Slip Op. 23-34 

UNITED STATES 

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

Court No. 21-00264 

MTD PRODUCTS INC., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant, 

and 

BRIGGS & STRATTON, LLC, 

Defendant-Intervenor.

Before: M. Miller Baker, Judge 

OPINION 

[The court denies Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on 

the agency record and instead grants judgment for Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor.] 

Dated: March 16, 2023 

Alex Schaefer, Crowell & Moring LLP of Washington, 

DC, argued for Plaintiff. With him on the briefs was 

Michael Bowen. 

Henry N.L. Smith, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. 

International Trade Commission of Washington, DC, 

argued for Defendant. With him on the brief was 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 2 

Andrea C. Casson, Assistant General Counsel for Litigation. 

Clint Long, King & Spalding LLP of Washington, DC, 

argued for Defendant-Intervenor. On the brief for Defendant-Intervenor was Stephen J. Orava. 

Baker, Judge: In this case stemming from antidumping and countervailing duty investigations of 

small vertical shaft engines from China, a domestic 

importer challenges the International Trade Commission’s finding that a surge in imports shortly before 

duties took effect warranted retroactive application of 

such duties. For the reasons set out below, the court 

sustains the Commission’s determination. 

I 

Under the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the Commerce Department ordinarily imposes antidumping 

and countervailing duties prospectively. See 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.206(a) (explaining that antidumping and countervailing duties normally apply to entries of merchandise “made on or after the date on which the Secretary 

first imposes provisional measures (most often the 

date on which notice of an affirmative preliminary determination is published in the Federal Register)”); see 

also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(d)(2)(B) (countervailing duties), 1673b(d)(2)(B) (antidumping duties). 

But the statute also contains a procedure allowing 

for retroactive application of duties in certain situa-
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 3 

tions. If the petitioner whose allegations sparked the 

investigation alleges “critical circumstances,” the Department must also determine whether “there have 

been massive imports of the subject merchandise over 

a relatively short period.” 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(a)(2) 

(countervailable subsidies), 1673d(a)(3) (dumping). 

If Commerce finds such critical circumstances, the 

Commission must then determine whether the imports in question “are likely to undermine seriously 

the remedial effect” of the order to be issued. Id.

§§ 1671d(b)(4)(A)(i) (countervailable subsidies), 

1673d(b)(4)(A)(i) (dumping). In making that determination, the Commission must consider 

(I) the timing and volume of the imports, 

(II) a rapid increase in inventories of the imports, and 

(III) any other circumstances indicating that the 

remedial effect of the [countervailing or antidumping] duty order will be seriously undermined. 

Id. §§ 1671d(b)(4)(A)(ii), 1673d(b)(4)(A)(ii). 

If the Commission finds that the surge in imports 

is likely to undermine the remedial effect of the countervailing duty and antidumping orders, duties may be 

imposed retroactively. The procedure varies depending on the facts of any given case, but as relevant here, 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 4 

the duties may apply retroactively “to unliquidated entries of merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after 90 days before the 

date on which suspension of liquidation was first ordered.” Id. §§ 1671b(e)(2)(A), 1671d(c)(4), 

1673b(e)(2)(A), 1673d(c)(4). The mechanism’s purpose 

is to prevent clever importers from circumventing impending antidumping and countervailing duties by 

rushing in their shipments before the duties take effect. See H.R. Rep. 96–317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 63 

(1979). 

II 

A 

Briggs & Stratton, LLC, is an American producer of 

“small vertical shaft engines.” Such engines are typically used in lawn mowers, pressure washers, and 

other outdoor power equipment. Appx2306–2307. In 

2020, Briggs & Stratton petitioned the Commission 

and Commerce for relief against alleged Chinese 

dumping of these engines, which the company asserted injured domestic industry. 

