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95–252 PDF 2015

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: ARE OUR AIRPORTS 

SAFE? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 13, 2015 

Serial No. 114–27 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DeSAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

JAMES ROBERTSON, Staff Director for Transportation and Public Assets Subcommittee 

MICHAEL KIKO, Professional Staff Member 

MELISSA BEAUMONT, Clerk 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on May 13, 2015 ............................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

The Hon. John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 6 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8 

Ms. Jennifer Grover, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. 

Government Acountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 20 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 22 

Mr. Rafi Ron, President & CEO, New Age Security Solutions 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 37 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 39 

APPENDIX 

Timeline of OGR Interaction with TSA/DHS ........................................................ 68 

Statement of Rep. Connolly .................................................................................... 69 

Statement of TSA before the Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform .... 71 


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TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: ARE OUR 

AIRPORTS SAFE? 

Wednesday, May 13, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

WASHINGTON, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:25 a.m., in room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz (chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Jordan, 

Walberg, Amash, DesJarlais, Massie, Meadows, DeSantis, Buck, 

Walker, Blum, Hice, Grothman, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney, Norton, Clay, Lynch, Connolly, Duckworth, Kelly, Lawrence, 

DeSaulnier, and Lujan Grisham. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. Without objection the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. 

We have an important hearing today dealing with the TSA. Airport security is pivotal to our Nation’s safety and security. We appreciate the thousands and thousands of men and women who 

serve at the TSA. I think they work hard. They are dedicated. They 

are committed. They don’t know what they are going to see. We 

have an inordinate amount of guns that are still trying to be taken 

through airports, weapons of all kinds. It’s a very difficult situation 

with literally tens and tens of thousands of security badges that 

are out there. 

We need to continue to have a good, vibrant discussion in this 

country about the safety and security of our airports and how to 

do that. And one of the things I like to say, and I’ve said it many 

times, and I’m sure I’ll continue to say it is, we’re different in this 

Nation in that we are self-critical. We do take a good, hard look 

at our security parameters and challenge the notion that the standard status quo is acceptable. 

One of the things that stuck out to me in the 9/11 report, the 

commission that came together, is that often government lacks 

imagination, where terrorists and would-be nefarious characters 

who want to do harm and provide mayhem, death, and destruction 

to the United States of America will often be more creative than 

our security personnel. And so to have this type of discussion, it’s 

good that we hear a variety of perspectives. We have had some 

good work from the inspector general. We have had good work from 

the GAO. We have a good perspective from others who have had 

to deal with highly targeted areas such as Israel. And that’s the 

type of discussion we have today. 


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But it does require that we have a very good communication between the Congress and Homeland Security, specifically the TSA. 

We have had an exceptionally difficult time, exceptionally difficult 

time, getting information from the TSA on some very basic matters. 

One of the things, for instance, that we asked for, this is a blank, 

ladies and gentlemen, this is a blank form, a blank form, not filled 

out, a blank form that people are to use as they assess security. 

We asked to see a copy of it. We were allowed to see it in camera, 

but members here were not allowed to see that. And so we asked 

for a copy of it. This is what they give us, 100 percent redacted. 

This is a blank form that they will not even allow Congress to see. 

Now, if that’s the type of cooperation we’re going to get from the 

TSA, we’re going to have some very difficult times. 

Now, we had invited Mr. Caraway, who is the acting administrator, to come before the Committee. At first we heard a variety 

of excuses. We needed more than 2 weeks. Then we had a big 

dustup because for weeks we had planned to do this, in fact, more 

than a month we had planned to do this. Felt that he as the acting 

administrator would be pivotal to this discussion. 

But Homeland Security objected to Mr. Ron’s presence on the 

panel. They felt that it was demeaning, demeaning, to actually 

have the acting administrator sit on the same panel as a nongovernment witness. That’s absurd. That’s offensive. It’s a waste of 

the Committee’s time. It’s a waste of Congress’ time. We don’t need 

two panels to have this discussion. We want to have one panel. 

Now, we had decided in a very bipartisan, mutual way, that cabinet level secretaries, if they come to testify before the Committee, 

will be the sole person to testify. If you’re below a cabinet level secretary, we’re not going to separate you out into your own panel. 

But the TSA, different than others that we have had—I would remind you that we have had a variety of other people come before 

this Committee who sit side-by-side with regular people from the 

outside, from the private sector—and so unfortunately the TSA has 

refused, and Mr. Carraway has refused the Committee’s invitation 

to appear before Congress. 

We have been working on this since the first part of April. 

They’ve had plenty of notice, and up until late, late, late yesterday, 

he was going to be here if it was a separate panel. But now because 

we are not going to waste this Committee’s time, we are not going 

to waste members’ time, they are not sitting here today, and we 

will have less of a hearing because of it. It’s an embarrassment 

that they would do that. They made these decisions themselves, 

but that is not the way it’s going to work around here. 

TSA had said, well, maybe we’ll give you somebody else. It’s not 

the TSA’s decision as to who Congress calls to testify. That is not 

their decision. It is the decision of Congress to understand and to 

be informed by those that they invite before Congress. But that’s 

where we find ourselves today. 

So with that I’m going to now yield to—I took a little extra time 

there with that explanation—but now I would like to now recognize 

the chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation, Mr. Mica of 

Florida. 


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Mr. MICA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Ranking Member for holding this meeting. I think it’s an insult to the 

Committee that TSA would not send the acting administrator to 

this panel with due notice. This is a very important oversight hearing. We spend about $7 billion a year now on TSA’s activities. And 

if anyone takes time to read this report—we’re going to hear from 

John Roth in a few minutes, the inspector general who produced 

this report—but every Member of Congress and people throughout 

the country should read this report. 

This report is an indictment of the failure of TSA, not just in one 

area, but in almost every one of their functions. It’s supposed to be 

a multi-tiered transportation security system they set up; and in 

every aspect—just glance through the report—everything from passenger baggage screening and passenger screening, one indictment 

after another on systems to provide access for people who don’t 

pose a risk, and we all support TSA PreCheck. They, in fact—and 

it’s designed to expedite passengers who don’t pose a risk. In fact, 

we find instances in which they failed to connect the dots and 

found a passenger who was a convicted terrorist, Sara Jane 

Olson—this is a press report—who went through TSA. Their system failed to find these people. 

The most important thing we’re trying to do is find people who 

pose a risk. The TSA agent who saw her go through actually identified her because she was such a well-known terrorist from her picture. And then what is even more astounding is he went to a superior, and he actually authorized the expediting of a terrorist 

through this system. This is an outrageous history. 

And I have to say, the chairman is not Jason-come-lately. If you 

read further in the report, they talk about equipment purchases 

and the failure of buying. You have to have the best technology 

when someone comes through, not just an expedited system, but to 

see what they have that poses a risk, whether it’s arms or now explosives and other devices that might harm us. 

Back in 2009 the chairman introduced legislation to restrict the 

purchase of some equipment that actually didn’t do the job, and 

this is a press account back then, and he was thwarted. They 

ended up buying equipment—read the report, an indictment of buying billions of dollars worth of equipment that failed. They bought 

puffers that failed. They bought this Rapiscan equipment. And it’s 

interesting, the history of it is also interesting that Linda Daschle 

represented one company—people might be familiar with that 

name L–3, and then Rapiscan which the chairman had raised some 

questions about privacy issues and not using it. 

They went ahead and spent—they split the contract, a half a billion dollar contract between the two competing lobbyists. A half a 

billion for the equipment is one thing. Then it cost another quarter 

of a billion per set of equipment to install this stuff. But this is an 

indictment of even the remaining equipment. The Rapiscan the 

chairman had raised questions about had to be taken out, had to 

be taken out. But then on top of that, this report says the equipment they have, they can’t maintain. They don’t know whether it 

works or not, and they don’t have people properly trained to run 

the equipment. 


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This is a very sad day, and I can see why TSA did not want to 

show up today. They have 61,000 employees. They have 15,000 administrators because we have a cap of 46,000 screeners. And this 

whole report outlines in each area, training,recruitment, acquisition of equipment, how they’ve failed. I see why that seat is empty 

today and TSA would not show their face to this Committee today. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentlemen. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. 

Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I do 

thank you for calling this very important hearing. The Transportation Security Administration has an incredibly challenging mission. It has to strike just the right balance between passenger safety and passenger convenience. Everyone who has been to an airport 

in the past 15 years can relate to the frustration of waiting in long 

lines at security checkpoints. 

But after 9/11, we are painfully aware of the dangers we face on 

a continuing basis. The challenge of the TSA is to develop programs that maximize safety and convenience, programs that protect the traveling public without making their experience unbearable. 

Last year Congress directed TSA to increase the number of passengers enrolled in the PreCheck program. Under the program, 

travelers submit background information, criminal histories and 

fingerprints. This information is run against terrorist watch lists 

and criminal data bases. If these searches turn up no problems, 

passengers are given known traveler numbers, and that allows 

them to pass through expedited security lines with fewer restrictions. 

When Congress passed this law, it gave TSA specific targets. For 

example, Congress directed TSA to certify that 25 percent of all 

passengers are eligible for expedited screening without lowering security standards, and that the agency has been working toward 

that goal. But, however, the inspector general and the Government 

Accountability Office have raised concerns about this process. For 

example, the current program relies on passengers to provide information about any new criminal convictions or similar information 

after they have enrolled in the program. In other words, the system 

relies on passengers to self-update. 

According to the inspector general, TSA should develop a system 

to conduct 24-hour recurrent vetting of PreCheck members against 

law enforcement and intelligence data bases. I know many people 

and many agencies have been working for years to do just that. I 

also understand how difficult it is to link various local State and 

Federal data systems. However, this may be one area in which our 

Committee can offer unique assistance, especially with our wide jurisdiction that cuts across all levels of government. 

