### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma y 4, 200 4
AN THON Y K . G OOD S v. TON Y P AR KER , WA RD EN Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Lake Coun ty No. 03-CR -8494 R. LeeMoore , Jr., Judge

No. W2003-02914-C CA-R 3-HC - F iled October 13, 2004

The pe titioner, Anthony

K. Goods, appeals t he L ake County Circuit Court’s dismi ssal of his petition for habeas corpus re lie f. We a ff irm in pa rt a ndre ve rs e in p art

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t i s R e ve r se d and C as e Re m ande d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.

An tho ny K. Go od s, Ap pe llant, Pro Se

. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; and Hele na Walton Yarbr oug h, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, Na shville, Tennessee , for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

On No v em b er3 , 2 0 0 3 , t h e p et i t i o n erfi l ed a petiti on for habeas corpus relief attacking h is 1 9 9 6 Sh e lb y

CountyCriminal Court convictions of espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry , second- deg ree murder, the ft, and attempt to co m m i t s econd-deg ree murder. A ll convictions were the re sults of g uiltypleas a cce pted on J une 6, 1996. The petition al leg ed that the plea ag ree ment called f

or concur rent sente nces of

45 y ear s for e s p ec ially

ag g ravated robbe ry , 55 y ear s for sec ond-deg ree murder, 12 y ear s for thef

t, and 30 y ear s for at t em p t ed sec ond-deg ree murder. T he petitioner w as desig nated a

persistent off

ender

. The petiti on claimed that, due to incompleteness, the unde rly ing
c o n v i c t i o n j u d g m e n t s w e r e v o i d

. F u rt h e r , t h e p e t i t i o n c l a i m e d t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u rt e xc e e de d it s jurisd ic tio n b y

imp os ing c on c ur

re nt, a s o pp os e d to ma nd a tory c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s. The pe titioner attache d copies of his c onviction judgments to his petition. They ref lect that the pe titioner pleade d g uiltyto eac h char g e, but in n o n e o f t h e judgments did the trial court mar k the box t o indicate that the pe titioner “is found . . . g uilty .” On the othe r hand, e ach judgme nt rec ited the cha

rg e by name, pr oscriptive Code sec tion, and class and date of offe nse. Eac h sentenc e wa s fully

described on the judg m en t form. Below the se ntencing information on ea ch-2-

judgme nt form, except for the attempted second-deg ree murder judg ment, the trial court marked the b o x t o i n d i ca t e: “T h e D ef

en d an th av i n g b ee n fo u n d gu i l t y i s re n d er ed i n fa m o u s
. . . . ” T h e t ri al j u d ge sig ne d a nde nte re d th e jud g me nts

.

The court below denie d ha be as c or pu s re l i ef , an d t h e pe t i t i o n er ap p ea l s t h atru l i n g. T h e m ai n t h ru s to f t h e p et i t i o n er ’s cl ai m s o n ap p ea l i s t h at t h e co u rt b el o w erre d i n d en y i n g habeas corpus relief

and in any event err ed in dismi ssing the pe tition wit hout the appointment of counse l and a he aring

. The leg al issues raise d in habeas c o r p us hearings a

re que stions of law, and our r eview of qu e sti on s o f l a w i s de novo

. Ha rt v . S tate , 21 S.W .3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000) (“[W] hether to gr ant the petition [ for ha be as c or pu s relief ] is a question of law that we re view de novo. ” ); Sta te v . H ill , 95 4 S. W.2 d 7 25 , 7 27 (T e nn . 1 99 7) (q ue sti on of la w r e vie we d o n a

pp e a l de novo ).
Habeas c orpus re lie f is av a ila ble on ly wh e n the a g g ri e ve d p arty ’s c on vic tio n is vo id or the sente nce ha s expi red. Se e Arc he r v . S tate , 851 S.W .2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). The pe titioner in the pr e se nt case make s n o a lle g a tio n th a t hi s se nte nc e s h a ve e xpir e d; h e on ly c la ims that hi s sentenc es, and he nce his c onviction judgments, a re void.

A v oid c on vic tio n is one wh ic h str ike s at the jurisd ic tio na l in te g ri ty of thetria l c ou rt

. Id. ; se e Sta te ex re l. An gli n v . Mitc he ll , 5 75 S.W. 2d28 4, 28 7 ( Te nn . 1 97 9) ; Pa ssa re lla v . S tate , 891 S.W .2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . Be cause in t h i s case the trial court appar ently had jurisdiction over the actus reus , the subject matter , and the pe rson of the pe titioner, the petitioner’s jurisd ic tio na l is su e is l imi te d to thec la im that th e c ou rt wa s w ith ou t auth ority to e nte r the jud g me nt. Se e An gli n , 575 S.W .2d at 287 (“‘ J urisdiction’ in the s ense here used, is not limit ed to jurisdiction of the pe rson or of the subject matter but a lso includes lawful authority of the c ourt to rende r the pa rt ic ula r o rd e r o r j ud g me nt w he re by thepeti ti on e r h a s b e e n impriso ne d. ” ); see also Arche r , 851 S.W. 2da t 16 4; Pa ssa re lla , 891 S.W .2d at 627.

