Be cause the district court sua sponte dismiss ed Moore’s C omplaint soon afte r i t was filed, 1 the c ur re nt re c or d is e xtre me ly sp ars e . Ac c or din g ly , the re c or d do e s n ot c on ta in t he la st a nd /or fi rs t name s o f s e ve ra l pr iso n o ff ic ia ls a nd pr iso ne rs . I t is unclear f

rom the re cord on what day this alleg edly

took place. 2 NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 10a0277n.06 No. 09-1307 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT TYRONE MOORE, Plaintiff - Appellant

v. UNKNO WN PR EVO, e t al., Def endants - A

ppellees ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

/ B e fo re : MA RTI

N, CL AY , a

nd KE TH L ED GE , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. BO YCE F. MARTI

N, J R., Circ uit Judge

. This is a prisoner c ivil rights ac tion filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ty

rone Moore was a prisoner at the Riverside Corr ectional F acility in I onia, Michig an. He alleg es that, on J uly 2, 2007, Nurse Prevo and two cor rec tion officer s, Sim mons and 1 Doe, infor med fe llow-prisoner F ranks, that Moore is HI V positive. Moore a lso alleg es that Inspector L . Br own aske d prisoner H enton if he kne w that Moore ha d a sexually transmitted disease, and that 2 Of fi c e r S a tte rl e e wa s “ inv olv e d. ” On July 6, Mo or e wa s tr ans fe rr e d to I onia Max im um Se c ur ity C o rr ec t i o n al Fa ci l i t y

b ec au s e t h e R i v er s i d e F ac i l i t y wa s cl o s i n g. On Octobe r 17, Moore filed a pr is o n er g rieva nce f orm with the Michig an De partment ofNo. 09-1307

Moore v . Unknown Prev o Pag e 2 Correc tions. I t was re ceive d by the g rieva nce board on October 25. Nurse Sala din, who investigated the g ri e va

nc e , d id n ot i nte rv ie w M oo re . O n N ov e mbe r 1 , Sa la din se nt a memora

nd um t o M

. Robinson, the g rieva

nce c oordinator, statingthat Saladin had investig ated Moore ’s g rieva nce a nd that Saladin found no docume nted enc ounters betwe en Prevo a nd Moore on July 2, that Mr. Fr anks was unknown at the health car e fac ility , that Prevo did not rec ollect meetingMoore, a nd that Prevo and the of

fice rs had adhere d to depar tment policies reg ardingthe privac y of a pr isoner’s medic al inf orma tio n . M o o r e w a s i n s t r u c t e d t h a t , s h o u l d

h e w i s ht o a

p p e a l t h e b o ar d ’ s d e c i s i o n , h e w ou ld need to f ile his appea l by

Dec ember

11. On Dec ember

7, Moore filed an appeal with the M ichig an De partment of Corr ections, listing the same a ll e g a ti o n s th a t h e h a d a s s e rte d in h is o r ig in a l g r ie v an c e . T h e g r ie v an c e b o ar d did not

rec eive the a

ppeal until Dec ember

17, howeve r, which w as af ter the filing dea dline. The boa rd denied his appe al bec ause it wa s late. Moore filed another appea l, stating that his first appea l was late bec ause he was be ing transfe rre d to a nother fac ility

. The board ag ain denied his appea l beca use, althoug h it a cknowledg ed that Moore wa s transfe rre d during the re levant time per iod, it found that the tr ans fe r d id n ot p ro vid e a ba sis to r e c on sid e r h is f

ir st a pp e a l. On August 4, 2008, M o ore f iled a pro se complaint and application to procee d in forma pa up e ris in the United States District Court for the W es tern District of Mic higa n, alleg ing that Prevo, Simmons, Doe, Satterlee , and Br own, in the ir individual a nd officia l c apac ities, had violated his Fourth Amendme nt rig ht to pr ivacy when they disclosed his HI V-positive status to other off icer s and inmates. Mag istrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody g rante d the re quest to proce ed in f or ma pa up e ris and soon there afte r, sua sponte issued a Report and Recommendation, r ecommending that Moore’ sNo. 09-1307

Moore v . Unknown Prev o Pag e 3

The languag e of the statute specifie s that the di strict court must dismiss an in f or ma pa up e ris 3 complaint that it finds has failed to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)( 2). complaint be dismissed for fa ilure to state a c laim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) (2 ) and ( a)( 3) and 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c ). She fur ther re commended that the dismiss al of the a ction count as a strike for pur poses of 28 U.S.C. §1915(g ) and that the court find no g ood-fa ith basis for appe al within the meaningof 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)( 3). Moore f iled an objection on Dec ember 12, ag ain alleg ing that his F ourth Amendment rig ht to p ri va c y ha d be e n vio late d. He a lso a sse rt e d f or the fi rs t ti me a

c omm on law s land e r p e r s e c la im and th a t th e D e p artm e n t o f Co r r e c ti o n s h a d v io late d s tate la w an d M ic h ig an D e p artm e n t of Correct i o n s p o licy . On Fe bruar y 5, 2009, the district court issued a n order and judg ment holding that Ma g istrate Judg e Carm od y ha d p roperly

c on c lud e d und e r S up re me Court and Sixth C ir c uit p r e c e d e n tt h a tM o o r e ’ s c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r i g h tt o p r i v a c y w a s n o tv i o l a t e d

b y t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f

h i s H IV infec tion to others. The cour t further held that Moore ha d waived his other arguments beca use he h a d n o tp r e s e n t e d

t h e mt o M a g i s t r a t e J u d g e C ar m o dy. Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) (B ), a district c ourt may dismiss sua sponte an in forma pa up e ris claim that is frivolous, malicious, or fa ils to st ate a cla i m upon which re lief may be g ra nte d. “ We r e vie w d e no vo the dis mis sa l of a pr iso ne r’ s c omp la int

on the ba sis that it fa ile d to 3 state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d.” Harbin-Bey v. Rutter , 420 F.3d 571, 575 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g McG ore v. W rigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 ( 6th Cir

. 1997)). “ I n deter mining wh e the r a pr iso ne r ha s fa ile d to state a c la im, we c on str ue his c omp la int in the lig ht m os t f avo ra ble to him, acc ept his fac tual alleg ations as true, a nd deter mine whether

he ca n prove a ny set of fa cts thatNo. 09-1307

Moore v . Unknown Prev o Pag e 4

The dissent points t o both W igginton and J

.P . v . D e Sa nti , 6 53 F .2 d 1 08 0 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 5) to 4 contend that we have a lrea dy held that prisoners have no constitutional right to privac y with reg ard to their persona l information, period. We do not c ontest that those ca ses ca n be re ad to speak in such broad te rms, so neither the dissent’ s nor the Third C i rc u it’s rea ding of our ca ses ca

n be ca lled unrea sonable. B ut we believe those ca ses’ a ctual holding s, as opposed to their dicta , rest on narr ower g rounds that do not f orec lose Moore’ s claim. Fur thermore , adopting the dissent’s re ading wo uld , it se e ms, c re a te a

c ir c uit sp lit ov e r whe the r i nmate s ma y br inga c la im a g a ins t ja il o ff

ic ia ls ov e r t he dis c los ur e of

the ir se ns iti ve me dic a l in fo rm a tio n to oth e r i nmate s. As state d a bo ve , b oth the Second a

nd Third Circuits have he ld that a prisoner would be able to bring such a claim sounding in the constitutional right to privac y . The Seve nt h C i rcuit has ex presse d doubt over whe ther a prisoner c ould bring such a cla im under the F ourth Amendment’s r ight to priva cy , but sugg ested that the Ei g hth

Am e ndme nt’ s c ru e l and unus ua l pu

nis hme nt c la

us e mig ht g ive ri se to s uc h a c la im. An de rso n v . R om e ro , 72 F.3d 518, 522-23 (7th Cir. 1995)

. We a re awa re of no other c ircuit to have cate g orica lly

barr ed a pr isoner fr om bring ing a claim ag ainst prison officia ls over the unne cessa ry dissemination of hi s sensitive medical information to other inm ates. Where our prec edents do not sq ua re ly fo re c los e Mo or e ’s su it, we se e no re a so n to e xten d th e m in a wa y tha t wo uld c re a te a c ir c uit sp lit

