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94–806 PDF 2015

OVERSIGHT OF THE AMTRAK ACCIDENT IN 

PHILADELPHIA 

(114–19) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 2, 2015 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

TODD ROKITA, Indiana 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

CRESENT HARDY, Nevada 

RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania 

GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana 

MIMI WALTERS, California 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

CARLOS CURBELO, Florida 

DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois 

JARED HUFFMAN, California 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... v 

WITNESSES 

Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 78 

Responses to questions for the record from the following Representatives: 

Hon. Andre ́ Carson, of Indiana ................................................................ 88 

Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, of Oregon ............................................................ 89 

Hon. Joseph H. Boardman, President and Chief Executive Officer, Amtrak: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 93 

Responses to questions for the record from the following Representatives: 

Hon. Todd Rokita, of Indiana ................................................................... 101 

Hon. Corrine Brown, of Florida ................................................................ 101 

Hon. Jerrold Nadler, of New York ........................................................... 102 

Sarah Feinberg, Acting Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 104 

Responses to questions for the record from the following Representatives: 

Republican Members of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure ................................................................................................. 113 

Hon. Andre ́ Carson, of Indiana ................................................................ 116 

Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, of Oregon ............................................................ 117 

Dennis R. Pierce, National President, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 

and Trainmen, and President, Teamsters Rail Conference: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 121 

Responses to questions for the record from the following Representatives: 

Hon. Andre ́ Carson, of Indiana ................................................................ 129 

Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, of Oregon ............................................................ 130 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Hon. John L. Mica, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, 

submission of the following documents: 

Article entitled, ‘‘SMART, BLET to Fight KCS In-Cab Cameras,’’ May 

10, 2013 .......................................................................................................... 24 

Letter from Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Deputy Chief, Spectrum and Competition Policy Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal 

Communications Commission, to Timothy Strafford, Assistant General 

Counsel, Association of American Railroads, January 8, 2014 ................. 26 

Hon. Michael E. Capuano, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Massachusetts, submission of the following documents: 

Letter from Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, to Hon. Doris O. Matsui, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of California, February 11, 2015 ................................................. 69 

Chart depicting aggregate actual Positive Train Control pole application 

submissions to the Federal Communications Commission for all railroads (as of May 22, 2015) ........................................................................... 72 

Chart depicting monthly Positive Train Control pole application submissions to the Federal Communications Commission by all railroads (as 

of May 22, 2015) ............................................................................................ 73 

Page

IV 

Hon. Michael E. Capuano, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Massachusetts, submission of the following documents—Continued 

Letter from Roger S. Noel, Chief, Mobility Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, to 

Brian W. Higgins and Lawrence J. Movshin, Wilkinson Barker Knauer, 

LLP, May 29, 2015 ........................................................................................ 74 

ADDITION TO THE RECORD 

National Transportation Safety Board, Preliminary Report, Railroad, 

DCA15MR010 ....................................................................................................... 133 

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Insert offset folio 2 here 94806.002
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Insert offset folio 3 here 94806.003
viii 


Insert offset folio 4 here 94806.004
(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE AMTRAK ACCIDENT IN 

PHILADELPHIA 

TUESDAY, JUNE 2, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

WASHINGTON, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Shuster (Chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The committee will come to order. Today’s hearing 

will focus on the tragic Amtrak accident that occurred in Philadelphia on May 12th. We have all heard some of the preliminary information surrounding this terrible event, an Amtrak Northeast 

Regional train en route from Washington to New York derailed at 

a curve in Philadelphia. 

The National Transportation Safety Board has reported that the 

train was traveling at 106 miles per hour despite a 50-mile-an-hour 

speed limit on that portion of the track. Eight passengers tragically 

lost their lives, and approximately 200 were injured. We were not 

aware of any defects or issues identified to date with respect to the 

track, the locomotive or other infrastructure. Today, we will get an 

update from the NTSB on where their investigation stands, and 

any additional information they can provide on the cause of this accident. 

Since the accident, the Federal Railroad Administration and Amtrak have taken several steps to improve safety along the Northeast Corridor. Amtrak is assessing all the curves along the NEC to 

determine if additional speed restrictions should be imposed. Amtrak has also announced it will be installing inward-facing cameras 

in its locomotives to help gain a better understanding of how incidents occur. And they have also committed to finish implementation of Positive Train Control on the Northeast Corridor by December of this year. 

Today, I want to review what actions Amtrak and the FRA took 

on passenger rail safety before this accident, particularly why FRA 

didn’t mandate the review of severe curves sooner. 

Finally, this accident, once again, highlighted the central role the 

Northeast Corridor plays in moving people along the east coast. 

The NEC represents 2 percent of the Nation’s landmass, but 18 

percent of the population and 20 percent of our Nation’s GDP. 

Hundreds of thousands of people use the corridor daily to get to 

work, travel between some of our largest cities. When the corridor 

is out for just several days, there is a real and significant impact 

on people’s lives and the economy. 

2 

This committee is committed to focusing resources and improving 

the Northeast Corridor, including in our bipartisan Amtrak reform 

bill that passed the House just a few months ago. I look forward 

to working with my friends in the Senate to get that reform bill 

enacted into law. In closing, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding these important issues. 

I would now like to recognize Ranking Member DeFazio for an 

opening statement. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding this 

hearing today. 

I certainly agree with you about the extraordinary importance to 

the concentrated population on the east coast of the United States 

on the use of this corridor on a daily basis in terms of the number 

of people that use it and the contribution to the economy and what 

happens when that corridor goes down. 

And I also agree that this committee does have a long-term commitment to Amtrak and other infrastructure needs of the United 

States. Unfortunately, that is not shared by your Republican colleagues on the Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development 

Appropriations Subcommittee. In fact, on the day of the accident, they cut $290 million from the 

capital budget of Amtrak. The capital budget goes to things like 

Positive Train Control. It also goes to things like the 140-year-old 

tunnel. You know, if that collapses or becomes unusable, the system will totally be out of use for an indefinite period of time or 

many of the 100-year-old bridges that need repair or replacement 

along that line. Any cuts to the budget of Amtrak, which has a $21 billion—$21 

billion, ‘‘B,’’ billion dollar—backlog on critical infrastructure investments, maintenance investments, things that do include Positive 

Train Control, do include bridges, bridge safety, do include signal 

systems, and other things that are so outmoded. And I don’t think 

they are using even vacuum tubes. They are sort of before that era. 

It is not OK. And to further reduce that budget is going to jeopardize minimally the operation of this corridor or, even worse, 

cause an accident directly with a tunnel collapse or a bridge collapse or failure of signal system. We can’t point to this accident 

and say that it was directly caused by a lack of investment. That 

is true. We still don’t know what happened, and we are looking forward to the NTSB’s findings. 

But we do know that the NTSB first, in 1969, proposed that we 

should move forward with Positive Train Control. They have something called the Most Wanted List. In 1990, the first edition of the 

Most Wanted List said we needed Positive Train Control. And since 

that time, quite a number of people have died in preventable accidents around the country because of the lack of Positive Train Control. 

Yes, human error. That is what Positive Train Control is designed to prevent: human error. This was probably human error. 

We still don’t know if there was a mechanical malfunction. It is a 

relatively new train set. But we don’t know yet. The point is, PTC 

could prevent accidents like this. It could have prevented many 

other accidents over the last two decades since it was first recommended by NTSB, and we need to move forward with all due 

3 

dispatch in installing that system on commuter railroads and passenger, other passenger railroads and on the entire Amtrak system, 

and on those required critical freight lines, particularly those carrying hazardous materials, particularly through urban areas. 

So I am pleased we are here today to try and understand better 

what caused this accident, what we might do to prevent them in 

the future. I don’t think we are going to get to any definitive point. 

But for me, bottom line is, you know, we can no longer ignore a 

$21 billion backlog. We can’t ignore we are running trains over 

100-year-old bridges of dubious stability. We can’t ignore that we 

are running trains through 140-year-old tunnels that need total rehabilitation. We can’t, any longer, ignore the fact that we have the 

signalization systems that are pre-vacuum tube era that are trying 

to link into more modern, sophisticated systems. 

So there is much to be done, and I wish that all our colleagues 

in Congress shared our commitment to infrastructure investment. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I thank the gentleman. 

And with the concurrence of the ranking member, I will now recognize the chairman of the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, 

and Hazardous Materials, Mr. Denham. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, and good morning. First, let me thank 

you for holding this hearing; obviously, very important. 

I also want to thank Ranking Member Capuano for quickly going 

up to Philadelphia and really surveying the situation with me. It 

was important to see firsthand and understand specifically some of 

the things that were happening. 

But let me talk a little bit about my frustration. We went up 

there to immediately assess the situation. NTSB was already making definitive statements, and now 3 weeks later, while we had a 

brand new locomotive, we still can’t confirm whether or not there 

was a malfunction with that locomotive. And even though NTSB 

made definitive statements, still cannot defend whether or not 

there was an operator error. Cannot identify whether or not there 

was an engineer that bypassed the system. 

The engineer has been working with NTSB, but still cannot 

verify that the cell phone that was in use, whether it was texting 

or using cell phone service during that time. It is my understanding the engineer has given his passport, and yet we can’t still 

identify whether or not there was an issue. So my concern is that 

NTSB came out and made an immediate statement a couple of 

hours after the accident, but 3 weeks later is unable to identify any 

of these issues around it. 

I think this committee expects answers. I think the families are 

owed answers. I think the American public is looking to make sure 

that rail is safe across our entire Nation. We are also looking for 

solutions. I am looking forward to seeing PTC implemented in a 

very, very quick manner. But I would ask that you take a look at 

this emergency proclamation that was put out—emergency order 

that was put out by FRA. 

My concern is, a year and a half ago, when we had Metro-North, 

one of the worst accidents that this country has ever seen, almost 

the exact same emergency order was put out. A year and a half 

ago. The same PTC was important, and yet we still don’t have PTC 

4 

on that area of track either. So now a new emergency order saying 

that we will have PTC on the Northeast Corridor by the end of the 

year, obviously we have concerns. 

We are looking for solutions. I think the families deserve to hear 

what those solutions are, but more importantly, that those solutions are actually put into place. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I thank the gentleman. 

Now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. 

Capuano. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for having 

this hearing. 

I welcome the members of the board. I am looking forward to 

your testimony. We all want answers. I know you want answers 

too, but I also want them to be right. More than anything else, 

they need to be right, not speculation. 

I also want to just comment that I know that many people along 

the Northeast Corridor, particularly those in Philadelphia, my 

friend, Congressman Brady, and my friend, Congressman Fattah, 

are watching this closely, and they want answers as well, and they 

will be keeping a close eye on this. 

I guess I am looking forward to the specific lessons we learn, but 

I also think we need to look at the lessons that Congress should 

learn. What should our priorities be? We talk a good game, but we 

are the funders. Are we going to fund this, or are we not going to 

fund it? We talk a good game, but PTC is not new, and it is not 

limited just to Amtrak. 

Positive Train Control is an issue across the country on every 

rail line of this country. Are we going to require it, or are we not? 

Everybody here knows we don’t want to talk about it, but there are 

several proposals floating around Congress right now to delay it 

even further. And we all understand the realities and the cost involved, but those are questions we need to ask on a serious basis, 

how much responsibility will we as Members of Congress take on 

our shoulders the next time an accident happens and we look in 

the mirror. 

Have we done everything we can reasonably do, reasonably do, 

to prevent it? I am not looking for scapegoats. I am looking for answers, as we all are. And I have full faith that the NTSB, along 

with the FRA and Amtrak, will find those answers. And, again, I 

want them quickly, but more importantly, I want them right. 

And again, I appreciate you being here, and I appreciate the 

chairman calling this hearing very much. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

And with that, I would like to welcome our panel of witnesses. 

Thank you for being here today. First, the Honorable Christopher 

Hart. He is the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety 

Board. 

Next, the Honorable Joseph Boardman, the President and Chief 

Executive Officer of Amtrak. 

Next, Ms. Sarah Feinberg, the Acting Administrator for the Federal Railroad Administration, and has just been nominated. So congratulations as you go through that process. Good luck. 

5 

And Dennis Pierce, the national president of the Brotherhood of 

Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen. 

Again, thank you, all, for being here. I ask unanimous consent 

that our witnesses’ full statements be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered. Since your complete written testimony is 

going to be in the record, we would ask you to keep it to about 5 

minutes, your statement. 

And with that, we will start with Mr. Hart. Please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. HART, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; HON. JOSEPH H. 

BOARDMAN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

AMTRAK; SARAH FEINBERG, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION; AND DENNIS R. PIERCE, 

NATIONAL PRESIDENT, BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE 

ENGINEERS AND TRAINMEN, AND PRESIDENT, TEAMSTERS 

RAIL CONFERENCE 

Mr. HART. Thank you, and good morning. 

Chairman Shuster, Ranking Member DeFazio, and members of 

the committee, thank you for inviting the NTSB to appear before 

you today. Earlier this morning, we released a preliminary report 

on this investigation. It is a summation of facts that we have released up to this point, and I would like to review these facts briefly with you this morning. 

At approximately 9:21 p.m. on Tuesday, May 12, Amtrak Regional Train 188 derailed at Frankford Junction north of Philadelphia’s 30th Street Station. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Can you pull your mic closer? 

Mr. HART. Oh, yes. I am sorry. 

As the chairman mentioned, the NTSB has determined that seconds before the derailment, the train was traveling at 106 miles an 

hour heading into a 50-mile-per-hour curve. Emergency braking 

was applied, but the train slowed to only 102 miles per hour before 

the data recording ended. Sadly, 8 people were killed, and more 

than 200 people were injured as a result of this accident. 

On behalf of the NTSB, I would like to offer my sincerest condolences to those who lost loved ones, and our thoughts remain with 

those who are still recovering from their injuries. Briefly, areas we 

will explore in this investigation include tracks, recorders, mechanical, signals, operations, human performance, survival factors, and 

medical. Much work remains, but there are few facts that I can report to you today. 

We know that a properly installed and functional Positive Train 

Control system, or PTC, would have prevented this accident. PTC 

is technology that is designed to prevent overspeed derailments as 

well as train-to-train collisions, incursions into roadway worker 

protection zones, and proceedings through misaligned switches. 

The accidents we have investigated have shown us that we need 

technology that can step in when humans fail due to distraction, 

medical conditions, or other factors. 

As a result, NTSB has called for train control technology for decades, as was mentioned, since 1969. Present law requires implementation of PTC by the end of this year, fully 7 years after the 

mandate was signed by Congress into law. We know that most railVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:13 Jul 20, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\FULL\6-2-15~1\94806.TXT JEAN
6 

roads will not comply with this law. Those railroads that have 

made the difficult decisions and invested in this proven safety enhancement should be commended for their leadership. Any extension of this deadline must have a transparent accounting of the 

steps that will be taken to meet a new deadline. Regulators and 

policymakers need that information to make important policy decisions, and the traveling public deserves that accountability. 

Railcar crashworthiness is another area that we will investigate. 

As you can see from the pictures, the survivable space in the first 

passenger car was severely compromised. We will fully document 

and analyze the damage to this car and other cars and make recommendations that the NTSB determines are necessary to improve 

crashworthiness and build on existing recommendations in this 

area. 

We have received full cooperation from the crew in their interviews and followup conversations. As you know, we are evaluating 

the engineer’s cell phone records to correlate the timing of the data 

and voice activity on May 12 with the accident timeline. This process involves reviewing the timestamps from the phone records, 

which are from different time zones, with data from other recorded 

information, such as the locomotive event recorder, the outwardfacing video camera, radio communications, and surveillance video. 

When we have clarity on this timeline, we will release this information to you and to the public. 

Additionally, the NTSB has called for inward- and outward-facing video and audio recorders on trains since 2007. While Amtrak 

uses outward-facing cameras, they were not using inward-facing 

cameras at the time of this accident. These cameras can provide 

critical information to the NTSB as we work to determine ways to 

prevent future accidents. 

In this case, the engineer states that he has no memory of the 

events leading up to the derailment. Video could fill in those gaps. 

I am encouraged by Amtrak’s announcement that they intend to install inward-facing cameras, but we recommended installing locomotive cab audio recorders as well. 

We look forward to learning more about Amtrak’s initiative, and 

I hope the FRA will proceed with requiring the installation of both 

inward-facing video cameras and locomotive cab audio recorders 

throughout the U.S. rail fleet. As I stated, we have much work 

ahead of us, and I will keep you informed as this investigation proceeds. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and 

I am available to answer your questions. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Hart. 

And with that, Mr. Boardman, please proceed. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Thank you. I must start this morning by offering 

my heartfelt regret for the recent derailment at Frankford Junction. It was Amtrak’s train on our railroad, and we are responsible 

for the incident and its consequences. I regret it deeply, and based 

on the conversations that I have had over the last 3 weeks, that 

sentiment is shared by everyone in our company. 

Everything we have done since the accident has been driven by 

a sincere hope that we could do something, however small, to mitigate the suffering and loss that everyone endured as a result of 

this terrible accident. We have been greatly helped in that effort 

7 

by the people of Philadelphia, and I would like to thank all of 

them, but particularly Mayor Nutter, the police, the fire, and the 

EMS services, and the staff of the hospitals who received and treated the injured. Thank you for everything you did on behalf of our 

passengers and our employees. 

I should also take this opportunity to note that we want to do 

everything we can to support the NTSB’s investigation. I will refrain from addressing matters that are still under investigation. 

We will be working closely with both the NTSB and our regulators, 

the FRA, to ensure we address the root causes of this accident. 

And to you, ladies and gentlemen of the committee, and to our 

passengers and employees, we run a safe railroad. And safety will 

continue to be our top priority. The Northeast Corridor, in particular, has an excellent safety record, and this accident is so 

shocking because it is so unexpected. And no other place in the 

country is a comparable volume of traffic moved with such a solid 

record. 

The last previous derailment on the Northeast Corridor with passenger fatalities occurred 28 years ago. The Northeast Corridor’s 

safety systems are the best in the country. We operate a layered 

signal system that provides trains with multiple levels of protection. There is a trackside signal system. There is an alerter to ensure that engineers are awake. There is a cab signal system. There 

is an Automatic Train Control system, ATC, to prevent train collisions and stop the train if the crews fail to acknowledge or comply 

with signals. 

And finally, in places, there is the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System, ACSES. That is Amtrak’s Positive Train Control system to stop trains if engineers fail to comply with authorized speed 

limits. ACSES is in service from New Haven to Boston and at 

points between Washington and New York where trains exceed 125 

miles an hour. It is installed in the rest of the Amtrak owned-andoperated Northeast Corridor and should be operational in time to 

comply with the Federal statutory mandate of December 31, 2015. 

These systems backstop the people who are responsible for safe 

movement of our trains. We operate a thorough training oversight 

and coaching system for our crews. Our engineers and conductors 

are required to pass an extensive FRA-approved training program 

and to develop a very high level of familiarity with the route. Probably millions of train movements negotiated the curve at Frankford 

Junction safely since Amtrak took over the Northeast Corridor in 

1976. 

The system works because, generally speaking, we have put together a series of layered nets, each guarding the previous layer. 

We rely on these systems, but we have never been able to completely eliminate the risk of human error. There is always a risk 

of a gap, and even the most tightly woven net. The train 188 derailment revealed one such hole in our safety net. 

