economical, as well as an esthetically pleasing bridge.

253
This program was in no sense a Federal lending

device; rather, it had the effect of postponing reimbursement of the Federal share of authorized Federalaid projects. It had two advantages to the States: • Programs involving Federal-aid work could be

planned and financed in advance of the availability of Federal funds. • Federal funds might be claimed at times and in

amounts determined by the maturity schedule of

the bond issue, reducing the demand for current

State tax revenue for debt service during the

time the bonds were maturing.

Financial Status in 1951

By 1951, the postwar pattern of highway financing was well established, except for the changes to come

with the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966. The

States were providing nearly two-thirds of the funds

(exclusive of borrowings) applied to the highway

program (about $2.7 billion), and motor-vehicle user

taxes, including tolls, accounted for about 97 percent

of these funds.

Contributions from Federal general funds were

$492 million. This amount was about $60 million

less than was available from this source in 1941, but

the 1941 amount had come largely from special un- employment relief appropriations rather than from

regular sources of highway aid. Funds provided by rural and urban local governments had recovered to approximately the level of

1931 : $483 million in local revenues of the rural governments and $585 million in local municipal revenues. Bond issues for road and street purposes during

1951 totaled $794 million, of which $635 million was

State borrowings. Beginning in 1948, the States re- sorted to heavy borrowing to expedite their accelerated

highway improvement programs.

By 1951, the program for catching up on deferred

maintenance and capital outlay was well underway.

Total capital outlay on all systems, which bottomed

out at $362 million in 1944, had reached a level of

$2.5 billion and was climbing rapidly. Maintenance

expenditures had recovered from a wartime low of

$640 million to a total of $1.6 billion in 1951. Total

highway expenditures were $4.6 billion.

Federal-Aid Funds and the 1956 Highway Legislation

Between 1944 and 1956, Federal legislation dictated

few major policy changes. The first Interstate System construction was specifically authorized in the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1952, which provided

for apportionment of $26 million on the basis of a 50-50 Federal-State matching ratio in each of the

fiscal years 1954 and 1965. These authorizations were

increased to $176 million each year for fiscal 1956 and

1957 by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1954, which

also raised the Federal share of project costs to 60

percent.

The twin 1956 Acts—the Federal-Aid Highway

Act and the Highway Revenue Act—are a major

landmark in the highway history of the United States. This legislation broke with tradition and established some new principles

• It authorized and provided for financing an entire highway network, now designated the National System of Interstate and Defense Hghways.

• It departed from the traditional 50-50 sharing

of project costs and the fixed formula for apportionment. • It established a Highway Trust Fund fed from

the proceeds of Federal excise taxes on motorvehicle users, which thus directly linked to highway expenditures.

The Highway Revenue Act of 1956 continued the

biennial authorizations of Federal-aid primary, sec- ondary, and urban highways (popularly termed the

ABC program). But the policy of authorizing

Federal aid to the States for highways for 1- to 3-year

periods was augmented by one of authorizing funds

for a long-range program to complete the Interstate Highway System.

A total of $27 billion was authorized for the Interstate System, to be apportioned on the basis of 90-10

percent Federal-State shares of project costs. For

the first 3 years of the program, apportionments

among the States were to be made on the basis of

total population (one-half). After this, the funds were to be apportioned according to the proportion

that the estimated cost in each State bore to the total cost of completing the entire System.

It was recognized that some States might be willing

and able, with current revenue or bond proceeds, to build their portions of the Interstate System faster

than the annual Federal-aid apportionment would

permit. The 1966 Act therefore provided for "advance" construction by arranging for later reimbursement to the State for the Federal share of the project

costs from apportionments of succeeding years. Federal aid was also made available for the cost of re- locating utilities displaced by federally aided highway

construction.

In linking Federal excise taxes on highway users and Federal aid for highways, this Act sought to accomplish three objectives: To finance the long-range

Federal-aid program, to provide the revenue wholly

from user-tax revenues, and to preserve the program

on a pay-as-you-go basis. Although automotive excise taxes of one type or another have been levied by

the Federal Government since 1917, except for the

period 1928-1932, no part of the proceeds of these taxes was earmarked for highways before 1956. Before that date, Federal aid for highways was appropriated from the General Fund of the Treasury and was not related to the income from taxes on motor

vehicles or their operation.

In the Highway Revenue Act of 1956, Congress

provided revenues for a program of highway expenditures on the Interstate and other Federal-aid highway

systems. The mechanism by which this was done was

to create a Highway Trust Fund into which were di- rected the proceeds of certain existing excise taxes on motor vehicles and automotive products and certain

additional taxes imposed by the Act itself. In particular, the Federal gasoline tax was in- creased from 2 to 3 cents and became the principal source of revenue of the Highway Trust Fund. In

order to provide more revenues, certain changes wei'e

254
made by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1959, in- cluding an increase in the motor-fuel tax from 3 to 4

cents a gallon.

The creation of the Highway Trust Fund resulted in

the direction of the greater part of the Federal auto- motive tax proceeds into that fund but not all of

them. Remaining as General Fund revenues were the

proceeds of the 10-percent Federal excise tax on auto- mobiles and motorcycles and the 8-percent tax on

parts and accessories. There is also a tax of 6 cents per gallon on lubricating oil. Since only about 60

percent of the lubi'icating oil is estimated to be con- sumed in highway vehicles, this tax was ordinarily

not as closely associated with motor vehicles and their use as are the taxes on motor vehicles, tires and tread

rubber, and motor fuels. Although nearly all of the income of the Highway

Trust Fund was derived from excise taxes paid by

highway users, certain amounts were derived from

nonhighway sources. The largest such amounts were

receipts from taxes paid on gasoline used in aircraft,

motorboats, and industrial use, but in this case 2 of

the 4 cents per gallon tax, if claimed, was subject to refund to the taxpayer. The proceeds of the tax on

tires used off the highway (5 cents per pound) was

also placed in the Ti-ust Fund, as was the small

amount of income obtained from automotive excise taxes paid by the Department of Defense on behalf

of highway-type vehicles used entirely in off-highway

service. Although such vehicles were exempt from

motor-fuel taxes, payment of taxes on the purchase of

trucks, buses, trailers, tires, and inner tubes was

required.

Because Federal-aid expenditures for highways

were now directly related to the income from certain

highway user taxes, the equity of tax payments in

relation to benefits and the highway costs occasioned

by various types of vehicles had to be considered.

The 1956 Act, therefore, called for a highway cost allocation study similar to those conducted by the

States but on a nationwide basis in order to bring

about "an equitable distribution of the tax burden

among various classes of persons using the Federalaid highways or otherwise deriving benefit from such

highways."

U8-169 northeast of Paola, Kan., is a modern two-lane highway built on right-of-way acquired for a four-lane express- way. A second pair of lanes can be added in a few years when the traffic volume warrants it.
By the end of the 1957 fiscal year, approximately

$1.5 billion had been deposited in the Trust Fund, of

which $3 million came from interest earned on in- vestments and the remainder from Federal automotive excise taxes. From this total, nearly $966 million was disbursed for work on the Interstate and ABC

programs, but there was a balance of obligations of

apportioned highway funds of nearly $2 billion. The 1956 Act also marked the first exercise of Federal limitations on commercial vehicle sizes and

weights. It established maximum width and weight

limitations on the Interstate Highway System to protect the Federal investment in this system and to prevent overstressing of bridges for safety purposes.

Toll Roads and the Interstate System

Inclusion of toll facilities on the Interstate System

has been a major issue since the accelerated program

was authorized in 1956. Of the 40,000 miles of highways approved for the System in the early 1950's,

1,100 were toll facilities. A 1955 report by the President's Advisory Committee on a National Highway

Program indicated that about 5,000 miles of toll roads

planned, being constructed, or in actual operation in

23 States would either parallel or coincide with the

proposed Interstate Highway System.

The Highway Act of 1956 adopted a Bureau of

Public Roads' recommendation for incorporating toll roads into the Interstate Highway System. The prohibition against the use of Federal funds for consti'ucting toll facilities was modified only to the extent

of permitting their use on the approaches to toll roads,

with two provisos

• If the only use of the access road was to serve as an approach to a toll road, the toll road must be

made toll free upon retirement of the outstanding

debt. • Satisfactory alternate free routes for bypassing

the toll sections must be available.

Seven toll facilities have received Interstate funds on condition that the tolls be removed upon retirement

of the debt

Indiana Toll Road

Northern Illinois Toll Highway

Kentucky Turnpike*

Maine Turnpike

New York Thi'uway

Ohio Turnpike

Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike

Because of the legal complexities and contractual

requirements under which the various toll facilities were established, a feasible means of freeing those on

the Interstate Highway System remains one of the

paramount unresolved issues. Many of the toll facilities operating as part of the Interstate System

have outstanding debt secured by toll I'evenues with

redemption dates beyond the year 2000. In a number

of cases, statutory provisions require tolls on such

facilities to be collected indefinitely, beyond the time

when the toll-secured debt is retii'ed.

* Tolls were removed from the Kentucky Turnpike on

.Tune 30, 1975.

In some cases, debt proceeds and revenues related

to both highway (including Interstate) and nonhighway facilities have been commingled and are not

readily identifiable. Toll revenues are primarily used

for operating the toll facilities and retiring the out- standing indebtedness but are also used in some in- stances for other public services (more often in the

case of toll bi^idges than toll roads). Thus, the loss of revenue for other purposes has to be taken into account. Since 1956, the Federal Highway Administration

has refused to approve the location of free routes on

the Interstate System in at least three cases where

the routes would parallel toll facilities determined to be adequate for traffic needs until 1975, where the

financial structure of the toll facilities was in danger

of being adversely affected. Bond Financing in the 1950's

Toll revenue bond financing was employed by 29 of

the 39 borrowing States during the decade of the

1950's, and in six States—California, Illinois, Indiana,

Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia—^it was the only

major type of bond financing used. Although revenue bond financing occupied a position of prominence,

road-user tax bonds and other limited obligations

evidenced a most significant increase. The seven Northern and Eastern States that issued $200 million or more of general and limited obligation bonds ac- counted for nearly two-thirds of all such bonds issued.

Municipal highway debt showed a much faster rate of growth than that of the counties and other rural

local governments. If the debt outstanding at the

beginning of 1950 is assigned a value of 100, the comparative volume of municipal debt outstanding at the

end of 1960 would be 215.5 and rural local debt, 148. The more pervasive demand for credit financing by

the municipalities was partly caused by the relatively

greater State financial assistance to rural governmental units and also to the rapid growth of metropolitan areas and urban traffic volumes during the

1950's. General obligation bonds were the predominant type of local issues. The Public Corporation Device

Although the device was not new even in the highway field, beginning in the 1940's and continuing

through the 1950's, public corporations (authorities) came into extensive use. The features that distinguish

the authority device are not always clear-cut. For ex- ample, a number of State highway departments—and

local governments too—directly finance and operate

toll projects. But this is not the primary function of a highway public works department. The term

"authority" is generally reserved for (1) those in- strumentalities whose primary responsibility is the

financing of highway facilities with revenue or limited obligation bonds, for which specific revenues are pledged, and (2) those that do not rely upon general

tax support or that themselves have the power to levy taxes. Between 1940 and 1960, authorities became an eco- nomic phenomenon of considerable consequence. During this time, 45 of them were created in the highway

field, bringing to 75 the number active on January 1, 1961.

266
Of the 19 toll road authorities, 17 sold bonds

amounting to $4 billion during the 1950's. This

amount was two-thirds of all debt incurred by authorities. One of the two not included among these

debt issues in the 1950's—the Turnpike Authority of

Kentucky—entered the bond market in 1961 and by

early 1962 had sold $186 million of Turnpike revenue

bonds.

The authority concept flourished because in most

instances it proved successful as (1) a means of

financing capital projects so as not to conflict with

constitutional limitations upon the creation of debt;

(2) a flexible instrument to manage "commercial" or self-supporting enterprises; and (3) an effective

agency for administering joint governmental projects—international, interstate, or intercommunity.

Economic Effects Thomas H. MacDonald commented on the relationship between advances in highway transportation, on

the one hand, and economic growth and raised standards of living, on the other, in these words

We were not a wealthy Nation when we began improving our highways . . . but the roads themselves helped us

create a new wealth, in business and industry and land

values. ... So it was not our wealth that made our highways possible. Rather, it was our highways that made

our wealth possible.'

The nature, size, and composition of the Nation's

output, the industrial structure within which it is produced, and the distribution of the corresponding

income flows, both geographically and among the

Nation's families, are all dependent in some degree

upon transportation facilities: their availability, lo- cation, and adequacy. Population mobility could not

have been achieved without them.

The movement of goods and people is reflected in

different ways: the movement of goods by truck and

trailer, the movement of people by bus transit and

private automobile, or the movement and expansion

of physical facilities and factories across the land.

To the extent that highways have aided in the more

efficient allocation of resources through their influence on this mobility, they have changed the pattern of

land use and development in the United States. In the early 1960's, it was estimated that approximately one out of every five individuals moved to another home in any single year, and one-third of

these individuals moved to a different county in re- sponse to economic and social opportunities. Almost

34 million persons moved in 1960.

The travel propensities of Americans were, and are, reflected in the number of mobile homes in the United

States. The Mobile Home Manufacturer's Association estimated that in 1958 almost 98,000 mobile homes

and nearly 31,000 trailei-s were produced, and that 1.2 million mobile homes in the United States housed some 3.0 million persons. The emphasis on mobility is also illustrated by the

investment of Americans in motor vehicles. In 1961,

motor vehicles numbered more than 76 million, an

increase of about 190 percent over a 30-year period,

during which population increased by about 45 percent. Thus, motor-vehicle ownership had increased

at a rate more than four times that of population

growth.

Goods Movement by Highway

Truck use of highways aids productivity in at least two ways: by expanding market areas and by lowering distribution costs. In goods movement, the re- duction of unit transport costs is a direct benefit to shippers. Whether these savings are passed on to the consumer or are partially absorbed by shippers or

their employees, significant savings are realized by

the national economy. Between 1958 and 1968, the

ton-miles moved by highway increased by 60 percent,

nearly twice the 36 percent increase for rail. In 1963, panel trucks, station wagons, and pickup

trucks constituted nearly 60 percent of the total number of trucks in the United States but carried less than 10 percent of the tonnage. Tractor-semitrailers, on the other hand, represented only 5 percent of the

number of trucks but handled 32 percent of the ton- nage.

Piggyback Revived

The fact that no single mode of transportation is capable of moving all kinds of freight with equal

efficiency suggests that the roles of the various modes

should be more complementary than competitive in

many areas. A system enabling each mode of trans- portation to perform the service for which it has the

greatest inherent advantage would contribute to more

efficient use of resources, the greatest need of today.

The development is as yet in an early stage, since the

setting is highly institutionalized and the American

transportation industry has always been aggressively

competitive.

The highway-rail piggyback service that had been

the subject of experimentation in the previous two

decades had all but disappeared by the late 1940's. A revival of efforts to inaugurate piggyback service

followed an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)

ruling in the New Haven case in 1954 that railroads

could haul trailers on flat cars (TOFC) under the

provisions of rail tariffs without having a motor carrier certificate. As a result, 32 railroads offered TOFC

service by January 1, 1955. The number of TOFC/

COFC (container-on-flatcar) rail cars loaded in that

year was 168,000. This was the first significant break

through the wall of aggressive intermodal competitiveness that has characterized the American transportation industry.

Piggyback combines the flexibility and low cost of

truck pickup and delivery and terminal service with

the low cost of rail line-haul operations. Because of

its significantly lower costs, it has grown most rapidly

in the transport of goods having a high value over medium and long distances.

Diversion to rail from highway freight transportation is most likely to occur along high-traffic corridors between major metropolitan centers, and its magnitude was not sufficient to have much dampening

effect on the total volume and growth of truck traffic. Through the 1950's the frequency of heavy gross

vehicle loads, especially for vehicles of 50,000 pounds

or moi'e, showed a steady, strong upward trend. From

1950 to 1959, the frequency of trucks in this weight

class increased from 58 to 227 per 1,000 trucks and

combinations, loaded and empty, a nearly fourfold

gain. New truck registrations by weight class showed

257
Trailers being transported on flatcars.

a very strong trend in the direction of increasingfrequency of heavier trucks and decreasing frequency

of medium weight trucks.

Since 1955, an especially heavy public investment

has been made in highways, much of it concentrated on high-grade intercity highways designed to carry

large volumes of heavy truck traffic. Capital outlay for

this purpose by Federal, State, and local governments

totaled nearly $136 billion between 1955 and 1971.

By 1970, the mileage of divided highways of four

or more lanes with partial or full control of access had increased eightfold since 1956, the first year when

highways were so classified. About 80 percent of this

increase was on intercity routes. Such controlledaccess highways on the Federal-Aid Primary System

increased from somewhat over 4,000 to nearly 41,000

miles, from 2 to nearly 16 percent of the total system

mileage.

A 40-ton capacity straddle-lift crane transfers containers from

piggyback flatcars to a highway carrier for shipment to destination.

As these high-grade highways have been provided,

intercity motor freight transportation has grown

rapidly. Truck ton-miles were 89 percent higher in

1971 than in 1955. During the same period, population grew 25 percent. The gross national product

(GNP) in constant dollars was up 69 percent and in- dustrial production, 81 percent. The ton-miles ac- counted for by carriers regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission more than doubled from 1955

to 1970, compared with a 73 percent increase for carriers not under regulation. The nonregulated carriers

accounted for an increasing share of all intercity

freight ton-miles, 9 percent in 1955 compared with 11

percent in 1970.

Urban goods movement is a major element in the

economy of the United States and especially in the

urban economies. Practically all freight moving in

rural areas either originates or terminates within

urban areas. Moreover, urban areas are the points of

meeting between carriers of different sizes, between

regulated and nonregulated carriers, and between

different modes of transportation.

The movement of goods in urban areas is performed

primarily by trucks, and truck travel in these areas increased during the 1960's even more than passenger

car travel: 80 compared with 74 percent. A 1965

study of the tri-State area comprising New York

City, New Jersey, and Connecticut indicated that

trucks moved over 75 percent of the tonnage and

accounted for 97 percent of the value of freight

moved.

Trucking and Other Modes

In the intercity freight market, significant impediments to free market forces are at work determining

the relative shares taken by each transportation mode.

Airlines and railroads in particular are subject to more pervasive and stringent economic regulations

than trucking. In 1970, only about 41 percent of

truck and 7 percent of water ton-miles were regulated.

Nationwide data for 1970 indicate that truck freight

expenditures were almost evenly divided between

local haul (49.4 percent) and intercity haul (50.6

percent). The intercity hauls usually terminate in

urban areas and become part of the urban traffic. Trucks haul primarily commodities of medium

value, but compete strongly with railroads and water

carriers for the high value ($1,000 per ton) less-thantruck-load business. Trucks dominate when hauls are

less than 400 miles. Yet for individual commodities,

the median lengths of haul by rail and truck are rather close. In 1970, the Nation's estimated total transportation

expenditure amounted to over $181 billion, 97 percent

of which was spent on domestic transportation.

Highway-oriented expenditures accounted for 82 percent. The dominance of highway-oriented modes becomes

even more evident in view of the fact that 1970 ex- penditures on intercity freight moved by truck ($20

billion) were greater than those for the rail, air,

water, and pipeline modes combined. Highway passenger travel accounted for 42 percent of total national transportation expenditures.

258
The concept of "gross product originating" (GPO)

is a useful one for measuring the amount of gross

national product (GNP) accounted for by transportation. The GNP equals the sum of GPO across all sectors of the economy. For transportation, the GPO

refers to the value added by transportation service.

The estimates for gross product originating in

transportation show a decline to 8.9 percent of gross

national product in 1970 from 9.1 percent in 1965, but

the sector changes have not been uniform. For ex- ample, value added by commercial airlines increased

by nearly 84 percent compared with 7 percent for

intercity buses. Value added by railroads increased

by less than half of 1 percent, whereas trucking in- creased by a little over 10 percent.

Commercial trucking accounted for about 13 per- cent of the total value added by transportation in

1970. Private trucking in freight accounted for 17

percent, and nonfi'eight private trucking for 27 percent. Value added by railroads declined from almost

12 percent to 10 percent of the total transportation

GPO.

In 1971, the railroads still remained the principal

intercity freight carriers, but their revenue position

declined because of the loss of much productive traffic to other modes of transportation. The trucks and the

airlines had captured much of their highest class

traffic, and the pipelines were carrying a large proportion of the movement of petroleum products.

The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association esti- mated that in 1974 trucks were hauling the following

percentages of important products

Fruits and vegetables 73

Cattle and calves to major 99

Hogs markets 100

Sheep and lambs 98

Sand and gravel 92

Crushed stone 75

Portland cement 83

Motor vehicles 48

Kefined petroleum products 39

The ICC-regulated general freight haulers are the

most conspicuous of all for-hire carriers seen on the

highway's because of the large number of vehicles and

combinations used, mainly van trucks with van trail- ers and tractors with semitrailers and full trailers. Their cargos consist principally of general merchandise, such as food products and manufactured articles. The operation for small shipments is similar in

many respects to former railroad less-than-carload

(LCL) freight handling. The shipments are picked

up directly from the shipper, taken to a freight

terminal for consolidation with other shipments going

in the same direction, and loaded into over-the-road

vehicles for the journey to the destination terminal,

where the procedure is reversed.

Financing Highways in the 1960's and 1970's

By 1961, the principal change in highway revenues was the infusion of much higher levels of Federal

aid, mostl}' drawn from imposts on highway users as a result of the 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act. The

Act of 1961 continued the temporary increase in the

A container being loaded aboard a ship.

An industry-government project called INTACT (intermodal

air cargo test) demonstrates the loading and unloading of intermodal containers on an Air Force Galaxy (C-5A).

Federal tax on motor fuels from 3 to 4 cents that was

enacted in 1959 and due to expire on June 20, 1961.

The rate was continued to the expected year of completion of the Interstate System in 1972 and since has

been further extended.

Net Federal aid to other governments of $2.7 billion

in 1961 more than trebled the 1956 figure, and it was

increased to $4.9 billion in 1973. All Federal revenue

applied to highways rose from $1 billion in 1956 to

$7.4 billion in 1973.

A demonstration at Colorado Springs, Colo., of a helicopter

lifting an intermodal container.

259
State current income used for roads, most of which came from highway-user taxes, exceeded $5.5 billion

in 1961 and $13 billion in 1973, the 1973 figure being

nearly 21^ times the 1956 level. The net Federal aid

received by the States rose dramatically from $776

million in 1956 to $4.5 billion in 1973.

Income of local governments from all sources to be

used for roads and streets grew rapidly after the end

of World War II, relatively more rapidly in urban

than in rural areas. Net aid to rural governments,

largely from the State and Federal Governments, in- creased from $675 million in 1956 to $844 million in

1961 to $1.9 billion in 1973. The amounts received by

urban governments were at a lower level in 1956 ($258

million), and rose to $357 million in 1961 and almost

$1.4 billion in 1973, an increase over the entire period

of 371 percent compared with 181 percent for rural

units. Revenues from local sources also made significant gains as property tax yields grew and larger sums were made available from general funds. Current revenues of the rural units available for roads

rose from $647 million in 1956 to $1.5 billion in 1973.

For urban governments, the comparable figures were

$881 million in 1956 and $2.7 billion in 1973.

Expenditures for highway capital improvements

responded to the growth in available revenues. State

capital outlay (including that for toll facilities) went

up from $3.9 to $9.5 billion between 1956 and 1973.

Before 1965, most of the increase after passage of the

Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 is attributable to the Interstate System. By 1965, Interstate investments stabilized, while non-Interstate expenditures

increased from $3.3 billion to $5.6 billion. Rural and urban local governments spent nearly

the same amount ($1 billion) for capital improvements in 1973. In the case of the rural units, this

expenditure represented a 125-percent increase over

1956, and in the case of the urban units, a 90-percent

increase.

Historically, capital costs have represented the major share of total annual disbursements for highways

by all levels of government. But with increasing

noncapital demands due to such related requirements

as providing for public safety, highway and vehicle

law enforcement, higher interest on indebtedness, and

increasing requirements for maintenance and operation of the highway plant, by 1975 the proportion of

public funds available for capital improvements had

declined to less than one-half of the dollars spent.

Inflation has had a serious effect on the Nation's

economy. The cost of highway construction has

doubled since 1967, and the miles of highway put in

place per dollar have shrunk considerably. Total

capital outlay of $13 billion expended in 1974 is only

$6.5 billion in terms of constant dollars (1967 base), a figure approximately equal to the constant-dollar

value for 1957.

The Nation's total expenditures for highways have

exhibited a pattern of steady growth since the end of

World War II, growing from $1.7 billion in 1945 to

$4.5 billion in 1950, $10.8 billion in 1960, and $20.8

billion in 1970. This rate of growth was 36 percent

faster than that of the gross national product (GNP).

For 1975, total highway expenditures were nearly $26

billion.

But, if the actual amounts are corrected to remove

the effects of inflation, the recent picture of highway

finance looks less optimistic. In terms of 1967 dollars,

total disbursements for highways by all levels of

government peaked in 1971 and have since been declining. Wliereas current-dollar disbursements in

1971 were more than twice those of 1960, the increase

in terms of constant dollars was only about one-third.

Total disbursements per registered vehicle have declined from $199 in 1971 to an estimated $189 in

1974. In terms of constant dollars, the decline began

in 1969 at $161 per registered vehicle and dropped to an estimated $110 in 1974.

Related to vehicle-miles of travel, disbursements

have fluctuated since 1971 and are now on the rise. But expressed in constant dollars, total disbursements

per million vehicle-miles of travel have been declining

since 1961. Thus, although the amount of travel has

greatly increased, expenditures for highway facilities related to this travel have declined.

Before World War II, highway construction rep- resented a more significant share of the gross national

product than it has at any time since. In 1939 it equalled 1.72 percent of that year's GNP. The highest postwar percentage was in 1958, when it reached

1.42. For 5-year periods, the average percentages of

GNP are as follows

1945-1950 0.58

1950-1955 0.92

1955-1960 1.27 1960-1965 1.28 1965-1970 1.19 The 1974 highway share of GNP (0.85) was less than

half that of 1939.

It would appear that, while the demand for highway services has been accelerating, it has not been

accompanied by a corresponding increase either in

the supply or in the quality of highway facilities. The demand for travel, which has grown in recent

years, is expected to increase in the future, although

at a reduced rate, despite such constraints as increased

fuel costs, fuel conservation efforts, and modal shifts

from automobile travel to various forms of mass

transit. It is possible that the performance of the

highway system, which is directly affected by investment, not only is not keeping pace with demand but

is actually deteriorating.

Broadening the Highway Program

The surge of statewide planning activity that began at the close of World War II included planning

for urban areas, and the rate of roadbuilding in these areas was greatly accelerated after passage of the

1956 Act. The development of urban transportation

from 1960 to 1970 was marked by a 28-percent in- crease in municipal highway mileage.

Despite the stepped-up population movement to the

suburbs that occurred in the postwar period, the central cities of the larger metropolitan areas were still considered to be the focal points of the local trans- portation network, and growing commuting and other

traffic was expected to pour more and more vehicles

into these areas. As increased long-distance com- muting into, out of, and through central cities produced heavier automobile traffic, the circular action260
TOTAL RECEIPTS FOR HIGHWAYS, BY GOVERNMENTAL UNITS

1921-1974

FIGURE 13

25 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

STATE GOVERNMENTS

COUNTY GOVERNMENTS 13 MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS

t921 192E 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976

reaction of declining transit patronage and increased

fares intensified the downward spiral of those utilities toward insoh'ency.

Although circumferential and bypass highways were

expected to drain off traffic that did not need to go

downtown, still large-scale highway building was

thought to be required, and plans for it generated

little opposition at first. Businessmen and city offi- cials generally encouraged automobile commuting to in-town employment and did not oppose providing

daytime storage space for the vehicles.

But as problems of city street congestion led to greater penetration of rural liighways into the heart

of central cities, more people were affected by the taking of right-of-way and by the construction and operation of highways. Organized opposition to the urban

highway improvement program became a major factor

in determining the course of Federal and State highway transportation legislation in the 1960's. A new political activism characterized this period

that expressed new needs and priorities that were

reflected in Federal legislation between 1962 and 1970

and that broadened the role of the Federal Government in the administration of highway construction

programs. The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1962

provided Federal reimbursement to those States that

could pay limited relocation allowances to persons

and businesses affected by highway construction, and

the 1968 Act provided all relocatees with Federal

relocation payments.

TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS FOR HIGHWAYS, BY FUNCTION

1921-1974

FIGURE 12 30

25

20 —

DEBT RETIREMENT

ADMINISTRATION, HIGHWAY PATROL, AND BONO INTEREST Q MAINTENANCE ^ CAPITAL OUTLAY

1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976

261
Two new programs were added in 1965. One was

designed to aid the States in the Appalachian region

in building main and feeder roads to assist in their

economic development. The second was a program

of landscaping and scenic enhancement of the Federalaid highway systems, including the control of outdoor

advertising and junkyards.

A major development in 1966 was the enactment by

the Congress of legislation embracing broad new

highway and motor vehicle safety programs. Funds

for these programs were to be appropriated from

general funds rather than from the Highway Trust

Fund.

The 1968 Federal Aid Highway Act established

programs known as TOPICS for improving highway

traffic operations in urban areas. Specific funds were

authorized to provide for making better use of existing highways through the application of traffic engineering techniques. The Act also created a right-ofway revolving fund and authorized additional funds

for the Federal-Aid Primary and Secondary System

in rural areas. A program was authorized for fringe

parking area demonstration, allowing the use of Federal-aid funds to construct parking facilities adjacent

to the rights-of-way of Federal-aid highways. Such

parking projects became a continuing part of the

regular Federal-aid highway program in 1970.

The 1970 Highway Act provided for the establishment of a Federal-Aid Urban System (the D system)

in the "urbanized" areas (a census-defined metropolitan area for statistical purposes). The Act changed

the Federal share of ABC funds from 50 to 70 percent, effective July 1, 1973, and provided that twothirds of the funds authorized for safety programs

for the 1972 and subsequent fiscal years be appropriated from the Trust Fund. The funds for all of these

programs formerly came from general funds. The

1970 Act also authorized a program to demonstrate

that highways can aid in the development of "growth

centers," areas with a high potential for economic

growth. This program was changed by the 1973 Act

to become a regular part of the Federal-aid highway

program.

The 1973 Federal Aid Highway Act introduced

several changes in highway policy

• Highway Trust Fund apportionments could be

used for public mass transportation systems, in- cluding the purchase of buses, in 1975 and for

rail transit facilities in 1976. • Bicycle facilities and pedestrian walkways could

be financed from Federal-aid funds. • The Trust Fund could be used to pay the cost of

parkways located on a Federal-aid system. • The Trust Fund would henceforth support the

entire cost of highway and motor vehicle safety

programs.

During 1972, no apportionment of Federal-aid

highway funds was made, because the Federal Aid

Highway Act was not passed until 1973. But during

1973, $4,743 million of Federal-aid funds were apportioned to the States for fiscal year 1974 as follows

Afportionment

(Millions of

Dollars)

System

2,544 Interstate 671

376

752

Rural primary

Rural secondary

Urban

Urban extensions:

280

97

23

Primary and secondary systems

Priority primary routes Metropolitan planning funds

A new program for constructing, reconstructing,

and improving roads that are not located on any

Federal-aid system was launched under provisions of

the Federal Aid Highway Amendments of 1974. The

$200 million made available for this program was

distributed according to a formula based on such

factors as land area, rural population, and off-system

road mileage.

Since the mid-1960's, the Office of Management and

Budget of the Executive Office of the President has

deferred portions of Federal aid for highways, which

may have constrained the total program level. But

there is no conclusive evidence that the States would

have maintained their 100-percent-State programs at the recorded levels during this period if full Federalaid authorizations were available.

On February 11, 1975, President Ford released an

additional $2 billion of impounded Federal-aid funds

for the 1975 fiscal year in order to stimulate employment. In April of the same year. Congress ended

the deferral of the remaining funds, permitting State

obligation of greater sums from the unobligated bal- ances of their apportioned and allocated funds.

Further, Congress passed and the President approved a measure allowing the temporary suspension

of the Federal-aid matching requirement and removed

restrictions on the transferability among non-Interstate program funds. These measures resulted in the

obligation of $7.6 billion of Federal-aid highway

funds in fiscal year 1975, the highest level of obligation in the history of the Federal-aid program.

Indicators of Highway Growth—the Long Term

The use of the roads as indicated by vehicle registrations, fuel consumption, and travel has increased

substantially in the last half century. Registered

motor vehicles totaled 3.6 million in 1916 and about

125 million—one vehicle for every 1.7 inhabitants—in

1973. Put another way, the 1973 total represents an

average of nearly two vehicles for every one of the

Nation's 67 million households. The increase in vehicle registrations has far outstripped the rate of

population growth.

In 1916 approximately 3 million automobiles and

250,000 trucks and buses were registered, i.e., about

14 passenger cars to every truck or bus. In 1973, the

registrations had risen to 102 million automobiles, 23

million trucks, and 426,000 buses. This is equivalent

to about 4 automobiles for every truck and 240 for

each bus. Preliminary data for 1974 indicate that the

number of registered vehicles has reached nearly 130

million, with passenger cars about 105 million, trucks

numbering about 25 million, and buses in the neighborhood of 445,000.

262
It should be noted that the number of motor vehicles registered is not the same as the number in

service at any given time, but it is a reasonable approximation. Registrations tend to exceed the number

of vehicles in service for a number of reasons

• Registrations are cumulative throughout the year. Vehicles registered in January may not be in

service in December. • Vehicles moved by the owner from one State to another may be registered in both States during

that year. • Vehicles scrapped during the year are not deleted from the registrations of that year. Estimating the number of vehicles in use is becoming increasingly difficult as the States change from a

fixed date beginning the registration j^ear to some

anniversary month, such as the birth month of the owner or the month of purchase of the vehicle.

Beginning with 1936, nationwide estimates of motor

vehicle travel, classified by vehicle type and road

system, became available for the first time. Over the

37-year period between that year and 1973, no signifi- cant increase in the iise of passenger cars is indicated

by the estimates of average annual travel. But when

the density of automobile ownership is considered,

multicar ownership is shown to have kept average

travel per vehicle down, while average travel per

household increased significantly. From 5.25 persons

per vehicle in 1936 (0.7 passenger cars per household),

the density of ownership increased to only 2.06 per- sons per vehicle (1.5 automobiles per household) in

1973. AMiile fuel consumption per automobile in- creased by about one-third during the period, fuel

consumption per household nearly tripled.

In 1973, the average annual travel of an individual

truck was 11,500 miles, a small increase over 1936,

when a truck averaged 10,000 miles. Single-unit

trucks averaged 9,900 miles per truck per year, while

the average for combinations was nearly 47,000 miles.

Between 1916 and 1973, trends in total motor fuel

consumption and travel have roughly paralleled each

other, and, as might be expected, both have related

rather closely to the trend in motor vehicle registrations. By 1973, annual fuel consumption per vehicle

had risen to only about 890 gallons from 750 in 1946

and 800 in 1966.

The upward creep of average automobile operating

speed that took place between 1947 and 1972 has implications for fuel consumption and is indicative of

the improvement in highways that has occurred over

the years. Speed increased from 45 to 62 miles per

hour on main rural highways. Stated another way,

only 30 percent of the passenger cars observed in

1945 were traveling more than 50 miles an hour, but

by 1972 nearly 90 percent were doing so. Today, after almost 60 years' experience with Federal aid to and State management of major highways,

primary responsibility for about 75 percent of the

Nation's highway mileage rests with about 35,000

units of government below the level of the States

(excluding the District of Columbia). But, with some notable exceptions, the roads under county and

local jurisdiction, for the most part, carry relatively

light traffic accounting for a small portion of the

total. In contrast, the 36,300 miles of the Interstate System open to traffic on January 1, 1975, constituting

less than 1 percent of the total miles of roads and

streets, are carrying about 16 percent of the nationwide total highway traffic. Adding the 6,200 miles

of highway carrying the traffic where the System is incomplete, the percentage of total traffic carried by

Interstate routes is 19 percent of the total carried by

all highways.

The coming of the Interstate Highway System took

the steam out of the toll road movement, and today

most of the major toll roads carry Interstate routes over a considerable portion of their length, though

Federal Interstate funds were not used to build the

sections for which tolls are charged. There were 56

public toll roads in operation in 1973, with net toll mileage of a little over 4,000 miles.

Over the 57-year period between 1916 and 1973,

road and street mileages in the contiguous United

States increased nearly 36 percent, from approximately 3 million to a little less than 4 million. While

this increase can be attributed partly to improved

mileage inventories, most of it came from new construction.

Changes in rural road mileage, on the one hand,

and municipal mileage, on the other, resulted from

transfers of rural roads to urban, as cities grew and

the Nation's population became predominantly urban.

^Vhereas rural road mileage increased by about 29

percent (700,000 miles), municipal mileage grew by

about 80 percent (300,000 miles).

With all the participating units of government

drawing as heavily as possible upon all other available sources of income, the task of developing our modern highway network would have been impossible

had it not been for the ability of certain governmental units to tap a lucrative source of revenue

the motor vehicle. It is to this source of revenue, as much as to any other single factor, that the United

States owes the extent and quality of its highway

systems.

REFERENCES

^ Early History in American Road Building, AASHO

The

First Fifty Years, 1914-1964 (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1965) p. 32.

^ C. Hayden, The History of Federal-Aid Highway Legislation (unpublished work in the Federal Highway Administration) p. 4. 'Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics

Summary to 1965 (U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Washington,

D.C., 1967), p. 23.

* W. Evans, A Legislative, Program Eligibility and Policy

Review of Federal Highway Programs, unpul)lished part of a

support study for the 1974 NATIONAL HIGHWAY NEEDS

STUDY (Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 6.

" Federal Highway Administration, Press Release, Table

MF-221 (U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Washington, D.C.)

Jan. 13, 1976.

" Bureau of Public Roads, Highway and Economic and

Social Change (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D.C,

1964), p. 1.

263
Planning

What Do We Mean—Highway Planning?

Everyone plans. One may spend hours and days

planning a vacation trip abroad. A housewife plans

constantly—from the trip to the store for the week's

supply of groceries to the time to put the vegetables on the stove for dinner. Engineers locate and design

a section of road and portray their results by a construction plan. And perhaps the ultimate example

is the successful result of planning to land a man on

the moon and return him to earth.

Highway planning, however, is different. In most

cases the individual, or even a huge organization such

as the National Aeronautical and Space Administration, is planning something he or it expects to do.

The ultimate result of highway' planning, more re- cently broadened to be called highway transportation

planning, is the development of a highway system to provide for the movement of vehicles—vehicles not

under the control of the planner but of the great

number of individuals who drive them. Highway

transportation is mostly, up to 96 percent, people

driving themselves or transporting their goods in

their own vehicles. The highway planner plans a system and the engineer builds and maintains it, but

they do not provide highway transportation. A rail- road company provides transportation; an airline

provides transportation; a transit company provides

transportation; but the highway agency provides for

transportation.

From another viewpoint, the question sometimes is raised as to whether we in the United States do any

highway planning. It is reasoned that there were

over 2,350,000 miles of rural roads and city streets at the time of the advent of the automobile, so what we

have been doing for some 75 years is highway improvement planning. Literally that is nearly true,

for most of the mileage added has been in the expanding suburban areas, with little planning, at least by

highway planners, and most of the planning has been

directed toward upgrading the early roads on or close to their original locations. Notable exceptions are seen in the Interstate System, which surely is a system

planned by highway planners for highway transportation, and in the great undeveloped State of Alaska

where new routes are being laid out to permit development of its natural resources. So compared to the

many underdeveloped countries, the United States has

in effect been doing not highway planning, but highway improvement planning.

Even in view of these qualifications, however, for

the purposes of this chapter, the term highway planning will be used in a generic sense and will include

whatever is done by the higlnvay planners in facili- tating highway transportation, coordinating it with

other modes, and helping make it compatible with

social and community values, whether the community

be the smallest town, a metropolitan area, or the

entire Nation.

264
m^^

The coordination between the California DOT and the Bay Area Rapid Transit District,

from planning through construction of over 11 miles of rail and highway facilities, saved the taxpayers millions of dollars, caused a minimum of disruption to the communities, and made the best use of the land by evaluating shared

social values and esthetics for the benefit of all.

Early Highway Planning

This discussion of highway planning will be devoted primarily to the period beginning in 1934, the

year of the passage of the Hayden-Cartwright Act

(Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona and Representative

Wilburn Cartwright of Oklahoma) that made highway planning possible on an organized and formal

basis. Yet planning obviously was an essential fea- ture of highway develoi:)ment even in colonial days.

Before the railroads put a temporary end to highway development, roads were definitely planned to meet such specific needs as connecting principal cities and opening new territory to development or for

military purposes. The birth of highway transportation as we know it probably can be dated as 1893,

when J. Frank Duryea first drove his gasoline buggy

on the streets of Springfield, ^Massachusetts. Roads

until then were being improved generally in short

sections radiating from towns and railroad shipping

points and were primarily for the movement of farm

products. The availability of the automobile, first usable only in towns and cities and as "pleasure"

vehicles, soon brought demands for improvement of

larger sections, and esi^ecially in the eastern States,

connecting the towns with one another.

It was this demand for connecting or trunk roads

that brought about the first real differences among

highway users, and what might be called the first highway planning—whether to concentrate on the

trunk roads or continue to extend the radius of the

farm-to-market roads. The question was settled early

in the small eastern States in favor of the former

rather than the farmer. In 1903 Rhode Island

adopted a definite system of State highways for construction by the State Board of Public Roads. A

similar proposal in Connecticut in 1901 was finally

enacted in 1913, while Maryland in 1908 adopted an

intercounty seat trunkline system, the first to be placed

under State control for both construction and main265
tenance. Similar actions in the central and western

States followed, only slowly, however, where towns

were farther apart and service to farms generally more important than tnmkline roads.

Again, as noted in earlier chapters, pressure developing from farm groups, city "pleasure" vehicle owners and, almost strangely, the League of American

A^Hieelman led the Congress in 1916 to authorize funds

for the improvement of rural post roads.

Two outstanding features of the 1916 Federal Aid

Road Act were the basis of apportionment of Federal

funds and the requirement that the States must have

or establish a State highway department adequately

equipped to receive and administer the funds. The

apportionment formula prevented any "pork barrel"

distribution of funds by the Federal agency (but not

necessarily at State level). The requirement of a State agency through which funds would be applied

to road improvement was with the intent of bringing

about the progressive development of a connected sys- tem of roads. These provisions were included as a

result of the experience of the Office of Road Inquiry

and several of the States that had already designated

State highway systems. At that time, however, the

Congress was not ready to accept as a requirement

that all States must have State highway systems.

The importance of the system concept still ranked

high in the thinking of the Office of Public Roads,

however, and in reaching toward this concept, the

Secretary of Agriculture required all States to submit

programs of improvements proposed over the 5 years

of the original authorization of Federal-aid funds for

highways and also to file with the Office of Public

Roads a "tentative" system on which the improvements would be made. So to this small degree, planning was already in evidence.

Hardly had the program gotten underway when

came World War I. To read at this time a recitation

of the effect of the war on the highway program is to

recall how well these same words could have been

used in describing the effect of World War II on the

highway program of that period. In a speech before

the American Society of Civil Engineers, Mr. MacDonald said:*

The Federal-aid work had scarcely begun, however,

when the world war intervened and practically put a

stop to all operations ; and the war did a number of other

things to the existing improved roads which, however

disastrous they may have appeared at the time, have

turned out to blessings in disguise. At the outset the

construction and maintenance of highways were declared

to constitute a non-essential industry. As a consequence new construction, except as required for the immediate

service of the army, was greatly curtailed. Maintenance

also was greatly hampered by the difficulty of obtaining

the necessary materials and the scarcity and high wages

of labor. At the same time there was released upon

roads generally inadequate to stand it an unprecedented

traffic of heavy motor trucks. To this experience and

the heavy damage which followed we owe the development of most of the sound principles and policies which now govern the improvement of highways.

* This quotation and much of the material for the early

history of highway planning are drawn primarily from papers

of Chief MacDonald and Mr. H. S. Fairbank.

The trucks rolled on, but the

scarcity of materials and men

for maintenance made it an

impossible task for these two men to accomplish much

more than to clear the

culvert of debris.

266
The first result was a strong reaction against the use

of heavy motor trucks. There were large numbers of people who, forgetting that a road is of service only in so far as it accommodates the need for economical

transportation, demand that the manufacture and op- eration of vehicles too heavy for the existing roads be

prohibited. As few of the roads were designed to carry motor truck traffic, to have taken this course would have

amounted to the throttling of a new development in transportation before it had a chance to demonstrate its utility, and it was rightly opposed with great energy by

the manufacturers of motor vehicles. The latter, on the

other hand, took a position at the opposite extreme from

which they demanded the right to manufacture and sell vehicles of large capacity and heavy weight, without re- gard to the strength of the roads, on the theory that the greater the capacity of the vehicle the smaller would be

the cost of operation per unit of capacity. The slogan was, 'build the roads to carry loads,' and this was met by

the opposite party with the equally dogmatic demand that the loads should be limited to the capacity of the existing

roads. The issue thus joined, the principals to the controversy

highway officials on the one side and the manufacturers

on the other—wisely agreed to submit their differences

to the test of mutual discussion ; and out of the series of conferences which ensued there came an agreement upon

certain fundamental facts and principles which have

served as the basis for a harmonious cooperation of the two groups, and which now constitute the foundations of highway improvement policy in all States.

The wartime experience was felt in another way

also. It was during this period that an intrepid team

drove a truck from Detroit to Washington to demonstrate the value to the military of motor transport.

This journey, almost an expedition in those days,

represents the birth of a new concept of mobility. It demonstrated the value of a connected system of highways. As much as any other factor, it brought about

what is now recognized as the most significant feature

of Federal aid to highways, the requirement that

funds be expended only on a Federal-aid system recom- mended by the States and approved by the Secretary

of Agriculture, the Department within which the

Bureau of Public Roads was then located.

This requirement was set forth in the 1921 Federal

Highway Act, and reflected the acceptance of the

earlier views as to the essentiality of concentrating

highway expenditures on a limited system, then set at 7 percent of the total highway mileage of each

State. The Act also recognized another national purpose for Federal aid^—^to serve possible military needs.

"V\Tiile later it came to be accepted that the highway

system's military value lay more in aiding in the

movement of the materials and products of war in- dustries than in the movement of strictly military

vehicles, this Act inspired the selection, by cooperative

action of the Bureau of Public Roads and the War

Department, of a system of routes of military importance to be included in the Federal-aid system.

This system, ultimately portrayed in the "Pershing

Map" (General Pershing accepted the responsibility

for this effort) served as the basis for the so-called

"strategic network" on which Federal-aid funds were

to be concentrated during World War II. Thus, the

1921 Act opened the door to another planning effort

the selection of principal highway systems, statewide

and national.

World War I also opened the door to another planning area, economic planning. The "harmonious co- operation" of roadbuilders and truck manufacturers

had led to the adoption of a limit of 7i/^ tons as the

capacity of vehicles for future production, a figure

deemed fair to both (the user being omitted from

consideration, evidently). Again quoting Chief MacDonald : ... It was recognized clearly for the first time that the

cost of highway transportation is made up of the cost of the highways and the cost of operating the vehicles over

the highways, and it was agreed that the common pur- pose of the public highway officials, vehicle manufacturers

and operators should be to reduce the total cost of trans- portation rather than one or the other of the elemental

costs. It could be proved that the number of largecapacity trucks already using some of the highways, principally those radiating from and connecting the larger

cities—had already grown to the point where the combined

savings in operating cost would more than balance the greater cost of providing highway service for them. As

to those highways there could be little doubt of the wis- dom and economy of building a type of surface adequate

for the heavy truck traffic. Other roads, similarly located with respect to cities, had not yet developed a sufficient amount of the heavy traffic to repay the additional cost of the stronger construction, but it was not difficult to foresee that such a condition would develop in the future. On the majority of the roads however, the development

of traffic of sufficient weight to justify the higher types

of construction was very remote ; and it was apparent

that the one-time prevailing condition of uniformity of

traffic on all roads had been definitely broken down. Instead, a new and much different condition had arisen under which the main inter-city roads were found to be carrying traffic far in excess of the much greater mileage

of local roads. Under the new condition the economic justification for the improvement of the main roads lay to a far greater

extent than formerly in the reduction of transportation

costs and to a lesser degree in the effect upon the value

of property. The main roads had become through traffic arteries, as distinguished from the more numerous local roads which continued to be of value primarily through

the service they render in giving access to the land.

From the point of view of highway planning, one

other important feature emerged from the war and

early postwar experience—the matter of highway fi- nance. Recognition that State highways accom- modated most through traffic and that the level of

their improvement should be based on total trans- portation cost gave responsibility for financing the

improvement logically to users, to be supported by

motor-vehicle license fees and excise taxes and the

motor-fuel taxes then beginning to come into more

widespread acceptance. Local roads primarily serving

farms were considered to be the responsibility of property owners served, with the financing coming primarily from real estate taxes, either on the property

served or on the entire community.

The experience gained during the first decade fol- lowing the 1916 Act pointed the direction highway

planning would take. The earliest efforts were in the area of traffic counting. Observations included not

only the numbers of vehicles, but their classification

(passenger cars and trucks of various sizes) to aid

in road design and State of registration to provide some gage of lengths of trips and the proportion of

travel that was interstate in character as a measure

of the propriety of Federal aid. The findings of

these surveys coupled with results of the physical re- search being undertaken, described in Chapter 4, gave

267
Connecticut conducted this traffic census during the period

September 1922-1923.

the means to get on with the early economic studies

perceived to be so important in decisions with respect

to degree of improvement to be provided and to the

appropriate sharing of the costs. Traffic counting is not modern phenomenon, dating

back at least to the Romans. But modern traffic vol- ume counting began not too long after the beginning

of the automobile era. Certainly by the early 1920's

many States and cities were making at least sporadic

traffic counts. Maine, for example, as early as 1916

began counting traffic for one week each year at 58

stations and was one of the first States to make a state- wide survey (in 1924) for the purpose of developing

the State highway system. California has a long history of counting at hundreds of stations for one day

each summer, using maintenance crews, a practice

continued well after the automatic traffic counter had come into general use. Concern was not limited to rural areas, for Cook

County in Illinois, with the Bureau of Public Roads

cooperating, conducted a traffic survey in 1924 and

used the results to develop a constructive program.

Ohio, following generally the Maine method, carried

out a full year statewide survey in 1925. The first metropolitan area traffic counting, also with Bureau

of Public Roads cooperation, was conducted in the

Cleveland area in 1927.

With this background, the Bureau of Public Roads

entered into agreements with several States in the late 1920's for cooperative traffic surveys, the Bureau us- ually supplying the supervision and the States the

coimting personnel. The New England States were among the early participants in these cooperative

studies, presumably because of their relatively higher

traffic volumes, but the most ambitious survey of this

period involved the 11 western States* in a simultaneous program. Here the Bureau joined with the

States in providing field supervision and, in the Washington Office, did much of the analysis and forecasting

of traffic volumes. Efforts to move on from the

traffic volumes forecast route by route to recommended

programs to meet the traffic demands proved to be

considerably less than successful, however, primarily

because of uncertainties in forecasting (the use of

motor-fuel consumption as a good indicator of traffic growth was still in trial stage) and inadequate knowledge of the capacities and condition of existing roadways.

Washington, Oregon, California, Montana, Idaho, Nevada,

Wyoming, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico.

The Highway Planning Surveys

With the growing recognition of the need for more

facts about highway program accomplishments to date

and to establish a basis for estimating the direction

and financial magnitude of future programs, the Bureau of Public Roads and some States had been con- sidering the possibility of a broad data collection effort. Their deliberations bore fruit by the inclusion in the

1934 Federal-Aid Highway Act of the following

wording

Sec. 11. With the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture, not to exceed 1% per centum of the amount ap- portioned for any year to any State . . . may be used for surveys, plans, and engineering investigations of projects

for future construction in such State, either on the Federal-aid highway system and extensions thereof or on

secondary or feeder roads. Though the word "planning" does not appear in

this section, it is the basic and still controlling legislation that authorizes the ongoing highway (or nowtermed highway transportation) planning process. The percentage figure has remained the same, but the

"may" has been changed to "shall." In addition, an

optional 14 percent of all funds, except Interstate,

has been made available for planning and research

purposes. To avoid the appearance of directing how

a State shall expend its own funds, with the change

from "may" to "shall" was added the provision "with

or without State matching." AVhile in the early years one State or another did not match Federal aid, these were the exceptions and now all States at least fully

match, and many "over match," Fedei-al-aid planning

funds, indicating the essentiality of the planning function. But to get to the avoidance of the word "planning,"

the reason lay in the fact that the word had come into

disrepute in many sections of the counti'y, and even

in Washington, due no doubt to the increasing centralization of authority in Washington as the country was still struggling to emerge from the Depression.

So the words "surveys, plans, and engineering in- vestigations of projects for future construction" were

in effect a euphemism for the word "planning." "\\^iile some States tried to interpret the wording as authorizing the funds for preliminary surveys and preparation of construction plans, the intent of those

supporting the legislation and of the Public Works

Committees of the Congress was clear, and Chief

MacDonald yielded at no time to the use of the funds

for anything less than the broad planning process

envisioned by the Bureau.

268
The 1934 Act contained another provision of im- mense importance to the rural residents, an importance

probably not fully appreciated at the time. In the

paragraph authorizing appropriations appeared the

words

Provided further, That not less than 25 per centum of the apportionment to any State shall be applied to second- ary or feeder roads, including farm to market roads, rural free delivery mail roads, and public-school bus

routes . . . As in the 1916 Act, there was no requirement for

the designation of a system, the authorization being

simply for roads of particular classifications with no

limit as to mileage. The Congress did not until years

later specifically authorize or require the designation

of a secondary system, for the authorizations reg- ularly continued were for "secondary or feeder roads."

The Defense Highway Act of 1941, however, evidently

assuming that the roads had formed a system, au- thorized the extension of the Federal -aid system and

the Secondary Road System to include all roads on

the strategic network to permit the application of

Federal-aid highway funds for their imj^rovement.

It was not until the Federal-Aid Highway Act of

1944 that the Congress ^'Provided, That these funds

shall be expended on a system of such roads selected

by the State highway departments in cooperation with

the coimty supervisors, county commissioners, or other

aj^propriate local road officials and the Commissioner

of Public Roads." Nevertheless, with the experience

of 1916 to 1921 still fresh in mind, the Bureau of

Public Roads administratively determined that the

States must designate systems on which the secondary

funds might be programed, initially setting the mileage limit at 10 percent of the rural highway mileage.

The 1944 Act in effect confirmed this early administrative decision and at the same time acceded to the

growing pressure from local officials to have a say

in the selection of routes to be improved with secondary funds.

It was under these conditions in 1934 and 1935,

with highway planning formalized by legislation, that

H. S. Fairbank began planning for planning. Fairbank, who impressed all who knew him as a brilliant

man, a man of broad vision, the most fluent writer

of Public Roads' history, was an engineer and a

scholar, j^et a practical man. He was indeed the

"father" of highway planning. He personally sketched

out the data collection and analytical processes, leav- ing only the details to be worked out by his subordinates (whom he preferred to think of as colleagues).

And through the early years he wrote and spoke

strongly and often in behalf of the planning concept

and in encouraging not only its adoption but its use

in policy, administrative, and engineering decisions.

Fairbank made it clear that the early work was not

planning but the collection and analysis of data to be used in planning, and the agreements between the

States and the Bureau were for the purpose of con- ducting highway planning surveys of three broad

types—road inventory, traffic, and financial and road

use. As a parenthetical note, it is when one advances

from data collection and analysis to forecasting the

future that one advances from surveying to planning.

Tlie inventory phase involved driving over every

mile of rural highway, recording its width, type, and

condition ; on the more important rotttes the geometric

features such as curves, grades and sight distances;

all farms, residences, businesses, industrial plants,

schools, hospitals, and any other cultural feature that

the roads must serve. All the information was to be

recorded on inch-to-the-mile county maps, and the

data tabiilated in a variety of ways for analytical use. The traffic surveys were built on the cooperative

traffic surveys described earlier but imderwent considerable improvement in method as automatic traffic counting equipment, a better understanding of road

design requirements, and improved statistical procedures became available. Basically they involved

intensive traffic volume counting on main routes, less intensive counting on secondary roads and spot checks on lightly traveled local roads. At all stations, vehicles were classified as to type, and on the main roads

a sampling of commercial vehicles was weighed on

portable scales, their cargoes classified, their origins

and destinations ascertained, and their tare weights

recorded where known. Origins and destinations of

passenger cars were also sampled. All these data were to be tabulated in various ways and shown on

appropriate maps. They served to show the service

highways were providing, the vehicle miles of travel

and ton miles of goods and products moved, the

lengths and purposes of trips, and average and peak

hour volumes for design purposes. WTien coupled

with the road inventory data, they showed the adequacy of the existing roads to provide for the move- ment of traffic and to serve the needs of rural land

use, particularly farms. They permitted estimates of

the cost of bringing road conditions up to a standard

regarded as suitable for current traffic and, to the ex- tent it could be forecast, future traffic. The third general area involved the recording of

expenditures and revenues for highways and all other

purposes from all units of government, including

special districts, to ascertain the degree to which user and other taxes were being applied to road purposes

by the individual units and, more generally, by the

various levels of government. These studies would

show the degree to which the main roads were in

fact supported by the users as the theorists then

thought appropriate, and the local roads by property

or general taxes. Today it is recognized that it is only at the extremes that the theory can fully operate

Measuring sight distances and curvature on existing

highways to get data to be used in planning.

269
New Mexico participated in an

ambitious traffic survey in 1930 with 10 other States. —freeways as a user responsibility and the dead end

road or street as a land service or community responsibility—with the great mass of roads in between deserving some support from each source since all such

roads serve both purposes. In 1934, however, there were no facts at all on which even to estimate the

propriety of highway finance of the day. In addition,

the financial survey included road-use studies which

determined from a sample of owners of vehicles in

places of A'^arious sizes the usage they made of roads

in the different systems. This might show, for ex- ample, the use of rural roads by urban residents compared to the use of city streets by rural residents,

to the end of appraising the propriety of the alloca- tion of funds collected by various levels of government to the several road systems. Also included in

the financial surveys were road life studies, which per- mitted estimates of the physical life of the roads

constituting the highway "plant."

Obviovisly, carrying out Fairbank's bold plan would

be an enormous task requiring much manpower, and

it might well not have been begun had not at least three significant items conjoined.

First, the country was still deep in the Depression.

"Make work" programs were being sought, and funds

for highway improvements were being made available

as works relief programs. One and one-half percent

of these funds added to similar percentages of regular

funds then made available under the Hayden-Cartwright Act provided substantial funding from highway sources. Second, the works relief funds for white-collar projects offered Work Projects Administration (WPA)

officials the opportunity to place many needy people

in jobs.

Third, the surfacing of the Federal-aid systems in

most States was well along toward completion, and

administrators were feeling pressures to extend road

improvements to the less important roads. The 1934

Act gave them this opportunity, but by requiring that

the States select a secondary system, the need for the

planning survey was obvious. In fact, Fairbank suggested that providing facts on which to select the

secondary system would be a main object of the effort. But at the same time Fairbank bore down heavily on

the idea that roads were never "completed" but must

be maintained, surfaces replaced, and the whole sys- tem upgraded to meet new demands of a growing

traffic. And the planning surveys were to provide the

data that would permit planning this continuing

process. So with the need for this new concept—planning

constantly emphasized by the Bureau, with the procedures formulated, and with funding and manpower

at hand, work was begun. The first State to get

underway was Pennsylvania in September 1935, closely

followed by Ohio in October of that year, and other

States joining in quickly thereafter.

With this planning survey process new and not

uncomplicated, it was expected that the Bureau of

Public Roads would be able to help the States by

sending people experienced in the earlier cooperative

traffic surveys to assist in starting the field work,

anticipating that States would accept the new concept

but slowly, perhaps five or six States in a year. But

once begim, States followed one another in quick

succession, some appreciating the need and the opportunity to meet it, and others influenced by the growing

number of other States undertaking the work. In fact

officials of one State remarked that "We heard that

[State name omitted by choice] was

starting one of these planning surveys and so we

thought we should have one too, whatever it is." But

for whatever reason, by September 1936, only a year

after the first survey was launched, 38 States had come into agreement with the Bureau and actually

started field work. The schedules varied considerably.

Fairbank had envisioned completing the field work

in one year (the traffic survey required that long

anyway to cover seasonal variations) and spending

another year in analysis. Some States did virtually

complete all tlie field work in a year, but more com- monly the several phases Avere spread over a longer

period, and in no case was the analysis completed in

270
a year. Even with the stretched-out approach, however, a great deal of manpower was involved. In

Ohio, for example, over 600 men were in the field within 2 months after the work got underway, some

occupied for a full year and others a shorter time.

There probably never was a tabulation of the total number of people employed in the early work, but it seems safe to say that at the height of the field work

at least 15,000 men were given employment, almost

all from the relief rolls or the ranks of the unemployed. Thus, leaving out the benefits of the planning

surveys to highway administration, the work repre- sented a major accomplishment in the constructive ex- penditure of work relief funds in a period of great

distress in the country.

But this sudden acceptance of highway planning

had a considerable impact on the Bureau of Public

Roads as well, for on it fell the task of aiding the

States in launching and supervising the work. The

few Bureau people who had worked on the cooperative traffic surveys hardly provided a nucleus from

which to start. So the Bureau set up a training program for highway planning supervisors, drawing not

only from the Washington staff, but recruiting from

the field offices and the forest and park programs as

well. The response was good, mostly from the younger

and perhaps more imaginative employees, many from

graduates of the ongoing Bureau's junior engineer

training program. With word of the training program getting around, States also began sending prospective supervisors to take the training courses.

'\^niile the number "processed" through the training

program was probably never tabulated, what is more

important the program marked the creation of a new

discipline—highway planning—the scope and importance of which surely could not have been foreseen

at that time.

One of the maps prepared as a result of the 1930 western traffic survey.

Thus were launched the highway planning surveys,

and simply keeping them on course during their

early years was a major concern of the Bureau. Data

collection procedures were steadily improved, and the

many problems that developed in tabulating, reconciling, and summarizing data were met and solved.

But the harder part was in moving from summaries

of data to reports and from reports to administrative

and policy decisions. It was to this aspect that Fairbank wrote and spoke so frequently in the years before

World War II. Perhaps his most pi-eceptive writing was in the area

of taxation, for he foresaw financing as the most

critical problem of the future. In the "depression

psychology" of the era, in which the official views

held that the country had reached its pinnacle of

development, that there would be permanent unemployment and our problem would be the equitable

distribution of limited resources, neither he nor any- one else could foresee the great upsui'ge in the economy

and even more in highway transportation that in

1956 made relatively easy the financing of the Interstate System—the greatest public works program in

history.

Planning the Interstate System

Wliile the States were absorbed in collecting and

analyzing highway planning data, and Fairbank particularly saw the need to develop a "climate" in the

States that would encourage them to carry on from

the easier stage of surveying to the more difficult one

of planning, the Bureau of Public Roads almost immediately had need to use the data for planning.

Early in 1937 President Roosevelt called Chief MacDonald into his office and handed him a map of the

United States on which he (the President) had drawn

three lines ea^t and west and three north and south

across the country. He reasoned that with the increasing use of the automobile the need for more and better

highways for long distance travel would be needed,

and suggested that the six routes he had sketched on

the map might be built and financed through the col- lection of tolls. And he asked Chief MacDonald to study the possibility. Again, such a program would

not only benefit the motor vehicle user but constitute a desirable public works program to provide employment. It can be said that this map is the lineal ancestor of the Interstate System, truly a document of

first importance in highway history.

Returning from the White House, Chief MacDonald

handed the map to Mr. Fairbank and asked him to get on with the study. Thus, began the first assembly

of detailed information on traffic flow on a national

basis, possible only because of the rapid i^rogress by

the States on the highway planning surveys. Wliile

data were still not available for all States, enough

States had progressed far enough to supply the data

needed for a reasonable appraisal of the feasibility

of the President's suggestion. As a first step, a traffic flow map of the United States was prepared, finished

in January 1938 and later updated to January 1939

and refined as more States could supply data. For

the first time a picture of travel on all main routes was available.

271
Although the map of the original six routes cannot be found, this map was authenticated in 1951 by Mr. Fairbank as having also been drawn by President Roosevelt and sent to the Bureau in 1938 to indicate the routes on which modern express highways should

be built. This m,ap shows three lines east and west and five north and south.

This map showed in striking manner the buildup

of traffic near the cities and the relatively low volumes

between them. This visual picture was reinforced by

results of the origin-destination studies already completed in several States, which showed the small per- centage of long trips and how the volumes even on

the longer stretched between cities were made up

largely of successions of short trips. The small amount

of really long distance travel—transcontinental—is shown in the report of the study Toll Roads and Free

Roads^ by a map indicating the origins and destinations of traffic crossing a cordon line running through

the States of Idaho, Nevada, and Arizona. Here on

all the main routes crossing this line only 300 vehicles

in an average day were traveling from the Pacific coast States to the Atlantic seaboard States, indicating

that transcontinental travel was almost negligible.

Only 20 trips from the west coast reached Florida, a

figure interestingly close to a finding of 23 trips that were destined to the west coast from Florida, as shown

by a similar cordon on the Florida border. Figures

such as these gave early evidence that long distance

travel would not be sufficient to justify the financing

through tolls of the six suggested routes. But it was

surmised that certain sections might be self-liquidating. So the investigation proceeded to ascertain

the most desirable location of the six routes from the

points of view of attracting travel and feasibility of

construction and to estimate their costs and probable

toll revenues.

The six routes totaled 14,336 miles in length, di- vided into 75 sections for estimates of cost and potential revenue. Section lengths ranged from just over

30 miles to one—Spokane, Washington, to Fargo,

North Dakota—extending 1,160 miles. Mile-by-mile

estimates were made of construction, maintenance, operating and debt service costs, aggregated by sections

and matched against estimated toll revenues, assuming

that travel by 1960 would be 2.5 times the 1937 figure.

The comparison confirmed the early surmise ; the reve- nue for the period 1945 (when the system would be

completed) to 1960 equaled less than 40 percent of

the cost for the entire system and the report concluded

the toll system was not feasible. Yet one section,

Jersey City to New Haven, showed revenues equaling

104 percent of the cost and adjoining sections from

Washington to Portland, Maine, near enough to the

break-even point to indicate feasibility of the entire

length. Other feasible sections were found running

east from Chicago and in southern California.

While the report's conclusion was unfavorable to the toll concept, the detailed study led to a finding

that a master plan for highways in the United States

called for appropriate action by the Federal and

State governments for "the construction of a special,

tentatively defined system of direct interrregional

highways, with all necessary connections through and

around cities, designed to meet the requirements of

the national defense in time of war and the needs of

a growing peacetime traffic of longer range." With

the "abundant data" supplied by the States from the

272
This draioing of a typical grade

separation, access roads, and toll booths

for a 4-lane road was included

in the toll road study.

."" j

iiJtgiBg

This sketch of a proposed express highway and bypass route around

Baltimore was a part of the master

plan for free hightcay development

in the toll road study.

planning surveys, the report examined the desirability

of a longer system not for toll-paying traffic but for

general use, totaling 26,700 miles and serving all principal cities and regions of the country, and found

it ". . . now desirable by law to establish this or a

closely similar System as the Primary Highway System of the United States." Much of the justification

of this system lay in its service to the cities, and in- deed, the report devoted many pages to a suggested

plan for higliways in an urban area, Fairbank using

his home city, Baltimore, as an example. Thus was

suggested the two major new directions Federal highway aid would take in the years ahead—the Interstate System and acceptance of responsibility of the Federal Government and the States in the areas of urban

transportation.

Aware of the study being made by the direction of

the President, the Congress to show its support for

the investigation (and perhaps to insure that it would

receive the report) included in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1938 the following provision

The Chief of the Bureau of Public Roads is hereby di- rected to investigate and make a report of his findings

and recommend to the Congress not later than February

1, 1939, with respect to the feasibility of building, and

cost of, superhighways not exceeding three in number,

running in a general direction from the eastern to the western portion of the United States, and not exceeding

three in number, running in a general direction from the northern to southern portion of the United States, includ- ing the feasibility of a toll system on such roads.

Approved on June 8, 1938, the Congress gave the

Bureau only 8 months to complete the investigation

and report, thus recognizing it was well on the way to completion at the time. The report was transmitted

to the Congress by the President on April 27, 1939.

The 1939 report soon had an impact. In April 1941

President Roosevelt appointed the National Interre- gional Highway Committee "to investigate the need

for a limited system of national highways to improve

the facilities now available for interregional trans- portation, . . . and [later became a study for] the

possibility of utilizing some of the manpower and

industrial capacity expected to be available at the

end of the war." * While there is no documentation

to support it, it seems fair to assume that the action

by the President stemmed from representations originating within the Bureau of Public Roads.

The Committee first met in June 1941 and immediately laid plans for a major study to be carried

out by the staff of the Bureau of Public Roads. The

Committee also enlisted the cooperation of the State

highway departments. Subsequently Public Law 146,

approved July 13, 1943 (an amendment to the Defense Highway Act of 1941) again alined the Legislative Branch witli the Executive Branch of the

Federal Government by authorizing and directing

Commissioner MacDonald to study and report on the

needs for interregional highways.

273
While both Toll Roads and Free Roads and Inter- regional Highways, the title of this second major re- port, were prepared under the direction of H. S. Fairbank by the staff of the Bureau of Public Roads

and with the substantial assistance of the State highway departments, there was a significant difference.

Toll Roads and Free Roads was a Bureau of Public

Roads product ; Interregional Highways was the product of the National Interregional Highway Committee

and submitted to President Roosevelt as such. He in

turn transmitted the report to the Congress to meet

its requirement of Commissioner MacDonald.

The composition of the Committee is particularly

important. Invited by the President to serve on the

Committee (all of whom accepted) were three men

from the highway field—Commissioner MacDonald,

G. Donald Kennedy from Michigan who was incoming President of the American Association of State

Highway Officials, and Charles H. Purcell, State

Highway Engineer from California; two were from

the city planning field—Harland Bartholemew, prominent city planner from St. Louis and Rexford Guy

Tugwell, Chairman of the New York City Planning

Commission; rounding out the Committee were

Frederic A. Delano, Chairman of the National Resources Planning Board and a political leader, and

Bibb Graves, former Governor of Alabama. The

Committee elected Mr. MacDonald as chairman, and

he in turn appointed Mr. Fairbank as secretary.

The composition of the Committee clearly shows the

importance then attached to the city and its problems

in developing a framework for national highway

development. The Committee met repeatedly, and

while the words of Interregional Highways were dis- tinctly Fairbank's, the principles expounded were

those discussed and agreed upon by the Committee

and which received its unanimous approval.

This was indeed a comprehensive study, beginning

with the meeting of the Committee in June 1941 and

extending until the submittal of the report on January 1, 1944. The system finally recommended was

selected by the Committee after examination of several

other systems, greater or less in mileage, as best

meeting the requirements laid down by the President

and the Congress. The report was transmitted to the

Congress on January 12, 1944, and the designation

of the system, identified as the National System of

Interstate Highways, was authorized by the Congress

in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of that year. After

much study and discussion, the routes of the system

as proposed by the several States, substantially as recommended by the Committee, were approved by the

Federal Works Administrator in August 1947. But

it was not until the passage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 that work on the system began in

earnest. Without doubt Inteiv^egional Highways was and re- mains the most significant document in the history

of highways in the United States. Several characteristics of the report make it particularly significant.

First is the composition of the Committee that produced it. The report was the product of highway

officials and planners with broad interests working

together.

Second, the system was not selected simply on the

basis of its traffic usage. It was recognized from the

beginning that the purpose of the system was to provide for highway transportation to serve the economic

and social needs of the Nation. Systems were devised

to serve the Nation's agricultural production, its mineral production, its forest products, its manufacturing centers and, of course, its population centers and defense establishments. Without the help of

computers, all these factors were laboriously shown

by shading county by county on maps, or by similar

devices, and the different systems "eyeballed" through

the areas of heaviest shading or largest circles. It was not until the final choice of the recommended

routes was made by the Committee that traffic volumes

to be expected were brought into the picture, and

then only to be used as a means to estimate costs and

relative economic benefits. Third, the importance of the system within the

cities was given much attention, with a major portion

of the report devoted to "Locating the Interregional

Routes in Urban Areas." Here principles of route

location, still sound today, were proposed and illus- trated. A paragraph from this report of 30 years

ago is worth quoting. It reads as follows:

In choosing these locations for the arterial routes, however, it should be recognized that the undeveloped lands which lie so favorably for highway purposes also present

opportunities equally favorable for other purposes of city

planning. Properly preserved and developed, they can become the needed parks and playgrounds for residents

of adjacent populated areas. Alternatively, they can be developed as new residential communities in the modem

manner, unhampered by previous commitment to the tra- ditional rectangular street plan. It is highly desirable,

therefore, that the location and plan of the new highways

in these areas shall be developed in harmonious relation with other appropriate uses of the now vacant land. Wherever possible, plans for all uses of the land should

be jointly developed and acquisition for all purposes of public uses should proceed simultaneously."

Fourth, the need for coordination with other modes

was emphasized with the words "However, it is at the

cities . . . that the closest attention should be paid to the possibilities of common location, and also to such location of the highways as will best and most

conveniently serve to promote their use in proper

coordination with other transportation means." ®

Fifth, the Committee recognized clearly the limitations of the system. To quote again.

Obviously, it is not possible by any limited highway

system, whatever the relative importance of its constituent

routes, to serve all the needs of the Nation's traffic. Nor

is it reasonable to assume that in and near the cities the routes included in such a limited system will if improved,

provide a complete solution to the serious problem of

city traffic congestion. ... In this connection the Committee has been restricted in its choice because the Presi- dent directed it to select an interregional rather than a

local system, and to consider national above local needs. ... it is important, both locally and nationally, to recog- nize this recommended system ... as that system and

those routes which best and most directly join region

with region and major city with major city.' Sixth, the Committee recognized the need for full cooperation at all levels of government (still to be

fully attained, it seems) by the words ". . . the particular locations of those routes [must] be agreed upon

in common by Federal, State, and municipal authorities who will share the responsibility for arterial high274
way improvement, tliat the desirable standards for

that improvement may be established and commonly

accepted. . . ." ® Finally, the Committee reiterated the recommendation of "Toll Roads and Free Roads" for the creation

of a Federal Land Authority, with powers of excess condemnation to aid in recoupment of increases in

land values resulting from construction of the system.

It also recommended creation of similar authorities

in the States, with the thought that a Federal-aid plan

might be developed to finance immediate acquisition

of land and to permit amortization of the costs by

State and local authorities over a long period of time.®

It is perhaps of interest that President Roosevelt in

transmitting the report to the Congress added in his

own words to the transmittal letter prepared in Public

Roads the following paragraph:

As a matter of fact, while the courts of the different States have varied in tlieir interpretations, the principle of excess condemnation is coming into wider use both here and in other countries. I always remember the

instance of the farmer who was asked to sell a narrow

right-of-way through his farm for a main connecting

highway. From an engineering point of view it would

have been as feasible to build the new highway across the dirt road that ran in front of his house and barn. Actually the owner received from a jury an amount

equal to the whole value of the farm. The road was

built. The owner of the land thereby acquired two new

frontages. He sold lots on one frontage for the former

value of his farm. A year or two later he sold the other frontage for the farm value of his farm. The result was that he still had his house and barn and 90 percent

of his original acreage, and in addition he had received

in cash three times the value of what the whole place was worth in the first instance.i" This recitation of what was in fact the early period

in urban highway j^lanning is simply to demonstrate

that highway officials at that time were ready to join

with those in other disciplines who could help in dev^eloping the Nation's needed transportation system,

and that the principles then established are still valid.

^^^lat has been done since has been built on this solid

foundation, and is no less a sound structure for con- tinued extension and growth of national, State, and

urban transportation from here on.

Planning in Wartime

"Wliile, of course, not even suspected at the time, the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1940 authorized the last apportionments for the regular Federal-aid highway

program to be made until toward the end of World

"War II. The next Federal-aid act was entitled the

Defense Highway Act of 1941, approved on November

19, 1941, less than 3 weeks before Pearl Harbor.

^AHiile the country was not yet at war, the possibility

of United States' involvement was recognized in the

year preceeding to be sufficient, at least in the highway

program, to give life to the adage "In time of peace, prepare for war." The Defense Highway Act in effect placed the road program on a war footing, too little and too late perhaps, but at least a start. The effect of war preparations, and later the war

itself, was felt in two principal ways, first in the need

to reconstitute the States' highway pi'ograms to concentrate on road improvements important, and later

essential, to the war effort, and second to carry on the

restructured program in the face of material shortages,

loss of key personnel to the military services, and re- duced road user revenues at State level. The Congress

responded to these problems to some degree, at least,

by authorizing 75 percent instead of 50 percent participation in projects on the strategic network and accept- ance of the full cost of providing access to military

establishments and essential industrial plants. In the area of critical material shortages, the Bureau of

Public Roads developed working relationships with

the succession of agencies responsible for allocating

critical materials to try to gain for the States the

authorizations to draw from the available supplies

enousrh material to meet the need on the most essential

projects. It was a period of great distress, of course, with

States seeing their road systems deteriorating under

the burden of heavy wartime loads. Materials were

allocated on the basis of priorities established by the

War Production Board, and it is safe to say that the

proof of need in the highway sphere could not have

been established without the data available or collected

as needed by the statewide highway planning surveys.

Priorities were granted after a project by project

review, centralized in Washington, under which each

application was examined in detail, and its essentiality

rated not only against other highway and transportation needs, but against needs in other areas—housing,

manufacturing, farming, and in fact every activity.

Precise information on the number of war connected

trips over proposed projects, the volumes of goods

and war material to be moved, the residences of employees, and many other facts related to the use of

the proposed projects had to be assembled, analyzed

and funneled to Washington. There the Bureau of

Public Roads could begin the torturous process of

gaining an allocation of the required steel, rubber,

cement, asphalt or other critical material. Suffice it to say that with the highway planning survey data,

enough cases could be supported to prevent a breakdown in highway transportation.

As Fairbank once remarked, if in time of peace, prepare for war, then in all logic in time of war one

should prepare for peace. And whether it may have

been that the long duration of the war could not have

been foreseen, preparations for peace indeed began

early in the war. The fact that work went steadily

forward on preparation of the Interregional Highuiays report was itself an indication of the long-range

view of planning for postwar needs. This effort absorbed a large share of the planning resources of

the Bureau of Public Roads not directly involved in

the war effort planning.

Another aspect of postwar preparation came in an amendment to the Defense Highway Act, approved

on July 13, 1943, that permitted the States to use any

funds still remaining from the apportionment under

the 1940 Federal-Aid Highway Act not only for the

"engineering and economic investigations" authorized

in 1934, but also for the preparation of plans, specifications, and estimates (PS&E). The purpose here was to keep the process of collection of essential data

going and also to provide a reservoir of "plans on the

shelf" to permit immediate start of highway construction once the emergency ended. This latter provision

illustrated that the "depression psychology" of the

275
1930's was not entirely dispelled from official thinking even by the exigencies of war. The view then held,

and reflected even in Interregional Highways^ was that

the return of the troops after the war and the sudden

cessation of war industry would, without advance preparations, produce massive unemployment and perhaps

even a depression such as followed World War I. No one could foresee that the pent-up demand for consumer goods, so long missing or in short supply,

and the desire for new products on the market as a

result of advances in technology associated with war

production would take years to satisfy. And this same psychology, parenthetically, probably accounted

for the persistent underestimating of traffic growth

for several years after the war. Another area of preparation for peace during war

is seen in the growing concern for the problems of

urban transportation. The predominantly short range

of highway trips and the buildup of traffic in and

near the cities disclosed in the studies for Toll Roads

and Free Roads were emphasized and further quantified by the early studies of the National Interre- gional Highway Committee. These findings led

Fairbank to repeatedly urge State highway officials and other groups to recognize the urban problems

they soon would be facing and to gain the cooperation

of city officials in an approach to what he saw as a mutual responsibility. Beyond that he saw the need

for gaining an understanding of urban transportation

needs and characteristics paralleling what the highway planning surveys were producing for the rural

areas. And he called on his staff to devise appropriate study procedures.

Obviously many of the techniques fully satisfactory

in rural areas could not be applied in cities. Procedures for counting traffic and determining origins

and destinations of trips in rural areas could not

simply be transferred to the networks of closely

spaced city streets. While traffic volumes on rural

roads where traffic had little choice of route were

indicative of improvement needs, volumes on city

streets, with traffic having almost infinite choices of

routes, had little significance. Traffic often followed

the improvement program, shifting from one street to another as the relative capacity or riding quality

shifted with the construction and maintenance programs. Wliat was needed was information that would

reveal the composition of traffic as shown by the portions that were throiigh trips as contrasted with the

longer-range trips within the area and the shortrange neighborhood trips, and trips not only by motor

vehicle but by transit as well. Generally these were

all being accommodated on the same streets, and the

need was obvious for street systems that would permit

separation of trips with their disparate interests and

permit the design of the different elements of the

system to be compatible with the type of service they

would provide. Origins, destinations and purposes

of trips were required, and stopping even a small

sample of vehicles to interview the drivers, as could

easily be done in rural areas, could hardly be practicable on busy city streets. Beyond that, the closely

spaced network would permit easy avoidance of an

interview station. And interviewing transit passengers presented new and not easy problems.

After exploring a variety of methods, some theoretically and some on the ground, with little prospect

for satisfying results, the home-interview method was

accepted as a possible approach. George Gallup was

having considerable success in his early opinion polls.

His method involved interviewing the right number,

as determined statistically, of representative members

of the different occupational groups comprising the

total population, such as doctors, plumbers, teachers,

housewives, laborers and even unemployed. This approach offered serious problems in attempting to adapt it on a scale necessary to a transportation sur- vey. Fortunately the Bureau of the Census at that

time was exploring means of reducing the costs of its complete censuses by the use of sampling methods.

It was its view that by preselected geographic samples, say one house in ten, a representative sample of

occupational groups would be obtained. That approach would also provide a geographic spread of

interviews for origins and destinations of trips needed

in travel studies. So the Bureau of the Census, while

exploring for their own purposes and finding in the

highway field a companion interest, agreed to assist by joining in assaying the statistical soundness of the

samples and to assist in supervising one or two early

studies so selected. Thus was born the home-interview

approach, the basis of today's urban transportation

planning process. While still in wartime, 1944, the

first home-interview studies to ascertain urban travel

habits were launched (not without some trepidation

to be sure) nearly simultaneously in Tulsa, Oklahoma

and Little Rock, Arkansas. Certainly the State and

city officials deserve a great deal of credit in agreeing

to undertake such a novel program on the basis of

assertions of belief by three Washington Office representatives that the approach would work! But work

it did, and from there it grew.

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944

All these preparations for peace in time of war,

mostly in the planning area, led to the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1944. With all the Federal-aid acts since 1916, it is difficult and probably not useful to try to single out one or a few that are the most significant. The 1916 Act, the first, was organic legislation that got it all started. The 1921 Act stands out

by introducing the system concept. More recently the

1956 Act, setting up the Highway Trust Fund and

authorizing funds to complete the Interstate System,

must be one of the most significant. But none can

stand out above the 1944 Act as "landmark" legislation.

First, it authorized apportionments for a 3-year

period beginning at the termination of the war emer- gency or at the concurrent resolution of the two houses

of Congress, and it authorized a large amount ($1.5

billion).

Second, it authorized funds specifically for expenditure on the "Federal-aid highway system in urban

areas," not for a Federal-aid urban system. (Originally the routes were "extensions" of the rural Federal-aid or Federal-aid secondary I'outes, and later

"portions" of those routes.)

Third, it required the selection of a Federal-aid

secondary system for which secondary funds were

earmarked.

276
Fourth, it divided the funds as follows: 45 percent

for the Federal-aid system (it was not yet designated

as the "primary" system, and the 45 percent could be

expended on rural or urban portions at the States' election); 30 percent for the secondary system; and

25 percent for the routes in ui'ban areas. This

45 :30 :25 ratio was to prevail until 1973.

Fifth, it authorized the designation of the National

System of Interstate Highways, following almost

exactly the recommendations of tlie National Inter- regional Highway Committee. The system was to be

". . . so located as to connect by routes, as direct as

practicable, the principal metropolitan areas, cities,

and industrial centers, to serve the national defense,

and to connect at suitable border points with routes of continental importance in the Dominion of Canada

and the Republic of Mexico. . . ." (Although it was

later to become an issue, nowhere did the Congress

indicate that the system should be expected to accom- modate purely local traffic, such as urban commuting

movement.)

Sixth, it provided that on any highway or street thereafter constructed with Federal aid ". . . the location, form, and character of informational, regulatory,

and warning signs, curb and pavement or other markings, and traffic signals installed or placed by any

public authority, or other agency, shall be subject to the approval of the State highway department with

the concurrence of the Public Roads Administration "

Seventh, it added to the authorization of the II/2 percent highway planning funds the words "and for

highway research necessary in connection therewith."

It was the view of the Public Roads Administration

that research in the structure and geometries of the

highway was proceeding well under State financing

or with Public Roads administrative funds, but that

not enough effort was being applied to research in the

areas of economics and administration. Once research

in these areas became established, the restriction was

lifted by subsequent legislation, but through the late forties and the fifties Commissioner MacDonald stood

firm against the use of any II/2 percent funds for the

generally more favorably viewed physical research.

Indeed the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944

stands as landmark legislation; and most of its forward looking provisions stemmed directly from the

highway planning efforts so strongly advocated and

ably administered by Fairbank and MacDonald. It was a mandate for the future.

Planning in the Postwar Period

Statewide Highway Planning

During the war, highways were officially regarded

as expendable, and they were pretty well spent. The

most noticeable resulting deficiencies were probably on the State primary systems, and even though Federal-aid funds authorized in the 1944 Act were available, it was soon apparent that funds at both State

and Federal levels would not be adequate to stay even with growing needs, to say nothing of recouping

the wartime losses. Traffic volumes were greatly depressed by gasoline rationing and the suspension of

passenger car production during the war, dropping

to about half their 1941 level in 1943 and 1944. It was generally expected that traffic would recover, but

slowly, and that time would be on the side of the

THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INTERSTATE AND DEFENSE HIGHWAYS

COMPLETED OR

IMPROVED AND OPEN TO TRAFFIC

CpUltd I. (all .r .cc.pl.bl* It.Bd.M.. .r inpra.cd I. I.nd.rdi

*d*«..l. for pr<t*Dt Ir.rr.c. ba>ll «>l1i liKr.lal* or olbtr p.btk FnBd*.

' MAJOR TOLL ROADS

UNDER CONSTRUCTION

• PRELIMINARY STATUS OR NOT YET IN PROGRESS

The Interstate System is the only completely planned highway system in the United States.

277
highway officials in organizing their catch-up programs. But this was not to be. Traffic volumes re- covering from their 1943 low point reached the 1941

level again in 1946, not somewhere around 1960 as perhaps wishful thinking had forecast. By 1948 they

had reached the prewar trend line, having thus completely recovered in only 5 years, and the volumes

continued to push vigorously upward, following al- most exactly the equally unexpected surging economic

growth.

To try to establish with the State legislatures the

need for more funds, many highway officials reasoned

that if highway planning facts were convincing to the War Production Board in allocation of critical

materials, they might be equally convincing to State

legislators as evidence of highway needs in their own

States. Some States did use the data to develop programs for bringing the State highway systems back

to reasonable service levels, hopeful of receiving legislative approval and necessary funding. But in- variably they met disappointment. The programs

were thought to be self-serving, that State highway

needs were emphasized at the expense of county and

local roads; or that they gave insufficient attention to the needs of the cities; or that the needs were overstated; or that the program would require increased

tax rates. Out of this confusing and often frustrating situation came the statewide highway needs

studies. The first in California, completed in 1946,

set the stage for what might be called an era of such

studies.

California's postwar highway problems were per- haps the most severe of any State, stemming largely

from the huge population increases during and immediately following the war. Responding to the

challenge, the State legislature enacted the CollierBurns Act, so named for its authors Senator Collier

and Assemblyman Bums, the chairmen of the respective highway committees. The Act laid down conditions perceived as needed for a successful survey of

highway deficiencies and which became virtually

"principles" that were generally adopted by other

States as they followed California's lead. The first "principle" the Act specified was the es- tablishment of a legislative commission to whom the

report was to be made and which could observe the

procedures and conduct of the work, thereby assuring

consideration of the report by the legislature.

Second, it provided for a survey of all roads and

streets, not just the State highway system, so no level of government could feel that its needs were ignored.

Third, it called for the survey to be conducted by

engineers from outside the State to avoid any possible

inference of favoring one system or one government

level over another.

Fourth, it called for a classification and grouping

into systems of all roads and streets according to their

functions, toward the end of assigning to the appropriate government levels the responsibility for administering and financing the improvement programs on

the different systems.

Fifth, it called for estimates of cost and recom- mendations of programs to bring the entire network

up to desirable standards.

In seeking "outside" engineering assistance, California came into agreement with the Automotive

Safety Foundation (ASF). This nonprofit foundation, sponsored by the automotive and associated in- dustries, such as oil and rubber, had been organized

to work with public and other private agencies toward

the improvement of highway safety. Its principal

purpose was to serve as a rallying point for activity

in the field of highway and traffic safety and, through

educational programs, sponsorship of conferences and

meetings, and financial support of projects, to mobilize resources for a concerted attack on the accident

problem. It had become convinced that improvement

in the engineering of the highway, not simply to produce safer designs but to relate the design standards

to the function and capacity requirements of the

routes, would constitute an important element in its program. In this position the Foundation received

the strong endorsement of the Public Roads Administration and with the Foundation's President, Pyke

Johnson, and Commissioner MacDonald lending their

strong and steady personal support, technical and

financial resources from public and private sectors were deftly marshalled in an attack on specific aspects

of the overall problems. Thus, the Automotive Safety

Foundation, through its engineering division organized under G. Donald Kennedy, formerly Highway

Commissioner of Michigan (the only elected Commissioner among the State highway administrators),

undertook to serve as the engineering consultant for

the California survey. This first effort led to increasing ASF involvement in highway needs studies over many years to come. The engineers did not conduct the surveys. Basic

data came from the highway planning surveys or, where more data were needed, they were collected by

the States, counties or cities as required. The engineers, with the aid of technical committees representing the various levels of government, developed

standards against which street and highway adequacy

might be judged. Cost estimates were prepared for

needed improvements to attain the agreed upon standards, estimates of revenue were made, and from the mass of data, construction programs were prepared.

Usually alternatives were proposed to show the governmental units responsible for the various systems

what would be required to "catch up" with needs in

periods of 10, 15 or 20 years, so the State legislature

and other governing bodies could choose how rapidly

they might or could bring their roads and streets to adequacy. Through the whole process, the legislative

commission could observe the work as it progressed,

and, thus, both political and technical leaders had had

a part in the preparation of the report.

Here perhaps a word on the meaning of "highway

needs" is in order. The phrase has become a part of our vocabulary, as shown by legislation at both Federal and State levels. The term is unfortunate per- haps in that it may lead to criticism that what has

been proposed is not to satisfy "needs" but "desires,"

and the forecast of "needs" is a self-fulfilling forecast

in that if a highway is built it will be used, and thus

the "need" demonstrated. Actually in the highway

needs studies, two sets of standards were generally

used, one called "tolerable" and the other "desirable."

278
The needs study might accept as not needing improvement sections that were barely adequate for cur- rent traffic or meeting "tolerable" standards. But

when any section was found to be below that level and was recommended for construction, the design was based on what would be required to meet traffic volumes of 20 years beyond the expected date of construction, with all desirable safety and environmental

factors included—the "desirable" standard.

TNTiat really is done is to establish a "level of service" that would in effect be a measure of the quality

of traffic flow—speed, comfort and safety all included.

The higher the design standard, the higher the level or quality of service, but also the higher the cost. Thus, the criterion becomes the degree to which the

desirable level of service can be attained, limited

generally by finances but sometimes, as in urban areas, by physical or environmental factors as well. The

level of service to be used as a goal can and, in fact,

generally must be the subject of some trade-offs between desirable and tolerable sendee. That is the

way in which "need" should be interpreted in the

needs studies. It is the amount of mobility and safety

that the public is willing to buy, given the potential

traffic volumes, and the costs in money, environmental

impact, and nonuser social and economic factors in- volved. Once the technical and administrative or

political leaders concerned have agreed upon the level of service that is appropriate for the routes or systems

to be studied under the particular conditions involved,

the cost estimate is simply the cost to achieve it. Question as to whether it is to satisfy a "need" or a

"desire" disappears, for the target generally lies somewhere in between.

Through the next decade, from the publication of

the report for California in 1946 up to the launching

of the Interstate program by the 1956 Act, the Foundation assisted 19 States in conducting their needs

studies, not all as complete as in California but all using the same format with respect to the request by

the State legislature for the study and the committee

structure involving both technical and political leaders. Of course in all, dependence for facts fell on the

highway planning surveys. Despite the visible success in the early studies, in- terest was slow in building up in many States, and

the pressures to overcome the immediate problems of

the wai'wom highway's were enough to give many

States reasons for not worrying about long-range

plans or programs. Attention even to keeping the

planning data up to date lagged. In this atmosphere

Fairbank pressed even harder to bring to the States

the importance of planning ahead. In one speech,

for example, he closed with these words

It is a remarkable fact that motor vehicle manufacturers, by a concerted action to improve, and more exactly

define the designed capacity of, their vehicles, and

through the recent invaluable assistance of the Automotive Safety Foundation, of which they are the principal

support, should be taking, as they are, a leading part in bringing about the needed multilateral cooperation toward

many of the objectives of highway transportation planning as here defined. Such cooperation and broad planning is being achieved

State by State, one after another. The results that have

issued from it in California, the even more gi-atifying results soon to appear in Michigan are certain to inspire similar effort in many States.

The Public Roads Administration is willing and anxious

to take its part. It was for this use, exactly, that the highway planning surveys were conceived ; to these ends

every item of the recommended outline of needed fact gathering was directed. A recent General Administrative Memorandum (No. 319, issued September 24, 1947) renews our promise of cooperation, and repeats an earlier suggestion of the manner in which information, that can

be well assembled only by the highway planning surveys, can he addressed to the ends of highway transportation

planning.

The State highway departments cannot, if they would,

avoid the responsibility of major contribution to such

planning effort when it is undertaken, as surely, soon or

late it will be, in every State. The State highway planning surveys will be the expected source of most of the

facts required in that planning.

May I, in closing, suggest to the head of each State highway department here attending, that he take a fresh look at his highway planning survey after the approaching holidays ; that, patiently, for it will require patience, he read the full text of General Administrative Memorandum No. 319 ; and, facing toward the west from

whence a new wind is blowing, decide for himself,

whether he is going to be ready, as the inevitable occasion will require, to fulfill the requirements of this thing

called highway transportation planning."

With the steady pressure of surging traffic growth,

the continued urging from Washington, and the success of the early needs studies carried on with the aid

of the Automotive Safety Foundation, 35 States had

followed California's lead by 1959 in preparing for

their future. Not all studies covered all aspects of

the problem, other consultants entered the field, and

in some States repeat studies were carried out to measure the effectiveness of programs adopted as a

result of the original studies or to up date the earlier

recommendations in light of unanticipated changes of

conditions, notably the rate of traffic growth. With

the attention given to the highway needs studies, the

use of statewide highway planning data had come

into its own in the decade after the war and established highway planning as an essential function of

the highway departments.

Urban Transportation Planning

The postwar decade saw wide expansion of the

urban transportation planning process that, as noted

earlier, emerged in Tulsa and Little Rock in 1944.

The methods were unique, untried, and the cost of

data collection high. The figure of 10 cents per capita

originally estimated proved to be far too low, but

even so it represented amounts well beyond any

figures that had been thought of as the cost of an urban traffic survey.

Even as the data collection process was new, so too were new analytical procedures required. The origins

and destinations of trips for a representative day

were recorded in the sample households and expanded

on the basis of the sample size to represent the total travel for the entire area. Recognizing that the particular route of travel was determined by the layout

of the street network and the capacity and condition

of the streets, no attempt was made to trace the actual

routes, but rather to show on a map the direct line

between origin and destination. With the sample

households grouped into zones of similar characteristics, or sometimes simply geographically delimited,

all trips between each zone and each other zone were shown by bands of varying widths. These bands

279
This map shows the major "desire lines" that resulted from a

transportation study made in Baltimore in 1938.

came to be known as "desire lines," showing the desired paths of all trips, either by private vehicle or

transit in the area. The heaviest bands then gave

indication of the desirable location of arterial routes (whether or not feasible) and the traffic volumes the

trips would produce. As a check on the accuracy of

the survey, the number of trips crossing a natural

screen line, such as a river, as shown by the desire

lines could be compared with actual vehicle counts. Generally a high accuracy was found, often over 90

percent agreement, but where the sample produced

too few trips (seldom did the interviews produce too many) the screen line counts provided a basis for

adjustment.

It is important to recall what was recognized then^

that the process was a survey. It did not produce a plan nor even the future volumes for design purposes.

The only way to estimate future travel was to assume

that if the planners expected the population to in- crease by say 50 percent, then 50 percent should be

added to all current origins and destinations. It was known that that wasn't right, for certainly population

or industry would grow more in some zones than in

others, but it was better than not increasing them at

all, which some planners were then urging. It be- came apparent early in the game that a relationship

existed between the use of the land and the travel it produced or attracted—and that it could be measured.

But means to use this relationship in developing plans

for the future were rudimentary at best. The earliest

effort to apply this approach was probably in San

Juan, Puerto Rico, where the travel to and from the

existing airport was transferred to the expected location of a new airport in developing a freeway plan.

It remained for the development of the computer

to permit exploitation of the land use-transportation

relationship, given its first major test in Detroit.

This new computer technology marked the turning

from surveying to planning. But the application of

the new technology could not have occurred without

the resources of the highway department's I14 percent

HPR funds being made available. And it could not

have been implemented without conversion of the

land use inventories and projections, then usually

shown on maps by zones of different colors, from a

qualitative to a quantitative basis. It was necessary

to Icnow the trip producing characteristics of each

type of land use. It was important to know not that

280
a zone was industrial, but what kind of industry was

there, for a shoe factory would produce far different

numbers of trips than a steel mill, for example. And

in residential zones income levels were important be- cause they were a factor in numbers of trips and

choice of modes. This in turn induced the highway

departments and interested cooperating cities to bring

into the planning process, up until then carried on

largely by engineers, professionals from other dis- ciplines—such as planning, geography, mathematics,

and sociology—better equipped by ti-aining to deal

with the factors of urban growth, to which transportation facilities must be related. This tremendous breakthrough in planning, a development which put land use and general planning

as well as transportation planning on a quantitative

basis, can be attributed to three factors, each essential—the introduction of the computer, the availability of resources never before within reach of planners,

and the bringing into the planning process, in many

cases with responsibility for the direction of the work,

of professionals from other than the engineering dis- cipline. But these factors themselves would not have

produced the result had it not been for strong urging

of the Public Roads Administration and the technical

advances developed by its staff' and the willingness of

many of the State highway departments and interested cities to participate in this major pioneering

effort. And it also required a liberal interpretation

of what is a highway purpose, for the use of highway

funds both at Federal and State level are restricted

by law to expenditures for highway purposes. Highway oflScials had one ally, however, and a strong one,

in the Bureau of the Budget, which informally urged

leaning as far as possible in the financing of land use and general planning. The logic, of course, is that one can hardly produce a transportation plan without

a land use plan reflecting the form of city or region

the local citizens will probably have if not necessarily

what they desire, and it was on this basis that highway officials, sometimes with justifiable concern as to

its legality, agreed to finance considerably more than

what might be narrowly construed as highway planning. In plain fact, land use from the beginning of

the modern planning process, has been accepted as the

base from which urban transportation planning must

start. And perhaps more recently but no less strongly

accepted is the fact that transportation can be an

important factor in determining land use. The two

are interrelated.

In the matter of financing of the land use portion

of the process, tribute must be paid to the Housing,

and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) and its officials which, as the "701" planning assistance funds became

available, joined in the effort as full partners at the

Federal level. The cordial and effective cooperation

of the staffs of HHFA and the Public Roads Administration and the direction of much of the 701 money

to the cooperative (sometimes called hyphenated)

land use-transportation planning process must rank

well up with the highway contribution in the success of the process.

"\Miile highway departments were placing major

emphasis on planning arterial routes in urban areas,

city street congestion was steadily worsening. Arterial highway improvements even though planned

were not appearing because of lack of funds, and it became increasingly obvious that even when built they

would still leave heavy congestion on city streets, particularly in the downtown areas. The fact that

the highway departments' efforts seemed to be result- ing in plans but not pi'Ograms was leading to expressions of quite divergent philosophies. Many city

officials, particularly traffic engineers and public works

directors, began urging de-emphasis on freeways and

concentration on traffic engineering type of improvements and minor construction programs as an immediate aid to lessening congestion. Highway officials, at least in some cases, held the view that such localized

improvements were stopgap at best, and that urban

officials should give greater attention to getting on

with what the highway officials saw as the essential

long-range improvements. It was in this atmosphere

that the National Committee on Urban Transportation (NCUT) was created in 1954, initiated and

sponsored by the Automotive Safety Foundation.

Its purpose was "to help cities do a better job of

transportation planning through systematic collection

and analysis of basic facts . . . [to] afford the public

the best possible transportation service at the least possible cost . . . and . . . aid in accomplishing desirable goals of urban renewal and sound suburban

growth." ^^ The list of organizations which formally named

representatives to constitute the National Committee

is impressive in its inclusion of virtually every asso- ciation concerned with transportation in the urban

area. The list is as follows

The American Municipal Association

The American Public Works Association

The International City Managers' Association

The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers

The American Society of Planning Officials The Municipal Finance Officers Association

The Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities

The National Association of County Officials The Bureau of Public Roads

Among the consultants to the Committee were Ralph Bartelsmeyer, then Chief Highway Engineer

of Illinois, who represented the American Association

of State Highway Officials, and George Anderson,

Vice President of the American Transit Association.

Ben West, Mayor of Nashville was the first chairman

of the Committee, later succeeded by Glenn Richards,

Commissioner of Public Works of Detroit.

The assembly of this Committee not only exemplified the ability of the Foundation to marshall re- sources to bear on a specific problem, but also marked

the beginning of the cooperative approach to urban

transportation problems.

The Committee enlisted a great many experts in

various areas of urban transportation to prepare a

series of technical manuals covering all phases of

data collection and processing, as well as recom- mendations for developing the plan, carrying out the

plan and improving transportation administration.

A count of the members of the subcommittees and

their consultants and advisors adds up to 142, all recognized experts or leaders in their respective fields. It was an unparalleled volunteer effort, from 1954

through to the publication of the book Better Trans281
portation for Tour City by the Public Administration

Service in 1958. This guide and the 17 procedural

manuals became "best sellers," for the Public Administration Service and went through several printings. The guide and manuals formed the basis for

Action Program of Urban Transportation Planning

which is discussed later. It was during the preparation of the NCUT guide

and manuals that the divergent philosophies of urban

transportation improvement began to merge. In the

Committee's early deliberations, strong representations were made that the planning effort by the States, then

often termed the "Bureau Method," was too expensive

and produced no data for localized traffic engineering

improvement. There was considerable sentiment that

the Committee take a firm stand in recommending

diversion of effort from the long-range to the shortrange studies and planning. Finally it was recognized that it would be most unwise to look on the two

approaches as competitive and that the city interests

should join with the States in total studies, long and

short range. This decision solidified the Committee's

attack on the problem, and the product of its work

soon brought the Public Roads Administration into

the activity as a financial sponsor along with the

Automotive Safety Foundation. And upon its completion, the program proposed by the Committee was

endorsed by the Bureau of Public Roads, and by the

Joint Committee on Highways that had by then been

named by the American Municipal Association and

the American Association of State Highway Officials. The Bureau also found that "In general, the studies

embraced in the program, if included in the statewide

highway planning survey of any state . . . are eligible

for financing assistance from federal-aid highway

funds apportioned to the states. . . ." "

Thus, this volunteer effort not only produced technical documents of lasting importance, but sparked

a significant gain in Federal-State-local relationships

and opened a channel for Federal aid to cities in

solving their local transportation problems. And,

incidentally, the Committee having completed its work in 1958, voluntarily disbanded, not a commonplace occurrence in Washington.

Planning in the Washington Office

The increasing activity in the area of highway

needs studies and the urban travel habit surveys

placed a considerable burden on the Washington

Office of the Bureau of Public Roads. Although a Federal planning engineer was located in each State

and in each field region, their responsibilities were

primarily administrative. Most of the technical as- sistance and reviews of the ongoing planning activities in the States came from Washington, especially

where innovative methods and pilot projects preceded

the more general adoption of new procedures or in- vestigation of new areas. Even so, much effort went

into advancing the art of planning, or as later more

explicitly defined to satisfy the accounting office, re- search in the planning method.

The highway needs study procedures offers one

example. The accepted procedure in the State studies was to estimate the deficiencies in the highway system

route by route as they existed at the time of the sur- vey and as they were expected to appear as traffic

continued to grow and roads continued to wear out

or become inadequate in capacity. Then the year by

year requirements to overcome these deficiencies were

accumulated to show the total need by systems or for

the entire State. Even before the highway planning surveys were

organized, work was being done under agreement between the Bureau of Public Roads and the Iowa State

University on what were called road life studies.

This study accepted that just as the average life of

human beings, or public utility installations, or rail- road ties could be forecast by actuarial methods, so too could the life of road surfaces. Plotting the curve of the actual lives of road surfaces from the

time of placement until they were retired from service

by reconstruction or for other reasons, including different surface types, would give characteristic curves based on actual experience. In many States bond

issue financing provided funds for a large mileage of

road to be built in a very short period, all or most of

which would have to be rebuilt or otherwise taken

from service at some future time. Provision must be

made for this replacement cost, and by matching the curve of retirements after, say, 10 years since construction with a curve that had been developed by

experience of similar surfaces over, say, a 30-year

period, the replacement needs, year by year, could be

forecast. This forecast did not reveal which particular sections would be retired, but it would give a

reasonable estimate of the total replacement program

to be anticipated in any year for financial planning.

The success of this approach led to its adoption as a part of the highway planning survey package in all States. Replacement of a road surface on the same

location did not retire the whole value of the original

investment, however. The right-of-way and probably

much of the grading and drainage, still were usable,

perhaps depreciated but still an asset. So it was

reasoned that a curve of investment life, similar to the road surface's structural life, could also be viewed on an actuarial basis. While there was, then at least, no statistical relationship between investment in the

system and demands upon it as shown by traffic volumes accommodated, it was further reasoned that

the depreciated investments in the highway plant

should keep pace with traffic growth. This view was

fully supported by the facts in the decade of the

thirties when the curve of traffic growth and the curve

of the value of the depreciated investment did almost

exactly coincide. Indeed, it has been reasoned and

may well be true that our highway systems in that

period came nearer to meeting the demands of the

traffic of its time than at any period before or since,

for it was in this decade that public works programs

were strongly financed as unemployment relief projects to the great benefit of the highway systems.

With highway construction virtually stopped during

the war, investment had barely recovered to its 1940

level by 1950, while traffic had grown by 50 percent.

These curves showed at a glance, by their vertical

separation, how far the investment fell below the

need—50 percent. And by their horizontal separation,

they showed how far behind traffic the investment

lagged in years—9 years, at the projected rate, to catch up even to 1950 needs, to say nothing about

recovering lost ground.

282
When this approach was tested in a number of

States in which the needed investment by years to achieve the accepted level of service had been calculated by accumulating the route-by-route needs, the

agreement in the total figures was indeed remarkable.

The investment life approach could not replace the

detailed survey, for it could not be directed toward

particular routes or sections necessary to program

construction expenditures. But it gave a check on the

detailed engineering method and also provided a

simple, easily understood means of keeping abreast of

progress year by year as the highway program proceeded.

In somewhat the reverse of the highway needs sit- uation, traffic volume forecasting was usually approached on an areawide basis. The classic procedure was to estimate population, motor vehicle ownership

per capita, and annual miles per vehicle over the years

and from these estimates calculate the total vehicle

miles of travel to be expected. In the "depression

psychology'" still persisting, estimates in all three ele- ments generally were too pessimistic, with the multiplication of all three producing far too low estimates

of traffic on which to base future highway needs cal- culations. In one case of a highway needs study, the

level estimated for 10 years ahead had been reached

before the report was printed. In exploring this sit- uation to try to find a more realistic basis for forecasting, it was discovered that, for the decade of the

thirties, traffic had been growing at almost the same

rate as the national economy and that, once the aberrations of the war were behind us, parallel growth was resumed. On the strength of that finding, in

1950 it was suggested by E. H. Holmes, Chief of the

Highway Transport Branch of BPE, that this rela- tionship was entirely logical and that in planning

ahead it would be unwise to anticipate a growth rate below that of the last two decades— 4 percent per year

compounded. (This rate of growth would see traffic double in 171/2 years; it did double in I614.) This

forecast was greeted with skepticism, to put it mildly,

perhaps not because of doubts as to the relationship,

but more by doubts that that rate of economic growth

could continue. It was not until 1954 that the

Bureau of Public Roads formally accepted the soundness of this relationship and raised its sights accordingly. Actually over the past two decades, the gross

national product has been growing at about 3 percent

annually while traffic has continued its 4 percent rate, presumably as our economy shifts from an industrial

to a service oriented society and with a generally

higher economic level. But even the more realistic approach to traffic growth forecasting on an areawide basis was of little help in estimating probable volumes on specific routes. With the aid of selected States, origin and destination

studies were carried on before and after major route improvements were made, and studies were made

comparing parallel routes, such as toll roads and

parallel existing routes. These studies disclosed that

the traffic on the new routes could be segregated into

four groups: trips "diverted" from other routes by

the higher level of service; trips "generated" simply

because the new routes offered a convenience not

previously available; "development" trips resulting

from new development along the routes; and finally, some trips simply resulting from "general traffic growth." Wliile subsequent research has refined this

approach, estimates using these four general divisions

of composition of the traffic stream were generally

the basis on which the States estimated needs, route by route, required for the important studies to be

conducted in 1954 and 1955.

