U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

94–941PDF 2015

IRAN’S ENDURING BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 10, 2015

Serial No. 114–41

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Retired (former Director, Defense 

Intelligence Agency) ............................................................................................. 10

The Honorable Robert Joseph, Ph.D., senior scholar, National Institute for 

Public Policy (former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security) ................................................................................................. 27

David A. Cooper, Ph.D., James V. Forrestal professor and chair of the Department of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College ............................ 37

Anthony H. Cordesman, Ph.D., Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 45

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Retired: Prepared statement ....... 14

The Honorable Robert Joseph, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................. 29

David A. Cooper, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 39

Anthony H. Cordesman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................ 48

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 120

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 121

(1)

IRAN’S ENDURING BALLISTIC MISSILE 

THREAT 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 10, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize Chairman Royce for as much time as he may consume. I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. 

We are also pleased that during this hearing we will be joined 

by Chairman Rogers of the House Armed Services Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces and other members of that subcommittee who 

may join us as well. 

They have jurisdictional concerns related to the matter before us 

today and, without objection, I will also be prepared to recognize 

any member of that subcommittee seeking recognition if and when 

they are present. 

We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection the 

witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the record 

and members may have 5 days in which to insert statements and 

questions for the record subject to the length limitation of the 

rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. We are less than 

3 weeks away from the supposed June 30th nuclear deal deadline. 

This dangerous deal will open the pathway for Iran to become a 

nuclear threshold state, will legitimize this pariah nation on the 

international scene and will help fund the regime’s other illicit behavior. 

And despite the ongoing nuclear negotiations and our repeated 

efforts to call attention to the shortcomings of the framework 

agreement, Iran continues to spread its terror across the globe, 

stoke sectarian tensions across the Middle East, destabilize the region and expand its hegemonic ambitions now controlling the Arab 

capitals of Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a, and oppress 

and persecute religious minorities. 

Iran continues to be one of the world’s worst human rights violators. Iran continues to violate international sanctions and even reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:01 Jul 06, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\061015\94941 SHIRL
2

portedly violate the terms of the Joint Plan of Action and now the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or Framework Agreement, 

and Iran’s regime continues to make advances on its ballistic missiles program. 

There are many glaring omissions from the Obama administration and the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran that have caused 

many to rightly worry and call this possible deal weak and dangerous. 

But perhaps the biggest failure of these negotiations was to limit 

them to just the nuclear profile and omit all of the other illicit activities, most notably the continued progress on the ballistic missile 

program. 

Just last week, the Pentagon reported that Iran continues to 

make technological advances on its missile program despite the ongoing negotiations and despite the sanctions, both multilateral and 

unilateral, for doing so. 

The mere fact that Iran continues to make these advances on 

intercontinental ballistic missiles—ICBMs—and other ballistic missiles—weapons that have very little practical use outside of delivering a nuclear payload—simply belies the notion that Iran’s nuclear program is intended for peaceful uses. 

Taken with reports that Iran’s nuclear stockpiles have actually 

grown during the negotiations, this demonstrates the regime’s clear 

and undeniable intent to develop a nuclear weapon. For the sake 

of negotiations, Iran’s ballistic missile program is off limits. 

But for the sake of lifting the sanctions on Iran at the U.N. Security Council, everything is nuclear related as the administration 

aims to lift as many sanctions as possible, in turn giving Iran more 

access to billions of dollars. This makes no sense and it is dangerous. 

So what impact will a potential nuclear deal have on Iran’s ballistic missile program, our U.S. national security and the stability 

of the region? 

Well, if the Iranian regime gets this reported $50 billion signing 

bonus, a good portion of that money will get invested right back 

into Iran’s illicit activities, including its ballistic missile program. 

As the U.N. panel of experts reported last week, we are already 

having a difficult time maintaining these sanctions as many nations are looking the other way on sanctions in expectations that 

they will get lifted. 

When the sanctions are lifted, Iran will go back to working with 

its allies—the regimes of North Korea, Syria, Russia and China—

to acquire what it needs to further advance its ballistic missile program. 

Iran and Syria have obtained ballistic missiles and technology 

from North Korea, a nexus that the Obama administration has 

failed to address head on by not prioritizing INKSNA sanctions 

against these dangerous regimes. 

With ballistic missiles already able to hit parts of Europe and 

target our ally, the democratic Jewish State of Israel, Iran will 

soon be able to create more sophisticated ballistic missiles that are 

more capable and Iran will be able to advance its ICBM program 

that one would be capable of hitting us here in the U.S. 

3

Iran has the most extensive ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, with the intelligence community assessing that Iran has 

a substantial inventory of medium-range ballistic missiles including the Shahab and its variants. 

Iran’s space program is a cover for its continued ICBM program, 

as the two would share many similarities. If Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs go unchecked it will give Tehran the ability 

to continue to perfect their ballistic missile program to be used 

once the nuclear deal expires. 

We have already seen Russia lift its suspension on the sale of S–

300 missile systems to Iran. These S–300s will give Iran a new capability to defend its nuclear facilities or its ballistic missile platforms. 

The ink wasn’t even dry yet on the framework agreement and 

Russia moved in to take advantage because Putin surely expects 

the Iranian sanctions to be lifted. 

This nuclear deal is not only the legitimization that Iran has 

sought on the international stage. It is also the green light that it 

needs to continue to pursue nuclear weapons and the platforms 

with which they would be delivered. 

I am done with my opening statement. I would like to ask Mr. 

Deutch if it is okay if I could recognize Chairman Royce. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Of course. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much for joining us, Chairman 

Royce, and Mr. Deutch is always a gentleman. Mr. Royce is recognized for as long as he would like. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Chairwoman. Appreciate it and 

appreciate you holding this hearing. 

And in many ways, Iran’s missile program has been a case study 

in how the Obama administration has handled these nuclear negotiations with Iran from the beginning and it is a case study in that 

it, again, reflects a situation where the United States has backed 

off in terms of the requirement. 

When the negotiations kicked off, the White House was insistent—and I am going to use their words now—insistent that the 

Iranians have to deal with matters related to their ballistic missile 

program. 

After all, the U.N. Security Council resolutions prohibit Iran’s 

work on ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. 

So here is the situation we are in. Iran’s Supreme Leader, after 

he heard these remarks, declared that this is a ‘‘stupid idiotic expectation’’ and he called it the main duty of all military officials in 

Iran to ‘‘mass produce ICBMs.’’ Soon, State Department negotiator 

Wendy Sherman was telling the committee as a result that U.N. 

missile sanctions are not about ballistic missiles per se—they are 

about nuclear-armed missiles.’’

So the whole—the whole argument changed. The problem is that 

ballistic missiles are the most reliable way to deliver nuclear warheads. 

Indeed, as we will hear this morning, ballistic missiles are not 

a separate and secondary issue but part and parcel of Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure. 

4

That is why Congress has targeted Iran’s missile program with 

sanctions right alongside its nuclear program, and we had intended 

that to be part of this agreement. 

One witness calls the development of a long-range missile program a litmus test for a country’s nuclear intentions, asserting that 

no country that has not aspired to possess nuclear weapons has 

ever opted to sustain a lengthy and expensive missile program. 

Iran is pressing ahead with both. Remember that when Libya 

and South Africa renounced nuclear weapons, by the way, in the 

case of applying sanctions on South Africa—that is one of the ways 

we got them to capitulate—when they made that announcement 

they also gave up the missile programs that went along with them. 

That is a long way from the, to quote the ayatollah, the ‘‘mass 

produce’’ directive given to the military—a long way from that attitude of the Supreme Leader there. 

Recently, this committee heard about the negotiating gains the 

Obama administration will need to make over the next few weeks 

to get an agreement that has a chance of being meaningfully 

verified. 

Given the relative ease in detecting nuclear programs, missile restrictions could be a key source of verification in any sort agreement with Iran. As one witness recalls, Reagan’s ‘‘trust but verify’’ 

didn’t rely on tracking nuclear fuel stockpiles or centrifuges but instead on counting Soviet delivery systems. 

And how close is Iran to achieving a nuclear warhead? Iran continues to stonewall the IAEA on key questions—all 12 key questions—including missile warhead design that its inspectors began 

pressing for over 31⁄2 years ago now. 

So we just don’t know. Unfortunately, in the run-up to the June 

30th deadline, the Obama administration has shown no interest in 

working to stop Iran’s ICBM program, instead boldly claiming that 

its agreement will cut off every path to a nuclear weapon. 

But as one witness asks, if the agreement effectively blocks 

Iran’s path to nuclear weapons, why would Iran continue to work 

on a costly weapons system that could never be effectively armed. 

And with the vast sanctions relief that is coming to Iran, there 

will be billions more for Iran to invest in and improve that ICBM 

program, which is, by the way, an increasing threat to U.S. forces 

and partners in the region and eventually to our allies in Europe 

and here at home. 

And if you doubt that they are going to use the sanctions relief 

on that program, I would just ask anyone to explain how it is that 

over this last month we have seen the reports about Iran transferring now the precision missiles that they have developed to 

Hezbollah so that now Hezbollah that already has 80,000 rockets 

and missiles, thanks to, you know, the generosity of Iran, is going 

to go to 100,000, is going to have precision-guided missiles and at 

the same time a new generation of missiles are being transferred 

to Hamas, by the way, along with a statement by Iran that they 

are going to rebuild the tunnels for Hamas. 

This telegraphs the intentions—the attitude and the intentions—

of this regime and their intentions are clearly there to mass 

produce ICBMs. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

5

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well put. Thank you so much, and we are 

honored that you would join us, Chairman Royce. 

And now, thank you for your kindness. Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for joining us today and thanks to our 

esteemed witnesses for being here as well. 

We are 20 days out from the imposed deadline to reach a deal 

to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The world has 

rightfully so been focused on the nuclear issue for the better part 

of 2 years. 

But in that time, while Iran’s diplomats sit face to face with the 

P5+1 negotiators, the regime has continued to engage in dangerous 

activities, everything from human rights abuses against its own 

people to the transfer of arms in violation of U.N. Security Council 

resolutions to material support for the Assad regime to supply 

Hezbollah with weapons, to the continued development of its ballistic missile program, a program, I might add, that has been subject to United Nations Security Council resolutions in 2006, 2007, 

2008 and 2010. 

Much of this program has relied on illicit transfer of technology 

and supplies from other pariah states like North Korea. Beginning 

in the early 1990s, Iran received help from Russia and China. 

Vestiges of those relationships may remain. 

It is unclear to what extent Iran’s program has become increasingly self-reliant in the face of international sanctions. However, 

aspects of the Iran-North Korea nexus continue to come to light. 

Just recently, press reports surfaced detailed an Iranian dissident group’s claim that a delegation of North Korean scientists 

were in Iran for the third time this year, and while those reports 

remain unconfirmed, the State Department did say that it would 

take any such reports seriously. 

The United States’ national intelligence estimate of 1999 predicted that Iran could test an ICBM in the year 2015. Now, thankfully, it continues to appear that Iran remains far from ready to 

meet that goal. 

But given the opaque nature of its program, it is difficult to assess just how far it has progressed and while Iran’s leaders have 

been known to make exaggerated claims it is impossible to leave 

anything to chance when it comes to this regime. 

We do know that Iran has successfully developed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and we know that Iran continues to 

work on space launch vehicles, likely as a cover for its aim to develop an ICBM. 

Many experts wonder what practical use could this regime possibly have for these advanced capabilities if not to carry a nuclear 

warhead. Iran’s short- and medium-range capabilities, if precise, 

have the potential to threaten our regional allies or, potentially, 

Europe, as President Obama warned in 2009. 

And while Iran may not be interested in regional state versus 

state conflict at this time, it does not mean that their nonstate 

proxies would hesitate to use these dangerous weapons. 

It is already estimated that Hezbollah has 100,000 missiles and 

rockets capable of striking anywhere in Israel. As Iran continues 

6

to develop its missile capabilities, Hezbollah is the natural beneficiary. 

Should Israel encounter another conflict with Hezbollah precision 

missiles could do incredible damage. Last year, the Times of Israel 

reported on a story from Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency 

which claimed the IRGC delivered a new class of missiles to 

Hezbollah with ranges of 250 to 350 kilometers and which can fit 

a 500 kilogram warhead. 

An IRGC brigadier general told the news agency that the new 

missiles will allow Hezbollah to hit any place in Israel ‘‘including 

targets in the south of the occupied territory.’’

He was also quoted as saying the Israel nuclear facility at 

Dimona is an easy target and Israeli missile experts quoted in the 

same report claimed that this class of missiles will be five times 

more accurate than the scuds Hezbollah had fired in the past. 

Further, with reports of Iran mending its relations with Hamas, 

have any new advanced missile transfers taken place between 

these two bad actors or with Iran’s more closely tied Gaza proxy, 

Islamic jihad. 

I would note that this is yet another reason that our joint missile 

defense cooperation with Israel receives such broad support from 

Congress and the administration. Iran’s unwavering support for 

the brutal Assad regime also calls into question whether Iran and 

Syria have continued cooperation on ballistic missiles. 

I also worry that even the mere perception of advanced ballistic 

missile capabilities could embolden Iran’s behavior. However, Iran 

does not currently possess advanced missile defense systems which 

could deter it from any regional provocations. 

This is all the more reason that it is imperative that Russia does 

not proceed with the sale of the S–300 missile defense system to 

Iran and the administration must continue to make clear that that 

sale cannot proceed. 

We must also continue to increase our cooperation and interoperability with our Gulf partners to ensure that they have adequate 

defense systems against these threats. And as we increase our 

presence in the Gulf, I would ask our panel what threat do Iran’s 

current ballistic missile capabilities pose to our own assets in the 

region. 

So to circle back where I began, we have been focused on the nuclear issue. But whether or not a deal is reached at the end of this 

month should have no bearing on the continued international sanctions on Iran’s missile development. 

I was disturbed by a U.N. report made public yesterday that despite Iran having a known illicit procurement network with continued activities often reported in the press, no new sanctions violations have been reported to the U.N. by any member countries. 

Furthermore, the Associated Press reported this morning that 

the United States might consider ballistic missile sanctions to be 

nuclear-related sanctions, therefore creating the possibility that 

these two could be lifted in a nuclear deal. 

That is extremely disturbing. I would just like to quote the article, Madam Chairman, in which officials say the administration 

can meet its obligations because of how it interprets nuclear sanctions. 

7

For example, they say measures designed to stop Iran from acquiring ballistic missiles are nuclear related because they were imposed to push Iran into the negotiations. Also, they say sanctions 

that may appear nonnuclear are often undergirded by previous actions conceived as efforts to stop Iran’s nuclear program. 

We know that our sanctions regime is complex, but now to say 

that ballistic missile sanctions were simply a tool to get Iran to the 

negotiating table as was suggested by an unnamed administration 

official would be a grave mistake. 

And to the article’s anonymous administration official I would 

say that these ballistic missile sanctions must be—remain in place 

and they must be enforced. 

With or without nuclear weapons, this remains an extraordinarily dangerous regime and allowing it to develop advanced missile technology risks continued destabilization of the entire Middle 

East. 

And I look forward to our witnesses’ views on whether they share 

my serious concerns and I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I share them. Thank you so much, Mr. 

Deutch. 

I am now pleased to recognize the members for 1-minute opening 

statements and we will begin with Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for having this important hearing on the ballistic missile threat in Iran. Your leadership for America makes a difference along with Chairman Ed 

Royce, and I am very grateful to see the bipartisan support that 

we have this morning on the concerns about the threats to the people of—throughout the Middle East, Central Asia and southeastern 

Europe. 

Their capabilities with potential nuclear weapons and long-range 

ballistic missiles threaten our allies in the region, especially Israel, 

with the regime’s goal of death to Israel, death to America. 

The murderous philosophy of the Iranian regime has not changed 

since Iran’s leaders murdered 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut in 1983. 

The American people know the Iranian government, which subjugates its own people, cannot be trusted. 

The President continues to ignore the glaring realities of the 

threat that Iran poses to American families and to neighboring 

countries of the Persian Gulf. 

I believe a nuclear Iran, along with long-range ballistic missiles, 

would be catastrophic and the President should change course. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

The nuclear negotiations with Iran have focused primarily on 

material and infrastructure, and when you look at the fact that 

Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistics missile program in 

the entire Middle East you can’t ignore the fact that that is a fundamental piece of the nuclear infrastructure as it is the most reliable means to deliver a nuclear weapon. 

So I think it is very, very important that this committee delve 

deeply into this issue and take advantage of the expertise that we 

8

have here so that we can refute any efforts to decouple these two 

issues because I think any review of the ballistics missile program, 

which dates back prior to the Iranian revolution in 1979 when in 

fact it was Israel and Iran that collaborated in the first ballistics 

missile program, Iran had provided the money and Israel had provided the technology when the United States refused to sell them 

Lance missiles. 

So there is a lot to study here and I am hopeful that the panel 

can help the committee determine, you know, a course of action 

here that is constructive. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. Trott is recognized. 

Mr. TROTT. I want to begin by thanking the chairwoman and 

ranking member for holding this timely hearing. As we approach 

the June 30th deadline it is important for Congress to be as informed as possible regarding Iran’s stockpile of weapons. 

Most experts agree that Iran has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, most of it coming from another rogue 

country, North Korea. 

Senior U.S. intelligence officials have consistently warned about 

Iran’s potential to deliver weapons of mass destruction with these 

missiles. Yet, when the administration got to the bargaining table 

they made concessions and decided not to include the ballistic missile program in the Joint Plan of Action. 

As recently as last week the Pentagon reported that Iran continues to develop ballistic missile technology that will undoubtedly 

be used for nuclear weapons. 

If Iran were to successfully engineer a nuclear warhead at one 

of their various covert facilities, the ballistic missiles would enable 

them to attach a warhead and put our closest ally, Israel, at significant risk. 

Even without a nuclear warhead, Iran’s arsenal of ballistic missiles can be used as an intimidation tool against vulnerable countries in the region. 

I look forward to hearing the witnesses’ testimonies today and I 

for one do not believe Iran will change. An America projecting 

weakness will not create stability and only exacerbates a problem 

that already threatens our security and the security of our friends. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. Meng of New York. 

Mr. Connolly, a former Senate staffer——

Mr. CONNOLLY. You knew that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That is why I overlooked you. You know how 

we treat our staffers. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I know, but I have converted. I am a House guy. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you to the 

panel for being here. This is, really, a critical conversation and 

there are some questions I hope we get answers to during the 

course of this conversation. 

What is your assessment of the nature of the threat? How serious is it and what is the time frame associated with it? What is 

our power to deter that threat? 

9

We give flowery speeches up here and passionate speeches but 

sometimes we don’t accept the fact that America’s ability to influence things and control things is limited. What are the incentives 

on Iran to desist? 

Do we have any and how well might they work? What does it 

mean in the region in terms of escalation? If they develop a ballistic missile capability that is precise, what pressure does that put 

on others in the region like the Saudis to do likewise? 

And then finally, how well is this issue addressed or will be addressed in the proposed agreement—nuclear agreement with Iran? 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I look forward to the answers. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and I apologize again, Mr. 

Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No problem. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I know that Mr. Brooks and Mr. 

DeSantis will wait for the question and answer period so we will 

go to Mr. Zeldin of New York. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I appreciate 

you having this important hearing, also to Chairman Royce and 

Ranking Member Deutch. 

We have a very distinguished panel today of witnesses. As a 

former Army military intelligence officer stationed in Fort 

Huachuca, Arizona while Lieutenant General Flynn was there—I 

thank you for your service and it is good to have you here. 

The is a very timely topic because I think for constituents like 

mine and all across America if an announcement is made that a 

deal is reached, Americans are going to want to make a decision 

for themselves as to whether or not it was a good deal or a bad 

deal and they want to know more as to what exactly to look for. 

So, hopefully, in the dialogue today and the questions and answers this provides an opportunity not just for Members of Congress to understand more of what to look for in analyzing a potential deal with Iran but also assisting our constituents so that they 

understand just how real this threat is and what is absolutely necessary to tackle these challenges. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Zeldin. 

Ms. Meng of New York. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member, for 

calling this important hearing and to all our distinguished witnesses for being with us today. 

Iran’s development of its ballistic missile program, its acquisition 

of new SME batteries, its widespread support for terrorism and its 

arming of Hamas and Hezbollah with potent new weapons, 

amongst many other nefarious activities, pose serious threats to 

the security of America and our allies. 