. would entitle him to relief.” Id. (c i t i n g Tur k e r v . O hio De

p't o f R e ha b. & Cor

rs. , 157 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998)). The district cour

t corre ctly

held that, under

our pre cede nt, inmates have no c onstitut ional pr iva c y ri g ht barr ing dis c los ur e of an inmate ’s HIV- po sit ive status to c orre c tio ns off ic e rs . See D oe

v . W igginton , 21 F.3d 733, 740 ( 6th Cir. 1994) (holding that prison officials did not violate an inmate’s rig ht to privacy when they

disclosed h is HI V status to a prison cor rec tion officer). Howeve r, the district c ourt did not disti ng uish this from Moore’s alleg ation that office rs told other inmates about Moore’ s HI V status. I n this case, the distinction makes a differ ence . 4 We have ne ve r a dd

re sse d wh e the r an inm a te ha s a F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt p ri va c y

int e re st in having his sensitive medical information kept confide ntial from other inmates. Howeve r, other

c ir c uit s’ pr e c e de nt o ff

e rs so me g uid anc e . T he Th ir d Ci rc uit ha s h e ld t hat an inmate ha s a constitutional privacy ri gh t g uardingag ainst disclosure of his sensitive medica l information,No. 09-1307

Moore v . Unknown Prev o Pag e 5 espec ially to other inmates. Do e v . D e lie , 257 F.3d 309, 317 (3d Cir. 2001). We adopt its reasoning in full. There are at least two ty pes of pr ivacy

protec ted by the Four

teenth Amendment: the i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s ti nav o i d i n g d i s c l o s u r e o f p e r s o n a l m a t t e r s , an d

t h e r i g h tto autonomy and indepe ndence in personal de cision-making

. See W halen [ v. Roe ], 429 U. S. [5 89 ,] 59 9- 60 0 [( 19 77 )]; [ U n i t e d S tat e s v . ] W

estinghouse [ Elec. Corp. ], 638 F.2d [570,] 577 [(3d Cir. 1995)] .

. . . As descr ibed above , [t he appe llant’s] privacy int e re st c le arl y

fa lls int o th e fi rs t c a te g or y . So me c ourt s h ave referr ed to the fi rs t c a te g or y a s a “ ri g ht t o c on fi de nti a lity ,” to d ist inguis h it fr om t he ri g ht t o a

uto no my and indepe ndence in personal de cision making

. E

. g . P o we ll v . S c h r iver , 1 7 5 F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1999). I t is be y ond question that information about one’s HIV-positive status is information of the mos t pe rs on a l ki nd

and that an in div idu a l ha s an int e re st in pr ote c tin g a g a ins t the dissemination of such information. See D oe v. [ Southeast ern Pa. Transp. A utho. ], 72 F .3 d [11 33 ,] 11 40 [(3 d Ci r. 19 95 )]; W esti ng ho us e , 6 3 8 F

. 2 d

a t 5 7 7. Moreove r, a pr isoner’s r ight to priva cy in this m edica l information is not fu nd ame nta lly

inc on sis te nt w ithinc arc e ra t i o n . T h e re fo re , w e joi n th e Se c on d Ci rc uit in rec og nizi ng that the constitutional ri gh t to privacy in one’s medica l information exis ts in prison. Se e Po we ll , 175 F.3d at 112. We a c kn owl edge, how e ve r, that a pr iso ne r d oe s n ot e njo y

a ri g ht o f p ri va c y

in h is medical information to the same e x tent as a f ree citizen. W e do not sug g est that [the a pp e lla nt] h a s a ri g ht t o c on c e a l th is d ia g no se d me dic a l c on dit ion fr om e ve ryon e in the cor rec tions sy stem. [The appellant’s] constitutional right is subject to substantial re str ic tio ns and lim itatio ns in or de r fo r c or re c tio na l of

fi c ia ls to a c hie ve legiti mate c o r r e c t i o n a l g o a l s an d

m a i n t a i ni n s t i tu t i o n a l s e c u r i t y.

De lie , 257 F.3d at 317 (finding that prison officia ls who disclosed an inmate’ s HI V-positive status to office rs, g uards, and inmates had violated the inmate’s c onstitut ionally protec ted privac y

rig ht). The Sec ond Circuit also has held that “prison officia ls c an impinge upon [t he rig ht to maintain the confide ntiality

of pre viously

undisclosed medica l information] onl y to the extent that their actions

are ‘re asonably

related to leg itimate penolog ical intere sts.’” Po we ll, 175 F.3d at 112 (finding thatNo. 09-1307