These were examples of developing and improving

planning techniques through research. During this

period, great advances were made in processing,

analyzing and interpreting data collected in the urban

travel habit studies. As noted earlier, with the data

processing equipment then available, the survey

method was validated in the early studies. Travel

could be accurately reproduced through home interviews. But to project travel into the future, the re- lationships between travel and land use had to be

established, and as also noted, it took the computer

and the introduction of new disciplines into the

process to do it. What emerged from this effort were a series of

relationships, called models in computer terminology,

that first showed the trips that might be expected

from a zone of known land use to other zones of

loiown land uses, as determined from the actual travel

in the area. Then with the number of trips from

each zone to each other zone calculated, another series

of models to permit the "assigning" of the trips to the

links of an existing or proposed network of routes,

either highway or transit, was developed. The first series of models employed economic and social factors

available by zones from census records, such as occupation, income level, and number in the family and

their ages. The second included physical factors such

as the purpose, time and distance of trips by various

routings, costs of parking if that were involved, cost of travel by transit, and other factors to predict the

mode and probable route of travel. The intensive

work in this area led to a computer program "package" of models that permitted the estimation of trips

and their routing with satisfying (to some, surprising) accuracy. In application of these models to estimate future travel and transportation facility

needs, future land use had to be estimated. Research

showed that computer simulation could also be used

to predict the probable use of land, basing the models

largely on theory and testing them against actual

changes in land use as the urban areas expanded.

In that success it may be said that the quantitative

approach had been brought to urban planning by the

transportation planners. The use of these models, in

combination, can show what transportation facilities are required to provide a desired level of service for a given land use; they will also show what density of

land use may be allowed if a desired level of trans- portation service on a given transportation network

is to be maintained. These models, refined as they

have been over the years, can appraise the effect of

land use on transportation, as well as the reverse, the

effect of transportation on land use. They can show

how to achieve balance between transportation and

other development.

283
Edward H. "Ted" Holmes

In 1906, Ted Holmes was born in Kingston, Massachusetts, close by

to Plymouth. By the time he was 10, the Federal-Aid Road Act of

1916 had become the first national Federal-aid program. Holmes knew

nothing of it at the time, nor did he realize that he later would join the

Bureau of Public Roads in what would become an intimate partnership

lasting 40 years. The value of that merger is still reflected in the quality of highway programs both in the United States and abroad.

Holmes graduated with a degree in civil engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1928. Having spent a summer as a student engineer making time studies for the Bureau of Public Roads,

he returned to the Bureau after graduation as a trainee, the launching

pad for most BPR engineers. Holmes once remarked that at this point

he probably envisioned his future as that of a highway contractor or

superintendent.

That vision changed, however, when he was chosen in 1929 for a

fellowship in the new field of traffic engineering at Harvard University,

from which he graduated with a master's degree in 1930. From that

time on, Ted Holmes was to devote his entire career to highway re- search and planning.

From his earliest endeavors, he pioneered in the development of workable solutions for both short- and long-range demands. His early efforts in the Bureau of Public Roads included the planning, adaptation, and

design of equipment and scientific techniques to measure the traffic characteristics essential to sound traffic planning, design and engineering. The now common practice of counting traffic with pneumatic

detectors was just one of the revolutionary steps that stemmed from

these studies. In the mid-1930's he had a major role in establishing the

Federal-aid statewide highway planning surveys which provided an

appropriate foundation for the continuing Federal and State highway

programs.

Among his goals were the pursuit, development and encouragement

of a supporting staff. Individually and collectively, those men were or became outstanding experts in their fields. This was due in principal measure to Holmes' ability to forge effective teams from talented individuals and to give each one an opportunity to reach his potential.

Holmes' direction and counsel were invaluable throughout the many

years when highway research and planning served as the keystone of

the Nation's highway transportation programs. Through the 1940's

and 1950's, he guided the development of the urban factual surveys and

analyses of traffic and urban development. These later evolved into a

scientific linking of transportation to land use which is now known

internationally as the "3 C" (comprehensive, continuing, cooperative)

State-local planning process. This innovation in urban transportation

planning, perhaps the most notable of all Ted Holmes' many contributions, was subsequently extended to statewide planning. The key to the success of that endeavor was the development of a high degree of

cooperation among Federal, State, and local officials that pei'haps

reached its high point with the Williamsburg Conference in 1965, which

he chaired.

Holmes' efforts covered many diverse subjects related to transport.

Among these was his discovery of a significant parallel between trends

in vehicle mileage (VMT) and the Gross National Product. In a speech in 1950, he advised his audience that they should expect an in- crease in traffic over the next 15 years of at least 4 percent annually.

Although at the time this forecast met with almost universal doubt, in

1965 the aA^erage rate had been 4.1 percent. Not all forecasters have

been that fortunate

284
Many of the great landmark reports to Congress bore his mark, among

them the Interregional Highways report of 1944 and a series of national

needs studies. They formed the framework for the National System of

Interstate and Defense Highways and the balance of the Federal-aid

system and, as such, are basic to the knowledge of the histor}'' of national

highway development in the United States. Thomas H. MacDonald, long the Commissioner of Public Roads,

conunented befoi-e his retirement in 1953: "At no time in the last 25

years has there been a report from Research which did not have the

stamp of genius in it." As understudy to H. S. Fairbank, Deputy

Commissioner of Research, Holmes' thoughts permeated all research

activities. For example, for years he guided the applied research and

development of new planning policy procedures. These were implemented in the Federal-aid highway program, which provided continual

stimulation for the physical, economic, and resource development of the

Nation.

In 1956 Holmes became Director of Research for the Bureau of Public

Roads. As such he fostered the development of the National Cooperative Highway Research Program within the Highway Research Board.

He also deserves credit for many activities between various levels of

government affecting the Nation's highway transport program. Examples include his leadership in determining appropriate sizes and

weights of commercial vehicles and a rational allocation of highway

costs between users and nonusers. When Research and Planning were divided into separate offices in

1962, Ted Holmes decided to go with Planning as its Director because,

as he later remarked, he saw there "the greater opportunity for improving our transportation and our society." In 1967 he assumed the re- sponsibility of Director of Policy Planning for the Federal Highway

Administration in the new Department of Transportation and, with the

reorganization of the FHWA, became Associate Administrator for

Planning.

Perhaps a fitting description of Ted Holmes is that of an "imagineer"—one who is able to link creative talent, engineering judgment,

and administrative finesse. His has always been an inquiring mind,

restless, seeking solutions soundly anchored in analysis of relevant facts,

yet always cognizant and respectful of opinions differing from his own. To his associates, he always pressed one significant point—"How well

we carry on our work will be judged not by this generation, but by

those future generations to follow."

His writings lace the literature of traffic engineering, highway and

transportation research, and planning. His "Man in California, 1980's"

paper, as so many others, reflects the range and brilliance of his thought.

Following his retirement from Federal service in 1971, he undertook a study of urban transportation planning for the International Road

Federation. His 1974 report. The Coordination of Urban Developvient

and the Planning and Development of Transportation Facilities, is a

basic source document on urban transportation and development planning practices in selected major countries around the world.

Holmes' accomplishments have been recognized in many quarters.

Some of the principal honors he has earned include the Department of

Commerce Meritorious Service Award, presented in 1950, and the Department's gold medal for Exceptional Service in 1962. He was pre- sented the Roy W. Crum Award for distinguished service by the

Highway Research Board in 1958. He received, in 1968, the Thomas

H. MacDonald Award "For Outstanding Service in Highway Engineering," from the American Association of State Highway Officials, and

in 1970, the Theodore M. Matson Award for Outstanding Contributions

to Traffic Engineering. At the close of his official service to the Department of Transportation in 1971, Secretary John A. Volpe presented

Mr. Holmes with the Department's Silver Medal for Meritorious

Achievement in a retirement ceremony attended by several hundred of

his friends and colleagues from government and many private organizations in the Washington area.

285
Mr. Holmes has also received acclaim from abroad. In 1965 he was

honored with an invitation to deliver the Sixth Reese Jeffreys Triennial

Lecture, Looking 25 Years Ahead in Highway Development in the

United States^ to the Town Planning Institute, London, England. He

was also invited to be the principal speaker at the Australian Road

Research Board Conference in 1972 and at the South African Institution of Civil Engineers in 1973.

Ted Holmes is home again in Kingston, Massachusetts, hard by

Plymouth. He lives there with his wife of 40 years, the former Elizabeth Boynton of San Francisco. The Holmeses have two sons, Joseph

and David, who still reside in the Washington, D.C. area. Greatly respected and honored in all his fields and activities, Ted

Holmes is a highly knowledgeable, yet modest, man with almost limitless energy, practical sense, good humor, and rare analytical talent. He has also been a leader with exceptional foresight and a unique

capability for understanding people and for organization and management. As Senator Jennings Randolph stated in the Congressional

Record, "He performed a major role in improving the lot of his fellow

men by helping to provide the highway facilities a mobile society demands. He has left an indelible mark on the Nation's highway program."

When a segment of 1-35 was built through this residential section of Minneapolis, Minn., the

continuity of the communitii teas preserved by

providing bridge structures for pedestrians

and local streets over I-S5.

286

I
''^ *4 m«* ii?^ - ^^'*NlaBiS*!'t^^' ^ 4

•i

...JIJiI "n -^ -i^f-^jg-

..^.*»':

^.t-^-f^i

*C
Reports to Congress

Since 1938, responding to the direction of the Congress for reports on various aspects of the highway

problem was sufficiently demanding almost to be

called a regular activity in itself. While not all re- ports were prepared by the planning staff, planning

data, available or collected as necessary, were involved

in all. In response to Section 2 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1948, the Commissioner was directed to report on the "current conditions and deficiencies" of

the Interstate System that had been finally designated

only on August 2 of the previous year. The report

Highway Needs of the National Defense^'^ showed

graphically the use made of the highway system during the war, still fresh in memory. It covered military traffic on the highways, and even a safe emer- gency landing of an airplane on the highway. It gave examples of heavy traffic service for employees

of industrial plants. One plant was opened on a road on which the average traffic of 700 vehicles was

swelled to 14,000 when the plant reached full production. It described many examples of accidents result- ing from inadequate highways and unsafe bridges.

But especially, it documented not only the great in- crease in truck movement, but the greatly increased

loads on the average truck. Motor truck vehicle

mileage more than doubled during the war years, and

the axle loads exceeding 18,000 pounds increased from

12 per thousand trucks prewar to nearly 70 per

thousand trucks in 1945. With this twelvefold in- crease in heavy axle loads, it is small wonder that the

highways emerged from the war badly battered.

What was made abundantly clear was that under the

circumstances of World War II, the use of the highways for military vehicles was very little indeed

compared to highway use for moving employees to and from warplants and military establishments and

for the movement of goods and manufactured products for the war effort. That in fact the highway

became literally a part of the assembly line is most

strikingly illustrated by the movement by truck of

airplane fuselages from Michigan to Texas for final

assembly. The actual experiences of war demonstrated the sound judgment of military and highway

officials, when recommending the routes of the Interstate System in 1941, that the greatest value of the

system to the military would lie in its part in keeping war industry at maximum production levels.

War production could he undertaken anywhere.

This PT boat was on its way to sea from an inland "shipyard."

This damaged WW II transport plane, having made an

emergency landing on the highway, was towed to the nearest airport. The wings were removed

for safe transport along the route.

fT>iMi-:

I

Trucks became a necessary

part of the WW II production line.

288
The Interstate System was examined mile by mile

for the first time since its designation to measure its deficiencies. Inadequate widths, excessive grades and

curvatures, short sight distances and especially weak

or narrow bridges and narrow tunnels wei-e recorded,

and estimates made to bring all deficient sections,

using the standards recommended for the Intei'state

System in Interregional Highioays, up to adequacy

for 1948 traffic. Just why the study estimated the cost to meet the

requirements of 1948 traffic while recognizing the con- tinuing increase in traffic volumes and truck weights

is not stated, but perhaps because the Congress gave no specific year in the future to which to direct the

estimate. In any event, the estimate totaled $11.2

billion, about half to correct deficiencies in rural areas and half in cities of population above 5,000. In esti- mating the cost at 1948 price levels, it was noted that

prices inight well decline in the years ahead, again

reflecting the still persisting "depression psychology."

The report further recommended that the system be

brought to adequacy in no more than 20 years, which

indicated an annual program of not less than $500

million. And then in 1968 it would be adequate only

for 1948 traffic. But this proposed program, seemingly a "too little-too late" endeavor, must be viewed

in light of the fact that at that time improvements

by the States on the Interstate System were totaling

only about $75 million annually, and the report rec- ommended nearly a sevenfold program increase. It further recommended that a much more rapid improvement program would be reflected in economic

and social benefits as well as meeting defense needs more quickly and proposed consideration of advancing the rate of construction by a bond issue. And it definitely proposed that the Federal participation in

projects on the Interstate System should be raised

above the 50 percent State-Federal matching figure.

Other recommendations proposed a revolving fund

for emergency construction not only for military

emergencies, but for civil disasters as well, and

authorization to acquire and stockpile critical materials.

"\^Tiile the authorizations for regular Federal aid were increasing somewhat in each biennial act (the

Congress had by then indicated an informal linkage

between authorization level and the revenue from the

Federal motor-fuel tax), no specific provision was made by the Congress for accelerating work on the

Interstate System until $25 million was authorized

for each year 1952 and 1953. In the 1954 Act a some- what more liberal provision Avas made by authorizing

$175 million for that year and 1955. It apportioned

the funds somewhat differently, half on the basis of

primary system apportionments and the other half on

the basis of State population. In addition it changed

the matching ratio to 60 percent Federal, 40 percent

State. So if Commissioner MacDonald's recommendation of $500 million annual authorization, made in

1949, now seems low, it took the Congress 5 years to come up to one-third of that level. There were probably two reasons, at least, for the

apparent reluctance of Congress to press ahead on

improving the Interstate System. First the States,

with limited funds (the highway needs studies had

yet to yield much fruit) and with deficiencies on all

roads, were reluctant to apply funds to the Interstate System on which the design standards were much

hiffher than on other roads and where much less mileage per dollar could be produced. In fact, many

States were strongly opposed to the "high" standards.

The other reason was the general pressure for more

attention to secondary and farm-to-market roads, with

the rural strength in State legislatures and in the

Congress always evident.

The second reason is given visibility by a letter of

May 27, 1949, from the Committee on Public Works

of the Senate to Commissioner MacDonald, asking

for a report on the condition of rural local roads.

This report The Local Rural Road ProMem was submitted to Congress in January 1950 and offered little support for the advocates of more aid for local roads.

Calling on the road inventory and traffic volume

and classification data from the highway planning

surveys, detailed studies were made of rural road

service in all States. Such items as the extent of road

surfacing; the distances of rural residents from all- weather roads; the road usage (from the road use

studies) of rural roads by farmers and other rural

residents; the average traffic volumes; the adequacy

of schoolbus and mail delivery I'outes; the motor vehicle ownership; and the social functions permitted

by the road system were studied.

With the aid of State and county engineers, esti- mates were made of the cost to bring the entire net- work up to acceptable standards. And finally the

question of highway finance and administration were

studied.

In capsule summary, it was found that funds allo- cated to local rural roads in 1947 amounted to $834,976,000—4 percent from Federal sources, 56 per- cent from State sources and 40 percent from local sources. Local support had dropped steadily to that

level from 81 percent in 1927, with reason to believe

the trend toward increasing support from the higher

government levels would continue. Against this

amount of available funds was an estimate of annual

construction, maintenance and administrative costs of

$894 million to reach adequacy for the entire network

in 20 years. The gap between revenue and program

costs in 1947 was only $60 million with evidence that

the revenue was steadily increasing. In the same

year that $835 million was being applied to local

roads, the amount applied to all State primary and

secondary roads was only about $1.4 billion. The report concluded local rural roads were not only

in good shape relative to roads in the other system,

they were in good shape in absolute terms in that funds

in sight were sufficient to put the whole system in ac- ceptable condition. The report also concluded that local

road administration was generally inefficient because

the many small units were unable to own and operate

suitable equipment or to retain competent engineering

staffs, and it recommended consolidation of local units

and close cooperation between State, county and local

officials in cariying on the county and local road

programs.

If the Congress and the State legislatures were

apathetic with I'espect to improving the Interstate System, the automobile driving public was not. If

better roads were not to be provided through the

usual procedures, other means were sought, and the

289
means proved to be the second toll era in the United

States. The Pennsylvania Turnpike, opened just before the war, proved to be a great boom to military

convoy and general truck movement during the war

period, if less beneficial to the bond holders. After

the war when the upsurge of traffic brought in more

than ample revenue, pressures for toll roads appeared

in other States. The Pennsylvania Turnpike's success was accepted with some reservation because of

the peculiarly favorable contrast with the existing

routes, for the Turnpike tunneled through several

ridges that the old road had to climb, utilizing the

tunnels of a railroad line never actually completed.

But the New Jersey Turnpike, opened in its full length in 1952 with no advantages of terrain, proved

to be a bonanza and thereafter the toll road movement

swept through State after State. The toll road movement not only produced roads;

it sparked an interest in Congress that had not been

ignited by the reports of 1944 or 1948. In the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1954, under section 13 the

"Secretary of Commerce [was] authorized and di- rected to make ... a study of the costs of completing

the several systems of highways in the several States

and of the progress and feasibility of toll roads with

particular attention to the possible effects of such toll roads upon the Federal-aid highway programs . . ." The report, to be submitted by February 1, 1965,

actually was prepared in two parts. The toll road

portion was transmitted on April 14, 1955, still a remarkably short time considering that the Act was

not approved until May 6, 1954. For those States in

which needs studies had been completed, the information required for the report was not too difficult, but

for those States which had not developed needs

studies, a heavy workload was imposed.

Looking first at the toll road study transmitted in

the report entitled Progress and Feasibility of Toll

Roads and Their Relation to the Federal-Aid Program^^ it found conditions far different than those

in the late thirties when Toll Roads and Free Roads

was prepared. Traffic volumes had increased, of

course, not only in magnitude, but in relation to the

adequacy of the road systems with its lagging improvement programs. And 16 years later there was

actual toll road experience to go on. With these favorable conditions, analyses were

made, for which some data already had been col- lected, to show the characteristics of the traffic using

the toll roads. The origins and destinations of trips,

their purposes, the time and distances involved in the

use of toll roads in comparison with alternate free

routes, the tolls paid, and the proportion of travel on the existing roads that was diverted to the toll route indicate the types of information used in the

analyses. Factors developed from these analyses were applied to all sections of the Interstate System

and other routes believed by the States to have toll potential to estimate probable use of toll roads and

the revenue the traffic would produce compared with

the costs of maintaining, operating and amortizing

the investment in the toll facilities. Any proposed

toll sections that showed revenues over the amortization period equaling II/2 times the total cost were

considered feasible of toll financing. (The investment

bankers of the time insisted on a "coverage" of 1.5. In the Toll Roads and Free Roads study, toll financing was assumed to be justified when the revenue and

cost were equal to a "coverage" of 1.0. Thus, the

1954 study was conservative and in line with current

practice.)

With the changes over the 16 years, however, 6,700

miles were found to be feasible of toll financing compared to the few hundred that might have been self- liquidating in 1938. All but 200 miles were found to be on the lines of the Interstate System, attesting

again to its prime importance. Should it be desired

to pool revenues from different routes, as did some

States such as Pennsylvania, with the stronger one

helping to carry those not quite feasible, additional

mileage not measured in the study could have been

included in the total. At the time of the 1954 study, 1,239 miles of toll road were open and 1,382 miles under construction.

In addition 3,314 miles had been authorized and an- other 2,253 miles proposed, exceeding somewhat, in

their total of 8,188 miles, the 6,700 miles estimated to be feasible in the study.

Looking back to the 1938 study, it is of interest that

every one of the toll roads in use or under construction in 1954 that lay along one of the six routes studied in 1938 was on a section of those routes then

found to be among the highest in feasibility. While

the magnitudes had changed over the 16-year period,

the relative positions had not. This change again

exemplifies the psychological effect of the Depression.

The 1938 report noted that nearly everyone who

could afford a car owned one, that their average in- comes were low and that they could ill afford to take

long trips, to say nothing of paying tolls. That position was buttressed by the road use studies showing

that only 1 percent of trips exceeded 100 miles in

length. (Even so they were important, for they produced 25 percent of the vehicle miles.

But 1954 was a boom period. Cars were better,

incomes higher and rising and the new toll roads were giving opportunity for more long trips. (More

recent figures show that the percentage of trips of over 100 miles has doubled, indicating that freeways,

toll or free, have opened a new market for the highway product, and expanded the horizons of American

society.)

With 6,700 miles estimated as feasible of toll financing, more if "pooling" within a State were permitted

and perhaps still more if "pooling" on a regional or national basis were accepted, one may wonder why

the report did not recommend at least some measure

of toll financing in the face of such unmet highway

needs and the good public acceptance of toll roads.

This question was argued intensely in the Bureau of

Public Roads, but in the end it was decided not to recommend any change in the 1921 provision "That

all highways constructed or reconstructed under the

provisions of this act shall be free of tolls of all kinds."

Partly it is likely that the Bureau did not wish to depart from such a long-standing provision without some indication of congressional interest ; and partly

it was the strong belief that a toll-financed system was not desirable. It was reasoned that toll roads,

290
generally with widely spaced entrance and exit points,

would not accommodate the predominant short trips,

and that the States would have to provide duplicate

facilities or at least continue to maintain the existing

ones. It was further reasoned that toll collection

could not fit well into the urban scene, and there lay

at least half the cost and far more than half the problem of the Interstate program. It was reasoned that

tolls simply added to user cost and that a free system

in the long run would be cheaper and more effective. And it was also reasoned that some States, as a matter

of policy, did not favor toll financing (California as the prime example), and it would be unfair to have a

national system part toll and part free. The collect- ing and pooling of tolls on a national basis for partial

support of the system, even though so doing would

result in a very direct user charge, was not seriously

considered. Thus, Recommendation No. 1 of the 1954

report was that "The present law forbidding the col- lection of tolls on highways constructed with Federalaid funds should be continued."

Recommendation No. 2, however, offered somewhat

of a compromise in allowing the inclusion of toll roads in the Interstate System provided adequate

roads of another Federal-aid system allowed for con- tinuous travel without traversing the toll sections.

This provision recognized the ridiculous situation that

would result if a State must parallel an existing toll road with another road built to Interstate standards

in order to provide a complete freeway system. Yet

it did provide for continuity of travel on free Federalaid roads should the traveler make that his choice.

Adoption of this recommendation moreover would

remove the ambiguity resulting from question as to whether the law prohibited the collection of tolls on any "highway" to which Federal-aid funds were applied, or only to specific projects on such a highway.

At any rate the report was extremely timely. The

second toll road era had been in a boom period, and

might well have continued were it not for congressional action to greatly increase the Interstate program. With hundreds of millions of dollars at stake,

the Interstate program was almost on dead center. Highway administrators could hardly program projects on sections where a toll road was under construction, nor could toll road authorities do so if there were a prospect of approval of a major increase in Interstate funding by Congress.

What the Congress faced in meeting the challenge was conveyed in the second study required by the

1954 Act, Needs of the Highway Systems, 1955-8Jt.,

which was transmitted March 25, 1955.^®

Tlie Post Office in Chicago, III., was built several years before, but the city plan called for a highway to run through the building.

The highway, open to traffic in 1956, completes the plan.

291
In the 1944 report recommending the designation

of the Interstate System, no attempt was made to estimate its cost, simply because of insufficient information or experience at that time. In 1948 the cost of improving the Interstate System was estimated at about $11 billion, roughly half rural and half urban.

Under that proposal, the system in 1968 would have

been brought to adequacy for 1948 traffic. In 1950 an estimate was made of the cost of bringing the

local rural roads to a state of adequacy. But now

for the first time the Congress called for an estimate

of the cost of "completing" all systems of roads and

streets. And for the first time the estimate could be

made with a reasonably realistic projection of the

rate of traffic growth based on the experience of the

first postwar decade (although even this projection

proved to be low). To interpret Congress meaning of "completing" and believing that considerable

urgency was now being expressed, it was decided that

the plan would call for completing the Interstate System by 1964 and all others by 1974, 10 to 20 years

respectively. It was further decided to plan the

Interstate System to be adequate in 1964 for 1974

traffic and the others adequate for the current traffic at the time of completion. As in present highway

needs studies, the concept of "tolerable" and "desirable" standards was used for the systems other than

Interstate, that is accepting sections that would still be adequate at the proposed date of completion of the

system, but constructing any that would be inadequate to standards for adequacy for 20 years beyond

the assumed date of construction. Construction programs to accomplish these ends were grouped into

5 -year periods.

With the conditions spelled out, the States were

once again called on for a massive data collection,

compilation, and analysis task, seeking the aid of the

cities and counties to assist in the areas of their interest. It could be expected that States that had built a

considerable mileage of high-standard, controlledaccess, divided highways could make realistic esti- mates of cost, but many such standards were difficult to visualize, and some States having no legal right to control access saw no reason to estimate on that basis.

Even so, however, the cost to complete the Interstate System was estimated at $23.2 billion, and for the

first 10 years' program for all other systems $78.6

billion, for a total cost for the 10-year period a "staggering" sum of $101.8 billion. In the next 20

years new construction and some reconstruction on

all systems would add $114.4 billion more, for a total construction cost over the 30-year period of $216.2

billion. As noted earlier, $216 billion can hardly be re- garded as a "need." It is simply the result of the

addition of the best estimates that could be made of

the cost of achieving the level of service accepted as the basis of the estimate of "completing" the system

to that standard.

With no realistic chance of meeting all the "needs" on all the systems, however, the $101 billion figure

for the 10-year program (roughly i/4 for the Interstate System which represented only 1 percent of the

total highway mileage) focused attention of the cost and iirgency of getting on with this most important

of all the systems. The report was to have its effect.

The 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act

Although the steps leading to the launching of the

Interstate program are described in Chapter 9, consideration of some aspects of the manner in which the

planning efforts were used in reaching the final decision seems in order, even at the risk of some repetition.

While the most immediate use of results of the 1954

study was in connection with legislation relating to the Interstate System, that report was by no means

the single, or even the most important, factor in the

ultimate congressional action. It did, however, provide the basic information on which two other major

attacks on the highway problem were based.

The first factor was the appointment of a committee

of the Governors Conference to study the highway

program, no doubt to some degree at least inspired

by representations from their highway administrators.

This committee had easy access, of course, to the re- sults of the needs studies the States were making in

response to requirements of the 1954 Federal-Aid

Highway Act. Paralleling this move, action again became evident

in the White House, with the appointment by President Eisenhower of the Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program, not only recognizing the

deficiencies of the highway system, but emphasizing

again the national responsibility for highway trans- portation. This committee, appointed in September

1954, quickly became known as the Clay Committee,

for President Eisenhower named General Lucius D.

Clay as its chairman. General Clay had become

acutely aware of transportation problems by virtue

of having had responsibility for creating and operating the successful Berlin Airlift but a few years

earlier. Thus, once again, a presidentially appointed committee was charged with consideration of the Nation's

highway needs. In contrast to the National Inter- regional Highway Committee created 13 years earlier,

which was a planning committee, the Clay Committee was an action committee. The Interregional Highway Committee spent 3 years in a massive data as- sembly and analysis program culminating in a plan,

but only in the most general recommendations for its implementation through a program. The Clay Committee, in a period of little more than 3 months, in

effect recommended an action program to implement

the earlier committee's plan. But both depended al- most entirely on planning data assembled, as a result

of acts of Congress, by the cooperating efforts of the

Bureau of Public Roads and the State highway departments.

The composition of the Clay Committee evidenced

this contrast. The Interregional Highway Committee, as described earlier, was heavily "planning"

oriented. The Clay Committee, in addition to its chairman, included Stephen I. Bechtel, head of a

large and successful contracting organization; David

Beck, president of the Teamsters Union; S. Sloan

Colt, a member of a New York investment banking

firm; and William A. Roberts, president of a com- pany manufacturing large construction machinery.

With these sharp differences in background and out- look influenced by the difference in the Committee's

charge, there was one important similarity. In each

case the secretary was provided by the Bureau of

292
Public Roads—H. S. Fairbank for the Interregional

Highway Committee and Francis C. Turner, then

Assistant to Commissioner duPont (later to be Federal Highway Administrator), for the Clay Committee. And in each case, through the secretary, came demands on the Public Roads stail for more data or data compiled or summarized in different ways, the

pace deliberate in the case of the earlier committee

and feverish in the case of the latter. In developing its recommendations, tlie Committee

not only had the massive array of data already mentioned, but sought the ad\-ice and aid of a group

of technical experts representing professional groups

and associations of users and of the officials of other

levels of government. It also received offerings from

22 national associations in hearings covering several

days in the fall of 1954. Significant in its recom- mendations were the recognition of the problem

and an estimate of the programs needed to meet

it that pretty much corroborated the conclusions of

other groups thinking about the same matters. What

stood out as markedly different was the proposal for

financing the program. Accepting, as did others generally, that the cost should be met by user taxes, it proposed accelerating tlie program by resorting to a bond issue. And it proposed the establishment of a new and separate Federal corporation to administer

the program, the actual construction of which would

still be the responsibility of the States and the Bureau

of Public Roads.

That the proposal for financing the program was

unique should not have been unexpected. For one

thing, even in the face of obvious highway needs over many years, adequate funding had not been authorized

by conventional methods. For another, the investment

banking influence within the Committee, and the fact

that Francis V. duPont, then Commissioner of Public

Roads, was experienced in the financial world and one

not reluctant to break with tradition, argued that

since conventional methods had not worked, a differ- ent and possibly more dramatic approach might succeed. In any event, the Clay Committee's report to the President was transmitted with his strong en- dorsement to the Congress on February 22, 1955, a month ahead of the report called for by Congress in

the 1954 Act. And soon after the "Administration

bill," incorporating the recommendations of the

Committee, went from the Wliite House to the

Congress.

The Clay Committee's report for the reasons described in Chapter 9 did not receive favorable accept- ance in the Congress. But without doubt it did

proWde the spark that ignited congressional action,

and the ultimate authorization of the greatest public

works program in history can be attributed more to Commissioner duPont and the Clay Committee than

to any other single factor. Recognizing the upswinging public demand for

improving highway transportation, brought into focus

by the Clay Committee's work and its attendant publicity, the Roads Subcommittee (of the Senate Committee on Public Works), under Senator Albert Gore

from Tennessee, began hearings early in February.

Senator Gore's hearings were more extensive and

more penetrating than any hearing previously held on the highway program. Every interested group

was heard, and the Subcommittee went deeply into

all facets of the problem, constantly calling for data on one subject after another, and questioning critically

all the material supplied. Commissioner duPont as- signed Frank Turner to act as liaison with the Public

Works Committee, and he participated in virtually

all its meetings, open or in executive session. Regularly he called the Bureau at the noon recess to say

that the Committee wanted certain information "for

this afternoon's session" and again in late afternoon

to say that the Committee "needs this information by

tomorrow morning." Many Public Roads people

worked well into many nights to meet these requests

Eventually came the "Gore bill" authorizing the

needed expanded program and calling for its administration by a commission separated from the Department of Commerce. In a very informal session after

the hearings. Senator Gore remarked that at the start of the hearings he had been opposed to heavy participation with Federal funds in a program that he

then saw as primarily for the benefit of the States,

but that the mass of evidence had "turned him around

360 degrees." Commissioner duPont observed that

that could only mean that he was back where he

started ! But Senator Gore replied that, of course, he meant 180 degrees, for he'd turned completely in

the opposite direction. It was in this good-humored

atmosphere that the lengthy hearings ended, with the

legislative and executive branches together and in

harmony. It was planning data that "turned the

Senator around."

The Senate hearings caused some ruffled feelings at the other end of the Capitol, for there it was maintained that highway legislation traditionally originated on the House side and that by jumping into

hearings so early, the Senate had usurped the responsibility of the House. So perhaps not to be outdone,

the House, not taking the evidence produced by the

Gore Subcommittee, held its own and nearly equally

lengthy hearings later in the session. And ultimately

it, too, proposed a bill, also for a greatly expanded

program with heavy Federal participation, but fol- lowing more conventional lines of administration.

Thus, toward the very end of the session with three

alternatives and with apparently some confusion in

signals between the Wliite House and the "Hill," the

proposed program, so heavily supported by the public,

went down, not so much by defeat as by default.

The highway interests were dejected. It was rea- soned that the 2d session of the 79th Congress would

be in an election year and that there was little pros- pect of enactment or approval of a big money bill in 1956. The program, it was reasoned, would have

to await the new Congress in 1957. But the seers evidently reckoned without the public, for when Congress reconvened in 1956, pressure to get on with the

highway program was obvious and heavy. The representatives had heard from their constituents during

their stay at home between sessions. As described in

Chapter 9, the Committee on Public Works and the

Committee on Ways and Means collaborated in providing the two-titled Act of 1956. The Interstate program conceived by President Roosevelt, planned

by the Interregional Highway Committee, galvanized

by the Clay Committee, and finally shaped by the

Congress, was about to be realized.

293
Planning After 1 956^Statewide

and National

Reimbursement for Toll Roads

Among the many and far-reaching effects of the

1956 Act, none was felt more immediately than its impact on toll road construction. The modern toll road era ended abruptly. With the promise of adequate funding coming primarily from Federal rather

than State user taxes for early improvement of most

of the mileage feasible of toll financing, justification

for that method no longer existed. This toll road era, in contrast to the early era, ended not in disaster and

bankruptcy, but in a substantial, and still financially

sound, contribution to the Nation's highway trans- portation needs.

The Congress gave serious consideration to the

problems that would arise if most of the toll road

mileage were incorporated, as anticipated, into the

system. There was much pressure from the user groups to make them free of tolls, but that raised

questions as to how the bonds could be retired far

ahead of maturity, even should the bond holders

agree. The toll road authorities were hardly favorable to going out of business so quickly after they

had launched their mostly successful ventures. As

a matter of national policy, there was inequity in users of the Interstate System having to pay tolls in some States but not in others, as discussed earlier in

the 1955 report to Congress. But what was perhaps

not generally nor fully recognized, the 1956 Act did

not provide for constructing the Interstate System

but for completing it. It was expected that routes or sections already adequate, or that could be made

so, for 1975 traffic under the Interstate standards

would be included in the System. Any Federal-aid

projects in this category would have received Federal

aid anyway, even if at the 50-50 or the later 60^0

ratio, but the toll roads had no Federal aid nor State

road-user funds applied to their construction. Nevertheless States such as Pennsylvania and New York,

with large percentages of their Interstate System al- ready completed by the toll road authorities, felt short changed in relation to States in which small

mileage met the Interstate standards and, thus, were

scheduled to receive relatively larger amounts of

"90-10" money.

In this atmosphere the Congress, by Section 114 of

the 1956 Act, called for a report to be made by the

Secretary of Commerce, in cooperation with the State

highway departments and other agencies as required

to aid the Congress," ... to determine whether or not

the Federal Government should equitably reimburse

any State for a portion of a highway which is on the

Interstate System, whether toll or free, the construction of which has been completed subsequent to August 2, 1947, or which is either in actual use or under construction by contract, for completion,

awarded not later than June 30, 1957 . . ." The American Association of State Highway Officials, appointed a committee to work with the Bureaii

of Public Roads in planning the study, and all States

provided the needed information. The findings, re- sulting from the summarization of voluminous data,

could be briefly expressed.

In short, the study disclosed that 10,859 miles met

the requirement for inclusion in the System, either

fully meeting the standards for 1975 traffic or being

suitable for upgrading to meet the standards. Less

than 2,000 miles were found to be fully adequate,

however. Included in the total were 1,950 miles of

toll roads in 26 States and 8,909 miles of free roads

in 47 States. The cost of the improvements that had been made

within the 10-year period specified (representing the

time between the approval of the Interstate System

and the effective beginning of the Trust Fund financing) was estimated at $6.09 billion, $2.59 billion for

toll roads and $3.50 billion for free roads. The depreciated value was also calculated, the depreciation

being very little since the roads were so recently built. Right-of-way was assumed not to depreciate in value;

grading and drainage was assumed to depreciate at a

rate of 1 percent per year (a life of 100 years), struc- tures at 2 percent, and pavement at 3 percent. On

this basis the depreciated value became $5.92 billion,

$2.52 billion for toll roads and $3.40 billion for free

roads.

The Congress faced something of a dilemma when

receiving the report in January 1958. To decide to reimburse would be to reverse its decision of 1956 to provide for the "completion" of the System, and in- stead, accept 90 percent of its total cost, including

sections already built. Probably the practical problem of finding $6 billion overrode any feeling of

"inequity," however, and the decision was to defer

consideration until later in the program. That time

has not yet come, and one can wonder whether it will.

The Continuing Needs Studies

Congress in 1954, in calling for the report on Needs of the Highway Systems^ 1955-1981^^ set in motion what proved to be nearly continuous examination

of the physical and financial problems in the highway

transportation area and the development of plans for

the years ahead. The report listed the highway needs

for all roads and streets over the 30-year period at $216 billion. This figure, later under changing conditions found to be at least 50 percent too low, was still a staggering amount and one patently out of reach.

The first result of the study was reflected in the 1956

Act. Title I, The Federal-Aid Highway Act, authorized the program to complete the Intei'state System,

the authorizations extending through 1969, 13 years

ahead. In the same Act the so-called ABC program

for primary, secondary, and urban roads was authorized for 3 years, through 1959, instead of for the

customary biennium. Thus in this way the Congress

picked out of the whole package of needs on all sys- tems, the Interstate System as the most urgent, and

provided for it authorizations unprecedented both in

length of time and amount.

That the Congress did not overlook the broader

needs situation, however, is seen in Title II, The

Highway Revenue Act of 1956, that imposed the

higher tax schedules to finance the program enacted

in Title I. As noted before, it was the joint consideration of liighway needs by the Committee on Public

Works and the Committee on Ways and Means in

1956, also unprecedented, that cleared the way for

294
passage of the legislation. But the Ways and Means

Committee did not stop there. Under section 210, it authorized and directed the Secretary of Commerce,

in cooperation with the State highway departments

to make an investigation and report to give the Congress ". . . information on the basis of which it may

determine what taxes should be imposed by the United

States, and in what amounts, in order to assure, insofar as practicable, an equitable distribution of the tax

burden among the various classes of persons using the

Federal-aid highways or otherwise deriving benefits

from such highways." INIoreover, it specifically di- rected that the study should be coordinated with the

AASHO Road Test, and with other research activities

of the Bureau, and it authorized funds "as may be

necessary" to carry out the investigation.

The final report was due in 1959 but was delayed

until 1961, and even then, the conclusions were based on preliminary performance equations derived by the

Road Test staff from the still unfinished AASHO

Road Test specifically for the section 210 study. A

supplementary report was made to Congress in 1965 once the final equations were available, although the

differences between the final and preliminary equations were so slight as to make unnecessary any revision of

the "210" study conclusions. In all, the series of re- ports, including four progress reports, occupied 940

pages in printed form.^'^ The "210" report surely equaled in stature the re- ports on transportation of earlier years, the Eastman

Report and the Report of the Board of Investigation

and Research^ but in its narrower scope and with

much more data available, it far exceeded them in

accuracy and precision of the information on which

to base highway policy.

By the time the 1959 Federal-Aid Highway Act

was passed, the more precise engineering estimates

of the cost of completing the Interstate System

had shown an increase in cost from the $27 billion

of the 1956 Act, based on the 1954 planning esti- mate, to $41 billion. Accompanying the FederalAid Highway Act was an amendment to Title II, the

Highway Revenue Act, to provide the added funds

then seen as needed. Lacking the expected results of

the "210" study, the motor-fuel taxes Avere increased one cent per gallon above the levels set in 1956 as a temporary measure. By 1961 the Congress had re- ceived the "210" report entitled Highway Cost Allocation Study^ with its estimates of the cost responsibility of the various classes of vehicles based on the

preliminary equations from the AASHO Road Test. The Ways and Means Committee, accepting the cost responsibility as calculated by the "incremental

method" and still striving to finance the completion

of the System by 1972, recommended continuing the

temporary increase in the tax on fuel, made other

adjustments of minor nature and, more significantly,

increased the tax on trucks from $1.50 to $3.00 per

year for each 1,000 pounds over 26,000 pounds in gross

weight. (This in effect applied to all trucks with more than 2 axles and all tractor truck semitrailers

and full trailers.) With the continued higher fuel

tax, applicable to all vehicles, the result was that pas- senger cars were taxed at just about the rate to cover

their cost responsibility and in line with the benefits

they were receiving from the program. The tax on

the heaviest trucks, on the other hand, despite the

large increase in their weight tax, did not come up to the level of the cost they occasioned, but exceeded

somewhat the calculable benefits they were receiving.

The decision on the truck taxes seemingly was consist- ent with the wording of section 210 in the 1956 Act

which called under paragraph (b) (2) for a determination of the "proportionate share" of the highway

costs and paragraph (b) (3) for the benefit of the

"use" of the highways by the vehicles of the various

classes. The curve of taxes in relation to gross weights

resulting from the Committee action lay just about

midway between the curves of costs and benefits, and

perliaps surprisingly, evoked no great objection from

the trucking industry. (One reason that the industry was not unwilling to accept the higher taxes was the

strongly implied commitment by the Congress that once sufficient mileage of the Interstate System was

open to traffic, the size and weight limits imposed for

the first time in Federal legislation in the 1956 Act

would be relaxed to the degree the higher design

standards would permit. Subsequent legislation to

effectuate this understanding failed of passage, however, until the Federal-Aid Highway Amendments of

1974 when modest increases in axle weights and gross

vehicle weights were allowed.) It might be noted

also that section 210 of the 1956 Act called for a determination of direct or indirect benefits other than

from the use of the highways. Wiile the "210" report

clearly showed such benefits, the Congress decided to assess the entire cost of the program on the users. The user rates set in 1961 still apply, soundly derived

from the results of the AASHO Road Test. While

the AASHO Road Test was undertaken to aid in

highway pavement design, the first use of its results was in connection with highway economics and

finance, and that use alone may well have justified its cost. The Functional Classification Study

But it became obvious that planning for highways,

at least after completion of the Interstate System if not earlier, must be undertaken, planning not only for

programs to meet the upcoming needs, but to finance

them. One of the striking facts to come out of the

1954 estimate of cost of completing the several highway systems, updated by the section 210 study, was the

inadequacy of the Secondary System in relation to the

rural Primary System and urban portions of the Primary and Secondary Systems. Also revealed was the

disparity among the States as to the mileage of the

Federal-Aid Secondary System, varying from as little as 6 percent of the rural highway mileage in one

State to 39 percent in another. Obviously the concept

of what should constitute a Federal-aid secondary

route needed definition. While the national total had

little significance except to illustrate the problem, it is of interest that the estimate of highway needs

prepared in connection with the 210 study showed

the needs from 1956 to 1971 on the Federal-aid

primary routes, other than Interstate, in relation to the needs on the Federal-aid secondary roads under

State control (about what the 1944 Act called principal secondary and feeder roads) to be in the ratio of

43.5 :17.6, compared to the authorization ratio of 45 :30 then still in effect. Obviously two aspects needed

investigations.

296
FOR A TYPICAL CITY OF 1,000,000 POPULATION

OF ALL APPROACHING TRAFFIC

ONLY 307o

GOES TO

HEART OF

CITY

TO HEART OF CITY 70% GOES ELSEWHERE

In 1960 intercity travel studies showed this basic travel pattern.

First the roads to be included in the Federal-aid

system should be designated under a functional classi- fication definition applicable to all States, and second

the general level of Federal aid for rural secondary

roads in relation to that for other systems, particularly in the urban area, needed review. It could be

considered a restudy and perhaps a restatement of

purpose of the Federal-aid secondary program after

its 20-year history.

These thoughts and others were brought to the at- tention of the States by Federal Highway Administrator Rex "Whitton in a 1963 speech. He outlined some of the problems and sketched the planning effort that would be required to analyze them and hopefully

reach a concensus on how to meet them. AASHO

authorized a high-level committee to cooperate with

the Bureau of Public Roads to carry out the necessary

studies and develop appropriate recommendations to be presented in a report to the Congress.

The Cooperating Committee, as it was designated,

met with its Bureau counterparts in the spring of

1964 and agreed upon a format for the study. It was

to be the most intensive study of highway needs yet

undertaken, covering all roads and streets. The most

significant new aspect was functional classification,

with roads and streets segregated in three broad

classes—arterial, collector, and local. Freeways would

be a special category of the arterial group. The

classification would be determined route by route by

its estimated future traffic, not simply by volume alone

but by the character of the traffic, trip length being an important determinant. This basis of classification

had been used in a preliminary way in an earlier

study by AASHO and the National Association of

County Officials (NACO) in a review of rural highway needs, but little experience was available as a guide to urban street classification and none at all in areas yet to be urbanized. Since the period to be

covered extended from 1972 to 1990 and with the

rapidly increasing urbanization of the country, this

latter situation presented a considerable problem.

Fortunately, however, the urban transportation studies

had by then progressed sufficiently in about 100 cities to permit the development of models that would show.

on the basis of area and population, the number of

lane-miles of streets needed in each category. So

where the urban studies would not permit detailed

estimates, at least gross figures could be produced

by resorting to the models. With facts thus as- sembled, estimates could be made of the desirable extent of systems on a functional basis that could be

compared with the systems then designated as "administrative" systems. (The study eventually con- firmed that the Primary Systems in most States were

well selected, but that as anticipated, the Secondary

Systems as administratively designated in many

States were badly distorted.)

On the basis of the agreed upon format, the Bureau

staff, with advice from the Committee as needed, prepared the necessary manuals, and approval to begin

the study came in the summer of 1964. The target

date for the report to Congress was set as January

1967.

Then began a cooperative approach to data collec- tion on a national basis, heretofore unequaled in the

transportation field. The National League of Cities

and the National Association of Counties formally

designated members to form a joint committee with

AASHO to oversee the work of data collection and

analysis. At its first meeting in early 1965, one member remarked that it was significant that for the first time officially designated representatives of State,

county, and city governments had convened in a formal meeting. It was further significant that it met in the offices of the Bureau of Public Roads. It

reflected intergovernmental cooperation in fact, not

just in theory. While ultimately an important product emerged from this initial meeting, its bright

promise was never fully realized. It was during the period of this study that several

factors appeared to complicate, delay, and confuse

the planning of highway programs after 1972, the

scheduled date of completion of the Interstate program. It might be said that prior to this study,

highways had been planned in isolation. "Wliile the

major planning studies, particularly in urban areas, recognized the need for coordination between highway

and other modes of transportation and took those

296
modes into consideration, the highway program as authorized by the Congress had gone ahead as an

independent program. It was during this period that

questions began to be raised as to whether there should

be "alternatives" to the highway program. Transit

interests began to speak with a stronger voice in the

Congress, as evidenced by the establishment in 1964

of the Urban Transportation Administration in the

Housing and Home Finance Agency (in 1965 this

Agency became a part of the Department of Housing

and Urban Development (HUD)). The larger cities began to see their overall needs for transportation,

and even for streets and highways, diverging from

the programs envisioned by the States. As noted earlier, each of the major reports on highway needs—1939, 1944, and 1955—had been ini- tiated by the executive branch, but each had the added

strength of being carried on by the paralleling direction of an act of Congress. So too in the 1964 study was the paralleling action initiated by the Public

AVorks Committee of the House, which passed unanimously a bill calling for a report on the highway needs

of the Nation to be submitted in January 1967, the

target date of the AASHO study of which the Committee was well aware. That bill died in the Senate,

which reasoned that the organic legislation required

annual reports by the Bureau of Public Roads anyway, so no specific legislation was needed. The fol- lowing year, 1965, Representative George H. Fallon,

then Chairman of the House Public Works Committee, introduced a somewhat similar bill, which finally

emerged as a Joint Resolution, S.J. Res. 81, instructing the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the

Bureau of Public Roads, to ". . . report to Congress

in January, 1968, and in January of every second

year thereafter, his estimate of the future highway

needs of the Nation." Thus, it appeared that the way

was cleared for the cooperative studies to continue by

the traditional coordinated direction of the legislative

and executive branches of the Federal Government.

The highway program, it was assumed, would continue to be an independently authorized, although

cooperatively developed, program.

If the Congress accepted that the program planned

cooperatively could best be authorized independently,

that view was not necessarily accepted by the executive branch. The Bureau of the Budget, through

which all reports to Congress involving Federal funds

in any amount then must pass, as early as 1961 when

the "210" report was being reviewed, reasoned that

any emphasis on the nonuser benefits might encourage

the application of general funds rather than exclusively road-user funds to support the program and

that to do so would be in the direction of unbalancing

the Federal budget. This position was taken even though the Congress in authorizing the study had

specifically called for an investigation of benefits to other than highway users. Meanwhile as the plans for the study moved ahead,

it became apparent that with the massive data collec- tion and analyses required for the functional classifi- cation of all roads and streets in all jurisdictions,

completion of a report by 1967 was out of the question.

Yet, with the final apportionments for the Interstate program to be made in 1969 to meet the scheduled

completion date, there was real urgency to provide

facts to the Congress to serve as a basis for the post- Interstate program because extensive hearings and a searching review of highway needs comparable to that

of 1955 and 1956 were anticipated. The AASHO Cooperating Committee, renamed by then the Committee

on the Continuing Plighway Program, concluded that

the Congress must be furnished at least gross estimates

of foreseeable needs as soon as possible and decided

to ask the States to provide estimates not on the basis

of functional systems to be designated as a result of

the study, but on the basis of the current administrative systems. This estimate would be furnished as an

"introductory" or "preliminary" report to give scale to the magnitude of the needed program, with refine- ments, once the functional classification could be completed. On the basis of this decision, ratified by the

AASHO executive committee in Atlanta at the annual

meeting in 1964, new manuals were prepared and

work moved quickly ahead on the truncated study.

This was followed by the much more deliberate and

complex work of functional classification and related

studies of other aspects of future needs, including

such elements as the greater attention to safety and

environmental considerations and bases for apportionment of funds not only among the systems, but among

the States and local jurisdictions. This decision was made fully workable by the passage of S.J. Res. 81 a few months later. As a result, it became possible

to furnish information to the Congress on different

aspects of the upcoming problems on a continuing

and timely basis at the biennial intervals specified in

the resolution rather than in a massive single report

comparable to the 1961 Highioay Cost Allocation

Study (the 210 study).

Highway planning at statewide and national levels seemed to be launched on a course that would lead to regular reporting to the Congress of needs for highway transportation, determined cooperatively by Federal, State and local officials, keeping abreast of

changing technology in all transportation modes and

of changing social and economic conditions. Most

importantly, the study efforts provided the groundwork and guidelines for the broader studies embracing

all modes of transportation that would be undertaken

in the future.

The Movement Toward Transportation Studies

Before the 1968 report had been completed, another

change at the Federal level further complicated

the longstanding relationship between the Bureau of

Public Roads, the Congress, and the State highway

departments—the establishment of the Department of

Transportation. Later the relationships were to be- come still more complex as departments of transportation were created in many States, a factor having

an especially trying effect on the Bureau's longtime

partner, the American Association of State Highway

Officials, which eventually absorbed or was absorbed

by the State DOT officials as the name of the organization was changed to the American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials. The

cordial relations between the Bureau, the States, and

the Congi-ess of earlier, simpler times was lost, per- haps never to be regained.

297
Among the functions included in the new Department were those of the Bureau of Public Roads, which

together with a new National Highway Safety Bureau

formed the Federal Highway Administration; of the

Federal Aviation Agency, formerly an independent

agency, which became the Federal Aviation Administration; of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, transferred bodily from the Department of

Housing and Urban Development; and the functions

of a new unit, the Federal Railroad Administration.

All these were termed "modal" administrations headed

by "modal" administrators. The purpose was, of

course, to bring about better coordination of the Federal effort in the different modes under a national

transportation policy to be developed by the Secretary.

The first incumbent of that office was Allen Boyd,

formerly Under Secretary for Transportation in the

Department of Commerce, and with the change in

administration in 1969, he was succeeded by John

Volpe, formerly Federal Highway Administrator and,

at that time. Governor of Massachusetts. Both men

were qualified by solid experience in transportation

and in administration.

While the assembly of transportation functions in a single department of the executive branch was a forward step, coordination of programs could hardly

be fully effective so long as three different congressional committees on each end of the Capitol retained

jurisdiction over the different functional areas. And

to complicate coordination still more, three administrations were "modal" in fact, aviation, railroads, and

highways. But urban mass transportation was not

modal at all, but geographic and functional in its area of responsibility.

In the planning area, still another complicating

factor was the establishment within the Federal Highway Administration of the Office of Policy Planning.

This office was not to take any functions from the

Bureau of Public Roads' Office of Planning, but to work with other modal administrations, with the

Secretary's staff, and with other agencies such as the

Bureau of the Budget in general policy matters. One

function was shepherding reports, such as the 1968

Highway Needs Report, to Congress through the approval channels within the Department and the

Bureau of the Budget. The office was also expected

to consider and propose long-range policy and action

programs in the areas of highways and highway

safety, but for various reasons, principally inability

to staff the office adequately, it never quite reached

its anticipated potential. The major efforts in planning remained, as intended, within the Bureau. Subsequently a reorganization under Secretary Volpe

brought the functions together, as Francis Turner,

who served as Director of Public Roads under Lowell

Bridwell, the first Federal Highway Administrator

under the Secretary of Transportation, succeeded

Bridwell with the change in administration. The

new Office of Planning was organized in two suboffices each under a director, one called Policy Planning that dealt generally with long-range planning

and relationships with other government agencies and

the Congress, and one called Highway Planning that

dealt primarily with the cooperative planning and

programing activities of the States and local jurisdictions. It was within the Office of Highway Planning

that research and development in the planning method

produced the striking advances in transportation

planning, particularly at metropolitan scale, but also

extended the statewide and national scale as well. Even with all these complicating factors, the 1968

National Highway Needs Report^* was transmitted

to Congress by Secretary Boyd, the report having

been approved by the Bureau of the Budget on January 31, 1968, meeting the requirements of S.J. Res.

81. In line with the AASHO decision, it included a

gross estimate of costs, as estimated by the State

highway departments, of bringing the administrative

systems up to standards agreed upon by the joint

AMA-AASHO-NACO* committees and the Federal

agencies, including the Bureau of the Budget. By

emphasizing that the estimate was that of the State

highway departments. Federal endorsement was

avoided, and perhaps with justification, considering

that the cost of improvements needed to meet the ac- cepted standards totaled $294 billion for the 20-year

period 1965 to 1985. There was concern that the sheer

magnitude of the estimate, without similar estimates

of 20-year needs in other modes, might induce such

substantial increase in Federal authorizations for

highways that other modes might suffer, relatively at

least, if not absolutely.

The $294 billion figure was indeed a staggering

figure, although not so startling when considered on

the basis of cost per vehicle-miles of travel as later

studies reported, and it stood in sharp contrast to the

cost estimated by the States in the 1954 study of $216

billion for the 30-year period of 1955 to 1984. The

difference reflected higher design standards, higher

urban costs brought about by the unanticipated urbanization of the country, higher unit construction prices,

and just the added costs occasioned by delays in meeting current needs as they developed.

In general terms the report outlined a desirable

direction of future policy as follows

1. Continuing assistance to the States for improving

the efficiency and safety of the highway system in

both rural and urban areas. (Studies would be neces- sary to redefine the Federal-aid systems and enable

sound economic analyses to reveal how and where the

investment of Federal funds would be most beneficial

in terms of national objectives; general economic and

social benefits; and transportation service to people

and commerce.)

2. Greater stress than in the past on the improvement of urban transportation and the development of

transportation plans calculated to raise the quality

and satisfaction of urban life.

3. Additional emphasis on the coordination of highways with other modes of transport, both intra- and

interurban, to ensure the optimum provision of the

best features of all modes and continuing emphasis on making the highway a salutary influence on the

environment, both in rural and urban areas.

* American Municipal Association-American Association of State Highway Officials-National Association of County

Officials.

298
Land and air transportation cross paths at Stapleton International

Airport over Interstate 70 in Denver, Colo.

More specifically the 1968 National Highway Needs

Report discussed the need for a functional classifica- tion study and gave considerable attention to trans- portation needs in urban areas, quite reminiscent of

similar discussions in the reports of 1939 and 1944.

It also explored in a limited way the problems of

developing highway or other transportation programs

at metropolitan scale and suggested specifically that

the planning agencies responsible for the urban trans- portation planning process in those areas be required

to develop 5-year construction programs based on the

planning data. Under the proposal, the State highway department could include in its program for any

area only projects included in the 5-year program.

It would not be required to program any projects in

the area, but it could not program projects in the area

that were not in the 5-year program. This proposal was calculated to insure that any improvements car- ried out by a highway department in a metropolitan

area would be in harmony with the needs of the area. At the same time, the metropolitan officials could not

infringe on the responsibility of the State highway

department in developing its statewide programs.

Hopefully this would reduce the areas of disagreements between the States and local and neighborhood

interests within the metropolitan areas, already, in an

increasing number of cases, becoming irritating if not

actually destructive of implementation of long-range

plans.

This proposal was the first attempt at the Federal

level to bring metropolitan area officials directly into

the programing of projects, and was entirely consist- ent with section 9 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act

of 1962, in which the Congress in establishing the

"3C" (continuing, cooperative, comprehensive) process

directed that ". . . the Secretary shall cooperate with

the States ... in the development of long-range highway plans and programs . . ." By that time the planning process was well in hand but little, virtually

nothing in fact, was being done cooperatively with

respect to programs.

The Congress received the report and published it as a "Committee Print," not giving it the stature of

the previous reports that were published as House

Documents. The only specific action it took with

respect to the report, however, was to affirm what the

States and the Bureau of Public Roads already had

in progress, the functional classification of all roads

and streets. Section 17 of the Federal-Aid Highway

Act of 1968 stated

The Secretary of Transportation shall, in the report to Congress required to be submitted by January 1970 . . . include the results of a systematic nationwide functional highway classification study to be made in cooperation

with the State highway departments and local govern- ments . . . desirable as one of the bases for realigning

Federal highway programs to better meet future needs

and priorities.

This section, by specifically including local governments in the planning, in effect required exactly what

A ASHO and the Bureau of Public Roads had undertaken in establishing the Cooperative Committee in

1964 and which by then was well along toward a conclusion. The provision in the Act assured that the

information as assembled by the States and local governments would reach the Congress.

Review of the major studies during the 30 years

following the 1939 report and the subsequent actions

of Congress show clearly that the significant changes

in policy followed careful review of deliberate planning studies by the Congress. While Federal Highway

Administrator Bridwell chose to separate the function

called policy planning from program planning, the

planning that had been carried on under the HaydenCartwright Act of 1934, in retrospect, was in itself policy planning, although conceived more to aid in

developing sound construction and financial programs

in the State, the results when assembled on a neutral

299
basis gave Congress the facts on which to base its policy decisions. Of course, times were simpler and

the program then could be considered almost in isola- tion. In more recent years urbanization, environmental considerations, competition among modes, and

other factors have complicated planning and action,

and with the greatly enlarged programs, the stakes are much higher. However, review of the Federal

aid highway acts from about 1968 onward shows clear

evidence that the Congress has been responding to outside pressures to an increasing degree and relying

less on the product of planning. Perhaps the committees tend to disregard the results of planning, or perhaps planning does not or cannot respond to the

accelerated pace of current life. "Wliatever the reason, planning seems to have played a smaller part in guiding the highway program in the last few years than

in earlier decades. While advances were made in

planning at the metropolitan level, particularly in the area of intermodal coordination (at the direction of

Congress and with added funding for that specific

purpose), similar insistence on broad planning as a prelude to national decisionmaking seems to be in

abeyance.

It is difficult to know when history should end, as

it merges gradually into contemporary life, and when

reporting begins. In this chapter, the purpose was to describe how the planning process developed and how

the results of the planning aided or led to policy

decisions and action programs. But in view of the

confusion with respect to both policy and action at the Federal level in the last 5- or 6-year period, and

without the damping effect of time to permit viewing

recent, almost contemporary, actions in reasonable

perspective, it seems presumptuous to try to attach

historic significance to recent actions. True, the

Congress has had the benefit of the periodic reports it directed to be made, and in the past few years, it has

also directed the executive branch to make many special studies and has generally taken some action as a

result. But most often these studies applied to special problems of a particular State or area, to proposals advanced by special interest groups, or to fringe

or minor aspects of broader programs. AVhile a reci- tation of the impact on planning of some of these

actions is of interest in revealing the course of Federal

action, it is simply that—a recitation, not an account

of history.

The 1970 Highway Needs Study

The 1970 Highway Needs Report was transmitted

to Congress in January 1970. This report listed,

State-by-State, all road and street mileage classified

in two ways, by administrative system and by functional systems, the latter as best it could be determined by general criteria in the time available. As

expected, the comparison showed reasonably good

coincidence between the Federal-Aid Primary System

and the system of principal arterials in the rural areas of 113,000 miles so classified, 104,000 miles being on

the Federal-Aid Primary System. Of the mileage

not on the Primary System, 5,400 miles were on the

Federal-Aid Secondary System and 3,600 miles were

not on either, indicating the desirability of some re- visions upward of those routes in system hierarchy.

On the other hand, some 21,000 miles of collector

routes, at best candidates for secondary status, were

on the Federal-Aid Primary System, and 75,000 miles

of strictly local routes had been included administratively in a Federal-aid system, 74,400 miles on the

Secondary and 600 miles inexplicably on the Primary

Systems.

More detailed review of the figures would show the

disparity between functional and administrative clas- sification to be far greater in some States than in

others—as noted earlier, the rural Federal-Aid Secondary System as a percentage of all rural roads in

the State ranged from 6 to 39 percent. This disparity

simply resulted from State policies of selecting the

most heavily traveled routes not on the Primary

System (and some no doubt qualifying for that

System) and improving them to high standards.

Other States preferred to spread their secondary

funds as widely as possible. This situation, 35 years

after the first authorization of secondary funds, was

a far cry from the role of secondary road construction

envisioned by Fairbank and MacDonald when they

proposed holding the system to 10 percent of the rural

mileage. With no clear support from Congress for a

limitation on system mileage, the Bureau of Public

Roads adopted a policy of approving most of what

the States requested in system additions, holding the

additions hopefully to a mileage to give "program

latitude" rather than requiring more specific criteria. But after 35 years some hard rethinking appeared to be in order.

Although disparity in rural classification existed,

that in the urban areas was far more pronounced,

accounted for by the fact that Federal aid in urban

areas was still limited to projects on extensions of

rural Federal-aid primary or secondary routes. As

should be expected, while 32,000 miles of urban arterials were on the Federal-Aid Primary System and

22,000 on the Secondary System, some 40,000 miles were not on either. This situation was the result of

the concept of authorizing Federal aid in urban areas only for segments of statewide systems that lay geographically in those areas. Even that concept was a

considerable advance from the original total prohibition of any Federal aid within urban areas of over

2,500 population. The Congress had never previously

viewed Federal aid as appropriate for improving an

arterial system for local urban travel.

The Movement to Support Urban Needs

The Congress by the 1968 Act, responding to con- tinued urging to give greater support to urban needs,

authorized a new program, the Urban Area Traffic

Operations Improvement Program. This program

quickly became known as the TOPICS program, an accronym for Traffic Operations Program to Improve

Capacity and Safety. It recognized that extension of

the freeway system into urban areas had relieved

traffic congestion on many arterials but, by the loca- tion and design of interchanges, had imposed heavier

volumes on other arterials or city streets on which

cities were not prepared to finance improvements.

Congress also recognized that generally the traffic operations systems in urban areas were not receiving

300
the full advantage of modern traffic engineerino: techniques, due primarily to lack of funds. To alleviate

these conditions, $200 million was authorized for each

of fiscal years 1970 and 1971, with the normal matching rates. And the Act required that projects to be

included in the program be based on the results of the

"3C" process. The TOPICS program was slow in getting started,

and complaints were heard that the requirement for

relation to the nature and cost of the projects. Bestudies prescribed by the Act was too exacting in

yond that, the "3C" process applied to urbanized areas

(those with populations of 50,000 or more), and the

TOPICS program was applicable to all urban areas, so many new studies had to be undertaken. Subsequently, the authorizing legislation was amended to require the application of the "3C" process only to projects within the urbanized areas. By 1970 urban pressures had become still heavier,

and calls for Federal aid for public transportation in

the larger cities were becoming louder and stronger.

Many voices urged diverting funds from the Highway

Trust Fund to aid mass transportation, particularly

rail rapid transit where capital costs were so high.

Congress responded in small measure through the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 in two specific

This is South Street in Pittsfleld, Mass., which has been improved

under the TOPICS program. Items eligible for such funding

include construction of the islands and smoother alinement,

installation of signals and lights, pavement markings for left and right turns and crosswalks, and channelization for turning traffic, all of which improve traffic flow and safety.
ways—authorization of a new system, the FederalAid Urban System, and of expenditures of funds on

exclusive bus lanes. The authorization of the Urban System presumably was attributable, at least in part, to the finding^s of

the 1970 Highway Needs Study, which focused atten- tion on the disparity between functional and administrative systems in urban areas, as well as to the

increasing demands of city officials for more Federal

aid. The study in effect confirmed their position.

Thus the new system concept was established. The

Federal-Aid Primary and Secondary Systems would

still extend into and through urban areas'to form a

connected statewide network. The Urban System

would, in urbanized areas, serve the heaviest corridors

and major centers of activity to aid intra-city movement. No route on the Urban System could be on

another Federal-aid system, and each route must con- nect with another route on the Urban System or one

of the other Federal-aid systems. And the System

must be selected by the appropriate local officials and

the State highway departments in cooperation (the

local officials appeared first, it may be noted) and on

the basis of the "3C" process. That this step in recognition of urban street and

highway needs was taken rather gingerly is seen in

the funding authorized for the different programs.

Funds were continued for the fiscal years 1972 and

1973 at its same level as for 1970 and 1971 for the

"ABC" program, and with the traditional 45-30 dis- tribution between them. The $1.1 billion authorization was divided 45 percent for projects on the

Primary System, and 30 percent for those on the

Secondary System, each available for either rural or urban portions. The remaining 25 percent was available only for sections on either system within urban

areas. In addition, $100 million was authorized for

each year for the new Urban System, but as an offset,

the authorization for TOPICS was reduced from

$200 million to $100 million. As another apparent

offset to this foot-in-the-door approach to aiding

urban areas, $125 million was authorized for projects on the Federal-Aid Primary and Secondary Systems

only outside urban areas, 60 percent on the Primary

and 40 percent on the Secondary Systems. Finally

50 percent of the authorization for Federal-aid primary and secondary funds for use in urban areas could be applied to the Urban System.

The other significant departure from tradition was

seen in section 111 of the 1970 Act which authorized

the use of Federal-aid funds for the construction of

exclusive or preferential bus lanes, and for facilities such as bus loading areas, shelters, and fringe or cor- ridor parking areas to serve bus or other mass trans- portation passengers. This action gave specific

authorization to a program for encouraging the

greater use of buses, an idea that had been urged for

several years by the Bureau of Public Roads.^** Administratively the Bureau of Public Roads had held

that it would be appropriate to reserve a lane for the

exclusive use of buses if so doing permitted the move- ment of more passengers than would result from its general use by all vehicles. Despite Bureau, and later Federal Highway Administration, urging, few State

highway departments had been sympathetic to this

approach to aiding urban public transportation, California and Wisconsin being notable exceptions.

By the time the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 was approved on August 13 of that year, the 4-system

hierarchy, initiated in the 1970 Act, had become firmly

established, and authorizations were made in terms

of the new concept. With the Interstate System

funds authorized under earlier legislation, the old

ABC 45-30-25 relationship was finally dropped, and

authorizations made separately for the Federal-aid

highway rural. Federal-aid secondary rural, and Federal-aid urban programs. The annual amounts for

the last 2 years, 1975 and 1976, of the 3-year authorization, built up slightly from 1973, were $700 million

for primary rural, $400 million for secondary rural,

and $800 million for urban. In addition $300 million was authorized for extensions of the Federal-Aid

Primary and Secondary Systems within urban areas. Other provisions of the 1973 Act showed more

positive concern over the urban program. The authority to construct highway facilities for public bus

transportation was extended to include participation

in the purchase of buses, and after July 1, 1975, for

the construction of fixed-rail facilities and the purchase of rolling stock from Federal-aid urban funds.

No new authorization of funds was provided, however, and to benefit from such applications of funds, a city must have the project included in the program

of the State highway department.

A more significant departure, however, permitted a

State, at the request of local officials and when found

to be in accordance with the results of the "3C" process, to delete Interstate System links and apply the

amount of funds thus saved to a nonhighway public

transportation system. The funds involved would not come from the Highway Trust Fund, however, but

would be drawn in the same amount from general

funds.

Another provision authorized $50 million for each

of 3 years for a "special urban high density traffic program," for the construction of highways, not more

than 10 miles in length, connecting to the Interstate System, if conforming to the results of the "3C"

process, in areas of high population density and heavy

traffic congestion that will serve the urgent needs of

commercial, industrial, airport, or national defense

installations.

Still another section of the 1973 Act redefined the manner of selecting the Urban System by requiring

not that it be selected by local officials and the State

highway departments in cooperation, but by ". . . the

appropriate local officials . . . with the concurrence of

the State highway departments . . . ," thus moving a

step beyond the 1970 Act in enlarging the authority

of the local officials. The System still must be in

conformity with the "3C" process, however, which is a cooperative process. These provisions and others relating to special in- terests or matters of local concern cannot help but

leave the impression that the Congress was acting more on the basis of accommodating different groups

or interests in program details or in minor expansion

of traditional boundaries of highway policy than on

the basis of long-range plan or policy goals. That

302
the periodic needs studies were not without their in- fluence, however, is seen in the provision in section 148

of the 1973 Act that called upon the States to designate three Federal-aid systems. The first was to be

the Federal-Aid Primary System, including extensions into and through urban areas. The second was

to be the Federal-Aid Secondary System, now to be

confined to rural areas. And the third was to be the

Federal-Aid Urban Sj'stem in all urbanized areas and

in smaller urban areas that the State highway department might want to designate. The systems were to be designated on the basis of their functional use as anticipated in 1980, which necessitated perceptive

planning of routes by function in areas yet to be

urbanized or developed in other ways. All the system

designations were to be effective after June 30, 1976.

In a requirement for earlier action, another section

of the 1973 Act called for the designation of "Priority

Pi'imary Routes." These routes were to be high traffic sections to supplement the Interstate System by

". . . furnishing needed adequate traffic collector and

distributor facilities . . ." These routes were to be

selected by the State highway departments in "consultation" (not cooperation) with appropriate local

officials. The States were to make an initial selection

of such routes and estimate and report to Congress

by July 1974 their cost. Without specific mileage

limitation, this provision was as open-ended as the

initial authoi-ization of the Federal-Aid Secondary

System. But funds increasing from $100 million in

1974 to $300 in 1976 were authorized.

Perhaps the most significant policy statement of

this or other recent acts was the "Declaration of

Policy" under section 107. This section declared that

". . . since the Interstate System is now in the final phase of completion it shall be the national policy

that increased emphasis be placed on construction and

reconstruction of the other Federal-aid systems . . . in order to bring all of the Federal-aid systems up to standards and to increase the safety of these systems

to the maximum extent." This policy declaration

presumably would curtail, and hopefully end, the bit- by-bit extensions of the Interstate System. The

Interstate System upon its completion, delayed and

in some areas curtailed as it was, will be fulfilling

admirably, even beyond expectations as to its traffic services and economic benefits, the concept laid down

by Congress in 1944. It was in antici^^ation of this

that AASHO and Public Roads began the post- Interstate studies in 1964, studies that reached fruition, at least in part, by this provision nearly a decade

later.

Statewide Highway Planning

At State level following passage of the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1956, planning efforts began rapid

expansion. The planning entailed in the early stages

of the Interstate program, particularly in the urban

areas, a greatly enlarged scope of responsibility—in

addition to the amount of work involved, its broadened planning to encompass financial and economic

areas and increasingly, the consideration of social and

environmental aspects of the highway programs.

Fortunately, because planning funds available were

a fixed percentage of the apportionments, the increased amounts apportioned for construction under

the 1956 Act meant substantial increases in planning

funds. Certainly no other general planning or trans- portation planning program ever was so strongly

funded in relation to current planning needs. Even

though in the early years of the post- 1956 period

funds quite amply met the needs, as more and more

elements were added to the planning responsibility,

this relative affluence soon disappeared.

All States accepted as a matter of course the necessity for keeping planning data current, and many

utilized the facts collected in response to studies called

for by Congress as a basis for developing statewide

plans and programs embracing all road systems.

Many reviewed their system designations, and some

repeated their earlier statewide needs studies. More

attention was paid to long-range programing and

efforts were made to provide analytical bases for

project annual improvement needs for the 10- and

20-year program periods.

Many States adopted the "sufficiency rating" approach, which rated each road section on the basis of

its traffic capacity, structural adequacy, and safety.

This approach was based partly on planning data,

but more on visual observation of current conditions

by an annual inventory. It resulted in a listing of

projects on the basis of their current adequacy, or

"sufficiency," as opposed to the longer range "deficiencies," more commonly reported in the broader needs

studies. Knowing the funds to be available for a coming year, a State could develop a construction

program simply by going down the list of sections

starting with the one currently least sufficient until

the available funds were all committed. While this was perhaps not planning, in that it emphasized only

current conditions, it was a useful administrative tool

because it permitted the highway department to demonstrate to the public that its current program was

directed toward correcting the most severe deficiencies, as determined on an objective rating scale. Objections to this approach were that it did not reveal

the real future needs, but simply provided an orderly

way to distribute currently available funds.

Other States, after the completion of the AASHO

Road Test in Illinois, made efforts to adapt to their

programing procedures the methods used by the road

test staff to determine when a section had been so badly damaged as to justify its being retired from

further testing, or in short, failed. The method employed a profilometer or a roughometer to measure

periodically the deterioration in riding quality, sec- tion by section. These readings did more than provide an objective basis for deciding that a section had

failed. It was found in analysis that the trends in

current riding quality measurements, called the "pres- ent serviceability rating," could also be used as a

reliable prediction of when failure would occur. It offered, in effect, a different approach to the life ex- pectancy of pavements by an analytical rather than

by the earlier actuarial approach and section by sec- tion rather than simply by pavement types. Some

States reasoned that similar trends of serviceability

ratings could show when particular sections of routes on their highway systems would need replacement,

and saw in that approach a means not only of antici303
pating annual program needs for several years ahead,

but possibly another approach to developing longrange plans—a synthesis approach—and with cooperation from the Bureau of Public Roads explored

the area with some success. One of the early applications of this approach was made by the New York

Thruway Authority in estimating its long-range major

maintenance and replacement programs.

By various approaches individual States were suc- cessful in developing and keeping reasonably current

long-range plans and, to a less satisfactory degree,

medium and short-range programs, generally based on objective planning processes. States probably were then and now are better able than the national

government to develop transportation policies objectively.

Increasingly States are gearing their transportation

policies and plans to general land use development

policies. Connecticut and Wisconsin offer early

examples of transportation considerations as a key

element in implementing desirable land use policies,

with the highway departments, and more recently in

some cases transportation departments, joining with

other State departments in developing the long-range

goals and policies. Wisconsin also offers an early

example of forecasting transportation needs by a so- phisticated simulation model developed as an out- growth of the urban transportation models expanded

to statewide scope. Illinois was another State enter- ing early into the use of statewide simulation models.

Increasingly States are coming to accept the futility

of attempting any longer to develop a highway policy

in isolation from other modes of transportation, or to develop a transportation policy except as an integral

element of an overall land use development policy, a view the Congress has yet to accept.

At the beginning of this chapter, the question was

raised as to whether in the United States any highway planning was carried on or whether what is called highway planning more realistically is highway

improvement planning. Alaska was cited as an exception. It so happened that an opportunity to

illustrate this distinction came with the Alaska Highway Study.

In the early 1930's, engineers planned to make the St. Croix River a part of a proposed Lake Superior-Mississippi Rii'er canal. However, in 1968 Congress made the Upper St. Croix part of the national system of wild a7id scenic rivers. Later the Wisconsin

Division of Highways developed a wayside and canoe landing along State hightvay 35 and negotiated scenic casements to assure

that a 200-foot strip along the river and the highway will remain in its natural state.

304
Under section 13 of the Federal-Aid Hicrhway Act

of 1962, the Secretaiy of Commerce was authorized,

in cooperation with the State of Alaska, to make a study of the adequacy of the Federal-aid hicrhway

system, to make specific recommendations for construction of roads through undeveloped areas, and to recommend a feasible program, including the sharing

of cost responsibilities, for implementing the recommendations. Although the Act authorized funds, no

funds were appropriated in that year, so the study

could not be undertaken until $400,000, half the

original authorization, were appropriated in 1963.

Through the Bureau of Public Roads, two consultants were employed, qualified by experience in economic

and engineering areas and by previous work in

Alaska. Their report, completed early in 1966, was

forwarded to Congress in May of that year. Briefly the consultants found that the current

Federal-aid systems, primary and secondary, adequately served the population in Alaska, in fact more

nearly meeting desirable standards than in any of the

"lower 48" States. It could be anticipated that the

entire system could be brought up to desirable standards within 16 years with the continuation of the

current rate of authorizations. As to highway needs

in undeveloped areas, the consultants found virtually none. Although it was recognized that natural re- sources would be developed, what specific resources

in what specific areas would warrant development

could not be forecast. Thus, the consultants con- cluded that a small amount of funds should be available to draw upon when and if a potential resource development prospect appeared.

"WTiat Alaska needed most was assistance in funding maintenance. Extraordinary maintenance problems existed because of snow and cold, and the use of

Federal aid for maintenance was, as elsewhere, prohibited by law. Because of its great area, Alaska

received a large amount of Federal aid in relation to other States. Alaska's matching ratio, because of the

preponderance of land in public holding, was about

5 percent State and 95 percent Federal, relatively

little State matching in contrast to other States. However, with small population and few vehicles, even with relatively high road-user taxes, virtually all highway revenue was required to match Federal aid,

and maintenance had to be financed from general

funds.

The reasoning, perhaps unexpected, with respect to the place of the highway in resource development, was interesting and could well be an example for

those promoting development in other areas. Alaska

is tremendously rich in natural resources, but little was then economically feasible for development due to

its remoteness from population centers and its dependence upon highway transportation. Its timber re- sources are close to tidewater. At the time of the

study, oil production was close to or in tidewater.

Exploration of the vast potential of the North Slope

would not be brought on simply by the existence of a highway, although if other factors made its exploration feasible ( as now has occurred), a highway to permit pipeline construction and maintenance would

be a necessity. Similarly the Rampart Dam, when

and if justified, would require a highway connection,

but building a highway to the site would hardly

initiate its construction. Tourism, a growing factor

of the economy despite high prices and the great

distance from population centers, would require no new highway development, for most of its scenic

features, its glaciers and moimtain peaks, and its hunting and fishing areas are within easy reach of the

present system. And there is no way to judge whether

any of the widely scattered mineral resources would

be feasible for development simply as a result of highway improvement. Thus, the recommendation of a small "drawing account" for development roads should

resource development in unanticipated locations be

found feasible. The consultants proposed three alternates. The

first would authorize additional appropriations from

general funds to aid the State in maintenance and in

constructing tertiary non-Federal-aid system development roads where and when opportunity appeared.

The second would allow the use of regular Federalaid funds for tertiary road construction. Both alter- nates would provide also for improvement in the

ferry system, as the "marine highway" system is economically more desirable than attempting to provide land transportation between certain points, such

as connecting Juneau, the capital, to other parts of

the State. The third alternate simply would authorize

the use of a portion of i-egular Federal-aid funds for

maintenance. All three alternates contemplated special authorizations for a 5-year period.

The Department of Commerce rejected the first alternate as not complying "with the President's

guidelines for budgetary ceilings and fiscal management." It recommended the acceptance of the second

and third alternates. Agreement could not be reached

within the Administration, which held that to make

special concession to Alaska was inconsistent with a

policy of equal treatment to all States and that au- thority to use Federal-aid funds on nonsystem roads

or for improving the ferry system was not appropriate. It was also held by some that the 10 percent

of construction funds for maintenance was excessive,

but perhaps any construction funds unutilized might

be used for maintenance, only at a rate declining from

all of that amount in the first year to none after 5 years. Finally when no agreement could be reached within

the Administration, Congress brought pressure to produce the report which led the Secretary of Commerce to transmit the report in May 1966 with his

recommendations unchanged, but included in the re- port a letter to him from the Bureau of the Budget

explaining its disagreement.

The controversy proved quite academic, however,

by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966, which was

enacted 4 months later. The Congress accepted the

evidence of need as described in the report by au- thorizing Federal-aid funds for development roads,

and increasing the amount of "construction and maintenance" by $14 million annually for a 5-year period,

1968 through 1972, to be appropriated from general

funds, not the Highway Trust Fund.

305
Planning In Urban Areas After 1956

While the 1956 Act ushered in a new era in highway

transportation with major emphasis on completing

the Interstate System, its effect was but little less on

the problems of the urban areas. Funds had been

available, even if in relatively small amounts, for

expenditure only in urban areas since 1944. Many

State highway departments had engaged in the urban

transportation studies with the cooperation of the

cities. But the States were few indeed that had ac- cepted the role they ultimately must in working with

the cities to aid in solving tJieir transportation problems. While many States sought the cities' advice

and cooperation in connection with programs in urban

areas, their concern generally (and quite naturally) was more with getting the highway through the city

in an acceptable manner than in contributing to a

solution of the city's internal transportation problems.

For the next decade the problems of the States in

carrying on the Federal-aid program in urban areas were far more severe in the areas of organization and

administration than in the technical or even financial

areas. But if the States were not prepared to work

together with the cities, the cities were no better prepared to join with the States in a full, cooperative manner.

Early in 1957, sensing well the problems that would

arise, Pyke Johnson, President of the Automotive

Safety Foundation, following the role it often played

of getting people with common interests together,

arranged to meet with the Executive Secretary of the

American Association of State Highway Officials,

Alfred E. Johnson, and Patrick Healy, Executive

Director of the American Municipal Association, in

the Office of the Commissioner of Public Roads, C. D.

Curtiss. In short order it was agreed that a top-level

committee, seven from each association, would be

formed to explore the State-city problems and to act as a catalyst in working toward solutions. Confirming their representatives' action, AASHO named its President, its Executive Secretary, the Director of

Planning of the Bureau of Public Roads and four

other key chief administrative officers. The AMA

named its President and six other top mayors or city

engineers to the committee, known as the AMAAASHO Committee on Highways. Public Roads

provided the committee secretary.

The gap between the two groups at the first meeting was clearly evident, although a good rapport was

established. One incident illustrates the differences.

The AMA group asked the AASHO representatives

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to recommend that the States each organize an "urban

division" to give undivided attention to urban problems, paralleling the secondary roads division each

State had set up in response to an earlier provision

of the Federal-aid highway legislation. The AASHO

group demurred and the proposal was again introduced at the next meeting. But instead of being

accepted, it was settled by a statement by Jasper

Womack, Chief Highway Engineer of California.

Cutting through all the verbiage, he observed that

the urban problems had become so widespread in

California that he might say that the whole Division

of Highways was an urban division, and that there was no way in which one particular unit could deal

with all facets of State-city relations, that the whole

department must be involved. General acceptance of

that view cleared the air and led to a mutual understanding and a truly cooperative spirit that persisted

for many years.

The First National Conference on Highways and Urban

Development

One of the first activities in which the Committee was engaged was the cosponsoring, along with the

Highway Research Board, of the first National Conference on Highways and Urban Development. At

that time the Automotive Safety Foundation was

supporting the staff activity of the Highway Research

Board Committee on Urban Research (later to be- come the Urban Research Department of the Board

under the chairmanship of Pyke Johnson, by then

retired from the Automotive Safety Foundation).

Through this Committee, the Foundation provided

financial support and technical assistance for the

Conference.

The AMA-AASHO Committee made sure that key

highway and city officials would participate. The

HRB Committee arranged for participation by key

transit officials, planners, and other professionals and

appropriate leaders from the business and academic

communities. The Executive Director of AASHO

agreed to serve as General Chairman, and ran the

Conference with a finn hand. In October 1958 the

first National Conference on Highways and Urban

Development was held at Sagamore, a conference

center operated by Syracuse University.

Had there been any doubt as to the sincerity with

which the conferees would go about their task, it was

quickly dispelled in the situation in which they found

themselves—living, eating, and working together for

a full week in the total isolation of the Adirondack

Mountains.

In his foreword to the Report, Chairman Johnson

says. The frank discussions of basic issues produced many

useful >?uidelines for developing sound cooperative plans

and for expediting action. Recognizing the great interest

in this subject throughout the country, the Conference

felt that these constructive ideas should be given the widest possible circulation as an aid to the many officials and civic leaders who have the responsibility of moving

the highway program and for coordinated, planned urban

development i)ut who were not privileged to attend the Sagamore Conference.'"

In the early stages of the discussions, parochial

views were expressed and professional jealousy was

sometimes apparent, but after all views were fully

aired.

The Conference agreed that the final choice among

possible alternatives in highway location and design

should be guided by a 'grand accounting' of costs and

benefits. Advantages and disadvantages of each alternative—in terms respectively of the highway user and the community—sliould be added up and evaluated, in comparison with the total cost entailed." Even as of 1958, thoughful highway and city officials found themselves together on the need for a "gi-and

accounting" and on the need for considering "community values." Probably no one present, however,

had any notion of the difficulty of measuring the

community costs and benefits. Agreement on principles was not difficult. Highway officials urged that their departments "should be

staffed with personnel experienced in urban problems"

and that "State Highway Departments, in cooperation with the local governments, should develop a

tentative program of urban highway improvement

for a period of at least five years in advance . . ." ^^ This latter step was agreed to by the highway engi- neers present only after considerable discussion be- cause of the unfortunate experience of some that

programs announced in advance led to land speculation and skyrocketing costs of right-of-way acquisition. It was finally accepted as a concession that

must be made if the cities were to be able to gear

their programs to those of the States. The State representatives agreed that the departments "should consult with local authorities on a continuing basis in highway planning" and, what was

probably far more significant than then realized, that

"it would be helpful to send engineers to seminars in

city planning." ^^ On their part, the city officials and planners ac- cepted their responsibility for developing "tools and

plans which can be of inestimable value in planning

the urban highway program." ^* These tools included

a land use plan, transportation plan, capital improvement program zoning ordinance, subdivision regulations, and others. It was agreed that some of the

purposes such tools could serve were

Zoning and subdivision controls can help achieve econ- omy in road development and protect the service values

of the facilities after they are built . . . City planners

need to develop and use factual material to support sug- gested controls for orderly community development as

related to highways. However, the community must

stand behind and support these controls to obtain such

benefits and economies."

(It is fair to ask whether the planners and elected

city officials have even now succeeded or made real

effort to meet this responsibility, accepted by their

representatives.

)

It was noted that

Urban planning can aid in determining the scale and

character of the highway program by providing highway

officials with estimates of urban growth and development

likely to take place in a metropolitan area in the next two decades or more. If new highways are to accomplish

their purpose and not become obsolete soon after completion, their planning must take into consideration the patterns of community growth, as well as the urbanizing

influence of the highway itself.^

307
The conference concluded on an optimistic note. The conferees, perhaps for the first time, had obtained

a good Imowledge of the total problem and were re- solved to do their agreed upon parts to solve it. The

question, of course, remained as to how to impart to other officials and professionals and civic leaders the

understanding reached, the principles accepted, and

the responsibilities that must be assumed.

The first requirement of dissemination was the

publication of a report of the meeting, and this the

Automotive Safety Foundation handled in admirable

fashion, with the report "Guidelines for Action" re- ceiving wide distribution and general acclaim. More

important, however, was the followup to get the guidelines put to use. Because of the high caliber of the

conferees and their stature in their own organizations,

channels to provide for this followup were available

and open. Among the 55 participants were included

four highway officials who had served or were to be

the heads of their respective State highway departments. Two of the mayors had served or were to serve as presidents of AMA, and several other participants held or were to hold office as presidents of

their respective national professional organizations

planners, traffic engineers and public works directors,

for example. Their participation in the conference

and their endorsement of the findings were important,

especially to members of their own groups.

An Action Program

The urban travel habit studies described earlier were by then being carried on in most large cities. Major efforts in research in ongoing studies in Detroit,

Chicago and Philadelphia, for example, were breaking

new ground in techniques for relating transportation

demand to land use and developing models for pre- dicting future land use to serve as a basis for plans

for future transportation facilities. But the great

bulk of the cities in the medium population group

were not active in preparing for their future trans- portation needs.

It was in this atmosphere that the AMA-AASHO

Committee continued to work through their parent

organizations to stimulate greater effort and a higher

degree of coordination between State and local officials. Appearances of speakers at one another's

meetings helped, as did releases describing advances

in technology and improved administrative and or- ganizational approaches. It was ultimately concluded

by the Committee, however, that a more specific attack

must be organized, and at its meeting in Kansas City

in January 1962, adopted the "Action Program."

This program as developed by the Committee called

for a series of regional meetings to which all State

highway departments and all cities would be invited

to send representatives. At these meetings the cooperative planning process would be described, the

sources of funds to undertake the studies outlined,

and the availability of technical assistance noted.

Through the regional engineers of the Bureau of

Public Roads, each State in the region was asked to

select in advance of the meeting for that region a

"pilot city," generally in the pojjulation range of

50,000 to 250,000, for it was felt that most of the

larger cities were already engaged in the cooperative

process. The pilot city would then serve as an ex- ample for officials of other cities in the State, where

they might observe how the process was carried out

with the hope of their undertaking similar work in

their own areas. The program as developed by the AMA-AASHO

Committee was quickly endorsed by their respective

parent organizations, and by the National Association

of County Officials (NACO) which was invited to join with the AMA and AASHO as a sponsor. The

program, laiown thereafter as the AMA-AASHONACO Action Program was launched in May 1962

with the first regional meeting in Chicago. As was

the case in all regional meetings, the regional engi- neer and all division engineers of the Bureau of

Public Roads participated by direction of Rex "Whitton, then Federal Highway Administrator. The

chief administrative officer from each State highway

department, along with staff personnel, attended.

Mayors or other representatives from many cities were there, along with a number of county officials. Staff members of the Bureau of Public Roads and the

American Municipal Association helped organize that

and the other conferences. Representatives of the

Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) took

part in this and all other conferences to explain how

"701" planning assistance funds* could be made available to the cities to aid them in meeting their share

of the cost of the cooperative endeavor.

The series extended into June 1963 before the entire

country was covered. During this period, over 1,500

State and local officials were brought face-to-face with

planning, many for the first time. But during the

series came the 1962 Federal-Aid Highway Act, which

changed somewhat the emphasis of the series of meetings. Instead of encouraging a voluntary effort, the

purpose became one of explaining the requirements

of Section 9 of the Act, now known as Section 134 of

title 23. There was no change in principle, however, nor in

the approach to the problem as a result of the 1962

Act. Prior to that it was emphasized to the participants that while the program was being described by

Federal officials, it was "your" program, one developed

and officially endorsed by "your" organizations. The

Federal role was to describe and help demonstrate

how the program could help to give technical assist- ance and to aid in the funding.

The 1962 Act was not a new congressionally con- ceived requirement, but rather an endorsement of a process already being proved effective in many areas. The Act simply required its extension to all urban

areas of 50,000 or more population. The language of

the Act bears this out in the first and last of the three

sentences that comprise section 9. The first sentence reads as follows

It is declared to be in tlie national interest to encourage and promote the development of transportation systems,

embracing various modes of transport, in a manner that

will serve the States and local communities effectively

and efficiently.

* Grants to State and local governments for planning coordi- nated transportation systems authorized by the Housing Act

of 1961 (75 Stat 149, 170).

308
Cincinnati's 1948 Master Plan included certain specific expressway recommendations. Exhaustive studies were made on this section of 1-71 to preserve the historic Lytic Park area. Two 3-lane tunnels for ramp traffic plus special lighting, ventilati07i, and flood and fire protection were all included. These tunnels also provide a base for restoring Lytic Park and the private development

of a multimilUon dollar apartment complex.

That is exactly why the Action Program had been

undertaken. It is exactly what was recommended at Sagamore 4 years earlier. Then the third sentence reads

After July 1, 1965 the Secretary shall not approve . . . any program of projects In any urban area of more than

50,000 population unless he finds that such projects are based on a continuing comprehensive transportation

planning process carried on cooperatively by the States and local communities in accordance with the objectives stated in this section.

309
And how to meet that requirement was exactly the

procedures that were being described in the regional

meetings, although initially the requirement, of course, was not contemplated. At the meetings subsequent

to the passage of the 1962 Act, it was pointed out

that no Federal planning is involved, nor in fact is any planning required if no projects are to be programed in a given urban area. But if the States did

expect to program projects, they could do so only on

the basis of planning adequately performed by the

States and local communities themselves. This sec- tion said it all in a few words. It put congressional

muscle behind an ongoing effort—to make a requirement of a program generally being carried on that

had been developing effectively but too slowly on a voluntary basis.

The Hershey Conference on Freeways in the Urban

Setting

The year 1962 saw also the setting of another

benchmark, the Hershey Conference on Freeways in

the Urban Setting. By that time the Interstate program had progressed far enough to make generally

apparent the impact it could have on urban areas. Criticism was being heard of the appearance of the

highway, particularly of its overhead structures, and

of the way in which it blended or failed to blend into

the neighborhoods it traversed. While it was regarded

beforehand as primarily an engineering conference,

it had planners as participants and its product was

an important planning factor. As expressed in the

Foreword of the report

The Highway program being carried out under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 constitutes the largest

form of federal assistance to urban development. The

state highway administrators charged with responsibility for this program, and the federal agencies involved, are aware of the significant role freeways will play in making

the city an attractive and desirable place to live and

work. This conference was called to solicit positive contributions of the professional groups who share with

local, state and federal officials the concern that freeways

be of widest possible benefit to the city."

In the Background Statement, it was noted that

"Since Sagamore, very substantial progress has been

made in cooperative efforts between state highway

departments and local officials in the planning of

highways and land use in urban areas." After com- menting on specific areas of progress since Sagamore,

it was observed that ". . . the concept that urban

highway systems should be planned in conjunction

with comprehensive community planning is now generally and widely accepted." ^^ The sponsors of the conference were the Bureau of

Public Roads, the Housing and Home Finance Agency

and the Automotive Safety Foundation, which again

provided financial support and staff help in organizing and reporting upon the conference. They set up

a Steering Committee representing

The American Institute of Architects

The American Institute of Planners

The American Municipal Association

The American Society of Civil Engineers

The American Society of Landscape Architects

The Automotive Safety Foundation

The Bureau of Public Roads

The Housing and Home Finance Agency

With the heavy representation of professional

groups, the Hershey effort in the freeway design field closely paralleled the earlier successful approach of

the National Committee on Urban Transportation in

the more general area of overall urban transportation.

Among the professional groups, the architects were most promimently represented, although other professions and professionals of other disciplines who were

there as representatives of official agencies provided

a good cross section of the technical, as distinguished

from the administrative, participants in urban highway development. Unfortunately, the highway field was not well represented.

The early discussions were revealing of strong biases

held by some of the participants. Some architects

protested that the highway engineers invited them

into the act only to provide a "cosmetic" treatment to structures beyond salvation as to appearance. They

were critical of highway standards, especially of

curvature, which they said demanded unnecessary and

undesirable destruction of the fabric of the city. On

their part, highway engineers protested that architects commissioned to design structures too often

produced costly designs difficult to construct simply

to produce unnecessarily refined esthetic effects. Nevertheless, the conferees by the conclusion of the

meeting came together on a series of findings and

recommendations. Among the findings, perhaps the

most important was

Freeways cannot be planned independently of the areas through which they pass. The planning concept should

extend to the entire sector of the city within the environs

of the freeway. The impact of the freeways must be

considered in terms not merely of limiting adverse effects but also of achieving positive opportunities for appreciation of value, for development of new land uses, and for changing land use through urban renewal and redevelopment.^" Following on the findings came a series of recommendations, sound then and still sound, for unfortunately most of them remain still to be carried out. Among them, three stand out. They were:

There is a fundamental need for teamwork in freeway

planning and design. This means teamwork during the preliminary planning phase between the state highway

departments who have responsibility for the planning and

development of highways, and the municipal agencies

responsible for the planning and development of the city. It also means teamwork during the design phase among

highway engineers, architects, city planners, landscape

architects and other specialists. Effective participation in design by these professions means participation from the very beginning when the

first choices as to location, roadway alignments, right-ofway cross sections and structures are being studied. The full realization of the contribution of the design

professions cannot be obtained unless this is done. More effective programs for informing the public and

obtaining community participation in freeway development must be undertaken by state highway departments

and local governments. A freeway program cannot ob- tain in any other way the community concensus neces- sary to its successful execution. Members of the design

professions and other specialists may render valuable

assistance by indicating tlieir concurrence with the design

and planning objectives presented to the public by the highway officials.'" That problems would arise in implementing the

findings of the conference evidently was anticipated

as noted in recommendation number 7, which recog310
nized the limited talent and experience needed to cope with the problem and recommended educational

and inservice training programs. In recommendation

8, it recognized the complexity of the urban problem,

and the ". . . imperfect and incomplete knowledge of

the desires and needs of families who live in cities and the mechanics of the functioning of urban complexes" and recommended larger and more intensive

research into all aspects of urban design and urban

living. But perhaps the most fundamental reason that

progress was (and still is) difficult is seen in recom- mendation 9, the import of which is well expressed

in its first sentence : "The necessity for compromise

among conflicting philosophies and design objectives

often nmst be recognized in urban and freeway

design."^^

A complex viaduct, crossing several streets and

rail lines, serves as an entrance way to Eugene, Oreg. Hoivever, the local street system

remains intact, and attractive park areas provide neighborhood contacts for pedestrians.
There was little followup of the Hershey Conference, The findings and recommendations were sound

and far-reaching, the report was well prepared and

widely distributed. But there was no group with

muscle to get behind the promotion of the results of

Hershey as did the AMA-AASHO Committee in the

case of Sagamore. And the professional groups, the

predominant participants at Hershey could, even had

they tried, have had little impact on the official agencies. State or local, unless they were receptive.

Transition into the "post-'62" period was not diffi- cult. Passage of the Act, of course, brought immediate acceleration of planning effort by the States, for

the effective date of the application of the re'quirements of the Act, July 1, 1965, was less than 3 years

from the date of its enactment. The first step in

implementing the Act was to spell out the planning

requirements that it placed on the States and the local

communities. The wording of the Act, that its intent was to encourage the development of long-range

plans and programs, made clear that the cooperation

between the State highway departments and the local

communities must be evidenced by agreement between

the highway departments and those in the local communities who had responsibility, the elected officials,

for committing those communities to a program.

This interpretation left many city planners unhappy,

for they had generally been responsible to planning

commissions which were often independent of the

local elected officials. But they generally had no commitment authority. How the States were to come

into agreement with the multitude of local jurisdictions in the larger areas presented real problems, but

the means, differing in one way or another, were

reached in all areas. As to the technical requirements for a planning

process adequate to meet the intent of the Act, the

Bureau of Public Roads turned to the AMA-AASHO

Committee as representatives of the State and local

communities for advice and assistance. The Committee designated a small task group to work with the

Bureau, and after much deliberation and testing

among knowledgable people in both associations, a BPR Instructional Memorandum was distributed in

March 1963. Because of the thoroughgoing writing

and rewriting of this memorandum, it still stands

with only minor niodifications, as the basic urban

transportation planning document.^^ It is perhaps

not amiss to recall that it provided specifically that

attention be given to social and community value

factors—preservation, enhancement, and extension of

parks and open space, preservation of historic buildings and sites, avoidance of disruption of neighborhoods, and appearance of the facility both from the

viewpoints of its users and its neighbors—all items

brought out at the Hershey Conference.

The need for rapid expansion of the planning process across the Nation led to the employment of consultants for the basic data collection and processing

in many areas. And it required the rapid formation

of policy committees or groups by other names, rep- resenting the States and the local communities in

each urban area, complicated by the fact that many

urban areas extended across State lines. As a result

most of the policy direction was by ad hoc groups,

hopefully to be superseded by more permanent organizations.

The Second National Conference on Highways and

Urban Development

Under these circumstances, the most remarkable

achievement in planning ever seen in this country was developed. Along with the development of the

machinery to administer the process came striking

advances in technology and in data processing equipment that produced a degree of sophistication in

planning techniques that perhaps outran the ability to administer it. By 1965 all but a handful of the

then 233 urbanized areas had qualified to meet the

terms of the Act. It was against this backdrop that

the Second National Conference on Highways and

Urban Development was held in December 1965 in

Williamsburg, Virginia.

The Williamsburg Conference was the direct result

of the concern within the AMA-AASHO Committee

that plans, then in the formulation stage, be converted

into programs and the recognition that the issue of

evaluating social and community values and relating

transportation plans and programs to them had not

been met. At its meeting in November 1964, the Committee agreed to hold a conference to review the

state-of-the-art and recommend courses of action for

the future and to invite the National Association of

County Officials to join the other two groups as an

official sponsor. The Federal Highway Administrator

expressed strong support for the idea and instructed

the Director of Planning of the Bureau of Public

Roads to find the necessary funds. This he did, half

within his own budget and half from the Automotive

Safety Foundation, which once again not only provided financial support but also the near full-time

assignment of the Assistant to the President to aid in

organizing the conference and producing the report.

The objectives of the Conference as spelled out by the

sponsors were as follows:

To identify community values, goals, and objectives;

and to explore how development of transportation sys- tems can serve to enhance values and aid in reaching

goals and objectives.

To evaluate and recommend alternative arrangements

for the organization, administration, and financing of the cooperative continuing transportation planning function

within multi-jurisdictional areas. To recommend methods and procedures for converting

cooperatively developed plans for interrelated systems of transportation in urban areas into improvement programs

of state, county, and municipal governments."

The Conference was particularly significant in the

degree to which the official agencies assumed responsibility for its conduct. The Steering Committee comprised the executive directors of the three Associations—^A. E. Johnson for AASHO, Patrick Healy for

AMA (now National League of Cities) and Bernard

Hillenbrand for NACO. The Bureau of Public Roads

provided the Chairman of the Steering Committee

(and of the Conference itself) in the person of the

Director of Planning of BPR and the Committee sec- retary. ASF provided the Conference secretary.

Each executive director presided over one of the three

full-day working sessions.

Of the 74 participants, nearly half were there as

official designees of the sponsoring association. The

othei's constituted a good cross section of other profes312
sionals from the fields of planning, architecture, landscape architecture, research, law and the transportation

industries. Concerned Federal agencies were repre- sented by high-level staff members. The directors of

the planning studies thought to be the most successful were in\ated and contributed heavily. Among the

highwa}' officials were six who served at one time or another as presidents of AASHO and three others

who were heads of their departments. Similar highlevel participation came from the other sponsors. The Federal Highway Administration and the Urban

Renewal Administrator filled places on the program.

At Williamsburg there were still some parochial

views expressed, and fairly sharp differences came out between participants as to the intent and effect of

policies or practices of one or another of the agencies

represented. But in general the atmosphere from the

beginning was one of seeking means to cooperate in

developing urban transportation facilities to benefit

the whole community, users and nonusers alike. A full day's discussion was devoted to the progress

of urban transportation planning, emphasizing its technical gains and its financing problems. Another

day was devoted to the broad problem of establishing

community goals and objectives and determining social

values, with successful examples in a few instances

described. And another day was devoted to administration, not only of planning and development of

plans, but of implementation, both of the transportation programs and of land use controls.

From this review of the state-of-the-art, it could

be faii'ly concluded that tremendous gains in planning

techniques had been accomplished and that the importance of close coordination between land use and

transportation had been universally accepted. Examples of successful processes embracing both trans- portation and land use planning over the widest range

of population and area boundaries showed that the

needed technical processes and administrative machinery could be organized. In these areas it was clearly

evident that they generally followed along the lines

foreseen as needed at Sagamore. But more than that,

the gains in the need for and ability to cooperate

among States and their local subdivisions had become

equally apparent.

The one area in which little progress had been

made, it would seem, was in land use controls. A^Tiile universally recognized that no transportation system

geared to a land use plan could effectively serv-e land

uses unless they developed in adherence to the plan,

the assurance of implementation of a land use plan

seemed no nearer that at Sagamore. In this area the

following measures were proposed to the Conference:

We must define the governmental level at which land- use issues are to be decided. We must devise positive, rather than negative, controls by which definitive allocations, or even prohibitions, of land use can be made.

We need powers by which public agencies can buy and

hold land for future use in accordance with short and

long-range development plans legally established and in the public interest.** The Conference concluded that:

Local governments in urban regions should develop

workable administrative mechanisms, such as associations of local governments, through which (a) the continuing.

coordinated planning process can be carried out in co- operation with Federal and State agencies on a regional

basis; and (b) regional plans can be effectively implemented."

In the deliberations and conclusions of the Conference no doubt was left that transportation plans

must take into account social and community values,

recognizing that as of that time there was no accepted

basis for integrating them into the economic analyses

customarily made of various alternatives. Again, re- search was indicated to be needed. But one important

point emerged without question—transportation itself

is a community value.

And in the conclusions, it was fully accepted that means to bring the decisionmakers into the planning

process and to keep the public informed as the planning and programing progressed must be achieved.

Words of the recommendation in this area were these

Urban planning agencies should work actively to achieve

(a) public understanding of the planning efforts, and

(b) participation of decision-making agencies at appropriate points in the planning process.'" While it was accepted that citizens should be kept

advised of the planning as it progressed, the conferees evidently saw no reason to bring the citizens

into the decisionmaking process, accepting that it was

to make decisions that the local officials were elected. The Williamsburg Report, like its predecessors, was

an excellent statement of sound accomplishment and

mutual understanding and was likewise given wide

distribution. But it carried a stronger official en- dorsement than any that went before. It was an offi- cially sponsored Conference, and that alone gave it more than usual stature. Beyond that the sponsoring

associations made a point of urging their members

to be guided by it. The executive director of AASHO

noted in his letter transmitting copies of the report

to the chief administrative officers of the member departments that "We hope that you will take advantage

of reviewing this Report to indoctrinate your Department on the importance of our urban responsibilities

and the magnitude of our urban challenges . . ." The

Federal Highway Administrator in transmitting

copies of the report to the Bureau's field organization

stated that:

The Williamsburg Resolves, buttressed by the accom- panying text of the report, display an impressive area of agreement among the representatives of the several levels of government and the professionals of the different dis- ciplines . . . By this memorandum I am placing the Bureau unequivocally in support of the principles enunciated in this report, and I shall expect all our offices to be guided by them.

Problems of Implementing the Conference

Recommendations

It has been said that the Williamsburg Conference

marked the high-water mark of urban transportation

planning. Without judging the merits of this view,

it did mark the high point in efforts of the professionals and associations of officials to join together in a common approach to the problems they had by then

fully agreed were mutual. It highlighted a "decade

of cooperation." Following that there seems to have

been a decline in real cooperation, and competitive

forces both within and without the transportation

313
The marriage of the freeway location and landscape to the Mission Bay Park in California serves multiple

functions, including a spectular view for the developing residential area.

area increasingly became evident. Concern over the

environment rose sharply, much of it quite proper, and

the general wave of dissent that swept the country was felt in the urban transportation area no less than

in many others. Citizens groups discovered their

ability to stop officially approved programs, even if unable themselves to implement or even to suggest

alternatives. Individual and neighborhood desires

took precedence over programs for the wider benefit

of larger areas. Self-interest groups took advantage

of the general unrest or uneasiness.

Yet, with all this, most of the concern being felt and the demands being heard in the decade after

Williamsburg were for the very things that professionals and officials had been seeking for many years.

314

Relating highways to the environment was accepted

as an important factor in highway location in Toll

Roads and Free Roads in 1939. It was accepted, in a

variety of wordings, in each of the conferences and

various official documents since that time.

The necessity for relating transportation to land

use was likewise acknowledged at every turn. IVliat

is now the Interstate System was laid out on that basis

in the early 1940's. That State and local officials must cooperate in planning and programing urban systems was noted regularly, with particular emphasis at Sagamore and

Williamsburg, by the National Committee on Urban

Transportation and the AIMA-AASHO Committee,

and of course, it was made a requirement by the 1962

Act.

t
r The need for coordinating programs for the different

modes of transportation was spelled out in Toll Roads

and Free Roads and in Interregional Hightaays, was recommended at every conference, and likewise was made a requirement in planning in the 1962 Act. Much of the initiative in all this was taken by

highway officials, but they received willing cooperation from the associations of city and county officials and the support of professional and public agencies

outside the official circles. Notably, the Automotive

Safety Foundation, supported by the so-called highway industry, provided financial support for the three

major conferences as well as for many research and

promotional activities in the broad areas of improving

urban transportation and enlisted public support for

sound programs.