And in the weeks since the derailment, many people have raised 

a seemingly simple question: Why didn’t the tracks where the accident occurred have some kind of safety feature installed to trip the 

signals and force the engineer to slow the train? This is the right 

question to ask, and I am going to address it directly while proVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:13 Jul 20, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\FULL\6-2-15~1\94806.TXT JEAN
8 

viding you the necessary background information to understand 

the answer. 

In 1990, an Amtrak train derailed on a sharp curve in Back Bay 

Station in Boston, and collided with an MBTA commuter train. 

That derailment was caused by an engineer failing to slow before 

a curve. Shortly thereafter, industry regulators and operators reviewed the NEC and looked for other places where the approached 

speed of a train was greater than the speed at which the train 

might derail in the curve if an engineer failed to slow down. 

At those points, we modified the ATC system by installing a code 

change point to force engineers to slow down. The southbound 

tracks at Frankford Junction were one such place. The derailment 

speed at Frankford Junction is 98 miles an hour. Northbound 

trains approach that curve at 80 miles an hour while the southbound train approaches at 110 miles an hour. 

So in short, when a train approaches from one direction but 

doesn’t slow down, there is no risk of derailment. But if a train 

comes from the other direction and doesn’t slow down for whatever 

reason, there is a risk of derailment. We therefore applied the 

modification to the southbound tracks so that trains approaching 

from the north at speeds of 110 would receive a signal indication 

in the cab just before the curve, forcing them to slow to 45 miles 

an hour so that they could pass through the curve safely at 50 

miles an hour. 

The northbound track did not have the same protection installed 

because the approach speed was 80 miles an hour, which was slow 

enough that a train could round the curve at that speed without 

derailing if the engineer failed to slow down. At that time, the notion that an engineer might actually accelerate into the northbound 

curve was not a circumstance we anticipated; and thus, we didn’t 

mitigate for it. 

It was a reasonable decision reached by reasonable experts under 

reasonable circumstances. And since this and similar change points 

were installed in 1991, the application of this policy successfully 

prevented overspeed derailments throughout the Northeast Corridor for about 25 years. That clearly changed on May 12. The 

proper response now is for us to figure out what happened and to 

narrow or eliminate the gap so that this accident cannot happen 

again. 

The full implementation of PTC later this year will be a major 

step forward in this regard. Until it is fully in service, we are working now with the FRA to implement the measures called for in the 

emergency order to ensure the safety of our trains and passengers. 

The most important thing we can do, however, is to implement 

PTC. Amtrak is the Nation’s leader in PTC. We were the first railroad to secure regulatory approval for our PTC system in the 

1990s, the first to put it into operation, and the only company to 

have a system approved for use for speeds up to 150 miles an hour. 

No other Class I railroad in the United States, not one, is as far 

along in installing PTC as Amtrak is. 

My belief in the importance of PTC predates my arrival at Amtrak. As the Federal Railroad Administrator, I worked hard to secure the passage of the law requiring PTC installation on the railroads. I still believe that the single greatest contribution that my 

9 

generation of railroaders can make to this industry is to implement 

PTC as rapidly as possible. And I promise you that by the end of 

this year this system, which will dramatically enhance safety, will 

be complete and operational on the NEC. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Boardman. 

With that, Ms. Feinberg, you may proceed. 

Ms. FEINBERG. Chairman Shuster, Ranking Member DeFazio, 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues related to the May 12 Amtrak accident in Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, and the safety of passenger rail. 

We extend our deepest sympathies to the victims of this accident 

and to their loved ones. And I can assure them that we will take 

every step we can to ensure an accident like this cannot happen 

again. 

I also want to thank the city of Philadelphia, its mayor, and its 

first responders for their heroic and incredible response to this accident. Their leadership was truly remarkable. 

Let me say at the outset, all of us at the FRA are heartbroken 

about this tragic accident. The driving mission of our organization 

is to keep the public safe, and so while every accident matters to 

us, this accident in particular, which appears to have been preventable, and which took so many lives and left so many injured, is 

truly painful for our FRA family. 

We continue to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident. While it will take time to complete the investigation, we 

have not and will not wait to take actions that will improve the 

safety of Amtrak as well as other passenger rail operations. 

On May 16, 4 days after the accident, I directed Amtrak to take 

several actions before allowing its operations to resume north of 

Philadelphia. I followed those directives with an emergency order 

on May 21. Amtrak has complied with those directives thus far, 

and the FRA will ensure that Amtrak follows through to fully implement them. 

When we released the May 21 emergency order, we also stated 

that we were considering taking additional steps to direct similar 

orders at other passenger railroads that may have similar curve 

and speed issues. We continue our work on those directives, and we 

plan to release additional information about that work in the coming days. 

And while the cause of this accident has not been officially determined, we do know that speed was a significant factor. And speed, 

simply put, is what we refer to as a human factor, a factor based 

on human behavior. Human factors remain a leading cause of all 

rail accidents. They are also the most difficult to address. 

But today, I want to announce that FRA is preparing a package 

of actions that we will finalize in the coming weeks and months 

aimed at addressing just these kinds of factors: human factors, factors such as speed, distraction, and training. These actions may include additional emergency orders, safety advisories, rulemakings, 

agreements or other initiatives. 

And again, beyond just those next steps, I want to assure you 

that the FRA is firmly committed to continue taking additional acVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:13 Jul 20, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\FULL\6-2-15~1\94806.TXT JEAN
10 

tions, as many as it takes, that will mitigate the risks and hazards 

identified in the ongoing investigation. 

Now, there has been significant amount of public discussion 

about what specifically would have prevented this accident, which 

specific technology and which new regulation. But the reality is, is 

if we believe that the cause of this accident was speed, it would 

have been prevented by Positive Train Control. 

As this committee is well aware, Positive Train Control is the 

single most important railroad safety technological development in 

more than a century, and it is absolutely necessary to ensuring the 

kind of safety that we expect on our rail system. Per the Congress’ 

mandate, railroads are required to install PTC on all passenger 

routes and certain freight routes by December 31, 2015, 7 months 

from now. 

FRA has been actively pushing the railroads to have PTC fully 

implemented by the deadline. We have met with the railroads for 

years on this issue. We have hired staff to assist and oversee the 

implementation of this technology. We have urged the submission 

of PTC safety and implementation plans. We have inquired with 

individual railroads and with the AAR about their progress. We 

have worked with the FCC to resolve issues related to spectrum. 

We have also urged, year after year, for more funding to be directed at commuter railroads and at Amtrak to implement Positive 

Train Control. For the past 2 years, as part of the GROW AMERICA Act, FRA has requested $825 million to assist commuter railroads with the implementation of PTC, as well as additional funding to aid with Amtrak’s implementation of PTC. 

GROW AMERICA has also proposed that FRA be granted authority to review, approve, and certify PTC safety plans on a railroad-by-railroad basis. FRA asks for this authority in order to ensure that railroads would be forced to work with safety regulators 

to take other or equivalent actions to raise the bar on safety even 

prior to full PTC implementation. We believe it is important that 

even those railroads that fail to meet the congressionally mandated 

deadline be required to improve safety in the interim. 

Despite the many challenges facing full implementation of PTC, 

the FRA’s role is to carry out the enforcement of the deadline that 

is mandated by the Congress and to ensure that railroads implement PTC as quickly, safely, and efficiently as possible. And so on 

January 1, 2016, the FRA will be prepared to take necessary enforcement actions against railroads that have failed to meet the 

deadline. Safety will always be the FRA’s first priority. 

We appreciate this committee’s attention and focus to issues related to the tragic Amtrak passenger train accident in Philadelphia. Again, I want to express our deepest sorrow for the victims 

and their families. We look forward to working with this committee 

to improve our programs and make the American rail network as 

safe, reliable, and efficient as possible, and I am happy to respond 

to your questions. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Ms. Feinberg. 

Now, Mr. Pierce, you may proceed. 

Mr. PIERCE. Good morning, Chairman Shuster, Ranking Member 

DeFazio, and committee members. The membership of the BLET 

11 

and the Teamsters rail conference that I represent. Thank you for 

the invitation—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Could you pull the microphone closer? 

Mr. PIERCE. OK. Thank you for the invitation to speak today. 

I first want to express our sincerest condolences to the victims 

of Amtrak 188 and to their families. This is sadly familiar territory 

for me, because I have had to convey BLET’s sorrow to the families 

of 11 members killed in the line of duty since I became national 

president 5 years ago, and I fear that this will happen many more 

times. 

It is even more tragic when technology could have prevented the 

deaths and Positive Train Control could have saved five of those 

lives. The NTSB has confirmed that excess speed contributed to the 

derailment of Amtrak 188, and also, that this accident was PTC 

preventable. These facts implicate several core elements of Federal 

oversight of the railroad industry: the PTC mandate, crew size, fatigue, inward-facing cameras, and our expectations for Amtrak. 

The small percentage of Americans who are working locomotive 

engineers and all railroad operating employees are among the 

mostly highly skilled, highly trained, and highly regulated professionals in the Nation. But today’s workplace often creates task 

overload for engineers, and when too much is expected of any system, man or machine, a breakdown is inevitable. 

One of the questions before us now is what level of risk we are 

willing to accept knowing all of that. Most of the industry, but not 

Amtrak or BNSF, seeks a blanket 5- to 7-year extension of the December 31 PTC deadline. Although not on the NEC, there have 

been peripheral problems with radio spectrum and FCC radio 

tower approvals, and those must be addressed. But they do not justify a blanket delay, and I urge you to not be stampeded into granting one. That would dishonor the memory of those who perished on 

May 12. 

And we must remember that PTC is no silver bullet. It is not designed to prevent every accident. And any claim that PTC renders 

a second crewmember unnecessary is just, plainly put, not true. 

PTC cannot replace the second crewmember because it doesn’t do 

the work of a second crewmember. It isn’t the second set of eyes 

and ears trained on the road ahead, to monitor the left side of the 

train for defects, stuck brakes, or observe the left side of the highway rail crossings for highway rail grade incidents, or to separate 

the trains when we have first responders that need to get access. 

We urge you to take up Congressman Young’s Safe Freight Act, 

H.R. 1763, addressing those concerns. And we also think the time 

may have come to reconsider the 1981 NERSA language that eliminated the second crewmember on Northeast Corridor locomotives. 

While we do not know whether fatigue played a part on Amtrak 

188, fatigue should be a major concern to all of us. To be frank, 

the 2008 overhaul of the rail hours of service has produced very little progress towards mitigating fatigue. Work schedules are still far 

too variable and unpredictable, especially on freight railroads. 

And instead of dealing with all issues contributing to fatigue, 

some have settled on single issues like sleep apnea. I am here to 

tell you that CPAP machines won’t address fatigue caused by variable and unpredictable work schedules because you have to know 

12 

when to sleep in order to get the benefit. We must redouble our efforts to eliminate the systemic fatigue in the railroad industry. 

I would also like to address the call for inward-facing cameras 

because it gets louder by the day. And we have said this for over 

2 years: Cameras can be an accident investigation tool, but they 

create a false sense of security if more than that is expected. Cameras don’t slow or stop trains; Positive Train Control does, and that 

is really the plainest way to put it. 

Our privacy concerns with cameras are what I would call America’s privacy concerns. Many railroads insist on leaving cameras on 

continuously, even when trains are stopped on a siding for hours 

at a time with crews captive on a locomotive cab that comprises 

about 65 square feet of space. Constant surveillance like this, we 

view as un-American and it really does nothing to improve railroad 

safety. The truth is that some railroads have shown more interest 

in using the camera data to punitively attack certain employees 

than for post-accident investigations, and that is just unacceptable 

to us. 

Finally, some things do come down to dollars and cents, at least 

for Amtrak, which cannot continue to survive on the funding that 

it receives. What we spend on passenger rail is embarrassing when 

compared to China, the U.K., France, Austria, and even India, Russia, and Turkey. We cannot expect Amtrak to run a first-class railroad if it is funded at third-world levels. 

We cannot expect reliable performance from infrastructure that 

is 75, or 100, or even 125 years old. Our transportation infrastructure is crumbling around our feet, including Amtrak, yet Amtrak 

is a good investment, a necessary resource, and shortchanging Amtrak creates other costs elsewhere. I strongly urge you to provide 

the resources necessary for Amtrak to thrive and grow and not to 

just limp along. 

I appreciate the opportunity to address you today. We have 

worked with this committee to accomplish much to enhance rail 

safety, and I look forward to working with you to implement the 

lessons learned from Amtrak 188. 

Thank you again for the invitation, and I will answer any questions that you may have. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Pierce. 

We will start with a round of questions. And I would encourage 

all Members to—there is a lot of interest. This is an important 

topic. So I would encourage you to keep to 5 minutes. If the interest remains high, we will consider doing a second round of questions. So, again, please respect the 5 minutes. There are a lot of 

folks here that I think are going to ask questions, and I will be 

quick with the gavel. So watch the clock. 

I will start off, Ms. Feinberg, in December of 2013, with the 

Metro-North commuter train derailment, it was a very similar circumstance. The train was going too fast. And the accident required 

the—or the FRA required Metro-North to put the codes into the 

ATC system to automatically slow the trains going at those speeds. 

And now you just issued an emergency order that literally cuts and 

pastes that order from 2 years ago to be put on Amtrak. 

It seems that the next logical step—and I think you said this— 

is right now you are going to look at all the curves. But don’t you 

13 

think they should have done that after the Metro-North derailment, should have put out orders, FRA to say—I know you weren’t 

there at the time. But wouldn’t that have been the logical step at 

that time to say let’s look at the Northeast Corridor, let’s look at 

the curves? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Well, what we actually did at that time was we 

put out a safety advisory urging commuter railroads to take a look 

at their curves and to see if there were additional steps that they 

should take. The emergency order that went out at that time was 

aimed at Metro-North. 

And I know, as you know, emergency orders are very narrow. 

They cannot be particularly broad. They have to be legally sustainable and enforceable. And at the time, the FRA looked at expanding that emergency order to many other railroads, to all commuter 

railroads and deemed that it would not be legally enforceable and 

that we did not have evidence to show that we had this problem 

elsewhere. 

As you may remember, Metro-North had a series of fatal and 

nonfatal accidents. They seem to have a systemic safety culture 

problem. And when we looked beyond Metro-North, we did not feel 

that this was a systemic problem with other railroads. We were not 

seeing derailments at other railroads. We were not seeing engineers at high speeds. And so we believed the emergency order 

aimed at Metro-North would only be enforceable for Metro-North. 

We did a safety advisory aimed at others. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. Legally, you thought you didn’t have the 

ability to do the Northeast Corridor? 

Ms. FEINBERG. That is correct. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, does the E.O. today, are you able to enforce 

it throughout the Northeast Corridor, have them look at it, or do 

you have legal problems there? 

Ms. FEINBERG. The E.O. that went out last week was—or, I am 

sorry—10 days ago was aimed specifically at Amtrak. We are now 

looking beyond Amtrak to see if we want to take similar or other 

steps aimed at other commuter railroads, but we wanted to act 

quickly aimed at Amtrak, and now we are looking at what else 

should be done beyond that. 

Mr. SHUSTER. So only Amtrak? 

Ms. FEINBERG. For the emergency order, correct. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Does that mean that you have the authority to tell 

Connecticut and Massachusetts, which have State-owned lines, are 

they able to be included in that, or do you have legal problems with 

that? 

Ms. FEINBERG. That would not work for the emergency order that 

is currently out but that is what we are looking at right now for 

next steps. 

Mr. SHUSTER. See if you can include them, OK. 

Mr. Boardman, Positive Train Control. You said in your statement you are committed to getting it by the end of the year. Can 

you talk a little bit about the process you have been going through 

the last couple of months? I know we had this conversation about 

spectrum. That really was the last step of the equation. Can you 

talk a little about the cost and the money? You have the money. 

And can you talk a little about the spectrum? 

14 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We, at this point in time, do have the Positive 

Train Control installed on the Northeast Corridor. All sections that 

we own on the Northeast Corridor spine. What we have learned, 

along with the freight railroads, that the 900-megahertz system 

that exists right now really wasn’t providing the kind of reliability 

and was having even more difficulty in high-density areas. So the 

decision was, by all railroads, that we needed to go to a 220-megahertz kind of radio system. That really provides a much better 

propagation of the signal, and a much more reliable service. 

So we finally received approval for the 220-megahertz system 

within the last couple of months, and we have to test it. We have 

to get the data radios ready. And that is what we are doing now. 

So that is where we are. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And you learned that because you had PTC operational from New Haven to Boston; is that correct? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. That is correct. Along with PTC we had in 

Michigan. 

Mr. SHUSTER. That is where you learned the lessons from that. 

And then the entire stretch from Washington, DC, to Boston will 

be under that new increased megahertz? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. For everything that we own or control. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. Right. Right. 

What would Massachusetts and Connecticut with the Stateowned—— 

Mr. BOARDMAN. There is a section between New York and New 

Haven; New Rochelle, actually, to New Haven that we don’t own 

or control. That is owned by New York State and by Connecticut, 

under control of Metro-North. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. 

Seeing my time is expired in the 5-minute rule, I turn to Mr. 

DeFazio. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I thank Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hart, you implied, and you didn’t expand upon it, that you 

are going to look at the cars themselves, whether or not more resilient cars could better protect passengers in crashes; is that correct? 

Mr. HART. That is correct. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Have you looked at that previously? 

Mr. HART. Yes, we have been looking at passenger car crashworthiness for quite a few years. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Boardman, I believe these cars are what era? 

1970s? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes, sir. They started being delivered in about 

1975. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And have you asked to replace them? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We have a plan to rebuild these cars and we are 

replacing some cars at this point in time, the ones that were built 

in the 1940s. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. In the 1940s? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yeah. OK. And are you going to somehow improve 

their resilience in the case of a crash? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Our expectation is to be able to use crash energy 

management, which is something that the entire passenger industry is beginning to do. 

15 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But these current cars don’t meet that? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. They do not. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. They do not. And what would that take? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. In terms of dollars or time? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yeah. I mean, have you asked for this money? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. If we asked for replacement of all the equipment we have, we are probably talking $3.5 billion to $4 billion. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Have you made a request? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We have made requests for rebuilding, and we 

have made some requests for replacing. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. And what happened to those requests? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. The requests for replacing was a complex request, because if they were long-distance trains or they weren’t receiving enough revenue for us to be able to pay back—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But the bottom line is, were you allocated the 

money or not? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. No, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. So Congress denied you the money? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. So, again, back to Mr. Hart, do you believe 

that we could either rehab these cars he is talking about in a way 

that would increase resilience and survivability, or do you think 

they need to be totally replaced? 

Mr. HART. Thank you for the question. That is one of the things 

we will be looking into, and we will look into it here just as we did 

with the WMATA accident, in terms of the crashworthiness of their 

cars. We are looking into what it will take to improve—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Pull your microphone closer, please. 

Mr. HART. I am sorry. We are looking into the crashworthiness 

of the cars for this accident as we did with the 2009 WMATA accident. We don’t know yet whether we would recommend new cars 

or whether these can be retrofitted. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. When I look at photos of—I mean, the locomotive looks pretty intact, and, of course, that is new construction 

and the engineer obviously survived. Yet, that first car never 

seen—and I heard some first responders say they had never, ever 

dealt with anything like that before. So, I mean, that implies—are 

there, in other nations or elsewhere around the world, where they 

have modern railroads, do they have more crashworthiness in their 

passenger cars? 

Mr. HART. That will be part of our investigation as to what other 

countries are doing in this respect. We are very concerned about 

making sure that we are the leading edge of crashworthiness for 

our passenger cars. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Ms. Feinberg, on Positive Train Control, I appreciate what you said about you are going to push really hard. 

