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CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL DRUG 

SMUGGLING: AN ASSESSMENT OF 

REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

Serial No. 113–67 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Serial No. 113–241 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME 

TRANSPORTATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 29, 2014 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/committee.action? 

chamber=house&committee=transportation and http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma 

ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida, 

Vice Chair 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex Officio) 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

JANICE HAHN, California 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director 

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

MATT SALMON, Arizona, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter from the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 

Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure ............................................................................................................... vi 

Memorandum from the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs ............................................................................. xi 

WITNESSES 

Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35 

Answers to questions for the record from Hon. Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York ................................ 40 

Ambassador Luis E. Arreaga, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau 

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department 

of State: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42 

General John F. Kelly, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, Southern Command, 

U.S. Department of Defense: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

Answers to questions for the record from Hon. Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York ................................ 93 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Response to request for information from Hon. Duncan Hunter, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, regarding the 

percentage of counterdrug Federal/general grants that are provided 

to help the Coast Guard’s counterdrug operations .................................... 16 

Response to request for information from Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a 

Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, for a summary 

of the Coast Guard’s interactions with Cuba regarding counterdrug 

operations/initiatives, including the Coast Guard’s April 2014 visit to 

Cuba ............................................................................................................... 26 

General John F. Kelly, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, Southern Command, 

U.S. Department of Defense, response to request for information from Hon. 

John Garamendi, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, 

regarding how the U.S. Southern Command might deploy unmanned aerial 

vehicles for the benefit of its missions ............................................................... 23 

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(1) 

CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL DRUG 

SMUGGLING: AN ASSESSMENT OF 

REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 

TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

JOINT WITH THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in 

Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. A quorum being present of the subcommittee, the 

subcommittees will come to order. I am going to start by recognizing myself and the ranking member—actually, our ranking 

member isn’t here. I will recognize myself and my fellow cochairman, Mr. Hunter, and then we will go to the ranking member on 

that subcommittee. And we are pleased to have this hearing today. 

Without objection, the members of the subcommittees could submit 

their opening remarks for the record. 

And now I yield myself as much time as I may consume to 

present my opening statement. And I want to start, first and foremost, by thanking my colleague, Chairman Duncan Hunter of the 

Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard 

and Maritime Transportation and his staff for working with me 

and my staff to convene today’s timely and important hearing on 

confronting transnational drug smuggling and an assessment of 

our strategy and regional partnerships. 

Recently the U.N. issued a report naming Latin America as the 

most violent region in the world, with 13 countries in the region 

listed among the top 20 worldwide in homicide rates. In fact, the 

top six most murderous countries per capita are all right here in 

our own Western Hemisphere. 

Transnational criminal and narcotics trafficking organizations 

are becoming more sophisticated in evading law enforcement and, 

as the U.N. report suggests, increasingly more violent. This violence along our border and near our shores poses a great threat to 

our national security and destabilizes our region. The United 

States has spent over $1 trillion since the 1970s attempting to disVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:59 Apr 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\4-29-1~1\87699.TXT JEAN
2 

rupt and dismantle drug cartels in Latin America with mixed success. I have convened this hearing jointly with Chairman Hunter 

today to drill down into whether U.S. law enforcement and military 

assets are being properly leveraged to address this serious threat. 

In this fight we have seen the consequences of our country being 

forced to confront dwindling financial resources when the DOD deemphasized its commitment to interdiction efforts which, in turn, 

affected our overall counternarcotics efforts. I am concerned what 

a disengaged DOD means for our overall counternarcotics strategy 

in the region. I think we must assume, at best, a level budgetary 

environment going forward. So our strategy to combat 

transnational criminal organizations needs to balance this budgetary constraint with still finding solutions that combat this 

scourge. 

Excuse me. From a foreign policy standpoint, we need to find 

ways to better engage our regional partners and help them build 

capacity more efficiently and more effectively. Ambassador 

Arreaga, you and I spoke briefly about important steps INL has 

taken to work with our hemispheric partners to build capacity and 

empower them to address the serious challenges posed by increasingly violent drug-trafficking organizations. I look forward to hearing more about the successes and challenges you face in implementing INL’s piece of the overall strategy. 

Where possible, I would like to see replicas of some of the most 

successful programs that we have helped implement in the region, 

like Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative of Mexico. Of course, 

the success plan of Colombia was only possible because of Colombia 

having the political will and leadership to win their country back 

from the terrorists and narco-traffickers. 

In Mexico we have seen an increased commitment on the part of 

the Mexican Government to partner with the U.S. in this effort 

through the Merida Initiative and other joint operations. This commitment has yielded very important successes, and we continue to 

build on them. It seems clear to me that no amount of U.S. taxpayer monies will ever be enough to finally turn this situation 

around without the buy-in and the support of the people and governments of Central America and the Caribbean. 

I am looking forward to hearing more about the success of Operation Martillo—or ‘‘hammer,’’ in English—since its inception in 

January of 2012. But I want to personally and publicly congratulate all who were involved in the two big cocaine seizures earlier 

this year in the southwestern Caribbean. I understand the street 

value of the seizures would have been somewhere in the neighborhood of $300 million. I think that this is a great example of what 

we can accomplish when we work together with our regional partners. 

I want to thank the Coast Guard and the SOUTHCOM Joint 

Interagency Task Force South for hosting my staff in Florida earlier this year in preparation for this hearing, and for agreeing to 

testify today. And it is always a pleasure to have State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs here to provide their insight on Central American and Caribbean security programs in the hemisphere. I thank them for their 

3 

willingness to work with my staff on a daily basis, and to come to 

our hearings, and to answer our questions. 

I am hopeful that this hearing will be an important step toward 

a more cohesive and more effective multi-agency strategy to protect 

our national security interests in our hemisphere. 

I will now recognize Chairman Duncan Hunter for his opening 

remarks. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Admiral, 

General, and Ambassador. Great to see you. General Kelly, really 

great to see you. 

The subcommittees are meeting today to review the Federal Government’s efforts to confront transnational drug smuggling and 

stem the flow of illegal drugs to the United States. I want to thank 

and commend Chairman Salmon and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for agreeing to explore this important topic in a joint 

hearing. 

Illicit drug use remains a serious concern for the United States. 

Illegal drugs not only pose a strain on our Nation’s health care and 

criminal justice systems, but their trade and transport cause significant safety and security concerns. The transport of illegal drugs 

affects millions throughout the country and the world. Some of the 

most notorious and violent criminals, cartels, and narco-terrorists 

are directly responsible for drug violence, crime, and corruption 

that are destabilizing foreign nations and risking the lives of American citizens here and abroad. 

Representing southern California, I am very aware of the harm 

that drug traffickers inflict on our communities. In recent years, violence stemming from the drug trade has spilled over the Mexican 

border and has led to the kidnappings and murders of numerous 

American citizens and law enforcement officers. A little over a year 

ago, Coast Guard Senior Chief Petty Officer Terrell Horne was 

killed while leading a boarding team in a counterdrug operation off 

the coast of Santa Cruz, California. Senior Chief Horne was carrying out the Coast Guard’s mission to interdict and apprehend illegal drug traffickers on the high seas. 

Stopping bulk drug shipments at sea before they are broken 

down into smaller packages is the most effective and efficient way 

to stop the flow of illegal drugs across our borders. The Coast 

Guard is the lead agency in maritime interdiction because it has 

unique military and law enforcement authorities which enable it to 

seamlessly disable a drug smuggling vessel, seize the drugs, and 

arrest the crew. But that only works when the Coast Guard, 

SOUTHCOM, and partner agencies and nations have the resources 

and assets to act on intelligence targets. 

However, cuts to the military’s budget, coupled with aging and 

rapidly failing Coast Guard assets, are undermining mission success. SOUTHCOM and the Coast Guard were only able to interdict 

roughly 20 percent of the cocaine bound for the United States in 

recent years. It is not because you don’t know where the rest is, 

but that is all you have the assets to interdict. That is half of the 

national target. Since 2009, the Coast Guard has only achieved its 

cocaine interdiction rate once. 

I hope today’s hearing will help clarify the direction we need to 

take in the future to ensure our men and women in uniform have 

4 

the resources and assets they need to carry out this and other critical missions. 

I know that I said this at our last hearing, but this will be the 

last time that Admiral Papp will appear before us. Maybe. Unless 

he comes to something else later. I want to again commend you for 

your leadership and thank you for your tremendous service to our 

Nation. 

You know, this is an interesting hearing for one big reason for 

me, and it is this: We can do 100 percent of this, theoretically, if 

you have the assets to do it. So, by only doing—by only interdicting 

20 percent, what that means is we don’t really care about the other 

80 percent. And we are not talking about marijuana here, we are 

talking about opiates, heroin, and cocaine, the main stuff brought 

up from the south that we are not decriminalizing here in the 

United States that kills our kids. 

So, with that, let’s just—especially, if we could right now—talk 

about why we don’t care about the other 80 percent. Why are we 

not trying to hit our target, when it just takes more assets to do 

so? It doesn’t take a new paradigm of how to interdict or anything; 

it just takes the assets. 

So, with that, I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I recognize Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Sires 

is not here. Perhaps Mr. Meeks could take his place. OK, good. 

Thank you. 

I am going to really shorten my statement here. The chairman, 

Mr. Hunter, handled almost all of it having to do with the Coast 

Guard, the Coast Guard budget, and the effect that the budget, or 

the lack of a good budget, is having on the Coast Guard’s ability 

to do its work, and quite possibly the reality that maybe we really 

don’t care that much, because we don’t seem to be putting sufficient money into the effort. In fact, it appears as though the current situation would even further diminish the Coast Guard’s budget and its ability to do its job. 

The chairman, Mr. Hunter, has gone through all of that, so I 

don’t propose to repeat all of it. But there is one thing that I would 

like to cover. And since the Foreign Affairs Committee has joined 

us—we have joined them—on this hearing, all too often we look at 

this problem from the point of view of America, and not often from 

the point of view of the countries that are supplying the drugs. 

Latin America, looking at the map that was put on our desk here. 

We can go to Southeast Asia or even to a place called Afghanistan. 

And we need to look at the perspective from those countries, and 

hear their view of our efforts or lack of efforts. You mentioned, Mr. 

Salmon, the issue of Colombia and the work that has been done 

there, which is a pretty good example of what can be done when 

we work with those countries that are our partners in this problem. 

So, at some point—I know we have the Ambassador here, and he 

will undoubtedly speak to us about the issue from that point of 

view, at least from the American point of view. But perhaps the 

Ambassador from Mexico might want to give us their point of view 

of this, or Colombia, or other countries that are the partners in this 

problem. So I would recommend that we do that at some point, and 

5 

listen carefully to their point of view, and see how that would affect 

our own strategies here. 

In the meantime, our subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Coast 

Guard and Maritime Transportation, is doing the best we can to 

make sure the Coast Guard has its assets. However, we are seriously hampered by sequestration, by the budget that passed the 

House of Representatives 2 weeks ago would make it even more 

difficult, because it does continue sequestration in the outyears. In 

fact, sequestration on steroids, making all of this even more difficult. 