In response, the Commission opened both antidumping and countervailing duty investigations to determine whether a domestic industry was injured by 

imports of such engines from China “that are alleged 

to be sold in the United States at less than fair value 

and alleged to be subsidized by the Government of 

China.” Small Vertical Shaft Engines from China; 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 5 

Institution of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty 

Investigations and Scheduling of Preliminary Phase 

Investigations, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,958, 16,958 (ITC 

Mar. 25, 2020). Commerce likewise found the petition 

sufficient to justify launching investigations. Certain 

Vertical Shaft Engines Between 99cc and up to 225cc, 

and Parts Thereof from the People’s Republic of China: 

Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 85 

Fed. Reg. 20,667, 20,667 (Dep’t Commerce Apr. 14, 

2020); Certain Vertical Shaft Engines Between 99cc 

and up to 225cc, and Parts Thereof from the People’s 

Republic of China: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value 

Investigation, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,670 (Dep’t Commerce 

Apr. 14, 2020). MTD Products Inc., a domestic importer of small vertical shaft engines from China, participated in these proceedings before both agencies. 

Shortly after the agencies began the investigations, 

Briggs & Stratton filed an amended petition alleging 

that critical circumstances existed. See Certain Vertical Shaft Engines Between 99cc and up to 225cc, and 

Parts Thereof from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, in Part, in the Countervailing Duty Investigation, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,851, 68,851 (Dep’t Commerce 

Oct. 30, 2020) (discussing Briggs & Stratton’s critical 

circumstances allegation). 

B 

In both the antidumping and countervailing duty 

investigations, Commerce preliminarily found critical 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 6 

circumstances existed as to imports of certain (but not 

all) small vertical engines from China. Certain Vertical Shaft Engines Between 99cc and up to 225cc, and 

Parts Thereof, from the People’s Republic of China: 

Preliminary Affirmative Determination of Sales at 

Less Than Fair Value, and Preliminary Affirmative 

Determination of Critical Circumstances, in Part, 85 

Fed. Reg. 66,932, 66,933 (Dep’t Commerce Oct. 21, 

2020) (antidumping duty); 85 Fed. Reg. at 68,851–52 

(countervailing duty). 

In its final determinations, Commerce continued to 

find that critical circumstances existed for imports of 

small vertical engines from a group of related entities 

known as the “Zongshen Companies” (collectively, 

Zongshen) and, in the antidumping duty investigation, 

for the China-wide entity.1 Certain Vertical Shaft Engines Between 99cc and up to 225cc, and Parts Thereof, 

from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative 

Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and 

Final Determination of Critical Circumstances, in 

Part, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,077, 14,078 (Dep’t Commerce 

Mar. 12, 2021) (antidumping duty); Appx1210 (countervailing duty). 

1 For an overview of the “country-wide rate” applicable in 

non-market economy matters, such as those involving 

China, see Hung Vuong Corp. v. United States, 483 F. 

Supp. 3d 1321, 1340–41 (CIT 2020). 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 7 

C 

For its part, the Commission found “that imports 

subject to Commerce’s affirmative critical circumstances determinations in the antidumping and countervailing duty investigations are likely to undermine 

seriously the remedial effect of the antidumping and 

countervailing duty orders.” Small Vertical Shaft Engines from China, 86 Fed. Reg. 22,975, 22,975 n.2 (ITC 

Apr. 30, 2021). 

In so doing, the Commission cited the statutory 

standard and explained that as to “the timing and volume of the imports,” 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d(b)(4)(A)(ii)(I) 

and 1671d(b)(4)(A)(ii)(I), its “practice is to consider[2]

import quantities prior to the filing of the petition 

[that is, pre-petition import quantities] with those subsequent to the filing of the petition [post-petition quantities] using data on the record regarding those firms 

for which Commerce has made an affirmative critical 

circumstances determination.” Appx3091. The Commission treated November 2019 through March 2020 

as the “pre-petition period” and April through August 

2020 as the “post-petition period.” Appx3093. 

The agency emphasized that there was a surge of 

imports during the summer of 2020, “an off-season 

portion of the year” during which imports do not normally increase. Appx3095. “These imports also in2 The court presumes the Commission intended this word 

to be “compare.” 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 8 

creased relative to apparent U.S. consumption at a 

time when consumption was declining, and the volumes associated with the increase were large . . . .” 