The need for keeping the public informed was recognized at Sagamore, and at Williamsburg the conferees

urged greater citizen participation in developing plans

and programs.

Yet, 10 years after Williamsburg, transportation

problems in many urban areas are no nearer solution

then in 1965. In fact, unrestrained development in a large number of urban areas, without corresponding

improvements in the total transportation systems, have

made their solutions even more remote. In retro- spect a n\unber of reasons can be seen why the urban

transportation planning effort leveled oflf or even

slipped backward, only having to be revised later and

broadened by direction at the national level by both

the legislative and executive branches. The effect of

any one of the several reasons can hardly be segre- gated because of their interrelationship both in nature

and over time. Each contributed to keeping planning

and the use of planning data in either policy or programing pretty much off balance, even though, in

tracing the impact of any one reason separately, might

not seem to indicate that it alone should have been

unduly influential.

Funding had to be a major factor in the difficulty

of continuing the effectiveness of planning in the ur- ban areas. The data collection required for the initial phases of the urban transportation process (the "3C"

process), called for in all urbanized areas by the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, was costly, ex- hausting any li/^ percent funds not required for other

planning functions, and in many States, requiring

considerable "over matching" by the States. A^Hiile the costs of the continuing phases were far less on an

annual basis, they were substantial. The development

of simulation models and the computer program packages to implement them required only keeping basic

data current by sampling methods and not complete re- surveys, but even that was not inexpensive. Funding

of the urban studies was also hurt by the decrease in

"701" planning assistance funds from the Department

of Housing and Ui'ban Development. Under earlier

policies of the Housing and Home Finance Agency,

"701" funds available for general urban planning were

directed heavily to aid the cities to carry on their

shares of the cooperative process. With the establishment of HUD, the policies changed, and emphasis on

long-range physical planning shifted to short-range

socially oriented planning, thus, placing virtually the

entire burden of Federal participation not only in

transportation planning, but in general land use planning as well, on the Federal Highway Administration.

Other demands on planning funds were also in- creasing, however, particularly to finance the state- wide surveys of highway needs begun by the joint

action of the Bureau of Public Roads and the States

and placed on a continuing basis by Congress. Other new programs imposed more and more responsibility on the process as the Congress underlined the essentiality of planning data to serve as a basis of State

and urban programs. In 1968 the TOPICS program

required that projects must be based on the "3C"

process, as did the fringe parking program also au- thorized by the 1968 Act. The process must provide

the basis for the selection of the Federal -Aid Urban

System authorized by the 1970 Act, and aid to bus

public transportation could be provided only if the

routes and special urban high density traffic program,

authorized in 1973, were on routes approved by the

"3C" process. While not specifically related to the

"3C" process, amendment of the basic provisions of

the 1934 Hayden-Cartwright Act expanded the area

eligible for use of the fi^ percent funds by adding a phrase to permit their use for planning of local public

transportation systems, which under the earlier language also included planning for their financing.

Wliile such expressions of confidence in the planning

process developed by voluntary cooperative effort two

decades earlier were heartening, the imposition of

these and other added functions made the effective

conduct not only of the added responsibilities but of

the more basic requirements of statewide planning in- creasingly difficult simply because of inadequacy of

funding. It was not until 1973, however, that Congress increased the 11/4 percent limitation on Federal

participation in planning by authorizing an additional

14 percent to aid transportation planning in metropolitan areas. Apportioned on the basis of urbanized

area population and required to be matched by the

States, the funds must be "passed through" by the

States ". . . to the metropolitan planning organizations designated by the State as responsible for car- rying [on the "3C" process]." By this authorization,

additional funds were made available for metropolitan

transportation planning, but still under the general

responsibility of the States, not turned over carte blanche to the metropolitan areas. Attempts by those

most concerned with planning over the previous years

to increase the V-/2 percent funds, never advanced to Congress by the Bureau, were finally successful only

after their inadequacy became painfully apparent.

Coupled with inadequacies of funds was the lack of

real concern for planning, especially in the urban

areas, by some States, and similar indifference on the

part of many cities. Changes in administration in

local governments brovight into office new officials who

were not even aware of the cooperative process in

which their jurisdictions were involved by formal

agreement. Many State highway departments were

not adequately staffed with professionals from disci- plines other than engineering to conduct the urban

planning process. Over one-third of the States re- sorted to consultants to complete the initial phases of

the planning process in order to meet the July 1, 1965,

deadline set by Congress in the 1962 Act. Having

315
thus met the requirement to permit programing of

projects in the urbanized areas, their interest flagged,

and without staff to keep data and analysis current,

the product of the planning became less and less adequate as a basis for programing.

Not to overemphasize the negative, a majority of

the States, especially those with the largest cities,

maintained and even strengthened their interest, and

in cooperation with the Bureau of Public Roads, universities, and other agencies, advanced the technology

of planning to a highly sophisticated level, so much

so that the process may well have outnm the ability to utilize it fully in administration. But despite the

advances in some States, a sufficient number allowed

the process to become dormant or lag so badly as to bring into question whether the requirement that the

process be continuing cooperative, and comprehensive, one or another or all three, were being met. Ultimately the Federal Highway Administration found

it necessary to require that the Division Engineer in

each State certify annually that the planning process

in each urbanzied area satisfactorily met the requirement of the 1962 Act as a basis for programing projects in those areas. Some of the problems with respect to the planning

process were the result of its success. It became widely

accepted throughout all the States, as its merits were

proved under actual test. It became accepted in other

countries as well, as their planners observed its operation in this country, or as American consultants made

their experiences available to them. Some countries

literally adopted the entire process bodily. But in the

enthusiasm of those who developed and were applying

the process so successfully, it perhaps became oversold.

It had its limitations. The process as it developed

could ascertain the relationship between transportation

and land use and forecast the number of trips in an

area, their origins and destinations, the mode of travel

that would be used. It could "assign" trips to specific routes and estimate traffic volumes with accuracy. But

it was developed on a metropolitan or "coarse-grained"

scale. The sampling techniques and the simulation

models were fully adequate to estimate future traffic volumes on freeways and major arterial streets, for

example, or on a heavily traveled transit line, but they were not sufficiently "fine-grained" to permit showing

turning movements at a particular intersection or volumes on particular ramps of an interchange. It was perfectly proper and hiq-hly desirable for the

Congress, in authorizing the TOPICS program,* for

example, to require that projects be based on the planning process. But what the Congress perhaps did not

appreciate, and what many States certainly did not, was that the process as then in operation was not the

"be-all" and "end-all" in planning, and could not

provide data needed to plan minor street improvements

or traffic signal timing as TOPICS required. Some

State highway officials found it hard to accept that

the process, so expensively organized and conducted,

could not supply the simple facts needed for TOPICS.

All that was needed, of course, was to expand the

"3C" process to treat local situations, using tested,

* Section 135 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 made

the Traffic Operations Program for Improvement of Capacity

and Safety (TOPICS) a continuing program.

more conventional methods, and this was done. But

the requirement to do so resulted in some disenchantment, temporarily at least, in some areas.

The Future of Urban Transportation Planning

The Bureau of Public Roads and others, fully aware

of the limitations of the process, once the basic job of

getting planning on an acceptable basis in all ur- banized areas was substantially accomplished, began

exploring methods of adapting the simulations procedure to broader use. Looking toward the finer- grained traffic data needs, a "micro-assignment" procedure was developed to meet the needs of localized

traffic analyses, and in the other direction, intensive

effort by Bureau staff led to the development of a multiregional approach to urban transportation problems at policy, rather than planning and programing,

levels. This latter approach called TRANS, an acronym

for Transportation Resources Allocation Study, made

it possible to examine the effect on transportation needs

of alternate land development policies and the dollar

costs and benefits, direct and indirect, of various trans- portation alternatives to the extent pertinent factors

could be expressed in monetary terms. In addition, it provided means for including "noncostable" items

such as the impact of the alternatives on social and

environmental areas to the extent their effects can be

measured, but only in nonmonetary terms. The model

is applicable to all urban areas aggregated on a national scale, or on a statewide scale, or down to the

larger metropolitan areas. Its purpose, as described

by two of the Bureau staff most deeply involved in

its development, was:

The determination of long-range government priorities,

policies, and programs is a complex process which blends hard politics with occasional naive idealism, trades off narrow interests against the common good ... It re- mains the responsibility of transportation planners . . . to maintain a firm philosophical and functional commitment to provide policy formulators and decision-makers

with a continuous flow of information and an objective

capability for digesting and evaluating this information. The TRANS-urban approach must be viewed in this context. It is not an automatic policy making tool. It is intended solely as a mechanism that can provide rational information that was perhaps not previously available." This concise statement applies not only to the mechanical process that was developed. It defines the

role of the planner as one in which he must supply

usable objective data to the political leader, the decisionmaker, and it calls on the decisionmaker to use it. The planning process has indeed become a highly

sophisticated process, developed by dedicated professionals drawn from a variety of disciplines Avhose

product was made possible only by computer technology. Applicable to all modes and to general planning as well, its development Avas financed virtually

entirely by road-user funds. It is unequaled in any

other planning area. Yet it can be effective only to the extent policymakers understand its products and

accept the objective data it presents as a basis for

their decisions.

Beyond the question of the mechanics or general

applicability of the planning process in engineering

analyses, the difficulty in gaining public acceptance of

plans and programs developed from planning facts

316
seems to cast doubts on the process itself. Planning

and development of a freeway system must be at metropolitan scale, and the metropolitan system must

be accepted as an inteo;ral element of a statewide highway network. A rapid transit line and even major

arterial route development are facilities of regional

importance and nuist be planned and developed at that scale. Yet their impact, both desirable and undesirable, is felt at a very local scale. While residents

of a neighborhood or even a larger community may

strongly favor a freeway system, they object to its location in their own neighborhood or community,

and even rail rapid transit proposals share this same

problem. Differences between local and regional goals can hardly be unexpected, but the highway program

brought them into sharp focus. The highway program also gave those with ecology concerns, often

at all costs, an opportunity to focus their efforts. The

only answer seemed to be to bring the citizens more

directly into the planning process. The Congress first recognized the need to give citi- zens the opportunity to comment on proposed highway

projects in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,

but for diametrically the opposite reason for what is now fundamental to project acceptance. At that time

citizens and travel-oriented businesses in small towns

feared the loss of business if the Interstate System,

with its required control of access and widely spaced

interchanges, were to bypass their communities. Responding to these groups, the 1956 Act, under section

116, declared that as a matter of policy:

Any State highway department which submits plans

for a Federal-aid highway project involving the bypassing

of, or going through, any city, town, or village, either incorporated or unincorporated, shall certify to the Commissioner of Public Roads that it has had public hearings, or has afforded the opportunity for such hearings,

and has considered the economic effects of such a location. Provided, that if such hearings have been held, a

copy of the transcript of said hearings shall be submitted

to the Commissioner of Public Roads, together with the

certification. From this start grew the public hearing process, with all its inadequacies, dissatisfactions and problems.

As it developed, it may have caused more problems

than it solved, and it is still a troubled area. Early,

most highway departments looked on the public hearing as an unfortunate added step in project approval

and went into the hearing intent on defending their

decisions against criticism. Later, as the requirements were extended ultimately to cover nearly all Federalaid projects. States increasingly attempted to make

the hearing a constructive step, often in difficult cases employing consultants to develop various alternatives

for consideration at the hearing, although only re- cently recognizing that one alternative should be to do nothing. The assumption that a project was to be

built and that citizen suggestions might help decide

which alternative was most suitable met with little favor among groups Avhich wanted only one thing

to be left alone. Criticism developed over the tendency

to make only engineering and economic analyses (after

all, the law only required consideration of economic

effects) and ignored social and environmental factors. As time went on, the requirement for two public

hearings, a location hearing and a design hearing, was introduced, and in the Federal-Aid Highway Act

of 1968, the Congress, responding to mounting dis- satisfaction with the highway program in many urban

areas, amended the language of the 1956 Act by strik- ing out the words "economic effects of such a location"

and substituting the words "economic and social effects of such a location, its impact on the environment, and

its consistency with the goals and objectives of such

urban planning as has been promulgated by the community." This change clearly brought the hearing

process directly into the planning area, where pre- viously it had been regarded generally as an engineering function. It imposed a further load on the "3C"

process, but it moved the process to closer liaison with

engineering.

This change still did not suffice as a means of reconciling divergent views as to the highway program, and

in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, the Congress

further required that the certification by the State

regarding the public hearing must be accompanied

by a report of the consideration given to the economic,

social, and environmental effects of any of the alternatives that were brought up at the hearing. It must

be assumed that representations had been made to the

Congress that the States paid insufficient attention to suggestions made at the hearings.

During the consideration of this amendment, the

Committee on Public Works explored with the Federal

Highway Administration the desirability of requiring

a third public hearing, preceding the location and design hearing probably to be called the planning hearing, at which more basic questions would be discussed

and hopefully an agreement reached that a highway

improvement in the particular corridor or area indeed was necessary. Concern over what such a hearing

process would involve led to the counter suggestion

that FHWA would devise a strategy by which there

could be meaningful input by citizens into the planning process. To this the Committee agreed and the

requirement for the third hearing was not pursued.

Thereupon it became incumbent on FHWA to develop guidelines to bring this about. Examination of

hearing transcripts and of other means some States

had used to reach agreement with local groups and

communities showed many examples (ranging from

modification of Interstate project design to not having

a village street), of changes stemming from the hearing process. Conferences, organized by the Highway

Research Board and other agencies, reviewed examples

of effective citizen participation and of the problems

of achieving it. Primarily, it had to be concluded,

citizen participation was most effective when it was

handled on a person-to-person basis, a highly subjective approach. The problem FHWA faced was trying

to institutionalize such a subjective procedure.

The result was that the first step involved little more than advising the State that the citizens must

be brought into the planning process, and gave them

examples of some successful devices to do that. This first step was followed by a more formal re- quirement in 1973 responding to section 136 of the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 under which each

State was called upon to develop an "Action Plan"

to ensure that proposed highway projects are based

upon a balancing of the adverse economic, social, and

environmental effects and the cost of eliminating oi

317
1-95 runs beneath this reflecting pool two blocks west of the Capitol in Washington, D.C.

Air-right Federal buildings at each end of the tunnel enclose the ventilation equipment.

The tunnel concept permitted the new Mall plan to retain this pool and the proposed

Ceremonial Drive along its western edge.

minimizing such effects against the need for fast, safe,

and efficient transportation. The guidelines and the

State Action Plans are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Obviously this section of the 1970 Act put public

hearings deeply into the planning process. As the

Action Plans were being received in the Federal Highway Administration during 1974, the manner in which

the States responded to the congressional intent would

become apparent.

It has been noted repeatedly in this chapter that

most urban transportation planning, and a considerable amount of general urban planning, had been fi- nanced with highway funds. It was also noted that

prior to the establishment of the Department of Housing and Urban Development the "701" funds that had

been heavily directed to aiding the cities in their

cooperation with the States, primarily for developing

the land use plan, were redirected more toward shortrange social goals. When aid to public transportation was initiated by Congress, administration of it was

placed in the Urban Transportation Administration then under HUD. No UTA funds were available for the sort of planning carried out under the

"3C" process that might be called transportation sys- tem planning, although funds could be used for project

planning, the type of work called project design in

highway terms and Avhich can be financed from construction funds. Projects could not be approved, however, unless they were found to be consistent with an

acceptable city or metropolitan plan such as had been

largely financed under the "701" funds. This finding, or certification of acceptability, was made within HUD

but not within the UTA. Subsequently, when the

Department of Transportation was establislied in 1967

and UMTA was brought in July 1, 1968, project

approval became the responsibility of DOT, yet certi- fication of acceptability imder the approved city or

metropolitan plan still remained in HUD and any

lingering hope of "701" fund assistance in system

planning disappeared. Responsibility for administering a rapidly and substantially expanding public

transportation improvement program fell upon an

Administration badly understaffed, with no field or- ganization and no funds for system planning.

To the Federal Highway Administration, it was

apparent that the same basic data, the same land use transportation relationships, the same modal-split

models applicable to highway planning were either

directly applicable or easily adaptable to transit planning. It offered the facilities of the established "3C"

processes in every urbanized area to aid transit system

planning and its field offices and its division planning

engineers to act as a field arm of UMTA. These

efforts met with only mild success, for over the years

transit interests had regarded "their mode" as competitive with highways, and starved for Federal aid in

comparison with the affluence of the highway mode

with what they saw as heavy Federal "subsidies,"

particularly the 90-10 Interstate program. Conversion of thinking of modes as competitive rather than

as complementary and of administration as antagonistic rather than cooperative was not easy, but gradually was accomplished with strong ui'ging on the part

of both FHWA and UMTA Administrators, Turner

and Villarreal. Instructions and memorandums signed

by both Administrators were issued, joint research

projects set up, joint committees organized, and ac- tual exchanges of personnel instituted. During this process, UMTA's basic legislation was modified to permit use of funds in a manner similar to the 11/9 percent planning funds, and the administrative budget

increased to allow at least the beginnings of a field organization. A full i)artnorshi]i in attacking urban

transportation problems had evolved, and at least in

318
one area the purpose of assemblin<i: Federal transportation responsibilities under one roof was bein^ realized. A somewhat similar situation existed in the

Federal Aviation Administration.

With the 'growing' cooperation evident at the Washin<i:ton level, the Department of Transportation beo:an

extending the policy to the field. In 1970 a memorandum from the Federal Highway Administrator to the Secretary' of Transportation reconnnended a program to be tried in three regions, which by then had

been made coextensive for all Administrations, in

developing: the planning program. Under this ex- periment, approval of the planning program in any

of the three areas, FHWA, UMTA, and FAA, would

be approved by the regional modal administrator only

when all three were correlated. Regional representatives of each Administration would meet to consider

the programs ad\'anced for approval by the State or

local jurisdictions, and if necessary discuss them

further with their counterparts, to assure that the

individual programs were complementary and not

overlapping. Hopefully a single planning agency,

such as the one developed cooperatively to meet the

requirements of the "3C" process, would carry on most

if not all the transportation planning up to about

project design stage (to use highway terms), with the

Federal share of the cost apportioned appropriately

among the three Administrations.

The trial program was to extend over a period of a

year, but within months after its initiation the Secretary ordered it to be extended to all regions and made

a permanent procedure. Thus at least in transportation planning, coordination was achieved on paper,

and increasingly in practice. By 1973 the procedure

had become loiown as the Unified Work Program and

all planning under the agreement must be performed

by a single planning agency. The policy established

by Congress in 1962 applicable to the highway program had now, by decision of the executive branch,

been made applicable to all modes.

In 40 years planning, not even called that in the beginning because of prejudice against the word, has advanced from highway improvement planning to broad,

sophisticated transportation planning, advancing in its theory and techniques even more than the technology

of any of the modes it plans. Unified at State and

local level by requirements of the Congress and Federal executive departments and expanded in scope by

acts of Congress as new demands appeared, it is a powerful tool in metropolitan planning, not only in

transportation, but in general planning as well. Congress has forced the disparate transportation elements

in metropolitan planning to come together at local

level. It has provided for coordination of modal

administrations within the executive branch.

But much remains to be done at the metropolitan

level in planning transportation and land uses as in- terrelated elements if the overall plan is to be an

accomplished fact. Local and metropolitan trans- portation policies can be based on sound planning, even though currently there is little assurance that

adequate land use controls or transportation programs

will necessarily ensure that transportation and land

use, however carefully planned, will achieve or retain

balance. States increasingly are coordinating transportation planning and programing through departments of transportation, but only a few are relating

them to approved statewide land use or development

plans or even policies. At the Federal level there is no national development plan or policy to which a transportation plan or policy can be related. Indeed,

much remains to be done.

REFERENCES

* History and Development of Road Building in the United

States, address by T. H. MacDonald before the Annual Convention of the Aniercian Society of Civil Engineers, pp. 44-45.

-Id., pp. 47, 48.

' H. Doc. 272, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.

* H. Doc. 379, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., Message from the Presi- dent to the Congress, p. III.

^ Id., pp. 62, 64.

' Id., p. 66.

' Id., pp. 4, 5.

« Id., p. 3.

» Id., p. 87. " Id., p. iv. " What is This Thing Called Planning?, address by H. S. Fairbanic before the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Southeastern

Association of State Highway Officials, Miami, Dec. 8, 1947, pp. 6, 7. " National Committee on Urban Transportation, Better Transportation for Your City (Public Administration Service, 1958) p. XI.

" Id. " H. Doc. 249, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. " H. Doc. 139, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. " H. Doc. 120, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. " H. Doc. 106, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. ; H. Doc. 344, 85th Cong.,

2d Sess. ; H. Doc. 91, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. ; H. Doc. 355, 86th

Cong., 2d Sess. ; H. Doc. 54, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. ; H. Doc. 72, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. ; H. Doc. 124, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. "House Comm. on Public Works, 1968 National Highway

Needs Report, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 90-22). " Transit and Federal Highways, address by E. H. Holmes

before the Engineers Club of St. Louis, Apr. 23, 1964, presented on behalf of Federal Highway Administrator Rex M. Whitton.

^°The Sagamore Conference on Highways and Urban De- velopment Report, (Syracuse University), Oct. 5-9, 1958, Forward.

''/d., p. 9. " Id., p. 14.

^'Id., p. 14.

"* Id., p. 14.

='/d., p. 15. " Id., p. 15. " The Hershey Conference on Freeways in the Urban

Setting Report, (Automotive Safety Foundation), Hershey,

Pa., June 1962, Foreward.

^ Id., Background.

^^ Id., Findings.

'" Id., Recommendations.

" Id., Recommendations.

'2 FHWA Federal-Aid Highway Program Manual, Vol. 4, Ch. 4, Sec. 2.

^' Highways and Urban Development, Report on the Second

National Conference, Williamsburg, Va., Dec. 12-16, 1965, p.

ii. ^Id., p. 33. "Jd., p. v. TM/(Z., p. V. "An Approach to Multi-Regional Urban Transportation

Policy Planning, a paper pre.sented before the Highway Research Board by H. Kassoflf and D. S. Gendell, Jan. 1971.

319
Re/eorch

Research was one of the principal missions of the

first national highway program in the United States

and is, in fact, the oldest continuous Federal highway

activity. The scope of federally conducted or assisted

research encompasses all of the Federal highway

programs and every facet of highway transportation

as a national resource and as a principal force in the

social and economic well-being of the people and

Government.

Early History

The history of highway research in the Federal

Government began with the establishment of the

Office of Road Inquiry (ORI) in the Department of

Agriculture in 1893. Prior to that date, there had been numerous investigations and experiments, but they were primarily scattered and isolated events. With

the creation of the ORI, whose primary mission was

to investigate the best methods of roadmaking and to

assist in disseminating this information, a formal,

organized research program began. In 1894, the ORI

issued 9 bulletins on such subjects as State laws, roadbuilding materials, and railroad rates for hauling

those materials.

Demonstration trains, originally loiown as "Good

Roads Trains," traveled throughout many parts of the

Nation in the 1890's. These trains were fitted with

construction and roadbuilding machinery and equipment as well as section models of macadam and other

types of road construction.

States, local authorities, railroad companies and

the manufacturers of earth-handling and roadbuilding machinery also cooperated in building short

sections of quality roads to demonstrate good roadbuilding practices. The emphasis was on drainage,

surface courses, and maintenance. Local materials

and manpower were used under the general supervision of Federal engineers. Sometimes on "Good

Roads Day," as many as 500 local farmers would take

a walking tour of a demonstration section being constructed. In 1910, the annual report of the Office of

Public Roads reported that 55 object lesson and ex- perimental roads had been completed during the

fiscal year.^

Although information on specific research activities

in the early 1900's is rather fragmentary, the most

substantial continuing effort was testing large numbers of samples of highway materials, including aggregate, cement, soil, asphalt, and tar. A Federal

laboratory was established in 1900 for mechanical and

chemical investigation of these materials. The results

of the tests were analyzed to obtain a general over- view of the characteristics of available materials and

their suitability for roadbuilding purposes. Samples

were sent in from all areas of the country and were

tested free of charge until 1924, when it was an- nounced that materials would no longer be tested for

the general public. In the early years, the laboratory

developed important tests to help improve bituminous

construction.

In addition, statistical and economic evaluations were made in 1910 of the efl'ect of road improvements

on communities. Some woi'k was also undertaken on

coatings and coverings for iron and steel corrosion.

In 1911 there were some object lesson projects on

culverts, and a bulletin was published on highway

bridges.

320
From the beginning, the Office of Public Roads included a group of men to develop new techniques through experiment

and research. Historically, this activity has involved a strong element of "let's try it and find out" as illustrated in this early

bitum^inous macadam pavement experiment. Today's broad

program of research and development dealing with problems

of safety, traffic management, environmental protection, materials, structures, and maintenance uses modern, scientific tech- niques in searching for solutions.

Rather than attempting to outline here a large

number of technical advances, several broad historical

milestones can be summarized. (1) The research

mission of the Federal agency was clearly established,

and, later. Federal funds were specifically earmarked

for research. (2) A major research journal. Public

Roads^ was founded. (3) The cooperative and jointparticipation concept with the States and industry was established. (4) The initial concentration on

material and surfaces was rapidly expanded into areas such as structures, economic consequences, and the

impact of traffic and trucks.

Federal Aid for Research

Federal AdministraHve Resources

The first sustained fiscal support for liighway re- search was authorized by section 21 of the Federal

Highway Act of 1921. The foundation for the Federal-aid State highway planning and research program was laid Avith the enactment of the HaydenCartwright Act of 1934.

Section 11 of the Ilayden-Cartwright Act specified

"AVith the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture,

not to exceed li/^ per centum of the amoimt apportioned for any year to any State . . . may be used for

surveys, plans, and engineering investigations. . . ." Under this authorization, some States, with the dele- gated approval of the Bureau of Public Roads, ini- tiated research activities, mostly in the area of physical

materials of the highway.

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 contained

for the first time the term "research" in addition to planning. Thus, the States at their option and with

the approval of Public Roads could use a portion of

the 114 percent planning funds for research. Funds

not used for planning or research could revert to the

construction program. With the enactment of the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, the II/2 percent

funds were restricted as of fiscal year 1964 to research

and planning purposes only. If they were not used

during their availability period, these funds would

lapse.

To further encourage the States to increase their

research and planning efforts, the 1962 FTighway Act

authorized, beginning with fiscal year 1964, the use

of an additional one-half of 1 percent of sums apportioned for each fiscal year for planning and research,

but this was optional. The initiative to conduct such

efforts rests with the State highway departments.

321
Prevost Hubbard

There were many professional men who made major contributions to the development of America's roads. One such man was a scientist

named Prevost Hubbard. Between 1905 and 1919 he developed for the

Office of Public Roads methods for testing and specifying bituminous

i:)avement materials which eventually became standards of the highway

construction industry and the foundation of modern materials technology.

Hubbard, born in 1881, was educated at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. He joined OPR in 1905 as the agency's

first laboratory chemist to help sort out and develop standards for the

wide variety of petroleum based products then being experimented with

as surfacing agents for highways.

He became active in the American Society for Testing Materials and

spearheaded, with Logan Waller Page, Committee H (now Committee

D-4 on Road and Paving Materials). He served as secretary of the

Committee from 1909 to 1946.

In 1919 Hubbard joined the Asphalt Institute, first known as the

Asphalt Association, to direct a research and development program

sponsored by the petroleum industry. The Institute's laboratory had

its beginning in the basement of Hubbard's home in "V^Hiite Plains,

New York. One of the first accomjilishments under his leadership was

the development of Medium Curing Cutback Asphalt, a liquid form of

asphalt, later used extensively in the construction of low-cost, lowvolume, all-weather pavements.

During the early 1920's an intensive effort was made to reduce the

number of specifications in effect in the United States. The asphalt

industry, under the direction of Hubbard, in cooperation with the States

and Bureau of Public Roads, was successful in reducing the grades of

asphalt cement in use from 88 to 9 and asphalt joint sealers from 14 to

4. Similarly, Hubbard's cooperative efforts during the 1930's led to the

successful reduction of the number of grades of liquid asphalts used by

33 States from 125 to 18. The latter study included an extensive testing program of most liquid

asphalts produced in the United States. J. T. Pauls of the Bureau of

Public Roads commented on the study in a progress report in 1932

Representatives of the Bureau of Public Roads and Mr. Hubbard of the Asphalt [Institute] stressed the fact that they believed in the adequacy of the proposed cooperative tests for the testing of liquid asphaltic products and

felt that many tests now being used by the States Avere unnecessary and

unsatisfactory.

Hubbard went on to develop methods for testing the design of paving

mixtures. With the assistance of F. C. Field of the Asphalt Institute,

Hubbard invented the Hubbard-Field Stability Test, which became the

first widely accepted test to measure the strength of asphalt paving

mixtures.

He died in 1971 at the age of 90. A year later Committee D-4 on Road and Paving Materials established the "Prevost Hubbard Award"

in recognition of his outstanding service to the Committee and to the

field of bituminous road and paving materials.

322
This is a 1915 traction dynamometer monntcd on a wagon,

used to 7neasure the force required to pull the vehicle over the road against the friction of the tcheels in contact with the road.

The Federal-Aid Highway Amendments Act of

1963 expanded the law to include development under

the research and planning section. The Act specified

that the I14 percent funds would be available, among

other purposes, ". . . for research and development,

necessary in connection with the planning, design,

construction, and maintenance of highways and highway systems. . . ." The intent of Congress was that

development would be an integral part of the overall

research and development program and that this provision would stinuUate the States to play a more

active role in the development phase.^

Public Roads Magazine

The Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 authorized a

5-year road program which had barely begim when

the United States entered the European war. Looking forward to the resuuiption of the road progi-am

after the war, Director Logan W. Page of the Office

of Public Roads and Rural Engineering (OPRRE)

foresaw tlie need for a journal devoted to the publication ". . . of the results of researches, experiments

and studies of those connected with this Office, and

of highway officials of the various States . . ."; and

also ". . . for the dissemination of such information

as the officials of the various States may desire to spread for the benefit of their contemporaries." ^ The first issue of the new publication, named PuhUc

Roads, appeared ]May 1918. It provided the State

highway officials with a welcome forum for the dis- cussion of current problems. The first issue brought

the industrj- up-to-date by summarizing motor vehicle

licensing laws and fees for registration and operators'

licenses. This wartime issue also ui'ged highway

builders to conserve scarce fuel by proper attention

to the firing of boilers and the careful use of steam

in road machines and in quarrying. An entire issue

(June 1918) was devoted to the catastrophic road

breakups caused by heavy trucking during the 1918

spring thaw. The May 1919 issue dealt with the

social and economic benefits of using convict labor on

the public roads. "When the Government distributed

the huge surpluses of military equipment to the States,

Public Roads ran articles on how to take care of the

equipment and convert it to civilian highway use.

PuhUc Roads published the resolutions adopted by

the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) at its annual meetings of December 1918,

1919, and 1920, and also the papers read at those

conventions. In eft'ect, it was the official journal of

AASHO until that organization launched its own

publication, American Ilighicays, in 1922.

Within a year of its first issue. Public Roads was

an important voice of the young highway industry,

with a long waiting list of would-be subscribers. In

fiscal year 1920, the authorized monthly circulation was raised to 4,500 copies, but hundreds of requests

for the magazine had to be refused. Budgetary cuts reduced the circulation to 4,000 copies per month for

fiscal year 1921, and, without explanation, publication was suspended altogether after the December 1921

issue. The suspension drew an immediate protest

from the American Road Builders' Association,

AASHO, and other organizations interested in roads

and also ". . . many expressions of regret not only

from its engineer subscribers, but also from the nontechnical administrative heads of coimty highway

activities to whom it had been helpful. Not the least gratifying of such expressions were those which came

entirely without solicitation from the editors of othei' technical engineering journals." * Public Roads resumed publication in March 1924,

with the return of better times. However, the magazine was no longer a forum for the administrative

and technical problems of the States, this function

having been assumed by American Highways after

Public Roads ceased publication. Instead, the new

Public Roads was exclusively a house research journal, and all of its contributors were engineers, scientists, and economists of the Bureau of Public Roads.

As the Bureau's research activities expanded. Public

Roads published papers dealing with every aspect of

highway research—finance and taxation, the economics

of transport systems, the properties of soil and road

materials, the management of construction operations

by contractors, the characteristics of highway traffic,

the strength of road slabs, and many others.

Public Roads was the original publisher of many

landmark papers in highway research. Most notable

of these was "Highway Capacity: Practical Applications of Research" by O. K. Xormann and W. P. Walker {Public Roads, October, December 1949).

Another paper, "Interrelationship of Load, Road and

Subgrade" by C. Hogentogler and C. Terzaghi {Public Roads, May 1929) laid the foundations of subgrade soil classification and marked a turning point

in studies of subgrade soils. The highway researchers of the tw^enties, thirties,

and forties were breaking new" ground. Often progress in a particular field of research depended on the

invention of new instruments to measure what had

never been measured before. A continuous stream of

such instruments issued from the Bureau of Public

Roads' insti"ument laboratory for nearly 40 years

the Goldbeck Pressure Cell for measuring pressui'es

under pavements; the electric-eye and road-tube traffic counters; the Benkelman Beam for measuring

minute deflections in pavements under load ; and many

others. Information about most of these devices first reached the scientific world through the pages of

Public Roads.

323
Publication, has continued without interruption

from March 1924 down to the present, although the

frequency of issues has varied widely. Througli the

years, Public Roads again expanded to include articles on highway research and development from sources outside of the Bureau of Public Roads. Throughout

its long history. Public Roach has maintained a high

standard of scientific accuracy and literary clarity

and, taken as a whole, is a remarkable chronology of

the development of highway engineering and eco- nomics in the motor age.

Federal-State-Industry Cooperation

The historic association between Federal highway

researchers and their counterparts in the States is considered unique in Federal Government programs,

past and present. Over the years, all of the States

have conducted research in cooperation with Public

Roads and contributed in countless ways to the program described here. One other important accomplishment in this longstanding Federal-State partnership has been the establishment of strong, viable

research staffs, facilities, and programs in the States. Another successful research relationship was established between Federal and State highway agencies

and interested outside groups, including other Government agencies, the academic community and associations, national organizations, professional societies,

and industry groups. These various bodies have

aided in identifying needs and in planning research

to fill those needs. They have assisted in the conduct

of studies with time, manpower, funds, and consultation and have taken an integral part in the development and implementation of results. One organization which has played a major role in

coordinating modern highway research and disseminating the results is the Transportation Research

Board (TRB), or, as it was known for half a century,

the Highway Research Board (HRB). It was or- ganized in 1920 as an agency of the National Research

Council in the National Academy of Sciences. Its purpose was to " 'assist in outlining a comprehensive

national program of highway research and coordinating activities thereunder; organize committees for

specific problems; deal with ways and means; and act in a general advisory capacity.' " ^ In recognition of

the increasing emphasis on the "systems" or balanced

The Maryland State Roads Commission testing laboratory in

1929.

approach to transportation problems, the TRB in recent years has modified its scope to include the

development of other modes of transportation as they

interact with highways. A more detailed discussion

of the TRB and its relationship to the Federal Highway Administration research efforts can be found in

Chapter 1 of Part II. In the last two decades, considerable cooperative

research has also been undertaken on an international

scale. A notable example is the continued involvement of Public Roads in a number of research committees of the Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development (OECD). Their efforts have been

particularly directed toward research for safer highway design and improved traffic operations. Since

1964 Public Roads has also worked with the Inter- national Road Federation in the collection and dis- semination of information through a worldwide

annual inventory of research and development activities.

Construction Materials and Structures

In the early period of highway construction in this

country, an understanding of the physical behavior

of the major materials was developed primarily by

trial and error, which led to the development of cri- teria and tests based, to a great extent, on empirical

relationships. Much of the early research work consisted of testing large numbers of samples of highway

materials to determine the essential characteristics of

available materials and their suitability for roadbuilding purposes. Developments with different materials

varied somewhat in time, but in general during the

1920's and early 1930's, the technology with respect

to soils, asphalts and other bituminous materials, ce- ment and concrete, and pavements, bridges, and other

structures was developed.

Soils In the very early stages of the roadbuilding in- dustry, little of a scientific nature was known about

soils as road materials other than that clay soils were

sticky and sadly lacking in vehicle support when wet

and that very sandy soils, while having fair performance when wet, were highly unsatisfactory when dry.

Thus, the first effective modification of soils for un- paved roads consisted of adding sand to clayed soils and clay to excessively sandy soils in a more or less

Taking soil samples for field subgrade soil studies.

324
"ciit-and-try" system. Plowever, tlie variable results obtained by casual blendino- soon made it apparent

that more than ej'eball en<>:ineerin<>- was needed in

dealing with soils and de\clopino- their potential as road material.

Most of the experiments up imtil 1920 were con- cerned with dust prevention and road surface preservation. Then, in 1920, the Bureau of Public Roads

began investigations "to obtain accurate scientific in- formation regarding the characteristics of soils which

affect their bearing value."" '' At about the same time,

several State highway departments established soil- testing units and each attacked the problem in its own

way. However, through exchange of infoi'mation at conferences and through American Society for Test- ing and Materials (ASTM), AASHO, and HRB, a

soil classification system and standard soils tests were

developed.

Soil Constants

One significant milestone was the development,

during the latter part of the 1920"s, of tests to measure

certain key characteristics of the various soil types

and their blends. These were the so-called soil constants which included the liquid limit, plastic limit,

and plasticity index, the latter being calculated from

the other two." These constants, which identify the

moisture retention and flow characteristics of a particular soil, have become indispensable criteria for

evaluating and predicting the performance of a given

soil as a pavement foundation and for use as a control

tool to facilitate the blending of inherently unsatisfactory soils to produce acceptable foundations.

Research in the late 1920's also disclosed that other

soil properties, in addition to plasticity, affect the

performance of soils in road foundations. It became

apparent that the wide range of soil types should be

classified on the basis of measurable characteristics,

such as fineness and chemical composition, to provide

highway engineers a working soil language. Based

on data obtained by testing thousands of soil samples

and observation of behavior of soils under field conditions, the Public Roads' soil classification system

This nuclear moisturc-doiHity gage icas developed in the late 1950's to instantly test subgrade compaction icithovt the need

to take samples and complete a laboratory a)ialysis.

was developed and first published in 1929. The best

soil for use in road foundations and earth structures was classified A-1. The series c(mtinued through

seven more main groups, the poorest being A-8. This

system, with appropriate revisions, later became the

ASTM and AASHO standards.

Continuing soils research included studies of re- sistance to frost heaving in cold climates (frost

susceptibility) and consolidation or settlement characteristics of soils. It was determined that frost

heave was greatest in silty soils and that the best

remedy was to remove and replace the silt with coarser grained materials, such as gravel, to a depth at which

frost action was not detrimental. Under the guidance

of Dr. Charles Terzaghi of the Massachusetts Insti- tute of Technology, serving as consultant to Public

Roads, apparatus for measuring the consolidation

characteristics of soils was also developed in the late 1920's, and the test data were used to determine the

i-ate and amount of settlement of highly compressible

soils. Occasional highway surface failures where the

quality of the foundation soil was considered to be

good indicated insufficient compaction during construction. To provide adequate compaction control, a test method for determining the moisture-density

relations of soils for earth dams was adapted to highway earthwork in the mid-1930's. Thereafter, compaction specifications for highway embankments,

subgrades and soil-aggregate base courses required

that the material have a proper amount of moisture

when compacted so that a target density could be

reached.

Soil Stabilization

Significant progress was made in soil stabilization

during the 1930's. Research showed that soils for use

in pavement subgrades could be improved by the

addition of portland cement, lime or bitumen, and

that calcium and sodium chlorides were effective dust

palliatives. During World War II, the Soils Laboratory collaborated with the Engineer Board, Fort

Belvoir, Virginia, in the evaluation of chemicals for

This is a circa 1935 electrical resistivity test along the George

Washington Memorial Parkway in Virginia. An electric cur- rent is passed through steel rods to measure ground resistance. This geophysical method is used to locate subsurface rock

formations.

326
soil stabilization. Beginning in 1954, and continuing

until about 1970, the Bureau in cooperation with the

chemical industiy evaluated about 50 chemicals for

soil stabilization. A few were found to be marginally

useful, but none were economically competitive with

Portland cement or lime for subgrades.

Remote Sensing

Throughout modern highway history, there has

been a continuing search for a rapid, effective way to explore conditions on or beneath the ground without

actual excavation or ground sui-veys. Beginning

about 1932, Public Roads promoted the development

and use of remote sensing methods for obtaining in- formation on soil and ground conditions in place.

The "cumulative-curve" method of presenting electri- cal resistivity data was developed and adapted to determine depth to bedrock, delineate sand-gravel

deposits and thickness of portland cement concrete pavement. Also, aerial photographic interpretation

principles were adapted to engineering-soil and materials mapping. Cooperative work between BPR

field offices and other agencies (U.S. Geological Survey, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA), the University of Michigan and Purdue

University) in 1960-1967 demonstrated that color

aerial photography was a good way to evaluate soil and terrain. Widespread use of these methods has

followed. The development and evaluation of ground

and aerial remote sensing methods for obtaining in- formation on terrain and environmental features con- tinued into the 1970's.

Bituminous Materials

Over the years. Public Roads has played a pre- dominant role in the development of asphalt technology and test methods for bituminous materials.

In 1903 it cooperated with the American Society for

Testing Materials in organizing a committee on road

and paving materials to develop essential standard

test methods and material specifications.

The BPR tried various tests on bituminous materials to determine their physical and chemical

properties and their suitability for use in road construction. Conclusions on which properties were

significant in relation to performance and on the best

methods for testing materials were disseminated in a

series of Department of Agriculture bulletins, beginning in 1911, which included the methods in use by

the Office of Public Roads at that time, and provided

a progression of guidelines for procedures in the use of bituminous materials. Many of the early ASTM

and AASHO standards for matei-ial and test method

specifications, which are used in highway construction, were derived from this series. The latest edition, now

called Standard Specifications and Methods of Tests for Highway Materials, was published by AASHO

in 1974.

Beginning in the 1920's and continuing through the

mid-1960's, most of the reseai'ch effort in the bitumi- nous area was concerned with studies of properties

of asphalts and tars produced in the United States,

and the relation of such properties to the performance

of pavements. Often such studies resulted in the

adoption of new specification requirements.

One of the most significant developments was the

simplification of specifications for liquid asphalts and

asphalt cements. A survey of penetration grade as- phalts in 1923 showed that 88 different specifications

for these materials were being used in the United

States. A joint conference of representatives of Public Roads and users and producers of asphalt recom- mended that only nine grades were sufficient to provide

the necessary materials. Those nine grades were

adopted by national groups and most of the States. Subsequently, the number of grades has been reduced

to five. In 1930 a similar survey showed that there were

119 different tests, including all variations, being used

in specifications for acceptable grades of liquid as- phaltic materials in the United States.® After a co- operative study of the materials being produced and

a series of conferences throughout the United States

sponsored by Public Roads, the Asphalt Institute, and

the petroleum industry, 13 grades were adopted by

most States and national groups. In most cases, the

reduced number of grades for both penetration grade

and liquid asphalts were adequate to fill the needs for

pavement construction and resulted in considerable

economic benefit to the user and producer of the

materials.

Development of the Thin-Film Oven Test The control of the hardening of asphalt in hotplant mixing and in mixtures in service has been of

major concern to the engineer and chemist since as- phalt was first used. In 1940 the Public Roads Administration developed a laboratory test that would

predict the amount of hardening of asphalt in hotplant mix construction. This became known as the

"Thin-Film Oven Test" and has been adopted as a standard specification test by ASTM, AASHO, and

essentially all State highway departments. This test was also adopted by several foreign countries to measure and control asphalt hardening.

Development of the Immersion-Compression Test The effect of moisture on asphalt paving mixtures,

macadams and surface treatments has been one of the

primary causes of pavement distress or early failure.

Tests were available to measure the effect of moisture on different aggregates coated with asphalt, but a

test was needed to measure the effect of water on

complete compacted mixtures representative of those

used in construction. To meet this need, the immersion-compression test was developed, based on a lab- oratory study made by the Bureau in 1942. The test produced valuable information on the susceptibility

of asphalt mixtures to loss in strength by water action.'' The immersion-compression test has been

adopted as a standard by ASTM, AASHO, and

many State highway departments and has been a valuable tool for investigating the cause of distressed

pavements.

326
Cement and Concrete Materials

The name "portland cement'' comes from an "artificial" cement patented by Joseph Aspdin in England

in 1824. Aspdin kept his process a secret, although

many others tried to duplicate this product. In 1845,

I. C. Johnson developed a product based on high

temperature calcination that was essentially "portland

cement" as ^\e know it today. Portland cement was

first manufactured in the United States in 1871.^° Concrete technology was in its early development

at the beginning of the 20th century. Today's re- fined knowledge of concrete design and utilization is the product of a number of organizations, such as Lewis Institute, American Concrete Institute, American Society for Testing and Materials, Portland

Cement Association, State highway departments, and

the Bureau of Public Roads, In particular, BPR

played an important role in developing knowledge of

the relationship of concrete's various components to concrete strengths and other characteristics and in

developing better tests and specifications for the

product. In addition, BPR performed studies which

established the quantitative relation between some

aggregates and the alkali content of cements and

determined the value of fly ash in concrete to control

the damaging alkali aggi'egate reactions as well as serve as a replacement for part of the cement. Other

research assessed the sulfate resistance of various concretes and the relation of such resistance to cement

composition. Air entraining agents to prevent freezethaw damage were also evaluated.

As the science of manufacturing portland cement

developed and more knowledge of the effect of special

compositions was gained, specialty cements such as "high-early-strength portland cement" or "sulfate re- sistant" cements began to appear on the market. This

led to the adoption by ASTM and AASHO ai'ound

1940 of five types of standard cements.

Bituminous mixtures being prepared in the Public Roads

Administratio7i research lab for immersion-compression tests to ascertain durability o/ materials for highway construction in 1948.

The development of standard cement tests was an

important part of Public Roads' research in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Difficulties arose when dis- crepancies were found in the results of tests run by

different testing laboratories around the country

whose function was to verify that highway construction materials met their required specifications and

also to test samples of completed highways. This

problem led to the establishment, in 1929, of the

Research engineer scans slice of concrete with microscope to determine size and distribution of air voids, important in the

durability of concrete, especially under the action of freezing

temperatures.

327
Cement Reference Laboratory (CRL) at the National

Bureau of Standards. It was an ASTM sponsored

activity actively supported by Public Roads from its inception. The CRL's duty was to determine whether

the laboratories' equipment was in order and to ob- serve whether the proper techniques were being used

in making the tests.*

Aggregates for Construction

The simplification, standardization, and uniform

application of aggregate gradations has been a major

effort since 1936. This work led to the early adoption

of a simplified practice of specifying sizes of coarse aggregate for concrete. In 1962 Public Roads en- couraged the States and other agencies to adopt

simplified procedures for aggregates used in bitumi- nous construction. The recommendations included

the development and adoption of standard aggregate

sizes, standard sieves, and a standard method of re- porting gradations. Public Roads also developed a new gradation chart that showed desired combinations of aggregate sizes in graphical form. Since

fewer blends were required, all customers could be

supplied from only a few stockpiles and producer

costs are minimized. This chart is now in wide use

for evaluating aggregates in bituminous paving mixtures. In 1928 studies were made of concrete containing

rounded gravel coarse aggregate versus the angular

material produced by crushing ledge stone or largesize waterworn gravel. This research determined that

crushed stone is generally preferred for paving work

because of the superior strength of the resulting

concrete.

* In 1960 the CRL was expanded into the Cement and

Concrete Reference Laboratory (CCRL).

Concrete slabs are subjected to daily applications of deicing

agents, such as calcium chloride, to determine the durability

of the concrete or the effectiveness of various protective treat- ments.

Research on concrete freezing and thawing was also

being conducted at this time. Public Roads research

led to the development of new concrete specifications

requiring denser and more durable types of coarse aggregate. Other research in this area included the

development of air-entrainment techniques and the

establishment of a list of acceptable air-entrainment

admixtures. Air entrainment is a process that puts

air bubbles in the cement to relieve the stresses caused

by freezing water. Later, Public Roads assisted in

the development of ASTM and AASHO specifications

and guidelines for air-entraining agents.

Coating Materials

Beginning in the 1920's, Public Roads became con- cerned with the need for improved field performance

of such common highway coating materials as paints

and galvanizing for metals for guardrails, more durable materials for culverts, and more lasting and

visible paint for lane markings and directional highway signs. A special chemical unit was established

to conduct research in this area. A significant result of this effort was the development in the late 1940's of a modified anticorrosion

paint primer for the bridge steel being shipped to the

Philippines for rebuilding its war-damaged highway

network. The standard red lead-linseed oil primer

then in use was found to be badly scratched and significantly stripped from the steel after its ari'ival in

the Philippines. To compound the problem, the ex- posed steel also corroded rapidly when stored under

the humid Philippine conditions. Studies showed

that a pigment combination of red lead and iron

oxide, as well as a combined base of linseed oil and

alkyd resin, would provide adequate corrosion protection and would be tough enough so that shipment

damage and deterioration in storage was minimal.^^

The specification developed has since become an AASHO standard used by a number of State highway departments.

Another development in coating materials was an

abrasion-resistant paint system for highway structures. Exceptionally high wind velocities combined

with wind-borne ice and soil particles in the Alaskan

Copper River Delta produced almost immediate and

extensive abrasive damage to the standard bridge

paint system in use. Laboratory and field research

by Public Roads and the Alaska Department of Highways were completed in 1965 and demonstrated that

rubber-based coating systems offered superior abrasive

resistance to these destructive forces.^^ Because traffic paints do not last long in heavy

traffic, there has been a continuing interest in developing better and more economical lane marking material. This has led to three distinctly new and rather

revolutionary types of lane markers. In general, the

new materials have been developed by industry with

evaluations performed by State higlnvay departments

and technical assistance and funding help from

Public Roads.

The new materials are

• Prefabricated plastic striping which is supplied

either as short rectangular segments or in rolls like paper towels and applied to the road surface

with permanent cement.

328
• Thermoplastic striping applied hot by either

extrusion or spraying- and capable of self-adhesion to the road surface. The stripe has good

visibility and excellent life characteristics. • Plastic dots reflectorized to have high visibility

in rainy weather and protected by steel or other

housings or base plates, the unit being firmly

cemented to the pavement surface. These devices are being designed to have a very low profile,

and the cement now available holds them so firmly to the pavement surface that they ai'e not

readil}' toni loose by street sweepers or even by

snowplows.

Each of these lane-marking developments is some- what more expensive in the initial installation than

conventional painted striping, but the initial extra

cost is often offset several times over by the greatly

extended life, which has proved to be as much as ten times that of painted stripes.

New Analytical Techniques

During the late 1940's and early 1950's Public

Roads pioneered in the application of sophisticated

instruments to help solve materials problems. Infrared spectroscopy was developed to identify the nature

and understand the behavior of chemical admixtures

for concrete, mineral composition of aggregates, and

other highway materials. An infrared spectrophotometer was acquired in the late 1950's and was suc- cessfully applied to analyzing, classifying, and

regulating the use of certain admixtures for concrete,

such as water reducers, hardening retarders, and air- entraining chemicals. These materials were of such

complex chemical nature that they had defied earlier

less sophisticated methods.

Pavement Research

In 1908, Director Page reported on 13 experimental

road sections on main roads connecting New York

and Boston. These experiments resulted in the suc- cessful upgrading and restoration of deteriorated

travel surfaces with various water-gas and coal tar products used primarily as dust palliatives. Additional reports by Page during the period 1909 through

1918 covered numerous experiments involving dust

Infrared spectrophotometric analysis can identify substances

present in such materials as paints, concrete admixtures, coatings, rubber, etc., by determining the frequency at which radiation is absorbed by the substance.

prevention and road preservation. These early treat- ments did much to make automobile travel faster and more pleasant and were relatively inexpensive for a

single apt^lication. However, since they required

frequent renewal, the total cost was appreciable, and

they finally had to be abandoned.

In the early 1930's, a gradual transition took place

from dust control treatments to surface treatments,

using tars and asphalts and better mineral cover. Also, during this period and continuing into the

1950's, many miles of penetration and waterbround

macadam pavements were built. These roads served

growing highway needs very successfully, and considerable mileage has survived to the present time.

Concurrent with the development of more substantial

surface treatments, primarily in the east and the

south, many central and western States experimented

with and developed effective procedures for the type

of pavement known as bituminous road mix.

In this period. Public Roads research was very ac- tive in coordinating field studies of roads in service

with laboratory research on materials. In the 1930's,

for example, studies in Colorado and Wyoming demonstrated the need for sealing or "surface treating"

road-mixed surfacings. As a result, bituminous seal coating became a fairly regular procedure. Another

example was a study of bituminous concrete roads in

Ohio which demonstrated the general serviceability

of this paving.

Concrete Pavement Research

Many articles were published documenting the

Bureau of Public Roads' research on portland cement

concrete pavements. Among the earliest was a study

in 1919 on the behavior of concrete slabs. The measured curling and warping movements of the slab were

evaluated, in addition to the effect of wheel loading,

and a thickness design formula based on the corner break was developed. This was followed in 1923 by

Dr. H. M. Westergaard's theoretical analysis of slabs on an elastic medium. There followed a period of

detailed studies by Bureau of Public Roads' researchers lasting until 1936 to verify and expand his results into a comprehensive design procedure, published as The Structural Design for Concrete Pavements, which

has remained the basic guide for a decade or more. Experimental roads continued to be built to test new concepts in concrete pavement. In 1921, the

Bureau of Public Roads built the first experimental

continuously reinforced concrete pavement near Washington, D.C., where many of the basic principles re- lated to that type of i^avement were developed." In

1937 the Bureau, in cooperation with the Indiana

State Highway Depai'tment at Stilesville, began an

extended field test of continuously reinforced concrete pavement, which now comprises a significant portion

of the Interstate System mileage. The BPR also

worked with industry in 1957 to produce the first U.S. prestressed concrete highway pavement, and,

subsequently, built a 3,200-foot experimental section

of pavement at Dulles International Airport in 1971.^* This concept too is gaining widespread acceptance.

329
The Bureau of Public Roads roughometer measures the roughness of the pavement in units of vertical spring motion per

unit of distance the wheel travels.

Research was also performed on reinforcing materials for concrete pavement. Bond studies in 1926

or steel reinforcing bars of various shapes and types

of deformation included pullout tests to evaluate the

contribution of the different types of bar deformation

to the load-carrying capability of concrete slabs. The

superior performance of several specific types of bars was established. In addition, results in 1958 of an

extensive laboratory study of the performance of load

transfer dowels in concrete pavement joints had an

immediate efi'ect in pavement design. Recommended

dowel bar lengths and diameters for effective load

transfer were widely adopted and are still in use

today.

The Bureau of Public Roads was an early leader

in efforts to provide a means of obtaining quantitative measures of pavement roughness. The result was a compact single-wheel trailer that measured and re- corded the roughness of the wheel path in units of

vertical spring motion per unit of distance traveled.

With this device, commonly known as the BPR

roughometer, it became possible to easily rate the

roughness of both new and old pavements. The term

"present serviceability index" as a function of roughness was used to express the results in numerical

terms. This index was used to specify the degree of

roughness for design standards and in rating construction.

Among other items of special equipment designed

by Public Roads engineers was a device to measure

the vertical displacement of pavement, both elastic

and permanent, caused by static and moving wheel

loads of various intensities and at different distances

from the point of load application. With these dis- placement data, it was possible to make design analyses for better subgrades and pavements. This

ingenious device, named the Benkelman Beam for its inventor, received nationwide attention and was duplicated by many State highway departments.

In addition to tests on roads in their normal condition, studies were made in the 1920's to determine the

impact forces of wheel loads generated by an "artificial" bump. One study was on a ramp 30 inches

long with a drop-off varying from I14 to 3 inches.

These tests demonstrated the superiority of pneumatic

tires versus solid rubber tires. Partly as a result,

solid rubber tires were rapidly phased out in the late

1920's.

Service Lives

Highways do wear out. Because they wear out,

highway programs must include continuous resurfacing and reconstruction operations to maintain highways in a usable and safe condition. Accordingly, a knowledge of service lives of highway pavements is essential.

Taking deflection measurements with the Benkelman Beam

to determine pavement displacement when a load is applied. Testing impact of vehicle wheels on pavement.

330
This machine was used in 1922 to test the impact of solid rubber tires on test pavement sections. By raisinff the tvheel and suddenly dropping it at impact forces comparable to truck

traffic on the roads, comparative pavement design strengths could be determined.

Research in the field began in 1935 when road life studies were incorporated as part of the statewide

planning surveys. At one time or another nearly all States cooperated in this research by providing the

basic data which were analyzed by Public Roads

staff. Although the purpose of the surveys was to determine average service life of road surfaces, the

data also provided the means for obtaining construction costs, salvage values of retired roadway elements,

and service lives of structures, gradings, and rightsof-way.

Based on an analysis of the records of surfaces and

roadway elements previously constructed and depreciated, it is now possible to estimate the amount

and cost of replacement of these elements. For ex- ample, the results of a study completed in 1971 indicated that of the total miles of roads remaining in

service in 1968, 60 percent will be retired in 10 years

and 87 percent in 20 years." Such information is essential to determine construction and reconstruction

programs and corresponding revenue needs of a future

period.

Bridge Research

Early highway bridge research was conducted in

response to the need to shape the AASHO standard

specifications for highway bridges, which were gradually developed between the formation of the AASHO

Bridge Committee in 1921 and the first printing of

the standards in 1931. Subjects of early bridge re- search studies included the expanded use of welding

and high-strength bolting for connections in steel structures, the widespread acceptance of continuous

composite bridge design and new techniques of construction, such as orthotropic deck design and cablestayed girder bridges. Other important developments were specifications covering the fatigue life of steel and the widespread adoption of new high-strength

structural steels for bridges.

A unique aspect of early structural research activity resulted from the catastrophic failure of the

Tacoma Narrows Suspension Bridge in the State of

Washington on November 7, 1940, due to flutter in- duced by high winds. Under the auspices of the

Advisory Board on the Investigation of Suspension

Bridges, formed in September 1942, a wind tunnel

large enough to accommodate a scale model of the

entire NarroAvs Bridge was designed and built at the

University of Washington. This tunnel was used to make exhaustive studies of the causes and possible

remedies for such a failure. After extensive redesign

utilizing the findings of that study, the Narrows

Bridge was rebuilt and has since served well without

excessive vibration or other evidence of distress. One

feature of the redesign was a slotted or grid type of

deck which largely relieved the vertical component of

wind streams impinging on the bridge.

The extensive investigations which followed the

collapse of the Narrows Bridge led to the construction in 1950 at the Fairbank Highway Research

Station of the George S. Vincent Memorial Wind

Tunnel, where model studies on the effects of winds

on highway structures were conducted. Models of

many of the major suspension bridges throughout the

United States and abroad have been investigated for

aerodynamic stability in this wind tunnel.

One of the subjects of those studies was the Golden

Gate Bridge. Excessive wind-induced vertical oscil- lations at a maximum amplitude of 13 feet had oc- curred while the Narrows Bridge investigation was

still underway, causing great official and public concern. Consequently, section-model studies of the

bridge were performed in the Vincent wind tunnel.

Some structural stiffening of the suspended portions

of the bridge, as well as the introduction of slots in

the deck to reduce the vertical component of the wind

force, proved effective, as in the case of the redesigned

Narrows Bridge, in remedying the excessive oscillation. A great deal of research was also initiated on all of the common bridge construction steels in order to learn more about their sensitivity to brittle fracture.

Once this research began to produce results, tentative

toughness specifications for bridge steels, using the

Charpy V-Notch impact specimen as a control, called

for tougher steel with increased steel strength and

thickness. These requirements were adopted by the

AASHTO Bridge and Materials Committees for in- clusion in the 1974 interim specifications.

Aerodynamic studies of suspension bridges are conducted in the George S. Vincent wind tunnel. A precise model of a portion

of the bridge deck is mounted on springs that match the stiff- ness of the actual cable system with instrumentation to measure

the oscillations produced by the wind stream.

331
.

One of the circular test tracks built in Arlington, Va., for measuring the impact forces of various wheel loads on pavements.

New Structural Concepts

In the early 1950's, the use of prestressed concrete

structural members in this country was hastened by

the many research studies dedicated to the solution

of problems arising in connection with the adoption

of this new structural concept. As a result, the use

of prestressed concrete bridges advanced rapidly in

the United States, achieving predominance as a construction material in many sections of the country.

Similarly, an intensive program of structural research

led to the widespread acceptance of the use of highstrength bolting of steel structural connections, an improvement over the previous exclusive dependence on riveting.

Public Roads studied a number of full-scale bridge

loadings in cooperation with the various State highway departments beginning with the Yadkin River

Bridge Test in 1928. And in 1950, Public Roads

instrumentation and assistance were made available

to any State highway department requesting assist- ance. As a result of these studies and the road tests, which included bridges, a significant contribution was made over the years to the improved fatigue design

of steel structures. Out of these studies came a better

understanding of such theoretical concepts as the

effects of structural fatigue on load distribution between members and the effect of incorporating new

materials, such as high-strength reinforcing steel or

A profilometer is used to measure wear and displacement of pavement caused by traffic on the Arlington, Va., test track.

332
lightweight concrete, on the performance of concrete highway bridges.

With the beginning of the Interstate System came

the need for fitting bridges to mucli more restrictive

and sophisticated geometries to provide for the needs

of high-speed traffic in congested areas while maintaining stnictural esthetics and economy. Straiglit

span members were no longer always adequate for the

needs, and the understandings of the structural design

of curved members was limited. Research undertaken,

both in the form of multi-State pooled-fund laboratory and analytical studies and the extensive use of

cooperative Federal-State field studies, helped fill this

urgent and critical need for improved curved girder

design teclinology. As a result of this research,

bridges today are designed and built with cui'ved

alinement and warped decks in a manner unheard of

two decades ago.

Road Tests Following World War I, a prime objective of the

State and Federal highway program was to reconstruct the surfaces and pavements of main highways

which had received widespread damage from the

greatly increased traffic of heavy trucks with solid

rubber-tired wheels. The light surfaces, designed for

horsedrawn or other light vehicles, failed under the

impact of the heavier vehicles. Road test data were

needed to determine the supporting capability of the

various subgrade soils, the stresses induced in rigid

and flexible pavements by the impact of motor vehicles, the eft'ects of expansion and contraction of

road surfaces caused by variations in temperature, the wear of traffic upon pavement surfaces, the distribution of loads upon bridges, and many other factors. To solve some of these problems, the Bureau of Public

Roads and the States initiated a series of road tests.

The Bates test road and test vehicles.

The Arlington Road Test. The first road test was

initiated in 1918 at BPR's Plxperimental Farm in

Arlington, Virginia, to measure qualitatively the impact forces of various wheel loads. The tests, con- ducted with Army trucks equipped with solid rubber

tires, were on concrete, brick and bituminous slabs on

circular tracks. The early tests indicated the major

effect of wheel impact forces and led to further studies

with more refined measuring instruments and the in- clusion of pneumatic tires. The Bates Road Test. For the Bates Road Test,

the Illinois Division of Highways constructed (58 test sections, inchiding six types of pavement on 2 miles

of road and, with the assistance of B1*R engineers,

conducted tests on them from 1920 to 1928. Trucks

were operated with conti'olled wheel loads that were

progressively increased from 2,500 to 18,000 pounds.

The test data gave the pavement type and thickness

required for a specified loading and showed the need

for control of wheel loads. A direct result of this

study was the use of a thickened edge concrete pavement.

The Pittsburg Road Test. Between 1921 and 1922,

another road test was conducted in Pittsburg, California, to determine the efficiency of both reinforced

and plain concrete pavements of variable thickness

and designs on certain types of subgrade soil. The

test was conducted by the Columbia Steel Company

on an elliptical track 560 feet in length containing 13 concrete pavement test sections. Much new information was learned, particularly concerning the effective- ness of longitudinal joints in preventing longitudinal

cracking.

The combined findings from these three contemporary road test studies led to major advances in pavement design practices. The relations were determined

between concentrated wheel loads and the thickness

of several common types of pavement, which were

directly usable on new highway plans. From the

range of wheel loads studied, highway officials were

able for the first time to reach agreement on the use

of a 9,000-pound maximum value as the economic

standard for highway pavement designs. More di- rectly evident to the public was the abrupt phasing

out of solid-rubber tires on trucks because of their

high impact destruction on all types of pavements.

Within a few years after 1926 the use of pneumatic

tires became universal. Also, these studies made evident the need for amplified research on soil support

values to attain better pavements.

The HyUa Valley Road Test. From 1944 to 1954

a series of studies on flexible pavements was con- ducted on the Hybla Valley test track in Alexandria,

Virginia, by BPR in cooperation with the Asphalt

Institute and HRB. A 2,000-foot oval track for full

size vehicles was built with selected soil foundation

and paved with asphaltic concrete. Using newly developed measuring equipment, data were obtained on

the vertical displacements of the pavements from both

static and moving wheel loads of varying intensities. A significant finding from these tests was that there

is considerable elastic movement within a nonrigid

pavement structure under load. A great deal was

also learned about instrumentation and field measure- ment procedures which greatly aided later test road

studies.

333
Road Test One—Md. In 1949 the Interregional

Council on Highway Transportation originated a test road study on a 1.1 -mile section of highway south of

La Plata, Maryland. The study and report was a cooperative effort of 11 eastern States, the District of

Columbia, Public Roads, truck manufacturers, the

I^etroleum industry, the Department of Defense and

HEB. The objective was to obtain data, for use both

in vehicle weight regulations and in pavement design, on the relative effect of four different axle loads on

the existing concrete pavement (four lanes), then in

excellent condition.

Test trucks with 8,000- and 22,400-pound single

axle loads were operated on adjacent lanes and trucks

with 32,000- and 44,800-pound tandem axle loads operated on the other pair of lanes. Nearly 240,000

single axle truck passes were made and about half as many of the tandem axle. The data on the progressive pavement deterioration,

evidenced by cracking, internal structure failure, and

joint depression, showed that damage was proportionate to axle loads. Significant data also were reported

concerning soil support features and stresses at various

points in the pavement slab. WASHO Road Test. In 1951 the Western Association of State Highway Officials (WASHO) set up

a test road to obtain data for use in establishing load

limits and in designing flexible pavements. Cooperating in this test were 11 western States, truck and

truck trailer manufacturers and three petroleum companies. The Highway Research Board supervised the

construction and testing to determine the effects of

four-axle loads on selected designs of flexible pavement. The Bureau of Public Roads assisted with

funds, personnel, instrumentation, photography, supplies and equipment. This test was run from 1952 to 1954 at a site near Malad, Idaho.

Two four-lane test loops, each with 1,900-foot

tangents, were constructed with five pavement struc- tural sections ranging in depth from 6 to 22 inches on each tangent. On one loop the pavements were

subjected to 18,000- and 22,000-pound single axle

loads and on the other 32,000- and 40,000-pound

tandem axle loads. The lighter loads were operated on the inner lanes. About 240,000 truck passes were

recorded on each of the loops.

The test data yielded significant relations of stresses within and failures of the several flexible pavement

design sections as the truck loadings progressed. Some

of the general findings were

• The 4-inch asphaltic concrete top course was

markedly superior to the 2-inch. • The heavier axle loads resulted in considerably more distress. • A paved shoulder contributed to the pavement

support. • Greatest distress occurred in the spring and least in the fall. • Distress from the tandem axle was equivalent to that of a single axle of about two-thirds of the

tandem weight.

The AASHO Road Test. After the WASHO Road

Test, the American Association of State Highway

Officials (AASHO) in agreement with the Bureau of

Public Roads decided to conduct a comprehensive

national test to obtain data on all significant variables.

In 1955, AASHO sponsored and requested the Highway Research Board to direct this test. The purpose was to study the performance of pavement and bridge

structures of known characteristics under moving

loads of known magnitude and frequency. Portland

cement concrete and asphaltic pavements, as well as certain types of bridges, were included in the specially

constructed test facility.

This $27 million project, located near Ottawa,

Illinois, was financed by the highway departments of

the 48 States, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and

Puerto Rico. Financial support was also provided by

the Bureau of Public Roads, the Automobile Manufacturers Association, the petroleum industry, and the

American Institute of Steel Construction. The Department of Defense furnished the heavy vehicles and

drivers for their test run operations. In addition,

there were many services and contributions by the

automotive, petroleum, tire, cement, and steel industries.

Traffic on loops during the AASHO road test.

334
The test road consisted of about 7 miles of two-lane

pavements, half of concrete and half bituminous. The

roadways included 16 short-span bridges. There were

836 separate test sections located in six loops which

varied in length from 2,000 to 6,600 feet. The test sections had selected factorial combinations of surface,

base, and subbase thicknesses. Axle loads differed on

each loop and varied from 2,000-pound single to 48,000-pound tandem; truck trailer units were in- cluded. Full-scale tests started in November 1958 and

terminated in November 1960. A total of 1,114,000

axle loads had been applied to the pavements and

bridges surviving at the last date. The project produced a reservoir of facts longneeded for the development of a more I'efined and

scientific design of pavements and short bridges.*

The test data well established the desired relations

of pavement stnictural designs (component thicknesses) and loadings (magnitude and frequency of

axle loads). These findings were developed in the

form of equations and graphs that showed the effects of particular variables on pavement performance.

These soon were incorporated by AASHO and others

into pavement design guides and manuals. The con- cept and use of a "serviceability index" to define pavement performance was a major item. And the data on equivalencies of single- and tandem-axle loads for

the same pavement performance was a high-use

product. Also important were : a method to predict

pavement performance from measurements of deflec- tions and strains; and data on the reduction of surface

skid resistance.

The test bridge findings largely verified desigii predictions of deflection and strain. The dynaniic studies

resulted in the formulation of new theoretical concepts for analytical e^'aluation of stresses and deflec-

* The extensive technical data and findings are recorded in seven Highway Research Board Special Reports Series 61, and Special Report 73.

tions from moving vehicles.

Construction and Maintenance

Production Costs The construction of highways in the early stages of our country's development involved mostly hand labor

and draft horse or mule power. Formal organization

and production efficiency were items unheard of, and

the pace of construction depended, for the most part, on the forcefulness and ingenuity of the foreman.

Later, as mechanized methods started to supplement

the man and nude power method, the need for sys- tematic organization increased. Elarly Public Roads

activities in this area concentrated mostly on object

lessons gained in test road construction.

In the early 1920's, the Production Cost Study

Program was initiated by the Bui'eau to assist the

highway industry in analyzing its various operations

regarding time utilization and operational efficiency

of equipment used in construction. This program,

led by T. Warren Allen, served two purposes: (1) To

assist the contractor by direct time-motion studies on

their operations, expressed in terms of production

rates and costs, pointing out observed inefficiencies and measures as to how he might improve on his

operations; and (2) to ti'ain junior engineers in Public Roads by direct exposure to the practicalities of

construction equipment operations and the overall

process of building a highway. This program con- tinued until 1936.

There were 16 short-span bridges on the AASHO road test to determine deflection and strain on bridges from heavy loads.

335
Because of personnel shortage during the war

emergency, the program was dormant for 10 years

and was reinstituted in 1946. By then the highway

construction and maintenance industi-y, with its far

flung operations reaching into every comer of the

country, was using thousands of major equipment

units and millions of dollars worth of material each

year. Economical and efficient use of this equipment,

manpower and materials was of concern to every seg- ment of the industry in order to stretch the highway

dollar to meet the need for more and better roads and

yet assure the competitive contractor a reasonable

profit.

During the next 20 years, production time and

motion studies were made on over 400 projects. Over

40 information reports were issued prior to 1960 by

Public Roads and the Highway Research Board on

performance, time utilization, and costs pertaining to equipment employed on highway construction and

maintenance work. In addition to routine production

studies on maintenance and consti'uction operations,

the program was directed also into other areas to gather information on a particular facet of construction. In 1952, a year-long comprehensive study was made with the objective of developing comparative

data regarding net cost to the public of construction

work performed by contract and by State forces in

North Carolina.

These cost studies were later expanded to obtain

data on economics of detours versus carrying traffic through construction and on economics of specifying

a single cold feed bin versus multiple bins for hot -mix

production. Other cost studies were made on various

types of bridge construction and grading and paving

work to develop comparative man- and equipment

hour unit cost data. Teams also studied such areas

as: (1) Determining relationship between mixing

time and productivity for dual drum pavers and for

central mix plants, (2) mechanics of aggregate drying in hot-mix plants, (3) optimum rolling pattern on hot-mix construction, (4) benefits of blending material prior to loading the concrete mixer, (5) evaluating a newly developed nuclear gage for determining

density of bituminous pavements, (6) evaluating time

lapse movies technique for studying construction, and

(7) demonstrating the need for surge bins. Also, a

Michigan was the site jor a imnter driving test to determine

safe speeds and handling of heavy vehicles on ice and snow,

including negotiating turns and curves.

series of short-term and long-term pilot maintenance

equipment and operations studies were conducted to pinpoint areas needing better organization and training.

This program was again terminated in 1966. The

Federal Highway Administration resumed this program in 1971 on a more limited scale. The benefits

that accrued from the early pre-World War II and

the later post-World War II programs were widely

reflected in many positive improvements in productivity. It can be said that they were a major factor,

directly and indirectly, in the constant evolution leading to automation of construction, control, and operation.

Maintenance Management

Even though research on highway materials and

construction processes had an influence on highway

maintenance and, in part, directly applied in maintenance operations, the separate study of management

of maintenance operations differs substantially from

the other areas of highway research. These investigations involved a considerable number of States, and

their results have affected all States. Highway maintenance has experienced many

changes through the years, most of which were based on intuition and practical considerations rather than

factual knowledge and scientific management principles. There were some limited-scope highway maintenance management studies through the 1940's, but

these did not constitute a significant serious research

program.

A 1950 joint study with the Connecticut State

Highway Department developed facts concerning the

performance of labor and equipment and appraised

management problems. Subsequently, about 20 other

small studies were conducted by the States during the

1950's. The results were not singularly significant,

but indicated a common need for better management.

In 1959, a major study by the State of Iowa, in cooperation with Public Roads, developed a comprehensive

system for producing facts and analyzing management

aspects. This report received considerable publicity

and the study's system was adopted in various ways

by many highway maintenance organizations.

During the 1960's, emerging conditions that re- quired a refined maintenance management role in- cluded the new Interstate System, the need for higher

levels of maintenance, a rapid change in technology,

and labor and budget problems. As a result, maintenance management became much more prominent

in both research and practice.

Research to improve maintenance management was

gi-eatly expanded to meet these challenges. Between

1960 and 1970, about half of the State highway or- ganizations conducted maintenance management

studies. There was considerable cross-fertilization

between these studies, and they covered a very wide

range of elements, from equipment development and

roadside practice to statewide planning and economic

investigations. In these studies, a number of major

management consultants wei-e involved as well as State universities. The results led to major improvements in maintenance operations throughout the

United States, and more refined studies are in progress.

336
Traffic and Safety

Capacity and Design

In response to Chief IMacDonald's concern, research was directed in the 1920's into three major areas:

(1) Road construction and maintenance, (2) the eco- nomics of road operation, and (3) the economic value

of highways to a community. Although elements of

highway capacity and design were mentioned, it was W. K. Hatt, Director of the Highway Research Committee of the National Reseai'ch Council, who in 1921

raised the following questions: "What is the capacity

of a road of a given width for any particular type of

vehicle as expressed in vehicles per hour, ton-miles

per year, etc.? "What is the appropriate unit for ex- pressing traffic for various purposes?" ^^

Research on Highway Geometries

In March 1925, Public Roads first reported a number of significant facts concerning the lateral distri- bution of traffic. These factors included the eifect of

road width, curves, shoulder conditions, grades, sur- face crown, and other physical features. Observers

recorded the positions of tires in relation to lines

painted across the pavement at 1-foot intervals. The

results indicated that 18 feet was the minimum pavement width which would permit passenger cars and

trucks to pass in safety and with a reasonable amount

of clearance. Speeds were not considered in this

study.

Four years later, in 1929, when equipment for

measuring speeds became more reliable, it was found

that the safe passing of "rapidly" moving automobiles and trucks required a surface width of at least 20 feet for two-lane rural highways.

Since 1929, researchers have progressively provided

the basic information required to set design standards

and operational controls for main roads and freeways.

In December 1944:, one of the recommendations of a BPR study of the effect of roadway width on traffic operations was that lane widths should be 12 feet for

safety and comfort of traffic operations. The AASHO

soon adopted this width as a standard for primary

highways in the United States. Within a short time

this standard was also adopted in many foreign countries. Vehicle widths remain about the same today,

and this lane width remains the basic standard.

Horizontal and Vertical Curves

xVn early design polic}- statement that is still cur- rent says that "In the design of highway curves it is necessai-y to establish the proper relation between

design speed and curvature and also their joint rela- tions with superelevation. AVhile these relations stem

from laws of mechanics, the actual values for use in

design depend upon practical limits and factors determined more or less empirically over the range of

variables involved." ^' A series of studies have been

made to relate the speed of operation on higliways to the horizontal and vertical alinement. One of the

earliest studies on the effect of speeds on geometric

design was conducted in 1929. Even though the legal

speed limits in the 1920's were 35 to 45 miles per hour,

A. Bruce, in his ai'ticle "The Effect of Increased

Speed of Vehicles on the Desigii of Highways," con- cluded that there was need for easier curves, greater

superelevation of curves, more extensive vertical curves, and greater sight distance on both horizontal

and vertical curves. In 1953 a comprehensive study of driver behavior on vertical and horizontal curves was completed by

Public Roads in cooperation with the New York Department of Public Works that showed that the per- centage of drivers exceeding a safe speed for the curve radius increased greatly on the sharper curves. The combination of curves over 5 degrees (radius

less than 1,200 feet) and grades in excess of 5 percent

also were found to result in an especially high accident rate on conventional rural highways.

A comprehensive study of "Driver Performance on

Horizontal Curves" was conducted during 1951-1954

in cooperation with five States at 35 horizontal curves. The separate studies were on two-lane, two-directional

roads. Among the more important conclusions were

the following: • Drivers did not change their speeds after enter- ing a horizontal curve. • The existing superelevation had no effect on

speeds. • Operating speeds and the radius of curve are

linearly related. • The curve radius had a greater effect on speeds

than sight distance.^^

In 1969 data in NCHRP* Report 68 on the application of vehicle operating characteristics to geometric

design substantially verified these results.

Highway Capacity

Highway capacity has been the subject of careful

and painstaking study for nearly six decades. A

rational and practical method for the determination

of highway capacity was essential for the sound eco- nomic and functional design of new highways and

for the many existing roads and streets which must

continue in use for extended periods of time. Basically, highway capacity concerns the effectiveness of

various highways to serve traffic and involves the

many elements of highway design, speeds, vehicle and

driver performance, and traffic control. In recent

years, due to the development of refined traffic study

methods, instrumentation and equipment, substantial

amounts of reliable field data have been used to develop new insights into problems of and solutions to

traffic operations.

In 1934 the BPR set up and took a dominant part

in a coordinated series of studies to obtain the basic

data on highway capacity. This widespread effort included studies on : methods of counting traffic

* National Cooperative Highway Research Program.

337
Olav Koch Nermann

In a career foreshortened by his untimely death at age 57, Olav Koch

Nermann's contributions to safe and efficient highway travel could be

matched by few others in a full lifetime of effort. Endowed with a rare combination of brilliance of mind, skill of hand, and enormous

physical strength and endurance, O. K. Normann set a pace that few

could follow. He was a leader in many fields but became best known

as the 'father' of the world's knowledge in the area of highway

capacity.

Normann was born in Kansas City, Missouri, on October 1, 1906, and

earned his Bachelor's degree in Civil Engineering at the University of

Minnesota in 1928. Immediately entering the Bureau of Public Roads

as a junior engineer in its training programme, Normann began the career that kept him in the Bureau until his death.

His inquisitive mind led him early into the field of research, and in

1935 he moved into the field of geometric design and highway capacity.

The approach he followed would probably now be called operations

research or system analysis in today's more sophisticated language.

Then it was recognized simply as the only logical way to approach the

problem. It accepted the movement of traffic as a dynamic system in- volving the vehicle, the driver, and the road. Organizing studies in

each of these segments, Normann himself synthesized the separate results

into principles derived from actual experiment on the road and in the

traffic stream to reflect the countless possible combinations of the in- dividual and collective actions of drivers and differing vehicle per- formance and roadway design elements.

This approach might not have been so successful had it not been

backed by Normann's own broad talents. As an analyst, he had an uncanny ability to detect trends and relations within masses of data

that customary statistical methods did not seem to reveal. While taking

full advantage of modern data processing and analysis techniques, he

did not forsake simple graphical and other methods that on more than one occasion proved out after the more complex methods failed. It was this depth of investigation that showed clearly, as research

progressed, what specific facts were lacking or where data in different

form would have helped. Here another of Normann's talents, mechanical skill, came to the fore, for seldom, it seems, was there available

the apparatus or equipment needed to measure particular facets of

driver behaviour or vehicle performance. Not only could Normann

specify what was needed—he could design and construct it, sometimes

with the design only in his mind, not on paper.

The impact of Normann's early research and writing led to his selec- tion as Chairman of the Highway Capacity Committee of the Highway

Research Board when it was first organized in 1944. His selection as chairman was unique, for at that time, as a general policy of the Bureau

of Public Roads, its employees could serve as members or as secretaries

of Board committees, but never as chairmen. Normann's accomplishments were so predominant in the field, however, that there could be no

sensible alternative to disregarding the policy in his case. Years of work by the committee members, aided by heavy contributions of data obtained by the Bureau of Public Roads and many state highway departments and city traffic engineering organizations, led to the publication of the Highway Capacity Manual in 1950. Much of the

willing support of this committee can be attributed not only to the

desire of various agencies to cooperate in the Boaixl's activities, but also to the personal regard individuals in these organizations felt for

Normann, the man, not just the chairman. Published with some early

reservations as to the breadth of interest it would attract, more than

26,000 English language copies have been sold, and the manual has been

translated into nine other languages.

338
Disbanded upon publication of the manual, the committee was subsequently reorganized by the Highway Research Board in 1953, again

with O. K. Normann as its chairman. Again, there could have been no other sensible choice. The committee was charged with extending

and updating the original manual, and at an appropriate time, pre- senting a revised version for publication. The new manual was nearing

completion Avhen death took the chairman. It will be his monument.

Although perhaps most widely known for his work in highway ca- pacity, Normann's research led him into all facets of geometric design

of highways, and many of today's standards of curvature, sight distance,

gradients, lane widths, and intersection design are traceable directly to his eflforts. Again, it was his understanding of the highway as but one

element of a system that enabled him to design his experiments so as to produce results of immediate applicability. Important as he regarded

the adequate i-eporting of research results, he felt their gi-eatest value

lay in prompt application.

As his technical field broadened, he was called upon, as is often the

case, to shoulder increasing administrative duties. He advanced steadily

through positions of heavier responsibility, until at the time of his

death, he was serving as Deputy Director for Research of the Office of

Research and Development in the Bureau of Public Roads. Despite the

burden of administrative duties, his interest in technical matters in no way slackened and he seemed to regard the administrative functions as merely added, not different, responsibilities. In effect, he did two jobs,

each in his characteristically thorough and exacting way—something he

could do because of his energy and physical endurance, but which

evoked mixed feelings of admiration and despair among those whom he

hopefully expected to keep pace. He was always a part of his community and accepted civic responsibilities with the same energy and enthusiasm that marked his professional life. He was active in and served as president of his Civic

Association, and as chairman of Better Government Committee of his

county's federation of civic associations.

In all aspects of life, not merely in his professional area, Normann

was a confirmed skeptic. In his view, there must be some better way

to do it, whatever it might be, than the way it was traditionally being

done. Little with which he was connected failed to show some evidence

of innovation before its completion—a healthy attribute in research,

but not always so desirable in other fields, such as, for example, home

building. Many are the anecdotes which will live long in retelling

among his vast circle of friends that stemmed from Normann's innovations, and from his amazing resourcefulness in turning apparent setbacks

and failures into advances and success. Through his highway work he became widely known around the

world. Many engineers from other countries, in travelling through the

United States, benefited by technical discussion and enjoyed his warm

hospitality. Along with his activity in the United States he had the

unique opportunity to direct the changeover from left-hand to righthand driving in Panama during World War II. He conducted a training course in highway capacity in Madrid in 1961 and was one of a small group of United States highway engineers who were given an

extensive tour through Russia in that same year. In his professional field, he was active in the Institute of Traffic

Engineers, and served as a member of its Board of Direction from 1959

to 1961, as well as President of the Washington Section, ITE, in 1956

to 1957.

Among the many testimonials and honours he received were the Department of Commerce Silver Medal for Meritorious Service in 1960,

and the Theodore M. Matson Memorial Award in recognition of the

advancement of the science of traffic engineering in 1957. A unique

feature of the latter award is that he was the first recipient.

339
Normann was deeply appreciative of these awards, and sincerely felt undeserving. But a little-known gesture only a few months before his

death meant more to him than any other. As chairman of the Highway

Capacity Committee as it was reconstituted in 1953, his role had not

been easy. The committee included in its membership men of brilliance,

but whose brilliance was in some cases matched by their strong wills. As

the work on the new manual was nearing completion, some issues be- came increasingly difficult to resolve, some philosophies were at wide

variance with others, and schisms within the committee threatened.

Eventually agreement was reached, but few knew of Normann's concern over what he construed as disharmony for which he felt somehow re- sponsible, and perhaps even a lack of confidence of the committee in

its chairman. His doubts and fears were relieved, however, during the

1964 meeting of the Highway Research Board when his committee members, in a carefully staged luncheon, presented him with a very fine

watch bearing the engraving 'to Mr. Capacity'. Such tributes are not

uncommon upon completion of assignments or retirement from office, but how often does a committee make such a heartfelt expression of

appreciation to a chairman who is continuing in office? No one is indispensable, but O. K. Normann came close to being f

irreplaceable.

Reprinted with permission from Australian Road Research^ Vol. ^,

No. /, Septemter 196^.

340
lateral placement of vehicles; distances for passing;

speeds of vehicles; spacing of vehicles in the traffic stream; and hill-climbinp: abilities of larger vehicles.

Improved jneasuring instniinonts and methods for

analyzing the large volume of data were also developed.

The Bureau innnediately applied these early results in design and construction programs. One direct

application was the analysis of data on transverse

positions of vehicles on bridges to assist in the establishment of standards for bridge widths. The basic

relations found between vehicle speeds and spacings

with varying volumes of connnercial traffic and under

various alinement conditions have been used and haA'e aided in estimating the likelihood of congestion in

tunnels and on bridges.

These early studies in principles of highway ca- pacity were developed and later expanded by O. K.

Normann, the "Mr. Capacity" of highway research.

He established that the practical or working capacity

of a highway is a relative value, being the number of

vehicles that a highway can carry without restricting

the speed or movement of vehicles to an extent that

drivers find intolerable. He also determined that the

minimum spacing the average driver allows between

his vehicle and a vehicle ahead varies for different

highway conditions, as well as the different speeds,

and that the theoretical or possible capacities vary

accordingly.

A major milestone was the determination of possible capacities, which are still used by design, traffic, and operating engineers today. On analyses of the

data assembled by 1941, Xormann concluded that

"The possible capacities are about 2,000 vehicles per

hour for both lanes of a 2-lane highway, 4,000 vehicles

per hour for two lanes of a 4-lane highway, and up

to 3,600 vehicles per hour for the best 3-lane highways." " The first edition of the Highivay Capacity

Manual, published in 1950, and the latest edition, published in 1965, provide the identical capacity values

for two- and four-lane highways. The value for

three-lane, two-way highways has been increased only

slightly to 4,000 vehicles per hour in the latest edition.

Both manuals have been widely used, the first having been translated into nine languages. These suc- cessively refined evaluations proved to be major tools

for engineers developing the details of current highway programs. With them, designers were able to determine the number of traffic lanes and other geometric features that should be provided to accommodate the predicted volumes and types of vehicles in

operation at practical speeds on a given highway.

Continuing research in the 1940's regarding characteristics of individual drivers showed that "persons

traveling long distances drive faster and generally

have newer cars than local travelers; young persons

drive somewhat faster than older persons; men drive

somewhat faster than women; and the newer vehicles are driven faster than older vehicles." ^° Two important conclusions were developed from this series of studies: (1) Highways built to accommodate a high percentage of drivers traveling on long trips

should, therefore, be designed for higher speeds than

highways on which trips are predominantly short,

and (2) there is no justification for a design of highways to accommodate speeds in excess of 70 miles per

hour under any condition. For about two decades

70 miles per hour has been the advocated upper design speed for the Interstate System and other main

highways.

Truck Performance

Data obtained and procedures developed in the

analysis of passing practices in the late 1930's have

resulted in guidelines for proper design of two-lane,

two-way highways, including the principles of stopping and passing sight distances. Also, the more

fundamental data then developed from the hill- climbing or gradeability studies are still in use today

in solving problems of highway design and traffic regulation. A basic conclusion of the gradeability

study was that for motor trucks even to approach

reasonable speeds on grades, grades must be reduced

to 3 percent or less. Where such grades are not practical, these data led to the concept of an additional

uphill or climbing lane on highways carrying substantial numbers of heavy trucks.

The desirability of design with grades as flat as practical was recognized in the 1954 AASHO design

policy guides. The 1956 Interstate standards named

maximum design grades of 3, 4, and 5 percent (except

in rugged terrain) for design speeds of 70, 60, and 50

m.p.h., respectively.

In 1948, a major study was conducted on the fuel

consumption of trucks in relation to their weight and

power. Cooperating in the study were vehicle manufacturing and operating groups, the Department of

the Army, the Pennsylvania Department of Highways, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, and

the Bureau of Public Roads. Important findings developed then, and still in use today, for commercial

vehicles were: (1) On any highway section, gasoline

consumption and travel time vary in a definite manner with the rate of rise and fall on the highway;

(2) gasoline consumption was definitely related to the

gross weight and the travel time to the weight-power

ratio of the vehicle; and (3) the results were applicable to paved highways and gasoline-powered vehicles in any part of the country.^^

This automatic traffic recorder was installed on US 24O in Maryland in 1938. It used photoelectric cells to project two beams across the road, and when a vehicle broke the two beams simultaneously, a cumulative count was recorded on a

tape. n

341
Stopping Distance

Braking performance of motor vehicles is another

important area which the Public Roads researchers

have been studying for over three decades. The

braking ability of all types of motor vehicles is an

essential factor in the safe and efficient movement of

traffic on our highways. The sight distance needed

for stopping is one of the important geometric design

elements.

In 1941, the Public Roads Administration started a broad program of brake performance studies of

motor vehicles in everyday traffic. The Advisory

Committee on Motor Vehicle Brake Research was

formed to direct and guide the program. This was

the beginning of a series of studies conducted at 7- to 10-year intervals, the latest of which was completed

in 1974. The objectives of these studies were to

(1) Establish a better understanding of the features

of vehicle braking performance; (2) determine what

levels of brake performance can reasonably be met by

vehicles in service; (3) determine the essential ele- ments of reasonable brake regulations; and (4)

determine practical means of enforcing brake regulations.

Military Highway Transport

Most highway research was initiated to provide

basic information for the development of street and

highway design and traffic operations for civilian

traffic. Much of this information has been applicable

also to military traffic movements, but military con- voys required special study. In the spring of 1940, a study to determine the effect of certain highway

conditions on the operation of military convoys was

conducted by BPR at the request of the Department

of the Army.

Ruote 82 in Connecticut winds its way down hill, but note, that there are two lanes for up-hill traffic, alloioing slower

traffic such as trucks, to use the outer lane and faster traffic to pass on the inner lane.
This study dealt with the effect of alinement, grade,

and pavement type and condition on convoy operations. It involved an analysis of the individual speeds

of all convoy vehicles and the longitudinal spacings

between theni. It was found that grades were the

only highway feature that materially affected the

speed of the military convoys. Highway grades of no more than 6 percent, and preferably 5 percent,

would allow practically all military vehicles to maintain speeds of 25 miles per hour as long as the road

surfaces were dry and solid. These data help produce

better controls for military convoy operations.

Traffic Control Devices

Units along a highway that regulate or advise the

vehicle operators are broadly known as traffic control

devices. Presently they consist of traffic signals, signs,

pavement markings and other markers or delineations

along the roadway. The earliest fonus were mile- stones and notched trees. With the advent of the

automobile, signing and markings became prevalent

in the early 1900's on principal highways in and

around the larger cities. Most of these early devices were developed by innovative people based primarily on their imagination and ingenuity.

The U.S. literature until the mid 1920's is practically void of records of research on devices used to control traffic. Instead, a unit was conceived, in- stalled, observed and conclusions drawn for future

guidance. Naming, numbering, and marking of roads

began with motorist clubs, chambers of commerce,

women's clubs and, to some extent, the States. Being

individually initiated, the overall result was a colorful

chaos. To bring order out of this chaos and thus

help to speed the traveler upon his way, the American

Association of State Highway Officials agreed in 1925

that the main roads of the country should be marked

with standardized information and direction sisTis. A 1927 manual, developed by a joint board of Federal

and State highway officials, published sign details and

the numbering system of U.S. highways. This in- corporated the numbering system adopted in 1925 for

In the late 1920's, a uniform route numbering system for U.S. highways was adopted, and these routes were identified with a

distinctive shield design.

the Federal-aid highway system, which is still in

effect. The various control devices now used for traffic management were mostly developed through private

industrial research. However, as early as 1934 the

Bureau of Public Roads had begun a series of intersection studies to determine the delay caused by different control metliods. A report in that year showed

that for an intersection having a total volume of 2,000

vehicles per hour, operation without any mechanical

control incurred the least delay to traffic. "Of all the

control methods [studied], officer control permitted

the fastest movement of traffic, closely followed by

the shortest fixed-time control, and traffic-actuated

control." ^^ This study not only set the pattern for

much future research in this area, but also established

methods and procedures for the conduct of studies of

the effect of traffic control devices on the safety and

efficiency of traffic operations.

The first national rural manual on traffic control

signs was issued by AASHO in 1927, and the Manual

on Street Traffic /Sig7is, Signals and Markings (urban) was issued in 1930 by the National Conference on

Street and Highway Safety. These first efforts at national standards gave details on sign shape, color,

legend and mountings. While colors were prescribed,

data were lacking as to their suitability. To fill this

need, the Bureau of Public Roads undertook a study,

completed in September 1933, on the visibility and

legibility of several alternative color combinations of

signs visible by day and by night, with and without

reflector buttons. This study showed that the black on yellow combination was more effective than either

black on white or white on black. It also determined

for the first time the effectiveness of reflecting buttons

in various sizes and spacings.^^

The first combined rural-urban Manual on Uniform

Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways

was issued in 1935. With each new edition of the

Manual, revisions were made based on research con- ducted by Public Roads, State highway departments,

universities, cities, industries, and others. For ex- ample, in the 1955 Manual the stop sign was changed

from black on yellow to white on red, a standard

in use today. This came about as a result of research

tests which demonstrated that motorists observe the

red sign more effectively than the yellow.^*

The Interstate manual adopted by AASHO and

approved by the Bureau of Public Roads in 1958 for

signing and pavement marking of the Interstate System was the result of recommendations based on

their joint engineering and psychological research.

The use of lowercase lettering became widespread

after research indicated that these letters are more

easily read by the average driver. There was di- versity of opinion on the color and reflectorization of

directional signs. A research project Avas imdertaken

by Public Roads in 1957, which gave substantial support for the final selection of green as the approved

color for directional sign background on the Interstate System.^^

343
The general advantages of pavement markings

were recognized after their first use in 1911, and they were included in the early manuals to some extent. However, it was not until 1947 that the effectiveness

of centerlines, particularly on two-lane, two-way

roads, was confirmed through research. The result of studies at 12 locations in seven States showed that

centerline markings provided a general improvement

in the transverse positioning of vehicles, that vehicles were driven closer to their proper position on the

I'oadway, and that they encroached on the left lane

much less frequently where there was a centerline.^®

Edge lines were added as a standard device in the

current Manual on Uniform Trafic Control Devices

for Streets and Highioays (1971) and are in universal

use. Their effectiveness was determined through a comprehensive study of driver behavior as related to pavement edge markings, conducted by BPE, in 1957

in Louisiana and the western States. This study

showed that edge lines were very effective aids in

confining traffic in the normal travel lane and in re- ducing partial shoulder use.

Freeway Control Systems

By the late 1950's a substantial number of freeways

had been developed in most of our larger cities. As a

result of increasing traffic on them, peak-hour congestion became a major problem. Research studies

showed congestion during the morning and evening

peak travel periods could be greatly reduced by the use of traffic surveillance and addition of further

controls. The application of the latest developments

in electronic and other technological equipment served

to increase operational efficiency and safety.

The Bureau of Public Roads, in cooperation with a number of State highway departments, spearheaded

the research and development in this area and has

promoted the practical results of its studies. The

first project was initiated in 1960 on John C. Lodge

Freeway in Detroit. The second one was initiated in

Demonstration moving merge control systems have been used

since about 1969 on freeway entrance ramps to help ramp

drivers enter a freeway in situations where it would be diffi- cult to determine adequate gaps in the freeway traffic. This

is an artist's concept of the moving greenband system, just one

type under consideration.

MERGING

CONTROL

GREENBAND

CONCEPT

1961 on the Eisenhower Expressway in Chicago and

the third in 1964 on the Gulf Freeway in Houston,

Texas. After 1965, a large number of States started

installing freeway surveillance and control systems,

the most extensive of which was the 42-mile loop

pilot project in Los Angeles.

In the late 1960's, Public Roads continued to ex- pand and refine the technology of freeway operations

by undertaking a major travel corridor control in- vestigation in Dallas. This research was a major

effort to explore the total corridor concept, including

the freeway, service road, arterial street, and sur- rounding system. Public transportation, bus operations, roadside communications and park-and-ride were modern-day additions to the effort. Public

Roads sponsored many other freeway operations

studies, among them the improved control of diamond

interchanges.

The concepts of integrated surveillance and control are equally important to urban nonfreeway systems.

Traffic signals, intersections, and individual aspects

have been mentioned. In the late 1960's, Public Roads

stimulated and assisted in "systems" approaches to control traffic for the whole of a certain urban area. One significant output has been the computerized

concept of arterial traffic control. Another major

project was an urban traffic control research laboratory operating on certain streets in Washington, D.C.,

which was still active in 1975. This study has had

many influences in the broad area of "software" for

urban systems, ranging from preprogramed to in- stantaneous timing. Another major component was

an integrated bus priority system. As meaningful

results from these studies have become available,

nearly all of the States have applied the new technology to other locations.

Lighting

During the late 1930's when driver behavior, highway capacity, and traffic control were under intensive

study, considerable research was devoted to the effect of highway lighting on traffic operations and safety.

For several years prior to this time, illuminating

engineers had studied means of reducing nighttime

accidents, which were proportionally higher then

those in the daytime. There were only a few hundred

miles of rural highways that Avere lighted, many of

which were temporary installations to demonstrate

and experiment with the safety aspects of lighting.

In 1939, the Public Roads Administration and the

Ohio Department of Highways concentrated their re- search efforts on the effect of lighting on the lateral

position, passing practices, headways, and speeds of

vehicles on rural highways. The results showed that

the behavior of drivers operating at night without

overhead light differed measurably from that in daytime, but that under artificial light they conformed

very nearly to their behavior in the daytime. This

indicated the advantage of highway lighting for cer- tain speed-volume-geometric highway conditions.-'

344
By the late 1950's, an increasing number of miles

of freeways were being put into operation. Because

very little was known about freeway lighting with

respect to driver behavior and safety, the Bureau and

the Connecticut State Highway Department undertook in 1959 a comprehensive field study on the effect of illumination and delineation. Xine different conditions of illumination and delineation were studied.

No significant difference with respect to vehicle speeds,

lateral position, and clearances between vehicles un- der the nine study conditions were noted. In general,

it appeai-ed that some benefit resulted from full-level illumination in the deceleration area and that even

greater benefit occurred when illumination was combined with roadside delineation. Since then HRB

has reported a number of similar studies which generally corroborate the original findings. As a result of these research conclusions, recent lighting installations have been largely located at interchanges and

other points of conflict or decision.

The photoloff sustem is a sequential set of photographs, usually

taken at oue-hundreth mile increments and recorded on a con- tinuous film strip, of the highivay and its immediate environ- ment. Each photograph normally provides the viewer with

the date it was made, the route, milepoint, and direction of

travel, but it can include other data as well. Photologging

teas developed more or less on the "let's try it and find out" m,ethod by research and operations engineers. Today it is an

operational tool i)i some 1,0 States. The varied uses to which

photologs may be applied include evaluating the adequacy of

traffic control devices, providing information for project design, identifying and evaluating high accident locations, acquiring planning inventory data and supplying data for research

studies.

Highway Safety

The basic principle of highway safety, as summarized by Thomas H. MacDonald in 1949 in Public

Roads magazine, is that maximum safety is pi'ovided

by designing, building and operating the highway

and vehicle to fit the driver's known capabilities and

limitations. This concept recognizes the tremendous

variation in age, ability, experience, skill and physical

and mental condition of tens of millions of drivers.

It prescribes that the highway and the vehicle should

accommodate the maximum amount of this variation

and assist the maximmn number of drivers in their

task. It has been the foundation for nearly all useful

and productive research in highway safety.

Since the 1930's, many studies have provided the

bases for safer design criteria for highways and vehicles. The highway safety research has included on- highway experiments and observational studies of

passing practices, lane position, braking and acceleration capability, grade-climbing ability, and other

aspects of driver behavior and vehicle performance.

Control of Access

Research studies over the past several decades have

shown that the most effective way to facilitate the

driver's task is to provide him with a highway having

full control of access. Such a highway, best exemplified by the Interstate Highway System, prohibits

345
access from abutting property, thus eliminating many

of the roadside conflicts which confront the driver.

Crossroads are grade separated, eliminating angle

collisions occurring at intersections. Wide medians

eliminate head-on collisions, and carefully planned

interchanges with long speed change lanes minimize

rear end and turning collisions. Research undertaken

in the early 1950's demonstrated that full control of

access reduces accidents, injuries and fatalities by 50

percent or more.^*

Control of access also has safety benefits on twolane highways. A study on a two-lane rural highway

with average daily traffic of about 8,000 vehicles

showed that, if the number of at-grade intersections

and roadside business driveways per mile were in- creased a hundredfold, the expected accident rate would increase approximately 14 times.^^

Roadside Safety

One of the major accident types is the single vehicle

run-off-the-road accident. Often the vehicle strikes an object such as a tree, rock, sign, or guardrail, re- sulting in injury or death to the vehicle's occupants.

Although studies designed to relieve this problem began in the 1920's, the most significant advances have

occurred in the recent past.

In December 1966 a short-range Public Roads re- search program was established for quick-payoff concepts and devices to substantially reduce the severity

of single vehicle collisions with fixed roadside struc- tural obstacles. The primary objective of this program was the development of devices that would

protect vehicle occupants against severe injury during

impact with rigid gore structures, bridge piers, sign

bridge supports, and open areas between twin bridges.

The studies emphasized the use of existing technology

in such fields as impact absorption barriers, new and

improved types of redirectional barriers, vehicle en- trapment devices, cable supported structures, and

improved computer simulation techniques. The impact acceptance criterion was tentatively set at a maximum deceleration limit corresponding to a 10- foot stopping distance from 60 miles per hour for

passenger vehicles, a survivable situation for shoulder

and lap-belted vehicle occupants.

Several types of impact attenuators, or crash

cushions, were successfully developed and tested. These include the steel drum barrier (an assemblage

of empty 55-gallon drums), a water cushion (an array

of waterfilled vinyl cells), and clusters of sand-filled

plastic drums. More than 3,000 such devices have

been installed on the highways to date, with evidence

that they are extremely effective in reducing severity

of single vehicle collisions. The overall concept and application of breakaway

sign supports were also developed primarily during

the past 10 years. Research efforts began with the

inception of multi-State, pooled-fund studies of the

breakaway sign and luminaire support concept. The

research included full-scale field experiments and

crash testing of vehicles into prototype breakaway

sign supports. In addition, much work was also developed or verified through the use of computer simulation and theoretical studies. Private industry also

joined in this effort and produced a number of breakaway concepts.

Motorists on ISJf in Connecticut are protected from a possible

fatal injury at this median strip bridge pier by a guardrail, the approach end of which is buried in the ground as the result of research into the causes and severity of accidents.

346

I
Reducing Skid Accidents

Skid accidents, which result from slippery pavements, especially when wet, are of such severity that

they have received considerable attention in reseai'ch and safety proprams for more than four decades.

Major skid factors include : water-on-pavement conditions, tires and their treads, pavement surface

characteristics, a<>"<jreffates and mixes used, pavement

age and surface wear, speeds and vehicle operations,

and highway geometries. There have been many

contributing research studies on individual factors

and their various combinations, but the complex interactions involved have inhibited easy and low-cost

solutions.

In the late 1920's Iowa State College began measuring road skid resistance with a towed trailer. Extension of these studies were reported in 1934; this proved

to be a milestone report on the theory of skidding and means for measuring. Within the next few years

many States, imiversities, industries and other groups

were engaged in related research. Both field meas- urements and laboratory studies on aggregates, mixes,

their polishing features, and means for measurement

were under study. The Hybla Valley and other test roads included these features. In the 1950's hydroplaning was identified as one of the skid conditions

of much concern on airports as well as roads. Also

the first steps toward grooving of concrete pavements

were being made to reduce slipperiness.

Skid prevention attained nationwide attention and

emphasis at an important international conference in

Charlottesville, Virginia, in 1958. This conference

dealt with many new research and development

studies to attain better skid resistance and served to redirect the research that has continued since then.

Because of the magnitude and severity of the problems in recent years, FHWA has instituted a large

scale research project imder its federally coordinated

program. It deals with friction requirements, pavement materials and surfaces, accident and cost effec- tiveness studies, and a national program to standardize

the skid measurement process. Early results from the research have provided

(1) Three regional test centers and the calibration of

dozens of State skid trailers; (2) a standard twowheel test ti'ailer and testing procedure; (3) guidelines to design appropriate variable message signs

under adverse weather conditions; and (4) improved

laboratory methods to select skid-resistant materials.

The Accident Prone Driver

Accident research studies have often been deficient

because of limited data and tlie difficulties in obtaining the data. Despite these limitations, key accident

studies have provided nnich useful information that

has dispelled certain myths and provided support for

research and practical day-to-day programs.

One such myth prevalent during the 1940's and

1950's that has been exploded is that of the so-called

"accident prone driver." A study in 1962-63, showed

that ". . . in any one year 0.5 percent of the drivers

have two or more reported accidents and that they

account for 13.9 percent of all accidents." •"' The

accident prone concept suggested that these drivers

be removed from the road, thereby reducing accidents

by 13.9 percent. Such a conclusion, however, was

erroneous. Nearly all of those who were "accident

repeaters" in any one year became so by chance alone;

the research revealed that 87 percent of the so-called

accident repeaters would not have even one reportable

accident the second year.

This trailer measures pavement skid resistance. A prescribed

film of icater is spread on the pavement junlc prior to brake

application. Instrvments on the trailer measure wheel motion

and traction during the entire braking cycle.

347
Speed and Accidents

For many years, hio;hway professionals have known

that highway safety could best be achieved by minimizing traffic turbulence and speed variance. Cooperative research by the Bureau of Public Roads and

several State highway departments in the late 1950's

and 1960's verified these views. Both two- and fourlane main rural highway's without control of access, as well as urban and rural freeways, exhibited the

lowest accident involvement rate for vehicles operating near the average speed for all traffic. For vehicles

traveling at both lower and higher speeds, the in- volvement rate increased sharply. For example, at speeds 15 miles per hour below the average speed on

Interstate highways, the accident involvement rate was five times as great as for vehicles operating at the average speed. When an accident occurred, the

severity increased with speed, particularly at travel

speeds above 60 miles per hour. The chance of being

killed in an accident was found to be about four times

as great at travel speeds of 73 miles per hour or higher

than at 60 miles per hour.^^ These findings have

been particularly useful in stimulating official and

public awareness of the effects of speed.

Driver and Vehicle Characteristics

In addition to speed, studies showed that other

characteristics for groups of drivers and vehicles were directly related to accidents on two- and fourlane main rural highways without control of access. Included Avere age, sex, and residence of driver; type,

age, and horsepower of vehicle; and the seat location

of individuals within passenger cars. It was found that local drivers tend to have higher

accident involvement rates than out-of-county drivers, particularly at night, and that drivers of passenger cars with low horsepower have higher

involvement rates than drivers of cars with higher

horsepower, regardless of several other variables

studied, including travel speed.^^

Highway Safety Study

In the late 1950's in response to a congressional

requirement, a comprehensive study of highway

safety was undertaken by the Bureau of Public Roads.

The report included a discussion of the traffic accident

problem and its setting, review of the highway trans- portation system, evaluation of current highway

safety activities, and a brief description of an adequate highway safety program. Results of this study were used to expand the Federal role in highway

safety, including creation of a special National Highway Safety Bureau in the Federal Highway Administration, and eventually creation of the National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Also, a nationwide computerized system was developed for

identifying drivers with suspended or revoked licenses

attempting to obtain drivers' licenses in other States.