Yet all of these issues are outside the scope of the nuclear negotiations and if they are going to remain such then we should support our friends in ways that are also outside the scope of negotiations. 

The U.S. should consider transferring massive ordnance 

penetrators, otherwise known as the 30,000-pound bunker buster 

bombs and the planes to deliver them, to Israel. In the face of the 

10

grave Iranian threat, let us provide adequate means of deterrence 

to Israel, our most trustworthy friend and ally in the Middle East. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Meng, and I would like to 

thank the gentleman from Alabama who was here with us for the 

opening statements, Mr. Rogers, chairman of the Strategic Forces 

Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee for being with us 

for the start of the hearing. 

Thank you so much to all of our members and now I am pleased 

to recognize our panelists. First, we are pleased to welcome General Michael Flynn. 

General Flynn served in the United States Army for 33 years 

and almost 1 year ago retired from his previous post as director of 

the Defense Intelligence Agency. Thank you, General, for being 

with us and for your distinguished and meritorious service to our 

nation. 

Second, we welcome Ambassador Robert Joseph. He is a senior 

scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy. Previously, Ambassador Joseph served as the United States special envoy for nuclear nonproliferation and under secretary of state for arms control 

and international security. Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. 

Next, we welcome Dr. David Cooper who is the James Forrestal 

Chair of the U.S. Naval War College, Department of National Security Affairs. Dr. Cooper has served in the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense as director of nonproliferation policy. 

And last, we welcome back a good friend of our subcommittee, 

Dr. Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh Burke Chair in strategy at 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

Previously, Dr. Cordesman served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as the 

director of policy and planning at the Department of Energy. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us. Your prepared statements will be made a part of the record. Please feel free to summarize. Thank you. 

General, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL T. FLYNN, 

USA, RETIRED (FORMER DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY) 

General FLYNN. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and 

Madam Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member Deutch, 

members of the joint committee, and I really do appreciate all of 

your statements. I think you really truly understand the challenges 

that we are facing. 

Thanks for the opportunity to present my views on Iran’s missile 

capabilities and how they impact regional as well as global issues 

now and in the future. 

These will directly and negatively impact the United States national security unless we develop a long-term strategy for our nation. 

There is just no way around it. Our closed 20th century bureaucratic system appears unable to adapt to the rapid and complex 

changes in threats we face in the 21st century, especially those occurring throughout the Middle East and the wider trans region. 

11

These problems are exacerbated from an ever expanding influence by the following—number one, the negative behavior and expanding influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran; number two, the 

increasing complexity in Iraq and Syria with absolutely no end in 

sight and no clear U.S. policy; number three, the new Middle East 

struggling to be born, and if we are not careful the United States 

will be left out of the growth of this region and our security at 

home will be placed at further risk; number four, the unfinished 

revolutions in places such as Yemen and parts of Africa and our 

ongoing transition in Afghanistan are all being taken advantage of 

by Iran, ISIS and al-Qaeda; number five, the resurgence of Russian 

and Chinese influence in the region, especially in the nuclear energy acquisition and development arenas, weapons proliferation 

and economic dominance, all clearly impacting the security of our 

country. 

Not only do these impact our security at home but they also impact our allies and friends in the region, most important, the state 

of Israel. 

Specifically focusing on the expanding Iranian missile program 

or missile development program and failing to acknowledge the frequent warnings from our intelligence community, especially defense intelligence, regarding the hegemonic behaviors of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran’s missile program is growing far 

stronger. 

Before I address a few solutions about what to do about their 

missile program I want to offer some things that I know, things 

that I believe and things that I don’t know but suspect and there 

are many in my full statement that I provided to the committee. 

Number one, to begin with, the nuclear deals that will likely be 

concluded this summer suffers from severe deficiencies, as you 

have all highlighted. Number two, Iran has every intention to build 

an ICBM and a nuclear weapons program. 

Number three, Iran’s stated desire to destroy Israel is very real. 

We have to take that very seriously. Number four, Iran killed or 

maimed thousands of Americans and Iraqis during our fight in Iraq 

during the period of 2003 to 2011 and despite our joint efforts to 

win the fight in Iraq this has all now been squandered. 

Number five, the ability to have real eyes on the state of Iranian 

nuclear development to include their missile program is nearly impossible. Six, Iran’s nuclear program has significant and not fully 

disclosed military dimensions including the warhead miniaturization blueprints. 

Number seven, I believe that Iran’s overarching strategic goals 

of enhancing its security, prestige and regional influence give it the 

ability to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. 

Number eight, I believe that Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons. Number nine, I know Iran possesses a substantial inventory of theater 

ballistic missiles capable of reaching parts of southeastern Europe 

today. 

Number ten, I know Iran is developing increasingly sophisticated 

missiles and improving the range and accuracy of its other missile 

systems. It is clear that the nuclear deal is not a permanent fix but 

merely a placeholder. 

12

The 10-year time frame only makes sense if the administration 

truly believes the Iranian regime will change its strategic course. 

Just as the spiralling down of the entire region is unlikely to 

change, believing Iran will change its strategic course is also wishful thinking. 

As the Washington Post editorialists have said, regime change in 

Tehran is the best way to stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The same applies to their missile arsenal which is of high 

quality and growing. 

Even today, their missiles cover most of the Middle East and the 

next generation will include ICBMs capable of attacking the American homeland. 

Just look at the cooperation with North Korea, China and Russia. Connect those dots and you get the outline of a global alliance 

aimed at the United States and our friends and allies. 

Russian assistance, North Korean cooperation and deep involvement by the Chinese and Iran are all part of a broader pattern. 

And finally, the U.S. intelligence community’s record in tracking 

clandestine nuclear weapons programs has been decidedly mixed. 

For instance, the U.S. had suspected for well over a decade that 

North Korea had a uranium enrichment program but did not learn 

about that—its centrifuge plan at Yongbyon until the plant was actually shown visibly to a delegation of former U.S. officials in 2010. 

The U.S. did not learn about the reactor that North Korea was 

building in eastern Syria—the al-Kibar site—until it was close to 

completion in 2007. 

The U.S. intelligence community did not become aware until 

nearly 4 years later that Iran had apparently suspended its structured weaponization program in 2003. 

The U.S. did not learn about Iran’s enrichment plans at Natanz 

or Fordow until several years after work on each had commenced, 

albeit several years before each became operational. 

Other examples include Iraq prior to ’91, South Africa in 1993 

and the A.Q. Khan network operating for well over a decade. Moreover, a recent Defense Science Board study of nuclear monitoring 

and verification technologies concluded that technologies and processes designed for current treaty verification and inspections are 

inadequate to future monitoring realities such as identifying small 

or nascent nuclear programs. 

This seems to imply that creative missile and nuclear proliferation would enjoy an advantage in the cat and mouse game that 

they are playing with the United States and the international community. 

There are a number of things that the international community 

can do. For instance, immediately direct Iran to open up all of its 

facilities—scientific, military and current nuclear facilities—for 

international inspections. 

Two would be the U.S. must take a more active role in the region 

for what will be a race for nuclearization, preferring energy development over weaponization. 

Number three, provide and/or demand greater authorities for all 

elements of U.S. national power to defeat the Islamic radicals we 

now call the Islamic State. 

13

Put them out of business, or seek and appoint leaders regionally, 

internationally and right here at home, give them the right and appropriate authorities that can actually accomplish the strategic objectives that we see. 

Immediately recognize, fully support, help organize and assist 

those regional partners create an Arab NATO-like structure and 

framework. 

Help build an Arab army that is able to secure their regional responsibilities. Clearly define and recognize that we face a very 

radicalized element in the likes of Islamic extremism, Sunni and 

Shi’a. 

The administration’s refusal to state what we can plainly see is 

beyond irresponsible and ranges on being dangerous for the longterm security of the United States. 

So what will the overall threat environment look like with regard 

to Iran and its expansion of its missile program? We should expect 

a far more aggressive Iran as it relates to the Gulf both overtly and 

covertly and one that will likely remain militarily engaged for the 

foreseeable future. 

While the sectarian angle is likely to limit Iran’s ability to support Sunni proxies and thereby limit their ability to project power, 

the ISIL crisis has created a significant cadre of Shi’a jihadists that 

can and will support Iran’s policies through means fair and foul. 

If Iran is able to contain and defeat ISIL and subjugate through 

proxies large portions of Iraq Sunni population, we should expect 

a whole host of initiatives intended to limit and eliminate Iranian 

influence by both state and private actors as is now occurring in 

Yemen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. General, if we could ask you to wrap it up. 

General FLYNN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

General FLYNN. I will wrap it up here. My bottom line is that 

I am assuming that the nuclear deal is going to be done and I 

think what we have to realize practically is that we have a country 

that we are dealing with that the rest of the region and the reasons 

why we have been dealing with them—the rest of the region has 

lost trust and faith in the United States of America and that is 

very real, and I think the latest GCC summit was a real example. 

It was a leaderless summit for a very specific reason and it was 

because the region just doesn’t trust us and actually the region is 

more concerned about Iranian hegemonic behavior and gaining 

massive influence in the entire region than they are right now 

about Iran developing a nuclear weapon. 

Now, the development of a nuclear weapon and its ballistic missile component is something that I firmly believe is going to happen and we just don’t have that kind of track record in the past 

for tracking that. 

So, Madam Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me to 

make some statements here and I look forward to questions. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Flynn follows:]

14


94941a-1.eps
15


94941a-2.eps
16


94941a-3.eps
17


94941a-4.eps
18


94941a-5.eps
19


94941a-6.eps
20


94941a-7.eps
21


94941a-8.eps
22


94941a-9.eps
23


94941a-10.eps
24


94941a-11.eps
25


94941a-12.eps
26


94941a-13.eps
27

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, General, and you honor 

us with your presence. Thank you. 

Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT JOSEPH, PH.D., 

SENIOR SCHOLAR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY) 

Mr. JOSEPH. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Deutch, other distinguished members. Thank you for the invitation to testify today. 

In my prepared statement I highlight a number of observations 

about Iran’s ballistic missile threat. Here I would just reinforce the 

point that Iran’s ballistic missiles are tools of coercion designed for 

strategic effect and as such I would emphasize the nexus between 

Iran’s ballistic missiles and its nuclear program. 