Commuter railroads are one of the greatest laggards here, and they 

have asked for help from Congress. Congress has not been forthcoming. How are we going to deal with the commuter railroads? 

Many of those operate on a margin or at a loss now to get this 

technology installed. 

Ms. FEINBERG. That is right. We have asked for $875 million to 

assist commuter railroads in implementing PTC. We have also 

opened up the RRIF program for railroads who are looking for 

16 

loans that will assist with PTC implementation. So we just completed work on a, I believe, $967 million loan to MTA that will assist with PTC implementation. 

And then as we approach the deadline, one of the things we have 

asked the Congress for authority for previously is to work with railroads who absolutely won’t miss the deadline—or who absolutely 

will miss the deadline, to work with them to raise the safety bar 

in the interim while they are still working to implement PTC. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So would they adopt some sort of interim operating 

changes to compensate for the lack of Positive Train Control? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Exactly, and they would have to go through an 

approval process and work with us. We would continue to hold 

their feet to the fire to make sure we were working towards PTC 

implementation. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And when you looked at a staffed process, those 

who are really trying and have been delayed by the FCC or otherwise versus those who just haven’t tried at all? 

Ms. FEINBERG. I would expect it would be merit-based, correct. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

Subcommittee Chairman Denham for the next round of questions. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Boardman, what operational changes has Amtrak made 

since the accident? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Could you ask that question—— 

Mr. DENHAM. In the last 3 weeks, what operational changes has 

Amtrak made, and will Amtrak be instituting more training in 

other efforts to ensure engineers are following all speed limits? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We did the code change on the northbound section of the Frankford curve as requested by the FRA. We have been 

evaluating the rest of the curves as required by the FRA, and also 

checking our entire Northeast Corridor to ensure that we had 

speed limit signs along the way, which all met the requirements of 

the emergency order. So we have done that. 

In terms of how we check on our engineers, we have a very robust and regular method for that. For example, just since January 

1, 2014, we have had over 16,000 speed checks of engineers along 

the Northeast Corridor. So that is like 35 times a day that we 

check somebody along the Northeast Corridor to make sure that 

they are operating at the right speed. 

We have a recurrent training program, a block training program 

that lasts for a week every year for each engineer. And they have 

to be certified on a biannual basis. So we continue to do that. Any 

kind of changes that occur, we continue to provide additional training for engineers. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. And how many curves does Amtrak 

now have after doing this audit that have ATC? How many do you 

still have that don’t have it that you want to implement the ATC 

on? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. After the Back Bay accident and the consensus 

for what we needed to accomplish, they identified six curves, one 

of those was the southbound section of the Frankford curve. Since 

17 

FRA requested us to look at it under the new circumstances, we 

have identified at least four more at this point in time. We have 

300 curves on the Northeast Corridor that could meet the newer 

conditions, and we are moving forward with those. 

Mr. DENHAM. One of the questions that has continued to come 

up, we have done the passenger rail reauthorization bill, we have 

funded it fully under this committee. What guarantees do we have 

that the Northeast Corridor profits will actually be used to implement new safety and PTC regulations? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. The way that we have worked with the committee on how we are developing a program is to make safety decisions on safety issues. And funding decisions are really about the 

larger scale of infrastructure, not only for the railroad, but for 

highways and for aviation, which I have been talking about for several years at this point in time and the necessity for increases in 

that way. 

Safety decisions, we are making those decisions and making sure 

that we provide safety decisions. 

Mr. DENHAM. I guess, the fundamental question is, when we pass 

a broad bill like that, what types of guarantees would there be on 

the priorities of those spending patterns? Last year, Amtrak spent 

$350 million on new cars. That may be an important issue, but the 

question would be, is it a priority of Congress, and is it a priority 

of Amtrak, and do those priorities align? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We think they do, Congressman. We work regularly with the staff of the committee. We work with the FRA. We 

work with all of those who are interested both in safety and the 

improvements along the Northeast Corridor. The sufficiency of 

funding if we do all the things that we want to do, there is always 

scarce resources, so we have to make those decisions based on 

those scarce resources. But we don’t reduce the idea that we need 

to have a safe railroad. We make safe decisions along the way. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. And my time is nearly expired, but before I yield back, let me just thank you for your efforts, Ms. 

Feinberg, FRA, NTSB, as well as the mayor of Philadelphia all 

coming together for a very, very rapid response. I appreciate not 

only the collaboration, but certainly the timeliness, and I know, 

speaking on behalf of Mr. Capuano and I being able to tour that 

with you and help to understand how we can resolve these problems in the future. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Capuano is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank the panel for the testimony it had. It is a 

very thoughtful and very difficult decision to make on how to 

prioritize. 

Mr. Hart, I would like to ask you, has the NTSB taken a look— 

and I am not so sure you have, and I am not even sure you 

should—have you taken a look at the decisions on prioritization of 

the PTC, or is that beyond the scope of your normal activities? 

Mr. HART. We would look at the specific event that we are investigating and determine what needs to be done to prevent that event 

from happening again. 

18 

Mr. CAPUANO. But you wouldn’t be in the business of determining whether the prioritization made by Amtrak or others— 

PTC—let’s assume everybody did PTC tomorrow. It can’t be implemented tomorrow. Every single rail company in the country would 

have to make a determination, what do we do first, second, third, 

fourth, fifth. That would not be the normal purview of the NTSB? 

Mr. HART. That is correct. We would look at what needs to be 

done, i.e., PTC implementation, not how it’s implemented. 

Mr. CAPUANO. That is fair enough. That is what I expected. 

Ms. Feinberg, I am just curious, do you agree with Mr. 

Boardman’s comments that Amtrak will reach the December 2015 

deadline to get PTC in the entire Northeast Corridor? 

Ms. FEINBERG. We see no reason why they will not meet that 

deadline. We believe they will. 

Mr. CAPUANO. And do you have any estimate of timeframe for 

the rest of the Amtrak system beyond the Northeast Corridor? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Well, beyond the Northeast Corridor, other than 

in Michigan, that the Amtrak service will be dependent on freights 

implementing PTC, and so that could take some time. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Do you have any estimate of the costs of that? 

Ms. FEINBERG. The cost is well into the billions. Billions have 

been spent, and they have got billions further to go. 

Mr. CAPUANO. So it would be multiple billions of dollars to the 

rest of the Amtrak system? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Yes. 

Mr. CAPUANO. And what about the rest of the Class I freight railroads? How much would that cost to get from where we are to full 

implementation? Do you have any estimate on that? 

Ms. FEINBERG. I actually thought that was the question you were 

just asking, so again, billions. 

Mr. CAPUANO. So that would be all the Class I including Amtrak? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Yes. 

Mr. CAPUANO. What about the short lines? Are they going to be 

implementing Positive Train Control, or is it just for the Class I’s 

and Amtrak? 

Ms. FEINBERG. For Class I’s and for passenger railroads. 

Mr. CAPUANO. So the short line freights will not be doing it? 

Ms. FEINBERG. We are working with the short lines a bit separately. 

Mr. CAPUANO. What about commuter rail? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Yes. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Will they be doing it? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Yes. 

Mr. CAPUANO. What about subway systems? I know that is not 

necessarily in your purview. I know that would be the FTA, but I 

would hope that the FTA would be working with you on that. 

Ms. FEINBERG. We work closely with the FTA and they work 

closely with their organizations. 

Mr. CAPUANO. So the final analysis, even if, under the best case 

scenario, the Government was flush with money and every private 

rail company were flush with money, it would take multiple billions of dollars and many years to get from where we are to where 

we want to be on Positive Train Control across the Nation on every 

line. Is that a fair assessment? 

19 

Ms. FEINBERG. Well, I would certainly agree with you on multiple billions with a ‘‘B.’’ But in terms of multiple years, I mean, 

I worry that we are approaching that position, but we believe that 

there is a congressionally mandated deadline for December 31, 

2015. We intend to enforce against it. This is not a new requirement for railroads. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Fair enough. 

Mr. Hart, have you taken a look on this accident whether seatbelts would have helped or not? 

Mr. HART. That is part of our passenger survivability investigation. Yes, we are looking at that. 

Mr. CAPUANO. So that would be part of your final report when 

you have one? 

Mr. HART. Yes. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Because I just rode the train up to Philadelphia 

with Mr. Denham. There are no seatbelts on the train. Yet, I flew 

down here today from Boston; I had a seatbelt. I had a seatbelt on 

the entire time. And it would strike me that I don’t know—had no 

idea—and I am looking forward to your report—that seatbelts 

would be something that should be considered both to prevent 

death and injury. 

Mr. HART. We will be looking at that as part of the survivability 

aspect. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Ms. Feinberg, if the NTSB were to recommend 

seatbelts in passenger trains, would that be something you would 

pursue? 

Ms. FEINBERG. It would certainly be something that we would 

look at that. There are different opinions about the requirement of 

seatbelts on trains. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Different opinions? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Yeah. While I recognize that seatbelts might seem 

like a good solution in the event of an accident, there are also people who tend to be up and walking around between cars during an 

accident. And the fact that you would have to harden the seats in 

order to put seatbelts into the seats—— 

Mr. CAPUANO. I understand. I am concerned about whether they 

should be put into current configurations. But I would suggest that 

people that have concerns about the seatbelts talk to the people at 

NTSB about automobiles, about planes. I understand, again, maybe 

their current configuration might need to be addressed over time. 

But the concept of seatbelts, again, I was under the impression it 

was no longer debatable that seatbelts in an accident at high 

speeds on any mode of transportation preferable to no seatbelts. If 

that is the case, maybe I will take mine out in the car too. 

Ms. FEINBERG. We would certainly work closely with the NTSB 

just as we do on every recommendation, but there is a belief that 

the hardening of the seats that would be required in order to put 

seatbelts onto trains would actually cause more injuries in an accident. 

Mr. CAPUANO. So we are back at it again. It is a cost-benefit 

analysis how many people have to die or get injured before we take 

the next step. The same question we had with automobiles 100 

years ago, the same question we had with planes, and now we will 

go through trains now. 

20 

Ms. FEINBERG. No, sir, not a cost-benefit issue. It is simply, how 

do you keep the most people inside the car safe. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

With that, Mr. Duncan is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Ms. Feinberg, last week Secretary Foxx appeared to agree that 

this accident was not necessarily caused by a lack of funding. In 

fact, his exact quote was, ‘‘I don’t think you can categorically say 

that more funding would have changed things.’’ Do you agree with 

that statement? 

Ms. FEINBERG. I think he was referring to the actual behavior of 

the engineer. I do think there are consequences to funding issues, 

yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. 

Mr. Boardman, I noticed that total operating revenues of Amtrak 

have gone up from $2.4 billion to $3.1 billion over the last 5 years, 

about a $700 million, or roughly a 20-percent increase in funding. 

And that on top of that, the Federal Government has given you 

$1.4 billion in additional funds each year. 

And I am wondering, I am assuming that you felt that Amtrak 

was moving fast enough in installing Positive Train Control because you said in your testimony that you were ahead of every 

other railroad; is that correct? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We are ahead of every other railroad. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And I am also assuming that you were shocked by 

this accident because you testified that it has been 28 years since 

you had a derailment-caused fatality or fatality caused by a derailment. So railroad passenger travel is still about the safest method 

of transportation; is that correct? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We believe that, yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And did you ever tell this committee or the Congress that you didn’t have the funds to move fast enough on installation of Positive Train Control? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We did not. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. 

Ms. Feinberg, what enforcement actions would you take against 

railroads that aren’t moving fast enough, and would a railroad be 

given credit? For instance, if one railroad is a little bit behind another railroad in installation, but they have a better safety record, 

or maybe they have the best safety record of any railroad, would 

they be given credit for that good safety record? 

Ms. FEINBERG. We are having an internal conversation at FRA 

now about how exactly we will plan to enforce against the deadline. 

Just as we discussed previously, there are—some railroads have 

behaved here better than others, certainly, and we don’t want to 

punish railroads that are farther ahead for the behavior of railroads who have not done any work on implementation at all. So we 

are having an internal conversation. We have got discretion within 

the statute on how we enforce against the deadline to include anything from very little enforcement to daily civil penalties. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Duncan. With that, Mr. Sires is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

21 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I ride the Amtrak just about every week. I ride the Amtrak just about every 

week, and this accident really hit home. Ms. Feinberg and Mr. 

Boardman, can you speak to the future of Amtrak and passenger 

rail that Congress continues to use patchwork approach to form the 

improvements? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Well, I would like to, Mr. Sires, say, and I have 

said many times, and specifically to the chairman, I think, that my 

concern has been the reliability of the railroad. The reliability of 

what we do for our hardware on our catenary system, the reliability of our use of tunnels, whether it is in New York or whether 

it is through the Baltimore tunnels, that our reliability on the Portal Bridge that is ready to be rebuilt, that doesn’t always shut 

properly. So the funding for infrastructure on the Northeast Corridor is absolutely behind the curve. 

In the last reauthorization of our funding in the PRIIA Act, there 

was a commission that was established of all the States, the Federal Government and Amtrak, along the Northeast Corridor, and 

that is where the $21 billion backlog really came from; the necessity for us to rebuild an equity investment in this corridor. 

We also have the requirement because of the growth of traffic on 

this corridor. We are handling over 2,000 trains a day on the corridor, and we need more capacity, which means we need some new 

assets as well; some new tunnels into New York; another new 

bridge going into New York, especially; and we need to fix this Baltimore choke point that we have along the corridor. 

So from my perspective, that is where the funding is really needed. We make safety decisions based on safety. And the infrastructure decisions were being made based on the available funds. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

Mr. Hart, I just can’t understand. This is 2015, and we are still 

analyzing whether the seatbelts would have made a difference. You 

know, I certainly agree with Congressman Capuano that all these 

cars, planes—they have shown that it works. And I don’t understand why in 2015, we are still analyzing this. And in terms of people walking around in the train, I mean, people get up and walk 

on the plane too, right, but you take your life in your hands sometimes when you walk around these trains back and forth. 

So Mr. Hart, can you answer that? I mean, I just don’t see why 

we have to analyze this anymore. We are now analyzing this thing 

to what? 

Mr. HART. Thank you for the question. We are looking at the 

total situation, not just the seatbelts but also the integrity of the 

seats themselves as Administrator Feinberg mentioned. There were 

several seats that detached from the floor. We are looking at the 

totality of circumstances regarding how to protect the occupants. 

Mr. SIRES. Well, I got to tell you, I mean, looking at the seats, 

it just seems logical to me that seatbelts would make a difference. 

And to wait to analyze it more and more and more, I don’t get it. 

I mean, I would be comfortable wearing a seatbelt. And I go on 

that train Mondays and Tuesdays and Thursdays and Fridays. I 

don’t see it, we have to wait for this. 

Ms. Feinberg, can you talk to that? 

22 

Ms. FEINBERG. In my experience, the NTSB is not shy about recommending improvements to safety. And so we will work closely 

with them, and anything that comes out of this accident we will 

work very closely. 

Mr. SIRES. Would you say this is one of the cheapest recommendations that you can make? 

Ms. FEINBERG. On seatbelts? 

Mr. SIRES. Yes. 

Ms. FEINBERG. No. I would not. 

Mr. SIRES. It is more expensive than all the other recommendations? 

Ms. FEINBERG. It is implementing seatbelts. And, again, you 

know, I will be deferential to Mr. Hart here, but implementing 

seatbelts on trains would require the change of every seat, which 

would—again, expense is not the priority here, but we would have 

to harden all of the seats. 

Mr. SIRES. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHUSTER. That would cost billions of dollars? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Yes. 

Mr. SHUSTER. OK. 

Mr. Mica, I recognize you for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, Mr. Hart, I have a copy of the Metrolink crash report 

from 2008. You are familiar with that? 

Mr. HART. Yes, I am. 

Mr. MICA. And in that, you had two recommendations, major recommendations. One that we have cameras installed, inward-looking cameras? 

Mr. HART. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. That was in 2008. And then you also had the Positive 

Train Control recommendation, correct? 

Mr. HART. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. I want to talk about both of those. 

First of all, let’s go back to this 2008 report. If you just look at 

it, that wasn’t the first time you recommended cameras or audio 

devices in the cab, is that correct? 

Mr. HART. That is correct. It goes back several years before that. 

Mr. MICA. In fact, in this report, you have 1997, after a 1996 

crash and no operating crewmember survived, that was an Amtrak 

train near Silver Spring, Maryland, February 16, 1996, you recommended. That is R–97–9 recommendation. Then you had another accident with no surviving crewmembers that occurred in 

1999 in Bryan, Ohio. Is that correct? And the recommendation, 

which is R–97–9 to the FRA. 

The first one was to NTSB recommended to the FRA that they 

install these devices. Then the second one was back in 1999, it says 

also recommended that the FRA install this. Then your recommendation in 2005, there was a crash of a CN freight train in 

Anding, Mississippi, NTSB made the following recommendations to 

FRA. Is that correct, sir? 

Mr. HART. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. MICA. R–07–3. 

What did FRA do, Ms. Feinberg? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Previously, the FRA has not taken action on—— 

23 

Mr. MICA. They did not take an action in any of these. OK. And 

then the 2008 was also a recommendation. They did not take an 

action on that either, is that correct? 

Ms. FEINBERG. That is correct. Our recent actions on inward-facing cameras—— 

Mr. MICA. In fact, it is been very difficult—in fact, since then, 

many of the freight rails have installed those devices. Are you 

aware of that, ma’am? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Yes. In fact—but it has been difficult. In fact, they 

have had to go through lawsuits. I want this to be entered into the 

record. Here is—Kansas City Southern was attempting to put 

into—cameras in the cab. They were sued by Mr. Comstock and his 

group. Not only were both unions fervently opposed to KCS lawsuit; they will be asking the court to enjoin them from going ahead 

with the plan. 

Could we put that in the record, please? OK. I ask unanimous 

consent. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

24 


Insert offset folio 5 here 94806.005
25 

Mr. MICA. All right. That’s cameras and a little bit of the history 

and nothing being done. 

Let’s talk about financing that is in Positive Train Control. You 

just recommended you are going to have FRA financing available? 

Ms. FEINBERG. The RRIF program does have financing available. 

MTA has—— 

Mr. MICA. Since 2012, how many RRIF loans have there been? 

Ms. FEINBERG. I believe there have been three. 

Mr. MICA. Two up till this year, I think. Well, a total of three. 

The joke is there is more FRA Administrators—we have had 

more FRA Administrators than we have had RRIF loans. So you 

have the capability to loan money. If you need adjustment on that, 

you need to get to us. In fact, the private sector has the responsibility for installing Positive Train Control. They have actually run 

into some problems, haven’t they, with FCC? So another Government agency has actually delayed this. 

This is part of a—part of the problem was, I think, Native Americans, and also approval by FCC of those requests for licenses. Isn’t 

that the truth? 

Ms. FEINBERG. For the—— 

Mr. MICA. Yes. So it is not all the freight railroads. Some of it 

has been delayed. I would like submitted for the record to also 

show that there have been problems with FCC. 

[The information follows:] 

26 


Insert offset folio 6 here 94806.006
27 


Insert offset folio 7 here 94806.007
28 


Insert offset folio 8 here 94806.008
29 

Mr. MICA. In fact, do you know how many licenses FCC has done 

per year approved on average? 

Ms. FEINBERG. I do not know how many per year. 