Moore v . Unknown Prev o Pag e 6

Moore a lleg es that the defe ndants invaded his Fourth Amendme nt privacy rig ht and makes 5 no mention of a F ourtee nth Amendment claim. In light of the substantial leewa y that we a ffor d pro se plea dings, Spotts v. United States , 429 F.3d 248, 250 (6th Cir. 2005) , we construe Moor e’s c omp la int a s g ro un din g his c la im i n th e F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt. The district cour

t r ef u s edt o co n s i d er

M o o re ’s s t at e- l aw cl ai m s al l egi n g co m m o nl aw s l an d er 6 per se , violation of Michiga n statutory

law, a n d violation of Michiga n Depa rtment of Corre ctions re g ulatio ns on

the g ro un d th a t th e y

we re no t r a ise d unti l Mo or e fi le d h is o bje c tio ns to t he Ma g istrate J udg e’s Repor

t and Recommendation. I n so doing, the court re lied upon our statement in Murr v. United States , 2 00 F .3 d 8 95 , 9 02 n. 1 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 0) , th a t “is su es r a ise d f or the fi rs t ti me in objections to mag istrate judg e’s r eport a nd recommendation are deeme d waived. . . [h]ence, Petitioner’s failure to raise this claim bef ore the mag istrate constitutes waive r.” This, of course , is ge nera lly the rule, but it is a rule that a ssumes the context of the normal civil ca se. I t assumes, at lea st, that th e p l aintiff (pr obably repr esente d by

counsel) ha s filed a c omplaint, that the co m p l ai n t h as been serve d, that the def endant ha s responde d by way of either answe r or dis po sit ive mot ion , a

nd tha t th e pla int if

f i s a wa re that th e matte r h a s b e e n r e fe rr e d to a ma g istrate for r eport a

nd rec ommendation. Unde r t h es e ci rcumstanc es, an a pprec iable amount of time ha s normally passed, a nd the plaintiff has be en put on not ice by the def endant’ s responsive plea ding of any potential defic iencies in his complaint that might ne cessitate a need to amend. I n th is c a se , h ow e ve r, the on ly thi ng that oc c ur re d wa s Mo or e fi lin g his c omp la int pr o s e on Au g us t 4, 20 08 . T he c omp la int

wa s n e ve r s e rv e d o r r e sp on de d to , a nd the ma g istra

te jud g e su a

sp on te rec ommended dismissal on September 18. In this posture, Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) would have a llowed Moore to a mend his c omplaint onc e as a matter of course , at least up until the ma g is tr a te ju d g e is s u e d th e Re p o rt an d Re c o mm e n d a ti o n . F u rth e r mo r e , a s a p r o s e li tig ant, we a ff or d M oo re c on sid e ra

ble latit ud e in b oth

the su bs tanc e of his ple a din g s and his c omp lia nc e wi th proce dural rule s. Sp ott

s , 4 29 F .3 d at 25 0; Un ite d S tates v . W ill is , 804 F.2d 961, 963 (6th Cir. 1986). I n light of the se circ umstances, we believe it proper to construe Moor e’s pr esentation of additional a prisoner had a pr ivacy

interest in kee ping his tra nssexual st atus from other inmates). We j oi n our s ist e r c ir c uit s in fi nd ingthat, a s a

matte r o f l aw, inm a te s h ave a F ourt e e nth Amendment privac y

interest in g uardingag ainst disclosure of se nsitive medical information from 5 oth e r i nmate s su

bje c t to le g iti mate pe no log ic a l in te re sts. Ac c or din g ly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in findi n g t h at M oore’ s privacy claims failed a s a matter of law. I t remains to be se en if Moore ’s

a lle g a tio ns have any

fa c tua l su

pp or t. 6No. 09-1307

Moore v . Unknown Prev o Pag e 7

claims in his objection to the report a nd rec ommendation as an implicit re quest for leave to amend, and that Mu rr ’s automatic wa iver rule must y ield. For the re asons above , we AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt t o th e e xten t th a t it dismiss es Moore ’s privac y claims reg ardingdisclosure of me dical information to correc tional staff. Howeve r, we VA CA TE the district c ourt’s dismiss al of Moore’ s state law c laims and REMAND with i n s tr u c ti o n s to c o n s id e r w h e th e r to a ll o w ame n dme n t u n d e r th e s ta n d ar d s o f F e d e r a l Rule of C i v i l P r o c e d

u r e 1 5

. W e a d d i t i o n a l l y RE VE RSE fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s o n M oo re ’s c la ims reg ardingdisclosure of me dical information to other inmates.No. 09-1307

Moore v . Unknown Prev o Pag e 8 KE TH L ED GE , Ci rc uit Judg e , d iss ent ing . M oo re c la ims that pr iso n o ff ic ia ls v iol a te d h is

co n s t i tu t i o n al ri gh t s b y t el l i n g o t h er p ri s o n er s t h at h e i s i n fe ct edwi t hHIV. T h e d i s t ri ct j u d ge t h o u g h tt h i s c l a i mb ar

r e d b y o u r p r e c e d e n t s , n o t a

b l y Doe v . W

igginton , 21 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 1994). Ithi nk so too , a nd the re fo re re sp e c tf

ull y dis se nt. Th e ma jor ity dis tin g uis he s W

igginton on the g round th at i t involved the disclosure of a n inmate’s HIV status by one prison officia l to another , wher eas he re the plaintiff alleg es that prison officia ls disclose d his H I V status to other inmates. B ut nothing in W igginton turned on the r ecipient of the messa g e. Instead, W igginton inv olv e d me re ly

a str a ig htf or wa rd a pp lic a tio n of our

ho ldi ngin J.P . v. De Sa nti , 6 5 3 F

. 2 d 1 0 8 0 ( 6 th Ci r . 1 9 8 1 ) , u n d e r w h ic h p r iv a te in f o r mati o n r e c e iv e s no constitutional protection unless it relates to one of “those pe rsonal right s t h at ca n be dee med ‘funda mental’ or ‘implicit in the conce pt of order ed liberty .’” Id. a t 10 90 ; se e als o Ka lls tro m v . Ci ty of Columbus , 136 F.3d 1055, 1061-6 2 (6t h Cir. 1998). De Sa nti itself involved a cla im of constitutional protection for r eports of “ social histories” pr epar ed by probation office rs in juvenilecourt c ases. See 65 3 F .2 d at 10 81 -8 2. We h e ld that dis se min a tio n of tho se re po rt s d id n ot v iol a te the juveniles’ c onstitut ional rig hts of privac y , beca use the information they contained w as “f

ar afie ld” from a

ny fundame ntal rig ht. Id. at 1090. Thus, when w e stated in W ig g inton t h at the inmate’s “pr ivacy

argument [was] indisti ng uishable fr om that made in De Sa nti ,” 21 F.3d at 740, we

mean t th a t th e in f

o r mati o n a t s ta

k e

—th e f a c t o f an inmate ’ s H I V in f e c ti o n

— d id n o t im

p li cate a fundame ntal rig ht and thus did not trigg er a ny constitutional protection at all. That, in my view, rende rs irre levant the distinction betwee n the re cipient in W igginton and the r ecipient he re.No. 09-1307

Moore v . Unknown Prev o Pag e 9 Our de cision in Jarvis v. B ellman , 52 F.3d 125 (6th Cir. 1995), confirms the poi nt. I n J arv is , we r ejec ted a r ape vic tim’s claim that prison officials violated her c onstitut ional privac y rig hts by permitting he r assa ilant to view her me dical records a nd those of her

infant child. Id. at 125-26. Relying on De Sa nti and W igginton , we r easone d broadly that “[d] isclosure of pla int iff’s medic al

rec ords does not rise to the le vel o f a breac h of a r ight r ecognized as ‘fundamental’ unde r the Constit ution.” Id. at 126. The sa me log ic compels dismis sal in this case, be cause the plaintiff’s claim her e is based sole ly on p ri s o n officia ls’ disclosure of a particula r deta il from his medical

re c or ds

. The Third Circ uit reads our prec edents the same way

Ido. I n Do e v . D e lie , 257 F.3d 309 ( 3d Cir . 2 00 1) —u

po n w hic h th e ma

jor ity re lie s h e re —th e Th ir d Ci rc uit a c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e “ Sixth Circuit had explicitl y

held that the rig ht of priva cy i s not impli cate d at a ll by pr iso n o ff

ic ia ls’ disclosure of an inmate ’s HIV status.” Id. at 3 1 9 n . 7 (e mp h as i s ad d ed ) ( ci t i n g W igginton , 21 F.3d

a t 74 0) . Ind e e d th e c ourt

ob se rv e d th a t the “ Sixth C ir c uit do e s n ot r e c og nize the ri g ht t o p ri va c y in one’s medic al information in anysetting.” Id. (empha sis added). F or the se re a so ns , I

re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.