In a strategic context, a nuclear front end would add tremendously to the coercive effect of Iran’s missiles. In an operational 

context, nuclear warheads would be the primary and, in my view, 

the only feasible payload for its longer range missiles. 

And for these reasons I believe it is analytically flawed to assess 

the missile threat in isolation from the nuclear negotiations. The 

stated goal of the P5+1 has evolved from denying Iran a nuclear 

weapons capability to temporarily extending the breakout time—a 

change that recognizes Iran as a nuclear weapons threshold state. 

So even in the unlikely circumstance that all U.S. negotiating 

goals are met after the restrictions are lifted in 10 or more years, 

Iran would again possess the capacity to break out within a few 

months or even weeks, and that is the best case. In fact, the missile nuclear relationship is critical in any near-term breakout scenario. 

For this reason, failure to limit ballistic missiles must be considered one of several central flaws in the emerging agreement. 

One argument used to justify excluding missiles is that if Iran’s 

nuclear weapons capability is precluded by the agreement, the 

threat of a nuclear-tipped missile goes away. 

There are a number of assumptions on which this argument is 

based. It assumes that permitting a large-scale enrichment capability is compatible with the goal of denying Iran a nuclear weapon. 

It assumes that the 12-month breakout time is meaningful. It assumes effective verification and it assumes that the international 

community will respond to cheating before Iran can mate a nuclear 

weapon to a missile. 

In my view, none of these assumptions hold up under scrutiny. 

Any agreement that allows Iran to continue to build its missile 

force while permitting it to maintain and in fact expand its nuclear 

capability will have severe negative consequences for the United 

States and our friends and allies. 

The threat to U.S. forces, to the U.S. homeland, to our NATO 

and Gulf allies and to Israel will increase, not decrease, under the 

anticipated agreement. 

Another consequence of a bad agreement is the increased prospect for proliferation. One likely result will be decisions by other 

states to acquire a similar capability. 

28

These states—Saudi Arabia, perhaps Turkey, perhaps Egypt and 

others—will want to ensure that they are not one step behind Iran 

unleashing the proliferation dynamic. And an agreement that effectively provides a stamp of approval for Iran’s nuclear activities will 

only give encouragement to other proliferators. 

Finally, because missiles are excluded at Iran’s insistence, the 

message to other rogue states will be that we are not serious about 

imposing costs for missile proliferation. 

This could be a further incentive for those states seeking weapons of mass destruction to acquire ballistic missiles as a means of 

delivery. For Iran, it could encourage even closer cooperation with 

North Korea on missile technology and perhaps in the nuclear 

weapons field. 

With tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief, Iran will have 

access to more resources for more missiles, for other weapons and 

for more terrorist activities. That agreement will result in a less 

stable and more dangerous world. 

I have four recommendations for congressional action. One, if 

there is an agreement—if one is reached, vote on it and reject it 

if is a bad agreement. I think the metrics are clear. Just ask yourself, does the agreement deny Iran a nuclear weapons capability? 

Does the agreement extend the breakout time in a meaningful 

way? Is the agreement verifiable? Is there a phased relief of sanctions and are there guaranteed snap back provisions and I think 

for each of these questions the answer is, clearly, no. 

Second, to the extent that it can be done, tie incremental sanctions relief to the fulfilment of Iran’s commitments. Third, establish 

a Team B of nonpartisan experts to assess Iran’s compliance. 

And four, move forward with funding for missile defenses against 

the emerging Iranian nuclear armed ICBM class missile threat. 

Let me just sum up by saying that I come at these issues from 

a nonproliferation perspective. In my view, if there is an agreement 

along the lines that has been described by the White House and 

by the Iranian leadership, I believe it will represent perhaps the 

single greatest strategic mistake in the national security area in 

the past 35-plus years of my career, and this includes some real 

blunders. 

Desert One in 1980, the North Korea agreed framework in 1994 

and, more recently, Russia reset and the Syria CW red line debacle. There is no doubt that some will describe the agreement as historic. 

You can expect that from the White House. You can expect that 

from the New York Times and it will be historic. It will be a historic blunder. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joseph follows:]

29


94941b-1.eps
30


94941b-2.eps
31


94941b-3.eps
32


94941b-4.eps
33


94941b-5.eps
34


94941b-6.eps
35


94941b-7.eps
36


94941b-8.eps
37

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

Dr. Cooper. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID A. COOPER, PH.D., JAMES V. FORRESTAL PROFESSOR AND CHAIR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

Mr. COOPER. Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch, other distinguished members of the committee, thank you for having me 

and I look forward to briefly summarizing a few key points from 

my written statement, which I should note are solely my own. 

In my statement, I note four problematic implications of not including missiles in the emergent nuclear deal with Iran being negotiated by the P5+1. 

One, most fundamentally is raising troubling questions about 

Iranian intentions and this is to a point that has been made by a 

number of you already and that is that there is a very close correlation between longer range, meaning intermediate range and beyond ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons power ambitions. 

And so at this moment, Iran is the only country in the world that 

says it has no nuclear weapons ambitions and yet has fielded an 

intermediate range ballistic missile. 

The second is verification. Verification is something where historically we have had a lot of experience using delivery systems in 

particular missiles as an object of verification and have shown that 

it is possible to have very strong confidence in the ability to verify 

agreements that include provisions with restrictions and transparency on such systems in contrast to a very patchy record of 

verification in terms of verifying nuclear fuel cycles and weapons 

programs per se. 

The third is breakout. It has been noted that nuclear weapons 

programs are a long-term process, but even more so ballistic missile programs. 

In this respect, I should say many horses are already out of this 

barn but there’s still an ICBM horse in the barn, at least for now, 

and that ICBM horse may well be the long pole in the Iranian tent 

in terms of being able to break out and become a full scope nuclear 

power. 

And finally, undermining missile nonproliferation, and this has 

been said and I would reinforce what has been said it is going to 

be challenging if Iran is perceived to be given a clean bill of nuclear 

nonproliferation health through this agreement to preserve the nuclear—excuse me, the missile nonproliferation regime which we 

have traditionally so associated with nuclear weapons. 

And indeed, it has been an Iranian goal for decades to undermine 

the legitimacy of the very concept of missile nonproliferation. 

So it will be a tremendous challenge if this agreement goes 

through to preserve a robust missile nonproliferation regime 

against Iran and, indeed, more widely. 

Let me summarize by saying there are three acknowledged pillars to what a safer nuclear program looks like from a nonproliferation standard—one, no indigenous enrichment or reprocessing; two, 

open transparency including full disclosure and resolution of past 

activities and an additional protocol in place with the IAEA; and 

38

three, no associated weapons programs and in particular longrange ballistic missiles. 

The prospective P5+1 deal may prove to be a negative trifecta in 

all three of these areas. However, the ballistic missile area is the 

only one that it does not appear to even attempt to address and 

that, I would say, again, is a very worrying indication that should 

raise questions. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:]

39


94941c-1.eps
40


94941c-2.eps
41


94941c-3.eps
42


94941c-4.eps
43


94941c-5.eps
44


94941c-6.eps
45

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Dr. Cooper. 

Dr. Cordesman. 

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, PH.D., ARLEIGH A. 

BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. CORDESMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and the members of the committee. A lot of very good points have already been 

raised. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could hold up your mic—put your 

microphone a little closer. 

Mr. CORDESMAN. Members of the committee and the previous 

witnesses have already raised a number of very good issues. But 

I would like to briefly talk about Iranian motivation. 

It is important to remember this is a country coming out of missile wars with Iraq—the so-called war of the cities—and I was in 

Iraq when I saw the Iranian side of this. 

It is also a matter of a feeling of isolation, of having been attacked with chemical weapons, of seeing weapons of mass destruction as real, as something that affected troops and civilians. 

They look around and they see a very well developed Israeli nuclear missile force. Pakistan—a Saudi missile force with Chinesesupplied missiles. They also see a rising confrontation between 

Sunni and Shi’ite—extremism of a Sunni kind counting extremism 

if their own kind. 

And you look at this environment and you ask yourself are you 

going to be moving toward stability with or without a nuclear 

agreement. And you look at the history of START, of SALT, of our 

efforts to negotiate with North Korea. In every case, it turned into 

an ongoing duel. That duel is not ended with Russia. It still is a 

problem where we have not brought stability or security through 

the arms control alone. 

The other side of this from an Iranian viewpoint is that most of 

the conventional forces are old. Many were essentially systems 

which were, again, to be deployed when I was serving in Iran. That 

was back in the early 1970s. 

They do not have an effective conventional force. They do have 

a very effective asymmetric warfare force. As has already been 

said, they can reach out very effectively to other countries and they 

are doing that in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon. 

These are very real issues and one of the key aspects of being 

able to use those tools is to have the ability to deter retaliation air 

strikes and capabilities which their air force and other forces can’t 

provide. 

The problem they face is, frankly, much of their missile force 

from short to long range may on paper have accuracy but in practice it is not reliable, it does not deliver accuracy in a form where 

a conventional warhead can be lethal except as an area strike 

weapon and a terror weapon. 

Israelis have warned us this is changing in the short-range dimension. It is technically far harder to produce real-world conventional precision strike capability than often people seem to understand technically and twice we had to deploy systems knowingly 

46

that had nuclear warheads with conventional capabilities we 

claimed that did not exist. 

So that leads, I think, to my tangible suggestions to the committee. First, do not take any of the reporting you hear on a technical basis for granted. 

Quite frankly, if you don’t, and General Flynn hinted at this, 

bring together intelligence experts versus policy spokesmen with 

people who actually have Q clearances and know about weapons 

design and actually work on missile design you can get advice and 

technical data which is largely a matter of speculation. 

So one of the key issues is how far has Iran moved toward a nuclear and precision strike option, and we have not seen a clear 

statement of this. 

Second, how well can you really verify missile and nuclear weapons progress in the future? I see two great dangers here. One, speculation on missiles based on the technical data of the guidance 

platform—this has never been a measure of real-world capability. 

You either know what the actual test data and derived aim point 

is or you don’t. The guidance platform accuracy does not tell you 

real-world performance. Second, there is a very wide range of nuclear weapons development activities which are extremely easy to 

conceal. Pakistan did that, and you ought to look at that model and 

not simply look—and I think witnesses have suggested this—at the 

fuel cycle. 

What do we really know about the statements they have had access to nuclear weapons design data? And here, having worked on 

this for DARPA, let me say that there are many people who talk 

about the ease of nuclear weapons design who are doing it on the 

basis of no practical experience whatsoever. 

You either have a Q clearance or you don’t. There is only one 

kind of expert in this business and that is somebody who has actually built a nuclear weapon, and even there the agreements are not 

common. 

Second, if you don’t have a limit to ballistic and cruise missile 

capabilities, and be careful here about cruise missiles, because they 

announced in March of this year a missile called the Soumar—a 

cruise missile supposedly precision strike—with a range of 2,000 

kilometers. 

And just to put this in perspective, they have also launched scud 

missiles from ships. So ICBMs is only part of this issue. In terms 

of any of this, can you really put a nuclear warhead on a missile 

without a fissile test? 

How much simulation can you actually carry out? How many 

missile tests do you need to get a derived aim point? And here 

again, if I were in the committee and somebody briefed me on guidance platform accuracy I would become very impatient. 

There is a need for real-world examination of what the issues 

are. If there are nuclear agreements, and this has been raised by 

the committee, what kind of technology transfers will be opened up 

and what kind of technology transfers matter? And these are not 

always obvious, since many of them are dual use. 

I think the mention has been made of North Korea. Let me note 

without getting into the details that there have been other experts 

47

who have commented that North Korea is actually beginning to 

learn solid fuel technology in part from Iran. 

And these are areas where you need to look at the full rate of 

technology transfer as well as illegal purchases by Iran. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Cordesman. 

I hate to be impatient myself but if you could wrap it up. 

Mr. CORDESMAN. Right. Let me just finish with two points. 

First, what are we—what are our response options if things go 

wrong? That is a kind of obvious question to answer if you are 

going to have an arms control agreement. 

And then finally, don’t focus too much on Iran. If you have this 

in parallel with North Korea, with China, which has recently been 

stated to be MIRVing and creating a submarine launch capability, 

intentions in Russia and you are trying to think out of the box, 

what is the nuclear future threat we really have to deter and deal 

with? And let me just say it isn’t Russia anymore. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cordesman follows:]

48


94941d-1.eps
49


94941d-2.eps
50


94941d-3.eps
51


94941d-4.eps
52


94941d-5.eps
53


94941d-6.eps
54


94941d-7.eps
55


94941d-8.eps
56


94941d-9.eps
57


94941d-10.eps
58


94941d-11.eps
59


94941d-12.eps
60


94941d-13.eps
61


94941d-14.eps
62


94941d-15.eps
63


94941d-16.eps
64


94941d-17.eps
65


94941d-18.eps
66


94941d-19.eps
67


94941d-20.eps
68


94941d-21.eps
69


94941d-22.eps
70


94941d-23.eps
71


94941d-24.eps
72


94941d-25.eps
73


94941d-26.eps
74


94941d-27.eps
75


94941d-28.eps
76


94941d-29.eps
77


94941d-30.eps
78


94941d-31.eps
79


94941d-32.eps
80


94941d-33.eps
81


94941d-34.eps
82


94941d-35.eps
83


94941d-36.eps
84


94941d-37.eps
85


94941d-38.eps
86


94941d-39.eps
87


94941d-40.eps
88


94941d-41.eps
89


94941d-42.eps
90


94941d-43.eps
91


94941d-44.eps
92


94941d-45.eps
93


94941d-46.eps
94


94941d-47.eps
95


94941d-48.eps
96


94941d-49.eps
97


94941d-50.eps
98


94941d-51.eps
99


94941d-52.eps
100


94941d-53.eps
101


94941d-54.eps
102


94941d-55.eps
103

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Dr. Cordesman, and we 

will start the question and answer part of it. 

Listening to this expert testimony brings to light the concerns 

that many of us have with the nuclear negotiations because of 

what is not in the deal—the failure to incorporate Iran’s ballistic 

missile program as part of the nuclear negotiations. We now face 

the nonproliferation concerns in the region as a result of this nuclear deal and as a result of ignoring the ballistic missile threat 

and the lifting of all of the sanctions at the U.N., which will impact 

Iran’s other illicit activities and will bolster the regime’s pockets 

and will continue to attack U.S. interests as a result. 

So with that in mind, my one question is can we fully understand the scope of Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear program 

without addressing the outstanding possible military dimension 

questions and will we ever know fully the extent of the PMD aspect 

of it? 

General Flynn. 

General FLYNN. And I will just—I will be very brief. 

So the latter part of your question, I don’t think we can ever fully 

understand. We will never have perfect, you know, what I call bulletproof intelligence on the capability that you just described. 

I do believe that as they move forward with this capability they 

will not risk failure without testing themselves through either, you 

know, actual physical testing of the capability itself by firing it in 

the region and also simulation components of testing. 

So I think we would see some of that, particularly if they decided 

to match an ICBM with a nuclear capability. 

So we would see some of that because they just would not risk 

failure of the system by just, you know, inadvertently launching 

something like that. So we would see some but we would never 

know the full extent of it. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Ambassador. 

Mr. JOSEPH. Thank you. I think the IAEA has done a—served an 

invaluable purpose for providing information and insights on the 

Iranian program. 

In November 2011, they identified in their quarterly report 12 of 

these activities that are potentially related to a military dimension 

and in fact some of those activities including the design on a warhead for a missile are only related to weaponization. Since then, as 

you point out, the IAEA has been stonewalled by the Iranians. 

Iran has made repeated promises that they would come clean. 

Apparently, what is being negotiated now—I don’t know what the 

final text will be, of course—but apparently we are going to accept 

yet another promise that they will come clean on these issues. 

My sense is in order to understand the 12-month extension of or 

expansion for breakout you need to understand where that baseline 

knowledge is and a critical component of that is how far Iran has 

come along on weaponization. 

We are just going to get one more promise and my expectation 

will be that the Iranians will stonewall, and let me say this is not 

just an IAEA implementation problem. This is a problem that directly relates to U.S. security. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

104

Dr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you. Obviously, I will defer to General Flynn 

and Ambassador Joseph in their comments with which I very much 

agree. 

I would make one other observation. I have approached this having been, as it were, in the trenches of this business for a couple 

of decades and one thing I have experienced is that when a country 

has had nuclear weapons ambitions and makes a strategic decision 

to change course and to give them up. 

It is, in my experience, surprisingly easy for them to demonstrate 

that convincingly. That is not what this looks like. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. Cordesman. 

Mr. CORDESMAN. First question—who is we? Because if we can’t 

bring the P5+1 and the EU and other countries along with us with 

convincing arguments about violation, if verification is not transparent, having an internal U.S. understanding will not be enough. 

Second, the IAEA only can report to the extent that we and other 

countries report to them and they can gain the data through inspection. Inspection is not an all-source approach to verification. 

The limits are extremely sharp. So one key question is exactly 

what will the U.S. effort be and the allied effort be to actually support the answer to your question. 

Finally, no, of course, we can’t fully understand it but we also 

need to be very careful about two things. First, their program is 

very marginal and very volatile yet may not be predictable to them. 

In fact, it almost certainly won’t be predictable to them. 

And finally, technicians and technocrats lie to autocratic leaders 

and one of the great questions is going to be what level of risk and 

uncertainty is going to take place within Iran and how well will 

they understand because that cruise missile I talked about probably was announced by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard without 

the authorization of the government and in some ways to block the 

agreement and that is not a sign of predictable unity. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, and as I recognize the 

ranking member for his question and answer period, I would like 

to ask Mr. Weber of Texas if he could take over the chair, as I have 

a speaking engagement in another building. 

Thank you so much. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

I wanted to follow up with the article that I referred to in my 

opening statement. The talks—all of these talks about the nuclear 

issue are premised upon the understanding that we have had that 

the sanctions with respect to support for terror, human rights violations and ballistic missiles—ballistic missile production will all 

remain in place. 

Suddenly, the news this morning suggests that some have a different interpretation of why those ballistic missile sanctions were 

put in place to begin with. 

And I would like to give the—our witnesses an opportunity to 

comment on this and why—and how you respond to the suggestion 

that the only reason that those sanctions were put in place was to 

get Iran to the negotiating table to talk about the nuclear issue, 

not to continue to block them from developing ballistic missiles. 

105

Dr. Cordesman. 

Mr. CORDESMAN. To be honest, I think one of the great problems 

is that sanctions don’t block technology transfer at many levels 

anyway. What they do is put leverage on Iran. 

But when it comes to many of the missile improvements these 

have taken place regardless of the limits and the existence of sanctions. 

They may have slowed down Iran and raised the cost. But as you 

pointed out when you have countries like North Korea, when you 

have an industrial espionage network you have to be very careful 

about how much of the actual technology transfer can be blocked. 

On a nuclear side, you could get a list of technologies that have 

been slowed down and presented problems. They responded in 

many ways by creating their own autonomous production capability. 

And so I think that, quite frankly, you hit on a key risk but the 

risk is not somehow that these sanctions are suddenly going to be 

raised in ways which increase the flow. 

They are going to increase, as other witnesses have said, the 

amount of money, the willingness of countries to basically ignore 

the consequence of their transfers and they remove the leverage 

from Iran to at least show some degree of restraint. 

Mr. DEUTCH. General Flynn, your thoughts on this. 

General FLYNN. Yes. Number one, I think the—I mean, once the 

sanctions are lifted and as we have seen I think since really 2013 

the genie is out of the bottle and, you know, this phrase ‘‘snap back 

sanctions’’ that is wishful thinking. 

The big challenge that I think what has happened is that when 

this discussion was going I don’t believe that the administration 

thought that this region was going to spiral in the direction that 

it has spiralled as fast as it has and I think that that is a bit—

you know, I wouldn’t say it has caught us by surprise because it 

was known. 

So that is just another component of this thing. I think the 

fourth part about—the third part about this is that the region 

should have been part of this discussion. 

So I got the P5+1 but there should have been along that path 

at least updates to the rest of the region because the fourth thing, 

and we are already seeing it happen, and the specific numbers of 

Saudi, Jordan, the UAE, Kuwait and Egypt already talking to the 

Russians and the Chinese about developing nuclear capabilities in 

their countries is a very real issue and there are specific numbers 

to exactly what they are going to do over the next decade or so. 