Other Safety Research

Other important studies have delineated the cost of

traffic accidents in considerable detail, permitting development of useful benefit-cost analyses of various

safety problems. Studies related to sizes and weights

of trucks in connection with the speed study mentioned earlier have been useful in justifying a combined reduction in speed to 65 miles per hour to save

fuel and lives coupled with a 10 percent increase in

allowable axle and gross weight limits on the Interstate System to further save fuel and reduce freight

haulage costs. Since 1970 research studies have provided methods

for designing improved guardrails, median barriers

and bridge rails, criteria for safer roadsides, improved

highway lighting, improved traffic signal configurations, warrants for enhancing safety at rail-highway

grade crossings, use of earth heat to melt snow, crack

detectors for bridges, and driver aids in fog. Also,

there has been increased attention to pedestrian and

bicycle safety, including the development of bicycle

safe grate inlets for city streets, wide dissemination

of a bikeway state-of-the-art and evaluation of sev- eral pedestrian countermeasures.

The in-motion vehicle iveighing and measuring system, obtains a description of the traffic traversing the area—number of

vehicles, speed and classification (car or truck). Then the weight and dimension subsystems add a complete description

of the truck portion of the traffic, including height, loidth, length, axle spacing and tceights, vehicle type, loading, etc. Installations such as this are being used in Texas and as demonstrations in several other States. IN-MOTION VEHICLE WEIGHING AND MEASURING SYSTEM

Signal conditioning equipment for weight

'and dimension signals.

kTraffic control signs. Legal vehicles bypass

the mechanical scale,

illegal vehicles are directed to the weighing

station.

Weighing station with mechanical

scale. The scale house contains

a closed-circuit television monitor, vehicle speed and

classification console, and other

electronic equipment.

348
Human Factors Engineering

During World War II. behavioral scientists pooled

their talents to help military systems engineers develop vehicle operating systems to be used by military

trainees with little or no engineering or scientific training. Fitting machines and environments to man's capabilities and limitations resulted in the

emergence of new disciplines known as engineering

psychology or human engineering. Tlie relationship

between highway design and operational techniques

became a major concern of tlie BPR's research

program.

In the 1950's a few engineering psychologists began

to translate the findings of classical experimental

psychology to tasks that confronted motorists operating their automobiles between towns and cities. They also attempted to determine the basic skills re- quired of drivers. The early models of driver behavior are now recognized to be overly simplistic, but

they alerted traffic engineers and other road authorities to the fact that most people using highways

differ from highway designers and traffic engineers

in their perception of the driving situation.

The lOSO's were characterized by three major approaches for incorporating driver characteristics into

highway designs and traffic operations techniques.

The first was an attempt to scale the difficulty of

specific types of driving situations by measuring

driver stress. The second w^as performance oriented

research characterized by measurement of the driving

patterns of large numbers of drivers on a variety of

road environments and was an extension of studies

undertaken by the Bureau of Public Roads in the

1930's and 1940's. The third was epidemiological re- search, aimed at establishing patterns of responses of

drivers which would permit officials to improve their

selection techniques or develop remedial training programs. Incorporation of driving behavior into highway design and operational techniques was a major

concern of the BPR's research program.

Behavior research in the 1960's began to mature.

A programmatic approach to determining driver

capabilities and limitations was begun in the late 1950"s when a team of behavior scientists began to conduct sophisticated analyses of the perceptual en- vironment faced by motorists traversing high-speed

roadways on potential collision courses with other

vehicles and obstacles. Fundamental work on road

tracking, speed sensing, car following, overtaking and

passing, object avoidance, sign reading, and path finding were performed jointly in BPR, several universities and bj' private contractors. Most notable among

the collective agencies was the portion of a program

of automated or semiautomatic vehicular control con- ducted by Ohio State University's Industrial Engineering Department.

In the mid-1960's, fundamental work aimed at delineating driving skills abated in favor of development of driving aids systems to assist motorists. Several such systems were identified to overcome high

accident situations and ])asic limitations of motorists;

developmental research study of them continues.

Some of the traffic control and information systems were

• A passing aid system to assist drivers in over- taking and passing on two- and three-lane highways.

• A merge control system to assist drivers in making complex decisions at freeway entrance ramps. • An experimental route guidance system for as- sisting motorists in finding their way to unfamiliar destinations.

The knowledge developed through these programs

and efforts of behavioral scientists have been integrated into modern highway design and traffic engineering.

Environmental Factors

Hydraulics and Hydrology

Hydraulics and hydrology, simply stated, are sci- ences developed to control the deleterious effects of water. There is adequate evidence that ancient cul- tures constructed amazingly elaborate conduits, aqueducts and other drainage structures to control the

flow of water. In the early development of rail trans- portation, bridges and culverts were certainly an

integral part of the design. With the advent of the

automobile and accelerated highway construction programs, drainage and water problems became more

critical. Bridge damage, washouts, and flooded roadways became intolerable, and paved surfaces required

good drainage to reduce hazardous conditions for the

movement of traffic and to prevent pavement failures.

Progress in the control of water flow and drainage was slow, and in the early days, designs were based on judgment without uniform policy guidelines or well-developed engineering technology. It was com- mon to size highway drainage structures by using a formula developed by Professor Talbot of the University of Illinois for the design of railroad struc- tures being built in the western States in the 1890's. That formula was the first attempt to provide a ra- tional approach to drainage design; it was crude but an improvement over previous methods. However,

it is interesting to note that in 1961, despite the fact

that by then more sophisticated techniques had been

developed, a survey by the American Society of Civil

Engineers concerning drainage practice showed 12

States still using Talbot's formula.

In the early 1920's, David Yarnell pioneered in

experimental hydraulic research with his study on the

flow of water through culverts based on extensive

full-scale tests conducted at the University of Iowa.

Unfortunately the report covered only culverts flowing full. Most culverts do not flow full, and the

factors affecting them are significantly different.

Yarnell went on with experiments on flow resistance

caused by pile trestles and flowover embankments.

His work on rainfall intensity-frequency relations was published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture

in the mid-1930's and for many years was widely

used across the country in determining the rainfall rate to apply in the use of the rational method of

estimating runoff.

Highway engineers had also been concerned about

erosion of highway ditches and slopes, but it took the

demonstration projects of the Soil Conservation

Service in the late 1930's to show how flattening of

slopes and rapid establishment of sod could control

erosion. About the same time the Soil Conservation

Service also began setting up experimental watershed

stations in several locations to study rainfall-runoff

relationships as affected by land use practices.

349
Durinof World War II, the Public Roads Administration became res^Donsible for constructing satellite airfields and found that data on rainfall and runoff were inadequate. Using rainfall simulators provided

and operated by the Soil Conservation Service, a

series of experiments on overland flow was conducted on paved and grass surfaces. The data analyzed and

reported by Public Roads in 1944 enabled engineers

to estimate for the first time flows over overland

routes. This paper has become a standard reference on the subject.

After World War II greater interest developed in

the application of hydraulic engineering principles

to highway design. One of the first applications of

the overland flow equations was in the design of a storm drain system in Chicago. From this, Tholin

and Kiefer developed the "Chicago Hydrograph

Method" which involved routing runoff through the

drainage system.

The Public Roads Administration developed a highwa}^ engineering drainage manual. The manual

provided step-by-step instructions, together with numerous nomographs and charts based on research

data, to facilitate the solution of hydraulic equations

for design of ci;lverts, open channels, and storm

drains. The manual was widely used in draft form

by the States in their highway programs and on most

of the toll roads because it provided imiform and

improved drainage design techniques. It was never

formally published and has since been superseded by

the series of Hydraulic Engineering Circulars published by BPR beginning in 1960. The original

manual and the Circulars have been used as text for

training courses and design practices throughout the

United States and abroad.

Following a series of disastrous floods, the Iowa

State Highway Commission began a research project

in 1948 at the University of Iowa to investigate scour

around bridge piers. Scour is the severe erosion of

firm supporting soils around bridge piers and is the

principal factor in the failure of bridges. The results

of that investigation enabled bridge designers to esti- mate the probable depth of scour during floods and

provide adequate supports.

A formal hydraulics research program Avas insti- tuted by Public Roads in 1949 in recognition of the

need for systematic study of hydraulics and hydrology

as an integral part of highway engineering. The

agency conducted in-house research principally in the

field of hydrology (analyses of runoff data) ; supervised contract research at a number of university and

Government laboratories; and monitored research

undertaken in several States. In the 1950's major research was continued on

bridge scour at the University of Iowa ; culvert design was studied at the National Bureau of Standards;

backwater caused by bridges was studied at Colorado

State University; head, or energy, losses in storm

drain junctions were studied at the University of

Missouri ; resistance losses in concrete pipe were

studied at the University of Minnesota; and urban

stormwater runoff was studied at the Johns Hopkins

University. All of the research was undertaken as a

result of expressed needs evolving from field experience. All reports provided design data and methods

readily used by highway designers.

Another field of research begun in the 1950's in a few States was the Cooperative Highway Program

of the U.S. Geological Survey for measurement and

analysis of runoff from small watersheds, preferably

for at least 10 years in each State. The objective was

to estimate the magnitude and frequency of peak

flows from watersheds generally under 25 square miles

in area. The program has grown to include at pres- ent about 30 States with an annual total expenditure

of about $1 million.

To protect this cut slope from erosion during highway construction, the first section of the cut already has new grass growing. The second section has been seeded and mulched,

while earthwork is still in progress on the third section.

350
In succeeding years hydraulic research for the

Federal Highway Administration has been conducted on hydraulic roughness of corrugated metal pipes by

the U.S. A^'aterways Experiment Station, on use of

riprap* to minimize scour at culvert outlets, on unsteady flow in a pipe at Colorado State University,

and on design of riprap lining for open channels at the University of ]Miiu\esota. not to mention numerous

smaller studies undertakoii elsewliere, usually in co- operation with a State highway department.

Roadside Development

One of tlie earliest publications to itlcntify the ele- ments of and the need for improved road environments was by Louis C. Haupt in 1891 /'' His theme was that good roadside development is a move toward

better roads. Little further attention was given to

this subject imtil the early 1930"s when AASHO and

HEB organized tlieir first roadside conunittees; at that time only 10 States were represented. Even

then, where roadside improvement was performed, it was done years after the higliway was constructed.

Finally, however, the research and development

work of the conunittees, with support from the Bureau of Public Roads, receixed progressively greater

attention, and for some 20 years adequate roadside

treatment has been a recognized part of design and

construction. Roadside development research has

covered such areas as erosion, esthetics, rest areas, resource conservation, planting and vegetation management.

The large number of studies and I'eports in this area of research was oriented mostl}^ to local problems

and conditions. A 1972 study showed that roadside

development efforts still seem to be very much a local matter. Efforts to broaden this activity- on a national

scale have thus far met Avith little success.

Vegetation Management

A major part of roadside development is vegetation

management. For 50 years, most of the work was

directed toward the prevention of erosion. A^^^ile erosion control is still a primary goal, for more than

a decade the Federal Highway Administration and

most States have recognized other values in vegetation. Research was directed to the selection of proper

vegetation to encourage the establishment of certain

species of wildlife. In addition, the esthetic value of

vegetation is recognized for its potential in maintaining balance between the highway and the natural

environment.

During the 1920's and 1930's, maintenance of roadside vegetation was usually done by hand. Although

research had greatly improved mowing equipment and

techniques by 1960, breakthroughs in the use of herbicides greatly altered roadside maintenance techniques.

As this work progressed, however, concern over the

long-term effect of herbicides created new interest in

development of dwarf ground covers.

* Riprap is a layer, facing or protective mound of stones, concrete, or other material, randomly placed to prevent erosion, scour or sloughing of a structure or embankment.

Today, with rising maintenance costs and public concern for our environment, the need is recognized

for a highly refined roadside development prograui.

Research and implementation efforts by FIIWA,

State agencies and others are focused on reduced

mowing, refinement of herbicide technology, and the

development and selection of vegetation that will re- duce nuiintcnance costs and enhance the overall en- \'ironment.

Recent Environmental Research

In the past 10 years, two areas of interest have been

receiving considerable attention: (1) Firm criteria

for esthetic enhancement of the view from the highway are evolving from key studies and are having a major impact on new highway design and upgrading

of existing roads, and (2) the need to protect the

wildlife environment has opened a broad vista of

studies addressing the compatibility of small and

large game, birds and fish with the highway environment.

Work on erosion control, roadside vegetation, management transportation economics, and hydrology were the forerunners of today's environmental re- search. This was highlighted by the establishment

of a formal research program in environmental design and control. In response to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the research is directed to understanding the interaction between

highways and the environment and developing technology to protect the environment.

Since 1970 this research has dealt with a wide range

of environmental elements including air, noise and

water quality ; social and economic effects ; roadside

rest areas; sewage treatment; vegetation management;

esthetics; water runoff; de-icing chemicals; spills of

hazardous materials; erosion control; and wildlife.

In summary, roadside development has progressed

during the past 50 years from a somewhat haphazard

approach to a highly sophisticated and comprehensive

science.

Nationally Coordinated Programs

In the early 1960's several significant events led to dramatic changes in the concept and activity of highway research. Enlarged research and development

legislative authority was enacted in 1962 and made

effective beginning with fiscal year 1964. There were growing problems for highway transportation along

with population growth, urban concentration, and

changing national priorities and- goals.

One major legislative change was the requirement

that 114 percent highway planning and reseai'ch

(HPR) funds must be used for planning and research

purposes. No longer was there an option of using

this money for construction. This requirement en- sured the strength and vitality of federally aided

planning and research programs in the States. Another event was the organizational separation of planning and research in the Bureau of Ptiblic Roads late in 1961. Research and development finally became a formal separate program in the Bureau.

351
At the same time, there was hig-h interest and strong

urging from scientists and technologists in the Department of Commerce and elsewhere to push the

Bureau of Public Roads beyond its historic materials

and physical research and undertake so-called "soft'' research in operations, human factors, systems analysis, safety, society- and the environment. Eesearch

programing and management could no longer be a

loose collection of a nvunber of separate, isolated,

totally unrelated studies. The problems were too complex and the resources too small. Comprehensive,

integrated and balanced research was the only answer. Starting in 1963, a multidisciplined task force re- viewed a wide range of problems and opportunities

for solution in the human, physical, environmental

and public policy fields. This culminated in the cre- ation of "A National Program of Research and Development for Highway Transportation," which

officially began in 1965.

If the National Program could be summed up in

three words, they would be coordination, concentration and flexibility. The Federal Highway Administrator called it a program to coordinate and

concentrate our efforts on the most urgent problems

with flexibility, responsiveness and recognition of

local and regional problems.^^ The program consisted

of detailed work plans and problem statements for

each; it served as a stimulus and guide for R&D ef- forts to develop and apply solutions rapidly.

The National Program was directed to three issues

of highest concern—highway safety, urban transportation, and reduction in the costs of construction and

maintenance. These issues were important because of

the considerable human losses and $10 billion annual

costs of accidents; the increasing problems of congestion, pollution and adverse socioeconomic impacts;

and the critical need to optimize technological processes and cost. In 1970 when the National Program was 5 years

old, FHWA initiated a new, nationally designed and

coordinated program for highway research and development called the Federally Coordinated Program

of Research and Development in Highway Transportation (FCP). The FCP was specially designed to meet the needs of the customer—highway program

managers and operating personnel in State and local agencies as well as the general public. It was also

designed to be particularly responsive to urgent new

problems in the environment, energy and resource

conservation, utilization of waste, the integration of

multitransportation goals, and increasing the efficiency

of the present system.

Research Into Practice

For a number of years, there had been a strong

movement throughout the highway community to ex- pand and strengthen the {practical utilization of re- search. The problems of highway transportation were becoming too large, and it seemed that too little was

being accomplished in putting the information gained

from research to work.

Both AASHO and FHWA acted in the late 1960's to formalize implementation. It was suggested that

each State name a high-level implementation coordinator and each FHWA region organize an implementation committee. Both of these suggestions were

carried out, but a national program still did not develop. It seems that plans, procedures and resources were lacking. There still was no formal national

focus. Skilled promotion was needed to gain managerial support, to overcome inertia and reluctance to change, and to secure the essential ingredients of

public acceptance.

In response to this need, FHWA in 1970 created a separate Office of Development. Thus a formal, substantial program was begun and within a couple of

years, the resources, plans, procedures and programs

were prepared. Development/implementation has be- come a full and substantial i^artner in the business of

"research to practice."

REFERENCES

* Bureau of Pl^blic Roads Annual Report, 1910, p. 769.

^ Federal-Aid Highway Act Amendments of 1963, S.R. 552, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6.

' L. Page, Salutatory, Public Roads, Vol. 1, No. 1, May 1918,

p. 3.

^ Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1922, p. 36.

^ Ideas and Actions : A History of the Highway Research

Board, 1920-1970 (Highway Research Board, Washington, D.C., 1970) p. 29.

" Subgrade Investigations Begun by Bureau of Ptiblic Roads,

Public Roads, Vol. 2, No. 24, Apr. 1920, p. 29. 'A. WiNTERMEYER, Adaptation of Atterberg Plasticity Tests

for Subgrade Soils, Public Roads, Vol. 7, No. 5, Jul. 1926,

pp. 119-122.

" B. Kelly & P. Hubbard, Rationalization and Simplification of Test Requirements for Liquid Asphaltic Materials, Public

Roads, Vol. 13, No. 6, Aug. 1932, p. 89. 'J. Pauls & H. Rex, A Test for Determining the Effect of Water on Bituminous Mixtures, Public Roads, Vol. 24, No. 5, Jul.-Aug.-Sept. 1945, pp. 115-129. "R. Bogue, Chemistry of Portland Cement (Reinhold

Publishing Corp., New York, 1947) pp. 10-14. "W. Halstead, The Behavior of Red Lead-Iron Oxide

Primers When Exposed Directly to Weathering, Public

Roads, Vol. 29, No. 9, Aug. 1957, p. 213. "B. Chaiken, Abrasion Resistance of Bridge Paints for Use in Alaska—Field and Laboratory Tests Evaluated, Public

Roads, Vol. 33, No. 10, Oct. 1965, p. 201. " J. Pauls, Reinforcing and the Subgrade as Factors in the Design of Concrete Pavements, Public Roads, Vol. 5, No. 8, Oct. 1924, pp. 1-9. " Prestressed Concrete Pavement Demoyistration at Dulles

International Airport, Public Roads, Vol. 37, No. 1, Jun. 1972,

pp. 16-21. "I. CoRvi & J. Houghton, Service Lives of Highivay Pave- ments—A Reappraisal, Public Roads, Vol. 36, No. 9, Aug.

1971, p. 192. "W. Hatt, The Field of Highway Research, Public Roads,

Vol. 4, No. 5, Sept. 1921, p. 17. " Policy On Geometric Design of Rural Highways (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1965) p. 152. ''A. Taragin, Driver Performance on Horizontal Curves,

Public Roads, Vol. 28, No. 2, Jun. 1954, pp. 27, 28. "O. K. Normann, Highivay Capacity, Proceedings, 21st Annual Meeting, Vol. 21 (Highway Research Board, Washington, D.C., 1941) p. 379. -"Public Roads Administration, Highway Practice In THE United States of America (Federal Works Agency,

Wasliington, D.C., 1949) p. 65.

-^C. Saal, Time and Gasoline Consumption In Motor

Truck Operation, Research Report 9-A (Highway Research

Board, Washington, D.C., 1950) p. 16.

362
''E. Holmes, The Effect of Control Methods on Traffic Flow, Public Roads, Vol. 14, No. 12, Feb. 1934, p. 240. " F. Mirxs, The Compdratire Visibility of Standard Luminous and XoiiliiviinoKS Highway Siyns, Public Roads, Vol. 14, No. 7, Sept. 1933, p. 111.

"^ G. Sessions, Traffic Devices : Histouicat. Aspects

Thereof (Institute of Traffic Engineers, Washington, D.C., 1971) p. 121. "Id., p. 123. ^A. Taragix, The Effect of Driver Beharior of Center

Lines on Two-Lane Roads, Proceedings, 27tli Annual Meeting,

Vol. 27 (Highway Research Board, Washington, D.C., 1947)

p. 273. "W. "Walker, Effects of Hif/hiray Liyhting on Driver Behavior, Public Roads, Vol. 21, No. 10, Deo. 1940, p. 187. ^C. Prisk, Hoiv Access Control Affects Accident Experience,

Public Roads, Vol. 29, No. 11, Dec. 1957, p. 266.

'.T. CiRiLLo, R. Beatty, S. Dietz, S. Kai'fman & J. Yates,

Interst.xte System Accident Research Study I (Federal

Highway Administration, Washington, D.C., 1970) p. I-l. TM D. Solomon, Highway Safety Myths, North Carolina

Symposium On Htghway Safety, Vol. 2 (the University of North Carolina Higlnvay Safety Research Center, Chapel

Hill, 1972) p. 41. " D. Solomon, Accidents On Main Rural Highways (Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C., Reprinted

1974) p. 12. ''The Federal Role in Highway Safety, H. Doc. 93, 86th

Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 71-83. "Roadside Development—Evaluation of Reseaucii, NCHRP

Report No. 137 (Highway Research Board, Washington, D.C., 1972) p. 45.

^' R. WnnroN, I'reface to A National Proculvm of Research

.\ND Develop.ment For Highway Transportation (Bureau

of Public Road.s, Washington, D.C., 1965) p. 11.

353
Right-of-UJQy

and

Environment

Historically, right-of-way acquisition for a new

highway or improving an existing highway meant

selecting the location or alinement based upon cost- benefit factors of the highway and then acquiring the

most economical and effective alternative without

much consideration given to the socio-economic impact on those along the proposed route or the community

as a whole. Occasionally land was reserved for public

thoroughfares, but usually the landowner discovered

that if the State or county wished to take his land for

a highway, he had little recourse but to give in, sometimes receiving fair market value for the property.

Since route selection and land acquisition for the

highway was entirely the responsibility of the State

and local authorities, the Federal Government took no part in this phase of the Federal-aid highway

program.

It was not until World War II that it became ex- pedient for the Federal Government to become in- volved in the acquisition of rights-of-way to provide

highways for the national defense. But the anguish

and hardships to the landowners in the path of the

highway continued unabated.

About 1950 when more highways were being built on entirely new locations, it became apparent that

sociological and economic impacts on connnunities

must become a principal factor in the location selec- tion process. "WHion the 1956 Federal -Aid Highway Act was

signed into law, the push for completion of the Interstate System, mostly on new locations, brought the

entire country's attention to social, economic and en- vironmental factors related to highways. In the 1960's

the public became quite vocal about its concerns, and

Congress, too, became aware that highway constiniction could have adverse as well as advantageous impact upon all individuals. Congress acted with

legislation to alleviate personal hardships and environmental detriment caused by highway and other

Federal-aid programs.

Right-of-Way

As with other aspects of the highway program, the

authority for right-of-way acquisition is assigned with

due regard for the distribution of powers between the

Federal and State governments. Thus, the major re- sponsibilities for initiation and execution have been

left to the States and their political subdivisions.

Although organized quite similarly in many re- spects, systems of highway administration in the

various States vary considerably. The resultant di- versity of systems renders difficult any attempt to outline their individual characteristics as applied to right-of-way acquisition. Therefore, only the aspects

of right-of-way administration connnon to most jurisdictions will be considered in this chapter. Special

emphasis is given to the evolution and dissemination

of right-of-way policies and procedures which are developed and administered by the Federal Government, especially in the area of Federal-aid highways.

354
The dcrdopmoit of the Interstate System helped focus national attention on the social, economic and environmental factors

of building hir/hicai/s. 1-80 icinds gracefully through the Delaware Valley Gap,

ichich is part of the National Park System in Netv Jersey.

The Legal Establishment of Right-of-Way

The establishment of highways is primarily under

the control of the State legislature, subject to constitutional limitations and restrictions. Except as so

restricted, the legislative power is practically unlimited. The legislature ma}' establish highways, but

State highwa}' departments, cities, counties or other

political subdivisions of the State are usually empowered to locate, design, purchase right-of-way for, construct, and maintain highways and to carry out related

highway functions.

Right-of-way for a designated highway may be ac- quired in one of three ways, or a combination of them

by donation, by purchase at the fair market value of

the property taken plus damages to any remainders

not taken, or by exercise of the power of eminent

domain. Eminent domain, the lawful expropi'iation

of pi'operty, is an inherent and necessary attribute of

sovereignty, existing independently of constitutional

provisions although subject to regulation. In order

to justify the taking of land for a highway, there

must exist a public necessity for the proposed road,

and it must be of public utility or convenience. The

road need not, however, be an absolute necessity; it is legally sufficient if it is required for public convenience

or advantage.

The determination of the necessity for the proposed

road is considered a legislative, rather than a judicial

question, and the determination is usually made by

administrative officials. Such action, however, is limited by certain common principles, among which is that property cannot be taken without due process of

law through condemnation proceedings and that property cannot be taken without the payment of just

compensation based on fair market value.

Early Background

Within the United States, right-of-way for over- land transportation started with the forest trails along the earth's natural contours. The trails first were followed on foot, then they became paths over which beasts of burden and ox carts could also move. At this stage, no concern was given to the acquisition

of right-of-way, for the only consideration was the

fastest route in getting from one place to another.

In most instances, the right of the public to maintain and use these roads was not established formally,

it was simply assumed. However, as the population

and the corresponding private ownership of property

increased, and as overland transportation became in- creasingly important for commerce, communications,

and conquest, right-of-way had to be established on a more fonnal basis to ensure the continued use of these

and future overland routes. In the latter part of the 1700's and early 1800's,

many privately chartered turnpike companies were

authorized to acquire rights-of-way for the turnpikes.

Little difficulty was experienced in acquiring the

needed rights-of-way. These companies eventually

suffered financial difficulties from the competition by

355
I'Vvnv

Shirley Highway (1-95) in Virginia has reversible bus and carpool lanes in the median to improve traffic movement during Washington, D.C., rush hours.

canals and railroads, and after a short time, most

were abandoned or turned over to local public agencies who acquired the highway right-of-way in the

process. By the middle of the 19th century, most

highways were being constructed by local and special

agencies of the States through which they passed,

with, in some instances, slight assistance from the

Federal Government.* But the formal acquisition

of deeded right-of-way evolved as a gradual process. In the early stages of State highway building, highways were built primarily to give access to farms,

homes, and businesses. They were truly "land service

roads," and rights-of-way usually were donated by

property owners or by others eager to get road improvements in their commimities. In many instances,

the landowner helped build the road through direct

labor or assessments. There was no question as to the

* In ]802 Congress passed the first semblance of Federalaid legislation in an act for the admission of the State of Ohio, whicli included a provision for 5 percent of the net

l)roceeds of tlie sales of public lands in the State to be devoted

to the construction of public roads. This type of provision was later extended to other States. In the next 90 years, Congress enacted literally hundreds of laws appropriating

funds for roads for military and other purposes, including roads providing communication with new settlements. The

aggregate amount appropriated l)y Congress up to 1893 for the

construction of roads and bridges is reported to have been in excess of .$17 million.'

landowner's right of access to the road since denying

him access would have defeated the purpose of the

road.

Many States adopted the policy of requiring the

local political subdivisions to furnish right-of-way for

State highways as a contributing share in the cost of

the facility. This practice, however, was gradually

abandoned except for local roads when the cost of

acquiring rights-of-way became too heavy a burden

on local agencies or political subdivisions. It then

became the general practice for the State highway

department to acquire the major portion of State

rights-of-way, especially for the arterial highways.

The land ordinance of 1785 provided for the rec- tangular system of surveying land. Under the sj'stem,

30 of the present States** were subdivided into townships 6 miles square, each containing 36 sections 1-mile

squai'e.^ These land lines, in many instances, became

the boundaries between farms and, thus, were the

lines of least resistance for local roads. Normally,

each property owner donated 33 feet on his side of the

section line, resulting in a right-of-way of one chain

or 66 feet wide.

** Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,

Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,

Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, IMontana, Nebraska, Nevada,

New IMexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, South

Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Alaska.'

356
In the Great Plains and Far "West, many connties

took advanta<ie of the Act of July 26, 1866 (18 Stat

253) in which Con<xress orantcd a fi'ee rifjht-of-way

for public roads over unreserved public lands by declarint>; all section lines in the county to be public

roads and. thus, reservina' the liaht-of-way before the

lands became private i)roperty. The Le<>islature of

Dakota Territory passed an act (43 USCA 266) makin<i- all section lines public roads 66 feet wide to the extent it Avas physically possible to build roads on

these lines. The first continuin<>- involvement of the Federal

Government in the Nation's hi<)-hway construction

pro<rram came with the ori<>inal Federal Aid Road

Act of 1916. This Act contained a definition of the

terni "construction" in broad <>'eneral terms which did

not specifically authorize or exclude Federal participation in ri<>ht-of-way costs. However, the Federal

iri<>hway Act of 1921 expressly excluded Federal participation in such costs by redefinino- the term "construction'' to except "costs of rights-of-way." The

effect of this definition was to bar rioht-of-way costs

frorii Federal participation for a number of years. The 1921 Act did, however, provide that rights-of-way

initrht be granted to the States across public lands or

reservations of the United States for any highway or

forest road or as a source of materials for the construction or maintenance of any such facility.

In 1938, Chief MacDonald expressed, in general

terms, BPR's thinking on right-of-Avay and clearly

forecast the transportation needs of the future. In a speech before the 24th Annual AASHO meeting, he

stated

"The new special motor roads in the Netherlands in- clude in the design two separated roadways for motor

traffic, a bicycle paved path on one side, a wide pedestrian

path also paved on the other, and at some distance re- moved, local roads adequately surfaced for land sei-rice and animal traffic. Here is a conception of a highway

service that, complete in its component parts, may he used safely liy all normal types of traffic, which quality should be reflected in many miles of highways in this country in the future. It may he urged that some of these types of traffic do not exist now in numl)ers to justify special provision for them, a valid olijection as to the immediate need ; l)ut it is not the important point.

The essential feature is the provision now for the land

necessary for the development of each traffic facility

when it is necessary. As our country matures and be- comes more congested in population, we sliall have the need for a combination of these or comparable highway

facilities." * In anticipation of its involvement in right-of-Avay

acquisition, the Bureau of Public Roads, in that same

^•ear, initiated a program of research involving highway right-of-way acquisition and development.

During the latter half of the 1930-40 decade, a number of bills were introduced in Congress proposing the authorization of Federal participation in right-of-way costs. Some of these bills even proposed

to permit Federal acquisition of necessary lands for

right-of-way purposes. None, however, received favoralde consideration. During the period prior to World "War II, acquiring land necessary for a highway was often thought of as a chore which would

ultimately have to be taken care of but which could

be postponed until after all other steps in the planning and programing of the work had been taken.

A deviation from the established policy of no Federal

participatioit in right-of-way costs did come in tlie Federal Aid Highway Act of 1940 which permitted

Federal participation in the cost "of necessary new

or additional rights-of-way" in the Territory of

Hawaii uiuler certain specified conditions related to the national defense. The Public Roads Administration was authorized to pay all or any part of the costs of specified projects, including the cost of right-ofway.

It Avas common practice to proceed with other preliminaries, including the preparation of plans, specifications, and estimates of const I'uction items, before

beginning the preparation of plats, descriptions, title evidence and appraisals of the individual parcels of

land required for right-of-way. Only after all other

preparatory work was completed did the agency begin

to acquire the right-of-way, often under pressure to meet construction schedules fixed without giving adequate consideration to the time necessarily involved

in all land transactions. The result was often the

last minute acquisition of rights-of-way without the

necessary basic data having been assembled. Because

of the delays that followed, there were complaints

that construction w^as constantly being held up be- cause of the antiquated and cumbersome procedures

pursued in securing the land.

This complacent prewar attitude and approach to the right-of-way problem existed at all levels of government. It was manifest both in the judicial and

legislative branches as well as in the administrative

units having jurisdiction over highway construction

and maintenance activities. Federal funds could not

participate in right-of-way costs, and the PRA took

a legally required "hands off" position. Ilowever, as time passed, it became apparent that the Federal

Government could not continue to tolerate the lack

of proper acquisition procedures which existed in

many jurisdictions as they related to the Federal-aid

highway program.

Active Federal Assistance in Right-of-Way Acquisition

Congress made its first major departure from the

policy of not participating in right-of-way costs with

the Defense Highway Act of 1941. It authorized 100

percent Federal reimbursement for right-of-way costs on defense access roads and the payment of threefourths of such costs on strategic network projects. It also authorized the Federal Government, itself, to acquire any new or additional lands that might be

required for such purposes. Under this authority,

many parcels of land were acquired by the PRA

throughout a number of States. PRA also issued

General Administrative Memorandum 149 in 1942 as a guide for States acquiring rights-of-way that would

be subject to Federal reimbursement imder this Act. Twenty-seven years after the passage of the Federal

Aid Road Act in 1916, Congress gave recognition to right-of-way as a necessary requisite to peacetime

highway construction with passage of Public Law 146

by the "78th Congress on July 13, 1943. This Act

redefined the term "construction" to include the cost of rights-of-way, thus permitting Federal participation in its funding. The following year the Federal

Aid Highway Act of 1944 again included the cost of

rights-of-way in the definition of the cost of construction. However, tlie Federal share of right-of-Avay

357
costs was restricted to one-third of such costs plus

certain increases in the public land States. For

projects eliminating: hazards at railway-hio-hway g-rade

crossings, 50 percent of the right-of-way and property

damage costs were reimbursable from Federal funds.

Because of the difference in the Federal participating

ratios between right-of-way costs and other construction costs established by the 1944 Act, it was necessary

to differentiate between what was a right-of-way and

what was a construction item. Since construction

costs were established by competitive bidding, it was

often simpler to document eligible construction costs than right-of-way costs for Federal participation.

Because of this and since the States received a fixed

apportionment of money, which if not used for rightof-way participation would be available for construction, most of the States did not take advantage of

their ability to claim Federal reimbursement for

right-of-way costs. They elected to use their Federal

allotments for construction costs which were more

easily substantiated.

PRA was very careful in analyzing the costs to be

sure that proper reimbursement from Federal funds was made. This caused confusion and difficulty until

the distinction in matching ratios was removed. However, it was not until the passage of the Federal Aid

Highway Act of 1950 that the Federal share of rightof-way costs was increased to 50 percent—the same

ratio then permitted for construction costs and thereby

eliminated the necessity for strict delineation of costs between right-of-way and construction.

The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1954 increased

the Federal participation ratio in all costs to 60 per- cent on projects located on the Interstate System and

the 1956 Act raised this ratio to 90 percent. The

participating ratio for right-of-way costs on regular

Federal-aid projects and on railroad grade crossing

protection projects remained at 50 percent. However,

the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1970 increased the

ratio on regular Federal-aid projects to 70 percent

beginning in fiscal year 1974. In summary, the pres- ent Federal participating ratios in right-of-way costs are

Railroad Grade Crossing Projects 50 percent

Regular Federal-Aid Projects 70 percent

Interstate System Projects 90 percent

Staffing Changes With Increased Federal Involvement

Staffing requirements of the State highway departments and the Bureau of Public Roads were related

to passage of highway legislation.

In the years when right-of-way was obtained without Federal participation, it was often acquired by

local authorities. At the State highway department

level, this activity had been handled as merely a part

of the overall duties of the engineering staffs in the

highway departments. Thus, few adequate State

right-of-way organizations were in existence.

In the headquarters office of the Bureau of Public

Roads, first right-of-way matters were handled in the

Solicitoi'^s Office by a single attorney. After passage

of the 1943 and 1944 Acts when Federal funds became

available for right-of-way cost reimbursement, an appraiser and anotlier attorney were added to tlie staff in the Bureau. The right-of-way staff was then elevated to branch status. A new directive governing

Federal participation in right-of-way costs was issued

in 1953 which required that right-of-way costs be

fully documented if Federal funds were desired. The

small branch in BPR was sufficient, since only a few

States were willing to go to the extra work necessary

to secvire Federal participation in their right-of-way

costs. As mentioned above, if a State were able to use all of its Federal-aid apportionment for highway

construction work, there was no loss if Federal funds were not claimed for right-of-way. So thei'e Avas no

necessity for the States to build iip their own rightof-way organizations.

With the passage of the Federal Aid Highway Act

of 1956, the full impact of Federal participation in

right-of-way costs was felt by the States. Interstate funds were apportioned on the basis of the cost to complete the System in each State. Therefore, each

State had to claim right-of-way costs in order to obtain all the Federal funds available for its Interstate program. With Federal funds assured for right-ofway costs on the Interstate System and as highway

programs moved into urban areas where right-of-way

problems were complex, it was inevitable that the

right-of-way organizations and procedures of both the

States and BPR had to be strengthened.

By May 1957, the right-of-way staff in the BPR

headquarters was expanded and raised to division

level. In 1962, a separate Office of Right-of-Way and

Location was formed. BPR developed and issued

expanded policy and procedure memorandums governing the Federal-aid right-of-way program and

established right-of-way staffs in each State and in

all regional offices to provide close and continuing

contact between the States and BPR. In 1963 BPR

established its own right-of-way training program to assure a continuing supply of properly educated and

trained personnel for right-of-way work. Thus, procedures and staff were created to assure prompt solution of problems, and controls and records were

instituted to assure the eligibility for Federal aid of

costs incurred by the States in the acquisition of

rights-of-way.

As for the States, in 1956 two States did not have

right-of-way staffs at all, and in many others rightof-way activities came under some other division. At

the urging of BPR and with much assistance from

AASHO, all States have made a steady improvement

over the years in their right-of-way organizations by

better coordination between design and right-of-way

and by the establishment of advance acquisition divisions, training units, i:)roperty management sections,

appraisal and review appraisal groups, relocation

units, environmental specialty sections, etc. The State

highway departnients are now effectively using rightof-way personnel from the inception of a project to

its conclusion. Such practices have brought about

savings of millions of dollars.

Federal Reimbursement Requirements

The Federal Highway Act of 1921 provided that

the State highway departments be suitably equipped

and organized to discharge their duties. With the

passage of the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act, the

Bureau of Public Roads, in order to fully ascertain

358
the capabilities of the State highwa)' departments in right-of-way acquisition matters, required that eacli State highway department submit a formal statement

covering its right-of-way organization, policies, and

procedures. The statement was required to be updated and revised as changes occurred.

By accepting the State's procedures. Public Roads

assumed the responsibility to assure that each State

would conduct its operations in accordance with its formal statement and that the State's pers(mnel were

competent and reliable. FIHVA continues to review

State property accpiisitions to assure conformance

with Federal rules and regulations governing reimbursements for expenditures made by the State. With minor exceptions, such as negotiations for

lands from national parks and forests and other Federal areas, FIHVA does not acquire lands or interest

in lands for the construction of Federal-aid highways

except in connection with the Interstate System, and

then only when it has been determined that the State

is either unable to acquire the necessary lands or

interests in lands or is unable to acquire them Avith

sufficient promptness. For example, from 1956 until

about 1962, Iowa, Idaho and several other States did

not have the legal authority to acquire property for

right-of-way until a court hearing had been held to

determine final payment. Until final payment had

been made to the property owner, construction could

not proceed. This pro\'ision in the State laws delayed

Interstate construction several months at the very

least and sometimes caused a delay until the next

construction season. In cases of this nature, the

Bureau of Public Roads acquired the property to permit timely construction schedules.

Appraisal and Appraisal Review

In the early years of highway construction, rightof-way was acquired by donation or by "horse trading" practices with little thought to a value appraisal

of the lands to be acquired. Later, appraisals were

used, but there were often a simple opinion of value

without written support.

Under such circumstances, the property owner was

to a degree dependent on the whims of the appraiser,

whose personal opinions could too easily affect the

amount of his estimate. Since these value opinions

usually were prepared by local men familiar with

land values in the general area, they usually were

surprisingly accurate. However, such imsupported

opinions of value could not be accepted for Federal

pai'ticipation and more sophisticated procedures were

required.

Close coordination between design and right-of-way blends this section of 1-90 on the Mississippi River in Minnesota—

\oith its buildings, terraces, plantings and parking areas—cotnpatiblg ivith its surroundings.

359
The States or their political subdivisions had, of

course, for many years been acquirinji rio:ht-of-way

for hig-h-vvay projects without Federal participation.

Although procedures, and particularly documentation,

in many States were inadequate, considerable knowledge had been acquired about how to take private

property for public use, and how to appraise "just

compensation" for it. In addition, the courts were

conversant with eminent domain procedures because

such processes had been used in cases of railroad and

utility right-of-way condemnations which established

precedents and opinions. Thus, it was prior to Federal participation that the "market value" concept came into iise as a means of determining "just compensation." Likewise, the "before and after" approach

in appraising damages came into use and the term "a

willing buyer and a willing seller" was discussed in

many court opinions.

The acquisition of right-of-way has been, and continues to be, a process of evoliztion brought about by

the experiences of men and the wisdom of trial judges

in acquiring private property for public use. When

the Federal Government became involved in reimbursing the States for right-of-way costs, the BPE

adopted, as the foundation of its right-of-way program, standards established by courts in eminent domain cases and procedures evolved in acquisition

programs of other agencies. One of the first procedures, still in use today, involved sound prenegotiation appraisal requirements where the fair market

value of land to be acquired was established and the

damages to the remaining property were determined

prior to negotiations or institution of condemnation

proceedings. These appraisals had to conform to es- tablished appraisal principles and techniques; be

independent judgments as to the value of the property; and be prepared without collaboration between

the various appraisers.

To assure that the States' appraisals are properly

prepared and documented, FHWA requires that a responsible reviewing appraiser in the State right-ofway division review each appraisal. Basically, it is the duty of the reviewing apx:)raiser to assemble,' re- view, analyze, and correlate all appraisal data into a

final estimate of value and damages that will fairly

compensate a landowner for his real property beingacquired. The reviewing appraiser's estimate of value

is offered in writing to the property owner on the

first negotiating visit where price is discussed.

Prior to the establishment of prenegotiation appraisals, it was noted that in one State the acquisition

cost was always in the exact amount of the appraisal.

Upon investigation, it was found that the State was

working out an agreement with the property owner

and then sending an ai^praiser out to make an appraisal supporting the settlement. An educational

pi'ogram prevented a continuation of this i^rocedure

and resulted in the property owners receiving the full appi'aised fair market value of their property.

The property owner has no role in the selection of

the appraisers for the acquiring agency. He is free,

however, to secure his own appraisals to guide him in

making his decision in subsequent negotiations. The

property owner is not always aware that sentiment or

long family tenure is of no use in determining the

value of his property. He will not receive more for

his property just because it has been in the family for

generations. Comparing the price offered w^ith the

price someone else received also is hazardous since no two situations are exactly the same. At the outset, the appraisers of land needed for

highways were often without training and experience.

The situation is entirely different today. The acquiring agencies employ appraisers who have been well

trained in their field through college courses and

training courses conducted by appraisal organizations

or the acquiring agencies themselves.

Negotiations

During the formative years (1941-1956) of rightof-way acquisition procedures, negotiations for rightsof-way often w'ere conducted by the person who

appraised the property. Usually, this person would

make a fair appraisal of the property being purchased. He would then call on the property owner

and after some discussion niake a verbal offer of some amount less than his appraisal. In these years many

property owners were not loiowledgeable about real

estate transactions. If the OAvner accepted the offer,

the acquiring agency "saved" the difference between

the appraisal and the offer, but the owner was actually

deprived of money that really belonged to him. If

the owner objected to the low offer, the appraiser/

negotiator would "horse trade" up to, or perhaps exceed, the amount of his appraisal. Under this system,

the knowledgeable person may have received more than

that to which he was entitled.

To help correct this inequity, BPR late in 1956

required that appraisal and negotiation functions be

separated. The appraiser would appraise the fair

market value, the reviewing appraiser would review

all appraisals and approve the amount to be offered

the property owner, a trained and qualified negotiator

would visit the property owner, explain the highway

improvement and the need for the property, and present in writing the amount approved by the reviewing

appraiser as the full fair market value of the property to be purchased. The negotiator would not have

authority to increase the amount of the written offer. Under certain prescribed conditions, the chief administrative officer, or other officials of the highway

department having final authority over right-of-way

matters, may make an administrative determination

whether a settlement should be attempted at an amount above that previously offered the property

owner. When a settlement is made on the basis of an

administrative determination and such a settlement

varies from the State review appraiser's determination of value, the file must contain a statement setting

forth the reason for the settlement.

In a few instances, a property owner refusing to

settle by negotiation has taken a case into court and

received a verdict less than the amount offered by the

acquiring agency. He then wanted to go back to the

amount offered. However, the acquiring agency was

bound by the court decision and could not pay more

than the court award.

360
Acquiring agencies make an effort to be extremely

fair with the property owner and, if there is^ a doubt,

to resolve it in his favor. The acquiring agency

normally will not go beyond the reasonable fair

market value. Occasional!}^ there are cases where

there is an honest difference of opinion as to value,

and in these instances, it is desirable to let a court decide the question.

It is recognized that sometimes there are hardships

resulting from taking property for which no just

compensation can be made. As a case in point, an

elderly couple had owned their home for many years. The wife had been blind for a number of those years, but because she knew the community, she could visit her friends, the stores, and other facilities within a

several-block radius unaccompanied. The family

agreed that the offer made for this home was, in fact,

generous, but moving the blind woman to a new

neighborhood was of genuine concern. Though the

couple had to move, here was a hardship for whicli

just compensation could not be legally paid.

In many cases, however, the situation of a family

that has to be relocated ends up for the better because

of strict regulations requiring health and safety

features. In a southern State, a man, his wife and 11

children, ranging in age from 6 months to 16 years,

lived in a three-room structure that the husband had

built. There were no plumbing facilities, and a fire- place provided the only heat. The husband was dis- abled and unemployed. The family subsisted largely on a $1,980 yearly allowance for aid to dependent

children.

The highway agency successfidly relocated the family to another house superior to their former dwelling.

The relocation officer was also instrumental in obtaining such necessities for the family as a stove, refrigerator, beds, bedding, furniture, and even clothing.

In this case, the relocation officer provided much more

than the strictly legal role required in the relocation

process, which is discussed later in this chapter.

As a result of the requirement for sound, supported

appraisals, appraisal review and independent negotiations, professionalism in the land acquisition organizations at all levels of government has been assured.

As will be seen later in this chapter, the i^resent Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 follows, to a great extent,

the procedures advocated and developed by the BPR

throughout the years. BPR's early directives required

the States to adopt acquisition practices which met

the same basic goals that the Act later embodied.

Disposition of Improvements

How best to dispose of buildings and appurtenances

purchased with land needed for highway rights-ofway is another important question involved in the

right-of-way operations. Originally the disposition

of improvements on the acquired right-of-way often was handled in an informal manner with no uniformity of treatment. A conunon form of disposition was

to include the buildings in the prime construction contract as a clearing item and let the contractor

dispose of them as he wislied. This was permitted

under a BPR right-of-way directive issued in 1956.

At times, however, the contractor would sell the improvements to the formei' owner or others for a consideral)le amount and at the same time receive payment

from the State for removing them from the right-ofway.

Since the contractor had no authority to operate

outside the right-of-way, a building that was only

partially within the I'ight-of-way was often partially

demolished leaving the remainder standing on the

private property. This resulted in situations that were costly to the private property owner to correct. To correct these situations, under current procedures, the owner of improvements and ai)purtenances on lands being acquired for right-of-way is allowed

the option of retaining them at a retention value pre- determined by the State through a c()mj)arative

process with improvements sold at public sale. If the owner does not wish to retain the improvements, the

acquiring agency will take title and sell them under

competitive conditions. The objective is to dispose of

the improvements by the method that will reflect the

greatest amoimt of credit to the project consistent

with equitable treatment for the former owner. Only

under unusual circumstances should they be included

in the construction contract as a clearing item. Where

leadtime is sufficient, acquired properties are leased

for private use on a short-term basis until tlie land is needed for construction of the highway.

Property in Public Ownership

Property in public ownership needed for highway

purposes is treated differently. Originally BPR did

not permit Federal participation in the cost of land

already in public ownership. However, participation was permitted in the removal, readjustment, repair, or restoration of facilities made necessary as a result

of the construction of the highway project. A later policy permitted Federal participation on the basis of

the appraisal of the property taken and the resulting

damages incurred. However, it proved to be difficult to determine the fair market value of public property,

such as a school, firehouse, library, etc., that is not

commonly bought and sold in the open market. In

many instances, the local government was subject to additional burdensome costs of replacing the public

facilities, since the old buildings could and would

have served their purposes for many years. Presently, when the State highway department

makes a request and can legally incur costs for the

functional replacement of real property and improvements in public ownership, Federal funds may participate in the costs if the functional replacement is determined to be in the overall public interest. The

costs are those necessary to replace the land and improvements being acquired with a similar needed facility having the same use. Usually, the present

buildings are old and out-of-date and the materials

with which they are constructed are often not available. The new buildings may be constructed with

modex'n materials and are required to be constructed

in accordance with present day local laws, building

codes, and reasonable prevailing standards in the area

for similar facilities. If the owning agency has suit- able land on which the new facility can be constructed,

payment may be made for the land taken for highway

purposes. If the owning agency does not have the

land, a replacement site may be purchased.

361
In order to widen Route 2 along the Ohio River, the West Virginia Department of Highioays specified prcsplitting and

benching of Round Hill. This project involved excavation of more than 5 million cubic yards of earth.

Advance Acquisition and Revolving Fund

As the highway program continued to expand, one major problem was insufficiency of leadtime for the

acquisition of rights-of-way. As soon as construction

plans were completed, right-of-way personnel were under constant pressure to acquire the right-of-way

so that the construction work could be advertised for

bids.

In order to encourage early acquisition of right-ofway, BPR issued a directive in July 1956 providing

that a State could be authorized to acquire right-ofway with its own funds and that later, when sufficient Federal funds were available, reimbursement for the

Fedei'al share of costs could be made back to the date

of authorization to proceed. Previously, it had been

customary for Federal funds to be available at the

time right-of-way acquisition was authorized.

The full requirements for land cannot be determined until the exact location of the highway is known and tlie final design is nearly completed. In

January 19.58, BPR issued a directive providing that

right-of-way acquisition could begin when the State

had indicated on maps or drawings the proposed

general location of the highway together with the

approximate limits of the right-of-way and they Avere acceptable to BPR. Federal funds could participate

in the right-of-way costs incurred at this early stage,

but before final reimbursement was made for the

right-of-way, the accounts had to be adjusted so that

Federal funds were finally used only for the land area

that was incorporated within the final right-of-way

widths.

Further right-of-way developments have made nec- essary the discontinuance of the above two procedures.

The first was in effect for about 20 years, and the

second for about 10 years. For the periods of time

the procedures were in effect, they helped acquire

rights-of-way expeditiously.

When right-of-way was acquired in advance, the

BPR and the State executed a project agreement

specifying that construction on the right-of-way

would be accomplished within a reasonable period of

362
time after acquisition. The Federal-Aid Highway

Act of 1956 provided for actual construction of a road on the right-of-way within 5 years. In 1959, the

time period was extended to 7 years, in 1973 to 10

years, and in 1976 Conoress provided that the period

could be extended beyond 10 years to whatever additional period was reasonable.

In the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Congress

established a right-of-way revolving fund for loans

to State highway departments to purchase right-ofAvay for future highway construction on any of the

Federal-aid systems. STo interest is to be charged.

The money can be used to pay both the State and

Federal shares of right-of-way acquisition, property

management costs, and for moving or relocation ex- penses of persons, businesses and farms. Actual construction on the right-of-way shall be connnenced not

less than 2 years (and as amended by later legislation) nor more than 10 years following the end of the fiscal year in which the cash advance is made unless a shorter or longer period is provided by FHWA.

Some advantages resulting from using the revolving fund are: • Additional leadtime for relocation of persons and

businesses. • Reduction of cost by purchasing land ahead of

rising prices. • Forestalling proposed private development on

land within the proposed right-of-way. • Acquisition of "hardship" parcels where the owner would suffer if purchase of his property were delayed.

Acquisition in advance was restricted b}' Congress

in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

Procedures developed under the Act provide for consideration of environmental aspects and approval of

the highway location before right-of-way purchases can be started, except in bona fide hardship cases. Prior to this Act, parcels could be purchased if they were in the probable limits of the proposed highway.

The size of the fund serves also as a restriction on

its use. Congress autliorized a total of only $300

million. However, administratively, about $50 million a year were pi'ovided to FHWA. One of the reasons for these financial limitations is that the fund

is to revolve. First a State borrows the money from

the fund for right-of-way acquisition on a specific

project. Sometime during the 2-year to 10-year period

the right-of-way is acquired, construction plans are completed, and the construction project is ready to be

advertised for bids. At this point in time, the State

must pay back 100 percent of its loan without interest. For the right-of-way purchased, the State must provide its matching share from its own revenues while

the Federal sliare will ])e paid from the current fiscal year highway funds for tlie project. The money paid

back to the revolving fund can then be loaned out

again to another State (or to the same State) for

another project and tlie whole piocess is repeated.

Uniform Real Property Acquisition Policy

With the entry in 1962 of BPR and the State highway departments into the field of relocation assistance

and payments, the problems incident to a multiplicity

of laws and procedures applicable to right-of-way

acquisition were increased. It was possible for a number of Federal and State agencies to be operating

in the same community at the same time, each under

its own individual laws and directives. Such a situation resulted in considerable differences in acquisition

procedures and in relocation assistance and payments

provided. This lack of imiformity, in many cases,

I'esulted in inequities to individuals.

As a case in point, there were two garment manufacturers across the street from each other. Their

businesses, buildings and equipment were comparable.

Under the then-existing Federal highway legislation,

the business whose property was being acquired for

highway purposes could be reimbursed the maximum

of $3,000 for moving expenses. The other owner

whose biisiness was being taken for an urban renewal

project could receive up to $25,000 for moving. The

owner whose property was being acquired for highway purposes was understandably upset at the differ- ence in treatment. To assure consistent treatment to owners by the

many Federal programs and to promote public confidence in Federal land acquisition practices, Congress

enacted the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real

Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. This Act was applicable to all Federal agencies and established a uniform policy on land acquisition practices for

their guidance.

FHWA, to implement this Act, issued policy directives which are being followed by the individual State

highway departments and makes periodic reviews to assure that the intent of the Act is being carried out.

Relocation

Relocation Assistance and Payments

As more and more property became essential for

the construction of the Interstate System and other

highways, it became apparent that the "fair market

value" concept as a basis for payment to the property owner did not completely reimburse him for his costs and required some persons to siiffer disproportionate

injuries. The cost of moving personal property, lo- cating substitute housing, making adjustments to new

quarters, utility deposits and fees, damages to property moved, higher rental payments, etc., were not a part of fair market value and often worked an ex- treme hardship on those whose property was being

acquired or who were forced to move from rental

premises. In the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962,

Congress required that the State higlaway departments

provide relocation advisory assistance to individuals

and families displaced by acquisition or clearance of

right-of-way for any Federal-aid highway. That Act

also permitted BPR to reimburse, as part of the cost of construction, such relocation payments as the State

highway departments might make to persons for their

moving expenses from the property. While the relo- cation advisory assistance services were mandatory,

the relocation payments were not. The payment fea- ture was entirely dependent upon State law, but few

States actually provided monetary reimbursement to people forced to move.

363
As the need for a national payment program for

relocation became increasingly urgent, Congress in- cluded in the 1968 Act the first mandatory payment

program for people who must relocate because of

Federal-aid highway construction. The legislation

established provisions to assist individuals, families,

businesses and nonprofit organizations in avoiding the

human and economic shock that can resvdt from in- voluntary displacement. The purpose of the new law was twofold: (1) To aid the national goal of providing every citizen with decent, safe and sanitary housing, and (2) to reduce the inequities of a strict application of the fair market value concept to Federal-aid highway right-of-Avay acquisitions.

Principal provisions of the law were that: • Each individual or family displaced must receive a scheduled moving expense and dislocation al- lowance or actual moving expenses. • Businesses, farms and nonprofit organizations

must receive their actual moving expenses or a lump sum payment based on an established formula in lieu of actual moving expenses. Payment

was also permitted when they discontinued their

operations because of displacement. • Owner occupants could receive a payment above

fair market value for their homes to assure their

ability to obtain decent, safe and sanitary replacement housing at least comparable to the homes

taken with designated upper limits. Decent, safe

and sanitary housing standards were established

by FHWA.

• Tenants could receive a payment to enable them

to rent comparable rental housing or purchase re- placement housing within a specified upper limit. • Each State highway department was required to provide relocation advisory service to those being

displaced.

Last Resort Housing

While the relocation advisory assistance and payments required by the 1968 Highway Act were a needed addition to the fair market value payments,

they did not take care of the situations where decent,

safe and sanitary replacement housing simply was not

available. In some communities, decent, safe and

sanitary housing is nearly impossible to find within

the economic means of those being displaced. Therefore, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 authorDuring right-of-way acquisition, sometimes moving a house

intact is a part of the relocation agreement.

ized, as part of the cost of highway construction, the

inclusion of the construction of existing housing to serve as replacement housing. Through this "last re- sort housing," the highway agency could release a tied-up project by rehabilitating or constructing

homes or apartments for the displaced pex'sons. Thus, no person woidd be required to move from his dwelling unless replacement housing was available.

The 1970 Highway Act also provided that the dis- placed dwelling owner could be compensated for any

increased interest costs that such owner was required

to pay for financing the acquisition of his new

dwelling.

The precedents established in the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1968 and the additional emphasis

supplied by the FHAVA and the highway industry

during the hearings on the 1970 Highway Act greatly

influenced the Congress to enact the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. The 1970 Uniform Act, which

nullified the relocation requirements of previous highway acts as well as those of other Federal legislation,

authorized last resort housing when

• An adequate supply of comparable decent, safe

and sanitary replacement housing is not available

for those persons to be displaced (either from

public housing agencies or private enterprise). • Comparable decent, safe and sanitary replacement

housing cannot be purchased for the maximum

payment of $15,000 in addition to the purchase

price of the displaced person's present dwelling. • Comparable decent, safe and sanitary housing

cannot be rented over a 4-year period for the

maximum payment of $4,000 in addition to the

rent presently being paid.

Current Status of Relocation Procedures

In addition to making decent, safe and sanitary

housing available to all those displaced, the relocation

program has, in general, not only been instrumental

in assisting those persons required to move to improve

the quality of their housing and standard of living,

but has also been instrumental in assisting many ten- ants to become homeowners.

The replacement housing payments and additional

benefits, plus the authority to provide replacement

housing as a last resort, facilitates the move, minimizes the hardship, and assists in the improvement

of the quality of life for most persons involuntarily

displaced.

The magnitude of the relocation program is re- vealed by the reports received from the States. In

fiscal year 1975, the Federal-aid highway program

relocated 21,162 persons from 8,605 dwelling units.

The average moving cost payment was $410 per claim.

In addition, 2,186 businesses were displaced at an

average moving most of $4,544; 116 farms at an aver- age moving cost of $1,075; and 103 nonpi'ofit organizations at an average moving cost of $916.

Of the total number of people displaced in fiscal year 1975, 44 percent were owners and 56 percent were tenants. Of the 21,162 people displaced, 24

percent were minorities. About 70 percent of the

residential units acquired represented housing over

$6,000 in value or renting for over $60 per month.

364
The motorist's vieivpomt ivas one of the design factors in the planning and construction of Junipero Serra Freeioay in San Bruno, California. A long range landscaping program was carefully planned for the

entire route. Trees within the right-of-way were either preserved or transplanted.

Replacement housing payments to OAvners averaged,

nationally, $4,755 and to tenants $1,137. The moving

cost payments and replacement housing payments

were supplementary to the payments made for the

pro^Derty taken under the "fair market value" concept

and represent the expanding concept of preventing,

to the extent possible, hardships upon the individuals

who are relocated because of the construction of a highway.

Location

A phase of highway construction which is closely

related to right-of-way is highway location. During

the early years of highway development, the emphasis was almost exclusively on the engineering features of

such location. Unless the highway was solely a land

service facility, the highway agency attempted to find

the most direct lines between the points that they

wanted to serve and to develop the most economical

way, in engineering terms, of building adequate roads

along these direct lines. They sought easy grades, the

shortest possible river crossings, and generally adopted

the lowest priced adequate solution that could be

found. This resulted in many hardships to the property owners for, too often, little consideration was

given to their needs and the needs of the community

as a whole. A trial attorney once remarked that it appeared to him that the engineers' procedure was

first to find a farmer's Avater supply and then make

that the centerline of the highway. While this judgment is harsh, it is clear all too often that a little consideration of right-of-way costs and damages at the location stage could have materially lowered the

cost of right-of-way and of the total highway project.

It has been understood that right-of-way personnel

should not determine the location of a highway. That

has always been an engineering detei'mination. However, the engineer should have input from the rightof-way man as to property costs and damages to

assist him in making his engineering determination.

As an example of this, a highway preliminary loca- tion ran through the middle of an airstrip. The

right-of-way man estimated damages at nearly

$400,000. A restudy was made, and a slight realinement resulted in taking only a portion off one end of

the airstrip. The damages were reduced to well under

$100,000. In addition, construction costs on the new

location were several thousand dollars less than they

would have been on the original location.

Another situation involved a very minor acquisition

from an iceplant which would have resulted in a major claim for damages because of having to relocate

and rearrange the freezing apparatus. A restudy

resulted in a sliglit relocation that avoided taking any

portion of the iceplant.

366
Beginning about 1950 and rapidly developing in

importance since that time, sociological and economic

impacts on communities have become the pi'incipal

and often overriding factors in the location select ioi\ process. This has been particularly true in the more

densely settled areas of the country. People who in

the past wanted a highway in order to have a way to get places suddenly did not want that same highway

reconstructed near their residences to attract and bet- ter serve large noisy volumes of traffic in which they

had no particular interest. Over the last few years,

esthetic values have become more and more important,

and this emphasis, of course, has culminated in the

current determination to preserve and enhance the

environment.

The highway location problems now are to find

those places to build the roads that will provide an

adequate highway facility for the particular traffic to be served and, at the same time, cause a minimal dis- ruption of families, a minimum disturbance of the

landscape, and the least adverse effect on such things

as established school districts, church parishes, park

areas and historical sites. The FHWA's role in location is largely to make certain that State highway

departments have placed in proper relationship the

various engineering, social, and environmental ele- ments of highway location.

The Environment

Pollution in the Horse and Buggy Era "King Mud" was the environmental problem that

most concerned the early traveler. Farmer and vil- lager, horseman and wagoner, to all of them, the mud

of the roadway was an unwelcome but frequent companion. Large towns might be isolated for days after a heavy rain. Horses floundering up to their bellies

in thick mud were a common sight, and the farmer,

unable to get his produce to markets that were empty, was confronted with spoilage and loss of income. The

better roads were found primarily in the major cities,

where carriages and wagons of many different kinds were in daily use. As the number of conveyances in- creased, so did the number of horses that pulled them,

and as the horses multiplied, they began to be denounced as polluters of the environment in harsh

terms similar to those applied to automobiles today.

Nineteenth century urban life generally moved at the pace of horsedrawn transportation. Evidence of

the horse could not be missed. It was seen in the

piles of manure littering the streets, attracting swarms

of flies and creating a stench, and in the numerous

livery stables that let loose an odor that could only mean "horse." ^ The city streets were usually the

repository for overworked, mistreated horses that

died making their rounds. Atlantic Monthly, in an

1866 article described Broadway as clogged with

" 'dead horses and vehicular entanglements.' " The

carcasses added another dimension to the smells and

the swarms of flies. In 1880, Xew York City removed some 15,000 dead horses from its streets, and Chicago

carted away nearly 10,000 horses as late as 1912.'' Because of this problem, tlie cities constantly feared

epidemics of cholera, smallpox, yellow fever, or typhoid. Medical authorities blamed the spread of

these diseases on filth in the atmosphere and believed

that the horse was the chief offender. In 1752, Boston

authorities voted funds to clean the streets to avoid

smallpox infection, and in 1795 during the yellow

fever season, they asked neighboring farmers to collect manure from the streets, free of charge.^ Even

in 1908, Appleton's Magazine, in an article "The

Horse v. Health," blamed most of the sanitary and

economic problems of cities on the horse. The article

calculated that the horse problem cost NeAv York City some $100 million each year.^

However, disease was not the only hazard caused by

the horse. Even in the I700's, noise pollution was

already becoming a problem in the cities. The clopping and clanking of horses' iron shoes and the irontired wheels of carts and wagons made ear-shattering

sounds on cobblestone pavements. Boston, in 1747,

banned traffic from a major street so that noise would

not disturb the sessions of the General Court. Later

Benjamin Franklin noted the " 'thundering of coaches,

chariots, chaises, waggons, drays, and the whole fraternity of noise' " that offended the ears of Philadelphians. A New York ordinance in 1785 banned teams

and wagons with iron-shod wheels from the streets, and as late as the 1890's, an article in Scientific

American referred to the sounds of traffic on busy New

York streets as making conversation difficult.'' The solution to these problems, critics agreed, was

the horseless carriage. As the motor car and the

truck began to replace the horse, benefits were clearly

seen. Streets were cleaner, pollution from manure

was diminished, the number of flies dropped, goods were transported more cheaply and more efficiently,

and traffic moved faster. By the early part of this

century, the advantages of the motor vehicle over the

horse were accepted in nearly every quarter.

The Conquest of Mud and Dust While the motor vehicle gradually diminished the

problem of sanitation, it was beginning to show some

of its own disadvantages. Mud in the rainy periods

and dust in dry continued to plague the traveler

through the close of the 19th century and well into

the 20th, and the automobile seemed to only exasperate

this problem.

Dust, although a minor factor, still bothered anyone

riding, driving or walking on or near a highway.

" 'The dust raised by an automobile, when running at a rate of less than twenty miles an hour, is not any

worse than that raised by many wagons, but when

this limit is exceeded, the automobile becomes the

dust nuisance.' "

^^ Many methods were used to try to control the mud

and dust problem. Sprinkling roads with crude oil or absorbent salts, while effective, was considered too expensive, and water was recommended to provide

" 'a better, smoother and more dustless surface than

we now enjoy.' " ^^ Martin Dodge, Director of the Office of Public

Road Inquiries, reported on an experimental road

project in the District of Columbia in 1900. This

project, the Queens Chapel Road in the District of

Columbia, was selected for a controlled oiling application for dust control. The annual report stated:

"This road was treated several weeks ago and so far

as we are now able to judge the new system is a suc366
cess as a dust settler. ... It is claimed by some that

the application of crude oil will make a surface impervious to water and consequently free from frost

and mud. If this be the case, oil will supersede <>ravel and stone in the improvement of country roads." ^- "With the various types of surfaces becoming available at the turn of the century, there was much dis- cussion as to the merit of each. Some of the criteria

usually taken into consideration were smoothness of

ride, durability, ease of repair, cost, etc. However,

thoufrh very mucli in a minority, there were those

who ar<i;ued for and developed experiments on the

health factors of various surfaces.

The Beginnings of Roadside Beautification

Other early concerns with environmental otl'octs of

hi<rhways were basically limited to beautification, and

that apparently was not a hi<>"h priority issue with

roadbuilders. "The efiort to promote the beautifying

of the liighways by plantinu' of shade ti-ees has not

received the I'ccognition and attention that it deserves,"

noted a speaker at tlie turn of the century. "A wellshaded road makes the work of the heavily laden

team easier, and greatly enliances the delight of the

man who is traveling for pleasure," he remarked,

appealing to the wealthy to supply the funds to carry

out "embellishment" of roadways."

In 1900 the Office of Public Roads issued Farmers'

Bulletin Xo. 338 in which roadside development along

macadam roads was discussed as follows

Xo matter how smooth and well constructed the trav- eled road may I)e, if the roadsides are not cared for, the highway as a whole will not give a good impression. All rubbish sliould he removed ; the excavations should be

filled and emlianknients smoothed and planted with grass wherever it will grow. Unsightly brush should be cut and grubbed out. Sometimes, however, the brush and

small trees, if suitably trimmed, add to the attractiveness

of the roadside.

All trees that are ornamental or which have value as shade trees should be preseiwed and protected, unless they grow so close together as to make a dense shade. . .

Care in the selection of the kinds of trees best suited to the locality is important."

By 1915 highway development had progressed to a degree that more environmental factors Avere being

considered. Some of these factors were enumerated

Graj/ birch trees loere planted along this Massachusetts

highway in 1928 to improve its appearance and to shade the highway.

Highway Utter removal was of concern in Delaware

as early as 1927.

in OPK Farmers' Bulletin Xo. 505. In an article

entitled Be/wfifs of Improved Roa(h, the following

items of social advantages were listed: (1) Improvement of schools, (2) improvement of rural delivery

service, (3) improvement of social conditions.

The esthetic value of roads well built and clean is sometimes reluctantly conceded or even denied by individuals.

It is noticeaV)le, however, that along improved roads there

is a visible tendency for farmers to improve the appear- ance of their homes and their outbuildings. . . . The

improved road not only has an esthetic value in itself, but it is potent in awakening the dwellers along its borders

to a sense of esthetic values in farm buildings and home

surroundings.

Social activities in rural communities need all the en- couragement and stimulus that can reasonably be given. All social activities take time and energy, and the countryroad condition therefore is a prime consideration to enable farmers and their families to afford time for social inter- course." Over the ensuing two decades, engineers periodically pointed to the esthetic advantages of tree planting. In 1920 a State highway connnissioner called

for the adoption in his State of the slogan "scenic

betterment," while at the same time warning against

the destruction of roadside beauty by billboards.^*^ In 1929, after describing in detail his State's program,

another official insisted that "the business of roadside

beautification" be made permanent. "It can never be

finished" he concluded." In an article in 1930, titled "Uncle Sam Considers Roadsides," Chief MacDonald

stated

Planting shade trees along highways is a necessary complement to surfacing of roadways, the Bureau believes. A number of States had started, with their own resources, improvement of roadsides l)efore passage of the amendment of the Federal Highway Act, autliorizing Federal

participation in planting shade trees along higliways in the Federal-aid system. Recognizing that the first duty

of the State Highway Departments is to surface highways,

the Bureau does not wish to force States to resort to Federal aid in tree-planting nor to lead States to begin

tree-planting until they are ready for it. But it will use

its influence to bring al)0ut adoption of suitable provisions

in all States to enable this work to be done. Correlated with roadside beautification is the problem

of ridding the main traveled liighways of the blatant commercial advertising signs. While the Bureau has no

authority to correct what often proves a menace to safe

driving, it has done what it could toward eliminating the

billboards by developing popular sentiment against them.

It is on the main traveled highways of the country that the billl)oards az-e concentrated."

367
Recognizing the lure of pleasiue driving, some

States could see roadways as integral pai-ts of the

parks they were beginning to build. One of the

earliest efforts in this direction was New York City's

Central Park, opened in 1862, with an excellent sys- tem of roadways for horsedrawn vehicles.^" One of

the earliest parks with boulevards to be completed as a total system was constructed in Kansas City, Missouri, with the original designs dating back to 1893.-" New York's Bronx River Parkway was the first parlcAvay in the "Westchester County system, a system

that in 1925 pioneered the limited access scenic road.-^

In 1928 the Bureau of Public Roads made its entry

into construction of national parkways. With a mandate to complete a highway from Washington, D.C.,

to Mount Vernon in Virginia, the Bureau, using

knowledge gained in observing the development of

the Westchester County parkway system, attacked the

problem of coordinating design, location, landscaping

and construction into a finished parkway that would

befit an approach to the home of our First President.

This, the Mount Vernon Memorial Parkway, was the

first major project to which the Bureau assigned a

full-time landscape architect. From the construction

of this project, a new awareness of the relationship of

landscaping to construction, design, and maintenance was established at the Federal level. In 1932 the American Association of State Highway

Officials joined Avith the Highway Research Board in

the appointment of a Joint Committee on Roadside

Development. During the next 8 years, the Joint

Committee prepared and published a number of re- ports. By 1940 it was felt that the field had enlarged

to the point of justifying some degree of specialization.

Accordingly, the Joint Committee was replaced by a committee appointed by HRB to continue research

activities and a committee appointed by AASHO to concentrate on administrative issues. As a means of exchanging ideas on all aspects of

roadside development, the Ohio Department of Highways and the Department of Landscape Architecture

of Ohio State University began sponsoring in 1941 an

annual Short Course on Roadside Development which

has developed over the years into a national conference.

The proceedings of the conference are published each

year to disseminate the latest information.

With increasing interest in the subject. Congress

proceeded to include in the Federal-Aid Highway Act

of 1938 approval for the use of construction funds to cover tcosts of roadside and landscape development.

This measure established a new standard for Federal

assistance in meeting costs beyond those incurx'ed for

purely engineering needs. As a result, many roadside

development activities Avere carired out. Nevertheless,

the provisions were permissive only, and since the

funds came from amounts otherAvise earmarked for

construction, there Avas a reluctance by a number of

States to allocate moneys to roadside development at the expense of badly needed neAV highways. It was

not until the HigliAvay Beautification Act of 1965

provided separate funding for roadside dcA-elopment

that States really took advantage of this permissiA^e

legislation.

A junkyard along the Baltimore-Washington Expressivay in Anne Arundel County is effectively screened with wood slats and with vines planted along the fence.

368
Scenic Enhancement Programs

Roadside development proo^rams were normally limited to areas within right-of-way lines to improve

appearance and safety, to provide amenities for the

travelinp- public, to facilitate maintenance, and to control runoff and erosion. Development of private land on the other side of these lines mip-ht greatly affect the capacity or the safety of tlie higlnvay or the view

seen by the motorist, but normally this development

could only be controlled through such measures as zoning, and this Avas considered, by State higliway

officials, to be the province of local governments.

Gradually, however, it was realized that highway

agencies had a legitimate interest in what took place on the other side of right-of-way lines. A paper pre- sented at tlie 1940 AASITO convention, for example,

advocated empowering State highway departments to apply roadside zoning along major arteries.^- Nothing came of that recommendation, but Congress did, in

the 19-40 Highway Act, authorize the use of up to 3

percent of apportioned Federal funds, without State

matching, for the purchase of land beyond normal

right-of-way lines to preserve natural beauty. As with

roadside development, funds used for such purchases came from amounts otherwise available for construction, and only limited use was made of this authorization. Again, separate funding for this program was

also provided later by the Highway Beautification Act

of 1965.

Parkways and Scenic Roads

During the 1920's and 1930's, a few new roads were

built with major attention to enhancing the pleasure

of driving. These included parkways constructed by

State and county agencies, national parkways, and a number of scenic roads in national forests. World

War II brought a stop to these programs. After the war, woxiv resumed on scenic roads in national forests,

and several State-sponsored scenic road programs were

initiated, notably in California and Wisconsin. A few new parlvAvays were built, but aside from these, the

parkway program never really developed again. Parkways became increasingly exi^ensive and the prohibition of truck traffic—one of the characteristics of

parkways—was a factor in its loss of popularity.

'\Vhile parkways were not barred from inclusion in

the Federal-aid program, the Bureau of Public Roads

had reservations about making Federal-aid funds available for highways from Avhich trucks were banned.

Bureau personnel did, however, participate in a comprehensive reoprt proposing an extensive program of

parkways and scenic roads which was prepared for

the President's Council on Recreation and Natural

Beauty bj' the Department of Commerce and released

in 1966."' Highway Beautification Act One of the high points in this country's efforts to impi'ove the appearance of highways has been the

Highway Beautification Act of 1965. Basically it authorized a threefold program

• Outdoor Advertising Control. Certain types of

signs adjacent to primary and Interstate highways

were to be removed, and States were required to adopt legislation, if necessarv. controlling new

signs. Compensation was to be mandatory and

Federal aid was to be available for 75 percent of

the costs. States failing to comply were to be

subject to a 10 percent loss of Federal highway

aid. There were certain important limitations in

the Act: on-premise signs were excluded; control

extended only 660-feet from the higliway right-ofway ; signs in commercial or industrial areas could

be controlled but not eliminated ; and Federal-aid

secondary highways were not covered.* • Jxinkyard Control. Certain existing junkyards

along Interstate or primary highways were to be

removed or screened, and States were to adopt

legislation, if necessary, controlling new junkyards. Federal assistance was to be available for

75 percent of the cost of the program. States

failing to comply were to be subject to a 10 percent

loss of Federal highway aid. Again, there wei*e

important limitations: control extended only 1,000

feet from the highway right-of-way and Federalaid secondary highways were not covered. • Scenic Enkancement. Alternative financing from

general funds without State matching funds was

established for the scenic enhancement and roadside development prograuis previously authorized.

In addition, scenic easements were authorized and

funds could be used not only for new projects,

but also for existing highways on the Federal-aid

system.

Progress imder the Highway Beautification Act was

at first quite slow, due perhaps to lack of moneys.

Within the last 5 years, however, appropriations have

increased and considerable progress has been made.

All States, for example, have now adopted the re- quired control legislation for outdoor advertising and

junkyards.

An Expanding Environmental Perspective

Although highway administrators had long con- sidered the advantages and disadvantages of road lo- cations and design features, recognition of the various

adverse impacts of the highway have only fairly

recently been expanded and quantified. There are a number of reasons for this lack of earlier awareness. Most important, perhaps, was the fact that prior to the mid-1950's few entirely new major highways were

built. Efforts were focused upon the improvement of

existing routes. Surfaces were paved or repaved, lanes were widened or added, and curves or grades were

smoothed. Occasionally short stretches of road were

realined or additional rights-of-way were needed for

other improvements, but generally the original alinement was preserved and little, if any, additional land was acquired.

Properties which, in the 1950's, were located next to major highways with heavy traffic flows were not

placed in this situation suddenly or unexpectedly.

The highways had evolved from impaved country

roads in stages over a period of years. During any

one stage, traffic increased steadily, but gradually,

year-by-year. The final impact may have been substantial, but since it was imposed bit-by-bit, there was time for adjustment and usually little, if any,

protest. In addition, many adjacent properties became

suitable for roadside commercial uses and land values

* The 660-foot limitation was removed by the Federal-Aid

Highway Amendment of 1974.

369
increased accordingly. In such instances, owners re- garded the improvement of the highway and the

growth of traffic as an asset rather than a nuisance.

Much of the Federal-aid program took place in

rural or undeveloped areas—urban projects were not

eligible prior to the mid-1930's, and it was not until

the 1944 Highway Act that a continuing program for

Federal assistance to urban projects was established.

Many of the adverse impacts of highways upon the

environment were, of course, minimal in rural or imdeveloped areas. Generally speaking, neither noise nor air pollution were significant problems either in

the early years. The ecology' of the areas traversed

may have been affected, but it has only been in recent

years, with the general recognition of the interdependent nature of the biosphere, that there has been

serious recognition of this possibility.

A matter of priorities also shaped the perspective

of these years. In 1920, there were 8 million passenger

cars, but by 1930 the number had expanded to 23 million and in 1940, to 27 million cars. This rapid ex- pansion loosened the restraints of fixed transit systems,

and suburbia, with access provided by the automobile,

became a way of life for millions. Little attention was being paid to the possible adverse effects of cars and trucks on the environment, for the emphasis was

on building or improving the roads and building them

faster to meet the burgeoning demand.

The socio-economic and political dislocations of the

thirties and forties also diverted attention from the

environmental effects of highways. The Depression

of the 1930's resulted in the encouragement of highway

construction as a means of relieving unemployment,

with little thought given to possible side effects. Similarly, during World War II, highway construction was devoted to projects needed to support the war

effort, no matter what their environmental conse- quences.

The Bureau of Public Roads did, however, take a

step in the instigation of an environmental concern in

the early 1950's. W. J. Keller, BPR Division Engineer in New Mexico, felt a program had to be developed to preserve a record of our past that was being

lost through highway construction. He envisioned a program for identifying archeological and paleontological sites prior to road construction. Keller vis- ualized a three-way partnership—the BPR, the State

highway department and the Museum of New Mexico.

Because of the working relationship developed, the

INIuseum recovered many items during 7 years of operation at 89 sites. More important to the Nation, Congress granted specific authority in the 1956 Federal-aid

highway legislation with respect to archeological and

paleontological salvage.

An economic issue affecting urban merchants was

the first general intimation that highway projects

could yield environmental problems as well as benefits. In improving existing highways, the major flow of

through traffic was channeled along the main shopping

streets of towns and cities. The merchants viewed

the cars passing their stores as carrying potential cus- tomers and were pleased when the numbers of cars

increased. From the standpoint of the motorist and

the highway engineer, however, shopping districts were

frequently bottlenecks causing congestion and delays.

Due to existing development, street widening to relieve

the congestion was usually out of the question, and,

thus, the obvious solution became a new highway bypassing built-up areas. Proposed bypasses were often bitterly resisted by

central-city merchants fearing substantial losses in

business by the diversion of traffic from downtown

streets. Highway builders argued that most through

traffic had no interest in shopping and that its presence on business district streets simply interfered with local

traffic which did desire to shop. The resulting conU.S. Route 48 toinds through western Maryland, not far from the trail followed by General Braddock

in the French and Indian War. Freeflowing alinement, wide medians and independently

sited roadways Mend ivell with the picturesque and historic countryside.

370
troversies led, in many cases to economic sui-veys and

studies designed to ascertain what the facts actually were. Typically these studies showed mixed results; some businesses suffered from the diversion of through

traffic, some benefitted, and some were little affected. This issue, which first surfaced in the yeai-s just

prior to World AVar II, reached a peak during tlie 1950's, and then gradually disappeared. Traffic vol- umes became so large that it was very apparent that

they could no longer be carried on existing urban

arteries. A number of other developments, starting in the

mid-1950's, served to focus attention on the effects that highways miglit have on adjacent areas. Prominent among these was the increasing reliance upon

freeways for the safe and effiicent handling of major

traffic flows. In developed areas, controlled access and

other characteristics of freeways were extremely diffi- cult to achieve by upgrading existing highways. New

freeways, therefore, were nearly always constructed

along new alinements, and thus, their impacts upon

adjacent areas were imposed suddenly and without

time for adjustment.

Many of the new freeways in the Interstate and

other programs were located in or near the large ur- ban areas Avliere traffic demand was the heaviest. These were also the areas where the possibilities for dis- placement from homes and businesses were the greatest

and where such adverse effects as noise and air pollution were most keenly felt. An awareness of the hazards caused by vehicular

emissions and poor air quality, in general, also basically

developed only in the last 10 to 15 years. The density

of smog over a number of large urban areas warning

of future dangers dramatically brought a heightened

environmental consciousness to the people at large and

increased the demands for corrective action.

Responses to Environmental Awareness

Increased awarene&s of the environmental effects of highways has led to a variety of responses by Congress, by the FHWA, and in some instances by other

agenices or organizations. Some of the congi*essional

actions have been additions or amendments to basic

highway legislation, but others, such as the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), apply

to a wide range of Federal programs, including highways.

Public Hearings

Lai'gely as a result of the bypass controversy, Congress, in the 1950 Federal-Aid Highway Act, required

State highway departments to hold piiblic hearings

for all projects bypassing cities or towns. In 1956

this requirement was enlarged by requiring public

hearings (or the opportunity for hearings afforded)

for routes going tlirough cities or towns as well as those bypassing cities or towns. Two years later, in

the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, the public hearing requirement was applied to Interstate projects.

In effect, public hearings are now necessai-y for all major projects and for projects of any size which

have generated public interest or controversy.

In 1969 the FHWA released new detailed provisions

requiring that two hearings (or the opportunity for

them) be held for each important project, one at the

location stage and the other at the design stage. Later,

in 1974, however, this two-hearing requirement was

modified. New regulations permit a State to omit one

of the hearings providing its Action Plan* spells out

acceptable alternative procedures for accomplishing

the same objectives.

* Action Plans are discussed later in this chapter.

Erosion control dnring consfructio?! is aided by these silt fence installations along the Natchez Trace Parkway. Other methods used are temporary riprap at culvert inlets, plastic sheetiiH/ to carry cross drainage, and brush barriers

in conjunction with filter fabric on embankments.

371
Consideration of Social, Economic, and Environmental

Factors In addition to holdinjj; public hearings, CongTess, in

1950 and 1956, required that consideration be given

to the economic effects of routes bypassing or going

through urban areas. In the 1968 liighway legislation,

it specified that social and environmental effects of

such projects be considered and be consistent with "the

goals and objectives of such urban planning as have

been promulgated by the community."

Meanwhile, BPR recognized pressures for increased

evaluation of alternative alinements during the route

location process and for more attention to social, eco- nomic, and environmental factors. Accordingly, in

1961 the Bureau issued a directive emphasizing the

need for full consideration of all reasonable alternative alinements and listing approximately 20 social,

economic, and environmental factors to be studied and

evaluated, if applicable, in the process of investigating

alternatives.

Interdisciplinary Studies and Joint Development Per- spective

As the importance of environmental considerations

became increasingly apparent during the 1960's, BPR

was receptive to innovative approaches to achieve

greater compatibility between highways and adjacent

land uses. These efforts have taken several forms: • Special studies of critical segments of highways,

usually on the Interstate System, have been undertaken by interdisciplinary groups, sometimes re- ferred to as design concept teams. Such studies

focused not only on the design of the highway,

but also on the planning or replanning of the

adjacent areas.* This type of study is still being

made, but the trend has been towards the utilization of in-house professional skills or established

planning agencies rather than the creation of a one-time team of outside experts.

* An excell<>nt discussion on tliis subject is presented in Urban Highway Design Teams, publislied by tlie Higliway

Users Federation for Safety and Mobility.

A doiontoion mini-mall joint development project in Tvnn Falls, Idaho.
• Joint development of highway rights-of-way has

been encouraged so as to acconiinodate otlier uses

^Yhich, by their nature or design, coukl be ren- dered compatible with the liighway. Such uses might be located over or under the higliway or, right-of-way lines permitting, beside the highway.

Joint development projects frecjuently provide for

parking facilities, parks, and recreation areas; other uses have included buildings, both public

and private, and mass transportation facilities,

such as rail rapid transit lines. • Trails within highway rights-of-way form a special category of joint development. "Within the

last few 3'eai-s, there has been greatly increased

interest in bicycling as a healthy form of recreation, an economical transportation mode, and a

significant means of conserving energy. In 1971,

the FHWA issued a notice urging States to give

favorable consideration to the inclusion of bicycle or hiking trails within highway rights-of-way

The location of 1-66 in Virginia teas altered to save historic Beverly's Mill near Middleburg.

under appropriate conditions. Two yeai-s later this notice was expanded and indicated that Federal highway funds could be used in the cost of

trails included in highwa}^ projects.

During 1973 Congi-ess carried this program one

step further by authorizing in the highway legislation the use of Federal funds, otherwise available to States for highway purposes, for the

provision of separate bikeways or walkways up

to a total of $40 million per year. • In 1965, the Federal Highway Administrator

brought together a group of eight distinguished

professionals—representing engineers, architects,

landscape architects, and planners—and requested

that they prepare a set of guidelines for the planning and design of urban expressways. The

product of their work was The Freeway in the

City, issued in May 1968. The report contained

many unusual and innovative proposals and rep- resented the most advanced thinking of its time on the problem of fitting a freeway into an urban

setting.

Protection for Parks, Recreation Areas, Wildlife and

Waterfowl Refuges, and Historic Sites Lands in parks, recreation areas, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites have particular en- vironmental significance. Preservation has emerged

as a conscious consideration in public works programs

and in the public's mind only in the last two decades.

Preservation had always been a latent concern in good

engineering practice.

One of the first movements for historic preservation came about in the 19tli century when Miss Ann Pamela

Cunningham and her Mount Vernon Ladies Association decided to preserve General George Washington's

home, Mount Vernon. This was and still is today a purely private effort. The current phase of preservation that is discerned

today is the environmental approach. Historic preser- vation was conceived as a facet of the physical en- vironment to be reflected in its total view. Historic

districts and restrictive zoning came about. Incor- porating sympathetic modern transportation facilities in these areas has presented the highway engineer

with many challenges.

As historic preservation has developed, legislative

mandates have helped define its direction and goals

and often presented interesting parallels with the

highway program. In 1906, the Antiquities Act was

passed which gave the Secretary of the Department

of the Interior responsibility for prehistoric and his- toric sites on Federal lands. In 1916, the year of the

first highway act, the National Park Service Act was

passed which included preservation of historic parks.

In 1935, the Historic Sites Act announced a national

policy to preserve for public use historic resources. This Act was the culmination of tlie associative value

and inherent architectural merit phases of tlie preser- vation movement and exists today in the National

Historic Landmark Program.

373
As the environmental phase of preservation was

developing, a legislative intei'lude occurred. Xot until

1966 was the envii-onmental phase recognized in the

National Historic Preservation Act which called for a national inventory of historic resources (including

historic districts) whose value could be national, State

or local in significance. Also, these sites were ex- tended a protective umbrella that required special

planning consideration for historic resources affected

by Federal public works projects. This same year

the Department of Transportation Act was passed in- cluding paragraph 4(f) which reflected national con- cern for historic sites and mandated that lands from

historic sites, public parks, recreation areas, etc., were

to be protected. This provision has been incorporated

into section 138 of title 23, U.S.C. Highways, as follows

. . . the Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of any publicly owned land

from a public parlc, recreation area, or wildlife and water- fowl refuge of national, State, or local significance . . . or any land from an historic site of national, State, or

local significance . . . unless (1) there is no feasible and

prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such

program includes all possible planning to minimize

harm. . . .* Since 1966 there have been several more policy re- finements. In 1969, the National Environmental Policy Act set forth a national policy in this area which

includes liistoric resources. In 1971 Presidential Executive Order No. 11593 put the Executive Department

deei^ly into the environmental phase of the historic

preservation movement. Most recently has been the

1974 Archeological and Historic Preservation Act

which has liberalized funding requirements for Federal agencies to spend moneys on preservation activities.

* This language is quite similar to that used in section 4(f)

of the 1966 Department of Transportation Act, and this re- quirement has since been identified as section 4(f). Sponsors

of projects coming within the bounds of section 4(f) are re- quired to demonstrate compliance with its requirements to the

satisfaction of DOT.

Other Federal Environmental Requirements and the

Highways

There are now numerous Federal environmental

laws and regulations relating to a wide range of Federal or Federal-aid programs, of which the Federalaid highway program is only one. To the extent that

highway projects are affected, they must and do comply. The inore significant of these measures are: • A-95 Notifcation Procedure. Named after Circular A-95 issued by the Bureau of the Budget

(now the Office of Management and Budget) originally in 1969, this procedure requires applicants

for Federal assistance for many types of projects

to provide advance notice and plans to State or metropolitan area clearinghouses. The clearinghouses inform interested State and local agencies

which, in turn, have the opportunity to comment.

Submitted comments must accompany the application for Federal assistance. • Historic Preservation Act (1966). Any project

impinging upon a historic site placed on the National Register must be referred to the Advisory

Council on Historic Preservation for its review

and comment. (This requirement relating to historic sites is in addition to the requirements imposed by section 4(f).) • National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. This

law, as its name indicates, is first and foremost a statement of policy designed to ". . . encourage

productive and enjoyable harmony between man

and his environment; to promote efforts which

will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimidate the health and

welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of

the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality."

Winthrop, Washington preserved its early Western Mstnnj l)i/ completely rebuilding its business district

ivith period facades at the time State Route 20 ivas completed in 1072.

374
The National Environmental Policy Act (XEPA)

undertakes two substantive actions. First, it establishes the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).

This three-man group is responsible for monitorinoprogress, or lack thereof, in the environmental field, for

advising the President, and for making recommendations on future actions or programs Avhich it believes

should be adopted. Secondly, XEPA requires for each

legislative proposal or otlier Federal action "significantly affecting the quality of tlie Iniman environment" a detailed statement covering:

"(1) the enviroiinu'iital impact of the proposed action,

"(ii) any adverse environmental effects wliicli cannot

be avoided should the proposal be implemented,

"(iil) alternatives to the proposed action,

"(Iv) the relationship between local sliort-term uses of man's environment and tlie maintenance and enliancement

of lonsr-term productivity, and

"(v) any irreversible and irretrieval)le commitments of resources which would I)e involved in tlie proposed action should it be implemented."

These statements, Ivuown as environmental impact

statements (EIS's), must be prepared for all Federalaid projects, including highways, meeting the test of

"significantly affecting the quality of the human en- vironment." Their preparation is a two-stage operation: draft EIS's are circulated to all concerned

agencies and the public for review and comment ; final EIS's tlien incorporate comments and indicate their

disposition. Since passage of NEPA, approximately

half of all EIS's prepared stem from highway projects.

All three of these requirements are similar in approach in that none of tliem authorizes the direct alter- ation or stopping of a project. All rely upon the wide

dissemination of information and the opportunity for

comments by others to influence the decisionmaking

process and to prevent or mitigate environmental damage. Eacli has the incidental, but important, effect of

helping to identify pertinent social, economic, and

environmental considerations.

.'1 fish ladder alongside ISJ, in Connecticut aids the migration

of fish while cnhancinf/ the natural environment.

Process Guidelines and Action Plans Approach to En- vironmental Protection

In 1970 Congress decided that previous efforts by

it and by the FHWA to assure adequate consideration

of the environmental aspects of highways should be

reinforced. Therefore, the 1970 Federal-Aid Highwaj'^

Act added three related measures dealing with en- vironmental considerations in general, noise standards,

and air quality.

In dealing with general environmental considerations, the Department of Transportation Avas called

upon to prepare and issue guidelines to assure (a) t]\at

possible social, economic, and environmental effects of proposed highway projects are fully considered and

(b) that final decisions on highway projects are made

in the best overall public interest, taking into accotmt

the need for fast, safe, and efficient transportation

and the costs of eliminating or minimizing adverse

effects. The resulting guidelines, known as the "Process

Guidelines," are aimed at influencing the methods by

which highway projects are developed rather than by

attempting detailed supervision or control of plans

or projects.

The Process Guidelines, officially issued in September 1972, require each State highway agency to prepare an Action Plan spelling out the organizational arrangement, the assignment of responsibilities, and the procedures to be followed in developing projects in

conformity with congressional intent. The Guidelines

outline issues which must be addressed, of which the

following are particularly important

• Identifcation of social., economic and environmental effects^ including, especially, the incidence

of such effects upon specific groups and interests. • Consideration of alternative courses of action.,

including, to the extent appropriate, alternative

locations, alternative types of scales of highway

improvements, other transportation modes, and

the option of no new construction (often referred

to as the "no build" alternative). • Systematic interdisciplinary approach., including

the need for consideration and evaluation of the

social, economic, and environmental effects of

highway projects by a wide range of professional

skills. • Involvement of other agencies and the public,

including the widespread dissemination of information and the active solicitation of comments

and views during all stages of project development.

"\\'liile coverage of the topics included in the Guidelines is required, the manner in which these subjects are addressed is left to the States, and thus, each

State has considerable freedom in. adjusting its Action

Plan to its own needs and conditions.

As of May 23, 1975, 52 of a possible 53 State Action

Plans were completed and approved,* and while it is too early to make definite judgment on their longrange effectiveness, an FHWA report to Congress in

1974 concluded, "It is impossible to read the Action

Plans so far approved without being struck by their

thoroughness and sincerity. These Action Plans dis-

* The total number of 53 Action Plans includes 50 States, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the FHWA Offices of Federal Highway Projects.

375
plaj' a willingness to experiment with the new techniques and approaches, a strong intent to solicit comments and to disseminate widely all relevant in- formation, and a determination to conduct an open

administration of the highway program. Not all of

the Action Plans reviewed are equally strong in all of their responses to the Process Guidelines, but the

general level of discussion is remarkably high." ^*

Noise Standards

The second of the 1970 environmental actions by

Congress was a requirement calling for the preparation

and promulgation of "standards for highway noise

levels compatible with different land uses" to be applied to future Federal-aid projects. In responses to

this mandate, FHWA published noise standards in

1972.

The standards established design noise levels for

various land uses and activities. These values are compared with predicted future noise levels expected

from new highway projects to determine noise impacts

and the possible need for noise abatement measures. Consideration of shifts in route alinement or grade,

the provision of buffer zones, the installation of noise

barriers, or (in limited cases) the noise insulation of

public-use institutional buildings are evaluated on all

such projects to the extent that opportunities to abate

noise reasonably exist. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 authorized

Federal-aid funds for noise abatement measures on

existing Federal-aid highways.

Two important aspects of the highway noise problem lie outside the authority of the FHWA. The

first is the noise emanating from the vehicle itself. Effective control here is dependent upon additional

legislation affecting the manufacture, maintenance,

and operation of motor vehicles. The second concerns

the imposition of controls over the development of

lands adjacent to highways to reflect actual or anticipated noise levels. FHWA's noise regulations in- struct highAvay officials to advise local governments of

expected noise levels for new projects. In addition,

the FHWA has issued an advisory manual on the

subject.^^

Air Quality Guidelines

The third 1970 environmental action directed by

Congress was the preparation and promulgation of

guidelines to assure that future highways are consistent with state implementation plans to meet the

National Ambient Air Quality Standards established

as a result of the 1970 Clean Air Act.

A landscaped sound barrier cuts traffic noise in residential areas adjacent to 1-35 between

Minnehaha Parkway and Diamond Lake in South Minneapolis, Minn.

376
Air Quality Guidelines prepared on the premise

that transportation planning and air quality planning

are interdependent and that neither should proceed

without full considei'ation of the other were issued in

final form by the FHWA in 197-t. The Guidelines

instruct highway officials responsible for urban trans- portation planning in areas subject to the 3C process*

to confer with the appropriate air pollution control

agencies; annually solicit comments on the consistency

of transportation plans with approved State Implementation Plans for attainment and maintenance of

air quality; and determine consistenc}- of transportation plans with State Implementation Plans. Other

provisions in the Guidelines are intended to ensure adequate coverage of air (juality considerations in

EIS's.

Achieving applicable air quality standards in some

urban areas will imdoubtedly be very difficidt. For

the more troublesome air quality problem areas, the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has re- quired transportation control plans designed to reduce

the volume of pollutants by such methods as improving the flow of traffic, impi'ovements in mass transportation, bans on parking, and encouraging carpooling.

Section 134 of title 23, U.S.C.

Of the various responses to the many environmental

problems, only a few set forth specific rules for application to individual projects. Section 4(f) of the Department of Transpoi'tation Act is one such instance.

Given the availability of a "feasible and prudent

alternative," land from public parks or certain I'elated uses cannot be used for a Federal-aid highway project.

The Noise Standai'ds issued by the FHWA are also

based upon a project approach. When predicted noise

levels for a project exceed specified design noise levels for various land uses and activities, then noise control measures are to be undertaken. If strict adherence

to the Standards are demonstratively unreasonable,

there are provisions for flexibility or exceptions.

Like noise, air quality is subject to quantitative

analysis, and it might, therefore, be assumed that it would be equally susceptible to a project approach.

Because so little is known about the subject of air

quality conditions and the elements involved are so varied, project rules have not been established with

the same degree of specificity as the Noise Standards.

The Air Qtuxilty Guidelines are, therefore, aimed at processes and procedures to assure consistency between

highway plans and State air quality plans.

An aerial ricic of the serpentine sound barrier.

377
-,&-4t-
The other environmental responses, while varied in

their approaches and methods, are alike in certain re- spects. They do not, for one thing, attempt to impose

regulations or standards aimed at individual projects,

presumably reflecting a concensus that any such effort "would be cumbersome or otherwise impracticable.

They are oriented, rather, to procedures, organization,

and personnel in the expectation that the right processes will lead to the right decisions on individual

projects.

Virtually all of these process-oriented responses are based upon one or more of a small group of fundamental principles

• The need for identification and evaluation of all significant factors. • The importance of wide participation in the highway development process by other agencies, offi- cials, and disciplines and by the general public. • The value of careful consideration of all feasible

alternatives, including, where appropriate, other

modes and the option of not proceeding with the

project in question. • The need for widespread dissemination of information to other agenices and to the public.

The application of these principles will not directly

solve environmental problems. But taken together,

they establish a process which goes a long way to assuring maximum compatibility between highways

and the environment.

Conclusion

In the development of the highway system of this

Xation, the original motivating factor in the roadbuilding was to be able to move quickly from one

point to another. All too often in the early years, the detrimental sociological and environmental impacts

that occurred as a result of highway construction were ignored or treated only when it became obvious

or hazardous, as in the case of the health problems

raised by horses.

The development of an awareness of the sociological

and environmental aspects of roadbuilding was a gradual, evolutionary process. The separation of State

and Federal functions allowed the development of this awareness and of the tools to correct the situation.

But the Federal-State partnership evolved such programs as appraisal, appraisal review, negotiation, re- location assistance and payment, replacement housing,

highway beautification, environmental protection, joint use of highway rights-of-way, and many more.

Tliere are yet many problems which affect man's

total environment that have to be solved. However,

mechanisms have been created in the interrelated, yet

independent, nature of the Federal-State partnership

and in the establishment of independent offices of

right-of-way and enA'ironment to assure that these concerns receive their full consideration in the building

of a liighway. The existence of these mechanisms do

not guarantee the successful solution to all the problems affecting man's total environment. However, their

existence does provide a well-founded hope and does

go a long way in assuring that the creation of the

highway system and the well-being of our total en- vironment will exist compatibly.

REFERENCES

' S. Booth, The History of Federal-Aid Legislation for Highicays, AASHO

The First Fifty Years, 1914-1964 (American

Association of State Highway Officials, Wasliington, D.C., 1965)

p. 151. 'W. Rayner, Elementary StrR\'EYiNG, Vol. I, 2d ed. (Van

Nostrand Company, Inc., New York, 1946) p. 278. 'Id.

* Contrasting United States and European Practices In Road Development, address by T. H. MacDonald before the 24th Annual Meeting of the American Association of State Highway Officials, Dallas, Tex., Dec. 5, 1938, Papers, 1937-39,

pp. 12, 13.

° J. A. Tarr, Urban Pollution—Many Long Years Ago, American Heritage, Vol. XXII, No. 6, Oct. 1971, p. 66.

" Id., p. 68.

' Id., p. 67.

' Id., p. 69.

° Id., p. 67. " What 'New York State is Doing, Good Roads Magazine,

N.S. Vol. IX, No. 2, Feb. 1908, p. 59.

"Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1900, p. 287. "M. Dickinson, The Beautifying and Endowment of Highways, Good Roads Magazine, Vol. IV, No. 8, Aug. 1903, p. 324. "A. Fletcher, Macadam Roads, Farmers' Bulletin, 338 (U.S.

Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 1909) p. 21. " Office of Public Roads, Benefits of Improved Roads, Farmers' Bulletin 505 (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington,

D.C. 1915) p. 20. " J. Hazlewood, Making Highways Ornamental and Useful,

Public Roads, Vol. 2, Nos. 21-22, .Jan.-Feb. 1920, pp. 14-16. " J. Taylor, Roadside Plan and Progress in Massachusetts,

Public Roads, Vol. 10, No. 6, Aug. 1929, p. 109. "T. H. MacDonald, Uncle Sam Considers Roadsides, American Civic Annual, Vol. II (American Civic Association, Inc., Washington, D.C. 1930) pp. 164, 165. "D. C. Smith, Urban Parks and Roads (Highway Users

Federation for Safety and Mobility, Washington, D.C. 1971)

pp. 7, 8. "Id., p. 21. " W. Bugge & W. Snow, The Complete Highway, The Highway and the Landscape (Rutgers Univeristy Press, New

Brunswick, N.J. 1959) p. 10. " H. Coons, Control of Roadside Exploitation, Con\tention

Group Meetings, Papers and Discussions (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C, 1940)

p. 40. "U.S. Dept. of Commerce, A Proposed Program for Scenic

Roads and Parkways (GPO, Washington, D.C, 1966) pp. 2-4.

'* Federal Highway Administration, Progress Report on Implementation of Process Guidelines (U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Washington, D.C, 1974) p. 15. " Federal Highway Administration, The Audible Landscape : A Manual for Highway Noise and Land Use (U.S.

Dept. of Transportation, Washington, D.C, 1974).

The right-of-way of 1-40 west of Needles, Calif., included a

.stand of rare choUn cactus described by one biologist as a

"motherlode." The stand was placed under the protection

of the California Natural Lands and Water Reserve System as an outdoor ecological laboratory.

379
1

De/iQn

U.S. Ji22 in rural Fcnnaylvania. The curvilinear alinement and roadside treatment have resulted in a design incorporating utility, beauty, and economy of maintenance.

380
Highway design is the art of anticipating the

roadway requirements of motor veliicle traffic and of

satisfying these requirements in the preparation of

construction plans. It involves the selection of dimensional values for geometric features such as widths,

radii of curvature, rates of cross section slopes and

longitudinal gradients; the determination of the re- quirements for the roadway structure (pavement and

base courses) and for the bridges, drainage and other

structures; the preservation and restoration of ground

cover and plant growtlis; the safety and efficiency of

traffic operations, including all forms of traffic control

devices; and the melding of the highway's alinement

and gradient with tlie landscape in a manner least disturbing to the natural environment. Engineering

analyses during the highway design must attain an

acceptable balance between the broad controls of eco- nomic limitations, land space usage and environmental

and social considerations.

The roads existing during the early years of the

automobile were not designed for motor vehicle usage;

they were simply wagon roads. For many years after

the automobile came into wide use, these same roads were adapted to automobile travel with little or no

change in location, alinement or geometries. Even

after the automobile became commonplace, a number

of years, or even decades, were to elapse before highways were constructed to meet the unique requirements of motor vehicle traffic. The transitional period from horsedrawn to motor

vehicle traffic occurred at a time when railroad trans- portation was approaching maturity. Trains shared

with the automobile one distinguishing characteristic

when compared with horsedrawn vehicles—both trav- eled at a faster speed. It was natural, then, that when

travel speed became recognizable as a factor in highway design, the leaders in this art turned to the practicing railroad designers for guidance in determining

alinement design details to satisfy the requirements

of the higher speeds of motor vehicles.

"\MTile building upon these bases of knowledge,

highway designers were often in a dilemma as to which features of wagon roads should be retained,

modified, or rejected, which characteristics of railroad

practice should be incorporated, and what new concepts were needed to satisfy the peculiar qualities of

automobile traffic. Resolution of these matters was

often the subject of heated debate with the answers

frequently being dictated by economics.

From the standpoint of highway design, the auto- mobile era logically falls into four fairly distinct

periods: (1) 1900-1920: the preemptory period during

which the motor vehicle usurped the wagon road in

its contemporary state of improvement; (2) 1920-

1930 : the uplifting period during Avhich existing roads were adapted to motor vehicular use, largely by shaping the cross section, draining and surfacing; (3)

1930-1940: the period of stabilization in the design of

conventional highway during which the dynamics

of motor vehicle traffic were recognized as a major

force to be dealt with; and (4) 1940-1976: the era of

the freeway.

It is significant that tliroughout the brief period of

development of the modern highway system there has

been a lag of a decade or more between the time of

recognition of a new design principle, or a standardization of a dimensional value, or the advocacy of a

concept, and the time that results of these advances

in design begin to show in completed highwaj^s. For

example, a discovery or determination in 1910 that

highway curves should be superelevated to offset centrifugal force found little application until after

1920 when the extensive program of surfacing highways came into full swing.

The categorization of the four design periods reflects the period of application of design principles,

rather than the period of their discovery. Each of

these periods is discussed in terms of the design characteristics in vogue at the time and of the factors that

influenced these characteristics.

Twilight of the Wagon Road: 1900-1920

The automobile came on the scene at a time when

roadbuilding was imdergoing a renaissance after 50

years of neglect. The better rural roads of the mid19th century were waterbound macadaui, 12 to 15 feet wide—^a width that was adecjuate for two loaded

wagons to pass each other with the horses at a walk.

To. shed water quickly, these roads were crowned on

both the straight sections and the curves, and the

crown, 6 to 8 inches higher in the center, was steep

enough to make driving at the sides uncomfortable.

Consequently all traffic ran in the middle, taking to the righthand side of the road only to pass other

vehicles.

In 1913, even mountain roads such as this earth road in Wise

County, Va., had relatively flat grades to accommodate horse- drawn vehicles.

381
Wagon roads outside of cities were usually unsurfaced except for the more heavily traveled trunk

routes. Highways carrying heavy tonnages of freight were surfaced with broken stone, gravel, or waterbound macadam. The National Road, for example,

which was constructed westward from Cumberland,

Maryland, in the early years of the 19th century, had

a 20-foot surface consisting of a 12-inch bottom course and a 6-inch top course of broken stone. This was

far superior to the typical highway of that period.

In addition to macadam, broken stone, and gravel,

other road surface materials used with varying success were brick, asphalt, wooden planks, sand-clay and

granite blocks.

The basic principles for constructing all forms of

surfaces as they are known today had been discovered

and put into limited practice before 1910. Except for

streets in the larger metropolitan areas and major

routes of commerce, most road surfaces were in a rather primitive state of improvement at that time

and were to remain so for several years to come. These roads were built for horsedrawn steel-tired

traffic traveling at a top speed of 8 miles per hour.

In recognition of the limited capability of animaldrawn conveyances to ascend grades, gradients seldom

exceeded 5 percent, and this resulted in rather crooked

locations carefully selected to avoid steep grades,

closely fitted to the terrain, with small cuts and fills to save grading costs. Side slopes in both cuts and

fills were as steep as the natural materials would

allow, usually li/^ feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical.

In the era of animal power, 105 feet was a generous

radius for horizontal curves. This would enable a

four-horse team and wagon having a total length of

50 feet to round a curve without leaving a 12-foot

travelled way. For two-horse rigs with wider roads,

the radius could be even shorter. Vertical curves were seldom used; the vertical angle between two 6

percent grades was only about 6 degrees, and this was

hardly enough of a peak or valley to cause discomfort

to anyone in a vehicle traveling at 4 or 5 miles per

hour.