F ir st, we e xami ne thepe tit ion e r’ s c la im that th e jud g me nts arevo id b e c aus e the y fail to set forth finding s of g uiltyas require d by Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proc edure 32(e)

. See Tenn. R. Crim. P

. 32(e) (“A judgme nt of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdic t or finding s, and the
a dju dic a tio n a ndse nte nc e .” ); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-209(e ) (2003) (re q uiring district attorney g ener al to complete the judgme nt form, including an indication of t he “type of offense for which the de fendant was cha rg ed and c onvicted”)

. This court h a s s a id , “ T h e in f o r ma ti o n w h ic h is r e q u ir e d to b e in c lu d e d inthe judgme nt form is standard[,] and it is ma ndatory that eac h judgme nt f orm contain this information.” State v. Harry M

ark Hurley , No. 233, slip op. at 5 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxvill e, Au g. 3, 1988), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1988) . This statement, howeve r, is of dubious import because, in Ha rry Mark Hurley , this court on direc t appe al , af t er noting the trial court’s failure to express in the judgme nt a finding of g uilty , said that the “judg ment of t he trial court is af firmed on the me rits but not as to its form.” Id ., slip op. at 6. T h e co u rt re m an d ed the c ase to the tria l court for the-3-

amendment of the ex isting j udg ment. Id. Be cause the Harry Mark Hurley court wa s adjudicating
a dir e c t app e a l a s o pp os e d to a c oll a te ra l atta c k u po n th e c on vic tio n ju dg me nt, it i s d if fi c ult to t e ll whether the court viewed the judg ment as void, mere ly voidable, or simply

benig n clerical er

ror.
I n our view, the judgme nts in the prese nt c ase are mere ly voidable. Ea ch judg ment form t ak en as a whole c onvey s complete information about the conviction off ense, inc luding the g uiltyplea and the details of the sentenc e. Although only three of the judg ments acknow ledg e that the def endant is re ndere d infamous base d upon his “having been f ound g uilty ,” we do not conclude that the fa ilure to include this statement on the attempt to commit second- deg ree murder judg ment so distinguishes i t from the others as to rende r i t void. Given the fac ts of t his case, w e conc lude that theju dgmen ts su bs ta nti a lly de c larethede sig nate d c on vic tio ns e ve n th ou g h th e y ma y be vo ida ble beca use the court did not fill in the blanks for specific ally expressing a finding of g uilty . A def

ect in the conviction proceeding s which renders the judgme nt mere ly voidable is not subject to collater al attack. See A rcher , 851 S.W .2d at 163. Thus, we c onclude that the trial court prope rly dismiss ed the habeas corpus c la im that th e jud g me nts we revo id d ue to the ir inc omp le te ne ss.
We now addre ss the second claim that the four se ntence s imposed on J une 6, 1996
are void. The petitioner claims that the trial court was require d to r un the four sentenc es consec utively , based upon the espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry , second- deg ree murder, and attempted second- deg ree murder oc curring w hile the petit ioner was on bail on the theft c harg e, which r esulted in the fourth June 6, 1996 conviction. The petitioner c laims that imposi ng concur rent sente nces rende red the m void. The petitioner r elies upon Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-20-111(b), wh ic h p ro vid e s:

[W hen] a defe ndant commits a felony while such d efe ndant was
re le a se d on ba il .

. . , a ndthede fe nd a nt i s c on vic te d o f b othof fe ns e s, the trial judg e shall not have discretion as to whe ther the se nt en ces shall run concur

rently

. . . but sha ll or der that such s en t en ce s be
s e r v e d c u m u l a t i v e l y.
Te nn . Code An n. § 40- 20 -1 11 (b ) ( 20 03 ); see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3) (re quiring consec utive serviceof a se ntence “for a felony wher e the defe ndant was rele ased on bail” with the sente nce f or the pre -bail off

ense, w hen “the defe ndant is convicted of both offense s”).

To be sure , the invalidity of the sentenc e itself, as w ell as the broa der inva lidityof the conviction, re s u l t s i n a void j udg ment and is a suff icient basis for habeas corpus relief

. See Stephenson v . Carlton , 2 8 S. W.3 d 9 10 , 9 11 (T e nn . 2 00 0) (a vo id se nte nc e , a s w e ll a s a vo id conviction, may

result in a void judg ment and be the subject of a habeas corpus proce eding ). To support a c laim for habeas corpus re lie f, ho we ve r, theill e g a lit y of a se nte nc e mus t be egr eg ious to the point of voidness. Cox v . S tate , 53 S.W .3d 287, 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)

. On the other

hand, in McLan ey v . B e ll , 59 S.W .3d 90 (Tenn. 2001), our supre me court, in addressing convictions that expressed inapposite sente ncing terms, s aid t hat an “illeg al” sentence equate s to a-4-

“jurisdi ct i o n al d efect.” Id . at 92. The c ourt stressed that when “the fac e of the judgme nt or the
rec ord of the underlying proce eding s shows that the . . . sentenc e is ill eg al, such sentenc e c re a te s a void judg ment for whic h habeas corpus relief is available.” Id . at 91 (e mphasis added) . Thus, an illega l, jurisdictionallydefe ctive sente nce is one that is “in direc t contra vention” of the sentenc ing act. Id

. at 94. Such a sente nce is void whe n it appear s on the fac e of the rec ord of the unde rly ing proce eding and is justiciable in a habeas corpus p ro ce ed i n g.