GAO and the inspector general have also raised concern with the 

Managed Inclusion program. Under this program TSA officers identify passengers that are not enrolled in the PreCheck program and 

direct them to pass through the PreCheck security lanes if they appear to be low risk. TSA uses behavioral detection officers to identify passengers with low risk indicators, such as children and the 


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elderly, and they also employ explosive trace detection and K–9 

teams. 

GAO reported that although TSA has tested the individual pieces 

of the Managed Inclusion program, it has not tested them as a 

whole system. In addition, the inspector general recommended that 

TSA halt the Managed Inclusion program until technology can be 

developed to connect terrorist watch lists to individual airport security checkpoints. 

Another concern is perimeter security. One of our witnesses 

today, Mr. Rafi Ron, of the New Age Security Solutions, has 

flagged this as an issue that needs much more attention, particularly given the various entities that play a role in this process, including local airport police, airport operators, and TSA. 

After a 15-year-old hopped a fence at the San Jose International 

Airport, climbed into an aircraft wheel well, and traveled to Hawaii, the Associated Press initiated the investigation of perimeter 

breaches. AP reported that approximately 268 perimeter security 

breaches have occurred since 2004 in airports that handle threequarters of the Nation’s commercial passenger traffic. We’re better 

than that. We’re only as strong as the weakest link in our chain, 

so it is important to ensure that all of these issues are addressed. 

It is easy to simply criticize the agency, but it is much more difficult, and it takes much more effort to identify solutions to these 

problems and ensure that they are well-implemented. 

I want to thank Chairman Chaffetz for calling this hearing, and, 

Mr. Chairman, I agree; Mr. Carraway ought to be here. And as I 

said to you before the hearing began, we need to fix a date for him 

to come in so that we can hear from him. I know the chairman has 

focused on these issued extensively, and I want to thank him for 

all of his hard work in this area, and I also look forward to the testimony today; and with that I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I will hold the record open for 5 legislative 

days for any members who would like to submit a written Statement. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But now will recognize our panel of witnesses. As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Melvin Carraway, Acting Administrator for the Department—of Transportation Security Administration at the Department of Homeland Security was scheduled to testify but has not arrived, has not shown up, has elected 

to not testify today, which was not an optional activity. 

We are pleased to have the Honorable John Roth, Inspector General for the Department of Homeland Security; Ms. Jennifer Grover, Acting Director of Homeland Security and Justice at the Government Accountability Office; and Mr. Rafi Ron, President and 

CEO of New Age Security Solutions, who also has extensive airport 

security work that he has personally participated in, in Israel. 

We welcome you all. Pursuant to Committee rules, all witnesses 

will be sworn before they testify, so if you will please rise and raise 

your right-hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 


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Thank you. Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in 

the affirmative. In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate it if you would limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire written record will be obviously made a part of the record. 

We’re pretty liberal on your verbal comments, but try to keep it 

close to 5. And we’ll start with you, Mr. Roth. You’re now recognized for 5 minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN ROTH 

Mr. ROTH. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and 

members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here to testify today about airport security issues. Each day TSA is required 

to screen about 1.8 million passengers and about 3 million carryon 

bags at 450 airports nationwide. TSA faces a classic asymmetric 

threat. It cannot afford to miss a single, genuine threat without potentially catastrophic consequences. A terrorist, on the other hand, 

only needs to get it right once. TSA’s 50,000 transportation security 

officers spend long hours performing tedious tasks that require constant vigilance. Complacency can be a huge problem. Ensuring consistency across DHS’ largest work force would challenge even the 

best of organizations. Unfortunately, although nearly 14 years have 

passed since TSA’s inception, we remain deeply concerned about its 

ability to execute its mission. 

Since 2004 we have published more than 115 audit and inspection reports about TSA’s programs and operations. We have issued 

hundreds of recommendations to attempt to improve TSA’s efficiency and effectiveness. We have conducted a series of covert penetration tests, essentially testing TSA’s ability to stop us from bringing in simulated explosives and weapons through checkpoints, as 

well as testing whether we could enter secure areas through other 

means. Although the results of those tests are classified, and we 

would be happy to brief any Member or their staffs in a secure setting with regard to our specific findings, we identified 

vulnerabilities caused by human and technology-based failures. 

We have audited and reported on TSA’s acquisitions. Our audit 

reports show that TSA faces significant challenges in contracting 

for goods and services. Despite spending billions on aviation security technology, our testing of certain systems has revealed no resulting improvement. 

We have examined the performance of TSA’s work force, which 

is largely a function of who is hired and how they are trained and 

managed. Our audits have repeatedly found that human error, 

often a simple failure to follow protocol, poses significant transportation security vulnerabilities. We have looked at how TSA plans 

for, buys, deploys, and maintains its equipment and have found 

challenges at every step in the process. These weaknesses have 

real and negative impact on transportation security as well. 

Additionally, we have looked at how TSA assesses risk in determining expedited screening. We applaud TSA’s efforts to use riskbased passenger screening because it allows TSA to focus on high 

or unknown risk passengers instead of known, vetted passengers 


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who pose less risk. However, we have deep concerns about some of 

TSA’s decisions about the level of risk. 

We recently assessed the PreCheck Initiative. As a result of that 

inspection, we concluded that some of the methods that the TSA 

used in determining risk are sound approaches to increasing the 

PreCheck population. But other methods, specifically some of TSA’s 

risk assessment rules, create security vulnerabilities. Based on our 

review, we believe TSA needs to modify the Initiative’s vetting and 

screening processes. Unfortunately TSA did not concur with the 

majority of our recommendations. We believe that this represents 

TSA’s failure to understand the gravity of the situation. 

As an example of PreCheck’s vulnerabilities, we recently reported that, through risk assessment rules, a notorious felon was 

granted expedited screening through PreCheck. The traveler was a 

former member of a domestic terrorist group and while a member 

was involved in numerous felonious criminal activities that led to 

arrest and conviction. After serving a multiple-year prison sentence, the traveler was released. Notwithstanding the fact that the 

transportation security officer recognized the traveler based on 

media coverage, that traveler was permitted to use expedited 

screening. 

TSA has taken some steps to implement our recommendations 

and address security vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, some problems 

appear to persist. While TSA cannot control all risks to transportation security, many issues are well within their control. Sound 

planning and strategies for efficiently acquiring, using, and maintaining screening equipment that operates at full capacity to detect 

dangerous items, for example, would go a long way toward improving overall operations. Better training and better management of 

transportation security officers would help mitigate the effects of 

human error, which can never be eliminated but can be reduced. 

Taken together, TSA’s focus on its management practices and its 

oversight of its technical assets and work force would help enhance 

security as well as customer service for air passengers. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared Statement. I welcome 

any questions you or other members of the Committee may have. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. And thanks to you and your 

staff who spent a lot of time putting this information together. We 

do appreciate it. 

[The prepared Statement of Mr. Roth follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Ms. Grover. You’re recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JENNIFER GROVER 

Ms. GROVER. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and other members and staff. Thank you for the 

opportunity to discuss TSA’s oversight of passenger and airport 

worker screening effectiveness. 

Screening systems must work properly to deliver the security 

protections that they promise. Over several years GAO has found 

weaknesses in TSA’s oversight of its screening systems, raising 

questions about whether TSA is falling short in its ability to ensure 

aviation security. TSA has taken some steps to improve oversight 

of these systems, but additional actions are needed. 

Today I will focus on four areas. First, a Secure Flight program 

which matches passenger information against Federal Government 

watch lists to ensure that those who should not fly or should receive enhanced screening are identified. Second, AIT systems, 

which are the full body scanners that are used to screen passengers 

for prohibited items at the checkpoint. Third, the Managed Inclusion screening process which TSA uses to provide expedited screening to passengers who were not previously identified as low risk; 

and, fourth, criminal history checks done to vet airport workers. 

Regarding Secure Flight, we found in September 2014 that TSA 

did not have timely and reliable information about the extent or 

causes of system matching errors which occur when Secure Flight 

fails to identify passengers who were actual matches to the watch 

list. In response to our recommendation, TSA has developed a 

mechanism to keep track of the known matching errors, and they 

are considering methods to evaluate overall Secure Flight matching 

accuracy rates on an ongoing basis. 

Regarding AIT, we found in March 2014, that TSA did not include information about screener performance when they were 

evaluating AIT effectiveness. Rather, TSA’s assessment was limited 

to the accuracy of the AIT systems in the laboratory. However, 

after an AIT identifies a potential threat, a screening officer must 

do a targeted pat down to resolve the alarm. Thus, the accuracy of 

the screeners in conducting their pat downs properly and identifying all threat items is key to understanding the effectiveness of 

the AIT systems in the airport operating environment. 

DHS concurred with our recommendation to measure AIT effectiveness as a function of both the technology and the screening officers who operate it but has not yet fully addressed the recommendation. 

Similarly, in December 2014, we found that TSA had not tested 

the security effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion system as it 

functions as a whole. As part of Managed Inclusion, TSA uses multiple layers of security, as you noted in your opening Statements, 

such as explosive detection devices and canines, to mitigate the inherent risk that’s associated with screening randomly selected passengers in a system that was specifically designed for low-risk passengers. However, if the security layers are not working as intended, then TSA may not be sufficiently screening passengers. As 

you noted, TSA has tested the individual layers of security used in 


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Managed Inclusion and has reported finding them effective, although GAO has raised concerns about the effectiveness of some of 

these layers such as behavior detection officers. At the time of our 

report, TSA was planning to complete testing of the Managed Inclusion system by mid–2016. 

Finally, regarding TSA’s involvement in airport worker vetting, 

we found in December 2011 that the criminal history information 

available to TSA and airports for background checks was limited. 

Specifically, TSA’s level of access to FBI criminal history records 

was excluding many State records. In response to our recommendation, TSA and the FBI confirmed that there was a risk of incomplete information, and the FBI has since reported expanding the 

criminal history records information that is available to TSA for 

these security threat assessments. 