So we are going to see proliferation in the region because we 

just—we took this—we looked at this too narrowly from the beginning. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Can I go back to your last point about what else 

is happening in the region? And I just ask all of the witnesses to 

your knowledge have any Iranian-origin ballistic missiles or heavy 

rockets or launchers been captured at this point by ISIS or other 

extremist Sunni factions either in Syria or in Iraq? Anyone have 

any response to that—thoughts on that? 

106

Mr. CORDESMAN. I think you need to be careful because Syrian 

systems, which are virtually identical to Iranian systems, many of 

them. 

But if those transfers have occurred I can only know of one site 

where that physically the Islamic State moved in and I do not 

know whether they actually found anything. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And just, finally, a quick question about the state 

of rocket manufacturing technology in Gaza and the extent to 

which the Iranians have been able to transfer the expertise necessary to have a full-fledged rocket development program in Gaza. 

Any thoughts? No? 

General FLYNN. I will just talk, you know, from open source reporting that, you know, in total violation of sanctions and in its 

typical behavior Iran has continued to provide those capabilities, as 

one or more of the members highlighted in their statements. So 

and that continues to be a problem. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman. 

I am going to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I appreciate you here—being here and testifying on 

this important topic. It is kind of like the cat and mouse game that 

never goes away. 

General Flynn, you testified that there is no end in sight, no 

clear U.S. policy, no sufficient U.S. whole of government approach 

to address the crisis in Iraq, and just a few days ago the President 

said that also, that there was no clear—whose role is that to set 

that policy? 

Is that the military coming to us or the State Department or is 

that—should the President set a role and say this is what we are 

going to do in those negotiations? 

General FLYNN. Yes. I mean, that has got to start from the President. The President has to be very clear about what it is that we 

want to do. He has then—he then has to put the right structure, 

framework, people in place to accomplish that and I——

Mr. YOHO. Okay, and I agree with that. 

General FLYNN. Yes. I mean, I just—I was—I was stunned by his 

comment 2 days ago or 3 days ago—stunned. 

Mr. YOHO. You know, and the people that come to me they say 

it is either out of ignorance, incompetence or by the design, and I 

don’t want to get into that. But it is—it is not acceptable. 

You know, we are going into a negotiation trying to prevent that 

which we can’t instead of preparing for that which will be. They 

are going to get a nuclear weapon and we need to look at that day, 

unfortunately. 

Let me ask you, just shifting to Iran and what is going on in 

Iraq, I read a report today that Iran—the Iraqi security forces used 

Iranian military equipment to advance in Mosul, I believe it was. 

In your opinion, is it possible with Iran having equipment in 

there and they are fighting not to be coordinating with U.S. troops 

or U.S. commanders? Is it possible to have two wars being conducted by two different countries fighting a common enemy? 

107

General FLYNN. I mean—wow. We have allowed this thing to get 

so out of kilt that I—it is hard for the forces that we have. I know 

for our military commanders it is hard for them to figure out sort 

of which end is up and which direction do you want me to take 

there, Mr. President. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree. It is, like, you don’t know what the left hand 

and the right hand are doing. 

General FLYNN. Yes. So Iran is, clearly, doing the things that you 

just said and they have Shi’a proxies. They have Shi’a militia. They 

have Iraqi military forces that are aligned underneath Shi’a leaders. 

I mean, this is a real big problem and the likelihood of Iran 

dominating Iraq and the breakup of Iraq actually, I think, is very 

real. I just—I believe that we are not going to see that region go 

back to the way it was. I just don’t believe that it is going to happen. 

Mr. YOHO. Ambassador Joseph, in your opinion do you see a coalition of the Sunnis, Shia’s and the Kurds forming a united Iraq 

that will stay together or do you see more of it breaking up, as 

General Flynn said? 

Mr. JOSEPH. I agree with the general. I think you are likely to 

see more of a, you know, disillusion—more of a breakdown and less 

unity of—than some have anticipated. 

I just think that the nature of the relationship between the Shi’a 

and the Sunni is such that there is—there is no prospect, at least 

that I can see, for a peaceful resolution. 

Mr. YOHO. And I would like to see our foreign policy gravitate 

toward that and let us not forget the lonely Kurds who are out 

there and I think they all kind of want to have their own country 

is what I see and I see a resistance to that. 

Dr. Joseph, you testified that the negative consequences of failure to include missile restrictions to deal with Iran are magnified 

by other flaws and negotiating powers toward Iran including enrichment breakout and we just heard a report the other day that, 

if I understood correctly, there is 20 percent more production of 

fissible material than there was before these negotiations started. 

Do you see this as a positive outcome in the Iran nuclear negotiation? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, I think there are a number of fatal flaws in 

our position and in fact in what has already been agreed. I think 

the principal flaw is that we did permit Iran enrichment in the 

first place. 

Once you allow Iran to maintain and in fact under this agreement expand a large-scale infrastructure for enrichment, the agreement in and of itself explicitly recognizes at that point Iran as a 

nuclear weapons threshold state. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. JOSEPH. We have made concessions on verification. I do not 

believe that we are going to get what we need, which is unfettered 

anywhere anytime access to all facilities that are relevant, to all 

people that are relevant and to all records that are relevant. 

We have made concessions in other areas but I think those are 

the two principal ones. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree. 

108

Mr. Chairman, I am out of time but not questions. 

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman for yielding back. 

Mr. Connolly. Oh, I am sorry. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think Mr. Higgins is——

Mr. WEBER. There we go, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Joseph, you had made reference to the breakout capability. We are told now that if Iran wanted to they could pursue 

a nuclear weapon in a period of between 3 and 4 months. 

The framework for the agreement extends that time to at least 

a year and some say conservatively so. You reject that and why? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes, I do. I think that this notion of extending 

breakout to 12 months is another flaw. The reason is that we won’t 

know when that 12-month clock begins in all likelihood unless Iran 

decides to break out at a monitored facility. 

The Iranians have proven themselves in this context to be masters of denial and deception. My sense is we won’t know when that 

clock begins. 

Even if we knew when the clock began, does anyone really think 

that the international community will come together and have a 

determined response within that 12-month time frame? It has 

taken us over a decade to get where we are. 

And even if one assumes that we will know when the clock starts 

and the international community will come together, we don’t have 

enough knowledge to understand where Iran is starting from and 

that has to do with its stonewalling on those activities that are possibly related to military—to the military dimension. 

It has to do with what Iran will have in terms of access to the 

low-enriched fissile material that is beyond the 300 kilograms that 

Iran would be allowed to have—will they have ready access to 

that? 

Some administration spokes people say it is going to go out of 

country. That would be great. The Iranians say it won’t——

Mr. HIGGINS. But now you are getting—but you are getting to 

verification now. I just want to stay on this issue of capability relative to the reduction of infrastructure and material, and we are 

told that the combination of the two would deny Iran the ability 

to produce weapons-grade materiel because of the reduction of the 

materiel and the infrastructure. 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, that is what we are told. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Right. Okay. 

Mr. JOSEPH. That is what we are told. But let me say that if Iran 

to date does not have a covert nuclear program it would be the first 

time in 20 years. 

We keep finding elements of a covert program including enrichment facilities, as we did with Fordow. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. So let me ask you this. You know, let us say 

that there is not the ability to verify. You know, we have been told 

by the administration that this plan is based not on trust but on 

verification and what you are saying is the history of covert activity 

by the Iranian regime makes that verification impossible? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, I think that, given the absence of unfettered 

access to facilities, people and records——

109

Mr. HIGGINS. Is that issue fully resolved yet in the—in the agreement? 

Mr. JOSEPH. The Supreme Leader has said it is. I mean, he is, 

you know, just one voice—probably a very important voice in this. 

He has said that military facilities are off limits. He said that access to nuclear scientists are off limits. This is just a pattern. 

It is a pattern of deception. It is a pattern of covert activities in 

this area that Iran has demonstrated for more than 20 years. 

Mr. HIGGINS. So what would you suggest the alternative is? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, I would suggest that instead of relieving sanctions we impose even more sanctions. It was sanctions that brought 

the Iranians to the table. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Do we now keep the sanctions regime alive——

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, I think it is imperative——

Mr. HIGGINS [continuing]. If Russia and China fall off? 

Mr. JOSEPH. I think it is imperative to demonstrate U.S. leadership in order to keep those sanctions on Iran, to keep the pressure 

on Iran and to insist on those elements that would make it an acceptable agreement including effective verification, and I think 

with sanctions and with the restoration——

Mr. HIGGINS. An effective——

Mr. JOSEPH [continuing]. Of a credible option for the use of 

force——

Mr. HIGGINS. And I just want to be clear—an effective 

verification would be unfettered access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities including those that are controlled by the military? 

Mr. JOSEPH. That is an essential element of effective verification. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman for yielding back and now we 

will go to Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair and thank the panelists. 

Ambassador Joseph, you listed a series of foreign policy debacles. 

Maybe you overlooked weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the 

invasion of Iraq. Would that not be a debacle? 

Mr. JOSEPH. I think it was, certainly, an intelligence failure of 

the first order. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And would you not agree that, frankly, the occupation of Iraq was equally a debacle in that it lead to the kind of 

chaos we have been managing for more than a decade? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, I think it—I think, certainly, we have had a 

decade of chaos in Iraq, absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. But, I mean, it flows from some decisions we 

made. We didn’t put enough troops in initially under the direction 

of the then secretary of defense. We stood by while looting and 

other crimes occurred because we didn’t have enough troops to police and it wasn’t our mission. 

We de-Ba’athisized the government, making a lot of government 

bureaucrats unemployed. We disbanded the military, creating a lot 

of disgruntled human beings who were armed that led directly to 

insurgencies. Is that not correct? 

Mr. JOSEPH. I think all of those things occurred and I would say 

that compared to what I believe we are now headed into in terms 

of a bad agreement with Iran those steps, as misfortunate as they 

110

have been, would rank much lower on the scale of foreign policy 

disasters and a bad nuclear agreement. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, no, you are comparing it now to the agreement. But you listed three debacles, all of which happened to be 

under a certain political party’s administration and I would just 

commend you that there are other debacles, if we are going to get 

in that game, and the fact that you overlooked or didn’t mention 

Iraq is quite striking, since most Americans I think would agree in 

retrospect it was a debacle. 

Mr. JOSEPH. Certainly, there have been debacles under both parties——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. 

Mr. JOSEPH [continuing]. Both administrations and it wasn’t 

playing a game. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. 

Mr. JOSEPH. It was simply the sum. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. It just struck me. 

You said to my colleague that the answer, and I want to make 

sure I get this correct, what you would recommend is pull the plug 

on this agreement or vote it down and actually impose more sanctions. Is that correct? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Now, let me just, you know, play devil’s advocate 

with you for a minute, if you don’t mind. So you, obviously, believe 

that would be efficacious. That would lead to desirable things and 

block or preempt the Iranians from pursuing undesirable things. 

What if the opposite is true? What is the probability, do you 

think, that by pulling the plug and imposing more sanctions the 

Iranians conclude it is totally without merit to try to negotiate with 

the West, our P5+1 allies and partners, frankly, get the solution 

with that approach and will not cooperate with the imposition of 

more sanctions? 

Is that not a possible scenario and undesirable outcome, though 

it is a probable outcome? 

Mr. JOSEPH. It is a possible scenario, absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And—but don’t we need to weigh that before we 

take such action? I mean, don’t we have to try to weigh what is 

the greater probability, an agreement that at least retards, rolls 

back some aspects of a nuclear development program versus, you 

know, one unintended consequence of actually an acceleration of 

that because now the Iranians have concluded they have nothing 

more to lose and our allies are disillusioned with our approach? 

Mr. JOSEPH. President Obama has said repeatedly that a bad 

agreement is worse than no agreement, and my sense is we are 

headed directly toward a bad agreement. So one has to weigh that 

as well. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. But one also has to weigh the consequences 

of one’s actions and I was simply trying to engage you in okay, 

while we are weighing—I mean, if you were the NSC advisor tomorrow, you know, surely you would have to do an analysis of the 

pros and cons of each approach and the approach you have advocated for certainly is not without some risks—some very great risks 

potentially. 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, there are risks all around. 

111

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, I know. 

Mr. JOSEPH. I mean, there are risks in going forward with the 

bad agreement. I come at this, again, from a nonproliferation perspective. I think this is going to light the torch for proliferation in 

the region. 

I think that not only will you have more states in the region 

going nuclear and acquiring more and more ballistic missiles but 

you are likely to have a real negative impact on the NPT regime 

and that is something we all need to care about. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I take your point and it is a fair one. But I would 

simply suggest to you in the interest of intellectual honesty one 

needs to examine whether your approach with the best of intentions actually leads to precisely the end result you want to avoid—

massive proliferation. 

My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman. I am going to ask a couple 

of questions here. 

General Flynn, I would like to hear you weigh in on the gentleman from Virginia’s questions about the prior process of 10 

years that being a debacle and is this one worse. What say you? 

General FLYNN. Yes. I mean, I would—for Mr. Connolly, I would 

just offer that your counsel is actually very appropriate about previous decisions that we have made over the last—shoot, the last 30-

plus years of just huge strategic errors. 

I mean, and believe me, the majority of my career has been in 

that part of the world. So I don’t disagree with anything that you 

said. 

This notion of proliferation it is already happening. What I want 

this country to be able to do is I want this country to be in the 

driver’s seat, okay. So I am assuming that the deal is going to be—

going to be done, bad deal, whatever. Whatever it is, and I am assuming that. 

So, now, what I want is I want the United States of America to 

be in the driver’s seat. I don’t want Russia to be talking to Jordan 

about building nuclear plants. I don’t want the Chinese or Pakistan 

to be talking to the Saudis about building potentially 10 to 15 

plants. 

I don’t want the Russians to go over to Egypt and talk to them 

about building nuclear plants. I want—I want us to be in that driver’s seat. 

You know, Iran—you know, I could go on and on all day about 

Iran and their behavior, you know, and their lies—flat out lies—

and then their spewing of constant hatred no matter whenever 

they talk. 

I mean, it doesn’t matter whether it is a general or the ayatollah 

himself. So what you are—what you are offering and what you 

have said is exactly right. It is counsel to say okay, let us assume 

some things are going to happen. 

Let us assume this is going to occur. Now what do we do about 

it and let us project forward. Let us look forward, because I—you 

know, rhyme and verse on the decisions that go into Iraq done deal 

and where it has potentially led us today. I got it. 

But now we have to figure out what is happening and I am telling you, because I read the regional news all the time, every day, 

112

and I just came from a trip—fairly extensive trip to the Middle 

East and this was one of the big issues that came up. 

And they are already talking—I mean, you had the crown prince 

of Saudi already in Korea, already talking to the French about nuclear development. 

I mean, Jordan, one of our—I mean, probably the closest—they 

are our closest friend, right, or certainly they believe that we are 

their closest friend—they are talking to the Russians about this 

business. 

So—about nuclear development—so we have to get very, very 

smart and we have to do it very quickly because it is going to happen, be for it because it is nuclear proliferation in this region and 

it will happen. 

What we want to do is we want to keep it at the nuclear energy 

level and not nuclear weaponization level and that, to me, is something that I believe this country—our country can actually lead on 

and make happen. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, General. 

Ambassador Joseph, you said earlier in your exchange with Mr. 

Higgins that we won’t know for sure on a breakout when the clock 

begins, and is it a three—I think he asked is it a 3 or 4 months 

breakout, is it a year breakout. 

Is that really your opinion that the clock hasn’t begun on that 

breakout? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, I think my point is that we don’t know. Maybe 

it already has. But I am just looking at experiences in the proliferation/nonproliferation area. We were caught off guard by the 

timing of the Soviet first test. 

We were caught off guard by the Chinese first test—by the timing. We were caught off guard, as the chairwoman mentioned, earlier today about the uranium enrichment program in North Korea, 

and that is with advanced collection capabilities. 

We just won’t know and that is the problem here. We just don’t 

know. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, forgive me, but I think that that clock is ticking. We really don’t know, I mean, by all the testimony here today 

of all the stonewalling they have done. 

So the gentleman from Florida alluded—mentioned the 20 percent increase in fissile material. You have read those reports. Are 

they accurate, in your opinion? 

Mr. JOSEPH. I think they are accurate. They are from the IAEA, 

who monitors this and keeps very good track of it. Absolutely. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. So have you asked yourself this question—

if they have increased the fissile material by 20 percent their technology and perhaps even their infrastructure has probably been increasing and improving at the same time? 

Mr. JOSEPH. There is just no doubt it has been increasing. I 

mean, under this agreement there are no restrictions as far as I 

know on research and development of advanced centrifuges and the 

next generation is, I am told, four times more efficient than the 

previous one. 

So, you know, again, there are all of these loopholes in the arrangement as they are being worked out. 

113

Mr. WEBER. And General Flynn, you said they will—the Iranians 

will not risk failure without testing, in your earlier comments. So 

what you are saying is that at some point we are going to see them 

test an ICBM. Is that correct? 

General FLYNN. Yes. I absolutely believe that they will do that. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

General FLYNN. They will—they will test. Whether they actually 

move to nuclearization of that capability they—we will eventually 

see them doing some of that and they have already taken some 

steps to do that. 

Mr. WEBER. So don’t they have—wouldn’t you imagine that they 

have that same calculus and when they do that testing they better 

be very, very close to their breakout. Would you agree with that? 

General FLYNN. Yes, I would. I mean, all you have to do is look 

at the North Korea example. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Ambassador Joseph, would you agree with 

that as well? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes, fully agree. 

Mr. WEBER. Dr. Cooper, would you agree with that? 

Mr. COOPER. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Dr. Cordesman? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. Quite frankly, no. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Fair enough. 

Mr. CORDESMAN. I mean, technically warhead design is very different from how you are defining breakout and you have to make 

a very clear distinction between having a nuclear device or event. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, but you also said—forgive me for interrupting—that what did you say, technocrats lie to—technicians and 

technocrats lie to autocrats. And so if they have misled us up to 

this point, and I get that there is a technological difference in that 

design. 

But if they are going to show that they have ICBM capability I 

have to believe that they are going to be just like your three colleagues there—that they are so close they would not risk letting us 

know that they have that capability unless they were on the 

threshold, and we are just going to have—we are just going to have 

to agree to disagree about that. 

I am out of time. I appreciate your response. And I am going to 

go to the gentleman, Mr. Mark Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to each of 

you for your testimony. 

So the Iranians have said that their nuclear advancement is for 

peaceful purposes. Is that correct? So I see nodding. Is there any 

peaceful reason to have an ICBM? Dr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you very much. 

This raises a very interesting question. The peaceful version of 

an ICBM is a space-launch vehicle. That is the dual use aspect of 

this. 

And the Iranians have been extremely cagey recently. They went 

from announcing a very ambitious space-launch program which 

was widely interpreted as a cover for an ICBM program, as has 

been mentioned. 

114

There have been a number of statements recently that suggested 

they don’t want an ICBM and even that they are modifying or even 

shutting down their space-launch program. 

I think the key here, given the intersection of space-launch technology and missile technology, this is really where we have a 

missed opportunity from this negotiating process. 

Even if the Iranians were not willing to consider restrictions on 

any of their programs, it is a pity that we did not even get transparency so that we could understand the nature of their spacelaunch program which is a very opaque program. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So, Dr. Cooper, what you are saying is is that if 

indeed it was for peaceful purposes we could come in with regards 

of raising this issue of ICBMs and determine very quickly whether 

it is a space-launch aspect that they are really pursuing or perhaps 

preparing for a nuclear capability. And I will come to you—Dr. Cooper, do you want to speak to that and then Dr. Cordesman, I will 

come to you. 

Mr. COOPER. There are junctures where a space-launch program 

and a military ICBM program separate and are distinguishable. 

But they are very late in the day and most——

Mr. MEADOWS. By very late—quantify that for a layman. On a 

scale of one to 10 with that being able to be a deliverable, 10 being 

the highest in terms of deliverable, is that at stage seven or eight 

or is that at five? 

Mr. COOPER. I am not technically proficient enough to try to 

quantify it at that level. But it is relatively late in the process and 

a lot of the heavy lifting technologically can occur within the same 

sort of program that you would have for an SLV program. 