With that, I will yield back whatever remaining time I have. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank the gentleman. I recognize the gentleman 

from North Carolina, Mr. Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. It has 

been pretty well covered. As Mr. Duncan Hunter said, Admiral 

Papp is probably making his swan song today, my old shipmate— 

strike that, my young shipmate. But, Admiral, I appreciate very 

much what you have done. Best wishes to you in your next life. But 

it has been a good rapport between our subcommittee and the Nation’s oldest continuous seagoing Service. Always ready. Thank 

you, Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Meeks? 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank both 

chairmans that are here, and, of course, Ranking Member. 

Let me just say narcotics has long been one of the main areas 

of focus of the United States foreign policy in Latin America. Seventeen of the twenty-two nations which President Obama identified 

as major producers of illicit drugs in 2014 are located in Latin 

America or the Caribbean. So this is not just an American problem, 

but it is truly a hemispheric problem, and one which we must tackle head on, and we must do it in multiple ways, I believe, and not 

just one way. 

As a friend of Latin America and a frequent visitor to the region, 

I have seen the effects of illicit drug trade personally. In fact, in 

Colombia, for example, a country which I care deeply about, have 

been to several times, I have seen the devastating effects the drug 

cartels and related criminal activity have had on particularly minority populations, especially the Afro-Colombian and indigenous 

peoples in places like Buenaventura and Cali. The horrendous violence and tragic poverty in such areas is a direct result of the drug 

trade. And while recent involvement of the police and military of 

our President Santos may give short-term solutions, we must combat the evils underlying society in these places in order to elevate 

the local people to the lives that they deserve. 

I returned just last week from a trip to Haiti and Guatemala and 

Mexico City. And there, too, I saw what can result in countries 

which are the hubs for drug transit. We must get to the root of this 

problem, and what facilitates the plague of drugs in the Western 

Hemisphere, and we must identify both the social and economic 

factors which contribute to the widespread production and transit 

of drugs in the region. And we must not rest until we are sure that 

they have been eradicated for good. 

6 

We know we have got to coordinate while we do this. We have 

got to coordinate what interdictions and what the Coast Guard is 

doing and what we have, to try to make sure that it is coordinated 

and we can run them out and not use what happens where we can 

run them from one country and they run to another country and— 

because they feel that we don’t have the same kind of assets there. 

So, despite, though, my frustration with what is going—this ongoing problem in the region, I must also say that I am optimistic. 

I am optimistic because we have the tools at our disposal that are 

working, and we have new tools that we are developing. And when 

I visited, for example, the National Police Academy in Haiti last 

week, I learned about a new partnership with the New York Police 

Department, and how the United States is facilitating counternarcotics capabilities abroad with our friends and partners. 

I also believe that legal trade is a powerful antidote to illicit drug 

trafficking. The free movement of goods and services is at the heart 

of a strong rule of law. And I am confident that new and upcoming 

free trade agreements will bolster the ability of the United States 

neighbors to develop robust, diversified economics which are not 

dependent on drugs. And I am confident that local farmers and 

workers will be able to find ways to make their living honorably, 

and to give back to their countries. Building trade capacity is an 

issue I care deeply about. And I believe this Congress must lend 

its support for the sake of both America and its partner nations. 

Lastly, I believe combating the drug trade is also important to 

bridge our differences and work together to solve a problem which 

hurts us all. I look forward to the day when America once again— 

we can’t do it now—but can cooperate with Venezuela, for example, 

in combating narcotics. I look forward to extending our hands in 

friendship to our neighbors in a sincere effort to rid the hemisphere 

of this horror, and to build new regional partnerships that will 

bring us closer together than ever before. 

Thank you, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Ms. Hahn, do you have some comments 

you would like to make? 

Ms. HAHN. I have a question. 

Mr. SALMON. OK, fine. We will go ahead and introduce. 

Pursuant to Committee Rule 7, the members of the subcommittee 

will be permitted to submit written statements to be included in 

the official hearing record. Without objection, the hearing record 

will remain open for 7 days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length of limitation 

of the rules. 

Admiral Papp is the 24th commander—Commandant, excuse 

me—of the United States Coast Guard. He previously served as the 

commander of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area, overseeing all U.S. 

Coast Guard operations in the eastern half of the world. Admiral 

Papp is a graduate of the United States Coast Guard Academy. He 

also holds an M.A. in national security and strategic studies from 

the U.S. Naval War College, and an M.S. in management from 

Salve Regina College. 

Ambassador Arreaga is a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Prior to his appointment, he served as the United States AmVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:59 Apr 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\4-29-1~1\87699.TXT JEAN
7 

bassador to the Republic of Iceland, and deputy chief of mission at 

the U.S. Embassy in Panama. Ambassador Arreaga holds a Ph.D. 

in economics and an M.A. in management from the University of 

Wisconsin. 

General Kelly is commander of the United States Southern Command. Prior to his current position, he served as a senior military 

assistant for the Secretary of Defense, and commanded Marine 

Forces Reserve and Marine Forces North. General Kelly is a graduate of the University of Massachusetts and U.S. National War 

College. 

I know it goes without saying you all understand the lighting 

system. Just understand that it goes yellow about the time you 

have about a minute left, and it goes red—it is time to cut it off. 

And you guys are so distinguished, I am not brave enough to probably cut you off, so try and be as adherent to that as you can. 

And, with that, Admiral Papp. 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, JR., COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AMBASSADOR LUIS E. ARREAGA, DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND GENERAL JOHN F. KELLY, 

U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDER, SOUTHERN COMMAND, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Admiral PAPP. Thank you, Chairman Salmon. And good morning, 

again, to Chairman Hunter and Ranking Member Garamendi, and 

to all the members of the subcommittees. I want to thank you for 

the opportunity to be here this morning to thank you for your continued support of the Coast Guard, and also to discuss the challenges that we face in confronting the illicit smuggling in the Western Hemisphere and its consequences that it has for our country. 

And I would be remiss this morning if I didn’t recognize some of 

our other partners in this fight: the Department of Justice, and our 

partner agencies in the Department of Homeland Security who also 

contribute greatly to the efforts to stem the flow of illicit traffic into 

the United States. 

We continue to face a significant threat in the drug transit zones 

of the Western Hemisphere and in the southern maritime approaches to the United States. Ruthless transnational criminal organizations advancing their illicit trade through coercion, bribery, 

and violence create a destabilizing effect on both the governments 

and economies of the Western Hemisphere and our partner nations. 

For instance, for the second consecutive year, Honduras has the 

world’s highest murder rate, a direct result of the massive influx 

of U.S.-bound cocaine entering Central America through the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean. And those drugs 

reach our shores, and the activities of those sophisticated criminal 

networks have an impact on America’s streets, as well, in the form 

of gang violence and turf wars by urban drug dealers. 

Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime law enforcement in support of the administration’s national drug control strategy, and the strategy to combat transnational organized crime. On 

8 

the frontlines of our detection, monitoring, and interdiction and apprehension operations, the Coast Guard deploys major cutters, 

long- and medium-range fixed-wing aircraft, airborne use-of-force 

helicopters, and our law enforcement detachments embarked on 

Navy and allied warships to stop drug traffickers in the transit 

zone, before the drugs can approach our shores. 

And working with U.S. Southern Command and the Departments 

of State and Justice—a really important fact here—we have established more than 40 maritime bilateral law enforcement agreements with our international stakeholders, including Venezuela, 

who we still cooperate with in the drug war. 

Our unique combination of ships, aircraft, and authorities, and 

partnerships has continuously proven to be an effective interdiction 

system when employed in the transit zone. Over the last 5 years, 

Coast Guard ships and law enforcement detachments operating in 

the offshore regions have removed more than 500 metric tons of cocaine with a wholesale value of nearly $17 billion. This is more 

than two times the amount of cocaine and twice the purity seized 

by all other U.S. Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies 

combined. 

This is where we get the very best value for the taxpayer’s dollar. 

It is also where we have our first best chance to address this problem: close to the source, and far from our shores, where the drugs 

are pure and uncut, where they are in their most vulnerable bulk 

form, and before they are divided into increasingly smaller loads, 

making them exponentially harder and more expensive to detect 

and interdict. 

And, Chairman Hunter, in response to do we care about the 

other 80 percent, of course we care about the other 80 percent. But 

it is not just about the drugs. For every shipment that we interdict 

at sea, we gather valuable information about the sophisticated 

criminal enterprises that move these drugs. By understanding the 

criminal networks, we are better prepared to combat other illicit 

enterprises, including human traffickers and international terrorists. Our interdictions remain a key weapon in the U.S. arsenal to 

combat transnational criminal networks. 

The Coast Guard and its partners rely upon this what we call 

cycle of success to disrupt the networks behind the illicit trafficking 

in the Western Hemisphere. Successful interdictions and subsequent prosecutions provide actionable intelligence on future events, 

producing follow-on seizures and additional intelligence, thus feeding that cycle of success. Our at-sea interdictions are the engine 

that drives this cycle and our success. More than half the designated priority drug targets extradited to the United States from 

South America over the last 10 years are directly linked to Coast 

Guard interdictions. 

Over 60 named drug-trafficking organizations have been dismantled because of our investigations originating with or supported by 

Coast Guard interdictions. The removal of these networks helped 

countries like Colombia restore citizen security and economic opportunity, contributing to a $14 billion increase of imports of the 

United States goods over the last 20 years. 

But despite our success, far too many illicit drugs still reach our 

shores. Our reduced numbers of ships can stop only a fraction of 

9 

the contraband our intelligence tells us is moving. Erosion of this 

cycle of success, either through degraded intelligence, a reduction 

in ships and aircraft, or a decrease in prosecutions, will have a 

chronic negative impact on our Department’s mission to secure and 

manage our borders. 

And you don’t need to look any further than a recent news report 

from Chicago to get a sense of how these criminal networks are impacting our communities once these drugs reach the homeland. The 

Sinaloa Cartel uses Chicago as a distribution hub by exploiting 

people in underserved communities to traffic their illicit goods. The 

impacts of this cartel activity are felt throughout our communities 

and manifest themselves in a host of problems infecting our society. 

This problem is not going away. The flow of illicit trade and 

drugs, people, and all the many forms it takes continues to threaten our homeland. Those engaged in this business bring their traffic 

on, over, and even under the sea, and exploit our global supply and 

transportation chains to deliver contraband to the market. The offshore interdiction of illegal drugs in bulk quantities is critical to 

the safety and security of our Nation. 

But even more important is the understanding and disrupting 

the sophisticated criminal networks that transport these drugs and 

sow instability throughout Central America and Mexico, and adversely impact our safety, security, and prosperity. As the Department of Defense rebalances the bulk of its fleet to the western Pacific, and as Coast Guard cutters continue to age, I fear that this 

problem is only going to get worse. Sustaining the cycle of success 

by strengthening international partnerships, investing in cutter 

and aircraft recapitalization, and leveraging interagency capabilities will keep deadly, addictive drugs off U.S. streets, disrupt 

transnational criminal networks, create space for security within 

the Western Hemisphere, and facilitate the safe flow of legitimate 

commerce and transport. 