In conclusion, TSA has made progress in improving its screening 

oversight such as by taking steps to understand the vulnerabilities 

in the Secure Flight program, and by working with the FBI to obtain access to more complete criminal background information. Yet 

more work remains to ensure that Secure Flight, AIT, and Managed Inclusion are working as TSA intends. 

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, this concludes 

my Statement. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

[Prepared Statement of Ms. Grover follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Ron, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF RAFI RON 

Mr. RON. First of all, I would like to thank the chairman and the 

members of the Committee for inviting me to testify again before 

you. I have chosen to speak today not on passenger screening, as 

the other witnesses have referred to this in details, but rather go 

into what Mr. Cummings mentioned earlier, and that is the failure 

to deal with what I would describe as the airport facility security, 

which is an extremely important part of our airport and aviation 

security system. 

What I wish the Committee to understand is that the importance 

of perimeter security has to be measured against the threat of 

somebody being able to access an aircraft parked on the ground 

without knowledge, without detection. And in the case of a stowaway, as we have witnessed in the past, they tried to get—to take 

hide in the wheel well, but instead of that, certainly instead of 120 

pounds of bone and flesh of a person, they leave behind a 2-pound 

device that will not be noticed. 

The measures that are being implemented today are simply unable to do that. So if I would put that into a nutshell, I would say 

that while we invest billions of dollars every year in screening passengers and at the same time we leave the perimeter, I don’t want 

to say unattended, but I would say unattended to a satisfactory 

level. What we actually do is invest all our resources on the front 

door and leaving the back door open. But at the end of the day it 

is the same aircraft that we are trying to protect by the screening 

that would be harmed by a relatively easy access of individuals 

through the perimeter. 

So perimeter is certainly something that we have noticed in the 

past. It was discussed in this Committee, and I haven’t seen a lot 

of development during the last few years despite the fact that it 

made a lot of headlines. 

The other subject that made it out of headlines lately, is the 

issue of the threat of the insider, or in other terms when employees 

become part of an operation, to carry out illegal activity that could 

be also translated into terrorist threat immediately. We saw the 

case in Atlanta. Although here in this case I have to say that TSA 

had responded to it rather quickly by increasing the background 

checks and the frequency of those checks. But as we just heard 

from the other witnesses, there is still an open question about the 

quality of the background check itself, whether that really provides 

us with the security that we need. 

And the third point that I’d like to refer to is the issue of how 

well do we protect the public and the employees at the airport 

against ground attacks as we witnessed a couple of years ago at 

LAX when an active shooter started shooting at the checkpoint and 

the security forces in the airport responded in a way that certainly 

can lead us to conclusions. There is a lot of room for improvement 

in this area. 

The common denominator of all these three points that I made 

is that none of them are related to passengers, and yet they are 

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sengers, and that means that the reason for that, in my view, is 

that in 2001, when TSA was established, it was established both 

as an implementer of security, as well as a regulator. 

And I don’t know any other example in government structures 

where an entity is actually regulating itself. There has to be a certain level of independence to the regulator, independence and authority, for the regulator to first of all, issue regulations that sometimes may not be comfortable for the implementer, but still have 

to be performed. And certainly when you look for the performance 

that doesn’t meet the regulatory requirements but you are in 

charge of implementation, that’s a conflict of interest, and I strongly recommend that the Committee will have a look at it and will 

consider a solution to that. 

And the last point that I’d like to make is that, when we look 

at police forces in airports around the country, we see the more or 

less standard law enforcement organizations as we meet in the city 

center. But we have to understand that at the airport, the police 

function, the police priority should be security and prevention rather than law enforcement and reaction. Because when a terrorist attack takes place, it’s all over. There’s very little that you can do except deal with the damages. If we talk about explosive devices, and 

even when we talk about active shooters, they are willing to perform better. And that certainly calls for a different type of airport 

policing. 

Airport police should be a dedicated, specialized force where the 

people are selected on the basis of their ability to perform those 

roles. They have to be trained and certified, and their certification 

has to be maintained. Exercises should be carried out on a regular 

basis, and at the end of the day, we have to make sure that the 

capability to prevent, or in cases where we need to respond, would 

be quick and effective. And this is not where we are today. Thank 

you very much. 

Mr. MICA [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Ron, and all of the witnesses. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Ron follows:] 


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Mr. MICA. We’re going to move now to a round of questioning, 

and I’ll start. First of all, what you just said was interesting. You 

said TSA tries to do everything, and there are very few models of 

this. I think only Romania, Bulgaria, and some Third World countries have that structure. 

And there should be some separation. The government should be 

in charge of security information, for example, getting the intelligence and preparing the list so even if you prepare a list, and you 

testified—well, first I’ll let you respond. Am I correct in what I 

stated about the structure being flawed? 

Mr. RON. Yes, you are correct. 

Mr. MICA. So that’s something again the Committee—we never 

set it up to have TSA continue to operate this huge screening force. 

Never in our wildest imagination would we imagine 46,000 screeners and 15,000 administrators. Stop and think about that. And, 

again, the report that has been released today, again you see why 

Carraway wouldn’t show up. Just go over it. This isn’t my findings. 

Are you fairly independent, Mr. Roth? You’re the inspector general? 

Mr. ROTH. I am, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Have you looked at this, and it’s the whole truth and 

nothing but the truth? First thing, we conducted a series of covert 

penetration tests. I also asked the staff, many of the members are 

new. You have not participated in a closed briefing, you need to get 

a closed briefing and hear about the rate of failures. You will be 

appalled. 

It’s appalling, the failure rate—you don’t have to give any specifics that are classified, but it’s an appalling failure rate. Right, 

Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. We are deeply concerned—— 

Mr. MICA. We have identified vulnerabilities caused by human 

and technology failures. We will set that up, in the Committee and 

Members of Congress. If audited TSA’s acquisitions, point No. 2, 

the acquisition history is a complete fiasco. I cited the competing 

lobbyists and buying equipment that didn’t work, people weren’t 

trained for. And now the report back, OK, here’s the GAO technology report, Ms. Grover, and you said in fact, you cited that some 

of the technology oversight in this report of March last year does 

not enforce compliance with operational directives. That’s still the 

case, that TSA does not—in fact, I think from March 2011 through 

February 2013, about half the airports with AIT systems did not 

report any IED checkpoint results. Is this correct? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir, that’s correct and—— 

Mr. MICA. And not much improvement according to what you 

found, Mr. Roth, on operation, training and auditing. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROTH. That’s correct. 

Mr. MICA. OK. The third point. These aren’t my points. This is 

what he found. We have examined the performance of TSA’s work 

force which is largely a function of who is hired and how they are 

hired and trained and managed. Still problems with recruiting. 

Right, Mr. Roth? Still problems with training, Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. Correct. 

Mr. MICA. Still problems with managing. Right? 


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Mr. ROTH. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. And their responsibility in conducting audit and oversight within the system. Right? 

Mr. ROTH. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. Audits have been repeatedly found of human error. 

And often a simple failure to follow protocol poses significant 

vulnerabilities. Is that your Statement, sir? 

Mr. ROTH. It is, sir. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Let’s go to the last one here. We have looked at 

how TSA plans to buy, deploy and maintain its equipment. Well, 

I read the history, people don’t realize that the threat is very serious and ongoing and that the bad guys are one step ahead of us. 

Just look at the history. The shoe bomber, TSA never detected it. 

Right? 

Mr. ROTH. Correct. 

Mr. MICA. The diaper bomber, never detected it. Right? 

Mr. ROTH. Correct. 

Mr. MICA. The New York Times Square bomber, he bought his 

ticket on the phone, went to JFK and went through all the screening systems and was not stopped until he got on the plane and it 

wasn’t TSA. Right? 

Mr. ROTH. That’s my understanding. 

Mr. MICA. OK. That’s my understanding. But these are failures of this very expensive, $7 billion, 61,000 people, system. This is an 

indictment, and it’s very concerning. The equipment failure is also 

very concerning because that’s sort of your last line of defense. We 

have advanced imaging technology, and yet people are not trained 

to operate it or detect threats. Is that right, Mr. Roth? Is that what 

you found? 

Mr. ROTH. We found significant human error. 

Mr. MICA. And the last thing is, these guys are smart. When the 

members and staff get the next briefing, the thing that concerns 

me is right now all these systems are pretty much metal or nitrate 

based. Is that pretty much an assumption, that they detect metal 

or nitrates for explosives? 

Mr. ROTH. I can’t testify about that. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Well, I can tell you that that is what they are. 

We tried to put in place a behavior detection system, which was a 

total failure. Other Committees have looked at how we did it. It’s 

wrong. Israel does it, but Israel can profile. We can’t profile. Israel 

can do other things that we can’t do, and behavior detection as far 

as you’re concerned and in one of these reports is a failure, too. 

That’s looking at people, detecting behavior. 

Mr. ROTH. Both the IG as well as GAO have done work on that. 

Mr. MICA. And then finally, some of the safeguards aren’t in 

place for the passengers’ PreCheck system and making sure that 

we eliminate people who pose a risk. That’s still the case? Yes or 

no? 

Mr. ROTH. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. That’s still the case, Ms. Grover? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. And what’s most astounding is this particular individual I cited before, the woman, was so notorious that the TSA officer identified her by other pictures he’d seen of the terrorist, went 


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to a supervisor, and she got not only a free pass, but expedited 

through TSA. That’s a failure, is it not, Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. Ms. Grover? 

Ms. GROVER. Well, the system in that case actually worked as 

TSA intended for it to work. That’s my understanding. 

Mr. MICA. But her data never came up because she was—— 

Ms. GROVER. She was not on the watch list. 

Mr. MICA. Exactly. Exactly. So that’s where we need to get this 

information, people who pose the risk we can identify, go after 

them or stop them. 

Finally, the badge issue, the badge issue. Was it a couple of years 

that the TSA approved the badges at Atlanta where they gave 

badges out and didn’t do the proper background checks. Is that 

right, Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. We have done some work on that. In 2013, we had 

an audit where we found that the backlog was so great that TSA 

allowed airports simply to grant the SITA badges without a background check being done at the time. 