Appx3095; Appx3099–3100 (same findings as to countervailing duty order). 

The Commission rejected MTD’s argument that 

COVID-19 shutdowns artificially depressed pre-petition import volumes, citing data showing that Zongshen exported more small vertical shaft engines to the 

United States in January–March 2020—the period for 

which MTD cited COVID-related shutdowns—than it 

did during the same period in 2019. Appx3096. The 

agency also found that Zongshen’s total imports in 

June and July 2020 were not just higher than any 

month during the pre-petition period—“they were the 

largest monthly export volumes to the United States 

from . . . Zongshen” over the entire period investigated. 

Appx3096–3097; Appx3100 (same findings as to countervailing duty order). 

Finally, the Commission concluded that the increased imports created “a large stockpile of imports 

prior to the imposition of provisional duties, at levels 

that were higher than all U.S. importers’ annual endof-year inventories from 2017 through 2019,” and that 

import prices bottomed out during the second and 

third quarters of 2020. Appx3097. The result was that 

U.S. purchasers had less need to buy small vertical 

shaft engines from the domestic engine industry for 

the 2021 season. Appx3101. “[W]e find that this mas-
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 9 

sive surge of imports and rapid inventory buildup is 

likely to protract the adverse impact of the subject imports on the domestic industry and thereby undermine 

seriously the remedial effect of the countervailing duty 

order.” Id.; Appx3097–3098 (same conclusion as to antidumping duty order). 

D 

After the Commission issued its determination that 

imports threatened to undermine the remedial effects 

of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders, 

Commerce issued the orders at issue here. The Department imposed antidumping duties on “unliquidated 

entries of small vertical engines from China entered, 

or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or 

after July 23, 2020,” i.e., 90 days before Commerce’s 

preliminary determination, as to entries from 

Zongshen and the China-wide entity. Certain Vertical 

Shaft Engines Between 99cc and up to 225cc, and Parts 

Thereof from the People’s Republic of China: Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 86 Fed. 

Reg. 23,675, 23,676 (Dep’t Commerce May 4, 2021). 

The countervailing duty portion similarly provided 

that as to entries from Chongqing Zongshen General 

Power Machine Co.—one of the Zongshen entities—

countervailing duties would be assessed on “unliquidated entries of small vertical engines which are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption 

on or after May 26, 2020,” i.e., 90 days before Commerce’s preliminary determination. Id. at 23,677. 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 10 

III 

MTD sued to challenge the Commission’s determination that the surge in imports threatened to undermine the orders’ remedial effect. See generally ECF 4.3

Briggs & Stratton intervened to defend the Commission’s determination. ECF 19. 

MTD filed the pending motion for judgment on the 

agency record. ECF 31 (motion); ECF 41 (brief). The 

government (ECF 39, confidential; ECF 40, public) 

and Briggs & Stratton (ECF 44) opposed; MTD replied 

(ECF 42, confidential; ECF 43, public). The court then 

heard argument. 

IV 

MTD sues under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) 

and 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i). The court has subject-matter jurisdiction via 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). 

In § 1516a(a)(2) actions, “[t]he court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found 

. . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the 

record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 

19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). That is, the question is 

not whether the court would have reached the same 

decision on the same record—rather, it is whether the 

3 MTD does not challenge the agencies’ findings about 

dumping or countervailable subsidies. Nor does the company challenge either the dumping or subsidy margins or 

Commerce’s critical circumstances determination. 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 11 

administrative record as a whole permits Commerce’s 

conclusion. 

Substantial evidence has been defined as more 

than a mere scintilla, as such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion. To determine if substantial evidence exists, we review the record as a 

whole, including evidence that supports as well 

as evidence that fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evidence. 

Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 

1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). 

V 

MTD raises two theories to challenge the Commission’s determination that the imports in question were 

likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the 

antidumping and countervailing duty orders. First, 

MTD asserts that the agency used faulty data. ECF 

41, at 10–19. Second, the company quarrels with how 

the Commission weighed the data. Id. at 20–28. 