The wagon roads were inconspicuous and, from

economic necessity, "rested lightly on the land."

However, it is doubtful that their builders considered

this fact as an esthetic advantage for their work or, for that matter, that they gave much thought to the

appearance of the road itself. In a few eastern States,

notably Massachusetts and Maryland, trees were

planted along the roads, but these had a practical

purpose in addition to creating visual beauty. Their

shade reduced the dusting and disintegration which

followed when waterbound macadam surfaces dried

too rapidly.

Early Location Methods

The railroads pioneered good location methods in

the early 20th century. Under the spur of competition among themselves and being relatively unhampered by manmade obstacles, the railroads began to seek locations with flatter gradients than previously

accepted in the interest of greater loads and less fuel

consumption. For such exacting requirements, the

old method of location by which the locator went into

the field, selected the route by direct observation, and

set the stakes as he went along was no longer adequate

in any but the most level country. The locator could

be aware of only what was in the range of his vision

a better location might lie over the next hill, but he

could not see it. A method had to be devised that

would permit the locator to examine a wider and

longer sweep of country, and to meet this need, a new

method of location evolved. This is called the "topographic method" to distinguish it from the old "direct

method."

Instead of staking the centerline directly on the

ground, the locator surveyed a preliminary line, or

"baseline," as a base for a strip topographic map.

After completing 4 or 5 miles of topography, the

locator spread his maps on a long table, and he looked

down upon them as if he were an observer in a balloon. Instead of seeing only a hill in front of him he saw the country in a miniature far ahead. His vision was not obstructed by trees, and he was not annoyed

by insects or the weather. He easily perceived the

vital features, or "controls," which determined the

best location for the centerline that would conform

with the railroad's geometric standards.

By scaling the horizontal distances between points

where his projected centerline intersected the contours

of the map, the locator obtained a profile which he

could analyze for gradients and earthwork balance.

If this profile was unsatisfactory, he could draw an- other paper projection, scale a new profile, and make

a new analysis. Only when he was satisfied that he

had the best location did he transfer the paper projection to the ground as his final staked location for

the centerline of the railroad.

It was to be many years before the art of highway

location and design was to attain such a high degree

of sophistication. Until about 1930, the railroad

method of alinement and profile was generally con- sidered the ultimate in design for highways as well.

The Impact of the Automobile on the Early Roads

Prior to and during the first decade of the 20th

century, the automobile had a negligible effect on the

design and construction of highways. It was looked

upon as an interloper which had to adapt itself to existing streets and highways. If adjustment was

necessary, it was encumbent upon the vehicle manufacturer and the operator to make such adjustment.

It was considered no more inconvenient for a motorist on a rural highway to slow to 6 or 8 miles per hour

for a right-angled curve than for him to do so at an urban street intersection. If climatic conditions were

unfavorable for motoring, the traveler merely substituted the horse for the auto. In northern latitudes,

roads were so frequently impassable for automobiles

during the winter months that cars were customarily

placed on jacks in the late autumn and remained

there until after the spring thaws in order to preserve

the tires. Despite enactment of the 1916 Federal Aid Road

Act, the harsh impact of the automobile on the highway system was felt very strongly in the second decade of the century, and this was particularly true of

the roadway surface. The automobile Avas extremely

damaging to macadam and gravel roads, which essentially were held together by the interlocking of stone

382
* 6' -

24' 6'

t12" nM^>

ikVOx^

^

^ ^ 2' y^ ^

\y*

EARTH ROAD

*> 7y5$>"

SOURCE: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF IOWA STATE HIGHWAY

COMMISSION 1913-1914

10'

y— • g'-«»>^ - '^, 1

GRAVEL SURFACE

SOURCE: SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT ARKANSAS STATE HIGHWAY

COMMISSION 1916

OIL MACADAM SURFACE

SOURCE: FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY

COMMISSION 1918, p. 49

TYPICAL SECTIONS 1900-1920

When roads became impassable, some motorists fell back on

the services of more

traditional transportation.

383
fragments and the cementing power of stone dust and

clay. The tread patterns of pneumatic tires tended

to suck the finer particles to the surface where they were caught in the turbulent air currents created by

the car's rapid movement. The result was a huge

cloud of dust, stifling to the motorist and abhorrent

to the property owner, but even worse was the devastating effect on the road surface. Waterbound ma- cadam was soon reduced to a residual layer of loose coarse material filled with potholes. On roads of

native clay, the surface became a dust layer 2 inches or more in depth during the dry season and as fine as powdered talc. A sudden shower would turn such a

layer of dust into a thin blanket of mud as slippery

as wet ice; a prolonged rain would convert it to a bottomless quagmire.

Another unexpected effect was greatly increased wear on the inside of curves and the loosening and

shifting of surfacing materials from the inner to the

outer side of the roadway on curves. Rather than

slowing to a speed commensurate with the radius of

the curve, drivers instinctively hugged the inside of

the curve, even to the extent of encroaching upon the

ditch slope, in order to lengthen the effective radius

and to take advantage of the "banking" afforded by

the ditch slope.

In the case of curves to the left, this meant crossing

into the opposing lane, since the normal, high crown was customarily carried around curves. As a conse- quence of resistance to lateral acceleration, loose sur- facing materials were thrown to the outer side of the

curves, resulting in a curve of longer radius that be- came somewhat superelevated by traffic, rather than

by design and construction.

The impact of the automobile on the early roads was not all on the negative side. In the case of gradient, for example, automobiles and trucks were capable

of ascending any grade suitable for horsedrawn traffic. If the surface provided sufficient traction, grades up

to 6 or 8 percent posed no serious problem for skilled

operators who had mastered the art of down-shifting

to a lower gear. One feature of vehicular design that was the cause of considerable consternation to many

drivers ascending hills was the location of the gas

tank with respect to the carburetor. Many vehicles,

including the most popular make of the era, relied

upon gravity flow of fuel from a tank beneath the

driver's seat to the engine's carburetor located only

2 or 3 inches lower than the bottom of the tank. It was not uncommon to stall on a grade for lack of gas, even with a tank partly filled. There is no evidence

that these experiences altered the design of highways,

however.

By the year 1920, many State higliAvay departments were recognizing the inadequacies of the design fea- tures of wagon roads, but aside from a very limited

mileage of added pavement during the period 1900-

1920, advances in design were very limited. It is questionable whether rural roads in many of the States

up to this time were actually designed. Rather, they came into being through the gradual improvement of

trails, and their shape and dimensions depended more

on the skill and judgment of a maintenance man

riding a split log drag than upon a professional design engineer guided by a set of design standards.

By the early 1900's the National Road, a superior highway for

its time, needed improvement. This is a section of the road

near Hancock, Md., before construction.

In a report prepared by the highway commissioner

of one of the States in 1915, county officials were

advised

Many of the counties . . . have the remains of roads . .

built during the early part of the nineteenth century . . . The old roads of this age still stand as monuments to the

ability and farsightedness of our forefathers . . . The

roads of that day were arteries of commerce. Later they gave way to the railroads and roadbuilding became a

forgotten and lost science. Any man who could nap rock was a roadbuilder. With the coming of the automobile and the motor truck

the road is again the artery of commerce. Interest has

been revived. We are beginning to appreciate the State highways and turnpikes built nearly one hundred yeai-s ago. We find them hard to improve on, even with present

day methods. We can build a better surface, but we

can't build a better subgrade. . . . ... a road once built is rarely changed, provided it is built according to certain laws which are as old as the

hills themselves. So insist that your road be properly

drained, well located, taking advantage of every topo- graphic condition. No grade should exceed a rise of 5' in 100', and lastly that you keep and take sufficient right of way to allow for ditches and any increase in width your road may require in the years to come . . . The

right of way, roadbed and drainage openings ai-e permanent. Tlie surface, regardless of what it is, will sooner

or later have to be replaced.'

At about the same time, a neighboring State re- ported that 90 percent of the roads within its boundaries were earth roads and added, prophetically, that

they were likely to remain earth roads for a great

many years.^ In 1933, 18 years later, less than 14

percent of the total road mileage in that State was

reported as surfaced.^ Despite the fact that over

13,000 miles had been paved in the interim, there had

been little gain percentagewise because of expansion

in the highway network.

384
KBk

The same section of 7-oad after construction.

Nationwide, the mileage of high type pavements on

i"ural highways in 1920 was negligible in relation to the total miles of highway, although substantial gains

had been made in gravel surfacing up to that time.

Regretabl}-, however, much of the rural pavement in

place at the beginning of World War I was destroyed

by heavy trucking in pursuance of the war effort. Dawn of the Motor Highway: 1920-1930

The period 1920-1930 may be characterized as a period of trial and error in adapting an assortment

of roads laid out for use by horses and wagons to the

use of automobiles and trucks, ^^^lile the highway

system continued to expand during this period, particularly in the agricultural belt of the Plains States,

the nature of the added highways was generally the same as the earlier wagon roads with perhaps the

addition of an all-weather surface, frequently gravel

or sand-clay. Except for roads in the New England

and North Atlantic States and in portions of the

Pacific States, few rui'al roads in 1920 were surfaced

with anything better than sand-clay or gravel. If one were careful in selecting his route, he could travel

from New York City to Washington, D.C., on paved

highways. From Washington to Richmond, however,

the best route was one-third longer than the most

direct one and included 99 miles of gravel surface

rather than a paved surface. From Chicago to ^Milwaukee, according to a prominent guidebook of

the day, the entii-e 92 miles was paved with concrete or macadam "except for one very rough mile."' Going

south from Chicago, the route to Lafayette, Indiana,

consisted of 98 miles of gravel, 26 miles of macadam,

and 16 miles of dirt. The entire 102-mile route from

Atlanta to Macon, Georgia, consisted of sand-clay

roads.^ With these segments of interstate highways

in the conditions described, it requires little imagination to visualize the condition of the lesser important

routes. Clearl}^ the most pressing need was for all- weather surfacing, and this was the course that the

roadbuilding program followed.

Geometric Design Features While most highway authorities were conscious of a need to modify the highway cross section and alinement to meet the requirements of motorized traffic,

there was little precedent upon which to base judgments of immediate design requirements, or worse, for

predicting those of the future. Highway engineers

had much in common with one self-made automotive

engineer of this period who has been quoted to the

effect that, "If its in a book its out of date." ^ * Elements recognized as warranting special consideration because of higher vehicular speed included

sight distance, curvature, and superelevation. Variables taken into account because of the volume and

character of traffic were pavement width and struc- tural needs. The manner of satisfying these requirements varied not only between States, but within

States. Minnesota, for example, found that, "Abrui^t narrow curves have contributed their share to fatal

accidents . . . which it is expected will be relieved

by . . . [a] requirement for a clear sight distance of

200 feet on all State roads with widening and banking on curves." '^ In 1921 it was the practice in Illinois, as another example, to eliminate right-angled turns

"whenever possible," and where such turns were necessary, a minimum radius of 500 feet was used. Moreover, "All curves which have a radius of less than

6,000 feet are super-elevated . . ." ^ The speed upon

which the superelevation was based was the legal

speed limit which, in 1921, was 25 m.p.h. This was

increased to 35 m.p.h. in 1928, with a maximum superelevation of 1 inch per foot for curves with radii of

less than 1,000 feet.^ The State of California, among

others, had earlier considered the matter of superelevation and, in 1917, had reached a compromise

decision to apply superelevation to concrete pavements

on mountain roads only. The rate of superelevation

to be applied varied from a maximum of % inch per

foot for curves having a radius of 75 feet or less to

i/g inch per foot for radii within the range of 225 to 300 feet.^ A few States used spiral transitions, but

the practice was not widespread. Obviously, most

decisions in the matter of roadway geometry were

arbitrarily made and had little scientific support.

Perhaps the element that varied most widely was

the width of surfacing. In Kentucky, for example,

during the years just before and after 1920, contracts were awarded for pavements ranging from 9 to 20

feet in width, with 14 feet predominating.^" Most

bridges had either 12- or 16-foot roadways. In Illi- nois during the same period, concrete and brick pavements were 10, 15, and 18 feet wide." It was common

practice at about this time to construct pavements

with sufficient width to accommodate only a single

lane of traffic. There was some disagreement as to whether the best position for such a pavement was in

the center of the roadbed or at the riffht-hand side

* The engineer was Childe Harold Wills, at the time an

employee of the Ford Motor Company and later producer of the Wills St. Claire Automobile.

385
going to the market center. One critic claimed that

the center was the most desirable position because it was better looking, was more easily drained, and was

safer to traffic." The dilemma as to the most suitable position for

single-lane pavements was soon resolved—the rate of

traffic growth was so rapid that single-lane pavements

were short lived and such construction was uneconomical. Consequently, this type construction was

discontinued. The Federal Highway Act of 1921

doubtless spurred this action. This legislation re- quired, for the first time, that the wearing surfaces on Federal-aid highways be at least 18 feet wide.

With the discontinuance of single-lane construction,

pi'actically all subsequent paving between 1920 and

1930 was of two-lane width, ranging from 14 to 20

feet. Pavements wider than two lanes were rarely

needed. The experience in Maryland may be typical.

In 1920 the concrete roads were constructed 15 feet

wide, 6 inches in depth at the edges and 8 inches in

depth at the center, resulting in a crown of 2 inches.

This same type construction was used in 1921. In

1922 the Commission thought it desirable to reduce

the crown and adopted a section 6i^ inches in depth

at the edges and 7i^ inches in the center. This construction method was used in 1922 and 1923. At that

time, however, concrete was finished by hand, and some difficulty was experienced in getting a smooth

road with only a 1-inch crown. In 1924 the Commission went back to building a 2-inch crown, still using

a 15-foot width, 6 inches in depth at the edges and

8 inches at the center. This type construction con- tinued to the end of 1927. In 1928 the thickened edge was adopted, and the standard width of roadway was

increased to 16 feet with a depth of 9 inches at the

edges and 6.3 inches at the center and was the method

still used in 1930."

In contrast, Illinois during this period was building

concrete pavements 18 feet wide (in some cases 20

feet) on a roadway 30 feet wide. In 1926 Illinois

constructed its first four-lane highway.^* Lanes 10

feet or more in width were rare anywhere in the

country.

4' 8' OR IT ^•^ 18' 8' OR IT

p^—

PORTLAND CEMENT CONCRETE PAVEMENT

SOURCE: ANNUAL REPORT ILLINOIS DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS 1927

18' 2" WEARING SURFACE

3'

4" BASE COURSE

ASPHALT MACADAM

SOURCE: PART II - REPORT OF CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY COMMISSION TO

ACCOMPANY FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT. NOV. 1, 1922

TYPICAL SECTIONS 1920-1930

386
Horsedrawn equipment making a cut and raising levee across Souwashy Creek Bottom^ near Meridian, Aliss.

Except where the terrain was flat, the rolling profile

and widening alinement of the wagon road era continued. Although location and design engineers rec- ognized the desirability of gentle curvature and

uniform grades, much of the design was dictated by

economics and the limitations of grading equipment.

Grading was performed largely with animal-drawn

equipment ; hence heavy cuts and fills and direct alinement were avoided in favor of sidehill locations.

Power shovels were in common use for rock excavation and sidehill casting, but the narrow cuts and fills of the period were too confining for efficient use of

motorized hauling units, which were also poorly

adapted to operating on newly placed embankments.

For the year 1920, Minnesota reported that equipment

actually engaged in highway construction included

2,693 scrapers (wheel, slip, or Fresno), .36 steam

shovels and 6,212 horses and mules, together with 466

motor trucks recently acquired as war surplus materials.^'^ In Illinois in 1924, a recordbreakirig year

for construction in tliat State, 11,700 men and 3,000

teams were emploj'ed, a "team" consisting of two or more animals. The day of mechanization was still in

the future.

Roadbuilders then, as always, were realists. They

were in a race with time to pave as many miles as possible with available funds. Office seekers made

extravagant promises for getting the voters out of the

mud. The report of one highway department in 1924

boasts that of the 4,671 miles of hard surfaced roads

then existent in the State, 75 percent were completed

during the 4-year tenure of the encumbent governor.^*'

One result of this frenzied effort to add miles of pavement was that many design features, later found to be hazardous, were incorporated into the highway

system before a background of experience could be

developed.

Every section of newly paved highway seemed to have its "deadman's curve." Vehicular brakes were

generally poor, as was lighting equipment. Many

trucks using the highways in the late twenties were

still equipped with acetylene or kerosene lamps, and

their speeds were limited by mechanical engine governors to 15 to 18 m.p.h. A good number of horsedrawn vehicles continued to use the public highways.

Passenger car speeds increased rapidly in keeping

with highway and automotive improvements. In

1920 most States had a 25 m.p.h. speed limit for rural

highways. By 1930 the speed limit most frequently

387
100

X

feUJ r

COD

UJ

a.

X

<

90

80

70

60

50

>>:

^)C-'tCL•^^ ^ /^

/

/

/ ^.J- ''/ r\/\ y

/

/

Y

1

"-XV > y\\

M^^f

vA< /

^"^

r^^ / - LEGEND - /

tm —X HIGH PRICE GROUP - O — MEDIUM PRICE GROUP

M/ii noior: /-«c»/-»i lO 1 L^^vv r nioi- vjMv^i^i

1925 1928 1931 1934

YEAR MODEL

1937 1940

AVERAGE TOP SPEEDS OF AMERICAN STOCK CARS IN HIGH, MEDIUM

AND LOW PRICE RANGES BY YEAR MODELS.

SOURCE: "HIGHWAY PRACTICE IIM THE USA". BUREAU OF PUBLIC ROADS, 1948, p. 65

encountered was 35, with a few States having limits

of 40 or 45 m.p.h. No highway, regardless of how

designed, could be properly fitted to the needs of such

a conglomeration of vehicles and regulations. Not

surprisingly, deaths and injuries soared.

There were also signs of pessimism in some quarters

as to the ability to cope with the unbridled growth in

motor vehicle usage through highway construction

alone. Taking note of the heavy weekend demands

being placed on improved highways, one State highway commission noted in 1926 : It seems quite clear to the commission tliat tlie regulation of traffic is the first step toward adequate use of the highways. Indeed, the number of vehicles placed upon

the highways each year is propoi'tionately greater than

the miles of highway which are added. The conditions

of traveling, in.stead of becoming better, are becoming

worse, due to congestion on these roads, and the entii'e solution does not seem to lie in the building of more

roads, but rather in the regulation of traffic that goes over them."

This philosophy was to find expression many times over in the years ahead. Traffic, however, continued

to increase in volume.

Partly as a result of the wide disparity in design

practices between the States, a new form of leadership

in the art of highway desigTi began to assert itself toward the end of this period. This Avas the Committee on Standards of the American Association of

State Highway Officials (AASHO), which had been

formed in 1914. Initially, AASHO's Committee on Standards confined itself to disseminating information on design to its members, but in 1928 it proposed

that the Association adopt "standards of practice" to guide the member States in technical matters in whicli some uniformity from State to State was urgentlj^

needed. The resulting first standards, 1928, pre- scribed : • That whenever practicable, shoulders shall have

a standard width of not less than 8 feet. • That on pavements, 10 feet shall be considered

as the standard Avidth for each traffic lane. • That the crown of a two-lane concrete pavement

shall be 1 inch. • That no part of a concrete pavement shall have

a thickness of less than 6 inches.^®

388
The AASHO Committee on Standards and its off- spring, the Committee on Planning and Design Policies, were destined to have a profound effect in

stabilizing highway design by recognizing and advocating the best and most economical practices of the

various higliway departments and in promoting the

I'esults of research efforts that were soon to be undertaken.

Advent of Aerial Surveying

Another development of the decade, 1920-1930, was

the initial use of aerial surveys in highway location.

Mention has been made of the "topographic method"

pioneered by the railroads for selecting the most suit- able alinement from among a number of alternatives.

Initially the topographic method did not meet with

much favor among highway builders for several reasons: (1) Alinement and profile Avere not as critical for highways as for railroads; (2) the method was

slower and more costly than the conventional or direct

method; and (3) most highway projects consisted of

improving an existing or established route, which

might be either a trail, a well traveled artery, or something in between. The penalty for using the direct

method was the production of an inferior, unsafe

highway.

A-V^ien aerial photography became available on a commercial scale, it offered a means of overcoming

the greatest objection to the to^^ographic method of

location, namely, heavy expense in time and manpower

in making field surveys and preparing maps. The

highway profession Avas quick to recognize the potential of aerial survey methods. An example of its use described briefly in the 1927 Aircraft Yearbook:

The Bureau of Public Roads of the Department of Agriculture has used the airplane in making of mosaics

to show the route of a proposed road and to ascertain over what territory the proposed road will travel. The

Army Air Coips has provided the equipment and personnel, and the Bureau has provided the films and paid the

cost of operation.

During the past year aerial survey has been made of a

proposed new highway from Washington to Mt. Vernon,

Va. The survey showed the old road as well as the terri- tory over which the new road would have to he laid. Surveys have been made in Connecticut along the coast

line, and again between Boston and New York in the

vicinity of the Boston Post Road, in an endeavor to find a new automobile route to take cai'e of the crowded

travel on the old Boston Post Road."

The article concluded that the saving in time and

money on these and other projects was very satisfactory, and future use of this means of mapping and

surveying was contemplated. This was a very conservative prediction.

A typical main liighway of the early 1920's. The major defects are the 16-foot co7icrete pavement width, narrow and poorly

maintained shoulders, and the encroachment of utility

poles.

389
Stabilization in Design Practices: 1930-1940

The period 1930-1940 was one of discovery, as well

as of stabilization. On the debit side, administrators were dismayed to discover that many highways paved

during the previous decade, in the expectation they

would last a lifetime, were already obsolete. There

were several reasons for this—the alinement was not

suited to current speeds, sight distances were too

short, pavements and shoulders were too narrow, and

traffic volume had simply outgrown the capacities of

many two-lane roads. Moreover, the seemingly unlimited capacity of multilane roads near cities was

being rapidly depleted as a result of uncontrolled

access. Pavements were deteriorating because of the

frequency of heavy axle loads. Trucks were seriously

interfering with the free movement of passenger cars where there were long steep grades.

On the plus side, the most outstanding discovery, or more properly, achievement, was the recognition

that most problems could be resolved through a co- ordinated research effort coupled with an organized

program to exchange knowledge and information

gained in the various States. A coordinated research program was given a strong

boost by the U.S. Congress in 1934 through passage

of the Hayden-Cartwright Act. This Act authorized

the use of up to li/^ percent of Federal-aid highway

funds for planning and research.

Secondly, distilling the results of experience and

research and promoting the best in design practices

commensurate Avith economic benefits found expression through the AASHO Committee on Planning

and Design Policies.

Design Policies In February 1937 a proposal was approved by

AASHO to establish a special committee consisting

of three key officials from the Bureau of Public Roads

(BPR) and 12 outstanding design engineers from the

States. This committee was named the Committee

on Administrative Design Policies. It was subsequently renamed the Committee on Planning and Design Policies, and membership was increased to include

20 members from the States with BPR furnishing a single member, a nonvoting secretary. A unique fea- ture of the committee working process was the provision of a small force of experts assigned by BPR to devote full time, if necessary, to the work of the

Committee.

The Committee's mode of operation was to outline a general program of work, after which the BPR

task force gathered and evaluated all the known in- formation on each subject. If there were gaps in the

existing knowledge, the BPR engineers identified

them for further study. Eventually the staff prepared

a tentative discussion, with indicated design controls,

guide values and other conclusions for that subject.

This was then criticized, evaluated, and supplemented

by the Committee members and reworked until a policy acceptable to them was produced. The result- ing policy was submitted through the Committee on

Standards to the AASHO Executive Committee for

ballot by the several States; with a two-thirds favorable vote, it became an approved policy, and also, in

effect, the national design policy of the United States on that particular subject.

The Committee soon developed design policy brochures on seven projects: (1) Highway classifications;

(2) sight distance; (3) marking and signing no- passing zones; (4) highway types; (5) intersections

at grade; (6) rotary intersections; and (7) grade

separations. These booklets have considerable his- torical significance since, together, they are the fundamental structure upon which all subsequent geometric

design policy for highways has been based.

A Policy on Highway Olassifcation, 1938—offered a method of classifying highways to indicate the

service expected of them. Three factors were considered in the classification: (1) Traffic volume, (2)

character of traffic, and (3) design speed.

"Traffic volume" represented the number of vehicles

per hour and Avas defined as the average of the probable maximum hourly traffic of several peak days.

Prior to this time, it had been common practice to consider traffic on a daily basis if, in fact, it was con- sidered at all in geometric design. In later years, research was to permit a degree of refinement, and

the 30th highest hourly volume of the design year

became the criterion of traffic volume classification for

design purposes.

"Character of traffic" was used to denote the relative

number, or percentage, of trucks and buses in the

traffic stream in order that alloAvance could be made

for them in design and operation of highways. Three

categories were utilized : "P" for traffic composed entirely of passenger cars or types of trucks which did

not impede smooth traffic operation ; "T" for traffic in

which the percentage of trucks likely to use the highway was such that movements of passenger cars would

be interfered with and, consequently, should be given

detailed considerations; and "M" for mixed traffic where the percentage of trucks was between that for

"T" and "P." While the classification was necessarily

vague, it did serve a useful purpose in recognizing

that truck traffic was an essential factor that must be

dealt with. This classification stood for many years

and was discontinued only after a means was devised

in 1950 for converting truck volumes into equivalent

passenger car volumes.

The "assumed design speed" was used for correlating the design features of a length of higliAvay that

affect, or are affected by, the speed of operation. For

this purpose, assumed design speed was chosen as being representative of the maximum approximately

uniform speed that probably would be adopted by the

faster group of drivers, exclusive of the i^eckless few,

that would use the highway. Speed classifications of

30, 40, 50, 60 and 70 miles per hour were agreed upon,

and guidance was offered as to conditions under which

each might be appropriate.

Adoption of speed as a design criterion was in rec- ognition of the fallacy of the previously held belief

that drivers could be relied upon to detect sharp

curvature and short sight distances sufficiently Avell to adjust their speed to conditions. The false assumption

that drivers would reduce their speed to as Ioav as 15 or 20 miles per hour at curves was a major cause

for high accident rates and the early obsolescense of

many highways paved prior to 1930. The design

speed concept was truly a landmark innovation in

highway engineering.-"

390
Center 77iarki)igs on curves aided motorists on this highway in 1921, but short

sight distances made passing dangerous.

A Policy on Sight Distance for Highways, 1940

provided a scientific approach to ansAvering the controversial question as to the length of sight distance

that should be provided to assure safety at curves and

ci-ests and also for overtaking and passing sloAver

A'ehicles on two- and three-lane highways.

In the absence of research results, which were to become available a few years later, certain assumptions were necessary in deriving the values. It is a

credit to the Committee that the assumptions were

remarkabh' accurate. In one of the first applications

of the design speed concept, the derived minimum

sight distance values for stopping ranged from 200

feet for an assumed design speed of 30 m.p.h. to 600

feet for a design speed of 70 m.p.h. It was fui'ther

postulated that this distance should be measured on a

line from the driver's eye 4.5 feet above the surface

to a hypothetical object 4 inches above the pavement."

There was considerable conjecture as to the height of

the object. Logic would dictate that visibility of the

road surface itself would provide the ultimate in

safety, but provision of the required sight distance

to the road surface would necessitate extremely long

vertical curves at hill crests and would, therefore, be

very costly. A standing or slow moving vehicle would

be the type of obstacle most likely to be encountered on a highway and a height of 2 feet, representative

of the height of tail lights for a typical vehicle, was

favored by some Committee members. Obstacles a

foot or so in height, even though encountered only

infrequently on highways, could result in serious ac- cidents if struck by cars and, consequently, such minimum heights were rejected on the grounds of being

unsafe. The 4-inch dimension finally agreed upon

represented a compromise between economics of construction and severity of hazard. (Both dimensions,

height of eye and height of object, were reevaluated

in 1961 and, because of reduced height of vehicle, were changed to 3.75 feet for height of eye and 6

inches as a compromise value for height of object.)

Passing sight distances were derived by dividing

the passing maneuvers into several component parts

and developing time-space relationships for each.

Desirable distances, as well as absolute minimums,

were developed. For two-lane roads, the "desirable"

values ranged from 600 feet for a design speed of

30 m.p.h. to 3,200 feet for a speed of 70 m.p.h. The

sight line was from the driver's eye, assumed to be

4.5 feet above the road surface, to the top of an on- coming car, also assumed to be 4.5 feet in height."

Both dimensions were changed to 3.75 feet in 1961 in

recognition of changes in vehicle design.

The three-lane highway, like the single-lane highway of 20 years earlier, enjoyed a comparatively

short period of popularity, and sight distances for

such highways, as well as for two-lane highways, were discussed in this policy. Very few three-lane

projects were constructed before 1930 or after 1940.

It was soon learned that, while they did provide

greater capacity than two-lane roads, the added increment was not great. With the rapid increase in traffic, they wei'e soon taxed to capacity. Moreover, they

did not lend themselves to conversion to multilane

divided highways. Of greatest concern, however, was

their poor accident experience. One reason for this

391
Kentucky's Daniel Boone

Parktvay exhibits modern de- sign features such as sweeping curves with adequate sight distances and gentle grades.

was that sight distances were frequently too short for

passing. The AASHO policy sought to overcome this

deficiency in future construction by furnishing derived values for needed passing sight distances on

three-lane roads. "Desirable minimum" values ranged

from 900 feet for 50 m.p.h. to 1,700 feet for 70 m.p.h.

Another reason for the poor accident experience on

three-lane roads was the lack of uniformity and the

haphazard manner in which they were marked to regulate overtaking and passing during the early

years of their use. A recognized need for impi'ovement in this department led to development of the

next of the several policies.

A Policy on G^'itena for Marhing and Signing NoPassing Zones on Tioo- and Three-Lane Roads, 1940

advocated a uniform system of marking two- and

three-lane roads to restrict passing where sight dis- tances were less than certain values as listed for vari- ous design speeds. The types of stripes and signs for

marking no-passing zones were the province of an- other AASHO committee, but the recommendations

of that committee were included in the policy. Since

this feature was more closely related to operation than

design, this subject received no further attention by

the Committee on Planning and Design Policies but,

instead, was handled thereafter by the National Joint

Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices.

392
A Policy on Highway Types (Geometric), 1940

outlined the distinctions between the t-\vo-, three-, and

four-lane highway types and divided highways. It dealt primarily with pavement Avidths and factors of

driver liehavior and higliway design that aft'ect width.

The policv related the traffic volume, the cliaracter of

traffic ("P," "M" or "T"), and design speed to the

minimum width of parement that should be provided.

For two-lane roads, the niininuun width of surfacing

varied from 16 feet for the lowest classification upward to 2-1 feet. (Single-lane roads wore acceptable

for volumes below five vehicles per hour.) Turning

paths were developed for tliree design vehicles—

a

passenger car, a truck, and a tractor-semitrailer.

The Committee lamented the absence of better highway capacity information that would permit delineation between the traffic warrants for two-, three-, and

four-lane pavements. Because of the intervention of

"World War II and for other reasons, such infonnation woiild not become available for another 10 years, although the basic research was already well advanced.

The policy discussed median design for divided

highways at considerable length, as well as curbs,

sidewalks, gaiardrails and shoulders. Shoulders 8 to 10 feet wide, clear of all obsti'uctions, were recommended.^^

A Policy on Intersections at Grade^ 1940—treated

the subject in groat detail, utilizing turning paths for

a design passenger car and a design truck. Design

requirements were developed for various types of in- tersections fi-om a simple crossing to the more elab- orate types of channolizod intersections Avith relatively

high-speed turning roadways and speed change lanes. Innovations included three-centered compound curves

for the pavement edge at turns, minimum I'adii for

separate turning I'oadways as related to design speed.

pavement widths for such roadAvays, and sight dis- tance requirements at intersections not controlled by

signals. Vehicle dimensions have changed since this

policy Avas prepared, but in all other respects the concepts haA'-e stood the test of time Avith little need for

modification.

A Policy on Rotary Intersections Avas not completed

until 1941. During the period 1930-1940, rotary in- tersections Avere thought to be a considerable improvement over conventional intersections, so much so that

they Avere often constructed as substitutes for gradeseparated interchanges. Events A\'ere to prove that,

like the three-lane road, their effective life was usually

rather short because of their limited capacity and the

rapid rate of traffic groAvth.

The policy provided guidance in selecting various

design dimensions such as radius of the central island,

roadway widths, and lengths of weaving sections as related to design speed.

4:1 FILLS TO 3'

3:1 FILLS 3' TO 7'

2:1 FILLS OVER 7'

.<<^,g^>>j>i?55^

PORTLAND CEMENT CONCRETE PAVEMENT

SOURCE: TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION

OF MISSOURI 1936

36' TO 44'

8' TO 10' 20' TO 24' ^ 8' TO 10'

-,<-!'3r;?'^Z^ ^^:^;i9^U^M ^^^^5^^^^

a ^Z^^MlJ^ A'i^.-.bO:c^>icvoari:.oNi?

TYPICAL 2-LANE HIGHWAY (GEOMETRIC)

SOURCE: A POLICY ON HIGHWAY TYPES (GEOMETRIC), AASHO 1940

TYPICAL SECTIONS 1930-1940

393
A Policy on Grade Separations for Intersecting

Highicays was the logical sequel to the two policies on intersections. It was the final one of the seven geometric design policies, and it was completed in

19-M.

The title of this policy is somewhat misleading

because it treated not only the separating structure,

but actually covered in great detail the design of

grade separated traffic interchanges. Design data were grouped in three categories: (1) Structures and

approaches. (2) ramp arrangements, and (3) ramp

design.

One important design element not treated in detail

by these several design policies was the relation between curvature, superelevation, and design speed.

Curves

By 1930 most States were superelevating all curves except those of very long radius: however, there was

little uniformity as to superelevation rates, just as there was little consistency in minimum radii for

curves. Empirical controls were generally applied,

with maximum cross slopes of about 10 percent.

A BPR study in 1920 focused attention on the

necessity of a tire-pavement friction factor for superelevation design and also noted that a spiral curve or

transition length was needed at each end of a curve

section for the change from normal pavement crown

to a superelevated section.^* One of several conclusions resulting from a long

series of studies on tire-pavement slridding relationships conducted by the Iowa State University was

that the maximum permissible speed as used in designing curves should not exceed that for which a useful side-friction coefficient of 0.30 was required to counteract centrifugal force. This conclusion was

reached in 1934.^^ In 1935. the BPR collected data from drivers across the country operating their own vehicles on curves of

known radius and superelevation by asking them to report the speed at which they began to feel a side

pitch outward. Analysis of these data resulted in a new design premise that safe operation on curves would be attained when the superelevation was sufficient to coiinteract centrifugal force for threequarters of the expected speed, relying on side friction to supply the remaining horizontal resistance up to a maximum side friction factor of -f 0.16 at 60 m.p.h.^*

The speed concerned was advocated to be the "as- sumed design speed." which was to be used as a basis

for coordination of all alinement and geometric design values. The side friction factor to be used in

calculating the minimum radius or the maximimi rate superelevation did not enjoy the same degree of final- ity as the speed criteria, although the values used were apparently on the safe side. Research is con- tinuing at the present time in an endeavor to discover

pavement materials and construction methods to improve the skid resistant qualities of pavements.

In 1937 the BPR completed a highway curve design

manual (later published as Transition Curves for

nighrcays. 1940) embodying the above proposals.

The manual presented data for 10 m.p.h. increments

in design speed for all curve design features—curve

radii, superelevation, curve widening and transition

(spiral) curves. These concepts and design details

were greatly needed and soon gained wide use, thus

stabilizing, to a large extent, curve design practices

throughout the countiy and nullifying for the time

being any necessity for the AASHO Committee to concentrate its efforts on this subject.

Gradients

Common logic has always dictated that, from the

traveler's point of view, the most desirable route between two points is the one that is straightest and has

the least rise and fall. In the days of wagon roadbuilding, circuity and indirection of alinement often

had to be substituted for directness in order to obtain a

suitable profile. The wagon roads were later con- verted to motor highways, frequently with little change in alinement and grade despite the fact that

automobiles and trucks could negotiate grades steeper

than the 4 to 6 percent commonly used for horsedrawn A^ehicles. This was clone in the interest of

economy, although the roadbuilders would have preferred a better alinement.

As the highway network expanded and more roads were built on new locations, particularly during the

late 1920*s and the 1930's, advantages were taken of

the better gradeability of motor vehicles, and grades

as steep as 9 percent Avere used sometimes to provide

a straight alinement. Design with long tangents be- came commonplace and road distances were shortened

by hundreds of miles in the aggregate. A BPR sum- mary of practice in 1929 stated : On main-line highways it is customary to adopt a maximum grade of 5 percent in gently rolling country

and 7 percent in rough country, but it is no longer con- sidered good practice to resort to sharp curvature in order to avoid grades steeper than 7 percent. If local conditions permit either a 7 percent grade with a sharp

curve or a short 9 percent grade with a wider curve, the

latter design is thought to be the better practice because

it is safer for modern motor trafBc.^' In the rolling terrain commonly encountered in the

midwest and far west where roads were developed on

section line locations, this type of design resulted in

many hundreds of miles of "roller coaster" highway

profiles. Design of profiles with frequent grades over

5 percent tended to minimize earthwork quantities,

with only shallow cuts and fills. As traffic volumes,

speeds, and truck loadings increased, the deficiencies

of short sight distances and high-downgrade speeds

proved that this type of profile was somewhat hazardous.

The alternative was a profile design of a railroad

grade type, that is, long, easy grades with long flat vertical curves in conjunction with long horizontal

tangents connected by gentle curves. Prior to 1930.

any extensive mileage of such highway construction

would have been out of the question because of the

large earthwork quantities and attendant high costs. The rapid mechanization of earthmoving equipment

that began in the early 1930-s revolutionized construction methods and made feasible the construction of

highways of a type that had heretofore existed only

in the fanciful minds of design engineers. Tractordrawn self-loading scrapers with capacities of 12

cubic yards came upon the scene for the first time.

Pneumatic tires had been improved to such an extent

that they could be used on heavy trucks, thus affording sufficient flotation to operate on newl}- placed

394
Connecticut's route 11 preserves the natural rack formations and vegetation

by varying the loidth of the median.

embankments and made long hauls a routine operation. The roadbed of the then-modern highway, even though it was only two lanes in width, afforded sufficient room for turning and maneuvering. AVhen

compared with unit construction costs for the earlier years, earthwork became the best bargain in the entire

roadbuilding operation.

The trends toward steeper gradients was arrested,

if not reversed, by these developments. However, it was not until 1950 or later that a consensus was ar- rived at and anything approaching standardization

of maximum grades was developed by AASHO.

Design Effects on the Environment

Highway construction inevitably left scars upon the

landscape. These were not particularly objectionable

until the era of heavy cuts and fills and relatively

wide roadbeds that accompanied the design concepts

of the 1930's. Most State highway departments had

programs for roadside development prior to that time, some as early as 1912. These programs consisted

largely of planting trees and shrubs. These were

reasonably successful prior to 1930 but were not adequate for the true automobile road. As one writer

described the situation in 1936 : The quite common belief that the adoption and execution of a mere beautification program for our highways

satisfies even the most obvious requirements and potentialities of roadside development is both incorrect and

disheartening. We must sadly admit that much of our

present so-called roadside improvement is little more than a landscape hair-cut or perhaps a horticultural manicure.

What is now most needed is to set up a better type of organization with engineering and landscape departments

properly coordinated and working in harmony.^'

This advice was heeded, at least in part, but the

demands for more miles of paved highways and for

widening and straightening existing ones continued

to take the lion's share of the highway dollar. Much

credit is due the Xational Park Service for their in- sistence upon the incorporation of esthetic quality in

the design of national parkways. An outstanding

example of the good results that could be produced

by the joint efforts of landscape architects and highway design engineers may be found in the Mount

Vernon Memorial Highway which was designed and

constructed by the Bureau of Public Roads for the

Park Service during the period 1929-1932.

Credit is also due to the membership of two committees within the highway fraternity—the Committee on Roadside Development of the American

Association of State Highway Officials and a similarly

named group in the Highway Research Board. Initially in 1932, these two groups were established as a

joint committee but were separated in 1939 under

their parent organizations. The term "complete highway" was coined by these committees to describe suc- cinctly the importance of blending into a highway the

fundamental elements of design, construction, and

maintenance. The complete highway had to incorporate utility, safety, beauty, and economy to satisfy

this very sound concept.

395
Highway beautification was also given a boost by

the National Recovery Act of 1933, which included

among its objectives the landscaping, with Public

Works funds, of a moderate mileage of main roadsides. The rules and regulations governing the use

of these funds required that at least one-half of 1 percent of each State's apportionment should be devoted to this type of improvement. Thus, a total of

approximately $2 million was set aside for pioneeringwork which had for its ideal the conversion of imsightly roadsides into attractive areas bordering roadways made safe for those traveling upon them.

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1940 was a further landmark in legislation in support of better

looking and safer roadsides. Section 11 of this act authorized the use of Federal funds for ". . . such

roadside and landscape development, including such

sanitary and other facilities as may be deemed reason- ably necessary to provide for the suitable accommodation of the public . . . and . . . likewise . . . the purchase

of . . . adjacent strips of land of limited width and

primary importance for the preservation of the

natural beauty through which highways are constructed . . ." The Highway Beautification Act of

1965 further liberalized the use of Federal funds for

roadside improvements, such as control of outdoor

advertising and the control of roadside junkyards.

Practical Applications

Returning for a moment to the Mount Vernon

Memorial Highway, one reason for its attractive appearance was its gentle sinuous alinement; there were no long tangents and no abrupt, short radius curves. Yet, the highway formed a reasonably direct route

between termini. It was the antithesis of the type of

alinement that was evolving for conventional two-lane

highways which, by their very nature, necessitated

that vehicles encroach upon the opposing lane of

traffic in order to overtake and pass slower vehicles.

Straight alinement with good sight distances was thus

a requisite of a good, safe two-lane road.

By way of contrast, the Mount Vernon highway was a four-lane highway on which faster cars could

overtake and pass slower ones without having to en- croach on the lane for oncoming traffic. Thus, pass- ing sight distance was not important. The curves on

the Mount Vernon highway were of longer radius

than those generally used on two-lane roads, and there was no necessity for the motorist to vary his speed in

traversing the entire length of the route. One curve has been said to be over 2 miles long. All curves were

provided with spiral transitions.

This departure from conventional curve design was

achieved through the use of a flexible spline of the

type used in ship design, and this was one of the early

applications of the method. A prei'equisite of this

method of location and design is a topographic map

of fairly large scale and of sufficient width to include

all alternative locations for the selected routes. As

has been mentioned, aerial pliotographs Avere very

helpful in this regard, and this project was one of the

first to use tliis technique. The methods for determining elevations from the two-dimensional photographs were crude and lacked precision, and there were other problems to be overcome, but the benefits

of seeing the vegetation, the drainage courses, the

configurations of the ground, and the land uses as they appeared in nature were tremendous.

Rapid strides were to be made in photographic

techniques and in the development of equipment for

interpreting and photogrammetrically plotting topography by use of contours on topographic maps entirely adequate for precise highway location and

design. Improvements were to continue. Looking

ahead, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 authorized "the use of photogrammetric methods in mapping, and the utilization of commercial enterprise for

such services." By 1960, the accuracy and practicality

of aerial survey methods were so well recognized that contractors were willing to accept payment for earthwork computed on the basis of cross sections measured

photogrammetrically using aerial photographs taken

before and after the construction work was performed.

An arterial highway of the lO^O's with uncontrolled

access. An early form of channelization helped

trafflc movements, but the danger from cars backing out onto the highway still remained.

At the same time that new techniques were being

discovered or improved, new concepts and principles were being recognized. One of these, soon to be exploited, was the principle of control of access. It would be difficult to say when the first public highway was planned with the express intent of excluding

abutting property owners from access to the road for

the purpose of protecting and preserving the operational character of the highway. One of the earliest

examples of a controlled access highway is the Bronx

River Parkway in New York. It was designed about

1914 and completed approximately 10 years later. It has been said that this project was conceived as an

attempt to protect the historical old Bronx River, but

as studies developed, it was found that protection was

feasible only if the land on both sides were purchased

in fee. Once the land was purchased, it appeared

desirable to use it for park purposes and then for a parkway to relieve the congestion on the heavily

traveled north-south streets in the area. Regardless

of whether this controlled access parkway came into

being by accident or whether by intent, it stood for

half a century as a lasting proof of the value of controlled access. Whereas other roads of much higher

standard built decades later have since become obsolete because of roadside interference, the original

Bronx River Parkway retained all of its beauty and

396
utility until the pressures of continued traffic growtli

necessitated reconstruction during- the IQeO's. Much

of this beauty was retained in the reconstruction

process. The example set by the Bronx River Parkway and

other early controlled access highwa3^s went largely

unnoticed for many years, mainly because one of the

primary functions of highways at that time was to serve the abutting property, not to isolate the road

user. During the period 1030-1940, highway designers

became aware of the adverse effect that unregulated

access could have upon highway traffic service. Strip

commercial development in the vicinity of towns and

cities was particularly troublesome. Vehicles turning

into and out of roadside businesses created congestion

and caused accidents. A few far-sighted individuals

recognized the principle of control of access that had

been pretty much dormant throughout the 1920's. Interest was not limited to the United States. In

1933, the first spade of earth was turned on a new

system of highwaj^s for the German Reich. These

autobahnen, with full control of access and designed

for speeds up to 120 miles per hour, were destined to exert considerable influence on American design

criteria. The roadbuilders in the United States demonstrated, however, that they were not dependent on the

German engineers for leadership in designing and

constructing freeways. Between 1934 and 1940 the

Merritt Parkway was constructed, extending the parkway and controlled access features of the Westchester

County, New York, parkway system across Connecticut. During its first full year of operation, it handled an average of 20,000 cars per day.

The Merritt Parkway near Darien, Conn.

The need for a traffic artery capable of handling

similar traffic volumes between Los Angeles and Pasadena led to the start of the six-lane Arroyo Seca Freeway in 1938. It had two 35-foot I'oadways with a

6-foot curbed median.

The Pennsylvania Turnpike, comi^leted in 1940

from Ii'win to Carlisle as a toll facility, was the first rural freeway of notable length in this counti*y. It was a four-lane divided highway, except for several

tunnels through mountains where the width was narI'owed to two lanes. Noteworthy features in the design standards were gentle alinement and relatively

fiat gradients suitable for high-speed travel despite

the rugged terrain traversed by portions of the route. Also, consistent with anticipated high-speed travel was a design requirement for speed change lanes 1,200

feet long at points of access. These and the several other freeways in use by 1940

met with immediate acceptance by the motoring public. The freeway era was born.

The Era of the Freeway: 1940-1976

Design Standards

Concentrated thought and effort toward a nationwide system of controlled access highways, both urban

and rural, began to gather momentum about 1940.

However, it Avould be totally erroneous to leave the

impression that no further advances were made in the

design of conventional highways after that date. It

is generally true that the advances were in the nature

of refinements of the basic concepts and principles

enunciated in AASHO's seven published design policies. These refinements generally took the form of more generous dimensions in such elements as pave397
1". 1'/4"0R 1V4"

20'. 22' OR 24' -CIRCULAR ARC-

>-rRnvui\jFn .<;iiRRRAnF -I 9

'^' -CROWNED SUBGRADE

PORTLAND CEMENT CONCRETE PAVEMENT, NORMAL TRAFFIC

SOURCE: ANNUAL REPORT ILLINOIS DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS 1942

^RESHAPED SUBGRADE 3/16' PER FT.

(42') WIDTH OF CEMENT TREATED DESIGN SOIL

(56') WIDTH OF LIME TREATED DESIGN SOIL

TYPICAL SECTION MAIN FACILITY

RT. OR LT. LANE IN DIRECTION OF TRAFFIC ® 4" HOT BITUMINOUS PAVEMENT

(D 3" & VARIABLE HOT BITUMINOUS PAVEMENT

(3) DOUBLE BITUMINOUS SURFACE TREATMENT ® 8%" PLANT MIX BITUMINOUS BASE COURSE ® 414" TO BE PLACED IN 1 @ 2V," COURSE AND 1 2" COURSE

d) 4" COURSE MAY BE PLACED IN ONE OR MORE COURSES AS NECESSARY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF CONTRACT

(D CEMENT TREATED OR LIME TREATED DESIGN SOIL © BITUMINOUS PRIME COAT (CURING SEAL) @ VARIABLE DEPTH GRANULAR MATERIAL

(8) ifi-f INDICATES EROSION CONTROL TREATMENT

FLEXIBLE PAVEMENT-lnterstate Highway 1975

SOURCE; INTERSTATE COST STUDY, MISSISSIPPI

RESHAPED SUBGRADE I

(41') WIDTH OF CEMENT TREATED DESIGN SOIL

(56) WIDTH OF LIME TREATED DESIGN SOIL

TYPICAL SECTION MAIN FACILITY

RT. OR LT. LANE IN DIRECTION OF TRAFFIC ® 8" CONTINUOUSLY REINFORCED CONCRETE PAVEMENT @ DOUBLE BITUMINOUS SURFACE TREATMENT

(D 7" & VARIABLE DEPTH PLANT MIX BITUMINOUS BASE ® 4" PLANT MIX BITUMINOUS BASE (TO BE PLACED IN ONE OR MORE COURSES AS NECESSARY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF CONTRACT)

(D VARIABLE DEPTH GRANULAR MATERIAL

(S) CEMENT TREATED OR LIME TREATED DESIGN SOIL

(J) BITUMINOUS PRIME COAT (CURING SEAL) (D -^ v-v-vr INDICATES EROSION CONTROL TREATMENT

RIGID PAVEMENT-lnterstate Highway 1975

SOURCE: INTERSTATE COST STUDY. MISSISSIPPI

TYPICAL SECTIONS 1940-1975

398
ment and shoulder widths, wider bridges, and flatter slopes with better rounding at intersections of slope

planes. The need for a more open type of design was

occasioned, in part, by the continued increase in travel

speeds, but in most cases, these liberal practices were

as much a result of a greater flow of money into the

highway coffers as to any sudden awareness of need

for more generous dimensions. It would be difficult to say which is cause and which is effect—increases

in speed or improvements in design standards—but

historically they have gone hand in hand.

AASHO prepared concise, abbreviated design

standards for the several classes of highways, starting

with those for primary highwaj's in 1941. Design

and construction standards for secondary and feeder

roads and for the Interstate System were published in

1945. These have since been expanded and upgraded,

as necessary, for the three general categories of roads.

The classification terminology has been changed some- what with the passage of time.*

These standards have since been approved by the

Federal Highway Administrator for application on

Federal-aid highways and are the specific controls for

the design of such higliways. Many States have also

adopted them in tlieir exact form for application on highways that are off the Federal-aid systems. Other

States have promulgated standards of their own for

application on their various classes of State highways.

'\^niei'e found to be in reasonable conformity with

AASHO standards, these have been approved by the

Federal Highway Administrator for use on the Federal-aid systems.

Getting AASHO standards approved has not al- waj's been accomplished without dissension and debate. "\^lien a pavement width of 24 feet was proposed

for heavily traveled two-lane roads in 1941, for ex- ample, some officials, accustomed to building lanes

only 9 or 10 feet wide and having been stung by the

bad accident experience on three-lane roads, were

fearful that drivers would mistake the 24-foot roadway for a three-lane road. Other States were deeply

concerned by the added costs for higher standards.

Rural Design Policies Highway design policies are general procedures and

controls which are less specific than design standards,

often with a range of acceptable values, and which

are officially adopted or accepted for application in

the design of higliways. In 1950, the seven separately

published design policies were reprinted and bound

as a single volume under the title. Policies on Geometric Highway Design. Parenthetically, tlie final one of the policies, published in 1944. dealt with interchanges and grade separations and should properly

be identified with freeway development to a greater

extent than with conventional highways. The policies were updated and republished in 1954 as A Policy on

Geometric Design of Rural Tlighvays, the "Blue

Book." This publication broadened considerably the

earlier work, largely as a result of research efforts in

* Current versions prepared by the Committee on Planning

and Design Policies are Geometric Design ,Sta7i(lards for the Xational f^ijstem of Interstate and Defense Highways—1967; Geometric Design standards for Hightcays Other Than Freeloays—1969; and Geometric Design Guide for Local Roads

and Streets—1970.

the field of traffic oi^eration. The Highway Capacity

Manual, published by the Highway Research Board

in 1950, supplied material on the relation between

highway capacity and roadway characteristics. This

information was incorporated in the 1954 rural design

policy and has been invaluable in aiding the designer

to better fit the highway to traffic requirements.

The results of studies of truck speeds on grades as related to motive power and load carried also became

available after 1940 and were used in selecting values

for control gradients for the design of the several

classes of higliAvays in different types of terrain. One

solution to the problem created by slow moving trucks on grades was the i^rovision of an added lane in the

uphill direction for use by trucks. These have become

known as "climbing lanes." Criteria for climbing

lanes were included in the 1954 policy.

The 1954 design policy also enlarged upon the design speed concept and included tables showing the

relation between design speed, degree of curvature,

rate of superelevation, and needed length of spiral

transition. The subjects of freeway design and interchange geometries were discussed to the extent that

the state-of-the-art permitted.

In 1965 the rural design policy was again brought

up to date and republished under the same title. A Need to Expand the Highway Network

As efforts to improve and expand the highway net- work continued, it became increasingly apparent to higliAvay administrators and lawmakers alike that

portions of the predominantly two-lane rural system

of highways were becoming severely strained by the ever increasing traffic burden. Urban arterials were becoming choked by intensified commercial development coupled with rapid traffic growth. Inadequacies

in the form of low travel speeds, low capacities, and

high accident rates were clearly evident to those at even the highest level of government. At the same

time, there was an awareness that transportation

within cities was a national matter rather than a local problem. As a means of defining the scope of the

problem and of developing remedial measures, President Roosevelt, on April 14, 1941, appointed the

National Interregional Highway Committee to ". . . investigate the need for a limited system of national

liighways to improve the facilities now available for

interregional transportation, and to advise ... as to the desirable character of such improvement. . . ." ^^ The product of the Committee's efforts was the

celebrated report Interregional Highv)ays, submitted

to the President on January 5, 1944. The ultimate

accomplishment was the incorporation in the FederalAid Highway Act of 1944 of a provision for designating a national system of highways and a further

provision for the expenditure of Federal-aid highway

funds in urban areas. Highlights of some of the recommendations of the

report as to locating and designing tlie system were: • The system would be both urban and rural in extent. • Roadways and structures would be designed to serve vehicles of the types and numbers to be

expected 20 years from the date of construction. • Intersections with crossroads and railroads would

be separated in grade.

399
Traffic jam at intersection of U.S. routes 3 and 20 in Boston, Mass., in the early 1940's.

Rural hridycs became dangerous bottlenecks token they ivere narroicer than the approach highway, often making two-way traffic hazardous or impossible.

400
• Kural sections would be designed for safe travel

at a speed of 75 m.p.li. in flat topography; urban

sections for 50 m.p.h. • Traffic lanes would be 12 feet wide. • Shoulders would be 10 feet wide except in nioini- tainous topography. • Embankments 10 feet or less in height would

have side slopes no steeper than 1 foot vertically

to 4 feet horizontally. • The roadway width on bridges would be at least 6 feet greater than the width of the pavement of

the approacli roadway ; on sliort bridges the roadway widtli would be as great as the width of

approach roadway, including shoidders.

There were many other details for the design and

construction of the system, including such items as signs and markings, lighting and landscaping. A dis- cussion of the principles of landscape design occupied

three and one-lialf pages of the report. It was a complete text within itself. The design criteria contained in the report wei'e

reconunendations only. The 19-14 legislation authorizing the designation of the National System of Interstate Highway's made no reference to the standards

to be used in the design and construction of that

System. This was to come later. Enabling legislation for financing and constructing

the System was enacted in 1956. This legislation

contained the unique provision that the standards for

the System would be those approved by the Secretary

of Commerce ". . . in cooperation with the State highway depai'tments." Thus, the continuance of the

voluntary cooperative efforts of the States and the

Bureau of Public Roads in formulating standards for

the other highway systems for the past 20 years was

firmly assured and made applicable to tlie Interstate System.

AASHO responded to the requirement of the law

by adopting standards for the System within 3 weeks

after passage of the Act. Many of the recommendations of the 1944 Inferregiondl lUghirays found ex- pression in these standards, whicli Avere approved by

the Secretary of Commerce in accordance with the

law.

Urban Design Policies The Committee on Planning and Design Policies was well aware, as it always had been, that bare-bone

standards are not enough to assure the design of a

safe, utilitarian higlnvay that is estlietically pleasing

and economical to construct and maintain. They rec- ognized a need for a more casual and philosophical

discussion of the principles of freeway location and

design. Tlie Committee was also confronted with the

challenge of developing guidelines for the utilization

of Fedei'al-aid funds in tlie construction or improvement of city streets and highways.

The Committee chose to combine tliese objectives

and to develop a policy on urban arterial highwaj's,

which would, of course, include freeways as well as conventional arterial surface streets. This effort culminated in tlie publication, in 1957, of A Policy on

Arterial Highways in Urhan Areas, the "Red Book."

"When work began on this policy, there were few free- ways in existence, and experience in their design and

operation was limited. Nevertheless, the vision and

foresight of the Committee members was sufficient to

result in a thorough and comprehensive text on this

subject, as well as on the more conventional types of

streets and urban highways. The discussion of interchange types and configurations was particularly ex- haustive.

Experience in the application of the 1957 urban

design policy was generally favorable, but after a period of years, operational deficiencies began to develop in many urban freeways built in accordance

with the 1957 doctrine. In large measure, these deficiencies were attributable to traffic loads far in excess of those that were anticipated at tlie design stages.

Nevertheless, many of the operational problems would

have been alleviated had some of the dimensional

\'alues and configurations been more generous. Accordingly, the policy was updated and republished in

1973 as A Policy on Design of Arterial Ilighioays

and Urhan Streets. In the process of revision, new

sections were added on urban transportation planning

and on arterial route location.

Design standards and guidelines have undergone

only minor modification and upgrading since adoption

of the first editions of the two geometric design policies, rural in 1954 and urban in 1957. Such changes

as have been made are attributable to two px'incipal

factors: (1) Travel speeds have continued to climb,

necessitating adjustments for all design features, and

(2) vehicular silhouettes have been lowered, requiring

flatter highway profiles to provide the necessary sight

distances for avoidance of accidents.

Clearances to roadside obstacles and the moderately

flat side slopes that were entirely adequate for the

travel speeds prevalent before the mid-1950's were found deficient when measured against the speeds and

other operational practices of the seventies, as is apparent from an examination of speed trends on main

rural highways. Consequently, more liberal dimensions have been incorporated in the standards and

above minimum design is the rule rather than the

exception.

It may be truthfully said that throughout the history of highway design development, the highway

user, in the collective sense, has dictated the character

of the highway by his manner of operation on it and

by the extent of his willingness to pay, through road

user imposts, for roads that would sustain that type

of operation. It remained for the design engineer,

working in concert with the research engineer, the

landscape architect, and the economist, to determine

the type of operation demanded by the vehicle operator (now and in the future), the design characteristics

of a highway system that would safely support that

type of operation witliout being unnecessarily extravagant, and the probable revenues that would be available. It would not be a gross exaggeration to say that

every highway project has represented a compromise

l)etween the ideal in design characteristics on the one hand and economic reality on the other. This is likely

to remain the case in tlie future.

401
Design For Safety

While not always indicated separately, safety in

highway vehicle operations has been an important

objective of highway design since the beginning of

the highway development programs. The identification by the 1920's of the need for clear stopping dis- tances, for widths to pass without major pullover, and

for usable curve radii led to early efforts to determine

and incorporate such appropriate features in the next

highway improvements. "With reasonable rapidity,

the design engineers accepted the identified highway

safety needs, developed newer design controls reflect- ing them and put them to use. In retrospect over the

last 50 years, it should be said that designers never were able to catch up with nor were the construction

programs able to provide the highways needed for

the rapidly changing vehicles, volumes, speeds, travel

habits and driver attitudes. The history of highway

design control development shows a progressive series

of adjustments that reflect the concerns for highway

safety evolving from the latest experiences and accident data. The same process continues today.

There is space here only to indicate a few examples

of design controls and practices that were pointed

toward better safety. In 1938-1944 initial design

policies of AASHO had many such items. The 1941

primary standards preamble urged that in using the

design values, "unquestioned adequacy rather than

strict economy should be the criterion." ^° The overall concept of design for expected volumes, for the

character of traffic and for an assumed design speed was a major effort for highway safety. The enumerated values and controls for lane width, shoulders, use of a dividing median, pavement crown, curve

radius and superelevation, minimum sight distance,

safety passing sections, guardrails where roadway

slopes were steep, appropriate intersection details and

layouts, and for grade separations with interchange

ramps all embody features patterned for safe vehicle

operations. The 1954 rural design policy book refined

these and provided additional details; advocacy of

controlled access design was a major addition. The

1965 revision expanded treatment of these details,

primarily in the realm of the higher volume and

higher speed operations which were then being ex- perienced. Both of these editions keyed into the separately developing standards for the several types of

traffic control devices which have a high safety orientation. Both the 1957 and the 1973 urban highway

policy books reflected design features needed for the

higher volumes and greater land space restrictions in

urban areas. They particularly stressed the design

details of grade separations, interchange patterns,

frontage roads, and practical geometries relative to expressways and freeways.

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1942 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 SPEED TRENDS ON MAIN RURAL HIGHWAYS BY VEHICLE TYPE

SOURCE: "HIGHWAY STATISTICS", FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, 1973, p. 81

402
The Snow Road Bridge over 1-^96 near Lansing, Mich., is an example of modern

safety design. Slanted back slopes and the absence of side piers on

either end make safe vehicle recovery possible.

The 1956 Interstate standards made a further

breakthrough in stating positive requirements for design with full access control throughout that System

and for use of higher realm geometric design values

as needed for operations at speeds of 60 m.p.h. and

above.

During 1959 and again in 1966, a special AASHO

Safety Committee conducted a natiouAvide survey of

highways which resulted in published reports enumerating design details to provide greater safety. The

second of these, Highioay De-sign and Operational

Practices Related to HigKvmy Safety., 1967, soon known as the "Yellow Book," included recommendations on the current highway design and practices to attain a higher degree of safety in both State and

local agency actions. Responding, Federal policy

directives called for utilization of the report recom- mendations on all project plans designed for a speed

of .50 m.p.h. or mox'e and a corrective program to apply the findings on existing highways. The report was updated and reissued in 1974 with the same title.

One of the newly advocated features from these

studies was the "clear roadside" concept, which by

1966 had been started in a few States. During the

early 1960's, it became evident through accident analyses that about one-third of all accidents were single

vehicle, run-off-the-pavement types, a high proportion

of which proved to be of high severity on collisions

with an object on the roadside, such as a rock, large

tree, or steep cut slope. Some of these objects were highway elements such as culvert headwalls, rigid

sign posts, lighting standards, bridge piers, etc. Better design and correction programs for safety were

needed to provide traversible roadsides of a width

well beyond the shoulder that was free of all formidable objects and reasonably flat and rounded so that

off-roadway drivers would have a chance to i-ecover

control of their vehicles. Actions taken included

lengthening culverts and overcrossings, moving sign

supports or using the breakaway type, eliminating

protruding drainage inlets, flattening and rounding

roadway slopes, and providing tested-types of crash

cushions at bridge abutments and between diverging

403
highways and guardrails in front of essential roadside

objects and as central barriers in narrow medians.

Main highways of new design now are being developed in this manner and corrections made to the ex- tent practical on existing highways. The cost effectiveness of some of these features remains moot

on low and intermediate volume highways and further

studies are continuing for their more widespread

application.

Traffic Control Devices

Traffic control devices are the several elements provided on highways to advise, guide, warn, regulate or otherwise inform the vehicle drivers. The basic types

of devices are signs, pavement markings, roadside

delineators and traffic signals. The 1971 Manual on

Uniform: Traffic Control Devices was approved by the

Federal Highway Administrator as the national standard for all highways open to public travel. This

Manual presents essential standards for design, location, installation and operation of all forms of traffic control devices and is the culmination of over 50 years

of progressive development of the devices and national

standards for their detailed and uniform use. The history of these developments can be briefly

reviewed in two stages. First are the series of individual and scattered instances to conceive and use some form of device. Second are the organized efforts to develop and attain acceptance of standards for

national uniformity.

Early Traffic Controls

In 1745 stone markers were placed between Trenton

and Perth Amboy on the principal highway between

New York and Philadelphia. They were installed at 2-mile intervals and at intersections with other public

roads. A public subscription was made to pay for

them. In 1763 the Boston Post Road similarly was marked with mileposts.

The Pennsylvania State authorizing act in 1792 for

the Philadelphia to Lancaster turnpike included re- quirements for mileposts and directional signs.

By 1902 some cautious automobile touring had begun, and the adventurers were losing their way. Often

there were no signs at all, or where there had been

signs, many had toppled over and been broken or faded beyond readability. As early as 1905, extensive

signpost work was performed by the Buffalo Automobile Club in New York State. In the next few years, auto clubs aci'oss the country undertook the task of a

basic directional signing on the principal highways

within their areas. Despite their local efforts, there were no national or long route installations.

In 1913 the Lincoln Memorial Highway Association was organized and funds collected toward promotion

and construction of a central east-west highway across the country. While the construction phase largely

became promotional assistance to the State highway

agencies, the Association shortly put into effect an

entire route marking along existing roads. Painted

red, white and blue band markings and symbols were

placed on utility poles, clearly designating the chosen

route. This example generated widespread activity

by many motorist and local clubs to similarly, but

distinctively, mark a selected and named route and

foster its improvement. By the 1920's, there were some 250 name routes, each with characteristic color

bands marked on roadside poles. In some cases, several such routes overlapped, resulting in totem poles

of multicolors. These color bands and symbols were

gradually replaced by route numbers as the States

installed signs designating them.

The widespread use of stone mileposts did not begin

until the early 1920's when mileposts appeared on the

roads of a few States in the form of concrete marker

posts. Gradually the mileposts began to be replaced

by signs indicating mileages to places ahead to aid

travelers. The rapid expansion and drastic changes

in our Nation's highway system beginning about 1910 were reflected in significant modifications in highway

markings. The realinement and abandonment of

roads, together with construction of ncAv highways,

made many of the old mileage signs virtually useless,

and they were gradually replaced by signs displaying

point-to-point distances and route numbers based

The Automobile Club of Maryland posting directional and mileage signs.

404
An early railroad crossiiig warning.

upon uniform statewide highAvay numbering systems.

In addition, travelers weve greatly aided by the widespread production and distribution of tourist maps

that made use of readily identifiable landmarks, as well as route markers and signs. This increased availability of other devices for the guidance of travelers

resulted in a marked decline in the use of mileposts,

except in a few States and on turnpikes.

Immediately after "World "War I, as the States en- gaged in a greatly speeded-up road development

program, it became apparent that a simplified and

adequate marking system was a necessity. In 1918,

Wisconsin decided that proper names could not be

applied to an extensive network of highways and so developed the route marker and the numbering method

of designating its higliAvays and for directing travel over them. The shape selected for its route marker

signs was a triangle with the apex down, using black

and Avhite colors. The triangle showed "State trunk

highway," the route number and the State name.

Also W^isconsin placed directional and distance signs

for the trunk system and for lesser roads."

In 1921 Minnesota established its trunk highway

system and promptly installed full-scale marking and

signing. Minnesota adopted a star shaped design,

with lemon yellow and black colors for all official route signs on the system and suggested white and

black for signs placed by other jurisdictions.^^

In 1911 the road commissioner in "Wayne County,

Michigan, ordered that a white line be painted down

the center of every bridge and curve under his authority. Later, he carried the idea to its logical conclusion

and painted the centerline along all the highways.

The obvious benefits of the centerline strip were

eventually realized, and the striping spread to all highway agencies.^^

In 1915, a Detroit police official designed the first stop sign. When the first installation proved effective,

the city promptly allocated funds to make six major

streets through thoroughfares, by placing stop signs on intersecting streets.^* Traffic sigiials were developing in this same decade,

first with the hand operated semaphores, then a motorized version that was patented in 1910. The first use of electric traffic signals was during the period

1912 to 1914 with Cleveland, Salt Lake City, and St. Paul all claiming their use to be the first.^^ In 1920,

the first three-colored traffic signal light to control

street and highway traffic was installed in Deti^oit.^*' The first four-way three-color signal was installed in Detroit in 1920."

The first traffic control tower, located within an

intersection, w^as set up in 1917, at a main Detroit

crossroad.^^ Similar towers also were used about the same time in Xew York City.

405
These route and mileage markers aided travelers passing

through Jackson, Mich.

Uniformity Through Standards

Late in 1922, three State highway department

officials from Minnesota, AVisconsin, and Indiana

joined in a trip through several States to try to work

out some basis for uniformity in the signing and

marking of their highways. The trio's findings were

reported at the 1923 meeting of the Mississippi Valley

Association of State Highway Departments. That

body agreed on them as a uniform signing and marking plan for the member States and passed its recom- mendations on to AASHO. Two years later the

system of signs and markers became the basis for the

first national standards.^^

The Mississippi Valley Association established dis- tinctive shapes for the several classes of signs, namely,

a circular railroad crossing sign, an octagonal stop

sign, a diamond-shaped slow sign, and a distinct route marker to be individually designed by each State. All of these signs were to have a white background

with black lettering and border. With the exception

of the route markers and the rectangular information

sign, all were to be two feet square or 2 feet across. Within a year Wisconsin, Minnesota, Indiana, and

Michigan were installing signs on their State systems

largely in harmony with the Association plan, and

other States in the Association were making plans to do so promptly. A Minnesota Highway Department

Manual of Markers and Signs was completed in April

1923.

The report of the National Conference on Street

and Highway Safety in 1924 by its Committee on

Construction and Engineering stated that:

Proper signs and signals are essential to the safe move- ment of traffic on any street or highway. . . . Signs

should be uniform for a given purpose throughout the United States. ... It can be assumed that the Federalaid signs . . . will be uniform in every state and will point the way to state and county highway authorities

to follow the same standards. . . . All signs should be

simple, with the least amount of wording necessary to make them readily understood, depending mainly on dis- tinctive shapes, symbols and colors."" The Conference report recommended that color in- dications, which would not be used for any other

purpose, should be red for "stop"; green for "proceed"; yellow for "caution" at curves; some special

cautionary color indications should be used at cross- roads; white letters or symbols should be used on the

red or green background, and black on the yellow.

Distance and direction signs should be black and

white.

Other recommendations were

Railroad crossings remaining at grade should be safe- guarded in every reasonable way. Standard warning

signs and pavement markings should be used to mark the approaches to all public railroad crossings.

Rural highways should be marked with a white center

line on curves, at and near hill crests, at irregular inter- sections, and at any other points where safety requires that motorists keep strictly to the right. No parking

even off the traveled roadway should be permitted opposite these white lines. White center lines should not be used on straight level sections of highway or street except

at highway, street or railroad crossings. Black center

lines on straight sections of highways are desirable. Pedestrian lanes sliould be marked on the pavement at

bu.sy intersections. Objects near the roadway, such as curbs, poles, fences and rocli surfaces, should be painted wliite. Ol)structions,

such as columns and curbs, at the centers of underpass,

should be striped diagonally black and white."

406
"' — —"^

to'' -V

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VBy 1922, fourteen towers of this type had been installed at main intersections

in Detroit, Mich.

DANGER

GO SLO

CURVE.

DANGER

JF

GO SLO

DANGER

GOjSLO

CROSS Broads

GO. SLO

B b EG

SCHOOL

STANDARD DANGER SI6NS-I9I9

407
At the annual meeting of AASHO in 1924, its Subcommittee on Traffic Control and Safety presented

recommendations for standard signs and markings

based largely on the work of the Mississippi Valley

Association, but incorporating at least one new feature, a color code to distinguish the several types of

signs. Acting on an AASHO resolution, the Secretary of Agriculture appointed a Joint Board on Interstate Highways in March 1925 with 21 members from

State highway departments and 3 from the Bureau

of Public Roads. In October, the Board made its report covering the proposed interstate highway net- work, the route numbering system, and a comprehensive set of sign designs. The system devised for

numbering the interstate network of highways (now

called the U.S. Numbered Highways) used even numbers for east and west roads and odd numbers for

north and south roads. Long distance routes which

might be connected entirely, or nearly so, across the

country were given multiple numbers of 10. The

principal north and south routes were given numbers

such as 1, 5, 11, 15. Other numbered routes could be

used for shorter lines between the main designated

routes. The Joint Board sign standards followed closely the

1924 Conference recommendations with the addition

of the now familiar "U.S. shield" marker for the new

network. A yellow background was adopted for all caution and danger message signs, including the stop

sign. There were no recommendations on luminous

or reflectorized signs.

The Joint Board report was submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture and approved by him November

8, 1925. It was accepted at the annual AASHO meeting a few days later and subsequently adopted by

letter ballot of the State highway departments.

During the following year, AASHO developed detailed sign standards and published the first edition

(1927) of the Manual and Specifcations for the

Manufacture^ Display, and Erection of U.S. Standard

Road Markers and Signs. This Manual set forth the

design and use of each type of sign and illustrated

most of the api^roved signs. It listed a series of working drawings of standard signs and alphabets that

had been prepared for distribution by the Bureau of

Public Roads. Also, it contained detailed specifications for materials and manufacturing of various

types of wood and metal signs. This 1927 Manual

was the first national rural manual on traffic control

signs and markings. A 1929 second edition authorized

the use of a luminous element mounted below a standard sign on the same post or on a separate mounting

in advance of the standard sign framed with a background of the same shape and color as the standard

sign that it supplemented. A 1931 revised edition

added a number of new signs, including a new design

for junction markers.

Two years after the 1927 AASHO Manual, other

officials gathered for urban sign standardization. The

National Conference on Street and Highway Safety,

recognizing the need for greater uniformity in street

The standardised U.S. route shield.

traffic sig-ns, signals, and markings, accepted an offer of the American Engineering Council to make a national survey of existing conditions and to prepare a recommended practice. The resulting report accepted

most of the AASHO Sign Manual standards, but

with some exceptions and qualifications. The recom- mended "stop" sign was to have a yellow background,

but the letters were to be red. Eighteen inches was

to be the standard outside dimension instead of 24

inches because the generally slower speeds in cities did not require lai'ge signs for visibility and the

smaller signs would occupy less space. Parking regulation signs and other signs applicable to city use were added. These parking signs were to be 12 by 18

inches with a white background. Red letters were to be used on "no parking" signs, and green letters where

limited time parking was permitted. Pedestrian re- strictions were to be shown in blue letters on a white

background, and other restrictions in black on white.

The urban recommendations also included subjects

not dealt with by AASHO, such as traffic signals,

pavement markings and safety zones. The signal

recommendations included terms, systems, control

types, colors, specifications, beacons, and "wigwag"

and flashing light train signals. The marking recom- mendations included pavement lines, railroads, identification, curve lines, words, pavement inserts, paint,

buttons, and markings on vertical elements such as obstructions and railroad gates.

The Council's report was submitted and approved

by the Third National Conference on Street and

Highway Safety in 1930. Then there were in exist- ence two national manuals, one for rural use and one

for municipal use, with some significant differences

between them. It was apparent to all that a single

manual covering all traffic control devices would be

desirable.

408
Soon a Joint Committee on Uniform TraiRc Control

Devices was established, represented by AASHO for

the rural manual and the National Conference for the

urban manual. At the first meeting of the Committee,

it was agreed that certain details should be thoroughly

investigated before completing the joint sign manual.

A project to investigate visibilitj' and legibility of

several alternative color combinations by day and

night, with and without reflector buttons, was ar- ranged with the Bureau of Standards by the Bureau

of Public Roads. The Bureau of Public Roads also

made delay studies at traffic control signals. With

these and other data, Committee compromise adjustments were worked out and a combined manual was

developed. The new manual was approved by the

Secretary of Agriculture as the standard code for

application on Federal-aid highways; it was published

in 1935 as the Manual on Uniform 7'inffic Control

Devices for Streets and Highways (MUTCD).

The new jNIanual dealt comprehensively with the

whole field of traffic control de\-ices. Signs were di- vided into three classifications—regulatory, warning,

and guide. The stop sign retained the yellow background and red letters were accepted as an alternative

to the black letters. The railroad crossing sign was a crossbuck to closely resemble the standard railroad

advance warning sign. The Manual included new

self-evident symbols to indicate crossroads, Y and T

intersections and side roads. The section on traffic signals supplied long needed guidance on the number,

meaning, and arrangement of signal lenses. Green was specified for go, yellow for caution, and red for

stop. The ^Manual provided that each signal should

have three lenses since the function of the yellow

light could not be attained witli a signal having only

two lenses. In 1938 the Joint Committee reexamined the Manual and recommended numerous updating revisions,

and a supplement was issued in February 1939.

As one of the aftermaths of the Pearl Harbor at- tack on December 7, 1941, problems of wartime traffic loomed, especially the altogether new possibility of

having to move traffic under blackout conditions. The

Joint Committee was revived, this time including the

Institute of Traffic Engineers as a member. The

"War Emergency Edition" of the Manual, published

at the end of 1942, was a condensed version of the

previous edition, modified only to deal with blackouts

and make certain wartime concessions, such as per- missive use of white pavement markings instead of

yellow because of material shortages.

In 1944 the Joint Committee agreed that the Manual must be entirely rewritten to include the needs of

changed conditions. In 1948, after a wide review, the

final draft was approved by the Joint Committee's

three sponsoring organizations and by the American

Standards Association. That year, also, the National

Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances was made a member of the Joint Committee replacing

the National Conference on Streets and Highway

Safety.

Some of the more significant changes in the 1948

Manual were : a diamond-shaped sign was prescribed

for all warning signs (except the circle for the rail- road crossing) ; a new intersection route turn symbol

sign was provided; a new "advisory speed" sign was

included for use with any warning signs; aiid the

growing need for larger signs was recognized and some of the minimum sizes were increased.

A major change and innovation was made in the

next Joint Connnittee JNIanual revision of 1955. The

stop sign was changed from black on yellow to white on red. The yield sign came into being in the now

familiar equilateral triangle with one point downwai'd

and used black lettering on yellow as were other

warning signs.

In 1955 the MUTCD did not include material for

the signing and marking of freeways. The National

Joint Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices

began drafting an extensive addition to the existing

manual in 1956 to cover expressway signs as called

for by the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act. Also in

1956, the American Association of State Highway

Officials set up a subcommittee of its traffic connnittee

to develop an Interstate Manual that would "incorporate the best experience from all the higher type

toll roads and freeways." The resulting Manual Avas adopted by AASHO in 1958. In February 1958, the

Manual for Signing and Pavement Marking of the

National System of Interstate and Defense Highways

was approved by the Bureau of Public Roads. A

second edition of the Interstate Manual was published

in 1961 and a slightly revised edition in 1962.

In the meantime, to provide broader representation,

the Joint Committee, in 1960, had enlarged its membership to include the National Association of County

Officials (now the National Association of Counties)

and the American Municipal Association (now the

National League of Cities). The Joint Committee

published a new MUTCD in 1961, drawing heavily on the AASHO Interstate Manual for expressway and

freeway signing. The new Manual had many refine- ments, changes in emphasis, and new applications of

engineering and psychological research and experience

in operations of the substantial mileage of high-speed

limited access highways, particularly of toll roads.

New features included the use of lowercase letters and

green background on freeway directional signs, re- flectorization or illumination for the background of

overhead signs, and reflectorization of all pavement

markings that have application at night. The 1961

MUTCD also included, for the first time, an extensive

special treatment of traffic control devices for highway

construction and maintenance operations and a group

of special signs for emei'gency civil defense applications. Standards for traffic signals were modernized

to keep up with technical advances in that field. The 1966 Highway Safety Act provided for the

first time that specific Federal safety funds be spent

l)y local governments as a step toward reducing the

number of accidents. The existing devices on all highways and streets were to be continually reviewed

and upgraded. The Federal-aid requirement for uni409
ss^

BIKE ROUTE




NO LEFT

TliOkJ

KEEP

Dl/^UT

New signs, 1971. Many of the signs combine international symbols and word equivalents.

form traffic control standards was extended to apply

to all streets and highways. The Act provided funds

for the improvements, which would ultimately place

the Nation under one set of traffic control standards.

Using the Joint Committee as an advisory board, a new updated revision of the MUTCD was prepared

by the FHWA staff. Issued as the 1971 Manual on Uniform Ti'^afflc Control Devices for Streets and

Highioays., it is now the national standard for all highways open to public travel. The 1971 MUTCD incorporates significant changes

in the wider use of symbols, which are international

in character, on both regulatory and warning signs.

A separate part covers traffic controls for school areas. A pennant shaped "no passing zone" sign and pentagon shaped school signs were added. For construction and maintenance work, the colors for the warningsigns were changed to orange. In the pavement marking area, yellow was added as the color to delineate

the separation of traffic flowing in opposite directions.

Traffic signal updating included recommending a 12-inch signal face instead of 8-inch for arrows. It emphasizes that engineering study always is an important part of the application of detail standards.

Surfacing and Paving the Highways

Development of Pavement Design

The history of the development of highway pavements in the United States to the present stage is a

series of incidents that are widespread both in time

and place. Once roads advanced beyond the footpaths and horse trails, their improvements into paved

highways were successive developmental efforts to match the available manpower, funds and natural re- sources against the changing needs of the types and

extent of vehicular traffic for each area's expanding

commerce. The first "macadam" surface in this country was

constructed in 1823 between Hagerstown and Boonsboro, Maryland. Rocks were broken by hand so as not to exceed 6 ounces in weight or to fail to pass a 2-inch ring. The material was laid in three separate

strata, the finished surface being 15 inches deep at the

center and 12 inches at each edge. The surface was

20 feet wide.*2

In the forested sections, plank roads were dominant

for a period. The first plank road in the United

States was opened to traffic in 18-16 in Syracuse, New

York. Advocates of plank roads made extravagant

410
claims as to their superiority over macadam, and

lumber being available, thousands of miles were built

in many States during the following decade. In a few years, the public discerned that the life of any

road is limited by the lasting qualities of the material

of which it is built. It took about 10 years for the

wooden planks to rot away, and the plank road era ended rather abruptly.*^

Dust palliatives were applied on gravel and mac- adam road surfaces as early as 1898. Tar and asphalt were used as protective surface coatings and later as binders.

Bituminous pavements were constriicted in "Washington, D.C., and Xew York City as early as about

1870.''* Bituminous macadam experiments began in

Boston in 1906, and a 1-mile section was constructed

there in 1907.-''' Recovering from the ravages of the Civil War, the

South needed a road surface that could be built and

maintained at a small cost from local materials in general abundance. Sand-clay surfacing, because it was lower in cost, adequate for light traffic, less dusty

and noisy, and more resilient than macadam, was the

logical answer to the road problems of the South

Atlantic and Gulf States in 1885. It was used widely

in these areas. The first brick pavement on a rural road was placed near Cleveland, Ohio, in 1893. The roadway was 32

feet wide, but the brick pavement, 8 feet wide, was

placed near one side of the roadway, leaving the re- maining width unsurfaced.'*®

Mention has been made of early macadam, brick,

and bituminous surfaces and pavements on rural

roads. By the 1890's the heavy-load hauling demands

in the large cities had led to construction of heavy

street pavement sections of the types which had shown

good stability. The horsedrawn drays hauling heavy

loads on steel-rimmed wheels had pulverized all but

the hardest pavement surfaces. Consequently, the

main streets of the large cities were built very heavily

and surfaced with granite blocks or hard paving

bricks. Concrete bases were used on some. The minor

business streets and residential streets were commonly

of macadam or gravel. Asphalt paving, begun in the

early 1870's. was immediately popular because of its smoothness, silence, lack of dust, and ease of cleaning.

By the 1890's, many of the city streets wei'e asphalt

surfaced to gain these advantages.

Credit for first surfacing a rural public road with

Portland cement concrete is conceded to Wayne

County, Michigan, where a 1-mile section was built in

1909. The i^avement was laid in two courses, 18 feet wide and having a total depth of 61/2 inches. The

first course was made of 1-21/2-5 mix of portland

cement, sand and limestone 4 inches deep and the

second course of a 1-2-3 mix of portland cement,

sand and crushed cobblestone 2i/^ inches deep. It was

laid in 25-foot sections.*' The heavy truck traffic during World War I inflicted widespread damage upon surfaces built during

the preceding generations to carry horsedrawn vehicles. After the war, there was a public clamor for

improved roads, at once and everywhere. Responsible

engineers agreed that they lacked the essential information required for the design and construction of a nationwide system of paved laighways as envisioned

by the framers of the 1916 Federal Aid Road Act. This led to the fornuilation and cari-ying out of the

continuing and extensive series of engineering re- search studies by the State highway departments,

Bureau of Public Roads and related industry. The

HighAvay Research Board, created in 1920, served to nationally correlate and disseminate the ensuing re- sults of the studies, delving into the proper relationship between highway loads, road surfaces, and

subgrades. The system of soil classification and analysis was developed, together with data on the many

detailed characteristics of aggregates, materials and

mixes under the varied field conditions and traffic loads. Traffic counting and weighing facilities were

set up, and the procedures for predicting traffic vol- umes and loadings were developed and put into use

in the late 1930's. As the numbers, sizes, weights and speeds of vehicles increased, highway officials struggled to provide

pavements with adequate structural strength to meet

the demands of traffic. Practices of highway design,

construction and maintenance were progressively re- vised upward. Some of these revisions were the result

of practical experience and some were based on results of engineering research. In the 1920's, many highway

engineers recognized that the supporting ability re- quired in the pavement structure of roads was determined principally by the axle loads of the vehicles.

There was also general recognition of the need for more factual information on all of the pavement and

soil elements.

Design Road Tests Beginning in 1920, several research projects using

specially constructed test tracks produced significant

advances in the science of pavement desigTi and construction. In 1920, the Bureau of Public Roads expedited its field tests on the large circular track

containing different pavement sections at Arlington,

Virginia. Experimental roads were constructed in

1921 by the Columbia Steel Company cooperating

with the California Highway Commission at Pittsburg east of San Francisco. The Bureau of Public

Roads intensified its laboratory tests and initiated a countrywide field study of subgrade soils. Universities became beehives of research activity. One major

effort to obtain such information was the Bates Experimental Road, a test conducted by the Illinois

Division of Highways in 1922 and 1923 near Springfield, Illinois, on a 2i/^-mile roadway divided into 63

test sections of varied materials and design.** The

test vehicles were trucks with solid rubber tires on which wheel loads were increased from 2,500 to 13,000

poimds as the testing progressed.

Within a few years, there were four principal types

of findings: (1) Subgrade soil tests were developed

which, together with traffic studies and otlier information, became valuable aids in pavement design. (2)

The destructive impact of the solid rubber tire was

isolated and overcome by the introduction of the

softer pneumatic tii'e. (3) Agreement was reached on the 9,000-pound wheel load as a logical basis upon

which to plan a long-term paving program. (4) The

thickened edge design of rigid pavements w^as adopted.

These findings soon ])rought about the adoption of

laws regulating vehicle weights.

411
The Baltimore-Washington Boulevard was

greatly damaged by World War I

truck traffic

By 1930, the same stretch of road had been

resurfaced with bituminous concrete and

widened by the construction of two

10-foot concrete shoulders.

«

I

"^>^^Mifld

*^-

412
The Baltimore-Washington Blvd. (U.S. route 1) in 1975.

413
Aware of the need for uniformity of State motor

vehicle weight regulations, the Governors Conference,

in 1949, requested a study of the matter. This study

resulted in a rigid pavement test road being established in Maryland, with participation by 11 State

highway departments, the District of Columbia, the

Bureau of Public Roads, auto manufacturers and the

petroleum industry. The purpose of the testing program was to determine the relative effects of various

axle loads and configurations on distress of rigid

pavement. The findings supplied extensive data on

the factors to be used in the design of rigid pavements.*^ Especially significant were those factors re- garding support material characteristics.

The Western Association of State Highway OiRcials

constructed a test road in Idaho in 1951 to aid in

establishing load limits and to develop rational design

methods for flexible pavements. A number of specially designed and constructed bituminous pavements

Avere carefully observed under the repeated application of a number of selected heavy axle loads. The

findings provided significant information on the materials and soil parameters for designing flexible pavements, especially in the western States where soil conditions are similar. Also the surfaced shoulder was found to contribute to the pavement structural

stability.^o

In 1955, the American Association of State Highway Officials undertook the AASHO Road Test at a

selected site near Ottawa, Illinois, with the Highway

Research Board accepting the responsibility of administering the project. Various heavy truck loads were operated on specially constructed pavement sec- tions of both rigid and flexible types until they

reached a failure stage. A vast amount of data was

collected and analyzed, providing engineering facts

for highway design and construction nationwide. In

addition, the test findings were aimed at determining

maximum desirable weights of vehicles to be operated on Federal-aid highways, including the Interstate System, and determining an equitable distribution of

the tax burden among various classes of persons using

Federal-aid highways.

The findings of the AASHO Road Test were summarized and prepared in the form of design equations

and graphs and made available to the States in 1962,

but it was not until 1973 that the data was updated

and published by AASHO as Interim Guide for the

Design of Rigid Pavement Structures. The equations

and graphs incorporated the research data for design

factors such as traffic, soil support and material

strengths. The guide today represents the major cur- rent data available for broad application in designing

pavements and is used by the Federal Highway Administration to measure the adequacy of the States' proposed pavement designs for use on Federal-aid

highways.

Present day pavements consist of layers of bitumi- nous materials or portland cement concrete, plain or

reinforced, with thicknesses ranging up to 10 inches;

in some instances, unusually high truck loadings call for even greater thicknesses. Most pavements today

include a subbase which is a stratum of material 4 to 20 inches thick between the pavement and natural

subgrade. This subbase is a granular material sometimes treated for stabilization with either cement or

asphalt. Design criteria, which account for soil support values, material strength characteristics and

traffic, are used to determine the thickness of the

pavement subbase.

Highway Development Record

The records of the development of roads and streets in the United States show a progressive increase in

the total mileage and a continued conversion from the

lower to higher surfacing and pavement types. The

actual rate of development and change reflects not

only the increase in funding for public highways to serve the rising traffic needs, but also the findings

from research studies on surface materials, aggregates,

reinforcements, mixes, construction and maintenance.

In 1904 there were about 2.35 million miles of public streets and highways. From 1910 to 1920 the total increased rapidly to about 3.2 million miles in all stages of improvement, ranging from primitive trails to highly improved urban thoroughfares. In 1920,

425,000 miles had some form of surfacing. Since

1950 the total mileage has increased consistently to the 1973 total of 3.8 million miles. The urban mileage

has been expanding somewhat more rapidly than the

rural mileage, particularly since 1950.

About 90 percent of the total road mileage was not

surfaced in 1904. During the total mileage expansion

in the teens, the nonsurfaced mileage actually in- creased, but the construction programs resulted in a gradual proportional decrease to about 80 percent in

1925. Since then the nonsurfaced mileaq^e has decreased rapidly to about 20 percent in 1973.

Since about 1920 the total surfaced mileage has

been increasing steadily to the 1973 total of 3.17

million miles. The gravel surfacing type has been

dominant. Since about 1935 the rate of surfacing

urban highways has been somewhat more rapid than

that for the rural mileage.

The mileage of rural gravel-type surfaces (soil,

slag, gravel and stone) increased regularly to about

1960. Since 1962 this type has been decreasing. It should be noted that the increase in gravel mileage

up to 1960 was over and above the mileage that was

upgraded to higher surface types. From 1935 to 1955

the rural gravel improved mileage was from 3 to 4

times that of the low bituminous mileage. The record on urban gravel mileage shows little change from

1941 to 1973, with a continuing total of 70,000 to 80,000 miles.

The low bituminous* rural mileage jumped substantially during the 1930's and increased steadily

until the late 1960's, when it leveled off. In the urban

areas, the low bituminous mileage continually in- creased.

The high bituminous** rural mileage followed the

upward trend of low bituminous type, with totals only about half to two-thirds that of the lower type.

The decided increase about 1950 corresponds with the

decrease in the low bituminous type. This type con- tinued the upward trend the last few years, as distinct

from the low bituminous mileage.

* Having a combined surface and base thickness less than

7 inches and/or low load-bearing capacity.

** Having a combined surface and base thiclvuess 7 inches or more and/or a high load-bearing capacity.

414
4000

«o

o

o

Q

LUz

CQo

o

LU<

LU

o

COX

LU

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

BUBAL

.^.v3^^^°-•

X

1900 05

_L jL ••"''' 1 1 ±.

CONCRETE - RURAL

J I I "i" i V 10 15 1920 25 30 35 1940 45 50 55 1960 65 70 1975

YEAR

SOURCE: "HIGHWAY STATISTICS," ANNUAL PUBLICATIONS 1945 - 1973.

The mileage record of the concrete type differs considerably from the other types. For the rural mileage

during the 1920\s and early 1930's, the total exceeded

that of both bituminous types. The existing rural concrete pavement mileage increased until 1935, lev- eled off for some 10 years, and since has decreased.

The mileage decrease for rural concrete pavements

reflects the conversion of sections of that type of pavement to the high bituminous type when an overlay was placed as a maintenance step. The existing urban

concrete mileage for the last 16 years shows no in- crease, the mileage being only half or less those of

bituminous pavements. The overlay conversion effect doubtless applies here also.

Proportionally, there has been substantially higher

type development of road and street mileage in the

urban area. The percentages of the 1973 mileages for

the various types were

State Highway

Total Rural Urban Systems

Total Existing Mileage

(1,000's) 3,807 3,176 631 764 Percentage by Type:

Nonsurfaced 20 23 4 3 Surfaced

Gravel 34 38 11 8 Low Bituminous 24 21 40 33 High Bituminous 19 16 36 48 Concrete 3 2 9 8 Total Surfaced 80 77 96 97

415
1300

1200

1100 -

1000 -

900 -

800 -

700 -

CO § 600 -

I 500 -

LUCDm 400 -

O 300 -

P

COx 200

LU

100

EXISTING MILEAGE OF ROADS AND STREETS

BY SEPARATE TYPES

RURAL

/

/

,^''r-:~- /

400

300

200

100

±

URBAN

— ^

J_ ± X J_ ± J_ X _L

CONCRETE

1

I I 1900 05 1910 15 20 25 1930 35 40 45 1950 55 60 65 1970 75

SOURCE: "HIGHWAY STATISTICS", ANNUAL YEAR PUBLICATIONS 1945 - 1973.

416
REFERENCES

' Second Biennial Report of the Department of Public

Roads Made to the Governor and General Assembly of Kentucky—Nov. 1, 1913 to Nov. 1, 1915 (The State Journal

Co., Frankfort, Ky., 1915) pp. 35, 36.

' Fifth Report of the Illinois State Highway Department For the Years 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916 (Illinois State

.lournal Co., Springfield, 111., 1917) p. 135.

' Sixteenth Annual Report of the Division of Highways—Jan. 1, 1933 to Dec. 31, 1933 (Illinois Department of

Pul)lic Works and Buildings, Springfield, 111., 1933) p. 10.

* Official Automobile Blue Book, various volumes for the year 1920 (Automobile Blue Book Publishing Co., New York). 'M. Duerksen, The Story of Abner Doble and His Magnificent Steam Cars, Cars & Parts, Jan. 1975, p. 102.

° Report of the State Highway Commission of Minnesota,

1915-1916, (Mar. 1, 1917) p. 18.

' Fourth Annual Report of the Division of Highways—

Jul. 1, 1920 to Dec. 31, 1921 (Illinois Department of Public

Works and Buildings, Springfield, 111., 1922) p. 9.

* Eleventh Annual Report of the Division of Highways—

Jan. 1, 1928 to Dec. 31, 1928 (Illinois Department of Public

Works and Buildings, Springfield, 111., 1929) p. 25.

" First Biennial Report of the California Highway Commission, 1917-1918 (State Printing Office, Sacramento, Calif., 1919) p. 51.

'" Biennial Reports of the State Highway Commission,

Commonwealth of Kentucky, various years from 1915 to 1921 (The State Journal Co., Frankfort, Ky.).

" Annual Reports of the Division of Highways, various

years from 1915 to 1921 (Illinois Department of Public Works

and Buildings, Springfield, 111.).

'= Id. " Report of the State Road Commission of Maryland

For the Years 1927, 1928, 1929 and 1930 (Baltimore, Md.,

Oct. 1, 1930) p. 85. "Annual Reports of the Division of Highways, various

years from 1921 to 1930 (Illinois Department of Public Works

and Buildings, Springfield, 111.). " Report of the Commissioner of Highways of Minnesota

For 1920 (Mar. 1, 1921) p. 4. " SEMi;NTH Annual Report of the Division of Highways—

Jan. 1, 1924 to Dec. 31, 1924 (Illinois Department of Public

Works and Buildings, Springfield, 111., 1925) p. 1. " Se\-enteenth, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Annual Reports OF the State Highway Commission For the Years

1924, 1925 and 1926 to the General Assembly of Maryland

(Baltimore, Md., Jan. 1927) p. 12. ^'Standards Approved b7j the American Association of State Highway Officials During the Year 1928, American Highways,

Vol. 7, No. 4, Oct. 1928, p. 21. "Aircraft Yearbook, 1927 (Aeronautical Chaml)er of Commerce of America, Inc., New York, 1927) pp. 96, 97. "A Policy On Highway Classification (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1940)

pp. 1, 2, 7, 8. "A Policy On Sight Distance For Highways (American

Association of State Highway Officials, Wa.shington, D.C., 1940) pp. 4, 17.

'' Id., p. 15. "A Policy On Highway Types (Geometric) (American

Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1940) pp. 65-69.

^' A. LuEDKE & J. Harrison, Superelevation and Easement

as Applied to Hightvay Curves, Public Roads, Vol. 3, No. 31, Nov. 1920, pp. 3-12.

'" R. MoYER, Further Skidding Tests With Particular Reference to Curves, Proceedings, 14th Annual Meeting, Vol. 14 (Highway Research Board, Washington, D.C., 1934) p. 129.

'^ J. Barnett, Safe Side Friction Factors and Superelevation

Design, Proceedings, 16th Annual Meeting, Vol. 16 (Highway

Research Board, Washington, D.C., 1936) pp. 72, 73. ' A. Bruce, The Effect of Increased Speed of Vehicles on

the Design of Highways, Public Roads, Vol. 10, No. 1, Mar.

1929, pp. 15, 16. ^ H. Kelsey, The Future of Roadside Development in Massachusetts, (Address delivered at the annual meeting of the Massachusetts Forest and Park Association in Boston,

Mass., Feb. 6, 1936) pp. 1, 2.

^° Interregional Highways, H. Doc. 379, 78th Cong., 2d

Sess., p. III. '"A Policy On Design Standards (American Association

of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1941) p. 5. "Traffic Devices: Historical Aspects Thereof (Institute of Traffic Engineers, Washington, D.C., 1971) p. 81.

''Id., p. 82. "Id., p .103. " C. Borth, Mankind On the Move (Automotive Safety

Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1969) p. 204.

'= ITE, supra, note 31, p. 24.

'^Id., p. 35.

''Id., p. 43.

"/(Z., p. 35.

''Id., pp. 82-84. '"Report of First National Conference On Street and

Highway Safety, Washington, D.C., Dec. 15-16, 1924, p. 21.

''Id., p. 26. "A. Rose, Historic American Highways—Public Roads

of the Past (American Association of State Highway Officials, Washington, D.C., 1953) pp. 52, 53. " Id., p. 70. "Fundamentals of Asphalt Paving (The Ohio Oil Company, 1949) pp. 18, 19. " A. Rose, supra, note 42, p. 105.

'"Id., p. 97. " Third Annual Report of the Board of County Road

Commissioners of Wayne County to the Board of Supervisors OF Wayne County—From Sept. 16, 1908 to Sept. 30, 1909, p. 23.

"* C. Older, Official Conclusions From the Bates Road, Public

Works, Vol. 54, No. 1, Jan. 1923, p. 13. " Final Report On Road Test One—Md. : Effect of Controlled Truck Axle Loadings On Concrete Pavement, Special

Report 4 (Highway Research Board, Washington, D.C., 1952)

pp. 7-11. ^The WASHO Road Test—Part 2, Test Data, Analyses, AND Findings, Special Report 22 (Highway Research Board,

Washington, D.C., 1955) pp. 4, 5.

417
Bridge/

Pre- 1776 Bridges

History teaches that all sciences and arts, including

bridge design and construction, benefit from the in- novations, successes and failures of the past. This

presupposes a tradition of learning not ahvays available to the American colonists. The first bridges in

this country were often built by untrained persons

inexperienced with the difficulties and problems of

constructin.of a bridge of adequate strength and reasonable durability. Instead, they substituted determination, native ingenuity, and more determination.

Economics and material availability generally limited the colonial bridges to timber or stone construction with timber being predominant. This was largely

due to the greater time and labor required to quarry

and transport stone. From this lowly beginning, the

complex design, construction and material sciences

have developed.

The existing bridges in the American colonies in

1776 were few and minor in size. At that time, all major cities and most towns and villages were located on navigable waterways, since the waterways offered

the most practical transportation between populated

areas. Barges, boats, canoes and fords Avere mainly

used wliere roads crossed the waterways. As the

population centers developed, some timber bridges were built over adjacent nari'ow waterways by local

authorities to facilitate access by travelers and commercial goods.

Generally, the bridges had log beam spans and were

limited to the length of timber available from local

trees. Abutments at the stream banks were timber

mud sills, wooden cribs, or dry stone masonry where

stone was available. Where more than one span was

required, timber pile bents, wooden cribs or wooden

mud sills were used for piers in the stream bed. The

cribs were usually braced and filled with rock or compacted earth. The life of these bridges was usually

short due to the rapid deterioration of the timber and

the washing out of the foundation structures. Some

floating bridges were constructed, usually of large logs

fastened together.

It is interesting to note that the Concord Bridge,

at which the homespun Xew England "Horatius"'

fired "the shot heard round the world," was a timber

beam and pile bent structure very similar to the

Sublician Bridge defended by his Roman prototype

nearly 2,000 years before.

Since the waterways were the main and pre-existing

arteries of travel and connnerce, any bridges built

o\er navigable waterways required openings and

clearances adequate for the passage of the waterway

traffic, whether sailing ships, barges, canoes or log

I'afts. Where the horizontal and vertical clearances

of fixed spans were not adequate for such passage,

418
Reproduction of historic timber beam and pile bent bridge at the original site in Concord, Mass.

movable spans were used. These were most likely

single or double leaf bascules (hinged sections) operated manually. Floating bridges were provided with

sections that co\dd be hinged or pulled out of place to permit the passage of waterway traiRc.^ Some short span stone arches were built, mainly in the colonies north of the Potomac River.

Timber Bridges 1776-1916

King-post or queen-post trusses (actually simple

braced beams) were in early use for short spans. However, the very common pier washouts experienced

by multispan beam bridges, plus the increasing knowledge of the society in general, led to the development

of timber trussed arches that could span wide rivers. A New England millwright named Timothy Palmer

built a series of patented trussed arches very like one

of those illustrated in Palladio's Treatise on Architecture (1570). The best known was the 244-foot

span across the Piscataqua River near Portsmouth,

New Hampshire, built in 1794.^ The roadways were

supported on the lower chords of the structure, re- sulting in steep grades ascending to the center from

each end of the spans. These bridges being true

arches, provision was made for their horizontal thrust

to be transferred to the substructure.

Besides Timothy Palmer, two other men, Louis

Wernwag and Theodore Burr, stand out as the first professional bridge builders in the United States. These men shared several things in common—they

were, of course, contemporaries, their structures were

all highly indeterminate combinations of trusses and

arches, and they most likely did not have the theoretiThe Upper Ferry Bridge over the Schuylkill River, Philadelphia, Pa., was

a covered timber trussed arch created by Lewis Wernwag in 1805.

419
Camp Nelson covered arch-truss over the Kentucky River

during razing i7i 1933. The three trussed 240-foot span bridge was built by Wernwag in 1838 and closed to traffic in 1926.

cal knowledge to anal3^ze such structures. They were

virtually carpenters building bridges in accordance

with their own experience or that related by others,

and they were among the group that produced the

distinctly American bridge characteristic, the covered

bridge. Their picturesque practice was, of course, a sound and practical measure that extended the life of the wooden structure immeasurably.

The first of many covered bridges in America was

built in 1800 by Palmer at Middle Ferry, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.^ The covering protected the

bridge members from decay to the extent that a properly maintained bridge would give many years of

service. The Waterford Bridge over the Hudson

River, a covered wood truss bridge built by Theodore

Burr in 1803-4, had a service life of 105 years (it was

destroyed by fire in 1909).*

The steep roadway grades of the trussed arches were objectionable, and by the beginning of the 19th

century, a combination truss and arch was developed

with the roadway supported by the lower chords and

having only a slight longitudinal camber. The height

or rise of the timber arch was about equal to the

depth of the truss, with the arch fastened to the truss web members at all intersections. The Susquehanna

River bridge at McCall's Ferry, Pennsylvania, built

in 1814-15 by Theodore Burr, contained a truss-arch

with a 367-foot span said to be the longest then built

in America.^ Burr's bridge represented a small, but

significant, change—the arch was added to the truss.

Inside view of typical Indiana covered bridge,

built in 1900, showing arch-truss details.

420

Covered timber truss bridge over the Connecticut River

between Cornish, N.H., and Wi7idsor, Vt. Built in 1866,

this 460-foot long, tico-span Town truss structure is said

to be the longest timber bridge remaining in this country.

In 1820, Ithiel Town patented a timber lattice truss,

although lattice trusses had been built in Vermont as early as 1813,^ and in 1829 Colonel Stephen H. Long

developed a panel truss with double diagonals, similar

to a Howe truss.'' These trusses could stand by themselves, and arches were not necessary. Thus, the truss bridge appeared in a recognizable modern form.

The web members, diagonals and verticals of the

earlier trussed arches and truss-arches were made of

timber. Some of the later web systems used iron rods

for tension verticals, diagonals and counters in the

web system. There were many other variations of

the truss besides those mentioned. Due to intensive

promotion, the various types were identified by the

name of the developer. '\^'lien iron and steel trusses were developed, the timber truss designations were

given to the corresponding geometric metal trusses,

i.e., Howe, Pratt, Fink, etc. Connections of members

were made by bearings of timber, forgings, iron bolts

and spikes, mortises and tenons, and hardwood dowels.

The layout and relative position of the trusses and

arches, the proportioning of the members, the methods

of support of the floor system, and type and magnitude of the connections were determined by the ex- perience and preference of the builder. There was no

published method of stress analysis available to the

builders for proportioning members and connections

until Squire Whipple's publication in 1847, An Essay

on Bridge Building^ and Herman Haupt's General

Theory of Bridge Construction in 1851,* although it appears that Colonel Long may have used mathematical theory in the design of his bridges.®

While the timber bridge had evolved into an almost

determinate, fully utilitarian structure, it was not free

of problems. Covering the truss with a roof and

siding had retarded deterioration, but there were still many failures of covered timber trusses due to lack of

maintenance, fires, floods, overloads, and inadequate

design. Nonetheless, the covered bridge era might

have lasted until the coming of the automobile were

it not for a combination of events that led bridge

designing into the modern era. The newly developed

truss and the fledgling analytic methods found themselves a new client, the railroad. Trains being unable

to ford even small streams or tolerate the sinuous

alinement and steep grades used by pedestrians and

wagon traffic, a great many bridges were needed, and

not only more bridges, but stronger and more durable

ones. This accelerated the growth of design technology.

i
As far as durability was concerned, early attempts

at increasing the life of timber in contact with earth

and water achieved little success. JNIethods used in- cluded dipping, soaking or brushing the timber with

creosote or salts, such as zinc chloride or mercuric

chloride. These methods were ineffective due to the

lack of penetration and leaching out of water soluble

preservatives.

"Wliile the railroads were especially desirous of finding a satisfactory method of prolonging the life of

the great number of ties and timber structures on

their systems, it was not until 1865 that the first pres- sure creosote treatment plant was constructed at Somerset, Massachusetts, primarily to treat timber

track ties." Other plants were constructed soon

thereafter for treatment of ties, piles and timber.

With the advent of timber treatment plants to supply the railroads, treated timber piles and lumber

became available for use on higliway structures, but

by then the use of metal in trusses was becoming more common. The general use of timber trusses for highway

bridges continued to the 1880's, but gradually decreased until bj^ 1916, there were practically none. However, such construction has continued in isolated areas where timber was readily available and in scenic areas as tourist attractions.

Cast-iron, Wrought-lron and Composite

Wood Bridges and Metal Bridges

The use of iron for incidental connecting parts was

introduced early in the construction of timber bridges

since it facilitated construction, improved the rigidity

of the structure and reduced maintenance problems.

"Wernwag used iron rods for the light web diagonal

of his Upper Ferry Bridge, popularly named the

"Colossus," in 1806."

Soon after the railroad era started in 1827, bridge

engineers realized that the timber truss-arch bridges were not serving satisfactorily under the speed and

weight of railroad traffic and sought various methods

to introduce iron members into the truss arch. Such

structures were called combination bridges.

One of the early combination bridges was a through

timber truss-iron arch bridge, a 133-foot span, carry- ing the Pennsylvania Central Railroad over a canal.

The bridge was so constructed that the timber truss would receive the load from the ties, transfer it to the

arch, and provide lateral support for the arch ribs

which were the main load carrying members. However, should the arch fail, the truss was adequate for

the full load. The engineer, possibly at the owner's

request, tested the completed structure by passing a 23-ton locomotive over it several times."