Mr. MICA. And of the items that was cited by Mr. Ron, one of 

the issues is people inside the system who pose a risk; the perimeter also he mentioned, which poses a risk that we don’t have systems in place for; and then the outdated structure that we have 

where TSA tries to do everything and does nothing very well, 

which is well-documented by your report. 

Thank you, Mr. Roth. And I yield now to Ms. Maloney, the 

gentlelady from New York. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I thank the panelists for your testimony and 

your work, and I thank the ranking member and chair for calling 

this important hearing. And I agree completely with the Statements of Mr. Roth when he said that the terrorist only has to be 

right once. We have to be right 100 percent of the time. We have 

got to stop them from coming through. 

I would say nothing is more important than protecting our people. And I will say that since 9/11, the New York City Police Department has documented well over 17 attempts to murder New 

Yorkers, and they have been thwarted through the combined efforts of all of law enforcement, including TSA, which is working 

every day to stop it. 

For some reason in our classified intelligence briefings, airlines 

continue to be a top priority for terrorists, a top target. They keep 

trying different ways. We hear it from press reports, your reports, 

and reports from airline stewardesses and captains of how they’re 

trying to break the perimeter, how they are trying to get into the 

cockpit in different ways. And so I see this as a collective effort to 

fight back. It’s not just TSA but all of us working with them to 

fight back. 

The PreCheck program, we also need commerce to work, and at 

first airlines were so backed up people weren’t even flying anymore. I will say now that in New York the PreCheck program is 

a success. Now the PreCheck line is longer than the normal line. 

More people are in the PreCheck line than in the other, so many 

people are in it, which I think speaks well that we have processed 

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So I want to ask Ms. Grover, apparently 33 percent of the passengers now pass through PreCheck. Is that correct? About how 

many people are in PreCheck now, would you say? 

Ms. GROVER. Well, the last data that I saw was almost half were 

receiving expedited screening in one form or another. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Half were receiving it in one form or another. 

Ms. GROVER. Right. 

Mrs. MALONEY. That is a remarkable achievement from where 

you started. I see this also an effort in many ways we are trying 

to crack down also on terrorist financing. Many of the banks are 

complaining about having to do PreCheck or they have to validate 

every single one of their customers, and there’s been some ideas 

about letting their system work with Homeland Security on combining a PreCheck list. They have to report, you have to report, on 

who’s in PreCheck. I think that’s a valuable new tool that we could 

look at in making it more efficient and also stopping more people. 

And I wonder, Ms. Grover, what you think about that, and I have 

a proposed outline of a pilot project in that area that I’d like you 

to look at and have your department get back to us. 

Ms. GROVER. Thank you. We would be happy to do that. Right 

now the background check for individuals who sign up for 

PreCheck are conducted by TSA, and it includes a criminal background check, a check on immigration status, and a third aspect 

of the check, and that’s against the terrorist screening data base. 

And so I’d be interested in talking with your staff about the specific 

work you’d like to do in terms of opportunities to expand that. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, there are other units in our country that 

are also doing background checks, so if we could compile them together and make it more efficient and knowing who these people 

are and increasing our ability to keep the bad people out of New 

York or out of the country, out of the country period. But as one 

who represented many people, many families who perished on 9/11, 

it’s an issue of grave concern to me. And when we created this 

whole system of review at airports, it was hotly debated whether 

it should be private or government, and many believed that our police and fire, who are charged in protecting us, are government. 

And TSA has the same level of importance in protecting our people 

and are now a huge target area which continues for some reason, 

airlines. I believe it should remain a government function. It’s too 

important, protecting lives of citizens. There is a movement in Congress to privatize it. I’m opposed to that. I believe it would weaken 

the system, not strengthen it. 

But I welcome this hearing of ideas of how we can strengthen 

this very important program. But the bottom line, we haven’t had 

another tragedy in a long time. When was the last time we had— 

we had many attempts—but when was the last time there was a 

terrorist attack that was successful on the airlines? Ms. Grover. 

Ms. GROVER. Well, I guess the 2009 attack would probably be the 

last significant one. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And what happened in 2009? 

Ms. GROVER. And that was an attempt to take down an airline. 

It was the gentleman that was bringing explosives on to the plane, 

and that was stopped on the plane. And in response to that, TSA 

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plosives, and they also started expanding the watch lists. But as 

part of our work we have found that there are weaknesses in the 

ability of the current systems to be able to identify even all of the 

people who are on the watch list. In fact, there are still errors in 

that. We also have work that has exposed weaknesses in the AIT 

systems and TSA’s knowledge of how well they work; so there is 

still work to be done. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, it’s a work in progress, and the bottom line, 

it was stopped. And so we join you in your efforts, and thank you 

for your testimony. My time is expired. Thank you. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Mr. Walberg. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ron, why do you 

believe preventing perimeter breaches should be a top priority? 

Mr. RON. Sir, would you repeat the question? 

Mr. WALBERG. In your testimony you mentioned perimeter 

breaches. You mentioned a wheel well situation, but why do you 

believe perimeter breaches should be a top priority? 

Mr. RON. Because at the end of the day, everything that we do 

at the checkpoint can be boiled down to the need to prevent a passenger from bringing an explosive device or a weapon that will 

allow an attack against the aircraft, the flying aircraft. The same 

target can be achieved simply by breaching the perimeter. The 

problem with breaching the perimeter is that—we have reports 

about 230-something cases that the Associated Press reported lately, but those are the cases that we know about. 

Keep in mind that most airports around the country do not have 

a detection system on their perimeter, and therefore one could 

enter and leave the airport without leaving any traces. There’s no 

systematic way to prevent that. And if at the end of the day that 

leads to the same result that we are trying to prevent at the checkpoint, I would consider it as being critical. 

Mr. WALBERG. Kind of negates all the effort then. Do you think 

that TSA is taking theinsider-outsider threat seriously? 

Mr. RON. I think that the fact that there’s a division between 

Federal responsibility and local responsibility. It leads to the failure to upgrade standards on perimeter security. While when it 

comes to a direct responsibility and implementation responsibility 

of TSA, we see all the resources available, and the screening operation takes the major, almost all of TSA’s operational budget. 

When it comes to perimeter security, it is expected that the airport 

will take care of that. The airport doesn’t have neither the manpower to do that. The number of police officers is too short for that. 

The ability to invest in a detection technology around the perimeter, which doesn’t come cheap, is also very limited. If in the past, 

and I have referred to prior to 9/11 when FAA was the regulator, 

only the regulator, and it also controlled the AIP program which 

provides grants to airports for improvements, security was part of 

it. Now the security is not very much a priority for FAA because 

it has pushed toward a DHS court. The idea of funding those, the 

necessary steps, is falling between the chairs. 

Mr. WALBERG. So the coordination is out of whack as well with 

the resources. Let me just move on. I’m asking each of you to respond to this question. Do you believe TSA overprescribes technological solutions and fails to think creatively about airport security? 


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Mr. RON. Yes, I do. I think that basically we do not pay enough 

attention to the passenger himself. The fact that we have started 

implementing steps in that direction, like PreCheck, should be welcome, although we need to carefully look carefully at what is being 

done as was suggested here earlier. But I think it is a step in the 

right direction. I also think that behavior detection is a part after 

it, but obviously I have a dispute on that with some of the other 

witnesses here. 

Mr. WALBERG. Ms. Grover, could you respond? 

Ms. GROVER. I would answer your question by saying that I 

think TSA is overemphasizing getting the programs up and running and underemphasizing evaluating their effectiveness, regardless of whether we’re talking about technology solutions or other 

solutions. 

Mr. WALBERG. Are we looking imagination and creativity? 

Ms. GROVER. You know, TSA is open to different options, and 

they put different strategies in place; but creativity is not helpful 

if TSA doesn’t have evidence to show it works. 

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Roth. 

Mr. ROTH. Just briefly, yes. I believe that the best technology solutions in the world, if the work force is not trained to use them, 

does not follow the protocols that they’re supposed to use, is useless. 

Mr. WALBERG. I guess my concern is as I’ve traveled through Detroit and Washington most generally, I see TSA agents attempting 

to perform their functions in most cases with courtesy, doing their 

jobs as it’s clear they have been told to do. But I just wonder if 

there aren’t some great ideas that could come from TSA agents 

themselves that people like Mr. Carraway and others aren’t willing 

to listen to or aren’t given time to listen to, on how to deal with 

our passengers and our security risk, which includes the perimeter. 

Because they hear about it just like us and know for a fact that 

all that they’ve done at the PreCheck line or the general line can 

be taken out of any type of positive results simply because we 

haven’t looked at all the places we could go. 

So thank you for your testimony. I see my time is expired. I yield 

back. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Lynch, you’re recognized. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, if I could 

just ask, I know that because of the scope and depth of the problem 

here, Mr. Carraway’s attendance here would be very, very important. I’m just wondering if the Committee has any plans to subpoena him, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. MICA. I honestly don’t know. I discussed that with the staff 

before—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Can I yield to the ranking member? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. What was the question? 

Mr. LYNCH. Well, the fact that—I mean, we got some wide problems here, from perimeter security to people that are on the 

PreCheck list that are felons, and it’s a pretty wide gap in our security. And Mr. Carraway’s attendance would be extremely important to us, and I’m just wondering, are we going to get him in here 

because a lot of my questions are for him? 

Mr. MICA. Same here. Oh, you yielded. 


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Mr. LYNCH. I did want to ask the ranking member. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Chairman Chaffetz and I did discuss this. He 

was trying to avoid a subpoena. What we were going to try to work 

out—and I mentioned it a little bit earlier in my opening—I agree, 

we really do need Carraway here, and so I asked the chairman to 

set a date certain for him to come in so that we can get him in here 

to ask questions, because you’re absolutely right. 

Mr. MICA. I would agree with Mr. Lynch, if you would, you asked 

me in the beginning. We talked about it with the chairman, and 

I would be supportive of a subpoena if necessary. 