A 

MTD contends that the Commission based its determination on (1) “export data subject to significant 

lead times,” (2) “incongruous and inaccurate comparison periods,” and (3) “artificial apparent increases in 

volume due in large part to the Covid-19 pandemic.” 

Id. at 10. MTD also argues that in “any case,” the 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 12 

agency (4) “failed to sufficiently explain how these issues impacted the timing and volume of apparent imports, the first statutory criterion under the critical 

circumstances analysis.” Id. at 11. 

1 

The court begins with MTD’s fourth and final contention, which the company barely made in passing in 

its opening brief and then fully developed in its reply 

as a statutory argument. Compare ECF 41 (opening 

brief), at 11, with ECF 43 (reply), at 1–5. While ordinarily the court would decline to address an argument 

only pressed for the first time on reply, the government took the bait and joined the issue in its brief. 

ECF 40, at 46. Thus, the court will entertain MTD’s 

late-blooming statutory argument. 

MTD contends that the Commission’s determination “must be based on . . . the information expressly 

required by the statute—import data. A finding based 

on anything else is inherently speculative, suspect, 

and unsustainable.” ECF 43, at 3 (emphasis in original). As the government argues, however, the Act 

simply directs the Commission to “consider” the “factor” of the “timing and volume of imports” and does not 

restrict what data the Commission may consider in so 

doing. ECF 40, at 46 (“[I]t is reasonable to interpret 

this language as permitting the Commission to consider several key points along the timeline of an import—such as order date, shipment date, export date, 

date of importation, or delivery date—as would be 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 13 

relevant under the circumstances of any particular investigation.”); see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d(b)(4)(A)(ii), 

1671d(b)(4)(A)(ii). Nothing in the statute restricts the 

Commission’s broad discretion to consider data reasonably relevant to determining the “timing and volume of imports.” Reinforcing this discretion, the Act 

directs the agency to consider—“among other factors it 

considers relevant”—“any other circumstances indicating that the remedial effect of the [orders] will be seriously undermined.” ECF 40, at 46 (emphasis and 

brackets the government’s) (quoting 19 U.S.C. 

§§ 1671d(b)(4)(A)(ii)(III) and 1673d(b)(4)(A)(ii)(III)). 

The court therefore turns to whether the agency’s reliance on the data in question was reasonable. 

2 

MTD argues that the Commission’s use of Chinese 

export data “would not account for the demonstrated 

90- to 120[-]day lead times applicable to exports of the 

subject merchandise.” ECF 41, at 12. The company 

contends that the use of “export data which is subject 

to lead times of three-to-four months” could be “problematic” because portions of the export data would 

“likely reflect imports ultimately subject to provisional 

measures.” Id. at 12–13. MTD also argues that engine 

shipments through July 2020 “reflected purchase commitments under contracts that had been inked in 

2019, long before the filing of the Petition.” ECF 43, 

at 9. It contends that the company “did not—and as a 

practical matter could not—both order and import 

such a massive quantity of engines” in the period after 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 14 

Briggs & Stratton filed its petition but before the agencies’ imposition of provisional measures. Id. at 9–10. 

The government responds that the Commission 

took note that MTD itself “reported that lead times for 

imports in 2020 varied widely because of shipment disruptions related to COVID-19.” ECF 40, at 34. It argues that because of such variations, “which covered 

most of the pre-petition period and all of the post-petition period, it was reasonable for the Commission to 

rely on export data, as export data was not as subject 

to variability in shipment times and, therefore, was a 

more comparable and reliable data source for evaluating the timing and volume of any post-petition increases.” Id. at 34–35. 

The administrative record shows that the agency 

responded to MTD’s argument by calling it “inapposite”: “Our critical circumstances data are based on 

monthly exports to the United States reported by 

[Zongshen], not on monthly U.S. imports, and therefore do not reflect shipment times from [Zongshen] . . . 

on which the estimated 90 to 120 day produced-to-order lead times are based.” Appx2347 n.256. The Commission also noted that MTD acknowledged placing orders during the spring of 2020 after Briggs & Stratton 

filed its petition and that the imports resulting from 

those orders “began arriving in the United States in 

the May–June period and continued in July and August.” Appx2347. 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 15 

The agency thus considered MTD’s arguments and 

gave a reasonable explanation for rejecting them 

based on the evidence in the record. Under the 

substantial evidence standard of review, that suffices. 

Although MTD asks the court to re-weigh the 

evidence, the standard of review does not allow the 

court to do so. See Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co. v. 

Int’l Trade Comm’n, 936 F.3d 1353, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 

2019). 

3 

MTD argues that the comparison periods the Commission used were inappropriate. The company notes 

that Briggs & Stratton filed its petitions on March 18, 

2020, and that the agency therefore included March in 

the “pre-petition period”: “[T]he Commission used the 

entirety of volume data for the months November 

2019–March 2020 as the ‘pre-petition’ period and that 

for April 2020–August 2020 as the ‘post-petition’ period. This resulted in 12 days’ worth of data wrongly 

included in the ‘pre-petition’ comparison period, and 7 

days incorrectly included in the ‘post-petition’ period.” 

ECF 41, at 11. 

The agency explained that it chose to place March 

2020 in the pre-petition period “in light of the specific 

circumstances of these investigations,” Appx2343, because Briggs & Stratton filed the petitions “towards 

the middle of the month,” Appx2343 n.241. The Commission further explained that its choice of August 

2020 for the end of the post-petition period was based 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 16 

on Commerce issuing its preliminary determination in 

the countervailing duty investigation on August 24, 

2020, “within the fifth month of the post-petition period we are using here.” Appx2343 n.243. The Commission referred to its “practice” as being to use the same 

pre- and post-petition periods for both the antidumping and countervailing duty matters. Id.

The agency thus gave a reasonable explanation for 

its choice of pre- and post-petition periods. MTD admits that it is “unclear exactly how much of the volume 

data for each [of] these two months [i.e., March and 

August 2020] fall within these erroneously included 

periods.” ECF 41, at 11–12. MTD’s arguments about 

the time periods leading to erroneous results are 

therefore speculative. 

4 

Finally, MTD argues that the Commission wrongly 

based its determination partially on “artificial apparent increases in volume due in large part to the 

COVID-19 pandemic.” Id. at 10. The company contends that the agency’s finding that monthly exports 

of subject merchandise hit their highest levels of the 

period of investigation from April to July 2020—that 

is, during the “post-petition” analysis period—was inappropriate because of the combination of “lead times” 

and the ripple effect of COVID-related production 

shutdowns in China between January and March 

2020. Id. at 14–15. “[I]t is likely that a substantial portion of the exports reflected in this period would have 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 17 

been ordered prior to the filing of the petitions,” id.

at 15, and MTD contends that the surge in imports 

was caused by Chinese manufacturers’ efforts to clear 

out a backlog of pending orders, id.

The Commission considered MTD’s arguments and 

acknowledged that Zongshen was indeed affected by 

COVID-related shutdowns in January through March 

2020, but the agency found that “those shutdowns did 

not appear to affect its exports to the United States” 

because those exports “were higher in January 

through March 2020 than during the same period in 

2019. Thus, to the extent MTD’s argument is that the 

increase in the post-petition period is to make up for 

exports delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 

record evidence on [Zongshen’s] exports to the United 

States contradicts this argument.” Appx2347 (footnote 

reference omitted). The Commission also noted that 

MTD acknowledged placing orders with Zongshen after the petition was filed and that those imports arrived in the U.S. during May through August 2020. Id.

The record shows that the Commission considered 

MTD’s argument, weighed the evidence, and found 

that argument unconvincing. The agency’s explanation is reasonable, and the court will not second-guess 

its findings. 