It is precisely for this reason that the United States and its partners within the Missile Technology Control Regime do not distinguish between space-launch vehicles and missile programs. 

They merely talk about the capabilities of any unmanned system 

capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload to 300 kilometers, 

which is a very low threshold. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Dr. Cordesman, welcome back. You were on a 

panel just a couple of days ago so welcome back. Do you want to 

respond to that? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. It is more a supplement to Dr. Cooper’s remarks than anything else. They have been very cagey about what 

they have been doing but they have also built a very large new test 

facility and they have created a much larger launch pad capability. 

They did have an accident, which was very serious and to some 

extent delayed part of their program. But I think you will find that 

when it comes down to what they can do they are making significant advances in the space program that have a direct correlation 

to the kind of booster tests you would need for an ICBM. 

And I think those physical indicators are very much something 

that you need to pay attention to. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So it is your professional opinion that they could 

be developing truly the deliverables for a nuclear warhead on a 

parallel track while working on their space program. Is that correct—if I am hearing you correctly? 

115

Mr. CORDESMAN. Certainly, because we know that countries like 

Pakistan, with a much lower technology base, did it 15 to 20 years 

ago. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Right. 

Mr. CORDESMAN. And the Parchin facility is something they 

would not have to rebuild. They could probably simulate or create 

that facility in far less detectable ways. Once they do that, here I 

would have to question one aspect of what Ambassador Solomon 

said. 

I am not sure that any amount of verification would give you the 

capability unless you had a major intelligence leak. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So General Flynn, let me come to you 

with my final question as I am running out of time. 

You are an expert in the region. You have spent much of your 

life there. I have an ex-CIA officer that gives me intel. 

He is retired now. He was in the region both in Pakistan and 

Israel, and so his assertions are that when we talk about proliferation is that there has been a real desire to acquire nuclear capability by some of these member states for many years dating back 

to 1999 and 2000. 

Would you concur with that and that we are about to embark on 

a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that we have not seen the 

likes of ever? 

General FLYNN. We are—we are embarking—we are—we have 

embarked on a nuclear race in the Middle East. Now, arms—you 

know, from everything that Iran has said they are—they have 

every intention of having a nuclear weapon. 

They have stated it and if I have learned anything about some 

of the threats that we face is if they say it they typically——

Mr. MEADOWS. They mean it. 

General FLYNN [continuing]. Try to do it. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Sure. 

General FLYNN. So and I agree with Dr. Cordesman. I mean, this 

is a difficult thing to do but some of the things that we have already seen them do over the last 5 or 6 years for their space program and, you know, both liquid and solid propellant systems that 

they have, I mean, they have done some pretty—they have done 

some leap ahead things that make them more ready today than 

they ever were and the time to get there, as the chairman was 

highlighting, is a lot shorter than we probably will estimate. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, General Flynn. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your generosity on the time. I yield 

back. 

Mr. WEBER. You are more than welcome, and I would like to just 

note, by the way, that the only thing we haven’t heard the Iranians 

say is that they are from the government and they are here to help 

us, number one. 

And number two, do we know of any other nation that has announced they are going to do a space program while chanting—

while their leadership chants ‘‘Death to Israel and American.’’

I just want to make those two comments. Good questions from 

the gentleman from North Carolina. At this time, we are going to 

go to the gentleman from Alabama, Chairman Rogers. 

116

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral Joseph, 

good to see you here again. I want to ask—direct my questions to 

you. 

Beyond nuclear weapons, I am concerned about what other weapons of mass destruction Iran may have. Are you familiar with the 

latest so-called ‘‘compliance report’’ from the State Department that 

indicates the United States cannot confirm Iran is complying with 

its obligations under the biological weapons and chemical weapons 

conventions? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes, sir. I am. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. What kind of verification—weapons 

verification do we need to know exactly what Iran would be deploying on its ballistic missiles, in your view? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, that is a tough question. As I mentioned, unfettered access anywhere anytime facilities, people, records, that is 

an essential component. But it is certainly not sufficient in and of 

itself. 

We would have to, I think, have a very intrusive approach to the 

ballistic missile development in Iran and I think it would have to 

be designed uniquely for Iran. 

I don’t know that there has been much thought to that. So what 

we do is we look for testing. We use all-source intelligence to try 

to understand the various parameters of the various missile programs. 

But as far as I can tell, there is no effective verification structure 

currently in place unless, of course, Iran does something very obviously and tests in the open. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ambassador, are you concerned that they do have 

biological and chemical weapons capability that they could put on 

their ballistic missiles? 

Mr. JOSEPH. I am concerned. I am more familiar on the chemical 

side than I am on the biological side. But I think that is—that is 

a real—a real risk that exists in the region which, of course, makes 

it imperative on us for our forces and for our allies to be prepared 

for all contingencies. 

Mr. ROGERS. On that front—this will be for the Ambassador or 

General Flynn—what kind of missile defense capability does the 

U.S. need to deploy for itself and its allies to be able to defend 

against literally hundreds and hundreds of Iranian ballistic missiles and terrorist proxies that will—that the Obama-Iranian sanctions relief negotiations will enable? 

General FLYNN. Yes. I mean, we have very specific capabilities 

in the surface to air missile, you know, sort of toolbox but also our 

Air Force and Naval air that is out there in the theater most of 

the time are aircraft carriers that bring an entire array of sort of 

defeat capabilities and also in the eastern Mediterranean is another area where we have continued to keep, you know, certainly, 

a Marine amphibious task group out there for a long period of time. 

So we have an array of capabilities. I believe that—in fact, I 

know because they have told me, in the Sunni Arab leader community one of the things that they do want out of this whole thing 

is an assurance—more of a guarantee than just a handshake that 

the United States will be there for the long term to basically proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:01 Jul 06, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\061015\94941 SHIRL
117

vide that kind of an umbrella that you are talking about—that you 

are asking about. 

Mr. JOSEPH. Mr. Chairman, could I just add to that one point? 

And it is a point that I know you feel very strongly about, and that 

is the need to do more to protect the homeland against an ICBM 

class threat from Iran. 

Forty-four ground-based interceptors in Alaska simply won’t do 

it. We cancelled the original third site. We have cancelled phase 

four of the European phased adaptive approach. We need to do 

more to protect the United States against this emerging threat. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, and the bad—the really sad news is I was in 

Fort Greeley last—2 weeks ago. We didn’t even have 44 interceptors yet. We are still working toward that. 

The last question, and this could be for anybody, do you all believe the United States can use Iranian assets currently under control of the U.S. to pay for such capabilities legally—I don’t know—

or politically? 

All right. I guess we don’t know. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 

yield back. 

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman, and the gentleman from 

Florida is recognized. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again I appreciate—

that is the first time I have seen a panel stumped. So good job. 

Dr. Cooper, what are the agreed upon, if there is any, the number of centrifuge Iran needs for a peaceful nuclear program? 

Mr. COOPER. I am not aware of that. 

Mr. YOHO. Ambassador, do you know the number we agreed 

upon in our negotiations? 

Mr. JOSEPH. In the negotiations, what has been reported in the 

press is somewhere between 5,000 and 6,000. I believe that it is 

5,000 at Natanz and another 1,000 centrifuges——

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Let me ask you this. Do you need more centrifuges for a peaceful nuclear program versus a nuclear weapons 

program? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, of course, it all depends on the number of nuclear reactors for which you are trying to develop the fuel. The Iranians say they need 100,000 centrifuges spinning because they 

have plans for many, many more reactors. 

Mr. YOHO. The way I understand it is you need hundreds of tons 

or tons of fissible material for reactors whereas a bomb you need 

kilograms. 

Mr. JOSEPH. That is right. 

Mr. YOHO. So you would need more for a peaceful nuclear program yet we are limiting them on the very things that we need. 

So, you know, it just—it doesn’t smell right. 

Let us see—what would it need to bring—what would need to 

happen in the Middle East to bring a stop to the nuclear arms race 

in the Middle East, General—Lieutenant General? 

General FLYNN. Yes. It is not going to happen. I mean, the nuclear—the nuclear—you know, the movement to nuclear capabilities in the Middle East is happening as we sit here today. So you 

are—this is irreversible. 

Mr. YOHO. Ambassador Joseph, what do you feel like? 

118

Mr. JOSEPH. I have to—I have to agree with the general. But 

what I would hope, and hope is seldom a sound basis for a strategy, but I would hope that the United States could restore the 

credibility of its security commitments in the region. I think that 

is an essential element. 

Again, it may not be sufficient but it essential if we are going 

to make progress. 

Mr. YOHO. And it is a start and that is something we have to 

do. I mean, and I have only been here for a little over 2 years but 

what I hear is the credibility of the United States, especially from 

our allies, is number one, they don’t know if they can rely on us. 

They don’t know if they can depend on us and, of course, we 

know what our enemies say. They don’t really—they don’t fear us 

or respect us. And I really don’t care if they respect us but they 

should—I don’t want them to fear us but they need to know we 

mean what we say. 

We talked a lot about verification and the IAEA and we know 

what a cat and mouse game Iran has played for the last 30 years. 

It doesn’t work. There is new technology out there. 

Are you guys familiar with the antineutrino technology and the 

water ways, the picking up—they can triangulate where nuclear reactors are or weapons? They can pick that up. That is doable technology, correct? No comments? 

General FLYNN. There is just—I mean, those are kinds of—that 

sort of stuff you are going to have to address with other committees. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. I will. But the technology is out there. I 

have done a lot of research into it and somebody said well, it is not 

doable yet. And I understand that, because at one point the nuclear 

bombs weren’t doable but it was there in theory. 

This nation rallied around that to make that happen. I say we 

need to rally around the research and development of the 

antineutrino detector plates to find out where these are so we don’t 

have to depend on Iran coming clean, and it is anywhere, everywhere detection at all times. 

And I think this is something for the United States. Ambassador 

Joseph, you said we need to prepare—we need to do a better job 

on national security and I think this is paramount and we will pass 

it on to the different committees. 

With that, I yield back and thank you for your time. 

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman. Okay. Well, it looks like we 

have exhausted all of our questions. We appreciate you all’s testimony and our hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(119)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

120

f


94941n.eps
121

Æ


94941m.eps