Mr. LYNCH. If it’s needed, I just want to voice my support for 

that as well. And the fact that the gentleman is not here sort of 

feeds into the whole narrative here that we have a bureaucracy 

that’s not really responding to the problem that’s out there. But I 

do want to thank the witnesses who are here. That should not diminish your attendance. I appreciate your valuable testimony. It’s 

already been helpful. 

As I said, we have got some major gaps in security. There have 

been several notable security breaches. I note that on September 

14, 2013, a TSA employee was arrested along with five others for 

participating in a scheme to smuggle undocumented immigrants 

into the United States. 

Additionally, two airline employees were arrested in December 

2014 for smuggling weapons, guns and ammunition, on at least 20 

flights from Atlanta to New York over an 8-month period. And two 

TSA security screeners at San Francisco International Airport were 

also arrested in March 2015 for allegedly operating a drug-smuggling conspiracy. In addition, on March 9 there was a report that 

was in the press. I believe NBC had a story about these 1,400 

badges that were—and these were security badges for employees to 

access secure areas. They had gone missing over roughly 2 years. 

That was at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. 

And as well, in the city of Boston, there’s closing arguments 

today on the death penalty question for one of the Marathon bombers; and the brother who is now deceased, was missed. He actually 

left the United States, left Boston. Went to Dagestan. We had a report from the Russians to our security offices, the FBI and the CIA, 

to alert them that he had been engaged in alarming behavior, contacting terrorist groups in Chechnya or Dagestan. And he was on 

the TIDE list, 700,000 names. 

So this is widespread. Mr. Roth, you’ve done a great job in terms 

of authenticating some of the gaps here, but do we need to give you 

more power to actually try to address some of this stuff? There 

seems to be a division of labor here between the airports and the 

TSA in terms of whose responsibility it is to set these security protocols? 

Mr. ROTH. It is a massive job. When you talk about the number 

of SITA badges that are out there. For example, in 2012, we reported that there were 3.7 million badges for secured areas, so the 

idea of trying to keep that secure with that size, 450 airports 

across the country, it’s just a massive job; 50,000 TSOs, 46,000 

transportation security officers. We have initiated a number of 

criminal investigations against individuals, which is I think typical 


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any time you get a work force that size who has that responsibility, 

so it is a massive job. 

Mr. LYNCH. Is there a lot of turnover among these TSOs, transportation security officers? 

Mr. ROTH. I have not looked at that. I’m not sure if GAO has 

looked at that or not, but I’m not sure. 

Mr. LYNCH. Well, I actually think a lot of the things we need to 

talk about probably are going to have to take place in a classified 

briefing unfortunately, so I won’t waste any more time. So I look 

forward to that opportunity. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Grothman. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Thank you. I have just have a couple questions. 

First of all, you said before, how many supervisors do you have as 

part of TSA? 

Ms. GROVER. So I’m not sure exactly how many supervisors there 

are, sir. That would be a better question for TSA. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. None of you up there would even have an 

opinion? 

Mr. ROTH. We have not looked at that policy. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. When you review or when you audit them, 

I have heard from TSA agents that they feel that there’s some 

overstaffing going on here. Do you concur with that, or do you feel 

there is? Or do you think they’re trying to do what they can to kind 

of tighten things up a little? 

Ms. GROVER. So we haven’t looked specifically at the question of 

whether or not there is too much in the supervisory area. But we 

did do a report in 2013 that looked specifically at the issue of misconduct and found that there were about 9,600 misconduct cases 

that were adjudicated by TSA over a 3-year period, and at that 

point the total personnel was about 56,000. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. How many? 

Ms. GROVER. Total personnel was about 56,000 I believe at that 

point, and so I would say there is certainly a need for some supervision. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. Could you give me, rattle off like the three 

major causes of doing things wrong, and misconduct? 

Ms. GROVER. Sure. The largest category of misconduct was attendance and leave issues, so essentially being absent from work 

without prior approval or extensive tardiness. The second category 

of misconduct was screening and security errors. That counted for 

a full fifth, 20 percent of those roughly 10,000 misconduct cases; 

and those would be instances where the SOPs were not followed, 

such as screeners allowing individuals or their bags to bypass 

screening or where TSOs were bypassing the equipment check, so 

those are types of misconduct cases that could lead to a degradation of security. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. So collectively you feel, if anything, they ought 

to be tightening things up a little bit more? 

Ms. GROVER. I don’t know if that necessarily translates to a need 

for additional supervisors. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Oh, no, no. 

Ms. GROVER. But certainly, yes, there is room for addressing 

those issues. 


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Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. Well, different people have opinions on that, 

but thanks. I will yield the rest of my time. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Just on your time. Now, the figures we 

have are that there were 61,000 TSA personnel, that’s the latest 

that I had. And we had a cap of 46,000 screeners, so which leaves 

you with about 15,000 people who are not screeners; is that correct? And we had just under 4,000 people in Washington, DC. within the close proximity making on average $104,000 apiece, pretty 

hefty overhead, wouldn’t you say? 

Ms. GROVER. Thank you, sir. I am not familiar with the exact 

numbers. Those sound right to me. 

Mr. MICA. Those are pretty close. But we’ve built a huge bureaucracy, never intended it to be that way, and we’ve got to get 

it under control, better managed, whether it’s training, acquisition 

of equipment, performance, the passenger facilitation systems that 

don’t work, a lot of deficits. 

And then Mr. Ron mentioned the issues of perimeter security, I 

just visited an airport this past week in Knoxville, and looking at 

their vulnerabilities, but you can take any airport and just, whether it is LaGuardia where you can get a little rubber raft and end 

up on the runway, or any major airport in the country is easily 

penetrable by their perimeters, some of the issues you raised, Mr. 

Ron. 

Let me conclude—I yield back your time. You have the—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Just one question. 

Mr. MICA. You have the time. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. A few years ago they instituted these new things 

to see through you or whatever, they were kind of controversial at 

the time. Have you ever thought about restricting their use or 

could you just comment in general on them? 

Mr. ROTH. What you’re referring to are what’s called the AIT machines, which is Advanced Imaging Technology machines, where 

you have to sort of put your hands up and then the things go. We 

are doing some covert testing on that as we speak. We’ll write a 

classified report with regard to that. Early returns give us some 

concern. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Concern of what nature? 

Mr. ROTH. Whether they are effective. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Good, maybe you won’t need them. 

Mr. MICA. Well, I might point out just for the record that—and 

I pointed it out at the beginning, I don’t know if you were here, 

sir, but the acquisition of that equipment was very controversial, 

and Mr. Chaffetz objected to them buying some of the equipment 

that was—what he felt violated people’s rights. They went ahead 

and split the contract, as I mentioned, between Mr. Chertoff’s client, which was Rapiscan, and then between L3, which was 

Nastachel, a half billion dollars worth of contracts split evenly. 

They ended up the Rapiscan could not be changed so that it 

wouldn’t violate people’s privacy and those—that equipment after 

being installed was pulled out. 

So we’ve been through that three-ring circus, now that this report focuses on the deployment of some of that equipment, for example the advanced imaging detection which is millimeter wave, 

where you put your hands up. And we have problems with mainVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:48 Aug 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\95252.TXT APRIL

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taining the equipment, operating the equipment, auditing the performance of the equipment all outlined by these witnesses. 

Mr. DeSaulnier, the gentleman from California is recognized. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by 

opening comments recognizing the enormity of the responsibilities 

that you have and assuming there have been many successes. But 

Mr. Roth, I wanted to talk about really two subject areas, and Mr. 

Ron, the second part is the perimeter given that I’m from the Bay 

Area and we’ve had a lot of news coverage on that case and other 

cases. 

But Mr. Roth, you mentioned in your opening comments that 

complacency is a huge problem and that human error is too common and basically it’s—the human error is simply to follow protocol. And also you mentioned that you have to be—TSA has to be 

right every time and a terrorist only has to be right one time. So 

we have lots of examples in proper quality assurance in different 

fields, in similar situations, at hospitals or industrial facilities. Is 

there a basic—or maybe Mr. Ron knows this or Ms. Grover, a basic 

management tool when you have these kind of situations to make 

sure that complacency isn’t the order of the day? 

Mr. ROTH. I think it is severalfold. You know, one is oversight, 

TSA itself has what they call I think red teams, which go in and 

do testing on systems and individuals to ensure that they get it 

right. We obviously do covert testing as well. And then I think it 

is it is a matter of training. As in the military, if there is a training 

culture that you do a certain protocol the same way every single 

time, then you’re going to at least lower the incidence of human 

error. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. So that’s not sufficient in this instance, is that 

your view? 

Mr. ROTH. The results that we have found have shown that there 

is room for improvement. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Is there in your view misprioritization? Should 

there be more emphasis on this as opposed to technology? 

Mr. ROTH. I think there needs to be more of an emphasis on 

training, yes. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Mr. Ron, your comment about very alarming 

that we put a lot of emphasis on the front door, but the back door 

is wide open, and given your comments and your experience both 

in Israel and Massachusetts, are there best practices both on a lowthreshold cost, sort of a medium and higher level? Because you also 

mention basically we don’t have the resources to do the higher 

level. 

Mr. RON. Thank you. I think that one thing that I find missing 

at the base is the lack of comprehensive approach to the challenges 

of aviation security. We are defining the relatively narrow angles 

and we take care of those angles, but sometimes we miss the wider 

picture. 

I think again that perimeter security is a perfect example for 

that, because while we’re trying to prevent exactly the same event 

on one side of the operation we invest a lot and on the other side 

of the operation we allow the situation to remain as poor as it is 

for many years, despite all the red lamps that they blink at us. 


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Mr. DESAULNIER. So in your previous experience you had to balance your resources, your funding with the risk assessment. Are we 

doing that sufficiently in this instance? 

Mr. RON. Yes, I think that risk assessment is an ongoing process. 