B 

Emphasizing the views of the Commissioner who 

partially dissented, see Appx2356 (Separate Views of 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 18 

Commissioner David S. Johanson), MTD challenges 

the Commission’s conclusion that imports before the 

imposition of provisional relief seriously undermined 

the remedial effect of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders. As the company observes, the 

Act’s critical circumstances mechanism seeks to prevent accelerated imports from circumventing duty orders. ECF 41, at 20–21. MTD contends, however, that 

such is not the situation here because its imports consisted of “custom-made, non-fungible products” which 

were not stockpiled and thus were unavailable for 

such tactics. Id.

The government responds that the Commission 

found that Briggs & Stratton was able to produce, and 

did produce, small vertical shaft engines suitable for 

MTD’s products. ECF 40, at 66 (citing Appx2313–

2314). The government further observes that the Commission determined that even though MTD does not 

ordinarily resell small engines from its inventory, “the 

additional inventories of imported [small vertical shaft 

engines] nevertheless represented orders that the domestic industry did not have an opportunity to obtain.” 

Id. (citing Appx2349, Appx2354). In that regard, the 

Commission also found that the inventory buildup associated with the surge in imports meant there would 

be less need for power tool manufacturers to purchase 

small engines for the next year’s season. Appx2349, 

Appx2353–2354. 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 19 

The Commission also noted the unusual timing of 

the surge in imports (or Chinese exports) of subject 

merchandise during a time of year when such imports 

do not normally increase and at a time when U.S. consumption of subject merchandise was apparently declining. Appx2345–2346. The agency placed significance on (1) the surge in imports coinciding with the 

time of year when domestic purchasers would be negotiating prices for engines to be delivered during the 

next year’s lawn mower season and (2) the imports arriving during the surge having among the lowest 

prices of any imports during the period of investigation. Appx2349. The Commission concluded that this 

combination of facts demonstrated that the surge of 

imports would “protract the adverse impact of the imports subject to the affirmative critical circumstances 

finding on the domestic industry and thereby undermine seriously the remedial effect of the antidumping 

order.” Id.; see also Appx2353–2354 (same analysis for 

countervailing duty order). 

MTD, however, argues that later events show that 

“the remedial effects of the Orders were not, in fact, 

seriously undermined by the apparent increase in imports over the post-petition period.” ECF 41, at 22; see 

also ECF 43, at 17 (“The remedial effects of the orders 

were not seriously undermined”) (point heading), 18 

(“MTD submits that . . . the record evidence demonstrates that the remedial effect of the Orders was not 

undermined, seriously or otherwise.”). 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 20 

The statute, however, requires the Commission to 

assess whether subject imports “are likely to undermine seriously the remedial effect[s]” of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders “to be issued.” 19 

U.S.C. §§ 1673d(b)(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added), 

1671d(b)(4)(A)(i) (same). In other words, the Commission makes an informed judgment in advance. The 

court need not decide whether the import surge did, in 

fact, seriously undermine the orders’ remedial effects 

because even if it did not, that fact would not invalidate the Commission’s finding under the statute. 

The Commission amply explained the reasons for 

its conclusion that a surge in subject imports 

threatened to seriously undermine the duty orders’ 

remedial effects. And although MTD disputes the 

evidentiary sufficiency of those findings, and urges the 

court to adopt the dissenting views of Commissioner 

Johanson, substantial evidence review does not permit 

the court to re-weigh the evidence as MTD proposes. 

“The possibility of drawing two inconsistent 

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an 

administrative agency’s finding from being supported 

by substantial evidence.” Siemens Energy, Inc. v. 

United States, 806 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 

(cleaned up) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 

383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Although the court agrees 

with MTD that the conclusion drawn by Commissioner 

Johanson is supported by the record, the conclusion 

drawn by the Commission majority—considering the 

record as a whole and the evidence that detracts from 
Ct. No. 21-00264 Page 21 

that conclusion—is also supported by the record. 

Under the substantial evidence standard, ties go to the 

agency. 

* * * 

For all these reasons, the court denies MTD’s motion for judgment on the agency record and grants 

judgment on the agency record to the government and 

Briggs & Stratton. See USCIT R. 56.2(b). A separate 

judgment will issue. See USCIT R. 58(a). 

Dated: March 16, 2023 /s/ M. Miller Baker

 New York, New York Judge