So, I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak on this very 

important topic this morning, and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Admiral. 

Ambassador Arreaga? 

Mr. ARREAGA. Good morning, Chairman Salmon, Chairman 

Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and other distinguished 

members of the subcommittee. Just a word of warning, my accent 

sometimes gets the better of me. So if you hear something that 

doesn’t make sense, it really does make sense; I just mispronounced it. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ARREAGA. Thank you so much for the opportunity to appear 

today with my colleagues, General Kelly and Admiral Papp, to discuss our work to undermine transnational organized crime, minimize its impact in the United States—on the United States, and 

improve citizen security in the Western Hemisphere. 

The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs, or INL, leads the Department’s 

anticrime, counternarcotics efforts globally. We shape and deliver 

assistance programs in nearly 80 countries to help partner nations 

10 

build their capacity to fight crime and prosecute criminals under 

the law. This is, no doubt, an enormous responsibility. And INL 

does not approach it alone. We partnered with the best and brightest in the United States Government to impart expertise and training, and we also partner with police departments, courts, and corrections entities from a number of your constituencies. 

In the Western Hemisphere the United States has established 

partnerships to confront shared threats and advance common interests. The collection of the maritime initiative with Mexico, our 

longstanding partnership with Colombia, the Central America Regional Security Initiative, CARSI, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative constitute our strategic approach to enhance and professionalize civilian enforcement institutions, court systems, and 

corrections capacity, so that they can investigate and undermine 

criminal groups, prosecute criminal offenders, and remove them 

from their operations. 

While the State Department has no direct role in interdiction efforts, the governments that we mentor and train in the Western 

Hemisphere do. Our assistance efforts results in enhanced foreign 

government capacity to interdict drugs, investigate crimes, and 

prosecute and incarcerate criminals. 

In the Bahamas, Jamaica, Panama, and Costa Rica, civil police 

and prosecutors, working with maritime law enforcement components, patrol their waters, seize narcotics, and judicialize cases. In 

other areas of the hemisphere, where law enforcement capacity is 

less developed, our regional partners, such as the Government of 

Colombia, are working in coordination with our programs to develop basic policing skills, and they are also working with our U.S. 

law enforcement and military partners to pursue narcotics traffickers. 

These successes, large and impressive as they are, pale in comparison to the magnitude of the drug transit threat in our hemisphere. Furthermore, while we are making progress in building 

partner nation capacity, and I want to emphasize this, it cannot 

make up for gaps in U.S. interdiction assets in the region. Let me 

repeat that. It cannot make up for gaps in U.S. interdiction assets 

in the region. 

We know that the Caribbean is experiencing an increase in drug 

flows, with a majority of shipments occurring by a maritime means. 

In 2011, cocaine transiting the Caribbean to the U.S. totaled approximately 5 percent of the total flow. This increased to 9 percent 

by 2012, and 16 percent by the end of 2013. Central America remains a priority, as 80 percent of documented drug flow from 

South America transits Central American territory. Under CARSI, 

the United States is implementing a comprehensive and integrated 

approach to stem illegal trafficking. 

We also recognize that it will take many years to see fruits of 

our efforts in Central America, owing to the magnitude of threats 

we confront there. 

The partnerships between the State Department, partner nations, the U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. SOUTHCOM constitute a 

proven and trusted mechanism that works every single day. 

It is also important to note that regional partnerships between 

nations are flourishing, that joint operations have become more 

11 

common, and that information sharing is happening in a near-realtime basis. This is a proven formula. While these are all significant 

developments, they are not enough to curtail the magnitude of trafficking operations. U.S. foreign assistance expertise and engagement by our law enforcement and military partners remains critical. However, the capability gaps abroad require more from us. 

Chairman Salmon, Chairman Duncan, and other distinguished 

Members, thank you for your focus on this important topic. I look 

forward to our discussion. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

General Kelly? 

General KELLY. Members of the committee, I look forward to discussing the strong counternarcotics partnerships between U.S. 

Southern Command and the interagency—especially the U.S. Coast 

Guard and the Department of Homeland Security and INL. Together we defend the southern approaches, or we try to defend the 

southern approaches of the United States. 

Chairmen, Members, those southern approaches are being assailed by dangerous criminal networks that are well resourced, 

adaptive, and skilled at exploiting all avenues of approach to the 

United States. Illicit trafficking threatens our country at every 

land, air, and sea border, and challenges the sovereignty of many 

of our partners in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Department of Defense plays a critical supporting role in the fight against 

illicit trafficking, although this role is under discussion and some 

disagree with it. 

As you know, we have congressionally mandated statutory responsibility as the lead Federal agency—that is, U.S. Southern 

Command does—as the lead Federal agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs towards the 

United States. Like the U.S. Coast Guard and DHS, along with 

DEA, FBI, and INL, we also build the partner capacity of nations 

which helps enhance security, stability, and antitrafficking efforts 

throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Together, with U.S. 

law enforcement and intelligence from foreign, military, and law 

enforcement partners, we focus on combating illicit drug trade, and 

supporting interdiction as far from our borders as possible, before 

those drugs are broken down into nearly impossible-to-detect load 

sizes. 

Our support to interdiction efforts not only keeps drugs like cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines from violating our shores, it 

puts international drug traffickers in jail and leads to invaluable 

intelligence that enhances our understanding of trafficking networks. All with almost no violence. 

And when we are adequately resourced, the defend-forward approach is very effective, although my component—Joint Interagency Task Force in Key West receives only 1.5 percent of the 

total U.S. Government counternarcotics budget, 1.5 percent. With 

the support of partners like DHS and the Coast Guard, DEA, and 

FBI, they remove—are responsible for removing 68 percent of all 

of the seized cocaine heading towards the United States. 

Our international partners are also key to our effectiveness, especially in our ongoing counterdrug operation, Martillo. Fifty percent of Martillo’s interactions would not have been possible without 

12 

the contributions of our partners. The outstanding support of nations like Colombia, Panama, Guatemala, Honduras, Belize, Costa 

Rica, and even Nicaragua, not to mention Canada, the United 

Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, it is what makes Martillo 

a success. I will be frank; we could not do it without these partners. They are fighting our drug fight for us. And their courage and 

commitment, in my opinion, is second to none. 

And human rights, ladies and gentlemen, are first and foremost 

in all of our relationships with these countries. And there is a lot 

we can do for them for very little, like providing inexpensive patrol 

craft with maintenance and training packages, as well as providing 

them ISR and intelligence support. Since we are unlikely to get any 

additional assets due to other global priorities, right now our partners are the only hope we have of putting a dent in the drug flow 

coming to the United States. 

And I emphasize this is our fight, not their fight. It is destructive 

to their countries, but it is our problem. And they are fighting it 

for us at great loss of life. They help us make a big dent all of the 

time. Last year alone, 132 metric tons of cocaine were seized and 

disrupted, thanks in part to their contributions to Operation 

Martillo, 132 tons, no violence. 

Unfortunately, that number is just a small fraction of the cocaine 

and other drugs that still reach our shores, which we were unable 

to get at, due to asset shortfalls. Since 2012, Southern Command 

has faced limited and declining U.S. Government maritime and air 

assets required for detection and monitoring and end game interdiction missions. We also receive less than 5 percent of our annual 

airborne ISR requirements. These limitations mean less presence, 

less deterrence, and less awareness of what is moving on trafficking networks, be it drugs, weapons, cash, human beings, or 

something even more detrimental to our national security, like terrorist agent or WMD. 

Make no mistake. Drug traffickers are exploiting our lack of 

presence, especially in the Caribbean. As we focus our limited assets off the Central American coast, we have started seeing a shift 

back to the old smuggling routes through the Caribbean. I worry 

that smaller Caribbean nations may soon be overwhelmed—I think 

they are being overwhelmed—by violence and powerful criminal 

networks as we have seen in some parts of Latin America—correction, Central America—already. 

On a recent trip to Haiti I saw some real improvement in the 

right direction in that country, but I fear the shift to the Caribbean, if left unchecked, could change the positive direction Haiti 

has taken. 

We are doing everything we can to at least partially mitigate this 

lack of assets. We are relying heavily on both the U.S. Coast Guard 

and Customs and Border Protection and other DHS assets, which 

now provide over 70 percent of the aircraft and cutters to support 

detection and monitoring mission. However, over the next few 

years, both the Department of Defense and the U.S. Coast Guard 

are facing an unprecedented downturn in the availability of large 

surface assets like U.S. Navy frigates and U.S. Coast Guard High 

Endurance Cutters. 

13 

In 2016, the Navy frigate inventory will go to zero. This makes 

our reliance on the U.S. Coast Guard—the Nation’s reliance on the 

U.S. Coast Guard and its national security and planned Offshore 

Patrol Cutters all the more critical. And I am deeply concerned to 

hear that the U.S. Coast Guard is facing major budget cuts, as is 

DOD. 

In closing, I share the Commandant’s conviction—the Coast 

Guard Commandant’s conviction that illicit trafficking by powerful 

criminal networks is a direct threat to our national security and 

the stability of our partners. I also share his concern that continued asset shortfalls pose a direct threat to the Department of Defense and U.S. Coast Guard’s ability to counter drugs. 

I look forward to discussing these and other issues with you. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. I thank the distinguished panel. I yield myself 5 

minutes to ask my questions. 

My first question would be for you, Ambassador. There is a number of initiatives in the Western Hemisphere that share the objective of improving citizen security, including the Merida Initiative in 

Mexico, the Central America Regional Security Initiative, CARSI, 

the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, CBSI. 

In what ways have State and USAID applied lessons learned 

from the various initiatives to maximize the effectiveness of their 

efforts across the Western Hemisphere? And maybe look at replicating success, as you mentioned—and I think yesterday, when we 

spoke, as well, we all agree that we have enjoyed tremendous success with Colombia. And I am wondering. How do we put all of that 

together and, from the lessons we have learned, how do we replicate some of those things? 

And I know that there are different nuances, but I would like 

your thoughts. 

Mr. ARREAGA. Thank you for your question. That—it is a very 

good question. And, as you know, Chairman, you have—different 

countries have different challenges, different levels of development. 

What we do try is to take the lessons learned from one to the other. 

And I think the case of Colombia is one case where Colombia is 

such a success story that they have become our partners. They export security. So we use them to train the forces, some of the forces 

in Central America on investigative techniques, polygraph management, interdiction techniques. And so—we take the success in one 

part of the country, we take it to another. 

Now we—let me give you another example. We are just about to 

establish a nationalized customs training academy in Panama. 

Now, this is a training academy that was established with INL 

funds and with enormous support from the Department of Homeland Security and CBP. This academy is now going to become a regional training center, where we are going to bring people from 

other parts of the hemisphere, from Central America, from Guatemala, and other places, so that they have the same doctrine, the 

same approach, the same type of techniques to control borders. 

Depending on the circumstances, when you think about, for example, our success in Peru, the success we have had in the Upper 

Huallaga Valley is because we have combined alternative development along with eradication. So we are looking at that model and 

14 

see what we can transfer it to other areas. We are beginning to see 

some potential plantings of coca plants, as in other parts of Peru. 

Mr. SALMON. And I have said this before, and I think most people that worked with the Colombia initiative have recognized that, 

while the United States contribution to that process was substantial, I think all of you have said pretty much the same thing: there 

is no way that that would have been accomplished without the political will coming from the leaders themselves in Colombia. 

And so, as we look to try to replicate some of those successes, I 

am really heartened to know that you are using folks who are in 

the trenches in Colombia to actually advise and consult and, you 

know, get their hands dirty with Mexico, with possibly other Latin 

American nations. But I think there is also another reason for that. 

Besides actually having the people that demonstrated the political 

will, I think that using them, you know, is a little bit more influential, because sometimes I wonder if we suggest it, if it might just 

be dead on arrival just because we suggested it and, you know, the 

fact that it is the Big Brother or, you know, the—you know, the 

United States, sometimes it causes more problems than solutions. 

Why do you think in Colombia they finally turned the corner? 

Was it—you know, was it a rebound? Was it his efforts? Was it, 

you know, a combination of things? What are your thoughts? And 

I am interested in all three of you, because, as I look at some of 

the things going on in Mexico right now, I know a lot of people are 

kind of wait-and-see with the new administration in Mexico, and 

we have all been kind of pleasantly surprised with the tenacity 

that they have approached this problem. 

I would like your thoughts on, you know, how can we better utilize some of the successes in the region, and what can we recommend, going forward, to do that? General, I will start with you. 

General KELLY. Mr. Chairman, first I would say the term—you 

said the U.S. investment in Colombia was substantial, significant, 

or whatever the term was. You are right, except that is a very relative term. United States, I think, 4, 5, 6 cents on the dollar in 

terms of what was spent to, if you will, turn Colombia around in 

the drug fight. And, of course, virtually no boots on—they did their 

own bleeding. They did their own fighting and dying. 

What we did—and they will be, I think, eternally grateful for— 

is the encouragement that this country, our country, gave them in 

the drug fight. I can remember when I worked up here on Capitol 

Hill some years ago, the discussion back in the late 1990s was 

should the United States allow Colombia to buy—not be given, but 

buy six Black Hawk airplanes, conventional helicopters. And the 

discussion in this room rotated around or oriented around the fact 

that why would we allow them to buy these things, it is a failed 

state, it is a narco state, it has gone over the edge, there is no hope 

for them. And, of course, here we are, 14 years later, 15 years later, 

and it is virtually a miracle, heroic effort. Why did they win? Because they were losing so badly. Why did they turn it around? Because they had no choice. 

The good news is we, as I say, allowed them—we supported 

them, we encouraged them. We did, in fact, in a sense, unleash, but 

unleash a small number of advisors and trainers, U.S. military. 

And it turned the place around. But the Colombians really did that 

15 

themselves because they were losing so badly. Unfortunately, that 

same plan, that same attitude we are not focusing in the same way 

on countries that are today very close to going over the edge. 

Where Colombia was in the 1990s, they are just a few inches away 

from falling off the cliff. Yet we are restricted from working with 

them for past sins in the 1980s. 

The beauty of having a Colombia—and they are such good partners, particularly in the military realm, they are such good partners with us—when we ask them to go somewhere else and train 

the Mexicans, the Hondurans, the Guatemalans, the Panamanians, 

they will do it almost without asking, and they will do it on their 

own. They are so appreciative of what we did for them. And, again, 

what we did for them was really encourage them for 20 years. And 

they have done such a magnificent job. 

But that is why it is important for them to go. Because I am, at 

least on the military side, I am restricted from working with so 

many of these countries because of limitations that are really based 

on past sins. And I will let it go at that, Mr.—— 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I have run out of time. I am going to 

recognize Duncan Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I guess it 

would be great if we could have the Judiciary Committee, where 

the money comes out for the counterdrug money that gets put into 

Federal grants throughout the United States. That is one big question, is why do you get so little of that. Is it because it is a jobs 

program throughout the United States for drug enforcement agencies at the municipal levels in the cities and States? 

I mean if you collect—if you had that money, you could theoretically reduce their need for a job at all, right, when it comes to drug 

interdiction within the United States. So why do you think that is? 

Do they have better lobbyists than you do? That is my question. 

Why is there less money going to you, as opposed to all these different agencies that the Department of Justice doles out grants to 

these agencies? Every local sheriff and every local police gets drug 

money to interdict drugs, and you don’t. So why is that? Admiral 

Papp? 

Admiral PAPP. Mr. Chairman, I—that is a real great grenade to 

jump on. 

[Laughter.] 

Admiral PAPP. But—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Sorry I didn’t ask one of the prescheduled questions. 

Admiral PAPP. But truth be known, I don’t know what the percentage is that they get, domestically. But what I do know is that 

I wear a number of hats. One of the hats I wear is—— 

Mr. HUNTER. General Kelly said 1.5 percent, 1.5 percent goes to 

SOUTHCOM and Coast Guard interdiction efforts. So that leaves 

98.5 for everybody else. 

Admiral PAPP. I can’t confirm or verify or deny—— 

Mr. HUNTER. I trust—— 

Admiral PAPP [continuing]. On that figure. I would have to go 

back and research that. 

But what I will say is that one of the hats I wear is as chairman 

of the Interdiction Committee, the TIC, which reports to the direcVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:59 Apr 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\4-29-1~1\87699.TXT JEAN
16 

tor of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. We are focused 

on interdiction. But one of the things I have gained during my time 

as Commandant is an appreciation for the need for supply reduction and demand reduction. It has to be spread out. We can argue, 

and certainly I would advocate for more funds for what we do. 

On the other hand, I can’t make a good judgment, because I 

think it has to be—much like Mr. Meeks talked about, we have to 

have a balanced approach to this. We need to work on reducing the 

demand, while we reduce the supply, while we work on trying to 

disrupt the transnational criminal organizations as well. 

Mr. HUNTER. I don’t want to run out of time—— 

Admiral PAPP. So I am trying to respond to your question, but 

I just don’t know the figures and the percentages to give you an 

accurate enough response. 

[The information follows:] 

As part of the 11 statutory missions, the Coast Guard is the lead Federal 

agency for maritime drug interdiction (and co-lead agency for air interdiction). The Coast Guard receives appropriated funds to carry out these missions and does not receive grant money. 

Mr. HUNTER. General Kelly? 

General KELLY. Congressman, I think, first of all, the 1.5 percent 

is not what the Coast Guard gets. What I get to manage the detection and monitoring of—and to assist in interdiction, the drug flow. 

I would be guessing, though. 

On your question about domestic funding, I would guess because 

we have tended to look at this issue as, you know, the cancer that 

is within our country. And we see the—you know, what it does to 

our youth and, for that matter, middle-aged people and older people, and the drug abuse. You know, 40,000 Americans die of drug 

overdoses every year. And you can’t even count the human misery 

of the number of people living under bridges or selling their bodies 

for a fix, and all of this kind of thing. 

So, I think, you know, we look at it and we say, ‘‘This is terrible, 

let’s try to solve this problem at home.’’ The last place to solve this 

problem—it is—part of the solution is here at home. But you know, 

once this drug gets ashore and makes its way into Mexico and the 

United States, it is impossible, really. I think we have a million 

law enforcement heroes in this country—DEA, local police, FBI— 

there is a million, and they get, about total, 20, 25 tons of cocaine 

every year. I can get 20—we can get, collectively, 25 tons of cocaine 

in a month, no violence. 

Mr. HUNTER. That is not balanced. Admiral Papp, you said—— 

General KELLY. Well, but that is where the fight is. 

Mr. HUNTER. That is not balanced at all. 

General KELLY. I think the efficiency of the fight is before it gets 

ashore in Central America or, now, increasingly into Haiti and Dominican Republic. But we focused this war on drugs for 30 or whatever years on the streets of America, which is the last place you 

really want to kind of put your main effort. My thoughts. 

Mr. HUNTER. I was reading, like, National Geographic or The 

Economist or something last week, and it said that the Sinaloa 

Cartel in the Sinaloa area in Mexico, that they are not growing 

17 

weed any more, they are not growing any marijuana. They are 

growing poppies. What is the big uptick on heroin coming in? 

General KELLY. Surprise to me when I took this job. I thought 

heroin that fed the United States demand, the habit, came from 

other parts of the world. Virtually all of it now comes from Latin 

America—and if you talk to the DEA, they will confirm this—virtually all of the heroin that comes and feeds the drug habit in the 

United States is grown now and produced—grown throughout 

Latin America, poppies, and then turned into heroin in Mexico, and 

then comes in. Virtually all of it. A tiny bit may come down from 

Canada, through Canada from, say, Afghanistan, but not a lot. It 

is almost entirely—and, oh, by the way, methamphetamines, again, 

largely produced today in Mexico and comes across the border. 

So, the zone that I live in, and that Admiral Papp, to a very large 

degree, fights alongside me, the zone that I live in, the three most 

detrimental influences in our society—cocaine, which is the big 

money-maker, by the way, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, 

is all produced south of the border and trafficked in on this incredibly efficient criminal network on which anything can ride: drugs, 

human beings, terrorists. Anything can ride on this network. It is— 

and it is globally linked. 

It is an amazing thing to see, and it is virtually a wide open 

entry into the United States or, for that matter, the United Kingdom. Or, for that matter, Africa. Or, for that matter, the Middle 

East. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Meeks? 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me—I guess I will 

just start with General Kelly, just so that I have an understanding 

of where the figure come from. I think I saw someplace that in 

March you told the Senate Armed Services Committee that you 

only had 5 percent of the assets you need to perform drug interdiction duties in the Caribbean region. And so, I was wondering, 

where that figure comes from, because I thought that the annual 

DOD’s budget for counternarcotics funding was over a billion dollars. So if it was only 5 percent that you had, I was just wondering 

how could that be. 

General KELLY. Sir, it is 5 percent of the ISR. That is airborne 

intelligence and reconnaissance. That is what—I only get 5 percent 

of what I think I need. And what that means is I only get 5 percent 

of aircraft like P–3 patrol aircraft, either from the United States 

Navy or from Homeland Security. The Border folks fly them and 

do tremendous work. We tend to fly those airplanes out of places 

like El Salvador, great partners. Or Honduras, great partners. But 

I only get 5 percent. 

And how you track this stuff as it moves on the high seas is we 

have a very, very good idea of when it leaves either Ecuador or Colombia. And then, as it moves either side of Central America—or 

now, increasingly off towards Puerto Rico, Haiti, Dominican Republic—as we get the intel, human intel, if you will, that it is about 

to move, then we pick it up, we vector—if we have them, which we 

generally don’t—ISR airplanes to pick up the go-fast—it is a speed 

boat carrying anywhere between 1 and, say, 4 tons of cocaine. And 

we pick that up, and then that airplane watches it until either a 

18 

Coast Guard or U.S. Navy helicopter—ship with a helicopter on 

it—can get close enough. And once the helicopter shows up, they 

basically stop and we seize and it is seized. 

So, without that airborne assets—and, oh, by the way, we use 

anything we can get. I mean I have had B–52s flying training missions with ISR parts on them, B–1 bombers with ISR parts on 

them, flying over the Caribbean, not—in international airspace, 

doing that mission for me. So we beg for the assets. And, as I say, 

I will take any asset I can get. And sometimes, believe it or not, 

it is a bomber or a JSTARS airplane. 

Mr. MEEKS. So, that—could there be some negotiations within 

DOD, or you talking about we need to give you additional assets 

or additional dollars to go to DOD to give you what you think you 

need? 

General KELLY. Sir, the national security policy or strategy of the 

United States, of course, is to pivot the Pacific, and to deal with 

the wars in the Middle East, and to deter other countries—you 

know who they are. That leaves—with the size of the U.S. military 

getting smaller, that leaves almost nothing for SOUTHCOM. I am 

not criticizing; that is just the reality of it. 

But again, this drug scourge causes our country 40,000 deaths a 

year, $200 billion in costs, and I think, to a very, very large degree, 

the biggest crime, or the biggest emotional thing, in my mind, is 

the human misery it causes. Because the dead are dead, but the 

people who are struggling with this stuff—and, again, living under 

bridges and selling their bodies for a hit, is just something that, to 

me, you know, keeps me awake at night. 

But again, these are decisions made outside of my purview. I just 

define the problem. 

Mr. MEEKS. And Admiral Papp, in your opening statement you 

indicated that you—we are continuing to work with Venezuela with 

reference to drug interdiction. Can you tell us how, and what is the 

relationship, or how—are they cooperating, or not cooperating? 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. We are getting good cooperation. I mentioned that we have 40 multilateral agreements. These have been 

worked out over the last 20 years with countries surrounding the 

Caribbean, South and Central America, based upon a partnership 

with the United States Coast Guard. And we work through the Department of Justice to hammer out these—and each one of them 

is a little bit different. 

But we still do, in fact, have protocols in place where we have 

a suspected vessel or Venezuelan vessel, we are able to go through 

these protocols to the Government of Venezuela, primarily the Venezuelan Coast Guard, and get permission to board vessels. And 

sometimes we have to make decisions that the vessels are returned 

to Venezuela. Other times we can take them for prosecution. But 

we continue to have cooperation there. 

And going back to what was—what Chairman Salmon answered, 

I have got a unique perspective on this, because I have been not 

only down there driving ships around the Caribbean, trying to do 

interdictions, but back in 1998 had a chance to do a diplomatic 

mission, going into Venezuela and Colombia. At the time, Venezuela was very friendly with us, and accepted us in there. When 

we pulled in Cartagena, in Colombia, quite a different situation 

19 

there. Cartagena was one of the few towns that you could go 

around in safely. 

So I have had a chance to watch how Plan Colombia has worked, 

the partnerships we developed with the Colombians, and, in fact, 

have been down there dealing with their head of navy. And we are 

very proud of the way that they have taken on a regional leadership down there. In fact, they are running drug symposiums, bringing in other countries, and we continue to work with them and sustain that relationship. 

And I think the key to that has been a continued commitment. 

They know we are not going away. But I have to admit that, as 

they see fewer and fewer resources devoted to the counterdrug mission down there, they begin to get a little anxious, because they 

perceive that as perhaps us backing away from sharing the battle 

with them. 

Mr. MEEKS. Can I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SALMON. I would like to go to the Ambassador now. I mentioned in my opening statement about this program that I saw in 

Haiti with New York City Policy Department officers there, working with them on a law enforcement and—on this—you know, this 

is, I think, good work on behalf of the State Department. 

I was wondering whether or not—are there other partnerships 

like that, where you find law enforcement from the United States 

working on the ground in some of the Caribbean islands to help 

with their judicial systems, or helping with their police systems? 

That way we can also get information there, and they can, in fact, 

lock up hardened criminals there before they come to the United 

States and spread illicit drugs. So is there any other kind of cooperation that the State Department is working with like the Haiti 

program any place else in Central America or the Caribbean? 

Mr. ARREAGA. Indeed, and thank you for your question. This is 

a great question, because it gives us a chance to highlight some of 

the partnerships that we have developed with States all over the 

United States. For instance, we have a relationship with the corrections department in New Mexico. So we train corrections officers 

so that jails in the region are actually jails that are meant to rehabilitate, as opposed to make them worse criminals. We work with 

attorneys general to teach about prosecution. We do this with a 

number of States. We work with—in fact, if I may, I would like to 

submit for the record a paper explaining all of the partnerships 

that we have. 

But this is one of the unsung aspects of what—the work that the 

United States is doing overseas. We are taking the expertise developed at various States—for instance, the Miami-Dade Police Department does a lot of training in counternarcotics. We also have 

a partnership with the Port of Miami, where customs officers come 

to Miami to see how we handle port security. 

You talked about doing some prosecutions there. Absolutely. 

That is exactly what we are trying to do. We are trying to build 

capacity on the investigation side and the prosecution side and the 

courts, because we want to empower these governments, these 

countries, to apprehend criminals, to try them, and to incarcerate 

them and, you know, do the whole range of judicial—the process. 

And we do that, depending on—it all depends on, of course, the 

20 

level of development. But that is part of our approach to security 

in the region. 

We also work with the office of—that deals with money laundering. We are encouraging countries to pass asset—for future 

laws, so that a lot of these agencies that have no resources can use 

that law to resource their activities. So we have lots of partnerships. And I think it is one of the best parts, because it gives us 

the flexibility to provide different types of assistance, depending on 

what is needed. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Ms. Hahn? 

Ms. HAHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Papp, during the 

last Coast Guard hearing you mentioned that drug, weapon, and 

human smuggling from panga boats still remained a huge threat, 

but that budget cuts hindered the Coast Guard’s ability to counter 

this danger, since they reduced the manpower and operating hours 

of the assets the Coast Guard needs to combat this continuing 

threat. 

For instance, in your previous testimony, you stated that sequestration clearly affected the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction efforts, 

as evidenced by the 35-percent reduction in marijuana seizures in 

fiscal year 2012 to 2013, when sequestration began to take effect. 

This clearly, obviously, shows that there is a direct correlation between the budget and operational capability, and that this common 

theme around here, that we all need to be doing more with less, 

is an impossible principle to constantly adhere to. 

Chief Petty Officer Terrell Horne lived in my congressional district at the time of his death from one of these panga boats. I live 

a mile from where one of those boats made land on the Palos 

Verdes Peninsula recently. So, of course, in my area, I am concerned about the potential effect that the next round of sequestration cuts could have on this danger, and especially as more evidence is showing that smugglers are increasingly using the southwest maritime route more and more. 

Just met last week in my district office with Admiral Schultz, the 

commander of the 11th District, and I also met with Captain Jenkins, the captain of the Port of Los Angeles. And I am very excited. 

And we also met with Captain Williams, who will be the incoming 

captain of the port, the first woman to hold that position in the history of the Coast Guard. 

So, we are all excited about that, but want to know what you can 

tell me of how you are working with local and foreign partners to 

ensure that our major American ports along these popular drugsmuggling routes such as L.A. and Long Beach are fully protected 

against this threat. And maybe in your answer you can also tell us 

how important it is that the Coast Guard at least maintains its 

current funding levels in order to preserve its current capability. 

Admiral PAPP. Thank you, Ms. Hahn. That is a great question, 

and I thank you for your advocacy. And also, once again, I will 

thank you for being out there for the memorial service with me for 

Senior Chief Horne, and the compassion that you showed for his 

family. 

While I am answering your question, if I could ask for the slide 

that I brought with me, if I could get that up there, or, if not, we 

can use the table drop that we did. There we go. 

21 

[Slide] 

Admiral PAPP. The challenge that you are talking about is right 

there, of course, along the border. And you are right. When we 

dropped our activities by 30 percent, we showed a 35-percent reduction in cocaine seizures for fiscal year 2013. And we are back 

to—we have restored our historic levels of operations right now. In 

fact, we have increased. 

Two new things that we are doing out there in your area is we 

are more frequently putting one of our major cutters in the area, 

rather than just patrol boats, because we can operate airborne use 

of force, one of our HITRON helicopters that stops the go-fast, the 

pangas, through—with trained marksmen. That has been so successful that, rather than tie up a cutter, we are now using—and 

we have cleared through the Department of Justice—we are using 

land-based airborne use of force. In other words, putting our 

HITRON helicopters at a shore station, and flying them under direction of the sector out there. 

The other thing that we are doing is we are leveraging our partnerships. We have the regional coordination mechanism, we call it. 

We have a command center at Sector San Diego, where we bring 

in our partners from Customs and Border Protection, Customs Air 

and Marine, the other Federal partners, and State and local law 

enforcement, as well, so we can coordinate and effectively synchronize all of our activities, get the most out of the resources that 

we have. We do that throughout the country. 

Each one of our captains of the port or our sector commanders, 

as you noted there, has very broad authorities. They head up area 

maritime security committees, they do port safety committees, and 

they bring all the partners together The only way we can get our 

business done effectively is through these partnerships that the 

Coast Guard is able to develop because of our broad-based authorities. 

Having said that, we are still limited by the amount of resources 

we can get out there. On this chart that I brought with me, we 

refer to these as threat vectors. But what they are, they are also 

vectors of prosperity. Those are our trade routes, as well, that we 

have to maintain and keep safe and secure. 

The blue shaded areas surrounding both coasts around Alaska, 

around the Hawaiian Islands, and our trust territories out in the 

Pacific, that is our exclusive economic zone. That is about—over 4 

million square miles of exclusive economic zone. It is the largest exclusive economic zone of any country in the world. And we have to 

distribute our major cutters over that entire area. So it is a lot of 

ground to cover. And we just have to make reasoned, risk-based decisions. 

General Kelly generally asks for at least six Coast Guard cutters. 

We are only able to provide four nowadays. And if we move one up 

there off the Baja, we reduce him to three. So it is like squeezing 

a balloon. You only have so much in it. And if you have got threats 

and other areas, you have got to move them around, and it is zerobased right now, and really—we are really hurting for resources 

there. 

Ms. HAHN. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Garamendi. 

22 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Kelly, your 

testimony indicates that you are basically pulling your assets out 

of the Caribbean area. What percentage of your total budget is consumed by Guantanamo? 

General KELLY. You mean the detainee ops at Guantanamo? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes. 

General KELLY. It is a separate budget. It is a very separate mission. I own it, and we do it really well. But it is a separate budget. 

But it is about—I think we spend, just for the detainee ops, it is 

right at about $130 million, something on that order. And, of 

course, as you know, Congressman, we are tenants on the Navy 

base down there. So there are other—just by being there, you 

know, we don’t have to buy electricity, and things like that. But 

$130 million is a good, round figure. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, we are—our task is to make choices about 

how we spend our taxpayers’ money. And so, Guantanamo and the 

continuation of it is expensive. And that is money that might have 

been spent elsewhere. 

Let’s talk about UAVs and the deployment of UAVs for a patrol. 

You mentioned helicopters off the coast of California and other 

places. What use of—what is the use of—the potential of using 

UAVs to increase your patrol capacity? Let’s start with Admiral 

Papp and then, General Kelly, if you could. 

Admiral PAPP. Well, we will take maritime patrol aviation any 

way we can get it. There is really three key elements to doing these 

interdictions. First of all is having good intelligence. And I think 

probably we are strongest—out of the trifecta here I am going to 

talk about, we are strongest in intelligence. We have got a lot of 

actionable information. What we have is an absence of resources. 

The next key thing after you have the intelligence is your ability 

to have maritime patrol aviation out there, whether it is manned 

aircraft or UAVs. It doesn’t matter, as long as we can have something out there that is going to detect what we know is moving. At 

the end of the day, though, you have got to have a surface asset 

there that can interdict. And that is where our real shortfall is. 

So, could we use more maritime aviation? Yes. Would UAVs 

help? Probably. Any additional hours we can get are going to be 

helpful. But at the end of the day you have got to have surface assets. And we have, as I said earlier, in terms of Coast Guard cutters for coverage, we are down to four down there right now. That 

is four today. We have a fleet of 44 cutters, total right now. We are 

building out new cutters. But at the end of this project, we are only 

going to have 33 cutters. So we are going in the wrong direction 

in order to provide what ends up being the most critical element 

of those three, as surface interdiction. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General Kelly? 

General KELLY. Is there—don’t have any drones of any kind right 

now. Certainly, if I could get some, I would love some. I mean, 

again, it is another form of ISR. The beauty of it is, you know, 

you—they don’t get tired. So, you know, when an airplane has to 

go refuel, that kind—they can stay a lot longer, and the drone 

doesn’t know that it is tired. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am specifically thinking about the use of 

UAVs such as the Global Hawk, can stay in the air 36 hours, long 

23 

patrol areas, and provides—can provide, I should think, significant 

information. The Navy is coming up with its new Trident, which 

is a version of the Global Hawk, specifically designed for maritime 

purposes. 

I would like the two gentlemen to get back to me about how you 

might deploy that asset to the benefit of the missions that you 

have. 

[Information follows from General John F. Kelly, United States 

Marine Corps, Commander, U.S. Southern Command:] 

Any long-duration, multisensor unmanned aerial vehicles would be of tremendous value to accomplishing the entire spectrum of missions in the 

SOUTHCOM AOR. We have numerous mission areas that would benefit 

from the imagery, signals intelligence, and moving target indictor sensors 

on board the newer generation Global Hawk and Triton aircraft. The support the Global Hawk provided in Haiti proved extremely valuable to rescue 

and recovery efforts in the initial stages of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. The extended loiter time would help offset gaps we currently experience in our detection and monitoring mission, and assist meeting overland ISR information needs. As I have testified in the past, the Air Force 

E–8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), with 

its moving target indictor capability, is a game changer in monitoring the 

maritime domain. The Global Hawk and the Triton, with their newest moving target indictor capabilities and extended duration, could prove to be 

equally important game changers. Additionally, these assets provide direct 

support to our partner nations in both South and Central America as we 

work together to build capability in Countering Transnational Organized 

Crime. I understand that the Triton may not be fully operational until 2017 

and that the Air Force is still working their long-term force structure issues 

in regard to the composition of the Global Hawk fleet; however, the current 

Air Force Global Hawk Variant and the Navy BAMS–D aircraft would provide valuable support to my missions in both the maritime and overland 

domains. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Also, General Kelly, I believe it was earlier testimony in the House Armed Services Committee you said what you 

need, among others, is a platform on which to land helicopters. And 

I think you actually said an old barge might actually work well 

enough, if it had refueling capability. Could you expand on that, 

since your frigates are being removed? What could backfill? 

General KELLY. Well, as—that phase of the process is called 

interdiction. The detection and monitoring, I do that to a very, very 

large degree. But it is an interagency process. So we see this stuff, 

whether in go-fast or an aircraft flying out of Venezuela, which is— 

virtually all of the aircraft movement of cocaine is coming out of 

Venezuela, either making its way to the Central American isthmus, 

or increasingly, up the West Indies to Dominican Republic, as an 

example, or Puerto Rico. 

But the end-game part is, generally speaking, to put a helicopter 

in the air, vectored, over there by airborne ISR. They see the gofast, they get astride the go-fast. On that helicopter is a marksman, 

United States coastguardsman. And he has, within his rules of engagement, he has the authority to shoot, if necessary, the engine 

or engines out of that go-fast. That hardly ever happens, because 

the go-fast knows it can’t outrun the helicopter. So they tend to 

stop, throw the illicit cargo over the side, and then wait to be 

picked up by a cutter or a U.S. Navy ship. 

So, in my view, at least, what you really need is something that 

the helicopter could fly off of. You don’t need an aircraft carrier, 

24 

you don’t need, you know, necessarily a big Navy ship or a Coast 

Guard cutter. In fact, 6 months last year we had the Royal Netherlands—they had a—I think it was a Coast Guard buoy tender. 

And—but it could put a helicopter on it, and it did great work for 

us in the interdiction mode. 

So, we are looking now at renting, if you will, a merchant ship 

that would be able to take a—it would be able to land and take off 

a—you know, a Coast Guard or a Navy or a Marine Corps, for that 

matter, with a coastguardsman on board, a helicopter, and also 

turning that merchant ship into a mother ship, so that these other 

smaller countries that really do the yeoman work for us, including 

places like Nicaragua, they can go to sea, and have a mother ship 

arrangement so they can get fuel, get food, and help us in this 

fight. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, it is pretty clear—and I am just going to 

take another 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman, if I might—it is pretty 

clear that we are in tight budget situations, likely to continue for 

the next 5 to 10 years. And we need to be creative. As you were 

talking, General Kelly, I am thinking maritime reserve, the fleets 

that we have, is there any potential that we could use one or another of those ships, maybe with a modification? I like the idea of 

a mother ship. We are going to have to be very creative. 

Obviously, Admiral Papp, we are going to be short of cutters. 

There is no—that is going to be at least for the next 5 years. Can 

we figure out a way of doing this with different kinds of assets? 

Admiral PAPP. So, sir, I think General Kelly is right. We will 

take whatever we can get. However, at the end of the day, I have 

got a responsibility for the safety of my people in a very complex, 

fast-paced operation. Even landing helicopters at sea is not an easy 

thing when you have got weather out there, when you are launching them in the middle of the night. So I am reluctant to say that 

landing them on anything is a good thing. 

Plus, the other thing is that, even when you stop the go-fast with 

your airborne use of force, you have got to have boats and a boarding team there to take custody, seize the people and the drugs, and 

you have got to launch that. 

Now, we have used other things. We have great partnerships 

with Great Britain, with the Dutch, and with the Canadians and 

the French, and we make use of their platforms wherever we can. 

And they are professional. They know how to land helicopters. 

They can launch and recover boats safely. We put our law enforcement detachments on board, and we make use of them as much as 

we can. But those countries are facing budget shortfalls, as well, 

and their participation has been diminished over the last couple 

years. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Which brings us back to austerity budgeting. 

Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. The gentlewoman from Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. First, I 

apologize for coming here on Latin time, but our subcommittee on 

Middle East and North Africa was meeting at the same time. So 

I am still over there and over here. Thank you, gentlemen, what 

a delight to be here. 

25 

Mr. Chairman, recently we heard the startling claim that Latin 

America has surpassed Africa as the world’s most violent region, 

accounting for about one-third of all global homicides. And we must 

recognize this as one of the many alarming symptoms of a booming 

transnational drug trade that is the enemy of security, of good governance, and democratic principles. This is a particularly pernicious issue in Central America and the Caribbean. 

An example of a proactive approach to the rise in drug-trafficking activity in the Caribbean is the partnership that we have 

established of INL and Port Miami, a major hub for travel and 

trade in the region. And through this initiative, Port Miami personnel provide training in anticrime and port security matters to 

their Caribbean counterparts. But this is just the beginning. The 

administration has put more resources into similarly targeted programs and show that it is serious about combating the illicit drug 

trade by doing so. 

The administration’s problem in Latin America is its failure to 

address the immediate needs of the region which affect our national security interests. And, General Kelly, your written testimony states, ‘‘Insufficient maritime service vessels and intelligence 

surveillance and reconnaissance platforms impair our primary mission to detect these threats and defend the southern approaches to 

the U.S. homeland.’’ That is why last year I offered an amendment 

to the NDAA to rectify this impediment and fix this issue. I intend 

to offer a similar amendment again this year, because we should 

not abandon the Western Hemisphere. And engagement is the key 

with democratic allies. 

With that in mind, what setbacks have we suffered due to the 

fact that our engagement with Honduras has been limited due to 

obstacles from the Senate? Has the positive progress of Operation 

Martillo evaporated due to the lapse of counternarcotics efforts? 

And, General Kelly, you also mentioned in your written testimony that legislative restrictions such as the prohibition of FMF 

funding with the Guatemalans limit our engagement. It is my understanding that there is also a DOD policy that prevents 

SOUTHCOM from utilizing to the maximum extent possible our assets in JTF–Bravo and Honduras for a counternarcotics operation. 

Has this policy hindered our ability to make a larger dent in efforts 

to fight drug trafficking? 

And these efforts are critical, not only because they threaten our 

security and that of our allies, but also because the illegal drug 

trade in this hemisphere impacts our national security interest 

through the world. Foreign terrorist organizations such as 

Hezbollah and the FARC engage in these illicit activities and fund 

their operations and advance the dangerous ambitions of regimes 

like that of Iran, which, as we have seen, is expanding its presence 

in the Western Hemisphere. Drugs equals terrorism financing. 

And lastly, I would like to raise an issue with the Coast Guard. 

My office has received information that our Coast Guard, with the 

help of the State Department, traveled to Cuba and is seeking to 

reach an understanding with a State-sponsored terrorism on counternarcotics efforts. I think it is appalling that our Coast Guard 

wishes to have closer ties with the Cuban regime that is the same 

tyranny that actually gives refuge—it harbors drug traffickers. It 

26 

jails American citizens, supports terrorism, and was caught redhanded as recently as this summer, trying to smuggle military 

equipment to North Korea through the Panama Canal—and we 

thank Panama for stopping it—and provides, to this day, safe 

haven to American fugitives. 

So, I share your concern with the rise in drug trafficking through 

the Caribbean, but doing business with the Cuban regime is not 

the solution, because they are actually part of the problem. And I 

will give it to anyone who would like to comment. 

Thank you, Admiral. 

Admiral PAPP. Thank you, ma’am. And, as always, thanks for 

your interest and support for the Coast Guard. And I regret that 

you are troubled by the activities. I will get more specifics and get 

a report back to you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It would be very helpful. Thank you so much. 