It has to be part of our operation continuously. It needs to be 

present all the time. It has to be done at every level. So when we 

talk about passengers, for example, there’s room for individual risk 

assessment per passenger in order to identify the of level of risk 

of that passenger. I think that the criminal background check is 

not enough. For that—— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. I was speaking more about in relationship to 

the front door to the back door. Are we putting enough? Is this a 

proper risk assessment that we should put more in the front door 

and not on the back door? You implied in your opening comment 

that we weren’t. 

Mr. RON. Yes, my answer is reasonable for that as well, yes. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Ms. Grover, do you care to comment on either 

the complacency problems or the perimeter problems? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. In earlier work that we did looking at perimeter security issues, what we found is that TSA had not been 

able to do a complete risk assessment because they weren’t sufficiently assessing the vulnerability of different airports. They have 

since made steps in that area and we do have a review underway 

now to look at that issue. 

The other thing, the other issue that I would raise to TSA is a 

question about whether or not they are making adequate use of the 

data that they have. They do require airports to report all incidents 

to TSA, but when we looked at that data set previously we found 

that it wasn’t organized or reported in a way that TSA could specifically identify how many of those incidents were related to perimeter or access breaches. Again, they have made some changes 

and so we’ll be able to report back in the future on whether they 

are able to analyze that data. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Hice is recognized. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This past February NBC 

News reported that over 1,400 security badges were missing in 

Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport just over the last 

2 years alone. Mr. Roth, could you briefly explain how TSA responds when some of these security badges turn up missing? 

Mr. ROTH. We are doing some ongoing review of TSA’s security 

controls, so my answer will be preliminary, but my understanding 

based on my conversations with TSA officials is once a badge goes 

missing, it is turned off. So this has to be sort of a two-factor authentication, you have to take the badge and swipe it to be able to 

enter secure areas. 

The difficulty of course is this idea of piggybacking, somebody 

else opens the door and you walk through, or other ways to be able 

to gain access to these secure areas. And that is the whole challenge behind these access badges, right? If you work in a McDonald’s at the airport, you get a badge, and then you quit the next 

day and you still have that badge. And it’s incumbent on the airport to report that to TSA so that badge gets turned off, and it is 

a vulnerability. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HICE. So you would say that the responsibility rests then 

with the airport, not with TSA? 

Mr. ROTH. It is a joint responsibility, as I understand it. 

Mr. HICE. Right, it ought to be a joint responsibility. And the airport—Atlanta airport was just the only airport reporting on that 

particular study, 1,400 badges missing in 2 years. How many 

would there be across the entire Nation? 

Mr. Ron, just a yes or no type question regarding this, would you 

consider 1,400 just out of one airport security badges showing up 

missing a major security breach and a potential problem? 

Mr. RON. Well, obviously it is a matter of proportions. Atlanta is 

one of the largest airports in the country and I assume that the 

number of badges that they issue is larger than most airports 

around the country, and I do not know what is the percentage, but 

I would say that every airport the worldwide that I know suffers 

from that problem. 

Mr. HICE. OK, my question, is this a security threat of significance that needs to be looked into, yes or no? 

Mr. RON. It is, it is. 

Mr. HICE. OK, all right. That’s—because obviously we’ve got a 

major problem here. We’ve got badges that are missing, stolen for 

whatever reason, but to the tune of thousands across the country. 

And what I’m hearing from you, Mr. Roth, is there’s really no—at 

least to your awareness—no policy to deal with this. And yet we’ve 

got a major potential security breach going on here of insider 

threats, really. 

Assess the, real quickly, the vulnerability of insider threat? 

Mr. ROTH. Well, if you have access to secure areas, that means 

you have access to the aircraft, the dangers there I think are selfevident. 

Mr. HICE. All right. Let me go back to another situation in Atlanta, Mr. Roth, and I’ll just continue with you. As we all know, 

there was a gun smuggling insider ring at the Atlanta airport that 

was discovered this last December. To your knowledge, has there 

been any changes in security checks and so forth since that gun 

smuggling ring was discovered? 

Mr. ROTH. As I said, we’re in the middle of an audit of this exact 

problem, so unfortunately I can’t give you a complete answer as I 

sit here today. 

Mr. HICE. Should there be changes? 

Mr. ROTH. Oh, absolutely. 

Mr. HICE. All right. What changes would you suggest? 

Mr. ROTH. Well, at this point I think I’d have to defer until we 

get our audit completed so we can make recommendations to TSA, 

first figure out what it is that we find and then make recommendations that make some sense. 

Mr. HICE. All right. What kind of—what needs to be done with 

verifying that those who have security badges do not have a criminal history? 

Mr. ROTH. We are about to come out with a report with regard 

to that, to check the TSA’s efficacy on doing criminal background 

checks. And I know GAO has done some work on that in the past. 

Mr. HICE. How many background checks are there? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. ROTH. Well, there would be one for every TSA employee who 

has a SIDA badge. So—— 

Mr. HICE. OK. So in that scenario, there would be one background check. Is there anything to protect the public from one of 

these individuals getting involved in criminal activity after they 

have already had the initial check? 

Mr. ROTH. No. And you know, we have a number of investigations that are set forth in my testimony in regard—— 

Mr. HICE. Should there be? 

Mr. ROTH. Well, absolutely there needs to be vigilance or criminal investigative presence against the TSA employees. 

Mr. HICE. I would ask you please to report back to our office on 

this type of thing. I would very much appreciate it. 

Mr. ROTH. Absolutely. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you. 

Mr. MICA. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. CLAY. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Ranking Member Cummings for conducting this hearing. I appreciate the efforts 

to streamline the security screening process for low-risk individuals 

and shift focus to those who are deemed at higher risk. My understanding is that all airline passengers are compared to Federal 

Government terrorism watch lists through the Secret Flight program. Ms. Grover, is that correct? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Mr. CLAY. OK. But only individuals enrolled in the PreCheck 

Program are also checked against other law enforcement lists such 

as immigration and criminal data bases; is that correct? 

Ms. GROVER. If they apply for PreCheck, then yes, then they are 

checked against the criminal background information. 

Mr. CLAY. And the PreCheck program requires individuals to 

self-report any new criminal activity or convictions after they are 

enrolled. In other words, individuals have to self-report any new 

crimes; is that correct? 

Ms. GROVER. Sir, I’m not actually sure if that’s true for 

PreCheck. I do know that’s the case for the aviation workers at the 

airport, that there is no followup background check, and I believe 

the same thing applies to PreCheck as well. 

Mr. CLAY. Mr. Roth, does this self-reporting requirement pose a 

potential security risk? 

Mr. ROTH. It does. And in fact, in the PreCheck program it does 

require self-reporting, there is no continuous pinging of the criminal justice system to figure out whether, you know, if I apply for 

PreCheck and then I get convicted of a crime a year later my 

PreCheck is still good for 5 years. If I don’t report that to TSA, 

TSA is not going to know about it. 

Mr. CLAY. Any idea of how many have self reported? 

Mr. ROTH. I don’t have that information. 

Mr. CLAY. Ms. Grover, any idea? 

Ms. GROVER. No, sir. 

Mr. CLAY. OK. Ms. Grover, GAO’s recent report identified instances in which Secure Flight did not accurately identify passengers on government watch lists; is that correct? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir, that’s right. 


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Mr. CLAY. What were GAO’s findings with regards to the ability 

of Secure Flight data appropriately designating individuals at low 

risk? 

Ms. GROVER. So the Secure Flight system, the first thing that it 

does is it’s used to identify individuals who are on the watch list. 

And we know that sometimes that there are errors there, that Secure Flight doesn’t always identify people on those high-risk watch 

lists. So after that set of identifications is done and those people 

are tagged, then the remaining passengers are also screened to see 

if they are a known low-risk traveler, and that’s the way that they 

are then identified for PreCheck. 

And then there’s another tier where there’s some automated assessments done where people can get additional PreCheck, that’s 

how come sometimes PreCheck shows up on your boarding pass 

even if you haven’t signed up for it in advance. 

Mr. CLAY. What measures can be taken to ensure that Secure 

Flight accurately assesses the risk level of all passengers? 

Ms. GROVER. We’ve recommended that TSA should have a new 

performance measure in place so that they can keep track on an 

ongoing basis of how well Secure Flight is doing actually identifying everyone on those Federal watch lists. And they are working 

on it, but that is not in place yet. 

Mr. CLAY. Then how do you keep from I guess stereotyping or 

profiling travelers? I mean, what are the precautions put in place 

to not do the profiling? 

Ms. GROVER. Well, that issue would be most relevant, say, at the 

airport when individuals are being selected, say for Managed Inclusion. And the TSOs are supposed to use like iPads that have 

randomizers in there, so there should be some protection from 

profiling there. But there have been questions raised about the behavior detection officers over many years about whether profiling 

could be factoring into their decisions, and they are part of that 

Managed Inclusion process. 

Mr. CLAY. OK. Mr. Roth, you made 17 recommendations to TSA 

in your March report, and many of them dealing with the ability 

of the PreCheck initiative to effectively assess risk level of the individual. Can you briefly walk through the areas you see as needing 

improvement? 

Mr. ROTH. Unfortunately most of those are either sensitive security information or classified, so it is difficult to talk about them. 

But we have made recommendations that TSA really needs to 

rethink how it is that they use the risk assessment rules. They 

have largely disagreed with our recommendations. 

Mr. CLAY. That’s unfortunate. Thank you all for your responses. 

And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MICA. You have 9 seconds, if I could have them. 

Mr. CLAY. Sure, I yield. 

Mr. MICA. Just a couple of points. You testified that the employees—well, first of all, they are not checking the backgrounds before 

they are employed, that’s part of your finding—and the worst instance was Atlanta. Then they are not checking afterwards. In 

other words, there is not a check if they appear on some criminal 

list or watch list afterwards that’s correct on employees. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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And then I wanted to know about PreCheck. Is there any going 

back and checking people after they’ve been cleared for PreCheck? 

I know in Israel they control whoever gets sorted to PreCheck, and 

then they are always reexamining those individuals and the information is brought in, and they can stop the pass or access from the 

information that is concurrently and continuously being examined. 