Mr. MICA. They do 20—they do around 2,000 a year. Do you 

know how many the freight company has been required to have approved and get approved so they could get this stuff installed by 

the end of the year? 

Ms. FEINBERG. In terms of antennas? 

Mr. MICA. It is 20—22,000. So there is a little bit of a backlog. 

And it is not right to penalize the freight rails for delays that are 

by an agency and things beyond their control. So when you say you 

are going to take them to task, I don’t think that that is the right 

thing to do. 

Just give disparity here, Mr. Chairman. Give me about 10 more. 

I yield back the balance of my time at this point. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Norton is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The focus here has 

been, of course, on Positive Train Control because it does seem like 

such a silver bullet. I am a little leery of silver bullets. And I note 

that Ms. Feinberg testified that human factors continue to be the 

leading cause of accidents as she says on page 6 of her testimony 

on train accidents. I think this train was going—what was it? One 

hundred fifty miles an hour at that curve? 

Ms. FEINBERG. 102. 

Ms. NORTON. 102. 

Now, Mr. Pierce, on page 6 of his testimony, says that although 

there has been concern about sleep disorders, he focuses on poor 

lineup information and far too many surprise calls for work. And 

he says, ‘‘we have identified these for more than a decade. Confirmed data has also shown that variable work cycles where engineers move from shift to shift routinely contribute to fatigue, yet 

very little has been done to address any of these issues.’’ 

Mr. Boardman, on November 25th, I wrote you a letter concerning the issue of fatigue. And I must ask you today, particularly 

considering that these very tracks carry volatile substances as well 

as passengers, I must ask you about the Amtrak proposal to reconfigure work schedules for train and engineer service employees at 

Union Station and in road service elsewhere on the Northeast Corridor. 

I would like to know if you are continuing to reconfigure these 

work schedules even after this accident or whether you have stood 

down on those work schedules for the time being. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. The route couplets that were changed along the 

Northeast Corridor remain. And the kinds of difficulties, I believe, 

that were testified to in terms of unpredictable work schedules 

don’t really exist at passenger railroads. And unless there is unpredictable weather, or if we have a problem out somewhere on the 

long-distance trains, there is a pretty predictable schedule that occurs for Amtrak engineers. 

Ms. NORTON. So you are mandating 12-hour shifts for a T&E employee? 

30 

Mr. BOARDMAN. They are not mandated at 12-hour shifts. They 

have a period of time that they have between the work schedules 

that they have. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Pierce—let me ask Mr. Pierce. 

Mr. Pierce, would you comment on what Mr. Boardman has said, 

and on this notion of poor lineup and surprise calls to work, whether that continues and what the effect has been on workers. 

Mr. PIERCE. My comments were inclusive of freight and passenger. And because freight and passenger, as you say, interact on 

the same tracks, so we view that as a related issue. Amtrak jobs 

are scheduled much more so than the freight environment, but 

there are cases where shift changes that come, and people rotate 

from one shift to another do contribute to fatigue. Our comments 

were intended to at least note the things that can contribute to unsafe rail operations, and fatigue is one of those. It has been identified by the NTSB for a very long time, and it is also that we still 

try to continue to get our arms around. 

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask our witness from NTSB whether you 

are looking at fatigue along with the obvious absence of PTC? If 

you are looking at issues of possible fatigue—I am assuming we 

don’t have people driving these trains who would just ordinarily go 

100 and whatever miles around the curve. And I am asking you if 

you are looking at what may have caused this engineer to be driving at excessive speed around this curve. 

Mr. HART. Yes. We typically look at fatigue in all accidents. We 

have been recommending for years fatigue management programs 

that use science-based principles to determine issues like shift 

changes. We know that is difficult on the circadian flow of a person’s body. So we have looked at that for quite a few years. 

Ms. NORTON. Have you looked at 12-hour work shifts as to 

whether or not those are consistent with safety and these surprise 

calls? 

Mr. HART. We have looked at a number of methods of work shifts 

and of cycle—of shift changes, and made recommendations that 

these need to be based on science-based fatigue management programs to look at the total picture and base them on science. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. HART. Thank you. 

Mr. DENHAM [presiding]. Mr. Gibbs. 

Mr. GIBBS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Boardman, I am a little confused. On the PTC we are talking 

about on this track, I think it was a conscious decision—well, first 

of all, you—in your testimony, you said on the southbound that instituted, PTC was in place, right, Positive Train Control, and on 

the northbound it wasn’t, because I think I read a report that it 

was decision that it probably couldn’t get enough speed. You said 

the speed, the maximum figure you could get to was 80 miles an 

hour and derailment speed is 93, I think, in your testimony? Is 

that correct? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. No, sir. 

Mr. GIBBS. What was that? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. It is not. It is not PTC, and it is a nonacceleration. The maximum allowed speed is 80 miles an hour northbound, 

and the turnover speed on the curve is 98. 

31 

Mr. GIBBS. No, I understand that. But I think I read in a report 

that the reason it was on the southbound—PTC was implemented 

on the southbound—— 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Excuse me, sir. I just want you to understand it 

is not Positive Train Control. This is not Positive Train Control 

that we are talking about here. It is Automatic Train Control. 

MR. GIBBS. OK. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. It is a difference—a major difference on how it 

operates. That is all. 

Mr. GIBBS. OK. So Automatic Train Control is on the southbound 

track? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GIBBS. And not on the northbound track? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes, sir, Automatic Train Control is on both 

tracks, but the code change for the curve was only on the southbound track. 

Mr. GIBBS. OK. So when you are talking about the megahertz 

thing, that was a different—that is PTC, not automated? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. When I was talking about—— 

Mr. GIBBS. When you were talking about the 900 megahertz. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes. I was talking about Positive Train Control 

there. 

Mr. GIBBS. OK. So we don’t have—so for clarity here, there is no 

Positive Train Control on the southbound. It is automated? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Positive Train Control has been installed but not 

yet activated there. 

Mr. GIBBS. OK. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. It is using a code coming out of the Automatic 

Train Control. There are four codes. 

Mr. GIBBS. OK. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. They were really made, initially, for not having 

one train run into each other in a block under the automatic block 

system. It is—— 

Mr. GIBBS. OK. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I am digging into a much deeper piece here, but 

it is not Positive Train Control. 

Mr. GIBBS. I was trying to understand this a little better. 

Also, since this was a new engine, does this engine—this train 

have a capability to gain speed faster than the way it was previously thought? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. The new ACS–64s have a different performance 

metric, just like we have three or four different kinds of locomotives that are out there that have different characteristics. So it 

wouldn’t surprise me that it does. 

Mr. GIBBS. OK. I think back in 2013 in a hearing you told Chairman Shuster, one of your bigger—one of the biggest priorities for 

Amtrak was to be the Northeast Corridor or long-distance services. 

And I believe you responded that long-distance services. 

In light of this accident, are you looking to revisiting that? I 

mean—the big question here today is why wasn’t PTC implemented sooner on this highly traveled Northeast Corridor? Were 

dollars reprogrammed to other areas of the country for long-distance services? 

32 

Mr. BOARDMAN. No, they weren’t. We made decisions based on 

safety, and we knew what our scheduled time was, and the deadline was going to be December 31st of 2015. So we were working 

against that and resolving the problems that we moved along with 

on that process. 

Mr. GIBBS. OK. 

Mr. Pierce, in your written testimony you talk about, you take 

issue with the PTC replacing the second member of the crew in the 

cab. You have a number of accidents cited. In Chairman Hart’s testimony, two-person crews were determined to—PTC would have 

prevented them, not the two-person crew. Do you agree with that 

or not? 

Mr. PIERCE. There is one example cited, I believe, at Red Oak, 

Iowa, that is—that was not a PTC-preventable accident. When two 

trains get into the same block, as we call it, of signal, there is no 

meaningful way for PTC to avoid collision in that circumstance. So 

we do not believe that PTC can actually replace the second crewmember, because it doesn’t do what he does and it isn’t always 

going to prevent a train-to-train collision. 

Mr. GIBBS. OK. 

Mr. PIERCE. The majority of them will be prevented, but not all. 

Mr. GIBBS. OK. 

Ms. Feinberg, do you have a—to institute PTC on the Northeast 

Corridor, apparently it is not where I thought some of the laws— 

you know, billions of dollars, cost? 

Ms. FEINBERG. I would defer to Amtrak on the actual cost, because I think they have—they have predicted it. But I think it is 

less than that just for the Northeast Corridor in terms of what they 

haven’t implemented and how far they have to go to complete implementation. 

Mr. GIBBS. Mr. Boardman. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I am sorry. I didn’t hear the base question. 

Mr. GIBBS. To put PTC—you said north—my previous question, 

that PTC is not implemented at all in the Northeast Corridor or 

parts? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. It is installed. It is not activated because we 

needed that radio frequency. 

Mr. GIBBS. It is megahertz. OK. So how much—what is the estimated cost to—— 

Mr. BOARDMAN. $111 million is where we are for the PTC on the 

Northeast Corridor. 

Mr. GIBBS. $111 million. OK. 

Thank you. My time has expired. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Gibbs. 

Ms. Edwards. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you to the witnesses today. 

I know that, you know, there is still a lot of facts and many more 

questions that we have to examine before we get some real answers, but there is some things—and I want to follow up with Ms. 

Norton’s comments. 

On May 12th, my understanding, Mr. Pierce, is that the engineer 

who was operating was doing so under a new rule, under a new 

controversial work schedule that began on March 23rd of 2015, and 

33 

that included shorter turnaround times on most runs that had happened than before March 23rd. And so I guess I am just curious 

as to whether the union or the workers had been consulted prior 

to the implementation of this new work schedule as to what they 

believe the impact would be on them. 

Mr. PIERCE. Yes, they have been. The unions are in discussions 

with Amtrak about the scheduling of the workforce on the assignments that you are talking about. 

The assignments, as they are in place today, though, as I understand it, do not violate the Federal hours of service, and they are 

not restricted by the current contract language. It is something 

that the parties work out between themselves as to the best way 

to assign those jobs, and our representatives on Amtrak are the 

ones involved in those negotiations now. 

Ms. EDWARDS. And did you express concerns to Amtrak about the 

schedules or about the inclusion of the schedules and the new modeling for scheduling? 

Mr. PIERCE. I know that our representatives have shared our 

concern over the schedules with Amtrak, yes. 

Ms. EDWARDS. And do you feel that that has been incorporated 

in the rule that has been in place? 

Mr. PIERCE. I am not sure I understand that last question. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Do you think that the concerns that you expressed 

about including the demands on scheduling issues that impact the 

workers have been appropriately included in the new work requirement? 

Mr. PIERCE. I don’t think the process is completed yet, so I can’t 

really comment on what the final product will be. I know the parties are discussing it now as to what the appropriate assignment 

and the respite time should be between those runs. 

Ms. EDWARDS. And to Mr. Boardman, can you describe for us, if 

you would, how you incorporate fatigue as an element of the modeling when it goes into the work schedules? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I cannot. 

Ms. EDWARDS. You don’t incorporate it in there, or you just don’t 

know? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I can’t describe if we have a modeling for fatigue 

in here. I know in this particular run there were no changes. It 

was the same schedule. 

Ms. EDWARDS. OK. But in developing the model, what is it that 

Amtrak does to incorporate worker fatigue, engineer fatigue in the 

model? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. In terms of whether we would have sufficient 

rest for the employee, we insure that that is the case. But having 

a model differently from a mathematical model—I am not sure of 

your question. 

Ms. EDWARDS. OK. So Mr. Hart, when you examine what it is 

that—of the number of things that may have gone wrong, will 

you—how do you look at fatigue and how do you look at the modeling for work schedules? 

Mr. HART. We start with the 72-hour history of the person involved and look at what that reflects. If that commands us to dig 

deeper, we will find out what kind of programs the employer has 

34 

that would result in the 72-hour history of this employee. And, we 

would dig deeper. But, we start with the 72-hour history. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Ms. Feinberg, has the FRA engaged in a process 

of implementing recommendations, previous recommendations, 

from the NTSB? 

Ms. FEINBERG. On this specific issue, we have done work on fatigue and generally for quite some time and are now in the midst 

of working on a comprehensive rulemaking that would address fatigue—— 

Ms. EDWARDS. So when—— 

Ms. FEINBERG [continuing]. Among other issues. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Because we have done this when there has been 

transit accidents and other things. When recommendations come 

from the NTSB, how do you decide, if it is not a requirement, the 

recommendations? How does the FRA decide whether it is going to 

implement them? Because it seems to me that many of these recommendations just kind of remain on a list forever until there is 

an accident, and then we look at the recommendations again. 

Ms. FEINBERG. Well, I wish it were as easy as the NTSB giving 

us recommendations and us just implementing them. But it just 

doesn’t work that way. I mean, we have to enter into a rulemaking, 

or we would have to go into an emergency order, which probably 

wouldn’t stand up in court. But, I mean, generally, a lot of times 

we would have to enter into a rulemaking that would ultimately 

take years. 

And there are occasionally some NTSB recommendations that we 

may not agree with, and Chairman Hart and I will write back and 

forth to each other; my predecessor would write back and forth to 

each other to talk about it, and our staff would frequently work together to see if we can come together on it. But, you know, I think 

when I arrived at the FRA we had 72 outstanding NTSB recommendations. I have said that it is one of my top priorities to 

clear the deck. I think we are down to 63, and we meet weekly and 

work to clear the deck every single week. 

Ms. EDWARDS. My time has long expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. 

Mr. Hanna. 

Mr. HANNA. Thank you. 

Among other things, and there are Members who would defund, 

cut back on Amtrak generally. This accident and this tragedy 

pointed out the importance of Amtrak, I think, in ways that we 

should observe. I think, Mr. Boardman, maybe you can speak to 

that. Because I view transportation of goods and people up and 

down the Northeast Corridor as a system. And what we noticed in 

those days—and you were back at work, I thought, very quickly, 

a matter of days—was a pressure on the highways, on aviation, an 

increase in—tremendous increase in some of those tickets and difficulties on the highway. 

I wonder if you, Mr. Boardman, and maybe Ms. Feinberg would 

like to speak to that anecdotally. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Certainly, Mr. Hanna. I believe that you are 

right. I think that people understood, I think, intellectually at first, 

that shutting down the railroad was going to cause a major ecoVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:13 Jul 20, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\FULL\6-2-15~1\94806.TXT JEAN
35 

nomic blip for people who wanted to get to work, that needed to 

do business and conduct their work on that particular part of the 

railroad. And then I think they understood it, after almost a week, 

much more emotionally and in their pocketbook because of the 

problems that occurred in that period of time. 

They could take 1 or 2 days, but when it became a shutdown for 

that period of time, their personal economy had suffered, and the 

mobility and the business community had suffered, and was suffering, from the increase and the number of cars that were on the 

highway and in the inability to even find a seat by aviation between—— 

Mr. HANNA. I heard tickets over $2,000 from New York to DC. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I read one of the articles where it was a pretty 

high level. And I think one of the things that the aviation people 

did say was the last seat is always much more expensive because 

the way they price their services. But it was definitely a problem. 

Mr. HANNA. Ms. Feinberg. 

Ms. FEINBERG. If I am remembering the numbers correctly, I think that NEC is a $100-million-a-day entity. And so any time 

service is shut down on the NEC or a portion of the Northeast Corridor, it has a dramatic impact, which is why we are frequently 

talking about the importance of making sure that the Northeast 

Corridor is in a state of good repair, and we are working on—— 

Mr. HANNA. And, of course, we have fully well concluded here 

that it is not in a state of good repair—— 

Ms. FEINBERG. That is right. 

Mr. HANNA [continuing]. The $21 billion. 

The one bridge that is over 100 years old that pivots, that could 

shut down virtually everything. If the plans are done, it could be 

built, if it were funded, and that is a point in the system that could 

virtually wreck everything for a long, long time. So that $100 million a day in a week would be, you know, $700 million, whatever. 

Ms. FEINBERG. And there are multiple choke points like that. 

Mr. HANNA. There are others. Do you know of others? 

Ms. FEINBERG. There are tunnels underneath the Hudson, the 

Baltimore tunnel. It just depends on where, but there are multiple 

choke points like that. 

Mr. HANNA. Mr. Hart, just a quick question for you. You and Mr. 

Pierce have a disagreement about audio and inward-facing cameras. I can understand both points of view, but I would like to give 

you a minute to maybe explain yours a little more thoroughly. Because, clearly, you have a difference of opinion over privacy and 

what Mr. Pierce referred to as un-American. 

Mr. HART. Yes. Thank you for the question. 

The more we know about what caused the crash, the more specifically we can recommend remedy to prevent it from happening 

again. That is the additional information we get from video and 

audio sources that helps us to be more specific about what caused 

the crash and then be more specific about our recommendations. 

Mr. HANNA. So would you say, as a public servant, public employee, engineer, that it is not too much to ask? 

Mr. HART. Well, Congress asked us to improve safety, and that 

is one of the ways we are trying to improve safety. We think that 

is a very important—— 

36 

Mr. HANNA. Mr. Pierce, your response, just to be fair. 

Mr. PIERCE. I think our position on cameras has been somewhat 

misrepresented. The problem that we have with cameras is that 

there is no regulation or legislation in effect today that govern 

their installation, and railroads are running programs on their own 

that they have imposed or implemented without consultation from 

the labor unions or from the people who are being filmed. 

Mr. HANNA. So you think there is a way to do this that could accommodate everyone? 

Mr. PIERCE. We have made, I don’t know how many proposals 

both through the RSAC process with FRA, and we have met individually with each of the Class I freight railroads to try to come 

up with ways to have a reasonable implementation. We have not 

satisfied our goal yet. 

Mr. HANNA. My time is expired. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. DENHAM. Ms. Frankel, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Well, one of the great things about being sort of at the end of 

the questioning is to get hear all the good ideas. And so this is 

what, so far, I have heard some suggestions: the cameras, seatbelts, hardening of the seats for the seatbelts, modernizing the 

cars, more training, more employees, better infrastructure, Positive 

Train Control. And I know that—and I join my colleagues in saying, extending sympathies to all the folks who lost loved ones and 

who are injured. And I know they’re back home are very angry, 

wanting to know why we can’t do more; we don’t do more. But I 

think it is pretty obvious that—I mean, you give billions of dollars 

of figures every time we mention one of these suggestions. 

So my question is, from a practical point of view, what do each 

of you recommend as the best way to proceed and that will keep 

train travel affordable and recognizing that this Congress has put 

a sequester on itself? 

Mr. HART. Humans make mistakes. That is fundamental. The 

engineers are very good population of people. They are hard working, trying to do the right thing, but they make mistakes because 

they are human. That is not criticism, that is just a statement of 

fact. Humans make mistakes. That is why Positive Train Control 

is the most important single backup to respond to human error. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I will stay on the Positive Train Controls for a 

minute. And I believe we will be done on the spine of the Northeast 

Corridor by the end of this year. That will contribute the greatest 

leap in safety for the Northeast Corridor, and Positive Train Control in this Nation should be done by this generation of railroaders. 

In terms of the infrastructure on the Northeast Corridor, it is no 

different than what is happening to our Interstate Highway System 

and to our aviation system. We, as a Nation, must begin to make 

an equity investment, even if we have to find other ways to do it 

with third parties, public-private financing. It has to occur for the 

future, or our economy will begin to suffer. That needs to happen. 

Ms. FEINBERG. In terms of human factors, Positive Train Control 

is the game changer, fatigue management, and bringing our infrastructure up to a state of good repair. 