In 1840, "William Howe patented the "Howe" truss. This was a true truss with timber chords and compression diagonals but with iron bars for the vertical

hangers. Iron members had been used before, but

they had always played a minor role. His patent also permitted prefabrication of parts,

permitting manufacture away from the site. The

ability to tighten up the hanger, via an adjustable nut

should it become loose, was an added benefit. The

parallel chord and X diagonal pattern soon became

a familiar part of the countryside since the Howe

truss was the most common of all timber trusses. However, this truss represented high tide for the timber truss and for the carpenter bridge builders, of

whom Howe was the last well-known one. What had

already happened in Europe was happening in America. Stress and strength were about to join stability as the criteria in bridge building.

The stone arch had been the main bridge type for

nearly 2,000 years. A masonry arch, if stable enough

to stand, was adequate for any conceivable load. For

this reason, stress analysis had been imnecessary.

With the advent of timber (and metal) beams and

trusses, it could no longer be assumed that the bridge's

existence was proof of its strength. The possibility

of overload and failure due to overload now existed,

especially with the heavier loads of the locomotive.

The timber trusses and combination timber-metal

trusses still suffered from the difficulty in joining

timber—the tensile strength of the joint was always

less than the strength of the timber member. This

made these trusses especially susceptible to falling

apart at the joints. On March 4, 1840, a Town lattice truss over Catskill Creek, New York, came apart

dropping a train of boxcars into the water, resulting

in the Nation's first railroad bridge fatality," The

need for a metal bridge had arrived.

Other methods were used in replacing wood with

iron in the arches of truss-arch railway bridges. Wliile

limited construction of short-span combination trusses with timber compression and wrought iron or steel tension members continued until the end of the 19th

century, it steadily decreased.

The engineer's first choice for a bridge metal was

cast iron, and 1836 saw the first cast-iron bridge in

this country, an 80-foot arch span, built over Dunlap

Creek in Brownsville, Pennsylvania, by the U.S.

Corps of Engineers." Shortly afterward, in 1840,

the first iron trusses came into existence when two

highway bridges were built over the Erie Canal by

Earl Trumbull and Squire "^Vhipple. Trumbull's

truss spanned 80 feet and had a wooden floor system.

It featured a parabolic bottom chord of wrought iron

bars. Squire Whipple's 72-foot bridge was the first example of the famous Whipple bowstring truss, so called because of its curved upper and horizontal

bottom chord. The tension members were wrought

iron and the compression members were cast iron.^^ AVhile most of Whipple's bowstring trusses have vanished, there are still some examples of his other design,

the trapezoidal truss, in service.

In 1844, 4 years after the first two iron bridges,

Thomas and Caleb Pratt patented the Pratt truss. This parallel chord truss with tension diagonals and

compression verticals in the web system was well

suited for metal trusses and, together with its many

modifications, became the most popular type of truss for short and intermediate span trusses to the present

day. Among its better known variations are the

Baltimore, Parker, Pegram, Pennsylvania and Petit

trusses."

421
First cast-iron bridge in the United States, over Dunlap Creek at Brownsville, Pa.

WHIPPLE ARCH-TRUSS BRIDGE.

WHIPPLE TRAPEZOinAL BRIDGE.

The second cast-iron arch in this country, completed

in 1860, was the Meigs Bridge over Rock Creek in

Washington, D.C.* Like the Dunlap Creek Bridge,

it was also built by the Corps of Engineers. Its two

cast-iron pipe arches supported the deck of the highway bridge and carried the water supply of the city over the creek. The 51 -inch outside diameter pipes

spanned 200 feet. The bridge deck and supi^orts were removed in 1916 and a new bridge was constructed over and independent of the pipes still carrying

water."

Ironically, the chief factor in the decline of the

cast-iron bridge was its success. The increased use of

wrought iron and cast iron for bridges, rails and other

related uses caused a boom in the iron industry and

created an incentive to develop new processes for producing iron and steel.

* Not to l)e confused with the Meigs Stone Arch over Cabin

John Creek in Maryland wliicli was also built under the supervision of Capt. IMontgoniery C. Meigs when he was with

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

The original Meigs Bridge over Rock Creek in Washington,

D.C., built in 1860 by the U.S. Corps of Engineers.

Although the Bessemer converter and open-hearth

furnace made the steel bridge inevitable, several

bridge failures also increased distrust of iron bridges.

The most notable was a failure of an iron Howe truss

at Ashtabula, Ohio, which took 65 lives in 1876, the

worst rail disaster in America so far. Surprisingly,

many highway bridges also failed, despite their rela- tively light live loads. This was due to the pres- sures for economy put upon county officials who lacked

technical expertise and fly-by-night bridge salesmen

and promoters, who, sometimes involved in political

and business corruption, provided cheap and inadequately designed structures. From the 1850's, companies were formed primarily

for constructing patented truss bridges, either under

their own patents or as licensees. There being very

few bridge engineers with a working knowledge of

stress analysis and truss design in the early years of

iron superstructures, these "bridge companies" became

firmly established. Bids let for short- and mediumlength span truss bridges allowed the bidder to fur422
The Eads Bridge over the Mississippi River was opened to traffic in 1874- Alloy steel was used for the

first time in this country for the members of the three arches of this double deck bridge.

The remaining trusses and

nish the superstructure to his own plans, "\\niile many

safe and satisfactory bridges were obtained by this

procedure, tliere were also many unsatisfactory

bridges. In some cases, the companies furnished weak

or inadequate bridges to compensate for underbidding

or to make excessive profits.

Due perhaps to a combination of poor engineering,

poor material, and fraud, the numerous failures of

iron and combination bridges brought about the complete abandonment of cast iron and led to the accept- ance of wrought iron and steel, the flowering of

modern truss design, and the rise of the civil engineer.

The first American all steel spans built M'ere the

five main spans of the Missouri River Bridge at Glasgow, Missouri. Bessemer steel was used for the

315-foot long trusses,

trestle work were made of wrought iron

However, the Glasgow trusses lagged by 10 years

the first extensive use of structural steel in a bridge.

It was in 1868 that construction commenced on the

first of the two "great bridges" of American history,*

the Eads Bridge across the Mississippi at St. Louis,

Missouri.

Until IS;"),"), the "Father of "Waters" had never been

spanned. Thirteen j'ears later, James Eads, a hero

of the Civil War, began building three alloy-steel

arches of 502-, 520-, and 502-foot spans, respectively, across the river. This bridge is noteworthy for an- other reason : The first iise of pneiimatic caissons in

the United States and, sadlv, the first death from the

"bends" or "caisson disease." (In all, 13 died.) It is interesting that Captain Eads had never built a bridge

before.^® Despite the magnificence of the Eads Bridge,

which is still in use, the future of the steel bridge was

with the plate girder and the truss. After Squire AVhipple's essays on bridge building,

the increasing knowledgability of the engineer led to further refinements in the metal truss as iron yielded

to steel. Among the changes were the use of bridge

rollers and the perfecting of the pinned connection.

The improved metallurgy permitted the evolution of

machined steel pins from the old iron trunnions and

the use of the now famous eyebar tension member.

The eyebar became the trademark of the American

truss bridge in the latter half of the 19th century.

In this area, the American engineers deviated from

European practice, which was turning to the more

rigid riveted gusset plate connections. The economy

and determinacy of the pinned truss was well suited

to the American bridge engineer's interest in struc- tural analysis. While the riveted joint was finally

accepted, the practice of using decider trusses and

longer panels was retained this side of the Atlantic.

Interest in determinate structures led to the use of

cantilever bridges. Eventually, cantilevers were so widespread that Europeans referred to them as the

"American" bridge.

In 1876, Charles Smith built the first such bridge

over the Kentucky River for the Cincinnati Southern

Railway with three 375-foot spans. Other long span

cantilever bridges were the Monongahela River Bridge

at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, built in 1904 with a maximum span length of 812 feet, and the Queensborough cantilever designed by Gustav Lindenthal in

1909 in New York City. Its maximum span was

1,182 feet.i» The use of plate girder bridges for short spans

began during the Civil War. While these spans were

limited to moderate length by the size and length of

the wrought-iron plates and shapes then being rolled,

longer spans were built as the available size of

* The second of the "great bridges" in America—the Brooli- lyn Bridge—is discussed under Suspension Bridges.

The Washington Street Bridge over the Harlem River in New York, City.

423
Details of a 200-foot Finley chain link suspension bridge.

wrought-iron and steel plates increased. The first American railroad girder bridge with a 100-foot span was built in 1887. Just 7 years later, a 182-foot span was constructed, a major span even by today's standards. The use of wrought-iron and steel I-beams for

short spans was initiated by the rolling of deeper

beams.

Still, early plate girder highway bridges were limited to short spans because of the inconvenience and

cost of transporting and erecting long members except

when the bridge site was near railroad transportation.^" Thus, long spans still belonged to the truss,

the suspension span, and the arch.

The first American plate girder arch bridge was

the Washington Street Bridge over the Harlem River

in New York City, built in 1886-88. It had two 510-

foot arch spans with plate girders 13 feet deep.^^

By the early 1870's, the size of I-beams rolled was

large enough to use for stringers in the floor systems

of short paneled truss bridges. This, together with

the development of plate girders for floor beams, led

to the general discontinuance of the use of wooden

stringers by 1875. However, wooden stringers were

used on short- and medium-length spans until 1890

and later." During the period 1874 to 1890, the

maximum depth of American rolled I-beams increased

from 101/2 inches to 20 inches.

Suspension Bridges

This most fascinating of all bridges first appeared

in America in 1801 when Judge James Finley built a 70-foot chain link suspension bridge over Jacobs

Creek near Greensburg, Pennsylvania. The chains were made from 1 inch square wrought-iron bars.

The links varied from 5 to 10 feet in length so as to match the distance between floor beams. The timber

floor system was stiff enough to distribute live loads

to several hangers and to resist deformation, undulaSuspension bridge built by Charles Ellet in 1849

over the Ohio River at Wheeling, W. Va.

tions and vibrations from the live load and wind

loads. The bridge failed under a six-horse team in

1825 but was repaired. A number of bridges were

built under the direction of Judge Finley or his

licensees. The maximum span lengths were probably

about 150 feet. The cable supports were usually timber towers on stone masonry piers. A suspension

bridge at Lehigh Gap, Pennsylvania, apparently the

last Finley type in use, was replaced by a modern

structure in 1933.^3 One of the largest of the chain link structures was

the Point Bridge over the Monongahela River at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Built in 1875-77, it was a

stiffened chain suspension span 800 feet long. The

main and backstay chains were of wrought-iron link

bars 20 feet 6 inches long.^*

The first highway bridge in America with wire

suspension cables was designed by Chai'les Ellet and

completed in 1842. It replaced Wernwag's wooden

trussed-arch Upper Ferry Bridge over the Schuylkill

River at Philadelphia.-'' As would be the case for all American suspension bridges until the Brooklyn

424
Roebling opened this suspension bridge over the Ohio River between Cincinnati, Ohio, and Covington, Ky., in 1866.

The Brooklyn Bridge over the East River in New York City.

Bridge, drawn wrought-iron wires were used for the

cables. Subsequent to 1840, several wrought-iron wire

bridges were built in America by Charles Ellet, John

A. Roebling, Thomas M. Griffith, Edward W. Serrell

and others. However, the suspension bridge was still in its infancy. It began to come of age in 1849 when

Ellet spanned the Ohio at Wheeling, Virginia, with

a 1,010-foot suspension span. When completed, this was the longest bridge span in the world. While it was damaged by wind in 1854, the bridge was repaired

and is still in service.^® John Roebling had built nine suspension bridges

by 1855, one of which was the 821 -foot span combination highway-railroad bridge over the Niagara Falls

rapids, a bridge most engineers thought doomed to

failure. When Mr. Ellet's temporary suspension

bridge was built at the site in 1848, the rope for pulling the first cable across the river was pulled across by a cord flown over the gorge by a boy with his

kite.2' In December 1866, Roebling opened his

recordbreaking Ohio River suspension span at Cincinnati. This structure, 1,05Y feet between towers, is also still in use.^^ During the flood of 1937, this was

the only highway bridge open across the Ohio between the Mississippi River and Sciotoville, Ohio.

There were at least two factors that Roebling had

considered in his bridges: the quality and protection

of the cable and the bracing of the structure against

aerodynamic loadings. Attention to these problems,

plus the other design aspects, made his bridges

successes. These major bridges, although unprecedented

achievements, were only the prototype for his crowning task, the second "great bridge" of America: the

Brooklyn Bridge over the East River. This bridge,

its 1,595-foot main span 50 percent longer than the

previous record span at Cincinnati, linked Brooklyn

and Manhattan and made New York's expansion possible. It was also the first bridge to use galvanized

steel cable. Building the East River bridge was probably the

most dramatic verse in the saga of bridges. Its creator, John Roebling, died of tetanus as a result of an accident during the early stages of construction.

His son. Colonel Washington Roebling, who had sur- vived the battle of Gettysburg, was crippled by the

"bends" and had to direct operations through his

wife, Emily. But in 1883, 14 years after construction

started, man had conquered the East River and

signaled the beginning of the great age of bridge

building.^^

Two other notable suspension bridges were built over the East River at New York City around the

turn of the century. The Williamsburg Bridge, built

in 1903, has a 1,600-foot main span. The main span

of the Manhattan Bridge, built in 1909, while 130 feet

shorter, yet is considered by many as the most graceful cable arc of any of New York's bridges.

425
The rising tempo of bridge building may be noted

from the fact that the Williamsburg Bridge, although

5 feet longer than the Brooklyn Bridge, was just a long bridge. The long-span title had gone across the

seas to the Firth of Forth's 1,700-foot cantilever span

in 1890.

Movable Bridges

Bridges with movable spans to accommodate water

traffic also date back to colonial times. The early

timber bridges were opened and closed by the only

available power—manpower. As a rule, they were

either bascule (draw) spans or swing spans which

rotated to open the channel to marine traffic. This,

of course, meant that only short span openings could

be used. Fortunately, the pace of life, as well as of

river traffic, was sufficiently slow so that lengthy

bridge opening times could be tolerated.

Some early spans were a wooden drawbridge between Boston and Charlestown over the Charles River,

built in 1785-86,=^° and the Haverhill Bridge over the

Merrimack River at Haverhill, Massachusetts, built in

1794 with a wooden bascule drawspan. The 30-foot

drawspan was raised by means of levers elevated on

a post on each side of the draw.^^ The Tiverton

Bridge over a tidal inlet near Howland Ferry, between Portsmouth and Tiverton, Rhode Island, built

in 1795, contained a sliding drawspan.^^

The advent of the railroads and steam-powered

boats made the span weights heavier and the opening

time of the movable spans more critical. Fortunately,

as wrought iron, and then steel, became the material

for the bridge members, steam became the motive

power for opening railroad and main highway movable bridges over busy waterways. For minor waterway crossings and during power failures, movable

spans were still opened manually.

As the larger rivers and tidal estuaries became more frequently bridged and river craft became wider

and longer, wider channel openings were required,

necessitating longer spans for movable bridges. Of

the movable bridges constructed during the last half

of the 19th century, two were notable. The first was

a railroad bridge located between Rock Island, Illinois,

and Davenport, Iowa, providing a swing span with

two 120-foot channel openings. Built in 1854—56, it was the second bridge to cross the Mississippi River.^^

The other was the Utica Lift Drawbridge, a 60-foot

X 18-foot movable deck, suspended by rods from the

lower chord panel points of an overhead fixed truss. The vertical lift was 11.6 feet. Opening time, using

preset weights, took 10 seconds. This was one of

several unusual vertical lift bridges which Squire

Whipple designed and built over the Erie Canal in

New York in the 1870's.3* The development of modern movable bridge spans

started in Chicago when the channels of the Chicago

River and related waterways were improved at the

turn of the century. Many of the existing movable

bridges were manually powered swing spans, with

center piers obstructing channels. These were re- placed with bascule and vertical lift spans. This era was begun by two famous bridges. The Halsted Street

Lift Bridge over the Chicago River in Chicago,

Illinois, 1894, lifted a 130-foot truss span with a 34-foot roadway and two 7-foot sidewalks using

steampower. Maximum vertical clearance was 155

feet above low water. Two light longitudinal, later- ally braced, trusses connected the tops of the towers. The design of this bridge introduced another famous

name in bridge engineering, J. A. L. Waddell.^^ The

other bridge, the Van Buren Street Bridge also over

the Chicago River, was opened in 1895. This 115-

foot span, double leaf of the Scherzer type, was the

first rolling lift bridge.^''

From then on there was a series of new movable

bridge types: the simple trunnion, or Chicago,* and

Strauss bascules, the Rail rolling lift,** and various

vertical lifts. The swing span, despite its economy

and minimal power requirements, fell into relative

disuse since it required a pier in the middle of the

stream and blocked the channel more during opening

and closing operations.

* So named because it was developed by the city of Chicago

bridge office. ** Rolling lifts were really bascules turning on a large

roller quadrant instead of a trunnion or axle.

This sketch of a manpower-operated bascule on the Pongo River Bridge in Virginia probably exaggerates

the difflcultics of such operations. From the Harpers

New Monthly May 1858.

Vertical lift bridge over the Cape Fear River at Wilmington,

N.C. The 400-foot lift span has a vertical clearance above mean high water of 65 feet in the closed position and 125 feet in the open position.

426
Lahe Washington Pontoon Bridge,

Seattle, Wash., is a concrete pontoon

bridge completed in 19^0. The

floating portion consists of 25 units 350 feet long, together with retracting

sections to provide a 200-foot opening for large vessels. Passage

for small boats is provided near each

shore under truss spans. The

pontoons are fixed laterally by long

steel cables fastened to submerged

concrete anchors.

The Oeorge P. Coleman Memorial Bridge over the Yorlc River near Yorlctown, Va. The double 500-foot swing

spaiis arc the largest tandem swing spans in the world.

Cabin John Bridge over Cabin John Creek in Montgomery

County, Md. The aqueduct for the Washington, D.C., water supply is in the spandrel fill under the roadway.

The great size of today's structures, which evolved

from the short span crossings of the Charles River

and Merrimack River, is due to the growth in technical

knowledge, experience, better steels, steam and electric

power, and a near perfect use of the old-fashioned

counterweight.

Stone Arches

Stone arches have not been a major element in highway bridge construction in this country. However, numerous short-span stone arches have been built in areas where stone and skilled masons were readily

available. These bridges are frequently seen alongside present highways where they have been left for

their historic and scenic value when highway alinement, width, or grade was improved. Long- and

short-span stone bridges have been built in parks and

large cities to be compatible with their surroundings.

One of the most notable stone arches was built during the Civil "War as a combination aqueduct and

road. The 220-foot filled spandrel ]Meigs Arch, which

carries Washington, D.C.'s water supply and MacArthur Boulevard over Cabin John Creek in Cabin

John, Maryland, was the longest span of its type Avhen

built. It is still in service despite its narrow roadway.^"

Where stone was readily available, stone arches of

nominal spans and stone arch culverts were frequently

used in railroad construction before metal superstructures were developed and accepted. Some of the note- worthy stone railroad bridges still in existence are: • Carrollton Viaduct over Gynn's Falls on the

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, near Baltimore,

Maryland, was built in 1829 of granite ashlar

masonry. The center span is 80 feet and the overall length is 297 feet.^* • Thomas Viaduct over Patapsco Creek on the

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, near Relay Station,

Maryland, was built in 1835 of granite ashlar

masonry and is 612 feet long and has eight full- centered arch spans.^^ • Starrucca Viaduct over Starrucca Creek (a tributary of the Susquehanna River) on the New York

and Erie Railroad, was built in 1847-48 with stone masonry made of stone quarried locally. The

viaduct is 1,040 feet long with a maximum height

of 110 feet above the creek.*° • The Morgan Bulkeley Bridge was constracted

across the Connecticut River between Hartford

and East Plartford with funds raised by subscription from all the towns aroimd the area in 1905. This beautiful structure of pink granite has 11

elliptic arches, tlie largest being 119 feet long.

In 1962, it was widened to carry Interstate 84.

427
The Morgan Bulkeley Bridge over the Connecticut River at Hartford, Conn.

Reinforced Concrete Bridges

Although concrete bridges are part of the modern

era, the early use of concrete was limited. Natural

cement entered into bridge construction as mortar for

stone masonry and for unreinforced concrete footings

and substructures as early as 1850. Although many

cement users switched to the more uniform and su- perior Portland cement after its first manufacture in

this country at Allentown, Pennsylvania, in 1871,

natural cement has continued to be used to a lesser extent even to this day.

The Clefridge pedestrian underpass was built of

concrete in Prospect Park, Brooklyn, New York, in

1871. This structure, said to be the earliest concrete arch constructed in America, is an arch that follows

the design of stone arches and has a radius, of 10

feet,"

The first reinforced concrete building in this country was built by W. E. Ward in New York State in 1875,

and the first reinforced concrete bridge in this country was a 20-foot span built in Golden Gate Park, San

Francisco, California, in 1889.^^ ^^ Other early reinforced concrete bridges were the

Eden Park Bridge, Cincinnati, Ohio, a 70-foot arch

span built in 1894-95 ; the five-span arches over the

Kansas River at Topeka, Kansas, built in 1896 with

a maximum span of 125 feet and a total length of

539 feet; and the 36-foot span stone-faced reinforced

concrete arch built according to the Melan method

near Rock Rapids, Iowa, in 1894. This latter bridge was moved to a roadside park when the bridge was

replaced in 1964." *^ The first 10 years of the 20th century saw a phenomenal gi'owth in the use of concrete structures on

both the highway and railroad systems. Many longspan concrete arch bridges with either plain or reinforced arches were built in populated places, probably

because of the architectural improvement over the

truss and trestle bridges of the time. The use of reinforced concrete for deck girders, culverts, slabs for

steel truss and girder spans, and bridge abutments

and piers soon became commonplace. Of special importance was the use of reinforced concrete slabs, still in use today, for bridge decks instead of timber, steel, or cast iron.

Construction to 1916

Through the years, the methods, materials and

equipment for bridge construction had developed and

improved with experience and invention. Steampowered equipment had supplanted men and horses

for heavy lifting and excavation. Deep foundation

excavation in open cofferdams, cellular cofferdams,

open caissons and pneumatic caissons had been developed and successfully used. Steam piston and

pulsometer pumps had supplanted the chain and ship

pumps of colonial days for draining foundation ex- cavations. Improved timber sheet piling,* such as the Wakefield type, and steel sheet piling were developed which resulted in relatively watertight

cofferdams.

Many steel fabricating shops had become established

with power equipment for handling and fabricating

the steel bridge members. Power shears, pimches and

drills were employed. Heavy hydraulic and pneumatic riveters were developed for driving tight rivets. Relatively efficient and structually satisfactory standards for riveted and pinned connections and other

structural details had been developed and were in use, by 1916.

Efficient and safe methods had also been developed

for erection of steel superstructures. Steam-powered

cranes, derricks and gin poles** were available for

* Designed to interlock, forming a wall or sheet to resist lateral pressures.

** Hoisting devices.

428
lifting heavy members. Relatively light pneiimatic

riveting guns were developed for driving field rivets

so that only small and minor structures had handriveted or bolted connections.

Most important of all, these construction improvements were documented in the literature, and en- gineers and teclmicians well versed in their application were available for bridge construction.

About 1870 engineers began developing shear and

moment anal^-ses to determine stresses for structural

design. Before that, structures were "proof loaded"

before acceptance, that is, highway bridges M-ere subjected to carts loaded with pig iron or stone, while

railroad bridges were subjected to two locomotives in tandem. Wliile this primarily tested the quality of

woi'kmanship and protected against the most • gross

errors, it did not provide for overloads or fatigue

failure. These proof-load requirements persisted in

the specifications until the turn of the century.

However, engineers were aware that the proof-load was no substitute for a rational design and, as their

knowledge grew, began to write design specifications.

^^Hiipple had already I'ecommended a design load of

100 pounds per square foot, equivalent to the whole

roadway area covered with men.*" In 1875, as a

result of a series of bridge failures, an American

Society of Civil Engineers committee recommended

live loading values for both railway and highway

bridges. For highwa}^ bridges, loads varjdng from

40 to 100 pounds per square foot were given, depending on span and type of usage.*^ "\^^lile railroad and

"bridge companies" issued their own specifications for

highway bridges, a concerted etfort for a specification

of national scope had to await the Operating Committee on Bridges and Structures of the American

Association of State Highway Officials in the 1920's. In 1910, the Office of Public Roads established a Division of Highway Bridges and Culverts. This new division, upon request from a State or local authority, assisted in bridge design and construction and

reviewed and advised on bridge plans and specifications prepared by States, local authorities or bridge

companies. It also prepared and published bulletins on highway bridge and culvert design and construction, including typical plans for reinforced concrete

culverts, abutments and piers and discussions on the

use and design of steel truss and plate girder bridges.

In 1913, the Office of Public Roads issued Circular

Xo. 11, Typical Sj^ecifcations for the Fabrication and

Erection of Steel Highway Bridges. This circular

specified a live loading of interurban electric cars or a 15-ton road roller plus a uniform live load on the

portion of the bridge deck not occupied by the roller. The Era of Great Bridges

It was said earlier that the opening of the Eads

and Brooklyn Bridges was the beginning of the great

bridge building era. As noted, it continued slowly

with the Williamsburg and Manhattan Bridges.

The Hell Gate Railroad Bridge in Xew York City,

built in 1916, and designed by Gustav Lindenthal,

spanned 9771^ feet between support pins and was the

longest and heaviest arch in the world. "When it was

built, it was considered an engineering marvel because

of the location conditions and the long span. It was

to have a profound effect on steel arch design.

At almost the same time, the long-span continuous

truss had finally come to America in the form of two

continuous spans of 775 feet over the Ohio River at Sciotoville, Ohio. (Strictly speaking, a continuous

truss had been used in the approaches to an earlier

structure, but Sciotoville was the first use of it for

main river spans.) Coincidentally, the longest simple

span truss, 720 feet, was built over the Mississippi

at Metropolis, Illinois. Both of these were railroad

bridges.

Not long after, a major cantilever truss with two

cantilever spans of 1,100 feet, designed by David B.

Steinman, crossed the Carquinez Straits near San

Francisco, California.

The long-span records continued to fall through the

1920's and 1930's. Detroit's Ambassador Bridge, 1,850-

foot suspension span surpassed the Quebec cantilever's

1,800 feet. In 1931, Othmar Amman's arch over the

Kill van Kull between Staten Island,New York, and

Bayonne, New Jersey, set a new arch record of 1,652

feet. In that same year (1931), the George Washington

Bridge was opened. This bridge across the Hudson

River in New York City reached 3,500 feet between

towers. At one bound, it had virtually doubled the

Ambassador's span. Not only that, but it was one

of the strongest bridges ever built, with the greatest

capacity—eight highway traffic lanes on the upper

deck and provision for future rapid transit below

(ultimately six highway lanes were added instead)

when the stiffening trusses would be added. While

the increase in technical knowledge was one factor,

the most important reason behind this great leap in

span length was, as Roebling had realized years before, the great improvement in the quality of the steel wire.

Since then, the George Washington Bridge has been

surpassed several times in span but not yet in strength

and capacity. The three longest spans are the 4,200-

foot center span of the Golden Gate in San Francisco

(1937), the 4,260-foot span of the Verrazano-Narrows

(1965) in New York City and also an Amman design,

and the 3,800-foot center span of the Mackinac Straits

Bridge which joins Michigan's upper and lower peninsulas.

The George Washington Bridge. The upper roadway has eight

t7'afflc lanes; a lower deck loith six lanes was added later.

429
San Francisco's Golden Gate Bridge.

The Mackinac Bridge over the Straits of Mackinac, where Lakes Huron and

Michigan meet. Completed in 1957, this bridge is nearly five miles long.

430
During the 1930's, many other noted long suspension bridges were built, among them two beautiful

spans, tlie Bronx-Whitestone in Xew York City and

the Oakland Bay Bridge, and that fateful structure,

the Tacoma Narrows Bridge over Puget Sound in Washington.

The Tacoma Narrows Bridge, like tlie Whitestone, was built with a plate girder instead of a stiffening

truss. In addition, although 2,800 feet between towers,

the cables were only 39 feet apart. Just over 4

months after being opened, it failed, literally twisting itself to pieces. The shallow stiffening girder,

combined with the light dead load of the relatively narrow bridge, was unable to resist the aerodynamic

forces that developed because of the steady Avinds of

Puget Sound. This failure led to considerable re- seai'ch and improvement of future structures, such as the Mackinac and Verrazano-Narrows Bridges, as well as stiffening of existing bridges. Since the

Whitestone Bridge showed signs of serious oscillation, a half truss was added to the top of the original

girder. It is noteworthy that the George Washington,

despite the absence of a stiffening truss, showed few

symptoms of instability, possibly due to its great

weight and width, as well as to the less constant wind

patterns of New York Harbor.

Current technology seems to make it less necessary

to build record spans. However, even today, a new

steel arch with a record span of 1,700 feet is under

construction at the New River Gorge in West Virginia.

These "great bridges" were all toll facilities built

by bond issues rather than Federal-aid financing.

After enactment of the Federal Aid Road Act of

1916, the Division of Highway Bridges and Culverts,

established in 1910, became the Bridge Division of

Public Roads. The immediate task of this Division was to set standards for design and construction of

bridges to be constructed under the 1916 Act. Under

the Act, roadway and bridge planning became a co- operative undertaking with the States initiating,

planning, designing and constructing the projects and

the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) advising, approving, committing Federal-aid matching funds for satis- factory plans and specifications and paying such funds

iipon successful final inspection of the completed

projects.

This cooperation was facilitated by the formation,

in 1921, of the Operating Committee on Bridges and

Structures of AASHO, known popularly as the

AASHO Bridge Committee, which was composed of

the bridge engineer of each State highway department and a designated bridge engineer from Public

Roads.

The Tacoma Narrows Bridge, showing

oscillation 1 hour before its collapse.

Architect's drawing of the New River Gorge Bridge in West Virginia. The hinged arch has a span of 1,700 feet, the longest of its kind in the loorld. Construction began in 1973.

431
The AASHO Bridge Committee's continuing function was to develop policies and specifications for

design and construction of highway bridges. Public

Roads bridge engineers served as chairman of the

AASHO Bridge Committee from 1921 until 1953 and

as secretary from then until the present time.

The AASHO Bridge Committee gradually developed the bridge specifications and issued the first printed edition of the AASHO Standard Specifications for HigMoay Bridges in 1931. These "Standard

Specifications" were not just specifications, but served

as a standard or guide for the preparation of State

specifications and for reference by bridge engineers.

They combined design criteria and policies with detailed specification guidelines. Primarily, "Standard

Specifications" set forth minimum requirements M'hich were consistent with the current practices. The same

objectives prevail in the current edition.

A notable innovation in the specifications was the use of a truck system of live load instead of road

rollers. The loadings, designated as H-20, H-15, and

H-10, specified basic two-axle design trucks of 20, 15,

and 10 tons, respectively. The H-truck loading was

a basic truck in each lane of the bridge, preceded and

followed by a train of trucks each weighing 3^ as much as the basic truck. An equivalent "lane loading," consisting of a concentrated load plus a uniformly distributed load for each lane of loaded

structure, was provided.

During the "great bridge" era between 1900 and

World War II, there was a phenomenal increase in

the number and size of lesser bridges as well as a growth in technical knowledge. The biggest new

development was reinforced concrete. The short-span

timber bridges were being displaced by concrete slab or concrete I-beam bridges. The reinforced concrete box culvert also became common. But aside from

this, most of the growth consisted of further developments and refinements of existing bridge types.

Riveted joints in steel trusses replaced the earlier pin

connected joints, and stiffer and more substantial truss members developed. Steel rolled beam and built-up

"plate girder" structures became common. The small

arch brige changed from stone to concrete and began

to grow in span length. Wider bridge roadways were

being used.

There were three new, or at least different, developments that were significant beginning in the 1920's. The first was the construction of a "parkway system"

in Westchester County. This progressive county began building roads with some control of access and

separation of cross traffic. This kind of road meant

bridges wherever traffic was to be separated, even where there was no river to be crossed. Usually, these

grade separation structures were not very large but

did need eye appeal. The result was the rebirth of

the stone arch (or stone-faced at least) and its variation, the rigid frame. The Westchester Parkway used

many stone-faced reinforced concrete arches and

frames for the Bronx River, Cross County, Saw Mill,

and Taconic Parkways. Arthur Hayden was the

bridge engineer at Westchester, and his book on the

Rigid Frame Bridge has become a classic. The parkway and freeway concept spread to Connecticut where

the Merritt and Wilbur Cross Parkways were built,

again with emphasis on esthetics. Every bridge on

the Merritt Parkway is different. This road is still one of the most delightful and scenic in the United

States. The second development was the almost exponential

increase in engineering theory and application. While

there were many whose studies made these new frames

and arches possible, there was one outstanding contribution. In 1932 Professor Hardy Cross of the

University of Illinois presented the method of

moment distribution for determining the moments

and shears in continuous beams, arches, and frames

in a paper to the American Society of Civil Engineers.

Prior to this time, the design of continuous frames was a tedious, intricate and time consuming process

which discouraged the use of indeterminate structures. Moment distribution came at a very favorable time

at the beginning of the widespread use of highway

grade separation structures for which rigid frames were especially appropriate.

The third significant factor was the growth of Federal interest and activity in the highway field. Public

Roads was still a relatively small agency, but it helped

the States through the transition to heavier automobile loadings. "Wliile the designated Federal-aid sys- tem at the start of the Federal-aid program was in

most States essentially a system of county roads

located and designed for preautomobile traffic, the

quality of bridges increased dramatically during the

1920's because of the cooperation of the States and

Public Roads, increased experience, and improved

criteria, specifications and guides. The example of the

improved highways and bridges created a demand for

similar improvements on other State highways. In

general, bridges on the Federal-aid system in this

period were of short to medium spans and of moderate

cost. The Federal-aid allocation and the State highway funds were not sufficient to finance high cost structures and at the same time to construct other

highway facilities in the State. Consequently, high

cost bridges and tunnels were frequently built by

bridge or tunnel authorities or private interests as

toll facilities. During these years, the AASHO Bridge Committee

continued to develop the bridge design specifications.

Basic two- and three-axle truck design loads were

substituted for the truck train loading in 1941, leavOn U.S. route 5 in Vermont, large vehicles were forced

to straddle the 'pavement ceyiterline in crossing this narrow bridge with its sharp-curved approaches.

432
This continuous steel truss bridge over the Allegheny River on 1-80 in Pennsylvania was completed in 1968. The 68- foot wide concrete deck easily accommodates four lanes of trafflc and a concrete median barrier.

ing the concentrated truck loading for short span

designs and the conventionalized lane loading for

longer span designs.

The design formulas for concrete floor slabs were

revised in the 1941 and the 1961 editions of the

AASHO Bridge Specifications to conform to the re- sults of slab tests. New revised editions of the specifications continued

to be developed and issued at 4- or 5-year intervals

up to the present day. The revisions keep the specifications up-to-date on new design concepts, safety

policies, use and development of materials and construction practices. The AASHO Bridge Specifications have become a valuable addition to the bridge

building profession, serving as guides to State highway departments, cities, counties and foreign countries

in the design of adequate but economical structures of all types.

A new design concept evolved during the 1930's

that bridge alinement should confonn to the overall

alinement of the highway. Previously, bridges, which

cost much more per unit of length than roadways, were generally located for minimum cost reasons, with

little regard to approach road curvature. The new

concept has resulted in much safer approach aline- ments.

Developments After World War II The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 authorized

the National System of Interstate Highways. Initial

standards for construction of the Interstate System

were developed jointly by Public Roads and AASHO

in 1945. The high standards for the Interstate System

to meet present and future traffic needs also necessitated changes in the character of highway bridges.

Standards for traffic capacity, load capacity, safety

and appearance of structures were given careful study

in order to provide for the safe and free movement

of vehicles over and through bridges.

The field of the bridge engineer was broadened be- cause of the number of large bridges required over waterways and because of the greatly increased number of grade separations.

Bridge railings were studied and led to the use

of rail curbs and streamlined railings. Full width

roadways (surface and shoulders) were advocated for

safety on short bridges, and deck type rather than

through type bridges were emphasized. Particular

attention was given to horizontal clearance at underpasses, with greater clearances to sidewalls and center

piers than had been customary.

Design with continuous spans was advocated. In

anticipation of the increased use of three-span con- tinuous reinforced concrete structures for urban and

Interstate bridges. Public Roads prepared a report,

433
1-480 exit ramp in Omaha, Nebr. This was one of the first major interchanges where curved composite steel box

girders were used.

Computing Moments for Continuous Concrete Bridges^

including design procedures and moment charts, which was published in the January-February-March 1944

issue of Public Roads.

While the use of AASHO H20 loading was quite

general, the new and heavier H20-S16 loading was

adopted for bridges on routes that would probably

be included in the Interstate Systein. There was a general trend toward the use of heavier loading design

of bridges on all highway systems.

With the toll turnpike era starting again after the war, good architectural treatment of structures was

encouraged, especially where improvement could be

made without substantial increase in cost. Consulting

engineers and architects were retained for design of

these toll road structures and for other major bridges on the Federal-aid system.

In the 10 years following World War II, the march

of new developments in the bridge field resumed.

One of the most widespread was the use of composite

steel beam bridges, which enabled the deck slab to work with the steel beams as a main load-carrying

member.

Another development was the use of welded bridges.

Welded steel bridges, except for minor details, had

not been permitted on the Federal-aid system until

after World War II because of the lack of toughness

(and resultant welding inadequacy) of most struc- tural steel used for bridges. At first, welding on

bridge members was limited to welding flange cover

plates to beams and web to flange connections on plate

girders. At BPR's urging, steel producers developed

a weldable steel for bridges which had sufficient chemical controls to produce a tougher steel. The

American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM)

adopted the Specification for Structural Steel for

Welding (A373) in 1954. ASTM A373 steel was supplanted in 1960 by ASTM A36 steel which had the same tougloness with a higher yield point. The availability of these steels rapidly expanded the scope and

volume of welded structures and eliminated the riveted

plate girder save for very large bridges and railroad

structures. More versatile designs and economy of

weight were obtained with welded designs.

At about the same time, high strength bolts were

developed for use in place of rivets in the connection

of structural members. These bolts, tightened to their proof load, clamp the plates tightly together

and transfer the stress in joints by friction rather than

by bearing and shear on the bolt. However, the most significant development of this

period was the use of prestressed concrete in which

highly stressed steel wires introduced compressive

forces into the concrete to offset the tensile stresses

434
The Red Bridge over the Seekonk River between Providence, and East Providence, R.I., is a welded plate girder bridge of composite construction.

caused by normal service load. In the early 1950's,

reports on European use of prestressed-concrete

bridges had aroused the interest of engineers and

cement producers in this country. The first American

prestressed bridge was the Walnut Lane Bridge in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, built in 1951. Subsequently, in 1955, Public Roads published the Criteria

for Py'estressed'Goncrete Bridges^ the only such publication in the United States at the time. With the

help of this j)amphlet and the standard plans published by the cement industry and Public Roads, the

use of prestressed-concrete for bridges rapidly developed and greatly expanded the span range of concrete structures. The desire for separation of grades led to extensive

use of long sections of viaduct construction in ui'ban areas on the Interstate as well as on other freeways.

Divided roadways, liberal bridge roadway widths and

increased pier and abutment clearances under over- passes became normal safety practices.

i "^ 1

The mainline and ramps of the Mission Valley Bridge in Ban

Diego, Calif., are prestressed concrete box girders. Architectural treatment gives the piers an old "Spanish flavor."

435
The National System of Interstate and Defense Highways

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 provided

for construction of the 41,000-mile Interstate System

with an accompanying source of funding. This

System, which was to be a modern, safe, limited access, divided highway, set highway and bridge design

engineers to work developing ideas for facilities which

would be adequate for estimated future needs. The

tremendous number of structures required to maintain

access control encouraged continuous study of struc- ture types and construction methods. Coincident with

this was the dawn of the computer age. The capability of these electronic macliines to perform lengthy

mathematical operations permitted more refined analysis of increasingly complex structures in less time.

Just as moment distribution gave impetus to con- tinuous frame analysis, the computer made indeterminate analysis commonplace. The elimination of

the computational drudgery brought a return to more

basic and theoretical solutions and away from the

approximation methods of the second quarter of the

century. The computer also created new approaches,

such as the finite element method.

The numerous large and complex grade separation

structures and extensive urban viaducts led to many

bridge developments in designing for improved architectural treatments and economy. Deck structures were generally used with girders curved to follow the

alinement of the roadway. Box girder design techHiyli strength steels vrrc used jar Die iccldcd areli truss inembers of the Sherman-Minton

Bridge over the Ohio River on 1-64 bctiveen Louisville, Ky., and Neio Albany, Ind.

436
Completed in 1973, the Sitka

Harbor Bridge in Sitka, Alaska,

is the first cable-stayed highway

bridge in the United States. The cable-stayed welded steel box girder design ivas selected

to make the structure as visually

unobstructii'e as possible from

Sitka and Castle Hill, the site of Baranof Castle, from which

the Russians governed Alaska

prior to 1867, when it became

a U.S. territory.

The Poplar Street Brirlgc over the Mississippi River at St. Louis, Mo.

437
This pedestrian b^-idge over U.S. 41 ii^ Menomonee Falls, Wis., was the

first cable-stayed girder bridge in the United States.

Built in 1973, the pedestrian overpass of the 47th Street Bypass in Boulder,

Colo., is a cast-in-place concrete box girder.

438
niques were developed for the longer spans. Reinforced concrete box girders and composite structural

steel box girders were constructed to conform to the

sinuous and undulating lines of the ramps and viaducts. Without the computer many of these struc- tures could hardly have been analyzed and designed

realistically or economically.

As happens so often, a breakthrough in one area seems to lead to one in another area. Prestressed

concrete has already been mentioned. New struc- tural steels were also developed to permit larger, more

hea^^ly stressed bridges. In 1959 and 1960, a new

high-strength low-alloy structural steel for riveted

construction, ASTM A440, and a companion steel for

welded construction, ASTINI A441, were produced to supersede the then-standard silicon steel. In 1961, a temporary specification for a 90,000-

100,000 pounds per square inch yield strength steel for long-span bridges Avas approved by Public Roads

for use on Federal-aid projects. After 3 years, an ASTM specification for this steel, High-YieJdStrength^ Quenched and Tempered Alloy Steel Plate^

Suitable for Weld/'ng, ASTM A514, was issued, and

the temporary specification was discontinued. This same procedure was followed in 1966 with the highstrength columbium and vanadium steels. ASTM

issued a specification for the steel, A572, without notch

toughness (impact testing to insure steel will resist fatigue cracking) requirements. BPR accepted the

ASTM specification for use on Federal-aid projects

with welded steel only if a special provision covering

notch toughness was includecl in the project specification. This was done, but the use of the special provisions was discontinued in 1974 when ASTM in- cluded notch toughness tests for all structural steels. The use of curved bridges produced other problems

besides design, e.g., the great amount of scrap metal

resulting from cutting the flanges to the curve. This

required development of new fabrication methods

whereby members were fabricated straight and then

heated and bent to the desired curvatures, thereby

eliminating the waste. To achieve better quality control in welding bridge

members, nondestructive testing by radiography, magnetic particle and ultrasonic testing were developed

by Public Roads bridge engineers. Ultrasonic testing

of welded groove joints was found to be a faster, more

sensitive and cheaper method of locating weld defects

than the methods previously used.

Among the many long-span bridges built on the

Interstate System to cross wide waterways, the Poplar

Street Bridge over the Mississippi River at St. Louis

is one of the most notable structures. A truss or arch

span was not acceptable since it was considered that its bulk would detract from the nearby Gateway Arch

and the Eads Bridge. The 8-lane bridge, constructed

in the mid-1960's with a 600-foot center span, is the

Nation's longest box girder bridge and the first large

structure in the United States to use orthotropic

design. Orthotropic design, developed in Europe,

consists of main girders and a stiffened steel plate

deck welded together so as to act jointly in supporting the structure. The stiffened plate deck serves a fourfold purpose as bridge deck, stringers, and an upper flange for l)oth tlie floor l:)eams and the main

girders, reducing the dead load of the structure.

Pedestrian crossings of freeways became necessary

in some locations to avoid undue division of established neighborhoods. Topography and personal

safety of pedestrians generally dictate the design of

overpasses. Protection for the traffic below from

objects dropped or thrown from pedestrian crossings

led to the use of enclosures or high fences of closely

meshed wires on the overpasses. Many unique and

attractive structures have been developed for these

overpasses.

Bridge Research

The AASHO Road Test near Ottawa, Illinois, dis- cussed in Chapters 4 and 6, is a good example of

Federal-State cooperation on research. Public Roads

bridge engineers designed and prepared the plans for

the 18 bridges in the program. The bridges were

designed with high working loads so that fatigue

failures could be expected. There wei-e 18 steel and/or

concrete beam spans representing contemporary

practices.

At the conclusion of the regular test traffic in

December 1960, 7 of the 11 surviving bridges were

subjected to accelerated fatigue tests, and two were

tested to failure by increased vehicle loads. The mass

of test-to-failure data on the behavior of the bridges

under repeated loading has proved to be of major

assistance in subsequent studies for developing specifications and design revisions.

Seven years later, full size welded plate girders were fatigue tested at Lehigh University under the

sponsorship of the Welding Research Council.

Analyses of the results of these tests resulted in design

and specification changes for welded and riveted plate

girders and confirmed the integrity of properly designed and constructed welded girders.

Since the late 1920's, research and development has

been greatly broadened in the nonstructural areas, such as hydraulics. While bridges and culverts have

been used for centuries to cross streams and rivers, the

structural elements of these crossings have attracted

most of the attention of engineers with less attention

given to the bridge's capacity to accommodate floods,

except for very large bridges over major rivers. Progress in highway hydraulics and drainage was slow,

and in the early days, designs were frequently based on judgment without well developed engineering technology or adequate rainfall data. Drainage structures, including bridges, were commonly sized by

using empirical formulas developed in the 19th

century.

Progressive engineers had long recognized the shortcomings of drainage design and had stressed the

importance of estimating the magnitude and frequency

of flood flows and the risk of damage. The lack of

hydrologic data and the dearth of information on

hydraulics of highway structures made it difficult to develop policy and design procedures.

Research on hydraulics and hydrology started in the

1920-1930 era, mainly encouraged by Public Roads

and other agencies of the Department of Agriculture,

and after Woi-ld War II, extensive development in

the application of hydraulic engineering principles to highway design began in Public Roads. During the

439
The infamous Silver Bridge over the Ohio River at Point Pleasant, W. Va.

1950's, an extensive program of research on the

hydraulics of culverts, bridges, and storm sewers was

undertaken, largely by contract with various universities and other Federal agencies.

In 1959 a Hydraulic Branch was established in the

Public Roads Bridge Division. The functions of this

Branch were to initiate and participate in hydraulic

research, to disseminate the practical application of

hydraulic design to bridge engineers and to review

hydraulic features of Federal-aid structures. Studies were also made on stream pollution from highway and

bridge construction and guidelines were issued on re- duction of such pollution.

One of the most important contributions in this area was BPR's Hydraulic Engineering Circulars and

Hydraulic Design Series Bulletins. These publications, still in use, provide practical methods for applying research results to designs and are widely used by

Federal, State and consulting engineers.

Other areas of bridge related research and development included safety measures, with particular

emphasis on

• Elimination or neutralization of hazardous fixed

objects along the roadside including bridge piers,

abutments, parapets, and culvert headwalls.

• Strengthening of bridge guardrail designs and

the new concept of a strong beam (rail) with a weak post that would yield partially and redirect

the errant vehicle safely bade to the road.

• Breakaway sign supports and lighting poles that

break when hit by a vehicle, thereby i-educing the

injury to vehicle and occupants on collision. In

collisions, tlie vehicle usually passes under the

sign or pole before it falls. These concepts were

developed at Texas A&M through State and Federal funding.

• Gore* protection devices to protect out-of-control

vehicles at the diverging point of ramp exits and

branching roadways. These rapidly reduce the

speed of an out-of-control vehicle by the absorption of energy by using springs, crushing of

drums, displacement of water or sand or related

methods.

• New criteria for design of sign supports, including new recommedations for certain aluminum

alloy design stresses, accepted and published by

AASHO in 1961.

The Scene Today

The State transportation agencies, the Federal Highway Administration, the highway industry and re- search groups have achieved a finely tuned, cooperative

highway program. It is difficult to say that any one group is responsible for new developments, since each

concerned group has played a part. Tliis is the way

it has been with the latest developments in bridge design, ultimate strength design (USD) for concrete and load factor design for steel. The Bureau of Public

Roads supported these developments vigorously and was in the forefront of this movement when it published the /Strength and Serviceahility Criteria—Reinforced Concrete Bridge Members—Ultimate Design

in 1966. This helped bring the bridge specifications

up to the American Concrete Institute (ACI) Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete which

had adopted USD in 1963. A Tentative Criteria for

Load, Factor Design of Steel Highway Bridges, with

* The elongated triangular area where one-way roadways

begin to separate.

440
commentary, was developed and circulated by the

American Iron and Steel Institute in 1968. This cri- teria for steel design was similar to the strength and

serviceability criteria for USD in that the designs are based on yield conditions and load factors. Basically,

these methods represent a departure from designing

a structure for service loads with an overall safety

factor. Under USD and load factor design, magnification of individual safety factors are applied to the various types of loads. The magnified loads are then totaled and used to proportion a member assumed

to be in a state of incipent yielding. These methods,

with additional controls for overload, excessive cracking, deflection, vibration, and permanent set and for

fatigue of material at working loads, have been incorporated in the AASHTO Bridge Design Specification

criteria. Comparisons of costs have shown an initial economy

in material costs for both steel and concrete members

proportioned by these methods over those proportioned

by working stress design, especially for long spans. The events chronicled here, aside from a few set- backs, have been a series of successes. One failure

should be recorded to alert the bridge engineer fraternity that these is more to be learned about materials

and fatigue structures. On the evening of December

15, 1967, a 39-year old eyebar suspension bridge

quivered slightly and then collapsed, carrying 46 i)er- sons to their deaths in the icy Ohio River. This

catastrophic failure of the Silver Bridge at Point

Pleasant, West Virginia, shocked the Nation.

An extensive investigation, including mechanical and

chemical tests of the failed structure, showed that the

failure was initiated by fracture of an eyebar in the

suspension chain. It was further determined that a small corrosion pit on the pin hole face of the eyebar

started a small crack and that the crack reached crit- ical size under the joint action of stress-corrosion and

fatigue.

The disturbing part about the Silver Bridge failure was the contributing causes listed as

• In 1927 when the bridge was designed, the phe- nomena of sti'ess corrosion and fatigue were not

known to occur in the classes of bridge material used

under conditions of exposure normally encountered

in rural areas. • The location of the flaw was inaccessible to visual

inspection.

The CdO Bridge over the Ohio River beticeen Cincijinati, Ohio, and Covington, Ky., was removed by explosives after inspec- tion revealed it was unsafe for highioay traffic. The replacement bridge was opened to highway traffic in 19TJf.

441
• The flaw could not have been detected by any in- spection method known to the state-of-the-art today

without disassembly of the eyebar.

These revelations led to a program of immediate

bridge inspections and bridge inventories directed by

a committtee formed at the direction of the President.

As a result of this committee's actions, new inspection

equipment is being developed and purchased and so- phisticated devices are being employed for inspecting

bridge members and for determining scour at bridge

piers. Bridges deemed unsafe are being closed to

traffic, and bridges are being reappraised as to load

capacities.

The 1968 Federal-Aid Highway Act mandated national bridae inspection standards for the Federal-aid

systems. These standards establish inspection qualifications and require biennial inspections. All States are required to maintain written inspection reports

and a current inventory of all bridges on the Federalaid systems.

The 1968 Act also required that an inspector training program for employees of the Federal and State

governments be established and be kept current with

new and improved techniques. In the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1970, a bridge replacement program

was required to replace substandard bridges over waterways and topographic barriers. This program

is now in full swing. Many of the most deficient

bridges have been or are being replaced. There are thousands of bridges on the Federal-aid system that

are posted as having limited capability of carrying

truck traffic. It is presently estimated that replacement cost would be approximately $2.3 billion. The 60 years since the first Federal-aid act have been

a challenge to the bridge engineer. The first goal was

to set a plan of cooperation and encouragement between Federal and State organizations in developing

bridge standards, then to devise a comprehensive and

workable program for planning, designing, approving

and inspecting Federal-aid bridges to meet the current

and predictable future needs of traffic. With no early

background for predicting traffic growth and facing an unprecedented increase in vehicle volumes, speed

and weight, increased higher standards for width,

alinement and strength of bridges were required, and

many existing bridges became obsolete. Continuous and careful attention to new developments was necessary to maintain current criteria and

specifications for bridge planning and design. The

first 60 years' pursuits and accomplishments leave a background of experience and knowledge for con- tinued accomplishmment of future comprehensive

programs.

Highway Tunnels

As was the case in Europe, tunneling activity in

this country began with the mining industry, followed

by canal tunnel construction, then the railroads and

finally highways. Most of the early canal and rail- road tunnel work was done in Pennsylvania, but California holds several important "firsts" for highway

tunnels.

By stretching the definition of a highway tunnel to include tunnels constructed for horsedrawn traffic before the automobile came into general use, probably

the oldest highway tunnel in the United States is located in California. Built during the 1870's, the

tunnel pierces a high rock cliff on the Pacific Ocean

about 6 miles south of San Francisco. Complete and

accurate records concerning this tunnel are lacking,

but historians speculate that the bore was built to permit local ranchers easy access to San Francisco

along the beaches.*^ *® The first tunnel of substantial length constructed to accommodate automobile traffic is also located in California. Completed in 1901, the Third Street Tunnel

passes through Bunker Hill in downtown Los Angeles.

Interestingly, the contractor made an imsuccessful at- tempt to use a tunnel boring machine on the project.^"

The pioneer spirit and Yankee ingenuity of American tunnel builders was perhaps most evident in the

1920's. During this era, some of the most famous

highway tunnels in the United States were built. Early in the 1920's a comprehensive research program

developed the fundamental data for vehicular tunnel

ventilation. The research was conducted in connection

with the design of the Holland Tunnel." Passing

under the Hudson River between New Jersey and

New York, the Holland Tunnel was the first major

subaqueous vehicular tunnel in the United States. It was opened to traffic in 1927. Three years earlier the

Liberty Tunnels were completed in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and, at 5,800 feet, were the longest highway

tunnels in the country at that time.'^ About the same

time, the Posey Tube under the estuary between Oakland and Alameda, California, was nearing completion. "When opened to traffic in 1928, the Posey Tube

became the first highway tunnel in the world to be

built by the "trench method." ^^ An American innovation, the trench method consists of sinking pre- fabricated tunnel sections into a prepared trench on

the riverbed. A total of 13 highway tunnels have

been built by the trench method, the latest being the

Wallace Tunnel on Interstate 10 in Mobile, Alabama,

opened to traffic in 1973.

The decade of the 1930's saw most of the tunnel

construction being concentrated in the western States. Many of these tunnels were located on the new access routes into the national parks. Probably the most

notable accomplishment during the 1930's was the

Yerba Buena Island Tunnel connecting the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridges in California. Completed

in 1937, it remains the only double-deck highway

tunnel in the country.

Immediately following World War II, tunnel construction activity quickened, and in 1950 another

record was established. The Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel

under the East River in New York City became the

longest highway tunnel in the country—a distinction

it still holds today.

Since the early 1960's, the bulk of U.S. highway

tunnel construction has been within the Interstate System. To date 15 major tunnels have been completed on the Interstate, 4 are under construction and

13 others are under design. These facilities are designed to safely handle high-speed traffic, a far cry

from that narrow passage carved through a cliff on a California beach.

442
REFERENCES

* L. Edwaeds, a Recoed of Histoky and Evolution of Early

American Bridges (University Press, Orono, Maine, 1959)

pp. 47, 48. ^Id., p. 197.

'Id., p. 40.

* Id., pp. 49, 50. 'Id., p. 50.

' Id., p. 56.

' Id., p. 61.

» Id., pp. 80, 82. 'Id., p. 63. " G. Hunt, A Century of Engineering in Wood Preservation,

Proceedings of Wood Symposium, September 3-13, 1952 (Timber Engineering Co., Washington, D.C., 1952) p. 66. "J. GiES, Bridges and Men (Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1963) p. 107. "H. Haupt, General Theory of Bridge Construction (D.

Appleton and Co., New York, 1853) pp. 243-247. " J. GiES, supra, note 11, p. 112. " L. Edwards, supra, note 1, p. 75. "Id., p. 71. "Id., p. 74. "Id., p. 76. " J. GiES, sttpra, note 11, pp. 155-177. "A. Reichmann, The History of Bi-idge Development, Jour- nal of the Western Society of Engineers Special Edition—

75 Years of Engineering Achievements In the Midwest,

Dec. 1944, pp. 60, 61. " L. Edwards, supra, note 1, pp. 125, 126. "/d., p. 204. "Id., p. 122.

'^Id., pp. 41-44.

"/d., pp. 202, 203.

''Id., pp. 162, 163. "/d., pp. 88-90. "/d., p. 167.

="/d., p. 90. TM Id., pp. 199, 200.

'" Id., p. 190. "/d., p. 194. 'Id., p. 198.

'' Id., p. 197. ^O. Ho\TEY, Movable Bridges, Vol. I (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1926) pp. 146-149.

^/d., pp. 151, 152.

'" L. Edwards, supra, note 1, pp. 203, 204.

''Id., p. 191.

'^Id., p. 198.

" Id., p. 200.

"- F. Turneaure & E. Maurer, Principles of Reinforced

Concrete Construction (John Wiley and Sons, New York,

1911) p. 2. " L. Edwards, supra, note 1, p. 137. "/d. " A. Reichmann, supra, note 19, p. 64. " L. Edwards, supra, note 1, p. 140. " Id., pp. 144, 145. *'E. Drew, First Highway Tunnel, California Highways

and Public Works, Vol. 35, Nos. 5-6, May-Jun. 1956, pp. 12, 13.

*" F. Stanger, An Interesting Historical Letter, California

Highways and Public Works, Vol. 35, Nos. 9-10, Sept.-Oct.

1956, p. 37.

'° J. QuiNTON, The Third Street Concrete and Brick-Lined

Tunnel, Los Angeles, Cal., Engineering News, Vol. XLVI, No.

3, Jul. 18, 1901, pp. 34-37. " Studies and Methods Adopted for Ventilating the Holland

Vehicular Tunnels, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 98, No.

23, Jun. 9, 1927, pp. 934-939. ^'Pioneer Highway Tunnels Modernized for Service, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 131, No. 9, Aug. 26, 1943, p. 68.

'^ T. Mereiman & T. WiGGiN, American Civil Engineers'

Handbook, 5th Ed. (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1949)

p. 1647.

443
Con/tfuction

and

fTlQintenonce

In the late 1800's, with the growth of the cities,

the demand for better roads increased. The need to move farm produce from the fields to the city in a

steady, dependable manner grew with the increasingcity population. Yet, only about 150,000 miles of the

rural roads were surfaced, while the vast majority was

of rutted, packed earth that became unusable with

inclement weather. In describing the prevalent condition of the roads in this country. General Roy Stone

said, "In many parts of the United States the roads

are torn up with the outcoming frost in the spring,

soaked with autumn rains, frozen into ridges in winter, and buried in the dust in the summer, making

four regular seasons of bad roads, besides innumerable

brief 'spells.' " ' Roadbuilding and maintenance, in the latter 19th

century, was still primarily accomplished by the

statute labor system using horsedrawn slij) scrapers

and teams and wagons. The road grader, first introduced in 1878, consisted of a steel blade hung beneath

Early grading operations were performed with pick, shovel, and animal-drawn equipment.

This wMledrawn slip scraper hauled very little earth compared to more modern devices.

444
Oradlng a new location at a washout in 1914- At right a man uses a plow to form

a ditch, others drive horse- drawn wheel scrapers.

Steam shovels were used lor excavation work in the early 1900's, but dump wagons were still horsedrawn.

dump wagons, shown here, were especially useful for dumping heavy, sticky material. Bottom

a wooden wagfon. But changes were starting to take

place. The Office of Road Inquiry, establislied in

1893, sent engineers to various parts of the country

to construct object lesson roads in order to demonstrate that year-round good roads were possible and

to show the proper roadbuilding methods to achieve

them. In machinery, the steam shovel and steam

roller were already in limited use but the new steam

tractor, with its broad iron wheels, foreshadowed the

retirement of the horse and mule from the road construction scene.

1900 to 1916—The Beginning of

Federal-Aid Construction

After the turn of the century, there were some very'

significant happenings which had quite an influence on the future of road construction. The Office of

Public Roads (OPR) engineers continued to teach

others how to build and maintain <rood roads under

the object lesson roads program while also studying

and investigating new methods themselves. The small

Federal laboratory in the OPR developed tests for

aggregates and other materials and made important

contributions toward overcoming defects in early bi- tuminous construction. Public Roads engineers determined and published typical specifications for

highway construction, the first of which was in 1913

concerning the fabrication and erection of steel highway bridges.

With the coming of the automobile, the macadam

and earth roads caused quite a dust nuisance in dry

weather. However, it was also about this time that

people realized that oil could be used as a road material. It was found that a road covered with oil would be free from dust in the dry season, yet hard

and firm in the wet season. This led the way to early

experiments with tar and bituminous material to improve road surfaces.^

445
In 1905, coal tar and crude oil were experimentally

applied to recompacted macadam streets in Jackson,

Tennessee. After nearly a year of observation, it showed that the coal tar had penetrated from 1 to 2

inches and maintained a hard smooth surface. However, the light crude oil used showed little permanent

results. The heavier crudes showed nearly the same

results as coal tar. Late in 1906, coal tar was used by

Ehode Island on a short section of the New York to Boston trunk highway in Charlestown in much the same method as building an ordinary macadam road.

After the subgrade had been thoroughly rolled, the

number one stone (114-inch to 214-inch diameter) was

spread to a depth of 6 inches and rolled to 4 inches.

Heated tar was then sprinkled on the first course with

dippers. The number two stone (li/^-inch to 114-inch

diameter) was next mixed by hand with hot tar and

spread to a depth of 3 inches on the first course and

rolled to 2 inches. A thin coat of fine stone (passing

i/^-inch ring) was then spread on the surface and

rolled into the number two course to fill up the voids

and provide a smooth surface—114, gallons of the tar per square yard were used in all. As this method provided a stable hard surface, it was advocated by State

engineers for use on first class highways.^

Use of Portland cement concrete pavement also was

beginning to grow, as the steel drum tilting mixer came into use. The first rural concrete pavement,

however, was not constructed until 1909 in Wayne

County, Michigan.

In terms of new equipment and techniques, steel forms were being produced for concrete work and the

gasoline engine came to construction work as the

power unit for hoisting and excavation equipment,

spelling doom for the steam engine. The diesel engine was also being developed and crawler tracks were

being tried on tractors and cranes. A wooden-boomed

excavator was rigged with a drag bucket in 1903,

making this the forerunner of the drag-line. By

1907, a sheepsfoot roller was in use on embankment

work on West Coast road construction. A rock

crusher and elevator was mounted on a four-wheel

truck in 1910 to become the first portable crushing

and screening plant.*

1

First graders ever used on highway construction work. Fixed

with adjustable blades to provide the desired slope and section,

graders were suited for fine grading and shaping.

Even though the first Federal Aid Road Act was

not passed until 1916, in 1912, the Congress authorized

funds for the improvement of post roads with the

appropriation of $500,000, to be expended in rebuilding and upgrading roads used in the rural free delivery of mails.

The first of these road projects to be built was in

Lauderdale County, Alabama, where approximately

30 miles of road was graded and surfaced with gravel

at a total cost of nearly $28,000. One-third of the

cost was paid with Federal funds and the remainder

An early roller compacting a roadbed.

446
The Offlce of Public Roads

and the American Highioay

Association sponsored this road improvement in Dunn, N.G., in 1914, the

first use of a drag in the county.

A horsedrawn sweeper cleans the surface of a macadam road

in preparation for bitiimoi application. It rid the surface of du^t and loose material so that the Mtumen would form a

positive bond between the cover aggregate and the macadam

layer.

"with State funds. Under this post road program,

each of the 48 States was to be allotted $10,000 and

the remaining $20,000 was to be used for administrative expenses and contingencies. It was estimated

that an average of $600 per mile would be spent on

this improvement whereb}^ about 50 miles would be

completed by each State with their total joint fund

of $30,000.=^ It is likely that these roads were built by contract,

rather than statute labor as in the past, thus, recognizing the importance of the new road technology. However, though there was probably a change in the labor

system, the roads must surely have been built by hand

with pick and shovel and by horsedrawn slips and

scrapers. The gravel surfacing material was no doubt

hauled by teams and wagons. Though many new

types of equipment were being developed or modified

and improved, construction equipment advertising was

in its infancy and so there was often a lack of widespread knowledge of the development. In other cases,

if the equipment were known, often the contractors were not ready to accept it or could not afford it. Therefore, during this time, the older methods of road

construction often prevailed long past the development of new machinery and techniques.

In this era of post road building, $1.8 million of

State and Federal-aid funds was spent in the construction of 425 miles of roads—certainly not a veiy

impressive accomplishment compared to present roadbuilding, but one that meant a great deal at the time.

A further advantage of the 1912 Act was that the

betterment of these post roads was a good training

ground for the engineers of the Office of Public Roads,

and this experience was to prove valuable in the administration of the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916.

Laying block pavement in Washington, D.C., in 1917.

447
1916 to 1926: The Start of the Federal-State

Joint Highway Effort

Evidence of the success of the small previous

Federal-aid program for post road construction surely

contributed to the passing of the Federal Aid Road

Act of 1916 which provided for the improvement of

any rural road over which the mails were carried.

One of the central features of this Act, in terms of

the future, was the requirement that the States must

have a highway department capable of designing,

constructing, and maintaining the designated roads

in order to share in the appropriation. Immediately

this brought about the creation of highway departments in those States not meeting this requirement.

Other provisions of the Act gave the States the

authority, subject to Federal approval, to select the

roads to be improved and the nature of the improvement, plus the responsibility of supervising the construction and the obligation to maintain the completed

pi'ojects.''

A Need for Maintenance

With Federal funds assured for highway construction, the door was open to considerable activity in

roadbuilding. By 1918, a feeling of well being was

the mood of the day. In the 1918 fiscal year alone,

6,249 miles of Federal-aid roads had been or were

being surfaced.^ New surface treatments were being

utilized, and equipment technology was advancing to make work easier and more productive. However,

the development of heavy trucks and their usage during World War I brought this mood quickly to an

end. Roads that were suitable for travel by passenger

cars rapidly deteriorated as they were subjected to the

loads imposed by 5- and 10-ton trucks. Prevost

Hubbard, the chief chemist and expert on bituminous

pavements for BPR described the situation in Public

Roads : Hundreds of miles of roads failed under the heavy

motor-truck traffic within a comparatively few weeks or months. Roads with bituminous surfaces, bituminous

macadam roads, and bituminous concrete roads all failed

A steam roller provides

motive power for a scarifier on an Indiana road in 1916.

Scarifiers were used to loosen

the material on the top layer

of the road. The surface was then graded and

compacted.

^:^^^...:i^

In 1)tc ('iirlji 1900'x, sonic coioitirs and cificn hired full-time caretakers to perform the maintenance functions preiHousltj

done by statute labor. This man was one of 95 caretakers

for a Pennsylvania county who received $50 per month to maintain from 3 to 5 miles of road.

alike, together with other types used in State and county

work. These failures were not only sudden but complete,

and almost overnight an excellent surface might become

impassable. ... A very large proportion of the failures have been characterized by an almost simultaneous de- struction of the entire road structure, and not merely the

disintegration of the wearing course or pavement proper.' The Bureau of Public Roads conducted extensive

research on this subject and concluded that possible

solutions to this problem required: (1) Stronger road

surfaces and better drainage, with special attention to sub-drainage, and (2) continual adequate maintenance. The Bureau recommended during this same period

that really economic and efficient maintenance could

be secured only by: (1) Patrols assigned to definite

sections for which they would be responsible for all ordinary routine work, and (2) well-equipped and

organized gangs or crews continuously employed

throughout the season to perform all work which

could not be economically performed by the patrol

alone.'' These recommendations became the basis for

tlie structure of most of the State maintenance organizf)tions.

448
A homemade tar kettle used

to heat tar as a surfacing

for dustless macadam.

The 1921 Federal Highway Act reinforced the construction and maintenance provisions of the 1916 Act

by requiring the States to maintain the highway constructed under the program and specifying actions to be taken if this were not done. Section 14 of the Act

required that where a State failed to maintain any

road constructed as a Federal-aid highway project,

the Secretaiy of Agriculture Avas to serve notice to that State. If the State did not repair the project

within 90 days, the Secretary was to make the repairs

by contract or Federal force account work and charge

the cost against the Federal funds allotted to the

State. No additional Federal-aid highAvay projects were to be approved for that State until the mainte- nance conditions Avere made satisfactory. When the

Federal Government Avas reimbursed for the mainte- nance performed, the funds Avere paid into the Federal

highway fund for I'eapportionment among all the

States for the construction of roads. The Secretary

could then approA'e further projects for that State.

Construction Partners Unlike earlier roadbuilding procedures, such as

statute labor or force account, by 1918, nearly all of

the road construction work was done by contract. The

State higliAvay departments, after getting the approval from the BPR on their highway programs,

project plans, specifications, and estimates of cost (PS&E), advertised for bids on the proposed work.

After studying the bids received and selecting a contractor, a construction contract was awarded by the

State highway department Avith the concurrence of

the BPR. Copies of all contract documents, as well

as plans and specifications, Avere forwarded to the

BPR Washington office for review and analysis. This

evaluation was to insure full compliance with Federal

laws and regulations in order to avoid difficulties in

paying the Federal share of the cost and to keep up

with new materials and methods of construction deApplication of bitumen on a macadam road in 1912. The man in the center foreground is sprinkling aggregate onto the freshly poured surface. Today mechanized spreaders perform the same task.

449
veloped by the various States. The information was

passed on to the other States for their mutual benefit. All of the construction work was supervised and in- spected by State engineers. Public roads field engi- neers made periodic inspections to assure compliance

with the approved PS&E. All changes in the plans

or extra work that became necessary during the life of contracts were reviewed by BPR. A final review

and inspection of all engineering features of the completed project was made by BPR before payment of

the final reimbursement for the Federal share of the

work done.

In the early twenties, the average length of Federalaid projects was just over 5 miles, and the average

cost per project was roughly $85,000. The average

This road was surfaced using the penetration method. Aggregate was spread on the roadbed first and the bitumen poured on top.

cost per mile was about $17,000. Of the roads completed during this period, about 25 percent were

paved, and the rest were surfaced with gravel, sandclay, or other select material. On the paved roads,

about 65 percent was spent on surfacing, 20 percent on grading and nearly 15 percent on structures. The

Federal share of these projects was approximately 50

percent.

The unit prices for the various items of road construction, such as excavation, concrete pavement and

structural concrete, were, in general, more expensive

in the twenties than they were in the thirties. Of

course, this was partly due to the Depression of the

1930's, but it was also due to the development of

equipment to replace more expensive hand methods.

This enabled roadbuilders to move more earth and

pour more concrete for the same amount of money in

the thirties than they could in the twenties.

The cost data were compiled on all projects and

forwarded to the BPR Washington office for analysis

to determine the trends in highway construction cost for various types of construction. This information

has proven to be of such general interest through the

years that it has become the basis of a quarterly index,

showing the relative movement of highway construction costs over a period of years.^°

During the early twenties, important advances and

experiments were made in all phases of management

techniques and standardization development in the

construction and maintenance of roadways. This

work by the BPR and private organizations increased

the capability to produce cheaper, more efficient,

quality roads.

A steam roller rolls a second coat of bitumen with chips on a macadam street in 1922. First a coat of bitumen was spread,

then a layer of large stones, followed by another coat of bi- tumen, and, finally, a layer of smaller stones to fill in the voids.
By the 1920's, crawler tractors icere pulling scrapers and other equipment. This tractor could pull 5 scrapers at once, enabling these men to excavate and move

material more efficiently.

An important program started by the BPR during

this period was the "Production Cost Studies," a management tool to promote efficient road construction

operations. These studies on earth moving and concrete pavement construction produced practical applications. From the results of these studies, savings of

from 25 to 35 percent were possible in earthwork by

selecting the right number of appropriate pieces of

equipment best suited to the particular job. The

process applied to the concrete paving operations

showed that production losses Avere mainly the result of the failure to provide appropriate hauling equipment in number and character to maintain the capacity of the concrete mixer. By careful elimination of

such losses, astonishing increases of from 25 to 100

percent were made by Public Roads engineers in the

output of working paving organizations. The most

gratifying result, however, was the success that some

contractors attained in nearly doubling their output

by employing similar methods, and thereby permitting them to drastically reduce their next bids on

concrete pavement items.^^

Another important development in earthwork was

the ability to compact soil embankments. Early ex- periments showed that the amount of moisture in soil had a great influence on the degree of compaction

that could be attained. This, of course, led to the

use of moisture control methods of compaction and

the develoi^ment of the "Proctor" method of testing

the compaction of soil embankments, a method which

later became standard on highway embankments

throughout tlie country.

The Public Roads engineers were actively working

with various State highway departments and vmiversities in cooperative investigations to develop suit- able cheap roadway surfacing materials. At the

University of Georgia, tests were underway on sandclay. In Iowa and South Dakota tests were being run on methods of stabilization of soils with cement and

lime. South Carolina was experimenting with bi- tuminous applications to preserve earth roads. Investigations continued in Iowa on the tractive resist- ance of various types of highway surfaces. In Kansas,

tests were being conductetl to measure tire wear on

various surfaces. In addition, the Bureau also was

continuously making routine examinations of highway

materials and coordinating the work of a large number of State and commercial laboratories making tests for the acceptance of materials on Federal-aid projects. The result of this work was a general improvement of all laboratories with the corresponding benefit

to both Federal-aid and State highway construction

projects. ^^

A tractor-pulled grader maintaining a gravel-surfaced road in Minnesota, ^clf-propcllcd motor graders tvcrc introduced in the early 1920's but were not widely used until much later.

451
A paving train near Memphis, Tenn., in 1929. Steel forms were set ahead of time on the subgrade to hold the concrete in place.

Excavation work o»i the Blue Ridge Parkway in 1936. In the background

i))cn drill 7(o/r.s for c.rplosircs

used to break up rock,

while a diesel-powered

shovel loads earth into dump trucks.

452
The Swing to Power Equipment

Equipment for highway construction was undergoing some tremendous changes during the period

1916-26. The steam shovel was being replaced with

gasoline engine-powered excavators. The lines of

horsedrawn wagons were disappearing as dump trucks were taking their places. Crawler tractors pulling

rotary scrapers were replacing horse or muledrawn

fresnos and drag scrapers. Monstrous early models

of the self-propelled scrapers were being developed

in the early 1920's." A manual hoisting bulldozer

blade was put on a crawler tractor in 1923, and by

1925 hydraulic controls were in use on the bulldozer

blades. The self-propelled motor grader was introduced in

the early 1920's, but it did not get widespread use

until much later. By 1922, an all-welded tractor drawn scraper with a 6-cubic yard capacity was in use and by 1924 electric handsaws were put to use in

construction. The steam crusher was being replaced

with gasoline engine models with revolving screens and belt conveyors, and in 1923 a completely portable

crushing and screening plant was placed on the

market."

Paving equipment was also coming into more use. In 1919, a bituminous distributor was introduced to help improve the quality and uniformity of penetration asphalt pavements; 1920 brought batching plants

(volumetric) for concrete aggregates, eliminating a

large amount of hand shovel and wheelbarrow work.

In 1923, a traveling concrete mixer was introduced

on pavement projects. An old issue of EngineeHng

Neios-Record contains a detailed description of the

construction of a concrete pavement in 1918

The rough grading was done entirely by machine;

meaning a pull-type grader equipped witli a scarifier. Fine grading was done by hand. A concrete mixer rode

l)etween wooden forms, with volumetric proportioning of the mix. The concrete was strucl< off and tamped with an iron-shod wooden templet, finished witli a wood float and a coarse wire stal)le broom. The concrete gang (23

men) averaged 500 feet of 9-foot wide, 8-inch thick pave- ment per 9-liour day."

1926 to 1944—Building More

and Better Roads

The Federal-aid system of building roads was well

established by this time. Construction followed the same basic procedure with the State highway departments selecting, designing and constructing their own

projects by contract, all with the approval of the

Bureau of Public Roads and with partial funding

from Federal appropriations.

Pressure from the general public was increasing to "get the farmer out of the mud" ; and the consolidated

school system required the improvement of many

miles of roads in order to facilitate the busing of more children to the wider dispersed schools. To get more miles improved with the funds available, many

of the highways were built as "stage" construction so that the road could be brought up to a higher type

later with additional improvement as traffic volumes

grew and the weight and speed of vehicles increased.

The 1930's ivitnessed an important advance—the introduction of the diesel engine on

tractors. This diesel-powered tractor teamed with a 5-cubic yard capacity scraper moved approximately 16,000 yards of earth in 14 days.

453
Stage construction was also used for other reasons. Some road projects were let to contract for the grading work alone, or perhaps the drainage work and

grading work, leaving the surfacing work to be done

by later contracts. This permitted the newly graded

embankments to settle for a couple of years before

placing surfacing materials. It was advantageous to

let nature compact these embankments over a period

of time because many States still did not use effective

compaction procedures in their grading work. This

also permitted the natural stabilizing of any slips and

slides that might occur in the generally steep back

slopes which were employed at that time in roadway

excavation.

Between 1926 and 1944, BPR and the American

Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO)

worked with various associations in the highway in- dustry toward the common goal of building more and

better highways. For example, the Portland Cement

Association (PCA) contributed financially to the es- tablishment in 1929 of the Cement Reference Laboratory by the National Bureau of Standards in cooperation with the American Society for Testing and

Materials (ASTM). The PCA was also instrumental

in the development of soil cement for low-cost surfacing.i" AASHO published the first edition of their

materials books in 1931, and then in 1940 and 1942

they published their Standard Specifications for Concrete Pavement and Bituminous Surface Treatment,

respectively. In the 1920's and early 1930's, the

Asphalt Institute, in cooperation with the BPR and

various other public agencies, standardized asphalt

cements and liquid asphalt products, thus, greatly re- ducing the number of grades and thereby facilitating

the writing of asphalt specifications. Also, the Asphalt Institute in cooperation with the American

Farm Bureau Federation was instrumental in initiat- ing a program of paving farm-to-market roads. Like

the capillaries of one's blood system, these feeder

Constructing a stabilized soil road. A scarifier prepares road

for the mixing of soil and cement.

roads played an important role in the transportation

system of today.^" In cooperation with public highway authorities, all of the industry associations, in one way or another, were major contributors to the

tremendous development of highway construction

during this period.

Modernization of Roadbuilding

Probably the two most important advances in modernizing construction equipment during the 1920's

and 1930's were: (1) The introduction of the diesel

engine on tractors and graders in 1931, and (2) the

development of large pneumatic tires which were used on scrapers as early as 1932, and on dump trucks in

1934, making it easier to operate on soft ground off the highway.

In the 19JfO's self-powered equipment for onsite material stabi- lization was developed. This machine mixed soil and cement and added water to create a stabilized base.

454
Earthivork equipment became heavier and more powerful in the late JfO's and 50's. Here a loader vnth a front-end scoop handles rock.

Bulldozer in action.

455
In other developments of construction equipment,

the front apron was first placed on scrapers in 1933,

making a 12-cubic yard load possible. Hydraulic

controls were placed on power shovels in 1937, then

in 1938 the self-propelled scrapers made it possible to move earth at a much faster pace. The compaction

of earth was also keeping- pace as the ballastable roll- ers were introduced in 1936. Paving equipment was

being revolutionized as the traveling concrete paver,

introduced in 1926, made use of the skip lever to acti- vate the water measurement and the timing of the

mix. In 1932, the dual-drum traveling paver helped

to increase production of concrete for pavements.

Internal vibrators for portland cement concrete were

patented in the United States in 1935 and soon used

widely to assist in the consolidation of concrete in the

forms. Bituminous paving equipment was being developed as the road mix machine was introduced in

1929, and the bituminous paver placed on the market

in 1932. This equipment provided more rapid construction of improved asphalt pavement at lower

cost."

Silver Lining of the Depression Cloud

As can be seen, many of these developments took

place during the Depression years, when so many in- dustries were virtually shut down because of the national economic situation. The highway industry was

probably one of the industries that was least injured

by the Depression. By using highway work as one of

the "make work" projects of this period, the National

Recovery Act brought employment close to the homes

of the unemployed. It was estimated that for every

person directly employed on road work, there were two others employed in the manufacture and trans- portation of road materials and equipment.^^

Thus, while being used as one of the "tools" to fight

the unemployment of the Depression, an added benefit was that the highway industry grew in capacity and was ready for the program of interregional highways

that was recommended by the report Toll Roads and

Free Roads in 1939. The program discussed in the

report became the basis for the plan of the National

System of Interstate and Defense Highways as we

laiow it today.

World War II Disrupts the Highways

The Interstate program had to be postponed, however, as the countiy plunged into World War II. The

Nation's roads took a hard beating during the war

years, as construction and maintenance were slowed

considerably. The road work accomplished was

largely composed of correction of critical deficiencies on main highways essential to war transportation.

All noncritical highway work was deferred, and the

use of critical materials was reduced to a minimum.

New construction was largely confined to access roads

to new military installations, defense plants, ports and

the like. World War II left its imprint on the highways. Many miles of the oldest highways, already worn and obsolete and scheduled for replacement, were kept in service. This situation, already bad, was

accentuated by the wear and tear of continuous

streams of war traffic. Thus, the mileage of roads no

longer adequate for the traffic carried and difficult to maintain in service, grew in size throughout the war. Due to the loss of personnel by State highway departments to the military forces and defense plants

and the unavailability of new equipment, spare parts,

tires and fuel, it was necessary for most States to sharply reduce their maintenance activities.^" The

quality of maintenance suffered. Only routine surface

maintenance, resurfacing, and resealing were intensified to preserve the existing surface, whatever type it happened to be. Operations to maintain shoulders,

clean ditches and culverts and mow the weeds were performed only as time, manpower, and equipment

allowed.^^

1944 to 1964—The Push For More Production

As the war in Europe neared an end. Congress

passed the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944. This was a far-reaching piece of legislation. It authorized

$500 million for each of the first 3 postwar years; it authorized, for the first time, the use of Federal-aid

highway funds in urban areas; it provided authorization for the construction of a Secondary Road System; and it directed the designation of a National

System of Interstate Highways. The funds authorized

in this legislation made possible an expanded and

A self-propelled,

self-loading scraper.

456
jpfc--*'*^ •_

This grader was designed to be as flexible as the human lorist. The blade shown here is especially useful for fine grading on

slopes and ditches; a bucket blade is used for excavation work.

essential program of construction and reconstruction

of highways which had borne the burden of heavy

wartime ti'affic with a minimum of maintenance or betterment activity.

This period of 1944-64 was one of greatly expanded

highway activity. Public Koads worked closely with

the AASHO, the Highway Kesearch Board (HEB),

and the various industry associations, especially in the

areas of coordination of construction practices, re- search, and the development of standard specifications.

In 1948, AASHO published its Policy on Maintenance of Roadioay Surfaces (revised in 1961). Then

in 1949, AASHO came out with its Manual of Highway Construction Practices and Methods. These two

publications were a great help in distributing information to the States so that all could benefit from the

successes that some States were having in their construction and maintenance procedures.

An elevating grader picks up material and conveys it to a waiting truck.

In 1960, AASHO published its guide on project

procedures, and in 1963, it published the first Guide

Specifcations for Highxoay Construction., which be- came the national standard for highway construction

specifications.

During this period, there were also tremendous ad- vances in the productivity of highway construction.

One of the big advances was the development, in 1945,

of self-powered equipment for onsite inaterial stabili- zation, which greatly increased the productivity and

control of stabilized bases and subbase courses. The

rubber-tired bulldozer, first placed on the market in

1947, and the vibrating roller, introduced in 1948,

proved to be very successful. In rock excavation, the new carbide insert on rock bits was a tremendous help

in lengthening the life of these bits. The application

of hydrostatic drive to construction equipment was

also being developed. In earthwork, as well as all phases of construction as a whole, the equipment

manufacturers were continuously developing heavier

and more powerful units to obtain more production

at less unit cost for a better quality highway.^^

Compaction is important in firrpnring a firm hir/hicay foundation. This compactor has pneumatic-tired, vibrating rollers which are particularly effective in compacting granular soils.

467
A paving train in Iowa in 1949 utilized dry batches dumped in

to two ticui-bdtch trai^eliiig mixers.

For this paving operation, concerts was hauled from a central mix plant

and poured into the spreader from a side dump (bin).

458
The array of road construction equipment that was

available at this time was huge and diverse, but every

unit was developed in an orderly fashion to fill a

definite need.

Significant advances in paving equipment were

started. In 1955, electronic controls were put into use in concrete batch plants, simplifying and giving

better control over batching. The triple-drum concrete paver, which could produce 125 batches per hour

compared to 87 batches for the dual-drum, was introduced in 1959. Central-plant mixing with hauling by

agitator trucks was used on large concrete pavingprojects. Transit mixei's were widely used in urban

paving and bridge work. Slipform pavers became

widely accepted on highway work. Spreading and

finishing equipment were developed to do a faster,

better job. The use of central-plant mixing and slipform paving methods made possible some astonishing

achievements in concrete pavement. Some road contractors reached the production rate of paving more

In 1958, there were over 12,000 Federal-aid highway

projects awarded at a total cost of about $3.5 billion to build or improve nearly 34,000 miles of roads. In

1964, approximately 7,000 Federal-aid px'ojects were awarded at a total value of about $4 billion, corre- sponding to 18,300 miles of roads. The average size contract in 1958 was almost $300,000 and in 1964 was

about $560,000—nearly doubled—while the total an- nual miles dropped. Obviously the trend was to

shorter, more costly projects. In general, the longer

rural, less costly Interstate projects were built first with the more costly and shorter urban projects fol- lowing.

The high degree of mechanization of highway construction activity enabled construction labor to in- crease production greatly while reducing the number

of man-hours required per mile of highway construction. The cost of highway construction over the

years, in fact, has risen quite slowly as compared to the cost of labor and materials.

The paving train's screw spreader.

than a mile per day of 24-foot wide, 9-inch thick

Portland cement concrete pavement with this type

modern equipment. This led to the "Mile-A-Day

Club," sponsored by the American Concrete Paving

Association. In 1973, one contractor set a new record

by paving 4.7 miles of 8-incli thick, 24-foot wide concrete pavement in a 23-hour period—^14,853 cubic

yards of concrete. In the early sixties, automatic slope and grade controls for asphalt paver screeds were developed. Rolling equipment for bituminous pavements showed

little apparent change over the years, but in reality

improvements were developed for these machines during this period which made them faster, more productive, and easier to operate.

Other innovative developments included a helicopter designed to hoist and haul a 6-ton payload for

construction work in inaccessible areas, and a vibratory sonic pile driver that could drive and pull piling

at a small fraction of the time needed with conventional equipment.

1964 to 1974—An Increased Emphasis

on Social Goals

By 1964 the Interstate program was in full swing.

While highway mileage accomplishment for the Interstate was still the main goal, attention was focusing on other aspects such as highway safety, highway

beautification, and consideration of wildlife and rec- reation areas, as well as historic sites. Environmentalists and ecologists were instrumental in keeping

environmental concerns, potentially affected by construction, at a high level of consciousness among

higliAvay builders. New construction procedures were

developed whereby detailed programs were implemented in order to reduce to a minimum the soil ero- sion during the construction process, and several

States wei'e investigating improved methods of sediment control for future highway construction use. Studies were undertaken to investigate new equipment and other means to control noise and air pollu459
1

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION

HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION COSTAND LABOR USAGETRENDS

iioa isa-ios

LABOR FACTORS MAM HOURS PER MILUON OQIURS

CONSTRUCTION COST IBAStO Oil CONSTANT OOLLARSI 400 anm

3B

m

m

m

M

ram

400.000

380.000

360.000

340.000

LSGtKIO: 1^ COMPOSITE CONTRACT BID PRICE INDEX CONVERTEI FROM AWARD BASIS TO EXPENDITURE BASIS ^m AVERAGE HOURLV WAGE INDEX la LABOR FACTORS MANHOURS USED PER MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF CONSTRUCTION, ADJUSTED

TO 1954 CONSTANT DOLLARS LABOR COST INDEX BASED ON PRODUCT OF AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES AND LABOR FACTORS MB MATERIAL PRICE INDEX BASED ON WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF UNIT PRICES FOR PORTLAND CEMENT.

ASPHALT. AGGREGATES. STEEL AND LUMBER

> J

/

r /

V

/

320.000

300.000

280.000

260JI00

240.000

220.000

/

/

'^AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES 1 1 /

r /

r i

^

^ CuiviKu;>iik >J CONTRACT -x

gin PRirFC M^

yn

200.000

180,000

160.000

140.000

120.000

m

Mi

-^ ^'\Bor 1 FA( TOR ! ^.^

^

^ yw

^ ^ As ^

^

Y"

ATEI

1 1 lAL PRICES

1 1 ^

120 ^^r^ u

^

^

Hi 5a^M«^tf

^

^

i^Khfl ^~ ^p

^

•^ -^

1M ^M

'^ ^*Bh ^ ^ 100.000 S .^-- -

a

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aaooo

60.000 ^LABOFI COST

i 1 1 ^

IS) 1961 1952 1953 19M 19G5 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1981 1962 1963 196« 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 197S 1976 1977 1978 1979 19

PREPARED BY

OFFICE OF HIGHWAY OPERATIONS CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE DIVISION CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION BRANCH

tion during the construction process. The dryer-drum

process for hot-mix asphalt plants and better mufflers

for heavy equipment were developed in an effort to reduce or eliminate these types of pollution.

There was an increased emphasis on highway

safety. New safety devices were built into new highways, such as sign posts that broke upon impact, safer

guardrails, and crash cushions which absorbed the

shock of a collision with fixed structural elements.

Activities on construction projects were also changing. Construction contractors in some States were

being required to furnish completely equipped laboratories and do their own surveying and layout staking, jobs which had previously been done by State

highway departments. More States Avere using aerial

photography and new data processing procedures to speed up monthly estimates.

The highway construction industry developed a greater awareness of public need and good public

relations. Soil erosion prevention and other environmental and ecological aspects became integral parts

of construction practices. Ways were studied to help

the construction labor force also. Where possible,

activities such as winter concreting techniques were

developed to help extend the construction season and

to give workers more yearly income, and occupational

safety measures were adopted to improve the working

conditions for the construction work force.

A slip form paver eliminates the need for setting steel forms,

since the forms move along with the paving machine. A rela- tively stiff concrete is used so that, by the time the machine

passes on, the concrete will hold its shape.

460
Bridge deck construction has

become increasingly mechanized. This finishing

machine permits the use of

stiffer concrete and produces a smooth deck surface.

Grading equipment had greatly improved by the 60's and 70's. This motor grader is not only self-propelled, but also has enough power to push a scraper.

Conflict for Space Brings New Maintenance Era As highway facilities became more and more con- gested and more people with their respective vehicles were fighting for this precious space on the streets and highways, the public began to resent the highway

worker with his equipment taking up space on the

public right -of-wa}', even if it did have to be maintained. The cry was : "Can't you find some other time

to do that; you can't block the road at this time of

day." So a new emphasis was placed on road maintenance. ^Maintenance organizations were subjected to numerous external pressures which caused sevei'e in- ternal stresses. Because a maintenance management

science had not been developed as fast as the technological improvements or sociological needs, the

existing management was not able to cope with the

problems of reporting systems, work methods and

procedures, perfoi'mance in terms of quality, quantity

and productivity, and planning and scheduling work.

An organized formal research program was expanded

considerably during this period, with studies covering

a wide variety of subjects.

In Virginia between 1963 and 1965, a Federal-aid

study was designed to cover nearly every aspect of

maintenance management. It involved the collection

of data concerning performance of labor and equipment; development and testing of various work

methods; establishment of quality, quantity and per- formance standards; development and testing of a new reporting system; development and testing of a budgeting system; and development and testing of

training materials. Other simultaneous studies were

in progress which zeroed in on various aspects of

maintenance management.

The basic components of maintenance management

systems derived from these studies have been accepted

by approximately 30 highway maintenance organizations. Such a system enables a highway department

to prepare a performance budget showing specific

maintenance activities and the resources in personnel,

materials and equipment required to carry them out. On this basis, the highway department can develop

long-range plans for maintenance operations and

evaluate performance of the various field organizational units. This, in turn, indicates where additional

Scraper being pushed by two tractors. Push-loading speeds up

the process of loading and hauling heavy materials.

w^^^*- i^<ja^

461
» v-4^v-:4,25^^r=;^

d

Grading operations on Interstate 9If in North

After a toater distribution truclc moistens the soil, sheeps foot and ballastable rollers compact it.

Dakota.

training is needed. Furthermore, such a system provides the manager with the information needed to insure that equipment is being used efficiently and

effectively, and to aid him in selecting the best unit

for the work to be done.

Since 1971 the Federal Highway Administration,

when requested, has assisted State organizations

interested in discussing the basic components of a maintenance management program. State highway

maintenance organizations that have implemented a maintenance management system are presently re- viewing management practices in equipment management and caj)ital outlay programs and are establishing

district and area boundaries for related maintenance

programs.

Advances in Equipment and Techniques

Construction industry associations were instrumental, as in previous periods, in the development of

new equipment in such areas as tamping and vibrating

rollers to speed up compaction of embankments and

base courses. The use of nuclear devices for testing

compaction on soil and base courses became more

widespread as these devices made this type of testing

much faster. Large screw augers were being used more frequently for structure foundation excavation.

New equipment developed for subsurface investigation

made it possible for more precise bidding on excavation work, because the contractor could depend on more accurate subsurface inforniation.

The laser beam has become a very useful tool for

engineers in establishing line and grade for pipe laying, eliminating the need for off-set lines and batter

boards. New methods of making pipe and specialized

equii^ment for cleaning pipe have also come into use during this period.

New methods for handling concrete, such as concrete pumps and new deck finishing equipment, have

made bridge work more productive and enabled contractors to produce safer, smoother riding bridge

roadways. Stay-in-place steel forms for concrete bridge decks were developed and thereby eliminated

the need for the removal of the forms, an often hazardous and difficult operation.

Precast concrete units such as culverts and barricades came to be widely used, also. Spreading and finishing equipment for pavements were developed into quite sophisticated machines that

eliminated much of the hand work. New types of

equipment for texturing and grooving concrete pavement surfaces came into use to help provide more

skid resistance.

Large automatically controlled, central-mix plants were quite extensively used in concrete pavement work

in this period from 1964 to 1974. Some States permitted asphalt plants to operate without screens, using

variable speed belts and multiple cold feed bins for

gradation control. Also, some asphalt plants were

equipped with surge storage, which allowed them to produce asphaltic concrete continuously without having to stop the plant to wait for haul trucks. The

development of practical electronic systems for auto- matic grade controls, which used sensing devices to follow a string-line or guide-wire, was very important.

Significant advances in equipment in nearly every

field of use were seen during this period in an effort by the industry, as a whole, to obtain faster, more

efficient j)roduction with less "down time."

Many advances have been made in developing new

materials and techniques for highway construction.

A new technique of presplitting faces of road back

slopes before blasting for excavation gave a much

more even back slope in rock cuts. Various treat- ments, such as lime and water-proof membranes, were

put into use to help overcome the problems of swelling soils. Even though they had been in use for many

years, synthetic aggregates were seeing niore use in

highway work during this period. New types of

coatings for structural steel and culvert pipe, as well

as pipe jointing materials, were being produced.

462
Additives for concrete that controlled the set for

better workability and that produced more durable

structures were being- further developed. Even so, concrete bridg'e decks were be<>inning to show signs

of early deterioration, caused by salt used as a de-icing

agent penetrating tlie concrete and destroying the re- inforcing steel. This brought about specialized construction methods for the protection of bridge decks,

such as the use of epoxy coated or gahanized reinforcing .steel and waterproof ma.stics or membranes.

During the years from 1967-1974, highway builders were finding an increasing scarcity of key highway

con.struction materials, such as cement, steel, asphalt,

and paint, which accelerated the search for alternate

materials. Gasoline and diesel oil for the big rigs

also became scarce, especially during the oil embargo

late in 1973 and early 1974. The use of some waste

matei'ials in higliway construction helped stretch

existing supplies somewhat. For example, some States

started using fly ash as a substitute for some of the

cement in concrete mixes. Some experimented with

rubber from old automobile tires to modify asphalt

in hot mixes.

Now the United States has become a Xation bound

together by an extensive ribbon of efficient wellmaintained, quality streets and highways. Where

once the horse and wagon slowly plowed through

muddy roadways, millions of cars and trucks swiftly

carry people, goods, and services to every corner of

this country, impacting the social and economic wellbeing of every conummit}'. The ability to steadily

obtain more pi-oduction and an improved quality of

construction and maintenance of this Nation's streets and highways while still preser\'ing a reasonably level cost is due to the combination of the many factors of

the construction and maintenance system as it has

developed. Some of these factors, which have been

discussed, are the couii)etitive bidding mechanism,

the improved managerial methods, a dependable public financing, the advancing technology, and the motive force of the State and Federal Governments in

desiring to meet the needs of the Nation and her

people.

However, though the capability and motivation were present, the success of this efl'ort re(iuired the

excellent cooperative spirit that existed among the

Federal Highway Administration and its predecessors,

the State highway departments, and the industry as- sociations. AVithout this partnership, there would not

be the sound construction industry or the effective

highway network that we have today.

Hanging a girder during construction of a

three-level interchange in Dallas, Tex.

463
A twin box culvert under construction.

464
REFERENCES

' A. C. Rose, Historic American Highways—Public Roads

OF THE Past , (American Association of State Highway Officials, Wasliington, D.C., 1953) p. 100.

-Id., p. 101. ^M., pp. i03-ior>.

* G. Galli, 100 Years of Construction Netvs—Events That

Shaped the Future, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 192, No.

18, Apr. 30, 1974, p. 455. 'A. C. Rose, supra, note 1, i). 108.

° Public Roads Administration, The Public Roads Adaiin- isTRATioN AND ITS WoRKs (Federal Works Agency, Washington, D.C., Revised Nov. 1946) p. 3.

' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1918, p. 5.

' P. Hubbard, Efficiency of Bituminous Surfaces and Pave- ments Under Motor Truck Traffic, Public Roads, Vol. 1, No.

10, Feh. 1919, p. 25. •a. p. Anderson, Modern Road Bt'ilding and Maintenance

(Hercules Powder Co., 1921), pp. 33, 103. " PRA, supra, note 6, pp. 25-27. " BuKEAU OF Public Roads Annual Report, 1926, p. 32.

'Id., pp. 34-35. " Civil Engineering Department and the Transportation

Engineering Center of the Ohio State University, Pro- ceedings OF THE Sixteenth Annual Ohio Highway Engineering Conference (Columbus, Ohio, Apr. 2-4, 1962), pp.

13-14. " G. Galli, supra, note 4, p. 455.

'^ Ohio State University, supra, note 13, p. 27. " 50th Anniversary of PCA, Civil Engineering, Vol. 36, No.

3, Mar. 1966, pp. 32-42. "The Asphalt Institute—Wh.\t It Is and What It Does, Information Series 110, (The Asphalt In.stitute, College

Park, Md., Jun. 1973).

"* G. Galli, supra, note 4, pp. 455, 456. ''Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1931, pp. 1-7. TM Southeastern Association of State Highway Officials,

Proceedings (Chattanooga, Tenn., 1943) p. 75. -'Convention (Jroi'p Meetings—Papers and Discussions

(St. Louis, Missouri, Dec. 1942), (American A.ssociation of State Highway Officials, Wa.shington, D.C.) p. 76. " G. Galli, supra, note 4, pp. 455-459.

465
Development

of the

Inter/tote

Program

The National System of Interstate and Defense

Highways, more commonly known as the Interstate Highway System, is a 42,600-mile network of free- ways, spanning the Nation and linking together and

serving more than 90 percent of all cities of over

50,000 population and thousands of smaller cities and

towns. The System comprises little more than 1 per- cent of the Nation's road and street mileage, but when

completed, it is expected to carry about 25 percent of

all traffic. While the Interstate System is a national system

connecting all States, it is a part of the State highway

system in each of the States in which it is located.

Federal highway funds, derived from highway-user

taxes, are used together with appropriate State funding for the construction of the Interstate System, but

tlie "ownership" is with the States, and the entire

burden of maintenance, administration, and regulation

falls upon the States and localities. The Interstate System, now nearing completion, is being constructed by a State-Federal partnership.

The State highway departments and the Department

of Defense assisted in the designation of the System's

routes. The States select and design the projects to be built each year; the necessary right-of-way is ac- quired by the States under State law, and the States

award and manage the construction contracts—all subject to the review and approval of the Federal

Highway Administration. The Federal share of the

total system cost, now estimated at $89 billion, is 90

percent, and States' shares are 10 percent.

The Birth of the Interstate System

Initial Consideration

The origin of the Interstate Highway System can

be related specifically to a formal report made to Congress in 1939. Before that, a few scattered parkways and urban arterials were already demonstrating

the virtues of controlled access highways with gradeseparated interchanges. There had been earlier

dreams of a transcontinental network of superhighways, although these were usually conceived of as bypassing all cities and serving only those who wanted

to make long trips.

In the 1930's there was mounting evidence of future

traffic congestion on the country's main travel arteries

but at the same time a prolonged period of economic

depression made normal public financing of higliway

improvement a difficult matter. There was a sudden

revival of interest, after almost a century, in toll road

financing, and toll roads were built in several of the

major traffic corridors.

466
The Piscataqua Rivet- Bridge on Interstate 95 literally joi7is the States of Maine and New Hampshire. It fits gracefully into

its environment and provides convenience, safety, and savings in travel time for the motorist.

The Federal-aid legislation in 1934 had authorized

the use of Federal-aid hin-hway funds for planning

purposes, and continuing statewide highway planning

surveys were initiated in 1935 under the guidance and

leadership of the Bureau of Public Roads. From

these studies came a wealth of factual information

which, for the first time, permitted some definition

and measurement of highway ti-ansportation and its problems and made possible highway planning based on knowledge rather than guess^vork.

A Study of Toll Roads Versus Free Roads

With this data to draw on, the Congress in 1938

requested the Bureau of Public Roads to study the

feasibility of a toll financed system of three east-west and three north-south superhighways. The resulting

comprehensive study made by Public Roads in cooperation with the State highway departments was re- ported to Congress in 1939 in the landmark publication Toll Roads and Free Roads.

This study demonstrated that the suggested 14,000-

mile toll road system would be far from self-supporting. Seeking more than a negative recommendation,

the study explored and documented the need for a

system of interregional superhighways, with connections through and around cities. A 26,700-mile nontoll network was proposed, with the recommendation

that the Federal Government share the construction

cost at more than the traditional 50 percent Federalaid rate.

The Interregional Highways Study

To pursue this concept. President Franklin D.

Roosevelt appointed a National Interregional Highway Committee in 1941. Thomas H. MacDonald,

Commissioner of Public Roads, became the Committee's chairman ; its secretary was Herbert S. Fairbank,

Deputy Commissioner for Research in the Public

Roads Administration.

Through them, the resources and assistance of the

Public Roads Administration and the States were made available to the Interregional Highway Committee. Then, in 1943, in the midst of World War II,

Congress requested Public Roads to make a study of

the need for a nationwide expressway sj'stem. The

Committee and Public Roads presented their report,

Interregional Highways, to Congress in 1944.

467
The study considered systems of several sizes, test- ing each by a variety of criteria, and recommended

as optimum a rural network of 33,900 miles. The

need for an additional 5,000 miles of auxiliary urban

routes was foreseen, bringing the total proposed sys- tem to about 39,000 miles, of which one-fifth would

be in urban areas. High standards of geometric design with full control of access were recommended. No overall cost estimate for the system was made. It was suggested

that postwar expenditures for its construction should

be $750 million a year, two-thirds of it on the urban

sections.

Designation of the System

Acting on the basis of the 1939 and 1944 reports,

the Congress in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of

1944 directed the designation of a National System

of Interstate Highways limited to 40,000 miles and

". . . so located as to connect by routes, as direct as

practicable, the principal metropolitan areas, cities,

and industrial centers, to serve the national defense,

and to connect at suitable border points with routes of continental importance . . ." The Act provided that the routes of the National

System of Interstate Highways be selected by joint

action of the State highway department of each State

and the adjoining States, with the approval of the

Public Roads Administration and were to be incorporated in the Federal-Aid Primary System if not

already included in it. In response to a request from PRA, the States proposed routes for inclusion in the System. Criteria for

selection included service to cities and rural population, to manufacturing and agricultural production,

to concentrations of motor-vehicle ownership and

traffic, and to national defense. Additional criteria

in urban areas included consideration of need for

through and circumferential routes and their relation

to land use, urban planning, and civil defense.

Considerable discussion ensued between the States

and the Department of Defense. On August 2, 1947,

selection of the general locations of the main routes of the Interstate System was announced. They totaled

37,700 miles, including 2,900 in urban areas. The

remaining mileage within the 40,000-mile limit was

reserved for auxiliary urban routes. Again on the recommendation of and in consultation with the States and the Department of Defense,

the general locations of 2,300 miles of urban circumferential and distributing routes were designated on

September 15, 1955.

This well designed interchange in Morris County, N.J., maintains much of the original

topography while smoothly blending the heavy trafflc of 1-80 and 287 with that of

U.S. 46. It provides long acceleration and deceleration lanes and wide shoulders for safe emergency stops.

468
Early System Construction

Progress in the designation of the routes on the

System had been slow. So was progress in construction. Congress authorized a sizable postwar Federal

aid highway program, but for the fiscal yeai\s 1946-53 no specific amounts were earmarked for the Interstate System.

In what now seems a token gesture, the FederalAid Highway Act of 1952 did authorize $25 million

for the Interstate System for each of the fiscal years

1954: and 1955, to be matched on the traditional 50-50

Federal-State cost sharing basis. The Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1954 authorized $175 million for the

Interstate for each of the fiscal years 1956 and 1957,

with the matching ratio changed to a 60-percent Federal share. These 1954-57 funds were apportioned

among the States by formulas used for apportioning

regular Primary System funds, taking into account

the area, population, and postal route mileage in each

State. Dxiring the first postwar decade, of course, a good

deal of the regular Federal-aid highway funds were

used on the Interstate System—some 27 i^ercent of the

Primary and 45 percent of the Urban Federal-aid

funds authorized for fiscal years 1946-56—however,

this level of construction funding fell far short of

meeting System traffic requirements or design standards.

Highway Needs Studies

National Defense

Although some work progressed, traffic needs on the

System increased at a faster rate than construction.

The Congress, in 1948, requested PRA to study the

status of the System and to comment on the relation

of highways to the national defense. The ensuing

study, made in cooperation with the State highway

departments, was reported to Congress in 1949 in the

document Highway Needs of the National Defense.

It demonstrated the critical deficiencies of the Interstate routes and estimated the cost of needed improvements at $11.3 billion; 47 percent of the suggested

improvements lay in urban areas. There Avere some recognized deficiencies in the esti- mate. It did not include the 2,300 iniles of urban

auxiliary routes, which were then yet to be designated.

It was realized that designs should be based on traffic needs of the futui'e, but it was found impracticable

to make such forecasts, so deficiencies of existing highways were measured against existing traffic. There were other flaws, easily seen in hindsight.

It was then considered that a good deal of the System

could be developed by reconstruction of or widening

existing highways, which later proved impractical on many route segments. And subsequent substantial

construction i)rice increases were unanticipated.

Highway Systems

The next few years brought a welter of discussion

and studies of the problem. Protracted hearings of

the Subcommittee on Eoads of the House of Representatives in 1953, published as the National Highway

Study., dwelt at length on the Interstate System among

other subjects.

In a message sent to the Governors Conference on

July 12, 1954, President Eisenhower called for "a

grand plan for a properly articulated highway sys- tem." ^ Later in 1954, a committee of the Governors

Conference reported to the President its belief that

the national government should assume primary re- sponsibility, with State participation, for financing

the Interstate System.

In the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1954, Congress

requested the Bureau of Public Roads to make several

extensive studies, in each of which the State highway

departments collaborated.

One study was reported in March 1955 in the document Needs of the Highway Systems., 1955-81^.. Construction needs of the 37,700-mile Interstate System

for the years 1955-64, to provide for traffic predicted

for 1974, were estimated to cost $23.2 billion, of which

46 percent would be spent in urban areas. Again, the

estimate did not cover the 2,300 miles of urban auxiliary routes. Thus, the estimate included essentially

the same mileage as the estimate reported in 1949, and

at about the same construction unit price levels. Yet the new cost estimate was double that reported

in 1949. This time an attempt was made to forecast

future traffic needs; higher standards were used for

estimate purposes, including access control throughout; and there was greater awareness of the probable

need for extensive location on new right-of-way.

Still, the report itself acknowledged that there was

a tendency in State estimates to reflect financial limitations rather than anticipated needs, and additionally a tendency to understate the needs. Further, both

this and the earlier estimates were made in a comparatively short time, with limited manpower. A

good deal of the estimating was done by map study

for route location and use of average quantities and

costs per mile.