Tell us about PreCheck and employees. 

Mr. ROTH. My answer, Mr. Clay, was referring to the PreCheck 

employees, that there was no recurrent vetting and it required sort 

of a voluntary disclosure. I’m not sure about the employees. 

Mr. MICA. Do you know? 

Ms. GROVER. So with respect to PreCheck enrollees, the only recurrent check is that they would be checked against the Federal 

watch list every time, but not for criminal background. And as far 

as aviation workers, it’s basically the same thing. They are checked 

regularly against the Federal watch lists. Although TSA has recently announced that they are going to start redoing criminal 

background checks every 2 years. I don’t know if that’s in place yet. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Thank you. Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I apologize to 

the panel because I’ve been at another hearing and I’m trying also 

to meet with constituents, but I did want to ask about something 

in Mr. Ron’s testimony that really stood out to me. You say although most aviation employees are honorable, hardworking Americans, recent reports indicate serious problems that range from firearms and so forth and so on. And so what is particularly troublesome is that the crimes are rarely the actions of an isolated individual, and networks of employees are flaunting the law and bypassing security for their personal motives. Such individuals are 

very susceptible to terrorist influences and so forth. 

Now, I know that a lot of times with this 24-hour news cycle, 

we’re almost sensationalizing even minor incidents. But that seems 

to me to be a pretty sensational type Statement, Mr. Ron, when 

you say networks of employees. And I’m wondering, I know you 

mention the Atlanta incident or the Atlanta smuggling, but I’m 

wondering, is this oversensationalized or is this happening in all 

the major airports? You say networks of employees. How widespread is this? 

Mr. RON. Most of the crimes that could generate benefits for employees that are willing to act criminally are involved with illegal 

materials like drugs and weapons that fly through the airport. It 

is never a single individual person that is involved. Usually there 

is somebody who delivers the substance. There is somebody who actually takes care of it and puts it on the aircraft. 

And if I take for example a case, of a few years ago, concerning 

a flight from Miami to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Once again, there 

was a matter of weapon smuggling through the aircraft. It was a 

duffle bag, if I’m not mistaken, 14 different weapons, including an 

AR–15—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. But you said that’s a case from several years ago. 

Mr. RON. That’s several years ago, yes. But this indicated—this 

case, that was brought by one employee into the restricted area. 

There was another employee that actually took the flight and received the bag in order to fly with the bag to San Juan according 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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to media reports. So this is I think a very good example as to how 

these things work. You can assume that similar involvement of 

more than one person is the case more frequently than otherwise. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, let me ask you something else, you were director of security at the Tel Aviv airport, I understand. What are 

some things you were able to do in Tel Aviv that people in your 

similar security field wouldn’t be able to do or aren’t doing here? 

Mr. RON. Well, Tel Aviv system is based very much on our ability 

to recognize the level of threat of individual employees, based on 

a much deeper background check to start with. And they are implementing—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. So we need to give much deeper background checks 

to all airport employees? 

Mr. RON. Well, there is a lot of—yes, background checks is one 

very important rule. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. 

Mr. RON. Beyond that I would say—and that has to do with the 

smaller size of Ben Gurion Airport in comparison to airports like 

Atlanta. But we were able to actually keep our finger on the pulse 

in terms of what happens with the employees at the airport. If 

somebody was behaving in a way that indicated that he may be involved in illegal activity, then we were immediately investigating 

it. There was a dedicated—there is a dedicated unit that is actually 

looking exactly only after that. They are making sure not only concerning security but also concerning regular criminal activity—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. So do you think we should have some type of incentive programs for airline—airport employees that turn in or recognize unusual criminal activity or something? 

Mr. RON. I’m sorry, I didn’t understand the question. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, in other words, should we teach other airline 

employees or airport employees things to watch for when you say 

that airport employees are acting in unusual ways? 

Mr. RON. Yes. I mean, obviously, there is—at the end of the day 

there is limited access to every badge holder, but when you speak 

about employees, this is different because by the way badges are 

also issued to non employees. But in the case of employees, we are 

able through the human resources and through our intelligence activity at the airport and through our ability to survey a city, those 

parts of the airport that are vulnerable to criminal activity in a 

way that makes it very effective. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask, I’ve run out of time. Let me ask Mr. 

Roth one last question. Mr. Roth, we’re spending mega billions now 

for security at the airports when you add it all together. Are we 

getting a bang for our bucks? Or—— 

Mr. ROTH. I think there is significant room for improvement. It 

is a massive task. I mean when you talk about, for example, security background checks on individuals that hold the passes to the 

secure areas, you’re talking about 3.7 million people that you would 

have to give a background check for. This is a massive, massive 

challenge. 

Can TSA tighten up? Absolutely. And the reports that we have 

written over the course of the years I think show there are areas 

where they can tighten up, but we need to understand the scope 

and significance of the problem that TSA faces. 


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Mr. DUNCAN. All right, thank you very much. 

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. If FedEx can track a package 

and American Express can detect instantaneously from an incidence with your credit card, certainly we can get this right and 

have many more people to deal with. Let’s yield to Ms. Kelly from 

Illinois. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Ranking 

Member Cummings, for holding a hearing on a pressing issue like 

our aviation security. I would also like to thank our witnesses who 

have taken time out of their busy schedules to speak with us today. 

Mr. Chairman, with the summer travel season fast approaching, 

our Nation’s airports will be pressed to the maximum capacity. 

This means long security lines, overworked TSA agents and control 

tower officials. It also means detecting and neutralizing a security 

threat in a crowded airport can be as difficult as finding a needle 

in a haystack. This is something all Americans, and of course my 

constituents in particular, know all too well. The greater Chicago 

area is currently served by two airports. I’m sure most people in 

this room here today at some point or another have missed a connecting flight or had a long layover in one of our airports. I hear 

complaints from my colleagues all the time. A culture of delays, 

overcrowded hallways and long security lines are not only frustrating and inefficient, but also unsafe. A need for a third airport 

in Chicago has been known for years. 

I have been working with Secretary Foxx and Administrator 

Huerta to make a south suburban airport a reality. I am pleased 

to say that the project is close to becoming a reality and I will continue to push for its creation. Therefore, I’d like to ask the witnesses to provide their insights into this matter. 

How does the fact that major airports are operating at capacity 

impact our national security? I’ll ask both my questions. Impact 

our national security. And the other, would construction of new airports improve our national security by easing pressures on current 

airports? And whoever wants to take the question. 

Ms. GROVER. So I can start. I agree with the other panelists that 

TSA is pressed, just the press of business is difficult. And as airports are operating more and more at capacity, there are some inherent challenges that go along with that. But what I would suggest is that the challenges that TSA faces in improving security 

across their systems are independent of exactly how many airports 

we have up and running and exactly whether they are working to 

capacity, because they are inherent systemwide efforts, and I’d like 

TSA to spend some more time focusing on how well their systems 

are working. 

Mr. RON. I want to repeat a point that I mentioned earlier that 

I think is relevant to your question, and that is once again the 

need to approach the subject or the challenge comprehensively. 

Right now, in my view, this is one of the weakest points in the 

strategy, because of a lack of comprehensiveness, we do leave corners unattended. And as we discussed here earlier, we talked about 

perimeter threats and there might be some others. And a much 

more comprehensive approach would allow us to evaluate and to 

run a more balanced system, which by the way will never be perfect. 


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Mr. ROTH. I think any time that you add size, you get complexity, and so enhanced complexity of course always leads to challenges, but to your specific question, unfortunately we haven’t done 

any specific work in that area so it’s difficult for me to comment. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you for your response, I appreciate it. I yield 

back. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Cummings. Thank you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Grover, are you familiar with the concerns 

the GAO raised about the Managed Inclusion program? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Can you explain what steps TSA is taking to address those concerns? 

Ms. GROVER. What TSA has told us is that they have an effectiveness study underway and they expect to have results toward 

the latter half of 2016. I believe specifically they are evaluating the 

role of the behavior detection officers and K–9, the K–9 teams as 

part of that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So the DHS inspector general recommended that 

the Managed Inclusion program be halted until technology exists 

to connect Secure Flight data to airport checkpoints. And this 

would prevent passengers that are known security threats from 

trespassing—bypassing rather more rigorous security inspections 

according to the IG. 

Now, Mr. Roth, has TSA halted the Managed Inclusion program? 

Mr. ROTH. My understanding based on conversations with TSA 

is that they are reducing both Managed Inclusion and some of the 

other methods they use to put people into expedited screening. And 

as more people apply to PreCheck and get vetted they are going reduce that. But it is still something that they use, something that 

we are concerned about. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And tell me what your concerns are? 

Mr. ROTH. Well, my concerns are that these are unknown passengers, they are unknown to TSA, which means they are unknown 

risk. And any time you have an unknown risk passenger going 

through expedited screening, which is inherently less secure, you 

have a security vulnerability. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what have they done about your concerns? 

Mr. ROTH. Well, we made a number of recommendations, again 

many of those are nonpublic recommendations, but they’ve largely 

nonconcurred with those recommendations, which we believe shows 

a lack of appreciation of the seriousness of the problem. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And did they give you excuses or what I 

mean—— 

Mr. ROTH. They simply disagree with the level of risk. They believe it is a level of risk that’s acceptable. As the IG I believe that 

it is not. One of the reasons I invite a classified briefing on this 

is because every time I give a classified briefing, Members of Congress tend to agree that it is an unacceptable risk. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you think they just discount your concerns? 

Do you get the impression that they don’t see you as the expert and 

they see themselves as so being? 

Mr. ROTH. Well, we’re the independent auditor, so that means we 

are objective and we look, you know, while we are in—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That’s not what I asked you. 