Mr. PIERCE. I think the Positive Train Control, because the only 

thing that is not a machine on a locomotive is the crew, and they 

37 

are human. And it would be like walking a tightrope without a net 

not to have PTC, and this comes down to a discussion over what 

level of risk we are willing to take as a Nation and how we would 

fund avoiding that risk. 

Ms. FRANKEL. And can, whoever wants to answer this question, 

just for the public’s purpose, could you explain why—what is the 

difficulty in getting Positive Train Control? Is it just the cost? Is 

it getting the airwaves? Is it the technology? What is the biggest 

obstacle? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I will take the first stab at it, at least. For Amtrak, it has been, recently, the getting the spectrum of radio that 

we really need to ensure the reliability for a system that needs to 

be vital and needs to be failsafe, and that has been the holdup. We 

have moved it quickly now with the FCC. The testing will occur, 

and we will get this done by the deadline on the Northeast Corridor. 

Ms. FRANKEL. So do you believe that the FCC has been responsive enough, or could they be more helpful? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We think they have been very responsive in the 

last couple, 3 weeks, yes. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Well, how long have you been trying to push this 

through? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We began to run into problems with this in 

around 2012 or thereabouts that they began to point us to the private sector to buy the spectrum. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Ms. Feinberg. 

Ms. FEINBERG. Funding is certainly an issue. Spectrum has been 

an issue. PTC, it is a complicated technology. It requires, you 

know, a back office. It requires the antennas, the spectrum, transponders, WASA. It is a complicated technology, and it takes time. 

The FRA requires railroads to submit a safety implementation 

plan to us so that we can go over that plan with the railroads, provide edits and changes, and so that we can work together to get 

them to a place where they are able to implement it. 

We have received one safety plan from a railroad. It was more 

than 5,000 pages long, and it was appropriately long. So it is a 

massive undertaking. It is complicated, and it is expensive. 

You know, we were able to get back to that railroad and provide 

them with feedback so they can move forward and start implementing, but it is certainly complicated and expensive. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Ms. Frankel. 

And before I recognize Mr. Rice, let me remind Members that we 

have about 20 Members waiting in line with 7 still before the 

gavel, and it is quickly approaching 12 o’clock. So if there are any 

Members that would like to submit their questions in writing, this 

committee would be happy to accommodate them. 

Mr. Rice, you are recognized. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, point of information. 

Mr. DENHAM. Yes, sir, Mr. Nadler. 

Mr. NADLER. Did you just ask that Members who may wish to 

submit their questions in writing, or are you limiting the right of 

people to ask questions aloud? 

38 

Mr. DENHAM. We are not dictating when this committee will adjourn. We are only saying if there are Members that would like 

to—— 

Mr. NADLER. OK. 

Mr. DENHAM [continuing]. By choice enter any questions in writing, we would certainly accommodate them. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. DENHAM. Mr. Rice. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will start with Mr. Hart. Mr. Hart, we have talked about a 

number of safety measures that could be added that would increase 

safety on these lines and some more expensive and some cheaper. 

We have talked about the Positive Train Control. We have talked 

about adding seatbelts and having to bulk up the seats. We talked 

about inward-facing cameras, among others. Between those three, 

which would be the cheapest to implement, do you think? 

Mr. HART. We don’t get into the cost of implementation. We just 

look at what most effectively improves safety. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you, Mr. Hart. 

Mr. Boardman, which would you think would be the cheapest 

among those three? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Well, for us, because we would already gotten 

the Positive Train Control moving forward, it is not a great expense at this point in time—— 

Mr. RICE. OK. 

Mr. BOARDMAN [continuing]. In the overall part of it. 

But we don’t think that the inward-facing cameras is an outrageous cost either. We think that is a more reasonable cost. 

Mr. RICE. Pretty reasonably priced thing, right? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yeah. It is not off the shelf. 

Mr. RICE. Why would inward-facing cameras increase safety? I 

mean, you are just taking a picture. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Because we can use them for efficiency testing. 

We can see what is going on with the engineer itself. We have actually had—— 

Mr. RICE. You think they might change the behavior of the engineer some? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We have a pilot program, and we have a system 

that we operate now, Metrolink, where there is much less stress 

than what the engineers thought they were going to have. And, actually, it’s really helped—— 

Mr. RICE. Stress, huh? Stress. 

Mr. BOARDMAN [continuing]. And other situations. 

Mr. RICE. Ms. Feinberg, among those three; the seatbelts, the inward-facing cameras, and the train control, which would be the 

cheapest to implement, do you think? 

Ms. FEINBERG. The most inexpensive would be inward-facing 

cameras. I think you would probably get more bang for your buck 

with PTC, but we are moving forward with both. 

Mr. RICE. Mr. Pierce, which one do you think would be the 

cheapest; Positive Train Control, inward-facing cameras? 

Mr. PIERCE. I think the jury is out on inward-facing cameras. 

The technology that the freight railroads have adopted has not 

even been measured to crash-worthiness standards. The technology 

39 

failed in several collisions, so the data was not available. It didn’t 

provide the post-accident testing that it is supposedly being provided for. 

Mr. RICE. Why don’t we have inward-facing cameras? I mean it’s 

been out; it’s been recommended; it’s been suggested. 

Ms. Feinberg, why don’t we have those now? 

Ms. FEINBERG. We do have inward-facing cameras now. Many of 

the Class I’s have already implemented inward-facing cameras. 

Mr. RICE. Why don’t we have them on all the trains? Why wasn’t 

there one on this train? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Well, because some have chosen not to implement 

inward-facing cameras. What we are doing is moving ahead with 

the rulemaking, although we may take some interim steps to recommend inward-facing cameras and to also put some regulations—— 

Mr. RICE. Chosen not to. Why haven’t they been mandated? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Well, the issue has rarely been for us to mandate 

them. It’s been that railroads are moving ahead with them regardless, and should we put—— 

Mr. RICE. Mr. Boardman, why haven’t they been mandated? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I don’t have the answer to the mandate. We 

have been supporting that it occur. 

Mr. RICE. Supporting. Why haven’t you required it? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Well—— 

Mr. RICE. It would be very inexpensive to put a camera in 

the—— 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I have required it at this point. So the decision 

is we are doing that. 

Mr. RICE. Why hasn’t it been required till now? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Because I did not make the decision myself to 

do that. We have been supporting the Railroad Safety Advisory 

Committee and discussing how this should happen. 

Mr. RICE. Who would have argued against putting in inward-facing cameras? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. A lot has to do with how the data is going to be 

used, and whether it is going to be appropriately used. 

Mr. RICE. You know, is it privacy issues with engineers? Is that 

one of the issues? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I would have to let the engineers answer that. 

Mr. RICE. Mr. Pierce. 

Mr. PIERCE. It is not only a privacy issue, it is just as Mr. 

Boardman says, it is the way the cameras are being utilized and 

how they are being implemented. There are no safeguards either 

legislative or regulatory. 

Mr. RICE. Safeguards? All it is doing is taking a picture. It is not 

going to hurt anything. What do you mean safeguard? Why 

wouldn’t they have an inward-facing camera? It is a cheap way to 

increase safety. Why would they not have an inward-facing camera? 

Mr. PIERCE. You are suggesting that we are going to change behavior, and that suggests there is intentional bad behavior, and I 

would argue that that is inappropriate or not an accurate representation. The bottom line is—— 

40 

Mr. RICE. Well, we have had proven cases of bad behavior. What, 

2 years ago there was a driver who said he fell asleep, I believe, 

going into a curve, and people were killed. We don’t know what 

happened in this case. 

Mr. PIERCE. I don’t consider fatigue bad behavior, Congressman. 

Mr. RICE. Well, I would think if they are on camera, they might 

be a little more aware of their surroundings. 

Mr. PIERCE. I do not think the camera will cure fatigue. It will 

not make you less tired if you are tired. 

Mr. RICE. I suspect that it would be a great increase in safety 

in terms of changing behavior. 

I want to ask one more question. 

Mr. Hart, you said that you were looking at phone data for the 

last 3 weeks, including changes in—it was complicated by changes 

in time zones. How many time zones do you cross in Philadelphia 

on this line? 

Mr. DENHAM. Mr. Hart, I would ask for a quick response. 

Mr. HART. Yes. 

The time zones we are talking about are the time zones in the 

phone system. The carrier’s systems are based in different time 

zones, and so the time zones we are talking about are the time 

zones in the phone and the carrier’s systems not the time zones 

that the train passes. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. 

Ms. Brownley. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Boardman, I wanted to ask—I feel pretty confident, based on 

your testimony, at least for the Northeast Corridor that you are 

going to be able to complete PTC in a timely way by 2015. I wanted 

to know whether you believe we have the resources and technology 

for Amtrak, at least, to complete PTC across the country by 2015? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Well, Amtrak doesn’t have the responsibility to 

actually implement the PTC across the country on host railroads 

for the most part. There have been a couple of Class III railroads, 

one in Kansas City and the other one in St. Louis, that believe that 

we need to be the ones to implement Positive Train Control in 

those communities. The rest of it is primarily the Class I railroads. 

And our part would be to implement it in our locomotives. And we 

will be ready, we believe, when they have their Positive Train Control available. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. So Amtrak in California, for example, you were 

saying you are not responsible for PTC there? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes. It is not our line. We are not responsible. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. I see. OK. 

Ms. Feinberg, in terms of implementation, are there any penalties that would be imposed for railroads that have not met the 

PTC implementation? 

Ms. FEINBERG. We have significant discretion in how we would 

impose penalties, but we are having an internal conversation, FRA, 

now about how we will go about enforcing against the deadline. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. And when will you complete that task and the 

public would know? 

Ms. FEINBERG. In the coming weeks, I would say. 

41 

Ms. BROWNLEY. In the coming weeks. 

And, Ms. Feinberg, I also wanted to follow up with you just in 

terms of your opinion in lieu of sort of full implementation of PTC. 

Do you think two-person crews is something that would be an appropriate safety net for the short term? It doesn’t sound to me like 

there is going to be full implementation by 2015. Certainly, the airlines have two crewmembers. 

Do you think that that is something that could be a short-term 

or interim safeguard? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Certainly, that is one of the things that we are 

taking a close look at, and that we believe could be an interim solution, along with probably some additional backstops as well. And 

there are some places where that two-person, two people in the cab 

may not be possible, but you could have additional folks on the 

train communicating back and forth to each other. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. And why would two people in the cab not be possible in some instances? 

Ms. FEINBERG. There is not room. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. There is not enough room. 

Mr. Hart, also the same question to you. Do you believe that a 

two-person crew might be an interim solution before PTC is fully 

implemented? 

Mr. HART. Our experience is limited. It would be based on our 

accidents. But from that limited experience, we don’t find that twoperson crews are necessarily an improvement. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. And why is that? It just seems to me common 

sense, that if you have two people driving a train, that if one person falls asleep, then the other person is there to take over. 

Mr. HART. In theory, that is true, but two people can fall asleep; 

two people can be distracted. But based on our limited experience 

in this and other modes, we are not finding two-person crews to 

necessarily be a safety improvement over single-person crews. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. Thank you, sir. 

I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Ms. Brownley. 

Mr. Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. Is it my understanding you would like 

me to yield some time to you? 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Perry. 

Just one quick question for Ms. Feinberg. Safety is, obviously, 

important across the entire country. And in my home State of California, PTC has been slow to be implemented as well. The sum of 

$3.7 billion was put to California high-speed rail. That money has 

now been transferred to the Caltrain, to electrify Caltrain. It has 

been transferred to the Transbay Terminal, $400 million of that, to 

help implement that Transbay Terminal. 

Why are we not transferring money to do PTC on the connector 

routes in California? 

Ms. FEINBERG. We have asked for significant funding for PTC 

implementation for the commuters. You are asking specifically if 

we would transfer money from the high-speed rail authority into 

PTC? 

Mr. DENHAM. You are using stimulus dollars in many different 

places in California for electrification and for changing the terVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:13 Jul 20, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\FULL\6-2-15~1\94806.TXT JEAN
42 

minal, but yet not using it for PTC, which, it is my understanding 

high-speed rail would need PTC. These connector routes should 

have PTC already. Why are we not using the money that is going 

to revert back to the Federal Government next year, if it is not 

spent, if that money is available today, why aren’t we using it for 

PTC in California? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Well, it will be going to PTC in California. Much of our money that has gone out, I think $600 million of it has gone 

towards PTC. 

Mr. DENHAM. So you are saying it is a priority? You just haven’t 

been able to spend it quick enough in California? 

Ms. FEINBERG. No. I believe that it will get spent on time, by the 

end of the year. 

Mr. DENHAM. OK. Just for the record, we are spending California 

high-speed rail dollars, Federal stimulus dollars, on many different 

areas in California to do other things. We are far behind on PTC, 

and it has not been a big enough priority to use those stimulus dollars on PTC in California? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Sir, if you are asking if we can take stimulus dollars that’s going to high-speed rail and transfer it to PTC, I don’t 

believe that would be in keeping with the grant agreement, but we 

can certainly take a look at it and come back to you with a formal 

response. But I don’t think that would be in keeping with the grant 

agreement. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. I yield back to Mr. Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Reclaiming my time. 

Ms. Feinberg, I just want to establish something. There has been 

an assertion, or at least an implication made in this committee that 

Congress itself, and maybe certain individuals of a certain party 

are responsible financially for the mishap, the accident in Philadelphia. So I just want to get the facts straight. 

It is my understanding as well that FRA has stated that a lack 

of public sector funding may cause unwanted delays in fully implementing PTC. And it also, according to my records, would cost 

about $131.2 million, $131.2 million to fully implement Positive 

Train Control on the Northeast Corridor, the track that Amtrak 

owns. 

Now, over 12 years, they have lost over $1 billion in food service. 

It is also the inspector general’s opinion that Amtrak paid large bonuses to ineligible management and staff. The 31 million Amtrak 

tickets sold last year were subsidized by the taxpayers to the tune 

of $42 to $350 apiece, and this particular portion of line makes 

anywhere from $400 million to $500 million a year. It seems to me, 

plus we give Amtrak, the taxpayers fund Amtrak to the tune of 

$1.3 billion to over $2 billion dollars a year. How come they can’t 

spend 10 percent of what they lost in food service on Positive Train 

Control, and is it Congress’ fault that positive train—is it FRA’s assertion that it is Congress’ fault that PTC wasn’t funded in the 

Northeast Corridor? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Well, on Amtrak, Amtrak has said that they will 

implement PTC by the congressionally mandated deadline of December 31, 2015. And we believe that—we agree with them that 

they can meet that deadline. 

Mr. PERRY. So it is not a funding issue? 

43 

Ms. FEINBERG. Amtrak does not have a funding issue in terms 

of PTC. They have said that they will meet the deadline. 

Mr. PERRY. Just to be clear, Amtrak does not have a funding 

issue with PTC by the deadline. So it is not Congress’ fault that 

it is not implemented timely? Correct or not correct? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Amtrak, specifically, has said that they will meet 

the deadline. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Ms. FEINBERG. We have had many conversations about the need 

for—or our request of the Congress to give additional assistance to 

commuter railroads to meet the deadline. We have also requested 

additional assistance for Amtrak to meet the deadline. 

Mr. PERRY. One last question, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I came here, I think about 2009, $800 billion in stimulus 

was passed, and the majority of it was to go to infrastructure. If 

PTC was such a concern, how much was spent of the $800 billion, 

understanding that $131.2 million, a very small percentage, if you 

look at that, would be required to fully implement PTC in the 

Northeast Corridor. How much was spent—allocated by this Congress, how much was spent on PTC if it is such a priority? Do you 

know? 

Mr. DENHAM. Ms. Feinberg, I would ask for a quick response. 

Ms. FEINBERG. We will have to get back to you with how much 

of that would—— 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. 

Mr. Nadler. 

Ms. BROWN. I think it is—— 

Mr. DENHAM. Ms. Brown, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As former ranking member of the Subcommittee on Railroads, 

Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, a strong supporter of rail, my 

heart goes out to the families and individuals who have suffered in 

the wake of the Amtrak train derailment that occurred recently in 

Philadelphia. I personally want to thank today’s panelists for their 

hard work and dedication—and the employees—that they have 

shown during the terrible disaster. 

Mr. Boardman, I want to particularly thank you for your leadership. But my question, I know that you all monitor the trains and 

the rates of the speed. Can you discuss what safeguards that you 

have in place to check the speed of your locomotives and engineers? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes, ma’am. We have a regular series—and I 

don’t think you were here earlier when I said that we looked and 

we have checked the speed of—we have had 16,000 checks of speed 

since January 1st of 2014. We do that through radar with our road 

foreman, and we do that by downloading the equipment in the locomotive to find out what speed they are traveling. 

Ms. BROWN. Yes, sir. I was here during the entire time. And I 

heard it. I just wanted you to repeat it again. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. BROWN. Positive Train Control. That is one and one of the 

most important aspects of safety. What we talked about the cars 

itself, and we talked about the crew. It is a combination. Can you 

expound on that a little bit? 

44 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Certainly. Positive Train Control is a system 

that is layered on top of several systems that we operate today, one 

of them being Automatic Train Control. And we even go back, and 

every time there is a temporary speed change, we use a manual 

system called Form D control system because the dispatcher and 

the engineer has to write down what has occurred here. So we use 

all the way from the manual system all the way up to a Positive 

Train Control system in order to ensure that we operate safely, and 

we do run a safe railroad. 

Ms. BROWN. Mr. Hart, other than Positive Train Control and the 

cameras, the facing cameras, what are some of the other safety 

measures do you think we need to put in place? 

Mr. HART. Thank you for the question. We have heard lots of 

talk about fatigue, and we are looking into that. Infrastructure is 

always an issue in terms of the maintenance and the state of good 

repair. We always are looking at that. So we are looking at the totality of circumstances. The best situation is for the train to stay 

on the track in the first place, and we want to make sure that happens. Then we want to provide some viability for the passengers if 

the train doesn’t stay on the track. 

Ms. BROWN. Ms. Feinberg, you know, you all acted quickly, and 

I want to thank you all for that. Do you think there is additional 

training that the employees need? 

Ms. FEINBERG. That is something that we are taking a look at 

now. When I referred to the potential—the package that we are 

putting together that would address potential human factors, that 

is something that we will be taking a close look at. 

Ms. BROWN. Mr. Pierce, what are some of your concerns about 

the training of employees for a disaster? And I want to commend 

that the employees did an excellent job. You know, I was being— 

it was being monitored. I started getting calls as soon as it happened, and I want to thank you for that. But what additional training do you think the employees need a for disaster? 

Mr. PIERCE. I think the training that the employees receive is, 

in large part, the normal operations type training. Disaster training is obviously something that we don’t hope we will ever have to 

experience. I am not sure exactly to what extent the difference is 

as to how much actual accident-type training that the employees 

are receiving on Amtrak right now. I would have to defer to Mr. 

Boardman on that one. 

Ms. BROWN. Mr. Boardman. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. So what Amtrak does today, it has emergency 

management system. We are working in concert with first responders up and down the corridor and across the country with police departments. And we have an incident command structure that was 

a requirement in the PRIIA law that we have a family assistance 

program. We have worked with the NTSB to make sure that we 

stand that up properly. And so we depend on those first responders 

in the community such as—and I talked about it earlier—Philadelphia in this particular case. 

But we have an ongoing good relationship with them, with the 

FRA, and with NTSB to make sure we have the proper training 

and disaster drills across the country. 

