1The Honorable Donald J. Stohr, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-2573

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Richard E. Johnson, Jr., *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

J.B. Esry, Sheriff of Randolph County, * Eastern District of Missouri

Missouri, Charlie Washum, Deputy *

Sheriff of Randolph County, Missouri, * [UNPUBLISHED]

General Lee Green, Deputy Sheriff of *

Randolph County, Missouri, *

*

Appellees. *

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 Submitted: April 6, 2000

 Filed: April 13, 2000 

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Before McMILLIAN, HANSEN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit

Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Richard E. Johnson, a Missouri prisoner, appeals from the final judgment entered

in the District Court1 for the Eastern District of Missouri, dismissing two named
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defendants and granting summary judgment to remaining defendants in his 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action. For reversal, Johnson argues the district court erred in applying

employment discrimination law to his retaliation claims, disregarding material evidence,

and making credibility determinations. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

Johnson filed this action against Randolph County, Missouri Sheriff J.B. Esry,

Deputy Sheriffs Charlie Washum and General Lee Green, Circuit Judge Channing

Blaeuer, and Public Defender Robert Fleming, claiming they twice transferred him as

a pretrial detainee from the Randolph County Jail to the Marion County Jail in

retaliation for his filing civil rights actions against them. He also claimed defendants

conspired to coerce him into voluntarily dismissing his civil rights complaints by

threatening that he otherwise would receive a harsh sentence in his criminal case. 

Upon de novo review, see Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1171 (8th Cir. 2000)

(per curiam), we conclude the district court correctly dismissed Johnson’s claims

against Judge Blaeuer and Fleming. Judicial immunity shielded Judge Blaeuer from a

suit for money damages. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (per curiam).

Although Fleming could act under color of state law as a public defender if he

conspired with state officials to deprive Johnson of federal rights, see Tower v. Glover,

467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984), Johnson’s conspiracy allegations were conclusory, see

Manis v. Sterling, 862 F.2d 679, 681 (8th Cir. 1988) (conspiracy allegations must be

pleaded with sufficient specificity and factual support to suggest meeting of minds). 

We also review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. See

Hawkins v. City of Farmington, 189 F.3d 695, 705-06 (8th Cir. 1999). Prison officials

may not punish an inmate by transferring him to another prison, or by isolating him,

because he exercises his constitutional right of access to the courts. See Goff v.

Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 736-37 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1209 (1994). To

succeed on a claim of retaliatory transfer or retaliatory discipline, an inmate must prove
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that, but for an unconstitutional retaliatory motive, the transfer or discipline would not

have occurred. See id. at 738. 

While we disagree with the district court’s application of employment

discrimination law--particularly, its adverse-impact requirement--to Johnson’s

retaliatory-transfer claim, see Dixon v. Brown, 38 F.3d 379, 380 (8th Cir. 1994)

(“[W]hen retaliatory conduct is involved, there is no independent injury requirement.”),

we find such application is immaterial in light of the district court’s correct application

of the “but for” analysis. We agree with the district court that Johnson failed to create

a jury issue on whether, but for his litigiousness, defendants would not have transferred

him or placed him in a cell by himself. See Farver v. Vilches, 155 F.3d 978, 979 (8th

Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (summary judgment for prison officials appropriate where

inmate produced no evidence he was transferred because he filed grievance, rather than

because he indicated he was not medically capable of working in jail’s kitchen).

We further conclude the district court properly rejected Johnson’s remaining

claims. His access-to-the-courts claim fails because he did not show any resulting

actual injury, see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-53 (1996); his access-to-thecourts claim on behalf of other inmates is meritless because he failed to show the

inmates could not bring claims in their own names or were left without reasonable

alternative assistance after his transfer, see Hamm v. Groose, 15 F.3d 110, 112 (8th

Cir. 1994); Gassler v. Rayl, 862 F.2d 706, 707 (8th Cir. 1988); his Sixth Amendment

claim fails because he did not show his temporary transfers to the Marion County Jail

denied him effective assistance of counsel, cf. McMaster v. Pung, 984 F.2d 948, 952

(8th Cir. 1993) (finding inmate was not denied access to legal counsel because he could

consult with counsel by telephone and through mail); and his due process claim lacks

merit because he did not allege facts indicating his transfer and eight days in a
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solitary cell amounted to an atypical and significant deprivation in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life, see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-86 (1995).

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.