It concerns many of my constituents. I know that it is dismissed 

by some. But, as a person who lost her homeland to Communism— 

I was born in Cuba, came here as a refugee, represent thousands 

of people in similar ways—we don’t have a romanticized view of the 

Communist tyranny in Cuba. 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma’am. We do keep a line of communication 

open I think, first of all, to protect our people, to make sure that 

there is never any mistake. As you know, the Freedom Flotilla and 

other activities over the years, we have lost people. And we try to 

make sure that we at least have some line of communication open 

so that we can prevent any mistakes from happening and putting 

people in jeopardy. We also get good information on other illegal 

activities. But we will take a review of this and make a report back 

to you on—— 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I would greatly appreciate it. Thank you so 

much, Admiral. 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information follows:] 

The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime safety, security and stewardship. The Coast Guard maintains a Telex link with the 

Cuban Border Guard for passing maritime counterdrug, illegal migration, 

and search and rescue information. The Telex link is the formal means of 

communication between the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard. The 

Telex system was established in 1980 to facilitate the transmittal of 

preapproved messages containing nonsensitive, real-time, tactical search 

and rescue information and suspicious aircraft and vessel movements. 

On a case-by-case basis, the Coast Guard and Cuban authorities share tactical information related to vessels transiting Cuban territorial waters suspected of trafficking drugs or migrants through Cuban territorial waters. 

This exchange of information with Cuban Border Guard assists in enhancing the maritime security and maritime domain awareness of the U.S. The 

Telex link is facilitated by a Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist assigned to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. 

Since July 2009, given an increased rate of maritime drug smuggling in the 

Caribbean, the Cuban Government has repeatedly asked to expand counternarcotics cooperation. The Department of State (DOS) accepted the Government of Cuba’s invitation to meet in Havana on April 10 and 11, 2014; at 

the request of the DOS, two members from the Coast Guard’s Office of Law 

Enforcement Policy participated in this DOS-led engagement. At this meeting, the Cuban and U.S. delegations shared concerns over the rising levels 

of drug smuggling in the Caribbean, with a focus on the maritime route 

around Cuba’s eastern tip between Jamaica and the Bahamas. 

27 

The U.S. delegation discussed nonbinding protocols for operational, onscene maritime communication coordination between the U.S. Coast Guard 

and the Cuban Border Guard; and for streamlining the bilateral confirmation of suspect vessel registry and possible ‘‘stop, board, and search’’ authorization. If implemented, these procedures would help to prevent drug traffickers’ exploitation of Cuban territorial waters and Cuban-flagged vessels 

as a means to evade law enforcement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I thank the chairman and the chairmanin-waiting. 

Mr. HUNTER [presiding]. Thank the gentlelady from Florida. We 

are going to go through one more round, if we have time. I just 

have—I have one last quick question that goes on what Mr. 

Garamendi was talking about. 

Admiral, when you talk about the assets, and you talk about the 

system, kind of the in-the-box acquisitions programs, and Congress 

ruining all of that, when at the same time, if you get a platform— 

and I think—I know this is crazy, but to put it in visual terms, 

‘‘Waterworld,’’ you got Dennis Hopper on the big tanker, 

‘‘Waterworld,’’ you know, the movie? Kevin Costner? I thought it 

was a great movie. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. HUNTER. But you have the big tanker, and you are able to 

operate off of that, why couldn’t you use the Ready Reserve Fleet? 

Why couldn’t you use—or why couldn’t you use floating platforms 

out there? And if the Coast Guard feels that it is dangerous, why 

not man those with contractors? It is kind of like an icebreaker. It 

doesn’t need to be manned by the U.S. military, be manned by people that know how to drive an icebreaker. They are not shooting 

at people who are shooting back. 

So, why can’t we think outside the box on this stuff? You have 

the Office of Naval Research, and a lot of other groups have a lot 

of other ships they can use for interdiction. They use them for testing purposes in San Diego and Norfolk, off of—in Florida, too. I 

mean these—there are interdiction assets out there. There are platforms out there, tons of them, which you could land a helicopter off 

and take off from. 

So, if that is what is holding us back, you can’t always be blaming it on sequestration and Congress is dumb. Why not go outside 

of the box a little bit and start doing—if you have everything down, 

why not do the interdiction part? If it is not that difficult. 

Now, let me just—let me finish. Fifty years ago, if you had this 

problem you would have given this to somebody, given them $5 

million, and they would interdict, and they would probably do a 

really good job of it. But instead, now, we kind of have this system 

that we have to work at. And if we don’t get enough of our ships 

that we require by nature of our requirements and the whole shipbuilding fleet building those particular ships, then we are not going 

to do it, because we don’t have the right ship to do it. 

So why not think outside the box, like Mr. Garamendi was talking about? Why not use merchant mariners? Why not use the RAF? 

Why not use our people that we pay to be ready to go anyway? 

Admiral PAPP. I can report back to you on all the innovative 

things that we have done. We actually look for anything that is 

passing through the area. 

28 

While not related to Western Hemisphere approaches, for instance, right now Admiral Locklear in Pacific Command, when he 

has ships that are transiting out to the WESTPAC, we are putting 

Coast Guard law enforcement detachments on them and running 

them through those—where I showed you the blue areas out in the 

Pacific around our trust territories and partner nations, we are 

sending them through there and doing fisheries law enforcement to 

protect the tuna fleet out there, things like that. 

So, we look for those opportunities. And, as I said, we have had 

British oilers, Dutch oilers—anything that we can get that is going 

to be in the Caribbean or the eastern Pacific that we know is going 

through, we take advantage of. We work with Fleet Forces Command down in Norfolk to make sure that, if people are up doing 

training deployments, whatever—the Canadian vessels that we 

have had down there, that is, once again, the result of talking to 

Maritime Forces Pacific, Maritime Forces Atlantic, the Canadian 

commands. And when they have ships that have to go on workups, 

instead of sending them other places they are now sending them 

down to the Caribbean or the eastern Pacific, and we are putting 

Coast Guard law enforcement detachments on them. 

So, we make use of anything that we know about. We will investigate and see what else is out there. Like anything else, if you are 

going to get a Ready Reserve Fleet ship underway, somebody has 

got to pay for that. Somebody has got to come up with the money, 

somebody has got to pay the mariners to come on board. We have 

reserve fleets that are out there, but I have seen the challenges 

that are faced when we have to work them up to get them ready. 

Just the one ship, the Cape Ray, that we sent over to deal with the 

Syrian chemicals, getting the mariners available and getting the 

money to run the ship and bring it up to standards, it is a challenge. 

Granted, I will take a Coast Guard cutter or a U.S. Navy ship 

any time I can, because I know, when I put a Coast Guard helicopter out there, there is standardization of protocols for landing, 

recovery, hot refueling, and everything else, because landing helicopters is a dangerous business. We have lost people doing that. 

So I—my only caution when I was talking to Mr. Garamendi was 

that you can’t just—it is easy to say, ‘‘Let’s put a barge out there,’’ 

or, ‘‘Let’s put a tanker out there,’’ or something else. My Coast 

Guard pilots can land on anything in an emergency. Is it an effective platform for prosecuting go-fast vessels and be able to go back 

and hot refuel and carry ammunition and everything else? 

Mr. HUNTER. I am going to be out of time. 

Admiral PAPP. I don’t know. We would have to work that 

through. 

Mr. HUNTER. But I would argue that it is better than nothing, 

which is what you have now, or very little. 

General KELLY. If I could add? 

Mr. HUNTER. Yes. 

General KELLY. We are already doing it, actually. Within the 

next couple of months I will have a—I have asked the system, and 

one of my fellow CO–COMS has found the money, and we will have 

about a 350-foot ship manned by U.S. merchant seamen, and we 

29 

will use that as a proof of concept—it is not modified yet—to 

launch and recover helicopters. 

As we move to the next step and do that, of course, we will have 

the right kind of training and the right kind of procedures, and the 

right kind of gear and equipment. But that ship, at least for—it is 

coming on—it will be working for me within the next 6 or 8 weeks, 

and I will have it for at least a year before we then move on to 

the next step, with helicopters. 

But while we are doing that, it will be working close in to Belize, 

Honduras, Guatemala. We already have U.S. Special Forces guys 

and gals, our U.S. Marines working with those partner nations on 

riverine ops, small boat—riverine ops are close in to the littorals. 

This ship will give them an opportunity to go further out, working 

for us, cued by our assets to go after go-fast, but they will be able 

to go further out because it will be a gas station. So we are actually 

doing everything you just described already in the next 6 or 8 

weeks. And I will let you know how it goes. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. One last question. Do you have to be— 

you said Coast Guard snipers out of helicopters. Does it have to be 

Coast Guard snipers, or can it be—because they have the unique 

law enforcement, military side? Or can it be anybody from any 

service? 

General KELLY. It is the law enforcement aspect. DOD, we can— 

you know, the DOD asset can do everything but the law enforcement part of it. So the shooter has got to be a Coast Guard or 

someone in law—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Or, like, DEA or FBI, or whoever. 

General KELLY. Possible. But I think I would let the Commandant, you know, fill you in on that. 

Admiral PAPP. Sir, it could be, as long as they go through the 

training. Getting the airborne use of force—— 

Mr. HUNTER. They would have to be a sniper, right? 

Admiral PAPP. Airborne use of force authorities was very difficult 

and challenging for us. We have to take that through the Department of Justice, because we need to be able to get their support to 

defend our shooters if something happens or goes wrong. 

So, who the shooter is, as long as we take them through our 

courses, get them certified. And, in fact, we have used other than 

Coast Guard. We have used Navy marksmen, as well, off Navy helicopters. And I am sure we could train other people. It is just a 

matter of taking them through the process. 

Mr. HUNTER. That is all I have. I am going to yield now. But 

thank you, Admiral and General and Ambassador. Admiral, great 

to see you this last time. Wish you well. And I yield to Mr. 

Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Working with you, 

I want to pursue thinking out of the box, and how we might be able 

to pursue the discussion and, quite possibly, the utilization, as we 

were just talking here. So we will leave that for the future and 

carry that on. 

I do want to—I have been asked by one of our friends from the 

Foreign Affairs Committee to raise the issue with General Kelly 

about the expulsion of 20 U.S. Defense Department employees that 

were attached to the U.S. Embassy in Quito. I believe this hapVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:59 Apr 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\4-29-1~1\87699.TXT JEAN
30 

pened over the last couple of weeks. Could you just briefly brief us 

on that, what it was all about, why it happened? 

General KELLY. I think Quito’s actions—Ecuador’s actions are 

kind of in line with kind of a general loss of U.S. influence in this 

part of the world, in Latin America, and for a lot of different reasons. 

In Ecuador’s case, in particular, my folks that were there—and 

they were my folks—not all of the military, by the way; an awful 

lot of disinformation passed by the capital and by the President of 

that country. But at the end of the day, Ecuador has thrown its lot 

in with countries like Venezuela, like Russia, like China. That is 

where they see the future of Latin America. So they have made 

that move. 