45 

Ms. BROWN. My time is running out, but what I would like from 

each of the members in writing, what are some of the infrastructure projects that we need in the Northeast Corridor like the Baltimore tunnels and other things to make sure that we in Congress 

are doing what we need to do? Because when my colleagues try to 

imply that money is not an issue, money is an issue, and some of 

the tunnels—and we went up on the train, and we talked to people 

along the way. And we know that there are many tunnels and infrastructure conditions that need to be upgraded. 

Mr. DENHAM. Mr. Boardman, I would ask for a quick response. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We will provide that list for you, Congresswoman. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. 

Mr. Rokita, you are recognized for 5—— 

Ms. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to not dismiss Mr. 

Boardman, but I would like it for Mr. Hart, Ms. Feinberg, and Mr. 

Pierce, what are some of the infrastructure things you think you 

can access in the Northeast Corridor. 

Mr. DENHAM. We will provide each of you the questions in writing, but we would ask for a response on infrastructure needs from 

each of you. 

Ms. BROWN. Thank you. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Ms. Brown. 

Mr. Rokita, I recognize you for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROKITA. I thank the Chair. I thank the witnesses for the testimony this morning. 

Following up on some questions that might have already been 

asked, I want to go to you, sir, about what seems to be, I think in 

your testimony, a right to privacy in the locomotive cab with regard 

to inward-facing cameras. Is that the position of the brotherhood 

or not? 

Mr. PIERCE. I didn’t say right to privacy. There are privacy concerns about the storage of data. I don’t think anybody in this room 

wants to see their last minutes, if they are killed in a locomotive 

collision, floating around on YouTube, to be quite honest with you. 

There are steps that need to be taken to make sure that the data 

is protected and that the data is used for what everybody seems 

to think it should be used for, which is post-accident testing. 

Mr. ROKITA. Right. But it seems like that is covered in other 

modes of transportation and other industry. Surely that could be 

worked out. You agree. Right? 

Mr. PIERCE. To date, it has not been worked out. There is no regulation. FRA has started the rulemaking process on cameras. 

But until there is a regulation, the railroads are running programs, each one independent of the other, and the data storage is 

something that is different on every railroad. 

Mr. ROKITA. Right. But however gruesome the photo or whatever 

the situation might be or whatever goes on YouTube, when you are 

on the job, you don’t agree that there is a right to privacy, do you? 

Mr. PIERCE. Well, you are kind of putting words in my mouth. 

Our concerns are many, but—— 

Mr. ROKITA. It is a yes or no question. I think you might have 

answered it already. 

You don’t agree that there is a right to privacy. Correct? 

46 

Mr. PIERCE. I don’t see it as a yes or no answer. It is more complicated—— 

Mr. ROKITA. There is a right to privacy when you are on the job 

in a locomotive cab. 

Mr. PIERCE. There should be a reasonable application of the installation of cameras, and we are willing to pursue one. We have 

not been afforded that opportunity yet. 

Mr. ROKITA. Do airline pilots have a right to privacy in anything 

recorded on the black box or anything on the ATC communications 

or anything like that? 

Mr. PIERCE. It is my understanding that FAA actually made a 

presentation to the RSAC group about the model that the airline 

industry uses and that was at our recommendation because we 

would embrace that. It has not been offered to us. 

Mr. ROKITA. OK. But you would embrace it if that was the case? 

Mr. PIERCE. Yes. 

Mr. ROKITA. OK. Great. 

Following up on Congressman Perry’s line of questions on the 

$800 billion spent on stimulus projects or other things regarding— 

I am sorry. I have a head in the way. 

Mr. Boardman, do you have any experience or recollection or any 

kind of numbers to give us regarding how much of that $800 billion 

was spent on PTC on your railroad? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. $800 billion? 

Mr. ROKITA. Yeah. Part of the stimulus package. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. No. 

Mr. ROKITA. Any of the subsidized money that was given over the 

last—— 

Mr. BOARDMAN. $800 billion is not a number that rings with me 

that—of course, Amtrak would love to have $800 billion. Don’t get 

me wrong. But, no, we don’t—— 

Mr. ROKITA. Any stimulus funds whatsoever. How much was 

spent on PTC, in your estimation? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We did not spend any stimulus money on PTC, 

per se, unless there was some particular part of another project 

that we are doing. 

Mr. ROKITA. Why not? It has been the clear testimony—— 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Because that wasn’t what it was used for. It was 

looking for real investment in the Niantic Bridge, for example and, 

also, rebuilding a whole section of our railroad—— 

Mr. ROKITA. Was there a legal prohibition, in your experience, 

against using stimulus funds for—— 

Mr. BOARDMAN. They were really looking for infrastructure 

projects. 

Mr. ROKITA. Was there a legal prohibition? Do you know? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I don’t know. 

Mr. ROKITA. And, Ms. Feinberg, can you add anything to that? 

Do you think there is a legal prohibition against using stimulus 

funds for PTC? 

Ms. FEINBERG. I am sorry. I don’t think that there is a legal prohibition against—I don’t think so. 

Mr. ROKITA. Why do you think we didn’t use funds for PTC, if 

that is the case? Or do you have any estimation of the amount of 

47 

stimulus funds that might have been used in any kind of PTC 

work? 

Ms. FEINBERG. To be honest, to take all of the stimulus dollars 

and give it to Amtrak and Class I’s to implement PTC, I am not 

sure that that was something that occurred to anyone. I don’t think 

it was even discussed. 

Mr. ROKITA. Really? Because it is being discussed like it was a 

no-brainer high priority that has been wanting to be done for decades, since 1969. 

And this never occurred to anyone, that you might use some of 

these funds for that? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Well, it was the Congress that mandated the implementation of PTC by the deadline that we are approaching now. 

Mr. ROKITA. Right. 

Ms. FEINBERG. I do not know if it was a subject that you all discussed at the time. 

Mr. ROKITA. No. I am asking if you discussed it, anyone in the 

industry. The industry and the regulators are all testifying here 

today that this was such an important provision whose concept 

came about—in 1969 I think is what Ranking Member DeFazio 

stated. 

So in all that interim time and then having the stimulus money, 

no one thought to use that money for PTC or—and now my question is: If so, how much was used for PTC? 

Mr. DENHAM. Ms. Feinberg, we have asked for a quick response. 

But this is another one we would ask in writing: With all of the 

stimulus dollars, why wasn’t PTC a priority during that spending? 

Mr. ROKITA. And, Mr. Chairman, if you can get a date from the 

witnesses as to when they can respond. 

Mr. DENHAM. Absolutely. We will get that at the final testimony. 

Mr. ROKITA. If we could get it on the record, that would be great. 

Mr. DENHAM. Ms. Feinberg, do you care to have a quick response? 

Ms. FEINBERG. I am sorry. Yes. We are happy to get that to you 

all. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. 

Mr. Nadler, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Mr. Boardman, of the $800 billion of stimulus funds, isn’t it true 

that Amtrak got about $1.1 billion total? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I am sorry, sir? 

Mr. NADLER. Of the $800 billion in stimulus funds, $240 billion 

of which was tax cuts, not spending, by the way, isn’t it true that 

Amtrak was allocated $1.1 billion; so, we are talking about $1.1 billion, not $800 billion? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I think it was $1.4—$1.3 billion. 

Mr. NADLER. $1.3 billion. 

And, basically, Congress instructed you to spend that on projects 

that were ready to go as fast as possible, infrastructure projects. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. NADLER. And you spent that on what, in broad terms? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Niantic River Bridge and some additional infrastructure projects. 

48 

Mr. NADLER. Infrastructure, bridges, and so forth, which, I assume, had you not spent it on those, there would have been safety 

problems? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. OK. Thank you. Now, Amtrak has requested $36.4 million to implement PTC in 

fiscal year 2016. Now, does this go beyond finishing the implementation of PTC by the end of this calendar year? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes. This is off the Northeast Corridor. This isn’t 

on the spine of the corridor. The spine of the corridor will be done 

by the end of December, but we have other work that we need to 

get done. 

Mr. NADLER. OK. And could Amtrak have implemented PTC 

sooner if it had more Federal funds? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Had they come a while ago, yes, but not now. 

Mr. NADLER. No. But if Amtrak had had more Federal funds a 

year or 2, 3, 4 years ago, it could have implemented—— 

Mr. BOARDMAN. When we would first started, if we had had a dependable amount of money to move forward, yes. 

Mr. NADLER. OK. Now, to switch topics for a moment, the tunnels into New York have been described as ticking time bombs because of damage from saltwater during Hurricane Sandy. 

What is the status of those tunnels? What would happen if they 

were to go out of service? And how much funding is necessary to 

prevent that from happening? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Well, we found out this winter what would happen if they went out of service because we had so much ice that 

we had regular ice patrols that had to knock down the ice in one 

tube or the other. 

And when that happened, you went from being able to move 24 

trains an hour down to 6 trains an hour. So we got a lot of complaints from New Jersey Transit and from Amtrak riders that they 

had to wait outside one of the tubes in order to get into New York 

City. So that is exactly what is—— 

Mr. NADLER. Going from 24 trains an hour to 6 trains an hour, 

as the only rail access into New York City from New Jersey, would 

have a significant effect on the economy? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. NADLER. Can you quantify that at all? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I will for you. I will get back to you with that 

answer. 

Mr. NADLER. Please. 

Now, I understand that Amtrak has a $21 billion backlog of 

projects on the Northeast Corridor just to achieve the state of good 

repair. Is that accurate? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. That is what the commission developed and produced. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Do you have any source of funding for that $21 billion? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. No more so than what we get each year. 

Mr. NADLER. And how much is in the budget that the House just 

passed? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. $1.39 billion was what we had last year, and I 

think that is—— 

49 

Mr. NADLER. No. No. But that is the total. That is not just for 

back projects on the NEC. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. No. Not for just the projects on the NEC. 

Mr. NADLER. So of the $21 billion necessary to just get up to a 

state of good repair on the Northeast Corridor, how much was appropriated for that purpose or available for that purpose in the 

amount of funds voted by the House a couple weeks ago? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. There were some dollars that were specifically 

identified for advancing our Gateway Project, but not capital dollars for us to actually build it. 

Mr. NADLER. No capital dollars at all. OK. 

So zero over 21. That is a pretty good ratio. 

Now, Ms. Feinberg, we have heard that Amtrak will have the 

PTC, Positive Train Control, in place by the end of the year, at 

least on the spine and a little later elsewhere. 

But what is the status of PTC implementation on other passenger rail lines, like Metro-North and Long Island Rail Road of 

New York and other commuter rails? And what would it take for 

commuter lines such as those in the New York area to meet the 

deadline? 

Ms. FEINBERG. They are very much struggling to meet the dead- line. We just completed a loan to the MTA for almost $1 billion to 

assist with their PTC implementation. That does not reach the 

deadline. That will go beyond the deadline. But—— 

Mr. NADLER. And do we have any estimate as to when the commuter rails across the country are likely to be able to implement 

PTC? 

Ms. FEINBERG. It varies dramatically, but I would say anywhere 

from 2016 to 2018 to 2020. 

Mr. NADLER. In other words, 1 year to 2 to 4 years after the 

deadline. And we know the possible safety repercussions. 

Let me just say that the transportation appropriations bill on the 

floor this week includes no money for commuter lines, such as 

Metro-North and the LIRR, to install PTC. Amtrak funds this out 

of Federal capital grants, which were just cut by $290 million. Despite the fact that there is a $21 billion backlog to achieve a state of good repair in the NEC, we spend about $50 billion on 

highways and about $17 billion on aviation and $1.2 billion on rail. 

There is something very wrong with the appropriations process. 

And for us to sit here and not understand that the fact that the 

Congress has been starving Amtrak has a large role to play in 

what we are talking about is putting our heads into the sand. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Nadler. 

Mr. Costello. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start with Ms. Feinberg. And I want to thank you for 

your time and attention the day following the tragedy, when Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Capuano, and myself went and 

visited the site. 

My question to you relates to 49 CFR, part 220, Restrictions on 

Railroad Operating Employees’ Use of Cellular Telephones and 

Other Electronic Devices, the final rule in which the Secretary essentially delegated to you the duties to exercise the authority to 

50 

prohibit the use of personal electronic devices that may distract 

employees from safely performing their duties. 

The FRA study found railroad operating employees were increasingly using distracting electronic devices in a manner that created 

hazards. And I am going from the Federal Register dated Monday, 

September 27, 2010. 

And I found this part particularly interesting, and it forms the 

basis of my question: ‘‘Relating to access to employees’ personal cell 

phone records, FRA has decided that a provision mandating that 

railroads require operating employees to provide access to personal 

cell phone records in the event of an accident is unnecessary for 

FRA purposes. Instead, FRA currently uses its investigative authority to obtain personal cell phone records when appropriate.’’ 

Is that what you are doing now? In other words, it is through 

your investigative arm and that is how you are getting the personal cell phone records? 

Ms. FEINBERG. That is correct. So following the accident, we just 

subpoenaed those records. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And we have talked a little about inward-looking 

cameras, I think is the term. 

If you had inward-looking cameras, would the operating engineer—at that point in time, you would be able to ascertain whether 

or not a personal cell phone was being used. Correct? 

Ms. FEINBERG. That is one of the purposes of an inward-facing 

camera. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Are there concerns that, without the inward-facing camera there—I did also go through this rule in detail. There 

are times throughout a ride when an operating engineer would legitimately be able to look at their personal cell phone? 

Ms. FEINBERG. The regulation is that the phone should be off and 

stored. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Should be. Right. OK. 

If we had an inward-facing camera, we would know already if 

that were the case? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Yes. And the inward-facing camera I think would 

also provide us information after an accident which would be useful. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Right. OK. 

Ms. FEINBERG. We wouldn’t be needing to have this debate at the 

moment. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And so my question next turns to Mr. Pierce. 

I understand that you were, I think, making a distinction between privacy concerns and a right to privacy. I sort of intuited 

that from some of your testimony and some of the questions that 

you were answering. 

Can you talk a little bit more about this reasonable implementation? Because I am a little concerned when we are talking about 

the privacy concerns of an individual operating engineer who would 

be taped while they are in the performance of their duties. Because, essentially, you have to balance that against the public safety considerations of the 200- or 300-plus passengers who were in 

the train. 

And I think a lot of us are concerned that your testimony seems 

to suggest that we need to really focus on the privacy concerns of 

51 

the operating engineer and not some of the public safety assurances and some of the information that would be elicited if you had 

the inward-facing cameras moving forward. 

So I want to give you an opportunity to sort of share with us a 

little bit more what it is about these privacy concerns that you hold 

so dear on behalf of your membership. 

Mr. PIERCE. Well, thank you. 

I do want to first comment about the comments that were made 

earlier about litigation when cameras started. The unions didn’t actually go to court to block cameras. KCS Railroad took us to court 

to install them. So I think the record needs to be clear on who actually started the litigation effort in order to install cameras. 

The cameras installed so far in the country have been on freight 

railroads, primarily on Class I properties. And those cameras run 

24/7, whether the train is moving, whether the train is stopped, 

and we have crewmembers that could sit on a train for up to 6 

hours without moving. 

We have asked that the railroad shut the cameras off if there is 

no safety-sensitive duties being performed, and they have refused. 

That is a privacy concern. 

Mr. COSTELLO. OK. But what about when they are operating? 

Mr. PIERCE. Right now they run 24/7. The parts that we have 

taken exception to I am trying to identify. We haven’t said that 

there should be an outright prohibition. We have said that the implementation has been done in a way that there are disputes over 

it. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe that there is a sound public policy 

in favor of having an inward-facing camera on the operating engineer at all times during the moving of a passenger rail? 

Mr. PIERCE. I know that that is where the industry is headed. 

Mr. COSTELLO. That could be a yes or no answer. 

Mr. PIERCE. Well, but just so you know, all of the activities of 

the engineer are already recorded on an event recorder through the 

technology of the control stand. All we are going to get is a picture 

of what he does, yet we already know, with the exception of the cell 

phone use, what he does. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Costello. 

Mr. Maloney. 

Mr. MALONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just to round out the point on funding—well, first of all, Ms. 

Feinberg, congratulations on being named the future Administrator. I want to point out that, throughout this process in my time 

on the committee, you have been exceptionally responsive, incredibly helpful to us in so many ways, and I am very excited to see 

that you are going to be continuing in this role. 

On the point on funding, the point is that, in the GROW AMERICA Act, you included $800 million for commuter rail systems to 

help them speed up the implementation of PTC. Right? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Correct. 

Mr. MALONEY. The point is it is not just Amtrak we are worried 

about. We are worried about all kinds of commuter systems that 

aren’t going to have the money to do this on time. Right? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Correct. 

52 

Mr. MALONEY. In fact, Amtrak is the only that has their act together on this. Right? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Amtrak is the only one that has their act together. I would say Metrolink is also in good shape and SEPTA is 

impressive. 

Mr. MALONEY. Right. So one of the great tragedies of this accident is that the fact is that Amtrak is in the best position of all 

the major rail systems we are concerned about to implement this 

life-saving technology. 

And there are real and important questions about what happened here and why, but among them is not some issue of Amtrak 

lagging behind other systems in its implementation of PTC. Isn’t 

that right? 

Ms. FEINBERG. That is correct. They are ahead of everyone else. 

Mr. MALONEY. And isn’t it, therefore, again, beside the point to 

talk about what Amtrak is doing with respect to the Federal funding? 

The point is that the Federal funding is absolutely critical for the 

other systems, like Metro-North, where the Spuyten Duyvil crash 

we know would have been prevented by PTC. And I want to thank 

you again for approving a $960 million loan for Metro-North to get 

that system moving faster with the installation of PTC. Right? 

And, in fact, you worked with us closely on my legislation included in the passenger rail bill, with the assistance of Mr. 

Denham and others, so that we could make explicitly clear that 

RRIF funding is available for all these systems because money is 

the issue. Right? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Correct. 

Mr. MALONEY. Right. And of all the people who ought to be 

apologizing for these accidents that keep happening because we 

don’t have the safety systems in place, the United States Congress 

maybe ought to be at the top of that list. Wouldn’t that be fair to 

say? 

Ms. FEINBERG. I think that would be fair to say. 

Mr. MALONEY. And I think that, when Mr. Boardman comes in 

here, who is clearly heartsick over this episode and who is doing 

everything he can and is going to meet this deadline and expresses 

his heartfelt regret, it might be nice if somebody on this committee 

expressed a heartfelt regret of the United States Congress for not 

having its act together in this area and so many others where the 

safety of the American people is being compromised because we are 

dithering instead of investing in our own country. Isn’t that fair to 

say? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Yes. 

Mr. MALONEY. Thank you. 

And we have got 30 accidents and 69 deaths and 1,200 injuries 

and this is the first one on Amtrak because we haven’t had one on 

Amtrak like this in a quarter century. Isn’t that right? 

Ms. FEINBERG. That is correct. 

Mr. MALONEY. So where the funding is most needed is where 

most of the deaths and most of the injuries are occurring. Isn’t that 

correct? 

Ms. FEINBERG. That’s right. 

53 

Mr. MALONEY. Thank you. So, so much for whether funding matters for safety. 

Now, I just have a couple specific questions. Mr. Boardman, 

maybe you can help me out. 

You said that the northbound trains approach at 80 miles an 

hour in this junction and the southbound trains approach at 110 

miles an hour and, so, they installed the system where they knew 

they had to slow down at least to get to the derailment speed of 

98 on the southbound side. 