Feasibility of Toll Roads

Another study requested by Congress in 1954 was

reported in April 1955 in the document Progress and

Feasibility of Toll Roads and Their Relation to the

Federal-Aid Program. At that time the toll turnpike was vigorously advocated by various promotional

groups as the ready solution to highway congestion

and financing. This study indicated that 6,700 miles

of routes could be successfully financed by tolls, but

predicted (reliably) that assurance of public funds

for early completion of the Interstate System would

soon end widespread interest in toll roads.

The report reaffirmed the desirability of the principle established in the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916

Roads l)uilt with Federal aid should be toll free. But

the report did recommend inclusion in the Interstate System of toll roads which met System standards

where there were reasonably satisfactory free roads

in the corridor permitting traffic to bypass the toll road. This simply recognized that toll roads, built

without Federal aid, existed on the lines of the Interstate System and that to duplicate them would be an

economic Avaste. The Clay Committee Report

FolloAving up on his message to the GoA^ernors Conference in 1954, President EisenhoAver appointed an Advisory Committee on a National HigliAvay Program,

Avith General Lucius D. Clay as its chairman. The

469
This attractive safety rest area and information center on 1-94 near New Buffalo, Mich., is the result of a combined

effort of architects, landscapers, and design engineers to preserve mature trees and to provide grassy picnic areas. The

pond was purposely created from a J^-acre borrow pit.

Committee's report, A 10-Year National Highioay

Program., was transmitted to Congress in February

1955. Using the Bureau of Public Roads-States

estimate of $23 billion and adding to it $4 billion for

the urban auxiliary routes not included in that esti- mate, the Committee arrived at an overall cost for

completion of the Interstate System, in the 10 years

1956-65, of $27 billion. The Federal share was figured

at $25 billion, or about 90 percent.

To manage the financing of the program, the Committee proposed creation of a Federal corporation

which would issue $20 billion of long-term bonds to be repaid over the 32-year period 1956-87 from the

existing 2-cent Federal motor-fuel tax. While the

proposal had many attractive aspects, features that

probably weighed most heavily against it were: (1)

it placed a ceiling for 32 years on the regular ABC

Federal-aid program (as a necessaiy part of the

financing plan) ; (2) it would cost $12 billion in bond

interest; and (3) it removed fiscal control of the

program, in effect, from the hands of Congress.

Program Established

Legislation Fails in 1955

Equipped with these reports. Congress began consideration of the highway problem early in 1955-—in

both the House and the Senate. The Senate Subcommittee on Roads held hearings extending from February into April. In the House, the Committee on

Public Works held hearings from April into July.

In addition to the public hearings, both committees

spent countless hours in executive session.

Both the Senate and the House had for consideration an Administration bill, modeled rather closely

after the recommendations of the President's Advisory

Committee. The Senate also had before it a bill in- troduced by Senator Albert Gore. This bill proposed

continuing the Federal-aid program generally in its traditional form but with substantial increase in

authorization levels. Annual authorizations for the

regular Federal-aid highway program would be in- creased from the existing level of $700 million to

$1.1 billion; Interstate authorizations from $176 million to $500 million; both authorizations would cover each of the 5 fiscal years 1956-1960 ; the Federal share

of Interstate costs would be increased from the level of 60 percent to a two-thirds share, and apportionment among the States would remain as prescribed

in the 1954 Act.

Later, Senator Francis Case introduced a bill providing over a 10-year period annual authorizations

of $450 million for the ABC program and $900 million for the Interstate System, the latter to be on a 90-10 matching ratio.

470
A modified version of the Gore bill was passed by

the Senate on May 25, 1955, providing $7.75 billion

for the Interstate System program, spread over the

5 fiscal years 1957-61, with the Federal share of costs

to be 90 percent. Numerous other significant provisions were included in the bill with respect to the

Interstate program. There were no provisions for

the revenue required.

In the House of Representatives consideration was

given to the Administration bill, the Senate-passed

bill, and a bill proi^osed by Representative George H.

Fallon. For the Interstate System, Fallon's bill of- fered $24 billion over the 12 years 1957-68, a 90-

percent Federal share of costs, and apportionment

among the States in the ratio of the estimated cost of

completing the System in each State to the total cost of completion in all the States. The bill proposed

increases in Federal motor- fuel and rubber taxes to provide needed revenue. A modified Fallon bill came before the House in the last days of the session but was defeated. The

Administration bill also was defeated. With adjournment of the 1st session of the 84th Congress, the Gore

bill, passed by the Senate, remained alive but dormant

for the rest of 1955.

The failure of Congress to enact legislation came

as a shock to many. There had been almost universal

testimony supporting an expanded highway program.

One major difficulty, perhaps, was the diversity of

proposals, each Aagorously supported or opposed.

Questions of toll financing, credit financing, and

current-revenue financing were hotly argued. Almost

every highway beneficiary group expressed willing- ness to pay its fair share of the cost—according to its own method of calculation. Some groups objected to any tax increases. There was one further possible reason why legislation was not enacted in 1955. The

public, still relatively uninformed on the issues, had

yet to raise a concerted voice.

1956^Year of Action

Congi'ess returned to the problem early in 1956.

User groups seemed more amenable to compromise;

the public was better informed, aroused, and strong

for action. The Federal corporation and the bond

financing plan were dead issues, and the Administration endorsed the pay-as-you-go principle.

In this receptive atmosphere the House Roads Subcommittee and the House Ways and Means Committee

separately undertook to develop the program features

and the finance provisions for Federal-aid highway

legislation. Many provisions of the 1955 bills were

adopted. A joint committee bill was approved by the

House on April 27, 1956.

Shortly thereafter the Senate Public Works Committee replaced the program features of the House

bill with a modified version of the 1955 Gore bill; and the Senate Finance Committee modified the

House bill's finance provisions. The revised bill was

approved bv the Senate, with some amendments, on May 29. Senate-House conferees developed a compromise

bill on June 25 and on the next day both the Senate

and the House approved it by overwhelming votes. On June 29, 1956, President Eisenhower signed the

bill into law.

This portion o/ 1-91 near Fairlee, Vt., is located on indc^i' m/r at alinements to preserve the natural terrain characteristics and

the beauty o/ the area.

471
\

The Federal-Aid Act Highway of 1956

General Provisions

The legislation, so painstakingly developed, is com- monly called the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,

but officially this is the name of Title I of twin acts;

it contains the program features. The other twin is Title II, the Highway Revenue Act of 1956, which

covers the financing provisions.

In recognition of its importance to the national

defense, the System's name was expanded to National

System of Interstate and Defense Highways. The

length limitation for the System was increased from

40,000 to 41,000 miles. (Later, in the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1968, an additional 1,500 miles of

Interstate System was authorized—bringing the total

system length to 42,500 miles.)

The Act prescribed that standards for the Interstate System should be adopted by the Secretary of

Commei'ce in cooperation with the State highway departments; that they should be adequate to accommodate the traffic forecast for 1975 (modified in later

legislation) and that they be applied uniformly

throughout the States. To preserve the operating

efficiency and safety of this System, access ramps at interchanges on Interstate highways were to be limited to those provided in the original project plans,

except as changes may be approved by the Secretary.

In authorizing Interstate funds, the 1956 Act significantly departed from the traditional biennial

authorization pattern. For the first time, an ac- celerated program to complete a highway system was

authorized. The Act authorized a total of $25 billion over the period 1957-69 as the Federal share of this

construction program.

The Act also established a new method of apportioning Interstate funds among the States, changing

after the first 3 years from a formula based on mileage, area, and population to an apportionment factor

for each State computed from the ratio of the cost of

completing the System in each State to the total cost of completing the System in all States. It further

provided for a series of cost estimates to establish

these values on a current basis as construction of the

System progressed in the years that followed.

The Federal share of Interstate project costs was

set at 90 percent, except in States with large areas of

Federal public land where the Federal share is in- creased proportionally up to a limit of 95 percent.

Title II—the Highway Revenue Act of 1956—es- tablished the Highway Trust Fund and assigned specific motor-vehicle user taxes to this fund for the

payment of highway construction costs. The Act also

provided that the highway program must be conducted on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, requiring that Trust Fund

revenues be adequate to meet all needs without drawing on the General Fund of the Treasury which had

previously supported the Federal-aid highway program.

Interstate Use Restrictions

The 1956 Act barred service stations and other

commercial establishments from location on or access within the Interstate System right-of-way on the

grounds that highway users should not be subjected

to monopoly and so that highway-oriented business

could engage in free competition. It is probable, also.

that many State highway departments were imenthusiastic about undertaking the franchise system,

with its attendant problems, which is common on toll roads. Service at businesses located on intersecting

roads is not difficult for Interstate travelers to obtain,

since interchanges occur much more frequently and

there is less inconvenience in leaving and re-entering

than on toll roads.

In a positive direction, the Act permitted use of

airspace above or below Interstate highways for parking purposes (a provision subsequently broadened to allow any public or private use that will not impair

the highway).

Gently curving 1-70 in the Eagle River Valley of Colorado

provides the motorist with new vistas of the countryside with

each turn. The weathering-steel guardrail blends with its surroundings. Flat slopes, designed for safety, are quickly

regaining vegetation because of the topsoil salvaged during

early stages of the construction.

Congressional belief that Interstate highways built

with 90 percent Federal funds should have some Federal protection against very heavy loads led to a provision in the Act on vehicle weight and width

limitations. The limits were essentially those of the

then-ciuTent policy of the American Association of

State Highway Officials, or alternatively those legally

permitted in a State on July 1, 1956, whichever were

greater. The law did not actually prescribe Federal

limitations per se, but accomplished its objective by

providing that no Federal-aid apportionment would

be made to any State that permitted vehicles on the

Interstate System of greater size or weight.

Route Location

To some extent. Congress entered into problems of route location. The 1956 Act proposed that "Insofar

as possible in consonance with this objective [prompt

completion of the Interstate System], existing highways located on an interstate route shall be used to the extent that such use is practicable, suitable, and

feasible, it being the intent that local needs, to the extent practicable, suitable, and feasible, shall be

given equal consideration with the needs of interstate

commerce."

472
This language was intended as permissive modification of the original legislative prescription in the

1944 Act that the system was ". . . to connect by

routes, as direct as practicable, the principal metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers ..." There

may also have been concern about the needs of the

cities as contrasted with those of cross-country travel,

about possible dislocations of homes and businesses,

and about the costs of new right-of-way.

Broadening a provision of the Federal-Aid Higliway Act of 1950, the 1906 Act required that the State

highway departments, in planning a Federal-aid

project (Interstate or ABC) involving the bypassing

of or going through a city or town, must hold, or

offer to hold, a public hearing and nmst consider the

economic effects of such a location. (This provision was subsequently expanded to cover rural Interstate projects as well.)

The public hearing has a dual purpose: for the

State to present and explain its proposals to the public and for the public to present its views to the State. Decision by popular vote was not intended. Decision

by the responsible highway official is properly made

by weighing the economic and social costs and benefits to highway users and to the locality, the region, and

the Nation, and choosing that solution which produces

the greatest overall benefit—often a far from simple

task.

Right-of-Way Acquisition

Acquisition of right-of-way had been recognized as a large, costly, and complicated aspect of the Interstate System program. To ease the problem, the 1956

Act authorized use of apportioned Federal-aid funds

for advance acquisition of right-of-way, provided that

actual construction followed within a specified period

(within 10 years now).

At that time, not all States could legally acquire

control of access, and while all could take land by

eminent domain, some could not begin construction on the land until the taking process had gone through

the courts. The 1956 Act, therefore, provided a means

whereby, at the request of a State, the Federal Government could acquire land (and prompt entry to it) or access control for an Interstate project and then

convey the title to the State. Some States took advantage of this mechanism ; however, most States soon

obtained legislation or procedures for obtaining access control and prompt right-of-way entry.

Toll Facilities The early consideration of toll road construction for

the Interstate S3'stem has already been mentioned.

The subject received a great deal of attention again

in both 1955 and 1956. The decision reached in the

1956 Act was that toll roads, bridges, and tunnels

could be included in the Interstate System if they

met the System standards and if their inclusion promoted development of an integrated system. The Act

reiterated that Federal-aid funds could not be used on

toll roads, nor on toll bridges and tunnels except under the special circumstances already covered by

Federal-aid legislation.

The Act did provide that Federal-aid Interstate funds could be used on an approach to a toll road

incorporated in the System, if the toll road is to be- come free when the bonds are liquidated and if there

is a reasonably satisfactory alternate free route available by which the toll section may be bypassed.

As a result of these provisions, some 2,300 miles of

toll facilities (roads, bridges, and tunnels) have since

been incorporated in the Interstate System.

A sharp controversy had developed over the question of reimbursement to the States for Interstate projects already built with less than 90-percent Federal aid or with none at all. While both free and toll facilities were involved, the arguments generally cen- tered on the latter. In the 1956 Act, the whole matter was in effect deferred—the law declai-ed the intent of

Congress to determine whether or not the States

should be reimbursed for work completed between

1947 and 1957, and if so, how, when, and how much;

and the Secretary of Commerce was requested to re- port to Congress on this issue. The report was made

in January 1958, but Congress took no action to provide reimbursement for either toll or free road construction.

The Highway Revenue Act of 1956

The language of Title II was formidable, for in

large part it comprised amendments to the Internal

Revenue Code. But it was a landmark in Federal

highway law since it established, for the first time, a linkage between Federal excise taxes on highway

users and Federal aid for highways. It sought to achieve three major objectives: To finance the longrange Federal-aid program, including the funds specifically authorized to complete the Interstate System

and an anticipated, but not legislated, escalating ABC

program during the same period; to provide revenue wholly from highway-user tax revenues; and to confine the program to a pay-as-you-go basis.

The Taxes

The Federal excise taxes earmarked to pay for the

Federal share of the highway program and their

rates reflected a balance between the need to pay for

highways and for other functions of Government and

the cost occasioned or the benefit gained by each

class of highway beneficiary in forms that were

practical of collection. The result of this endeavor

by Congress appeared at the time to be a productive

and generally equitable tax schedule. Considerable

revision was made in later legislation. The taxes in- cluded an increase in the tax on motor-vehicle fuel, an increase in the excise tax on the manufacturer's

sale price on commercial vehicles (new trucks, buses,

and trailers), a new annual use tax on vehicles in excess of 26,000 pounds gross weight, and an increase

in the tax on highway vehicle tires.

The Highway Trust Fund

Linkage between highway-user tax revenue and

Federal aid for highways was formalized in the 1956

Act by creation of the Highway Trust Fund. Into

the Fund go the earmarked taxes; out of it are appropriated the Federal-aid funds for payment to the

States.

473
THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INTERSTATE AND DEFENSE HIGHWAYS

STATUS OF IMPROVEMENT AS OF SEPTEMBER 30,1976

Preliminary Engineering and Under Adequate

Statut

or Not Yet

in Progre>i

Right-of-Way

in Progreft

Ba«ic Con.truclion

Toll Pretent

Traffic 679 Miles 1,908 Miles 2,044 Miles 2,266 Milei 1,984 Miles

Total Open to Traffic 37,869 Miles

It was recognized that expenditures would exceed

income in the early years of the Trust Fund, but this

deficit would be overcome by excess revenue in later years. The 1956 Act, therefore, included a provision

permitting borrowing or "repayable advances" from

the U.S. Treasury. However, this provision was in

effect nullified by an amendment requiring pay-asyou-go operation. The amendment (Byrd Amendment) required that if the projected expenditures

which would result from a pending apportionment of

authorized funds were forecast to exceed projected

Ti'ust Fund receipts, then the apportionment was to be appropriately reduced to prevent a deficit.

1956—A Landmark Year

In the 1956 Act, the Congress acknowledged that

it was dealing with forecasts of highway needs and

of tax revenue and that future legislation might well

be needed to bring about proper balancing of receipts

and expenditures and of costs and benefits to beneficiaries of highways. Accordingly, it requested the

Secretary of Commerce to undertake an extensive in- vestigation which became known as the highway cost allocation study; the final report was completed in

January 1961.

The twin 1956 Acts were indeed a major landmark

in the highway history of the United States. It was

perhaps less than perfect legislation, arrived at after

long and sometimes hot debate. Much of it evolved

through compromise, aimed at practical solutions.

Nevertheless, the legislation broke with traditions

and created some new principles

• It authorized completion of an entire national

highway network—the Interstate System—and

provided for its financing (on the basis of costs recognized at that time). • It required the establishment of, and broadly defined, location and design criteria for the System. • It departed from the historic 50-50 Federal-State

sharing of project costs and the fixed formula

method of apportionment. • It created a linkage between highway-user tax revenue and highway expenditure and established

the Highway Trust Fund.

• It began an accelerated highway improvement

program which was to bring about a new era in

highway transportation in America.

474
The Accelerated Program

The Starting Point

To the public, the accelerated program for building

the Interstate System as announced in 1956 was obviously a big job, but not necessarily complex. Perhaps this thinking derived from the characteristic

development of a toll road—a one-route project, all starting from scratch, all on new location, all built in a short period of time, and all under the management

of a single agency, with all the money available at the

beginning or as needed.

But the Interstate program was being accomplished

by 49 States and the District of Columbia (there are no Interstate routes in Alaska), in cooperation with

the Federal Bureau of Public Roads. Cities, counties,

and towns had a direct interest in how routes were to be (or were not) located to serve them; and while toll roads characteristically approach but do not enter the

cities, the Interstate System would, and at the same

time would serve large volumes of the local traflS.c load.

Not all Interstate routes were starting from the same status of development in 1956. Some sections,

indeed, were already completed, although these were

mostly toll roads. Some others were in varied stages

of development—a two-lane highway needing expansion to four lanes; an expressway lacking full control

of access or needing additional grade separations or

lanes. About four-fifths of the Interstate mileage was

destined to be built on new location, but some would

follow an existing highway, perhaps using it as one

of its separated pairs of directional roadways.

The alinement of 1-280 in densely populated northern 'Mew Jersey was

carefully selected to have a minimal impact on the established neighborhoods and existing traffic patterns.

475
Not all States were starting from the same status

in 1956 either, for a variety of reasons. A "shelf" of

acceptable project plans was available in some States

but not in others. Some State highway departments were able to staff up to the job rapidly while others

took much longer; many had previously acquired

little or no right-of-way on their own ; some had never

before designed or built freeways on a large scale. Interstate projects are complex undertakings, con- suming 3 or 4 years from beginning of route location

study to final completion—and often much longer in

urban areas. In the early years of the program, a

large proportion of effort and expenditure was devoted to preliminary engineering and right-of-way

acquisition. Construction followed at some later

period.

All of this explains why the Interstate System

program did not instantly jump into high gear on the

morning of June 30, 1956, producing great stretches

of completed pavement. It necessarily would be a number of years before any notable mileage was

opened to traffic.

Design Standards

The 1956 Act called for adoption of uniform design

standards for the Interstate System in all States. The American Association of State Highway Officials

and the Bureau of Public Roads, anticipating the

need, began developing geometric standards (those

governing curvature, gradient, number and width of

lanes, etc.) in May 1956 and by July had completed

and adopted a full set of such standards. This rapid

accomplishment was possible because the AASHO

Committee on Planning and Design Policies had been

evolving progressive freeway standards for years and

had developed a set of Interstate System standards as early as 1945.

The major items in the adopted standards included:

control of access throughout the System; design adequacy for projected 1975 traffic—later changed (in

1963 Act) to a 20-year minimum design period from

the date of project approval; 12-foot travel lane

width; 10-foot minimum shoulder width; elimination

of railroad grade crossings; elimination of highway

at-grade intersections; design speeds of 50, 60, and 70

m.p.h respectively for mountainous, rolling, or flat terrain conditions; curvatures and gradients consistent

with design speeds; separated traffic lanes with variable median widths on a right-of-way adequate in

width to accommodate these standards; and minimum

widths for highway bridges.

The 1956 design standards were formulated as minimum rather than fixed levels, with the expectation

that minimum levels would be used only where higher

ones would result in excessive cost. They have served

well, and have required but little modification since

their adoption.

Reasonable uniformity prescribed through minimum

standards seemed fully appropriate for the Interstate System insofar as geometries were concerned, since

these are the features the driver sees and is directly

affected by. In contrast, however, structural design

features which govern load-carrying capacity and

durability are hidden from the driver's eye. Moreover, structural design of a roadway is necessarily

largely guided by localized circumstances—physical

conditions, availability of materials, and local experi- ence and practice. Consequently "uniformity" in

structural design was not prescribed in detail for the

Interstate System—only the requirement that design

be soundly and justifiably arrived at and be adequate

to support anticipated traffic loads.

While these geometric standards complied with the

basic requirements of the law at the time of adoption,

they were soon found to be inadequate to meet realistic needs for future traffic service. The statutory design

year 1975 was changed by Congress in the 1963 Highway Amendment Act to provide a design requirement

for traffic service adequate for a 20-year period com- mencing on the date of plan approval for the initial

A bicycle path has been built within the right-of-way of 1-94

in Minneapolis, Minn., that extends for over half a mile

and safely connects two neighborhoods.

construction of the project. The Committee Report

stated this action was necessary to prevent premature

obsolescence in the System design. And, in 1966, the

Congress amended Title 23 to provide that "Such

standards shall in all cases provide for at least four

lanes of traffic."

Designation of Additional System Mileage

As noted earlier, the 1944 Federal-Aid Highway

Act provided for the designation of an Interstate System not to exceed 40,000 miles, and in August

1947 a System totaling 37,700 miles was designated

which included routes through and skirting major

cities. The remaining mileage authorized (2,300

miles) was designated in September 1955 for additional routes around and through urban areas. At the time of the initial System designation, there were no detailed location studies and no engineering

and economic analyses available for consideration.

The locations within each State, therefore, were diagrammetic only, and the estimated mileage of designated System segments was derived from the length

of the existing principal highways in the route cor476
be added to the System within the authorized mileage

ridors selected for the System. As more precise data

became available, the mileage and location of the

designated segments were adjusted accordingly.

Savings in the total System length, resulting from more detailed studies of the related engineering, eco- nomic and sociological factors involved in the highway location, permitted added System segments under

the original statutory length limitation. In addition,

Congress in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956

increased the authorized length of the Interstate System by 1,000 miles. Thus, the Secretary of Commerce, on October 18, 1957, was able to announce an

increase of 2,102 miles of Interstate routes that could

Signing and Numbering

From the very nature of Interstate System traffic,

signs on the System need to be highly visible, properly located, clearly understood, and completely uniform. After study of existing practices on expressways

and field tests by the Bureau of Public Roads, the

American Association of State Highway Officials in

1958 adopted a manual on signing and pavement

marking for the Interstate System. The manual prescribed as the Interstate route number marker the

now familiar red-white-and-blue shield. Guide signs,

primarily for carrying destination information, are uniformly white on green; signs concerning services

The rest and information area on 1-90 near Sheridan, Wyo., provides picnic areas for the family and

play areas for children. A choice of a moment beside the delicate ponds or a lovely view of mountains is also available to arrest the traveler's eye.

limit. With these additions, there remained a reserve

of 350 miles which was held to cover possible increases

in the length of individual route segments as more

detailed location studies progressed.

Section 17 of the Hawaii Omnibus Act of 1960

(PL 86-624) included an amendment that removed

the limitation that the Interstate System be designated

entirely' within the continental United States. Under

the provisions of this amendment, three routes on the

island of Oahu in the State of Hawaii were approved

as additions to the System in August 1960, utilizing some of the "reserve" mileage noted above. And in

the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Congress

authorized an additional 1,500 miles on the Interstate System. This led to an announcement in December

1968 of the designation of route segments totaling

1,473 miles in length.

Subsequent System adjustments, additions and dele- tions have resulted in the present status of full com- mitment of the total 42,500 miles authorized by

Congress for the Interstate highways.

and rest areas are white on blue. The manual also

specified the message sizes and, in general terms, the

placement of signs so that uniformity will prevail

throughout the System.

The American Association of State Highway Officials also developed a complete numbering system

for Interstate routes. Those routes with odd numbers

run north-south; those with even numbers run east- west. Major routes have one- or two-digit numbers,

and the long, evenly spaced routes have numbers ending in 5 or 0. The lowest numbers are in the west

and south to avoid conflict locally with the U.S. Route

numbers. In urban areas the main route numbers are

carried through on the paths of the major traffic streams. Connecting circumferential or loop routes

at urban areas have three-digit numbers, using the

main route number with an even-number prefix.

Radial and spur routes also have three-digit numbers,

with an odd-number prefix.

477
Toll Roads

As already noted, the 1956 Act permitted inclusion

of toll roads in the Interstate System, although it continued to bar the use of Federal aid for toll road

construction or for further improvement of such in- cluded routes. On the recommendation of the States,

it was announced on August 21, 1957, that 2,102 miles

of then existing toll roads in 15 States were being

officially included in the System. The only sizable

toll section imdertaken on the designated Interstate System since 1956 is a 53-mile portion of 1-95 in

Maryland and Delaware. This segment was completed in 1963 and was constructed following special

congressional legislation.

Program Funding

initial Authorization Level

Although Congress in 1944 directed that the Interstate System be designated, it made no provision for

special Federal funding for the construction of the

System until years later. The 1952 Act included a token Interstate authorization of $25 million each for

fiscal years 1954 and 1955 and the 1954 Act included

$175 million for fiscal years 1956 and 1957. This

"beginning" of special Interstate System funding

authorization was followed by the creation of the

Highway Trust Fund in 1956.

In Section 108 of the 1956 Act the Congress declared it to be essential to the national interest to provide for the early completion of the Interstate System as authorized and designated in accordance

with the 1944 Act. Section 108 states it was ". . . the

intent of the Congress that the Interstate System be

completed as nearly as practicable over a thirteenyear period and that the entire System in all the

States be brought to simultaneous completion." There was authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years

1957-69 a total of $24.8 billion of Federal funds, to be matched by the States on a 90-10 Federal-State

ratio, for the purpose of expediting the construction,

reconstruction or improvement of the Interstate System. This amount combined with the unexpended

balance of previous authorizations brought the total

of available Federal Interstate authorization to $25.14

billion as of June 1956.

It should be noted that up to this time there had

been no detailed estimate on a section-by-section basis

of the cost of building the Interstate System. The

$25 billion Federal authorization in the Act was based on the Clay Committee Report, in which the total

System cost was stated at $27 billion—with a Federal

share of $25 billion recommended.

The Congress, in the 1956 Act, recognized the

changing requirements for the System and the need

for up-to-date periodic estimates of the cost of completing the System and required a series of such

estimates beginning in 1958.

1958 Cost Estimate

The first of the series of periodic estimates of the

cost of completing the Interstate System was submitted to the Congress in January 1958. This esti- mate was prepared by the individual States during

calendar year 1957. To provide for uniformity of

estimate procedures among the States, an instruction

manual was adopted which extended the standards

for design and construction of the System.

The unit price level of 1956 construction in each

State was selected as a cost base. Units of construction quantities estimated for the System completion

in each State were computed against this unit price

base for the total cost determination. The estimate

total exceeded the authorization level established by

Congress 2 years earlier in the 1956 Act. In submitting this first estimate to Congress, Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks noted

Although this estimate shows an increase in cost over

the amounts authorized by section 108 (d) of the 1956

Act, I do not see any need for consideration at the present

time of new legislative measures which would add to the income of the highway trust fund. This is the first esti- mate of a series of five and is made in the early stage of

the highway program launched by the 1956 Act. As con- struction of the Interstate System progresses toward

completion and as the amount of remaining work cor- respondingly decreases, future estimates of cost will be

made on a broader basis of experience and these esti- mates will progressively become more accurate by reflect- ing actual trends in cost, either upward or downward,

that cannot be forecast as well now. Until this additional experience is acquired, consideration of any ad- justments in authorization of funds or revenues would

be premature.^

The 1958 estimate included only 38,548 miles of the

41,000-mile System authorized by Congress. This

differential resulted from the fact that the 1,000-mile

addition to the System, authorized by Congress in

1956, was specifically excluded from the estimate by

provisions of the 1956 Act; and the additional 1,102

miles available for allocation October 18, 1957, be- came available after the cutoff date for preparation

of the estimate. The total cost for the 38,548 miles was estimated to be $37.6 billion of which $33.9 billion was the Federal share, and $3.7 billion the States' matching share.

The basic information in the 1958 estimate was

supplemented by data presented in hearings con- ducted before the House Ways and Means Committee

in July 1959, at which time preliminary cost data for

the remaining 2,452 miles of the 41,000-mile System

were reported. The combination of these submittals was an estimate totaling $41 billion for 41,000 miles.

Of this total the Federal share was estimated to be

$37 billion. This was the first detailed Interstate cost estimate submitted to the Congress which encompassed

the entire System mileage authorized up to that time.

No costs were included for State highway planning

and research, or for Bureau of Public Roads administration and research. Since both of these activities are charged against Federal Interstate funds, the costs should have been included. This omission was cor- rected in the 1961 estimate.

Economic Recession and the 1958 Federal-Aid Highway

ActIn 1958 the Nation found itself in the grip of an

extended economic recession, and acceleration of the

Federal-aid Highway program was considered as one means to hasten recovery. The Federal-Aid Highway

Act of 1958 was prepared with this objective in view.

Among other provisions, it increased the annual Interstate authorizations of the 1956 Act from $2.0 billion

478
The plants and vegetation

used along 1-64 in Greenhrier

County, W. Va., were selected

to blend ivith the natural

vegetation on the rolling hills of the Qreenbrier River

Valley.

to $2.2 billion for fiscal year 1959, and from $2.2

billion to $2.5 billion for each of the fiscal years 1960

and 1961. These increases were partially in recognition by the Congress that the Interstate System was

going to cost more than had been provided for in the

1956 Act ; partially because Congress desired to ac- celerate progress toward completion of the System;

and partially because of the recession in the economy.

More important perhaps than the increases in au- thorization levels—in its ultimate impact on the program financing—was the provision of the 1958 Act

which set aside the pay-as-you-go provision of the

1956 Act for 2 years and directed apportionment to the States of the full amounts authorized for fiscal years 1959 and 1960, namely, $2.2 billion and $2.5

billion. This provision in the 1958 Act for expanded

and accelerated expenditures was not matched by a commensurate provision for additional Trust Fund

revenue. The net effect was to advance appreciably the time

when the Federal-aid program would enter a period

during which annual expenditures would exceed Trust

Fund I'evenues. And when the pay-as-you-go amendment again became effective after its 2-year suspension, it was obvious that Federal-aid highway program

financing was in need of adjustment.

Temporary Relief A report on the study of allocating highway costs and benefits and a new estimate of the cost of completing the Interstate System, both called for by the

1956 Act, were expected to be completed early in 1961.

It was generally assumed that a long-range solution

to Federal-aid financing problems should then be

undertaken and that, in tlie meanwhile, temporary

relief measures would be sufficient. Consequently, early in 1959 President Eisenhower

proposed a temporary increase of li^ cents per gallon

in the Federal motor-fuel tax. The Congress, in the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1959, increased the tax

from 3 to 4 cents per gallon for the period from

October 1, 1959, to June 30, 1961.

The 1959 Act also reduced the Interstate authorization for fiscal year 1961 to $2.0 billion. When the

time came to make the apportionment in October

1959, however, the pay-as-you-go provision made it necessary to reduce the apportionment to $1.8 billion. In addition, because of the necessity for correlating

the level of anticipated Trust Fund revenues and ex- penditures, the Bureau of Public Roads in 1959 insti- tuted a program of "reimbursement planning" under

which a limit was set quarterly on the rate at which

each State could obligate funds to contracts in order

to assure that Federal payments of ultimate reimbursement to the States for work accomplished could

be made within the limits of the available Trust Fund

balance.

The 1961 Estimate

In 1961 the second estimate of cost of the Interstate System was submitted to the Congress. Again, as in

the 1958 estimate, the total cost was $41 billion with

a Federal share of $37 billion. The unit price base for the 1961 estimate was the

average unit price level in each individual State for

calendar year 1959. There had been a lowering of

construction unit price levels between the 1956 level used in the 1958 estimate and the 1959 level used for

the 1961 estimate. AVith this lowering of construction prices, the construction costs reported in 1961 were reduced. This was offset by including the costs of administration and research and planning, which

were omitted from the 1958 report. A comparison of

the 1958 estimate and the 1961 estimate is shown in

Table 1.

479
Table 1—Comparison of the 1958 and the 1961 estimates of total cost for the 41,000-mile Interstate System

(Millions of dollars)

2.

Item

1, Interstate System routes included in 1958 estimates: 1958 estimate (38, 548 miles) 1961 estimate (38,522 miles)

Remaining system mileage:

1958 estimate adjusted to include 1,452 miles, excluding 1,000-mile addition _. 1961 estimate (1,528 miles), excluding 950 miles of 1,000-mile addition: Routes designated in 1957 (952 miles)

Hawaii routes designated in 1960 (48 miles)

Reserved for specific routes, detailed location not yet established (220 miles)

Held for final measurement C308 miles)

Subtotal

Routes included in 1, 000-mile addition: 1958 estimate adjusted to include the 1, 000 miles. 1961 estimate (950 miles)

Subtotal, 41,000-mile system.

4. State highway planning and research

5. Public Roads administration and research.

6. Contingencies

Grand total .

1958

Total

cost

$ 37, 570

1,613

1,613

1,111

40,294

706

$ 41,000

Federal funds

$ 33,900

1,452

1,452

1,000

36,352

648

$ 37,000

1961

Total

cost

$ 36,848

1,209

216

220

308

1,953

449

39,250

574

357

809

$ 41,000

Federal funds

S 33,234

1,087

195

198 277

1,757

404

35, 395

511 357

737

$ 37,000

The 1961 estimate report stated that the estimates

reflected accurate appraisals of the cost in each State

based on 1959 price levels but "do not represent a commitment of funds to the location, design, or cost of individual projects to be undertaken on the Interstate System." ^ The estimates were considered adequate for establishing apportionment factors for

distributing Federal funds among the States for the

fiscal years 1963, 1964, 1965, and 1966—the purpose

for which Congress intended the estimate—and for

the enactment of necessary legislation modifying the

level of authorization for construction of the Interstate System and providing the revenue needed to pay

for the costs involved.

Highway Cost Allocation Study

The highway cost allocation study, undertaken pursuant to the 1956 Act, was reported on to Congress

in January 1961. Its jjurpose was to provide Congress

with information on which it might make an equitable

distribution of the Federal tax burden for the support

of the Federal-aid highway program among the

various classes of persons using Federal-aid highways

or otherwise deriving benefits from them. The need

for additional revenue to meet the cost of the Interstate System program had already become evident

from the 1958 cost estimate, as substantiated by the

1961 cost estimate.

The highway cost allocation study was unquestionably the most comprehensive and exhaustive study of

highway economics ever undertaken. The study findings relative to highway-user benefits of passenger

cars and trucks of different weight categories strongly

influenced the legislation that was to put Interstate financing back on a sound basis.

The 1961 Federal-Aid Highway Act

In February 1961 President Kennedy, in a message

to Congress, endorsed continuation of the pay-as-yougo principle and support of the Federal-aid highway

program wholly by highway-user taxes, for which he

recommended certain increases. After extensive

study, the Congress rejuvenated the Interstate program by passage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act

of 1961.

Under the 1956 Act, as amended in 1958 and 1959, some $11.7 billion of Federal Interstate funds had

already been apportioned to the States for fiscal years

1957-62. The 1961 Act revised the remaining authorization schedule to provide $2.4 billion for fiscal year

1963, $2.6 billion for 1964, $2.7 billion for 1965, $2.8

billion for 1966, $2.9 billion for 1967, $3.0 billion each

for 1968, 1969, and 1970, and $2,885 billion for 1971.

Thus the total of Federal funds apportioned or au- thorized was increased to $37 billion, the 90-percent

Federal share of the total $41 billion Interstate program cost.

480
Nebraska's "Chain O' Lakes" along ISO

resulted from borrow pits used during

construction of this part of the highway.

These lakes have been landscaped with

native grasses and trees and offer the highway user water-oriented recreation and provide midlife sanctuaries.

To provide the needed financing, the 1961 Act re- vised the existing schedule of highway-user excise taxes dedicated to the Highway Trust Fund. The

motor-fuel tax was continued at 4 cents per gallon

until October 1, 1972. For the same period, the tax

per pound was increased on highway vehicle tires from 8 to 10 cents, on inner tubes from 9 to 10 cents,

and on retread rubber from 3 to 5 cents. The use tax on heavy vehicles, those of over 26,000 pounds gross

weight, was increased from $1.50 to $3.00 per 1,000

pounds per year. All of the 10-percent tax on the

manufacturer's sale price of new trucks, buses, and

trailers was earmarked to the Trust Fund, instead of

only half as had been provided by the 1956 Act. By this 1961 Act, both the necessary authorizations

to complete the Interstate System on the basis of the

most recent estimate available and the revenues to pay for the job were provided.

Construction Progress

Following passage of the 1961 Act and the regular

funding of the program which resulted, construction

of the System moved forward steadily. "Miles open

to traffic" grew in number on virtually a straight-line

basis year by year. The States were able to move to construction on most sections of the System without

major delay and total progress was limited only by

the funding available.

There were problems relating to the location of some segments of the System, generally involving en- vironmental considerations, but these were relatively

few in number when considered against the total

system concept. Progress in general was excellent. In 1967, as a Federal budget requirement, the au- thorized Federal funding was withheld in part. Although the States had available balances of

unobligated apportioned funds, they were not per- mitted to exceed a predetermined level of Federal

funding. The result was the beginning of the con- troversy over "withholding" of funds authorized by

the Congress and otherwise legally available.

With obligation ceilings controlling the total level of highway construction after 1967, there was a slackening of the rate at which new sections of the Interstate System were opened to traffic. However, even with these controls, there were in service at the end

of 1974 over 36,000 miles of the 42,500-mile System

and another 2,800 miles were under basic construction,

481
generally on new location. Only about 400 miles, or about 1 percent, of the System remained in a no- progress status at that time.

Increase In System Cost

With the changes in statutory engineering requirements (20-year traffic projection (1963), minimimi

design of four lanes (1966), and increased System

length by 1,500 miles (1968)) for the Interstate System, there were also legislative requirements enacted

by the Congress in recognition of the public need in areas of economic, sociologic, and environmental considerations. Included in this category of legislative

requirements were: • Assistance for relocating families and businesses

1962 • Transportation planning requirements in urban

areas for joint modes

—1962 • Scenic enhancement provisions, spot safety improvement program—1965 • Joint development concept, soil erosion control,

preservation of parklands

—1966 • Fringe parking facilities, increased relocation

assistance, replacement housing

—1968 • Exclusive or preferential bus lanes, highway traffic control devices, passenger loading areas to serve bus and other mass transit passengers—1970 • Urban mass transit provisions involving the withdrawal and substitution of certain Interstate routes

in large urban areas

—1973

The provisions of the 1973 Act have not yet been

fully implemented, and the ultimate cost effect of this

legislation is not known.

Such changes havea marked effect on the cost of

constructing

a highway system. This had been ex- pected from the start. The earliest reports to Congress on the need for an interregional highway system

stated the "impossibility" of venturing an approximate estimate of the cost of building the entire interregional system to the standards recommended. It was stated that to be of value, such an estimate would

have to be predicated on far more exact determination

of all variables involved than had been possible to undertake. Further, the Congress was informed that even had such precise determination been attempted,

the "usefulness and validity of an estimate of the

ultimate cost of

a construction program that must

inevitably extend overa period of perhaps 20 years

and be affected by unpredictable changes in the general economy, in the habits and desires of people, in

the character of vehicles, and in other circumstances,

would still be highly questionable." *

With safety for the pedestrian in mind,

a 1,082-foot long

pedestrian overpass was built over 1-95 in Shirlington, Va., that safely connects a large apartment complex on the

east side of the highway mtha large

shopping center on the west.

482
f^

^J<^* )\r~<

t ^ i

**ASHINGTON

L< >^ / «l"I.t«T _ ) /

' ;

"Uf

V/. /-

City of 1

r

/*<£ Salt Lake City

Tlie Oregon Trail

as of 1848.

The eastbound lane of 1-80, east of Pendleton, Oreg., is built on the site of the Old Oregon Trail and takes the motorist

into tortuous, but spectacularly scenic, mountain country. In this area, the east- and westbound lanes may be more than a mile apart.

483
The report continued, "Construction to the standards recommended will certainly be expensive beyond

the common experience in building most of the ordinary existing roads and streets, but the merit of the

expenditure is to be judged not by such a comparison

but rather by the value of the advantages to be gained

in traffic facilitation, in reduced costs of vehicle operations, and in lowered accident rates." ^ As noted earlier, the 1958 and 1961 estimates, each

totaling $41 billion in cost, formed the basis for the

1961 Act. In compliance with statutory requirements,

additional cost estimates were submitted to Congress

in 1965, 1968, 1970, 1972, and 1975. Future estimates are to be submitted in January 1977.

In each of the reports to Congress, information was

submitted regarding the difference in total costs re- ported. With the changes in the statutory requirements as to the total system concept and the enactment

of new environmental and sociological requirementby

it was expected there would be introduced elements

of cost not considered in the initial estimates. These

increased costs were not "overruns" or "errors" in

previous estimates, but were rather, a reflection of

changing construction prices and changes in law

enacted by Congress in recognition of changing public

need, including design changes for mobility, safety,

and environmental requirements.

Table 2 categorizes the major influences affecting

total costs and shows the cost increase in each cate- gory. Some elements of the 1973 highway legislation are yet to be implemented, and the permissive substitution of System segments and cost in urban areas

will be reflected in the highway and mass transit

construction programs in urban areas. These changes

will affect the construction cost on the Interstate System.

Table 2—Interstate System cost estimates, increases by cost categories

(Millions of dollars)

Description of cost category

Estimate cost increase by years

Category No.

1965

over

1961

1968

over 1965

1970

over 1968

1972

over 1970

1975

over 1972 Total

1 Unit price increase $1,135 $1,875 $2,395 $3,825 $5, 870 $15, 100

2 Engineering cost increase 161 385 350 125 515 1,536

3 Right-of-way values—relocation assistance,

homes and businesses 693 890 910 250 1,060 3,803

4 Statutory design year change—added lanes, 4-lane minimum, etc. 739 675 320 100 515 2, 349

5 Statutory mileage increase, major System

adjustments, etc. 941 930 4,155 -235 30 5,821

6 Added interchanges and grade separation

structures 289 990 240 185 160 1,864

7 Increase in roadway design, bridge width, tunnel clearances 445 1,245 3,265 1,015 2,355 8,325

8 Additional safety elements on new and on completed sections 1,530 335 1,865

9 Increased social, economic and environmental

requirements 1,207 555 285 515 1,110 3,672

10 Mass transit—fringe parking provisions

of 1970 Act 125 125

11 Construction project overruns 257 257

Subtotal* 5,610 9,075 12,255 5,905 11,872 44,717

Total Estimate 1961 = $41,000* $46, 800 $56, 500 $69, 870 $76,300 $89, 200

* The arithmetic disparity between the addition of these last two entries is the element of cost involved in categories of State highway planning and research, FHWA administration and research, and in contingency items. These are listed in the reports to Congress.

484
Completion of the Interstate System

The System is nearing completion in rural areas and in most of the urban areas. The benefits derived

in the new freedom of movement and safety of travel

have been enormous. The movement of people and

goods on this System results in a user-benefit ratio of

about $2.90 for every dollar invested in the construction of the System over its service life period. The

differential in operating safety on this highway sys- tem, over other highway systems, will result in a saving of an estimated 8,000 lives per year. The

System contributes dramatically to the economic development of the areas it serves and, because of the

advanced design features involved, will continue to serve this development long after other highways

would have become functionally obsolete. The "finished" System may yet be altered in urban

areas as the 1973 Highway Act is implemented and

as Congress gives further consideration to the total transportation needs in the large urban areas. However, these adjustments can and will be made without

impairment of the total value of the Interstate System

to this Xation's economic growth and social well being.

The $90 billion level which is approximately the

"cost of completion" of this giant public works project

is a fair price for the end product. The highway

system cannot be compared in service or in cost to the

limited facility under consideration when the basic

highway legislation was first being formulated. The

Nation can well be grateful to the Congress for its wisdom in adjusting highway statutes to meet public

interest requirements as the System developed. The

end product will be a lasting testimonial to the Congress and to the highway oi'ganizations. State and

Federal, who were responsible for carrying out the

program.

REFERENCES

' BxjREAU OF Public Roads Annual Report, 1954, p. 3.

^ A Report of Factors For Use In Apportioning Funds

For The National System of Interstate and Defense

Highways, H. Doc. 300, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. Ill, IV.

' The 1961 Interstate System Cost Estimate, H. Doc. 49, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13.

* Interregional Highways, H. Doc. 379, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.,

p. 114. 'Id.

485
Con/tfuction

in the

Federol

Domoin

Millions of Americans visit national parks and

forests and other Federal recreational areas each year. From this experience, they enrich their lives and gain

new appreciation of their national heritage and of the

natural beauty of the country. It is difficult today

to realize that just a few decades ago the trip that is casually made now by automobile was impossible be- cause there was no transportation system giving citi- zens access to these areas. The thrust of western migration across the continent

during the first 150 years settled the land and still left vast areas in the public domain. It was from these

public land areas that Congress established the first national parks and national forests. Yellowstone

National Park, the first national park, was created by

act of Congress in 1872.^ Other national parks were

gradually added and by 1900, included Yosemite,

General Grant, Mt. Rainier, and Sequoia. A rapid

expansion of the national parks system followed in

succeeding years. National forests have developed in a similar fashion.

The first forest reserves were authorized by Congress

in 1891,^ and again, they were taken from the public

domain in the West. The forest reserves were created

to perpetuate the country's supply of timber and to ensure a more regular flow of water from streams by

preserving the forest floor to prevent too rapid run-off

and flooding. In 1905, Congress transferred the forest reserves from the Department of the Interior to the

Department of Agriculture, and in 1907, Congress

changed the name "forest reserve" to national forest. Like the national parks, the national forests expanded

rapidly and today constitute a major resource of this

Nation.

The development of both the national parks system

and the national forests occurred during the same

period as the development of the Nation's highway

system. Because the Federal Highway Administration is the "roadbuilder" for the Federal Government,

it has been directly engaged in the location, design,

and construction of public roads to and through the

national parks and forests and other Federal domain

areas since 1905. In spite of extremely limited staff and resources in the early days, the Office of Public

Roads constructed a macadam road on the grounds of

the Weather Bureau Station in Mount Weather,

Virginia; assisted the Forest Service in securing in- formation to be used in the preparation of a manual

on trailmaking and maintenance; and gave advice on

the construction of wagon roads and trails in forest reserves to facilitate lumbering. One engineer was

detailed for a short time in the Yellowstone Reserve

during 1906 to investigate and make recommendations

for the improvement and maintenance of forest roads

and trails.^ In 1912 the Agriculture Appropriation Act con- tained a provision that 10 percent of all moneys re- ceived from the national forests during each fiscal year be available at the end of the year for use by the

Secretary of Agriculture for the construction and

maintenance of roads and trails within the national

forests in the States from which such proceeds were

derived. This provision was made a continuing appropriation by the Agriculture Appropriation Act of

1913. These laws provided, for the first time, a sus- tained source of revenue for road improvement purposes in the public domain.

486
Mount Rainier National Park in the State of Washington was established in 1899. The peak is covered with snow year round.

Because of increased responsibilities for direct road

construction activity, a Division of National Park and

Forest Roads was created in 1914 in the Office of

Public Roads to give advice and to supervise major

construction projects in national parks and foi-ests in

cooperation with the Department of the Interior and

the Forest Service. At that time, improved roads were practically nonexistent throughout the vast areas

of the West where the principal national parks and

forests were located.

Forest Highways and Development Roads

By the end of fiscal year 1916, the direct Federal

highway construction program was well established.

The annual report for that year states that approximately 127 miles of reconnaissance surveys and 350

miles of location surveys were made. Maintenance

work had been done on approximately 160 miles.

Construction work was in progress on about 170 miles,

of which approximately 70 miles were completed during the fiscal year. Of great significance was the

construction of the road across Rabbit Ear Pass in

the Routt National Forest in Colorado—which opened

large sections of country, and the initiation of

construction of the Trinity River Road in Trinity

County, California, which would eventually provide

a year-round highway connection from the upper

Sacramento Valley with the coast of Humboldt Bay.

Another significant survey that year was on the Mt.

Hood Road in Oregon. This road was essential for

the comprehensive development of the Oregon National Forest and in providing a southern outlet for

Columbia River highway traffic* By section 8 of the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916,

the sum of $1 million was aj^propriated for each of

the fiscal years 1917 through 1926 for a total of $10

million to be available until expended under the supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture for the survey,

construction and maintenance of roads, trails and

bridges within the national forests. The Act provided

that the work would be carried on under cooperative

agreements with the State, territory or county authorities on a basis equitable to both parties. The

subsequent rules and regulations provided that the

cooperating agency would contribute at least 50 per- cent of the cost of the work and also the entire cost of

maintenance. There was thus made available for the

construction of so-called "section 8 national forest

roads" slightly more than $2 million annually.

The Federal Aid Road Act necessitated the establishment of a complete Federal highway engineering

organization throughout the country, and in 1917, 10

Districts were established to carry out the responsibilities mandated in the Act.

. . . The Secretary of Agriculture placed with the Bureau of Public Roads the responsibility for all engineering and construction worli on the national forest roads and cooperative forest roads to be built under

section 8 of the Act. At the same time he placed with

the Forest Service the responsibility for the general ad- ministrative work necessary in selecting the roads to be

constructed, securing cooperation and cooperative funds,

arranging the allotment of funds and financing of projects

and, in general, harmonizing the scheme of road construction with the requirements of the national forests." Independent of the section 8 funds, the so-called

"10 percent fund" was still available to the Forest

Service annually for road and trail construction lo- cated entirely within the national forest areas. Part

of this fund was allotted by the Forest Service for

expenditure by the Bureau of Public Roads on survey

and road construction work on major projects which

usually were also financed with matching funds. The

487
The Bitterroot-Bighole Road in Beaverhead National Forest, Mont.,

exemplifies the type of forest highway constructed around 1916.

Berthoud Pass crosses the Continental Divide about 60 miles from Denver

and was on a line of the main east-west highway in Colorado in 1920. This steam shovel was surplus equipment after WW I and allowed considerable savings in time and costs.

488
remainder of the 10 percent fund was expended di- rectly by the Forest Service on the construction of

trails and other minor road construction and mainte- nance projects needed for the administration of the

forests. Within BPR, the field responsibility for the

forest road work was such that each district forester

would deal with only one district engineer.

Breaking the Mountain Barrier

In 1918 the national forests in the "West comprised

274,000 square miles, equivalent to the area of the

States of California, Oregon, and one-fourth of

Washington.® They were, in general, located on the

slopes of the Rocky, Cascade, and Sierra Nevada

Mountains between Canada and Mexico. They comprised rough and rugged terrain which was an imposing barrier to transcontinental travel. Of greater

State and local interest was the fact that the intensive

development of agricultural and other resources of

the valleys required the improvement of roads adjacent to and through the national forests. It was

imperative that mountain barriers within the national

forests be conquered if the Great Plains were to be

connected to the Pacific by trunk highways and north

and south travel provided in the intermountain States. Dr. L. I. Hewes, then General Inspector of BPR,

described the importance of forest road work in 1920

as follows:

. . . Except to the westerner and the traveler, the idea

of altitude may not carry great significance. But the

effect of altitude may be realized when it is stated that from the Canadian boundary to Helena, Mont., there has

never yet been built a road crossing the Rocky Mountains.

Automobilists who visit Glacier National Park cannot

drive from Glacier to Bolton, 30 miles away, until the road partly within the Blackfeet Forest along the southern boundary of the park is completed. There is no road in the State of Washington that can be traveled the entire year across the Cascade Mountains between the Inland- Empire and Puget Sound and western Washington populations. The same is true in Oregon. The only all-the- year passable road from the Columbia basin to the coast

is down the gorge of the Columbia River ; and at the

point where the Cascade Range would cross the river a

national forest road has just been constructed on the north bank from Stevenson to White Salmon. There are now in process of construction in the 11 Western States more than 20 projects, all of which run over mountain

passes at elevations of from 3,000 to 10,000 feet. These

particular roads involve some of the most difficult pieces

of construction in the entire western road program, and

many are connecting links in State highways. The

McKenzie Pass Road across the Cascade Mountains be- tween Eugene and Bend in Oregon runs for 3 miles on a mountain top over a fresh lava flow in which not a single

plant grows.

Second, every national park in the western one-third

of the continent is practically surrounded by national

forests, and motorists can not reach the roads already

constructed in the national parks unless the roads

through the forests leading to the parks are first constructed. Glacier National Park in Montana is bordered by the Blackfeet National Forest ; the Yellowstone is completely

surrounded by six forests, except for a narrow strip

along the railroad branch from Livingston. Mount

Rainier is completely surrounded ; Crater Lake can be approached only through the National forest, although a narrow strip of patented land exists on the southeast

;

Yosemite is completely surrounded, except for the road

to El Porto : and Sequoia lies in the heart of the Sequoia

Forest.' In addition to the importance of forest highways to through travel and to community development, they

were essential to the conservation and resource development of the national forests themselves. Annually, there was a tremendous loss of timber due to

fires since there was no way to fight forest fires in

remote areas without access roads. In 1920, heavy

timber operations in the national forests were still some years away ; however, the need for a forest highway system was evident if both timber and other

forest resources, including recreation, were to be

developed.

Early Administration

The Federal Highway Act of 1921 provided a number of elements needed for the administration of the

cooperative Federal-aid highway program. Section

23 of this Act substantially increased the funds available for the forest highways and recognized that there were two distinct classes of roads needed in the national forests. The "forest highways," which were in

many instances extensions within the forest of the

State and local road system, were needed for com- munity use and resource development; in addition,

"forest development roads" were needed for the protection, administration and resource development of

the national forests themselves. The forest development roads have been a direct responsibility of the

Forest Service, and their location, design, and construction supervision has generally been by Forest

Service engineers, sometimes with assistance from the

Bureau of Public Roads.

The rules and regulations for administration of

forest roads and trails, approved by the Secretary of

Agriculture on March 11, 1922, provided for the development of a forest highway system through the

cooperative effort of the State highway departments,

the Bureau of Public Roads and the Forest Service.

These regulations also provided for the development

by the three agencies of an annual work program

defining those projects selected for improvement with

forest highway funds. These procedures have worked

so well that they have been followed for over 50 years

with little change.

By 1921 the importance of forest highways to inter- state and regional travel, as well as to the full development of State and local road systems, was fully

recognized. At that time, there were approximately

14,000 miles of main State and county roads within

the forests still to be constructed, and in addition, it was estimated there were approximately 13,000 miles

of forest development roads or service roads needed

in the administration of the forests.^ To facilitate the construction work in the western

States, BPR established the Western Regional Office at San Francisco, California, under the direction of

Dr. L. I. Hewes, Deputy Chief Engineer in Charge.

The six western districts (with headquarters at Portland, San Francisco, Denver, Missoula, Ogden, and

Albuquerque) were placed under the Western Regional

Headquarters. These locations were also the headquarters of the corresponding forest districts. By 1929 there were 14,166 miles on the forest highway system of which 12,015 miles were in the 11 western States, South Dakota and Alaska. Some improvement had been made on 4,091 miles since the beginning of the program.^ Total expenditure through

fiscal year 1929 was $77 million.

489
Laurence I. Hewes

No one man contributed more to the development of the highways of

the West than Dr. Laurence Ilsley Hewes. He opened the Western

Headquarters Office of the Bureau of Public Koads in 1921 when Washington officials felt that the magnitude of the national forest highways

and the expected increased workload resulting from the 1921 Federal

Highway Act needed more direct supervision than was possible by

having all review authority placed in Washington. In the course of

his 29-year tenure, he stimulated and guided highway progress over an

area representing one-third of the Nation.

Dr. Hewes was born in New Hampshire. He received a B.S. degree

from Dartmouth College in 1898 and a Ph.D. from Yale University in

1901. He then taught science and mathematics at Rhode Island State

College, Yale University and Whitman College, Walla Walla, Washington. In 1911 he was appointed as a Senior Highway Engineer with

the Federal Office of Public Roads in Washington, D.C.

In 1920, as General Inspector, he conducted a study of the operations

of the California Highway Commission and of its accomplishments

under three State highway bond issues. The report was cited as being

the most comprehensive study of results obtained through the development of a State highway system that had yet been undertaken. In

fact, this report was the initial highway needs study of the type later

authorized under Section 11 of the 1934 Hayden-Cartwright Act, which

authorized Federal-aid funds to cover the cost of highway planning

surveys.

Dr. Hewes was selected in 1921 to administer the Federal-aid highways and the direct Federal highway construction programs in the 11

western States and the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii. He served

continuously as chief of the Western Headquarters for almost 30 years. During that time. Dr. Hewes guided and shaped the highway trans- portation patterns of the Federal-aid highway system. He assured the

connection of Federal-aid road systems in the West with the principal

roads of Canada and Mexico and with Federal-aid routes of the States

to the east. He directed the construction of thousands of miles of

Federal roads and trails through the national forests and parks. He

directed the coordinated efforts of Public Roads and the western States

leading to the designation of the city-to-city routes of the National

System of Interstate and Defense Highways. He also directed the

activities leading to the designation of the Federal-Aid Secondary

Road System and Federal-aid route extensions through the urban areas

in the West that were authorized in the 1944 Highway Act. As an engineer, controller, expediter and manager. Dr. Hewes had an

influence on every phase of highway construction. "The problem of

keeping a high mountain pass free from winter blockade in Colorado was as fascinating problem to him as repairing flood damage on an Oregon valley road, or the threat of shifting sands to travel in the

Imperial Valley," according to a testimonial written after his death.

His interest in keeping the Federal-State partnership active and

healthy led him to play a major role in the establishment of the Western

Association of State Highway Officials (consisting of the 11 western

States, Alaska, Hawaii, Texas, and the Forest Service, Park Service,

Land Management and Public Roads agencies). He participated in all of its meetings and in the work of its various committees.

In addition. Dr. Hewes contributed many technical and policy papers

dealing with highways. He authored several books on mathematics and

highway engineering, the most important of which was American Highway Practice, a standard engineering reference first published in 1942.

In collaboration with Professor Clark Oglesby of Stanford University,

he published several revised editions.

In 1934 Dr. Hewes was Chairman of the American Delegation to the

Seventh International Roads Congress at Munich, Germany, In 1946-47

he was Consulting Engineer to the government of Saudi Arabia.

490
Dr, Hewes' chief hobby was his job, but family was a close second.

He and Mrs. Hewes, an author of novels for children, raised a family

of five. He was also an enthusiastic tennis player and a butterfly collector. He was skilled enough in lepidopterology to have articles on the

subject published in National Geographic magazine.

Dr. Hewes was a member of the American Society of Civil Engineers,

the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the California Academy of Sciences, the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco,

the Cosmos Club of Washington, D.C., and the Sigma Xi honorary

fraternity.

Just prior to his death on March 2, 1950, he received the Gold Medal

Award of the U.S. Department of Commerce for exceptional service.

A year later, the Western Association of State Highway Officials formally approved the establishment of the "Dr. L. I. Hewes Award,"

to be given annually to a highway engineer from WASHO in recognition of an outstanding contribution to highway development.

"This award," reads the resolution, "will perpetrate the name and

achievements of Laurence Ilsley Hewes . . . whose superlative contributions in every phase of highway engineering gave great impetus to Western highway development."

491
Tooth Rock Tunnel on the Colmnhia River, Highway Oreg., constructed by BPR in 1936-37. The old highway

can be seen above the tunnel portal.

492
The Growth of a Valuable Resource

In the 1930's, the Bureau of Public Roads' direct

Federal construction program in the Federal domain

greatly expanded. The onset of the Great Depression

prompted Congress to enact legislation expanding

public works construction, including funds for roads

and trails in the national forests and national parks.

For example, the regular forest highway fund

authorizations under section 23 of the Federal Highway Act during the period 1921-1929 totaled $58

million, whereas in the period 1930-1939, these funds

totaled $93 million. In addition, under the National

Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and several emer- gency relief and construction acts, $43 million in additional funds were authorized and appropriated for

forest highways and development roads and trails. Of the total funds, $95 million were expended on

forest highways and $40 million were expended on

forest development roads and trails during this period.

By 1940, the original national forest lands had been

increased by more than 17 million acres, purchased

under the Weeks Act passed by Congress in 1911 and

amended in 1924, which authorized the purchase of

forest lands to protect the navigability of streams,

and to help perpetuate the country's water supply.

All the original national forests were taken from the

public domain lands in the West. By 1940, there were

2 national forests in Alaska, 1 in Puerto Rico, and

158 in 36 States.

"UHiile in 1930 there were only 65 miles of forest

highways with a bituminous surface, by 1939 there were about 1,670 miles of surfaced roads that had

some form of bituminous surfacing or paving."

The improvement of the Nation's highway trans- portation system was making the national forest areas increasingly accessible and contributed to their becoming a great national resource. In addition to the

production of saw timber, the national forests provided a water source for cities, towns, farm irrigation,

and hydroelectric power; grazing land for cattle.

sheep and horses; protection for wildlife; mining re- sources; and reci'eation areas. In 1931, there were

8 million visits by people who used the national forests

for camping and other forms of recreation." In 1939,

14.5 million people visited the national forests.^^

Postwar Developments on the Forest Highways

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 authorized

for each of the first 3 postwar years, $25 million for

forest highways, $4.3 million for highways in national

parks, and $10 million for parkways. By concurrent

resolution of Congress, the first postwar fiscal year was determined to be the 1946 fiscal year. During the war, timber was cut from commercial

stands on such a scale that the supply was nearly

exhausted. In developing the postwar national housing program, it became imperative to use the timber

resources of the national forests. This resulted in an immediate demand for timber access roads.

At the same time, it was recognized that many

forest highways on the Federal-aid and State highway

systems constructed in the earlier years needed modernization to provide an adequate level of service for

the increasing traffic volume. However, the scarcity

of materials and supplies and the high national priority assigned to building houses affected the resumption

of the forest highway program.

A directive from the Office of War Mobilization,

issued on August 5, 1946, restricted the award of contracts for construction in Federal areas to improvements needed for the production of lumber in

order to conserve the use of materials needed for the

expanding housing program. The President limited

expenditures for forest highways during fiscal year

1946 to $12.5 million.

Work on the forest highways on the Federal-Aid

Primary Highway System had ceased in 1942, and

little had been done to repair surface damage during

the war years. Hauling logs and timber had left a deep imprint on many miles of main forest highways.

Wind Cave-Dcadtcood and Sylvan Lake Road

in S. Dakota with a new railroad bridge

crossing over the forest highway.

493
Toward the end of the forties, there was, therefore,

increasing pressure from many quarters to modernize

these highways to meet the growing traffic demand.

The Public Roads Administration, in cooperation

with the State highway departments and the Forest

Service, undertook a study of the network of forest

highways in the western States and Alaska and re- ported in 1948 that an expenditure of $40 million for

each of the next 10 years would be required to provide a well balanced and adequate system.^^

In spite of many problems, in 1949, 232 miles of

forest highways were completed at a cost of $8 million

and projects were under construction at the close of

the year on 521 miles, estimated to cost $24 million."

Many important forest highway projects were either

under construction or programed for improvement.

The direct Federal construction program was growing in size and complexity during the fifties. Forest

highways were authorized $219 million during this

period which was more than twice the amount au- thorized during the thirties. The amount authorized

for forest development roads and trails was $222

million compared with $40 million during the thirties. A concerted effort was made during the 1950's to modernize the forest highways on the Federal-aid

highway system that were no longer adequate. A

310-foot steel arch bridge was constructed across the

Snake River in the Teton National Forest in Wyoming, and 26 miles of forest highway was built through

the Snake River Canyon, becoming a part of U.S.

Route 89. This opened a new route that saved from

50 to 135 miles when traveling from Utah and southeastern Idaho to Jackson Hole, Grand Teton National

Park and Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming.

This route permits a gradual climb to Jackson, Wyoming (elevation 6,235 feet) instead of going over the

summit through Teton Pass at an elevation of 8,450

feet by tortuous mountain road. Because of the difference in elevation, the new route also made a great

difference in travel conditions during the winter

months.

Highways in the Territory of Alaska

In addition to the normal forest highway program,

the 1950 Federal-Aid Highway Act contained a special forest highway provision of $3.5 million each for

fiscal years 1951 and 1952 for the construction of new

highways in the Tongass National Forest in Alaska.

The Bureau had been building forest highways in

Alaska since 1919 through an agreement with the

Alaska Road Commission in the Department of the

Interior. One such project was the Turnagain Arm

Highway, connecting Anchorage with Seward and the

Kenai Peninsula highway system. In addition, BPR,

by mutual agreement with the Alaska Road Commission occasionally performed highway engineering

functions throughout Alaska. By 1956, some 400

miles of forest highways at a cost of approximately

$50 million had been constructed in Alaska by BPR.

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 extended

the Federal-aid highway program to Alaska for the

first time, and it transferred all the functions and

responsibilities for the Territory's highway program

to BPR. Personnel of the Alaska Road Commission

were transferred to the existing BPR Alaska at this

time, and the direct responsibility for the location.

surveys, design, contract administration, construction

supervision, and highway maintenance of the 5,356-

mile highway system placed the Bureau in the position of acting as a State highway department. In

1959, Alaska became a State, and the Alaska Omnibus

Act made the State responsible for the Federal-aid

highway program on a basis comparable to that of

the other States. A 10-Year Program

In 1958, Congress directed that a study be made to determine how well the forest highway system was

meeting the highway transportation needs of the

counties and communities that were within or adjacent

to the national forests and that a 10-year program to meet these needs be prepared in cooperation with the

Forest Service and the States. The report was submitted to Congress in January 1960. The report

noted that: • The roads of primary importance to the States,

counties, and communities which were not designated as forest highways totaled 28,884 miles.

Approximately 48 percent of this mileage was on

the Federal-aid highway systems as follows:

Interstate Highway System 360

Primary System 2,332

Secondary System 11,272

13,964

As a comparison, 82 percent, or 19,927 miles out

of a total of 24,399 miles, of presently designated

forest highways was on a Federal-aid system. • It would cost approximately $2.6 billion to complete construction of all presently designated

forest highways to adequate standards. • A 10-year construction and maintenance program

for roads of primary importance but which were

not designated forest highways would cost a total

of $803 million for construction and $237 million

for maintenance. • A similar 10-year construction and maintenance

program for presently designated forest highways

would cost a total of $1.4 billion for construction

and $305 million for maintenance.

The report estimated that the 10-year construction

programs, totaling about $2.2 billion, "could be

financed by continued authorization of Federal forest- highway funds at the presently authorized level of

$33 million annually, together with the use of all other funds normally expended on forest highways,

including Federal-aid funds, State and local matching

money, and other State and local funds." ^^ The report recommended that, since Federal-aid

funds were not eligible for maintenance of highways

and, in the past, authorized funds had been fully

obligated for construction of forest highways, the

approximately $542 million estimated for maintenance

during the 10-year period should be derived from

State and local sources. The report also recommended

that the apportionment of funds be continued in the

historic manner.^®

As of January 1960, national forests, or purchase

units under the Weeks Act, were located in 41 States

and in Puerto Rico. In all of these States, there was

494
iiiSmM-X7 amm

McKenzie Highway (Oreg. Fn-22) in Willamette National Forest

is a modern design and has numerous safety features.

a designated forest highway system except in North

Dakota. Xine other States* had no national forests or purchase units, and, consequently no forest highway system.

Since 1960, the direct Federal highway construction

program has continued at about the same program

level. Beginning with the Federal-Aid Highway Act

of 1958, forest highway funds have been authorized

for each of the succeeding years at the level of $33

million. Historically, funds for the forest highway

system have been authorized and appropriated from

the general fund. However, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 directed that, beginning with the

fiscal year 1972, the forest highway funds would come

from the Highway Trust Fund. This Act amended

the definition of the term "forest highway" to require

all forest highways to be on the Federal-aid system.

This change eliminated the former Class III forest

highway designation which included those highways

designated as forest highways which were not on the

Federal-aid system.

* Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, ]\Iassachusetts, New .Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island.

The Hardships of Working on Forest Roads

The history of the BPR's direct Federal construction program is a record of the work of three generations of highway engineers, many of whom devoted

their entire professional careers to this service. By

the very nature of the work, they accepted hardship

and personal privation for the love and challenge of

the work. Arthur E. Loder, Assistant Chief Engineer

of BPR in 1918 aptly described their lot. Much of the work is located at high altitudes where

heavy snow remains until late in the spring. The streams

carrying away the melting snow remain at flood stage

making them difficult to ford until the last of June and

in some cases even later. In such places the snow may

begin to fall again in September and often stops field work before October. Although the work is located in every climate from the torrid desert, through regions of excessive rainfall and high timberline altitudes to the frozen forests of Alaska, the average season for efficient work is short. Under these conditions work must be organized and rushed as fast as possible while conditions

permit.

Although the locating engineer's work, with its inter- esting problems and the call of mountain and forest, is so fascinating that he is rarely content thereafter to live

in the plains, his existence is a busy one and his hardships real. He soon learns to regard as a luxury his bed

made by pounding the earth with an ax to remove the

495
I

When the Clakamas River in ML Hood National Forest reached a "200-ucar frequexcij" When

^^^^^ ^^^^^ .^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^.^^^ Highway 55 was destroi/ed.

496
In 1967 repair work ivas nnder'tcay on Orcg. FH 55. The men ivorking on this project took a

quick course in mountain climbing, which

later saved the life of at least one man.

The slope was drilled and small charges of dynamite were set to blast the face of the

slope for ivhat is called presplitting of cut slopes. The drills and other equipment had to be high-lined on

cables to the top of the slope.

Men and equipment operating

above Highway 55, both secured by ropes and cables. The work today is still as challenging as ever.

497
stones and roughest projections, and never has difficulty in sleeping without shelter unless the coyotes howl too much. He is also content with his morning bath in an

icy stream and never complains of an all day and night

hike to find camp, but the romance of the work gives way

to the most serious problem of existence when, on a long

lonesome reconnaissance a week's travel from base, he

wakes in the morning to find that a neighborly bear has

visited camp, destroying his light grub pack and making

away with the bacon upon which he had relied for subsistence on his return journey. If to this is added the sadness of finding that his horses have slipped their hobbles and disappeared completely, leaving him afoot, hungry, and four days from grub, his misery is complete.

When a survey party sets forth with a standard camp,

living conditions are usually good. The hardships are more often encountered on the long reconnaissance sur- veys when an attempt is made to travel with little equipment, depending upon game and good fortune for

subsistence. Some sections can be traversed more easily

by waiting for snowfall and using snowshoes or skis. In Alaska the dog train is useful. It is not an uncommon

experience for the party to bunk in the snow without tent. Occasionally the survey must be carried along the face

of precipitous slopes and rocky clilfs where a misstep or a

loosened rock would be disastrous. In such cases long ropes from above suspend the men or protect them from

accident. In 1916 one member of a survey party on this work lost his life from a fall of several hundred feet on

account of not taking such precaution."

In 1926, the BPR Annual Report described forest

highway construction : "For the engineering features

involved in their construction and the difficulties over- come these roads are not surpassed in the world."

Today we smoothly cross these same mountain barriers on Interstate highways which are a tribute to 50 years of highway engineering progress pioneered

by those engineers who made the first highway locations and carried through the design and construction

of the first improved highways across the mountain

barriers, tying all parts of our country together with

a modern highway transportation system.

National Park Roads and Trails

The construction of roads in national parks was an

essential element of park development. Prior to the

establishment of the National Park Service in the

Department of the Interior in 1916, improvements

within each park appear to have been the responsibility of the park superintendent, and road improvements were at best spasmodic as funds were made

available, but some progress was made. Yellowstone

National Park was allotted $15,000 in 1877, the first appropriation for roads in a national park.^^

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers took over the

roadbuilding responsibility in Yellowstone National

Park in the summer of 1883 and continued to be re- sponsible for road construction in the Park until 1918.

During this period, the basic road system was constructed. General Hiram M. Chittenden, associated

with Yellowstone National Park from 1891 to 1893

and from 1899 to 1906, is credited with having a major influence on the development of the Yellowstone

Park loop road system. He was one of the early

advocates of building high quality roads in the Park,

roads that would sit lightly on the landscape, taking

advantage of the terrain by curvilinear alinement.^^

By the mid-1920's, it was becoming increasingly

evident that the activities of the State highway departments, the Bureau of Public Roads, the Forest

Service, and the National Park Service needed to be

closely correlated. In most instances, the national

parks were practically surrounded by forests, and in

almost every case, the approach to the parks was

dependent on the construction of a main road through

the forests. In 1924 Congress enacted special legislation (43

Stat. 90) for the authorization of road construction in

national parks. Following this legislation, BPR and

the National Park Service worked out a Memorandum

of Agreement on the survey, construction and improvement of roads and trails in the national parks

and national monuments. This document and later ones established broad principles for standardizing

construction of these highways and joining them with

forest roads and trails, State highways, and the

Federal-aid system to form an interconnected system

of highways.^"

A statement of policy on roads was made by Director Stephen T. Mather in the National Park

Service's annual report of 1924

It is not the plan to have the parks gridironed with

roads, but in each it is desired to make a good sensible road system so that visitors may have a good chance to enjoy them. At the same time large sections of each

park will be kept in a natural wilderness state without

piercing feeder roads and will be accessible only by trails by the horseback rider and the hiker. All this has been

carefully considered in laying out our road program.

Particular attention also will be given to laying out the roads themselves so that they will disturb as little as

possible the vegetation, forests, and rocky hillsides through

which they are built. . . ."

See America First Under the new park road Act, work was initiated

in 1925 on the construction of the transmountain

highway in Glacier National Park, Montana. This

project was considered one of the most important of

the transcontinental highways. It was located between

Lake MacDonald and St. Mary Lake and connected

these two areas of Glacier National Park via Logan

Pass. By the mid-1920's, a national system of improved

highways was beginning to take form, encouraging

family vacations by automobile and visits to the national parks and national forests. "See America

First" was the slogan. Auto camping was becoming

increasingly popular. The first automobiles had been

admitted to Yellowstone National Park in 1915,^2 and

from 1918 to 1925 approximately 1.6 million private

autos entered the national parks.^^

Locating National Parks in the East All but one of the major parks were west of the

Mississippi River, while two-thirds of the population

lived east. Director Mather wrote in 1923, "I should

like to see additional national parks established east of the Mississippi, but just how this can be accomplished is not clear." ^* While western parks had been created out of the

public domain, the only extensive land in public

ownership in the East were the number of forest re- serves acquired under the provisions of the Weeks

Act, which authorized the purchase of land for the

protection of forests and the headwaters of streams.

It appeared the only practical way national park areas could be acquired would be by donation or by purchasing land with privately donated funds.

498
In 1925 Mr. MacDonald made a tnsit to the construction

site of the Transmountain Highway in Glacier National Park, Mont.

The Transmoutitain Highway (now called Going-to-thc-Sun Highway) under

construction in 1927.

^ ^ ^

^«?»:^

Going-to-the-Sun Highway in 1962 in Glacier National

Park, Mont.

499
As a result of Director Mather's concerns, Secretary

of the Interior Hubert Work, in 1924, established a Southern Appalachian National Park Commission to make an investigation of the southern Appalachian

Mountains region and to determine whether there were suitable areas for national parks. The initial committee appointed by the Secretary was composed

of public-spirited men who served without compensation. The only funds available for the Commission's

use were those provided by private individuals. The

Commission devoted much personal time in reconnais- sance of the area, meeting with local groups and in- vestigating the feasibility of areas to be recommended

for national parks. From these studies. Congress

drafted the necessary legislation in 1925 authorizing

the securing of lands in the southern Appalachian

Mountains for perpetual preservation as national

parks.

By 1926 enough public support had been generated

so that enabling laws in both the State legislatures

and in Congress led to the establishment of the Great

Smoky Mountains National Park in North Carolina

and Tennessee and the Shenandoah National Park in

Virginia. Later the Mammoth Cave National Park

was established in Kentucky.

In the Commission's 1924 report to the Secretary of

the Interior, the following comment was made on the

Blue Ridge area of Virginia that became the Shenandoah National Park:

The greatest single feature, however, is a possible skyline drive along the mountain top, following a continuous

ridge and looking down westerly on the Shenandoah

Valley, some 2,500 to 3,500 feet below, and also com- manding a view of the Piedmont Plain stretching easterly

to the Washington Monument, which landmark of our

National Capital may be seen on a clear day. Few scenic drives in the world could surpass it."

It was this vision that led ultimately to the construction of the Skyline Drive in the proposed Shenandoah

National Park.

Pioneer Road Construction

By 1930 the work initiated in 1924 for the National

Park Service on the improvement of park roads was a

significant part of the total direct Federal construction program. A system of national park roads had

been selected for improvement, involving some 1,500

miles of road. The cost of improvement was $50 million, and $22.5 million had been authorized between

1924 and 1930, of which $20 million had been actually

appropriated. Of the planned system, 302 miles were

already improved at a cost of approximately $9.2

million, and construction was underway on 241 miles on which the cost was estimated to be approximately

$9.6 million.2«

The initial project in 1924 of surveying the trans- mountain highway in Glacier National Park and the

work on the Zion-Mount Carmel Road illustrate the

difficulties to be surmounted in pioneer road construction. The transmountain highway project was only

accessible by saddle horses, and in the very early

stages of work, the average load for a packhorse was

very small. The project was on the west side of the

Continental Divide in the Rocky Mountains and was

15.7 miles long. It started at an elevation of 3,537

feet and, for the major portion of its length, climbed

along the "Garden Wall" to Logan Pass at an elevation of 6,648 feet. In the upper reaches, the location

followed virtually a vertical cliff for long distances.

On the Zion-Mount Carmel Road in Zion National

Park, Utah, which was completed in 1930, a tunnel was necessary.

In the 4.6 mile stretch of the Zion Park Road in Upper

Pine Creek Canyon, there is more than a mile of tunnel. The tunnel is sufficiently near to the cliff face so that it has been possible to cut openings or galleries through the face from which views of the canyon may be obtained. . .

Before actual construction work began much had to be done in preparation. A feasible route had to be found by

which to climb from the floor of the valley, 1,400 feet in elevation to the park boundary at 4,100 feet. The survey

involved weeks of arduous labor, climbing rocky slopes,

cutting through dense thickets, hanging from hazardous

points, and at all times maintaining an accuracy of meas- urement which would allow computations to be made

closely enough for proper control and close estimate of the work to be done. In starting the tunnel work, it was necessary to begin

at several points along the line and excavate the galleries

first and then complete the tunnel between these points. All measurements had to be made from the outside, car- ried in and projected through the tunnel. Scaffolds were

built on the outside of the cliffs, and all supplies and

materials were lifted to these galleries."

The National Park System

On June 10, 1933, President Roosevelt signed an

executive order establishing the national park system

which was to be administered by the National Park

Service. The components of the system were identified in six groupings: (1) The National Capital Parks,

comprising the lands reserved by the Federal Government after the founding of the District of Columbia

in 1790 on which today are found the Capitol, the

White House, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials

with the connecting mall and park area, the Rock

Creek Park authorized in 1890, and other areas and

buildings in the Nation's Capital of great historical

significance; (2) 21 national memorials; (3) 11 national military parks and 9 national battlefield sites; (4) national cemeteries, including the Gettysburg

National Cemetery and 10 other similar cemeteries

established at the sites of historic battlefields; (5) 10

national monuments on military reservations; and (6)

21 national monuments on national forest lands. Altogether, there were 137 areas in the national park

system.^**

Between 1933 and 1940, six new national parks were

established: the Everglades National Park, Florida,

1934; the Great Smoky Mountains National Park,

North Carolina and Tennessee, 1934; the Shenandoah

National Park, Virginia, 1935; Big Bend National

Park, Texas, 1935 ; the Olympic National Park, Washington, 1938; and King's Canyon National Park,

California, 1940. BPR's activity on park road construction was thus greatly expanded.

As a result of the 1933 executive order. Commissioner MacDonald, in January 1934, established the

Eastern Parks and Forests District in Washington,

D.C., to provide an organization to undertake the

location, design, and construction of park and forest

and such other highway work in the eastern section

of the United States as might be entrusted to the

Bureau. The result of this action was to bring under

500
The east portal of the tunnel cm the Zion-Moxmt Carmel Highway in Utah.

501
Excavation of gallery No. 1

late in 1927.

View of Pine Creek Canyon

from gallery No. 4-

502
View of the completed gallery No. 4 with reinforced concrete

lining from across Pine Creek Canyon.

the new district direct supervision of all the work

contemplated or underway in the East. The territory

of the region included 30 States east of the Rocky

Mountains and the District of Columbia. The work

in the western States and Alaska remained as organized in 1921 under a Western Regional Office. All of the park work was performed under the

interagency agreement of 1926, and by 1939, 1,577

miles of road in or leading to 43 national parks and

monuments had been improved on the national park

system.^® For example, much of the original Yellowstone Park loop road was reconstructed suitable for

automobile traffic. The Red Lodge-Cook City approach road to Yellowstone Xational Park and the

Cameron Desert View approach road to Grand Canyon National Park in Arizona were both completed.

The Crater Lake Xational Park loop road in Oregon,

portions of the Fall River Highway in the Rocky

Mountain Xational Park, and the Wawona Tunnel

project in Yosemite Xational Park in California were

also completed. This timnel was approximately 4,200

feet in length. The Big Oak Flat Road on which the

Wawona Tunnel is located replaced a carriage road

built in 1874 which was very narrow with a steep

descent into Yosemite Valley. Building a road to

acceptable standards to replace the old road called for

the best highway engineering skills. The new road,

10 miles in length, included three tunnels, three major

bridges, and 2 miles of exceptionally difficult construction. Work was also in progress on the Tioga Pass

Road, giving access to Yosemite National Park from

points east of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.

Skyline Drive

Late in 1930, work was begun on the Skyline Drive

to provide employment for the inhabitants of the

drought-stricken Shenandoah Valley and to open a road in the newly authorized Shenandoah National

Park for recreational use. Today, Skyline Drive extends from the northern

boundary of the Shenandoah National Park at the

outskirts of Front Royal, Virginia, and then in a

southerly direction along the crest of the Blue Ridge

Mountains to Jarman's Gap near where U.S. Route

250 crosses the summit of the Blue Ridge Mountains

at Rockfish Gap, a distance of approximately 97 miles.

In altitude, the Skyline Drive varies from approximately 600 feet at Front Royal to a maximum elevation on the north section of 3,390 feet on the side of

Hogback Mountain.

503
Cole Creek Bridge in the Great Smoky Mountai7is.

A creek channel change was necessary on this section of the highway in the Great Smoky Mountains. Native rock was used for the wall.

604
A section of Skyline Drive in the Shenandoah National Park

about 9 miles south of Front Royal, Va.

Hand-laid rock embankment at Beacon Hollow Overlook on Skyline Drive.

W-'m

m" •?T»rs5.-<

to^* .^^!

505
>. : ' —sis' '^ ^ • «• .

Construction in 1938 of Crater Lake Rim Road switchback along Applegate Peak

(at left) in Oregon. Men in foreground are installing a culvert.

Preliminary surveys were started in January 1931

with only 5 months to make surveys, prepare plans,

and award contracts for approximately 40 miles of

highway. The initial construction work was let under

two contracts, a 20-mile section from Thornton Gap

to Big Meadows and a 20-mile section from the

Rapidan River via Big Meadows to Swift Run Gap.

Both contracts were awarded in the latter part of

June 1931.

The Skyline Drive was constructed in three major

sections. Part of the first section between Thornton

Gap and Swift Run Gap was surfaced by the summer

of 1934, Because of the public clamor to use the park

road, it was decided to open the Drive on September

15, 1934, between Thornton Gap and Big Meadows.

But it soon became impossible to keep tourists off the

section from Big Meadows to Swift Run Gap and

work was delayed. The surfacing on this part was

completed in 1935.

The northern section between Thornton Gap and

Front Royal was placed under contract in 1934, and

the final surfacing was completed in time for the

dedication of the Park by President Roosevelt in

July 1936. The final section of Skyline Drive between

Swift Run Gap and Jarman Gap was constructed

between 1936 and 1939.3° It has been estimated that the grading and base

course operations, covering the years 1931 through

1938, provided approximately 2.1 million man-hours

of employment and the total construction cost was

approximately $4 million.

506

Although begun hurriedly during the Depression to stimulate employment, the blend of this park road

into the mountain landscape, providing the most

scenic views of the panorama of the foothills of the

Blue Ridge Mountains and the plains of Virginia, was

no accident. It was the joint effort of the National

Park Service landscape architects and the Bureau's

highway engineers in carrying out the policy on park

roads announced in 1924.

A Master Plan for the National Park System

Very early the National Park Service had evolved

a general development plan or master plan as a guide

for the development of each park area in the national

park system. The road system plan was an integral

part of the overall master park plan and was developed through collaboration of Bureau engineers working closely with the landscape architects and engineers

in the National Park Service. It was customary for

the road system plan to be approved both by the

Director of the National Park Service and the Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Roads. The road

system plan provided a means for identifying roadway needs and improvements and allowed for phase

construction of park roads and trails. During the 1940's, much work was accomplished on

the development of the road system plans while the

construction program was at a low ebb. However,

even though there was a scarcity of materials because

of the urgency of the housing program, the mileage on the national park system increased from 1,577 to 1,979 miles.3i
Spreading crushed stone over fresh oil on Crater Lake Rim Road.

Keeping Up With the Vacationers

After the establishment in 1933 of the national park

system, the Bureau of Public Roads was called on to build roads in many of the areas as they were added

to the national park system.

The development of the Nation's highway transportation system had also brought a tremendous increase

in recreational travel in the years following the close

of World War II. Visits to the national park system

mounted from a low of 6 million in 1942 to 33 million

in 1950 and to 72 million in imo.'^

Providing an adequate road system serving each of

the national park areas was an essential element of

the development of each area. To accommodate the

travelers, much work was necessary. For example,

during the fifties, the Stevens Canyon Highway in the

southeastern part of Mount Rainier National Park in

Washington was completed. The Moran-Yellowstone

Park approach road, between the Grand Teton National Park and Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming, was also completed. In the eastern United States,

the work included park road construction in the

Acadia National Park in Maine, located on beautiful

Mount Desert Island, in the Great Smolcy Mountains

National Park, and in the new Everglades National

Park.

The Mission 66 national park 10-year program had

as a target date the completion by 1966 of the modernization of the national park system, now comprising 183 separate units. The upgrading of existing

park roads and trails, construction of new park roads

and construction on the eight national parkways administered by the National Park Service was a major

part of this program. Special emphasis was placed on modernizing the Yellowstone National Park road

system in anticipation of the celebration of the 100th

anniversary of Yellowstone Park in 1972.

One of the last transmountain highways of the

West, reminiscent of the early twenties pioneer effort, was the North Cross State Highway in Washington,

constructed during the 1960's. After construction was

substantially completed, the North Cascades National

Park was established. The highway bisects the national park and is its principal access road. Important

segments of the highway were designed and constructed as forest highway projects.

Throughout the national park system the unusual

terrain features encountered, the necessity to preserve

to the maximum extent the natural scene, the fulfill- ment of park objectives in constructing roads to points

of special scenic interest, and to meet the requirements

of other park objectives, challenged the best ingenuity

of the highway engineer working with the landscape

architect.

The Development of Parkways

A parkway differs from a park road in that the

park road is within or leads to a national park or monument and is intended primarily to provide access

to the national park without disturbing its beauty.

On the other hand, the parkway was developed as a highway primarily for through traffic, excluding commercial vehicles, with full or partial control of access, and usually located either within a park or a parklike

setting.

507
Jordan Pond in the Acadia National Park in Maine.

Early parkways showed the potential of the parkway. The first parkway in the Nation was the Bronx

River Parkway completely opened to traffic in 1924.

By 1934, 114 miles of parkways existed in the New

York City area. These parkways, developed by

private authorities to move commuter traffic, generated

great interest among highway engineers because of

the imaginative design concept. When properly designed, the parkway could serve a twofold purpose

it would provide a park and an arterial highway at the same time, and in a manner that would impact

favorably upon the surrounding environment.

The design concept was to develop the parkway

from the interior outward in such a way as to provide

freedom in the determination of the highway location

to take maximum advantage of the landscape for

scenic vistas and to preserve the parkway environment by suitable planting and screening. The necessity for preserving the arterial highway aspect was

also recognized, and access to the parkway was provided only at long intervals. Special attention was

given to the development of interesting alinement by

long, easy curves fitted to the natural contour of the

land, with special emphasis given to the landscaping

scheme so that the completed road became a part of

the natural countryside.^^

The concept of national parkways under the authority of the National Park Service came about in 1928

when an act of Congress authorized a highway between Mount Vernon and Arlington Memorial Bridge

to commemorate the birth of George Washington.

National parkways encompass ribbons of land of

scenic interest belonging to the U.S. Government and

are authorized by an act of Congress. They are not

designed for high-speed point-to-point travel, but they

do constitute a through traffic highway.

The Mount Vernon Memorial Parkway

In December 1924, the 68th Congress, by joint resolution, established the United States Commission for

the Celebration of the 200th Anniversary of the Birth

of George Washington. In May 1928, the 70th Congress passed a law directing the Bicentennial Commission, acting through and using the services of the

Department of Agriculture, to construct a suitable

memorial highway to connect Mount Vernon, the

home of George Washington, with the south end of

the Arlington Memorial Bridge which crosses the

Potomac River at the city of Washington. The objective was to have the Mount Vernon Memorial

Parkway completed in time for the bicentennial cele- bration in 1932.

The concept of a highway to Mount Vernon originated with a group of public-spirited citizens organized in 1886 and incorporated by the Virginia

Legislature as the Mount Vernon Avenue Association

in 1888. An interesting sidelight is that the Virginia

Legislature simultaneously, by a joint resolution,

transferred to the Association a claim for $120,000.

(The State had loaned this money to the United States

Government in 1790 to be used toward the erection of

the public buildings at the permanent seat of government in the United States. The loan was paid in

person to President George Washington, and the

money was disbursed under his supervision.) The

General Assembly empowered the Association to collect and receive the claim and the interest on it from

the U.S. Government and to use the funds to construct the proposed memorial avenue to Mount

Vernon.^*

508
No tangible progress was made until the passage of

the 1928 Act. The Secretary of Agriculture immediately delegated the duty of surveying and supervising the construction of the highway to the Bureau

of Public Roads. Earlier the Bureau had made re- connaissance surveys of two possible locations at the

request of the Committee on Roads of the House of

Representatives, one an inland route and the other a route along the shore of the Potomac River. With

the approval of the Bicentennial Commission, the

river route was selected as having the greater scenic

and historical advantage, and offering superiority for

the development of park areas between the highway

and the river.^'' Surveying and determining the final location were begun on June 15, 1928, and the work

was pursued with all possible vigor. The development

of the Mount Vernon Memorial Highway was most

fortuitous because it provided an opportunity for the

BPR to further develop the parkway design concept.

In 1930 Congress enlarged the concept of the Mount

Vernon Memoi'ial Parkway to provide for the development of a parkway along the shores of the Potomac

all the way up to Great Falls in Virginia and from

Fort Washington to Great Falls in Maryland, in- corporating the parkway section already under construction as part of the George Washington Memorial

Parkway.

The Mount Vernon Memorial Parkway was completed on schedule and was dedicated in a special

ceremony in conjunction with the annual meeting of

the American Association of State Highway Officials in 1932. This occasion afforded highway engineers a chance to see at firsthand an example of the full development of the parkway concept. Forty-four years

The Mount Vernon Memorial Parkway in Virginia a couple years after it was opened to traffic in 1932.

509
George Washington Memorial Parkway in Virginia in 1959.

later, the Mount Vernon Memorial Parkway, now the

George AVashington Memorial Parkway, remains one

of the most scenic drives in the national capital area and a continuing tribute to our first President.

The Blue Ridge Parkway

The establishment of the Great Smoky Mountains

National Park and the Shenandoah National Park

and the success of the Skyline Drive as it was developing in the Shenandoah National Park led almost

to a natural conclusion—the construction of a parkway connecting the two parks.

The southern Appalachian region between these two

parks was one of great natural beauty and an area depressed economically even before the Great Depression. Because of the mountainous terrain, large sec- tions of the Appalachian area had become isolated

from the mainstream of national development. Improved highway transportation was recognized as

essential to the economic development of the area. As early as 1911, Colonel Joseph Hyde Pratt, head

of the North Carolina Geological and Economic Survey, had promoted the idea of a recreational road

opening up the beauty of the North Carolina mountains to be called the "Crest of the Blue Ridge Highway." Subsequently, an Appalachian Highway

Company was organized which undertook to build

such a road as a toll facility. The effort, however, was abandoned with the onset of World War I.^^

However, by 1933 a combination of many factors,

together with the enabling funds of the National

Industrial Recovery Act, made the construction of

such a tremendous public works project feasible.

There was great competition between North Carolina and Tennessee over the location for the park-topark highway, but the final location was a North

Carolina routing. (An agreement between President

Roosevelt and Secretary of the Interior Ickes provided that the Government would select the route and

the States would donate the right-of-way.) In December 1933, the National Park Service received an

additional appropriation of nearly $4 million to start the Blue Ridge Parkway.

The design and construction of this parkway was to become a major effort for the Region 15* staff for

many years.- Few roads have presented such a variety

of location problems. The terrain varies from gentle

to the most rugged in which road construction has

been undertaken east of the Mississippi River. The

Blue Ridge Parkway, from the Shenandoah National

Park in Virginia to the Great Smoky Mountains

National Park in North Carolina and Tennessee,

covers a distance of 476 miles. With the Skyline

Drive in the Shenandoah National Park, it provides

573 miles of scenic parkway extending from Front

Royal, Virginia, to Cherokee, North Carolina.

* The Eastern Parks and Forests District headquarters be- came BPR's Region 15 in 1957.

510
W^:

The Blue Ridge Parkway winds along the crest of the mountains.

''Wvy'-;^-

.*'* X'

The Blue Ridge Parkway in the fall.

r

i -J

/ V,

M-

; -*< -"^^
The James River Bridge on the Blue Ridge Parkway has a pedestrian

walkway beneath the motor vehicle deck.

1

Most of the parkway is above 3,000 feet. It does

not drop below 2,000 feet except for a few river crossings, such as the James, Roanoke, and French Broad

Rivers. Sections of the parkway near Mount Mitchell,

North Carolina, and on the Pisgah Ridge rise above

5,000 feet. By the end of 1939, 47 miles had been surfaced and

an additional 87 miles graded, drained, and gravelbase constructed on the Blue Ridge Parkway. An

additional 170 miles were under construction.^^ ^^ After World War II, work was resumed on the

Blue Ridge Parkway. By 1975 the Blue Ridge Parkway was complete except for a short gap near Grandfather Mountain in North Carolina.

The Natchez Trace Parkway

In 1934 Congress passed an act directing the study

of an additional parkway, the Natchez Trace Parkway, to follow, as nearly as possible, the original

route of the old Natchez Trace.^^ The Natchez Trace was one of the early important Indian Trails, extending from the Cumberland River at Nashville in a southwest course through the Chickasaw and Choctaw

Indian lands near Jackson, Mississippi, to Natchez,

Mississippi.

As early as 1798, Governor Winthrop Sargent of

the Mississippi Territory was urging the construction

of a post road to the Natchez District, and in 1801

and 1802 treaties made with the Chickasaw and Choc512
taw Nations permitted construction of a wagon road

through their lands. This old Natchez Trace was

used by the early pioneers who rafted their produce

from the Ohio and Cumberland River valleys via the

Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to New Orleans and then

returned over the Trace to their homes.*" It was also an important military route for General Andrew

Jackson's army of Tennessee volunteers during the war of 1812." Today the Natchez Trace Parkway

extends approximately 455 miles and is about 75 per- cent completed.

The George "Washington Memorial Parkway, the

Blue Ridge Parkway, and the Natchez Trace Parkway

are covered here to show what is involved in establishing a national parkway. One additional parkway

should be mentioned.

In 1930 Congress passed an act establishing a Colonial National Monument of the area which in- cludes Jamestown Island, the 1607 site of the first permanent English settlement, and Yorktown, the

scene of the culminating battle of the American Revolution in 1781. The Act also authorized the Secretary

of the Interior to examine the feasibility of a parkway through the monument.

The Colonial Parkway, covering 23 miles from

Yorktown to Jamestown Island via Williamsburg,

Virginia, was opened to traffic in time for the 350th

anniversary celebration of the founding of Jamestown.

Defense Access Roads

During the years of World War II, the normal

construction of all highways was stopped, and many

employees engaged in this work entered war service.

A large contingent of direct Federal construction

employees, particularly in the western districts, were

assigned to the construction of the Alaska Highway.

Others were engaged in the construction of roads to war establishments such as the Indian Head Access

Road to the Naval Powder Factory and the military

highway to Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland,

which was later transferred to the National Park

Service and renamed the Suitland Parkway. But

aside from the Alaska Highway project, the biggest

highway project undertaken during the years of the war was the building of the road system servicing the

new War Department building constructed in Arlington, Virginia.

The Pentagon Road Network

In the summer of 1941, Congress appropriated $35

million to be used by the War Department for the

construction of a new office building, now known as the Pentagon. The building was to provide office space for 40,000 workers, and in addition, other defense installations were planned in the immediate

vicinity. The War Department requested the Federal

Works Agency to undertake the layout and design and

to supervise the construction of the highway network

to service the new War Department building.

The Natchez Trace Parkway in Mississippi.

513
The inadequacy of roads approaching the Potomac

River bridges crossing from Virginia to Washington,

D.C., had been a matter of increasing concern for

many years. For example, in January 1934, Chief

MacDonald prepared a report on the situation for the

National Capital Parks and Planning Commission.

The report proposed a plan for a system of arterial

highways to be used as a basis for a progressive program of improvements. Through the years, little was

accomplished toward these objectives, and by 1941 the

traific flow across the Memorial, Key, and 14th Street

bridges had reached an average daily total of 118,000

vehicles, with an hourly peak flow close to 11,000

vehicles.

The request from the War Department required the

best design and planning engineers available. A special design section was established in the Public Roads

Administration's headquarters. Engineers were as- sembled from field offices to work on the largest single

design project ever undertaken by Public Roads up

to that time.

The design problem was superimposing a new high

traffic volume created by the new government office buildings on an already congested road system. The

location of the existing bridges across the Potomac

River, the proximity of Arlington Cemetery, the necessity of connecting the principal highways, and the

requirement that the design be functional as well as

esthetically compatible, posed formidable problems.

Coincident with the studies for the Pentagon net- work, the Virginia Department of Highways con- ducted studies for a new highway from Woodbridge,

Virginia, to Arlington, to bypass Alexandria and con- nect with the Potomac River bridges. (This highway

today is known as the Henry G. Shirley Memorial

Highway.)

In September 1942, agreement was reached that the

portion of the Shirley Highway from an interchange

with Virginia Route 7 to the connection with the

Pentagon network would be certified by the War

Department as a defense access road project, and the

Public Roads Administration was directed to build it. Responsibility for construction of the two projects was assigned to Region 15, Eastern Parks and Forests

Roads. The work was completed in 1952.*^ The

Pentagon network today is a part of 1-95 and has

been reconstructed with some new alinement under

the Interstate program.

Access Roads for the Bureau of Land Management

In 1949 the Interior Department Appropriation

Act for 1950 provided for construction of access roads on and to grant lands that had been returned to the

Federal Government in the early 1900's. These lands,

known as "O & C lands," were under the jurisdiction

of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and in

1950 a Memorandum of Agreement was drawn up

between BLM and BPR identifying responsibilities

for the work. The Interior Department Appropriation Act for 1951 directed that funds be turned over

to BPR.

The O & C lands were originally two separate land

grants. The first was the Oregon and California

Railroad grant in 1866 for a railroad from Portland

to the California border consisting of odd numbered

sections on each side of the road location for a 20-mile

wide strip. In 1869 limitations were imposed that

the land could be sold only to bona fide settlers and

that not more than 160 acres at not more than $2.50

per acre could be sold to any one person. However,

the conditions of the grant were violated, and in 1915

The Suitland Parkway near Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

514
board feet presently available, or about 3 percent of

the Nation's total production. In addition, receipts

for fiscal year 1976 were $118 million, of which 50

percent is returned to the 18 counties for such uses as roads, schools, public works, and other needs of the

counties. The Treasury Department receives 25 per- cent of the remainder and BLM uses the other 25

percent to manage the lands.^* Funds transferred to BPR for design and construction have ranged from an initial $550,000 for fiscal year 1951 to $11.6 million for fiscal year 1975. Since

1954 BPR has also been responsible for the performance of the maintenance work on these roads. To date,

BPR has constructed 4,900 miles of one- and two-lane

roads on the O & C lands. Although initially developed as timber access roads, most of the roads are open to the public, and recreational use of these roads

has increased substantially in recent years.

The Xestucca River Road in the Oregon Coast Range was

improved m 1967 for use as a timber access road, but it has become an area also used for recreational purposes.

the Supreme Court enjoined the Company from further disposition of lands. About 2.9 million acres were returned to the Federal Government in 1916.

The other piece of land was granted in 1868 to the

Southern Oregon Company for a wagon road between

Coos Bay and Roseburg consisting of three alternate

sections per mile in a strip 3 miles on either side of

the wagon road location. When this land was re- turned in 1919 for similar reasons, the Federal Government reclaimed 93,000 acres.*^ The O & C lands are located in the Coast Range

and on the western slope of the Cascades in Oregon

and contain very valuable and productive timber

lands. At the time of the 1950 agreement, the O & C

lands were essentially unroaded and isolated. The

roads designed and constructed under BPR supervision made these lands accessible for timber production. The major impact of the road construction was the

improvement in the local economy stimulated by the

logging operations. Timber available for sale went

from 500 million board feet in 1937 to 1.2 billion

Demonstration Projects Program

In 1969 a Demonstration Projects Program was

established in Region 15 with the objective of promoting, by demonstration, the application of new

technology as it applied to highway location, design,

construction, maintenance, and operation. This program was to reestablish one of the most successful

programs initiated by the original Office of Road

Inquiry in 1897 and carried on as a major program

effort for many years thereafter—the construction of

"object lesson roads" and the conduct of demonstration programs. This program was established in

Region 15 because this office had experienced most

every type of highway construction under a wide

range of field conditions and because the Region 15

project personnel included competent practicing highway engineers and technicians who could communicate

readily with their counterparts in the FHWA headquarters R and D and field offices and State transportation agencies.

Since the establishment of the Demonstration

Projects Program, many successful demonstration

projects have been carried out. Particularly note- worthy was the construction on the grounds of Dulles

Airport in 1972 of one of the first prestressed reinforced concrete pavements and the construction of a large parking lot in conjunction with the Transpo '72 exhibition, using a calcium sulphate sludge and fly

ash as a base stabilization product.

The Chaco Wash Bridge on the Navajo Indian Reservation in New Mexico was built by agree- ment for the Bureau of Indian

Affairs. Note the rock and loire channel protection in the right

foreground.

515
The Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge on I-Jf95, the Capital Beltway,

crosses the Potomac River south of Washington, D.G.

In 1974-75 a program for detecting the premature

deterioration of reinforced concrete highway bridge

decks as a result of using deicing salts became available for demonstration. It was a two-part project,

the initial project being a series of evaluation techniques to determine the degree of damage already

occurring in the bridge deck and the second project

demonstrated an electrical method to stop the corro- sion of reinforcing steel occurring in the bridge deck.

Erosion along highway rights-of-way, particularly

at major drainage structures, has presented the highway engineer with numerous design, construction, and

maintenance problems. These problems exist because

the construction of a highway system often disrupts,

and in many instances alters, natural drainage net- works. This disruption and alteration generally re- sults in high velocity flow within highway drainage

structures. While this is desirable from the standpoint of carrying large volumes of runoff in relatively

small structures, it frequently leads to serious erosion

problems. A demonstration project was established

to educate and train highway engineers on the proper

selection and design of a broad range of flow control

devices which serve to dissipate the hydraulic energy.

Two other demonstration projects expected to benefit State agencies in cost-effectiveness planning are the

demonstration of noise measurement techniques,

equipment systems, data interpretation, and the demonstration of air quality monitoring devices. By the

requirements of the 1970 Federal-Aid Highway Act,

noise level standards and air quality guidelines were

developed. The demonstration projects make known

to the State agencies the equipment available to make

necessary measurements, techniques for analyzing the

data and projecting the impact of planned construction projects, and to assist the States in selecting the

equipment suitable to their particular needs based on

cost/benefit.

The Demonstration Projects Program attempts to touch on every aspect of concern within the highway

industry. In addition to the five projects above, the

Demonstration Program included demonstrations on

safety (High Performance and Energy Absorbing

Bridge Rails), waste materials (Discarded Tires in

Highway Construction), conservation of natural re- sources (Recycling Asphalt Pavements), public education (Highway Photomontage) to translate the

technical information of highway planning and design so that the community can become knowledgeably

involved, design (Automated Design System), and

many other features, concepts and techniques.

The success of any program is its measure of effec- tiveness in terms of real world results. Just as the

object lesson roads of the early days of the Federal

Highway Administration broadcast the knowledge

available and how to do it with the materials at hand

for cost/benefit, so also is the purpose of today's

Demonstration Projects Program. The long-range

objective of both efforts is a more economical environmentally acceptable transportation system for the

good of the country.

516
A Program to Enrich the Quality of Life

In addition to the work performed for the Forest

Service, the National Park Service, the War Department, and the Bureau of Land Management, the

Federal Highway Administration has standing agreements with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in the Department of the Interior, and with several other

agencies to construct roads on lands under their

jurisdictions upon request.

An interesting project developed when, in 1956,

Congress directed that the Bureau of Public Eoads

should build the "Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge.

This 5,900-foot bridge across the Potomac River is a

vital link in the Capital Beltway around Washington,

D.C. Region 15 supervised the construction of the

bridge because the bridge involved three governmental jurisdictions—Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Maryland. The Woodrow Wilson

Memorial Bridge was opened to traffic in 1961.

The Federal Highway Administration has, for a continuous span of 70 years, contributed its highway

engineering expertise to the planning, location, design,

and construction of roads in the Federal domain for

other government agencies. The many beautiful

highways and parkways constructed under this program are a legacy for future generations to enjoy as they continue to serve the transportation system in

the national forests and parks and other Federal domain areas. In 1973, citizens visited the national forests and

national park system areas in record numbers—188

million visitor-days in national forests and 215 million

visits to national park system areas. These figures

speak for themselves in rating the contribution the

direct Federal highway program has made to enriching the quality of life for our Nation.

REFERENCES

' R. Lee, Family Tkee of the National Park Service

(Eastern National Park and Monument Association, Philadelphia, 1972) p. 9.

' Public Roads Administration, Report to the Committee

On Roads, House of Representatives, Forest Highway

System (Federal Works Agency, Washington, D.C, 1940)

p. 2.

' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1906, p. 23

1907, p. 21.

* Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1916, pp. 5, 6. 'A. LoDEB, The Location and Building of Roads in the National Forests, Public Roads, Vol. 1, No. 4, Aug. 1918, p. 7.

'Id., p. 5.

' L. Hewes, Federal Road Building in the National Forests

of the West, Public Roads, Vol. 3, No. 26, Jun. 1920, p. 18.

' BuTBEAU OF Public Roads Annual Report, 1921, p. 20. 'Bu'REAU of Public Roads Annual Report, 1929, pp. 37, 38. '"Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1939, pp. 62, 63. " U.S. Department of Agriculture, Annual Report of the

Forester (GPO, Washington, D.C, 1932) p. 23. " Forest Lands of the United States, S. Doc. 32, 77th

Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9. " Bureau of Pl^blic Roads Annual Report, 1948, pp. 24, 35. " Bu'REAU OF Public Roads Annual Report, 1949, p. 38.

"Bureau of Public Roads, Report On the Forest Highway Study Required By Section 3(b) of the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1958 (Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D.C,

1960) pp. 1, 2. " Id., p. 2. "A. LoDER, supra, note 5, pp. 11, 12. " B. O'Brien, The Yellowstone National Park Road System

Past, Present and Future (unpublished dissertation, University

of Washington, 1965) p. 10. "/d., pp. 81, 96-102.

"• Memorandum of Agreement Between the National Park

Service and the Bureau of Public Roads Relating to the

Survey, Construction, and Improvement of Roads and Trails

in the National Parks and National Monuments, .Jan. -Feb.

1926. " S. Mather, Report of the Director of the National Park

Service, Annual Report of the Department of the Interior, 1924 (GPO, Washington, D.C, 1924) p. 14. " B. O'Brien, supra, note 18, p. 125. " S. Mather, Report of the Director of the National Park

Service, Annual Report of the Department of the Interior, 1925 (GPO, Washington, D.C, 1925) p. 65. " S. Mather, Report of the Director of the National Park

Service, Annual Report of the Department of the Interior, 1923 (GPO, Washington, D.C, 1923) p. 14. "U.S. Department of the Interior, Final Report of the

Southern Appalachian National Park Commission to the

Secretary of the Interior, .June 30, 1931 (GPO, Wasliington,

D.C, 1931) p. 8. ^°T. MacDonald, The Bureau of Public Roads and Its Work (BPR, Washington, D.C, .June 1930) pp. 42, 43. "Id., pp. 40-42. ^ R. Lee, supra, note 1, pp. 21-35.