But the people that were in there working with them with full 

knowledge of the Ecuadorian Government, they have been there for 

years and years and years. They were working with them on the 

counterdrug effort, which is a real problem in Ecuador. They have 

been helpful, the Ecuadorians have. But they have decided to 

throw their lot in with other countries, so we are in the process 

of—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. A geopolitical issue and—— 

General KELLY. Yes. And, you know, it is a great way to snub 

their nose at the United States. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK. And this is a question from Representative 

Engel to you, Mr. Papp. I am just going to briefly go over it. The 

defense—a November 15, 2013, interview with Defense News, you 

stated that since you have lost naval ships in the eastern Pacific 

and Caribbean for drug interdiction, the Coast Guard would publish a Western Hemisphere strategy on how to fill these gaps. That 

is 5 months ago, and Mr. Engel wants to know when is the report 

due. What is the status of it? 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. We have been trying to come up with 

strategies for the specific areas, evolving missions. We put out an 

Arctic strategy just last year, and we have been working on our 

Western Hemisphere strategy. 

My feeling is, with the focus of the Department of Defense assets 

going towards the Pacific, we still have responsibilities in the Pacific. But my primary responsibilities are along those threat vectors 

that were shown in the chart up there. So, how do we conduct 

that? How do we use that for support? How do we lay out what our 

doctrine is for the Service and get that approved by our Department is important. 

We are very close. I have read through the draft. However, we 

have a new Commandant that is coming in in 30 days. And I 

thought that, rather than make it look like I am signing off on a 

Western Hemisphere strategy as I go out the door, there should be 

buy-in from the next Commandant, which I believe there is. And 

he will publish it shortly after taking command of the Service. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much, Admiral. I think that is 

exactly the right thing to do, let the next fellow coming in, let it 

be his program, also. And I am sure you will be building off yours. 

That was Mr. Engel’s question. 

I see our chairman has returned, and I believe Ms. Hahn has a 

question. 

31 

Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentlelady and our colleague from 

California. 

Ms. HAHN. Thank you, Chairman. And I want to go on the 

record. Obviously, it is disheartening for me to hear about the incredible cuts that we have imposed on our Coast Guard and, again, 

continuing to ask them to do more with less. And we are the 

United States Coast Guard. To be talking about contracting out, 

and landing on barges, and—it is really unfortunate. 

I wish we could restore the cuts we made, and not impose the 

next round of sequestration on our Coast Guard. We either believe 

in your mission and what you are trying to do, or we don’t. And 

it is unfortunate that we are at this state. So I just want to go on 

the record saying I believe in your mission, and I really feel like 

we are shortchanging not only your Department, but certainly the 

American people. 

Ambassador, one of the primary missions behind the Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is to build 

partnerships with State and local law enforcement agencies here at 

home in order to allow these agencies to provide their unique expertise to foreign agencies and governments that desperately need 

it. In order to incentivize State and local agencies to provide this 

expertise, the State Department reimburses these agencies for the 

cost incurred. That strengthens our overall international security. 

That also bolsters our relationships with our foreign partners, 

while simultaneously creating opportunities here at home. 

I would like for you to talk about your agency’s work with our 

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and the California Department of Corrections, and explain how their expertise and training has been critical in preventing violence in foreign countries, 

particularly Mexico. 

Mr. ARREAGA. Thank you very much. The California Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation has provided training to Mexican 

and Salvadorian corrections officers. Now, these—the type of training they receive is the type of training to deal with some of the 

very hard-core issues that these institutions face in their own countries. For instance, riots, the protection of the facilities, and many 

times, facilities—we think of facilities of keeping people from going 

out. But a lot of times some of the challenges that they face is actually people trying to come in to free prisoners. So, we have a whole 

range of programs that are trying to provide those kinds of 

trainings to them. 

I will owe you an answer on the question of the Los Angeles 

Sheriff’s Department. I don’t have that with me right now, but I 

will certainly provide it. But we have many other opportunities. 

Let me give you a couple of examples. 

The Superior Court of Arizona has provided forensic training to 

Costa Rica for judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. The New 

York Police Department, as it was mentioned, provides some training in Haiti. The Broward County sheriff has trained the Bahamian police and other agencies on gender-based violence. The 

Miami-Dade Police Department has trained Haitian police. The 

North Miami Police Department has trained the Trinidad and Tobago police on sex crimes. I mean the list goes on. For us, it is 

quite a pleasure to have these partnerships. 

32 

Another example is, for example, the Washington State Criminal 

Justice Training Commission hosted a study tour by the Mexican 

police managers. The California Department of Corrections—I 

think I mentioned that already, yes. So, we have a long list, and 

this is a list that is growing. 

Of course, we have to be careful not to stretch ourselves too thin 

and find the comparative advantage that these institutions bring to 

the table, so that we can leverage it when we go overseas. 

Ms. HAHN. Thank you. Admiral Papp, I just want to ask you one 

last question. One of the things you mentioned earlier was that you 

think we need to address in this war on drugs is the demand, along 

with the supply. And wondering if this trend in the United 

States—Colorado, Washington, probably California will be next in 

legalizing marijuana. Do you think that this is going to have a 

long-term impact, or effect, in stemming the U.S. demand for illegal drugs? Or have we had enough time to analyze what this is actually going to mean in this—in drug trade? 

Admiral PAPP. I don’t think we have had enough time. We discussed it at the last principals meeting of the Interdiction Committee. And, across the board for most of the agencies—and this includes all the homeland security agencies, DEA, Justice Department, FBI, NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, and others—the anecdotal 

information coming back from most of the partners in dealing with 

our South and Central American partners are that they are confused by the signals that the legalization sends. 

They wonder about our commitment to continuing the fight. And 

when they are investing so much, both in resources and blood, they 

have to question that. They want to know about our commitment. 

Plus, they see fewer and fewer U.S. resources coming down there 

to join them. We reassure them. We tell them what the law is, and 

our continued commitment. But it can’t help but create some 

doubts. 

Other anecdotal information is because of changes in the market 

with legalization and homegrown marijuana, that is causing some 

people to switch to heroin production now, increasing the heroin on 

our streets. So it is a complex, multivariable equation, which I 

don’t think we have a good handle on, but it is causing a lot of concern. 

And I just want to give you my thanks for, once again, your advocacy and your comments here before you turn to the other question. And I don’t want to leave anybody with the impression that 

I am unwilling to look at other things. We are trying to innovate 

and make use of whatever resources are available out there. My 

job, as the Commandant of the Coast Guard is to advocate for what 

I think, in my best military advice, is best for the country. I advocate for Coast Guard cutters because they are a known entity. We 

have qualified, trained Coast Guard people, and boarding parties, 

people who can handle boats, who can land and launch and recover 

helicopters safely. 

And, if some other incident, whether it is a mass migration or 

a fisheries patrol or something in the Bering Sea, I can send them 

to do those activities, as well. Whereas as a barge that can land 

a helicopter is pretty much a single mission thing that I can’t use 

for anything else in the Coast Guard. While it might be valuable 

33 

and give us something more, my job is to give you the optimal solution. Then yours is to decide whether we can afford it or not. But 

thank you. 

Ms. HAHN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentlelady. 

Ms. HAHN. I yield. 

Mr. HUNTER. And one last question that she just made me think 

of. Who is in charge of saying, ‘‘We are not going to go after weed 

any more, we are going to focus on’’—and do you do that when it 

comes to targeting? I mean do you say there is a bunch of—there 

is, I don’t know, tons of bales of marijuana coming in, and heroin 

and cocaine, and we are going to prioritize those according to— 

how? And who makes those decisions? Or is that not how it happens? 

Admiral PAPP. There is no question, sir. It is illegal, and we continue to target it. And we will stop it to the best of our ability with 

the resources—— 

Mr. HUNTER. But what I am saying, though, is the opposite of 

that. If you are going to have—and you are, most likely, in the next 

10 years—let’s say 20 States legalize marijuana, it becomes decriminalized, which it basically is now anyway, especially in the 

western side of the country, why keep going after something that 

has been approved by the States? And I am asking who makes that 

decision? Who says, ‘‘Stop going after the marijuana loads. We are 

going to go after heroin and coke and meth,’’ or the precursors, 

whatever—who makes that decision? 

General KELLY. Well, at least in my realm, Congressman, I 

focus—we don’t see a lot of marijuana moving from Latin America 

into—if you don’t count Mexico—moving into the United States. It 

is cocaine, methamphetamines, heroin. It is my understanding 

most marijuana consumed in the United States now is grown all 

over the country. 

Mr. HUNTER. Made in America. 

General KELLY. Domestically, yes. You know, it is grown in cellars in Manhattan, it is grown in national forests in Colorado. 

But to what the Commandant said about dealing with our partners, I mean we get—you know, our drug problem has caused 

many countries in Latin America, the most violent places on 

earth—Honduras being the most violent place on the planet, and 

much of that is due—almost all of it is due to our drug problem, 

as the drug traffics through. The police throughout most of the region are either entirely corrupt or so intimidated that they won’t 

do their jobs, because they are so intimidated against—because of 

the violence. Courts and judges and all of the same thing. 

So, to give you an example—or the example—when Colorado and 

Washington legalized marijuana, you know, I was queried by a lot 

of the partners. And I said, ‘‘Don’t worry, it is still against Federal 

law, and the law will be enforced.’’ And, of course, it is my understanding—I am not a domestic guy—but it is not being enforced. 

And the word—and, you know, I have said this before—the word 

‘‘hypocrite’’ comes into the conversation. And, you know, as we 

are—everyone at this table is certainly trying to convince these 

countries to stay in the fight, fight our fight against drugs, we 

seemingly are not caring much about drugs any more. 

34 

So I find it pretty hard. And I am pretty close to a lot of ministers of defense, Presidents, you know, people like that. A very different relationship than even our State Department has with them. 

And, you know, they are pretty nondiplomatic with me, as I am to 

them. And they wonder what, frankly, what the hell we are doing. 

But I don’t—and you see an increasing number—start talking 

President Santos of Colombia. God, if they stop what they are 

doing in terms of our drug fight, we are really, really screwed. I 

mean they took 200 tons of cocaine off the market last year. They 

manually eradicated 30,000 hectares of coca before it was picked. 

They destroyed—found and destroyed 1,500 cocaine labs. If they 

stop doing that because they see less of a commitment in our country and a move towards legalization, we might as well, you 

know—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Why would you tie in the legalization of marijuana 

with heroin and coke? 

General KELLY. Well, they see a general lack of enforcement and 

getting after some of these other drugs. And as everyone at this 

table has pointed out, the solution, to a large degree—not the 

elimination, but the solution to the drug problem is before it gets 

to Mexico and into the United States. And there is almost no commitment to do that, based on what they see, in spite of the fact we 

do work with them and we do give a certain amount of money, and 

we do have, you know, at least—like today we have three Navy 

ships, four Coast Guard cutters in the Caribbean and in the Pacific 

doing the work. That comes and goes. And they don’t see the commitment. And they have got others things to spend their money on, 

as well. 

Mr. HUNTER. That is all I have. I don’t think there are any other 

Members here to ask questions. So, with that, this subcommittee 

is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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