But isn’t, in fact, the required speed through that corner 45 miles 

per hour when you slow down? In other words, you don’t just slow 

down to a speed, you know, equal to or less than the derailment 

speed. You actually go down about half of it. Right? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We go down to a 50-mile-an-hour speed for a 

safety measure, from the 98. 

Mr. MALONEY. And so can you help me understand, then. If that 

is the case, the recommended speed going northbound, even though 

the approach is below the derailment speed, it is not recommended 

that you take it at 80 even though you won’t derail until 98. Right? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. No. And we have been going around that corner 

since the 1930s in the same construct that is there without this 

code change. 

Mr. MALONEY. But at what speed should an engineer take that 

corridor—— 

Mr. BOARDMAN. At 50 miles an hour. 

Mr. MALONEY [continuing]. Northbound? 50. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yeah. 

Mr. MALONEY. And so it was just an oversight not to put the 

ATC system there to force the reduction in speed to 50? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. No. What had happened, because of the Back 

Bay incident, the entire community of safety folks, along with the 

regulator, looked at what was reasonable for us as an industry to 

do. 

And what was reasonable was to make sure that we put in six 

locations a code change—because the only code change you could 

really do was down to 45 miles an hour—and that was where you 

were approaching at a speed that would overturn the train in the 

corridor. 

Mr. MALONEY. I see. I see. And that is what we are working on 

now, is we are just going to close that gap. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes. 

Mr. MALONEY. Last question. And just a couple of seconds left. 

Mr. Hart, could you just tell us again in plain English why we 

don’t know whether this operator was on the phone 3 weeks after 

the accident. You said it was a time zone issue? Can’t we just get 

the records? I mean, do we have the records? And, if so, wouldn’t 

we know whether he was on the phone? 

Mr. HART. We do have the records. The engineer was very cooperative. He even gave us the password to his cell phone. 

As we peeled the onion, we found more and more complicated 

issues relating to the fact that texting was on one time zone, the 

voice calls were on another time zone, there were duplications in 

the data, and other factors. So it turned out to be far more complicated than anybody anticipated. 

54 

Mr. MALONEY. But we will be able to determine beyond peradventure whether the phone was being operated at the time of the 

accident or shortly before? 

Mr. HART. Yes. We will be able to verify the accuracy of that. Because obviously that is very, very crucial, to get that right. 

Mr. MALONEY. All right. And thank you, sir, for the extraordinary work your agency does. 

Mr. HART. Thank you. 

Mr. MALONEY. I have seen it up close in the Metro-North crash, 

and it is really extraordinary how professional and how efficient 

you guys are. 

Mr. HART. Thank you. 

Mr. MALONEY. So thank you, all. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Hart. 

Mrs. Comstock. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to follow up on that. After 3 weeks, I have to say I am 

very frustrated that we don’t have a timeline today in any way, 

shape, or form. To the extent we have one, it indicates the train 

departed at 9:10 and then the crash is at 9:21. 

So in terms of the phone records, to follow up on that, since the 

requirements say that it should be turned off and stored, do we 

know if the phone was turned off and stored during that 9:10 to 

9:21 timeframe? 

Mr. HART. What we know is that there was use of the phone on 

that day, May 12. What we don’t know with certainty are the specifics that will address your question. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. OK. But like, you know, I just texted back my 

daughter, ‘‘Yes. I can baby-sit on Friday,’’ you know, 11:42. That 

is on my phone now. Now, if it was a California phone, I guess it 

might say 8:42 and then you could figure it out. 

I mean, 3 weeks after, why can’t we take those 11 minutes and 

have a timeline for the victims and the families to have that type 

of information? I just don’t understand what the holdup is. 

Mr. HART. It has been far more complicated than any of us anticipated to be able to not only get the record from that phone, but 

then also to verify with the other source—— 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. But was the device turned off? 

Mr. HART. We don’t—— 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. Because if the device was turned off, then you 

could not have used it between 9:10 and 9:21. Right? 

Mr. HART. One of the things in determining the timeline in that 

day is when was the device turned on and when was it turned off. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. But just given the 3 hours in California, your 

timeline would have certain limits. I mean, if he hadn’t used the 

phone within certain hours, you would know whether it is possible 

or not. 

Like if my phone said 8:42 instead of 11:42, then you would know 

there was an issue. But if it said 7:42, then you would know it is 

not possible. So I am just trying to understand why this is so complicated. 

Mr. HART. Well, for example, we found discrepancies within the 

carrier’s own time systems in which it didn’t agree with itself. So 

55 

we have got a lot to work out that is far more complicated than 

we anticipated. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. OK. Well, then, how much would it cost us to 

not allow an engineer to have a phone in the cabin? 

Mr. HART. I couldn’t speak to that question. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. Would it cost anything? 

Mr. HART. We don’t deal in the cost ramifications. We are looking 

at—— 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. No. But my understanding is the regulations 

say that the railroads have the right to implement their own more 

stringent rules. 

Why can’t we today just say you are not allowed to have your 

personal devices in the cabin, period? Just like when we go to classified briefings, it is not a trust system. We can’t bring it in. Why 

can’t we do that today? 

Mr. HART. I would defer on that question to Ms. Feinberg. 

Ms. FEINBERG. Railroads can certainly put that into place. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. That would not be a cost issue, would it? 

Ms. FEINBERG. I would not think so. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. OK. Would you all feel safer if someone did not 

have a device? We wouldn’t be 3 weeks later trying to tell people 

whether or not they had a device and were using it at that time? 

Mr. HART. Well, it would certainly make our investigation easier 

if we didn’t have to look into this, but we do have to look into it 

and—— 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. But if we implemented a policy that just said 

don’t have the devices in there, period. If you need to use a device, 

you step out of a cabin. You do whatever. You use it when you are 

stopped. But it cannot physically go in there. Is there an issue 

about—why isn’t that done? 

Mr. HART. Again, I would have to defer to the regulators and to 

the railroads on that. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. Does anyone think there would be a cost related 

to removing personal devices from the cabin? 

Mr. PIERCE. Use of the devices is already prohibited. You are 

talking about an additional prohibition, but I am sure that the 

NTSB would also investigate compliance with that prohibition just 

like they do with today’s prohibition. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. OK. And what kind of compliance issues are 

there? What kind of spot checks are there right now to know, short 

of an accident, whether someone’s using their phone or texting during their time in the cabin? 

Mr. PIERCE. Certain locomotives now are equipped with cell 

phone detection equipment. It can be detected and—— 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. Did this cabin have that detection so that they 

could detect it? 

Mr. PIERCE. I don’t believe so. 

Mr. HART. I don’t know the answer to that at this point. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. It seems like the no-cost safety solution here is 

today to say don’t bring them in. 

Mr. HART. What is detectable is the signal in and the signal out. 

What is not detectable so easy is was somebody manipulating the 

phone, for example, by using an app, but not actually sending a 

signal at that moment. 

56 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. OK. But you did find the cell phone was in the 

cabin that day? 

Mr. HART. Yes. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. And was it turned off or not? 

Mr. HART. I do not know the answer to that. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. Does anybody know if it was turned on or off? 

How could we not know that at this point? That is the regulation. 

So if it was on, that was a regulation violation. Right? 

Mr. HART. I don’t know it at this moment. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. Do any of the witnesses today know that? 

Ms. FEINBERG. I mean, I would just say that, as, you know, the 

NTSB leads the investigation, we partner with them and we also 

do our own investigation. 

There has not been a concern on the FRA’s part that we will not 

figure this information out. It is a little complicated. It is more 

complicated than—— 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. I understand the complication, but this is something that is so easy to find out quickly and then we could know— 

like this action could’ve been taken a day after. 

Hey, until we know—we know there was a cell phone in there. 

Why don’t we just say you are not going to bring your cell phones 

in the cabin anymore? 

Because unless someone can tell me there is a safety concern 

about not having—my grandfather worked on the railroads for 40 

years and he safely worked on them for 40 years without a cell 

phone. 

So I am just trying to figure out, is there a cell phone issue here 

that you need to have it in the cabin for safety purposes? 

Mr. DENHAM. The gentlelady’s time is expired. 

We will present these questions in writing as well. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. Mr. Chairman, I really hope we can get a 

timeline very quickly because I just find it very frustrating not to 

have some of this basic information. That is not a judgment thing. 

It is just facts. And then we can explain it and make decisions. But 

people are talking about safety concerns and where we are doing 

these things and there is no cost issues. We are sitting around 

after 3 weeks not doing something about it. 

Mr. HART. We will develop a very precise timeline. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. And what do we have—— 

Mr. DENHAM. The gentlelady’s time is expired. 

Ms. Esty, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. ESTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank all of our panelists today for your hard 

work. 

As a representative from Connecticut, I have to say, you know, 

the folks I represent are concerned, and we are talking about thousands of people in my district who ride the lines every day to get 

to work. 

And so it is in our shared interest for their safety and, also, for 

the integrity of the system. I mean, when we talk about numbers 

of deaths, confidence in the system is vital. So I want to start, in 

part, with that. 

57 

And, again, I extend my congratulations to you, Ms. Feinberg. 

You have been exceptionally responsive and helpful, and I hope 

that the Senate moves rapidly on your confirmation. 

There has been a lot of things that have been talked about in today’s hearing, and I want to make sure we are getting clarity on 

the record, particularly because of this issue about Positive Train 

Control and lines owned by Amtrak as well as all the other lines 

that we have passengers riding on, particularly in the Northeast 

Corridor. 

Is there anything else—and this is for you, Ms. Feinberg—that 

is needed to get Positive Train Control on all portions of the Northeast Corridor, regardless of who owns the track? 

We know we have got funding for and a commitment by Amtrak 

to meet that, but we have lines owned in Connecticut, substantially, a bit in New York, a bit in Massachusetts. 

Is there anything else in terms of funding or authority that is 

necessary for that? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Well, in terms of funding, there are funding 

struggles throughout the system on PTC. In terms of authority, we 

are concerned that some railroads will miss the deadline and that 

we will then lack the authority to force them to implement interim 

measures that will raise the bar on safety between that moment 

and when they actually have PTC implemented. 

We have asked the Congress for that authority. We think it is 

appropriate. If the deadline is going to be missed, we want to make 

sure that the railroads are taking steps to raise the bar in safety 

before they implement PTC fully. 

Ms. ESTY. If you can follow up with us on the specific authority 

you believe you need. I have commuter lines dropping down from, 

say, Danbury, dropping down from Waterbury, through New Britain, through Meriden. These are really important for us to check. 

Ms. FEINBERG. We will do that. 

Ms. ESTY. Also, following up on a question from Chairman Shuster—and it is a similar question—is there any action you need 

from Congress or authority to follow up on evaluating the safety of 

these curves? 

Obviously, we want to get high-speed rail line. And if we are getting derailments that is well below what, say, the Acela that I take 

from time to time is running, is there additional authority that you 

believe you need from us to make that possible? 

Ms. FEINBERG. I don’t believe that we need additional authority 

on the curves. Where Amtrak has supplied us with the curves that 

they are focused on, we are taking a look at that list. 

We will go back and forth with them and make sure that we 

agree on the actions, moving forward, on those specific curves. We 

are continuing to work on next steps that go beyond Amtrak on 

curves and speed, and we will have more to say on that in the coming days. 

I think there is, going back to Chairman Shuster’s question, 

some frustration that could more have been done following the 

Metro-North incident. Again, you know, I am not sure that comes 

down to authority so much as, you know, as regulators, we have 

very few tools and the tools that we have, they are sometimes blunt 

instruments. 

58 

And so emergency order authority is incredibly narrow and can’t 

be as broad as we want. Safety advisories are recommendations. 

They don’t have to be followed. And the rulemaking process takes 

years. So—— 

Ms. ESTY. Thank you. 

And for you, Mr. Boardman, I have some concern, given the importance of these accidents, that so much emphasis is being placed 

just on PTC. I am looking at billions of dollars in infrastructure upgrades. 

And, in particular, if you could talk about—how are you going 

about prioritizing the bridges that are 100 years old and more that 

the Northeast Corridor runs across these bridges every single day? 

And what, if any, help in addition to the additional funding, 

which I join my colleague and not only seatmate, but adjacent districts, with Mr. Maloney that we need a lot more funding to address this backlog of infrastructure, which is also safety. If a bridge 

goes down when a train is attempting to cross, that is also a safety 

concern. 

Can you talk a little bit about the prioritization? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Certainly. I think one of the most important 

things that occurred was in the PRIIA Act, the commission that 

was established in the Northeast of all the States, the Federal Government, and Amtrak to look at what projects needed to be done, 

what the backlog was, and how we needed to prioritize for the future. 

And a lot of that conversation that has occurred has really identified the projects that need to be done, a lot of them, bridges, tunnels, the major impacts that we need to get done. 

They have been identified. In one particular case, we have ready 

to build the Portal Bridge, which would be about a $1 billion 

project. So our priority is there for these infrastructure improvements, which will also improve safety. It is in place. 

Ms. ESTY. Thank you. 

Mr. DENHAM. Mr. Zeldin, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was actually on the route 24 hours beforehand. I represent New 

York 1 on the East End of Long Island. Some other Members were 

traveling with me as well. 

And as we are here, I would be remiss if I didn’t offer my 

thoughts and prayers to the families of those whose lives were lost, 

of those who were injured. It is a terrible tragedy that took place. 

I kind of wish that all of the entirety of Congress would be willing to allow us and the families to mourn for Amtrak and for the 

employees of Amtrak, everyone who was impacted by it. I wish that 

there was a little more time that was dedicated towards mourning. 

Unfortunately, the next day—and I think it is pretty shameful 

and disgusting—not even 24 hours go by and we have an entire 

party here in Congress that was blaming a potential future funding 

cut on an accident that happened yesterday. I mean, I have heard 

of spin, but this is a first for me. 

I mean, literally, you wake up the next morning and, instead of 

dedicating your day towards mourning the loss of those—I mean, 

the families that were so greatly impacted, you come onto the floor 

throughout these halls and you stand in front of the cameras withVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:13 Jul 20, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\FULL\6-2-15~1\94806.TXT JEAN
59 

out saying my heart goes out to the family, without offering up any 

type of emotional remorse—because it is a terrible tragedy that impacted Amtrak—immediately you are blaming a potential future 

funding cut on an accident that happened yesterday. I would challenge anyone to find an example of this in history. And you couldn’t 

even wait 48 hours to start with the politics. It started the next 

morning. 

The engineer was obviously traveling over twice the speed limit, 

and that is the reason why there is an investigation. It is very important to Amtrak that they finish the project of getting PTC operational, specifically on the Northeast Corridor. I know that this 

body passed legislation. 

Being from the Northeast and knowing how profitable the Northeast Corridor and the Acela trains are, it is good that we see that 

money getting reinvested back into the system. I have some colleagues in some other parts of the country who may think otherwise, and that is OK. I am parochial in a way to my home State, 

my home region. 

I came here from New York State. In the State legislature, I 

served on the Transportation Committee, the MTA, which is the 

Nation’s largest, you know, mass transit system for that locality. 

And we have heard the Metro-North talked about and the Long Island Rail Road. 

We found a way, Republicans and Democrats working together, 

to try to create a second track between Farmingdale and 

Ronkonkoma on Long Island for the Long Island Rail Road. 

There are infrastructure improvements all over the New York 

City metropolitan area with the involvement of people of New York 

City, up in Albany, working with the MTA, working with the 

unions, trying to figure out how to invest in the infrastructure. 

It is also important to note that that Amtrak legislation that was 

passed by the House discusses the RRIF component. That allows 

the MTA to apply for the $1 billion in financing. 

But the investment can be made—it would be very nice if my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, instead of us trying—and, listen, when we ask, ‘‘It is a great idea. How you are going to pay 

for it?’’, it is not to get to no. It is to get to yes. 

For me personally, I want to be part of the discussion to figure 

out how we can invest in our infrastructure all across the country. 

That is what I believe as a matter of principle. 

But with my final minute, Mr. Hart, just getting back to you, 

just so I understand something, are there texts on the phone from 

9:10 to 9:21? 

Mr. HART. We know that there is text, data, and voice activity 

that day, and we will develop a specific timeline of when the phone 

was in use. 

Mr. ZELDIN. But on the phone itself, like when you look at the 

phone and you scroll through texts, it doesn’t show a text from 9:10 

to 9:21? 

Mr. HART. We will have a timeline of that by the time we are 

done. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Because I understand Mrs. Comstock’s frustration. 

And it just seems like something that, you know, if he gives you 

60 

access to the phone, you look at the phone and then you know the 

answer in, like, 5 minutes. 

Mr. HART. We were surprised by the complexity of it ourselves. 

Mr. ZELDIN. OK. And you can also balance—— 

Mr. HART. And we are experts at this. 

Mr. ZELDIN. I know you are. And, I mean, the entire route has 

all these—are you getting cooperation from the cell phone companies? 

Mr. HART. Yes. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Do you have all the cell phone towers, the pings off 

towers? 

Mr. HART. Yes. 

Mr. ZELDIN. I mean, it really shouldn’t be that hard. 

Just so you know, for the families, the real advocacy—the effort 

on your part to try to get answers and Amtrak’s efforts and all of 

you who are here for that cause, the frustration on our end, too, 

is just on behalf of constituents and families who are eager. They 

understand when some things take longer than others, but maybe 

they just don’t understand on this front why we don’t have more 

answers as far as the engineer goes. 

Yield back the balance of my time. 

And thank you for being here. 

Mr. DENHAM. Time is expired. 

The gentlelady, Ms. Titus. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I very much appreciate and support all your efforts in the Northeast Corridor, but I would like to shift west of the Mississippi for 

just a few minutes. 

At 11:19 on June 24, 2011, a tractor-trailer driving north on U.S. 

95 slammed into the side of Amtrak Train No. 5 on the California 

Zephyr line. This was at a railroad grade crossing outside the small 

town of Miriam in rural Nevada. 

Now, the driver of the truck was at fault. He had been on duty 

for nearly 9 hours, I might add. But he failed to heed the train 

horn and went ahead and crossed the track. The impact of that created a fire. It killed the driver, killed the train conductor, killed 4 

passengers, and injured 15 other passengers and 1 additional crewmember. 

Now, PTC wouldn’t have stopped that, but the investigation that 

was done by NTSB outlined concerns about side-impact strength 

requirements for passenger cars and what happens with impact 

crashworthiness when it comes from the side. 

If you look at the report they issued, two recommendations were 

to develop side-impact crashworthiness standards, including performance validation for passenger railcars, and then, once those 

side-impact crashworthiness standards had been developed, to require that new passenger railcars be built to those standards. 

I would just ask you, Ms. Feinberg—we have had all these studies about train-to-train collisions. Has any research been done on 

these types of side-collision impacts? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Yes, ma’am. We are doing research now. At the 

NTSB’s recommendation, we are doing research now on those side 

impacts. 

61 

Ms. TITUS. Is that it? Can you give me any more information 

about what that entails or where you see that going? Or will you 

be making recommendations or changing regulations? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Yes, ma’am. That research is ongoing, and we can 

get your office a full report. I mean, apart from that, we have done 

a tremendous amount of work on grade crossings generally, which 

have continued to be a problem for many years and, in fact, are on 

a slight uptick this year. And we have a multifaceted approach to 

grade crossings generally, but on side-impact collisions alone, our 

research is ongoing. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, if I could then ask Mr. Boardman—and this 

goes back to the very first question that Mr. DeFazio asked about 

buying new train cars—if this study, whenever it gets done, comes 

with the recommendation that new requirements should be made 

for train cars that meet some increased standards for side crashes, 

are we going to get any new cars? How many cars have we gotten? 