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Mr. ROTH. I apologize for that. Yes, we have a disagreement, a 

fundamental disagreement about what level of risk is acceptable. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So now, let’s go to this issue of the perimeter, 

Mr. Roth. We’ve seen a disturbing report of a 15-year-old boy who 

traveled from San Jose International Airport to Hawaii in a wheel 

well of an aircraft. Mr. Roth, what steps can TSA take to improve 

perimeter security and ensure that incidents like this don’t happen 

in the future. What can they do? 

Mr. ROTH. My understanding of TSA’s position is that, that is the 

responsibility of the airport itself and not of TSA. We have not 

looked at that specific issue, so I don’t have any specifics with regard to their response. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Ron, do you have an opinion on that? 

Mr. RON. Yes, I think that this is one of the problems that we 

have and this is why it falls between the chairs because why TSA 

does not consider it part of its responsibility. I think as a regulator 

it has to make sure that somebody else does it, and at the moment 

this is not really happening. The airports are not willing and in 

many cases are unable to provide what it takes to protect their security with an intrusion detection systems and the manpower that 

requires to respond to alarms. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And how is that done in other airports where 

you’ve been? 

Mr. RON. Well, if I take for example Tel Aviv airport, Tel Aviv 

airport there is no division of responsibility. The responsibility 

structure is very, very clear and there’s only one security organization that takes care of all aspects of security, whether it is passengers or the facility, and that makes it much easier to calculate 

the priorities. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So Mr. Roth, whose responsibility did they say 

it was, the perimeter? 

Mr. ROTH. My understanding is that TSA takes the position that 

it’s the airport’s responsibility and not TSA’s. Again, that’s based 

on my understanding, but we haven’t done any work in this area. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Grover, you want to say something? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir, if I may. TSA does take the position that 

it is the airport’s responsibility to decide how their perimeter will 

be secured. What TSA does is they come in and they check—they 

do a paper check essentially to say given what the airport has decided to put in place for the perimeter, does that match up with 

the requirements? And then they also do an annual compliance inspection where they actually observe to make sure that those measures are in place. And we do have a study underway now to do an 

assessment of what is going on. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Wait a minute, back up. 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You said they—they—TSA says this is what we 

think it ought to be; is that right? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes. Yes, sir, there are regulations, and then TSA 

issues security directives, for example, that lay out sort of at a high 

level what the requirements need to be to secure the perimeter. 

And then at each individual airport, the airport decides exactly 

how they are going to meet that requirement. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. 


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Ms. GROVER. Right. So it could be a fence or maybe the airport 

would say, well, we don’t really need a fence because we have a 

body of water there. So then TSA comes in and they review that 

airport’s security program. That’s a paper review where TSA basically says, check, check, check, check, check. OK, yes, we think it’s 

reasonable that you are securing your perimeter in all of these 

ways. And then once a year TSA also comes in and does a compliance inspection where they say walk—they walk the perimeter and 

they confirm is the fence there and does it have holes in it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. What happens the day after the inspection somebody cuts a hole in the fence? I mean, how does that work? And 

do we then have a gap? 

Ms. GROVER. That is the airport’s responsibility to monitor. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. You know, one of the things that concerns 

me, and we saw this on the Transportation Committee, you have 

these folks who constantly claim that everything is tight and there 

are no problems and then they say when the rubber meets the 

road, everything is going to be fine. But then we find that there 

are gaps because everybody is assuming that the other person’s 

doing it, and then it ends up that there is a problem. 

And I am just wondering, you know, if you have—I mean, when 

we look at what’s happening around the world and we look at organizations like ISIS and others, I mean, to create a hole in a fence 

and folks figure out well, maybe they are not looking at that fence 

as often as they should. They had an inspection yesterday and now 

I have got a whole year to wait. Are you satisfied with that procedure or you don’t get into that. 

Ms. GROVER. So there are definite vulnerabilities, and we have 

identified them before, and we have called out to TSA and let them 

know that we didn’t think that they had sufficient vulnerability assessments in place to check on the airports. So that’s part of the 

issue we are going to be looking at again right now, and we would 

be happy to report back to you on it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, I would love to have that, because that’s of 

great concern. Thank you all very much, your testimony has been 

very informative. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Mr. Cummings. If you could—if you could 

patch that fence, then you could put five pounds of plastic explosives on a drone, and drive it into an airplane as it’s taking off or 

use shoulder fired missile, come into the market, do the same 

thing. It all gets back to intelligence, finding these people before 

they can commit the act. 

Mrs. Lawrence you’re recognized, 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Talk about the issue of 

access through the IDs, on March 9, 2015, NBC News reported that 

1,400 badges that granted access to secure areas had gone missing 

over a 2-year period. Are you familiar with this report, Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. I am. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. What happens when an ID badge is lost or reported stolen? 

Ms. GROVER. So as soon as the badge has been reported lost or 

missing, then the airport should deactivate it immediately. It’s my 

understanding that there’s a threshold of 5 percent. So once 5 percent of the badges for any particular area have been reported as 


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missing, then the airport is responsible for reissuing all of the 

badges to all the employees who have access in that area. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Do you know how the airports keep track of 

this? Are you engaged in that tracking process? 

Ms. GROVER. So we have not done a specific review of how well 

the tracking process is working, but I can tell you generally that 

the way it works is that the airports are required to do a 100 percent audit of the badges once a year. That’s a paper exercise, so it 

involves the airport taking a list of all of the badges that have been 

issued and checking it up against the contractor lists to say, do our 

lists still match? And then twice a year they do an additional 10 

percent random sample, that’s also a paper exercise. And TSA’s responsibility is to come behind and make sure that the airport has 

done their job in doing those checks. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. So that’s my followup. When the TSA is supposed to come behind, so there is an audit process that is given to 

any airport. Is there an inspection process? How do you know 

that—how do you verify that the airports are in compliance, because the concern that we have about these missing ID badges is 

we provide all the security under TSA that we have the expectations, how do—how does TSA verify that there’s an inspection 

needed because the audit has failed? And what is the procedure? 

Mr. ROTH. It’s a couplefold. It’s my understanding is that TSA 

will go through and they will in fact audit these things and have 

an entire office of inspection—— 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. How frequently? 

Mr. ROTH. I don’t have the answer to that. One of the other 

things that we do, for example, what we are doing now is we are 

conducting an independent audit of TSA’s processes and controls 

for doing this. We were as concerned as I suspect you were with 

regard to the media reports. And so we are taking a look at that 

very issue. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. I just want to say that I’m glad to hear that you 

are conducting the audit of that process. It is disturbing to me that 

the access to secure areas, this number is too high. And in doing 

that audit I really want to State for the record that I feel it’s too 

high. You’re going to have to convince me otherwise. 

And things like the frequency, when is there accountability 

issued for the airports and for employees for these loss of badges. 

And the question of the answer after a certain period that everyone 

gets their badges reissued, how frequently is that happening? And 

what triggers that number? 

So those are the concerns I have. As we are—it should be a comprehensive approach. I would hope that the media would not drive 

our response to these issues, that’s troubling to me. It should have 

been something that has been triggered by our own internal audits, 

if we are doing that, instead of saying, oh, it’s in the media now, 

we need to respond. So thank you. 

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady, and I guess there are no further members. I’ll conclude the hearing, but it’s not acceptable for 

TSA to respond to the chief investigative and oversight of Congress 

Committee with pages and pages of redacted information. Do you 

have trouble, Mr. Roth, getting information from them or—— 

Mr. ROTH. We do not. 


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Mr. MICA. You do not, but we do. And your report I think it is 

about as comprehensive as I have seen. It covers a whole host of 

areas. I think you did an excellent job. The problem is it just highlights that after years and years, we have created a very expensive, 

dysfunctional, transportation security system, and there are many 

potentials for risks that are not addressed. 

The more I—on having helped create TSA in the beginning and 

create the system, the more I look at this the more I am convinced 

that you go back to intelligence, intelligence, intelligence. Get TSA 

out of the screening business. As you heard Mr. Ron say, we’re the 

only country in the world that the—where the agency is the regulator, the auditor, the systems manager, and it doesn’t do any of 

them well. 

But if we could concentrate on connecting the dots so that we 

have the information in the data base that we can clear people we 

know who’s traveling and poses a risk. If we can track people. Almost everyone most recently that—Boston bombers, other people, 

we failed to connect the dots. The dots were there. But we have 

concentrated a huge number of people in managing an unmanageable system that others can do to conduct a screening process 

through, then concentrate on getting the intelligence, the security 

information setting the protocols and altering them to meet the 

threat. Mr. Ron, isn’t that what we should do? 

Mr. RON. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. I didn’t want to take words out of your mouth. 

Mr. RON. Relatively speaking, yes. 

Mr. MICA. Yes. And the Israelis have done a great job. They have 

a different system, been there many times. After 9/11 they helped 

us in many areas and have continued to lend their expertise. And 

I can tell you, and in this hearing, if it wasn’t for Israeli intelligence and British intelligence we would have been taken down 

several times, because they don’t have to deal with some of the 

laws and protections and barriers that we have, because we have 

a different society and different laws. 

But this is a very serious situation. This is an indictment of 

TSA’s values and we need to change this. I’ve never said to do 

away with TSA, we need to change their role so that they are in 

charge of again security, intelligence, connecting the dots, and then 

auditing the system and getting out of this craziness that is using 

all of our manpower and money for a system that shakes down little old ladies, veterans, and people who pose no risk. And Mr. Roth 

agrees with that Statement, don’t you, Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Ms. Grover is a little bit hesitant but she might 

agree. 

Ms. GROVER. We agree that there are vulnerabilities in the system that definitely need to be addressed. 

Mr. MICA. Need to be addressed. 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. So with those Statements what I am going to do is ask 

unanimous consent that the record be left open for a period of 10 

business days. You may get additional questions, and I think there 

will be some coming to TSA, maybe wrapped in a subpoena for Mr. 


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Carraway, but in any event the record will be left open. Without 

objection, so ordered. 

Mr. MICA. There being no further business before this full Committee hearing of Government Oversight and Reform Committee 

and the Subcommittee on Transportation and Public Assets, this 

hearing is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 


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