'' BPR, supra, note 10, pp. 63, 64.

'" B. Smith, The Story of the Skyline Drive, The Virginia

Road Builder, Vol. I, No. 4, Nov. 1945, pp. 11, 12 ; Vol. I, No. 5, Jan. 1946, pp. 6-8; Vol. I, No. 6, Mar. 1946, pp. 8, 9; Vol. II, No. 1, May-Jun. 1946, pp. 8, 9; Vol. II, No. 2, Jul.-Aug. 1946,

pp. 8-11 ; Vol. II, No. 3, Sept.-Oct. 1946, pp. 10, 11. " Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1949, p. 105. " R. Lee, supra, note 1, p. 38. "E. James, Parkway Features of Interest to the Highway

Engineer, Public Roads, Vol. 10, No. 2, Apr. 1929, pp. 21, 22.

'* J. Reavis, Mount Vernon Avenue, A National Memorial

Highway From Washington to Mount Vernon (Mount

Vernon Avenue Association, Washington, D.C, 1888) pp. 4—7.

'' R. Toms & J. Johnson, The Design and Construction of

the Mount Vernon Memorial Highway, Journal of the Ameri- can Concrete Institute, Vol. 3, No. 8, Apr. 1932. p. 563. '°H. JoLLEY, The Blue Ridge Parkway (University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 1969) pp. 12, 13. " H. Spelman, Design and Construction Features of the Blue Ridge Parkway, Roads and Streets, Vol. 79, No. 7, Jul. 1936, pp. 27, 28. ^ H. Spelman, Tunnels and Bridges Solve Difficult Location

Problems on Ifl6-Mile Blue Ridge Parkway, Civil Engineering,

Vol. 17, No. 7, Jul. 1947, p. 20.

'^ Natchez Trace Parkway Survey, S. Doc. No. 148, 76th

Cong., 3d Sess., pp. v, 150.

'" Id., pp. 26, 81, 32. " Id., pp. 82, 83, 85. " F. Cron, Appendix A, Statement of Historical Reference

Relating to the Development of the Pentagon Road System

and the Connecting Shirley Memorial Highway, Oct. 24, 1960, unpublished appendix to Pentagon Area Transportation

Study (BPR, Washington, D.C, 1961). " Information from unpublished material in the Division of Forestry in the Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department

of the Interior. " Interview with Robert Bainbridge of the Division of Forestry in the Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department

of the Interior.

517
Internotionol

Operation/

Concurrent with the extensive development of highways in the United States, the Federal Highway

Administration and its predecessors have traditionally

carried out a number of important projects and operations in the international field. Three of the major

international efforts undertaken have been the Alaska

Highway, the Inter-American Highway, and a con- tinuing technical assistance program to foreign countries. Also, with transportation research assuming an increasing international importance in recent

years, the international exchange of information and

the coordinated multinational development of trans- portation research has become an important function

in the research and development programs of the

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).

In its international operations, the FHWA

cooperates with major financial and developmental

institutions, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American

Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank, the

United Nations, the Organization of American States,

and the Department of State through its Agency for

International Development (AID). In addition, foreign contacts have been established through international technical seminars and technical forums

sponsored by such groups as the International Road

Federation and basic engineering societies. Perhaps the two best known projects the FHWA

has worked on outside of the United States are the

Alaska Highway and the Inter-American Highway.

The Alaska Highway was an urgent World War II undertaking, requiring slightly over 2 years to construct, while the Inter-American Highway, begun

about 1930, has only recently been completed with a

paved surface. Just south of the southern terminus

of the Inter-American Highway, the Darien Gap

Highway is now under construction as a final link

between North and South America. Neither of these

endeavors has been the sole responsibility of the

FHWA, but in both instances, the FHWA has been

the prime motivator on the technical aspects of the

undertaking. The greatest contribution to world

transportation has been FHWA's technical assistance

programs in many countries around the globe.

Early International Exchanges

Today it is common to think in terms of global events and places, but near the turn of the 20th century, American engineers were already very much

aware of the events and technological advances

abroad. With the clamor for roads growing constantly stronger in the 1890's, the Department of State

initiated a project to gather information concerning

European road laws and methods of construction.

This information was a factor in stimulating the

Congress in 1893 to establish in the Department of

Agriculture the Office of Road Inquiry.

One of the first published studies of the Office was

Cost of Hauling Farm Products in Europe. An in- ternational influence can also be seen in the 1901

Annual Report of the Office of Public Road Inquiries

(OPRI). In the section on Testing of Road Materials, Director Martin Dodge stated "The importance

of laboratory tests on road materials has long been

recognized both in this country and in Europe. For

over thirty years the national schools of roads and

bridges of France have conducted careful tests of all materials used in the construction of National highways. These laboratory tests have been the means of

518
highway Expenditures

for 1971

Less than US $ 100 MilUoo

Betweeo US $ 100 and $ 500 Mlllk vXv^XvX; Between US $ 500 and $ 1000 Milli(

More than US % 1000 MtUion

FHWA Foreign Assistance Programs

Major Program #

Other Technical Assistance -

Use of the base map granted by the

I INTERNATIONAL ROAD FEDERATION I

The Federal Highway Administration and its predecessors have sent engineers

and technicians throughout the world to help build and maintain roads.

greatly reducing the cost of road construction, and it is a well-known fact that the French roads are the

best in the world. . . ." ^ The OPRI first participated in an international

event in 1900 when the Office built an object lesson

road for observation of engineers and officials attending the First International Good Roads Convention

at Port Huron, Michigan. "A special feature of the

work was that the traction engine was used instead of

horses to draw the road machine and dumping wagons, which plan proved very satisfactory. Thus, the

traction engine served the treble purpose of furnishing

power for the crusher, drawing the road grader, etc., and rolling the road." ^ In 1908 Maurice O. Eldridge, Chief of Records,

Office of Public Road Inquiries, submitted a paper on

"Cost of Road Building in the United States" for the

First International Road Congress in Paris, France.

In the same year, a new investigation by OPRI of

road construction, maintenance and administration in

foreign countries was also in progress.^

By 1910 the library of the Office of Public Roads

(OPR) was receiving periodicals and reports from

the major European countries. In 1911 the library

reported ". . . Foreign countries which are issuing

reports concerning highway activities have also placed

this office on their mailing list in exchange for similar

courtesies from us [Public Roads]." ** In 1913 the OPR made its first exhibition outside

the United States. Financed by a special appropriation from Congress, an exhibit was set up at the Inter- national Dry Farming Congress in Lethbridge,

Canada. It was also in this year that Congress re- quested the Department of State to obtain the latest information available concerning 17 items of highway

development from some 19 countries of Europe and

Asia. When this material was obtained, it was studied

by OPR officials and given to Congress for their use

in considering legislation.

During the next 8 years, which included World

War I, the Office had little foreign exchange of in- formation on peacetime road developments, but U.S.

research and development in this area accelerated

* The 1912 Annual Report noted, "The office has also re- ceived large collections of city engineer's reports from Australia, Austria, Belgium, British Guiana, Canada, China, Costa

Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, England, France,

Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, the Netherlands,

Norway, Peru, Romania, Russia, Salvador, Scotland, Straits Settlements, Sweden, Switzerland and the Union of South

Africa."

519
rapidly. When the Department of Agriculture decided in 1922 to send an exhibition to the Brazilian

International Centennial Exposition, the Bureau of

Public Roads (BPR) was selected to participate. Its exhibit was a large model of a gravel road in various

phases of construction placed in front of a realistic background supplied by an oil painting. For this

meeting a special report explaining the work of the

Bureau and its exhibit was prepared, translated into

Portuguese, and distributed.^

Following the successful demonstration at the

Brazilian exhibit, Chief MacDonald was appointed

as a delegate to attend the first Pan-American Road

Congress in Argentina in October 1925. H. H. Rice,

Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, clearly defined the reasons for participation in this Congress when he

stated

We feel that our mission is especially important on

account of this country's long and costly experience in establishing an adequate system of highways. Those who

have been connected with the good roads movement in the United States since its inception have learned many

lessons which should be of the greatest value to any other nation in the earlier stages of highway development.

If, by citing our own experiences, we can help our

sister nations of the south to avoid the needless waste of time and millions of dollars of money which we were

obliged to go through before highway construction had

become systematized as it is now in this country, we feel that our return trip to South America will be productive

of . . . good results. . . .' After his return from this Congress, Chief MacDonald presented a paper titled "Our International

Relations as Shown by the Pan-American Congress

at Buenos Aires" to the 11th Annual Meeting of

AASHO. In concluding his address, Chief MacDonald established what was to be the guiding policy

of the Bureau when he stated

What is here written must be heard for its one pur- pose—rather two purposes. The first is to stimulate our own imagination and to sustain a more profound faith

in this work of highway building. The other is to point one way in which we may be of the greatest service to these other countries. There are many opportunities open

to help in the tremendous highway improvement program

they must have. . . . There is a definite responsibility

upon this generation for the establishment of international

relations of enduring character. In the next quarter

century these will be of greater importance. The solidarity of the Western Hemisphere and the opportunity for each republic to work out its own destiny under favorable and helpful conditions is the end sought. Without highway improvement of magnificent proportions these conditions are impossible. Mutual sympathy and helpfulness

is the spirit of Pan Americanism. It is the finer states- manship.'

Shortly after this, the Bureau appointed a technical

advisor to the American Delegation at a Conference on Automobile Circulation held in Paris, France.

In October 1930 the Sixth International Road

Congress was held in Washington, D.C., with the

Chief of the Bureau of Public Roads serving as Secretary-General of the American Organizing Commission. Engineers from 64 countries attended. The

Congress consisted of general discussions and reports

of road problems of mutual interest to all engineers.

At about this same time, in line with the policy

expressed by Chief MacDonald, the Bureau became

actively involved in the design and construction of

the Inter-American Highway. But with the increased

load of national recovery programs in the mid-1930's,

very little attention was given to other overseas operations or exchanges.

In 1938, Chief MacDonald presented a paper at the

24th Annual Meeting of the AASHO titled "Contrasting United States and European Practice in Road

Development." He pointed out significant developments on the European scene, such as the German

autobahn, and emphasized the benefits to be gained by

the study and application of events and programs

undertaken by other political entities. He stressed

that "This is not an advocacy that we should or should not be governed by or adopt the policies and

methods of other countries; rather that we should

intelligently appraise the results of the cycles of time

through which the older countries have gone as an

invaluable experience from which we can profit sans

cost." ® In 1938, E. W. James, who was deeply involved in

the Inter-American Highway, was detailed to Cuba

to provide assistance to Cuban engineers in reconstruction of the central highway. By 1939 other

requests from Latin-American countries for technical

assistance began to come to the Bureau. Under provisions of Public Law No. 545 of the 75th Congress

and Public Law No. 63 of the 76th Congress, the

Bureau sent engineers to Venezuela, Colombia, and

Ecuador for short-term specialized assistance. On

May 25, 1939, the Export-Import Bank of Washington officially requested the Secretary of Agriculture

to arrange for the assignment of engineers from the

Bureau to assist the Bank in connection with the ex- tension of credits for public road construction in

Latin America.

Economic Development Becomes the Guiding Force With the advent of World War II, PRA engineers

became involved in urgent projects in Panama, on the

Inter-American Highway, and on the Alaska Highway as part of the defense effort. In addition to these high priority projects, Public Roads engineers

in 1943 were detailed to highway projects in Bolivia,

Haiti, and Santo Domingo. By the end of the war,

these projects had either been completed or were

phased down to a peacetime schedule.

However, a new priority on overseas operations had

emerged. The United States took on the responsibility to assist in the recovery of our friends and allies from the devastation and economic ruin resulting

from the war. Two major programs were soon to be

initiated under separate legislation by Congress. The

first of these was the reconstruction and rehabilitation

of the war-damaged highway system of the Philippines. The second was the development of a highway

organization in Turkey capable of the construction

and maintenance of an expanding road system to be

undertaken as a part of a Mutual Security Program.

From 1946 to 1950 these two programs drew heavily

upon the manpower and technical backup skill of

Public Roads. Over 100 engineers and technicians were sent overseas to work and train local engineers

and equipment personnel.

The effect of the U.S. highway operations in the

Philippines was probably most clearly and sincerely

expressed in a letter written to the Bureau in 1952 by

520
Jose Lozada, Chief Engineer of the Philippine Highway Department, in which he said

Undoubtedly untold material benefits have accrued to the Country in general in the implementation of the Rehabilitation Program. But the benefits derived there- from by the Bureau of Public Works, particularly the Division of Highways, are in themselves invaluable and

immeasurable. The wealth of new knowledge and modern

practices in the design, construction and maintenance of highways, unfolded before us by the engineers of the

U.S. Bureau of Public Roads on the basis of their past

experience, has saved the Philippine Government time,

effort and expense in ferreting out suitable highway

procedures thru the usual cumbersome and costly channel

of 'cut and try' method. . . . With a sound foundation, tempered and tried during

those hectic days of implementing the Rehabilitation Program and enriched by constant associations with the

U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, the Division of Highways

is now much better prepared to shoulder the responsibility of executing the highway building programs of the Philippine Government, especially in connection with the total Economic Mobilization of the Country."

During the 1950-1960 period, Bureau overseas operations expanded as the need increased for technical

assistance to the developing countries throughout the

world. Bureau engineers traveled throughout the

world on special assignments undertaken in cooperation with the International Cooperation Administration (ICA),* the Export-Import Bank, and the

* Now known as the Agency for International Development

(AID).

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Major programs during this period were initiated or completed in Ethiopia, Iran, Jordan,

Liberia, Turkey, and the Philippines.

From 1960 to 1970, Bureau technical assistance con- tinued at about the same level with major programs

initiated or completed in Laos, Cambodia, Yemen,

Brazil, Nepal, Philippines, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, and the Sudan.

During these two decades, all technical assistance

programs of the Bureau were characterized by an

intensive effort to provide adequate training and se- lective procurement of equipment to do the job.

Mechanization has been the key to modern road

construction on the scale necessary to meet the needs

of transport throughout the world. Over $250 million

worth of equipment and spare parts, destined for

highway departments of foreign governments or for

construction projects undertaken by the Bureau overseas, have been procured by the Bureau since 1930.

Because timely deliveries of spare parts and servicing

of equipment is essential throughout its life. Bureau

engineers and administrators elected to utilize the

Bureau procurement and contracting office for this

service. The Bureau required factory inspection prior

to shipping on all major equipment purchases.

In addition to equipment procurement. Bureau

engineers designed or assisted foreign engineers in the

This thru truss bridge was built with BPR assistance in the Philippines during the rehabilitation program.

521
design of many bridges, the superstructures of which

were later purchased in the United States. For the

Philippines alone, of the approximately 500 bridges

erected in the rehabilitation program, over 300 bridges were designed, procured in the United States, shipped,

and erected.

By the end of 1969, major programs of FHWA's

overseas operations were nearly completed, and an

overseas force of over 200 engineers and technicians was reduced to less than 70. From 1970 to 1974, programs consisted of relatively small teams of engineers

assigned to Brazil, Argentina, Laos and Kuwait, with

specialists being detailed to other countries for specific

assignments when requested. Although current technical assistance requirements in many countries have

changed to more sophisticated elements of highway

and transportation techniques, such as the design and

construction of limited access expressways in Kuwait,

the need for basic highway assistance still exists in

many developing nations.

In total, the Federal Highway Administration and

its predecessors have sent engineers and technicians

to over 50 countries throughout the world. From the

deserts of Sudan and Jordan to the mountains of

Nepal and Bolivia, from the jungles of the Amazon

and Mindanao to the plateaus of Yemen and Ethiopia,

and to the hills of Laos and Cambodia, FHWA engi- neers and technicians have helped develop local per- sonnel to build and maintain roads, roads that provide

much needed access for food, medicines and all of the

many other items needed to improve living. In more

than eight countries where these engineers have

worked, revolutions and open civil warfare have taken

place during the life of the projects, but no Bureau

employee has been seriously injured. In many in- stances, the Bureau continued operations during the

unrest. However, a record of the international activities

in road construction by the United States is not complete without a discussion of its work on the Inter- American Highway, the Alaska Highway, and its major technical assistance programs. Whether for

the purpose of defense or international aid, it is in

these operations that the capabilities of the United

States, through its agent. Public Roads, was tested in

imaginatively meeting totally different and complex

situations, and in the professional competence, toughness, and diplomacy of its personnel. It is also in

these operations with foreign countries that major

positive impacts were effected as scores of engineers,

technicians, and machine operators were trained, and

as roads, which facilitated communications, defense,

and economic development, were built or repaired. A

more detailed examination of these operations presents

a glimpse of the diversity and depth of the programs

undertaken and the challenges that were met by the

Federal Highway Administration and its predecessors

as it worked in the international arena. The Inter-American Highway

The dream of linking North and South America is an old one. King Charles V of Spain, in the early

1500's, ordered a road built from Mexico to South

America.^" However, practical difficulties at that

time made this plan impossible. In the 1880's, Henry

Clay publicly proposed a hemispheric route for the

purpose of promoting good will and improving social

and economic progress.^^ The idea gained impetus

when a proposal was advanced in the U.S. Congress

in 1884 for connecting the American continents by means of a Pan-American Railroad. Congress

authorized the creation of a special commission to consult with the American Republics about the possibilities of railroad communication between their

countries and the United States. As a result, at the

First International American Conference held in

December 1889 in Washington, D.C., the railroad

project received active support. Subsequently the

Pan-American Railroad Committee was created and

over a period of years worked diligently but unsuccessfully to develop interest in the project.

In 1923, with automotive travel coming of age, the

Fifth Conference of American States meeting in

Santiago, Chile, recommended the holding of an auto- mobile highway conference, looking toward the construction of a network of roads to facilitate freer

passage within and between the various republics of

the Americas. This was the start that was needed.

The first Pan-American Highway Congress was

held in Buenos Aires in 1925, and it was decided to have the Highway Congress become a permanent

activity of the Pan American Union. Three years

after this meeting, the Sixth Conference of American

States met at Havana, Cuba. This conference au- thorized the Pan-American Highway Congress to take

the actions necessary to obtain financing and technical

cooperation for preliminary studies of feasible routes for construction of an Inter-American Highway. The

U.S. Congress took action on the idea of an Inter- American Highway on March 4, 1929 (45 Stat 1697)

when a joint resolution was passed authorizing the

appropriation of funds for the reconnaissance survey

for a road to connect North and South America.

The concept of a Pan-American Highway System,

meanwhile, was advanced at the Second Pan-American

Highway Congress held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in

early October 1929. At this Congress a resolution was

adopted stating that each member country should prepare a complete study of its highway system plan in

order to meet the needs of intercommunication of its political subdivisions and to provide the most con- venient junction with the highway system of the

neighboring countries. The governments were also

requested to designate, as international highways,

those main arteries of transportation which connected

or would connect the capitals of the different countries with a view to incorporating them in the PanAmerican Highway System.

Following the Congress in Rio de Janeiro, the Republic of Panama invited all of the countries of

Central America, Mexico, and the United States to a conference in Panama City to consider ways and means of furthering the proposed plan for a road

survey between the isthmus and the Rio Grande River.

On October 7, 1929, this first Inter-American (Regional) Conference was held at the National Palace

in Panama City. The representatives* enthusiastically

endorsed the proposed survey and took action calling

* From Panama, Costa Rica, the Canal Zone, Nicaragua,

Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the United States.

522
President Calvin CooUdge welcomes the Pan American Highway Commission at the White House in 1924- This group,

representing 19 Latin American countries, toured the United States to observe construction progress under the Federal-aid program.

on the several governments to furnish transportation,

assistance, maps, existing survey records and other

such cooperation that would help in carrying out the

required field work. Office space and drafting quarters were provided rent-free by Panama in the National Palace until the conclusion of the field work in

May 1933. This was the genesis of the "Inter- American Highway," a section of the hemispheric

Pan-American Highway System.*

As a followup in March 1930, the U.S. Congress

appropriated $50,000, previously authorized in the

joint resolution, "To enable the Secretary of State to cooperate with the several Governments, members of

the Pan American Union, when he shall find that any

or all of such States having initiated a request or

signified a desire to the Pan American Union to co- operate in the reconnaissance surveys to develop the

facts and to report to Congress as to the feasibility of

possible routes, the probable cost, the economic service

and such other information as will be pertinent to the

building of an inter-American highway or highways. . . ." ^^ The Act specified that all official con-

* Although the road from Laredo, Texas, to Panama City

is commonly referred to as the Inter-American Highway, the

section of road from the southern border of Mexico to Panama

constitutes the length in which the U.S. Government, through

the BPR (FHWA), has participated.

tacts were to be made by the Department of State,

and by arrangement with the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Public Roads was to conduct

the reconnaissance.

By June 21, 1930, an engineering party of BPR

engineers had left the United States for Panama, and

by July 1, 1930, the Office for the Technical Committee of the Commission in Panama was established and

located, at the invitation of the Government of

Panama, in the National Palace.

By May 1933 the field work was complete, and work

began in Washington on the report to be submitted

to Congress.

First U.S. Appropriation for Construction

In 1934 an appropriation of $5 million was re- quested from the U.S. Congress. It was estimated

that this amount would be required to construct a

passable dirt road which would connect the existing

stretches of road and, thus, make the Inter-American

Highway a continuous reality. Congress, however,

only appropriated $1 million which was to be divided

between Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa

Rica, and Panama for plans and construction of a number of major bridges and the continuation of

survey work. The first construction work was to be

523
INTER- AMERICAN HIGHWAY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT Or STATE

PnCPARCO BV UNITED STATES BUREAU OF PUBLIC ROADS

WA5M1NOT0N. D C OCTOOtn, r933

Proposed route of the Inter-American Highway in 1933.

done on a cooperative basis with the United States

furnishing the plans, specifications and estimates for

the bridges, all the steel and other fabricated materials

for the superstructures, mechanical equipment, and

transportation of materials and equipment to the work

sites. In addition, the United States was to construct the superstructures and furnish all supervision and

inspection. Each cooperating country was to furnish

all local materials and transportation of these materials, purchase right-of-way, furnish labor needed

to construct the bridge foundations and substructures, remove bridge falsework, grade bridge approaches and

clean up the job site. Guatemala, Honduras and Panama quickly agreed on the disposition of their shares for bridge construction. Costa Rica did not wish to use its share of this

allotment for bridges but desired, instead, to construct portions of the southern section of the highway in

order to open up promising agricultural areas. After

lengthy negotiations, it was agreed, in September

1937, that the United States would provide technical

assistance, furnish adequate modern equipment and

provide culvert materials. The Government of Costa

Rica would provide the labor and local materials

needed for the work. Because of the difficult terrain,

work on these sections progressed slowly over the next

few years. With the completion of surveys handled

from the Panama office and the initiation of construction in Costa Rica, the Bureau established its headquarters office in San Jose, Costa Rica, in October

1935.

The Threat of War Steps Up Construction

In 1939 the Commanding General of the Panama

Canal requested the PRA to administer the construction of a 61-mile road project from Chorrera to Rio

Hato, where an important air defense facility was

located. Panama was to undertake the construction

with PRA acting principally as monitor. For this

project. Congress provided $1.8 million to the U.S.

Army, and in 1940 Panama received a $2.5 million

loan from the Export-Import Bank to cover its share

of the cost. With the advent of war in 1941 and the

military importance of the highway, the U.S. Government took over full financing of the project. With

some 45 miles to complete. Public Roads took charge,

and by July 1942, just 7 months later, the project was

completed. Although this project was originally a

military requirement, because of its location and alinement, it was later incorporated into the Inter-Ameri- can Highway.

524
Ouatemala constructed this 300-foot bridge over the Tamazulapa River

as its first project on the Inter-American Highway.

At the same time, Public Roads was also working

with the military on the transisthmus highway, also

known as the Boyd-Roosevelt Highway. Work on

this project began in 1940, but due to heavy rains and

other problems, work did not proceed rapidly. With

the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, work began on

a 20-hour day basis, and by April 1942, a battalion

of field artillery was able to move from the Pacific

side of the isthmus to the Atlantic side in 3 hours in contrast to the previous 24 hours required by other

modes.

Meanwhile, because of the possibility of attacks on

the sea routes to Panama, Congress, on December 26,

1941, authorized expenditure of $20 million for construction (55 Stat 196). One-third of the construction

cost was to be contributed by the Central American

countries and Panama. This established the pattern

for %-% matching formula which, in general, has

been followed ever since. However, Panama, desiring

that the road there be built in its entirety with a concrete surface, agreed to contribute the total differ- ence between what would otherwise have been its matching share and the amount necessary to complete

the road at the higher cost of the concrete. First priority in speeding up the construction of

missing sections was assigned to completion of the

work in Costa Rica. Recognizing the difficulties and

cost of construction in the rugged Costa Rica mountain country, Congress appropriated an additional

amount of $12 million without matching requirements

(55 Stat 540), As a result of military studies and

events in early 1942, the Secretary of War, on June 6, 1942, authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to

initiate necessary surveys and preconstruction work

to complete the highway to military needs. Soon

after, the Secretary authorized construction to proceed with military funds. The work by the Corps was to be undertaken in cooperation with Public

Roads and the respective countries. To complete the

project in the shortest possible time, standards were

drastically reduced.

In late September 1943, because of changing priorities, the Army Chief of Engineers received orders to begin demobilization of their activities on the highway.

Prior to the commencement of the War Department

project, the local governments and Public Roads had

completed 696 miles of all-weather road through the

Central American Republics south of Mexico. This

left 864 miles to be constructed or completed. Of

this, approximately 460 miles was to be new construction and 404 miles was to be widening and improving

already existing dry-weather roads. When the U.S.

Army project was terminated in 1943, about 58 per- cent of the project was completed at a cost of approximately $36 million, and of the total 864 miles,

approximately 600 miles were passable." Work con- tinued on projects in the respective countries until

1951 when appropriations were expended.*

* From December 1941 to December 1946, 333 miles of Inter- American Higliway and 62 miles of the Rama Road were

improved under Public Roads programs.

525
Edwin Warley James

When Edwin Warley James left the Corps of Engineers' New London

(Conn.) District Office in 1910 to work for the Office of Public Koads,

the fledgling automobile and roadbuilding industry gained a hard working, brilliant engineer and an author and future diplomat.

James, who was to become the "Father of the Inter-American Highway," was born October 17, 1877, in Ossining, N.Y. After he graduated

from Phillip's Exeter Academy in 1897, he continued his studies at Harvard University, where he was a 1901 cum laude graduate.

He went to work in a publishing office, but his interest in engineering

led him to spend his evenings studying drafting and steel detailing at the Boston Evening Institute. This schooling only increased his desire

for greater engineering knowledge, and in 1905 he entered the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he completed the final 2 years

of engineering study. In March of that year he married Ethel Townsend.

After he graduated from MIT, James received an appointment with

the Corps of Engineers and 6 months later was on his way to the

Philippine Islands as a district engineer. After 2 years of supervising

public works projects in the Provinces of Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, he

returned to New London.

It was here that he worked on design and surveys for the intracoastal

canal. James was now in his early thirties and had a solid background

of engineering experience.

When in May 1910 Public Roads needed two experienced engineers,

James applied for one of the positions and was accepted.

He immediately dug into the problems of road construction, and it wasn't long after passage of the Post Road Act of 1912 that Director

Page selected and assigned responsibility for administration of the

program to James.

Under this Act, experimental roads were built in a number of States

with the cooperation of counties and other legislative districts. From

this experience, James became fully aware of the many problems en- countered with Federal assistance at the operational level. As a result, he realized that programs funded through the Federal

Government could best be administered through State organizations.

At every opportunity, he supported this view and when the 1916 Federal Aid Road Act was passed, enough legislators had been convinced

to establish a Federal-State relationship—a relationship which has been

fundamental in the development of highway systems throughout the

United States—to make it part of the law.

After passage of the 1916 Act, James was placed in charge of project

implementation. Faced with project submissions and no uniform procedures or criteria, he soon established standards for plan sheets and

other information necessary for project review and approval.

It wasn't long before Federal legislation called for selection of a primary highway system, and criteria were required to assure the best

route selections to meet the purposes of the law. Once again he ac- cepted the challenge and when Thomas H. MacDonald became the Director in May 1919, he asked James to select a small committee and

assist him with the project. Using Post Office maps and Census Bureau

information, James and his assistants established a formula that as- sured them that the routes selected would serve to a maximum extent the greatest needs of the country at the time. This method withstood

many controversies and inquiries that flooded the. desk of the administrator. It was quite natural now that the question of route markings and

designation would be required for interstate travel. Once again James

was called upon to provide a solution. Taking advantage of his ex- perience and the personal relationships developed over the years, he,

along with others from the Bureau, was able to get the cooperation from

526
States, road associations, and other elements to endorse a plan for U.S.

route numbering.

Shortly thereafter as Chief of the Design Division he spearheaded

the development of uniform signs and markings. His great interest in

traffic control devices was evidenced with his appointment in 1925 as Chairman of the AASHO Committee on Highway Signs, Signals and

Markers and the subsequent publication in 1927 of the Manual and

Specifcations for the Manufacture^ Display and Erection of V.S.

Standard Road Markers and Signs prepared under his supervision.

From 1924 to 1943 he served as chairman of the AASHO Committee

on Standards. In March 1930 James became Chief of the new Division

of Highway Transport.

This Division, under his leadership, brought the Bureau of Public

Roads into the newly reorganized field of traffic engineering and the

developing fields of highway finance and economics.

For nine years James, as Chief of the Division, supervised the development in the Bureau of this new field of highway transport, including

planning surveys, traffic surveys and related studies, coordinating activities with AASHO and the Highway Research Board.

Although occupied with the duties of his new position, he was still able to assume responsibility for undertaking a comprehensive feasibil- ity and reconnaissance study of an Inter-American Highway. The

resultant report, Reconnaissance Survey of the Proposed Inter-American

Highway from the Republic of Panama to the United States, became

the basis of construction of this important international highway.

By 1939 James was deeply involved with construction programs on

the Inter-American route as well as foreign assistance programs. He

continued with these projects until he retired in 1953.

During the course of his career, he served as Chief Inspector of Post

Roads, Chief of the Division of Maintenance, General Inspector, Assistant Chief Engineer, Chief of Design, Chief of Highway Transport,

and Chief of the Inter-American Highway Division.

James continually found time to express his thoughts and knowledge

in articles prepared for publication in engineering magazines and periodicals. Well over 200 such articles were published, with many of

them in Spanish, a language which James spoke fluently.

With his background of work in the Philippines and his knowledge

of design, construction and planning, he prepared the book titled Highway Construction, Administration, and Finance—1929. The book,

prepared especially for the purpose of acquainting Latin American

officials and engineers with road practice in the United States, was

translated into 17 languages and distributed throughout the world.

In 1930 it was selected for the Belgian Award as first prize in a worldwide competition by the International Association of Road Congresses.

With a genuine handshake, sincerity, and directness to the problem,

James represented the best in highway engineering that the first half

century of the automobile age could produce.

His greatest assets were reflected in his relentless drive to achieve or

solve problems in the highway field. Perhaps the James theory concerning man and the use of his intellect were best expressed in a letter he wrote as he approached his 90th year. On his well-worn typewriter he wrote to a friend : "I have never been

able to sympathize with the fellow who retires and at once begins to rust out." During his career he received many awards and citations. Receipt of

the Citation for Meritorious Service and Gold Medal Award of the

Department of Commerce in 1950 and the Citation and Decoration of

Foreign Service (U.S.) in 1944 represented acknowledgement by his

government of his devotion to his job.

Needless to say, James was the "amigo" of the highway engineering

professionals of Latin America and materially extended the image of

the Bureau as an organization dedicated to the art of building roads

and, in foreign assistance, of helping those who wished to help themselves.

527
The Selegua Canyon in northern Guatemala as it was in 1959 depicts the rough terrain along the Inter-American Highway.

An All-Weather Road Becomes a Reality

Impressed with the progress being made on the

highway and the cooperative attitude of the participating countries, Congress in the early 1950's au- thorized expenditures aggregating $64 million in the

Public Roads Federal Highway Acts of 1950, 1952,

and 1954. Of this total amount, however, there still remained unappropriated at the beginning of the 84th

Congress in 1955 the sum of $49.3 million.

The most dramatic progress in financing the highway began after President Eisenhower's message to Congress in 1955 urging the early completion of the

highway. Congress promptly and overwhelmingly

passed the legislation requested by the President and

proposed that the highway be finished within 3 years. To this end, the Appropriation Act of June 30, 1955

(69 Stat 233) appropriated $25.3 million, a special

act of July 1, 1955 (69 Stat 244) appropriated $24

million previously authorized and an additional $25.7

million, and an act of August 4, 1955 (69 Stat 452)

appropriated an additional $37.7 million.

Regular appropriations continued during subsequent years, permitting construction to progress in

each country with the final gaps of an all-weather

road being completed in Guatemala and Costa Rica

at about the same time in 1963. The final paving of

the highway was not completed until late 1973 when

the difficult mountain section was finally surfaced.

Formal dedication of the Inter-American Highway

took place in the form of a motorcade from Panama

to Mexico City in April 1963. This motorcade of

three buses carried the leading officials from practically every country in the Western Hemisphere.

Formal dedication ceremonies were held at each border crossing with Presidents of the neighboring countries often attending. Receptions were held at major

cities and enthusiastic greetings were given the travelers throughout the trip.

A current road map of the Central American Republics reveals the significant role of the Inter- American Highway in the overall socio-economic and

highway transportation development within each Republic. Generally located in the more heavily populated areas of the western or Pacific side of the

isthmus, the Inter-American Highway, as a main

artery, serves to intensify the development in such

areas, provides a base for many feeder roads to virtually isolated communities, and in some instances,

opens up riches in the interior and eastern sections of

these countries. Initially, the opening of certain sec- tions of an early pioneer road were strongly resisted

by many farmers who looked upon the road engineers

and the small construction crews as invaders. Soon,

however, they recognized the benefits that the highway

was bringing to them—a ready access to markets, a means for more frequent visits with relatives in the

city, and a virtual end to their isolation.

528
The Inter-American Highway in rural Honduras in 1963.

Thus, the forces of socio-economic development

emerged slowly, but strongly, sparked in a small, but

very significant, manner by the Inter-American Highway which, later, contributed toward the extensive

advances made by the Republics of the isthmus. The

Inter-American Highway found its rightful place in

the economic history of these countries and in the

hierarchy of events that, over the years, led to the

establishment of a bond of friendship between them

and their partner, the United States of America.

The Darien Gap*

The Pan-American Highway Congress, meeting in

Lima, Peru, in 1951, requested the Organization of

American States to urgently create an ad hoc committee of experts to determine the most efficient and

expeditious manner for opening to traffic the incomplete stretches of the "longitudinal Pan-American

Highway." A committee was established in 1952 to study and develop recommendations by which each

country could finance and construct the missing sec- tions of the highway within its borders.

Subsequently, this technical committee, in October

1953, recommended studies in the Darien for the first time. l^Tien the Sixth Pan-American Highway Congress, met in July 1954, it recommended that a technical expedition be organized to conduct research and

planning surveys in the Darien Region of Panama

* "The vast jungle region adjoining tiie Republics of Panama

and Colombia, known as Darien Province in the first country

and as the Department of Choco in the second, bore from its discovery the generic name of DARIEN. This possibly re- sulted from the name given by the Indians to the torrential river now known as Atrato. . . ." "

and the adjacent area of Colombia.^^ Finances for

early explorations, administration, and promotion were provided by annual contributions of $30,000 each

from Colombia and Panama.

In February 1955, the Darien Subcommittee was

organized to be made up of technicians designated by

each of the Governments of Panama, Colombia, and

the United States. The first Darien Subcommittee

meeting was held in August 1955 in Panama.

The south or Pacific route was recommended for

both countries with a border crossing at Cruce de

Espave, but both countries modified this recommendation, making the border point at the landmark known

as Palo de las Letras.^^

With an apparent feasible route for a highway

through the Darien having been agreed upon, efforts began to obtain financing for surveys. The Eighth

Pan-American Highway Congress in Bogota, Colombia, in May 1960, adopted a financing plan requiring

all member countries of the Organization of American

States to participate.

By late 1962, the Darien Subcommittee had negotiated contracts with consulting firms from the United

States, Panama and Colombia to undertake the sur- veys and studies of the route. A BPR engineer was

assigned to work with the Darien Subcommittee in

administering the $3 million survey program.

As the surveys progressed in Colombia, it became

increasingly evident that the route along the Pacific

Coast was impractical; the mountainous terrain, the

torrential rains exceeding 400 inches per year, and the

length of the route clearly made it unacceptable for an international highway. Thus, at the seventh meet529
The Darien Gap highway was cut through almost impenetrable

swamps adjoining the Republics of Panama and Colombia.

ing of the Permanent Executive Committee of the

Pan-American Highway Congress in Mexico City in

1964, permission was obtained for the Bureau of

Public Roads to undertake geophysical research

studies of the alternate or Atrato route along the

Caribbean Coast of Colombia. This route had always

been considered impossible because of the extensive

Atrato swamps.

Using a helicopter which could land engineers and

equipment on the surface of the swamp, field investigations of the preselected routes were made. Visual

examination of surface conditions was supplemented

by peat sampler penetrations into the swamp.

Once the specific route had been recommended, a geophysical survey was made by using electrical re- sistivity methods along the route corridor across the

swamp. A sufficient number of tests were made to indicate a reasonably stable sand layer could be anticipated at depths of about 20 to 36 feet below the

swamp surface to confirm the feasibility that the

highway could be built across the Atrato swamp and

it would save 205 miles in length, about $115 million

in cost, and 5 years in construction time.

The Atrato route was approved, and as a result of

this breakthrough and tremendous saving, the entire

Darien project received international publicity and

support from the Organization of American States. The Darien Gap project was selected by the National

Society of Professional Engineers as one of the top

10 engineering achievements in 1968.

The U.S. Congress authorized the initiation of construction on the Darien program by an amendment

to the 1970 Federal-Aid Highway Act. This amendment provided that funds should be obligated and

expended under the same terms, conditions, and re- quirements with respect to the Darien Gap Highway

as were the funds authorized for the Inter-American

Highway. The amendment authorized the appropriation of $100 million for the Darien Gap program.

Administration of FHWA interests in the project

is under the direction of the Region 19 office in the

Panama Canal Zone, with field supervision being

handled from division offices in both Panama and

Colombia. The entire route, except for 14 miles in

Colombia, has now been designed or is under contract

for final design, with construction well underway in

Panama. It is anticipated that by 1982 the vision of

many legislators, engineers, and highway administrators for a "land bridge" to connect the Americas

may become a reality.

The Alaska Highway

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December

7, 1941, and their closely following successes in the

Pacific found Alaska, located on the great circle route between the United States and Japan, in a position

highly vulnerable to attack.

On January 16, 1942, the President appointed a Cabinet Committee consisting of the Secretaries of

Navy, War, and Interior to consider the necessity of

and proper route for a highway to Alaska. In February, it was concluded that a highway was necessary

and that it should fulfill two major i-equirements

530
• Furnish a supply route to link up the airfield established in Canada and Alaska by the Canadian

Government and the United States Army Air

Force. • Provide an auxiliary overland route to Alaska,

relatively secure from attack by the enemy, to supplement sea and air routes and, thus, provide

a measure of safety for the armed forces and air- craft ferrying personnel.*"

Many previous studies had been made of the most

desirable routing to Alaska, but due to the wartime

emergency, military considerations became the prime

criteria. The project was approved by President

Roosevelt on February 11, 1942, with work on the

project authorized to begin at once. Final agreement

with Canada was reached on March 18, 1942.

The work to be performed by the United States

would begin at Dawson Creek, British Columbia, and

The Alaska Highway stretches from Dawson Creek, British Columbia, to Fairbanks, Alaska.

531
extend northwestward to Big Delta, Alaska, where

connections were to be made with existing transportation facilities. The authorization provided for construction of a pioneer road by U.S. Army engineer

troops, followed by contractors, furnished and directed by the Public Koads Administration, who

would improve the pioneer road to an authorized

standard.

Public Roads received instructions from the War

Department to build the final highway according to established standard specifications for roads and

bridges in national forests and parks. The road was

to be two lanes, and surfacing was to be of local materials, with final surfacing to be applied only after

earthwork had stabilized. Temporary bridges were

to be trestles of local timber. Permanent bridges were to be left to future financing and to the determination of the government authorities charged with

operation of the road. The Army sector commanders

were to locate the pioneer road with such ultimate

standards in mind that would permit maximum use

of the alinement for the final road.^^

As originally conceived, the work of constructing

the highway was divided between the engineer troops

of the Army and civilian contractors under the direction of Public Roads. In actuality, however, it was

a combined effort with overlapping work responsibility, shifts in priorities, and a great deal of truly

cooperative effort from the time of the arrival of the

first Army troops at Dawson Creek on March 10, 1942, to the removal of all contractor personnel and supervisory engineers of Public Roads at the end of October

1943. As a highway project alone, ignoring military

and economic considerations, the route selected was

perhaps inferior to one located west of the main range

of the Rocky Mountains but because of the war, a completely different set of requirements and priorities was necessary.

With the general route established, decisions had to be made concerning location and design in or across canyons, rivers, mountain passes and muskeg; the

weather for work schedules; the use and source of

native materials; as well as many other engineering

and logistic considerations.

Mobilization

Immediately upon receiving notice of the impending agreement, the PRA Western Headquarters

started a search of the whole West Coast for water

transportation. Eventually, transportation to and

from the project, both freight and personnel, was

handled by a contractor and consisted of a fleet of

4 freighters, 10 tugboats, 5 passenger boats (converted

yachts) and 1 manned barge built in 1868, assembled

in Lake Union and Lake Washington in Seattle. In

addition, early contingents of personnel were carried

to Skagway by the Army Transportation Service,

classified as either passengers or cargo, depending on

order of boarding and location of berth above or below decks.

Simultaneously trucks, tools, and other equipment

and materials were gathered from the camps of the

Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) in the northwest

for use on the project. These were started north by

whatever transport could be obtained. The resources of the Work Projects Administration (WPA) were

also tapped for roadbuilding and office equipment.

Both of these agencies were being terminated at the

time, and the use of surplus equipment was mutually

beneficial.

Field headquarters were established in Whitehorse,

Yukon Territory, with a subsidiary office at Gulkana,

Alaska, and in Ft. St. John, British Columbia, with

a subsidiary office at Ft. Nelson on the Liard River.

PRA work in the Whitehorse sector did not commence

until over a month after activities started on the

Ft. St. John end of the project. The first contingent

of 12 men from Denver arrived in Ft. St. John on March 14 and 15, and the first troops and PRA per- sonnel reached Skagway, Alaska, early in April, with

Public Roads men finally reaching Whitehorse in

mid-April.

Personnel carrier arriving in Alaska.

I

532
A location crew fording the Donjck River.

Access to the entire project was limited to three

major routes: by rail to Dawson Creek, B.C., by boat

to Skagway and then rail to Whitehorse, and by boat

to Valdez, Alaska, and then by highway to Gulkana.

This restricted access inevitably resulted in serious

congestion at all three points. In the spring of 1942,

600 carloads arrived by rail at Dawson Creek within

a period of 5 weeks. At one time 200 carloads were

awaiting shipment at Prince Rupert, B.C., for Skagway or Valdez.

The level of activity soon made it apparent to PRA

personnel that a project office had to be established

close to the scene of action, and in April 1942, a district office was established in Seattle. This office was

later moved to Edmonton, Alberta, in January 1943

as contractor operations accelerated.

Reconnaissance and Location

Initial reconnaissance to establish a preliminary

location for the Alaska Highway was conducted by

air, on foot, and with pack trains and dog sleds. Aerial reconnaissance was new but invaluable in lo- cating the route from Watson Lake to Whitehorse

and crossing the Continental Divide. However, it was

necessary to send ground reconnaissance teams on foot or with dog sleds to survey many sections of the highway. A\lTien feasible, a winter road was used by sur- veying parties, but the very nature of a winter road,

located through the wettest areas and on frozen rivers

in contrast to the requirements for an all-weather

route, demanded that the reconnaissance teams do

much hiking to locate the route of the proposed road some distance away. When dog sleds were used,

usually a couple of engineers, their guides and dog

teams would set off for weeks at a time and cover hundreds of miles. Much of this work was performed

in temperatures between —20° F. and 4-40° F., and

with the exception of an occasional trapper's cabin,

the men lived in the open under a canvas fly. When sufficient reconnaissance work had been done,

though far from complete, work began on locating the

centerline for the pioneer road. Sixty packhorse outfits were organized at the beginning of May 1942, to accompany survey crews working out of Ft. Nelson.

These PRA survey crews began flagging line for the

Army clearing crew. In late May, Army and Public

Roads location parties moved north from St. John to

establish that section of the pioneer road. Aerial

photographs of the area ahead were made available

to the location engineers in the field camps, enabling

them, by use of compass and prominent landmarks,

to locate critical "control" points in the route selection.

Much of the time, particularly in the Ft. St. John

sector, this preliminary line was flagged and blazed

just ahead of the bulldozers. In fact, at times the

locators expressed fear of being run over by the heavy

equipment. In some areas ground reconnaissance was

not really completed until after location surveys had

started. However, no significant rerunning of surveys was required.

Construction, 1942

The rate of actual construction in 1942 is difficult to conceive, but the fact that practically all of the

pioneer road was built in 5 months, and most of it in

4 months, gives an idea of the urgency of the project.

The Army involvement in construction of the pioneer

road consisted of seven engineer regiments comprising

a force of 394 officers and 10,765 enlisted men."

As soon as the Army troops started construction,

it was apparent that, without help from the civilian

contractors, it would be impossible to complete the

access road or keep anything resembling the originally

planned schedule. Consequently, work forces began

to be merged. By the end of July, contractors were

being shifted about and rescheduled all up and down

the line to supplement and speed up construction of

the pioneer road regardless of prior arrangements.

Army requests for the construction of the Dawson

Creek railhead, pipeline, flight strips, and other in- stallations, coupled with a labor and spare parts

shortage and increasing equipment breakdowns, com- pounded to further delay the work despite the closest kind of cooperation. Perseverance prevailed, however, and on October 25 the final breakthrough came

at Beaver Creek in the Yukon Territory near the

Alaska border. A formal ceremony at Soldiers Sum533
A ribbon separates Royal Ca- nadian Mounted Police and U.S. Army troops at the dedication

of the Alaska Highway in 1942.

mit, on the south end of Kluane Lake, celebrated the

event on November 20, 1942.

Winter, 1942-43

After the breakthrough at Beaver Creek, much re- mained to be done to make the truck trail a usable

road. The westerly portion presented a dreary prospect, and work continued on into the winter under

extreme weather conditions. Record low temperatures were encountered, reaching 72 degrees below zero on

the northern sector. Diesel fuel failed to flow from

the equipment fuel tanks to the engines, and steel parts broke with increasing frequency. Throughout

the project, temporary bridges were "freezing in" and

going out when forming ice pulled them apart. However, work continued at a fairly high level during the

winter on major structures over the Peace, Sikanni

Chief, Muskwa, and Liard Rivers, on rock cuts where

possible, and on preparation for the 1943 construction season by repairing equipment and building shops and

camps.

Engineering design work in preparation for the

following year's construction was carried on throughout the winter, the design for the permanent highway

being essentially completed by the beginning of the

1943 season. On April 7, 1943, however, the policies on standards and alinement were radically altered by

an Army directive. This directive ordered a substantial lowering of design standards and required that

construction of the all-weather route follow the pio- neer truck trail to the maximum extent that could

provide a usable road.^°

Layers of trees were laid over

the permafrost as the first step

in stabilizing the pioneer road.

534
Moving freight along the highway near the Alaska- Yukon border was a hazardous operation in the summer of 1943. The ditch on the left was the original

pioneer road.

In retrospect, the first year was one of many problems of logistics, establishment and reestablishment

of policy, inconsistencies, and conflict, but also, it was

a year in which a spirit of full cooperation and dedication developed in all workers on the job, regardless

of status. A truck trail of sorts was built, much of

it improved to a usable, all-weather standard, and the

construction of a highway in 1943 was made a possibility.

Construction, 1943

The road, as it evolved at the end of 1943, was

constructed almost entirely in that year. However,

the original road, resulting from the 1942 effort, must

be given full credit for its contribution to the final effort in communication and transport.

The directive changing the standards and alinement

caused a substantial shift in emphasis of the 1943

work of the contractors under the direction of Public

Roads. As a result, the final road contained a considerable length of indirect mileage, excessively steep

grades and substandard alinement. This was an out- growth of the fact that the original road had been

constructed to a large degree along the lines of least resistance, with no appreciable thought given at that

time to locating it as a permanent, all-weather, and

reasonably safe facility.

The spring breakup during May destroyed a large

number of temporary bridges south of Watson Lake,

but stockpiled materials enabled rapid replacement.

Although this was a temporary setback, over all progress on the project was maintained by a work force

The completed Alaska

Highway as it appeared at Summit Lake in the Rocky

Mountains in 1943.

535
of over 11,000 men. Throughout June bad weather

seriously delayed the construction schedule on the

southerly section, including numerous washouts of

structures. Despite this, work on the major structures was not seriously impeded and some were put into

use.On June 9 and 10 disaster struck when heavy rains

extending 200 miles north and south of Ft. Nelson

caused the destruction of 24 temporary bridges. A

coordinated effort by all the forces, using stockpiled

and salvaged material, resulted in reopening this sec- tion for through traffic by July 20, nearly 2 weeks

sooner than the most favorable estimates made at the

time of the floods. Even with the temporary loss of six more bridges

to high water west of Ft. Nelson early in August, the

opening of the Peace River Bridge to one-way traffic August 4, and later that month to two-way traffic, was

accomplished. Fortunately, by this time it had be- come almost routine to replace temporary spans, and

5 days after the washouts traffic was again moving

over the sector. As late as August the 40-mile section near the

Alaska-Yukon border was still impassable. Access to the area was possible only by float planes. Finally on October 13 the gap was closed, reopening the road

permanently. Followup forces improved it to re- quired standards. By October 31, 99 bridges had been

completed, and 34 were either under construction or not yet started. The entire pioneer road was in a

usable condition.

At the peak of operations in September 1943, there were 1,850 PEA employees and 14,100 civilian employees of 81 contractors working with 11,107 units

of equipment. Except for two companies, the Army

engineer regiments had been moved in February 1943

to new assignments elsewhere. As with the pioneer

road, the 1,420 miles of final highway was largely

built in a 4-month period, with the final overall cost for both the pioneer road and completed highway

amounting to $138,312,166.

Cost of Alaska Highway

Item PRA Funds Army Funds Total Cost of pioneer road $ 10,196,759 $ 9,547,826 $ 19,744,585 Cost of final type road 87,205,328 6,874,307 94,079,635

Other work 11,615,913 11,615,913

Final job inventory 12,872,033 12,872,033

$121,890,033 $16,422,133 $138,312,166"

The challenge of administering the civilian program

in constructing the Alaska Highway at a time when

Bureau personnel were helping to complete the Inter- American Highway and administering wartime activities on domestic highway systems required a tremendous effort by everyone in the organization.

In retrospect, these undertakings confirmed the soundness of Commissioner MacDonald's personnel and

administrative policies, the comprehensive training

programs of young engineers, especially on field construction projects in the national forests and parks

and other Federal lands, and the spirit and pride of

all employees in maintaining the professional stature of the Bureau.

Postwar Operations

The Philippine Program—1946 to 1969

Public Roads began work in the Philippines in

1946 under authorization contained in Public Law

370, 79th Congress, an Act for the rehabilitation of war damage to the Philippines (usually referred to

as the Rehabilitation Act of 1946). The Act au- thorized Public Roads ". . . after consultation with

the Philippine Government, to plan, design, restore,

and build, . . . such roads, essential streets and bridges

as may be necessary . . . for national defense and

economic rehabilitation and development of the

Philippines." It also provided authorization for

training engineers of the Philippine Government.

Under this authorization and with a fiscal appropriation of slightly more than $40 million. Public

Roads assigned three of its highway engineers under

F. C. Turner to begin the program.

The program began under difficult conditions. Recruitment of engineers in the States did not proceed

readily since many Public Roads engineers had just

finished difficult wartime assignments. Housing was

practically nonexistent, office facilities limited, and at this time, there was a Pacific shipping strike in progress. For the Philippine Bureau of Public Works,

only a few experienced engineers were immediately

available.

By September 1947, however, many of the initial problems were overcome and the project was well

underway with key positions filled and operating procedures well defined. A highway planning and programing section was established in the Philippine

Bureau of Public Works to undertake a complete

road and bridge inventory necessary for future eco- nomic development. This new section was also re- sponsible for recommendations on the organization of a Philippine Division of Highways separate and dis- tinct from the numerous other operations of the

Philippine Bureau of Public Works. The recom- mendations of the highway planning survey (HPS)

were accepted, and in 1948 a Philippine Division of

Highways within the Bureau of Public Works was

established by executive order.

Under the "Rehab" program administered by the

reorganized highway department, approximately 500

bridges and 360 miles of high-type roads and streets were constructed.

The work of the U.S. Division Office under the

Rehabilitation Act of 1946 continued through 1951 at which time Public Roads was requested by the Inter- national Cooperation Administration (ICA) to remain

in the Philippines as highway consultants to the ICA

and as advisors to the Philippine Bureau of Public

Highways. Public Roads personnel completed the

work under the Rehabilitation Act, wliich had been

extended 1 year, and accepted new work authorized

by ICA. Funds were provided by ICA with matching funds by the Philippine Government for a program of improvements for a nationwide highway

network, construction of development roads (principally on the Island of Mindanao), replacement of

temporary wooden bridges, and the development of

village and feeder roads. The training program be- som in 1948 was continued and was so successful that

536
Unloading steel for bridge replacement in the Philippines.

537
Construction of the Mindanao development road.

Turkish terrain required intensive maintenance.

538
by 1952 the Philippine Bureau of Public Highways

was staffed entirely by local engineers and technicians

and was recognized as one of the most capable highway organizations in Asia. During 1961 and 1962 the

BPR/ICA activities were gradually phased out, and

the Bureau Division Office in the Philippines was

closed. Meanwhile, however, negotiations were underway

between the Philippine Government and the Development Loan Fund (a U.S. Government lending insti- tution) for a substantial loan for highway purposes.

Tliis loan, identified as DLF No. 67, was approved in

June 1959 in the amount of $18.75 million. The loan

agreement specified that the borrower (Philippine

Government) make arrangements for the Bureau of

Public Roads to act as liaison between the Philippine

Government and the lending agency.^-

After a difficult beginning, the program progressed

satisfactorily, and the majority of program activities were completed in September 1969.

The Turkish Program—1947 to 1958

On May 22, 1947, the 80th Congress enacted Public

Law 75, known as the Aid to Greece and Turkey

Program. The law included a sum of $5 million to Turkey for highway purposes. Originally scheduled

to be administered and operated by the U.S. Army,

it was shortly found more suitable for the Public

Roads Administration (PRA). Thus, on July 12,

1947, the State Department and the PRA signed an agreement in which Public Roads would supervise the

highway program in Turkey under the terms of the Act. By the end of 1947, the PRA's staff consisted of

18 men, engineers and specialists sharing space with

their Turkish counterparts for a good opportunity for

close working relationships and training. The initial objectives of the administrative and planning advisors

were to prepare a report on the status of highway

development and to negotiate a formal agreement with

the Turkish Government covering the objectives of

the cooperative program ; establish the obligations to be assumed by each party; formulate the ways of at- taining the desired objectives; and arrange the financial requirements for the program. The report was

completed, presented to the Turkish Government, and

an agreement executed on April 26, 1948. This agreement stated that the Public Roads group would assist the Ministry of Public Works of Turkey in establishing a long-range highway improvement program and

in establishing a pattern for highway administration on a national scale. The initial staffing of the Public Roads group provided the required organizational arrangement for

accomplishing the work. Specialists were added to the organizational units as required, but when Turkish

personnel were capable of taking over an organizational unit, that unit was dropped from the Public

Roads organization. The first division to be trans- ferred to exclusive Turkish administration was the

Planning and Programing Division in 1954.

The 11 years of training and working together between BPR and the Turkish personnel bore fruit. "Wlien the technical assistance program began in

Turkey, BPR personnel could not identify a counter- part in the Turkish organization for many of the

divisions such as in Survey and Design or in Materials. Or, if there were counterpart groups, many

of the techniques used were not mechanized. Thus,

units had to be organized and staffed, and training

for counterparts and their sections had to be undertaken. The better graduates from this instruction

became instructors for new classes. While the on-thejob instruction was going on, further practical exPack animals move aggregate in remote areas of Turkey.

539
perience was being gained by the Turkish personnel

as they built and maintained the highway system.

By far the greatest part of the Bureau's effort was

in supplying equipment. The initial aid program

provided for shipment to Turkey of equipment, materials, and parts valued at approximately $4.5 million; subsequent aid programs increased this figure to approximately $41 million. Equipment was already

arriving in Turkey in December 1947 when the first of the PRA group arrived.

The task of institution building* required innovative measures, especially in training matters. Initially,

recruiting local personnel satisfactory as equipment

operators proved to be difficult, and to furnish enough

operators, the Turkish Army supplied officers and

men to the program. This speeded up construction

of strategic highways and was considered to be sufficient justification for bringing army personnel into

the training progi'am. Prior to starting actual road

construction, all operators received training on the

new equipment.

The basic program was essentially completed by the

mid-1950's, and the last advisor returned to the United

States in late 1958. Measured in terms of highway

improvement, the mileage of all-weather roads on the

Turkish National Road system more than doubled

between 1948 and 1958, and on the Provincial System

it increased fivefold. In 1960 the Turkish highway

department was maintaining 14,450 miles of national

roads and 13,182 miles of provincial roads. From

1940 to 1960, over 800 bridges were built on the national system and more than 400 on the provincial

roads. In evaluating the Turkish program, the fol- lowing assessment was made in a study prepared in

1962 by the Columbia University School of Law:

Financially, the extent of the aid hardly comes up to the level of the aid received by the other sectors and

organizations in Turkey. Yet, the outstanding feature of the aid is that in this instance the technical assistance has been rendered directly by the Federal Bureau of Public Roads. Consequently, the technical aspect of the work done has been of the highest level. The fact that the organization was set up and put into operation by the

U.S. experts has been the principal factor in the eventual

success of the project.

Within a short time, the general Directorate of Highways has evolved into a first-class organization. So much

so that today it is in a position to extend technical assist- ance to certain countries in the Middle East implementing

highway-construction programs. The aid extended to Turkey in connection with her highway program and the results achieved through that

aid confirm the fact that, in the case of underdeveloped

countries, technical aid is more important than financial and that it should be given priority.^'

Training Foreign Nationals

The Federal Highway Administration has always

placed strong emphasis on training. The training of

young engineers and construction operators in developing the roadbuilding capability in this country

proved so significant that an initial emphasis in this

* Institution building is assisting in the development of a

higlnvay organization equipped with adequate laws and pro- cedures and administered and operated by trained persoiniel.

The ultimate desired result of technical assistance is to de- velop the capability of a country's liigliway organization to administer, l)uild, and maintain a highway system adequate

to develop their economy and improve the standard of living.

area was naturally of high priority in all overseas

projects also. The first major applications of overseas training

programs were undertaken in the projects in Turkey

and the Philippines. Since then institution building

through training has been a part of all technical as- sistance provided by FHWA. Because conditions in

each country vary tremendously in facilities, educational level, and other factors, each overseas Division

Office has been required to develop training programs

specifically to meet the needs of that country.

A deficiency Bureau engineers noted in all overseas programs immediately after World War II was the

lack of manuals or procedural guides. In order to overcome this, early in each program, a Bureau advisor assisted his local counterpart in preparing

manuals to cover his specific technical field. These

manuals were in the local language and were designed

to fit conditions within that country. Practically all Bureau technical manuals and some State highway

department manuals have been modified and issued in

the language of the various countries. Thus, American design standards, planning techniques, material

tests and specifications, and equipment practices have

been adopted, in various degrees, throughout the

world. The use of these manuals by the respective

countries for both training and operations has been

one of the greatest influences on the growth and development of their highway departments.

Major overseas programs where training was the

key element for the successful establishment of a workable highway department were undertaken, in

addition to Turkey and the Philippine Republic, in

Ethiopia, Iran, and Laos. Less extensive programs

were undertaken in Nepal, Lebanon, Sudan, Brazil,

Bolivia, Kuwait, Jordan, Dominican Republic, and

Cambodia.

While the overseas divisions carried out the greater

portion of their training activities onsite, the need to

train, in this country, staff engineers and administrators of foreign highway departments was also rec- ognized. Since 1948, the Bureau has welcomed over

10,000 engineers and highway officials for various

types of formal training programs.

In 1949 BPR and the Department of State decided

to offer to groups of foreign engineers a formal course

of lectures, discussions, demonstrations; and field trips.

The course included 6 weeks of lectures and discussions in Washington, 2 weeks visiting equipment and

automobile plants, and subsequent visits to various

State highway departments where field operations and

Federal-State cooperation could be observed. This

program continued for 4 years, the final course being

held in 1952.

By combining a relatively small group of specialists overseas with the extensive backup provided by the

FHWA headquarters and field offices working in co- operation with State highway departments, FHWA

has contributed much to assist the world in its struggle

to expand economic development by opening new

areas. Certainly the work of the FHWA around the

world, through its use and teaching of American design standards and construction trades, has fulfilled Mr. MacDonald's charge in 1925. It is, indeed, the

finer statesmanship.

540
REFERENCES

' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1901, p. 243.

" Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1900, p. 289.

' Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1908, p. 6.

* Bureau of Public Roads Annual Report, 1911, p. 46.

' Bureau of Public Roads, The Bureau of Public Roads

AND Its Exhibit (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 1922) pp. 5, 6.

^ H. H. Rice Appointed Chninna7i of U.S. Delegation to Pan-American Road Congress at Buenos Aires, Good Roads,

Vol. 68, No. 7, Aug. 1925, pp. 196, 197.

' T. MacDonald, Our International Relations as Shown by

the Pan-American Road Congress at Buenos Aires, Address

delivered at 11th Annual Meeting, American Association of State Highway Officials, Detroit, Mich., Nov. 19, 1925, Papers,

1924r-25, p. 11. *T. MacDonald, Contrasting United States and European

Practices in Road Derclopment, Address delivered at 24th Annual Meeting, American Association of State Highway

Officials, Dallas, Tex., Dec. 5, 1938, Papers, 1937-39, pp. 3, 4. "Bureau of Public Roads, Testimonial (Manila Division

Office, Manila, 1952), pp. 12, 13.

"* Staff of The House Comm. On Public Works, 86th

Cong., 2d Sess., Report of The Construction Progress On

Inter-American Highway in Central America and Panama

(Comm. Print 22) p. 146. " Staff of The House Comm. On Public Works, 88th

Cong., 1st. Sess., The Final Link, Report On The Darien

Gap and Progress Toward Completion of The Inter-Ameri- can Highway (Connn. Print 2) p. 3.

'= Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1930 (46 Stat 115).

" Staff of The House Comm. On Roads, The Inter- American Highway—An Interim Report Pursuant To H.

Res. 255 (Comm. Print, Dec. 18, 1946) pp. vi, vii, 11. "Darien Subcommittee, The Darien Gap Project (Darien

(Jap Subcommittee, Panama, Oct. 1965) p. 1. "Final Act, Sixth Pan-American Highway Congress,

July 11-23, 1954 (Conun. on Economic and Social Affairs,

Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., 1955) p. 22. "Final Conclusions and Recommendations Regarding

Location, Design, and Constritction of The Pan-Amekican

Highway Through The Darien Gap In The Republics of P.vnama and Colombia (Darien Subcommittee, I'anama, 1968)

p. 11. " The Alaska Highway, H. Rep. 1705, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 9, 10.

'" lA'tter to Gen. Clarence L. Sturdevant, Office of the Chief

of Engineers, from Thomas II. MacDonald, Commissioner,

Public Roads Administration, Mar. 4, 1942, in Construction

OF The Alaska Highway (I'ublic Roads Admin., Washington,

D.C., 1945) pp. 102-105.

'°H. Rep., supra, note 17, p. 14.

'^ Letter to J. S. Bright, Public Roads Administration, from

Col. L. D. Worsham, Corps of Engineers, Division Engineer,

Apr. 7, 1943, in Construction of The Alaska Highway

(I'ublic Roads Admin., Washington, D.C., 1945) pp. 164, 165. ' H. Rep., supra, note 17, p. 26. " Loan Agreement Between Department of Public Works

AND Communications, Republic of The Philippines, and The

Development Loan Fund, DLF Loan No. 67, June 29, 1959. " Columbia University School of Law, Public International Development Financing In Turkey (Columbia University Press, New York, 1962) pp. 132, 133.

541
Epilogue—

The

Succe//

Story

The story of the development of highways and of

highway transportation in the United States, as pre- sented here, has been limited largely to the role of

the Federal Government in the construction of our

Nation's highways under the remarkably successful

Federal-aid highway program. As the name indicates, the "Federal-aid" program is one involving

joint Federal-State funding and execution of the design and construction of highways on approved sys- tems of interconnected routes in all States. The

Federal-State funding varies with the designated sys- tem on which the improvement is undertaken, and the

States, at their option, may schedule construction

without Federal funding and without Federal review.

In the Federal-aid highway program, each of the

State highway departments has served as a full and

equal partner in that State and merits equal credit

for the program accomplishments. This text has re- corded the story of the Bureau of Public Roads as one

of the partners. The accomplishments of each State

highway department in a common and parallel en- deavor is a separate story. It has been a truly suc- cessful partnership program.

The agency that was to become the Bureau of

Public Roads, and ultimately the Federal Highway

Administration, was created in 1893 with an initial appropriation of $10,000 per year. The activities of

the agency were limited to making "inquiries" among

State and local units as to road construction and

maintenance practices. The initial "staff" was the

Special Agent and Engineer, General Roy Stone, and

a clerical assistant, and the first year's expenditures

totaled less than $3,000 of the available appropriation.

Thus, at the outset, frugality in manpower and administrative expenditures, through the years, characterized the performance of the Federal Government's

highway agency, by whatever title it was termed under

law.

Initially, the interest of the Federal Government in

road improvement was minimal, and years passed be'- fore the public demand for improved rural mail delivery service resulted in a Federal enactment of

financial aid to the States for improvement of selected

post roads. Experimentation in road construction

methods and in the use of construction materials was

the forerunner of today's sophisticated program of

construction and research in the highway industry.

The post road improvement program led to the

Federal-aid highway program and provided valuable

experience which was of assistance to the Congress

in its framing of the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916

the first real Federal-aid highway legislation.

Early efforts toward a system of Federal highways,

constructed and maintained by the Federal Government, did not prevail. Rather, there developed an

underlying concept of State ownership. State responsibility, and State program initiation, with the Federal agency advising and consulting and with the

Federal Government providing financial assistance.

The Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 established the

partnership role of the State and Federal Governments in a program of Federal aid for highway construction, and tlie Federal Highway Act of 1921,

together with the Post Office Appropriation Act of

1922, provided a multiyear plan of Federal funding

542
for the program—both essential to the continuous

program that has endured to the present.

During the time period in which congressional ac- tion on the basic highway legislation Avas evolving,

first Logan 'Waller Page (1905-1918) and then Thomas

H. MacDonald (1919-1953) were appointed to be

Director of Public Roads and ably developed the

Bureau of Public Roads (as it is known to most

Americans). Under these two men, the Bureau procedures implemented the basic concept of equal Federal-State partnership roles in carrying out the

congressional mandate for Federal assistance in constructing a highway system in the United States. The

State had the responsibility to locate and design the

proposed highways, to secure the necessary rights-ofway, to advertise and award the proposed construction

contracts, and to supervise the construction activity

under the contract which followed. The role of the

Bureau of Public Roads was that of consultation,

advice, review and approval at each of the successive

steps as the project developed from its initial proposal

to its final contract completion. The State owned and

agreed to maintain the highways on which Federalaid moneys were spent.

While the size of the program has increased dramatically—from an authorization level of $75 million

in 1922 to a program level in excess of $5 billion in

1974—the same basic procedures initiated in the beginning years of the program are still followed. This

stability of program operation has resulted in widespread confidence in and acceptance of the highway

program at local, State and Federal levels, both in and

out of the highway program.

The success of the Federal-aid highway program is unquestioned, and the reasons are many. The Congress consistently provided advance authorizations

and timely appropriations so that the States, from

the beginning, could move with confidence knowing

in advance the level of authorization at which they

could operate and Imowing that appropriated funds

would be adequate to provide cash reimbursement for

their expenditures. The Congress increased the level of financing as public needs I'equired, and expansion

of the scope of program activities has been authorized

as special needs for highway transportation became

eAddent. The sage action of Congress in highway

legislation has been a most important factor in the

success of the Federal-aid highway program.

A second and equally important factor has been the

development of strong, competent individual State

highway organizations and their interaction with

members of the construction industry in implementing

the program made possible by the congressional authorizations. The States have developed organizations with the technical and administrative ability to meet the changing program demands, and the construction industry nationwide has kept pace through

advancing construction technology and integrity of

purpose to meet the growing needs in highway construction procedures.

Recognizing the contributions of Congress, the

States, and the construction industry toward the development of highway transportation in the United

States, the Bureau of Public Roads, for its part, has

implemented and administered the legislation since

1916 and has fostered the successful Federal-State

partnership.

In the formative years, the Bureau held a tight rein

in guiding development of the program. All approval

authority was administered from the central office in

Washington, with assistance provided through 10 field district offices to which routine operating responsibility and authority was delegated, and a Regional

Office which served as an extension of the Washington

Office covering operations of the program in 11 west- ern States in which most of the direct Federal construction work was performed. Strong central office control prevailed over all system approvals, program

actions, and project plans and specifications. Construction contract administration was a more local responsibility with review at the field level. This initial strong central control accomplished a major objective of uniformity in the administration

of emerging regulations and procedures among the

States, thus establishing Federal-aid programs in each

State on a common basis. Mr. MacDonald developed within the Bureau a

spirit of organizational pride in professional excel- lence of perfoi'mance combined with a dedication to public service and unquestioned integrity. The ability

of the Bureau to attract competent and dedicated

personnel through the years stemmed in a large part

from the early organizational image. The well or- dered, fully professional pi'ogram was attractive to young engineers who sensed the opportunity to participate in a rewarding program and who normally

remained in that service throughout their professional

careers. In the 1940's a major organizational change established BPR offices in each State, with geographical

regional offices designated to serve as intermediary

between these State level organizational units and the

central office in Washington. The reorganization re- sulted in closer operating coordination at the State

level and the development of staff capability at the

regional level, both of which were to be of immense

value in the decentralization of program control and

delegation of authority which were to follow a few

years later. The increase in the size of the Federal-aid program

funding in the postwar years, the expanding Federal

interest in urban transportation problems, and the

anticipated legislation for separate funding for construction of the Interstate System resulted in major

delegation of operating authority in 1953, and in the

following 2 years, authority for all program and

project approval action was delegated. The submission of project plans to Washington was discontinued

as a general requirement. The Washington Office role became that of consultant and arbitrator on project

matters and one of leadership in establishing program

policy consistent with the total transportation program objectives of the Administration and of Congress. The result was that the Bureau effectively

administered a vastly increased program with very

little increase in the number of personnel.

Changes in the program have been many, and their

impact has been dramatic. The program started as a

rural post road improvement program. With the

growth of the Nation and of its urban population, the

543
program became one of meeting the complex trans- portation and social problems in urban areas and the

needs for intercity and interstate motor vehicle trans- portation. The changing focus in national highway

needs and in national transportation objectives had

been anticipated by BPR leaders and had prompted

their early efforts in the fields of highway planning

and needs studies, highway research sponsorship,

highway design and construction, highway traffic operation, and highway transportation economics. This

capability to meet the demands of changing national

interests with major program changes and with a modest, but flexible, staff is the real success story of

the Bureau of Public Roads. It is a story of dedicated and competent public service which has earned

the confidence and respect of the American people over a 60-year period. Professional excellence with

total integrity has marked that performance from the

beginning.

But what about tomorrow? Is it not only natural

to expect that this impressive story of accomplishment

will continue well into the future?

Engraved on the facade of the National Archives

building is the phrase "What is past is prologue."

This is certainly true with respect to the long and

successful highway building era in America. We can- not contemplate the present without knowledge of the

past nor forecast the future in ignorance of either.

The national highway program is in the throes of

major change in direction and emphasis. These

changes are emanating from complex issues and problems associated with growing questions of government

involvement. For instance, the appropriate roles of

Federal, State, and local governments in highway construction, operation, and maintenance are being reconsidered. We realize that the Interstate System is going to require a continuing process of resurfacing,

restoring, and rehabilitation to maintain the high level of transportation service demanded by the public.

This will be quite expensive and probably beyond the

financial capability of the States to do it adequately.

A program for Federal participation in the upgrading

and rehabilitation of the Interstate System has been

authorized in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1976.

The Federal role in other highway systems—the

Primary, Secondary, and Urban Systems—will also

be examined closely and debated in the coming months

and years. It appears likely that more of the responsibility for planning the construction, maintenance,

and operation of these systems will shift away from

the Federal and further toward State and local levels of government over time, consistent with the policy of

increasing the decisionmaking flexibility of these levels of government to deal with issues of lesser national

significance.

During the past 10 years, although the total investment for all highway functions by all levels of government has increased substantially, inflation has eroded

the highway dollar so seriously that actual construction activities on highways has in fact decreased. In

the same 10-year period, the number of miles of highways in the United States, the number of registered

vehicles, and the number of vehicle miles of travel

have all increased substantially. These facts indicate

that, at best, we have maintained approximately the

same lev(;l of performance on our highway system

during the last 10 years. As more facts are gathered,

however, we may learn that the highway system's

overall performance has deteriorated. A major issue,

then, will be to determine appropriate funding levels to maintain a reasonable performance level on our highways and to provide for those funds fairly and

equitably in accordance with the benefits derived by

the users of the highway system. Included in this

issue is the question of what funding mechanisms can

be used to adequately finance the Nation's highway

system—for example, shall we retain the Highway

Trust Fund or establish a Transportation Trust Fund ? Or should we return to jjeneral revenue funding for

highways? And how will rising State and local funding needs be satisfied? These are questions which will

also be debated during the coming months.

More attention will be given in the coming years

to upgrading public transportation, including light

and heavy rail mass transit and railroad facilities. At the same time, more rigorous analytical procedures

will be needed in making such large transportation

investment decisions through cost-effectiveness studies

and analyses of alternatives. Highway builders, the

engineers who developed the highway system that is the envy of the whole world, may be expected to assist in the rehabilitation of the fixed rail systems in the

Nation. We may expect that State and Federal highway organizations will become more closely involved

in this new major thrust within the transportation

family.

A major objective now and in the years to come will

be to make better use of the highway facilities we al- ready have. Land and other resources in many areas are iDecoming scarce, and fuel is becoming more precious. Accordingly, we may expect to see in the

future a continuing emphasis on the more efficient utilization of our existing facilities. Better traffic management, auto-restricted zones in our dense urban

areas, preferential transit bus and carpool treatments,

better utilization of air space and below ground space

in rights-of-way—all of these concepts will receive more attention in the coming years, especially in the more densely populated urban areas where efficiency

is paramount.

More attention will be given to the conservation of

energy and the development of new sources of energy.

We will need to discipline ourselves to use less fuel

by driving at slower speeds and developing more fuel

efficient vehicles. It would be comforting to predict

the development of new, clean, infinite sources of

energy. After all, the United States did not become

a great Nation by saving energy, but by using huge

quantities of it. We may again reach a time when

we can use all the energy we want without polluting

the atmosphere or depleting finite resources, but this

day is far off, and in the interim, conservation must

be our watchword.

Improved highway safety will continue as a high

priority goal. Significant improvement has been

realized in very recent years, due in part to the nationwide 55 mile per hour maximum speed limit. Since

1973, the actual number of fatalities, as well as the

fatality rate, have been significantly reduced. But

we must continue to improve highway design and

544
engineering so that the roads become ever more "forgiving" of errant drivers and vehicles. At the same

time, we must continue to make the vehicles themselves more mechanically safe, and we must tiy to better equip the human beings who operate those vehicles to do so safely.

Past investments in highway improvements have

provided a high level of mobility for the general population. In the future we can anticipate greater efforts to provide better mobility for the young, the elderly,

and the handicapped who lack ready access to auto- mobile transportation. In this regard, local elected

officials of urbanized areas may elect to use certain

apportioned highway funds for public mass trans- portation projects instead of for highways. Such an

effort may be expected to extend to the transportation

disadvantaged segment of our population the same

opportunities for social, cultural, recreational, and

economic benefits enjoyed by the rest of us. The United States does not have an explicit national

land use policy. The uncertainty regarding the nature

and direction of changes in land use and settlement

patterns is increased by the lack of a concensus re- garding desirable growth within and among regions

and between urban and nonurban areas. The Federal

Highway Administration and the State and local highway organizations have responded to the needs of our growing Nation well in the past. As we look to the

future, our efforts must be to provide even greater

flexibility of choice to the States and local governments

to provide highway services to meet changing population or economic developmental patterns that may

emerge or be consciously pursued.

Out of all our past efforts—planning, designing,

constructing, bridge building, and organizational ef- forts at all levels of government—has conie a superb

system of highways to serve a growing Nation. The

challenge now and in the future is to preserve and

enhance the performance level of our highways and

at the same time promote within a multi-modal trans- portation family a more flexible and innovative trans- portation system. Our past performance, in all respects, would indicate that we will be equal to the

challenge. We must demonstrate that we are.

545
HIGHWAY RELATED LEGISLATION

The following is a chronological list of national laws

which have had a significant impact on the growth and

development of the Federal-Aid Highway System.

Title Date Number

Land Grant to Ohio Act of 1823 Feb. 28, 1823 3 Stat 727

Agriculture Appropriation Act Mar. 3, 1893 27 Stat 134

of 1894

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1895 Aug. 8, 1894 28 Stat 264

Agriculture Appropriation Act Mar. 2, 1895 28 Stat 727

of 1896

Agriculture Appropriation Act Apr. 25, 1896 29 Stat 99

of 1897

Agriculture Appropriation Act Apr. 28, 1897 30 Stat 1 of 1898

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1899 Mar. 22, 1898 30 Stat 30

Agriculture Appropriation Act Mar. 1, 1899 30 Stat 47

of 1900

Agriculture Appropriation Act May 25, 1900 31 Stat 191

of 1901

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1902 Mar. 2, 1901 31 Stat 22

Agriculture Appropriation Act June 3, 1902 32 Stat 286

of 1903

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1904 Mar. 3, 1903 32 Stat 1147

Agriculture Appropriation Act Apr. 23, 1904 33 Stat 226

of 1905

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1906 Mar. 3, 1905 33 Stat 361

Agriculture Appropriation Act June 30, 1906 34 Stat 369

of 1907

Agriculture Appropriation Act Mar. 4, 1907 34 Stat 2256

of 1908

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1909 May 23, 1908 35 Stat 251

Agriculture Appropriation Act Mar. 4, 1909 35 Stat 1039

of 1910

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1911

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1912

Post Office Appropriation Act

of 1913

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1914

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1915

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1916

May 26, 1910 36 Stat 416

Mar. 4, 1911 36 Stat 1235

Aug. 24, 1912 37 Stat 551

Mar. 4, 1913 37 Stat 828

June 30, 1914 38 Stat 415

Mar. 4, 1915 38 Stat 1088

Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 July 11, 1916 39 Stat 355

Post Office Appropriation Act July 28, 1916 39 Stat 412

of 1917

The full title, date of passage and citation number

are given for each reference.

Title Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1917

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1918

Post Office Appropriation Act

of 1919

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1919

Post Office Appropriation Act

of 1920

Date Number

Aug. 11, 1916 39 Stat 446

Mar. 4, 1917 39 Stat 1134

July 2, 1918 40 Stat 742

Oct. 1, 1918 40 Stat 973

Feb. 28, 1919 40 Stat 1189

Army Appropriation Act of 1919 July 11, 1919 41 Stat 105

Agriculture Appropriati(jn Act July 24, 1919 41 Stat 234

of 1920 Wadsworth-Kahn Act of 1920

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1921

Agriculture Appropriation Act

of 1922 Budget and Accounting Act

Federal Highway Act of 1921

Post Office Appropriation Act

of 1923

Mar. 15, 1920 41 Stat 530 May 31, 1920 41 Stat 694

Mar. 3, 1921 41 Stat 1315

June 10, 1921 42 Stat 207

Nov. 9, 1921 42 Stat 22 June 19, 1922 42 Stat 660

Federal-Aid Highway Amendment Feb. 12, 1925 43 Stat 889

of 1925

Federal-Aid Highway Amendment June 22, 1926 44 Stat 760

of 1926

Agriculture Appropriation Act Jan. 18, 1927 44 Stat 976

of 1928

Federal-Aid Highway Amendment Mar. 3, 1927 44 Stat 1398

1927

Federal-Aid Highway Amendment May 21, 1928 45 Stat 683

1928

Federal-Aid Highway Amendment May 5, 1930 46 Stat 261 1930

George Washington Memorial May 29, 1930 46 Stat 482 Parkway Act 1930 Emergency Construction Act

of 1930

Dec. 20, 1930 46 Stat 1030

Federal-Aid Highway Amendment Jan. 31, 1931 46 Stat 1053

1931 1

Emergency Relief and

Construction Act 1932

July 21, 1932 47 Stat 709

National Industrial Recovery Act June 16, 1933 48 Stat 195

Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1934 June 18, 1934 48 Stat 993 Emergency Relief Appropriation Apr. 8, 1935 49 Stat 115 Act of 1935

Davis-Bacon Act 1935

Federal-Aid Highway Act Amendment 1937

Apr. 30, 1935 49 Stat 1011

June 16, 1936 49 Stat 1519

546
Title Federal-Aid Highway Act 1938

Defense Highway Act 1941

Inter-American Highway Act 1941

Defense Highway Act Amendment

1942

Federal-Aid Highway Amendment

1943

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1944

Federal-Aid Highway Amendment

1945

Philippine Rehabilitation Act

1946

Federal-Aid Highway Amendment

1946

Federal-Aid Highway Amendment

1947

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1948

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1950 Budget and Accounting

Procedures Act

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1952 Departments of State, Justice and Commerce Appropriation Act 1954

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1954 Department of Commerce and

Related Agencies Appropriation Act 1956

Inter-American Highway

Appropriation Act

Supplemental Appropriation Act

1956

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 Highway Revenue Act of 1956

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958

Alaska Statehood Act

Alaska Omnibus Act

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1959

Mutual Security Appropriation Act 1960

Date Number

June 8, 1938 52 Stat 633

Nov. 19, 1941 55 Stat 765

Dec. 26, 1941 55 Stat 860

July 2, 1942 56 Stat 562

July 13, 1943 57 Stat 560

Dec. 20, 1944 58 Stat 838

July 31, 1945 59 Stat 507

Apr. 30, 1946 60 Stat 128

July 29, 1946 60 Stat 709

June 21, 1947 61 Stat 136

June 29, 1948 62 Stat 1105

Sept. 7, 1950 64 Stat 785

Sept. 12, 1950 64 Stat 832

June 25, 1952 66 Stat 158

Aug. 5, 1953 67 Stat 367

May 6, 1954 68 Stat 70 June 30, 1955 69 Stat 226

July 1, 1955 69 Stat 244

Aug. 4, 1955 69 Stat 450

June 29, 1956

June 29, 1956

Aug. 7, 1958

Apr. 16, 1958

June 25, 1959

Sept. 21, 1959

Sept. 28, 1959

70 Stat 374

70 Stat 387

72 Stat 389

72 Stat 89

73 Stat 141

73 Stat 611

73 Stat 717

Title National Driver Register Service Act

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1961

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1962

Federal-Aid Highway

Amendments Act 1963 Urban Mass Transportation Act

1964

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1964 Government Employees Salary

Reform Act of 1964

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 Amendments 1965 Highway Beautiflcation Act

of 1965

National Traffic and Motor

Vehicle Safety Act 1966 Highway Safety Act 1966

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1966

Historic Preservation Act 1966 Department of Transportation Act 1966 Highway Interstate Systems

Modification Act 1968

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1968

National Environmental Policy Act 1969

Clean Air Amendments of 1970

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1970 Highway Safety Act 1970 Uniform Relocation Assistance

and Real Property Acquisition

Policies Act of 1970

Noise Control Act of 1972

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1973 Emergency Highway Energy

Conservation Act 1974

National Mass Transportation

Assistance Act 1974

Federal-Aid Highway

Amendments of 1974

Date Number

Aug. 14, 1960 74 Stat 526

June 29, 1961 75 Stat 122

Oct. 23, 1962 76 Stat 1145

Oct. 24, 1963 77 Stat 276

July 9, 1964 78 Stat 302

Aug. 13, 1964 78 Stat 397

Aug. 14, 1964 78 Stat 400

Aug. 28, 1965 79 Stat 578

Oct. 22, 1965 79 Stat 1028

Sept. 9, 1966 80 Stat 718

Sept. 9, 1966 80 Stat 731

Sept. 13, 1966 80 Stat 766

Oct. 15, 1966 80 Stat 915

Oct. 15, 1966 80 Stat 931

Jan. 2, 1968 81 Stat 772

Aug. -J, 1968 82 Stat 815

Jan. 1, 1970 83 Stat 852

Dec. 31, 1970 84 Stat 1676

Dec. 31, 1970 84 Stat 1713

Dec. 31, 1970 84 Stat 1739

Jan. 2, 1971 84 Stat 1894

Oct. 27, 1972 86 Stat 1234

Aug. 13, 1973 87 Stat 250

Jan. 2, 1974 87 Stat 1046

Nov. 26, 1974 88 Stat 1565

Jan. 4, 1975 88 Stat 2281

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1960 July 14, 1960 74 Stat 522 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1976 May 5, 1976 90 Stat 425

547
PICTURE CREDITS

We gratefully acknowledge all those whose illus- trations were used in this book. Many of the color

plates, especially in Part I, are paintings in a series

of 109 by the late Carl Rakeman (1878-1965), which

were completed in the 1930's and 1940's on the theme

of American transportation development. Rakeman

was an employee of the Bureau of Public Roads who

studied at the Corcoran Art School and the Royal

Academies of Dusseldorf, Munich and Paris. Among

other accomplishments, he helped complete the painted

decorations of the U.S. Capitol. Special thanks are

also extended to the National Archives and Records

PART I CHAPTER]. THE COLONIAL LEGACY

Page 4 (BR) : Winter Trail. Drawing by H. W.

Hendley.

Page 5 (BL) : Post Rider. Drawing by H. W.

Hendley.

Page 7 (T) : Rolling Tobacco. Drawing by H.

W. Hendley, after H. E. Elliott.

CHAPTER 3. EARLY FEDERAL AID FOR ROADS AND

CANALS

Page 18 (B) : Fairview Inn. Courtesy of Culver

Pictures, Inc. CHAPTER 5. THE GOOD ROADS MOVEMENT

The Cherrelyn Horsecar. Courtesy

of E. H. Maloney and Edie

Dines.

Bishop Creek. Courtesy of California Division of Highways.

Plank Road. Courtesy of California Division of Highways.

Sacramento Canyon. Courtesy of

California Division of Highways.

DAWN OF THE MOTOR AGE

1907 Columbia. Courtesy of Hank

Head.

The Pasear Highway. Courtesy of

the California Division of Highways.

Scenes of El Camino Sierra. Courtesy of the California Division

of Highways.

Challenge of early AAA tours. Courtesy of the Michigan Department of State Highways and

Transportation.

CHAPTER 8. THE DRIVE FOR FEDERAL AID

Page 84 (T) : Spring thaw and roads in Michigan. Courtesy of the Michigan

Page 40 (T):

(B):

Page 51 (T):

(BR):

Page 52 (T):

CHAPTER 6. C Page 55 (BR)

Page 58 (T):

Page 59 (M):

Page 60 (T):

Service, which stored and protected much of the

photographic material of the Federal Highway Administration and its predecessor agencies which appears in this history.

The following is a listing by chapter of all those

individuals and organizations outside of the Federal

Highway Administration who contributed illustra- tions printed in this book. The abbreviations with

the page number of each credit indicate position;

i.e., Top (T), Top Left (TL), Top Right (TR),

Middle (M), Middle Left (ML), Middle Right (MR),

Bottom (B), Bottom Left (BL), Bottom Right (BR).

1

Page 85 (B) :

Department of State Highways

and Transportation.

State Highway No. 1 (Now 1-25)

in New Mexico. Courtesy of

New Mexico State Highway Department.

CHAPTER 9. PLANNING A HIGHWAY SYSTEM

Page 93 (B) :

Page 94 (T) :

Page 95 (MR) :

W. Hicks and Sons General Store,

Rockville, Md. (1900). Courtesy

of William L. Hicks.

State highway officials on inspection tour. Courtesy of the Michigan Department of State Highways and Transportation.

McConnellsburg, Pa. Courtesy of

the Michigan Department of

State Highways and Transportation.

CHAPTER 10. Page 118 (T) :

Page 122 (M)

Page 127 (T) :

CHAPTER 11. Page 151 (B) :

CHAPTER 12.

Page 169 (T)

THE HIGHWAY BOOM

: Concrete Mixer patching a bad

spot on the road. Courtesy of

Hank Head.

: Maryland State Roads Commission

testing laboratory. Courtesy of

the Maryland State Roads Commission.

First centerline on a rural state highway. Courtesy of the Michigan Department of State Highways and Transportation.

ROADS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

The Pennsylvania Turnpike. Courtesy of the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission.

EVENTS LEADING TO ENACTMENT OF

THE 1956 FEDERAL AID HIGHWAY ACT

: Turnpike toll booth. Courtesy of

the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission.

I

548
PART II CHAPTER 1. ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL AID

PROGRAM

Page 207 (ML)

Page 207 (BL) :

Page 210 (MR)

Old tour bus. Courtesy of the

Grey Line, Inc. Modern tour bus. Courtesy of the

Urban Mass Transit Authority.

Lansing, Michigan street scene. Courtesy of the Michigan Department of State Highways and

Transportation.

Courtesy of Hank

CHAPTER 2. FINANCE AND ECONOMICS

Page 240 (TL) : 1905 Cadillac.

Head.

Page 244 (T) : 1922 Superior Motor Coach body.

Courtesy of the National Association of Motor Bus Owners.

Rio Grande Gorge Bridge near

Taos, N.M. Courtesy of the New

Mexico State Highway Department.

40 ton straddle-lift crane. Courtesy of the Southern Pacific Co.

Air Force C-5 Galaxy. Courtesy

of Tadder/Baltimore.

Page 250 (T)

Page 258 (BL) :

Page 259 (MR)

CHAPTER

Page 270

Page 291

Page 299

CHAPTER

Page 332

Page 332

CHAPTER

Page 367

Page 373

PLANNING

(T)

(B)

(T)

Traffic survey station. Courtesy of

the New Mexico Highway Department.

Chicago Post Office. Courtesy of

H. Dean Fravel.

Stapleton International Airport.

Courtesy of the Denver Post.

4. RESEARCH

(T) : Circular Track in Arlington, Virginia. Courtesy of Carl A.

Carpenter.

(B) : Profilometer. Courtesy of Carl A.

Carpenter.

5. RIGHT-OF-WAY AND ENVIRONMENT

(TR) : Highway road crew removing lit- ter. Courtesy of the Delaware

Department of Highways.

(BL) : Beverly's Mill in Middleburg, Virginia. Courtesy of U.S. News

and World Report.

CHAPTER 6. DESIGN

Page 383 (BL)

Page 384 (TR)

Page 385 (TL)

Horse towing an old car in winter.

Courtesy of the Michigan Department of State Highways and

Transportation.

The National Road near Hancock,

Maryland (before construction).

Courtesy of the Maryland State

Roads Commission.

The National Road near Hancock,

Maryland (after construction).

Courtesy of the Maryland State

Roads Commission.

Page 391 (T)

Page 396 (MR) :

Page 404 (B) :

Page 406 (TL) :

Page 407 (T) :

Page 412 (T) :

Page 412 (B) :

Center marked highway curve,

1921. Courtesy of the Michigan

Department of State Highways

and Transportation.

Arterial highway of 1940's. Courtesy of Donald W. Loutzenheiser.

Automobile Club of Maryland posting directional and mileage signs.

Courtesy of the Institute of Traffic Engineers.

Jackson, Miss, route markers. Courtesy of the Institute of Traffic

Engineers.

Intersection in Detroit, Mich.

(1922). Courtesy of the Institute

of Traffic Engineers.

The Baltimore-Washington Boulevard. Courtesy of the Maryland

State Roads Commission.

The Baltimore-Washington Boulevard widened in the 1930's. Courtesy of the Maryland State Roads

Commission.

CHAPTER 7. BRIDGES

Page 419 (T) :

Page 420 (TL)

Page 420 (TR)

Page 420 (BL) :

Page 425 (T) :

Page 426 (BR) :

Page 427 (T) :

Page 427 (ML) :

Page 428 (T) :

Covered bridge reproduction near Concord, Massachusetts. Courtesy of the Massachusetts Department of Public Works.

Camp Nelson Bridge over the Kentucky River. Courtesy of the

Kentucky Department of Transportation.

Covered timber bridge over the

Connecticut River between Cornish, N.H. and Windsor, Vt. Courtesy of the New Hampshire

Department of Public Works

and Highways.

Indiana covered bridge (1900).

Courtesy of the Indiana Historical Society.

Roebling Bridge over the Ohio

River between Cincinnati, Ohio,

and Covington, Kentucky. Courtesy of the Kentucky Department

of Transportation.

Vertical lift bridge over the Cape

Fear River at Wilmington, North

Carolina. Courtesy of the North

Carolina Department of Transportation.

Lake Washington Pontoon Bridge,

Seattle, Washington. Courtesy

of the Washington Department

of Highways.

George P. Coleman Memorial

Bridge. Courtesy of the Virginia

Department of Highways and

Transportation

The Morgan Bulkeley Bridge.

Courtesy of the Connecticut Department of Transportation.

549
Page 430 (T) :

Page 430 (B) :

Page 431 (TR) :

Page 431 (B) :

Page 433 (T) :

Page 434 (T) :

Page 435 (T) :

Page 435 (BR) :

Page 436 (B) :

Page 437 (T) :

Page 437 (B) :

Page 438 (T) :

San Francisco's Golden Gate

Bridge. Courtesy of H, Dean

Fravel.

Mackinac Bridge over the Straits

of Mackinac. Courtesy of the

Michigan Department of State

Highways and Transportation.

Tacoma Narrows Bridge. Courtesy

of the National Museum of Sci- ence and Technology.

New River Gorge Bridge in West

Virginia. Courtesy of the West

Virginia Department of Highways.

1-80 Bridge over the Allegheny

River. Courtesy of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.

1-480 exit ramp in Omaha, Nebraska. Courtesy of the Nebraska

State Highway Department.

Red Bridge over the Seekonk

River. Courtesy of the Rhode

Island Department of Transportation.

Mission Valley Bridge in San

Diego, California. Courtesy of

the California Department of

Transportation.

Sitka Harbor Bridge in Sitka,

Alaska. Courtesy of the Alaska

Department of Highways.

Sherman Minton Bridge over the

Ohio River. Courtesy of the

Kentucky Department of Transportation.

Poplar Street Bridge over the

Mississippi River. Courtesy of

the Illinois Department of Transportation.

Pedestrian bridge over U.S. 41 in

Menoraonee Falls, Wisconsin.

Courtesy of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation.

Page 438 (B)

Page 441 (B)

47th Street Bypass in Boulder,

Colorado. Courtesy of the Colorado Department of Highways.

Demolition of C & O Bridge over

the Ohio River. Courtesy of the

Kentucky Department of Transportation.

CHAPTER 10. CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE

Page 487 (T)

Page 496:

Page 499 (B) :

Page 504 (T) :

Page 504 (B) :

Page 508 (T) :

Page 511 (T) :

Page 511 (B) :

Page 512 (T) :

Page 514 (B) :

Mount Rainer. Courtesy of James

L. Obenschain, Sr. Clakamas River flood. Courtesy of

the Oregon State Highway Department.

Going-to-the-Sun Highway. Courtesy of James L. Obenschain, Sr. Cole Creek Bridge. Courtesy of

James L. Obenschain, Sr. Creek channel in the Great Smoky

Mountains. Courtesy of James

L. Obenschain, Sr. Jordan Pond. Courtesy of James

L. Obenschain, Sr. Blue Ridge Parkway. Courtesy of

James L. Obenschain, Sr. Blue Ridge Parkway in the fall. Courtesy of the National Park

Service.

James River Bridge on the Blue

Ridge Parkway. Courtesy of

the National Park Service.

Suitland Parkway. Courtesy of

James L. Obenschain, Sr. CHAPTER 11. INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

Page 519 (T) :

Page 535 (B) :

End papers:

Map of FHWA Foreign Assistance

Programs. Courtesy of the International Road Federation.

Alaska Highway at Summit Lake.

Courtesy of Gail Pinkstaff.

Fairview Inn on the National Pike.

Courtesy of Culver Pictures, Inc.

550
INDEX

Accidents, 115, 127-129, 135, 149, 246, 262, 278, 279,

337, 342, 344-348, 352, 391-392, 401^03, 406, 408,

440, 459, 460, 484, 485

Agricultural Appropriation Act of 1893, 44

Agricultural Appropriation Act of 1894, 200

Agricultural Appropriation Act of 1905, 52

Agricultural Appropriation Act of 1928, 138

Agricultural Appropriation Act of 1936, 125

Alaska Highway, 149, 530-536

American Association of State Highway Officials (A.A.S.H.O.), 79, 86, 96, 98, 101-102, 104, 106-

108, 120, 145, 148, 152, 158, 163, 165-166, 172, 202,

207-208, 296-297, 326, 334, 341

American Automobile Association, 60-61, 74, 76, 84-85,

102, 106

Army Corps of Engineers, 21, 31, 107, 138, 498

Automobiles, 52, 54-57, 60, 115, 123-124, 147, 154, 162,

238, 247, 370, 382, 384, 390, 411, 414 (also see Registration)

Bankhead Act 1916, 107

Barnett, Joseph, 188-190

Beautification, (see Highway Beautification Act 1965)

Bridwell, Lowell K., 194

Bridges, 19, 240, 331-332, 418^42

Bureau of Public Roads, 102-110, 120-121, 124-126,

129, 132, 134, 137-140, 150, 156, 163, 169-173, 208-

209, 214, 218, 267-268, 271, 281-282, 298, 327, 330,

337, 339, 341, 352, 368, 431, 448^51, 453^54

Capper-Cramton Act, 139

Congestion, 115, 154, 165-166, 171, 261, 281, 300, 370,

466

Construction, (see Roads)

Cumberland Road, (see National Road)

Curtiss, Charles D., 172, 193

Defense, (see Roads)

Defense Highway Act 1941, 150, 249, 269, 275

Design, 337-341, 349, 381-382, 384r-398, 401, 411, 476

Dodge, Martin, 46-50, 52, 64, 191, 235

Department of Transportation, 297, 298, 318, 319

Department of Transportation Act 1956, 218

Department of Transportation Act 1966, 221

Department of Transportation Act 1974, 372

DuPont, Francis V., 170, 192

Eldridge, Maurice O., 46, 50, 215-216, 519

Emergency Relief & Construction Act 1932, 124

Emergency Relief Appropriation Act 1935, 125, 130

Environment, 221, 223, 314, 349-352, 366, 378, 396,

459^60

Expressways, 150, 152, 160, 163, 169, 171, 397-467

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1934, 268-269, 467

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1938, 134, 278, 368

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1940, 249, 275, 369

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1944, 153, 156-158, 214,

249, 269, 274, 276, 321, 456, 468, 493

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1948, 165, 288

Federal-Aid Highway Act, 1950, 165, 221, 252, 258,

494, 528

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1952, 166, 254, 469, 528

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1954, 166, 171, 254, 292,

294, 358, 469, 528

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1956, 159, 174, 222, 228,

234, 254, 256, 259-260, 292, 303, 317, 358, 362, 396,

472, 476-477, 494

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1958, 478-479

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1959, 255, 479

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1961, 259, 481

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1962, 211, 269, 299, 305,

315, 321, 363

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1966, 305

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1968, 262, 299, 315, 317,

363, 364, 442, 472, 477

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1970, 223, 237, 262, 315,

317, 358, 364, 376, 442, 495

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1973, 202, 262, 302, 377

Federal-Aid Highway Act 1976, 226, 230

Federal Aid Road Act 1916, 83, 86, 93, 100, 103, 108,

113, 144, 202, 204, 219, 240-242, 244

Federal Aid System, 108-109, 113-114, 116, 125-126,

136, 140-142, 156, 160-161, 164-165, 167, 170 (also

see Roads)

Federal Highway Act 1921, 108-109, 113, 121, 126,

136, 138, 142, 205-206, 214, 220, 242, 244, 246,

321, 357-358

Federal Highway Administration, 210, 219, 222, 226,

231, 233, 236-237, 256, 298, 315, 352, 359, et al. Finance

bonds, 41, 73, 89, 101-102, 114, 137, 151-152, 163-173,

239, 243-244, 247, 248, 252, 256, 282, 431, 470^71

Federal aid, 198-214, 220, 227-235, 240, 243, 245-247,

253-255, 259-260, 266-267, 270, 273, 282, 289, 431-

432, 470;

State aid, 43^4, 50, 57, 64, 76, 155, 199-200, 239,

249, 260;

taxes, 37-39, 41-42, 50, 57, 74, 84, 114, 118, 122-125,

131, 148, 157, 163-164, 166-167, 169-173, 238, 242,

245, 247, 250-251, 254-255, 267, 271, 295, 473

tolls, 7-11, 14, 18, 20-23, 30, 116, 136-137, 164-167,

169, 244, 271, 290-291

Forest Roads, (see Roads)

551
Gallatin, Albert, 17

Good Roads Association (see Good Roads Movement)

Good Roads Movement, 41-44, 46-50, 57, 67, 75, 124

Good Roads Train, 48-50, 76

Grade Crossings, 125, 128-130, 136, 159, 165, 246-247,

393-394

Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1934, 124-125, 130, 134,

139, 156-157, 167, 171, 247, 265, 270, 321

Hewes, L. I., 489^91

Highway Access, (see Right-of-Way)

Highway Beautification Act 1965, 367-369

Highway Related Legislation, 546-547

Highway Research Board, (see Research)

Highway Revenue Act 1956, 174, 228, 254, 472-474

Highway Trust Fund, 173, 211, 227-230, 254-256, 262,

276, 301, 473-475, 481

Historic Preservation, 373-374

Holmes, Edward H., 283-286

Hubbard, Prevost, 117, 322

Inter-American Highway, 139-140, 150, 522-530

International Roads (see Roads)

Interstate (see Roads)

James, Edwin W., 73, 108, 110, 520, 526-527

King Drag Laws, 22

League of American Wheelmen, 42-43, 56, 76

Lincoln Highway Association, 83, 95, 109, 135

Long Distance Roads, (see Roads, Transcontinental)

Maintenance, (see Roads)

Mass Transit, 262, 301-302, 312

McAdam, John L., 12-13, 21, 52, 117-118

MacDonald, Thomas M., 103, 105-107, 108, 113, 114,

121, 123, 126, 135-136, 138, 142, 144, 147-148, 161,

170, 176-179, 192, 206-208, 233, 257, 268, 271,

273-274, 277, 289, 367, 467, 500, 520

Mount Vernon Memorial Highway, 134, 139, 394, 405

National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 125, 130,

139, 156-157, 246-247, 493

National Roads, (see Roads)

National Road, (or National Pike, Cumberland Road),

10, 14, 16-17, 19, 21-22, 24, 26, 29, 32, 109, 198-

199, 201, 273, 382

National Good Roads Association, 48-50, (also see Good Roads Movement)

Normann, O. K., 338-341

Object Lesson Roads, 45-48, 64-66, 72-75, 83, 320,

515-516 (also see Good Roads Movement)

Office of Public Roads, 37, 52, 62, 64-69, 72-76, 80,

82-84, 86-87, 89, 235, 240-241, 266, 367, 519

Office of Public Roads and Rural Engineering, 87, 95-

96, 100-101, 118, 204

Office of Public Road Inquiries, 46-50, 52, 88

Office of Road Inquiry, 44-46

Page, Logan W., 47, 52, 57, 64-65, 67, 72-76, 80, 82-83,

87, 89, 96, 98, 101-102, 114, 117, 191, 206, 323, 329

Parkways, 56, 86, 133-134, 137-139, 154, 159-160, 163,

167-169, 368-369, 396-397, 507-512

Pioneer Freighter, 62, 83

Planning, 264, 265-271, 276-286, 294, 295, 299, 303,

304, 306, 316-319, 351

Pneumatic Tires, 42, 54, 119, 145, 384, 394, 454

Post Office Appropriation Act 1912, 84, 240

Post Office Appropriation Act 1913, 81, 201

Post Office Appropriation Act 1919, 102, 103, 107

Post Office Appropriation Act 1922, 108

Post Office Appropriation Act 1923, 206, 227

Post Roads, (see Roads)

Public Roads Administration, 142-145, 147-151, 166-

158, 160-162, 165-166, 168-169

Railroads, 13, 14, 23-24, 26, 29-34, 36, 39, 44, 49-50,

76, 84, 90-93, 97-99, 113, 117, 127, 145, 150, 154,

250, 257, 259, 420

Registration, 57, 60, 109, 114, 123, 124, 126, 143, 146,

154, 161, 169, 239-242, 245, 248, 251, 262, 263

Relocation, 363-365

Right-of-Way, 9, 12, 20-21, 24, 37, 56-57, 87, 102,

114-115, 117, 126, 132-137, 139, 149-150, 152-153,

159-160, 163, 165, 168, 199, 249, 294, 354-365, 473

Remote Sensing, 326, 389, 394

Research, 208-210, 277, 320-352, 439

Road Signs, 61, 78, 109-110, 115, 130, 343, 404-410, 477

Roads

construction, 2, 9-13, 24-25, 37, 39, 45, 47-48, 50,

56-57, 64-67, 87, 89, 98, 100, 10^106, 113-114,

117-118, 121, 137, 147, 161, 171, 324, 325-329, 332,

333, 335, 385, 388, 394, 395, 444-464, 495, 498, 519

defense, 18-19, 24, 26, 30-31, 62, 94-100, 138, 142-

153, 166, 241, 249, 267, 275, 357, 468, 469, 513, 514,

524, 525, 531-536;

Federal aid, 16-24, 26, 44, 47, 80-89, 98, 113-115,

143-147, 155, 157-160, 165-167, 169-173, 295, 296,

300, 302, 447-448, 494, 542-545;

forests, 75, 126, 137-139, 170, 242, 247, 487-507

other nations', 139-140, 149-150, 152, 518-536, 539,

540;

Interstate, 83, 96, 102, 107-110, 116, 136-137, 152-

153, 156-159, 165-166, 168-174, 211, 213, 228, 230,

243, 249, 252, 254, 256, 259-260, 263-264, 271, 273-

277, 281-292, 295-296, 303, 341, 343, 345, 354, 466-

485, 543-544;

maintenance, 6, 8, 12-15, 20, 30, 36-37, 41, 43-44,

47, 65, 68, 78, 80-81, 83, 93, 95, 98, 105, 118, 134,

147, 161-163, 165, 249, 330, 331, 336, 444-464;

national, 47, 62, 84-85, 95, 101-102, 106, 108, 137,

151, 153, 173;

post, 16, 22-23, 26, 80-87, 100-102, 106, 108, 114, 201-

202, 240;

rural, 36-37, 41, 48, 50, 56-57, 64, 66, 72, 80-81,

85-86, 89, 102, 114-118, 128, 132, 151-152, 156-157,

160-162, 238, 240-241, 262-264, 381-382, 384, 414,

415, 468;

toll, 8-12, 14, 21, 36, 50, 117, 135-137, 142, 150-152,

165, 171, 247-248, 252, 256-257, 263, 272, 274, 294,

466^67, 469;

552
transcontinental, 62, 83, 85, 101, 107-109, 113, 136,

138, 152-153, 272, 277, 498

urban, 34, 39, 41, 47, 56, 66, 103, 125, 135-136, 151-

152, 154, 156-158, 160, 163, 169-172, 263

Safety (see Accidents)

Settlements, 16, 26, 29, 32, 34

Signs (see Road Signs)

Shirley, Henry G., 106

State Aid (see Finance)

Statute Labor, 7, 10, 12, 36-37, 41, 238

Steamboats, 29-31

Stone, Roy (General), 44-47, 83, 191, 206, 213, 444

Suburbs, 39, 133, 154

Taxes (see Finance)

Tiemann, Norbert T., 195

Trade, 10-12, 14, 18, 20, 24, 38-39, 44-45, 49, 57, 84-86,

98-100, 102, 115, 121, 126, 166, 247, 257-259, 274

Tresaquet, J.P.M., 12, 13, 20, 52, 117

Trucking, 92-95, 97-99, 102, 114, 117-119, 122, 132,

137, 145-147, 163, 169, 171, 241-242, 248, 250, 257-

259, 288, 295

Tunnels, 442

Turner, Francis C, 185-187, 195

Turnpikes, 8-16, 22-24, 29-31, 36, 136-137, 150-151,

159, 166-169

Turnpike Companies, 8-13, 15, 22-24, 36

Uniform Relocation Assistance & Real Property

Acquisitions Policy Act 1970, 211, 221, 363-364

Volpe, John A., 193

Wheelmen (see League of American Wheelmen)

Whitton, Rex M., 194

Zane's Trace, 16

irU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ; 1977 O-230-457

553


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