We have heard that they were 40 years old. You look at the pictures of the cars that were so crashed compared to the locomotive. 

Would you elaborate on that a little bit more. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. These are the bilevel cars which have a lower 

section. I went to that accident site. 

Ms. TITUS. I think you were the assistant director or something 

at that time. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Pardon me? 

Ms. TITUS. I realize you were involved in this report for the accident in Nevada. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. No. I was the CEO for Amtrak. 

I went out there at that time and looked at what happened. It 

was a double tractor-trailer. The side impact is what killed our conductor, but it was really a singular case, that the back trailer came 

up and hit the top of the train that did the passenger—or deaths 

and injuries. 

I am not a mechanical engineer. There is a huge problem at that 

particular location. It was a very strange crash because there was 

total visibility for the truck that went into the side of the train. 

And if you were going to protect for that by replacing the equipment, you would have major engineering that would have to occur, 

and I would have to see whether any such thing could happen. 

Ms. TITUS. So you disagreed with the recommendation that they 

need to look at side—— 

Mr. BOARDMAN. No. No. I don’t disagree with the recommendation at all. I just think it would be a very difficult thing to—we 

can’t retrofit it for it. So it would have to be new equipment. You 

are probably talking 450 of the bilevel-type cars. 

You are talking probably $3.5 million to $4 million apiece for 

each of those cars. That would be a substantial cost in doing that. 

And it would take us probably 10 years to make those kinds of 

changes and deliver new equipment. 

Ms. TITUS. What about as you buy new cars? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We haven’t bought any new cars in a considerable period of time. 

Ms. TITUS. That was my point, going back to Mr. DeFazio’s question. 

62 

We have heard a lot about spending money for the signaling system, and we have heard about money about infrastructure. But 

what about all these old cars? What is the plan there? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. The plan right now—what we did with the single-level cars and with the locomotives, we are paying for that out 

of the fares that we receive in the Northeast Corridor. 

On the long-distance trains, there is no additional revenue. It is 

a completely deficit operation, and we don’t have those resources 

to borrow money on the RRIF program or any other way to replace 

those cars. 

Ms. TITUS. And that seems to me to be a problem. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. 

Mr. DENHAM. Mr. Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to each of the witnesses for being here today. 

My first question, Mr. Boardman. Going back to earlier statements you made during the Q and A, you had mentioned that there 

were 6 to possibly 10—if I am doing the math right— 

vulnerabilities identified similar to what we saw in the Northeast 

Corridor and the northbound train going toward the curve. And 

you mentioned that these types of curves existed. 

And have you installed code change points at those curves? And, 

if so, was there a cost to do so? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. So you have to go back to the Back Bay incident 

in 1990. And when that occurred, the safety community got together, the operators got together, to look at what needs to be done 

to protect ourselves in that case. 

And what they identified were six curves on the Northeast Corridor that they needed to treat. And those six curves included the 

north side of the Frankford curve because the southbound entrance 

speed at 110 was greater than what the turnover speed was in the 

curve itself. 

Mr. DAVIS. Correct. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. And so they put a code change point there. 

Mr. DAVIS. Is there a cost to install the code change point there? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I will get to that in a minute. 

On the south side, there was not a need to do that because the 

northbound approach speed was 80 miles an hour. And, therefore, 

even if that engineer failed to slow, they wouldn’t overturn. So 

there were six places along the way. 

Mr. DAVIS. A total of six. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. And there is a moderate cost to do anything, as 

you know, but it is not a major cost. 

Mr. DAVIS. What is the moderate cost? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I don’t know. 

The Automatic Train Control system really provides an idea 

whether there is something in front of you on the tracks. So the 

way that you do this code change is you really have a bit of fiction 

here. You say there is something at the curve, and so that is when 

you put the code change point in. So it wasn’t built to do Positive 

Train Control. 

Mr. DAVIS. OK. 

63 

Mr. BOARDMAN. And the other four, where you added up six and 

four, what we looked at with the FRA emergency order was the 

change that occurred here in that conditions that exist on the south 

side—and we put that code change in on the south side—we looked 

to find out on the Northeast Corridor—we have 300 curves—what 

conditions—or what curves meeting that condition need to be 

changed. And that is what we told FRA we would work to do. 

Mr. DAVIS. OK. I don’t have a lot of time left. I have a lot of 

questions. 

So if you could have your staff get back to me on if you found 

any other Amtrak corridors with the same issues and when do you 

estimate you will be done identifying and actually installing code 

changes on those areas identified as vulnerable. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. We would only do this on the Northeast Corridor 

on the emergency order. 

Mr. DAVIS. I mean, I have Amtrak corridors in my State of Illinois. 

Are there any other vulnerabilities there that you have identified? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. You have them all over the United States because we are mostly on host railroads. And they depend on the expertise of our engineers and how the signaling system work or, if 

there is no signaling at all—and there are locations across the 

country where that occurs—they depend on what we call a Form 

D control point—control system. 

Mr. DAVIS. OK. Well, I am going to move on to a different subject. 

In a 2012 inspector general report, Amtrak was criticized because, despite the legal requirements to do so, Amtrak did not include the funding requirements for PTC in its 5-year financial plan 

and annual budget request. And this is directly from the IG report 

here. 

Your engineering and finance departments could not explain this 

critical omission. Can you? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Well, what we saw in that particular report from 

2012 was that they were looking for us to have come to Congress 

to specifically ask for PTC service, and that wasn’t how we operated with with Congress. We had almost like a block grant of capital projects. 

We identified—I identified, as soon as I got over there, what it 

was going to cost for us to meet this requirement by December of 

2015, and it was about the safety of that, not about the dollars of 

that. 

Mr. DAVIS. OK. I am reading the report here, and it just said, 

‘‘Further, a transportation official stated that his departments purposely omitted PTC installation costs on host railroad lines from 

Amtrak’s 5-year plan and annual budget request. He cited his belief that including these costs in the budget would weaken Amtrak’s negotiating position with the host railroads,’’ et cetera. 

That is concerning to us. But I appreciate the job you do. Thank 

you for being here. Thank you to all the witnesses. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. 

Mr. Sanford. 

64 

Mr. SANFORD. Thank you. 

In deference to my dear chairman, I am going to try and make 

my comments brief, since I am separating him and each one of you 

all from lunch. And you guys and gal have been most generous 

with your time, and I appreciate it. 

I would associate my comments with what Congressman Zeldin 

said just a moment ago with regard to indeed mourning for the loss 

of life, a very sad day. 

But what I think is important in the wake of any sad day or any 

tragedy is to go in, do the investigation, but to make sure that, in 

many ways, as a society, we don’t overreact in ways that would 

make the system less sustainable from a financial standpoint, we 

don’t overreact in ways which really impinge upon sort of the cornerstone of the American republic, which is individual liberty, and 

we don’t overreact in ways in which it becomes so constraining so 

that the practical effect is people saying, well, I am walking. 

I guess the safest of all mechanisms would be to put people in 

those things that you strap into at a public fair. I mean, you are 

locked in, but from the standpoint of practical effect, you can’t use 

your laptop, you can’t talk on the phone, and you would say, I am 

going to a different mode of transportation. 

And with that in mind, it seems to me, in the course of the hearing, two ideas have come out that I think would be dangerous in 

terms of overreaction to the real-world tragedy that each one of you 

all have had to deal with. 

One is this idea of seatbelts. You know, if you think about it, 

there is a reason there are seatbelts on the airplanes, which is you 

have all kinds of vertical and horizontal considerations based on 

airlift that is well outside the control of the pilot. 

We have been in those thunderstorm moments where you are 

like, ‘‘oh, my goodness, what is happening next?’’ That does not 

occur on the train. And what we all know is, when a plane crashes, 

wearing a seatbelt or not, tragically, a lot of people die. 

Same thing with school buses. I mean, a lot of kids ride to and 

from schools daily and, in most cases that I am aware of, certainly 

in the case of South Carolina, there aren’t seatbelts for those kids. 

I think it would have dangerous effects—I would love to hear 

some of your further thoughts on this—if you were to impose seatbelts as a reaction to this real-world tragedy. My sense is it would 

be a step too far. 

The other, I guess, would be directed more to you, Mr. Pierce, 

and that is this notion of moving to two men in the front of the 

train. It seems to me it would be an added financial burden to the 

Amtrak system, which is already straining to the tune of more 

than $1 billion a year in terms of subsidy and other. 

And if you look at the whole notion of moving toward Positive 

Train Control, the idea is to take out that possibility of human 

error, which wouldn’t be, frankly, truncated or eliminated if you 

move to a two-man system up front. 

I think it is important, what you all have done at the Amtrak 

level to move to this notion of inward-facing cameras. I mean, I 

think that that can watch out for human error. But I think that 

that would be a step too far as well. 

Any thoughts on either one of those two as steps too far? 

65 

Ms. FEINBERG. I mean, we are moving ahead with inward-facing 

cameras. To be clear, this was something that my predecessor was 

moving ahead with prior to his departure. This committee has 

many times urged the FRA to make sure that we are making use 

of the RSAC committee process. 

We asked the RSAC to take action on inward-facing cameras. 

They have been unable to come to a conclusion. We told them last 

week that we were taking it out of the RSAC and moving ahead. 

Mr. SANFORD. You would agree with me on seatbelts or two men 

in the front? 

Ms. FEINBERG. Seatbelts, again, my concern is—the way that I 

have been briefed on it is that the need to harden the seats in 

order to put seatbelts in would be more dangerous to passengers 

than belting passengers in. 

So, you know, if the NTSB feels differently, we will start our engagement and conversations with them, but that is my understanding of why seatbelts may not be the best move on a train because it would make people more dangerous. 

On two-person crews, you know—— 

Mr. SANFORD. And I just go back to marketability as well. Oftentimes when I travel to New York—I have a son that works there. 

I used to work there—the reality is people are up and moving and 

that is part of why you take the train as opposed to getting on an 

airplane. 

You can be on the phone. You can be having a small group meeting with a couple of other folks. You take that out, I think you 

begin to lose market share that much further relative to plane 

travel. 

The other, though? I am sorry. 

Ms. FEINBERG. On two-person crews, that is something we have 

been taking a close look at. To be clear, it is less relevant in passenger service because there are multiple people in a crew. So Amtrak had six people on the crew on this particular train. It usually 

is discussed separately. 

But, you know, following the Metro-North incident, one thing we 

required of Metro-North is for the engineers to be in almost constant conversation with the conductor to make sure that they are 

talking back and forth, signals, and to make sure that the conductor had access to an emergency brake, which is another good 

approach. 

Mr. SANFORD. I hear my chairman’s ever so gentle tap, tap, tap. 

I get the message, sir. 

Mr. DENHAM. I would like to thank the gentleman for being so 

expedient today and yielding back so much time. 

Mr. Babin. 

Dr. BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last, but not 

least, hopefully. 

Thank you, witnesses, for your time and efforts as we try to 

reach answers to this great tragedy that occurred in the Northeast 

Corridor. It has been interesting to listen to some of these lines of 

questioning. It is hard for me to imagine why it is so complicated 

to get the answer to whether the engineer was utilizing a cell 

phone at the time of the crash. 

66 

It seems like it should be just a simple answer, a simple endeavor, to find out exactly, as Mrs. Comstock said in her line of questioning, hey, during this period of time, did he text? Did he use his 

phone? It should be there. It is hard to figure out why that is not 

true. 

And in terms of further investigations, there was a news report— 

several of them—that stated that Amtrak Regional 188 had a fistsized area of severe damage on its windshield, possibly consistent 

with that of being struck by some rock or object. 

Twenty minutes before the crash of 188, a regional commuter 

train in the same area had to stop service after its window was hit 

by an object. 

Finally, also around the same time, Amtrak Acela 2173 was apparently also struck by an object while traveling southbound in the 

very same area. 

And there is an old saying that, while once is an accident, twice 

is a coincidence, and three times is a pattern. Do you think, Mr. 

Hart, that that applies here? 

Mr. HART. We are confident that the train left the station without any windshield damage because that is part of the inspection 

process before leaving the station. So we are confident that the 

damage occurred after leaving the station. 

What we don’t know is whether it occurred before the accident 

or after the accident. We do know that it was not a result of a firearm. The FBI helped us determine that. But we know that rocks 

are thrown at train windshields all the time and it can crack the 

windshield. That could have happened here. 

That is a way that the windshield could be damaged, but it also 

could be post-accident damage as well. 

Dr. BABIN. So there has been no revelations or any findings during the investigation of any individual or individuals, culprits, responsible for the damage done to the other two trains as well? 

Have we found out anything in that regard? 

Mr. HART. No. We do not have any information yet in that regard. 

Dr. BABIN. Would anybody else, any other panelist, like to address that, the possibility of damage to the windshield? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I think we have from time to time had people 

throw rocks at our trains. But what is the specific question, sir? In 

terms of what? 

Dr. BABIN. Well, you know, when I rode—I have family that lives 

in Manhattan and they ride this train. I have ridden the train several times along the same corridor. 

And I have remarked to myself and to others that there is certainly a lot of availability, a possibility of vandalism, somebody 

pitching something over onto a train or firing a weapon or whatever. 

And I just wonder, besides the investigation that is ongoing now, 

has there been any addressing of this possibility by NTSB or any 

of the other of your agencies? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Well, actually, the way we have been addressing 

a particular area that we have difficulty, including this one, is with 

our Amtrak Police Department and the partnerships we have with 

the police departments along the way. 

67 

So as we have been there, we are looking to see where those 

rocks might have come from. And anywhere else that we have that 

kind of difficulty on the corridor, we do have an investigation that 

goes on to see if we can find the when and the where and who that 

might be tossing rocks. 

And it is generally an immature person, some kind of kids or 

something, that are doing that. And it is not just the trains. It is 

the buses, the cars, the other kinds of conveyances as well. 

Dr. BABIN. OK. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. DENHAM. Gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Capuano. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hart, what time is it? 

Mr. HART. 1:06. 

Mr. CAPUANO. I have got 1:06. That has 1:05. 

Do seconds matter on a train going 100 miles an hour? 

Mr. HART. They are very crucial. Yes. 

Mr. CAPUANO. And my presumption—correct me if I am wrong— 

is, at this point as we speak, you have some general knowledge of 

what occurred with that cell phone. Is that a fair assumption or 

have you just not looked at it at all? 

Mr. HART. Yes. We are looking at it intensively with respect to 

May 12, that specific day. 

Mr. CAPUANO. So you are dotting your i’s and crossing your t’s 

before you make a public statement? 

Mr. HART. Yes. That is very crucial that we get that fact right, 

and we are not going to be hurried into getting a wrong answer. 

Mr. CAPUANO. And is that the normal course of events for the 

NTSB? 

Mr. HART. Yes. We look at cell phones all the time now because 

we are seeing cell phone distraction so frequently, unfortunately, in 

every mode. 

Mr. CAPUANO. I appreciate that. And, again, I, like everyone else, 

I am frustrated the cell phone thing is not settled yet. But I presume you have got some general information about what has happened; you have been reluctant to say it because you are dotting 

your i’s and crossing your t’s, which is exactly what I want you to 

do. Now, it would be nice if you could dot all those i’s and cross 

all those t’s now. I hope it is soon. I assume it will be. But, nonetheless, I guess I am on the way. 

On seatbelts, Ms. Feinberg, again, you are not as old as I am. 

When I was a kid, we didn’t have seatbelts in the car. We had 

them, but—I am not even sure if we had them. I take it back. 

I used to be thrown in the back of the station wagon. We could 

play all day long and run around the back of the station wagon, 

until my mother and father turned around and made the classic 

threat, sit down and shut up, or I will turn around; I will stop this 

car. You know, every kid my age heard that. Yet, we put seatbelts 

in cars. You restricted my freedom. Now I can’t run around in the 

car. You have seatbelts in airplanes. You restricted my freedom, 

yet I could still get up, go to the toilet, talk to my friends in the 

back. And I understand fully well that the structure of current 

trains may not make it much use. 

68 

I get that. And I get the fact that it may take us 5, 10, 15 years, 

to get where we want to be on seatbelts. But at some point, again, 

on the presumption that seatbelts help, and I presume they do because the automobile industry and the airplane industry have instituted them. And I know some people don’t wear them. I am not 

perfect at it myself. I didn’t start wearing my seatbelt until I started screaming at my own kids to put their seatbelt on, otherwise, 

Dad would get arrested, which at that age they actually cared 

about. At some age, they are not so sure. And then I realized what 

a hypocrite I was. I started wearing my own seatbelt. Which, like 

it or not, it is better for me. I get that. And I am not suggesting 

we need to put seatbelts in the train now. 

But to pretend that seatbelts in a train is somehow going to, you 

know, restrict people’s freedom and drive the ridership down is absurd. And I would simply encourage you, if it is a safety issue— 

again, I am not the expert. I will listen to the NTSB. If seatbelts 

can help save lives or stop injuries, then we will should start planning on the implementation of them. If it can’t be done on the current train configuration, fine. I get that. But at some point, Mr. 

Boardman, you are going to order some new trains. When you do, 

maybe you can implement seatbelts on it. But those are the two 

things. With that, I just want to do one other thing. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask you to consent to include in the record materials from FCC, which shows what the FCC has done to help and/ 

or hinder the railroad’s move towards Positive Train Control. 

Mr. DENHAM. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

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Mr. CAPUANO. With that, I yield back. See, I did give you time. 

Mr. DENHAM. If Mr. Sanford were here, he would take note. 

Obviously, there is a lot of frustration in this committee, and certainly, a lot of tension to the lack of answers thereof. It has been 

3 weeks now. This has been all over the media, rightly so. There 

has been loss of life. There are Americans that are still looking for 

answers in this as well. I know you will continue to do your research, but you have now come before the entire Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure of Congress to come here and 

not have cell phone information, whether the cell phone was on or 

off, operable, to not understand what those records are after 3 

weeks, to not have an idea whether there was a mechanical failure 

when you have the train, a brand new Siemens train has been put 

in service less than a year ago, and we can’t do the autopsy on the 

train and understand whether there was a mechanical failure. 

It sounds like, while the engineer does not have recollection seconds before the crash, but he is at least being cooperative. We 

ought to have some assumptions, or some facts of whether or not 

there could have been operator error or an operator that actually 

created some type of malfunction. There are very few answers right 

now 3 weeks after one of the most horrific crashes that our Nation 

has ever seen. 

So because of that, we are going to ask you for a timely response 

to the questions that have come here today. We need to make a determination whether or not this body will have another hearing 

several weeks from now. 

So with that, I would ask unanimous consent that the record of 

today’s hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have 

provided answers to any questions that may have been submitted 

to them in writing, and unanimous consent that the record remain 

open for 15 days for additional comments, and that witnesses provide answers to our questions for the record within 15 days of today’s hearing. 

Without objection, so ordered. I would like to thank each of our 

witnesses for being here today. Again, I would also like to thank 

our witnesses for your expedient response to the crash site itself 

and the collaboration that each of you showed in working together 

to resolve that. 

And Mr. Hart, any response? 

Mr. HART. Yes. Just one final comment. We have not found any 

anomalies with respect to the locomotive, just for clarification. We 

haven’t found any anomalies with respect to the tracks, the signals, 

the brakes, or the locomotive that would explain this accident. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Hart. 

If no other Members have anything to add, the committee stands 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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