F ir s t , w e d i s c e r n n o j u r i s d i c t i o n a l f l a w i n t h e tri a l c o u rt ’ s i m p o s i n g t h e e s p e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry , second- deg ree murder, and attempted second- deg ree murder sentenc es to run concur rently to one another . Code section 40-20- 111(b)’ s mandate of consec utive s en t en ci ng a dd re sse s th e a lig nme nt b e tw e e n th e se nte nc e in the pr e -b a il of fe ns e a ndthea g g re g a te se nte nc e in the offe nses that occur

red while the offe nder was on bail. Nothing in the statute require s consec utive serviceamong the sentenc es of the post-bail offense s.

Th a t said, ho we ve r, we dis c e rnthat th e c on vic tio n c ou rt ma y hav e exc e e de d it s jurisdiction in im posing t h e s entence in the thef t conviction – the pre -bail off ense – to run concur rently with the sentenc es for the thr ee post-bail offense s. For this re ason, the habeas corpus court e rre d in f

ailing to a ppoint c ounsel to repr esent the pe titioner and in failing to conduct a habeas corpus hearing.

T h i s r e s u l t

i s d i c t at e d b y McLaney , in which the habeas corpus petitioner complaine d that hi s c on c ur

re nt a lig nme nt o f a

se nte nc e fo r a

pr e -b a il o ff

e ns e wi th se nte nc e s f

or po st- ba il offe nses was void. See M cLaney, 59 S.W . 3d at 92. Appar ently , M cL aney barg ained f

or and obtained a g lobal plea ag ree ment that embra ced se ntence s for a g g ravated ra pe (the pre- bail offe nse) and for rape and burg lary

(the post-ba il offense s). See State v. Jackie W . McLaney , No. 74 (Te nn. Crim. App., Knoxvi lle, Mar. 31, 1988) (on McL aney ’s appe al from de nial of post-convic tion relief,
a p p e l l a t e c o u rtr e v e a l s t h a t , e v e n t h o u g h t h e g u i l t y p l e a t o a g g r a v a t e d r ap e w a s e n t e r e d t w o d a ys befor e the g uiltypleas to ra pe and bur g lary , the various pleas we re p ar t and par cel of one plea ag ree ment). In McLaney , the supreme court said that, “ if the fa cts [were] as alleg ed, the tria l court imposed a sentenc e in dir ect contra vention of the sentenc ing act

. . . [and] this would create an illeg al sentenc e.” McLaney , 5 9 S. W.3 d at 93 . D e sp ite Mc L a ne y ’s habeas corpus a lle g a tio ns of su c h a vo id sentenc e, the ha be as c or

pu s court de clined to appoint counse l or t o aff ord him a hea

ring . The supreme court reve rsed and require d the habeas corpus court to determine whether “the recor d of the underly ing proce eding s clea rly showed that the latter r ape and burg lary offe nses wer e committed while McL aney was on ba il.” Id. at 94. Furthermore , the McLaneycourt dire cted that should the habeas corpus court find that to be the case – with the result that the s en t en ce s in the latter c ases would be void – “on rema nd to the orig inal convicting trial court, a g uiltyplea may

be withdra wn.” Id. at 95. The court reasone d that beca use “Mc L aney

enter ed into his guilty

plea in exchang e for

a concur rent sentence which was, in actua lity , illega l,

. . . [he] is entitled to withdraw the plea.” Id. (citations omitted).

I n pertinent pa

rticulars, the curr ent petitioner’s c ase, a s alleg ed, tra cks that of McL aney . He a lleg ed that he e ntere d into a g lo b al plea a g ree ment – one that embr ace d both the-5-

bailed off ense and the post-bail offe nses. The ag ree ment specifie d that the sentenc e for the a lleg ed ba ile d o ff e ns e wa s imp os e d to ru n c on c ur re ntl y wi th e a c h of the se nte nc e s fo r the a lle g e d p os t- ba il sentenc es. I f true, the petitioner’s sente nces would direc tly contra vene Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-20-111( b), resulting in a void sentence pursuant to McLaney

. McLaneyrequire s that the pe tit ion e r h a ve theop po rtun ity , th ro ug h th e app oin tme nt o f c ou ns e l a nda n ev ide nti ary he ari ng , to establish the claims he a lleg es in his petition.

Acc ording ly , the orde r of the h a b e a s c o r p us c ou rt is r e ve rs e d a ndthec a se is
rema nded. The court shall appoi n t co u nsel to repr esent the pe titioner, aff ord the pe titioner a hearing, and take any

other a ctions as may

be wa rranted by

the principles e nunciated in McLaney

.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE